SECURITY SECTOR REFORM’S UTILITY IN CONFLICT PREVENTION

A Monograph

by

Major Jared Rudacille
U.S. Army

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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Security Sector’s Reforms’ Utility in Conflict Prevention

Major Jared M. Rudacille

Regionally aligned forces conducting security force assistance and foreign internal defense promise to assist the Combatant Commands in shaping the operational environment to prevent conflict. However, operational planners must understand that security force assistance and foreign internal defense are only two components of security sector reform; thus, the promise that they will prevent conflict is dubious at best. This study examines the various approaches to security sector reform and then applies the U.S. government’s methodology to security sector reform in Mali from 2004-2012. The hypothesis of this study is if the Department of Defense conducts security force assistance and foreign internal defense with a state’s military then conflict decreases in that state. The evidence suggests that security sector reform realistically falls short in preventing conflict; however, there are positive secondary effects that may often be associated with the process.

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate:  Major Jared M. Rudacille

Monograph Title:  Security Sector Reform’s Utility in Conflict Prevention

Approved by:

______________________________,  Monograph Director
Bruce Stanley, Ph.D.

______________________________,  Seminar Leader
Juan K. Ulloa, COL

______________________________,  Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
Henry A. Arnold III, COL

Accepted this 23rd day of May 2013 by:

______________________________,  Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM’S UTILITY IN CONFLICT PREVENTION by Major Jared Rudacille, 64 pages.

Regionally aligned forces conducting security force assistance and foreign internal defense promise to assist the Combatant Commands in shaping the operational environment to prevent conflict. However, operational planners must understand that security force assistance and foreign internal defense are only two components of security sector reform; thus, the promise that they will prevent conflict is dubious at best. This study examines the various approaches to security sector reform and then applies the U.S. government’s methodology to security sector reform in Mali from 2004-2012. The purpose of the study is to analyze the Department of Defense’s contribution to security sector reform theory in the context of Mali to determine whether security force assistance and foreign internal defense can shape the operational environment to prevent conflict. The hypothesis of this study is if the Department of Defense conducts security force assistance and foreign internal defense with a state’s military then conflict decreases in that state. The significance of this study is that it provides a valuable, broad understanding of how the Department of Defense plans to contribute to security sector reform theory in the near future.

The evidence suggests that security sector reform realistically falls short in preventing conflict; however, there are three significant constructive outcomes in U.S. efforts at security sector reform. The U.S. may increase its influence with the targeted state by partnering with various levels of government and local leadership. The U.S. also gains a better understanding of the nature of the conflict in the state and the human terrain of the actors in it. The U.S. may also increase its access with the state for future operations by developing that nation’s infrastructure. The U.S. should revise its objectives for security sector reform to something more feasible; however, it should not remove it from the possibilities of future policies.
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarm, Demobilize, and Reintegration</td>
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INTRODUCTION

The Army’s contributions to shaping regional environments to promote peace and prevent the outbreak of conflicts are vitally important in an era where low-level conflicts can rapidly morph into global crises. As the only service designed to provide long-term and persistent presence, Army forces today partner with allies and demonstrate American commitment in key regions around the globe...Their efforts strengthen the capabilities of our partners, increase our understanding of local dynamics, and build lines of communication between militaries and nations increasingly necessary in a complex interconnected world. Soldiers standing side-by-side with foreign militaries provide the nation strategic access to places and societies that might be otherwise inaccessible.

― Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, CSA’s Strategic Intent

In the 1990s, the U.S. government developed its security sector reform theory after the realization that security is required before economic development can occur in conflict states. The objective of security sector reform (SSR) is to “design, develop, and deliver foreign assistance such that it promotes effective, legitimate, transparent, and accountable security and development in partner states.” The Department of Defense’s role in security sector reform is supporting the reform, restructuring, or re-establishment of the armed forces and the defense sector across the operational spectrum. The Department of Defense does this through a complicated process of security cooperation, security assistance, foreign internal defense, and security force assistance. Since 2013, the Army is placing greater emphasis on security sector reform by providing regionally aligned forces to conduct these activities to build partnerships across all the combatant commands and to shape the combatant commands operational

1 Chief of Staff of the United States Army, “CSA’s Strategic Intent: Delivering Strategic Landpower in an Uncertain World,” Online at www.army.mil [accessed on 05 February 2013]


environment to prevent conflicts. Is the security sector reform theory still valid to allocate our forces in such a manner to achieve our nation’s objectives? The thesis of this monograph is that regionally aligned forces conducting security force assistance and foreign internal defense promise to assist the Combatant Commands in shaping the operational environment to prevent conflict. However, operational planners must understand that security force assistance and foreign internal defense are only two aspects of security sector reform; thus, the promise that they will prevent conflict is dubious at best.

If security sector reform through foreign internal defense and security force assistance failed in Mali, then a problem emerges with the Department of Defense’s approach. This suggests that the United States should refine its operational approach to security sector reform or refine the desired goals. In the case of Mali, the state was a rising democracy in the Trans-Saharan region of Africa after 1992. The United States partnered with the government and its forces for over twenty years before the latest coups caused the U.S. to remove support. The U.S. wanted to reform Mali’s entire security sector to promote democracy and liberalize its markets. Unfortunately the U.S. focused primarily on countering terrorism in the region and did not attempt to significantly reform Mali’s other security sectors. The U.S. was not the only country to fail to implement reforms in Mali. France failed as well. The U.S. and France failed to synchronize their efforts to achieve the reform necessary in Mali before conflict erupted in 2012 and external military intervention was needed.

The purpose of the study is to analyze the Department of Defense’s contribution to security sector reform theory in the context of Mali to determine whether security force assistance and foreign internal defense can shape the operational environment to prevent conflict. The significance of this study is that it provides a valuable, broad understanding of how the Department of Defense plans to contribute to security sector reform theory in the near future.
contemporary case study. The study also provides an example of the potential impact of security sector reform on conflict dynamics. Finally, this study can provide a basis for future security sector reform to make it more responsive to the goals of the department of Defense and Combatant Commands.

The objective of security sector reform theory is to “design, develop, and deliver foreign assistance such that it promotes effective, legitimate, transparent, and accountable security and development in partner states.” Security sector reform theory is an extension of liberal peacebuilding that contends democratization and market liberalization are sources of peace. The US government broadly believes that through a comprehensive approach to security sector reform the United States can shape the environment to prevent conflict. The Department of Defense achieves the U.S. government’s objectives by conducting security cooperation and security assistance. Foreign internal defense and security force assistance are primary activities of the security assistance lexicon. Security assistance programs are critical tools to fund and enable security force assistance activities. The U.S. Army plans to fulfill these missions by regionally aligning forces to partner with states arranged by geographic combatant commands.

The concept of using conventional Army forces for conducting security sector reform for the nation is not new. This study uses Paul Reynolds’ framework in *A Primer in Theory Construction* to determine if this is truly a new paradigm, and if it is, what implications it may have for the future force. Reynolds’s theory requires the paradigm to be abstract, intersubjective, and empirically relevant. It is important to understand the broad ideas of his theories before

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5 The comprehensive approach not only includes the U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Defense, and USAID, but also other government agencies, contractors, and businesses.

evaluating them against Reynolds’ criteria.

Abstract requires the theory to be independent of space and time. This study uses historical examples where Army conventional forces are employed to conduct security sector reform of foreign militaries in the literature review and methodology. Intersubjectivity requires the theory to be explicit and rigorous. The literature review and methodology also covers the doctrine and terminology used for regionally aligned forces concept and determine if there is agreement across the wider military community on the concept. Finally, the paradigm must be empirically relevant, requiring an objective comparison of the theory to other ideas. The literature review will discuss alternate theories and paradigms for conducting security sector reform with a limited budget and reduced size of military force. It will also consider ideas external to the military to determine if it remains feasible for a military force to execute.

According to Thomas Kuhn, the theory needs to represent radical new conceptualizations of the phenomena, suggest new research strategy or methodological procedure, or suggest new problems for solutions to be a new paradigm. This study also analyzes the security sector reform mission in Mali to determine if it was successful and whether the outcome is an anomaly or not. If it is an anomaly, Thomas Kuhn believes it could indicate a crisis of the paradigm, possibly causing a scientific revolution for the theory to change.7 This would have wider implications for security sector reform.

The hypothesis of this study is if the Department of Defense conducts security force assistance and foreign internal defense with a state’s military then conflict decreases in that state. There are six significant research questions to consider. First, what Department of State security programs were implemented in Mali? Second, what Department of Defense security programs

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were implemented in Mali? Third, how was the United States security sector reform approach implemented in Mali? Fourth, how often did the United States security sector reform implementers engage with Mali from 2004-2012? Fifth, why did conflict begin in Mali in 2006 and 2012? Sixth, why did Mali’s security sector reform initiatives fail? These questions assist in determining if the Department of Defense’s approach to Mali was an anomaly and whether it may have implications for future security sector reform efforts.

This study is limited in the following manner. First, the study is limited in scope to present the information. This causes the study to focus on the broader picture of the problem and limits it to one, detailed case study to evaluate. Second, the research in this study is limited to open source information. This causes the study to possibly exclude some important details on concepts and events that occurred. Third, the study only includes one case study to confirm or deny the hypothesis. It is possible that there are additional anomalies to prove or disprove the research. This monograph will not provide the final solution to security sector reform, but provide a discourse that can possibly improve the concepts discussed. I challenge the reader to conduct further research to add to the discourse.

The delimitations used by the researcher in this study are determined by a desire to gain an understanding of security sector reform; foreign internal defense and security force assistance in context with the Army’s desire to use regionally align forces to conduct these missions in the future. In order to gain a relevant perspective, the researcher only applied a contemporary case of the U.S. partnering with Mali to conduct security sector reform. There are numerous other examples the author could have chose, including Kenya, Somalia, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. This study will examine the interagency approach to security sector reform to examine the complex coordination required to conduct reform in weak states. Since the interagency approach is applied, this study will not include as much detail about the specific actions, training methodologies, or specific projects individual units applied to their mission at the tactical level.
This study includes four essential assumptions. First, the operational environment will remain in a state of persistent conflict for the near future. Second, security sector reform is designed to prevent or shape the conflict environment and will remain as a tool of foreign policy. Third, the forces conducting security sector reform are being employed for foreign internal defense or security force assistance and not for combat, peacekeeping, or other operations. Fourth, the Army plans to implement the Reginal Alignment of Forces policy to provide general purpose forces to conduct security sector reform through security cooperation, security force assistance, and foreign internal defense.

The monograph is organized into six sections. Section one includes the background of the study, statement of the problem, purpose of the study, significance of the study, definition of terms, theoretical framework, research questions, limitations, delimitations, and the assumptions of the study. Section two is a literature review that discusses security sector reform theory and three different proponents approaches to policy. It will also define key concepts of security sector reform and provides empirical evidence for the importance of this study’s hypothesis. Section three describes the methodology of this study. It will discuss the selection of the case study, the data collection plan, and data analysis approach. Section four is the case study. The case study analyzes the implementation of security sector reform in Mali in the early 21st Century and determines why the U.S. government’s efforts failed to prevent the outbreak of violence in 2006 and 2012. It provides a background of Mali’s security situation and the security sector reform operations and answers the research questions to prove the hypothesis as true or false. The study then measures the military’s security sector reform success in Mali against the U.S. government’s intended objectives. Section five will qualitatively analyze the case study using the methodology discussed in section three. Section six provides a summary of the study and presents the study’s findings, as well as implications for future theory, practice, and research.
LITERATURE REVIEW

This section provides the rational for conducting research on security sector reform (SSR) and its relationship to the United States approach to reforming the security sector in Mali. This section will discuss security sector reform theory from the macro level as described by various organizations and states. It will also determine what actors comprise the security sector. The section will also define key terms associated with the United States approach to security sector reform. Finally, this section will justify the monograph hypothesis in the context of U.S. security sector reform approach to Mali in the first part of the twenty-first century. First, what is the underlying theory of security sector reform?

Elements of security sector reform have been around for many decades. In 1949, U.S. military personnel began training foreign militaries under the Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Programs. States would conduct activities to reform governments of neighboring states to prevent unlawful activities on their borders. However, security reform emerged in the 1960s to handle the decolonialization process in Latin America, Africa, and Asia to build nations and unite people. Back then, security reform approaches were not integrated and generally only focused on the military forces of the state. It was not until the end of the Cold War that the international system reconceptualized security sector as an interconnected system. The

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10 ‘In the pre-Cold War period the primary concern was invasion either of a nation or its allies.’ During the Cold War, the provision of SFA/ FID activities were aimed at preventing the spread of communism—mainly shoring up the defense against the Warsaw Pact. Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, David R. Segal, Edited, The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 14.
development of SSR coincided with a new focus on human security.

Security sector reform is a “set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that are undertaken by a series of stakeholders to improve the way a state or governing body provides safety, security, and justice to its civilian population within the context of rule of law.” Security sector reform theory is an extension of liberal peacebuilding that contends democratization and market liberalization are sources of peace. International actors like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) defines security system reform as “increase[ing] partner countries’ ability to meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance, transparency and the rule of law.” The United States defines security sector reform as reform efforts directed at the institutions, processes, and forces that provide security and promote the rule of law. Thus; SSR is about creating a secure environment that is conducive to development, poverty reduction, and democracy in a country.

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11 Dr. Sarah Meharg goes further in defining the security sector as the “organs of government with which the power of coercive authority can execute the will of the state” since many governments are not similar if their construct. Sarah Meharg and Aleisha Arnusch, Security Sector Reform: A Case Study Approach to Transition and Capacity Building, Strategic Studies Institute (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2010), 3.

12 The underlying assumption is that the reform processes that occurs within the state’s government system will cause a positive feedback on each other. The theoretical framework is based on the historical experiences of Western Europe and the body of sociological, political and economic research developed in this context. The theoretical bases of this are the theories of civilization and modernization of Max Weber, Karl Marx, and Emil Durkheim. Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, “The Power of Liberal International Organizations,” in Michael N. Barnett, Raymond Duvall, Power in Global Governance (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 163-164.


Even though the international community has different labels for security sector reform, these states generally agree that the various SSR approaches should address the ineffective and inefficient provision of security and accountability and oversight of the security sector by some form of justice. Justice is increasingly becoming a concern because often times the providers may themselves be a source of insecurity. Democratic governance is the cornerstone of every SSR approach, regardless of whether it is a specific state’s or an international organization’s specific theory. According to the OECD, two of the key goals of SSR are to prevent conflict and build peace.16

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15 In the center, where all three overlap, is where the reform is achieving maximum results because it incorporates the institution, security forces, and peace support operations that work to bring the change to the from the institutional to the local levels. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *DAC Guidelines and Reference Series: Security System Reform and Governance* (Paris, France: OECD Publishing, 2005), 20.

The OECD-DAC identified two focus areas in their 2007 review of the security sector reform construct for states to consider. First, the international community needs to focus on “strengthening capacities of civil servants, political leaders and oversight bodies to ensure that they have the understanding and the tools to steer the security system.” This is because most donors tend to focus only on developing the military capabilities of a government. Second, the international community needs to include a population-centered approach to security to incorporate individuals and local communities in the security and justice of the state. The next sub-section examines the actors that constitute the security sector of a state.

The security system of a state is a complex system of systems. There are many different views in how to group the security sector actors; however, they all focus on a liberal, democratically based government system that needs to be reformed. The OECD-DAC identifies a state’s security system as core security actors, security management and oversight organizations, justice and law enforcement institutions, and non-statutory security forces. The core security actors are comprised of armed forces, police, gendarmeries, paramilitary forces, presidential guards, intelligence and security services (both military and civilian), coast guards, border guards, customs authorities, and reserve or local security units (civil defense forces, national guards, militias). The security and management oversight organizations include a state’s executive, legislative, ministerial, financial, and civil society entities that provide oversight and control of that state’s security actors. Justice and law enforcement include the judicial bodies, police, corrections, prosecution, human rights, and ombudsmen of the state. Finally, the non-statutory

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forces include the non-state sanction security organizations that operate both within and external to the law in the state. By including non-statutory governing bodies as a security system actor, the OECD-DAC’s definition is broader than many state’s definitions. Most states only recognize legitimate military and police forces. This has implications as to whether a state will include the non-statutory security forces in the process of reforming the security sector or treating them as a problem blocking the solution.

Jane Chanaa of the International Institute for Strategic Studies simply groups the security actors into four dimensions: political, institutional, economic, and societal. The political dimension manages the security sector. The institutional dimension represents the forces that maintain a mandate for providing security. The economic dimension deals with the security force’s consumption of resources and a state’s revenue and collection mechanisms. The societal dimension provides the checks and balances on the security system. According to Chanaa, it is for long-term reform to be accepted and institutionalized, at the macro and micro levels, it is essential to reform the society.

Finally, the African Union Commission identified five key actors in their *Handbook on Security Sector Governance in Africa* report from November 2003. Those actors are (1) organizations legally mandated to use force, (2) judicial and public safety organizations, (3) civil management and oversight organizations, (4) non-state security organizations, and (5) non-statutory civil society (See Figure 2 below). The organization then divided those actors into two categories—non-state security organizations and civil society organizations. The coalition also prefers the use of security sector transformation instead of reform. They believe the term


transformation more accurately represents the commitment of African governments to internalize the security change within a democratic framework.

Figure 2. African Union depiction of Security Sector Actors

Even though each donor organization organizes the security sector in different ways, none of them appear to be incorrect. There seems to be a consensus that security actors include a governing body responsible for the management and oversight of the system. The system requires legal armed forces for the internal and external defense of the state. The security system needs a democratic, or at the very least impartial, judicial system with police, border, and judicial investigation forces. Finally, the state and donors also need to incorporate non-statutory security organizations and civil society to reform the security system. For a donor to effectively reform a state’s security sector it cannot just focus on one actor to successfully transform the security system into a capable, responsive system that prevents conflict. The donor must balance all security actors’ capabilities over a long period. The next sub-section defines key security sector reform terms used in the United States.

This subsection defines key terminology that the United States uses in its lexicon of security sector reform. It defines the terms of security sector reform, security cooperation,

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22 Donors can include state and non-state actors who donate funding, resources, and expertise to reform a targeted state’s security sector. They can also be single-state, coalitions, and multi-national in nature.
security assistance, foreign internal defense, and security force assistance. It also describes potential programs or actions associated with the term and who is responsible for executing the programs.

The U.S. is increasingly using the term security sector assistance instead of reform; however, this remains a departure from OSCD-DAC’s term of security systems reform. The U.S. risks de-emphasizing the importance of long-term reform in a state’s security system with the new lexicon. This is particularly important due to the long-term nature of security sector reform. The DoD defines security sector reform as a comprehensive set of programs and activities undertaken to improve the way a host nation provides safety, security, and justice.\textsuperscript{23} The United States applies a comprehensive approach to SSR. The key components of security sector reform in the United States are security cooperation and security assistance.

According to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s (DSCA) website, security cooperation “comprises all activities undertaken by the Department of Defense (DoD) to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives.\textsuperscript{24} It includes all DoD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DoD-administered Security Assistance (SA) programs, that build defense and security relationships; promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and SA activities; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime


and contingency access to host nations." Joint Publication 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*, states security cooperation includes all Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.

![Figure 3. Department of Defense Security Cooperation Activities](image)


For the U.S., the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DCSA) is the central agency that synchronizes global security cooperation programs, funding and efforts across Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the State Department, Combatant Commands, the military services, and industry.\footnote{Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “The Official Home of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency,” Online at http://www.dsca.mil [accessed on 26 March 2013].} This means that DSCA is responsible for the effective policy, processes, training, and financial management necessary to execute security cooperation within the DoD. According to DoD Directive 5132.03 “DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation,” in the United States system it is the responsibility of the military combatant commanders to develop the military aspect of their theater security cooperation programs in conjunction with the Department of State officials in their respective states.\footnote{The Combatant Commanders develop campaign plans to “conduct security cooperation programs and activities; coordinate on seam issues for combatant commands with geographic responsibility; coordinate on their individual functional responsibilities for combatant commands with a global focus; complete campaign plan and campaign support plan assessments, as appropriate; provide appropriate assistance as requested by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy or the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency; and supervise the Security Cooperation Organizations in matters related to execution of the Guidance for Employment of the Force, including the provision of necessary technical assistance and administrative support to the Security Cooperation Organizations.” Department of Defense Directive 5132.03.” DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation,” Online at http://www.dtic.mil /whs/directives/corres/pdf/513203p.pdf [accessed on 24 March 2013].} The Middle East Division of the DCSA provides oversight, guidance, planning, coordination, and direction to AFRICOM for the African continent.

Security assistance is the group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.”\footnote{Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-22, \textit{Foreign Internal Defense} (Washington,}
Department of State administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency.\textsuperscript{31} It allows the transfer of military articles and services to friendly foreign governments. Security assistance programs include Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), Excess Defense Articles, and Drawdown.\textsuperscript{32} The U.S. Department of State conduct three types of security assistance in Africa: foreign military financing (FMF), international military education and training (IMET), and peacekeeping operations (PO). The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) is the principal DoD organization through which the Secretary of Defense carries out responsibilities for security assistance. These programs include U.S. service school training to international officers, foreign internal defense, delivery of defense weapons systems, and assistance in developing infrastructure and economic systems to improve foreign government’s stability. Usually a Security Assistance Organization (SAO), under the direction of the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission, conducts the in-country management of each recipient nation's security assistance programs.

Foreign internal defense is strictly a U.S. DoD term. Foreign internal defense is the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs


\textsuperscript{32} According to the Security Assistance Management Manual, security assistance programs is a group of programs, authorized under Title 22 authorities, by which the United States provides defense articles, military education and training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, cash sales, or lease, in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Security Cooperation Overview and Relationships,” Online at http://www.dsca.osd.mil/samm/ESAMM/Chapter01.htm [accessed on 24 March 2013].
taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. Foreign internal defense focuses on preparing foreign security forces to combat lawlessness, subversion, insurgency, and terrorism from internal threats. FID falls into the irregular warfare concept of the range of military operations. Both special forces and conventional forces can conduct foreign internal defense activities. The U.S. Army plans to utilize regionally aligned forces to execute the missions in specific, assigned theaters.

![Diagram: Department of Defense Range of Military Operations](image)

Figure 4. Department of Defense Range of Military Operations.

Security force assistance is strictly a U.S. Department of Defense term. Security force assistance includes all Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the

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U.S. government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions.\(^{35}\) SFA includes the tasks of organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding and advising foreign security forces and foreign security institutions. At the strategic level, SFA focuses on preparing foreign security forces to combat lawlessness, subversion, insurgency, and terrorism from internal threats. The tactical level focuses on training and advisory skills.\(^{36}\) Security assistance programs are critical tools to fund and enable SFA activities, which contribute to a state’s security sector. Security force assistance is similar to foreign internal defense in that they both prepare a state’s security forces to defend against internal threats. Where they depart is that security force assistance can also prepare foreign security forces to defend against external threats. SFA can also improve interoperability of a state’s forces for alliance operations. Additionally, the military conducts SFA across the entire range of military operations. Both special forces and conventional forces can conduct security force assistance activities. The U.S. Army plans to utilize regionally aligned forces to execute security cooperation activities in regions where they are habitually aligned. The final sub-section provides empirical observations about security sector reform.


\(^{36}\) Security force assistance and foreign internal defense only tend to differ in the means they are applied. Security force assistance in generally conducted by conventional forces, while special operations forces generally conduct foreign internal defense. Both are subsets of security cooperation. The Joint Staff, J7 Joint Doctrine and Education Division, “50th Joint Doctrine Planners Conference Minutes, 14-15 November 2012” (Suffolk, VA: Joint and Coalition Warfighting, 14 December 2012).
Security sector reform, in general, is a comprehensive approach by a donor or multiple donors to reform the security system of a state to make it responsive to its population and prevent conflict. Democratic governance is a cornerstone to SSR. A donor must consider the capabilities of all the actors in the complex security system and not just focus on the military actors. The United States applies the same principles and approaches as most of the international community to conduct security sector reform of weak and failed states.

Within the U.S. government system, there are many actors who must synchronize their goals, objectives, and activities in conducting security sector reform within a foreign government. Based on the evidence of security sector reform theory and the United States approach to security sector reform, the thesis that regionally aligned forces conducting security force assistance and foreign internal defense promise to assist the Combatant Commands in shaping the operational

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environment to prevent conflict is valid. Operational planners must understand that security force assistance and foreign internal defense are only two components of security sector reform; thus, the promise that these security cooperation activities will prevent conflict is dubious at best.

Combatant Commands, in coordination with the Department of State, the U.S. Embassy, and partner nation leadership determine what programs will occur, and the size of the military support that supports them. Security Cooperation activities take place in countries where the Department of State has approved U.S. military program execution, and where the Department of State and the Combatant Command have host nation authorization to employ U.S. forces. The State Department, Defense Department, and USAID must coordinate with the Mali country team and the Malian government to develop and execute security sector reform activities within Mali. Within these departments, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency is the lead agency that coordinates with AFRICOM, SOCAFRICA, FORSCOM, TRADOC, and the U.S. embassy country team in Mali. Additionally, the U.S. government needs to influence and synchronize with various other governments, intergovernmental agencies, and civilian contractors that conduct security sector reform in Mali. AFRICOM needs to consider all the external and internal actors it needs to coordinate with to synchronize security assistance in Mali. Security sector reform coordination is not an easy task; however, many of these actors often coordinate in various other alliance activities for more conventional type operations—so there is no reason they cannot cooperate to reform Mali’s security sector in an effective manner. The next section describes the research methodology of the case study and

METHODOLOGY

The previous section defined the security sector theory and frameworks and placed it into context with the United States lexicon for implementation. This section will explain the research methodology of the monograph by describing the selection of the case study, and explaining the approach to collecting and analyzing the data. First, it is important to understand the problem that
the study is attempting to solve.

The purpose of the study is to test the U.S. government’s theory of security sector reform by analyzing its conduct of SSR in Mali from 2004 to 2012. A problem emerges if the U.S. approach to security sector reform failed in Mali in the early twenty-first century. If that is the case, the Department of Defense may have to refine its concept of security sector reform or refine the objectives they expect it to reach. This can have implications for the future implementation of regionally aligned conventional forces conducting SFA and FID in weak or failed states as part of geographic combatant commands. This study is a policy-evaluative study that attempts to determine if SSR theory will produce the results it promises.\(^\text{38}\) First, it is important to explain the selection of Mali for the case study.

A case study methodology “copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result it relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion; as another result it benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis.”\(^\text{39}\) This monograph only analyzes a single case; however, this case study alone can test if the hypothesis is supported or not. According to King, Keohane, and Verba, it is “possible even within a single conventionally labeled ‘case study’ to observe many separate implications” of a theory.\(^\text{40}\)


\(^{40}\) Many of these countries in Africa are states in name only due to ill defined borders, fiscal limitations, nomadic populations, limited resources, and and limited security influence and control. This is especially true the further lies interior from the coast. Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative*
Mali was still recovering from a bloody internal conflict with the ethnic Tuaregs in the early 1990s. Since that conflict, it had achieved one of the best records of democratization in Africa.\textsuperscript{41} There are three reasons why Mali’s descent into chaos represents a critical test to the security sector reform theory. First, Malians do not see the religious Muslim and ethnic Tuareg situation in northern Mali as a democratization problem—they see it as a security problem.\textsuperscript{42} Second, democratic governance in the security sector fits within the regional security arrangements in Africa. This is because states in sub-Saharan Africa share common security needs: they have a cross border problem that magnifies their security challenges; these states require a collective response to security issues (ECOWAS); and external donors had more success with developing collective capacity development at the regional and sub-regional levels of Africa in recent past.\textsuperscript{43} Finally, there was a robust U.S. security sector reform initiative in Mali from 2004 to 2012.

This case study attempts to answer structured research questions through multiple primary and secondary open sourced documents. The three categories of primary sources for this monograph are limited to government public documents, directives, and publications. These sources include published policy directives and papers, briefings and speeches by government officials, and various other policy documents available to the public. Additionally, there are three general categories of secondary sources that are especially useful to a qualitative case study approach: traditional academic research, studies by peer reviewed journals and independent


policy research organizations, and statements by members of the public policy community. With all of these resources, there is enough qualitative information available to prove or refute the hypothesis. The hypothesis of this study is if the Department of Defense conducts security force assistance and foreign internal defense with a state’s military then conflict decreases in that state. There are six structured research questions to consider.

The first two questions deal with how the Department of State, USAID, and Department of Defense were to coordinate their efforts in Mali. First, what Department of State security programs were implemented in Mali? The answer to this question will describe the Foreign Military Sales program to Mali and will deconflict the State Department with the Defense Department’s role in the Trans-Sahara Counterteerrorism Initiative (TSCTI) program. Second, what Department of Defense security programs were implemented in Mali? This question is to determine the Department of Defense’s strategy that will lead Mali to the security sector reform it needed to reduce conflict. These questions provide a broad context of what was supposed to occur in Mali.

The third and fourth questions will explain how the programs were actually implemented in Mali. Third, how was the United States security sector reform approach implemented in Mali? The response to this question will describe the Trans Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI), the Operation Enduring Freedom Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS), and the African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) programs. These were the fundamental programs used to reform Mali’s military forces. Fourth, how often did the United States security sector reform implementers engage with Mali from 2004-2012? This question attempts to show the tempo and scale of involvement of the U.S. government’s security sector reform in Mali. The study will probably display that the U.S. had a near constant, low-level presence in Mali during this time.

The fifth and sixth question examine why security sector reform failed in Mali. The fifth question is why did conflict begin in Mali in 2006 and 2012? The answer to this question will
reveal that the security sector reform approach the U.S. implemented in Mali failed to prevent conflict. It will address the internal and external factors that led to conflict in both instances.

Sixth, why did Mali’s security sector reform initiatives fail? This question will attempt to identify the variable(s) that caused the failure of Mali’s security sector reform. By identifying the variables that caused Mali’s security reform initiatives to fail, it will determine whether security sector reform theory is false or whether the U.S. failed to implement the theory properly. This question may also provide implications for the future of U.S. security sector reform theory, military doctrine, and regional alignments of forces approaches for reducing conflict in other states.

Analyzing security sector reform in weak or failed states requires both a theoretical framework and an empirical foundation. The recent work of several authors who have examined security sector reform in Africa and Mali provide the heuristic framework for this monograph. An examination of SSR, security cooperation, and security assistance in Mali in the early twenty-first century provides the empirical foundation for the analysis.

Conditions in failed states undergoing security sector reform present significant challenges to research methodology. Widespread violence poses real and significant risks to academic researchers. The chaotic conditions, poor infrastructure, and limited public services make traditional quantitative research methodologies almost unworkable. As a result, very little quantitative research is available in the failed state literature. Even qualitative approaches are limited by the high levels of fear, suspicion, and outright intimidation common to failed states. These limitations restrict this study to secondary sources and qualitative methodologies that do not require extensive databases broadly comparable across multiple cases. The six structured research questions will increase observations and descriptive inferences in the single case. This
methodology will ultimately create causal inferences through process tracing.\textsuperscript{44} Stephen van Evera explains that process tracing often offers strong tests of a theory.\textsuperscript{45} The next section examines the U.S. government’s security sector reform approach in Mali in the early twenty-first century.

CASE STUDY: U.S. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM OF MALI FROM 2004-2012

In the early twenty-first century, Mali represented a bright star for democracy and the trans-Saharan region. However, in 2006 and 2012, Mali suffered significantly in its attempts to reform its government and provide security for its entire population. If security sector reform through foreign internal defense and security force assistance failed in Mali, then a problem emerges with the department of Defense’s approach. This suggests that the United States should refine its operational approach to security sector reform or refine the desired goals. The thesis of this monograph is that regionally aligned forces conducting security force assistance and foreign internal defense promises to assist the Combatant Commands in shaping the operational environment to prevent conflict. However, operational planners must understand that security force assistance and foreign internal defense are only one component of security sector reform; thus, the promise that they will prevent conflict is dubious at best. The hypothesis of this study is if the Department of Defense conducts security force assistance and foreign internal defense with a state’s military then conflict decreases in that state. This section will provide a broad history of the events that occurred in the early twenty-first century and examine the security sector reform initiatives of the United States military from 2004-2012 in an attempt to prevent Mali from falling into violence.

\textsuperscript{44} Process tracing “explores the chain of events or the decision-making process by which initial case conditions are translated into case outcomes.” Stephen van Evera, \textit{Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science} (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 64.

Mali transitioned to a fledgling democracy in 1992 that increased its importance to the United States government in the Trans-Sahel region. In June 1990, experienced Tuareg fighters returned from Libya’s war with Chad and began the Second Tuareg Rebellion to secede northern Mali. The Tuareg’s claim neglect and discrimination by the Malian government and often want independence. This non-autonomous movement coupled with a democratic resistance movement that eventually led to a 1992 coup d’état that resulted in a democratic Mali. The United States Departments of State and Defense implemented various Foreign Military Sales and security cooperation programs in 1992 to assist in the democratization of the Malian government. Other nations also assisted with similar programs.

However, the establishment of a weak democratic government did not end the conflict and the worse inter-ethnic violence in Mali continued until 1995. The groups in the north split based on ethno-tribal fault lines. Many Tuareg-Arab rebels also coordinated with the Algerian Groupe Salafiste pour la prédication et le combat (GSPC) terrorist organization to obtain arms, ammunition, and training during the fighting. During this time, the United States Department of State and USAID provided $2 million to the United Nations Trust Fund that supported a program


47 The 1992 coup was preceded by the Tamanrasset Accord and followed by the National Pact that was signed on 11 APR 1992. These agreements reduced, but did not end, the violence in Mali. The Tamanrasset Accord created a mixed Malian and rebel security force for northern Mali that led to the eventual full integration of the Tuaregs into the Malian military. Colonel Dan Henk, “Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: the Tuareg Insurgency in Mali” (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 01 May 1988), 17.

of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) Program for ex-combatants in northern Mali.\textsuperscript{49} The United Nations Trust Fund effectively demobilized 11,000 ex-combatants and destroyed over 3,000 weapons.\textsuperscript{50} The Tuareg-Arab rebellion finally ended in 1996 with the Flame of Peace Ceremony in Timbuktu. About 2,400 ex-combatants joined the Malian military.\textsuperscript{51} This did not solve all the security problems for the young Malian democracy.

Mali’s democratization increased at a significant pace from 1996-2006. Decentralization of power was the primary focus of democratization during this time.\textsuperscript{52} Violence fell but it did not extinguish with the Flames of Peace Ceremony. Not all weapons and ammunition were destroyed in the ceremony and arms smuggling across the Sahel continued as a source of revenue for the northern tribes. Criminal activity increased during these years due to a lack of democratic governance in northern Mali and limited NGO access in the desert.\textsuperscript{53} Most Malians viewed the


\textsuperscript{50} Muggah, Robert, “Listening for Change, Participatory Evaluations of DDR are Arms Reduction in Mali Cambodia, and Albania” (U.N. Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDR): United Nations, 2005), 8.


\textsuperscript{52} Colonel Dan Henk, “Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: the Tuareg Insurgency in Mali” (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 01 May 1988), 27.

northern Tuareg problem as a security problem, rather than a democratization problem. During this period, USAID, the Peace Corps, and other organizations were heavily involved in helping the Malian government with programs focusing on food security, health, education, governance, counterterrorism, and military professionalization. USAID continued their efforts in northern Mali to combat religious extremism. The United States Departments of State and Defense increased their security cooperation programs and security assistance. Both departments began focusing heavily on Malian counterterrorism capabilities after 11 September 2001.

In 2006, the Tuaregs launched another rebellion in Niger and Mali, concentrated in Mali’s northeastern Kidal Region. Malian President Amadou Toumani Touré signed an Algerian-brokered peace deal with the Tuaregs granting them more autonomy than any other region in Mali. This was not enough for the Tuaregs and they increased attacks once again from August 2007-2008. It took a major military offensive against the Tuareg bases in 2009 to prevent the country from breaking out in another civil war. During this time, the United States did not increase security cooperation and security assistance programs to Mali’s security forces primarily due to the violence.

On 12 October 2011, hundreds of experienced Tuareg soldiers who had fought for the Qaddafi regime returned to northern Mali with a large number of light and heavy weapons that they stole from Libya. This was followed by a coup d’état of the democratic government by a

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57 Peter J. Schraeder, “Traditional Conflict Medicine? Lessons for Putting Mali and Other
group of discontent junior military officers on 21 March 2012. By law, all United States security cooperation and security assistance initiatives were cancelled after the 2012 military coup. This coup also led to the military’s partial collapse. A number of U.S.-trained Malian security forces abandoned the government and fled with their arms, ammunition and equipment to fight in the north. In the ensuing confusion, the Tuareg rebels seized control of numerous towns and airfields in northern Mali and declared the area the independent country of Azawad. The Tuareg’s increased cooperation with the Islamic radical movements Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar al Dine (“Defenders of the Faith”), and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA). These groups have polar opposite strategic objectives but often coordinate on the tactical level. At the beginning on the latest crisis, the Malian military lacked


58 This is the first African or Middle Eastern nation to be negatively effected by the Arab Spring. Tuareg clans in northern Mali started the most recent rebellion after the government repeatedly breached peace contracts. The Tuareg issues included: a lack of proper representation for Arabs and Tuareg in important positions in the government, foreign ministry and army, and at all levels of administration; the absence of a policy of decentralization which could have enabled the communities in the North to handle their own business in accordance with the local cultural context; the overwhelming majority of civil servants were from the South, all of them sedentarists”… and “the militarization of the north.” Peter J. Schraeder, “Traditional Conflict Medicine? Lessons for Putting Mali and Other African Countries on the Road to Peace,” Nordic Journal of African Studies, Vol 20, Issue 2. (Helsinki, Finland: 2011), 182.


61 Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has its origins in the 1990s Algerian Civil War long before the war on al Qaida or the organization’s expansion into the Sahel region. Most regional specialists believed that the Tuaregs and Arabs would fight each other because the Tuaregs are not radical Islamists. Karen M. Sudkamp, “Build, Develop, Support: Phase 0 as the
the ability to project force and had an ideologically divided security force of less than 7,000 soldiers with serious human rights issues.\textsuperscript{62} Mali needs to consider how to counter an insurgency and an international terrorism crisis with a weak democracy that has an unreliable security system.

At the request of the Malian government, France launched military operations against insurgent targets in northern Mali on 11 January 2013. The United States pressed for national elections and mediation to end the violence. The internationally supported French have since reclaimed most of northern Mali in a major offensive. The Malian government has requested the U.N. to build the capacity of the Malian transitional authorities in the areas of political negotiation, SSR and humanitarian assistance.\textsuperscript{63} With the end of French military operations, many questions are arising as to how to prevent the same problem from arising in the future.

What Department of State security programs were implemented in Mali? The United States Department of State implemented a narrow approach to security sector reform in Mali. The Department of State’s approach focused on counterterrorism training and actions with Foreign Military Sales to arm the Malian military. According to Alexis Ariff of the Congressional research Service, “prior to the coup, the United States was one of the largest bilateral donors to Mali, with aid programs focusing on food security, health, education, governance, counterterrorism, and military professionalization.”\textsuperscript{64} In an effort to further decentralize Mali’s

\begin{flushright}
Decisive Counterterrorism Operation- A Case Study of North West Africa” (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 23 May 2011), 3.
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\textsuperscript{64} The U.S. was providing approximately $140 million U.S. dollars in aid per year. Alexis Ariff, “Congressional Research Service Report for Congress: Crisis in Mali,” (Washington, DC:
government, USAID’s Shared Governance program provided training to mayors, communal council members, and civil society organizations that enabled them to “design and manage the delivery of health, education, agricultural production, water, and other services to constituents” in an effort to improve human security. The Department of State and USAID did not have any other programs that increased the Malian government’s broader security management, justice policies, or police capacity.

The Department of State has three programs for security assistance—foreign military financing (FMF or FMS) for the acquisition of U.S. defense equipment, services, and training; the International Military Education and Training program (IMET) offers military training on a grant basis to foreign military officials; and peacekeeping operations. Foreign military financing provides “grants and loans to assist foreign nations in purchasing U.S. produced weapons, defense articles, defense services and military training.” FMF focuses on providing the equipment for the private military contractors (PMCs) and United States military trainers to train the Malian military forces. IMET allows international personnel to attend United States military schools “to further the goal of regional stability through effective, mutually beneficial military-to-military relations; to provide training that augments the capabilities of participant nations’ military forces; and to increase the ability of foreign military and civilian personnel to instill and maintain democratic values.” IMET focuses on the future military leadership of Mali and other

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The Department of State implemented a series of security cooperation programs to increase the Malian military’s counterterrorism capacity from 1992-2012. The Pan-Sahel initiative was the initial program that was followed by the Global Peace Operations Initiative and the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). The Pan-Sahel initiative was initially formed in 2003, to support the training of military units from Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger in counterterrorism tactics. In 2005, it expanded to include Algeria, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia and became the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) program. The TSCTP is also sub-part of the broader Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) that began in 2005.

The GPOI is an international security cooperation program that planned to train and equip 75,000 peacekeepers worldwide by 2010, to establish a deployment and logistics support capacity, conduct multi-national peace operation exercises, support constabulary/gendarmerie Centers of Excellence, and provide assistance to international peacekeeping training centers. The African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program is another initiative that began in 1997 and is funded under the GPOI to focus on training foreign militaries. ACOTA


69 GPOI is a 5-year, U.S. government-funded security assistance program intended to enhance international capacity to effectively conduct United Nations and regional peace support operations (PSOs) by building partner country capabilities to train and sustain peacekeeping proficiencies; increasing the number of capable military troops and formed police units (FPUs) available for deployment; and facilitating the preparation, logistical support, and deployment of military units and FPUs to PSOs. The program was primarily focused on Africa. Department of State, “Global Peace Operations Initiative,” Online at http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/gpoi/ [accessed on 18 April 2013].
is a train-the-trainer program that provides training on infantry skills, human rights, humanitarian operations, and rules of engagement consistent with Chapter VII of U.N. Charter. Although the Department of State is responsible for program oversight and budget, the Department of Defense implements 50 percent of the programs in Africa. ACOTA is a broader African security program while the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership specifically targets the trans-Saharan region. Mali received support from both programs.

The TSCTP became the Department of State’s primary SSR initiative in Mali after 2004. It was executed through foreign internal defense and security force assistance by private military contractors and United States military forces. TSCTP is a security cooperation program that focuses on counterterrorism, democratic governance, and military assistance and includes a public diplomacy component. This program is a combined program between Department of State, Department of Defense, and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in what is known as a “3-D” program. The Department of Defense supported TSCTP through its OEF-TS program. The TSCTP’s intent is to create an environment that is inhospitable to terrorist and trafficking operations in the African Maghreb through a ten country regional approach to counterterrorism.

TSCTP’s objectives are to:

70 Colonel David Crawford, “EUCOM Vision for Africa...and Opportunities for USMC Engagement” (19 January 2006).

71 “The U.S. Department of State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs manages the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account through which GPOI is funded. Accordingly, the Bureau is responsible for the program oversight and financial management of GPOI-funded activities.” This is in conflict with earlier policy that stated DCSA was responsible for all security cooperation efforts and highlights the complexity in the U.S. system. After discussing these programs with various officials, it seems there is a broader issue of who actually has a majority of control over these programs. Department of State, “GPOI: State-DOD Partnership,” Online at http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/gpoi/c47008.htm [accessed on 18 April 2013].


73 Department of State, TSCTP U.S. Foreign Assistance Performance Publication FY
(1) Strengthen regional counterterrorism capabilities; (2) enhance and institutionalize cooperation among the region’s security forces; (3) deny public support and sanctuary for terrorists through strategically targeted development assistance; (4) promote good governance; (5) develop public diplomacy strategies to defend good governance and values and discredit terrorist ideology; and (6) strengthen bilateral military ties with the countries of the Maghreb and Sahel.74

As the United States primary effort of SSR in Mali, the TSCTP should have impacted all domains of security sector reform in Mali to be successful and enable the United States to achieve its goals in the country. All the other programs supplemented this initiative either directly or indirectly.

The evidence suggests that the Department of State did not have a broad security sector reform policy for Mali. The TSCP program had broad objectives that had the potential to impact Mali’s security sector from the institutional level downward. The State Department had supporting programs that could broaden its impact with developing leaders and equipping security forces to achieve the training readiness the TSCP was trying to develop. The TSCP does not directly address the judicial system or how the United States implements the TSCP policy may affect the outcomes of the reform initiative.


What Department of Defense security programs were implemented in Mali? The United States Department of Defense took a very narrow approach to security sector reform in Mali. The U.S. European Command (EUCOM), Africa Command (AFRICOM), and Special Operations Command (specifically SOCAFRICA) are all responsible for Mali in the early twenty-first century. The EUCOM was the primary combatant command responsible for Mali from 2004-2008. The EUCOM did not consider Mali a focus state in a 2006 EUCOM brief for the "Vision of Africa in 2015." The OEF-TS program officially transferred to AFRICOM’s responsibility in 2008. According to its mission statement, AFRICOM, “…in concert with other U.S. government agencies and international partners, conducts sustained security engagement

through military-to-military programs, military-sponsored activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy.”

The National Guard Bureau State Partnership Program also supported strategic objectives and building partnership capacity in Mali during the time period. It can be accepted that the Department of Defense’s mission from 2004-2012 was to work in concert with other U.S. government agencies and international partners to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy.

Figure 7. AFRICOM OEF-TS Organizational Structure

From 1992-2012, The Department of Defense trained Mali’s military through security cooperation missions and exercises focused on counterterrorism operations, communications, and

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77 U.S. Africa Command “AFRICOM OEF-TS Brief,” UNCLASSIFIED (September 2011), Slide 12.
officer education. The Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS) program was created to train and equip host nation forces to conduct rapid-reaction operations in order to preclude terrorists and terror organizations from establishing sanctuaries in the Sahel region. The OEF-TS program’s objectives are to defeat, deny, and diminish development of terrorist safe havens in Trans-Sahara Africa through an indirect approach. OEF-TS supports the State Department’s Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Program by providing military forces to train with Malian security forces to improve their intelligence, regional coordination, logistics, border control, and targeting capacity. The Department of Defense also participated in security assistance initiatives with Mali through other military-to-military programs, civil-military operations, Medical Civic Action Programs (MedCAP), and sustainment training as part of OEF-TS support to the TSCP. If properly resourced, the Department of Defense’s OEF-TS program could support the broader TSCTP initiative to reform Mali’s military capabilities only. The Defense Department did not have any redundant programs to reform Mali’s broader security sector if the State Department failed to reform those domains.

How was the United States security sector reform approach implemented in Mali? The United States, through the Departments of Defense, State, and USAID (3D), conducted SSR in Mali primarily through the combined TSCTP, OEF-TS, FMF, and IMS programs. These programs translate into a series of exercises, engagements, and equipment fielding initiatives with Mali’s security forces at the tactical and technical levels. There was minimal effort at reforming the institutional level of Mali’s security sector.

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Figure 8. Combined 3-D Effects of TSCTP and OEF-TS in Mali.\textsuperscript{79}

The military exercises between the United States and Mali fall in the FID and SFA domains of security cooperation for the TSCTP and OEF-TS programs. As part of the TSCTP, Special Operations Command supplied trainers through a series of joint combined exchange exercises. In these operations, “A-teams of about 12 special operators would train local troops and, in return, received knowledge about fighting in that country.”\textsuperscript{80} According to the former SOCOM Commander, Admiral William H. McRaven, these teams also provided civil affairs teams to conduct engineering projects, school projects, and medical projects for the Malian

\textsuperscript{79} U.S. Africa Command “AFRICOM OEF-TS Brief,” UNCLASSIFIED (September 2011), Slide 5.

people. One of the biggest issues with this program was that the Malian security forces did not have enough equipment to train with the SOCOM forces. Joint Combined Exercise Flintlock appears to be the capstone exercise for the region that built the capacity of Mali, and other African militaries, operational capabilities. In 2006, Exercise Flintlock became a formalized, annual training program under Joint Special Operations Task Force Trans-Sahara and later AFRICOM in 2008. This exercise represented the premier training event between Mali’s military forces and the Department of State and Defense under TSCTP. Exercise Flintlock is a regional counterterrorism training event that took place in different locations across Africa with over nineteen countries. It focuses on counterterrorism operations planning and collaboration with other African nations. Mali also participates in Exercises Accord, Endeavor, Africa Lion, and other military-to-military engagements that focused at the tactical level.

For the ACOTA and TSCTP programs, the Department of State primarily hired private military contractors to conduct the security cooperation programs in Mali and the Trans-Sahel. These contractors costs roughly $100 million per year under the Africa Peacekeeping Program (AFRICAP) Reompete program and include organizations like DynCorp International Incorporated, PAE Government Services Inc, Protection Strategies Incorporated, Northrop Grumman Corporation, Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), and AECOM Government Services Incorporated. PAE, AECOM and Protection Strategies were organizations


83 AFRICAP is the State Department’s Africa portion of Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) funding. All these organizations provide military style contracting from combat trainers to logistics and housing services. Noel Brinkerhoff, “U.S. Military Contractors Move into Africa,”
that provided the civilian-military police force training in Mali. These contractors were the primary forces that conducted security force assistance and foreign internal defense with Mali’s police forces. No other civilian police and military forces from the United States were identified to train Mali’s police force and judicial system. Due to combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Special Operations Forces, National Guard, and other general purpose forces supported where they could.

The United States failed to properly equip Malian security forces and develop ethical, future leaders of their security system. The United States provided $934,000 in various FMF funding from 2004-2011. The State Department also provided $2,437,000 and trained 185 personnel under the Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program. The United States also provided $1,402,000 in IMET funds and trained 70 personnel under the program. The leader of the 2012 Malian military coup, CPT Amadou Haya Sanogo, was one of those IMET personnel that trained multiple times in America from 2004-2010. From 2004 to 2007, the


__85 The United States was not the only country conducting SSR in Mali. France failed as well, but that is outside the purview of this study.


__87 Ibid, 101, 121.

__88 Ibid, 93, 113.

__89 The interim Prime Minister Diarra is also a former NASA astrophysicist who participated in multiple space projects. Kevin H. Govern, “Smart Power for Hard Problems: The Role of Special Operations Forces Strengthening the Rule of Law and Human Rights in Africa”__
USAID decreased the budget amount it allocated for human rights and democracy and government aid to Mali from $1,611,000 to $1,148,000—resulting in a 12 percent decrease.\(^\text{90}\)

USAID recognized their greatest challenge during that period was distributing aid to northern Mali without compromising its support to southern region. In 2007, Millennium Challenge Corporation selected Mali to participate in a five-year compact worth $460 million to increase agricultural production and productivity and expand Mali’s access to markets and trade.\(^\text{91}\) This program terminated in 2012 due to the coup d’état and subsequent violence.

From 2004-2012, the United States conducted a very narrow approach to security sector reform focused primarily on counterterrorism and arming Mali’s military forces. The TSCP program was primarily implemented at the tactical levels and did not reform Mali’s broader security institution. The State Department’s programs were directed at counterterrorism capability of Mali’s security forces and did not focus on justice, reconciliation, or Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) of armed factions. Very little training focused institutionally. A majority of the TSCP training was conducted by private military contractors, and only supplemented by the military when possible. The United States failed to provide the equipment support to Mali’s security forces early enough to have an impact. It also failed to institutionalize accountability of the equipment, which later fell into hostile anti-government

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\(^\text{91}\) The Millennium Challenge Corporation is an independent and U.S. foreign aid agency to provide large-scale grants to fund country-led solutions for reducing poverty through sustainable economic growth. Selected countries must demonstrate a commitment to just and democratic governance, investments in its people, and economic freedom as measured by different policy indicators. Millennium Challenge Corporation, “Mali Compact,” Online at http://www.mcc.gov/pages/countries/program/mali-compact [accessed on 25 April 2013].
control. As the former AFRICOM Commander, General Cater Ham stated; “[The United States failed to train Malian troops on “values, ethics and a military ethos.”]92 The Department of State supported limited SSR initiatives in Mali through frequent visits to the state to conduct exercises and engagements.

How often did the United States security sector reform implementers engage with Mali from 2004-2012? United States Departments of Defense, State, and USAID did not maintain a constant presence in Mali conducting security sector reform. The State Department and USAID maintained a small commitment of personnel who were located in Mali on a long term basis. Most program exercises occurred on an annual basis and were supplemented with smaller security cooperation missions. The TSCTP personnel did not maintain a dedicated Department of Defense presence in Mali. Operations were conducted through the Embassy in Bamako or short-term deployments by training teams.93 The SOCOM A-Teams conducted month-long surges in Mali but did not provide continuous training coverage of Mali security forces.94 In 2009, the United States conducted 11 joint and bilateral exercises with Mali’s security forces, which represents one of the highest numbers of events of this type in a single country in Africa.95


Exercise Flintlock 09 was one of the largest exercises conducted by JSOC-TS with Mali. 96

Why did conflict begin in Mali in 2006 and 2012? After more than seventeen years of support from the United States and other countries, Mali erupted into violence between the central government, Tuareg Mouvemment National de Liberation de l’Azawad (MNLA) separatists and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) Arabs in the north. The militant organizations were taking advantage of the ungoverned space of northern Mali for years that eventually boiled over into another major conflict in the region. 97 The coup and deterioration of Mali’s security capabilities led to gross human rights abuses during the turmoil. 98 Most of this violence occurred due to the northern tribes’ dissatisfaction with the central government, an influx of arms and foreign fighters from Libya’s war, and an increase in freedom of maneuver of Arabs involved with AQIM. 99 The MNLA and AQIM initially worked together before their cooperation collapsed due to differing strategies and expected end states. 100 During the initial violence, many Tuareg operating in the Malian security forces defected to the Tuareg rebels, taking their military equipment with them. Mali’s security forces were incapable of preventing the mass defections or halting the advance of the belligerents that eventually controlled two-thirds of the northern part of

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100 The MNLA and AQIM organizations are loosely organized and consist of a collection of armed groups that have their differing approaches and end state for northern Mali and the Trans-Sahel.
the state. Human rights abuses occurred on both sides of the fighting. The United States and other
countries failed to reform Mali’s security sector in over a decade of engagement with Mali’s
security forces. The security sector did not just collapse at the institutional level, but also at the
operational and tactical levels.

Why did Mali’s security sector reform initiatives fail? The United States failed to reform
Mali’s judicial system, it did not expand on former DDR programs to disarm militants in the
north after Libya’s collapse, it did not instill ethics in the security forces to prevent human rights
abuses, it did not provide enough equipment for the security forces to accomplish their missions,
and it did not instill systems to account for the equipment. The United States correctly recognizes
that without a “credible, legitimate, effective government and military, it will be difficult for the
Malian state to lead operations in the north or implement a peace deal.”101 However, the United
States approach to developing Mali’s security sector was narrowly focused on counterterrorism
training of the Malian military forces, with seemingly minimal effort in other sectors. Mali is the
third TSCTP focus country to undergo a military coup since 2008.102 Most of the United States
efforts at capacity building were at the tactical and technical levels and not at the institutional.

The United States did not effectively reform Mali’s judicial system, nor did it attempt to
build on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration efforts in the country to reduce the
amount of arms available to belligerents. USAID’s Shared Governance program did not reach a
broader, institutional impact beyond a series of meetings and conventions in the three years of

101 Alexis Ariff, “Congressional Research Service report for Congress: Crisis in Mali”

102 Mauritania and Niger also had coups while supported by the TSCP program. Alexis
Ariff, “Congressional Research Service report for Congress: Crisis in Mali” (Washington, DC:
CRS, 14 January 2013, 1; and “SSR Newsletter,” Number 16 (New York, NY: United Nations
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, October-December 2012), 16.
The United States failed to equip the Malian forces in enough time to significantly impact the ways they employed force. The United States also failed to develop accountability measures to prevent that equipment from falling into enemy hands. The equipment the Malian security forces retain is obsolete and unsustainable. The United States also failed to provide ethical training to the security forces. Alexis Ariff stated that “U.S. military professionalization training [in Mali] emphasized civilian control and respect for human rights.” However, the conduct of the military forces on both sides of the conflict was brutal and displays the need for more controls on the forces from a centralized government and increased focus on reforming the Malian society. This kind of reform does not occur over ten years, but is generational in many cases. The United States terminated assistance to Mali as a result of the 2012 coup, human rights abuses, and American laws.

The United States was not the only country conducting SSR in Mali and shares the same challenges with its European partners. France also had major programs focused on building the Malian security force capacity during the same period. The French targeted the political-military institution for education and training on “developing decision-making and planning abilities at the strategic and operational levels, and improving the interoperability of armed forces.”


the French cooperation in Africa as a part of the Reinforcement of African Peace Keeping Capability (RECAMP) program is “essentially focused on ground forces. This is due to the legacy of the French presence in Africa, the need expressed by the African countries and the lack of real Air Forces in francophone Africa.”

Yet, both United States and France’s SSR efforts to prevent conflict failed.

The evidence suggests that the United States approach to security sector reform in Mali consisted of a narrow series of interagency programs operated by the State Department, Department of Defense, and USAID. The approach centered on the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership program that focused primarily on security force assistance and foreign internal defense at the tactical level—and minimally at the operational level. The Department of Defense supported the TSCTP program by providing special operations forces, National Guard forces and minimal general purpose forces to build Mali’s security force capacity. The training focused on tactical counterterrorism operations. The State Department supported the program through limited Foreign Military Financing and International Military Education Training. USAID’s Shared Governance program was the only program that attempted to reform Mali’s central government to make it more decentralized and responsive to the population. The State Department and USAID had minimal full-time engagement with Mali’s government and population, while the Department of Defense primarily conducted operations through short term deployments and military-to-military exercises. Seventeen years of building Mali’s capacity to democratically govern itself failed in 2012 when the country erupted in violence between the central government and the northern Tuaregs and Arabs. This led to mass collapse of the military systems that the U.S. did implemented in the country. The United States failed to reform Mali’s judicial system, it did not expand on former DDR programs to disarm militants in the north after

Libya’s collapse, it did not instill ethics in the security forces to prevent human rights abuses, it did not provide enough equipment for the security forces to accomplish their missions, and it did not instill system to account for the equipment. Although this case study oversimplifies the programs and exercises that were conducted between the United States and Mali, it does provide a broader framework to increase our understanding of the problem to possibly prevent future similar failures.

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

The case study of security sector reform of Mali brings some concepts to life that has implications on the United States security sector reform narrative. This section will capture the findings of the case study and determine whether the hypothesis is supported, unsupported, or produces mixed results.

The hypothesis of this study is that the United States conducts security sector reform through security force assistance and foreign internal defense with a state’s security forces then conflict decreases in that state. Evidence suggests that the hypothesis is unsupported. The United States implemented a narrow approach to security sector reform in Mali led by the State Department and supported by the Department of Defense and USAID. The United States SSR approach from 2004-2012 focused heavily on security force assistance and foreign internal defense activities to develop Mali’s counterterrorism capabilities. The approach was supported by limited reform at the institutional level of Mali’s security sector and limited Foreign Military Financing of Mali’s security forces. The culmination of seventeen years of security force assistance and foreign internal defense failed after the 2012 coup and subsequent violence that involved mass defections, gross human rights violations, and an incapable Malian security force

to address the problem.

Thus, the United States may need to refine the end state they expect from these reforms, or refocus how it applies resources to security sector reform of other states. The United States, in conjunction with the nation, need to analyze what aspects of security sector reform that nation requires and negotiate to reform those most needed areas—instead of focusing just on the problem it wants to solve—if it wants to be successful. The United States needs to build a security sector reform strategy that coordinates the interagency effort that reforms a designated state’s institutional, operational, and tactical levels. The United States needs to reform all areas of the security sector, instead of focusing on a state’s military forces. This is the case of fighting the war we got versus the war we want.

The findings of this study have potentially wider implications for how the Department of Defense continues to employ military forces using security force assistance and foreign internal defense to build the capacity of other nations’ security sectors. This includes the employment of regionally aligned forces, Special Operations Forces, and the National Guard State Sponsorship Program. Trainers selected for these military-to-military engagements need to not only be technically and tactically proficient, but also able to instill ethical proficiency. Trainers need to instill ethics and human rights values in the state’s security system to make it responsive to the government and population. They also need to build systems of accountability for the weapons and equipment the United States provides the state for their security forces to prevent the equipment from falling into enemy hands, as much as possible. The results therefore mean that the original thesis that regionally aligned forces conducting security force assistance and foreign internal defense promise to assist the Combatant Commands in shaping the operational environment to prevent conflict is dubious at best is supported.
CONCLUSION

The purpose of this study is to analyze the Department of Defense’s contribution to security sector reform theory in the context of Mali to determine whether security force assistance and foreign internal defense can shape the operational environment to prevent conflict. The study achieved this purpose through analyzing the different approaches to security sector reform and applying those approaches to the methods the United States used to reform Mali’s security sector from 2004-2012. By analyzing the United States approach to Mali, the study can draw conclusions for the future employment of forces in various methods to reform other states’ security sectors.

The thesis of the study is that regionally aligned forces conducting security force assistance and foreign internal defense promise to assist the Combatant Commands in shaping the operational environment to prevent conflict is dubious at best. This thesis is supported. The evidence suggests that the United States failed to implement security sector reform in Mali from 2004-2012 through an interagency approach in which the State Department, Department of Defense, and USAID contributed to the reform. The United States approach relied heavily on security force assistance and foreign internal defense, focusing primarily on counterterrorism operations. Even with this limited focus, the Malian security forces were incapable of operationally defeating the AQIM terrorists and MNLA separatists in the north without heavy French and ECOWAS support.

The evidence suggests that conducting SSR of a targeted state to prevent conflict is extremely difficult to achieve. Although that may be the case, it does not signify that the U.S. should avoid conducting security sector reform. There are four significant constructive outcomes in U.S. efforts at security sector reform. First, by partnering with these states, the U.S. has the potential to increase its influence with the government, security organizations, and the local populations. This process assists in developing partners for the U.S. to cooperate with in the
future. This has the greatest impact at the Department of State and Department of Defense levels. Second, the U.S. has the potential to increase its understanding of these countries, their people and culture, and their conflicts. The more the U.S. partners with these states, the more it can increase its institutional knowledge of the area to respond to crisis in the future. This has the greatest impact on the Army’s future employment on the Regional Alignment of Forces policy. Third, the U.S. has the potential of improving the partnered state’s infrastructure, including military facilities. The U.S. increases its military access to the state and region by building airports, roads, railways, and headquarters. This has the greatest impact for the National Guard State Sponsorship Program. Finally, conducting Security Sector Reform with partnered nations provides the U.S. military time, which has implications for the U.S. military’s force structure and security posture. If the U.S. can keep conflicts at lower levels or prevent conflicts from quickly spreading into regional conflicts, it can accept risk in the size and capability’s of its force in a fiscally restrictive domestic environment. These partners may be employed to potentially limit the conflict or augment multinational forces who may deploy to the area. This outcome relies on a significant assumption that warrants future analysis. If the U.S. adjusts the objectives of security sector reform to something more realistic and includes some of these positive potential outcomes in those objectives, it maintains the utility of conducting long-term SSR programs into the foreseeable future.

The U.S. will likely continue to use SSR theory to drive security assistance and security cooperation of weak or failing states in the future. Since this is the case, there are five significant factors to consider when determining whether to conduct SSR of a country beyond the strategic decision to execute. First, there are inherent difficulties in undertaking SSR in the third world, our mental model of military forces and the role of the use of force is quite different to those of sub-Saharan Africa or other regions of the world. Second, SSR cannot be undertaken in isolation. Third, SSR is a type of systems reform—not just a military or even a portion of the
military’s reform. It is a complicated process and there are no template solutions for how to achieve the desired endstate. Operational planners need to have a more lateral approach rather than the traditional linear approach. Fourth, it is difficult to organize and synchronize a strategy for the long term. The question is whether the State Department, USAID, Justice, Treasury, etcetera, are undertaking actions simultaneously and in an integrated fashion—otherwise DoD efforts will flounder. It is even more difficult to then synchronize these efforts with donor partners and their conflicting interests. Fifth, reforms will only work if it is in the interest of the host nation.

Here are six important questions that operational planners need to consider before formulating an operational approach to SSR in a targeted state. What is our endstate we are attempting to achieve? What or whose doctrine, tactics, and standards are we using to train the targeted security sector? Over the short term, Western military doctrine does not work well in the third world security system. Whose weapons are you training them with? Are you creating a dependency by your actions or are you allowing them to stand alone? Do our trainers understand the operational environment they are operating in? How do our actions influence the local power structures, cultures, tribal relations? These questions should set the planners on a glidepath to understanding the endstate they are to achieve and the environment and conditions they need to operate under to increase the potential for success.

There are some shortcomings in this study that could impact the findings. First, this study relies on a single case study to base its finding and analysis. Future studies can expand this format to include other cases that may increase the validity of this study’s conclusion. Second, this study focused primarily at the interagency level, with a heavier focus on the Department of Defense. Future research can concentrate on the specific programs that the Department of State, USAID, and Department of Defense executed in Mali to further validate this study. Finally, the results are not in on Mali. Over the next few years, Mali may increase its democratization and improve its
responses to the population in the security sector. History may always rewrite this case as an example of success in security sector reform.

This study is significant because it can influence how the Department of Defense employs forces to conduct security sector reform in the future. It can affect how the Army uses regionally aligned forces for building partner capacity in their assigned regions. It can also influence how the Combatant Commanders and the Army National Guard implement the State Partnership Program in the future. The Department of Defense cannot conduct security sector reform alone. If the U.S. decides to return to Mali after the French intervention, the study can influence what areas the United States may attempt to reform Mali’s security sector and may also influence the expected end state and goals it will achieve in doing so.
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