BUILDING PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL TO IMPROVE GENDER EQUALITY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Strategic Studies

by

GEOFFREY J. HEIPLE, MAJOR, U.S. ARMY RESERVE
B.A., University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana, 2001
J.D., Duquesne University School of Law, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 2010
M.P.P.M., University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 2011

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2014-01

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
This paper addresses whether the United States can build institutional capacity at the ministerial level through security cooperation activities in order to improve and advance gender equality. It considers this through an analysis of U.S. national interests; the role of culture in a society; and the Whole of Government approach championed by the U.S. policy and security community. This analysis is crucial as the U.S. military transitions to increased security cooperation missions in a post OIF/OEF operating environment characterized by a decrease in funding and resources. Policymakers and military leaders stress that the U.S. must work through partners to strengthen their own institutions, address economic issues, and develop competent military and security forces in order to deter conflict. The effects of conflict disproportionately affect women and children more than men, most often in the developing world. Building capacity that contributes to improving women’s rights and opportunities may possibly accomplish two goals—lifting women into better roles and positions across their countries and directly usurping conflict outright, or ensuring it will be less catastrophic to women. This study utilizes the experience of the Republic of Liberia as a case study to examine the primary and secondary research questions.
Name of Candidate: Major Geoffrey J. Heiple

Thesis Title: Building Partnership Capacity at the Ministerial Level to Improve Gender Equality

Approved by:

Jack D. Kem, Ph.D., Thesis Committee Chair
Joyce P. DiMarco, M.A., Member
Heather R. Karambelas, M.A., Member

Accepted this 13th day of June 2014 by:

Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D., Director, Graduate Degree Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

BUILDING PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL TO IMPROVE GENDER EQUALITY, by Major Geoffrey J. Heiple, 96 pages.

This paper addresses whether the United States can build institutional capacity at the ministerial level through security cooperation activities in order to improve and advance gender equality. It considers this through an analysis of U.S. national interests; the role of culture in a society; and the Whole of Government approach championed by the U.S. policy and security community. This analysis is crucial as the U.S. military transitions to increased security cooperation missions in a post OIF/OEF operating environment characterized by a decrease in funding and resources. Policymakers and military leaders stress that the U.S. must work through partners to strengthen their own institutions, address economic issues, and develop competent military and security forces in order to deter conflict. The effects of conflict disproportionately affect women and children more than men, most often in the developing world. Building capacity that contributes to improving women’s rights and opportunities may possibly accomplish two goals—lifting women into better roles and positions across their countries and directly usurping conflict outright, or ensuring it will be less catastrophic to women. This study utilizes the experience of the Republic of Liberia as a case study to examine the primary and secondary research questions.
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<td>ADP</td>
<td>Army Doctrinal Publication</td>
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<td>ADRP</td>
<td>Army Doctrinal Reference Publication</td>
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<td>AFL</td>
<td>Armed Forces of Liberia</td>
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<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>U.S. Africa Command</td>
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<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>BPC</td>
<td>Building Partnership Capacity</td>
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<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>COCOM</td>
<td>Combatant Command</td>
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<td>DATT</td>
<td>Defense Attaché</td>
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<td>DDPS</td>
<td>Deputy Director for Partnership Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarming, Demobilization, and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DIRI</td>
<td>Defense Institution Reform Initiative</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DoDD</td>
<td>Department of Defense Directive</td>
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<td>DoDI</td>
<td>Department of Defense Instruction</td>
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<td>Department of State</td>
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<td>DSCA</td>
<td>Defense Security Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>GCC</td>
<td>Geographic Combatant Commander (COCOM)</td>
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<td>GEF</td>
<td>Guidance for Employment of the Force</td>
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<td>HN</td>
<td>Host Nation</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>JIIM</td>
<td>Joint Interagency Intergovernmental and Multinational</td>
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<td>JOC</td>
<td>Joint Operational Concept</td>
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<td>JP</td>
<td>Joint Publication</td>
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<td>JSCP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</td>
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<td>LURD</td>
<td>Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD)</td>
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<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
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<td>Ministry of Defense Advisors</td>
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<td>MODEL</td>
<td>Movement for Democracy in Liberia</td>
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<td>MoGD</td>
<td>Ministry of Gender and Development</td>
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<td>NA</td>
<td>Nation Assistance</td>
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<td>NAC</td>
<td>Neighborhood Advisory Council</td>
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<td>National Action Plan</td>
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<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>OSD</td>
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<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Review</td>
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<td>SC</td>
<td>Security Cooperation</td>
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<td>SDO</td>
<td>Senior Defense Official</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>SECDEF</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>TCP</td>
<td>Theater Campaign Plan</td>
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<td>TRC</td>
<td>Truth and Reconciliation Commission</td>
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<td>TSC</td>
<td>Theater Security Cooperation</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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<td>WoG</td>
<td>Whole of Government</td>
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Promoting gender equality and advancing the status of all women and girls around the world remains one of the greatest unmet challenges of our time, and one that is vital to achieving our overall foreign policy objectives. Ensuring that women and girls, including those most marginalized, are able to participate fully in public life, are free from violence, and have equal access to education, economic opportunity, and health care increases broader economic prosperity, as well as political stability and security.

— President Barack Obama, January 30, 2013

If wealth was the inevitable result of hard work and enterprise, every woman in Africa would be a millionaire.

— George Montblot

Background

As the United States continues withdrawing forces from Afghanistan, as part of an overall reduction in deployed units to the Middle East specifically, Security Cooperation (SC) missions are poised to become the primary ways in which U.S. military forces are utilized around the world. The ending of major combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, coupled with defense budget constraints and a reevaluation of America’s role of global policeman (and enforcer of norms) by both policymakers and the American people, will undoubtedly usher in a new era of international engagement for the armed forces of the United States. Despite the opinions of many Americans that countries facing unrest should “handle it themselves,” as in the case of Egypt or Syria, as well as so many who believe the U.S. Government (USG) should focus more on domestic issues than international crises, the U.S. must remain fully engaged in the global community and in protecting and advancing U.S. interests across the world. Nevertheless, the military force

1
serving as the guarantor of that promise will find itself projecting power as part of a strategy that will largely center on Security Cooperation.

In very broad terms, this paper fundamentally asks what should the United States seek to accomplish by conducting SC. Through Security Cooperation, U.S. policymakers leverage the capabilities of U.S. defense and diplomatic resources, as part of an overall strategy, to prevent wars from happening in the first place. By conducting SC, the United States seeks to develop and enhance military partnerships with the goal of promoting international cooperation on strategic issues, advancing U.S. interests, and building capabilities within allied military forces. According to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) website,

SC comprises all activities undertaken by the Department of Defense (DoD) to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. It includes all DoD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DoD-administered Security Assistance (SA) programs, that build defense and security relationships; promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and SA activities; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations. (DSCA 2014)

While the Department of State (DoS) is the lead federal agency in conducting security cooperation, DoD primarily executes its SC responsibilities through DSCA in close coordination with its regional Geographic Combatant Commands (COCOMs). In fact, Building Partnership Capacity (BPC) is an increasingly important mission within SC. According to the BPC Quadrennial Defense Review Roadmap published in May 2006,

The nation’s strategic objectives are unattainable without a unified approach among capable partners at home and with key friends and allies abroad. Effectively integrating DOD’s contribution with those of other instruments of national power, as well as with international partners, was a central theme of the
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. The Department of Defense requires a long-term, focused approach to build the capacity and capability of its mission-critical partnerships. (OSD 2006, 3)

Partners in this effort include allies and host nation governments, U.S. agencies and departments, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector amongst others (OSD 2006, 4). Furthermore, these activities enhance the U.S. military’s standing with foreign nations and provide a useful training vehicle for U.S. forces should escalating conditions require additional personnel and equipment.

Thus, at a very basic level, the U.S. conducts Security Cooperation, in partnership with various partner-countries and other entities, to advance its strategic interests and to prevent conflicts from occurring. Clearly, stopping violence before it starts is a worthy undertaking, and anytime the U.S. can act to help partners prevent atrocities from befalling innocent civilians should be explored. Yet, with regard to the first part of why the U.S. conducts security cooperation, the most recent National Security Strategy of the United States, published in May 2010 identifies four enduring American interests:

- The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners;
- A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity;
- Respect for universal values at home and around the world; and
- An international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges. (White House 2010, 7)

Therefore, the most pressing concern for policymakers and military leaders is determining, in the post-OIF/OEF world of budget constraints and downsizing the force, what interests are worth advancing and where should the U.S. act to prevent conflict?

This paper advances the notion that furthering the rights of women is an important U.S. core national interest and merits consideration in developing security cooperation
programs. Gender, as a strategic interest, is significant for several reasons. First, supporting the rights of women and girls is specifically mentioned as a policy goal in several national-level planning documents, and specifically in the 2010 NSS which notes that “countries are more peaceful and prosperous when women are accorded full and equal rights and opportunity” (White House 2010, 38). This policy reinforces United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security passed in 2000 which recognized that civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict, and the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building (United Nations 2000, 1-4). Secondly, setting the conditions to improve women’s rights in a particular country through security cooperation activities may have the effect of preempting conflict before it occurs and alleviating a greater degree of violence and destruction should conflict erupt.

Furthermore, U.S. goals in promoting advances in women’s rights can be made even accounting for cultural impediments that do not necessarily agree with such achievements. In many parts of the world where women’s rights are not recognized by ethnic groups and tribes, it is still possible, through ministerial capacity building, to produce more meaningful opportunities for women both in relative terms to those who might serve in national armies and police, as well as in real terms for a society. Finally, however, this paper will consider whether the whole-of-government approach, as currently configured, can accomplish such a strategic goal.

However, additional questions emerge. Should the U.S. undertake security cooperation activities to further specific core values that may not necessarily be shared by
foreign cultures? Are women’s rights an inherent part of U.S. military operations that the U.S. is obliged to promote women’s rights as it conducts SC? This paper seeks to understand if the U.S. military, through a whole of government approach, can focus its efforts to build partnership capacity at the ministerial level that can, in turn, improve opportunities for women.

Since 9/11, the primary focus of the United States military arguably, has been on prosecuting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of an overall strategy to protect the U.S. homeland from future attacks, thus addressing America’s interest in security. In carrying the fight to the enemy in Afghanistan, the U.S. military directly confronted the Al Qaeda perpetrators of 9/11 and their complicit hosts, the Taliban. Iraq’s connections to Al Qaeda proved to be tenuous at best and its suspected Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) development program was not quite as threatening to U.S. interests as was first articulated.

Nevertheless, in both instances, the U.S. military conducted what was called “full-spectrum operations” (now doctrinally updated by the Army with the term Decisive Action) to combat the enemy forces in both theaters of war. The U.S. military executed primarily offensive operations and then transitioned to what can be termed collectively as stability operations—meant to pacify a disrupted population afflicted by warfare by restoring essential services, providing humanitarian assistance, promoting justice by the rule of law, and establishing fledgling democratic institutions.

In contrast, Security Cooperation is a measured approach to promoting U.S. interests globally that utilizes the defense establishment as a means to achieve a necessary strategic end in a partner country that relies primarily on stability-type
operations. Typically, when the U.S. military conducts SC, it does so as part of a DoS/DoD joint effort to build capacity by developing capabilities within partner armed forces by improving tactics, planning processes, or logistics systems. Additionally, security cooperation takes the form of foreign arms sales as well as training seminars and joint training exercises like U.S. Southern Command’s Panamax in Panama, U.S. Central Command’s Brightstar in Egypt, and U.S. Pacific Command’s Rim of the Pacific, comprised of multiple countries’ forces. Further activities have included officer exchange programs and the training of foreign military officers in U.S. professional military education courses like the Command and General Staff College and the War College.

More recently, however, U.S. military forces, often in coordination with and operating under the guidance of, the DoS and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) also participated in developing ministerial and operational capabilities through tailored SC programs throughout the world. Most notably, these efforts have focused on maturing nascent Iraqi and Afghan forces and institutions to improve capabilities within their military formations and in the ministries that oversee them. In Afghanistan, the thought was that “green-suiters” (military officers) should mentor fellow military officers, but that a civilian cadre drawn from across the U.S. government and allied governments could mentor and assist Afghan civilians placed in charge of its defense establishment. However, these activities also concern tactical and operational proficiency of maneuver forces; sustainment, medical, and engineering functions; personnel and administrative policies; budget development, materiel acquisition and contracting; and professional military education.
Engaging foreign partners at the ministerial level typically reflects a synergistic confluence of DSCA activities with support from COMOs, U.S. missions and embassies within partner countries, and the DoS. This coordinated effort has the effect of developing and enhancing strategic-level programs that advance U.S. interests while, in many instances, improving the partner country’s ability to execute those programs. The U.S. role in Afghanistan offers a practical example. The Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) program, which utilizes DoD civilian specialists and is executed by DSCA, worked with the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI) to develop a functional logistics reporting tool (MoDA 2014). Supporting that effort with military-to-military engagement, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) may then partner with Afghan military logisticians to fully implement that ministerial accomplishment at the operational and tactical levels.

In reviewing U.S. military SC efforts since 9/11, one can identify hundreds of examples where U.S. attempts to build partnership capacity through security cooperation activities achieved both positive and negative results at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels and even among the U.S. executive agencies coordinating the activity. As applied to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, these activities occurred in what U.S. Joint Doctrine refers to as Phases IV (Stabilize) and V (Enable Civil Authority) (CJCS 2011c, III-41). In the course of time and space, these activities occur following the cessation of major combat operations. However, U.S. policymakers would prefer to emphasize SC activities during Phase 0 (Shaping) in order to prevent conflicts from occurring in the first place. By carefully crafting an SC strategy that builds partnership capacity at all levels, the United States assists partner nations while achieving strategic interests by:
shaping perceptions and influencing the behavior of both adversaries and partner nations, developing partner nation and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, improving information exchange and intelligence sharing, and providing US forces with peacetime and contingency access. (CJCS 2011c, III-42)

Research Question

Thus, this paper seeks to explore whether it is appropriate for the U.S. military to build partnership capacity at the ministerial level to improve gender equality through security cooperation. Fundamental to this paper’s approach is considering the relationship between gender and conflict. Focusing specifically on Africa and using events in Liberia as a case study, this paper sets out to confirm three secondary research questions. First, this paper seeks to understand if conducting SC missions to improve women’s opportunities is in the best interests of the United States. As conflict has been shown to disproportionately affect women more harshly, a pro-active SC policy that not only attempts to preempt conflict, but focuses on those likely most harmed by conflict strengthens their relative position and decreases the potential for conflict to occur. Secondly, this paper considers whether a society’s culture is an impediment to this particular type of SC operation. Third, this paper aims to address whether the current U.S. Whole of Government approach which characterizes its attempt to unify diplomatic, military, economic, and information action through the Departments of State and Defense, and others, as well as the military and USAID is organized effectively to achieve such a result through security cooperation.

SC is not new to U.S. defense strategy. Major Nicholas Simontis notes that the U.S. military’s involvement with SC dates as far back as the Revolutionary War and evolved considerably during the 20th Century (2013, 4-5). Furthermore, the Defense
Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) “has been involved with more than 220 nations and international organizations” (Wilson 2012a, 17). Nevertheless, a lack of coordination amongst USG entities in the conduct of BPC, as well as the complexity of applying the BPC framework to women’s issues specifically provide considerable areas of research within the parameters of this paper.

Assumptions

This thesis does not make any assumptions towards the data presented and discussed. However, this paper, presents a U.S. approach towards national security interests as well as an American view of women’s rights and gender equality, although the topic is considered through the lens of culture in chapter 4.

Limitations

The information gathered for the research of this thesis largely falls into one of four categories—U.S. national planning documents and military doctrine; Liberian government gender policy; commentary on U.S. security cooperation activities; and commentary on the relationship between gender and conflict. Unfortunately, specific programs are not discussed due to their sensitivity and U.S. Africa Command policies and specific plans were not available. The author attempted to make contact with a female officer serving in the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) for the purpose of gaining her unique perspective, but through an intermediary, she never responded.

Delimitations

There are a multitude of factors that impact building partner capacity through security cooperation. As this paper sought to address the interaction between those
activities and a gender equality initiative, the three most significant factors, as considered by the author and the committee were explored.

**Significance**

Researching and writing this thesis combines an interest in African affairs with an attempt to address a serious human rights issue from a military approach. Needless to say, those areas do not lend themselves to easy or obvious interactions. And unfortunately, too many women bear the torment of injustice and fundamental unfairness in societies that desire to maintain the status quo. This work is offered to those who will open-mindedly consider the dynamic relationship between capacity building at the ministerial level, the U.S. military’s role, and most importantly, the women in the world’s potential conflict zones who should be provided with opportunities to further themselves, improve their own societies, and work to reduce the potential for violence in their borders.

Following a comprehensive literature review, this paper will explore the current working relationship between DoS, DoD, and Nongovernmental Organization (NGO) stakeholders in conducting security cooperation activities that result in BPC at the ministerial level. Next, it will consider previous and ongoing U.S. efforts to expand access and provide opportunities for women both in service to their countries and as ordinary citizens. Most critically, it will demonstrate how and why the U.S. can deliver a BPC program to a partner nation. Liberia’s specific challenges with gender issues, specifically related to conflict, provide a ready framework in which to apply potential lessons. Finally, the paper will briefly address the relevance and ability to apply this type of program to the West African region.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter provides a broad review of materials spanning the breadth of this topic from multiple sources. The first section considers national-level or strategic planning documents formulated by policymakers and senior U.S. government officials in the executive branch. The next section reviews pertinent aspects of U.S. joint doctrine and some U.S. Army doctrine relevant to stability operations and security cooperation. The third section discusses the Whole of Government approach to conducting stability operations. The final two sections address the connection between women’s rights and U.S. national security interests as well as specific gender issues concerning Liberia’s experience with conflict.

National Security Planning Documents

The United States military carries out a myriad of operations and missions across the world as an element of American power. While many understand the military’s role in the conduct of combat operations, U.S. joint doctrine identifies over a dozen types of military operations; several of which do not necessarily involve combat actions. Stability Operations, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, Peace Operations, and Civil Support are but some of the types of missions that U.S. forces carry out in various places (CJCS 2011a, 3-0). These types of operations are conducted in order to shape not only the strategic military environment, but for a host of diplomatic, economic, and cultural reasons considered to be in the national interest of the United States. It is important to
understand the strategic framework that sets the conditions for the U.S. military to conduct stability operations with the potential to build partner capacity.

Most significantly, the *National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS)*, published every four years, provides a foundation for understanding how the United States sees itself as well as how it will engage the global community in order to achieve its national strategic end states. Noting the “emergence of new challenges and the shortcomings of the international system,” President Obama calls for American engagement with other countries to strengthen international institutions and galvanize collective action that serves common interests and he highlights that “America has never succeeded through isolationism” (White House 2010, 3-11).

Interestingly, the President identifies certain “universal values” to which Americans and, importantly, those countries that seek to partner with us, should subscribe. “Nations that respect human rights and democratic values are more successful and stronger partners, and individuals who enjoy such respect are more able to achieve their full potential (White House 2010, 5). Finally, the President conveys that success is dependent upon how well the U.S. can balance and integrate all the elements of American power in order to achieve this end (White House 2010, 5).

Published in 2012, the President endorses DoD’s articulation of U.S. strategic interests in *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*. The paper calls for the sustained engagement of partner nations in order to achieve national interests.
U.S. forces will conduct a sustainable pace of presence in operations abroad. . . . These activities reinforce deterrence, help to build the capacity and competence of U.S., allied, and partner forces for internal and external defense, strengthen alliance cohesion, and increase U.S. influence. (DoD 2012, 5)

Furthermore, the document notes, within the context of stability operations, “the United States will emphasize non-military means and military-to-military cooperation to address instability and reduce the demand for significant U.S. force commitments to stability operations” (DoD 2012, 6). The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) further recognized the value of assisting partners to build capacity before a conflict occurs can mitigate or possibly prevent them in the first place (DoD 2010, 73).

It is within this strategic framework, shaped by the NSS and QDR, as well as the National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy, that the President, Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) provide additional strategic policy and planning guidance through the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). “The GEF merges Contingency Planning Guidance and Security Cooperation Guidance into one document. . . . provides Presidential and SECDEF politico-military guidance” (CJCS 2013, II-4). “The JSCP provides guidance to Combatant Commanders (GCCs), Service Chiefs, CSA directors, applicable DOD agencies . . . to accomplish tasks and missions based on near-term military capabilities” (CJCS 2013, II-4). The GEF and JSCP serve as the foundation of Theater Campaign Plans (TCPs) which are developed and executed by Geographic Combatant Commands (COCOMs) and feature a robust mix of stability operations and Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) activities.

The COCOMs were established to properly focus appropriate resources towards assigned missions, to provide abundant command and control capabilities, and to
establish enduring relationships with those countries located within the boundaries of the various commands. The COCOM Commander or GCC is the senior military officer, responsible to the President through the SECDEF, charged with conducting all military operations within the COCOM’s Area of Responsibility (AOR). GCCs “are the vital link between those who determine national security policy and strategy and the military forces or subordinate Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) that conduct military operations” (CJCS 2013, II-6). Since 1948, COCOMs have had the authority and responsibility to conduct theater engagement planning (Hartmayer and Hansen 2013, 25).

**U.S. Joint Doctrine and U.S. Army Doctrine**

In order to execute TCPs, GCCs must develop theater strategies. “GCCs develop strategies that translate national and multinational direction into strategic concepts or courses of action to meet strategic and joint operation planning requirements” (CJCS 2013, II-6). These planning activities, and the operations resulting from them, conducted by a COCOM are integral to achieving the national strategic aims advanced by the President, SECDEF, and CJCS through their various planning documents. Thus, COCOMs perform their missions at the intersection of the strategic and operational levels of U.S. policy. The GCC must have a clear understanding of the vision and goals of the President and other senior leaders and be able to channel that broad, overarching guidance into meaningful, successful military operations that achieve U.S. interests. TCPs are crafted by examining and executing multiple national planning documents as previously described. As Lieutenant Colonels Hartmayer and Hansen explain,

Critically, for the service component commander as part of the joint team, the emphasis in the Guidance for Employment of the Force on “steady-state”
activities to achieve end states and objectives reflects the centrality of security cooperation activities in our national strategic guidance documents. (2013, 26)

As a way of understanding the stages of operations within a COCOM, GCCs often utilize the Joint Phasing Model to further organize and refine their operational efforts in executing their TCPs.

Phasing, which can be used in any operation regardless of size, helps the JFC organize large operations by integrating and synchronizing subordinate operations. Phasing helps JFCs and staffs visualize, design, and plan the entire operation or campaign and define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose. (CJCS 2011c, xvii)

Figure 1 shows the Phasing Model from Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. The most likely time to conduct TSC is during Phase 0, or “Shaping,” which encompasses routine military activities and incorporates various interagency activities to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies (CJCS 2011c, III-42). Shaping Operations are executed continuously with the intent to enhance international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation in support of defined military and national strategic objectives (CJCS 2011c, III-42).
The individual components of the joint force, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, focus training primarily on conducting combat operations. However, in the COCOM realm, where the joint forces come together operationally, they are more likely conducting routine, day-to-day non-combat military activities as described in the TCP and executed during Phase 0. The GCC promulgates the TCP to “focus on the command’s steady-state (Phase 0) activities, which include ongoing operations, security cooperation, and other shaping or preventive activities” (CJCS 2013, II-4). Successful
Phase 0 operations are crucial to creating an environment where the United States can advance and achieve its national interests without engaging in combat action. According to Hartmayer and Hansen,

Ultimately, the goal of theater security cooperation is to improve national security through well-postured, prepared, and interoperable partners. Synchronized and nested phase zero operations are a vital component in preventing the requirement for later phases. (2013, 29)

U.S. military forces, principally the joint COCOMs, rely upon joint doctrine as a starting point for developing TCPs. As noted in Joint Publication 3-0 Joint Operations, “GCCs shape their AORs through security cooperation activities by continually employing military forces to complement and reinforce other instruments of national power” (CJCS 2011a, V-10). “Ideally, security cooperation activities lessen the causes of a potential crisis before a situation deteriorates and requires coercive U.S. military intervention” (CJCS 2011a, V-10). This correlates with the recognition that “the United States will emphasize non-military means and military-to-military cooperation to address instability. . . . U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations” (DoD 2012, 6). This point acknowledges that the United States does not have the resources, especially in a financially constrained setting, to provide long-term stability forces as it did for the past ten years in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Within the doctrinal realm, it is noteworthy, given the preponderance of stability operations tasks that fall upon the United States Army, as opposed to sister services, that recently revised doctrine elevated the significance of stability operations. Army Field Manual 3-0 (subsequently updated by Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 3-0) formally established stability operations as being as important as offensive and defensive operations and describes the primarily military task to be conducted to support broader

It is important to understand how the United States, from a military perspective and furthered by the actions of the COCOMs, can shape regions of the world where conflict may gather before extensive hostilities occur. “Sustained presence contributes to deterrence and promotes a secure environment in which diplomatic, economic, and informational programs designed to reduce the causes of instability can perform as designed” (CJCS 2011a, V-10). COCOMs undertake Nation Assistance (NA) activities to maintain peaceful situations, bolster democratic processes, and build partner capacity through extensive TSC plans in concert with Host Nation (HN) forces and institutions. NA is “civil or military assistance (other than FHA) rendered to a nation by U.S. forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises, or emergencies, or war” (CJCS 2011a, V-14). “Nation assistance operations support the HN by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability” (CJCS 2011a, V-14). JP 3-0 notes that all nation assistance actions are integrated into the U.S. ambassador’s country plan (CJCS 2011a, V-14).

The concept of Building Partner Capacity (BPC), and its relationship to the operational term, Stability Operations, is worthy of deeper examination in order to understand their application to various military operations. “Although both concepts have deep historical roots, building partner capacity and stability operations have only recently migrated to positions near the top of the U.S. national security agenda (Marquis et al.
The 2010 QDR recognizes that U.S. national security is tied specifically to America’s ability to build partner capacity (DoD 2010, xiv). The 2010 NSS also acknowledges that “where governments are incapable of meeting their citizens’ basic needs and fulfilling their responsibilities to provide security within their borders, the United States must invest in the capacity of strong and capable partners to advance common security interests” (White House 2010, 26). According to a 2006 RAND Corporation study which examined the 2006 BPC Execution Roadmap derived from the 2006 QDR, BPC was defined as a multi-agency, multinational initiative that draws on the elements of security cooperation to achieve U.S. strategic objectives that include: defeating terrorist networks; preventing hostile states and nonstate actors from acquiring or using WMD; conducting irregular warfare and stability operations; and enabling host countries to provide good governance. (Marquis et al. 2010, 5)

“PCB (Partner Capacity Building) is to enhance the capabilities of and cooperation with our international partners” (Wuestner 2009, 9). Building partnership capacity is listed among the NA programs that promote long-term regional stability, sustainable development, and the growth of responsive institutions according to JP 3-07, Stability Operations (CJCS 2011b, I-8).

Thus, the relationship between BPC and stability operations is interdependent and somewhat synonymous. “Despite the lack of specific guidance that explicitly connects stability operations with BPC, Army-led workshops on stability operations almost always include some aspect of the need to build the capacity of partner armies for stability” (Marquis et al. 2010, 34). For the purposes of this study, stability operations is understood as a collection of mission sets that further accomplish BPC as part of an
overall TSC strategy. According to Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 3000.05, published in September 2009,

   stability operations is defined as an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (Flournoy 2009, 1)

“Stability operations play an important role in joint operations conducted in consonance with the geographic combatant commanders’ (GCCs’) theater campaign plan objectives and support the objectives of individual country teams” (CJCS 2011b, I-7). Relying on the principles of joint operations, stability operations are conducted by the COCOMs across the range of military operations and throughout all phases of conflict.

   Considering that COCOMs normally execute TSC operations during Phase 0, the Shaping Phase, it is then that stability operations are likely to play their most significant role in advancing U.S. interests outside of major combat operations. According to JP 3-0, the notional balance of forces for Shaping indicates an overwhelming emphasis on Stability Operations with Offensive and Defensive Operations in limited roles, respectively (CJCS 2011a, V-36). DoDI 3000.05 reiterates that stability operations are “a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations” (Flournoy 2009, 2). JP 3-07 Stability Operations notes,

   Shaping activities that assist fragile states, preventing them from becoming seriously unstable, or that help build capabilities of partner countries can help create the conditions for the successful conduct of joint operations; or they can prevent the necessity for the conduct of operations in the future. (CJCS 2011b, II-10)
Nevertheless, U.S. military forces may not be the primary means by which the United States conducts stability operations. Multiple U.S. Government (USG) agencies as well as many intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) cooperate in the execution of stability tasks. “Stability operations necessarily draw on all elements of national power: diplomatic, military, information, and economic” (Marquis et al. 2010, 25).

Stabilization efforts are primarily the responsibility of development and U.S. Foreign Service personnel from across the USG. The Department of State (DOS) is charged with responsibility for leading a whole-of-government approach to stabilization that includes the array of USG departments and agencies, including DOD and component Services and agencies. (CJCS 2011b, I-1-I-2)

A point raised in the 2006 RAND study was that the DOD possessed the capacity, mainly the resources of personnel, funding, and security to manage large-scale capacity-building activities, but DoS and other civilian departments possess the capability consisting of technical, cultural, linguistic among others (Marquis et al. 2010, 12). U.S. military forces should understand their role—sometimes leading, but mostly supporting—in contributing to a whole-of-government stability approach that can achieve U.S. national interests.

DSCA and COCOMs

Particularly noteworthy in a discussion of theater campaign planning to conduct security cooperation is the relationship between DSCA and the various COCOMs. GCCs are the primary military officers charged with the responsibility of conducting operations in an assigned AOR. However, as the DoD’s executive agent for security cooperation, DSCA’s role should be in concert with, and supportive of, the COCOM’s plan. According to its website,
DSCA is the central agency that synchronizes global security cooperation programs, funding and efforts across OSD, Joint Staff, State Department, COCOMS, the services and U.S. Industry. DSCA is responsible for the effective policy, processes, training, and financial management necessary to execute security cooperation within the DoD. (DSCA 2014)

Former DSCA Director, VADM William E. Landay III noted that DSCA is “primarily responsible for overseeing and managing the majority of Security Cooperation programs for DoD,” and “our primary focus there is the regional COCOMs. Their goals and objectives, their theater Security Cooperation plans and their efforts to build relationships with each country in their region provide the framework which we work to support” (Wilson 2012b, 8-9). Furthermore, DSCA’s Deputy Director for Partnership Strategy (DDPS), Air Force BG Maryanne Miller acknowledged that her responsibilities are carried out through the COCOM TCPs (Tegler 2012, 48).

Whole of Government Approach to Stability Operations

Following the 9/11 attacks, it became evident that closer coordination and communication was required among elements of the U.S. government charged with the country’s defense. As James Locher III wrote, “[t]he national security system of the United States is outdated and ineffective in responding to the threats that our country faces today” (2010, 29). Daniel S. Papp noted, “[t]he often interrelated and predominantly nontraditional nature of many of the emerging challenges and threats to national and global security require new ways of thinking and new plans of action” (2012, ix). Based upon those positions, successive U.S. administrations understood the necessity of harnessing all levers of U.S. national power to meet and defeat such threats. The 2010 NSS noted that strengthening national capacity required a “whole of government approach” (White House 2010, 14). “We are improving the integration of
skills and capabilities within our military and civilian institutions so they complement each other and operate seamlessly. We are also improving coordinated planning and policymaking” (White House 2010, 14). Finally, “[t]he value of civil-military teaming to achieve a comprehensive approach has been validated by all of the observers of international crises for the last 60 years” (Flavin 2012, 309).

Derived from the 2010 NSS, the Whole of Government (WoG) effort should unite defense, diplomacy, economic, development, homeland security, and intelligence functions to achieve a responsive, integrated security framework that protects and advances U.S. interests. This seemed to reflect, what was commonly known as the “three D’s” of diplomacy, defense, and development as the ways in which the United States shapes favorable conditions and attitudes towards the U.S. abroad. “The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is the lead development agency; the Department of State (DOS) leads on diplomacy; and the Department of Defense (DOD) leads on defense issues” (Skoric 2012, 1). “The 3D approach recognizes that to address the root causes of conflict, a wide range of skills, expertise, capabilities and resources are required, and that no single agency or department has them all” (Skoric 2012, 1). “[W]e must employ multiple instruments of national power to build a foreign nation’s (FN’s) internal capacity in a preventive mode to help them defend themselves and maintain stability” (CJCS 2011b, I-1).

Confronted with situations that required the interaction of multiple elements of national power, U.S. policymakers invoked the whole of government approach towards what became universally accepted as Stability Operations. Stability Operations, especially in how they relate to the WoG requires defining. Army Doctrinal Reference
Publication (ADRP) 3-07, *Stability Operations* provides that, “a whole-of-government approach is an approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal” (Department of the Army 2012, 1-4). This point is reinforced in JP-1, *The Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* in seeking to achieve unified action in joint operations. “Unified action synchronizes, coordinates, and/or integrates joint, single-Service, and multinational operations of other USG departments and agencies, NGOs, IGOs” (CJCS 2013, II-7). In addition, the *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review* (QDDR) published in 2010 also contains dozens of references to pursuing objectives utilizing a whole of government approach in many DoS and USAID operations, particularly in preventing and responding to crisis, conflict, and instability (DoS 2010, 139).

A whole of government approach is further endorsed by certain IGOs, especially in places known as “fragile states.” According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), “the defining features of state fragility are to be found in a state’s inability or unwillingness to provide physical security, legitimate political institutions, sound economic management and social services for the benefit of its population” (OECD 2006, 17). U.S. joint doctrine sees failing states in categories of failed, failing, and recovering, though the distinction or transition between them is rarely clear (CJCS 2011b, I-10). Nevertheless, the OECD advocates the use of a whole of government approach to such conditions. Given the wide range of interdependent problems experienced by failing states, “successful development in a fragile environment depends, at least in part, on well-sequenced and coherent progress across the political,
security, economic and administrative domains” (OECD 2006, 7). Fragile states are exactly the types of places where the U.S. considers conducting stability operations in order to advance U.S. interests, promote democratic norms, and develop partner capacity so that no threats to the U.S. can emerge from difficult to govern spaces.

Unfortunately, it has been a challenge in the post-9/11 environment to successfully integrate the efforts of the DoD, DoS, USAID, and other agencies into a consistently cooperative relationship to form a whole of government approach to complex threats. Former Defense Secretaries Leon Panetta and Robert Gates as well as former Secretaries of State Condoleezza Rice and Hillary Clinton all recognized the need to improve this relationship and supported more effective integration. Yet, Locher suggests multiple reasons why this has been difficult to achieve:

1. Autonomous agencies resist a whole of government approach to missions
2. Components of national security are not managed as a system
3. An overburdened White House is forced to centralize issue management
4. Resources are not aligned with strategic objectives
5. Congress cannot provide a whole of government approach due to a focus on the parts.

Nevertheless, Locher acknowledged that the Obama Administration is trying to attain greater integration by uniting the National Security Council staffs with the Homeland Security Council Staffs and empowering leaders to reach across bureaucratic divides through incentives to collaborate (Locher 2010, 42-44).

Yet, despite the efforts of the Obama Administration, and those of its predecessor, to increase whole of government integration, most of the literature concerning whole of
government improvements have come primarily in coordinating Phases 4-5 and not in the extensive planning and preparation required of Phase 0 Shaping. “There are fundamental structural issues that impede an integrated planning process through the U.S. national security community” (Habeck 2010, 69). For one, the understanding of planning is quite different in the DoD compared to the DoS. The nesting of national planning documents and the dedication of military staffs to strategic planning work is vastly different from the general approach and potentially uncoordinated, individual visions advanced the DoS’s offices and bureaus (Habeck 2010, 71-2). U.S. military doctrine and policymakers have attempted to delineate roles and responsibilities for a whole of government approach to stability operations.

**Stability Roles and Responsibilities Within Whole of Government Context**

In conducting stability operations, the DoD, and by extension, U.S. military forces, most often serve in a supporting role. In fact, “the primary military contribution to stabilization is to protect and defend the population, facilitating the personal security of the people, and thus, creating a platform for political, economic, and human security” (CJCS 2011b, I-2). The political, economic, and human security functions are performed by other instruments of power such as DoS, NGOs, IGOs, or partner nations. However, due to its ability to place a significant amount of personnel and equipment into critical locations, the U.S. military is often able to conduct certain stability tasks more quickly and with greater resources than USG counterparts. This was often especially true in post-conflict settings such as Iraq and Afghanistan.
The 2010 RAND Corporation study attempted to more precisely define and deconflict DoS and DoD roles in stability operations. As designated by NSPD-44 (National Security Policy Directive), the State Department is the focal point for coordinating reconstruction and stabilization activities (Marquis et al. 2010, 26). The DoS identified five broad sectors in which to conduct stability missions: Security; Governance and participation; Justice and reconciliation; Humanitarian assistance and social well-being; and Economic stabilization and infrastructure (Marquis et al. 2010, 26-7). The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which is closely affiliated with DoS, participates in stability operations to reverse the decline in fragile states and advance their recovery to a stage where transformational development progress is possible (Marquis et al. 2010, 27).

Similarly, the DoD developed a policy framework for executing stability operations. First, DoD Directive 3000.05 Military Support for SSTR Operations, published in 2006, implemented NSPD-44 and identified several DoD stability operations tasks and goals. Based upon that directive, the Joint Operational Concept (JOC) developed by Joint Forces Command to assist in planning for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations in 2006 identified six major mission elements:

- Establish and maintain a safe and secure environment
- Establish representative, effective governance and the rule of law
- Deliver humanitarian assistance
- Reconstruct critical infrastructure and restore essential services
- Support economic development
Conduct strategic communications (Marquis et al. 2010, 30).

However, DoDI 3000.05 (2009), which canceled DoDD 3000.05 (2005), more clearly delineated under what circumstances DoD would serve as a lead, supporting, or assisting organization. Drawing upon the military’s stability operations experience over the past 10 years of war and focusing more on Phase 3 (Dominate) and Phase 4 (Stabilize) tasks, DOD looks to lead stability operations that establish civil security and civil control; restore or provide essential services; repair critical infrastructure; and provide humanitarian assistance (Flournoy 2009, 2).

DoD functions as part of an integrated team to support stability operations planning efforts of other U.S. government agencies (Flournoy 2009, 2). Thus, when it comes to stabilization efforts such as Disarming, Demobilizing, and Reintegrating (DDR) former belligerents into a civil society; rehabilitating former belligerents and units into legitimate security forces; strengthening governance and the rule of law; and fostering economic stability and development, the DoD is in an assist role (Flournoy 2009, 3). Therefore, in conducting Phase 0 Shaping operations that further BPC activities as part of a TSC strategy, the COCOM must cooperate and integrate with U.S. government partners, notably the DoS and DSCA among others, to achieve U.S. strategic interests. DSCA DDPS BG Miller noted, “DoD has a role that dovetails with State: to accomplish a whole of government approach to Security Assistance and Cooperation. DDPS monitors the process and authorities fort the COCOMs as they build their Theater Campaign Plans; these plans guide COCOM efforts to build partner capacity” (Tegler 2012, 49).

Crucial to understanding not only the U.S. military’s role in stability operations, but the whole-of-government approach to such issues, the RAND study identified critical
issues with the coordination and execution of BPC and stability operations tasks between DoS and DoD. “[T]here is no clearly defined and well-integrated strategy for using BPC activities to build stability operations capabilities in partner nations. In addition, key agencies have yet to reach a consensus on their respective roles and missions” (Marquis et al. 2010, 21). Thus, despite the significant development of policy by several USG departments, marshalling a well-organized, integrated, and responsive system forward to achieve national interests remains complicated.

Women’s Rights and U.S. National Security Interests

This section considers the international advancement of women’s rights in the context of a national security interest to the United States. Although the previous sections of this chapter summarize and advance doctrinal and strategic U.S. positions, there is little published that applies this understanding towards promoting and furthering gender equality. Thus, this paper, in considering women’s rights and women’s opportunities in the context of U.S. national interests attempts to understand if there truly is a relationship between the subjects as well as how they interact to inform policymakers and practitioners alike.

According to PeaceWomen.org, the United States is one of 38 countries that developed a National Action Plan (NAP) that created an official policy to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace, and Security. UNSCR 1325 “was the first Security Council resolution to focus in detail on the unique vulnerabilities and needs of women and girls in conflict” (MoGD 2014). Published in December 2011, the U.S. NAP on Women, Peace, and Security notes that “the engagement and protection of women as agents of peace and stability will be central
to the United States’ efforts to promote security, prevent, respond to, and resolve conflict, and rebuild societies” (White House 2011, 1). The NAP specifically references both the 2010 QDDR and the U.S. NSS with the goal of gender integration or “mainstreaming” to promote gender equality and improve programming and policy outcomes (White House 2011, 1).

UNSCR 1325, as well as the countries that have created NAPs for its implementation, recognize the disproportionate amount of violence and suffering that affect women during and following conflict. “Where cultures of violence and discrimination against women and girls exist prior to conflict, they will be exacerbated during conflict” (UN 2002, 1). Women are likely to be targeted more because of their cultural status and their sex (UN 2002, 2). According to the 2002 UN study analyzing the implementation of UNSCR 1325,

Gender-based and sexual violence have increasingly become weapons of warfare and are one of the defining characteristics of contemporary armed conflict. Rape, forced impregnation, forced abortion, trafficking, sexual slavery and the intentional spread of sexually transmitted infections (STIs), including human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS), are elements of contemporary conflict. (UN 2002, 2)

“Thus, increased violence against women can be a cause and a consequence of a societal breakdown” (White House 2011, 6). Recently gathered conflict evidence supports the assertion that fighting forces have specifically targeted women, adolescent girls and, to a lesser extent, girl children (UNSC 2002, 16). “The forms of violence used – torture, rape, mass rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced sterilization and the forced termination of pregnancies, and mutilations – and the ways in which perpetrators carry out these violent acts, are closely linked to gender relations in the society and culture” (UNSC 2002, 16-7).
Relying on voluminous research and data acquired by the UN as well as NGOs, the U.S. NAP provides a framework to improve the conditions of women afflicted by conflict. “This plan represents a government-wide effort to leverage U.S. diplomatic, defense, and development resources to improve participation of women in peace and conflict prevention processes, protect women and girls from SGBV, and help ensure that women have full and equal access to relief and recovery resources” (White House 2011, 11). The NAP continues,

We must take strong, unified action to ensure that victims have access to justice, that those responsible for these crimes are held accountable, and that those who contemplate violence against civilians understand their actions will carry consequences…successful conflict prevention efforts must rest on key investments in women’s economic empowerment, education, and health. (White House 2011, 7-8)

As a matter of U.S. policy, relevant U.S. departments and agencies will coordinate implementation of the plan and agencies will be held accountable to ensure the policies and initiatives endorsed in the plan are properly carried out (White House 2011, 1-2). To illustrate this point, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton “issued the Department of State’s first ever Secretarial Policy Guidance on Promoting Gender Equality to Achieve our National Security and Foreign Policy Objectives, providing the Department with guidance on how to promote gender equality in service of America’s foreign policy” (DoS 2012, 1).

**Case Study: Liberia’s Experience With Gender Violence and Security**

This section reviews the events surrounding Liberia’s civil war in order to provide context for the specific issue of gender-related violence. This section further introduces actions taken by Liberia’s leaders to develop responsive policies and institutions to
confront gender-related violence. U.S. SC activities to build ministerial capacity would directly serve to bolster Liberia’s efforts in this endeavor.

The Liberian Civil War

There is not sufficient space in this paper to revisit, extensively, the entire horrible scope of atrocities and devastation that gripped Liberia during its (un)civil war(s). In the first of what were actually two conflicts, the First Liberian Civil War lasted from 1989 until 1996. Prior to this, Liberia was ruled for 125 years by an oligarchy which was overthrown by noncommissioned officers of the Liberian army in 1980 (Sawyer 2013, 262). Then, between 1980 and 1989, Liberians lived under a military, then civilian dictatorship headed by Samuel Doe (Sawyer 2013, 262-3). “The Liberian war began in 1989 with a rebellion launched by Charles Taylor which unseated then President, Samuel Doe and engulfed the country in the first civil war that lasted until 1996” (Medie 2009, 11). “More than half of Liberians became refugees and about 8 percent of the population (two hundred thousand people) were killed in fighting or massacres” (Hegre, Østby, and Raleigh 2009, 607).

The international community slowly responded to the brutal, bloody conflict. ECOWAS, the Economic Community of West African States and, eventually, the United Nations intervened which brought about a ceasefire in 1995. “In 1997, Charles Taylor was ‘elected’ president mainly because many Liberians feared continued violence if he lost the elections” (Medie 2009, 11-12).

Yet, violence persisted as the Second Liberian Civil War erupted in 1999. The time between Taylor’s election in 1997 and the war in 1999 offered no respite. “That period witnessed the most horrific dictatorial rule in Liberian history by Charles Taylor”
Taylor’s corrupt regime found itself once again amid full-scale war in 1999. At that time, two rebel groups, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) in the north and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) in the south challenged Taylor’s legitimacy.

The savage fighting amongst the three groups—LURD, MODEL, and Taylor’s Liberian government forces further plunged the already weak country into deeper despair. “The combined attacks of the LURD and MODEL on government forces led to massive killing and torture along ethnic lines and mass exodus of Liberians into exile” (Iroanya 2008, 83). 2003 saw a willingness by LURD and MODEL to enter peace negotiations with the government. Taylor was also indicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone for war crimes (eventually transferred to the International Criminal Court at The Hague).

Following a comprehensive peace agreement, a small contingent of U.S. Marines and ECOWAS peace-keepers led by Nigeria secured Monrovia. Following a transitional government, general elections were held in 2005 with Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, a Unity Party candidate eventually winning following a run-off. She was the first female elected head of state on the African continent and has challenged her administration to improve conditions for all Liberians, especially women.

The Effects of Liberia’s Civil War on Women

The fighting and violence that raged across Liberia for 14 years disproportionately affected non-combatants and women in particular. A comprehensive study published in the Journal of International Women’s Studies in 2011 provides a keen insight into conflict’s impacts against women. Women suffered physical and psychological abuse, rape, torture, and exposure to drugs and HIV/AIDS which directly
affected reproductive and mental health; disruptions to educational programs severely
damaged societal development; and thousands of women involved with the fighting
forces did not participate in the DDR process (Liebling-Kalifani et al. 2011, 6).

Several women and girls were abducted during the war by armed forces. Women
participants in the study described how they were abducted and subjected to
forced marriage to rebels. They described being systematically raped and tortured.
. . . Women associated with fighting forces faced significant discrimination and
carried a burden of shame for being forced to carry out acts that were viewed as
‘unacceptable for women’ in Liberian society. (Liebling-Kalifani et al. 2011, 7-8)

“The war destroyed the infrastructure of the country—including power, water, and road
systems—and disrupted social institutions, including the educational and political
systems, the clan and village structures, and families” (Williams 2011, 79).

It was not just the direct actions of the principal belligerents in Liberia’s civil
wars who perpetrated Sexually Based Gender Violence (SBGV) against women. “Liberia
registered more than 6,000 children fathered by peacekeepers from the Economic
Community of Western African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) between 1990 and
1998, many of whom had been abandoned by both their fathers and their mothers and
lived on the streets,” (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002, 16). According to a study published in
Emerging Infectious Diseases in 2004,

Liberia's civil war resulted in approximately 215,000 refugees at the end of 2001;
50% to 80% of these refugees were women. During the civil war, an estimated
40% of all Liberian women were raped. Loss of family forces women to depend
on men and may lead to rape, forced marriage, prostitution, domestic abuse, and
increasing risk of HIV and other sexually transmitted infections. Lack of postwar
shelter compounds other problems and increases exposure to mosquito-borne
diseases. Lack of clean drinking water introduces risks of bacillary dysentery,
cholera, diarrheal disease, typhoid, hepatitis A, and other diseases. (Bennett et al.
2004)

The information provided in this section is merely a snapshot of the considerable amount
of statistics compiled on the atrocities committed against women during this conflict.
Amid the terror and despair that affected so many innocent victims during the Liberian strife, it is liberating to note the important role women played in helping to bring about the end of hostilities. Defying many males who believed women did not have a role to play in the peace process, numerous women activists began organizing in 1994 and made their presence known at several peace conferences (Press 2011, 120). “As fighting increased again in 2003, women demonstrated for peace in large numbers in Monrovia” (Press 2011, 121). The groups of women who risked their lives so their voices could be heard featured the poor and the well-off, Muslims as well as Christians (Press 2011, 121). “The outbreak of the war in 1989 led women’s groups to mount national campaigns against GBV and other injustices” (Medie 2013, 387). The 2008 documentary, Pray the Devil Back to Hell tells the story of a group of Liberian women who would not succumb to fear. The film showcases Liberian women chaining themselves to barricades at the peace talks in Ghana, amongst other riveting scenes, all done to bring about peace and dignity to their war-torn land.

Sirleaf’s Election and Formation of a Gender Policy

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement reached in 2003 ushered in a new era for Liberia, as well as African politics. Following the cessation of fighting, Charles Taylor sought refuge in Nigeria and was initially indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2003 for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Eventually, Taylor was convicted at The Hague and he was sentenced to 50 years confinement following a guilty verdict on 11 charges. Emerging from 14 years of brutal, mostly ethnic-based fighting, Liberia sat at a position as vulnerable and delicate as ever existed in its history. In 2005, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, a former U.S. educated Liberian politician and senior banking

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official became the first female elected head of state on the African continent. Sirleaf immediately sought to address the nation’s wounds.

Confronted by significant governance challenges, Sirleaf’s administration attempted to gain ground in several areas. First, the security sector was in ruins following the prolonged conflict. “Through decades of dictatorship and civil war, the government and its security forces came to be seen by most Liberians as perpetrators of violence, masters of corruption, and abusers of power” (Gompert et al. 2007, 1). The public sector was also decimated and dysfunctional. “There are two aspects to public sector reform agenda in Liberia, namely decentralization and public service reform” (Sawyer 2013, 267). A bloated and inefficient public service coupled with an historically overcentralized constitution proved difficult for Sirleaf to overcome (Sawyer 2013, 268). Yet, one of Sirleaf’s most celebrated achievements was her creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to begin healing the fissures and remedying the despair felt by so many Liberians.

The TRC findings, released in 2009, constituted an exhaustive assessment of the root causes of Liberian conflict as well as the human rights toll taken upon its people. With regard to women, the primary TRC report identified “unfair discrimination against women and denial of their rightful place in society as equal partners” as one of the root causes of Liberia’s conflict (TRC 2009, 17). Furthermore, prominently noted in the TRC’s final report is a 112 page evaluation of how gender emerged as a devastatingly brutal factor throughout Liberia’s civil war.

Chapter 2 reviewed multiple sources of literature from national-level policy and strategy documents to specific information related to gender equality, framed by
academics and research experts. Through this review, this paper attempts to provide an important contextual association between U.S. national interests tied to national objectives and the potential U.S. role in furthering gender equality through its security cooperation activities. While U.S. national interests do not change much and security cooperation activities are not new to the military establishment, utilizing the military element of national power at the ministerial level to improve women’s opportunities is a novel concept. Based upon U.S. experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, where considerable lessons were learned in developing women’s programs, it is conceivable that such practices can be utilized in other international locations, especially during the Phase 0, Shaping time, to better enhance women’s roles in societies troubled by conflict.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The primary research question of this paper is whether it is appropriate for the U.S. military to build partnership capacity at the ministerial level, through security cooperation, in order to improve gender equality. Amid this consideration is a requirement to address what the United States could do and what it should do in this regard. Many who consider the vast capabilities and multiple elements of national power which the U.S. holds might quickly assume that it could act to further just about any policy it sets out to achieve. Answering the question of could does not get to the substance of this question; this paper is really trying to answer the “should” question. However, while focusing more precisely then on should the U.S. seek to conduct security cooperation activities with an eye towards achieving an altruistic goal like improving gender equality will nevertheless require one to consider, in a secondary manner, whether the U.S. indeed has the ability to do so, and thus, could it achieve such a goal.

In choosing a research methodology for this topic, options were somewhat limited. Quantitative metrics were difficult to ascertain, leading the paper to adopt a qualitative approach towards analyzing the phenomena in question. As this paper advances the concept of conducting military action in pursuit of a strategic-level interest, the singular theoretical case study approach was most useful. According to Fidel, “The case study attempts, on the one hand, to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of the event under study but at the same time to develop more general theoretical statements about regularities in the observed phenomena” (Fidel 1984, 274). The utility of this approach lies in how data from observed relationships may be applied to a larger
understanding, in different societies, of how women’s opportunities may be furthered through security cooperation.

The case presented in this paper largely falls outside the purpose of the types of BPC activities in which the U.S. has previously engaged. Thus, considering the interaction of strategic, operational, and cultural factors through a particular case offers a much needed starting point from which to further analyze and discuss both the utility for pursuing BPC in this context and whether or not the instruments of U.S. power can logically achieve a desired outcome.

For the purposes of this study, opportunities are discussed in terms of those outcomes which are likely achievable through BPC interactions. Such opportunities are divided between (1) military and civilian occupational positions in the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and armed forces; (2) economic benefits that improve the societal standing of women such as preferential business incentives and loans; and (3) educational and training programs that provide women better skills that enable them to more actively assert themselves within a society. As for the second group considered, while incentives may not, on their own, enable women to enjoy greater opportunities, such benefits can lead to greater gender equity and are thus worthy of inclusion in this discussion. Gains furthered by BPC programs that can promote these types of opportunities can contribute, potentially to an overall qualitative enhancement of women’s rights as a whole, and across the country.

As U.S. military operations in the post-OIF/OEF environment are likely to feature BPC missions prominently exercised through security cooperation endeavors, it is important to consider both what the U.S. can realistically accomplish in such actions and
whether it is currently organized to achieve success. This paper explores three secondary questions in attempting to determine whether the U.S. can indeed further women’s opportunities through BPC engagement focused on ministerial development: (1) Does the U.S. maintain a national interest in conducting security cooperation that can improve gender equity; (2) Can BPC programs realistically achieve meaningful gains in gender equality despite potential inherent cultural resistance to advancing women’s rights; and (3) Is the U.S. organizational framework for building partner capacity through security cooperation realized through the current whole-of-government approach?

Various areas of literature were examined to consider how best to answer, or at least attempt to discuss ways of addressing issues raised by those questions. The primary documents to review, in order to understand U.S. national interests, are the most recent U.S. national-level planning documents which shape U.S. policies and contribute to the development of military, diplomatic, and theater-specific strategies. The 2010 *National Security Strategy*, the 2010 and 2014 *Quadrennial Defense Reviews*, the 2010 *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*, and the White House’s 2012 *National Action Plan for Women, Peace, and Security* set an important foundation for the significance of gender as a consideration in the development of diplomatic and defense policies by executive agencies. Additional presidential memoranda and operational guidance promulgated by the Secretary of State regarding gender in furthering national security and foreign policy objectives link the strategic documents together and instruct subordinate organizations on how to take proper action.

In determining the military’s role in furthering gender-promoting activities through BPC, it is necessary to consider current military doctrine as well as the
documents and website information provided by DSCA, MoDA, and DIRI. Given the organization of the COCOM and the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) environment in which the U.S. military executes operations, the most logical starting point is Joint Doctrine. Heavily referenced throughout the literature review, joint doctrine sets the framework by which the individual branches of the armed forces have nested their own separate doctrine, though there are certainly some unique aspects to each branch’s doctrine. Nevertheless, joint doctrine speaks to the organizing principles and phasing construct that the COCOM Commander considers in implementing his theater strategy. This strategy is further resourced and coordinated with executive agencies like DSCA, USAID, and DoS to accomplish BPC activities in a whole-of-government context.

A second variable touching on whether the U.S. can further women’s opportunities through the security cooperation construct is whether such efforts can only be considered as a function of culture. Some have argued that regardless of the actions the U.S. may take to improve women’s rights through security cooperation, it matters not because of cultural considerations. In other words, if a society is predisposed to reject the notion of women’s equality, then attempts by the United States to improve women’s opportunities through BPC are potentially wasteful and mis-directed. Said yet another way, whether the United States is able to achieve success through a BPC program that furthers women’s opportunities will only come down to the particular culture of the environment.

There is near universal recognition of the disproportionate effects of conflict on women and children. Grim statistics, not only from Liberia’s fierce civil wars but also
from conflicts across the world, support this conclusion. Utilizing Liberia’s experience as a case study, this paper confronts a society in which culturally sensitive gender issues permeate the various ethnic groups. Regardless, the democratic government of Liberia has taken important steps, by its own accord and in contravention of some ethnic beliefs, to improve women’s rights through meaningful policies. In this situation, the U.S. is not only fulfilling its own national interest, but it is truly partnering with another country to address a key issue that not only threatens security, but hinders development.

Finally, with respect to culture, this paper focuses on building partner capacity as part of security cooperation activities. Furthering women’s opportunities in already established international partnerships, while potentially may become a more important measure of effectiveness, is not a holistically new concept in the U.S. values-based approach to BPC. The case has surely been made to countries with lower female numbers in their armed forces and where women’s rights are curbed that the U.S. desires a more equal participation by women in society in general. Thus, as a further stipulation for U.S. security cooperation, some countries may refuse. However, such resistance does not entirely upend pursuing BPC to improve women’s rights as a concept, especially as female members of the U.S. armed forces and diplomatic corps, in addition to American NGOs, further that message with their presence and performance every day.

The third variable bearing on the U.S. military’s ability to build partnership capacity at the ministerial level is in the current whole-of-government (WoG) approach. Spawned from the equally indistinct “the inter-agency,” WoG (in a post-OIF world) characterizes the way in which the massive U.S. executive apparatus attempts to achieve unified action in order to accomplish U.S. strategic goals informed by the policy
apparatus. This is obviously an extremely difficult and complex undertaking. Over 10 years of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan where U.S. military forces worked very closely with elements of DoS, USAID, and other agencies on a frequent basis still have not dramatically improved the cooperative process. In reviewing policy documents, coupled with RAND analyses and views of other commentators, there is plenty of room for blame but also many strong suggestions for improvement and greater efficiency.

This paper reviews current issues in the WoG approach that affect BPC activities. Coordinating the efforts between COCOMs, DSCA, DoS, USAID, and host of other executive agencies is a process that, with little more than codified obligations which seem to spell it out clearly on paper, in actuality is fraught with difficulty. Once again, looking towards previous U.S. experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as lessons from other countries’ experiences, this paper will indicate where cooperation has achieved success and where further refinement is necessary.

To understand the interaction of the different potential efforts posed by the secondary research questions set against the specific types of women’s opportunities considered by the primary research question, this paper will utilize Table 1. This table will help illustrate gaps in current policy on improving gender equality as well as potential issues with current U.S. strategy in executing SC programs. Additionally, where opportunities and efforts interact, the table will indicate where there is a weak relationship (requiring significant additional efforts), a moderate relationship (where there is some proximity between the opportunity and the effort), or a superior relationship (where there is a significant interaction between the opportunity and the effort.)
Table 1. Interaction of Efforts With Opportunities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPPORTUNITIES</th>
<th>EFFORTS</th>
<th>Occupational Positions in MoD and Armed Forces</th>
<th>Economic Benefits and Business Incentives</th>
<th>Educational and Training Programs</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. National Interests in Security Cooperation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Overcoming Cultural Resistance to Gender Equality</td>
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<td>Current WoG Approach to SC</td>
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Source: Created by author.

This paper utilizes the current situation in Liberia as a case study to derive possible answers to the identified research questions. The Liberian experience provides a useful mechanism to understand if the United States can build partnership capacity at the ministerial level as well as considering if gender equality is truly within U.S. national interests to promote internationally through its security cooperation programs. The following chapter will explore these topics and provide an analysis of the research questions set against possible areas where gender equality may be achieved. The United States and Liberia share a complex and dynamic history. Their contemporary interaction, coupled with Liberia’s recent emergence from years of civil war and isolation, provides an opportunity to explore potential U.S. efforts to improve gender equality as part of a dedicated security cooperation program.
CHAPTER 4
DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

Introduction

This thesis examined whether it is appropriate for the United States to build partnership capacity at the ministerial level, through security cooperation activities, in order to improve opportunities for women. The impetus for conducting research into this topic emerges from two considerations. First, following the winding down of major U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan set against a forecasted decrease in the overall defense budget, U.S. military activities in the foreseeable future will largely focus on security cooperation missions. The most prevalent aspect of such missions will be building partnership capacity among allied nations’ military capabilities, at all levels, both to secure U.S. strategic interests in the current environment and to enable host nations to better prepare for and overcome a host of conventional and unconventional security challenges.

The second consideration inherent to this study is the threat of conflict and its characteristics. As a significant security consideration in many locations around the world, conflict threatens the peace and stability of fragile states and post-conflict states in recovery. Multiple studies reinforce the point that violence and turmoil associated with conflict disproportionately affect women and children more seriously than men. In conflict areas, many women are victimized by rape and abuse; are often without essential services to provide care and treatment for maltreatment, disease, and complications arising from pregnancy; and they are disadvantaged compared to men in trying to acquire basic provisions and shelter. Following the cessation of violence, women must still
overcome disenfranchisement and unequal DDR processes while attempting to determine how they will make a living and interact in a disrupted society.

The relationship between these two considerations presents opportunities for the United States to better synchronize its military and diplomatic strategies. By building capacity with partner nations, the U.S. improves the host nation’s capabilities in crisis management, counterterrorism, and civil defense—improvements in each component contribute to stability. By further focusing efforts in this undertaking on improving opportunities for women, the U.S. can not only help set the conditions for conflict prevention, but it can help empower a crucial segment of partner country populations towards civic action and economic prosperity while counteracting the type of violence that so unfairly victimizes them in times of unrest.

Chapter 4 is organized into four sections. In the first three sections, this chapter addresses the primary research question by further exploring three secondary research questions: (1) is improving women’s rights through BPC in the strategic interest of the United States; (2) can the U.S. expect to achieve improvements in women’s opportunities through BPC activities even in cultures that have difficulty in recognizing equal rights; and (3) whether the current U.S. organizational approach to BPC through the whole-of-government concept can affect a positive result. Finally, using Table 1 from chapter 3, it will classify the types of opportunities that can reasonably be influenced by BPC at the ministerial level against the analysis of the three secondary questions.
Section One: A Strategy to Improve Women’s Opportunities—The Moral Imperative

Consistently woven amongst several of America’s national-level strategic planning documents and ultimately emanating from the NSS are the enduring national interests of the United States. “Respect for universal values at home and around the world” is featured prominently as one of only four such core values of utmost importance to the United States as an entity. Although disputed by some countries, universal values certainly include respect for human rights, of which women’s equality and women’s rights are paramount. Human rights encompass all manner of ways in which people are treated, especially minorities in any group and those afflicted by war and conflict. On one hand, Americans possibly take for granted that women are typically entitled to the same opportunities as men. However, even the U.S. must contend internally with prejudice and discrimination against women. Through significant efforts, state-sponsored discrimination against women has largely disappeared in the U.S., with notable exceptions that are often challenged in courts or remedied in legislative bodies.

For women in other parts of the world, however, such opportunities that so many females and males have worked hard to achieve for women in the U.S. are but fantasy. Certainly culture plays an important role in this situation and recognizing the importance of human rights should also necessarily carry with it a recognition of cultural traditions and viewpoints, even if they are not fully understood by Americans. The question then is to consider whether women’s rights are part of not only the substance of human rights, but a universally held value that merits advocacy and protection. “Engaging women as political and social actors can change policy choices and makes institutions more representative and better performing” (DoS 2012, 1).
The U.S., as the world’s superpower and primary promoter of democracy, may be challenged in advancing the notion that women’s rights are indeed a universally held value. Certainly several nations may disagree; their peoples unable to acknowledge the equal role women should play in their own societies. And for its part, the U.S. looks, once again, like the ivory tower on the hill spouting rules and norms that citizens of the world must adopt, lest they be considered outside the mainstream.

Nevertheless, women’s rights, as a universal norm and as a value, are further articulated by the United Nations within the larger context of global human rights. The General Assembly, comprised of the recognized governments of the world, as well as the UN Security Council, has enacted multiple documents that acknowledge the universal sanctity of women’s rights. The Conventional for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) adopted in 1979 and now with more than 180 signatories defines discrimination against women as

any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field. (UN 1979)

Those countries who commit to this convention affirm that there is a universal problem, that women suffer discrimination based on their sex; that they are subject at times to unequal treatment before the law; and that so many other entities, groups, and organizations may also infringe upon women because of their sex.

However, those signatories, not only to CEDAW but to a host of other UN documents, affirm something else too. They pledge to overcome the challenges of oppression, to make level the field so that their legal systems do not distinguish between
sexes unfairly, and that they take an active role in securing the protections of the rule of law so that women may enjoy the same opportunities as men. This international recognition and commitment should indicate the universality of women’s rights. U.S. actions taken to further and enhance such a position are not made to impose American will on those who would resist, but to affirm a deeply held conviction that men and women are equal.

In 2013, President Obama drew increased awareness to the efforts of the U.S. to engage in women’s rights both at home and abroad. “To elevate and integrate this strategic focus on the promotion of gender equality and the advancement of women and girls around the world, executive departments and agencies have issued policy and operational guidance” (White House 2013, 1). The President continued, “enhancing U.S. global leadership on gender equality requires dedicated resources, personnel with appropriate expertise in advancing the status of women and girls worldwide, and commitment from senior leadership.” (White House 2013, 2). Finally, he called upon the National Security Advisor to chair an interagency working group to coordinate U.S. policy on such issues (White House 2013, 3). These measures were taken in addition to the President’s development of the National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security created through Executive Order 13595 in December 2011.

Therefore, when one considers the enduring U.S. interests articulated in the 2010 NSS and amplified by policy and strategy documents across the span of government, the protection of universally held values is such an important concept. Gender equality and women’s rights go hand in hand—the countries of the world, meeting at the UN understand that; even if many within their borders do not. Thus it is even more
compelling that the U.S. enlist broad international support in committing itself to action by furthering the role of women in society by promoting opportunities that enable them to achieve roles within their society that secure the promise of further opportunities for their female children. This is not a new concept, as U.S. operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan featured military, civilian, and diplomatic personnel, amongst others, attempting to implement policies that improved gender equality as part of an overall national strategy.

Recent U.S. Military Experience With Promoting Gender Equality

As part of the U.S. military strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan, there was a concerted effort to improve gender equality in both countries. Commenting on U.S. actions in both countries, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) noted that “advancing women’s empowerment is an essential priority for transitions in conflict countries, as it can contribute directly to sustainable stability” (Kuehnast et al. 2012, 3). In Iraq, the USAID, DoS, as well as DoD, worked to further women’s opportunities. Following the fall of Baghdad in 2003 as Neighborhood Advisory Councils (NACs) were established throughout the mahallas of the city, each one was required to have at least one female representative. This was a concerted effort by the U.S. military, which interacted with the NACs several times per week, to further women’s issues and ensure there was some discussion of women’s needs at the grassroots level.

In concert with that effort, the DoS, which had the overall lead in Iraq following the cessation of offensive operations, sought to make a similar impact nationally. However, as security conditions deteriorated after 2005, women’s issues were relegated
far behind more pressing matters, like trying to tame the various insurgent uprisings (Kuehnast et al. 2012, 1). This setback was compounded by certain religious groups seeking to ensure women’s rights did not advance. “Following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, international organizations and governments had all-around good intentions to improve women’s rights” (Kuehnast et al. 2012, 3). Thus, the women’s rights movement in Iraq stagnated and quotas protecting women’s political inclusion risked being eliminated (Kuehnast et al. 2012, 3).

On the other hand, though women’s opportunities appeared to face more of a challenge in Afghanistan given the Taliban’s harsh treatment towards females, efforts there have been more successful. According to the World Bank, Afghan women held 28 percent of seats in the national parliament (World Bank 2014). Amnesty International reported that 40 percent of the voters in Afghanistan’s 2010 election were women (Kuehnast et al. 2012, 3). Furthermore, grounding its efforts in international legal conventions like UNSCR 1325 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and CEDAW, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) supported gender and human rights activities (Kem 2012, 135). More importantly, these actions found legal basis within Afghan legislation, both in the Constitution of Afghanistan and the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) which identified gender mainstreaming as the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s principal strategy for achieving gender equality in Afghanistan (Kem, 2012, 137). Finally, the strategy employed in Afghanistan crossed multiple ministry boundaries and harnessed the collective action of U.S. and NATO partners to improve women’s opportunities in the Afghan military and the Afghan National Police (Kem 2012, 138-9).
As the recent examples in Iraq and Afghanistan show, results have been mixed. Even in Afghanistan where there have likely been greater success in furthering gender equality compared to Iraq, it has neither been easy nor universally accepted by the entire population within these countries’ respective borders. Nevertheless, these examples highlight U.S. attempts to take necessary action in post-conflict (Phase 4 – Stabilize) countries to improve both opportunities for women which have the intended effect of furthering gender equality. While BPC activities through security cooperation are normally conducted in Phase 0 – Shaping which differs from the Iraq and Afghanistan experiences, this nevertheless provides U.S. strategists with an opportunity to begin diffusing problematic gender hot spots before violent conflict emerges.

As applied to the Liberia case study, the United States would find similar grounding to promote women’s opportunities in Liberian law. The National Gender Policy (NGP) of Liberia, enacted in 2009 by the Ministry of Gender and Development (MoGD) and reflecting the Constitution of Liberia’s guarantee of equal human rights, was intended to eradicate and eliminate all gender related problems in Liberia (MoGD 2009, 6). A signatory to CEDAW, UNSCR 1325 (which Liberia adopted a National Action Plan to implement), and a host of other international and regional treaties on gender equality, Liberia’s national interests are in harmony with the avowed policies of the U.S. government on women’s issues.

Acknowledging the multiple levers of government required to make impactful progress, the NGP “places heavy responsibility on line Ministries and Agencies to play a key role in follow-up, implementation, and monitoring” (MoGD 2009, 5). Thus, the U.S. can potentially engage multiple ministries, specifically those of Defense, Interior, and the
Foreign Ministry to promote gender equality activities as part of a Whole of Government approach. In fact, a senior embassy official remarked that the U.S. government is already working hard to identify opportunities to address women’s issues in Liberia and that AFRICOM established a working group to discuss ways to increase women’s opportunities in the AFL.

In considering U.S. national interests as an effort towards the opportunities listed in Table 1, there are uneven results. First, given U.S. strategy that seeks to capitalize on improving women’s opportunities both because it is spelled out in policy and it empowers a class that historically suffers disproportionate violence during conflict, it is logical to understand at least a moderate effect on MoD and AFL opportunities for women through the execution of U.S. national interests. Additionally, the U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa (USSTSA) specifically addresses increasing opportunities for women in youth as a part of promoting opportunity and development—one of four pillars of the strategy (White House 2012, 6). Thus, there is a connection between advancing economic opportunities for women and U.S. national interests which is furthered most prominently by USAID’s Office of Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment which diligently works to secure funding for business and economic incentives for women in Liberia and around the world. This paper recognizes a moderate effect here.

Furthermore, recognizing the pronounced connection between women’s opportunities and education, U.S. policies are keen to understand this crucial relationship. Not only is the education of women foremost in strategic planning documents, but the U.S. committed to undertake education enhancements to improve women’s opportunities
both in Iraq and Afghanistan. Thus, there is clearly a strong relationship between the U.S. national interests and the promotion of education and training opportunities for women, especially where they have traditionally not been afforded the same access as men.

Section Two: Overcoming Cultural Obstacles

Introduction

Necessary to the discussion of furthering gender equality in parts of the world that may not share the same values, customs, and traditions as Americans, is the role of culture in a particular environment. That places in the world where women are often treated as second class citizens tend to experience violent conflict is no accident, but possibly a symptom of dysfunction. Where rich and diverse cultures are unable to live peaceably with other cultures or find themselves governed by authoritarian regimes that impose harsh measures against women, like the Taliban, gender equality seems an insurmountable barrier.

Further, while this paper took note in the previous section of the near universality of international concurrence on women’s rights and gender equality, many groups within national boundaries still resent women as a class and strive to maintain a status quo where women are relegated to the background and kept there due to a lack of opportunities, an inability to receive basic education, and a society that imposes specific roles and responsibilities upon women, regardless of their individual preferences. This paper acknowledges that in just about any situation where a society comprised of certain values and understandings attempts to foist those beliefs onto another country, regardless of how similar they might be, there is bound to be some friction in the application. The balance then is to understand if a potential good, in this case furthering gender equality, is
greater than the potential societal disruption advanced by the countering force, like a powerful ethnic or religious group. From a strategic perspective, this requires an entity like the U.S. to evaluate whether the way it may choose to achieve an end like gender equality is indeed furthered despite resistance from members of a certain segment of society.

Where countries actively partake in suppressing women’s rights and not recognizing gender equality, there is obviously a significant barrier to a country like the U.S. seeking to upset such deeply rooted beliefs and overturn sovereign actions. However, there are examples where the U.S. cultivates and partners with allies, such as Saudi Arabia, and tends to turn a blind eye to gender inequality issues due to strong relationships in other areas of mutual concern. But as the U.S. focuses on conducting increased security cooperation missions in various countries across the world, the citizens of these countries, and certainly the female populations, will undoubtedly see U.S. servicewomen, diplomats, and other government officials working in leadership positions or in ancillary roles executing BPC missions within their borders.

In several places around the world, American diplomats and servicemembers conform to cultural practices as ambassadors of their country. In particular, American females assigned to military bases or diplomatic missions in some Middle Eastern countries, where women are not equals to men, will cover their hair and possibly their faces in public and will likely wear very conservative garments, both for security and to respect the local culture. Nevertheless, the U.S. still gets on with conducting military and diplomatic affairs despite the official or unofficial position of these countries with respect to women.
Furthermore, during OIF and OEF, American combat units were forced to contend with cultural sensitivity surrounding Afghan or Iraqi women subject to search by U.S. servicemen. Female Engagement Teams (FETs) blossomed to meet the need to have women interact with women so as not to offend the diverse cultures. In these cases, as has been previously mentioned, the U.S. and its NATO allies were simultaneously seeking to develop opportunities for women through training and education programs, as well as identify women to serve in the national police and military forces. So, did the U.S. really encounter a cultural barrier in the first place or was it able to overcome it because of the good it was attempting to do within the respective countries? Was it ever truly able to overcome a cultural barrier? Would the U.S. have achieved similar success if the primary focus of its efforts was to improve gender equality? Regardless of the answers to the first two questions, it is likely that the answer to the third would be “no.” Yet, that is the question at the root of this thesis as the U.S. transitions to more security cooperation missions in partnership with other countries.

Therefore, there are really two parts to understand potential cultural impediments to gender equality activities furthered through security cooperation. First, one must address whether cultural barriers are in fact a problem—do the beliefs of certain groups dictate how the government of a country, where those ethnic groups live, will interact with countries like the U.S. who seek to bring development and security opportunities, but with a “cultural cost,” that of recognizing gender equality? Secondly, if there are barriers to such action by a donor country, can they be overcome? While it is likely very easy to answer the first question in the affirmative based upon interactions with cultures
all over the world, this paper will nonetheless attempt to understand the cultural paradigm as it affects women in Liberia for the purpose of the case study.

Gender Equality in the African Context

The issue of culture and gender equality is of momentous importance throughout the continent of Africa. Nevertheless, this paper cannot and does not provide an intricate dissection of the myriad cultures in Africa and there interactive dynamics with respect to women. However, a useful definition of culture and women’s experiences within the broad scope of Africa’s cultures are required, given the case study of Liberia and the potentially broad application of this research in promoting gender equality through security cooperation in other parts of the world. Understanding culture as the beliefs, customs, traditions, practices, and language of a specific group, one realizes there are hundreds of diverse and unique cultures across Africa. Many of these cultures are informed by their religious experiences as well, with some embracing traditional or mythical African traditions and others embracing Islam, Christianity, or another religion.

For many who disagree with certain aspects of other cultures as well as those who choose not to follow the practices of their culture, these belief systems impose deeper strains upon them when they are translated into force of law by the state apparatus in a particular country. Recently, for example, Kenya passed a law legalizing polygamy, which was embraced by some ethnic groups, but reviled by others and by most Kenyan women, especially female legislators. That the Afghanistan Taliban considered women to be inferior to men in every way and that women should at all times be subservient to men further illustrates this challenge.
Across Africa, there are uneven experiences with gender equality. The Kenya example aside, many countries in West Africa especially must contend with forced marriages of young girls, some of them barely teenagers, to older men and the controversial practice of Female Genital Cutting (FGC). In Ghana, the mobilization of women’s movements in an effort to better assert their rights faced many challenges both before and after the dictatorship of Jerry Rawlings. As Rawlings was forced to step down in 2000, women’s organizations in Ghana began challenging the government more openly (Viterna and Fallon 2008, 678) While they succeeded in getting a domestic violence bill passed in an attempt to curtail a brutal three-year string of serial killings against women, their representation in national elective bodies following the transition to democracy were less than expected (Viterna and Fallon 2008, 678-9).

A lack of access to basic education is another symptom of gender inequality in many parts of Africa, especially in Liberia’s neighborhood of West Africa. With many cultures advancing the notion that a woman’s place is in the home, caring for the family, an education is a dangerous commodity. The recent abduction of over 200 teenaged school girls in Nigeria by Boko Haram drew significant international attention to the plight of women subjected to conflict and violence on the continent. In Cote d’Ivoire, the Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE) observed in a 2013 report that there were significant linkages between the lack of educational opportunities afforded to women and their subsequent unequal relegation to informal careers, based largely on their lack of literacy (FAWE 2013, 22).

Despite these glaring socioeconomic statistics and findings, gender equality, as a policy, is largely advanced by numerous African countries and intergovernmental
organizations. The African Union (AU) is dedicated to improving women’s opportunities and access to training programs through its implementation of the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (SDGEA). As mentioned, only three African countries have not ratified CEDAW—Sudan, South Sudan, and Somalia. Furthermore, eight of the twelve African countries to develop National Action Plans to implement UNSCR 1325 are West African nations. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) established a Gender Development Centre, with the charge to make women’s opportunities more equal with those afforded to men.

The Women of Liberia: Applying the Case Study

Turning then to Liberia specifically, culture is as important a consideration for governance, economics, and interactions amongst members of the Liberian society as it is anywhere else in the world. The frequent clashes amongst Liberians throughout its history typically occurs along ethnic lines, primarily between the Americo-Liberians and the indigenous peoples from different clans that first lived in that part of Africa and continue to do so through today. As cultural considerations in Liberia pertain to women, “gender disparities and unacceptable inequalities persist at all levels. Deeply entrenched attitude [sic] against women and girls, perpetuate inequality and discrimination against women in public and private life, on a daily basis” (MoGD 2009, 5).

Women are disproportionately affected in negative ways throughout many sectors of Liberian society. “Women own less land and mostly depend on male relatives to access land” (MoGD 2009, 9). Although women make up 54 percent of the labor force, they do not receive equal pay and their jobs are confined to certain sectors (MoGD 2009, 5). “Girls unequal access to schooling is a crucial issue that is responsible for the high
rate of illiteracy among girls and women” (MoGD 2009, 11). Liberian women are more vulnerable to HIV and AIDS than males; 44 percent of women between the ages of 15 and 49 have experienced physical violence since they were 15; and women lack equal access to the justice system as well as a limited public understanding of citizens’ rights under the law (MoGD 2009, 13-4). The Liberian “culture,” if it can be called that, though it greatly oversimplifies diverse ethnic groups within Liberia, would seem to disfavor women as a whole.

Professor Susan H. Williams of the Indiana University Maurer School of Law frames the predicament facing Liberian women quite well. Despite legal advances for gender equality on paper, women must contend with continued inequality through their customary, or cultural relationships. “If the problematic culture is a majority culture. . . . then the question becomes whether legal sources of human rights—such as a constitution or international convention—should be understood to prevent the majority from expressing its culture through discriminatory customary legal rules” (Williams 2011, 68). Professor Williams goes on to note that in Liberia, while the rule of law is embracing gender equality, there is no legal mechanism to guarantee women representation or participation in customary systems (2011, 84).

Yet, perplexing to outside observers, however, prior to the civil wars, Liberia’s culture seemed to offer women a particularly important role. Praised for their unique contributions to achieving peace following two tumultuous civil wars, there is a place for women in Liberian society that recognizes their leadership and virtues. In the *Journal of International Women’s Studies*, Mary Moran noted that in Liberia, a mother and a wife are taken seriously, the authority of mothers and senior female kin was cited repeatedly in
over eighty interviews she conducted in 2006 with men who avoided violence during the war (2012, 58).

The situation affecting Liberian women is all the more curious considering the election of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf to the presidency in 2005. As the first female elected head of state on the African continent, the rise of the “Iron Lady” should have signaled a glorious new era to behold for Liberia’s long mistreated women. President Sirleaf said in an interview with World Affairs, “If you were to go back to countries where women have not been allowed to prosper, those countries haven’t been able to move their society along in the same way” (Cooper 2010, 48). She has tried nobly to rally her country, especially her ministries, to advance gender equality. She’s championed a National Action Plan to implement UNSCR 1325 and approved the Liberian NGP.

Analyzing Liberia’s experience in the context of its region and around the continent helps one understand the nuances of gender roles. Nigerian sociologist Oyeronke Oyewumi argued that “social identity in West Africa must be understood as highly situational: ‘social positions of people shifted constantly in relation to those with whom they were interacting; consequently, social identity was relational and could not be essentialized’” (Moran 2012, 57). Thus, though Liberian women appear to be systemically disadvantaged in Liberian society, this comment helps explain why, however, many women participated as armed combatants and unit leaders during the civil wars. The calculus of women’s experience shifted; though many were victimized regardless. Liberian women as fighters and Liberian women as peacemakers fulfilled roles within Liberian society reflective of their temporary condition in Liberia’s culture.
The Consequences of Culture—Policy vs. Implementation

So, the question of culture’s possible impediment to advancing gender equality is difficult to resolve. That many men, and even possibly some women, across West Africa are content with a woman’s role in society, there is little doubt that cultural norms are at the heart of the feminine experience there. It is equally true, however, that many governments, in West Africa and around the world, have undertaken steps to promote increased gender equality and provide for greater opportunities for women, at least on paper. Thus, a fundamental disconnect is likely found in the implementation of policies on a national scale. In Liberia, this is evident where, despite Sirleaf’s successes and her championing of women’s causes in concert with so many women’s organizations in Liberia, little has actually changed for Liberian women in that society. Culture then, it would seem is a barrier.

However, it would seem that whatever cultural barriers may exist to inhibit greater gender equality, as furthered through outside efforts, may depend upon the entity pushing the change. If an NGO is leading the effort, a country has very little incentive to emphasize gender equalizing programs. IGOs, like ECOWAS and the AU, may have more limited success as they are attempting to implement regional or continental norms. The challenge for a power like the U.S., which seeks to infuse money, training programs, and other aid, is to realize actual gains tied to policy initiatives. Put another way, the elements of U.S. national power may have some success in furthering gender equality more so that internal initiatives, NGOs, and IGOs because incentives are likely tied to U.S. contributions. Trade status, interest-free loans, foreign military sales, diplomatic recognition, and security cooperation activities achieve access—much like they do in
many places around the world. Therefore, even if cultural barriers do exist to stifle the implementation of effective regional or national policies to improve gender equality, the U.S. is potentially poised to overcome those obstacles through incentivized interactions.

Nevertheless, this paper acknowledges that gender policy is likely a prerequisite to any type of policy success. A country that has no definitive gender policy and has not at least attempted to adhere to international conventions of which it is a party may be a more difficult nut to crack from an outsider’s perspective. Even if Afghanistan, where many would naturally assume there exists a fundamental inequality between men and women on the part of culture, the Afghan government’s recognition of its treaty obligations to gender equality serves as an important starting point to which outside influence, like that of the U.S., may exploit a cooperative approach to formative gender policies.

In considering how the effect of overcoming cultural barriers applies to the three types of opportunities that BPC could affect for women, there are equally mixed results. For the U.S. to champion increased opportunities for women in a country’s armed forces or within their Defense Ministries, there is likely a moderate relationship as the U.S. can tie funding, programs, and training towards enhanced female outputs. There is also a moderate interaction between the U.S. ability to influence training and education programs, most likely through USAID and other diplomatic levers.

However, concerning incentivized business and economic opportunities for women, there is a weak relationship. Without proper education and training, it is doubtful that the U.S. would have much success in attempting to directly influence business programs that favor women as this opportunity is unfortunately susceptible to cultural
challenges which have placed women at a disadvantage already. However, “Income-generating activities, vocational training and micro-finance schemes would empower women and girls economically to enable them access to health services” (Liebling-Kalifani et al. 2011, 17). Unless steps are taken to strengthen women, as a class, at the very foundation of a society, simply throwing money at possible business ventures with untrained women at the helm is not likely to produce positive results.

Section Three: The Whole of Government Approach to Security Cooperation

Introduction

Since the U.S. experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan began, there has been widespread acknowledgement by commentators, policymakers, and senior military officers to embrace a Whole of Government (WoG) approach towards achieving unified action. This holistic approach successfully harnesses the capabilities of the U.S. elements of national power to achieve synergistic results in solving complex problems of a strategic nature. “The need for enhanced—whole of government capabilities will be driven by the complex operating conditions, strong potential for civilian interaction, and the need in many cases to work closely with agencies of a foreign government” (Hadley et al. 2010, 37). WoG has been the go-to phrase, included in nearly all national level planning documents as the key concept driving U.S. interaction amongst the various elements of U.S. power. General David Rodriguez, Commander U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), in his most recent statement to the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) commented favorably on Congress’s role in enabling a WoG approach to his “critical region” (AFRICOM 2014, 12).
Given the multi-faceted concept of security cooperation, which leverages effects across military, diplomatic, and economic domains, it is poignant to consider WoG responses in successfully implementing security cooperation programs, especially where the U.S. seeks to build partner capacity. Covered at length in the literature review, there exists a particular set of relationships between U.S. government agencies and the military that drives the WoG process. For the purposes of this paper, examination of the WoG will largely focus on DoS, USAID, DoD, and the military although other agencies and departments could conceivably be a part of any WoG application. As the DoS is charged to lead U.S. foreign affairs, it seems right that they are statutorily and administratively in charge of all U.S. security cooperation activities. However, this section will explore the rest of the WoG soup and analyze relationships and performance among multiple U.S. government stakeholders.

The Evolution of the Whole of Government Approach

Whole of Government, as a concept, was not discussed much in the public or governmental spheres until Operation Iraqi Freedom’s aftermath. The seemingly late understanding of a unified governmental approach reflected decades of ad hoc organizations and uncoordinated actions among governmental bodies, not just in the U.S. but elsewhere too. William J. Flavin wrote that the British experience in Malaysia was off to a horrendous start until military and political leaders in London successfully created an integrated approach that emphasized “civil-military teaming” (Flavin 2012, 316). Similarly, the U.S. could not get its hands around the civil-military issues in Vietnam early on. “No two U.S. government agencies shared a common vision or common approach on how to solve the problem of the conflict” (Flavin 2012, 317). However, in
creating the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), the U.S. better integrated its various agencies with the military and achieved some successes.

More recently, it can be argued that whatever lessons might have been learned from previous conflicts, the expansive demands of the contemporary operating environment have left government agencies unable to successfully and coherently coordinate civil-military operations. While there were undoubtedly some positive outcomes of the civil-military interactions in the U.S. experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, many first-hand experiences suggest that relations were strained, inconsistent, and fraught with bureaucratic entanglements. Flavin further notes that the approach at the operational level is flawed and cites the lack of doctrine for and synchronization among Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan and Iraq as evidence of these types of problems (2010, 329).

Even away from the warzones, many observe the WoG approach to be well-intentioned but dysfunctional. For example, in RAND’s analysis of the U.S. Train and Equip Program (also known as the “1206 Program”), which authorizes the DoD, with the concurrence of the DoS, to train and equip foreign militaries for counterterrorism and stability operations, it found a lack of formal guidance; a lack of measurable objectives tied to broader goals; unclear assessment roles and responsibilities for stakeholders; and a need to improve coordination (Moroney et al. 2011, xiii, xvi). Especially concerning for the purposes of this thesis, Boyer and Allardice write,

Service and joint doctrines are lacking regarding building partnership capacity (BPC) and security force assistance (SFA) at the strategic level, especially in the area of military support to the development of self-sustaining institutional capacity within host nation ministries. (2013, 69)
Making Sense of the Current Whole of Government Organization

Part of the challenge to the WoG approach is that there is not one handy all-encompassing multi-cabinet, joint, interagency field manual that neatly arranges relationships and provides structure to the participating interagency entities charged to overcome complex, dynamic problems. While, as noted, the DoS is charged to lead foreign endeavors that feature WoG engagement, the myriad performance measures, objectives, and checklists utilized by the U.S. military, DoD, DoS, USAID, and a host of other organizations are similar, but do not necessarily line up perfectly which enables the various agencies potentially to use the most beneficial metric or measure that will make it look the best.

Perhaps the most fundamental issue that exists between these different elements is that the DoD typically has the capacity and resources while the DoS, usually in the lead, possesses more of the international and diplomatic capabilities but must rely heavily on the U.S. military and other elements of national power in WoG applications. RAND offers an example where a “train-the-trainer” program was implemented in conjunction with Italy to build partner capacity in some Senegalese forces. The results of the program were not as encouraging as was hoped, yet the DoD continued to execute the program and was not engaged in the policy or programming areas while the program manager was a DoS bureau that communicated directly with the Italian Ministry of Defense in selecting the countries to receive the training (Paul et al. 2013, 28).

RAND has provided additional critical analyses of the U.S. WoG approach. In the book, Developing Army Strategy for Building Partner Capacity for Stability Operations, the authors take note of the competing manuals, policy letters, planning documents, and
instructions that characterize the manner in which each WoG entity engages a situation. Critical to understanding how the WoG approach can build partner capacity through security cooperation is knowing what phase of conflict is occurring. RAND utilizes the following table:

**Table 2. Organizational Roles Across the Main Phases of Conflict**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Prevention</th>
<th>Conflict Management</th>
<th>Post-conflict Reconstruction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lead organization</td>
<td>State Department / USAID</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting organization</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
<td>State Department</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In applying table 2 to BPC activities generally, and to the case study specifically, the phasing situation relevant to the discussion would be in conflict prevention. As mentioned, this is consistent with Joint Doctrine’s Phase 0, the Shaping Phase. In a WoG approach, DoS is charged to coordinate the efforts of the multiple agencies. This is also appropriate to the target level of this paper’s SC efforts, building capacity at the ministerial level. This does not happen in a vacuum though. Certainly key individuals and programs are interacting with department heads and possibly even the minister himself in a foreign government at the strategy or policymaking level. However, such programs are likely to be reinforced through interactions at the operational and tactical levels and jointly supported by DoS and DoD entities.
In conducting security cooperation missions to build partner capacity at the ministerial level in the Shaping Phase or pre-conflict phase, the U.S. military will be in a supporting role but closely coordinating with DoS personnel. This can manifest in one of two forms—foreign military sales and assistance where military equipment is sold or provided to a foreign country or through security cooperation activities that emphasize training and program development. This paper focuses on the latter, which will likely mean officials from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), through programs like the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA), and the Defense Institutional Reform Initiative (DIRI), as well as uniformed military officers, interacting with senior officials in a foreign country’s ministry of defense. They will initiate training programs, coordinate meetings and exchanges, and work to develop doctrine or policies that can enable a partner nation’s military to improve its processes and functionality. Considering U.S. policy and national interests, it is vital that this mission be undertaken to foster capabilities within these ministries that will posture their forces to better preempt conflict, maintain secure borders, and be operationally consistent with U.S. military actions, values, and policies.

The key to the process succeeding is capitalizing on the dynamic relationship amongst the U.S. stakeholders involved in the WoG approach. While it is obvious that the most ideal programs will receive strong support and acceptance by a host nation with talented, capable administrators in key roles working with and informing the U.S. assistance, if the U.S. agencies and military cannot cooperate to achieve programmatic goals from the outset, then the partner country will not have To say, the DoS is in charge, everyone else with an interest in this event just coordinate your efforts, that is not
practical. For one, while the DoS is leading the effort, even within its own organization are there multiple bureaus as well as USAID working through and with the embassy in a particular country. From the DoD perspective, there are the various organizations previously mentioned, but there is also the COCOM Commander and operational-level forces that can be tasked to perform duties in furtherance of SC goals.

At present, there are several flaws in the WoG approach. First, at the basic level, there is no coherent and unifying doctrine. There is Joint Doctrine, but it is not tied specifically to DoS measures of performance; nor are any DoD entities like DSCA or DIRI or MoDA consistently nested vertically with State or horizontally with the COCOMs under doctrine. While there might be attempts to mesh vision statements or core competencies, this does not happen by plan and the whole foundation lacks unified purpose. This is not to say that DSCA or DoS, as individual entities, are not capably performing their assigned roles. Through DIRI, DSCA solicits recommendations from COCOM commanders and also bounces these off of Regional Assistant Secretaries of State for prioritization (DSCA 2014). Within State’s framework, there is incredible coordination among regional bureaus with embassies and with USAID, plus there are typically extensive exchanges between chiefs of mission and assistant secretaries. However, this paper is concerned with the massing of effects by multiple government agencies. Also, there is no overarching, joint, interagency entity with power to coordinate this massive effort. As noted, while State is tasked to lead, it lacks capacity and resources. DoD certainly has the resources but not all international assistance requires a military solution despite the military’s worldwide footprint and the cultural experts largely do not reside at the Pentagon.
It is not altogether clear that a COCOM’s Theater Campaign Plan is linked to BPC-type strategic level planning at the State Department or at various U.S. embassies within a particular region. With competing directives, competencies, and performance objectives that do not quite line up, coupled with the difficulty of close coordination amongst various bureaus, departments, and commands, the WoG approach may be generating positive outcomes, but it is not running optimally.

The consequences of this well-intentioned, but unevenly executed approach loom large in the partner country to which the U.S. has directed its efforts. In applying the WoG approach to the case study, there are obvious points of separation, though there is some coordination between the listed entities. Moreover, as concepts such as Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) come online, at least within the Army, the way in which a WoG approach is coherently executed will necessarily affect the ways in which servicemembers and U.S. civilians interact with their counterparts at the operational and tactical levels. The case study will also consider how the WoG approach as an effort is tied to the opportunities in Table. 1.

Whole of Government Approach to Liberia Case Study

Currently in Liberia, there is an on-going WoG approach to build partner capacity at the ministerial level. The DoS, largely by and through the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia, coordinates the diplomatic mission of the U.S. with regard to the Liberian government and performs the overall direction in country. In seeking to interact with the Liberian Ministry of Defense (MoD), DoS officials in Washington and diplomats on the ground in Liberia work with DoD entities such as the Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché
(SDO/DATT) in the embassy, DSCA, as well as AFRICOM to craft meaningful ways to engage the MoD.

U.S. officials working on these issues through the U.S. Embassy in Liberia, provided keen insight into how the U.S. is engaging the Liberian MoD. In their comments through VTC, they discussed success in FMS activities as well as a training partnership program with the Michigan Army National Guard that places a ready pool of U.S. military personnel to participate in exercises with the AFL. This partnership provides a consistent source of experienced U.S. military personnel that continue to build relationships at the tactical and the operational (slightly) levels to improve capacity for a partner nation. The only real interaction they provided, from a WoG approach, concerned U.S. funding for AFL base operations. Due to a reduction in appropriations, it was necessary that the SDO/DATT as well as the ambassador, jointly engage the Minister of Defense concerning the issue. However, there did not seem to be any additional WoG actions in place beyond mere coordinating meetings. There seemed to be a lack of any type of measures of performance or measures of effectiveness that gauge the entire U.S. WoG approach along multiple lines of effort to programs in Liberia, whether focusing on the MoD or other entities.

The officials recognized the gender issues as they pertained to the AFL. They noted that Liberia has not reached its goal of achieving 20 percent female within the AFL. They did not elaborate, other than to note the lack of basic education for a majority of Liberian women is clearly a contributing factor to the current level of only four percent of the AFL. But, this presents the type of problem that a WoG approach could possibly improve. Considering lessons learned from Afghanistan, there is a recognized need for
DIRI, in coordination with DoS and AFRICOM to work with the MoD to establish training programs specifically geared towards women.

Turning attention to the criteria in table 1, one observes key effects from the intersection of opportunities and efforts. A WoG approach, which leverages multiple elements of national power in a cohesive, synergistic way, can directly impact the Liberian MoD. Thus, there is a superior level of interaction that can potentially be expanded. In addition, the WoG approach, which could utilize DoS and DoD actors could better involve the Departments of Commerce or Treasury and, working with and through some NGOs and IGOs, establish economic incentive programs and education and training programs that do not currently exist. This would be a new focus of the WoG approach, so it is doubtful at this point to assume there to be a superior level effect. However, one can estimate that there would be a moderate effect to organizing a WoG approach specifically towards economic incentives and training opportunities that favor women. Such initiatives could help the MoD achieve the female percentage it seeks in order to more effectively integrate women into positions dominated by men. The summary of the effects through table 1 is presented in table 3.
Table 3. Interaction of Efforts With Opportunities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPPORTUNITIES</th>
<th>EFORTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Occupational Positions in MoD and Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. National Interests in Security Cooperation</td>
<td>MODERATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overcoming Cultural Resistance to Gender Equality</td>
<td>MODERATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current WoG Approach to SC</td>
<td>SUPERIOR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Created by author.

This section considered the secondary questions that get at the heart of whether it is appropriate for the U.S. military to build partnership capacity at the ministerial level to improve gender equality through security cooperation. Set against three realistic opportunities: (1) female positions in a defense ministry and armed forces; (2) economic incentives for female businesses; and (3) educational and training opportunities targeted to women. Utilizing the Liberia case study, it examined the policy foundation upon which a successful strategy might achieve effects. Furthermore, it considered potential cultural challenges to such actions. Finally, it looked at the way in which the U.S. could attempt to promote gender equality programs through security cooperation utilizing the Whole of Government approach. The final chapter will tie together the conclusions and make some recommendations.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

Through data analysis, this paper arrived at several important conclusions. Reviewing Table 3, one understands that the greatest effects can be realized in two gender improving opportunities that can be accomplished through building partner capacity at the ministerial level. Developing positions and opportunities for women within a country’s ministry of defense or its armed forces was bolstered both by U.S. policy and additional strategic positions across multiple agency lines that can further this type of an effort. Secondly, training and education programs aimed at providing women with better access to basic education and increasing literacy programs are similarly furthered by U.S. policy and a whole of government approach that can derive successes in multiple areas, not just limited to military activities.

Using Liberia as a case study was useful, not only as a potential focal point for future action on this subject, but as a starting point in adapting programs and strategies across West Africa and perhaps more broadly around the world. The Liberia study allowed this paper to consider a WoG approach, U.S. national interests, and the importance of a society’s culture in achieving gains with respect to women’s opportunities. In the context of West Africa, the Liberian narrative is indicative of similar experiences shared by its neighbors in the region. ECOWAS is at the fore in trying to understand how it can better shape the area to be more reflective of the language in so many constitutions that tacitly acknowledge human rights for both genders and support equal treatment and opportunities for women.
In a broader context though, the Liberia case study is useful for other regions where the U.S. maintains a strong interest in promoting gender equality. Certainly in Asia, South America, and the Middle East, the U.S. is trying to develop programs and leverage its resources that encourage partner countries to take meaningful steps to improve women’s rights and opportunities for them. So too does the U.S. seek to preempt conflict and promote peace and stability in every region of the world. As this paper demonstrated, actions taken to improve the standing of women in any society tends to have an overall positive effect in that society in terms of reduced violence, higher education, and a more productive economic base.

One caveat is necessary, though. The positive effects represented in Table 3 reflect a workable and proficient WoG approach. The current WoG application, not only in Liberia, but largely in multiple regions, is hampered by inefficiencies, a lack of coordination, inter-agency competition, and a failure to nest outcomes and performance measures. Only by effectively integrating all the elements of national power through the foreign policy apparatus might consistently optimal results be achieved.

Based upon the conclusions reached in this thesis, a few recommendations are advanced.

**Recommendations**

1. Regional U.S. stakeholders should be mandated to identify opportunities to promote gender equality activities in their areas of responsibility. While this paper highlighted many references in national level policy documents from the White House, DoS, DoD, and others on the need to foster gender equality initiatives, there seems to be a lack of forcing function that would ensure such possibilities are required to be
submitted as part of any comprehensive strategy, Theater Security Plan, or report to Congress. By effectively ensuring that multiple agencies committed to overseas roles are identifying gender equality opportunities, at least annually, there is a greater chance that more attention will be paid to this emphasis. There is then a better chance that programs will be run with the explicit intent to create better opportunities for women, especially in parts of the world that desperately need the U.S. to push the issue.

The key issue surrounding this forcing function, however, is who or what should have the responsibility of coordinating and overseeing such a requirement amongst different stakeholders. Given the noted significance of gender issues tied to conflict prevention in multiple strategic planning documents, it would likely be most appropriate for the National Security Council (NSC) to oversee the implementation of this guidance across multiple actors like the DoS, DoD, USAID, and other agencies. Furthermore, as a policymaking body, the NSC can ensure that gender issues are carefully articulated and consistent among multiple stakeholders, and it also possesses the regional expertise to consider specific cultural implications tied to promoting gender equality.

2. This study also suggests that the most meaningful programs to improve gender equality are those focused on training and education. With illiteracy looming as the main restriction to bringing more women into official and military positions and with the advantage the U.S. enjoys in developing educational programs aimed at improving literacy, this is a win-win across the board. Women will be more successful when they have all the tools they need to effectively assert their strength, their knowledge, and their values across the world. The key to unlocking that potential rests in targeted literacy and educational offerings that lead women into positions where they can better contribute to
their societies. For some, that will mean civil service and armed forces—two areas which building partner capacity at the ministerial level was shown to affect. Directly interacting with the MoD through DSCA and uniformed military personnel, and with DoS concurrence, achieves unified effort at the decisive point. However, as an aside, women in places like Liberia can also go on to be teachers themselves and continue to perpetuate the cycle of women improving their status through a commitment to education and development.

3. The final recommendation concerns the WoG approach. This paper called attention to the recognition by a multitude of U.S. government agencies as well as the military of the critical importance of a WoG approach to solving complex problems in the contemporary operating environment. The military understands the role that the DoS and USAID can play in qualitatively improving conditions for populations where the military is charged to secure and protect. Simultaneously, many diplomats understand the amazing resources that the committed professionals of the DoD and the military can bring to help them achieve their policy goals in remote and challenging parts of the world. Unfortunately, the synchronization of objectives, performance measures, and competencies, as well as strategic-level planning by all stakeholders is deficient. Once a cohesive doctrine is developed that takes into account the skills and needs of each entity, coordination and planning should improve. This will therefore lead to better execution once measures of performance and measures of effectiveness are commonly developed, understood, and adhered to in the execution of any multi-agency operation. Indeed, this paper hopefully demonstrated how useful this would be to the cause of improving gender equality and just how well the U.S. could do at realizing it.
This paper recognized that as security cooperation activities will increase over the next several years, shaping the environment where the U.S. military will operate will be of greater importance, potentially, than how the U.S. military actually performs once hostilities in a particular location have begun. Given the unfortunate but recognized relationship between conflict and its effects on women, policymakers and military officials developing strategy should consider how improving gender equity programs through BPC activities may change that dynamic for the better. A society that fully recognizes, respects, and advances gender equality is likely one that is more stable and thus less likely to spawn violent conflict where the U.S. may have to consider sending a larger number of forces to quell a disruptive situation. Understanding that promoting gender equality is tied to its national interests, the U.S. stands in a position to carefully engage conflict-prone places of the world where women suffer discrimination through a Whole of Government approach that unifies the elements of diplomacy, development, and defense. Although Liberia was used as an example, its complicated dynamic is similarly on display in several regions around the world. While pursuing an issue like improving gender equality may potentially upset a partner nation’s society, it may be necessary in order to advance the cause of human rights more broadly, which is always sound policy and meaningful strategy in the long run.
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