Interagency in the Combatant Command: A Model for Efficiency Now Without Waiting for Legislation

LT John M. Gleason

Paper Advisor (if Any): CDR Chad Piacenti, USN, Prof. William McDonald

The importance of interagency coordination within the combatant command has increased dramatically since the creation of Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) in 2001. These were the first attempts at enhancing interagency coordination inside of a combatant command staff to provide a whole of government approach. Since their inception, however, JIACGs have been organized and utilized in various ways based on the desire of the combatant commander, with differing degrees of success. AFRICOM’s designers attempted to break from this uncertainty, in that they included interagency personnel directly into the staff structure and elevated the command’s Political Advisor to that of Deputy Commander. This paper will show that combatant command staffs are most efficient when organized in this manner, as opposed to strictly possessing a JIACG for interagency coordination, and recommends combatant commanders adopt this approach without waiting for Congress to legislate such a change.

Interagency, Combatant Command, CORDS, AFRICOM, JIACG, JIATF


A paper submitted to the Naval War College faculty in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.
INTERAGENCY IN THE COMBATANT COMMAND: A MODEL FOR EFFICIENCY NOW WITHOUT WAITING FOR LEGISLATION

by

John M. Gleason

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The importance of interagency coordination within the combatant command has increased dramatically since the creation of Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) in 2001. These were the first attempts at enhancing interagency coordination inside of a combatant command staff to provide a whole of government approach. Since their inception, however, JIACGs have been organized and utilized in various ways based on the desire of the combatant commander, with differing degrees of success. AFRICOM’s designers attempted to break from this uncertainty, in that they included interagency personnel directly into the staff structure and elevated the command’s Political Advisor to that of Deputy Commander. This paper will show that combatant command staffs are most efficient when organized in this manner, as opposed to strictly possessing a JIACG for interagency coordination, and recommends combatant commanders adopt this approach without waiting for Congress to legislate such a change.
INTRODUCTION

The geographic combatant commander (GCC) has immense resources at his or her disposal, including a joint staff and an interagency support group composed of various members from other government organizations. These professionals are assigned to assist the commander and his or her deputies, providing invaluable knowledge, experience, and ability in their specialized fields. The specific department representation, and the number of overall interagency representation, varies widely among the five geographic combatant commands. There is no mandated or commonly accepted structure to integrate interagency members into a combatant command. Joint interagency working groups (JIACGs) were quickly implemented following the September 11th attacks and were a good first attempt at coordination. Since then, however, combatant commanders have taken various steps to organize interagency coordination. Interagency personnel have been placed in J9 directorates, joint interagency task forces, or traditional JIACGs. Most recently, with the creation of Africa Command (AFRICOM), interagency organization was incorporated directly into the command structure, complete with a civilian ambassador serving as a deputy commander equal to the military deputy. This structure is most reminiscent of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program of Vietnam, which succeeded in finally unifying pacification efforts prior to the eventual U.S. withdrawal.

While truly integrated interagency efforts would most likely require legislation directing its implementation, the structure of AFRICOM deliberately created a CORDS-like structure in an attempt to better unify effort and create a central authority mechanism for US crisis

response and policy implementation within the GCC’s Area of Responsibility (AOR). With some modifications, this structure is the best compromise for combatant commanders. Interagency organization should be entwined within the combatant commander’s staff, rather than joined together as a separate entity, to provide a whole-of-government approach in an efficient manner towards successful unity of effort. This will provide a more efficient model now, without waiting for new legislation.

BACKGROUND

The US Government codified the jointness concept in 1986 with the passing of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DoD) Reorganization Act. This legislation required the Joint Chiefs and the individual services to take actions intended to enhance cooperation and teamwork among DoD organizations. Prior to this legislation, jointness occurred only when directed by superiors or based on the willingness of individuals to work with counterparts in other services. This landmark reorganization act changed the way America fought and started a culture shift towards operating jointly, which greatly enhanced warfighting capability. As often occurs, the act was proposed in response to a crisis: the 1979 failed attempt to rescue American embassy hostages in Iran. The 2001 World Trade Center attack similarly prompted action and led U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to direct the creation of JIACGs in an attempt to address interagency cooperation shortcomings.5

The creation of JIACGs became a great first step towards integrating DoD activities with those of other government agencies. They are bubbles off the edge of a combatant command structure in which to house interagency personnel assigned to the command staff.

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5 Bogdanos, “Transforming Joint Interagency Coordination,” 3.
to provide the commander with whole of government support. Typically, they are specifically used as a separate planning and advisory group, with no decision authority. If allowed to fully function, they can be very effective at successfully combining the efforts of multiple agencies towards a common goal. However, several issues plagued JIACG initial success, and these issues continue to restrain efficiency. Agencies were weary of sending personnel to a military command, essentially losing an asset with little perceived benefit to their parent organizations. While part of the organization, JIACGs remain a separate entity with the accompanied perception of secondary importance. Similar to a JIACG, a Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) is separate from the command structure, but is a much more focused method to combat a specific issue. JIATFs exist separately from the interagency personnel at the command staff, specifically grouped to enhance unity of effort towards a singular mission. While JIATFs should be treated separately, they can be a model for the possible success of interagency efficiency.

Many authors have effectively argued for complete combatant command overhaul or interagency integration, but history proves that sweeping change will not occur unless Congress mandates it by law and ensures its implementation. Wars and conflicts had been fought with some degree of jointness prior to Goldwater-Nichols, but the law was required to force a move towards universal jointness by implementing education, reorganization, and manning requirements. Understandably, jointness, like interagency cooperation, is an evolving ideal, and the Goldwater-Nichols Act was a huge legislative step towards enhancing jointness among the U.S. military. To achieve similar results with interagency coordination, a comparable piece of legislation will be required. For example, a Deputy Political Advisor

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7 Brown, “AFRICOM at 5 Years,” 22.
(POLAD)\(^8\) at CENTCOM suggested aligning state department regional bureaus and defense department combatant commands to better foster cooperation between the two organizations.\(^9\) Also proposed have been far more drastic changes to the entire structure, replacing the separate state and defense structures with a fully integrated geographic organization, headed by an official from either the state or defense department, depending on the nature of the particular region.\(^10\) However, such legislation may not come for many years, if ever, and combatant commanders have a current need to efficiently integrate interagency personnel for a whole-of-government approach.

**PROPOSAL**

To better integrate interagency personnel into the command staff and make them most efficient, they must functionally become part of the staff structure. This is the natural pinnacle of interagency cooperation: a fully-functioning and cohesive unit supporting the commander in the execution of the mission. While JIACGs were a great beginning and necessary first step, they are still segregated to some extent and therefore not the most efficient entity. Each combatant command should have a civilian deputy commander, at the same level as the military deputy, responsible to the commander for interagency coordination and to act as a foreign policy advisor. Underneath that person, concurrent with the J-codes, should be the interagency personnel. There should not be separation into a parallel command structure, but two equal halves of the same command, fully integrated under two deputies, supporting one commander. AFRICOM was designed with this construct, and there are also historical models which support such a structure. President Johnson realized that US

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8 The POLAD is a State Department official, usually ambassador level, assigned to a combatant commander as a high level advisor for diplomatic issues.
9 CENTCOM Deputy POLAD, phone conversation with author, April 24, 2014.
pacification efforts in Vietnam were disjointed among the various agencies, and so instructed Robert Komer to find a solution for unified effort. Ambassador Komer suggested placing a single manager over a unified effort, an idea eventually called the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support program, or CORDS.\textsuperscript{11}

The pre-CORDS interagency situation in Vietnam, and the lack of coordination between agencies, contained many similar problems facing today’s combatant commands. There was a “dual chain of command that failed to coordinate military and civilian efforts.”\textsuperscript{12} Multiple agencies attempted to accomplish similar missions, including an ambassador responsible for overall US action in South Vietnam, and a military with vastly superior resources as compared to the other agencies. CORDS ensured that the ambassador retained overall authority, but recognized that the full mass of the US effort would be required for success and should be unified into one comprehensive package under the full authority of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) commander.\textsuperscript{13} Similarly, the geographic combatant commands maintain responsibility for US interests around the globe, with huge resources, and facing situations which seldom allow for unilateral military solutions.

The necessity of interagency unity of effort is not disputed. The challenge is how best to achieve unity of effort despite the different cultures, priorities, and interests of each organization, each fighting to keep its independence and freedom of action.\textsuperscript{14} By virtue of Presidential Directive, the CORDS program ensured the US unity of effort in Vietnam.

through the civilian deputy, reporting to the military head.\textsuperscript{15} This structure allowed the civilians to continue their important duties supporting their various agencies’ goals, but in a coordinated manner with other agencies. While each agency had specific tasks and specialties, and often performed vastly different activities, “the whole was greater than the sum of its parts.”\textsuperscript{16} This was not a dual chain of command, but a single structure with two parallel but separate lines leading to the same commander.\textsuperscript{17} The modern-day staff of a combatant command should be similarly structured. Within the same organization, the deputy commanders of both the military and civilian staffs can lead their people towards efficient cooperation. Instead of the interagency personnel working in a bubble separate from their military counterparts, they can be working with them side by side, engaged in the everyday operations and challenges and constantly supporting their commanders with specialized expertise. Like the CORDS program in Vietnam, it will not be perfect, but it will be the best mix of pros and cons to produce the most efficient possible staff structure until Congress establishes an alternative.\textsuperscript{18}

While the CORDS program provides historical basis for the separate but equal command structure, AFRICOM was designed with interagency in mind and operates within the proposed organizational model. As the youngest of the geographic combatant commands, established in 2007, AFRICOM’s creators structured it with the understanding that military power has limits, and must be closely coordinated with other elements for efficiency and success.\textsuperscript{19} It was the first combatant command to elevate its political advisor, a State Department representative at the ambassador level, to the post of civilian deputy.

\textsuperscript{15} Andrade and Willbanks, “CORDS/Phoenix,” 14.
\textsuperscript{16} Mandy Honn et al., “A Legacy of Vietnam: Lessons from CORDS,” 45.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 41.
\textsuperscript{18} Scoville, \textit{Reorganizing for Pacification Support}, 65.
\textsuperscript{19} Brown, “AFRICOM at 5 Years,” 11.
commander, and contained the most interagency positions of any geographic combatant command. Their efforts are focused on the 3D approach to security: diplomacy, development and defense; and it was intended for one quarter of their staff to be comprised of interagency personnel.20

Along with a civilian deputy integrated towards the top of the leadership, AFRICOM has augmented their J-coded staff with interagency personnel. There are State Department personnel within J-3(Operations) and J-5(Strategy, Plans and Program), and a senior Foreign Service officer (FSO) heads J-9(Outreach).21 A USAID representative heads a branch within J-5, and there are more than twenty other interagency personnel from eleven different agencies spread throughout the command, some strictly as liaisons, but mostly embedded with the staff.22 This integration is the result of careful study and analysis. While it remains a military command and part of the Department of Defense, its planners designed it from the very beginning as a model for a whole of government approach to foreign affairs. The best coordination of interagency efforts occurs when those personnel are working with their military counterparts on a daily basis, directly influencing the command’s planning and responses, and not separated from their military colleagues. According to one State Department official, AFRICOM’s unique interagency construct has directly led to various successes in its AOR, through projects such as African Partnership Station, efforts to combat AIDS and sexual violence, and a whole of government effort to thwart piracy off of the Horn of Africa.23 Operations in Libya highlighted interagency success at AFRICOM, and both the staff and a specifically formed interagency cell validated this interagency working concept

20 Ibid, 16, 22.
21 Ibid., 23.
22 Ibid., 25.
through timely responses for information only possible with such close interagency coordination. Although not perfect and still evolving, AFRICOM’s structure provides the foundation for a cultural shift towards increased interagency cooperation, leading to this greater success at the operational level.

**CURRENT COMMAND STRUCTURES**

Geographic combatant commanders exercise great autonomy when structuring their command structure and support organizations. While every command was directed to organize a JIACG for greater interagency coordination, JIACG utilization has varied widely among the various combatant commands as each new commander organizes their command to suit individual needs and requirements. Through careful examination of Central Command (CENTCOM), Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), and Pacific Command (PACOM) structures, one can make distinctions among the various methods commanders have utilized to enhance interagency efforts and move toward an integrated command structure.

Most relevant over the past decade, CENTCOM has experienced great interagency successes and hardships, based largely on the relationships of top officials in the region. CENTCOM relies heavily on separate interagency working groups and its JIACG, and does not place its Political Advisor (POLAD) within the command structure. In fact, its current website fails to include or even mention the political advisor. This highlights the current importance of personalities and relationships on civil-military coordination, in the absence of legislation directing unified efforts. For example, the coordination between military and civilian efforts in Afghanistan swung between successful integration and disjointed effort

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24 Brown, “AFRICOM at 5 Years,” 50.
five times in a nine year period, based solely on the relationship between the commanding
general and the appointed ambassador. This fluctuating coordination relates directly to the
lack of established interagency structure within large staffs, creating the opportunity for
failure. After acknowledging such a lack of unity of effort in Afghanistan, the House Armed
Services Committee called for greater interagency structure to withstand the effect of
personality on interagency coordination.

The creation and evolution of CENTCOM’s JIACG highlights the struggle for
combatant commands to embrace interagency coordination outside of a staff structure.
CENTCOM’s JIACG was the first to be created after Secretary Rumsfeld authorized their
creation, and it comprised a small group focused strictly on counterterrorism, deploying as a
specialized unit. It broadened into a larger group more representative of the whole of
government approach, but still limited by the agencies’ control over their participating
agents. Finally, the group was treated like a task force, not as part of the command staff, and
splinter cells were transferred throughout the region based on specific needs, even acting as
the equivalent of a command team until an embassy was established. It has now
culminated as the Interagency Task Force for Irregular Warfare, highlighting its
transformation from small task force, to large interagency group, and back to being a task
force. According to one of their Deputy POLADs, the command’s four-person State
Department office serves strictly as advisor to the combatant commander, operating as an
entity outside of both the command structure and JIACG, reviewing proposals and

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27 Ibid., 125.
28 Schwarzenberg, “Where are the JIACGs Today?,” 30.
29 Bogdanos, “Transforming Joint Interagency Coordination,” 6-11.
30 Schwarzenberg, “Where are the JIACGs Today?,” 30.
coordinating with the State Department in Washington. Their evaluations are still signed by their own department, but the military chief of staff has a role in rating their performance. He added that many of the other interagency personnel have started to integrate, with FBI personnel in J-3, CIA in J-2 (Intelligence), and USAID personnel working in both J-3 and J-5. This partial integration should serve the commander better than keeping the interagency personnel separated in a JIACG. While successful in its own right, the JIACG in CENTCOM functioned more as a multi-role JIATF the commander could use as a crisis team instead of a staff helping to mold overall unity of effort, highlighting the possibility of inefficiency when interagency personnel are not integrated into a staff structure.

SOUTHCOM has also been highlighted because of its interagency successes, due to the highly touted JIATF-South organization. Unlike CENTCOM’s use of its JIACG like a task force, SOUTHCOM created this task force specifically to align efforts towards a single mission: counternarcotics. This is the distinction between JIATFs and true interagency coordination at the combatant command level. A JIATF is a small group with a singular mindset and mission, whereas interagency personnel assigned to a combatant command staff must be integrated to provide unity of effort across the entire scope of regional involvement. While not a replacement for integrated interagency staff efforts, the success of JIATF-S makes it a model for coordination efforts and “the benchmark interagency organization to emulate.”

The success of JIATF-S at an operational and tactical level can be duplicated at the theater-strategic, combatant command level. The difference is the willingness of all agencies to voluntarily focus on unity of effort and mission accomplishment, instead of individual

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31 CENTCOM Deputy POLAD, phone conversation with author, April 24, 2014.
32 Ibid.
agency achievement. This important concept allows for unity of command at JIATF-South, under the direction of a Coast Guard Admiral. The parent agencies have also surrendered the performance evaluation process of their personnel to the task force, a huge factor towards integration. This means that the supervisors within JIATF-South evaluate the performance of their people directly, allowing interagency individuals to wholly support the task group instead of worrying about how their professional allegiances may impact their careers. Importantly, however, this degree of agency trust is entirely voluntary, and is difficult to garner and maintain at a higher level.

Although JIATF-South is an interagency success, SOUTHCOM’s headquarters structure itself was questioned after the response to the earthquake in Haiti, but its initial failures resulted from an overall restructuring experiment and was not based on interagency integration. Southern Command reorganized into a directorate structure in 2008, in an effort to enhance efficiency and better conduct interagency relations. They reorganized from the traditional J-codes to a modern business-like organization in an attempt to more successfully accomplish its regional stability and security mission. They also established their State Department POLAD as a civilian deputy commander, responsible for the interagency personnel and coordination efforts. According to joint doctrine, a commander has the freedom to organize their command as they desire to accomplish their assigned mission. Its commander felt that, based on other successful implementations of the directorate model in the corporate world, SOUTHCOM could likewise function better as an organization of

34 Ibid., 119.
36 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, March 25, 2013, IV-2.
directorates. From 2008 until Operation Unified Response began in January 2010, the reorganization successfully achieved its intended goals in strengthening interagency cooperation and enhancing productivity.\footnote{GAO, \textit{U.S. Southern Command}, 22.} The massive Haiti disaster relief effort strained the new structure, however, when the staff could not easily plan long-term operations or organize the huge influx of augmentees unfamiliar with a directorate system.\footnote{Ibid., 27.} Personnel and units assigned to assist SOUTHCOM with the disaster relief mission did not know where to go for guidance or who to report to, being accustomed to J-codes and unaccustomed to the directorate construct. This organizational shortcoming, and not the interagency integration, forced SOUTHCOM to return to the traditional joint staff structure within the first week of the crisis response.\footnote{Ibid., 28.} It was their interagency focus that remained firm and allowed such a quick change and successful response.

Since the Secretary of Defense mandated the creation of JIACGs, PACOM’s interagency coordination has also had a varied past. Their JIACG originally acted as a true coordination group, playing the role of middle-man between country teams and the various departments in Washington, trying to align all efforts for the United States’ influence in the Pacific region.\footnote{Schwarzenberg, “Where are the JIACGs Today?,” 28.} They attempted to act on behalf of the commander’s staff, almost as a separate outgrowth to separate themselves from any particular military department, but representing the command as a whole. They acted as a true JIACG, coordinating interagency efforts within the combatant command, to smooth the command’s external relations and enhance planning and execution of missions requiring interagency efforts. These are the intended benefits of including interagency personnel within a staff, despite the fact that they
are still somewhat independent as a separate group. However, as often happens without a codified structure, a change in leadership led to reorganization. They are now split between outside entities, with the POLAD being part of the special staff (and not a deputy commander) and a majority of the remaining interagency efforts in the JIACG assigned to the J-9 directorate. Although PACOM greatly supports interagency efforts, it does not have a civilian deputy or interagency personnel integrated directly into its staff structure.

**CONCLUSIONS**

The struggle for unity of effort has evolved throughout the last century and the beginning of the current one. Its evolution has flowed from a willingness of the Army and Navy in World War Two to work together based on leadership personalities, to the National Security Act of 1947 creating entities like the Department of Defense and the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 codifying much of the unity of effort the military currently enjoys. While it has taken decades since the National Security Act for the different services to think, organize and act jointly, the search for true interagency unity of effort is still in its beginning stages.

Modern interagency coordination with the combatant commands began with the creation and implementation of the JIACGs in response to disjointed post-September 11th efforts. This concept attempts to link global military and civilian efforts by combining personnel into one command headquarters, but fails to fully integrate them. By attaching them onto the structure as a separate entity, it allows for increased coordination but invites isolation and stove piping of effort. The interagency personnel are involved to the extent that they are tasked, rather than being fully integrated. The concept allows commanders and their

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41 See PACOM Website: http://www.pacom.mil/organization/staff-directorates/index.shtml
deputies to utilize them as much or as little as they desire, allowing for the potential for underutilization or being used as a task force instead of being truly assimilated.

The direction to possess a JIACG and interagency personnel, without guidance on utilization or integration, has caused several different interagency constructs over the past ten years between the various geographic combatant commands. PACOM’s first coordination group operated almost as its own entity, coordinating for the command between country teams and Washington to enhance unity of effort. CENTCOM, as the first to organize a JIACG, initially used theirs mainly as a task force dedicated to attacking problems as they arose. SOUTHCOM completely reorganized to a directorate system to better enable the interagency effort, but the directorate system could not support large scale military operations or planning and so was forced to switch back at the start of a crisis. Notably, this switch was the result of overall command staff organization and was not the consequence of interagency integration, nor would the proposed integrated structure change current staff capability in similar operations. Their JIATF has been heralded as the model for interagency coordination, but it is relatively small-scale, focused specifically on a singular problem, and is not an integrated part of the commander’s staff. PACOM and CENTCOM both utilize their POLADs solely as State Department advisors, keeping them as a small part of their executive or special staff. SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM have elevated their POLADs to Deputy Commander status, equal to their military deputies and responsible for the interagency efforts in addition to their State Department advisory roles. Because interagency integration is simply the guidance and intent, commanders have historically utilized their interagency personnel and JIACGs to their liking, based on preference and perceived usefulness.
These problems could be addressed by an entire combatant command reorganization, with a requirement from Congress to be of a whole of government construct. While ideal in theory, the legislation required for such an enormous shuffle is not likely to come soon, if ever. Because of the present need for better interagency coordination, and due to the current political environment, commanders must take action themselves and not wait for it to be legislated.

The CORDS program and current AFRICOM construct provide ample historical and modern support for a civilian-led command component. The single combatant commander retains the best possible unity of command, while civilian and military deputies integrate their personnel towards unity of effort. The current legislation cannot support a fully integrated structure, but military and interagency personnel, working side by side and reporting to their respective deputies, can provide more complete unity of effort. The JIACG was a great first step towards integration, but the evolution of interagency inclusion cannot be allowed to stall with the interagency effort relegated to a separate organization pinned to the overall structure. The concept of unity of effort demands interagency inclusion, and requires that agency personnel be integrated into the command structure to work alongside their military counterparts.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

First, the most immediate change a combatant commander should make is to elevate the POLAD to the position of Civilian Deputy Director. AFRICOM was designed with this construct, and SOUTHCOM has recently changed to it. A civilian deputy displays the importance of interagency coordination both to his or her own assigned personnel and to the various departments, organizations and foreign entities with which the command interacts. A
civilian deputy can also coordinate and be responsible for interagency efforts within the command organization. This is the easiest and most effective change a commander can make to enhance their command’s whole of government approach.

Secondly, commanders should move from the JIACG construct to one of integration. True unity of effort includes military and civilian personnel working together as part of a combined staff, not working separately and comparing efforts afterwards. JIACGs were also not designed to be a task force, but a way for interagency expertise to be part of the command itself. JIATFs function very well for their limited intended purpose, and should remain separate from the integrated interagency staff. The practical interagency evolution began with JIACGs, but the growth process must continue with a transition to fully integrated staffs to allow for more complete unity of effort within the combatant command.
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