ON CONTEMPORARY WAR AND THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES: THE AFGHAN WAR AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

by

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Since the 1990s, German soldiers have been continuously deployed abroad without geographical restrictions. This policy breaks with the customs of the Cold War, in which the Bundeswehr focused strictly on continental roles and missions of forward defense in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The thesis argues that the evolution of the Bundeswehr to operational forces was a military adaptation determined by sociopolitical and military dynamics. Missions abroad transformed the Bundeswehr and had implications on the political level, and in society more broadly, in the face of domestic doubts and a public skepticism about war.

More specifically, this transition has forced more qualitative changes than did unification and perhaps anything that came before. The heart and brains of the Bundeswehr changed because the Afghan mission was a new operational environment with unknown demands and consequences to which soldiers and civilians had to adapt in order to carry out the mission with success amid strategic ambiguity and domestic resistance. It resulted in a change of thinking, which has led to an emergence of a new identity of the Bundeswehr with a new Einsatz-Generation, which will have significant effects in Germany and among its allies well after the Germans cease security and combat operations in Afghanistan.

14. SUBJECT TERMS
Afghanistan, Bundeswehr, Einsatz-Generation, functional extension, German armed forces, Germany, Innere Führung, International Security Assistance Force, miles bellicus, miles protector, military operations other than war, military professionalism, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Operation Enduring Freedom, paradoxical requirements, soldiers for combat, soldiers for peace

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ABSTRACT

Since the 1990s, German soldiers have been continuously deployed abroad without geographical restrictions. This policy breaks with the customs of the Cold War, in which the Bundeswehr focused strictly on continental roles and missions of forward defense in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The thesis argues that the evolution of the Bundeswehr to operational forces was a military adaptation determined by sociopolitical and military dynamics. Missions abroad transformed the Bundeswehr and had implications on the political level, and in society more broadly, in the face of domestic doubts and a public skepticism about war.

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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
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<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASB</td>
<td>Ausbildungs- und Schutzbataillone (training and protection battalions)</td>
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<td>ATA</td>
<td>Afghan Transitional Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMVg</td>
<td>Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (Federal Ministry of Defense)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Union of Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>COIN</td>
<td>counterinsurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSU</td>
<td>Christian Social Union in Bavaria</td>
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<tr>
<td>Drs.</td>
<td>Drucksache (printed circular)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>Free Democratic Party</td>
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<td>IED</td>
<td>improvised explosive device</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>KSK</td>
<td>Kommando Spezialkräfte (Special Forces Command)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEDEVAC</td>
<td>medical evacuation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MICV</td>
<td>mechanized infantry combat vehicles</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOOTW</td>
<td>military operations other than war</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>Nuclear, Biological, Chemical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEF</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMLT</td>
<td>Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Teams</td>
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<tr>
<td>QRF</td>
<td>Quick Reaction Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Regional Command</td>
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<td>SF</td>
<td>Special Forces</td>
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<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilization Force</td>
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<td>SPD</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party of Germany</td>
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This master’s thesis covers interpretations of social, political, and military events and dynamics and, therefore, comments on controversial points that have been of discussion among politicians, journalists, historians, scholars, and others interested in German military transformation. While the author cannot hope that all readers will agree with all the present findings and observations, he notes that this work is thoroughly based on years of service in the German armed forces, including scholarly work at two different universities on different continents, culminating in this effort and graduation from the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in the United States of America.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Five centuries ago, a political philosopher of state and armies, Niccolò Machiavelli, wrote in his book, *History of Florence*, that states “may go to war when they will, but cannot always withdraw when they like.”¹ He further remarked that wars are unpredictable and have unforeseeable implications—intended and unintended—which for him begged the question of the ideal posture of military power in the state especially in view of the less effective soldiering done by mercenaries in the early modern period.

A German soldier of today who wants to borrow something from the great spirit of Machiavelli for this moment will ask, as the great Florentine did in his own time, how contemporary military organizations fit the altered face of war, and how has the recent record of service and its fighting shed light on the character and essence of the German soldier and his or her army as it did in another epoch on the armies of Florence? In this connection, the role of the Afghan conflict, with the possible exception of the worsening crisis in Ukraine, is surely the most significant event in the contemporary history of the German military since German unity in 1990, if not earlier. It is a chapter in the evolution of armed forces that begs its full meaning as to the spirit of armies and their adjustment to contemporary conflict in its entire variety. Specifically, what changes has the prolonged engagement in Afghanistan brought to the Bundeswehr?

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS

War since the late twentieth century, as well as operational and organizational changes in the German military, have had a long-term impact on the evolution of armed forces and raise important questions about the contemporary history of Germany’s military in NATO. Why and how have the Bundeswehr and German soldiering changed during the Afghan war in the dimensions of strategy, organization, and especially in institutions of command, obedience, and morale? What main contributing factors in

politics, society, military organization, the battlefield, and allies account for the evolution of the Bundeswehr? Why and how did the Afghan war bring about a new identity of soldier and a new ethos of the Bundeswehr? How will the Bundeswehr evolve after the Germans cease security and combat operations in Afghanistan in 2014 and return to a state and society that has little appetite for conflict and to a Europe where the basis of peace is seriously eroding?

B. IMPORTANCE

The German military has evolved through a breakneck process of adaptation, force reduction, and new missions since 1990, which has often left the heads of soldiers and civilians spinning in an effort to adjust custom and practice to a new reality. This epoch began with the peaceful and even collegial roll-up of the Cold War German-German military confrontation, the start of NATO enlargement, a significant reduction in the size of the Bundeswehr, and the advent of operations, however small, outside of Europe on a global scale.

Since 1992, German soldiers have been deployed abroad without interruption. Today, some 5,700 members of the armed forces are stationed in Afghanistan, in Kosovo, in the Mediterranean, in Africa, and off the coast of Somalia. This policy and posture broke with the customs of the Cold War, when the Bundeswehr had been focused solely on continental roles and missions of forward defense in NATO. After the end of the Cold

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Note: Translations of all foreign titles cited are provided in the bibliography. Following the guidelines of the Chicago Manual of Style 16th Edition, the titles are translated freely by the author as a guide to the non-German-speaking reader; these translations should not be taken to bind a future publisher or formal translator.
War and German unification, the use of German soldiers in the international system changed fundamentally with the start of expeditionary operations in concert with international security organization.3

This change was new for the German public, but it was not new for the German military, especially for those men and women of a new and significant generation who had served in the former Yugoslavia, in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)—a NATO-led security mission—in Afghanistan.4 They had already served and fought for nine years in Afghanistan, and since 2001, the beginning of the Afghanistan conflict, the armed forces had begun to change—transform—its national security strategy, structure, organization, combat aircraft and vehicles, combat gear, military training, operational and tactical procedures, and most importantly, its identity. The heart and brains of the Bundeswehr, the soldiers, changed because the Afghan conflict was a new operational environment with unknown demands and consequences to which soldiers and civilians had to adapt to carry out this mission with success amid strategic ambiguity and domestic resistance.

What gave rise to political debates in the early 1990s and in the beginning of the Afghan war in 2002 has become more typical, if not quite normal: the use of German military beyond territorial defense to enforce “peace and human rights, which are not just given but must be preserved and—where necessary—defended by force of arms; this is


also duty of the Bundeswehr.” The variety of tasks of the German armed forces is manifold: ranging from the very first peace-keeping support in Cambodia, humanitarian aid in Somalia, peace-enforcing on the Balkans, especially in the Yugoslav successor states, and participating in global war against terrorism to multinational operations against piracy at the Horn of Africa. The evolution of the Bundeswehr and its adaptation to a new operational environment has nonetheless been undertaken in the face of deep domestic doubts about such operations, a public skepticism about war in general, and a lack of moral support for soldiers that contrasts starkly with the view of the armed forces in other leading Western democracies.

The fraught nature of armed conflict in Germany manifests itself even in the words that German officials use—or do not use—in discussing these missions. In 2010, the former German Federal President, Horst Köhler, did not simply call the Afghan mission a “conflict”; he called it a new “war.” For the first time in German history since World War II, the German government spoke of war as something other than the total war or nuclear Armageddon on German soil. War as a political concept in the German political and strategic culture carries a very different meaning compared to the Anglo-American world, with its less fateful record of war and soldiers. War is seen almost exclusively in personal (i.e., the portrait of Gerhard Schröder’s father in Stahlhelm and Feldbluse—a father whom the former chancellor never knew) and tragic terms, a generalized reaction to the militarism of the past and especially to the Nazi abuse of soldierly virtue and the glories of battle, which hold no allure in public life.


In the years before 2010, the public and political notion of the Afghanistan mission began to change in terms of armed conflict toward war. Despite the unique features of military command and obedience, deaths of German soldiers were considered “casualties using the German word for killed by accident, rather than the word for a soldier fallen in the battle” until late 2008. During most of Minister of Defense Dr. Franz Josef Jung’s tenure, war-related words and signs in public communication were avoided and only the word Kampfeinsatz (combat mission) versus “war” was used to express the operational context of the German ISAF mission. German parliamentarians talked about combat missions, avoiding the notion of war.

In 2009, however, Dr. Jung struck a new path in the debate on war and fallen soldiers when he stressed his gratitude and appreciation for the dead soldiers who had fallen for Germany in efforts of peace at an official funeral service for two German soldiers who were killed by a suicide attack in Kunduz. His words seemed particularly charged. No German soldiers had been killed in action in more than sixty years, and the terms remained charged with their historical burden, associated with guilt. Gefallene (fallen) and its related term Krieg (war) also contrasted with the carefully cultivated picture of Bundeswehr’s Afghanistan mission being about stabilization or reconstruction rather than a warlike situation. Indeed, both terms—Krieg and Gefallene—are neither defined nor mentioned in the German military Law on the Legal Status of Soldiers. With his choice of words, Dr. Jung’s funeral speech resulted not only from a broad debate within the Federal Ministry of Defense and within in the Bundestag but also

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8 Brehm et al., *Armee im Einsatz*, 164.


10 Dörler-Dierken, “Identitätspolitik der Bundeswehr,” 140; King, “Adaptation or Refusal to Adapt,” 102.


emerged from the extensive amendment of *Innere Führung* that was altered to suit the new military experiences including the necessity to fight.

In other words, the transformation due to the Afghan conflict has forced more qualitative changes of the German armed forces than unification or, perhaps, any development before it. Such adaptions of service and purpose as well as fighting power were undertaken significantly enough, while German troops were under fire in Afghanistan. This present work and its inquiry into contemporary war and changes of the German military will promote a better understanding of the Afghan war and its consequences for the German contemporary military in particular.

C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS

“War is a mere continuation of politics by other means,” goes a well-known statement from the Prussian officer and military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, who elaborated on the political and moral aspects of war in his prominent work *Vom Kriege*. It is certainly the common perception across the world that the instrument to conduct war is the military. In this context, war means violent acts against enemies to overwhelm their will. To fulfill this purpose, military organizations must have the willingness to go to extremes. Thus, members of the military organizations—soldiers—have to be prepared and trained to execute that will, in case of the need to kill others or to risk their life. This functional description is the unique attribute that separates the military profession from most others. However, such a professional code collides with the convictions of many civilians and others who regard any state use of violence in any form as a monstrosity. The stance is particularly pronounced in Germany today.

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14 Ibid., 50.
15 Ibid., 56.
Politics and military organizations have an interlocking relationship with each other; politics determine the institutional and organizational nature of the military: ideals of command and leadership, quality and quantity, and their responsibilities combined with political and strategic goals for military operations. Politics define the guidelines and set the parameters for military organizations in a hierarchical, top-down procedure. Military organizations must meet the requirements and fulfill the purpose of the political interest. Because German “security is not defined in geographical terms only,” there are basically no geographical restrictions on German military deployment.  

As the late Dr. Peter Struck noted, the security of Germany is “also defended in the Hindu Kush.”

The Federal Republic of Germany is, after the United States and United Kingdom, currently third on the list of contributors of deployed soldiers abroad. Since 1992, the intensity and the extent of these military missions have grown, which resulted in 103 German soldiers killed in action, 55 of them in the Afghan war. The increasing demand on military capabilities changed the German military that fights wars—and the way the armed forces, the politicians, and the public view the fighting forces and their missions.

A closer analysis of the Afghan war reveals that public and political perceptions diverge from the reality that confronts the military. Consequently, in a process of steps since 1989, the armed forces not only created a new set of strategic policy papers emphasizing the importance of military missions abroad but also inherently adapted ethos, organization, and command to their nature amid the new operational demands. Thus, the evolution of the Bundeswehr cannot only be seen as a top-down procedure initiated by German politics. The altered military missions that intensified apace meant

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new experiences and new perceptions: peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, Somalia and the Adriatic in 1992, in Bosnia, 1995, as well as in Kosovo, 1999, and, most fateful, the security-building and warfare in Afghanistan since 2001. These military missions at Europe’s periphery had implications on the political level as concerns foreign and security policy as well as the role of the forces in society. Hence, analyzing the evolution of the Bundeswehr only through, say, a collection of security policy statements and proclamations of ministers and chiefs of defense does not show the full process of adaptation to the new set of demands, nor does it encompass the extent of the changes of the German military.

In contrast, the consideration, especially by an officer with operational experience of a bottom-up process of change, reveals what the transition meant for the soldiers’ alternating operational demands and how it, in turn, resulted in a change of thinking, which has led to an emergence of a new identity of the Bundeswehr. The 2008 modifications of *Innere Führung*, which institutionalizes the core concepts of command and leadership of the Bundeswehr, underscores this change of mind that can be interpreted with the concept of a *miles protector* or a *miles bellicus*.

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

The present thesis relies on existing scholarly literature of political and social sciences and of contemporary history. The repertoire of scholarly work with a focus on German military reforms as well as on German security and defense politics—especially after unification in 1990—is manifold and demands a closer analysis. Publications from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, the Institute for Military History and Social Sciences of the Bundeswehr, and the Federal Agency for Civic Education provide a broader body of scholarly works that address the development of the armed forces against the background of German military deployments. Additionally,

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policy papers of the Federal Government, of the Lower House of German Parliament (Bundestag), and of the Federal Minister of Defense are open sources and broaden the available scholarly literature on this topic significantly.

The German Institute for International and Security Affairs, along with the Institute for Military History and Social Sciences of the Bundeswehr, provides essential and significant academic literature for this thesis about modern war and changes of the Bundeswehr. The German Institute for International and Security Affairs possesses a plethora of academic literature focusing on the evolution of the German military since World War II up to current military deployments. Their essays illustrate the course of German deployments starting in Morocco in 1960, and discuss policies, military operations, and the causes of their success or failure.23 The essays provide a broad understanding that the armed forces had to adapt to a new set of demands.24 International constraints as well as operational and functional demands led the German military to alter their structure, organization, military training, and purpose, which resulted in challenging the ideals of command and leadership. This rethinking and its discussion are not new in contemporary German military history; for instance, the Karst-Baudissin controversy of the 1960s touched off a similar re-examination (see Chapter II).25 New essays picked up that old discussion and demanded a rethinking of the German military ideals underlining their argument on the emergence of a new Bundeswehr that must be mobile, flexible, and

23 Chiari and Pahl, Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr, 25.


interoperable with allied partners to conduct military operations—war—without geographical restrictions.26 This point of view gives up on the idea of the citizen in uniform—the key ideal of Innere Führung—and emphasizes military professionalism with its single focus on fighting wars.

The German military, however, did not change because of a debate about command and leadership but due to German politics in general and to the operational environment in particular. Starting with out-of-area missions in the 1990s, different environments ranging from humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping and enforcing operations to high-intensity warfare changed “postwar Germany’s reluctant armed forces,” prompting them to build up military expertise and to gain international confidence.27

The Institute for Military History and Social Sciences of the Bundeswehr, which is an institute under the chain of command of the German Armed Forces Office, focuses on military topics of contemporary German history studies. The institute published several social science journals that addressed the development of the German military and the emergence of operations of the armed forces engaging terrorist threats abroad, and, furthermore, the challenges to Innere Führung and also problems and strain, which soldiers are confronted with during their deployment.28 Most articles do not concentrate findings on military issues only but incorporate research from public opinion surveys on security and defense issues as well.

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The essays of the social science journals can be categorized into different fields of interest, each focusing on specific challenges due to military operations. The emergence of new ideals of command, leadership, and military profession is addressed by, among others, Elmar Wiesendahl, former Head of Department of the German General Staff College. Critical essays raise questions about whether the ongoing transformation of the German military requires a new corporate philosophy, which may or may not be consistent with *Innere Führung*. The discussion emphasizes the importance of identity, professionalized self-image, and their relationship with the military profession in general as well as for the Bundeswehr in particular. Jens Warburg and Maja Apelt, who address the development of new military operations and their meaning for military professionalism, complement the discussion about the role of soldiers and the applicability of *Innere Führung* abroad. Their essays, among others, illustrate the growing challenges—“paradoxical requirements”—of military operations ranging from “feeding and clothing displaced refugees—providing humanitarian assistance […] and] holding two warring tribes apart—conducting peacekeeping operations, […] to] fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle. All on the same day, all within three city blocks. It will be what we call the three-block war.” These paradoxical requirements demand a new set of skills. The changing military operations, in particular the Afghan war, were new, unknown operational environments with broader demands and consequences.

On military professionalism, the academic literature points out that cross-cultural competence is one key necessity to carry out missions successfully. Maren Tomforde and Phil C. Langer emphasize the necessity of cross-cultural competence, which is a prerequisite for the “relationship to local civilians built on communication and

29 “Wohin steuert die Führung?,” *Zeitschrift für Innere Führung*, accessed on October 26, 2013, http://www.ifzeitschrift.de/portal/a/ifz!/at/p/e4/JYvBCsfwEAX_aLcpB9Fbay?iTRCt0nmbbbw QJCVsL1gfb4jYCY7DydmvHnzZISDNwss-Byv42G_Qb5ZePH5AZnLkYuw0x-QnvJePJRiCJykW8s LZUzQSlqwhylKijEXYltdpXsrqdqu_1PqQ63PS-VvrcXnF1rvkBE4RWgw!!/

confidence,”31 across all hierarchic levels of the chain of command because operating “without cultural understanding is to operate blind and deaf.”32 To deploy soldiers abroad requires taking into account cultural differences not only in political terms (the strategic level) but also in the military realm (the tactical level): a consequence of the Afghan war that had to be adapted for and incorporated into strategic policies and for the ideals of command and leadership of the German military.

The Federal Agency for Civic Education offers a diversity of academic literature focusing on the development of the German military, the Afghan war, and about Afghanistan.33 The literature elaborates on failures of German politics and international strategies, on escapist political and military decisions, and on challenges that arose because the Hindu Kush might not be understood in Western terms of rationality or thought.34 According to Klaus Naumann, political and military failures occurred already at the beginning of the Afghan military endeavor, in 2001, when politicians decided to use a two-way approach to build up democracy in Afghanistan: OEF on the one hand and ISAF on the other—two inherently diametrical operations. The literature shows politicians, who are unwilling to take responsibility for intensifying military operations in Afghanistan, and the German military, which is confronted with the reality of war and is forced to adapt to it accordingly, resulting in a rushed evolution of the German military from the bottom.


32 The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Joint Doctrine Note 1/09: The Significance of Culture to the Military (Swindon: Ministry of Defense, 2009), 1.

33 Susanne Koelbl and Olaf Ihlau, Geliebtes, dunkles Land: Menschen und Mächte in Afghanistan (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2008); Naumann, Klaus, Einsatz ohne Ziel? Die Politikbedürftigkeit des Militärischen (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2010); Ahmed Rashid, Am Abgrund: Afghanistan, Pakistan und der Westen (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2013); Franziska Storz, Marc Baumann, Martin Langeder, Mauritius Much, and Bastian Obermayer, Feldpost: Briefe deutscher Soldaten aus Afghanistan (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2011); Andreas Timmermann-Levanas, and Andrea Richter, Die reden – Wir sterben (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2010).

34 Koelbl, Geliebtes, dunkles Land, 10.
Additionally, policy papers of the Federal Government, of the Bundestag, and of the Federal Ministry of Defense broaden the findings of the aforementioned scholarly literature. The different sources illustrate German politics in respect to strategic interests influencing the development of the armed forces and deciding to use armed forces abroad. Since unification, Germany’s participation in military operations alongside its allied partners has increased significantly. A closer look at the German White Papers 1994 and 2006 published by the Federal Government and at the Defense Policy Guidelines from 1992, 2003, and 2011 by the Federal Ministry of Defense reveal a change in German politics. The White Paper 2006 emphasizes, as before, the dynamics of a constantly changing picture of international conflict and war. Thus, the armed forces must obtain a high degree of flexibility and adaptability to cope with new operational environments abroad. According to the current defense policy, the German military focuses no longer on territorial defense because of the unlikelihood of conventional aggression. Their main purpose covers international crisis prevention, including the fight against terrorism.

To implement this defense reorientation, both governmental sources argued to transform the former forward defense force into a modern crisis intervention force. This new idea of the Bundeswehr was already expressed in 1995 when the Bundestag passed a law stating that the Bundestag must decide on all German military missions. The adaptation of German law was a first political step that not only established the requirements to guarantee future participation of German military abroad but also confirmed the special responsibility of German politics for military operations.

35 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Weißbuch 2006 zur Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr (Berlin: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2006), accessed on February 6, 2014, http://www.bmvg.de/resource/resource/MzEzNTM4MmUzMzMyMmUzMzMTM1MzMyMzYTQ2ODY1NmQ2NzY4MzEyMDIwMjAyMDIw/WB_2006_dt_mB.pdf; Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien für den Geschäftsbereich des Bundesministers der Verteidigung (Berlin: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2003), accessed on February 6, 2014, http://www.bmvg.de/resource/resource/MzEzNTM4MmUzMzMyMmUzMzMTM1MzMyMzYTQ2ODY1NmQ2NzY4MzEyMDIwMjAyMDIw/Verteidigungspolitische%20Richtlinien%20(27.05.11).pdf.

These governmental sources present the same causal argumentation to modernize and to adapt the armed forces to the most likely art of modern conflict and war. These coherent policies seemed to fade in the course of events in alternating military operations and intensifying warfare during the Afghan war. While the security situation in Afghanistan declined after 2003 continuously, several letters of inquiry of the Bundestag criticized the Federal Government and questioned the coherent, transparent policies of German military actions.37

In light of the extensive use of foreign literature in the present work, the author has provided unofficial translations of all foreign titles cited in the bibliography.

E. METHODS AND SOURCES

The main contributing factors to the evolution of Bundeswehr include German politics, the character of German and international military institutions, and the course of events during military operations. The former issue includes changes in German politics after unification in 1990 and the gradual acclimatization of the public to support an expanding international responsibility with military means. The latter issue includes the development of the Bundeswehr in the face of different military operations that started with providing humanitarian aid and intensified with each following military intervention, to the point of highly lethal warfare in Afghanistan. Taking the Afghan war as the focus of this analytical framework, the changes of German politics and development of the armed forces will be discussed in detail:

• Why and how have the Bundeswehr and German soldiering changed during the Afghan war?

• What main contributing factors in state, society, the armed forces, international organizations and elsewhere have accounted for the evolution of the Bundeswehr?

• Why and how did the Afghan war result in the emergence of a new military as well as civil military identity of the Bundeswehr?

• What impact will the evolution of the Bundeswehr have after the Germans cease security and combat operations in Afghanistan in 2014?

These research questions are answered in single case studies of contemporary German history starting after the unification in 1990, but emphasizing the Afghan war from 2001 until 2014. Figure 1 presents a timeline against the background of alternating chancellorship with each corresponding minister of defense at different phases of the Afghan conflict.

Figure 1. Phases of the Afghan conflict.

Different chancellorships and ministers of defense followed distinct strategies that influenced the evolution of the German military directly. The reality of conflict and war did not coherently reflect Berlin’s political ideas and strategies. Based on governmental sources and academic literature, this thesis describes in a chronological sequence the course of events in Afghanistan and the consequential development of the armed forces.
while taking the different domestic legislative and cabinet periods with their different security and defense policies into account.

F. **THESIS OVERVIEW**

The thesis consists of six chapters. After this introduction, Chapter II addresses early changes of the German military, including the classic Cold War debate between Heinz Karst and Wolf Graf von Baudissin about the role of the soldier and combat in it. Then, Chapter III presents the security and defense policies of Dr. Peter Struck, illustrating the initial setup of OEF and ISAF. Chapter IV illustrates the transition from Dr. Struck to Dr. Jung and the subsequent transition to Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg discussing the challenges and constraints for the expansion of the ISAF mandate beyond Kabul. The political transition from zu Guttenberg to Dr. Thomas de Maizière as well as the subsequent transition to Dr. Ursula von der Leyen will be part of Chapter V, which emphasizes the need for a strategy change in the face of intensified combat, military adaptation of the Bundeswehr, and Berlin’s debates on *Krieg* and *Gefallene*. The last chapter addresses the evolution of the Bundeswehr to operational forces and picks up the social, political, and military challenges and opportunities of a modern military in a free, safe, and democratic nation.

The thesis concludes by illustrating the course of events in the Afghan conflict, which ultimately emerged in German domestic politics and perceptions as a war. These chapters trace the story of the change in the spirit and service of the German soldier in the stress of conflict and domestic politics as well as the political culture that assigns little merit to fighting. This transition meant alternating operational demands for the soldiers, and it resulted in a change of thinking, which has led to a new identity of the Bundeswehr, which will surely have a significant effect well after the Germans cease security and combat operations in Afghanistan in 2014.
II. THE KARST–BAUDISSIN CONTROVERSY: MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

As Wolf Graf von Baudissin argued, “soldiers are like children of their time;”\textsuperscript{38} neither the image of German soldiers nor \textit{Innere Führung} was understood to be inviolably set in stone and unalterable. The early debate between the founding fathers of \textit{Innere Führung}, Brigadier General Heinz Karst and Lieutenant General Wolf Graf von Baudissin, continues to reverberate in the question of whether democracy or military effectiveness should have a higher value in the German armed forces.\textsuperscript{39}

\textit{Innere Führung} addresses this question because it “defines the concept of leadership development and civic education” within the Bundeswehr and fuses the basic principles “of the self-image of soldiers” in the German democratic society with the duty to preserve the law and military discipline.\textsuperscript{40} As the historical, political, and social context changes with the society and international relations, the soldiers and the military forces with their strategies and doctrines adapt accordingly. Hence, \textit{Innere Führung} is a dynamic concept that has to deal with these domestic and international changes to face present-day internal as well as external political events, challenges, and threats. While it was adapted to the context and challenges of the time in 1972 during the administration of Minister of Defense Helmut Schmidt, in 1993 on behalf of Minister of Defense Volker Rühe, and in 2008 amended during the term of office of Minister of Defense Dr. Jung, it

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{40} Federal Ministry of Defense, Joint Service Regulation 10/1: \textit{Innere Führung (Leadership Development and Civic Education)} (Bonn: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2008), accessed on March 24, 2014, http://www.kommando.streitkraeftebasis.de/resource/resource/MzEzNTM4MmUzMzMyMmUzMzAzMDY4NjQzNDM3NnU2NTMyNjkyMDJwMjAyM Dlw/ZDv_10-1_Englisch.pdf, 1–3.
\end{itemize}
never lost sight of the fundamentals of the German military based on the “guiding principle of the ‘citizen in uniform.’”41

A. INNERE FÜHRUNG: GERMAN MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

Because the armed forces were considered to be a state within a state during the Weimar Republic and the Wehrmacht was deemed criminal for the atrocities of World War II during the Nazi regime, the establishment of the Bundeswehr and its relationship between the state and society had to be entirely reorganized. After 1949, West German statesmen were confronted with the necessity to match the newly formed Bundeswehr closely to society as well as to the new political system.42

The foundation of the Bundeswehr and Germany’s rearmament were laid with the Himmeroder Denkschrift (Himmerod Memorandum) in October 1950 that set the external organizational conditions (i.e., structure and number of soldiers). The document also provides the earliest call for refounding the German armed forces on a very different internal basis—the forerunner of Innere Führung. Since its first mention in 1953, Innere Führung has been understood as the guideline that determines the internal organizational conditions such as the leadership, civic education of the people, and thus, the prerequisite for the interaction between the people; meaning how soldiers—and citizens—work together and respect another.

Four core aspects of Innere Führung are key and unchanged constructs: legitimation, integration, motivation, and the design of the internal order. First, legitimation demands that German soldiers know at all times why they serve Germany and what legal, political, and ethical standards must be followed. Second, integration rests on the main principle of Innere Führung: citizen in uniform.43 The focus has always


43 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Innere Führung, Nr. 105.
been on the integration of the Bundeswehr into the German state and its society.\textsuperscript{44} Soldiers promote the public’s understanding of the need for Bundeswehr missions; they simultaneously remain an active part of the society. Only those people who experience the fundamental rights of the \textit{Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland} (the German constitution or Basic Law) themselves, appreciate and also defend them. Third, motivation is necessary to push the soldiers’ maximum commitment to the mission’s purpose and its success. Finally, the design of the internal order emphasizes the balance between the performance of military professionalism and the preservation of human dignity and rule of law at all times.\textsuperscript{45} Despite several military adaptations to accommodate changing operational environments and their demands, these core principles were never revisited and remain now almost instinctive conventions of \textit{Innere Führung}.

At the same time, \textit{Innere Führung}—almost sixty years old—is no rigid concept. Different methods and approaches to the implementation of this Joint Service Regulation have been assessed and developed in the intervening years.\textsuperscript{46} Three tasks of \textit{Innere Führung}—leadership, civic education, and legal and military discipline—were especially important because superior officers had to bear the special responsibility for these three tasks. Thus, the key message and also the touchstone for superiors are: “Humans who want to command other human beings have to like them first.”\textsuperscript{47} \textit{Innere Führung} sees \textit{Auftragstaktik} (mission order) as the paramount command concept that enables operational freedom for and participation of subordinates to achieve mission success.\textsuperscript{48}

\textsuperscript{44} Abenheim, \textit{Bundeswehr und Tradition}, 31.
\textsuperscript{45} Groß, “‘Innere Führung,’” 7–8.
\textsuperscript{47} Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, \textit{Innere Führung}, Nr. 607.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., Nr. 604–24.
Additionally, *Innere Führung* equally addresses the daily contact between soldiers and citizens next to “injury and death, dealing with anxiety or with questions of guilt and failure.” Further political education in law and military discipline illustrate the legitimation of the tasks of the Bundeswehr against the background of ethical and legal standards. As a former commander of the Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr (German General Staff College) argued, “*Innere Führung* is not a simple supplement for commanding troops. The Joint Service Regulation permeates the entire military service in time of peace and war. It is a profoundly political, social, and military concept, no intramilitary doctrine.”

*Innere Führung* has become a fixture in the German military mind and practice. It has, however, never curtailed debates about the contents and scope of the Joint Service Regulation between the so-called traditionalists (including Heinz Karst) and reformers (including Wolf Graf von Baudissin). What is the proper focus of the fighting man and woman in Germany? Soldiers as fighters or as guarantors of peace through deterrence?

**B. KARST: SOLDIERS FOR COMBAT**

*Wherever in the war, grenadiers on grenadiers, tank on tank, plane on plane, warship on warship, in short, soldiers face soldiers, an unwavering will has to animate them: to defeat the enemy.*

—Brigadier General Heinz Karst

Heinz Karst—one of the most important representatives of the traditionalists among the founding fathers of *Innere Führung*—viewed soldiers as fighters first and foremost. Therefore, “the main purpose of an army to be a powerful instrument of

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politics” was brought to the fore. Although Karst emphasized that a powerful West German army could contribute through deterrence to peace, the soldiers were the focus because they only achieved a deterrent effect if they fulfilled their core mission: fighting with all their strength. Hence, the task of preventing war was not part of the military realm but clearly part of the political responsibility. As Karst argued, “the soldier’s only job is to win a possible war. [...] The better he guarantees to succeed, the more likely the peace is secured.” This thought was an essential element of Karst’s argument, which he underlined with several examples. For instance, he discussed the armed conflicts in the 1960s and confronted his audience with questions on why American soldiers in Vietnam or Israeli soldiers in the Arab-Israeli War could be motivated to fight if—with respect to Baudissin—soldiers’ genuine goal was assumingly to keep peace.

Karst’s arguments on *Innere Führung* and on the image of the Bundeswehr in German society pointed out the ability to fight as the primary purpose of the armed forces. At the same time, he addressed secondary tasks, which also have to be fulfilled by the armed forces. For example, he frequently mentioned aspects of civic education as another task. Although he highlighted this as an important task, he strongly criticized both politics and society for the public’s lack of understanding of military dynamics and, thus, made the civic educational task necessary and part of Bundeswehr’s mission consequently. Metaphorically, Karst presented the image of employers and employees and complained that it must not be the task of the Bundeswehr—employees—to explain the society—employer—which modern states establish armed forces for defense and for its populace.

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53 Karst, *Bild des Soldaten*, 359–60
54 Ibid., 14.
According to Karst, the German people and the politicians—as the representation of the people—missed the basic understanding of defense. In particular, he criticized the recurring fear of politics and society regarding a state within a state, as was the case with the military in the Weimar Republic. Thus, he strongly supported the integration of the armed forces into the society, but he equally highlighted the importance and meaning of Article 87a of the German constitution.\(^{57}\) Hence, Karst argued for the purposes of defense rather than integration at the center of thinking that should prevail in the military, social, and political realm.\(^{58}\) Thus, Karst’s criticism of \textit{Innere Führung} can be reduced to two main points. First, \textit{Innere Führung} did not only presume but also required a certain image of a democratic society that with respect to Karst did not or could not exist in reality. Second, Karst argued that the desired image of \textit{Innere Führung} was vague because the founding fathers of \textit{Innere Führung} only presented a negative definition—enumerating arguments that were not part of \textit{Innere Führung}—and did not provide a clear message on how \textit{Innere Führung} had to be understood in terms of military, social, and political importance for the Bundeswehr and for the German people.\(^{59}\)

According to Karst, the \textit{Menschenführung} (soldierly leadership and command over people) is the key element of \textit{Innere Führung}, by which the Bundeswehr and superiors actually have a responsibility to promote organizational changes and military progress. As Karst argued, the priority was the will and the ability to master the order of battle, and he concluded that “the paramount objective of soldierly leadership can only be to train young citizens to military efficiency.”\(^{60}\) Because mastering the order of battle and exploring military efficiency was no option for the German military in the years of 1955 to 1994, Karst criticized the potential evolution of the armed forces that lose sight of their


\(^{58}\) Karst, “Menschenführung in der Bundeswehr,” 114–5.


\(^{60}\) Ibid., 25.
real purpose and would train “workers in uniform,” who escape into their civilian lives after the daily hours of service solely.61

C. VON BAUDISSIN: SOLDIERS FOR PEACE

Only a Bundeswehr with officers who understand peacekeeping as its mission—ready for commitment to a free and peaceful future—can expect youth’s respect.62

–Lieutenant General Wolf Graf von Baudissin

Wolf Graf von Baudissin saw five essential tasks of the armed forces that were of concern in addition to the defense of life and liberty of free German people. First, armed forces—by their mere presence and size—can deter the potential enemy from conducting an attack; mirroring a neorealist standpoint. Thereby, they reduce the fear of an attack in the population, which has an impact on the social climate of the populace: action and not reaction in terms of political and military effort prevail. Hence, the military can be used as a tool to overcome the cooperation dilemma within international relations to establish a common and peaceful Europe.63 Additionally, the armed forces can introduce young people to the system of the state and its institutions and thus provide governmental guidance for future civilian occupations.64

In times of deterrence that would culminate in a total war (including mutual assured destruction with a nuclear annihilation), Baudissin stressed that the only job for soldiers must be to stand up for peace and to avoid any escalation that could end in a war.65 As he argued, there “is no political goal, which may be pursued with military

61 Walz, “Fragen an die Begründer der Inneren Führung,” 22.
63 The cooperation dilemma within international relations is a result of the anarchic international system in which sovereign states pursue their genuine national interests. Sovereign states are the primary actors in a leaderless world and maintain the social and political order within their territory. Joint and combined military operations (e.g., NATO and European Union cooperations) are based on similar national interests and values and create trust between states’ authorities, organizations, and individuals. Therefore, military as a tool can solidify cooperative behavior based on improved and secured relations between states.
64 Baudissin, Soldat für den Frieden, 24.
65 Ibid.
Therefore, he demanded a fundamental reform of German military thinking by “using peace as the core motive of soldierly service.” Against this background, Baudissin argued that armed forces could make an important contribution to a policy of deterrence and peacekeeping only by their size, equipment, and morale. However, he underscored the importance of paying attention to the scope of deterrence at the same time. Military actions in an armed conflict did not aim for the maximum destruction of the enemy. According to Baudissin, the aim had to be to act to the extent that the *status quo res erant ante bellum* could be restored. More specifically, he remarked that modern soldiers should not necessarily be trained to kill or die for mission success if other—milder—means of the use of force could be used to fulfill the mission. This point of view indicated a crucial difference in whether “killing and dying … are regarded as an end in itself … or as a consequence of the mission with its orders.”

In particular, Baudissin touted the importance of civic education because it exerted the biggest influence on soldiers and thus formed the greatest contribution to peace. In other words, achievements in terms of leadership and civic education within the Bundeswehr could be transferred with the ideal of the “citizen in uniform” directly into the German society; solidifying the will of the people to a peaceful life consequently. As Baudissin argued, “[leadership and civic education] directly and indirectly influence society and determine the reliability of the institution [*Bundeswehr*] as a tool for peace and security policy.” He left no doubt that every German citizen must understand that people could not exist without a society, and they must make their contribution to maintain the social and political system. If these social and political

67 Ibid., 28.
68 In other words, soldiers conduct operations to establish the state in which things are as they were before the war. Baudissin, *Soldat für den Frieden*, 37–41.
69 Baudissin, *Soldat für den Frieden*, 41.
70 Ibid.
72 Baudissin, *Soldat für den Frieden*, 41.
aspects of leadership were disregarded, Baudissin viewed the danger of the emergence of spiraling traditional values that in turn would oppose peace.73

D. COMPARISON: KARST-BAUDISSIN ON GERMAN MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

Both Karst as a representative of the traditionalists and Baudissin as a reformer affirmed the core values of *Innere Führung*. They strongly supported the main idea that soldiers were only willing to stand up for a cause if they understood and experienced the cause. With respect to the principle of legitimation, both underlined the importance of human dignity and civic rights to the maximum extent in order to ethically and socially consolidate a soldier’s character and behavior.

While integration—as another fundamental principle—was seen as a vital necessity for successful armed forces, Karst and Baudissin expressed divergent arguments and implications for military professionalism. Baudissin regarded the military as a kind of school of the nation that had to teach its citizens to stand up for the German state and its society. Karst claimed that Baudissin’s understanding of teaching the society was not the key idea because this social and political process must be generated from within society. This argument was one of the main criticisms of Karst because he was convinced that *Innere Führung* rested on an understanding of society that was not found in reality. For Karst, the aspect of motivation was intertwined with legitimation and integration. When society and superiors fostered legitimation and integration, motivation would thrive by itself.

Admittedly, Karst had a very positive view of the soldier’s nature. Baudissin highlighted the Bundeswehr’s purpose for the society and thus enforced superiors’ special responsibility to keep citizens in uniform motivated. There is only little discourse on the design of the internal order between Karst and Baudissin—or their successors and followers. The traditionalists and the reformers have seen that the context of internal order has created the balance between humane treatment and effective mission success.

Hence, this aspect is similarly accepted like the viewpoints on legitimation. In sum, it is important to recognize that neither Karst (traditionalist) nor Baudissin (reformer) criticized the core principles of *Innere Führung*.

The essential controversy between Karst and Baudissin was based on fundamentally different views on the role of the military. With respect to the atomic age and the chance of total destruction, they agreed that no soldier wanted to fight and preferred peace necessarily. Karst took a much reduced view of the task of the armed forces. While the traditionalists saw the preparation and conduct of military operations as the only task of the military, the reformers argued for additional far-reaching—political and social—duties next to the ability and the will to fight. In addition to deterrence and combat duties, occupational guidance, education of the society, and support of political cooperation in the international realm were equally important. In sum, Karst expected citizens to take the uniform and perform the duties that they have learned from society, while Baudissin assumed that the Bundeswehr—with conscription—trained and educated people as citizens in uniform in the end.

According to Baudissin, the Bundeswehr has also possessed a crucial political and social component. Conversely, Karst claimed, “the integration of soldiers in society takes a lesser place in the possible civil appearance of the soldier [citizen in uniform] than the resolute readiness and willingness to defend the German people.” For this reason, the educational aspect of the military differed significantly between Karst and Baudissin. While Baudissin demanded more political education to foster citizens in uniform, Karst preferred to reduce deficits of superiors and soldiers in terms of military professionalism. Hence, Karst highlighted combat-willingness of soldiers and the *Wehrhaftigkeit* (spirit of defense) of Germany.

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76 Walz, “Fragen an die Begründer der Inneren Führung,” 40; Nägler, *Der gewollte Soldat*, 130.

77 Nägler, *Der gewollte Soldat*, 38.
Finally, the discourse between traditionalists and reformers challenged the question of whether democracy or military effectiveness should have a higher value in the Bundeswehr. More specifically, the debate has been about whether there are armed forces in a democracy or democracy within the armed forces. Both views present different implications for military professionalism and operations: A military in a democracy may be capable and willing solely to fight, but a democracy in a military has to fulfill diverse and additional tasks to be mission successful. While Karst feared a demilitarization of soldiers’ nature, Baudissin saw the chance to civilize the military.

This controversy on the nature, the use, and the importance of armed forces for a modern German state did not end with the German unification. Indeed, they have even intensified against the background of new military adaptation to allies’ demands and operational requirements, reductions in the size of the Bundeswehr in the event of the peace dividend, and new—multinational—missions in terms of quality and quantity outside of Europe on a global horizon since 1990. The Bundeswehr has evolved to suit the new political, social, and military challenges including civil protection, emergency management, peacekeeping and peace-enforcing missions, humanitarian aid, and the global war on terrorism. These political, social, and military dynamics fueled the debates between the traditionalists and the reformers that led among other factors to the first amendment of Innere Führung on behalf of the Minister of Defense Volker Rühe in 1993 and to another extensively revised version under Minister of Defense Jung on the eve of Germany’s engagement and participation in high-intensity military operations in

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79 Ibid., 7.
81 Chiari and Pahl, Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr, 12–7.
Afghanistan in 2008.\textsuperscript{82} In a nutshell, not only the political and social but in particular the military developments abroad forced the Federal Ministry of Defense to amend \textit{Innere Führung} to the current demands of operational forces that mirrored controversial aspects and arguments of the debates already known from Karst and Baudissin.

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III. ISAF AND OEF: PEACEKEEPING IN KABUL AND A CONVENTIONAL WAR

Today, international terrorism is the biggest threat to the freedom and security of the international system. The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, in New York, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania illustrated that “international terrorists … pose an immediate threat that can have a wide range of implications for state and society” that jeopardizes nation coherence and survival.83 Terrorist attacks had already been conducted before 2001, and history shows that nonstate actors were used by some states to covertly pursue national interests. After the terrible attacks in 2001, however, the academic community and state authorities questioned the sources and effects of terrorism and the solutions for it.84

Terrorism is a contested term without a “universally accepted definition” but a reasonable explanation incorporates “violence by nonstate actors that is directed against noncombatants, intended to coerce or garner support among particular audiences rather than to win on the battlefield, or both.”85 A realist perspective attributes to terrorism an intentional ideological, political character with the attempt to affect, to influence, or to change political realities. In short, a realist lens allows for an understanding of terrorism in which nonstate actors “follow a strategic logic” of coercion.86

Terrorists are rational actors and “political utility maximizers; people use terrorism when the expected political gains minus the expected costs outweigh the net expected benefits of alternative forms of protest.”87 Thus, states can adapt strategies and

build up structures to counteract terrorism. State actors have the choice between two coercive strategies: punishment or denial. One has to keep in mind that states are exposed to political and social complications while fighting terrorism. Most likely, state actors do not know who to bargain with, to evade, to deter, or to attack. “Terrorism is an extremism of means” that must be encountered with a wide range of means taking the full state repertoire of political, economic, and military tools into account, generally starting with “stronger border controls to make it more difficult for terrorists” to enter homelands but primarily with fighting terrorism at its place of origin. Thus, after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, the United States made not only clear that “allies of terror are the enemies of civilization” but also mobilized its military forces, started a war on terror, and attacked Afghanistan, which was defined as a harbor for terrorists and an ally of terror.

In response to the terrorist attacks and after President George W. Bush’s declaration of war on terrorism, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) rated these “horrifying terrorist attacks … as a threat to international peace and security” and committed its further actions “to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks.” The UNSC thereby highlighted the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defense” under the provision of Article 51 of the United Nations (UN) Charter. Additionally, the NATO Council confirmed for the first time in history that an attack had been conducted from abroad—Afghanistan—and thus the NATO members considered these attacks to be “against them all and consequently they … assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such

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action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain
the security of the North Atlantic area.” 93 Thus, a nation’s inherent right of self-defense and
the implementation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty consequently led the United
States to invade Afghanistan in October 2001 and further activated willing nations to
engage with political, economic, and military means in Afghanistan.

A. GERMANY’S UNLIMITED SOLIDARITY AND OEF I–III

Immediately after the terroristic attacks, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder
declared in front of the Bundestag unlimited solidarity of the German people with the
United States and ensured political, economic, military support to fight international
terrorism. 94 Against the background of a full support of the opposing union parties
Christian Democratic Union of Germany/Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CDU/CSU)
and Free Democratic Party (FDP), the Bundestag passed a resolution to politically,
economically, and militarily support the United States with an absolute majority. The
coalition votes, however, indicated political struggles within the rows of the ruling
coalition of Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and Alliance ‘90/The Greens
because the coalition would have only gained an own majority by a few votes. 95 The
political dilemma of the government was evident and Chancellor Schröder pushed the
SPD and Alliance ‘90/The Greens with new arguments—alliance obligations to prevent a
“humanitarian catastrophe”—to support military operations. 96 The military support
comprised a maximum of 3,900 German soldiers and included nuclear, biological,
chemical (NBC) defense forces, units for medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), Special

93 The North Atlantic Treaty, (Washington, D.C., April 4, 1949), accessed on February 6, 2014,
NATO Online Library, Bilateral Meeting NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson and U.S. President
94 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/186 (Berlin: Bundesanzeiger Verlagsgesellschaft, 2001),
Bundestag, Entschließungsantrag der Fraktionen SPD, CDU/CSU, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN und FDP
95 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/187 (Berlin: Bundesanzeiger Verlagsgesellschaft, 2001),
96 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/198 (Berlin: Bundesanzeiger Verlagsgesellschaft, 2001),
Operations Forces, air transport forces, and naval forces.\textsuperscript{97} Within a few days, the Bundestag was confronted with an argumentation shift from granting unlimited solidarity to planning serious, intensive warfare operation under the umbrella of a U.S.-led coalition of Operation Enduring Freedom that relied on self-defense and had no United Nations mandate. This political shift spread dissent among the members of the Federal Government and jeopardized a stable political condition for the upcoming election on the OEF resolution of the Bundestag.

While the Bundestag debated Germany’s participation and military contribution, the United States and the United Kingdom launched air strikes independently from NATO and the United Nations because Afghanistan’s Taliban rulers ignored the American ultimatum to hand over Osama bin Laden.\textsuperscript{98} In the initial phase of the Afghanistan war, British and American forces established in Afghanistan a military footprint with less than 2,500 soldiers to “conduct locally limited high intensity war-fighting against the Taliban forces around Kandahar” and to support the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (Afghan Northern Alliance), which fought side by side with the Western powers against the Taliban regime.\textsuperscript{99}

The German political debate escalated about the legality of military participation in Afghanistan; the coalition between SPD and Alliance ‘90/The Greens seemed to break apart, putting internal and external political viability of Schröder’s coalition at risk. Only the Bundestag’s vote of confidence for Chancellor Schröder in November 2001 stopped the political fragmentation.


Although in political debates the German government emphasized the inescapable constraints of the international situation and the declaration of war on terrorism that forced German commitment, which left no choice but to participate in OEF combat missions—a clear third image theory\(^\text{100}\)—Chancellor Schröder only marginally won the vote of confidence. The government passed a mandate on OEF with 336 of the 662 members of the Bundestag in favor, a win with a majority of four votes.\(^\text{101}\) This development in the Bundestag illustrated two factors that played a role well after deploying troops to Afghanistan. First, Schröder managed to silence members of the German government to solidify his remaining term in office and to continue the coalition between SPD and Alliance ‘90/The Greens in the Bundestag. Second, the political debates and disagreements illustrated the Bundestag’s aimlessness with respect to Afghanistan’s future and uncertainty about military interventions and deployment of German troops to Afghanistan. This political dissent and political party loyalty led to the first mandate on German military participation in Afghanistan (OEF I).

One year later, the meaning of OEF and Germany’s projection of military force dominated the second Bundestag debate (OEF II). While the government stressed the threat of international terrorism and the importance of friendship and solidarity in a multipolar world, the opposition challenged the will of the government to use the full

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\(^\text{100}\) Different theories may fall into distinct theoretical baskets—first, second, or third image arguments—that provide a proper way to classify theories in the academic field of international relations. Each basket takes a causal argumentation into account to explain state behavior in the international system. First image theories view human nature as an \textit{a priori} determinant for state behavior. Second image theories focus on the internal character of states, which has an influence on the state behavior. In other words, some states are more aggressive or passive by nature, which reflects an inside-out argument on their international behavior. Third image theories emphasize the importance of external factors that override internal domestic conditions. These theories regard the anarchic architecture of the international system, which exerts severe and inescapable constraints, as determinant for state behavior. Particularly, neoliberalism presents a third image theory because it illustrates that not only institutions within the state and in the international system affect state behavior but also that the anarchic structure of the international system impacts interactions between states; Robert Axelrod and Robert I. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” in \textit{Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate}, ed. David A. Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 8–9, 11.

extent of the OEF mandate.\textsuperscript{102} The debate addressed the problem that the German forces lacked government backup to take all military means by fighting international terrorism according to OEF II terms and thus to fulfill their mission as mandated by the Bundestag.\textsuperscript{103} The criticisms did not affect the decision on the mandate and it was passed without much dissent; however, discrepancies between the need of military force and the willingness to politically accept military interventions became evident.

In 2003, the Bundestag passed the third mandate on OEF. The deployment plan of the German government determined to withdraw the NBC defense forces stationed in Kuwait and thus reduce the OEF numbers of soldiers to 3,100.\textsuperscript{104} The debate shed light on another political discrepancy that was not only a specific to OEF but also seemed to be part of German former military interventions. One parliament member expressed incomprehension and discontent as to why the Bundestag should pass a mandate for the deployment of 3,100 soldiers when only 700 German soldiers were deployed, and furthermore, no arguments or plans for additional deployments had been made by the government.\textsuperscript{105} With respect to former German missions abroad, this disproportion was nothing new; however, a ratio of 4.4 (3,100 mandated soldiers/700 deployed soldiers) exceeded the ratio of the Kosovo Force (KFOR with 2.4 in 2003) and the Stabilization


Force (SFOR with 2.3 in 1998) by far. While OEF differed in military, political, and geographical dimensions in general and in conflict, as well as in warfare intensity in particular from KFOR and SFOR, the mandate/deployment ratio served as an indicator that the German government was uncertain what OEF, its military content, and implications really included. From the German government’s point of view, it would be reasonable to keep a flexible option to deploy additional soldiers when needed but from the parliament’s standpoint, it undercut the genuine principle of a parliamentary army because the deciding vote for military deployment had been lost.

**B. BONN AGREEMENT AND ISAF I–II**

In November 2001, the UNSC condemned “the Taliban for allowing Afghanistan to be used as a base for the export of terrorism by the Al-Qaida network and other terrorist groups” and made clear that the United Nations would “play a central role in supporting the efforts of the Afghan people to establish … a new and transitional administration.” In his report on the situation in Afghanistan, the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, highlighted that a multinational engagement would be a difficult peacekeeping mission that would encounter significant hostilities and endure several years. UN Resolution 1378 and Brahimi’s report initiated a conference on the Petersberg near Bonn that addressed further actions to promote peace in Afghanistan and to rebuild the Afghan government. In December, the Petersberg Conference established an Afghan Interim Administration and proclaimed an “early deployment to Afghanistan of a United Nations mandated force,”

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107 Ibid.
Initially to provide security for Kabul and its adjacent areas. After the Petersberg Conference, the UNSC authorized in accordance with the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan “the establishment for six months of an International Security Assistance Force to assist the Afghan Interim Authority” to maintain the security in and around Kabul with all necessary measures and to provide a secure environment for the personnel of the United Nations.

The German government welcomed the decisions of the UNSC and the Petersberg Conference and discussed Germany’s future position with respect to the upcoming UN mandate in Kabul. A clear difference between the debates on OEF and on the participation according to the Petersberg Conference is evident and reflects Germany’s “traditional preference for multilateral, humanitarian approach to conflict.” While the Bundestag criticized military operations and German participation in OEF that almost led to a breakup of the government only a few weeks earlier, the Bundestag was at this point keen to step into the lead nation position by highlighting three points. First, German troops had a peacemaking advantage because they were not part of the initial attacks in Afghanistan. Second, Germany had had good relations with Afghanistan in the past because it had invested in infrastructure in and around Kabul before World War II. Thus, it had no unhappy colonial history there like Britain or France, nor did Germany have any legacy of unrequited expectations, like the United States. Moreover, it was not perceived to have any neo-colonial interest in that region.

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Third, Germany hosted the first conference—Petersberg Conference—that set the cornerstone for a peaceful future for the Afghan people. After German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, explained in front of the German Committee on Foreign Affairs that Germany had no national interest in that region and thus argued against a lead nation position, the Bundestag debates shifted from arguments on solidarity to questions about national interest and challenged the German government’s plan of action in international relations.

These debates, however, did not affect the support of the mandate on ISAF, which was passed with a majority of more than 90 percent of the members of the Bundestag. The mandate was based on the UNSC Resolution 1386 and on the agreements from the Petersberg Conference and entailed the deployment of 1,200 German soldiers to maintain the security in and around Kabul for an operational term of initially six months. Chancellor Schröder’s initial assumption on German participation in ISAF pointed out that not all mandates required soldiers for that kind of mission. Furthermore, he implied the German deployment would stay below the number of soldiers initially passed by the legislature; ironically, after six months the Bundestag debated and passed a request for an additional 200 soldiers for ISAF.

The shift in arguments to explain and justify German participation in ISAF became apparent in the subsequent ISAF yearly debates. On ISAF II (second Bundestag mandate on ISAF) Minister of Defense Dr. Peter Struck highlighted the aim of German military participation to deny terrorists safe haven and training space in Afghanistan. The main point of his speech, however, was to address the new tasks of the Bundeswehr:

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116 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/210, 20834.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid., 20850.

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defending Germany together with allies and partners with military means against international terrorism where it is at home. After German troops had served for one year in Afghanistan, the Bundestag listened to a monologue that precisely articulated German national interest and presented an understanding of security and defense that sought to keep threats and crises away from Germany and its allies. Dr. Struck left no doubt that German military involvement served national security interest only to guarantee Germany’s defense. Thus, missions in Afghanistan, in the Balkans, or at the Horn of Africa had the same underlying principle of German security politics: German defense.

The connection of military missions far from Germany and their use for German extended territorial defense seemed to fit perfectly. Some members of the Bundestag, however, did not share this point of view, and challenged continued German ISAF participation. In particular, the reasoning of national interests of Germany was challenged because German extended territorial defense seemed to be misleading. The Bundestag saw the focus on fighting international terrorism together with allies and partners in Afghanistan. Other criticism came up because ISAF had already exceeded pre-planned costs, and the deteriorating security situation outside of Kabul created doubts about the success of ISAF. Several government statements borrowed these criticisms and emphasized a disproportion between ISAF soldiers and Afghan armed men in and around Kabul.

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122 Ibid., 1315.
123 Ibid., 1318.
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
Consequently, the German government demanded an increase of the number of German soldiers to 2,500. The German mandate on ISAF II was passed with a majority of 565 of 576 delegates. The broad political acceptance of the Bundestag changed in 2003 when the government proclaimed its will to extend military intervention beyond Kabul (ISAF III).

C. **TWOFOLD MILITARY WAY: OEF VIS-À-VIS ISAF**

With respect to the Bundestag mandates and the deployment of German soldiers to Afghanistan, Germany’s military intervention encompassed a twofold design. First, German Special Operations Forces were engaged in the U.S.-led OEF mission against international terrorism. Second, German soldiers were part of ISAF and deployed to Kabul “to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas.” The double mandate for two inherently different missions in Afghanistan enabled the German government to fulfill allied demands for conducting warfare against an enemy and to use German soldiers for peacekeeping missions, a mission dimension the German military was familiar with (e.g., Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo). It also allowed the government to distract attention from the bad image of OEF—which was not backed by a UN mandate—with a good image of ISAF that promoted the post-conflict image of the Bundeswehr.

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126 Deutscher Bundestag, *Plenarprotokoll 15/17*, 1315.
127 Ibid., 1332.
For German soldiers, it meant a functional differentiation. On the one hand, OEF soldiers conducted conventional and highly intensive combat against the Taliban regime, and, on the other, ISAF soldiers started to become engaged in military operations other than war (MOOTW), which are according to former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld “no jobs for a soldier, but only a soldier can do it.” This differentiation led to different perspectives about the mission among soldiers within the Bundeswehr and to a focus on post-conflict interventions in and around Kabul by losing sight of the development in the rest of Afghanistan.

Initially, 100 Special Operations Forces soldiers (German KSK) conducted conventional warfare together with United States and United Kingdom Special Operations Forces in the southern part of Afghanistan (Kandahar) against Taliban forces. For the first time since World War II, Germany found itself planning and conducting conventional war. Thus, the deployment of the German KSK in Afghanistan was a serious paradigm shift in the era of Bundeswehr missions abroad. At the time, the deployment seemed to rely more on political promises than military necessity. The controversial former KSK commander, General Reinhard Günzel, who was later relieved, stated that initial operations in Afghanistan demanded specialized forces and regular military troops rather than genuine Special Forces capabilities.

131 Warburg, “Paradoxe Anforderungen,” 70.
136 Ibid., 397.
While the war in Afghanistan was visible to the German populace, the actions of the German KSK were at this point neither known nor debated in the Bundestag.\textsuperscript{137} The German KSK took part alongside allied partners in several battle operations against Taliban and al-Qaeda forces, including the Battle of Tora Bora and Operation Anaconda.\textsuperscript{138} The main objective—besides supporting allied operations—was to capture members of the Taliban regime and the al-Qaeda network and to monitor border crossings to Pakistan.\textsuperscript{139} To these ends, the German KSK was embedded in the U.S. command and control architecture and also depended on U.S. operations because they lacked their own transport capabilities.\textsuperscript{140} After the conventional war ended, the German KSK controlled areas of interest in the southern part of Kabul.\textsuperscript{141}

The first regular German military forces (under the ISAF mandate) arrived in January 2002 after the Military Technical Agreement between ISAF and the Interim Administration of Afghanistan was signed.\textsuperscript{142} Upon their arrival, a military base close to Kabul was established (Camp Warehouse) and less than two weeks later, German soldiers started patrols in and around Kabul with unprotected vehicles to execute the ISAF mandate and to show force in the area of responsibility (AOR).\textsuperscript{143} The ISAF


\textsuperscript{139} Neece, “Ending Alliance Solidarity,” 228.

\textsuperscript{140} Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer, “German Special Operations Forces: The Case for Revision,” SWP Comments 26 (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2006), 2.

\textsuperscript{141} Noetzel and Schreer, “German Special Operations Forces,” 2.


mission was understood to be a peacekeeping and, thus, nation-building mission similar to other already successfully conducted missions prominently like those on the Balkans. Furthermore, Germany had a good reputation among the Afghan government after the success of the Petersberg Conference, and German politicians and soldiers assumed they would be welcomed as partners to rebuild and secure Afghanistan’s capital.\footnote{Hans J. Gießmann, Armin Wagner, “Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr,” \textit{Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte} (2009): 3.}

Soldiers found themselves in a new environment that differed from the European continent where they had trained. Although the German military had already been involved in many international operations, the equipment had originally been designed for national defense purposes on German territory and was not suitable in the Afghan environment and for the ISAF mission. The lack of secure communication and strategic, tactical mobility became another critical factor.\footnote{Sascha Lange, “Neue Bundeswehr auf altem Sockel Wege aus dem Dilemma,” \textit{SWP-Studie} S2 (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2005): 14–5.} For instance, air transport relied on the C-160 Transall which was originally designed for operational, tactical transport between close battle zones in the European plains and their corresponding environmental conditions. In Afghanistan, however, where hot and high conditions and difficult environments prevail, the C-160 was not capable to perform continuous operations and was pushed to its transport limits, which resulted in takeoff/landing operations during summer nights only. Despite the lack of basic military equipment (e.g., secure communication) and necessary capabilities (e.g., logistics and transport assets), the security situation for German soldiers in Kabul seemed to be favorable. Thus, military safety regulations for combat zones were not of first concern.\footnote{Susanne Koelbl and Udo Ludwig, “Bundeswehr: Wie konnte das passieren?,” \textit{Der Spiegel} 35 (Hamburg: Spiegel-Verlag, 2003), accessed on February 16, 2014, http://wissen.spiegel.de/wissen/image/show.html?did=28415116&aref=image035/E0334/ROSP200303500230025.PDF.}

In January 2002, Germany’s contribution to ISAF started with 1,200 soldiers in Afghanistan. An additional 160 German soldiers were stationed in Termez (Uzbekistan) where an air transport hub for logistics was established to conduct air transport flights from and to Kabul.\footnote{Pommerin, “Vom ‘Kalten Krieg’ zu globaler Konfliktverhütung und Krisenbewältigung,” 384–6.} By the end of 2002, the German Bundestag increased the number

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of German troops to 2,500 soldiers.\textsuperscript{148} From 2002 until 2003, German soldiers conducted several support and humanitarian aid missions in and around Kabul as well as to the Hindu Kush Mountains. During the first two years, several soldiers were killed or wounded in accidents (e.g., CH-53 reconnaissance flight over Kabul) and from mine explosions.\textsuperscript{149}

Despite military intelligence information on thriving danger and aggravation of the security situation within the AOR in 2003, German political and military officials were caught by surprise when a pre-planned suicide attack on a German convoy—an unprotected bus—to the Kabul International Airport killed four soldiers and left 29 soldiers injured, some seriously.\textsuperscript{150} A subsequent political and military assessment on the deteriorating security situation with a focus on the emergence of insurgents in and around Kabul was not conducted.

D. CONCLUSION

In Afghanistan, for the first time since World War II, German soldiers fought in a war. In other words, Germany not only defended itself and its allies in the Hindu Kush but was also involved in high-intensity combat. This controversial perspective sheds light on the twofold design of German military intervention in Afghanistan. On one side, the German government used the Special Forces of the Bundeswehr for political and military reasons to solidify Germany’s international position as a credible and trustworthy partner and to satisfy the operational demands of German allies. Furthermore, the German KSK were the only German forces deployed to the southern part of Afghanistan to fight side-by-side with other partners of the U.S.-led coalition of OEF.


\textsuperscript{149} Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, “Chronologie des Einsatzes in Afghanistan ISAF,” accessed on February 16, 2014, http://www.einsatz.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/einsatzbw/?ut/p/c4/LcgxDoAgDEbhs3gBurt5C3Uvx1qhgRQjVRJOr4N50_dopi_FIx4mWZFopGmTfqlurTsVLFpg7SOi3ZzSv9gaOxw-QKUY1G3hypoXKTjoglEP3AjH-VW0!./

\textsuperscript{150} Koelbl and Ludwig, “Bundeswehr: Wie konnte das passieren?”
The German KSK is a force that is special in several aspects. First, its members are specially trained and equipped for primarily conducting unconventional warfare and thus, covertly, secret operations all over the world; meaning the German KSK knew what was at stake and were capable to execute combat tasks. Second, missions of the German KSK follow a different logic than deployments of German regular troops. Contrary to the deployment of regular troops, most German KSK deployments do not require a prior approval of the Bundestag due to their genuine missions.\textsuperscript{151} Thus, the use of this force is neither monitored nor debated in the Bundestag that deploys them to an area of national interest to fulfill their missions. In other words, the deployment of the German KSK in Afghanistan made it possible to slip silently into a new era of Bundeswehr missions abroad.

On the other side, the German government followed its tradition to push for a multilateral peacekeeping and humanitarian solution to the emerging conflict in Afghanistan. The initial holding of the Petersberg Conference and the Bundestag’s readiness and willingness to contribute German soldiers for a peacekeeping operation under a UN mandate mirrored Germany’s tradition and practice of multilateral interventionism. How to deal, nationally and internationally, with peacekeeping operations and the impact of those operations on German soldiers were not only known but also seemed to fit the image and ideals of the German military. Regular German forces had already proved their expertise in peacekeeping and nation building operations in Africa and on the Balkans; now they were ready to do the same in Afghanistan.

The long, hot debates and profound dissent in the Bundestag showed, however, that German politicians were not pleased with the twofold design of German military intervention in Afghanistan. Only Chancellor Schröder’s credible threat to break up the coalition silenced his members of the government, and thus, the coalition’s will to stay in power outweighed aspects of German soldiers not only defending Germany far off national territory but also fighting in a war. Although the Bundestag passed the first and following mandates most times with a legislative approval of more than 95 percent of the

\textsuperscript{151} Bundesministerium der Justiz, \textit{Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz}, § 5 (1) Nachträgliche Zustimmung.
members of the Bundestag, the debates on the different mandates always gave reasons to widen the parliament’s discussion, to challenge the government’s will to deploy soldiers, to request a coherent strategy for the Afghanistan mission, and to question Germany’s national interest. Legislative automatisms for debating and passing mandates stayed away, but most critical questions remained unanswered or were tackled in the following years of the ongoing OEF and ISAF missions—starting with the debate to expand ISAF beyond Kabul and its surrounding areas in 2003.

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IV. MISSION DEFINES WHAT? PEACEKEEPING IN AND AROUND KABUL

Looking at its essence, the military service is a very honorable, very fair, and very noble profession. The core of soldiering is nothing else than the defense of goodness, truth, and especially of those who are unjustly attacked.153

–Pope Ioannes Paulus II

In 2003, the German deployment was not limited to military participation in Afghanistan; German soldiers were involved in missions on the Balkans, in Africa, and in distant places on the Eurasian continent.154 The Afghanistan conflict, however, outshined the other German deployments in political and military complexity as well as uncertainty. Minister of Defense Rudolf Scharping rejected in 2002 any leadership role in Afghanistan, any expansion of military participation beyond the city border of Kabul, any additional deployments. Furthermore, one year later he proclaimed Berlin’s intent to withdraw German troops after the Afghan elections in 2004.155 In the same year, the course of events in Afghanistan, however, presented a different situation and military dynamic: Germany took a lead nation role in the Northern part of Afghanistan, the military contribution was expanded beyond Kabul, more German troops were requested by international allies, and a withdrawal of German troops after 2004 was no option; precisely, German troops and arms deployment as well as military tasks and operations increased after 2003 progressively.

Different plans of action—for why and how to tackle the Afghan conflict—between the OEF and ISAF participating nations fueled the aforementioned strategic ambiguity. While some nations demanded high-intensity warfare and kinetic counterterrorism operations, other nations preferred peacekeeping and nation building.

operations focusing on reconstruction and humanitarian aid.\footnote{156} In particular, the latter mission understanding was—especially with respect to coalition governments—suitable to win public and political support. To gain a broad majority of supporters is crucial to coalition governments because different political parties constitute the government that formulates a common foreign political and military strategy. The necessity to gain support for military deployments from less pro-interventionist parties causes political ambiguities and compromises.\footnote{157}

Thus, it is not surprising that the Bundestag debate on the Afghanistan conflict mainly started with humanitarian and security aspects to set the stage for German military involvement outside of the NATO Article VI territory.\footnote{158} Although humanitarian and security aspects had been in the focus of former Bundeswehr missions, the same German political and military agendas did not fit the situation and development during the deteriorating security situation of the Afghan conflict.\footnote{159} German military politics were designed for “domestic and foreign policy agendas rather than to circumstances on the ground.”\footnote{160} In less than ten years, the German public and its politicians were not only confronted with German soldier wounded and deaths but also with a new Bundeswehr that was initially handcuffed with a costly risk minimization approach, and the need to conduct high-intensity warfare and implement counterinsurgency tactics to win support of local Afghan tribes.\footnote{161}

\footnote{156} Auerswald and Saideman, \textit{NATO in Afghanistan}, 70.  
\footnote{157} Ibid., 141.  
\footnote{160} Ibid., 13.  
A. GERMAN ISAF EXPANSION AND PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS (PRT) IN AND AROUND KABUL

In 2003, the UNSC adapted the ISAF mission and authorized ISAF expansion “to support the Afghan Transitional Authority … in the maintenance of security in areas of Afghanistan outside of Kabul and its environs,” to establish a secure environment and to guarantee the safety of the Afghan people, UN personnel, and members of other organizations.162 Thereby, all ISAF participating member states were authorized “to take all necessary measures to fulfill its mandate.”163 Two days after the UNSC mandate was issued, the Bundestag decided on an extended German ISAF contribution with a lead function for the ISAF expansion and ordered additional troops to Afghanistan (see Figure 2).

![Bundestag force cap on German military deployment.](image)

Figure 2. Bundestag force cap on German military deployment.164

163 Ibid.
164 Data collected by author according to Deutscher Bundestag. Refer to the bibliography: Drucksache 14/7930, Drs. 14/9246, Drs. 14/9246, Drs. 15/128, Drs. 15/128, Drs. 15/1700, Drs. 15/1880, Drs. 15/37, Drs. 15/3710, Drs. 15/3710, Drs. 15/5996, Drs. 16/10473, Drs. 16/14157, Drs. 16/2573, Drs. 16/6460, Drs. 17/11685, Drs. 17/11685, Drs. 17/39, Drs. 17/4402, Drs. 17/4402, Drs. 17/654, Drs. 17/8166, Drs. 17/8166, and Drs. 18/436.
Berlin’s decision to expand its troop contribution relied on the first Afghanistan concept formulated in 2003 by leading officials of the Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. This inter-ministerial cooperation coordinated and harmonized efforts in state matters of police forces, institutions, infrastructure, and safety within the area of responsibility (AOR) of each Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). With the use of PRT, the German government’s intention was to establish self-sustaining “islands of security” that spread a “feeling of security through visibility” promoting a democratization dynamic in Afghanistan. “Developing without security is unachievable, and security without development is meaningless” was the proclaimed key idea to success. The PRT mission objective was to “assist the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority, in order to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment … to enable Security Sector Reform and reconstruction efforts.” Thus, the focus of the PRT mission was—with respect to ISAF soldiers—to step into an assisting and empowering role solely.

The U.S. implementation of the PRT concept, however, focused more on military aspects and aimed to show military force of detached units across the AOR that are part of the local communities, actively cooperate with the local population, and build up trust among the local population, and thus gather human intelligence. In short, both approaches demanded military presence relying on a different rationale. The German

166 Merz, “Still on the way to Afghanistan?” 8.
167 Ibid., 9.
point of view was clear: Military forces were a necessity to facilitate the PRT tasks, radiating a stabilizing effect in the region and guaranteeing freedom of operation for civil personnel who promote political, economic, and social development of the Afghan people.\textsuperscript{171} Although the Afghanistan concept was the first German policy document addressing a strategy in Afghanistan and providing a general and vague list of goals, it lacked clear operationalized objectives and end-state commitments that could be addressed with civil or military means.\textsuperscript{172} First published in 2007, the Afghanistan concept—after its revision omitted democratization as an objective in 2006—mirrored its inconsequentiality and conceptual shortfall.\textsuperscript{173}

Besides the implementation of the Afghanistan concept and its idea of a comprehensive approach merging military and civilian assets for state building purposes using a “civilian reconstruction team with a military protection element,” German politics had another reason to expand its contribution in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{174} In 2003, Chancellor Schröder rejected any participation and support to the United States in the Operation Iraqi Freedom and thus Berlin’s administration aimed to temper the moods of its allies by intensifying its military contribution in the Northern part of Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{175} Hence, the German government took over ISAF command and as lead-nation with Dutch and Danish contingents and further doubled its troops consequently.\textsuperscript{176} The rationale for ISAF’s expansion was to project Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) beyond Kabul in a four-


\textsuperscript{174} Sangar, “Weight of the Past(s),” 4.

\textsuperscript{175} Merz, “Still on the way to Afghanistan?” 4.

phased counterclockwise geographical expansion to gain responsibility and control throughout Afghanistan. While PRT under the OEF mandate were already set up between 2002 and 2003 in Afghanistan by American, British, and New Zealand forces under the command of the Combined Joint Operations Task Force 180, the German military initially took over the control of the U.S.-led PRT in Kunduz in 2003 and built an additional PRT in the province of Feyzabad.

The German decision to establish PRT in the AOR depended not only on relatively secure locations but also on military capabilities to project military forces, when needed. Thus, Kunduz was selected to house the first German PRT because German soldiers had good relations with the local population, German air mobility (e.g., MEDEVAC) capabilities were sufficient to cope with the distance, and the AOR seemed safer compared to the other areas. In the words of General Harald Kujat the region in and around Kunduz was preferred because “in contrast to the South, the conditions there were stable and the prospects for success good. A limited deployment, a calm region, no war, but reconstruction; that is something for the Bundeswehr.” This statement reflects the public and political perceptions on the Afghan conflict but it eclipses the operations of the German KSK. While they were conducting warfare under the OEF mandate side-by-side with allies, the German ISAF forces began to establish

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177 First, ISAF expanded to the North of Kabul under a German-Dutch command of a German-led PRT. The second phase focused on the West and the third phase took control over the South. The control over the East was part of phase four with U.S.-led PRT making ISAF’s responsibility to support security contiguous and complete throughout the country; Catherine Dale, “War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, accessed on February 27, 2014, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40156.pdf, 23.


180 Ibid., 8–9; Merz, “Still on the way to Afghanistan?” 9.

181 German four-star General Harald Kujat was Chairman of the NATO Military Committee during this time.

182 Sangar, “Weight of the Past(s),” 4.
PRT with an emphasis on trust building and on social development in the Northern part of Afghanistan.¹⁸³

Since 2006, Afghanistan has been divided in and managed by four Regional Commands (RC) and the German military commands RC North, which is established in Mazar-e-Sharif.¹⁸⁴ At that time, 450 soldiers were mandated for the PRT Kunduz mission and less than a fifth were infantry soldiers to fulfill the assistant role of a PRT-embedded military protection element “in an area of the size of Slovenia with about 1.8 million inhabitants.”¹⁸⁵ The initial strategic shortfall of the Afghanistan concept combined with an unwinnable military upper hand for show of force to conduct peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan shed light on the lacking prerequisites of the ATA to gain influence and control in the area beyond Kabul.¹⁸⁶ Thus, the local support for the ATA and for German ISAF soldiers gradually diminished in the AOR and the operational environment became unstable and hostile progressively.

Although Germany was the first ISAF participating nation that marshaled peacekeeping operations beyond Kabul, the German military focused its strategy on two PRT, combining civil and military means (i.e., comprehensive approach) to rebuild social infrastructure in the Northern region, whereas German soldiers protected the civil development and passively stabilized the AOR. In other words, Germany’s chosen comprehensive approach allowed political and military officials to highlight the nation building and peacekeeping side of Germany’s contribution in Afghanistan, distracting


¹⁸⁴ King, Transformation of Europe’s Armed Forces, 43.


from the conventional war in the South and portraying the ISAF mission less militarily.187

B.  GERMAN MILITARY IMPLICATIONS

A close look at the German military implications sheds light on two prominent factors. First, Berlin’s contribution to ISAF was, in terms of military forces, financial cost, and duration, the biggest military, economic, and political involvement of Germany. Second, Berlin commanded the third largest ISAF contingent in Afghanistan.188 From 2002 until 2006, German soldiering to enforce the UN mandate and thus to enable the ATA to fulfill their government duties reflected two main principles. On one side, Berlin focused on the civil dimension in the Afghanistan conflict and kept the military part in the background. On the other, Berlin emphasized a defensive risk minimization approach to keep German soldiers out of danger and away from hostile fire.189

The contrast to the American course of action and their locations of PRT serves as one example. While German PRT were located in secure areas embedded in pro-ISAF communities to build up civil architecture and to promote social development, U.S.-led PRT were often used as Forward Operating Bases that were located in hostile areas to conduct military operations and to keep close contact with those communities.190 In other words, Berlin’s chosen path to project military force was of a defensive nature to sell the image of a peacekeeping rather than an occupying force.191

This image went hand-in-hand with German military restrictions—national caveats—that expressed the operational translation of Berlin’s defensive risk minimization approach. Germany’s record of coalition governments and very close political supervision over the Bundeswehr combined with a weak parliament to politicize

189 Harsch, “Reluctant Warrior,” 11.
190 Ibid., 13–15.
191 Sangar, “Weight of the Past(s),” 5.
and problematize any military engagement.\textsuperscript{192} The response was a comprehensive set of constraints. Hence, the German caveats for ISAF operations set strict limits to use force for self-defense only and restrained German military forces to a purely defensive and passive nature.\textsuperscript{193} The caveats limited not only freedom of action in military operations but also hindered trust building with the population and progress to empower the ATA in the AOR.\textsuperscript{194} Other ISAF participating nations used national caveats as well, but German operational restrictions were extraordinarily restrictive, which during the Afghan conflict were progressively criticized by the other ISAF participating countries.\textsuperscript{195}

Despite German expansion in the Northern part of Afghanistan, German troops and operations were regionally confined in and around Kabul. National engagement was neither allowed to permanently support allied partners in other RCs nor to assist the ATA to enforce its authority when operations were outside of the RC North.\textsuperscript{196} Additionally, German ISAF troops were strictly cut off from any OEF engagements to portray a clean ISAF image and to avoid escalating military involvements.\textsuperscript{197} Berlin’s strategy had a clear point: OEF troops fought terrorism and ISAF troops stimulated nation building;\textsuperscript{198} even though, both troops were operating in the same areas among local communities whose people could not differentiate between different troops and their tasks. Precisely, while OEF soldiers used target lists to capture or kill terrorists within the same AOR, German forces had to follow restrictive regulations that “prohibited German troops’ use of lethal force unless an attack was in process or imminent,” including a ban to fire on retreating identified adversaries.\textsuperscript{199}

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{192} King, \textit{Transformation of Europe’s Armed Forces}, 238.
\item \textsuperscript{193} Merz, “Still on the way to Afghanistan?” 10.
\item \textsuperscript{194} Sangar, “Weight of the Past(s),” 7.
\item \textsuperscript{195} Rid and Zapfe, “Mission Command without Mission,” 203; Auerswald and Saideman, \textit{NATO in Afghanistan}, 71‒3.
\item \textsuperscript{196} Harsch, “Reluctant Warrior,” 14.
\item \textsuperscript{197} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{198} Merz, “Still on the way to Afghanistan?” 6.
\item \textsuperscript{199} Harsch, “Reluctant Warrior,” 14.
\end{itemize}
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In sum, Berlin’s decision to use its military forces was based on a neutral, passive, and defensive nature to avoid any potential conflict that could risk German soldiers “of being harmed or of harming others.” Even after the suicide attack on a crowded marketplace in the center of Kunduz that killed three German soldiers in 2007, these strict restrictions remained unchanged.

In the beginning of peacekeeping in the RC North, German soldiers conducted patrols in lightly unarmored vehicles, showed military force in well-known areas and communities, gathered human intelligence on the general security situation, and selected potential locations for infrastructural improvements and social development projects. Thereby, German soldiers identified local power-holders (key leaders) who were used as points of contact to address security and social issues. Key leader engagements allowed information exchange in return for civil projects and funds for construction initiated by the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. Schools, churches, wells, and other infrastructure were built that consequently portrayed German ISAF soldiers as “aid workers in uniform” in the medial realm.

The close contact not only provided the German military with vital intelligence but also promoted trust within the local communities. Rightly, close contact with the population is understood as a way to reduce security threats. Close contact with communities far off PRT, however, was no option for German soldiers because caveats prohibited overnight operations. A lack of sufficiently protected vehicles further complicated showing military presence and footprint in the AOR. Additionally,

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201 Auerswald and Saideman, NATO in Afghanistan, 73.
202 Sangar, “Weight of the Past(s),” 5.
204 Sangar, “Weight of the Past(s),” 5.
205 Ibid., 7.
206 Münch, “Freund oder Feind?”, 51.
207 Merz, “Still on the way to Afghanistan?” 9.
208 Kuehne, “German and U.S.-led provincial reconstruction teams,” 98.
limited air mobility capacities hindered long-range projection of military force that left some regions without ISAF influence and control.\textsuperscript{209}

Since 2003, the general security situation in RC North had deteriorated gradually, and the level of violence against pro-ISAF civilians and against ISAF soldiers thrived. The increase in suicide attacks, improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, and rocket attacks on the PRT mirrored the security decline during that time.\textsuperscript{210} Although the favorable situation in and around Kabul was compared to the other parts of Afghanistan as relatively safer, insurgents\textsuperscript{211} slowly infiltrated the local communities, regained influence, and spread violence and terror.\textsuperscript{212} Berlin’s rationale to use a neutral, passive, and defensive approach resulted in losing the support and trust of the local communities and in losing sight of the armed conflict that slowly emerged at the AOR’s periphery and steadily spread into the PRT’s vicinity.\textsuperscript{213} While the insurgents had avoided openly attacking German soldiers since the German ISAF expansion, insurgents’ tactics started to change in 2006 when Bundeswehr forces were frequently and openly fired at.\textsuperscript{214}

This change of warfare not only shed light on the worsened security situation but also on spreading insurgent control over local communities. Berlin answered the emerging insurgents and growing attacks with increased force protection. According to Minister of Defense Dr. Jung’s directive, German military patrols were allowed with

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{209} In the RC North, six CH-53 GS helicopters were stationed in Mazar-e-Sharif for transport and personnel recovery operations; Rid and Zapfe, “Mission Command without Mission,” 202–3.
  \item \textsuperscript{211} Mainly Taliban and other radical Islamic factions (al-Qaida, Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan); Guido Steinberg and Nils Wörner, “Eskalation im Raum Kunduz - Wer sind die Aufständischen in Nordafghanistan?” SWP-Aktuell 84 (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2010), 4–6; Steinhoff, “Determinants and politics of German military transformation,” 127.
  \item \textsuperscript{212} Boris Wilke, “Wie weiter in Afghanistan? Regionale Wiederaufbauteams als möglicher Einstieg in ein größeres internationales Engagement,” SWP-Aktuell 33 (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2003), 2.
  \item \textsuperscript{214} Sangar, “Weight of the Past(s),” 8.
\end{itemize}
armored vehicles at pre-planned times only and for some patrols German soldiers had to
stay within these armored vehicles; cutting off contact with the Afghan people
entirely. Consequently, the show of military presence in the AOR further decreased. In
other words, Berlin decided that force protection prevailed over the ISAF mission. While
military presence and visibility of German ISAF soldiers diminished in the public realm,
cooperation with and ties to key leaders and local people were out of reach, and the
influence of insurgents further thrived and the level of violence escalated consequently.

C. GERMAN MILITARY CONSTRAINTS AND CHALLENGES

The shifting situation since 2003 in and around Kabul challenged German soldiers
in two ways. First, the mission changed profoundly over time from a peacekeeping
mission in a stable and relatively safe environment to a combat mission against
insurgents, which confronted ISAF forces with escalating hostilities. Second, the daily
situation and confrontations were extremely diverse and thus demanded civil and military
sets of skills to cope with fast changing social dynamics. While Berlin’s approach at the
strategic level relied on risk minimization with restrictive caveats to avoid any
confrontation, the soldiers at the tactical level had to adapt to the local operational
environments with paradoxical demands that initiated “a protracted process of military
adaptation and learning.” Berlin did not want a military image and eclipsed the
traditional skills of soldiering to promote a peacekeeping image. Admittedly, the
traditional skills of soldiering had been long abandoned before the Afghan conflict and it
was clear that not fighting but peacekeeping, saving, mediating, and helping were
required to succeed in contemporary missions. The Afghan conflict, however, showed
that these new sets of requirements posed challenges for the German military that
affected both the tactical and the strategic level directly.

215 Sangar, “Weight of the Past(s),” 8; Merz, “Still on the way to Afghanistan?” 11.
Keeping in mind that the ISAF mandate defined an enabling and assisting role of ISAF soldiers, the enforcement of ATA influence and control relied on the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the Afghan National Army (ANA)—which hardly existed. Following the logic of the ISAF mandate, member forces did not stand in the first line while they supported ANA and ANP forces conducting their missions. The tactical scenario presented a “second row approach” that put ANA and ANP forces executing missions while ISAF forces could intervene if mission success was jeopardized. The rationale behind the second row approach was to legitimize the Afghan government and its security forces and to avoid an occupier image of the ISAF forces.

The second row approach, however, faced serious problems when Afghan communities did not accept Kabul’s leaders and when compromised individuals of Afghan security forces turned around and opened fire at German ISAF soldiers. Additionally, German caveats prohibited offensive direct intervention, and the second row approach resulted in force protection rather than in enforcement of ANA and ANP mission goals. This situation was further complicated because other ISAF soldiers had less restrictive caveats that not only sold German ISAF soldiers down the river—compared to their ISAF partners—but also aroused desires on the German military side. The different military approaches were well known by ISAF commanders. An ISAF commander compared British and German military forces stating: “You ask a UK company to break into a house they will do so. A German company, they will not. Germany will not change. Some nations do not want non-national responsibility.” Key Afghan leaders were aware of this difference as well and criticized the lack of support of German ISAF forces for local communities by fighting off terror from insurgents. According to the district governor of Kunduz, the German lines of command had to be blessed by the Command in Mazar-e-Sharif that took too long and in the end military

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220 Ibid., 85–7.

221 King, The Transformation of Europe’s Armed Forces, 278.
help was a long time coming.²²² Hence, Berlin’s strategic decision to stay in the background—second row—and to avoid high-intensity warfare constrained German military professionalism at the tactical level. This decision resulted in criticism on disparate “risk-sharing” from other ISAF contributing nations such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada.²²³

German ISAF soldiers faced another dilemma that differed in intensity and quality from other missions abroad. Although German caveats were extraordinarily restrictive, the need to combine fighting and protector skills was clear. The ISAF soldiers were confronted with a situation that fused peacekeeping with armed conflicts close to war.²²⁴ While one moment required neglecting force protection to build up trust in the local situation, a moment later demanded asking for joint fire support to guarantee the survival of ISAF forces and of Afghan people. Certainly, the combination of aggressor and protector skills was nothing new in MOOTW, but those operations required additional skills outside the military domain.

The necessary addition of diverse professional skills to traditional military skills put modern military professionalism to the test. This “functional extension” demands non-traditional military skills that are part of the civilian realm.²²⁵ As UN Secretary-General Hammarskjöld famously noted, “Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it.”²²⁶ Modern military professionalism requires additional skills that belong to other professional domains such as police forces, diplomacy, mediation, and cultural expertise.²²⁷ The situation in the field and the national interest matter and dictate what skill is needed at what time and place to be successful. This is one of the reasons why the German White Paper still highlights German military professionalism that

²²² Auerswald and Saidemann, NATO in Afghanistan, 149.
²²⁵ Warburg, “Paradoxe Anforderungen,” 60.
demands both military expertise and knowledge of “political, humanitarian, economic, and cultural aspects.” Therefore, the genuine traditional military skill to conduct warfare was placed on the same level with other professional skills because the interplay of different skills or the dominance of one particular skill might be the deciding factor for tactical or strategic success.

The operational environment in the Northern part of Afghanistan presented this paradoxical image of fast shifting—sometimes opposing—functional demands that stressed the flexibility and capability of German ISAF forces. While the German military was acquainted with the course of events and their challenges from peacekeeping missions that mostly relied on de-escalating rather than proactive, kinetic actions, German soldiers had neither the government backup and permission nor the specialized training to conduct the required kinetic and counterinsurgency operations. On one side, German soldiers were in the focus with police-like, humanitarian skills; on the other, they stood hampered by national caveats on the sideline—such as “neutral referees”—when traditional military skills were required. Hence, the confrontation with paradoxical demands and the functional extension of the military professionalism were the first steps toward an operational German military that was not ready to be fully involved in high-intensity warfare including counterinsurgency tactics.

D. CONCLUSION: MILES PROTECTOR IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

The analysis of the German expansion of the ISAF mandate reveals that political decisions diverged from the changing operational environment that confronted the military at the tactical level. In a top-down procedure, Berlin assigned no merit to fighting and set strict directives to promote a public-likable peacekeeping image by avoiding any escalation and any German military involvement in armed conflicts. Thus,

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229 Warburg, “Paradoxe Anforderungen,” 65.
Germany chose a risk minimization approach that forced its soldiers to step into a neutral, passive, and defensive role posing paradoxical demands to military professionalism. Thus, the functional extension started to alter the heart and brains of the German military itself and to challenge core concepts of command and leadership in the Bundeswehr. The military dynamics in the RC North increased in complexity and the political supervision intensified—being perceived to equal a micromanagement command directly from Berlin—that called the principles of Innere Führung into question.232 While the core of Innere Führung demands that German soldiers in general and military leaders in particular be self-determined and self-confident and to proactively and dynamically engage in missions, Berlin’s strategic approach imposed a freezing effect on the German military professionalism and on the cultural foundation of the Bundeswehr.233

The initial unknown and unexpected operational demands in the RC North tested not only the soldiers in the field but also the culture of the Bundeswehr. The paradoxical requirements and functional extension resulted in thinking about military professionalism, viewing the soldiers’ role as a miles protector that goes hand-in-hand with Baudissin’s citizen in uniform. The term miles protector—first coined by Swiss General Gustav Däniker—fuses traditional military skills with new operational demands. Combat skills and non-traditional military skills such as those required by diplomats, mediators, and cultural experts are equally important for mission success. The miles protector is understood as a post-Cold War soldier who masters the complexity of new armed conflicts by embodying a broad set of skills and knowledge.234 Certainly, the operational advantage is that additional skills and knowledge extend the capacity for additional options of perceptions and actions to solve complex situations of armed conflicts, even when confronting different cultures.235

232 King, The Transformation of Europe’s Armed Forces, 193.
The German White Paper 2006—three years after German soldiers were conducting patrols in the RC North—argues that “besides being combatants, the servicemen and women in the new Bundeswehr are at the same time helpers, protectors, and mediators. This job profile calls for analytical and action-taking capabilities that go far beyond purely military needs.”236 Those capabilities require modern soldiers who possess political, religious, and ethical education in general and cross-cultural training in particular to cope with paradoxical demands in fast changing operational environments far off the homeland with a differently socialized populace that might not be understood in familiar terms of thought. Thus, mastery and concurrence of capabilities beyond traditional military skills are necessary for soldiers’ understanding and confidence in their actions. This circumstance forced a military adaptation at the tactical level that slowly changed Berlin’s perception of soldiering in complex conflicts.

The political and military awareness of the importance of “capabilities that go far beyond purely military needs”237 emerged gradually when German ISAF forces expanded their mission beyond Kabul. While the complexity of the ISAF mission increased and included fast changing tasks that required humanitarian helpers as well as political and social mediators, the general security situation, moreover, deteriorated and required protectors and fighters progressively. Interestingly, protection of the Afghan people with military means on the ground was not part of the German mandate until 2009.238 With respect to Berlin’s chosen strategy toward military intervention in the Northern part of Afghanistan, the German soldiers were yet not ready to comply with the latter job profiles. After 2009, Germany’s strategy, however, changed and a shift in

237 Ibid.
focusing on helper and mediator tasks to protector and fighter profiles emerged, partly eclipsing miles protector and bringing miles bellicus to the fore.
V. FIGHTING, ARMED CONFLICT, AND WAR

*War is an act of violence to compel our adversary to fulfill our will.*

—Carl von Clausewitz

After the initial military defeat in 2001, the Taliban forces evaded capture but steadily increased their forces and progressively filled the security vacuum with shadow governments across Afghanistan. The expansion of ISAF beyond Kabul with the use of PRT established the physical presence of military force in communities that improved the general security situation and interlocked peacekeeping with the Afghan population. This approach initially hindered Taliban influence and protracted their control over the local population in the beginning of the Taliban insurrection. Since 2006, the ISAF mission evolved from a peacekeeping mission with the focus on security and stabilization of Afghanistan to a mission with the focus on fighting insurgents such as Taliban, Haqqani Network, Hezb-i-Islami, foreign fighters, various tribes in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and criminal networks profiting from the narcotics trade. The intensification of U.S. deployment in Southern Afghanistan and, therefore, more offensive operations pushed insurgents to the RC North that was relatively free of military presence and safe for insurgents, and consequently increasing attacks on the German military.

Since then, the political and strategic disjunction between the ISAF and the OEF mission has been hardly upheld because the tasks and mission goal became mainly congruent. The German military adaptation to the social developments and to the change of the ISAF mission demanded a different and unknown military approach. In

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239 Quotation translated by the author; von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, 50.
2006, the *Spiegel Magazine* printed a cover picture with the title, “The Germans must learn to kill,” which called attention to the seriousness and the controversy in political and social debates in Germany.244

The difference in the operational environment and in the shift of the mission from peacekeeping to combat operations was significantly dramatic by comparing the situation in 2003 and 2010. While in 2003 fewer than 2,000 German soldiers were involved in peacekeeping operations using unarmored and unprotected vehicles and were portrayed as “aid workers in uniform” to build up a devastated country, the operational environment in 2010 was not only far more hostile toward German soldiers but also more than 5,300 German soldiers conducted offensive operations using armored and protected vehicles, heavy German howitzers were stationed in Kabul, unmanned air vehicles were observing the country, and infantry maneuvering forces were fighting insurgents in Northern Afghanistan.245 Additionally, the defense budget between 2005 and 2010 increased by 7.6 billion Euros; this was the first time since the defense budget progressively ran from 3.2 percent of the German gross domestic product (GDP) in 1975, down to 1.05 percent of GDP in 2005, and up to 1.25 percent of GDP in 2010.246

Another striking difference illustrated the change of investigations initiated by the Federal Prosecutor General. In 2008, a German soldier was repatriated and investigated by public attorneys because he opened fire and killed three Afghan people after using warning shots according to the Rules of Engagements (ROE) on an approaching Afghan car that was assumed to be a vehicle borne IED.247 Two years later, in 2010, German soldiers conducted offensive operations—also relying on ROE—in areas of Kunduz and Baghlan, thereby killing hundreds of insurgents. To the contrary, two German soldiers

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were awarded with the cross of bravery and nobody was sent home and investigated by attorneys.248

Since 2006, ISAF participating countries had started to openly criticize the passive and defensive posture of the German security policy toward Afghanistan and demanded more contribution in offensive operations in order to successfully confront the spread of insurgents across Afghanistan with military means.249 After long debates in the Bundestag, the parliament decided to deploy six tactical aircraft with reconnaissance equipment (Tornado RECCE) and quick infantry maneuvering forces—Quick Reaction Forces (QRF)—to the RC North.250 Thus, it was the pressure by the allies rather than a political assessment or a strategic decision that accelerated Germany’s military offensive participation, eclipsing the risk minimization approach gradually.251 This intensification of a military approach was controversial and contested between the politicians in the different rows of the Bundestag. The demand of one member of the parliament to “promise … that they [i.e., infantry] won’t shoot once they’re down there” questioned the understanding and awareness of the military dynamic of the Afghan conflict and the necessity to shift from a passive to an active Afghanistan security strategy.252

Furthermore, one has to keep in mind that the Tornado RECCE were prohibited to engage in close air support (CAS) and were employed for reconnaissance purposes solely, prohibiting any share of INTEL for joint targeting purposes.253 Thus, the Bundestag was yet not willing to engage in offensive operations like their allies in the adjacent RC. Also, a letter from U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Michael Gates to the


250 Bundesregierung, “ISAF,” Drs. 16/6460, 2–3; Merz, “Still on the way to Afghanistan?” 1.


253 Additionally, the Tornado RECCE reconnaissance was of limited usefulness against fast-moving adversaries blending in with the Afghan populace; Harsch, “Reluctant Warrior,” 20.
German Minister of Defense Dr. Jung in 2008 demanding a stronger commitment with more forces, additional helicopters, and loosened caveats did not alter Berlin’s decision to stay in the second row.\(^{254}\)

Certainly, Berlin’s decision and its troops were in the spotlight because Germany commanded the third largest contingent and its forces had a good reputation for being very proficient.\(^{255}\) The Bundestag-imposed caveats, however, impacted German operations in Afghanistan and the course of events in the Afghan conflict, including the deterioration the security situation since 2003, and considerably spoiled the Bundeswehr’s reputation among its Western allies. As the *Spiegel* Magazine stated, “the Germans might as well stay at home. [ … ] Germany has acquired the reputation of a discredited nation, a nation incapable of waging war, a cowardly nation.”\(^ {256}\) The operational demand and tone by German allies shifted progressively demanding of Berlin a stronger commitment with military forces in Afghanistan that found its political peak at the Munich Conference on Security Policy when U.S. Secretary of Defense Gates openly argued that “at the same time, in NATO, some allies ought not to have the luxury of opting only for stability and civilian operations, thus forcing other Allies to bear a disproportionate share of the fighting and the dying.”\(^ {257}\)

Undoubtedly, the addressee of Gate’s statement was clear to all participants of the conference. In 2009, Minister of Defense Karl-Theodor Freiherr zu Guttenberg demanded more support from the German parliament as well and started a political outrage when he highlighted in a speech in front of the Bundestag that he shared the soldiers’ perception of a warlike situation in and around Kunduz.\(^ {258}\) In the same year, the Bundestag

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\(^{254}\) Giegerich, “NATO im Einsatz,” 72.

\(^{255}\) Auerswald and Saidemann, *NATO in Afghanistan*, 142.


mandated additional troops to Afghanistan and loosened the restrictive caveats that paved the way for more military freedom of action, including active participation with allies and the conduct of high-intensity offensive operations in the RC North.259

A. SECURITY DECLINE: ADAPTATION OF THE BUNDESWEHRL

Since 2006, a series of coordinated insurgent attacks against Afghan communities, military and police facilities, and ISAF soldiers and installations increased alarmingly. The suicide attack on a crowded marketplace in May 2007 serves as one example of the spiral of violence.260 Since the beginning of Germany’s contribution to ISAF, 55 German soldiers died in Afghanistan, 35 were killed in action; 15 German soldiers during the first six years and another 23 between 2007 and 2011.261 The insurgency spread from the South and East through the districts into the Northern part of Afghanistan and the German military was increasingly confronted with guerrilla warlike combat situations resulting in a rising number of wounded and killed ISAF soldiers.262 When the IED attacks against German forces “almost doubled within a year, from 27 in 2007 to 44 in 2008,” the initial belief in a peacekeeping mission changed not only at the tactical level but also in Berlin.263

Germany responded to the emergence of a spiral of violence in the RC North with increased force protection in the tactical sphere. German commanders notably changed the quantity and quality of military patrols. German ISAF soldiers conducted far fewer patrols in and around Kabul between 2006 and 2008, and Minister of Defense Dr. Jung prohibited any patrol activities with unarmored vehicles—or operating outside armored

259 Auerswald and Saideman, NATO in Afghanistan,” 73; King, “Adaptation or Refusal to Adapt,” 102.
260 Sangar, “Weight of the Past(s),” 8.
263 Sangar, “Weight of the Past(s),” 8.
vehicles in most cases. Consequently, the German military presence partly diminished in the RC North and close contact with local communities and their leaders was jeopardized. While the military presence and its projection of force in the RC North faded, violence further spread and insurgents’ activities altered from guerrilla like tactics—hit-and-run—to open attacks that not only increased fatalities on ISAF forces but also eroded Berlin’s will for an active approach toward the Afghanistan conflict.

After the most severe of several assaults on the crowded marketplace in the center of Kunduz in May 2007, only the small Task Force 47—German KSK—continued to covertly conduct operations outside Kabul and the strong footprint of German forces initially fell back into the well-protected ISAF bases. As one development worker explained, the ISAF soldiers were “locking the door from the inside.” Force protection prevailed in the ISAF mission and more than 3,000 soldiers of the German contingent were disconnected from the populace, neglecting the center of gravity of any counterinsurgency (COIN) tactic. Certainly to this point of time, the Bundeswehr and the German government were still far from understanding and conducting COIN tactics. Only 10 percent of the German contingent was involved in operations beyond the fence of the ISAF bases and thus only a minority passed the main gate to conduct operations to provide security and gain the trust of the local population during their four- or six-month deployments. This already small faction of operational units reduced their presence in the field and the emphasis on self and force protection eclipsed security

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265 Sangar, “Weight of the Past(s),” 8.
267 Merz, “Still on the way to Afghanistan?” 11.
269 The Army Staff (FüH III 2) wrote the first conceptual paper on COIN in 2009; Chiari, “Krieg als Reise?” 26; Rid and Zapfe, “Mission Command without Mission,” 199.
270 King, Transformation of Europe’s Armed Forces, 286; King, “Adaptation or Refusal to Adapt,” 102.
and trust building temporarily, which cost them situational awareness, INTEL oversight, and opportunities “to secure and win over the local population.”

Two statements by senior staff officers presented a clear picture of the situation at the tactical level at that time. First, the former German PRT Kunduz commander in 2008 portrayed his impressions and argued, “my predecessor concentrated his forces ... because the base was being fired upon with missiles on a daily basis; he then desperately tightened all forces to protect himself against the missiles and thus lost sight of the fact that one has to be present in 60 kilometers, in 120 kilometers of distance. In those places where we were not present, oh wonder, the Taliban gained a foothold.”

Second, former advisor to General Stanley Allen McChrystal—ISAF commander—reported his “submarine-like” impressions of the German military approach in the RC North:

[T]he experience of traveling around Mazar-e-Sharif [ ... ] in an armored German vehicle, whereby I could only observe Mazar and the Afghans themselves through a narrow two inch by four inch slit of bullet-proof glass, really bothered me. It was ... as if I was seeing Afghanistan through a periscope. And if this was how most German soldiers were seeing Afghanistan, I had no confidence that any of them really understood what was going on in Northern Afghanistan at a time when the provinces under German responsibility were noticeably worsening.

Conversely, these statements illustrated the constraints of German military engagements, and showed, on the other, the uncomfortable situation the soldiers were confronted with in the tactical sphere. Furthermore, not only was the German military clearly ordered to avoid casualties but were they also directly tied to Berlin’s “operational and tactical micromanagement” setting strict rules and constraints for any German operations at the tactical level that left no doubt about Berlin’s lacking political will to engage in an offensive approach. In short, the ISAF mission and COIN principles and tactics—apparently unknown to this point from the strategic down to the tactical level—

272 Sangar, “Weight of the Past(s),” 9.
were neglected for fear of own casualties. Despite a spiral of violence in the RC North since 2005, Berlin’s focus to avoid German military deaths in the fields and to portray the peacekeeping and stabilization nature of the Afghan mission went hand-in-hand with neglecting COIN principles and tactics because “successful COIN requires acceptance of risks,” which Berlin was not willing to take.

Consequently, two aspects should be highlighted. First, Berlin’s close political and risk-averse supervision limited the military freedom of action for German commanders and soldiers in the operational and tactical sphere. Trust in and independence of commanding officers, which is the core aspect of Innere Führung, was thereby even lost to the first line of troopers that seriously weakened the Bundeswehr’s effectiveness overall. Second, the German military initially lacked military equipment—improved body armor, armored carriers and vehicles, and air mobility. That progressively pushed demand but re-equipment of the Afghan contingent was meeting the crucial demand only slowly. Thus, the German military not only started with significant constraints that reduced its effectiveness in the field, but also Berlin’s reluctance to amend its politics to reflect the realities at the operational and tactical level delayed vital military needs of operational freedom with its required equipment.

One has to keep in mind that the Bundeswehr with respect to human and material factors is—among NATO partners—commonly viewed as the best army in Europe. First, German military industries, which equip the German military, rank next to the U.S. forces as the lead in NATO. Second, German military personnel are known for their excellent education and military training, as is widely acknowledged and certified by NATO. Third, Germany has the lead in the European economy and politics and thus

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276 Auerswald and Saidemann, NATO in Afghanistan, 146.

277 Kuehne, “German and U.S.-led provincial reconstruction teams,” 98.

278 King, Transformation of Europe’s Armed Forces, 277–8.

279 Ibid.
generally has the means to equip its forces best. Germany’s ISAF involvement, however, greatly damaged Germany’s reputation for possessing a very capable military and “the Bundeswehr is now accused of becoming professionally disorientated, lacking military leadership and is viewed with dismay by many British officers.” As Anthony King cites a British officer recounting, “Think of Germany. We used to admire them. They had great kit. Their senior officers in the Bundeswehr in early days were still from the German military caste, with experience or fathers with experience in the Wehrmacht and with grandfathers who fought in World War I. But that has gone, they have become almost pacifist. They are flailing around.”

Against the background of these statements and security issues at the operational and tactical level, the adaptation of the Bundeswehr changed noticeably in the military realm and emerged from bottom-up influencing the political-strategic level after 2007 for several reasons. On one side, the U.S. surge was not confined to the Southern and Eastern part of Afghanistan but also a significant military growth of U.S. personnel and equipment occurred in the RC North. Additionally, a U.S. general with extensive military insight including Special Forces experience was assigned next to the German RC North commander to push for military success and to put an end to thriving insurgency with more personnel and capabilities.

On the other, German military reports emerged from the bottom criticizing the deterioration of the general security situation, unavailability of equipment in the ISAF contingent, escapist pre-deployment training, the Bundestag’s insufficient force cap, lack of political support and information that burgeoned uncertainties among German soldiers, and extraordinarily restrictive ROE that all together exerted severe limitations, complicated the German military mission, and endangered soldiers’ survival in the

280 King, Transformation of Europe’s Armed Forces, 277–8.
281 Ibid.
283 The availability of helicopters increased from 6 German CH-53 (heavy-lift transporters) to over 50 U.S. helicopters (medium-, and heavy-lift transporters) within a few weeks, not to mention the big jump of U.S. forces; Rid and Zapfe, “Mission Command without Mission,” 204–5.
As one Master Sergeant of the PRT Feyzabad argued, “We want to play in the Champions League while our soccer shoes do not even meet the standard of a County League!” Since 2003—and increasingly since 2006—the reports of the Wehrbeauftragter (Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces), Reinhold Robbe, addressed the deterioration of the general security situation, the necessity to improve security means and forces, and linked doubts among German soldiers on the ISAF significance to Berlin’s approach toward the Afghan armed conflict.

Specifically in 2008 and 2009, Robbe emphasized German military criticism pointing at an increasingly worsened security situation and the lack of military equipment and personnel. As he argued in his report of 2009, “I react now admittedly annoyed when soldiers inform me—to this day—on no improvements regarding a sufficient number of armored vehicles for infantry units, which had to bear the brunt of heavy fighting in Kunduz province.” Furthermore, he left no doubt that he had addressed this operational and tactical deficit several times. He continued, “In particular, incomprehension hit me when official reports on operations attempted to play down the escalating number of combat attacks on German patrols to brief exchanges of fire. In fact, it was fighting, which lasted several hours mostly,” and he concluded that the Bundeswehr neither reacted quickly nor flexibly and thus did not meet its claim to be a modern army.

A lot of debate in the Bundestag followed that tried to downplay these statements and reports; however, German politicians began to speak out and suggested amending the

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special remarks on the use of force. Berlin’s politics and approach altered when the situation in the RC North had already severely degraded. Precisely, ISAF soldiers were confronted with increasing violence and the operational environment mirrored a more kinetic nature than formerly known peacekeeping operations. These political and military dynamics hit the political scenery in Berlin in full scale and confronted parliamentarians with the real threat that German soldiers could be wounded in action, or even get killed in action, and most likely kill people on behalf of Germany for mission success. The debate on Krieg and Gefallene was imminent.

In spring 2009, Berlin altered the ROE for its deployed soldiers in Afghanistan. Not only were the ROE cut from seven down to four pages but also the special remarks on the use of force were amended to read, “attacks can be prevented, for example, by taking action against individuals who are planning, preparing or supporting attacks, or who exhibit other forms of hostile behavior.” Germany further decided to deploy heavy weapons, three armored-howitzers, and started to conduct offensive and high-intensity operations side-by-side with ISAF allies, leaving the position of a neutral referee and meeting the reality on the ground that had long been demanded by Germany’s allies.

B. BERLIN’S REVISION: KRIEG AND GEFALLENE

In the years before 2009, the public and political notion of the Afghanistan mission began to change from armed conflict to war. While the Ministry of Defense administration under Dr. Jung initially avoided war-related words and signs in public communication, he fueled public debates on Krieg (war) and its related term Gefallene (fallen soldiers) when he emphasized his gratitude and appreciation for dead soldiers at an official funeral service. The long-standing political defensive stance toward the term Krieg and Gefallene and the highlighted picture of Bundeswehr’s Afghanistan

291 Auerswald and Saidemann, NATO in Afghanistan, 151.
292 Ibid.
293 Ibid., 148; Harsch, “Reluctant Warrior,” 17.
294 Dörler-Dierken, “Identitätspolitik der Bundeswehr,” 140; King, “Adaptation or Refusal to Adapt,” 102.
mission being of stabilization or reconstruction nature rather than a warlike situation followed a coherent political standpoint. Dr. Jung’s funeral speech resulted not only from a broad debate within the Federal Ministry of Defense but also emerged from the extensive amendment of Innere Führung that was adapted to new operational demands and military experiences.

Despite several and substantial changes in the structure and missions of the Bundeswehr, the Joint Service Regulation 10/1 on Innere Führung (Leadership Development and Civic Education) was not altered for 15 years. The long period of validity of the Joint Service Regulation 10/1 from 1993 underlined its importance for the Bundeswehr’s corporate culture and it accompanied the organizational changes of the German military without being touched by the Federal Ministry of Defense. More specifically, those organizational changes were immense and happened in a timeframe of less than one generation: the German military shrunk from little less than 500,000 soldiers—at the collapse of the Warsaw Pact—to 170,000 soldiers with an additional 15,000 voluntary conscripts, the Bundestag abandoned obligatory military conscription, the Federal Constitutional Court paved the way for military operations around the world in July 1994, the European Court obliged the German executive to allow women to access all service areas of the armed forces in 2001, and, above all, the German forces had been sent on behalf of Germany on numerous missions abroad, bringing real dangers to soldiers’ life and limb. All these crucial developments among others forced the Federal Ministry of Defense to amend Innere Führung to the current demands of operational forces.

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While *Innere Führung* from 1993 described the basic duty of German soldiers to loyally serve the Federal Republic of Germany and to bravely defend the rights and freedom of the German people under risk of life and limb, the version of 2008 added, “military service involves risking life and limb and, in the final analysis, the obligation to kill in battle.”\(^{297}\) Additionally, the current *Innere Führung* was altered to reflect more precisely and realistically the operational environments and their conditions than its former version and rightly states, “Military service, particularly in command assignments, places high demands on the personality of a soldier. The principles of *Innere Führung* provide soldiers with a sound foundation for their actions. After all, military missions may require them to kill in battle and to risk their own lives as well as the lives of their comrades.”\(^{298}\)

Furthermore, the Joint Service Regulation 10/1 not only provides a catalog of military virtues\(^ {299}\) to follow but also leaves no doubt about the extensive operational demands to “perform different roles at very short notice, even in extreme situations” that require “a high degree of ethical competence.”\(^ {300}\) This modern comprehension of German military professionalism is not confined to the military realm because *Innere Führung* is not intended for official use only but is also available to the public. Additionally, it is a *novum* in the German social and political realm that *Innere Führung* explicitly addresses the burden of and the confrontation with extreme operational environments and encountered experiences including the possibility of death in the early months of 2008.

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\(^{298}\) Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Innere Führung*, Nr. 505.

\(^{299}\) This catalog of military virtues (*soldatischer Wertekanon*) demands from soldiers in general and from all superiors in particular to be “brave, loyal and conscientious, comradely and considerate, disciplined, competent and willing to learn, truthful to themselves and to others, fair, tolerant and open to other cultures and able to distinguish right from wrong conduct,” Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Innere Führung*, Nr. 507.

\(^{300}\) Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Innere Führung*, Nr. 507.
While parliamentarians and the German press continued to debate on the term fallen soldiers in Afghanistan, Minister of Defense zu Guttenberg, who took over the Ministry of Defense in 2009, called the “conflict” a “war” and thus broke a German social and political taboo. As zu Guttenberg proclaimed, “Without question, there are warlike conditions [kriegsähnliche Zustände] in parts of Afghanistan.” Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel added—one year after a German-ordered airstrike in September 2009—in a speech in front of the German troops in Kunduz: “We have here not only warlike conditions, but you are involved in fighting as it occurs in war.”

The Kunduz airstrike of September 2009 was a significant turning point of Germany’s involvement in the Afghanistan conflict. The shocking incident in the vicinity of Kunduz that killed more than one hundred Afghan people shifted the German political and public perception of a peacekeeping mission to one of war, changing the entire nature of Germany’s further ISAF operations. The altered perception and the following debate in the Bundestag resulted in a more offensive standpoint that expressed Germany’s willingness to project military power with “all necessary measures.” The Bundestag and the German people had no doubt that the nature of the German deployment had become more hostile. Consequently, the German caveats were loosened to the full extent of the ISAF mandate and reflected the realities on the ground.


302 Auerswald and Saidemann, NATO in Afghanistan, 145.


304 Auerswald and Saidemann, NATO in Afghanistan, 145.

305 Harsch, “Reluctant Warrior,” 5.


at the tactical sphere.\textsuperscript{308} With the turn of 2009, the extensive change of \textit{Innere Führung}, the political and social perception of warlike conditions including contentious debates on \textit{Krieg} and \textit{Gefallene}, as well as the altered special remarks on the use of force “granted the Bundeswehr more resources and tactical autonomy to conduct offensive operations.”\textsuperscript{309}

C. COMBAT INTENSIFIES AND DOMESTIC POLITICS

By 2008, insurgents dominated large parts of the districts of Baghlan and Kunduz, used violence as tool to control the Afghan people, and established a working shadow government solidifying their rule of terror throughout the provinces.\textsuperscript{310} The insurgents openly attacked ISAF forces that not only increasingly threatened all foreign interventions but also jeopardized the coalition will for the ISAF mission. Since then, German soldiers were progressively involved in fighting missions that lasted several hours in most instances.\textsuperscript{311} On Good Friday in 2010, a sophisticated ambush in the district of Chahar Darreh hit the heart of the Bundeswehr in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{312} The Taliban conducted a pre-planned assault killing three German soldiers, wounding five, most of them seriously.\textsuperscript{313}

A comparison between the two Bundestag mandates and their debates in 2008 and 2010 clarifies the changing German reaction toward thriving insurgency and thus the military implications for German soldiering. The mandate in 2008 did not include the


\textsuperscript{309} Sangar, “Weight of the Past(s),” 11.

\textsuperscript{310} Ibid., 10.


\textsuperscript{312} Ibid.

protection of the local population as part of the Bundeswehr mission. Additionally, the military tasks of stabilization, security, protection, and evacuation were mentioned at position three in the task ranking. The mandate merely referred to the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) as additional forces, hardly mentioning the new command over the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) of the RC North. The OMLT followed the NATO approach for ISAF operations and consisted of small units of ISAF soldiers embedded in Afghan battalion-level infantry units. OMLT not only supported ANA units in training and operations but were also crucial force enablers by providing “critical functions such as communicating with artillery, air support, logistics, and other NATO assets in the field,” which Afghan security forces lacked. Thus, OMLT improved ANA’s assertiveness and success in the field directly and promoted the credibility and legitimacy of Kabul’s rule.

In the RC North, Germany used from four to seven OMLT depending on the size and structure of the corresponding ANA unit. Due to higher combat risks in the RC East, West, and South, the German OMLT did not follow their mentored-ANA units conducting operations beyond the border of the RC North because Minister of Defense Dr. Jung prohibited, with respect to the Bundestag mandate, any German military involvement in the other RCs to avoid combat operations, which could risk soldiers’ lives. While the security situation in the RC North deteriorated, the OMLT mission in the RC North gradually shifted, however, from a “supposedly risk-free way to train and build up regular Afghan units” to high-intensity combat missions.

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315 Ibid., 3.
316 Ibid., 6–7.
317 Auerswald and Saidemann, *NATO in Afghanistan*, 50.
318 Ibid.
319 Bundesregierung, “ISAF,” Drs. 16/10473, 7.
320 Auerswald and Saidemann, *NATO in Afghanistan*, 147.
Additionally, the task for the Quick Reaction Force was transferred from Norwegian to German forces in July 2008 according to NATO agreements.\textsuperscript{322} The following Bundestag debate half a year later presented skeptical parliamentarians and a Parliamentary State Secretary of Defense who persistently explained the QRF tasks\textsuperscript{323} and their necessity for operations in the RC North. He refused an increase of the force cap, and emphasized that the quality and nature of German operations did not alter with the takeover of the QRF.\textsuperscript{324}

Interestingly, the fulfillment of the new QRF task assumedly did not require additional soldiers, and the assignment of forces to the QRF consequently reduced operational personnel in other units. In fact, military personnel were repatriated even earlier to meet the Bundestag force cap. Also, QRF’s provision with mechanized infantry combat vehicles (MICV) and Dingo 2\textsuperscript{325} to conduct offensive operations against insurgents, together with the ANA forces, challenges the aforementioned claim that the quality and nature of German operations was not already deeply changing.\textsuperscript{326}

To the contrary, the mandate in 2010 shed light on the change in the quality and nature of Bundeswehr operations. First, the mandate included the protection of the local population as part of the Bundeswehr mission.\textsuperscript{327} Second, the military tasks of military training and equipment support, stabilization, security, protection, and evacuation were

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{322} Bundesregierung, “ISAF,” Drs. 16/10473, 6.
\item \textsuperscript{323} The QRF was the tactical reserve of the RC North and its tasks comprised patrol operations, security operations, crowd control, evacuation operations, and offensive operations against enemy forces; Deutscher Bundestag, “Stenografischer Bericht: 139. Sitzung,” Plenarprotokoll 16/139 (Berlin: Bundesanzeiger Verlagsgesellschaft, 2008), accessed on March 25, 2014, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/16/16139.pdf, 14643.
\item \textsuperscript{324} Bundestag, “Stenografischer Bericht,” Plenarprotokoll 16/139, 14643.
\item \textsuperscript{325} A German heavily armored military infantry vehicle.
\end{itemize}
mentioned in first and second position in the task ranking. Third, the force cap was increased by 850 to a total of 5,350 German soldiers to adjust to the new “focus of the Bundeswehr mandate to protection and training functions.” In other words, infantry maneuvering forces eclipsed PRT forces. These so-called Ausbildungs- und Schutzbataillone (ASB, training and protection battalions) were stationed in Kunduz and Mazar-e-Sharif, replaced the QRF and counted around 1,400 soldiers, consisting of two infantry companies, one engineer company, and one reconnaissance company.

In addition, the ASB had access to the fire support of the three armored-howitzers stationed in Kunduz. At the tactical level, the new focus on the Bundeswehr mandate to protection and training functions meant offensive and active engagement in combat operations to immediately oppose a further deterioration of the security situation, and to shape, clear, hold, and build districts that had been dominated by insurgents. In contrast to former military presence, German forces conducted overnight operations, had

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329 Ibid., 6.

330 Presse-und Informationsstab BMVg, “Schutz und Ausbildung: Schwerpunkte in Afghanistan,” Bundeswehr, updated on August 9, 2010, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/?ut/p/c4/NY3NCsIwEITfKGlVULz5gBFvWl7KWMzmTRrTdlswygvCnIDMzAffIRuY4mM6lzgp5Mq186q3bfTrsRqecCVg1lyAyih9y0KhUgbSNzUQ_AhvQuqakal_QMgM85V13lG2GChwpWXWMIgxjSxzXQggo8gSwpQIhxRVxrHRp0i5kY15EodVZkp6PSZr8IX522_z02KxxXm-vctd91x2-hbKd3Q!!/; Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Omid Nouripour, Agnes Malczak, Katja Keul, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, “Bundeswehreinsatz und Ausbildung im Afghanistan-Konzept der Bundesregierung,” Drs. 17/1195 (Berlin: Bundesanzeiger Verlagsgesellschaft, 2010), accessed on May 10, 2014, http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/011/1701195.pdf, 2–3.

331 The shape, clear, hold, and build transition followed the systematic model for counterinsurgency operations in accordance with the Joint Publication (JP) 3–24 and with the NATO ISAF guidance. The JP 3–24 COIN argues four phases: emphasis on intelligence and reconnaissance to shape the operational environment, elimination of the enemy to clear the operational environment from hostilities, military presence of force to hold and deny enemy active and passive support, and build peace by promoting political and social reconstruction; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3–24, Counterinsurgency (Washington: U.S. Army, 2013), V16; Hartwig von Schubert, “Afghanistan und die Tugend strategischer Geduld: Eine politisch-ethische Studie,” in Soldiers im Einsatz:

332 Sangar, “Weight of the Past(s),” 13.
close contact with the Afghan people, and conducted attacks on insurgents.\textsuperscript{333} Thereby, German forces attempted to tackle the center of gravity of an insurgency following the key COIN tactic: isolate the insurgent from the populace.\textsuperscript{334}

Two different offensive operations highlighted the adapted German military course of actions in the RC North: Operation \textit{Harekate Yolo} in 2007 and Operation \textit{Halmazag} in 2010. The former was the first offensive combined operation in the RC North conducted by several coalition partners (Germany, the United States, Norway, Latvia, Spain, Hungary) and ANA forces.\textsuperscript{335} For the first time, the Bundeswehr supported a direct offensive and coordinated operation against insurgents, which was led by the German commander of the RC North.\textsuperscript{336}

This operation must be understood as the first offensive military engagement under German command since World War II. Confronting the deteriorating security situation in the RC North, the objective of \textit{Harekate Yolo} was to suppress spreading insurgencies, to put an end to insurgent-dominated districts, and to re-establish ISAF and Afghan rule in the AOR.\textsuperscript{337} Next to the more than 500 ISAF soldiers, the Afghan forces had the largest contribution in the operation with up to 900 soldiers, giving the insurgent sweep an “Afghan face.”\textsuperscript{338} The German military took part with about 200 soldiers and mainly supported with logistics, combat support services, radio communications, medical support, and paramedics.\textsuperscript{339} \textit{Harekate Yolo} successfully ended after several weeks

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\textsuperscript{333} Rid and Zapfe, “Mission Command without Mission,” 206.
\textsuperscript{336} Nachtwei, “Afghanistaneinsatz der Bundeswehr,” 8.
\textsuperscript{339} Wiegold, “Afghanistan-Einsatz.”; Timo and Schreer, “German Army and Counterinsurgency,” 3.
\end{flushright}
without ISAF losses and re-established ISAF and Afghan rule in the former insurgent-occupied areas. Although the Parliamentary State Secretary of Defense once again refused a “fundamentally new quality of the ISAF operation” three months later in front of the Bundestag, the German-led operation paved the way for a significant German military adaptation toward operational necessities in the RC North. As Dr. Timo Noetzel and Dr. Benjamin Schreer argued, “counterinsurgency has now become the major operational focus even for German forces. Up until this operation [Harekate Yolo], ISAF had concentrated on patrols aimed at gathering intelligence and contributing to the security of ISAF’s bases in the North. Now, the emphasis will increasingly be on offensive operations against insurgents, together with Afghan security forces. This is necessary to fulfill the task of supporting the Afghan central government as well as to protect the local population and ISAF troops.”

The later operation in 2010, Halmazag, deviated from the operation Harekate Yolo in terms of use of force and German military adaptations to the thriving insurgency in the RC North. About 300 German ASB soldiers together with 120 U.S. forces, Belgian, and Afghan security forces (ANA and ANP) took over key terrain in the insurgents’ stronghold Chara Darreh district to improve the security situation and the protection of the population in the vicinity of Kunduz. The operation’s objective was to secure a permanent presence of ISAF forces in key terrain, to clear the area district-by-district from insurgents, to hold the seized terrain with increased presence of Afghan security forces, to establish a combat outpost—following the new ISAF concept of the Bundeswehr—that controlled the immediate vicinity of insurgencies in the Southern Chara Darreh district, and to enforce the freedom of action for ISAF and Afghan security

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341 Noetzel and Schreer, “German Army and Counterinsurgency,” 3.

forces overall. For several days, Bundeswehr infantry forces among their allies were involved in high-intensity warfare, including extensive close air support from armored-howitzers, combat helicopters, and fighter jets. A senior German officer reflected on the operation and said: “We have taken actions against the Taliban, not them against us as it always was in the past.” Despite deaths on both sides, NATO and the German government claimed success for the operation Halmazag that had achieved the desired end: clearing the AOR from insurgents.

Bundeswehr forces conducted and commanded their first full-fledged offensive operation that did not go unnoticed in either Kabul or Brussels (NATO headquarters); citing a senior NATO officer: “The Bundeswehr task forces do a good job […] when Berlin permits it.” The German forces proved their military capabilities, and as Anthony King argues, they “understood the fire-fight in professional terms. They had executed the drills they had learnt in training and not only did this ensure their survival during this fight, but it was to become established at the basis of the unity for the rest of their deployment.”

Finally, initial German caveats had permitted the use of kinetic force in immediate self-defense only, and less than two years later—while the Afghan conflict had already lasted for eight years—the German military compelled enemies to fulfill their will by using kinetic force against any personnel who planned, prepared, supported, and executed the attacks.

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345 Seliger, “Der Sieg bei Isa Khel.”


347 Sangar, “Weight of the Past(s),” 13; Seliger, “Der Sieg bei Isa Khel.”

escaped attacks, or who exhibited other forms of hostile behavior toward German soldiers.349

D. CONCLUSION: MILES BELLICUS IN ARMED CONFLICT OR WAR

Since the decline of the general security situation, the gradual political adaptation faced formerly unknown military dynamics and escalating bottom-up pressure and the military adaptation was confronted with alarming deficits and uncertainties at the operational and tactical level. Both adaptations shed light on the Bundeswehr’s learning progress and experience during the Afghan armed conflict. Thomas Rid and Martin Zapfe hit the mark by arguing that the conglomerate of “more centralized ISAF-control, more allied forces in the North, and more enemy pressure” affected Berlin’s politics that—since the first German soldiers set foot on Afghan ground—progressively altered Germany’s willingness to use force abroad.350

Beyond the shadow of a doubt, personnel with their experiences are the core of an organization and animate the organization’s effectiveness and survival. Regardless of any new Bundeswehr structure or doctrine, the Einsatz-Generation (operationally-experienced generation of German soldiers) will deeply affect the Bundeswehr’s corporate culture and identity.351 In the end, an organization’s personnel socializes with the surrounding environment, and the Einsatz-Generation’s experience will spillover and have a lasting impact on the Bundeswehr and on less experienced soldiers—if superior officers and also Berlin permit it.

Due to the Afghanistan mission, the Einsatz-Generation is able to differentiate between the nature and the concurrence of PRT and maneuvering forces. Due to political and military dynamics, the German ISAF initial emphasis on reconstruction tasks shifted toward protection of the Afghan people to include COIN tactics. Indeed, both approaches to improve the security situation of the Afghan people and to enforce Afghan rule could

349 Auerswald and Saidemann, NATO in Afghanistan, 151; Sangar, “Weight of the Past(s),” 12.
not be isolated from one another. While senior military officers rejected partnering with the Afghan security forces in the beginning of the conflict, they embraced those partnerships (e.g., OMLT) in the worsening situation in the RC North and, further, pointed at the importance of combat capabilities for mission success.\textsuperscript{352} As the former Inspector of the Army argued in 2010,

I think the insight that the ability to fight must be the decisive feature of all Army soldiers—including those deployed in stabilization operations—has now been generally accepted. [...] Plainly stated, as soldiers, our unique feature is the ability to fight. [...] And when you analyze how the company commander of the QRF or of a Task Force company operates [...] then this is exactly what the Panzer forces have been practicing for decades, previously under the term “battle of combined arms” and now under the term “operation of joint forces.”\textsuperscript{353}

Other German generals concluded that Bundeswehr soldiers had finally arrived at the “cutting-edge of their profession … to be able to fight and, if required, to be willing to fight.”\textsuperscript{354} Following this logic, some German soldiers distanced themselves from the principles of \textit{Innere Führung} because they perceived its relevance as being part of a military metaphysical approach that suited the normality but not real cases of operations abroad.\textsuperscript{355} The application of \textit{Innere Führung} seemed to be disconnected from the battlefield that revealed old traditionalist postures, claiming that “\textit{Innere Führung} made neither good citizens nor good soldiers.”\textsuperscript{356} These debates on and operational experiences of military virtuosity and bravery—typical since the existence of military professionalism and also thriving during the Great Wars in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—supported long-standing traditionalist thoughts and fueled the emergence of a \textit{miles bellicus} concept, which was assumed to be the pure form of soldiering for contemporary operations of joint forces.\textsuperscript{357}

\textsuperscript{352} Sangar, “Weight of the Past(s),” 27.
\textsuperscript{353} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{354} Ibid., 26–8.
\textsuperscript{356} King, \textit{Transformation of Europe’s Armed Forces}, 194.
According to Elmar Wiesendahl, the *miles bellicus* concept is based on the struggle of armed violence in battle alone in which the enemy is crushed by superiority of arms, personnel, morality, and conduct of operations.\(^{358}\) Thereby, *miles bellicus* provides neither insight into military tasks in the transition from war to peace nor military tasks during peacetime to prevent a new spiral of violence.\(^{359}\) Additionally, *miles bellicus* comprehends the use of force (i.e., military violence) as the only means to confront enemies and insurgents.\(^{360}\) Particularly in MOOTW, the *miles bellicus* is pushed beyond its capabilities because it neglects any functional extensions. Furthermore, the one-sided approach is not in accord with COIN principles in which protection of the people, trust building with the local populace, and isolation of the insurgents from the society are key factors. Bluntly, if there is no war, *miles bellicus* has no job and thus loses its usefulness. *Miles bellicus* is based on soldierly values and virtues; it lacks democratic and social values.\(^{361}\) As Elmar Wiesendahl argued, *miles bellicus* and *miles protector* will never be on the same sheet of paper.\(^{362}\) Thus, the *miles bellicus* concept omits key aspects of modern military professionalism, most notably the ability to give and to receive trust.

While *Innere Führung* was adapted in 2008 to meet modern operational demands, it distances itself from any ideas that could be linked to *miles bellicus* thoughts solely. It expressly mentions the importance of different roles, which require different capabilities, including ethical, political, cultural, social, and military competencies.\(^{363}\) Thereby, *Innere Führung* is interestingly the only German Joint Service Regulation that emphasizes trust and puts this term and its meaning at the center of military professionalism.\(^{364}\) Trust must be understood as the “firm belief in the reliability, truth, ability, or strength of someone or something;” it leaves no doubt about a twofold

\(^{358}\) Wiesendahl, “Zurück zum Krieger?” 245.

\(^{359}\) Ibid.

\(^{360}\) Ibid.

\(^{361}\) Ibid., 246.

\(^{362}\) Ibid.

\(^{363}\) Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Innere Führung*, Nr. 507.

\(^{364}\) Trust is more often explained and mentioned than comradeship and discipline in the context of German military professionalism; Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Innere Führung*. 88
To be specific, German soldiers had to trust Berlin’s approach toward the Afghanistan armed conflict which progressively changed over time, and Berlin had to trust its deployed soldiers and give them the freedom they required in terms of German military professionalism to have a successful mission. A twofold relationship was sporadically met on both sides and had to develop and thrive against the background of military and political adaptation during the Afghanistan conflict.

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VI. THE EVOLUTION OF THE BUNDESWEHR TO OPERATIONAL FORCES

Dem deutschen Volke.\textsuperscript{366}

–Inscription on the Reichstag

Wir.Dienen.Deutschland.\textsuperscript{367}

–Slogan of the Bundeswehr

Since its establishment in 1955, the Bundeswehr has taken a special place in modern German history, politics, and society. Before 1990, the German military trained to fight a war “which never broke out and whose nature was different to current operations.”\textsuperscript{368} While other European powers deployed their troops worldwide, the Bundeswehr focused on forward defense and gradually became acquainted with foreign missions, which confronted the German public and its soldiers with heretofore unknown social, political, and military dynamics.\textsuperscript{369} With the peaceful end of the Cold War, the Bundeswehr adapted to the nature of current operations, while the call for German soldiers increased and intensified on a global level in terms of mission quantity and quality.

Against the background of Germany’s self-image as a civil power and its proclivity to favor civil and political approaches over military interventionism, few politicians and military experts viewed with pleasure the evolution of the Bundeswehr to operational forces. In 1994, this evolution gradually emerged with quantitatively and qualitatively intensifying out-of-area missions, requiring new tasks of the Bundeswehr beyond national defense. To be sure, the Ministry of Defense has always emphasized the

\textsuperscript{366}The inscription on the front of the Reichstag building with the dedication: To the German people.


\textsuperscript{368}King, \textit{Transformation of Europe’s Armed Forces}, 192.

\textsuperscript{369}Ibid.
defensive character of the armed forces and has left no doubt that “the military, with its special capabilities, plays an important but not exclusive role” and is “only to be employed where civilian means are unsuitable, unavailable or unsuccessful.” Still, German society rightly questioned any further deployment of German soldiers as a tool to engage in foreign politics and to solve international conflicts. Thus, debates thrived in the medial realm, and thus, the German public became increasingly skeptical and opposed to Bundeswehr deployments.370 As Ulrike Esther Franke argued, “[S]kepticism vis-à-vis military force and its use as a foreign policy instrument has been an essential axiom of German foreign policy since 1945.”371

Certainly, it is not only Germany’s historical guilt and its terrible experiences of more than a decade of war on German soil but there is also another reason that prevails as to why the Germans do not happily talk about war: Today, Germany is a peaceful country and the German people live in safety. Armed conflict has been far from German territory; military equipment and weapons in particular, to say nothing of death and wounded soldiers, are not an immediate part of German life. At the same time, Germany uses its forces abroad to project the nation’s interest. The decision on the use of military force is taken in a legitimate and democratically controlled way. Bundeswehr deployments are generally based on a UN mandate in accordance with international law, but they also are based on the German constitution and thus on the Bundestag and on the will of the German populace.

Moreover, the legitimate use of German soldiers relies on the German spirit of ideals of command and leadership—*Innere Führung*—that puts sense of trust, responsibility, and respect for other people, cultures, politics, ethnicities, and societies in German military professionalism. On this broad basis, Germany contributes in its own military understanding to peace and stability. Admittedly, Germany’s self-image of a civil power has developed for good reasons; shaping the future of the international


system, however, demands living up to a nation’s responsibility. As the Minister of Defense Dr. Ursula von der Leyen argued in 2014, “we [Germans] cannot turn away when murder and rape happen on a daily basis.” Thus, one must say that the use of soldiers is considered to be a tool to enforce the state monopoly on the use of violence and to safeguard rule of law where foreign regimes are not capable or not willing to do so. *Ergo,* the use of soldiers is an instrument for peace and stability that is employed to stand between the German political and social comprehension and awareness of good and evil.

This political and social perception generates controversies in the public realm. Hence, these sociopolitical dynamics formulate a decisive interest “to the German people” that serves as the foundation of any German military interventionism. In considering recent statements of Minister of Defense Dr. von der Leyen and the Bundeswehr missions in general, as well as the Afghanistan mission in particular, German politics and the military have not only become more self-confident and courageous but also more experienced and thus deliberative about projecting the nation’s interest with military means. More specifically, while German soldiers had to trust Berlin’s approach to the Afghanistan mission that progressively changed over time, Berlin also had to trust its deployed soldiers and give them the necessary freedom of action in terms of German military professionalism. This relationship of trust largely developed and thrived against the background of the military and political adaptations during the Afghanistan war.

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The critical turning point came in 2009 when German politicians started to talk about “war” and the media presented Germany’s soldiers not as “aid workers in uniform” but associated them with long-time forgotten and unknown images of firing howitzers, moving in MICV under hostile fire, participating in coordinated CAS and high-intensity combat operations. These images confronted the German public with the ugly side of military interventionism. Hence, the Afghanistan conflict extended the German political and social comprehension and awareness of good and evil because for the first time in German history, the German government not only spoke of war but also deployed soldiers to fight a war in Afghanistan. These changes of the use of German soldiers had more qualitative impacts on the German armed forces than the 20 years since unification and perhaps before. These political, social, and military changes created the *Einsatz-Generation* that will surely have a significant effect well after the Germans cease security and combat operations in Afghanistan in 2014.

This military adaptation in the past decade illustrated a change of thinking of German military professionalism that resulted in the emergence of a new identity for the Bundeswehr from within. Moreover, it sheds light on the role of soldiers as *miles protector* and *bellicus*. In considering military professionalism, analog interpretations were revitalized from the past with the different perspectives of Baudissin and Karst. On one side, Baudissin regarded the military organization as a kind of democratic school of the republic that had to teach its citizens to stand up for the West German state and its society. Karst claimed that teaching the society could not be the key role for a military organization. He pointed out that society must generate the social and political process from within to stand up for the German state and its interests. As such, he was convinced that *Innere Führung* was founded on an understanding of society that was too ideal.

The Afghanistan conflict, however, showed that debates in society and in the Bundestag on the use of violence and deployments abroad changed significantly and, hence, the German people critically questioned the foreign policy of projecting national interests with military means. With respect to Baudissin, the Bundeswehr increasingly possesses a crucial political and social component because the soldiers are equal members of the society who engage in political and social debates that are closely
monitored by other institutions (i.e., media, defense committee) and members of the society. Thus, the integration of soldiers in society does not translate to more—or more prominent—soldiers in and around government or society in Germany. It does, however, have a decisive impact on sociopolitical dynamics. The resolute readiness and willingness to defend the German people is one vital part of military professionalism, but it does not provide the whole story of the armed forces in a democracy.

Almost 14 years of military service in Afghanistan significantly determined the evolution of the Bundeswehr to operational forces. The involvement in Afghanistan started with a twofold and controversial design of opposing missions (OEF and ISAF) that was initiated by Chancellor Schröder’s threat to break up the coalition and the demand to follow his lead. The coalition’s will to stay in power outweighed aspects of German soldiers’ tasks that had an unforeseen scope: peacekeeping in the beginning and fighting in a war far from national territory in the end. While Berlin’s initial decision—following the logic of a top-down procedure—assigned no merit to fighting and set strict directives to promote a publicly acceptable peacekeeping image by avoiding any escalation and any German military involvement in armed conflicts, it caused the military dynamics in the RC North to increase in complexity and consequently intensified political supervision.

Berlin’s political and operational micromanagement called the principles of Innere Führung into question and challenged German military professionalism, which tested soldiers in the field and confronted the culture of the Bundeswehr with formerly unknown and unexpected operational demands. Mastery of the complexity of twenty-first century armed conflicts was achieved by embodying a broad set of skills and knowledge. This circumstance forced a military adaptation at the strategic, operational, and tactical level that slowly changed Berlin’s perception of soldiering in complex conflicts. After 2009, Germany’s strategy changed and a shift from focusing on helper and mediator tasks to protector and fighter profiles emerged, bringing a new Einsatz-Generation to the fore. This Einsatz-Generation will deeply affect the Bundeswehr’s corporate culture and identity because they possess operational experiences and can differentiate between the
nature of complex conflicts and the concurrence of helper, mediator, protector, and fighter profiles.

With the Afghanistan conflict, the Bundeswehr was confronted with the cutting edge of the military profession that extends from actors who help and mediate to those who protect and fight. To be successful means to acquire different capabilities that rely on ethical, political, cultural, social, and militarily competences. Beyond the shadow of a doubt, uneducated soldiers neither rely on these overarching competences nor know that they are instruments of peace and stability. They drag down a military organization, which becomes a means for warfare purposes solely.

The thesis argues that the evolution of the Bundeswehr to operational forces was a dynamic sociopolitical and military process that was determined by the concurrence of top-down and bottom-up factors, which were largely affected by the operational and tactical course of events of the German mission in Afghanistan. Thus, German politics and military at different levels, ranging from the strategic to the tactical level, had a significant impact on military adaptation that created operational forces and broadened the political and social understanding of the use of German military abroad. In addition to Dirk Steinhoff’s claim that “German military transformation is informed by driving forces and limiting factors on the international level, as well as the domestic level,” one must see the root of the change from within the heart and mind of the army itself as due to altered military missions. Military missions beyond European borders transformed the German military that had implications on the political level as it concerns foreign and security policy as well as the role of the forces in society. Top-down aspects (i.e., a collection of security policy statements and proclamations of ministers and chiefs of defense) and bottom-up aspects (i.e., changes in thinking about the spirit and service of the German military professionalism in the stress of conflict and domestic politics and political culture) illustrate the adaptation to a new set of political, social, cultural, and

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374 The term transformation is defined in the German Defense White Paper 2006 that reads, “Transformation is the proactive shaping of a continuous process of adaptation to the ever-changing framework conditions with the aim of enhancing the Bundeswehr’s operational effectiveness,” Federal Ministry of Defense, White Paper 2006, 75.

375 Steinhoff, “Determinants and politics of German military transformation,” v.
operational demands and clarify the extent of the changes of the German military professionalism.

In considering the German ISAF and OEF case, the initial dual military design, the defensive risk minimization, the paradoxical demands, and the thinking about ideals of command and leadership of the German military were the challenges to operational German forces. While the complexity of the ISAF mission increased and included fast-changing tasks that required humanitarian helpers as well as political and social mediators, the deteriorating general security situation required protectors and fighters.

Consequently, some soldiers and politicians put the arrival of the German military at the “cutting-edge of their profession … to be able to fight and, if required, to be willing to fight” on the same level with the soldiers’ role as a miles bellicus. Debates on the different roles of soldiers, including the necessity and meaning of armed forces in a democracy, were already known from the Karst-Baudissin controversy on German military professionalism. As Rudolf Hamann stated, rethinking Innere Führung means having to address the evolution of the Bundeswehr from a forward defense force to an operational force. The clear statement of the German Federal President, Joachim Gauck, in front of the Reichstag during a ceremonial oath of the Bundeswehr, “to be a soldier means going where the Bundestag sends you,” underlines what it means to possess operational forces in a democratic nation. Thus, the evolution of the Bundeswehr to operational forces relies on its loyal servants—soldiers—and on their will to adapt to contemporary social, political, and operational demands. Rightly, the German White Paper 2006 argues that “the Bundeswehr’s transformation process cannot succeed unless there is a lasting willingness for change.” In particular, the Einsatz-Generation

376 Sangar, “Weight of the Past(s),” 26–8.

377 Rudolf Hamann, “Im Gleichschritt in die Sackgasse,” in Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr: Sozialwissenschaftliche Analysen, Diagnosen und Perspektiven, ed. Sabine Jaberg, Heiko Biehl, Günter Mohrmann and Maren Tomforde (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 2009), 68.


will contribute to this willingness for change and will certainly have an impact on the evolution of the Bundeswehr.

The *Einsatz-Generation*, however, challenges the evolution of the Bundeswehr in different ways, mainly by confronting comrades who feel alienated or not part of the Bundeswehr as operational forces. 380 First, one has to take soldiers of another generation into account, those who joined the forces before the conduct of out-of-area missions and, surely, pledged allegiance to Germany under the premise of forward defense forces during the Cold War. 381 Those comrades probably find themselves in a role conflict confronted with the changes of the Bundeswehr, which has not only various objectives in terms of quantity and quality but also in the conduct of military operations—war—without geographical restrictions. 382

Although the well-known understanding that officers train their troops in peace and command them in war remains valid, the complexity of military interventions requires military professionalism that is founded on both military expertise and knowledge of political, humanitarian, economic, and cultural aspects incorporating a diversity of soldiers’ roles as combatants, helpers, protectors and mediators. 383 The reasonable and opportune fusion of these roles, going far beyond pure military needs, implies arriving at the cutting-edge of the military profession. Therefore, the Bundeswehr mission in Afghanistan has been unique for both the German populace and military because German soldiers were confronted with this fusion, ranging from deliberate, analytical, and action-taking capabilities and willingness in general, to facing the reality of wounded and killed soldiers for the first time in German history. 384

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381 Ibid., 104.

382 Tomforde, “Auslandseinsätze als Initiation in die ‘neue’ Bundeswehr,” 104.


384 King, “Adaptation or Refusal to Adapt,” 102.
In a nutshell, more than a decade of peacekeeping and fighting in Afghanistan transformed the Bundeswehr toward operational forces, and as Thomas Rid and Martin Zapfe argued, “in the early 2010s it is hard to find a non-commissioned or commissioned officer up to the rank of brigadier general who has not served in Kabul, Mazar-e Sharif, Kunduz, or Feyzabad.” In other words, German ISAF soldiers who were formerly portrayed as “aid workers in uniform” were transformed into operational soldiers, who conduct MOOTW, including high-intensity warfare missions, and who are able and willing to fight. As General Harald Kujat highlighted, the Bundeswehr mission in Afghanistan created an Einsatz-Generation “with personal combat experience, contributing to a ‘more self-confident’ Bundeswehr.” Additionally, President Gauck picked up this perception of self-confidence and extended the concept of citizen in uniform, calling the soldiers “Mutbürger in Uniform” (brave-citizens in uniform) because only their profession demands risking life and limb, killing other humans, and enduring the death of comrades.

Next to the argument of the emergence of a new Bundeswehr that creates conflicting roles, non-deployed soldiers might feel alienated from the Bundeswehr because the military missions define mission-experienced soldiers against others. As modern armed forces abolish the mass military model, the armed forces are reduced in size and that results in internally different social dynamics and a new a corporate identity,

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387 Alessi, “How Afghanistan Changed the German Military.”

388 Bruno Kasdorf, “Verantwortung ist angesagt,” Deutsches Heer, updated on February 4, 2014, http://www.deutschesheer.de/portal/a/heer/ut/p/c/4/NYZND0LwEITf_el-oXbykGvXgRvS9nQ5mnZtGLD28XcSaZTPJNBh-YHenenlKF1gWssbH-0L7BMQvQoD0HAIJgsE2-dcoQtOVmZYg1p0NTyr-N9OeoYblq/S-al-py9kCaBKymGhcwimYDvssDFFdtTKl-av47M-Xqt5sd2V1Pd1wGsfjFwNZiEw/.
especially when missions generate a cohesion effect. Consequently, the *Einsatz-Generation* forms a two-class military differentiation between mission-experienced and non-experienced soldiers automatically. As Maren Tomforde argued, “you [soldiers] have to have been there [the mission] at least once, otherwise you can’t really talk, when your comrades discuss operations. And operations get talked about a lot.” Also, Anthony King concludes, “foreign missions are creating a mission oriented military identity which deployed soldiers understand as an important transition from the ‘classic’ trained soldier to a deployable trooper in a newly structured Bundeswehr. In other words, operational experiences have had a collective effect and have contributed to a new self-understanding in the direction of deployable military professionals.”

This professionalization from the “‘classic’ trained soldier to a deployable trooper” is not only visible to other comrades but also acknowledged by Foreign Duty Medals as a national decoration awarded during military ceremonies. First awarded in 1996 for the deployment to the Balkans (IFOR), the number of different Foreign Duty Medals has increased with each foreign mission. On one side, the award is a defining symbol of mission-experienced soldiers, and thus, it defines them against others. On the other side, it is the official recognition of their service—acknowledging their participation in humanitarian, peacekeeping, and fighting missions in foreign countries—on behalf of the German people. Next to the Bundeswehr Cross of Honor, which was first introduced in 1980, other national decorations and medals were created at the peak of

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389 In considering Anthony King’s argumentations, cohesion effect means, “professional European soldiers may be increasingly extending comradeship to those who can perform their drills properly. […] Cohesion is becoming a function of professional practice, not so much a prior condition of it as it seems to have been in the mass conscript armies of the twentieth century,” King, *Transformation of Europe’s Armed Forces*, 235–6.


391 King, *Transformation of Europe’s Armed Forces*, 198.

392 Ibid.

393 Ibid.


Germany’s engagement and participation in high-intensity military operations in 2008 and 2010: the Bundeswehr Cross of Honor for Valor and the Einsatzmedaille Gefecht (Medal of Combat Action). The former was first awarded for an act of bravery “in the face of the enemy” by German ISAF soldiers, who were fighting side by side with U.S. forces against Taliban camps and clearing the area from hostile forces in the end.\textsuperscript{396} The latter was introduced to award soldiers, who “at least once actively participated in combat operations or suffered terrorist or military violence under high personal risk.”\textsuperscript{397} In particular, the introduction of the Einsatzmedaille Gefecht is a matter of controversy among historians, politicians, and military experts who fear a militarization of the German politics and an emergence of a new heroic identity of the Bundeswehr that would be disconnected from German military traditions and Innere Führung.\textsuperscript{398} In a nutshell, the importance of symbols—medals and decorations—is essential for creating cohesion and an identity. More specifically, it is also proof of military professionalism.

Today, the Bundeswehr relies on soldiers with a diversity of experience and capabilities. Some soldiers are basic-trained, others are mission-experienced, and a few are “specialists in violence;” however, they all have in common that they are part of the German society and not isolated within the military realm.\textsuperscript{399} As an equal member of the society, the brave citizens in uniform embody the political, social, and military values of the German populace and thus carry their experience and sociopolitical conflicts into the society. The evolution of the Bundeswehr into an operational force was a result of the different phases of the Afghanistan mission and Innere Führung with its adaptation, which was a successful balancing act to harmonize the fundamentals of German military professionalism with the integration of the German military in the society.

\textsuperscript{396} Rid and Zapfe, “German Military Adaptation in Afghanistan,” 207–8; King, “Adaptation or Refusal to Adapt,” 102.
\textsuperscript{398} Rid and Zapfe, “German Military Adaptation in Afghanistan,” 208–9; King, “Adaptation or Refusal to Adapt,” 102.
Although Germany was conducting war in Afghanistan, the importance of capabilities—which go beyond the use of violence—and their necessity to guarantee mission success was evident, giving de-escalation and peace a real chance. Importantly, *Innere Führung* neither defines the center of gravity nor strategic or tactical objectives to guarantee mission success. Rather, it provides the political, social, and military spirit and ideals to fulfill current and future Bundeswehr missions. While the new operational forces with a new *Einsatz-Generation* developed, *Innere Führung* not only “proved its worth on operations” but especially held the armed forces like a clamp together.

In the end, the Afghanistan mission has enhanced German military professionalism of the personnel and the military organization, deepened the civil-military identity and integration of the Bundeswehr in the society, and also promoted Germany’s credibility with its developed operational forces as a reliable ally within the international system. This military is able and—when necessary—willing to fight on behalf of Germany.

The critical question is what sort of role will be assigned to the Bundeswehr in the years ahead. The current campaign of the Bundeswehr provides an idea what German people have to expect in terms of German military professionalism. The notion of “*Wir.Dienen.Deutschland.*” (We.Serve.Germany.) expresses three key aspects in terms of the role and ideals of the Bundeswehr. First, the emphasis on “we” leaves no doubt that the German military is not only deeply integrated in the German society but also underlines the importance that German soldiers are equal members of the society with the same political and social values of the German populace. Second, serving—including to risk life and limb in the extreme—to guarantee Germany’s freedom and security remains the core ideal of the identity of the Bundeswehr. Third, the emphasis on Germany, home of Germans, which is a free, safe, and an internationally respected

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402 Ibid.
partner and friend, and also pride to protect German values and interests. A triad that goes hand-in-hand with ideals of *Innere Führung* and, in particular, with the inscription on the Reichstag: *Dem deutschen Volke!*

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403 Thomas de Maizière, “Wir. Dienen. Deutschland. – Das Selbstverständnis der Bundeswehr,” Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, accessed on October 3, 2013, http://www.bundeswehr.de/resource/resource/MzEzNTM4MmUzMzMyMmUzMzMTM1MzMyMzMTM2MzIzMzMDMwMzAzMDMwMzAzMDY3NzA3MzM1NzM2MzM2NzgyMDIwMjAyMDIw/Wir.Dienen.Deutschland._barrierefrei_final_Juni%202011_KG.pdf, 3.
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