THE DELIVERY OF AN EFFECTIVE COLLECTIVE SECURITY MECHANISM IN WEST AFRICA: IT IS LONG OVERDUE

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

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General Studies

by

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The Delivery of an Effective Collective Security Mechanism in West Africa: It is Long Overdue

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This thesis examined the dawn of a collective security mechanism in the new Africa Union and the ECOWAS sub-region called the Africa Peace and Security Architecture. It looked at the framework for the ECOWAS sub-region and its potential for success. Success however depended on the timely projection of forces.

A qualitative research methodology applied for the study analysed data from five case studies on the African continent against an analytical framework of commitment, balance of power and host nation consent to determine the basis for a timely intervention.

The study revealed that most African governments lacked commitment to the protocols of the Union and in the rare case where they showed willingness to commit troops, they lacked the capacity to project forces into a mission area. Hegemons, UN and international community have consistently taken the lead in crisis intervention on the continent, either by deploying troops or supporting the African Union with resources.

The study concluded that for collective security to take off in Africa, the continent must improve its capacity, by developing a common strategy and improving on its cooperation with the international community and allies.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

THE DELIVERY OF AN EFFECTIVE COLLECTIVE MECHANISM IN WEST AFRICA: IT IS LONG OVERDUE, by Major Emmanuel Kojo Appiah, 120 pages

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<td>EAC</td>
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<td>ECCAS</td>
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The struggle for African independence from colonial rule was followed by successive intra-state conflicts for political power through whatever means. These conflicts were waged mainly by ethnic tribes and opposition parties disappointed at their loss of national pride and power. These nascent countries, without the benefit of experience and expertise in dealing with this paradigm change of replicating 20th century representative governance, worsened the situation, as their handling of the crises fell short of acceptable standards in both human rights and the law of armed conflict.

These conflicts are manifested in rebellions, civil wars and insurgencies and are seen as protests motivated by genuine and extreme grievances. The antagonists are hailed as public-spirited heroes by their followers for fighting against injustice often against their kith and kin. Economically, these insurrections are viewed as a form of organized crime, or more radically, as something that is better understood from the perspective of its participants, with little regard for the damning consequences and their implications for the greater interest of the state (Collier 2006).

With time, there were profound and dramatic rises in challenges of intra-state conflicts particularly in less developed sub-Saharan African. Freedom wars, intractable wars, proxy wars, the latter typical of conflicts of the context of bipolar dispute of post-World War II between the USA and the USSR, popularly known as the Cold War. Despite these differences in war types, the sources of conflict in Africa are linked by a number of common themes and experiences. African states have gained an unenviable reputation for chronic instability and strife, endemic corruption, and waste of human and
natural resources. During the cold war, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was a staunch defender of the sovereignty of Africa’s newly independent states and an advocate for a non-intervention doctrine. The rulers were also opposed to international intervention in internal conflicts. They denied the legality and legitimacy of military intervention, including those taken to preserve fundamental human rights. This policy of indifference seemed conducive to a continent stepping out of colonialism and wanting to shed all traces of dependence (Wheeler 2000 4-11; Grasa and Mateos 2010).

Furthermore, by the 1990s, the OAU had lost a great part of its credibility, often accused of indifference towards development, bureaucratic paralysis, and being an elite club of dictators far from the realities of the socio-economic woes of the common African. They were too preoccupied with lofty political ideals and declarations influenced by their newly acquired education from abroad, which bore little resemblance to the challenges posed by extreme poverty, conflict, poor governance or the respect of human rights which existed in Africa.

The international community was however too conversant with the rising cause of insecurity on the continent. Developing countries in Africa accounted for 90 percent of all wars and other violent conflicts after WWII. The security-development nexus was therefore viewed as an extremely important factor for the world’s development and global cooperation. Donors called for a change in Africa’s affairs, primarily on security issues, and a new political system and an organization able to perform all its functions as intended (BMZ 2005).

Faced with a new era due to the end of the Cold War and the security vacuum it created by the sudden withdrawal of military might of the world powers, it generated an
unprecedented response to national and regional security cooperation and the requirement for a strong continental body to represent it on the global scene. The multiple blocs and hastily assembled overlapping alliances were often politically weak, unable to address the severe socio-economic and military implosions and the absence of a legitimate unified body combined to worsen the plight of Africa. A change in mandate necessitated a transition to the African Union (AU) in the 21st century (Besada 2010).

The United Nations (UN) has constantly taken the lead to find solutions to African conflicts beginning in 1960 in the old Belgian Congo. From the UN’s perspective, regional arrangements for peace and security serve the interests of states in three ways: they contribute to preventing, containing and resolving violent conflicts. International institutions like the UN have the benefit of providing information, reducing transaction costs, and most importantly providing legitimacy to the participating member states. They serve as focal points for coordination, and operate on the principle of reciprocity. The provision of information helps to mitigate the uncertainty, risks and consequential insecurity emanating from an anarchic international system are also equally shared. In 2002, the new AU, which replaced the OAU, outlined a peace and security architecture to resolve crises on the continent. This document placed the responsibility for conflict resolution firmly on the political leadership of the continent (Keohane and Martin 1995, 42-44).

Not insulated from global trends, the African continent has become a fertile ground for emerging threats of terrorism. The integration of these dynamics into more traditional conflicts pose a much bigger challenge for the continent. Africa’s lack of economic and technological growth is not helping either, as a young, intelligent but idle
segment of the population provides the human resources to fuel these hybrid threats. The Sahel region of sub-Saharan Africa has become a troubled area and a subject for global attention.

It does not seem ethically justifiable to implore all African countries with special responsibilities to help solve conflicts anywhere on the continent, usually conflicts for which the rest of the continent’s 53 states cannot possibly be blamed. The stance to forge a collective responsibility is not new, it has been practiced since the 17th century in one form or another, but it has always been a challenge to the continent, and the change towards that direction could only be applauded as a fresh start (Moller 2009).

Africa is currently experiencing a potentially significant transformation with regard to the norms and institutions governing multilateral relations on the continent. This gradual shift has the potential to transform the way the continent addresses the mutually constituted challenges of peace, security and development, as it seeks to change the nature of bilateral relations within Africa as well as its interaction with the international system (Engel et al., 2010).

In 2012, an ECOWAS Stand-by Force (ESF) of the West African sub-region, responded to a recurring conflict in Mali waged by ethnic Tuaregs of northern Mali applying a conflict resolution mechanism known as the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The conflict began decades ago, but the recent conflict had a twist to it. Recruited insurgents, who fought for Colonel Gaddafi during the Libya uprising, with support from al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Algeria, Boko Haram in Nigeria and a local terrorist cell called Ansar Dine teamed up to present a formidable threat to the sovereignty of Mali. This was to be the first major alliance of an insurgency
with a terrorism component in West Africa. Mali, was overwhelmed and the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), (the lead rebel faction) went on a blitzkrieg, capturing three key northern towns in days. This set the stage for putting into action ten years of preparation and planning with the deployment of an ECOWAS Brigade (ECOBRIG). The ESF measure of performance against the latest threat to security would be tested in the following areas: mobilization, integration, movement and logistics, force projection, intelligence capability, command and control and contingency and operational plans.

Ultimately, any evaluation of the AU’s APSA must take a stance on whether it has made a real difference to the maintenance of peace and security in Africa. In this regard, it is reasonable to assume that despite the obvious problems, the security situation in Africa would probably have been worse without it. The AU and its APSA is a product of the times, but it must be seen to be and actually fulfilling the reasons why it came into existence, because the continent needs a peaceful environment to develop.

Research Questions

This thesis will answer the primary question: Is the ESF as a collective security mechanism postured to meet the security threats of the 21st century in the ECOWAS sub-region? The following secondary questions will be addressed: (1) What does the African Union Peace and Security Architecture as a collective security concept aim to achieve? (2) Is the framework for peace and security in ECOWAS tenable? (3) What are the influences of the international community and regional hegemon? (4) What security threats does terrorism add to the traditional threats in the sub-region? (5) Did the ESF effectively fulfill its mandate in Mali?
Assumptions

It is assumed that, the organization and resource requirements of the peace and security architecture would not be fully met and would depend on international donors for funding. Again, the five sub-regional standby forces of the ASF operate independently in their respective sub-regions, but neighboring countries would provide troops and intelligence to assist in operations. It is also assumed that African political leaders have a firm grasp of international politics and UN and AU protocols towards conflict resolution. Finally, it is assumed that, terrorists and violent non-state actors pose security threats not only to states, but the regional and global community as well.

Definitions

African Union Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The African Peace and Security Architecture is built around structures, objectives, principles and values, as well as decision-making processes relating to the prevention, management and resolution of crises and conflicts, post-conflict reconstruction and development in the continent (African Union 2004).

Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Previously known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, its aim is to overthrow the government of Algeria to restore an Islamic state. It currently operates between the borders of Algeria and Mali offering support to sister terrorist groups.

Ansar Dine. Ansar Dine means ‘helpers of the Islamic religion’ or ‘defenders of the faith’ in Arabic. Ansar Dine is a militant Islamist group led by Iyad Ag Ghaly, one of the most prominent leaders of the Tuareg rebellion in the 1990s. It is still active in the Sahel region.
Balance of Power. Balance of power supports the idea that regional national security is enhanced when military capabilities of members of an alliance are distributed so that no one state is strong enough to dominate all the others. The balance of power theory says that (smaller, weaker) states will balance the power or preponderance of more powerful ones to ensure that the latter do not become too powerful to impose its will (Kegley and Wittkopf 2005, 503).

Boko Haram. Boko Haram is an Islamist jihadist movement in Northern Nigeria with the aim of installing Islamic sharia in the whole of Nigeria. Boko Haram, in the Hausa language means, ‘western education is sin’.

Commitment. Commitment is recognition by members of an alliance that a stable peace founded upon a stable balance of power, is predicated upon a common framework and moral principles concern of all and must be followed and preserved (Waltz 1979 62).

ECOWAS Stand-by Force (ESF). This is the ECOWAS regional mechanism of the ASF for the West Africa sub-region. It consists of 16 troop-contributing countries and the force is known as ECOWAS Brigade (ECOBRIG).

National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). This is a separatist secular group of ethnic Tuaregs who clamor for an independent state of Azawad in northern Mali.

Sahel Region. The Sahel, a word derived from the Arabic ‘Sahel’ meaning shore, is a semi-arid belt of barren, sandy and rock-strewn land which stretches 3,860km across the breadth of the African continent and marks the physical and cultural divide between the continent’s more fertile south and Saharan desert north (IRIN 2008).
Scope

The scope of this thesis will be limited to the formation of the AU APSA and the Regional Mechanisms (RMs) especially the ESF expected to be operational in the year 2010. The ESF is mainly responsible for the West African sub-region and the evaluation of its operational capability will be limited to the Sahel region and particularly Mali.

This research will focus on the intervention of the ESF’s collective security mechanism in Mali, but will draw comparison with other conflicts in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Cote d’Ivoire and Somalia to draw conclusions on the factors underpinning timely intervention in an insurgency. The research will identify what is lacking in the Peace and Security Architecture to counter the threats and the lessons learned to provide future guidance. It will not delve into details, the causes of intrastate conflicts and its effects.

Limitations

There is a lot of literary material on collective security, dating from the sixteenth century, but the African continent became conversant with the subject in the 20th century. This limits the analyses of the effectiveness of a collective security mechanism in the early 1990s in Liberia and especially in Africa, where the phenomenon began to take shape in 2006 in Somalia. Moreover, the focus on collective security in Africa is a new concept and not many publications have been dedicated to it, especially from the African perspective. Most discussions on collective security on Africa have come from Western academia and national think tanks. Due to its current developments, any information on the Mali conflict will come from international news outlets, communiques from ECOWAS and AU bodies and limited official documents from the ESF. I will not
be able to conduct official interviews with staff officers, especially those from Ghana who participated in the operations due to my present location, and I am thus restricted to informal reports from their experiences. The scope of this thesis is also limited by the limited literature available on the study of the Mali crises. Much of this analysis is currently ongoing and many of the plans, operational orders, after action review and memoirs are yet to be published or made public. The research will rely heavily on journals, reported eye-witness accounts and unclassified materials from ECOBRIG operations.

**Delimitations**

The study will examine the effectiveness of the ESF conflict resolution framework within the context of collective security against the impact of traditional security challenges. It will examine the APSA and its supporting departments and the role of the UN, USA and other well-meaning allies towards the enhancement of AU collective security mechanisms especially the operations of AFRICOM in the case of the latter. This study does not dedicate much research to the various non-state actors and what their interests are or to the five decade history of the conflict, but their threat to the ESF operationally will be of interest to this thesis. Analysis will be conducted from the data from the current crises which began in January 2012 until the mandate for the ESF was achieved in July 2012. Again, the level of support of the international community (France in this case) towards the operational success of the ESF will be discussed.
Significance

The AU continues to fumble its way through crises prevention and resolution on the continent. The ratification and acceptance of the 2003 APSA gave hope to Africans and promised to end the plethora of conflicts on the continent. The use of military forces as a means to achieve a resolution in any conflict is critical to setting the conditions for the long-term political settlement of that conflict. Hence the need to have a well-organized intervention force, manned and equipped to conduct operations independently with minimum assistance from the international community, is imperative.

With over 10 years of planning behind it, the ESF looks to avoid the numerous challenges experienced in Chad, Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire (past African attempts at collective security). As if these experiences are not telling enough, the emerging trend of terrorism on the continent poses a much larger risk which rightly deserves the attention of the AU. The direct negative effect of coups, economic collapse, and rebellions are threats to national security in Mali and its West African neighbors.

Summary and Conclusions

Africa’s lack of economic and democratic credentials are the causes of its numerous security lapses. Its attempts at conflict resolution have been abysmal and often characterized by failure. The international community has continuously supported the continent with aid and resources which are not coordinated for greater success. The continent embarked on changes towards the concept of collective security in order to create a conducive environment in the various sub-regions to harness individual countries’ potential for a collective economic take off and prosperity. The adoption of the AU Peace and Security Architecture provides hope that the continent is ready to face its
challenges with a united front, without which the people of Africa will permanently tread the path of wars, poverty and regression.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

This chapter will take a look at the concept of collective security and the requirements that needed to be satisfied for it to be an effective system. It will analyze the AU Peace and Security Council and its protocols for the African Peace and Security Structure; its prospects for international and regional cooperation and challenges in the face of threats in the 21st century.

The term collective security has been associated with the threat to the peace and security of states. Cardinal Richelieu, considered to be the world’s first prime minister under King Louis XIII, first proposed a scheme for collective security in 1629, which was partially reflected in the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. Then, collective security was usually described as the security of states in their relation to other states, sometimes called international security (Kelsen 2001, 1). Others like Mwagwabi have added to the argument that a peaceful and stable world order can only be maintained with the benefit of a collective security system, with the military as an integral part to that cause (Mwagwabi 2012).

The validity and feasibility of the concept of collective security has for a long time been subjected to debate and challenges on various grounds. Robert and Kingsbury define collective security as an arrangement where each state in the system accepts that the security of one of them is a concern of all, and agrees to join in a collective response to aggression (Robert and Kingsbury 1993, 30).
This arrangement is solely aimed at the preservation of peace by the alliance of states, yet not necessarily giving up its balance of power in the process. The arrangement is based on the critical assumption that wars are likely to occur, and they ought to be prevented. Ironically, in the past wars have not only been used for conquest but in some instances to settle disputes (Mwagwabi 2012).

The concept of collective security has gone through drastic changes. While it is compelling in theory it is inevitably selective in practice. Collective security is better understood as a strategy and process, rather than as a condition. Nation states have always chosen their allegiances to serve their best interest and their interests’ changes. The lead-up to and beginning of the First World War gave further stimulus to the age old but dominant concept of collective security against threats which we have seen embryonically in the context of Europe. The principal objections related to the alleged incompatibility of collective security are with the selfish national interests of states. This is aided by the lack of its feasibility in an international society without a global government to enforce its protocols without exemptions (Helmke 2010, 45).

The revelations and lessons from WWI pushed for a political and legal foundation to guide alliances and political systems in their future actions. The concept is primarily directed against the illegal use of force within the group of states forming the collective security system rather than against an external threat. The collective character of the security established manifests itself firstly in the fact that the use of force is forbidden by the legal order which is valued equally for all members constituted by the order. Secondly, it establishes that the reaction against an illegal use of force is a collective action to restrain military action (Kelsen 2001, 7). This principle was observed and
addressed by Immanuel Kant in his 1795 piece, “Perpetual Peace: a Philosophical Sketch” which states that:

No state shall by force interfere with the constitution or government of another state, for what is there to authorize it to do so? The offense, perhaps, which a state gives to the subjects of another state? Rather, the example of the evil into which a state has fallen because of its lawlessness should serve as a warning. Moreover, the bad example which one free person affords another as a *scandalum acceptum* is not an infringement of his rights. But it would be quite different if a state, by internal rebellion, should fall into two parts, each of which pretended to be a separate state making claim to the whole. To lend assistance to one of these cannot be considered an interference in the constitution of the other state (for it is then in a state of anarchy). But so long as the internal dissension has not come to this critical point, such interference by foreign powers would infringe on the rights of an independent people struggling with its internal disease; hence it would itself be an offense and would render the autonomy of all states insecure. (Kant 2003)

It has been further argued that, the classical notion of collective security’s domestic interests are no longer defined as belonging to a sphere separate from that of international interests; rather, they are seen as existing in relation to transnational, regional and global spheres. The space of international law is becoming increasingly international, as opposed to interstate, and the state is no longer capable of serving as the sole locus of international law’s legitimacy (Mgbeoji 2003, 64).

Successive interstate wars and world conflicts, especially World War II, gave credence to the formation of the United Nations and a plethora of alliances for the purposes of collective security. African and Asian states, which gained independence from the fallout of WWII, gladly joined the trend, all in a bid to present a legitimate political front. Notably amongst these alliances are: North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), South American Defense Council (SADC), Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), The League of Arab
States, the WARSAW Pact and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) with the UN as a quasi-global government.

Emerging trends of overpopulation, terrorism and economic decline, among others, further obliged these organizations to give collective security a new paradigm. At the global level, the concept and norm of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was first introduced and promoted in 2001 by a correspondent report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). The Commission was initiated by the Canadian Government as a direct reaction to the long and disreputable history of retroactively mandated humanitarian interventions by individual nations or so-called coalitions of the willing (ICISS 2000, 29).

States now justify their use of force within the existing framework of individual and collective self-defense. The justifications given by states for the contemporary international use of force have centered around three core categories: First, the use of force for humanitarian reasons; Second, the use of force to counter terrorism in instances in which it is both harbored and sponsored by states; Third, the use of force against so-called rogue states which are seen to violate what are perceived as standards of acceptable international behavior (Helmke 2010, 29-164).

**The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)**

In staying relevant to the ever changing political climate and global trends, the OAU transformed itself into the AU beginning in 1999, shifting its mandate from ensuring total Africa independence to a focus on economic and security transformation. The Union’s mission of collective security originates from the protocol establishing the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) which came into force in 2003. Article 13(2) of
that protocol, states that members shall take steps to establish the Africa Standby Force (ASF) and other bodies under the auspices of the APSA (Besada 2010, 1).

Some argued that the APSA framework was the appropriate security apparatus for political and military leadership to tackle Africa’s problems the African way. By July 2002, in line with the changing political climate in the post-cold war era, the AU had to conform to the international codes of behavior. It had to be a modern political organization, ready to rid itself of the internal dynamics of a continent borne out of its past attempts at peace and security following partial fulfillment of African decolonization. The underlying pressure was to conform to the standards of democracy, good governance and rule of law. The APSA, was touted as an evolving all-encompassing conflict resolution mechanism to halt the potential conflicts on the continent. This, it is argued will pave the way for Africa’s socio-economic development and for its countries to be recognized as viable international partners (Jegede 2009).

The APSA’s parent body, the PSC, is first and foremost conceptualized as a “collective security and early warning arrangement” in its task as a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. Among other objectives, the new age of security cooperation within the continent was hoped would lead to improved stability, making it more attractive for international investment, trade and development. Regionalism would mean a more efficient use of its vast but underutilized natural and human resources (Engel et al., 2010. 9-17).

The AU Constitutive Act made the provision for the PSC, a structure that is inspired by the UN Security Council. Thus the main organ of the AU had the overarching objective of promoting peace and security. It introduced new norms, institutions, actors,
agendas and solutions. The relationship between the AU PSC and the UN SC is not clearly defined, but it is joined in a partnership in the larger interest of the AU. For some capabilities, the AU will also form partnerships with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Bank and other specialized agencies (Gumedze 2011, 48).

With the protocol finalized on 26 December 2003, the PSC, similar to the UN Security Council, entered into force composed of fifteen member states appointed on a rotational basis. The difference between the AU’s PSC and the UNSC is that the former has no permanent membership seats or vetoes. Decisions are taken by a majority vote. For very important decisions, a two-thirds vote is needed (Maasdorp 2011).

Encouraging signs were visible at the highest level, in the first formal session of the PSC. The meeting reaffirmed the commitment of African leaders to promote a stable, secure, peaceful and developed Africa, and the desire to assume a greater role in the maintenance of peace and security. African leaders spoke generously about the dawn of a new era of non-indifference, which they hailed as a marked change from the old non-interference policy that had crippled the OAU, and made it powerless in the field of preventing violent conflicts. They proclaimed the PSC “as a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, and a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate a timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa” (Akokpari et al. 2008, 40-43).

The PSC has a mandate of conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding, humanitarian assistance, post-war rebuilding, promotion of a common defense policy, imposition of sanctions, as well as requesting the Assembly of Heads of State to
authorize a military intervention in cases established in Article 4 of the AU Charter. The recognized functions of the PSC are as follows:

1. Promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa.
2. Preventive diplomacy and the maintenance of peace.

The PSC Protocol requires that the RECs are part of its general security framework, even though the RECs are not directly controlled by the AU but have agreed to be affiliated with it. The protocol requires that all the RECs replicate the elements as indicated in the diagram below.

![Africa Peace and Security Architecture Diagram](image-url)

Figure 1. The Africa Peace and Security Architecture

**Source:** Maasdorp Kobus, *African Union Approaches to Conflict Management* (Canberra, Australia: Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence, 27 July 2011).
The arms and feet of the PSC are the RECs, and the APSA is its path to success. The success or otherwise of the APSA cannot be discussed in isolation of any of its elements (Africa Union 2010). Following is a discussion of the elements of the PSC.

**Continental Early Warning System (CEWS)**

The CEWS was originally conceived by the OAU as the introduction of the APSA mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. In the AU, it has been modified to include open source software programs that track, monitor and report security trends at the RECs level. Regional Early Warning Systems (REWS) feed into the CEWS and provide useful information to the PSC for decision making (Maasdorp 2011).

According to the PSC Protocol, the CEWS is to consist of an observation and monitoring center—the situation room, located at the Conflict Management Division (CMD) of the AU and two observation and monitoring units of the RECs for conflict prevention, management and resolution, which are linked directly to the situation room (African Union 2010).

In addition, to facilitate the effective functioning of the CEWS, Article 12 (3) of the PSC Protocol requires the AU commission to collaborate with the UN and its agencies, other relevant international organizations, research centers, academic institutions and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) (African Union 2010).

The AU PSC draft roadmap contained a tentative concept and timeframe for the implementation and operationalization of the CEWS, covering the following areas: (1) information collection, (2) strategic analysis of the data collected and development of an indicators module, (3) early warning reports and engagement with decision-makers,
and (4) coordination and collaboration between the AU, the RECs and other key stakeholders (Engel et al. 2009, 92-93).

Some experts have questioned the capability of the system suggesting that it is under-developed and suffers from personnel and resource shortages to accomplish these critical tasks. Other major criticism focuses on the structural disconnection between the RECs’ systems and the high-level decision-making bodies of the AU. In addition political considerations tend to prevail over warnings which impede timely and competent AU prevention efforts (Wulf and Debiel 2009; Wane et al. 2010). Adelman asserts that, “the major point of early warning information gathering and analysis is not the information and analysis in itself of the crisis area, but the use of that information and analysis to gain the trust of the decision-makers and to provide them with effective options” (Adelman 1996).

Again the CEWS is also in charge of the preparations for the ASF, which was planned to be operational by June 2010, but proved a challenge, requiring a two year extension (Moller 2009).

**African Standby Force (ASF)**

PSC protocol, Article 13(1) established the ASF. The protocol came into force July 9, 2002. The force is made up of military, police and civilian components on standby in five regions that must be ready for deployment within a certain time frame of activation by the PSC (Cilliers 2008). The force comprises five multinational brigades drawn from the RECs, taking advantage of their unique structures, capacities, experiences, resources, regional legitimacy, and knowledge of local conflicts (Bogland et al. 2008).
Activation of the force was planned for June 2010 based on completion of phase two scheduled from July, 2005 to June 30, 2010 so that it would be ready to deploy in more complex missions, but the launch was persistently delayed. It was envisaged that by 2010 the AU would have developed the capacity to manage complex peacekeeping operations, while the five regions would continue to develop the capacity to deploy a mission headquarters as directed involving AU/regional peacekeeping forces. The ASF received substantial investment from donors and the UN, through the Special Peace Fund, with principal donors like the EU, the USA, the UK and Germany (Cilliers and Malan 2005; Cilliers and Potgieter 2010).

The five ASF’s regions are:

1. Northern African Regional Capability (NARC) with the Regional Headquarters located in Tripoli, Libya.

2. East African Standby Forces (EASBRIG) with the Brigade Headquarters located in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and the planning element in Nairobi, Kenya.

3. Central African Standby Forces (ECCAS) with the Regional Headquarters located in Libreville, Gabon. (FOMAC)

4. West African Standby Forces (ECOWAS) with the Regional Headquarters located in Abuja, Nigeria.

5. Southern African Standby Forces (SADC) with their Regional Headquarters located in Gaborone, Botswana.
Each of the ASF regions is to be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components in various capacities, in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at the appropriate notice. As a step towards this, a Military Staff Committee is to be established. This staff will work on standardization issues regarding equipment and doctrines that needed reconciliation (Moller 2009).
Panel of the Wise

The Panel of the Wise was officially launched in December 2007. It supports and advises the PSC through the use of good offices, mediation, conciliation and research (Arrieta 2011). This panel is appointed by the Assembly to play an advisory role to the Chairperson of the PSC. The chairperson may delegate responsibility for particular conflict situations to the Panel. The Panel reports to the PSC and the PSC reports to the Assembly (Maasdorp 2011).

African Peace Fund (APF)

The APF is designated for peace support operations and is financed by contributions of member states and donors. One such donor is the European Union which between 2008 and 2012 allocated an amount of €600 million for peace support operations (European Commission 2012).

Common African Defense and Security Policy

This policy requires the chiefs of staff of the armed forces of member states to meet quarterly to deliberate on common security issues. Common security threats facing Africa dictate that the Common Defense and Security Policy addresses the following areas of activity among others: promotion of the spirit of collective defense and a culture of peace, the trafficking of small arms and light weapons, peace-building and peacekeeping as well as post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction, including demobilization, disarmament and reintegration. It also addresses landmines, child soldiers, nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons, HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, malaria and other infectious diseases, terrorism, humanitarian issues, and environmental matters (Maasdorp 2011; African Union 2004).

**Military Staff Committee**

The military staff committee is comprised of military personnel who meet at set times to discuss peace and security matters. They advise and make recommendations to the PSC on military and security issues for the promotion and the maintenance of peace and security in Africa (Maasdorp 2011).

**Partnerships, Alliances and Hegemon Relationship**

The AU PSC is first of all modeled after the UNSC, with very few variations. The ASF/RMs are obliged to operate under the framework of Chapters Six and Seven of the UN charter (in seeking pacific settlements to disputes and actions to threats of peace). The consequences of operating outside the confines of the world body are not lost on the AU, which is funded by donors in the international community. AU–UN cooperation is critical to the survival of AU efforts at promoting peace; first to legitimize the actions of the AU since the UN has primacy for the maintenance of international peace, second, to solicit the UNSC to oversee parties’ dispute settlement efforts and most importantly to allow cooperation with UN agencies and departments and its agencies. Among other efforts, it organizes desk to desk meetings between the two bodies for the purpose of cooperation, capacity building, integration, and to share values (Boutellis and Williams 2013; ECOWAS 2010).

This partnership has survived and witnessed collaborative efforts at peacemaking in the Central Africa Republic, Sudan and the DRC. However, more could be achieved if
a greater level of mutual respect and adherence to comparative advantage and political legitimacy is given to African governments in intra-state conflicts which are most rampant on the continent. However, this is subjected to the major African powers’ ability to take the lead role (African Union 2010b).

To an independent observer, some African countries could be tagged as potential regional hegemons capable of taking the lead in the affairs on the continent. South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria and Ethiopia have the largest populations, better economic potential and most effective armies. Scholars argue that though these countries could handle domestic insurrection, they stand to be considered as hegemons only if their armies could project force beyond their borders in a professional way and not tied to any national interest. They must also be able to aid their sub-regions economically and see an aggression from any rogue state as a threat to economic development and regional security. Interventions by France in Africa have seldom been without any accompanying interests, even if these interests were described cautiously as an interest in establishing regional stability, the preservation of the state system inherited from the colonial past or putting an end to human suffering, as were the cases in Cote d’Ivoire and Mali recently (Dehez 2008).

Courtesy of its dysfunctional style of hegemon, Africa continues to seek assistance from its past colonial masters like Britain and particularly France which has a continuous presence and an open invitation to reassert itself in the internal politics of its past colonies at the immediate onset of crises. In recent times however, the USA has emerged as a partner following the attacks on the Kenyan and Tanzanian embassies in 1998 and more prominently after the 9/11 attacks. However, the security framework for the establishment of AFRICOM, which began initial operations in October 2007, was
rightly perceived as counterproductive to the AU’s own efforts in providing a strategic response to African conflicts in the establishment of ASF (Berouk 2009; Makinda 2007).

United States Africa Command and Africa

AFRICOM, in concert with interagency and international partners, builds defense capabilities, responds to crises, and deters and defeats transnational threats in order to advance US national interests and promote regional security, stability and prosperity. It relies on a 3D approach of diplomacy, development and defense to reach an end state where Africa is not a safe haven for violent extremists such as al Qaida (AFRICOM 2014). In its 2011 posture statement, in the year preceding the Mali crisis, AFRICOM established the following theater objectives:

1. Ensure that the al Qaeda networks and associated violent extremists do not attack the United States;
2. Maintain assured access and freedom of movement throughout the AOR;
3. Assist African states and regional organizations in developing the will, capability, and capacity to combat transnational threats such as terrorism, piracy, and the illicit trafficking of weapons, people and narcotics;
4. Assist African states and regional organizations in developing the capacity to execute effective continental peace operations and to respond to crises; and,
5. Encourage African militaries to operate under civilian authority, respect the rule of law, abide by international human rights norms, and contribute to stability in their respective states.

AFRICOM assists in developing the military capacity of individual West African states and encourages regional security cooperation through military exercises. Exercise
FLINTLOCK 11, in February and March 2011, was a special operations exercise that focused on military interoperability and capacity building with partner nations in North and West Africa. Approximately 669 African, European and U.S. participants from 17 nations trained together in this 17-day exercise (AFRICOM 2011).

As is the case with each of the regions, bilateral military-to-military and State Department sponsored African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) missions assist individual member states develop capacity and capability (Kolva 2010).

The command’s mission statement states among other tasks that, “AFRICOM conducts military operations to deter aggression and respond to crises.” AFRICOM’s primary objective, as the US Quadrennial Defense Review put it, was to prevent problems from becoming crises and crises from becoming catastrophes (Whelan 2007).

Surprisingly AFRICOM was met with opposition, it has been argued that AFRICOM does not complement the evolving APSA and therefore the two had nothing in common. This could be true since the AU peace apparatus’ main aim is directed at insurgency and rebellions which have been the bane of African states and not terrorism, which is the lead agenda for AFRICOM.

Threats and Emerging Threats to Peace

The different societies that make up the global village today are interconnected as never before, because they face threats that no nation can hope to master by acting alone and provide opportunities that can be much more effectively exploited if all nations work together. Traditional concepts of security do not provide adequate solutions to the current challenges of intrastate conflict and regional instability. Today, many states, particularly
from Africa, are less concerned about deterring or defending against aggression than about preserving the overall stability of their region (Mihalka 2005).

In Africa, the most significant consequences of the high levels of poverty have been associated with the high risk of conflict. Experts estimate that poor countries are much more likely to experience civil war than developed countries. Recent statistical research on poverty and conflict suggests that for a country at the 50th percentile for income, the risk of experiencing civil conflict within five years is 7–11 percent and rises to 15–18 percent for countries at the bottom 10th percentile. Africa appears consistent with these findings. Most dangerous are those conflict zones that collapse into fully failed states, which lose the ability to control much of their territory. Afghanistan and Somalia are classic failed states where anarchy facilitated the ascendancy of Islamic extremists who gained their foothold by defeating warlords and providing essential social services to bereft populations (Brainard and Chollet 2007, 37-40).

There is strong evidence in support of this theory. Based on extensive cross-national quantitative data on every country conducted from 1945 to 1999 and in over 20 in-depth case studies of countries that experienced civil war during this period, scholars found that poverty indeed put governments at a disadvantage vis-a-vis dissidents. For example, Mali’s government lacks the resources and institutional capacity to provide adequately for its citizens. Large numbers do not have enough to eat or have access to potable water, basic medical care, or educational opportunities for their children. In Mali, as elsewhere, the social services gap is being filled by outsiders, often Wahhabist charities and mosques funded from the Gulf States (Jones and Johnston 2013).
The 9/11 attacks changed the discourse on world order and Africa in the process. Previously the history of Western politics thought of terrorism as being associated with myriad forms of political violence, including repressive government brutality, armed rebel attacks, political assassinations, kidnappings, hijacking, and suicide bombings (Smith 2010, 10).

David Galula provides a further explanation, that apart from the violence it sought to create, terrorism is a way for insurgents to compensate for the lack of resources forcing the contested government to spend money, drain the national coffers and when diminished returns set in, the war is prolonged. He continued to suggest that terrorism is designed to attract publicity for the movement and to spread fear and insecurity, and to go on to a campaign of “selective terrorism” to acquire control of the population in a very short time- what is termed as the battle for silence (Galula 2006, 15).

The concept of collective security is premised on the theory that peace is universal and indivisible. This notion, it seems, attains its greatest popularity among states after the shedding of blood and lives in expensive warfare or, as in recent times, in the aftermath of growing acts of international terrorism (Mgbeoji 2003, 65). This is a far cry from the past when individual states, like Adolf Hitler’s Nazi Germany, Stalin’s USSR, Mao’s China and Mussolini’s Italy, reigned terror on the populations with unprecedented efficiency and ruthlessness to maximum effect in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s (Hoffman 2006, 4-13).

In the 21st century, a rigorous program to address a transnational problem like terrorism by a state or a non-state actor will only succeed in shifting the problems to neighboring states, hence the need for a global approach, regional cooperation and
assistance from advanced states, to direct their efforts towards failed states which appear attractive to terrorists (Cohen 2001).

The emerging nature of transnational terrorism fully came to a head with the 9/11 attack, and forced the USA’s declaration of its Global War on Terror (GWOT). This public stand was taken against radical terrorist groups whose resort to terrorism was fuelled by religious ideology, which differs from the political concept of power but has further consequences. In the case of the GWOT, Islamic fundamentalists interpreted the declaration as an affront to the beliefs of all Muslims worldwide making terrorism an attractive method of violence by faith-based organizations with the aptitude for fanaticism and a dose of nationalism. Nicola Sigrid Funke theorized that Islamist fundamentalism has replaced the Cold War, and the financial cost of GWOT may justify that assertion (University of Pretoria 2004).

The disparity between Communist and Islamic insurgencies continued to widen after 11 September 2001. The former declined to just two (Nepal and Philippines); the lowest since WW II, while the latter remained significantly higher, with 12 recorded onsets, despite a dramatic decline in overall conflict (Jones and Johnston 2013). In North Africa alone (Maghreb and Sahel), acts of terrorism increased from 21 in 2011 to 204 in the 2009 pre-Arab spring era and never showed any drastic decline after the uprisings died down.
Many have looked at terrorism as a byproduct of religious ideology but it will forever be associated with the struggle for nationhood and recognition (US Navy 1989). Many able-bodied men from the Sahel region who shared similar ideologies fought on both sides of the Libyan uprisings.

There were growing concerns as to the intentions of the terrorist organizations that the Arab spring nurtured and their future objectives after the flame died out. In the Sahel, the answer was quick to manifest itself in a new insurgency headlined by the Movement for the National Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) whose sole aim was to create
an independent state of Azawad of the Tuareg tribe in Northern Mali. This objective has been pursued since Mali’s independence in 1962.

In a matter of weeks, the terrorism threat level that had been rising in the large ungoverned space in North Africa and the Sahel since September 2001 soared, and what many considered only a regional problem, metamorphosed into a crisis with global implications. In January 2012, al Qaeda-linked extremists in northern Mali namely, with the aid of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) Al-Shabaab of Somalia, Ansar Dine of Mali and Boko Haram of Nigeria, the MNLA almost succeeded in seizing the country’s capital, Bamako. This prompted a timely French military intervention which culminated in a deadly response and hostage showdown at the In Amenas natural gas facility in Algeria that took the lives of 37 foreigners, including four Americans (Ahmed 2013).

The Sahel gradually assumed the mantle as the arc of instability in becoming a safe haven for al Qaeda to recover from its losses in Afghanistan and Iraq. The contemporary threat of terrorism is however, only one of the causes of Africa’s perennial coups, civil wars, genocide and rebellions that accounts for the dark history of the continent after the anti-colonial wars for independence. Independence however brought little respite, as a cycle of poverty, hunger, human rights abuses, power struggles, elite corruption and ethnic tensions combined to put the continent on the path to struggle. These robbed the continent of its democratic and economic potentials, committing it to a third world status.

Wars of regime change, often engineered by self-described revolutionary movements to overthrow the existing government and establish a new socio-economic
dispensation, including conditions and content of citizenship, are most rampant. Conflicts from Liberia to Sierra Leone and to Cote d’Ivoire in the West African sub-region perhaps gave the APSA its framework and not terrorism, however, this may not be the only criticism of the APSA (Nhema 2008, 7).

Challenges and Expectations

Independent analysts outside the confines of a real war testing environment gave their gloomy prediction and opinions. That Bjorn Moller bluntly suggested that there is a wide gap between the AU’s ambitions, plans, organizational setups and its actual accomplishments would come as no great surprise. “It would be surprising if the world’s poorest continent were able to solve the world’s most frequent and widespread as well as most deadly conflicts” he elaborated (Moller 2009).

Indeed, past interventions have demonstrated lack of professionalism, lack of inter-operability and little respect for human rights; although the situation has improved over the years. In fact, most of the national security institutions are “poorly structured, corrupt, unprofessional, ill equipped and governed by corruptible oversight bodies”, as stated by the former Head of the ECOWAS Commission, Mohamed Ibn Chambas (Bagayoko 2009).

The AU also appears to align itself with the complex diagnosis of the causes of African conflicts. These diagnoses focus on endogenous factors, (state failure, poverty, underdevelopment and the greed of African war lords) to the detriment of important exogenous factors. These include the greed of western governments which control arms sales for profit, 21st century powerhouses like China and Brazil, who are interested in Africa’s natural resources and transnational corporations and the impact of their
international economic and trade policies. This is a combination which has contributed greatly to the crisis of African states and the deterioration of well-being in African societies (Arrieta 2011).

As far as protocols are concerned, the Constitutive Act of the AU had contradicting principles which undermined a comprehensive organization for a competent intervention. However, it was the UN that made the doctrine of nonintervention a universal principle. The 1945 United Nations Conference on International Organization, held in San Francisco to draft the charter of the organization, enshrined the norm of nonintervention by giving an expansive meaning to the scope of domestic jurisdiction (Amitav 2009, 32).

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter is even stricter. As Article 53 (1) stipulates, “no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council”. Informing the UN, as the ECOWAS Protocol states, about military action is therefore not enough. Yet Africans have regularly expressed frustration with the UN based on the fact that the UNSC has not always lived up fully to its responsibility to Africa, although 60 percent of its time is taken up by deliberations on African conflicts. The argument is that the General Assembly is far from the conflicts and not in a position to have an effective appreciation of them. African leaders have suggested that the AU makes the decision to authorize force (Akokpari et al. 2008, 55-56).

The AU charter recognizes sovereign equality (Art 4a), non-intervention (Art 4g), *uti possidetis* (Art 4b), the prohibition of the use of force and the peaceful resolution of disputes (Art 4f) and non-interference by any member state in the internal affairs of
another (Art 4g). However, the rare used clause in Art 4h, citing the right of the AU to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, is a novelty. This is in reference to the responsibility to protect (R2P) that has its origins in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Similarly, the concept R2P expanded beyond military protection, and included a three-dimensional notion of responsibility to prevent, react, and rebuild. The promoters of the concept argue that the world needed a multilateral and principled security response in the face of mass atrocities, genocide and crimes against humanity (Besada 2010).

Again, it is the right of member states to request intervention from the AU in order to restore peace and security (Art 4j) and all must have a respect for democratic principles and human rights (Art 4m). From the foregoing, the situation creates an atmosphere for ambiguity and a whole lot of room for excuse, controversy, political alibis and tensions (African Union 2000).

In February 2003, a new proviso was added: “serious threat to legitimate order to restore peace and stability to a member”. Some authors (Jegede 2009, 424) refer to this as an intervention in defense of democracy, but others question its ambiguity which could be used to support regimes whether they are democratic or not, considering the political and cultural narratives that have plagued the continent (Kioko 2003, 814; Baimu and Sturman 2003).

In another vein, even though most contemporary conflicts in Africa are often defined as domestic, they are deeply embedded in a regional and cross-border context. As illustrated by cases in Liberia, Sierra Leone, DRC, and more recently Sudan (Darfur) and
Chad, most conflicts on the African continent spill over into neighboring countries or draw regional actors into what is often better understood as regional war-zones rather than simply being the internal conflict of a sovereign state. The AU’s intervention is a clear case of “having a bucket of water close by when you see your neighbor’s beard on fire” according to an African proverb (Engel 2009, 19).

Since its formation, the AU carved its niche by dispensing diplomatic and military action within the framework of the APSA. It condemned several unconstitutional government changes; Guinea, Niger, Mali, Madagascar, Mauritania, Togo and the Central Africa Republic, by suspending their membership in the AU until they restored democratic governance. It has also taken action in a wide range of conflict situations: Burundi, Comoros, Ivory Coast, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, DRC, Somalia and Sudan. The missions have varied from mediation and electoral supervision to peace missions. The latter often replaced by the UN or hybrid missions which are often characterized by resource constraints (Arrieta 2011).

The never ending question of resource constraints of the militaries of member countries in responding to missions is a factor likely to impact on early warning systems, training, logistics integration and speed of deployment. This assertion is not out of place considering the fact that even UN operations suffer from logistic constraints and lack of skilled human resources. Baker and Alemayehu Behabtu highlighted the weak sustainment capacities of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), keeping up with the history of well documented failures identified in the areas of technical, financial and logistical support. However, this situation of external dependence on the UN is neither optimal nor sustainable (Baker 2007, 121; Behabtu 2013; UN 2008).
Like most heterogeneous organizations, the ASF would have several issues to deal with: lack of synergy and unnecessary duplication between continental and regional structures due to the negative effects of differences in languages, doctrine, culture and varying degrees of national power. Bogland details that, “at least there are 42 different regional organizations and institutions in Africa with varying aims and ambitions, and many African states belong to two or three different bodies and blocs”. This statement confirms some constructivist claims that these internal blocs are shaped not only by anarchy and material structures, but also by social structures based on shared knowledge and understandings, and that groups of states can experience conflict or co-operative relationships as a result of these subjective dynamics (Bogland et al. 2007, 29).

This situation hinders compliance by countries with the political and financial obligations they may have with each regional (or sub-regional) organization. These different organizations are also competing for the same international assistance funds (Bogland et al. 2007 29; Wendt 1995).

Nonetheless, these member states are obliged to send troops into conflict zones, at the displeasure of their partners in the blocs, as well as international patrons. For example, the initial decision of ECOWAS to intervene in the war in Liberia in 1991 received only lukewarm support of the Francophone members of the community, except Guinea which felt obliged because it shared membership of the Mano River Union with Liberia. To add to that Cote d’Ivoire, a French speaking country became a conduit for the supply of arms to Charles Taylor’s rebels due to a past relationship between Liberia’s former President William Tolbert and Felix Houphouet Biogny as in-laws. It is a fact that
Samuel Doe, the leader of Liberia at the time, executed Tolbert who was his predecessor, hence Côte d’Ivoire’s action to support Taylor against Doe (Adar and Juma 2010, 75).

Another important challenge for the APSA is its dependence on the main but unreliable regional powers (Nigeria-ECOWAS, South Africa-SADC, Ethiopia and Kenya-EAC, Egypt- NARC). These countries have the greatest capacity to deploy troops in the field, although with some limitations or caveats (Sarkin 2009, and Power 2005, 16). These challenges arise because some of these countries pursue independent national interests that contradict some of the APSA principles yet publicly endorse the APSA to enhance their international credibility and legitimacy. Nigeria, for example, led the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone voluntarily, and promoted the new peace and security architecture in ECOWAS but was conspicuously absent during the Ivorian crises of 2003, possibly due to fatigue from ECOMOG operations or in opposition to South Africa’s aggressive approach evident in its deployment of a frigate in Ivorian waters (Nna-emeka Okereke 2012).

A common cause of the complexity in relations between the regional hegemonic powers and neighboring countries in times when they are most needed is when loyalty to nationalism becomes a priority or maybe in genuine reaction to internal political instability of a sovereign country. They cannot be predicted to act in a certain way away from the expected internal logic and behavior of that country. For example, Ethiopia has a militarist and anti-regionalist posture, Nigeria is militarist and regionalist and South Africa is anti-militarist and regionalist, but like in the case of the Ivorian crises, South Africa and Nigeria acted contrary to expectations (Nathan 2010; Adebajo and Landsberg 2003).
It is only logical to conclude that state interests have limits especially when they face internal struggles themselves. This is reinforced by Hans Morgenthau, the originator of the international relations concept of realism, and alluded to by Waltz with the terms political stability and competence. Countries torn apart by civil war or internal strife such as Egypt and Libya (Arab spring), Uganda (Lord’s Resistance Army-LRA rebellion), Cote d’Ivoire (electoral dispute) and Nigeria (Boko Haram) in recent times cannot easily exert power over others. Others, such as South Africa may be able to play a hegemonic role, but are not particularly eager to do so as their main interests lie elsewhere (Waltz 1979, 131; Morgenthau 1960, 110-148).

Bjorn Moller reiterated these fears with the suggestion that if states such as Nigeria or South Africa happened not to be elected members of the PSC, they just might retaliate by keeping their substantial contributions to peacekeeping operations to the prescribed minimum, which would have severe detrimental consequences for missions that tend to depend very much on their large contributions (Moller 2009).

Of the many problems African countries face, endemic corruption and poor governance have worsened them. These have informed the strategies of donors as far as funding is concerned. Klingbelier et al, explained that in their support for the APSA, donors use a range of instruments or modes of delivery, each with its distinct advantages and disadvantages. The way in which donors provide support shows, that important measures in the field of development, such as the pooling of resources and the harmonization of standards and requirements, have not been fully implemented. This may be due to the fact that the field of peace and security touches on the national interests of external actors and those donors are constrained by specific internal rules and regulations.
These rules and regulations cause the reluctance to pool resources or to institutionalize a division of labor amongst donors in support of the APSA (Klingbelier et al. 2008).

It is evident that, only leadership motivated by a clear vision and the determination to deliver positive value to Africa citizens can overcome the institutional weaknesses that have ensnared weaker or more susceptible African leaders in webs of cavalier or conscious malfeasance. It is only then that international donors can trust in Africa’s ability to channel the allocated means to the appropriate ends (Brainard and Chollet 2007).

Contrary to the mounting sense of hopelessness, others like Williams think that, in terms of the PSC’s institutional design, it is starting to make some headway, at least by putting some flesh on its institutional bones and by tentatively starting to address the non-military dimensions of security (Williams 2009). The peace and security regime under the auspices of the AU is commendable in that it makes the prospects of the AU, in terms of the promotion and protection of human rights, a reality, at least on paper. However, these trends do not warrant unqualified optimism (Sabelo Gumedze 2011, 62).

**Overview of the APSA**

Perhaps the greatest offset to the APSA is its inability to observe the increasing threat of terrorism and the lackadaisical response to deal with it. Somalia in the late 1990s presented a hint of the hybrid threat of religious non-state actors and insurgency. Yet, literature on the subject of the ASPA response to it is limited. This is because the APSA failed to conduct a major forum to discuss the issue holistically.

In the height of the Arab spring, the AU was without any working plan because the APSA never offered one, or due to Western powers involvement, restricted itself to
its only viable option of passive mediation. An objective for the coordination of efforts to fight terrorism was only a late addition in 2010. African states have hitherto inflated terrorist attacks to attract aid and resources from the international community (Grasa and Mateos 2010).

Article 7(i) of the AU PSC Protocol mandates that the Peace and Security Council ensure the implementation of the AU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and other relevant international, continental and regional conventions and instruments and harmonize and coordinate efforts at regional and continental levels to combat international terrorism (African Union 2011).

This intervention was intended to bring an end to hostilities between Colonel Gaddafi’s forces and the rebel groups making up the Transitional National Council in Libya. Besides its unsuccessful mediation role in Libya, the AU accepted the new regimes and leaders of Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, with their distinct orientations, into its fold. It came with forced migrations motivated by internal displacements and refugees, as well as the scourge of terrorism and arms proliferation in Mali and Nigeria in the forms of the MNLA and Boko Haram respectively (Nna-Emeka Okereke 2012).

Early warnings from the UN suggested a talk of a triple threat: the links and the impact of organized crime, drug trafficking and terrorism. The responses have gradually evolved. At first only simple transit was discussed, while minimizing its impact, i.e., omitting the destabilizing potential for civil society and states. The magnitude of the threat was lost on both the international community and the AU (Grasa and Mateos 2012).
The terrorism protocol suggests little in terms of combat, but has more to do with monitoring and reporting terrorism threats as soon as they occur by individual countries as clearly spelt out in Article 6. The role of RECs is therefore limited to only reporting in collaboration with civil society organizations. Thus, it is only a casual attempt at sharing information and the establishment of a focal point, as suggested in Article 4. In early 2013, ECOWAS leaders have since departed from that stance due to the increasing threats of terrorist organizations (ECOWAS 2013a).

As a counter-terrorism measure, many states declare a state of emergency, which sometimes results in a number of human rights being restricted or derogated. Fitzpatrick rightly argues that, derogation of norms apply in all emergencies threatening the life of the nation, regardless of the source of the threat, both in war and in peace. In Africa in particular, a balance is needed to curb excesses in order to fashion a more sophisticated counter approach to win the trust of the masses (Fitzpatrick 2006).

More disturbing is the fact that, while the focus of the US government is on global terrorism, with AFRICOM inheriting the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTFHOA) created in late 2002, the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI) established in 2003, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI) established in 2005, and the Africa Coastal/Border Security Program created in 2005, terrorism also appears to receive the bulk of attention by the continent. However, even though AFRICOM mentioned kidnappings and attacks by al Qaida linked organizations in the Sahel, it did not anticipate the threat of the spiraling effect of the Libyan uprising.

The extent of AFRICOM’s commitment to African states is being contested. In 2006, the US Principal Under-Secretary of Defense Ryan Henry, declared that
AFRICOM was not meant to be an operational entity but an organizational change that did not mean any sort of change in a basing structure or troop positions on the continent (Mangala 2011).

AFRICOM is consistently engaged in Phase Zero shaping operations or at worst Phase 1 deterrence operations. As already outlined, the measure of AFRICOM’s success would be “if it keeps American troops out of Africa for the next 50 years”. This would, keep the US safe from a distance (Mangala 2011).

The APSA therefore only stands to benefit from the efficiency of AFRICOM in minor engagements or the use of drone strikes on strategic targets. This clearly leaves countries like Niger, Nigeria and Mali in the Sahel region to deal with homegrown terrorists the likes of Boko Haram and Ansar Dine. It is therefore left to the RMs to combat this threat and do so effectively.

**The ECOWAS Standby Force**

The ASF requires that each RM/REC have one permanent planning element with at least one personnel member from each of the three components (military, police and civilian). One standby brigade, consisting of one contingent of military, and at least two companies of police/gendarmerie ideally on standby in member states to support two complex missions simultaneously. A roster of about 290 civilians for mission support and specialized roles, one Military Logistics Depot (MLD), centers of excellence and training facilities and a permanent brigade headquarters (Mbaye and Alghali 2008).

In structure, the ESF, like any of the RMs was to raise a force with the following operational capability:
1. Brigade (mission level) headquarters and support unit of up to 65 personnel and 16 vehicles.

2. A headquarters company and support unit of up to 120 personnel.

3. Four light infantry battalions, each composed of up to 750 personnel and 70 vehicles.

4. An engineer unit of up to 505 personnel.

5. A light signals unit of up to 135 personnel.

6. A reconnaissance company (wheeled) of up to 150 personnel.

7. A helicopter unit of up to 80 personnel, ten vehicles and four helicopters.

8. A military police unit of up to 48 personnel and 17 vehicles.

9. A light multi-role logistical unit of up to 190 personnel and 40 vehicles;

10. A level II medical unit of up to 35 personnel and 10 vehicles.

11. A military observer group of up to 120 officers.

12. A civilian support group consisting of logistical, administrative and budget components (Cilliers and Malan 2005).

The forces, as a component of the ASF, were to operate under the following scenarios:

1. Scenario 1. AU/regional military advice to a political mission. Deployment required within 30 days of an AU mandate resolution.

2. Scenario 2. AU/regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission. Deployment required within 30 days of an AU mandate resolution.

4. Scenario 4. AU/regional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions (and peace-building). Deployment required within 30 days of an AU mandate resolution.

5. Scenario 5. AU peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions, including those involving low-level spoilers. ASF completed deployment required within 90 days of an AU mandate resolution, with the military component being able to deploy in 30 days.

6. Scenario 6. AU intervention, for example in genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly. Here it is envisaged that the AU would have the capability to deploy a robust military force in 14 days (African Union 2010).

The ECOWAS conflict prevention framework towards conflict prevention comprises the following elements:

1. Operational prevention, including early warning, mediation, conciliation, preventive disarmament and preventive deployment using interactive means, such as good offices and the ECOWAS Standby Force.

2. Structural prevention, which is often elaborated under peace building initiatives and comprising political, institutional (governance) and developmental reforms, capacity enhancement and advocacy on the culture of peace. Peace building, on the other hand, describes the development of the requisite multi-actor institutional capacity to design, implement and monitor initiatives aimed at checking the deterioration of social and economic conditions during hostilities, and strengthening the peace fabric of post conflict
countries over a long period of time in order to prevent a relapse into violent conflict. Aimed at operationalizing Chapter IX of the mechanism, initiatives to this end include, but are not limited to, humanitarian assistance, restoration and maintenance of economic and social infrastructure, restoration and reform of governance institutions (political, economic, sociocultural and security), justice, rule of law, reconciliation and reintegration, and conflict sensitive development (ECOWAS 2008).

For some reasons, member countries of ECOWAS have not fared well in pursuing the structural prevention option, which seems cheaper and more viable to save lives. However, in line with its preferred choice, there have been efforts at meeting the requirements for the ESF.

The ESF framework envisaged a troop strength of 6,500 pledged by contributing nations, and coordinated through the Mission Planning and Management Cell. The idea is for the task force to have the capacity to deploy rapidly to meet initial contingency requirements. If the military effort requires an expanded force, the main brigade will be deployed. It is assumed that all forces committed to the ESF will meet the criteria and standards set out in an ECOWAS memorandum of understanding. It was highly recommended that contributing countries specialized in capacities of their choice and make same commitments towards exercises and deployment (Ghana pledged the engineer unit). A further planning assumption is that the ESF Task Force will have the capability to deploy for up to 90 days, after which one of the following options will be implemented:

1. The Task Force elements will return to the troop-contributing nations.
2. The Task Force will remain deployed as an element of the ESF Main Brigade.

3. The Task Force will become an element of an AU or UN mission.

4. The Task Force will hand over to a UN or AU force as determined by the ECOWAS secretariat. (ECOWAS 2008)

Before it could declare its successful attainments of its benchmarks to confront the security threats of the continent, the Mali crises of January 2012 presented an opportunity for the evaluation of the APSA in the West African sub-region, bringing with it operational and logistics challenges and a wide gap in the field of intelligence on the full extent of the terrorism threat.

**Summary**

The concept of collective security has become relevant to modern societies in a bid to rid itself of the factors that consistently started wars and made unilateral intervention a difficult and costly proposition. The creation of the UN after WWII and the end of the Cold War paved the way for the AU to adopt a more practical approach to conflict resolution through collective security. To be efficient, collective security requires legal backing and respect for state sovereignty, balance of power between international, regional and state and in the case of Africa, knowledge of the protocols on conflict resolution mechanisms. The AU APSA designed for RMs, is largely dependent on the content and experience of past conflicts which leaves a gap in the effects of emerging threats and local and international hegemonic relationships. The RM of the ESF of the ECOWAS sub-region is responsible for the West Africa sub-region and is responsible to bring peace to Mali.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

Chapter 1 of this research gave reasons why the AU needed an effective security mechanism like the APSA after the Cold War. Its unsuccessful attempts at resolving African conflicts were traced to ad-hoc mechanisms that lacked both the military capability and enforceable regulations. The concept of collective security among member states with the collaboration of the UN and international community appeared to be an attractive solution.

Chapter 2 looked at what is currently written on the concept of collective security. It revealed the complex nature of a holistic security architecture with the issues of legality and legitimacy as sensitive subjects. The research looked at the AU’s APSA model for security cooperation on the continent and if it considered UN protocols, and local social dynamics, in addition to the traditional causes of conflict Africa is accustomed to. It went further to probe the model’s fidelity in the new age of terrorism and AFRICOM parallel mandate for Africa, the effect of APSA mechanism and the over dependence on the international community and hegemons.

The research for this thesis was based on the descriptive content of primary and secondary data. The primary sources included ECOWAS papers documenting its framework for the requirement of a RM of an ESF brigade as part of an overall ASF and its reports on political and military actions in respect of the conflict in Mali. Secondary data were from books, journal articles, magazines, and unpublished material from government sources. Data was sourced from the Combined Arms Research Library, the
ECOWAS Library and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center (KAIPTC) (one of the centers of excellence for ECOWAS), the National War College, and from published reports from policy think tanks, like RAND Corporation, Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), and the African Center for Strategic Studies, as well as academic websites. This research facilitated an analysis of ECOWAS’s collective security architecture; the role of the ASPA and its benchmarks for readiness when considering the use the militaries of member states as a final instrument of power for conflict resolution.

Methodology

This chapter outlines the research methodology and design. A qualitative methodology was used in the conduct of this research using comparative case studies. The purpose of this approach is to explore the thesis with other specific illustrations other than the ESF’s involvement in Mali bounded by the common themes of political will and commitment from coalition members to quickly intervene at the onset of crises (Creswell 2007, 73). The case study is best suited to studying the speed of mobilization of an intervening force to quickly bring an insurgency to a level where the national security apparatus can handle it.

The case studies of AU interventions in the DRC, Somalia, Cote d’Ivoire and the recent Mali uprisings give an indication of progress of the continent’s collective security mechanism. The selection of these case studies affords comparison for the ESF against its counterparts in the SADC, IGAD, EAC and ECCAS in the sub-Saharan region of Africa. Though the researcher may be biased and harbor prejudices as to the overall outcome of the diplomatic and military efforts, the aim was to conduct a fair assessment of the APSA
by conducting a holistic account of the diplomatic and other variables that ultimately affect timely interventions. This approach was done with the objective of observing the political processes in depth, and of finding gaps within the ECOWAS conflict prevention framework within the context of existing and emerging threats and implications for the future. To this end the researcher also analyzed positive reports and any successes in this direction by the ESF as reported by experts to retain a fair and balanced assessment for analysis in chapter 4 (Creswell 2006, 40-41).

Qualitative Methodology

Qualitative research involves analysis of data such as words, pictures, objects and artifacts. In this method of research, the researcher is the main data-gathering instrument.

According to Anne-Marie Ambert, qualitative methods trade comparative objective studies of a broad range of subjects for depth, to facilitate understanding on a more finite sampling. Qualitative methods are focused on how and why people behave, think and make meaning, rather than focusing on what people believe on a large scale. Another benefit is that, qualitative research enables the researcher to analyze data from the macro to the micro level without risking analytical integrity (Ambert et al. 1995, 880).

Other scholars like Taylor Powell and Renner, insist that in analyzing qualitative data, the researcher must know the material, focus the analysis and categorize the information by identifying themes or patterns and organizing them into coherent categories. The researcher then continues with an interpretation of the data where he attaches meaning and significance to the analysis (Taylor Powell and Renner 2003).
The research relied on a triangulation method by deliberately seeking evidence from a wide range of sources and comparing analyses from those different sources to increase the validity of findings. Sources of information included, but were not limited to, reported interviews, personal observations of the mobilization of Ghanaian forces for deployment in Mali as well as expert analyses.

I preferred the concept of methodological congruence advanced by Morse and Richards. Thus concepts posits that the questions, and methods of research are all interconnected and interrelated so that the study appears as a cohesive whole rather than as fragmented, isolated parts (Morse and Richards 2002, 73).

It is a fact that the Mali crisis that began in January 2012 became the first test for the ESF apparatus. More so, while the apparatus was expected to be fully functional then, it was yet to be exercised. The fact that it made the attempt to fulfill its obligations without violations puts the ESF’s framework and data from its operations into context. It thus lends itself to a comparative case study approach.

The research was structured to conform to Stake’s approach to conducting case studies as follows:

1. Determine Appropriate Qualitative Approach

The researcher determined that a comparative case study was appropriate to address the research problem. The case study helped provide answers to the questions relating to the effectiveness of the APSA in intervening successfully in Africa’s insurgencies operating in an era of terrorism threats and member countries adhering to protocols.
2. Identify Case studies to be analyzed

The researcher identified the comparative case studies sampling from the DRC crises of 1996 and 2012, Cote d’Ivoire in 2010 and Somalia in 2005. Though the actors, motives and the methods apply may be different, they are bounded by their status as intrastate conflicts. It therefore offers a unique basis to compare to what an effective ESF must do as the thesis seeks to answer the primary question posed.

3. Collect the Data

The data provided from the Mali crisis were extensive, drawing on multiple sources and the case studies mentioned. It came in the form of archival records, documents, interviews from active participants and expert opinions from the international community, donor countries, independent media houses and relief agencies.

4. Analyze the Data

A holistic analysis was conducted to evaluate the ESF using the criteria of commitment, balance of power and host nation consent central to the analytical processes in the framework approach was a series of interconnected stages that enabled the move back and forth across the data until a coherent account emerges (Ritchie and Lewis 2003). This resulted in the constant refinement of themes that aided the development of a conceptual framework.

5. Apply the Analysis for Future Application

The research provided the basis for lessons learned that needed to be applied to application of the APSA and the ESF to identify any weaknesses. The ESF can then work to perfect its framework by taking advantage of opportunities offered by the international community to complement its strengths in its mandate to seek peace and security.
Conduct of the Research

The research utilized the five steps for conducting research as identified by William Wiersma. First, one must identify and isolate the problem and the identification of relevant case studies. Second, review of available literature and determine the application of diplomatic and military national instruments of power in the concept of collective security, to achieve economic power for Africa to develop in peace. Third, collect and classify data and review case studies. Fourth, data analyze data and determination of the effectiveness of collective security as a concept using the AU’s APSA and the RMs as yardstick. Lastly, the researcher drew conclusions resulting from the study and made recommendations (Wiersma and Jurs 2008).

Step 1: Identification and Isolation of the Problem

As indicated earlier in chapter 1, Africa, from precolonial era prosecuted a political mandate to see to the total independence of all African states. Civil wars and insurgencies increased in the heat of the Cold War between the USA and then USSR which supported opposing ideologies. The lack of a collective security framework continued to undermine the economic growth on the continent, creating a cycle of tribal and ethnic conflicts. Consequently, peace and security eluded the continent. With the near total independence of African states achieved and the end of the Cold War, a new mandate for Africa was needed. The AU APSA was created in 2002 to help resolve the simmering decades of conflicts. It was designed to promote security and create an environment conducive for economic growth. The concept of security cooperation is new to Africa. With the complex dynamics of African politics borrowed from different
colonial masters, a comprehensive framework would be nothing close to perfect, but it was highly anticipated with great expectations.

The continent, reeling from its not so glorious past, is burdened with debt and relies on international donors to finance its budgets. The continent already lacks both an effective conflict resolution mechanism and a readily available financial strength to help alleviate the situation. The involvement of past colonial masters and the global impact of emerging threats requires that Africa has to operate under the whims and caprices of the international powers. In such a scenario, the prime interest of Africans becomes a deferred priority.

The ESF, the regional standby force for the West African sub-region became embroiled in the Mali conflict of January 2012, having to deal with the political, diplomatic and military aspects of a long term insurrection for the autonomous Tuareg state of Azawad. This case study therefore presents a classic case to test the framework for security in the sub-region.

Step 2: Review of Relevant Information

Chapter 2 of this research reviewed the literature related to the concept of security cooperation, the emerging dynamics of a legal framework and the responsibility of states and their right to protect civilian populations under special circumstances. It is evident that the creation of the UN in post WWII helped provide the framework for peace and security. However, the formation of alliances and blocs continues to pose threats, and conflicts have raged on albeit on a smaller scale than pre WWII. The AU PSC modelled its APSA along that of the UNSC. Between 2002 and 2012, the APSA attempted conflict resolutions in Cote d’Ivoire, Somalia and Sudan (Darfur) with some success augmented
with significant help from the international community. Regional mechanisms projected to be ready by 2010 were yet to take off. Thus the USA, UN and the EU have taken the lead in the respective peace missions with AFRICOM, in coordination with US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), spearheading the all-encompassing GWOT in the African OA.

There is a lack of literature on the APSA’s timeliness which though mentioned in the six scenarios is yet to be tested. Attempts at conflict resolution in Somalia, DRC and Cote d’Ivoire did not have the benefit of a framework, but a timeline became necessary for the purposes of planning and deployment in order to end the human suffering that characterized insurgent actions. The Mali case study is expected to offer a more advanced path to a timely intervention due to the establishment of the ESF. This research is aimed at confirming that assertion.

Step 3: Collection and Classification of Data

The study used two primary methods to answer both the primary and the secondary research questions. It reviewed the literature on collective security, and identified that Africa’s response to conflict interventions is dependent on resources, political and legal commitment to protocols, and local and foreign hegemons. The perfect understanding of the combination of these variables is not feasible but a thorough understanding of these and Africa’s precarious history are key to understanding how fast the continent can react to conflicts. The study used both primary and secondary data to focus on the research questions. The data was classified into three categories as follows:

1. The concept of collective security in modern times and its protocols.
2. The essential elements to a prompt response by a coalition to meet its set timeline in any conflict scenario.

3. Challenges to speedy deployment of coalition.

Step 4: Data Analysis

The basis of analysis is the speed with which the ECOWAS responds to political and military conflict situations. Speed further refers to how quickly a response led to the insertion of troops in Mali. African regional bodies have consistently grappled with dictators with divergent political views. These bodies traditionally depended on external economic support and influences by local and foreign hegemons. It would be interesting to examine how these factors compared to the timelines set by the ESF in its quest to intervene in Mali. The study will draw on the indicators identified in the literature review and parts of the analytical framework developed by LTC Edward Rugendo of the Kenyan Army in “Prospects of Collective Security in the Eastern Africa Region” his MMAS thesis at CGSC. I will apply this framework to the conflicts to be studied in the case studies mentioned (Regan 1998).

Criteria selection and explanation

The study examined the concept of an effective collective security system through the key indicators identified in chapter 2. It is the collective responsibility of member states to see an attack on one as an attack on all and the legal basis for interference. The affected country must also not consider an intervention as a violation of its sovereignty and seeks assistance from the alliance. The R2P protocol is seen as a tool to avert civilian suffering and to protect the civilian population in the event of human rights abuse or
terrorism. The protocol gives the regional hegemon and the wider international community the free hand to intervene to promote their national interests as well as those of the region, even when they are not invited to act. The concept assumes that the international community will collectively condemn the offenses committed against a state by a commonly identified aggressor. The actions of the members of an alliance must be done in the spirit of pragmatism and not along tribal affiliations and or bilateral pacts or agreements (Pfetsch and Rohloff 2000).

Key Factors for Analysis

For the concept of collective security to respond in a timely manner in Africa, the first key element is that governments of allied member countries must possess knowledge of all aspects of governance, their nation’s foreign policies and be familiar with world politics to promote effective dialogue and negotiations in accordance with the commitments they have made to the regional body. It must have demonstrated this by taking part in planning conferences, training exercises and payment of dues and openly registered its caveats to the adopted framework of the peace architecture. At the onset of the conflict the country must back their commitment through the ability to quickly deploy troops and equipment in accordance with its obligations to the coalition.

This must be reconciled with the preservation of the sovereignty of the affected member of the alliance or coalition. The individual member state therefore weighs its options in the best interest of the population it seeks to protect. It is only when its use of national powers and requests for support fail will an outside intervention be justified.

The second key element is the balance of power between sub-regional bodies (like RECs), the AU, and the UN. Balance of power exists when all member countries have
equal representation and can freely contribute to resolutions. The presence of a local hegemonic power insisting on leading the process offsets this balance and a collaborative effort. A breakdown in the process of authorization of mandates and resolutions is likely to throw otherwise honorable intentions into jeopardy. The efficient application of world politicking is key to drafting an effective document at the world stage level where words or articles mean different things to different countries. The presence of an international hegemon, like the French or the USA, in the international system is more likely to alter the balance of power and may skew operations as their interests dictate. The ensuing power struggles generated by these scenarios determines the speed with which intervention forces are inserted to begin operations. Africa’s fragile economic condition and its attractive natural resources makes it a soft target for hegemons to struggle to take the lead in operations with varied interests. It is thus left to the five permanent members of the UNSC with veto powers to influence the actions of the UN to balance that power (Hoffman and Taw 1992; Ebegbulem 2011).

Finally, for a successful intervention the host nation must demonstrate its commitment to the mitigation of the conflict in the greater interest of all of its citizens. It is a fact that some governments have raised and sponsored militias to prosecute their dirty political agenda to consolidate their power. Most of these instances include, systematic killing of an entire ethnic group, harassment of opposition leaders and creation of a state of uneasy calm to warrant the deployment of government forces. In such scenarios, the host nation vehemently opposes an intervention into what it considers a domestic affair. These diplomatic tussles help delay intervention whilst the civilian population suffer.
Details of the criteria shape the details of the five case studies in Chapter 4 in order to determine the improvements made by the AU, ECOWAS and ESF in their quest to implement the first step of the concept of collective security and at best offer recommendations judging from the successes of the three case studies from the DRC, Cote d’Ivoire and Somalia. Assessment would depend on the presence or absence of any of the variables leading to an intervention (See table 1).

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<th>Indicators</th>
<th>DRC 1</th>
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<th>Cote d’Ivoire</th>
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<td><strong>Commitment</strong></td>
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<td>a. Political will of alliance</td>
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<td>a. Hegemon lead</td>
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<td>b. Regional/UN lead</td>
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<td><strong>Host nation consent</strong></td>
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**Step 5: Findings Conclusions and Recommendations**

Based on the analysis of the data in step four, the study will arrive at findings drawn from the common themes and differences, regarding the overall readiness of the ESF, leading to its deployment in Mali. This will give an indication of its potential to
prosecute the concept of collective security in the sub-region or if deployment was late to, make any meaningful impact in saving an already dire situation.

The researcher then made recommendations for the improvement of the ESF and recommended an alternative to Africa’s ESF for further research.

**Chapters Arrangement**

This study is composed of five chapters. Chapter 1 introduced the background to what was seen as Africa’s indifference and ad hoc measures to security cooperation during the Cold War era as it struggled with post-colonial conflicts. With the end of the Cold War and the successful liberation of all the state from colonization, it needed to comply with international politics. These needs plunged the continent into a new era of collective security. The chapter further defined some key terms frequently used in the study. Chapter 2 covered the literature review. The researcher observed that the concept of collective security is new to Africa and thus the concept drew from many sources like the UN and EU to set up the AU PSC which established the APSA. The APSA is yet to fully tackle a conflict situation on its terms, but past conflicts give it a conceptual framework to work with. Chapter 3 outlined the qualitative research methodology that was employed and discussed the comparative case studies approach adopted. Chapter 4 will present an analysis of the case studies against the framework underpinning this research. Chapter 5 will present a summary of the analysis and recommended changes to the ESFs framework to conflict prevention and recommend a subject matter area for further research.
Summary

This research study uses a qualitative methodology with a comparative case study approach. Analyses on the data was examined using the criteria for the timely intervention of coalitions, drawn from case studies from military operations in DRC, Cote d'Ivoire, and Somalia in comparison to the efforts of the ESF in Mali.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

The APSA called for an ASF and RMs to be operational by June 2012 to begin a new age of applying an effective political and military solution to curb the frequent rebellions that plague the continent. Any form of intervention must be done with the utmost commitment of the coalition members. Timely insertion also depends on the balance of power among actors, be it a lead nation initiative or a coalition of the willing, coupled with the availability of resources. These factors are all based on the transparency of the affected government and the alliance’s efforts at recognizing its sovereignty.

The government threatened by an insurgency is the most important actor, as plans and enthusiasm from a coalition can never fully compensate for lack of will or counter-productive behavior on the part of the supported government (US Gov 2009).

International intervention has long been a part of global politics, in various forms and degrees of politeness, but limited in the amount of moral, political and material/economic support it can deliver. When one power or a coalition decides to intervene in another state and is determined to prevail, there are three important possibilities. The intervention can restrict the supported side’s freedom of action, leading to resistance from that group and may reduce the incentives for further assistance from competing powers. The intervener’s commitment to augmenting government forces, rather than substituting them and the provision of strategic logistics support are strong signals for progress (Miller 2010).
Chapters 1 and 2 looked at the background to African conflicts and the APSA’s framework for a 21st century concept of collective security within the context of a regional hegemon, local dynamics and resources which set the stage for a real takeoff of any intervention of a sort. Chapter 3 discussed the qualitative research methodology used by the researcher for this study. This chapter will analyze five case studies to determine how timely intervention of a coalition or external support inserts troops against the background of the commitment by a coalition, balance of power among member states and the affected government’s consent to seek an end to the conflict. The five case studies are the two DRC Wars (between 1996 and 2012), the Cote d’Ivoire conflict of 2010, the Somali conflict in 2005 and the Mali conflict of 2012.

**Case Study 1: First DRC War (Oct 1996-May 1997)**

**Background**

The DRC, as it is known today, was called the Republic of Congo after it received its independence from the Belgians in June 1960. Mobutu Sese Seko carried out a coup d’état in 1965 and ruled as its dictator renaming the country to the Republic of Zaire in October 1971.

Following the Rwandan genocide of April 1994, large numbers of the defeated Hutu militants, known as the *Interahamwe*, and Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) members of Hutu origin crossed into Zaire as refugees. These militant refugees, numbering around 850,000, settled in about 35 camps in the North and South Kivu districts and later regrouped as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). These districts were home to ethnic Tutsis who fled Rwanda in the late 1950s and early 60s
after Hutu reprisals following independence. They integrated into the then Belgium Congo and became known locally as the Banyamulenges (Stearns 2013).

These newly arrived Hutus and the Interahamwe continued their genocidal methods used in Rwanda by killing Congolese Tutsis. This development created a security situation within Zaire. This situation compelled thousands of Tutsis to return to a safe Rwanda sharing stories of recruitments by the FDLR designed to revive the war against the new Tutsi led government of Rwanda. Rwanda’s calls to President Mobutu and the UN to relocate the refugees off its border went unheeded. Government representatives in Eastern Zaire proclaimed that the Tutsis were no longer welcome in Zaire, threatening to enforce nationality laws passed in 1981 which withdrew their citizenship. The Rwandan government took measures to topple the Government of Mobutu using the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL), made up of a number of opposition groups to Mobutu, led by Laurent Desiree Kabila (Stearns 2013).

Mobutu only had support from the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebels in Angola. By December 1996 the AFDL rebels had gained control of the eastern corridor and about 70 percent of the country, sending the disorganized Zaire Armed Forces (FAZ) and their foreign mercenaries retreating to Kinshasa. The war lasted seven months ending with Mobutu going into exile followed by the triumphant entry of Kabila into Kinshasa on 17 May 1996 (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2004).
Figure 4. Map of DRC

External Intervention

Commitment

When the AFDL made inroads into eastern Zaire towards the refugee camps, the already precarious situation escalated into a humanitarian catastrophe which came to the attention of the UNSC. At the 3713th meeting of the UNSC meeting on 15 November 1996, the representative of Zaire expressed his thanks to the UNSG for his initiative in submitting the matter to the Security Council, but added that his country was the victim of obvious aggression and that the primary cause of the situation was the problem of refugees from Rwanda and Burundi. He called on the international community to exert pressure on Rwanda to seek a diplomatic settlement and expressed his belief that once the refugee problem was solved calm would return to the region (UN 1999).

France and the USA were the two dominant powers in this situation, with the USA having supported the Mobutu regime during the Cold War and France for the Hutu regime in Rwanda after independence. France’s Operation Turquoise, which halted the Rwandan Patriotic Army’s advance to create a safe corridor for the FAR to escape into Zaire complicated its further involvement in the crises as the USA’s support for Rwanda increased. Again, the SADC re-established in 1994 could not do anything because of the complicit involvement of Rwanda, Uganda and Angola on the rebel side killing any hope of a regional response (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2004).

Speaking in Paris after talks with the French Foreign Minister, Herve de Charette, on 1 March 1997, Secretary General Kofi Annan called for the UNSC to send an international military force to help deliver relief and to extricate tens of thousands of refugees caught in the crossfire. Mr. Annan said he would try to persuade the Security
Council to reverse its decision not to send a humanitarian mission to the area. According to him, the UNSC had considered authorizing such a force in December 1996 with a Chapter VII mandate to end 31 March 1997 (S/RES/1080/1996). The UN however failed to act after hundreds of thousands of refugees left eastern Zaire on their own once the fighting began there. In the end there was no real international desire by the member states to intervene. Mr. Annan said, referring to a military force. “They were not ready to go” he added (Lewis 1997; UN 1999).

With no intervention from either regional or international alliances or by hegemonic powers, the Chief of Staff of the Army (FAZ) declared he could not guarantee the safety of the president and the capital. Mobutu was then escorted out of the country, paving the way for Kabila’s entry into Kinshasa. Accordingly, the assessment for the variable of commitment would be rated as absent (Maykuth 1997).

Balance of Power

The USA’s interest in the Great Lakes region can be traced to its alliance with both Rwanda and Uganda and its falling out with Mobutu who was fast becoming a spent force after so many years of US patronage, particularly during the Cold War period. France’s unilateral decision to conduct Operation Turquoise did not go down with the international body and the USA. Subsequently France, lost its leverage to intervene, not even with the humanitarian card. Therefore the balance of power was absent since the US’s role in the intervention efforts stifled UN resolve. Hegemon lead was therefore present whilst regional and UN role was absent.
Host Nation Consent

The representative of Zaire to the UN and Mobutu, both wanted an intervention force to deal with the humanitarian situation. It was deduced that any force inserted would have favored the Kinshasa regime and kept it in power. Therefore, host nation consent is assessed as present (See table 2).

Case Study 2: Eastern DRC Crises (Nov 1999-Present)

Background

The UN successfully deployed a UN Mission in the DRC, named United Nations Mission in Congo (MONUC), in November 1999 under UNSCRs 1258 and 1291 after the Lusaka Accords which ended the first war. The mission was to take action to protect civilians after the country relapsed into war in August 1998. The war, known as the Great War, again involved six African countries including Rwanda, Angola, Chad, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Burundi. Following numerous diplomatic attempts, a Joint Verification Mechanism was signed by the governments of Rwanda and the DRC (former Zaire) on 22 September 2004. This paved the way for all foreign troops to withdraw their forces from Congo and implement measures against cross border violations leading to the withdrawal of support to proxy militant groups. Security sector reforms also saw the FAZ restructured as the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) with little professional foundation. The FARDC was hit with mutinies and lacked in their capacity to carry out effective combat operations (Dagne 2011).

By 30 July 2006, the DRC organized its first elections in over four decades. President Joseph Kabila duly won the mandate and legitimized his rule, earning him
international recognition and support. Peace and security for an economic turnaround were in the cards, but DRC’s problems were far from over (UN 2007a).

In October 2008, a new militant group, The National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), led by a Tutsi FARDC General, Laurent Nkunda, mutinied and moved east. DRC pointed fingers at Rwanda for supporting the rebels. The US, France and UK- led diplomatic efforts to curb the rising tensions whilst the UN appointed former Nigerian president General Olusegun Obasanjo to lead efforts to broker a ceasefire. This was welcomed as a test for the new AU’s APSA, which aimed at formalizing a peace and security mechanism to solve Africa’s security problems. Other predatory rebel groups in the complex mix of rebellion against the DRC were the FDLR, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a Ugandan based Islam rebel group, and the DRC backed Mai-Mai militia in the Congo and the Lord’s Resistance Army from Uganda. In April 2012 a new militant group, the M23 movement, emerged to replace the CNDP, challenging the 23 March 2009 failed peace agreement, hence its M23 name. The group quickly rose to media attention due to their atrocious raping of women and children (Dagne 2011).

External Intervention

Commitment

In November 2012, the M23 rebels, under General Bosco Ntaganda, occupied Goma, the capital of North Kivu despite the presence of about 1,500 UN troops, and remained there in violation of UNSCR 2076 which condemned their actions. This was seen as a setback to the UN mission now in the stability phase of operations and had been renamed the UN Stability Operations in Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) on 1 July 2010. It also demonstrated the weakness of the military capability of the DRC to
take responsibility for internal security hurting the country’s credibility in the process. On 18 March 2013, the UN passed UNSCR 2098 calling for an intervention brigade under the auspices of MONUSCO to carry out targeted operations against all armed groups that threatened the civilian population of eastern DRC. This new model for an offensive combat force, termed the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), consisted of troops from Tanzania, South Africa and Malawi equipped with unmanned drones and Rooivalk attack helicopters, commanded by General James Aloisi Mwakibolwa of Tanzania (Gberie 2013).

The resolution praised the efforts of the UNSG, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), the SADC, and the AU to restore peace and security in eastern DRC. It was preceded by the signing, in Addis Ababa on 24 February 2013, of the PSC Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region (UN 2013).

The brigade started deploying troops in May 2013 and was expected to be fully operational by September 2013. The decision to deploy an intervention brigade was first conceived by regional leaders in the ICGLR in July 2012. Uganda and South Africa led the discussion of the failure of MONUSCO and the government of the DRC to stop the activities of all other militant groups like UNITA, FDLR and the LRA which threatened the governments of neighboring countries. It pledged a troop strength of 3,500 personnel, mostly from SADC with South Africa and Tanzania (ICGLR and EAC) also pledging troops. The deployment of a combined force that had never planned, trained or operated together before was due to meet some challenges (IPI 2013).
The force, if inserted, would set a precedent by operating under a divergent rules of engagement (ROE) and a more robust concept of operations to that of MONUSCO, even though it operated as an ambiguous Chapter VII operations with the UN leaning more to the protection of civilians and not the targeting of armed groups. The force’s neutrality could not be guaranteed. It sought to challenge the principles of peacekeeping operations which could lead to open attacks on MONUSCO forces and unacceptable risk for UN civilian staff and aid workers. Also, the estimated annual budget of $100 million dollars was too much a cost for developing nations to support (Mutton 2013).

By November, the concept of the FIB became attractive to the UN after the fall of Goma to M23. The regional political consensus and agreement by the UN in principle to adopt the force made the UN a party to the conflict and the source of funds (IPI 2013).

Although South Africa was outside the ICGLR, it felt compelled to act. It saw a secure DRC as a potential partner for greater economic success for the whole African continent (Mutton 2013). Even though it contributed the bulk of the 3,069 troops to Tanzania’s 1000, South Africa ceded the command of the force, which came to be known as the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB). Again, even though the UN does not permit neighboring countries to deploy troops, Tanzania was made the exception. Uganda and Rwanda had reservations due to their notorious interferences in the DRC. They however, raised no official objections to Tanzanian troops along their borders. Uganda and Rwanda were part of the 11 countries that signed on to the PSC framework and felt compelled to support the initiative. Rwanda, however did not attempt to disarm armed groups, especially the M23 movement, along its border as directed by UNSCR 2136 because they were seen as a buffer between Kigali and the FDLR (UN 2014).
The first troops of the FIB arrived on 13 May 2013, started operations in June 2013 and by 31 August 2013 caused the withdrawal of M23, 30 kilometers from its initial positions. On 21 October 2013, the last elements of the Malawi troops arrived in Goma, North Kivu province. Their deployment was largely due to the already operational UN mission in the DRC for which the budget was sponsored with additional funds from the World Bank. Though the US is strongly allied to Uganda and Rwanda, it played an important diplomatic role and supported the FIB in DRC with strategic lift capability. In his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 26 February 2014, Roger Meece, former US Ambassador to the UN and UN Special Representative Secretary General (SRSG) to DRC, elaborated on the US role in the success story of the FIB. The FIB, in a four day battle with M23 in late October defeated the disorganized M23. A similar solution is being suggested for the Central Africa Republic with the present conflict there (UN 2014; US Gov 2014).

The commitment of the coalition would therefore be assessed as present, demonstrated by their willingness to commit to the PSC framework. They also showed the ability to project troops into the DRC following UN authorization and assistance. So the variable of readiness to deploy troops would be assessed as present.

Balance of Power

The members of ICGLR, SADC and EAC collaborated under the AU PSC to reach a framework which was supported by all the member states. The international community and the UN saw the intervention as redundant to MONUSCO and risky, but demonstrated their support after the security situation became dire. The operation became a joint effort between the AU RMUs and the UN with the support of the US. The variable
of balance of power would therefore be assessed as present. A regional hegemon lead was absent but instead an AU and UN cooperation was present.

**Host Nation Consent**

The UN remained the legitimate authority in the DRC with the consent of the DRC government as far as security of the region was concerned. Though the UN had reservations about the FIB, it finally gave consent, accepting risk in its operations. Its principles, credibility and mandate did not force a rejection of the FIB, but supported and guided it to success. Host nation consent is therefore rated as present (See table 2).

**Case Study 3: The Ivorian crisis of 2010**

**Background**

For over three decades after independence, Cote d’Ivoire was ruled by Felix Houphouet-Boigny until his death in December 1993. Without the benefit of a practicing democracy, his death threw the country in chaos with various political parties struggling for power. The Army waded in on the gambit organizing a coup in December 1999 with General Robert Guei becoming the de facto head of state. Elections organized in October 2000 barred Henri Konan Bedie, of the former ruling Party, (banned after military takeover) and popular candidate Alasane Dramane Ouatarra, of the Rally of the Republicans (RDR), from running. Ouatarra was denied on the grounds that he was not a true Ivorian. Laurent Gbagbo of the Ivorian Popular Front won and was sworn in as president for a five year term beginning October 2000. The pronouncement angered the northern inhabitants who trace their lineage from Mali and Burkina Faso. These events sowed the seeds for future insurrection in the Cote d’Ivoire (Cook 2011).
On 19 September 2002 soldiers of northern origin mutinied across the country, but only managed to gain control of the northern half of the country and called themselves the *Forces Nouvelle* (FN). As the conflict continued, the French government brokered the Linas Marcoussis accord which enabled ECOWAS troops to deploy in support of the 4000 strong French Operation *LICORNE* whilst a lasting diplomatic solution was pursued. The UN passed UNSCR 1528 and the United Nations Mission in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI) took effect on 4 March 2004 (UN 2004).

Gbagbo took advantage of the political stalemate to postpone elections, ruling for ten years without the mandate of Ivoirians. On 28 November 2010, the UN helped supervise a presidential runoff between Laurent Gbagbo and Alasane Ouatarra, after the 31 October presidential elections organized in accordance with the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA) produced no majority winner. Ouatarra’s candidacy had been restored by the supreme court of Cote d’Ivoire. The Ivorian independent electoral commission on 2 December declared Ouatarra the winner with 54 percent of the votes. Typical of many recent African leaders, Gbagbo refused to accept the results. The president of the constitutional council backed him up, declaring him the winner the following day. The UN, international community, the USA and France backed Ouatarra. Gbagbo, in a fit of rage, asked the UN to leave Cote d’Ivoire on 18 December and promised to use force against the peacekeepers. The ensuing power struggle ended when the FN, rallied with UN support, to engage the Armed Forces of Cote d’Ivoire (FRCI) in an ultimate showdown which ended on 11 April 2011 with the capture of Gbagbo at the presidential palace (Cook 2011).
External Intervention

Commitment

China and Russia criticized UN certification of the elections process and raised concerns about its adjudication in an election in a sovereign country, citing most of its actions as contrary to the impartiality principle of the body. These developments increased anti-UN sentiments with UNOCI becoming a target for pro-Gbagbo militia (Cook 2011).

On 7 December 2010, ECOWAS demanded that Gbagbo cede the presidency, but to no avail. On 28 December an ECOWAS delegation of three heads of states (Cape Verde, Sierra Leone and Benin) delivered an ultimatum of ECOWAS possible actions to Gbagbo, including the use of legitimate force, to remove him from power. Gbagbo did not accept the ECOWAS demand for him to step down but instead reportedly demanded a vote recount and an amnesty, were he to cede the presidency. ECOWAS leaders decided to defer immediate military intervention in favor of further negotiation, as regional military leaders met to plan and coordinate a possible deployment (Cook 2011).

The ECOWAS delegation, now joined by Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga, the designated AU mediator, met with Ouatarra and Gbagbo on 3 January 2011, and again demanded that Gbagbo cede power. Prime Minister Odinga emphasized that a power-sharing deal was not feasible and offered to provide amnesty to Gbagbo if he stepped down. Instead, Gbagbo agreed to negotiate a peaceful end to the crisis without any preconditions and pledged that he would lift a blockade of the hotel where the Ouatarra government was housed under armed UNOCI and FN protection. By late January, he had fulfilled neither pledge. ECOWAS military chiefs from several member...
countries from late December had prepared plans to forcefully take over power from Gbagbo using the ESF if diplomatic efforts to pressure him to cede the presidency failed. A further logistics meeting was held in mid-January 2011 in Mali to finalize the forces’ deployment. Ghana, however, later declined to participate in a potential intervention, citing an overburden of international peacekeeping deployments in other regions, preferring preventive diplomacy. It cited the risk implications of any intervention on an estimated 600,000 Ghanaians in Cote d’Ivoire. Nigeria also had domestic security concerns of its own that might preclude it from contributing forces. With their experiences in ECOMOG operations in Sierra Leone fresh on their minds, their hesitation to commit troops was understandable (ECOWAS 2011; Kokutse 2011).

The commitment of the ECOWAS member states to an intervention was divided, yet they passed a declaration for military intervention, unanimously. After the passage of the declaration, some member countries showed open support to Gbagbo, killing any hope for a unified force. The variable of commitment would therefore be assessed as absent.

**Balance of Power**

On December 31, the UK announced that it would politically support use of force by ECOWAS in the UNSC, but did not offer or commit any troops for this purpose. The UK had also prepared military contingency plans with the French, but the objective of such plans was limited to evacuations of foreign citizens and had not been described publicly. The new South African president, Jacob Zuma in January 2011, stated that he believed the poll discrepancies discussed earlier, marred the Ivoirian vote and that he favored an AU mediation to end the crisis, despite his government’s (Thabo Mbeki)
earlier release of a statement endorsing an ECOWAS communique recognizing Ouatarra as President-elect, and calling for Gbagbo to yield power without delay. At the same time South Africa had deployed a naval frigate off the coast of Cote d’Ivoire, an action further confusing others of their position. Jacob Zuma would later offer his support to Ouatarra (Cook 2011; Rossouw 2011).

The lukewarm attitude of the AU members to willingly commit to an intervention led to a last effort in a 10 March 2011 PSC meeting in Addis Ababa in which the AU reaffirmed Ouatarra as the winner of the elections, called for him to form a government of national unity and directed him to fully implement the OPA. Members of the Gbagbo delegation rejected these resolutions and received open support from Gambia, Ghana, Equatorial Guinea, Angola and Uganda. This scenario crushed any diplomatic efforts to prevent a military action between the UN, France and FN on one side against the FRCI defending Gbagbo.

The UN thereafter, in an effort to enforce the electoral results, passed UNSCR 1975 on 30 March 2011, imposing sanctions on individuals operating against reconciliation in Cote d’Ivoire, and empowering the UN to use excessive force to defend itself. France, the ex-colonial power, took part in controversial military actions involving armed helicopter gunships which targeted the arms cache of the regular forces of Cote d’Ivoire (FRCI). The move strategically weakened the FRCI allowing the FN to take the capital city, Abidjan on 11 April 2011 much to the relief of the USA and the wider international community (UN 2011).

With this failure to present a united front, ECOWAS and the AU lost an opportunity to lead a coalition to solve an African problem. The UN, backed by the UK
and France, regained the initiative to reassert its control. The variable for balance of power would therefore be assessed as absent, due to the greater influence of the UK and France and the apparent lack of AU and ECOWAS cooperation. The ECOWAS and AU lost its chance to lead, and therefore the variable for regional lead is rated absent.

Host Nation Support

President Gbagbo hanging on to political power for ten years, manipulating all diplomatic efforts to his advantage. He was not ready to agree to a force designated to ensure his removal from office. Host nation consent was therefore absent (See table 2).

Case Study 4: Somalia Crises of 2006

Background

By 2004, the Somali crises, which began in 1991, had changed scenarios and actors over a protracted period of time. However on 10 October 2004, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed was elected president of Somalia and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was established with a five year mandate to prepare for elections in 2009. To protect the new TFG, the AU in May 2005 authorized the deployment of an IGAD peace support mission in Somalia (IGASOM). The IGAD is a peace mediation body made up of several east African nations with Ethiopia having a larger interest because of its borders with the failed Moslem state of Somalia. Without a UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) and the logistics support that comes with it, IGASOM could not deploy immediately. They hoped that a UN arms embargo was enough to keep the warlords at bay.

However, by June 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) overran Mogadishu placing any hope of a transition to normalcy in jeopardy. Fresh peace talks with the ICU
called for a revision of the mission plan. The UN partially lifted the arms embargo and a six month mandate was issued for IGASOM on 6 December 2006, barring bordering states from deploying. Ethiopia however intervened in late December breeching the arm embargo and protocols. By January 2007, the ICU was on the run and the UN sought to consolidate the gains. It called for preemptive strikes against the emerging resilient militant unit of the ICU known as the al Shabaab which seemed to enjoy the support of the Muslim population (UN 2006; UN 2007b).

External Intervention

Commitment

At the 69th meeting of the PSC on 19 January 2007, IGASOM was defined and approved by the AUPSC. On 21 February 2007, the UN finally authorized an intervention under the auspices of the AU by passing UNSCR 1744 for an expanded mission called the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The mission was to protect the TFG, its institutions and the National Security Forces of Somali (NSF); enforce the arm embargo; and force a dialogue among stakeholders for a lasting peace under a chapter VII mandate. Many countries outside IGAD pledged to send troops as Ethiopian forces withdrew. Uganda, Nigeria, Ghana, Burundi and Malawi were the first countries to pledge troops and equipment for an 8,000 strong military and police force. The AU pledged a paltry 15 million dollars, whilst the US and EU pledged 40 million and 15 million euros respectively (UN 2007c; Ngugi 2013).

Uganda, the largest TCC with over 6,000 troops, began deployment in early March 2007. They assumed command of the operations from the onset. By August 2007, Burundian troops were ready to deploy, but were waiting on equipment promised by the
US and France which arrived for deployment beginning November 2007. The deployments of these countries were facilitated by the US government who spent a total of 81.1 million dollars in 2007 alone. The expenses covered $19.6 million and $14.5 million on the initial deployments of Uganda and Burundi respectively. Other costs included ACOTA training, additional equipment, logistics and security sector reforms. In July 2010 an expanded AMISOM, with a more robust mandate saw force strengths increased to 17,700 with new major TCC including Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti and Sierra Leone, whose mission was to achieve the desired effect on the Al-Shabaab militants. The enormous US contribution could be traced to the GWOT and the objective of preventing the horn of Africa from becoming an al-Qaeda haven (US Gov 2007).

The IGAD, AU and EAC RM were committed in their efforts to a lasting peace in Somalia. These three organizations were responsible for initiating IGASOM, even when UN sanctions and arms embargo were thought to be enough to deescalate fighting. They also showed their willingness to intervene by pledging troops. Some countries, like Uganda and Burundi, pursued the cause and by 2007 had troops trained and ready for deployment. Therefore, the variable of commitment from the regional alliance could be rated as present. The willingness of IGAD and AU members was never in doubt, and Uganda showed this in its ability to deploy troops as soon as the UN resolution was passed, albeit with the strategic lift support of the US. The remaining countries’ inability to deploy could not be traced to political indifferences, but due to lack of logistics. The ability to deploy troops would however be assessed as present.
Balance of Power

Whilst Ethiopia’s actions are understandable, it did not directly go against the wishes of the IGAD and the AU. When the AU was given the role to head the mission, Uganda, with the tacit support of the US, became the torch bearer for AMISOM. They deployed in March 2007, with an independent concept of operations whilst they awaited augmentation from Burundi. The variable of balance of power is assessed as present. Though Uganda dominated the proceedings leading to the intervention, it did not attract opposition from other members for its actions, as its efforts were in the larger interest of the AU and IGAD. Regional alliance lead at the beginning of AMISOM was absent, because Uganda retained operational command by providing the first four force commanders of the mission.

Host Nation Support.

The AU force’s entry into Somalia was not welcomed by all stakeholders to the conflict. But the UN was the transitional authority in the failed state of Somalia until the TFG was inaugurated in 2004. It could be therefore assessed that host nation support was present since the NSF fought alongside the AMISOM troops.

Case Study 5: Mali crises of 2012

Background

Nearly six months after the arrival of the Tuareg returnees from the Libya uprising, which ended in October 2011, the never ending conflict of Tuareg insurrection in northern Mali was reignited. The MNLA launched its first attack on 17 January 2012. Between 18 and 24 January 2012, in the town of Aguelhoc, in northern Mali, 150 Malian
soldiers were reportedly killed by elements of the MNLA and their Islamist alliance consisting of MUJWA, Ansar Dine, AQIM and Boko Haram. The Malian Armed Forces deployed in the northern territories were overrun due to lack of resources. The intention of the MNLA was to declare the independence of Azawad state for the ethnic Tuaregs, after three failed attempts beginning immediately after independence in 1962. Theirs was a now or never approach (ISS 2012).

On 22 March 2012, a month before President Amadou Tomane Toure’s rule was to expire, elements of the Malian military, led by Captain Amadou Sanogo, embarked on a successful coup d’état. He formed the National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and State (CNRDR) to save what was left of the republic. The unexpected overthrow of President Toure dealt a deathblow to the democratic process in the country. The rebels capitalized on the failing security situation and took control of Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu.

External Intervention

Commitment

ECOWAS heads of state decided to deploy a massive arsenal of political, diplomatic, economic and financial sanctions against Mali for as long as the junta remained in power. As early as 27 March 2012, ECOWAS held an extraordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State in Abidjan that focused on resolving the crisis with a military deployment as the final measure (ECOWAS 2012).

Diplomatic mediation led to the signing on 6 April 2012 of an agreed framework by three actors: Amadou Sanogo, Prime Minister Cheick Modibo Diarra and Interim President Dioncounda Traore. Elements of the framework were the reaffirmation of
Mali’s territory, the outright condemnation of the terrorists groups operating in northern Mali and the opening of access for humanitarian activities to the north. The mandate of the ECOWAS Standby Force, as authorized by the AU Peace and Security Council at its 323rd meeting of 12 June 2012 in New York, set three main objectives: to ensure security of transition institutions; to restructure the Malian Security and Defense Forces (MSDF); and most importantly to restore state authority in the north (African Union 2012).

The communiqué of that meeting further stated that the required security and military arrangements should be put in place in collaboration with the core countries, namely Algeria, Mauritania and Niger. Interim President Traore had earlier requested the support of France and the UN to prevent an irreversible turnaround in the situation. UNSCR 2056 adopted on 5 July 2012 called for a restoration to constitutional order and a roadmap to fresh elections. Another letter from Traore to the UN on 18 September elevated Mali’s request for assistance as the security situation worsened. The UNSC passed Resolution 2071 on 12 October, honoring the Malian government’s request for assistance by asking for detailed plans for military intervention from interested parties. UNSCR 2071 authorized the AU and ECOWAS to plan for military intervention in Mali. On October 24, the AU reinstated Mali as a member in anticipation of planned military intervention. United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2085 was passed in December 2012, which authorized deployment of an African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) (UN 2012a; UN 2012b).

As part of its plans for deployment and intervention, the AU after its 353rd meeting on 25 January 2013, constituted an African capacity for immediate response to the crises by activating the Africa Intermediate Crisis Response Capacity (AICRC). The
roles and planning timeline were along that of the ECOWAS to intervene and enforce peace in the north. The Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) would then be structured in detail once the generic structure of the AICRC was approved (African Union 2013).

Whilst plans stalled, the rebel military advance ended with the MNLA’s proclamation of the independence of Azawad on 5 April 2012. By 8 January 2013 they had made significant gains and were on the outskirts of Mali taking the city of Konna on 10 January. When rebels threatened Bamako, after little had been done to transform the MSDF’s capabilities, ECOWAS decided to deploy, but lacked the capacity to do so. There were no plans, concepts of operation or logistics support. The AU command structure only approved a concept of operations on 28 February 2013, a move too late to have stopped the MNLA’s advance to Bamako (ECOWAS 2013b).

For these reasons, the commitment of the ECOWAS and AU regional body to peace in Mali would be rated as present. They showed enough political will to resolve the crises but assessment on the variable of readiness to deploy would be assessed as absent. The willingness of ECOWAS to intervene earlier was only hastened after the rebels were at the outskirts of Bamako. With the ESF becoming operational in 2012, plans for deployment by member states should have been far more advanced than they were in January 2013.

**Balance of Power**

In order to stop the MNLA’s advance on Bamako, France launched an offensive (Operation SERVAL) on 11 January 2013. They deployed elements from Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire and Chad before a brigade from France deployed within three weeks.
France took action for fear of Mali becoming a launch pad for terrorist presence in the region. AFRICOM, EU and NATO rallied to support UNSCR 2085. The AFISMA force was estimated not to be ready until September 2013, but these allies assisted with strategic air lifts to deploy AFISMA troops earlier than projected (French Gov 2013).

The objectives of the French Operation SERVAL in Mali were exactly the reverse of the NATO intervention two years previously in Libya. Once the air strikes in Mali had begun, France had to put boots on the ground. France’s allies, including the United States, backed the intervention militarily, politically, and diplomatically (Tramond and Seigneur 2013).

The long term consequences of a safe haven for terrorists in the Sahel, coupled with the prompt response from France, acknowledged that African solutions to African problems are not always feasible and that some crises are truly global and need international support (Vines 2013).

France and other European allies – first among them the British and the USA carried out more than 1,000 flights towards and within the theatre of operations. Thirty percent of the logistics were strategically lifted by other allies which included Canada, Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, Spain, Italy with the Netherlands and Germany present in-theatre. About 50 percent of the in-flight refueling was carried out by the USA so the solidarity of Mali’s allies was both immediate and for the long term (French Gov 2013).

The cost of Operation SERVAL, as of 16 April 2013, reached 205 million Euros. The total included 91 million euros for strategic transport, 55 million Euros for personnel and 59 million Euros in miscellaneous costs. ECOWAS countries had difficulties raising cash and looked to donors to fund their deployment. ECOWAS and the EU have signed
agreements worth 76 million euros for AFISMA and free movement of persons and migration in the region in addition to European Development Funds of 583 million Euros (Vanguard 2013).

Even though France acted alone in combat operations, it did so with the backing of the USA and received major support from the EU and international donors. It was not only an act in its own national interest but widely supported due to the sensitive nature of the Sahel as a safe haven for terrorists. The balance of power would be assessed as present. However, France’s timely intervention indicates the presence of a hegemon lead as the regional presence was absent at the much needed time for intervention.

Host Nation Support

For several months, the question of how to regain control of the north remained a major point of disagreement. The junta rejected the idea of receiving any external support or intervention, asserting notions of sovereignty and non-interference and viewed the external support as an obstacle to their authority. When the Malian Minister of Defense, Yamoussa Camara visited Abidjan on 22 September 2012 and held discussions with the then ECOWAS President; Cote d’Ivoire’s Alassane Ouatarra, he declared that the issue at stake was finding the best method of deploying forces without affecting the susceptibilities and sensibilities of the populations who would be carefully watching the deployment of any foreign troops in Mali. He argued that things must be done with some discretion in order to guarantee the support of the people of northern Mali (Bergamaschi 2013; World Press 2012).

This difference of opinion and the long discussions that ensued revealed the magnitude of the crisis of confidence between Bamako and the West African
organization. It emerged quite clearly that the Malian interim administration was not very familiar with the ECOWAS instruments, in particular the Additional Protocol of 2001 on Democracy and Good Governance, which had long been derailed by actors who were more focused on their own interests than on good governance and improving the security situation. On 11 January 2013, the French President made the decision to launch Operation SERVAL to halt the jihadists groups’ advance towards Bamako. This military operation came after several months of diplomatic work at the UNSC in New York in 2012 within the framework of Resolutions 2056, 2071 and 2085. On the same day of 11 January 2013, French air strikes on Mali commenced Operation SERVAL. France further deployed a brigade of nearly 4,000 troops to Mali, including Special Forces. Working alongside Malian troops, they quickly forced the Islamists out of the region’s major cities (US Army 2013).

Host nation support, at the onset of the crisis was dodgy. But as the situation became more critical, they realized that they risked losing their political power if they remained defiant to external interference. The MSDF partnered with France to halt the rebel advance. The interim president’s letters to the UN however indicates his lack of confidence in ECOWAS and in the AU’s ability. In view of the above, host nation consent would still be rated as present (See table 2).
Table 2. Assessment of criteria for the timely intervention of a coalition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>DRC</th>
<th>DRC 2</th>
<th>Cote d'Ivoire</th>
<th>Somalia</th>
<th>Mali</th>
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<td>Commitment</td>
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<td>a. Political Will of Alliance</td>
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<td>b. Readiness to deploy Troops / Logistics</td>
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<td>Balance of power</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>a. Hegemon lead</td>
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<td>b. Regional/UN lead</td>
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<td>Host Nation Consent</td>
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Summary

The ECOWAS Stand-by Force’s timely intervention is key to having an effective RM collective security mechanism that could be deployed in time to halt a deteriorating security situation. Comparative analysis of five case studies involving other Regional Mechanisms before and after the adoption of the Africa Peace and Security Architecture in DRC in 1996 and again in 2013, Cote d’Ivoire in 2011, Somalia in 2006 against the Malian case study of 2012 helped place the ECOWAS Stand-by Force deployment into perspective. The analytical framework using the variables of commitment, balance of power and host nation support were applied these variable against these case studies. The findings will be discussed in Chapter 5. Any themes and patterns that emerged will be the
source of recommendations for the Africa Union’s Africa Peace and Security Architecture and ECOWAS Stand-by Force future undertakings.
CHAPTER 5
FINDINGS and CONCLUSION

Findings

“What have you got to say my friends about this painful time we are living through?”

(English translation of lyrics from the song, Imidiwan Ma Tennam, by a Tuareg-Berber band called Tinariwen (Tinariwen 2011).

The AU’s collective security mechanism was conceptualized together with a new PSC agency to drive the APSA towards a more functional conflict resolution mechanism on the continent. Past experiences of its handling of peace mediations and botched military interventions gave it the basis for the ASF and RMs to finalize their standby brigades by July 2010. Some of the factors which enhance timely intervention by the regional body with the authority of the UN are commitment from the member countries, balance of power among the AU countries and world powers and host nation consent. Five case studies analyzed in the previous chapter indicate that, whilst commitment is manifested in political will, it does not always translate to readiness and the capability to deploy troops and equipment. Also, the role of a hegemonic power and its influence in leading an intervention is essential either in a peacekeeping, peace enforcement or chapter VIII arrangement under a UN mandate.

The lack of commitment by African leaders in the first DRC war and the Cote d’Ivoire crises sealed any hope of an African intervention. On both occasions the member countries took sides either by fighting, as in the case of DRC by openly showing support for one party to the conflict. The APSA was functional in 2010, but this fact did not help
going into the Ivorian crises as it did little to bring political pressure on members to oblige to protocols and frameworks. Commitment by member countries of an alliance is the first step to an effective intervention attempt. The ECOWAS member states were all in support of both political and military action, but their delayed approach, especially to a military intervention nearly resulted in an embarrassment.

Commitment of allied members, however does not automatically translate into commitment of troops. Whilst countries may be keen on an intervention force, it is their readiness to deploy well trained troops and equipment which ultimately proves commitment. In the case of the insertion of the FIB in DRC and AMISOM in Somalia, the troop contributing countries were ready with a trained force to enter the AO to begin operations. Uganda, for instance, had troops training for two years awaiting deployment orders into Somalia. South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi had from the adoption of the PSC framework February 2012 prepared troops and equipment for insertion. However, the ESF had from the beginning of the Mali crisis only considered training for the MSDF to deal with the situation. When that failed, the MNLA advance to the capital needed a professional and competent hegemon in the form of France to counter the threat. Collaboration with hegemons with common interests could be an added advantage.

Analysis from the successful interventions with the FIB in the DRC, Uganda in AMISOM and the French in Mali could all be traced to the lead role of a hegemon, either directly involved in combat operations or leading behind the scenes. It is important to note that, in all the case studies, the absence of a hegemon amplified the lack of commitment from African leaders which subsequently made any intervention attempts impossible. On the other hand, local as well as external hegemons like the USA and
France made enormous contributions to planning, operations and strategic logistical support towards external interventions in the DRC in 2013, and in Somalia and Mali. The AU must recognize that, the responsibility of security on the continent rests with them, and they must be in the forefront irrespective of any hegemon support. This must be done within the logistic constraints of the entire AU apparatus. If the insurgency is of a local capacity, the capability of an RM should be able to contain it. However, if it requires external support, this must be done with the cooperation of the interested hegemon to maximum effect.

The presence of an established UN mission in a conflict proved to be a great catalyst for any regional or hegemon lead intervention. The FIB insertion into the Eastern DRC was in part facilitated by the expert planning of the MONUSCO military staff which helped integrate the force. The FIB benefitted from intelligence and expert analyses already gathered on the activities of the M23 and other rebel groups. The same could be said of France’s backing of the UN in the Ivorian crisis. The in country presence of the UN masked France’s desire to get involved. Though China and Russia opposed the UN’s role in the electoral process, the fact that it was operational and running made no difference, and France duly took advantage to prosecute its actions.

The presence of a hegemon is most successful when it does not offset the balance of a regional power. The US and France’s differences in the first DRC war, left the UN powerless in sending a humanitarian mission. The diplomatic wrangling of two superpowers consequently affected the world body and the AU’s effort. Due to an existing UN mission in the DRC, the FIB had international support, whilst the US supported Uganda’s quick deployment in Somalia and again together with the EU, provided resources for
France’s intervention in Mali. Even though the AU and regional bodies showed commitment and the host nation demonstrated consent towards these deployments, it cannot be verified if commitment would wane if member countries and the affected country were against these interventions in any case due to lack of logistics. Without hegemonic influence nothing happens by way of intervention, since hegemon powers like the US, France and the UK provided all the strategic airlift for all the interventions identified. The AU needs to present a common front against any external superpower in the interest of its population in order to retain legitimacy in its arguments on the international stage.

Conclusion

The AU transitioned into a more reactive political body, shying away from its indifference to Africa’s cycle of violence and unstable governance under the old OAU structure. The continent inherited institutions from its colonial past and sought to emulate best practices from the more experienced European institutions and UN hoping for a better Africa. The AU PSC gave birth to the APSA, which was nurtured over an eight year period to begin effective political and most importantly a military approach to ending both intra and interstate conflicts.

The Mali crises presented the perfect opportunity for the ECOWAS sub-region to test its RM and the readiness of the ESF in accordance with its protocols and operational plans. This research revealed the unique dynamics of the Malian case study with a global interest, beyond the AU influence, due to the potential of the Sahel region as a terrorist safe haven. The ECOWAS RM, called ESF was employed as a military resort to train the MSDF, while France was neck deep in the activation of its contingency plans. The
mission quickly became an AU responsibility, but delays in submitting plans for a UN mandate saw the swift intervention of France to save the AU and ECOWAS embarrassment as the rebels almost reached Bamako.

Recommendations

First, African countries must not pursue their independent interests at all cost, since the prospects for a workable framework for security cooperation is dependent on total commitment by all member states. African intrastate conflicts are ethnic in nature, and easily spill across borders. Affected member states’ campaign thus go beyond regional lines and thus need the effective involvement of two or more of the RMs. The AU’s role must therefore be very extensive and requires an all-encompassing effort of all the five RMs. The responsibility lies first with the continent, and we should be ready to prove that in whatever way or form.

Secondly, The APSA should establish a central planning cell to oversee the RMs and their brigades and synchronize planning for complex operations. Due to the different cultures, doctrines and languages, and above all, AU’s interests, a structured and rigid approach to compliance is critical to meeting timelines to planned missions. The continent must be able to share ideas and make contingency plans based on sound intelligence and not on assumptions. It should learn from the experiences of other international security cooperation organizations like NATO and OSCE, which still relies on the US for support.

The AU must liaise their efforts for efficient delivery of international support in both military and logistical support. The support of a superpower is not always assured, but when it is available, the RMs must complement the capability of that force. The
establishment of AFRICOM should help coordinate the efforts of the international community, especially France, the UK and the USA. This coordination will help relieve the AU of its major headache of funding and strategic airlift capability. Otherwise, the ASF and the RMs must demonstrate its capacity to defeat an internal insurgency with the capability it possesses.

For the delivery of an effective collective security in the West Africa sub-region, the ESF stands to benefit from a capable ASF and regional hegemon under the following conditions:

First, the ESF must improve on its planning and training regimes. These should be done after the operational requirements for each and every potential insurgency have been studied and analyzed. It is only then that the concept of operations, contingencies and logistical deficiencies and budget can be readily made available for a timely intervention.

Additionally, the ESF must collaborate with security experts and civil society organizations in all ECOWAS countries for holistic analysis of events and trends likely to translate into conflicts. Civilian early warning organizations and centers of excellence must take a more central role in formulating strategies from an independent stance. This is critical to maintaining public support for all military operations.

Finally, military planning should incorporate the conceptual role of non-state actors, who want to benefit from the state of insecurity in the region for their own selfish ends. These spoilers have the potential of becoming part of the problem. To this end, the ESF should not only become a reactionary force, but must enforce arms embargo,
conduct show of force operation and share doctrine as appropriate to enrich national military capacity.

Recommendations for Further Study

All successful deployments depicted by the case studies were conducted either by a hegemonic power or with the logistical support of the international community and UN planning. It is evidence that, the RMs don’t have the strategic capacity to project troops into a mission area. It is recommended that further research is done to study the requirement for the AU to project a composite brigade by air, sea and land into any mission area on the continent through the possibility of pooling resources.
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