The Canadian Forces use of private security in Afghanistan: a consequence of national decisions.

Since the end of the Cold War, cuts to Canadian defense spending by successive national governments have caused gaps in National Defense. The number of soldiers, particularly those in support trades has decreased. This is concurrent to an increase in the number of tasks, both domestically and internationally that the Canadian Government has given the Department of National Defense. This has given rise to the use of Private Security Companies by the Canadian Forces. The number of Private Security Companies employed by Canada increased in Afghanistan from 2005 to 2011. While there has been a great deal written on the moral, legal and ethical issues associated with using private security to augment the Canadian Forces capability, there has not been a detailed examination of the causes that led to the requirement to use Private Security Companies. The evidence suggests that the augmentation requirement is a natural result of decisions made at the national political level.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

CANADIAN FORCES USE OF PRIVATE SECURITY IN AFGHANISTAN: A CONSEQUENCE OF NATIONAL DECISIONS by MAJ Stephen D. Noel, 50 pages.

Since the end of the Cold War, cuts to Canadian defense spending by successive national governments have caused gaps in National Defense. The number of soldiers, particularly those in support trades has decreased. This is concurrent to an increase in the number of tasks, both domestically and internationally that the Canadian Government has given the Department of National Defense. This has given rise to the use of Private Security Companies by the Canadian Forces.

The number of Private Security Companies employed by Canada increased in Afghanistan from 2005 to 2011. While there has been a great deal written on the moral, legal and ethical issues associated with using private security to augment the Canadian Forces capability, there has not been a detailed examination of the causes that led to the requirement to use Private Security Companies. The evidence suggests that the augmentation requirement is a natural result of decisions made at the national political level.

The value of this study is to increase decision makers understanding of the impact of private security augmentation on Canadian Forces operations in future conflicts. By informing the military, the Canadian Forces can operationalize planning for the use of private security in future conflicts.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I did not set out to write about Private Security Companies. I owe a debt of gratitude to Dr. Stanley who guided me in this endeavor. His research in the area of private security companies was the foundation of this paper. I also owe thanks to Major Jared Rudacille whose thoroughness and attention to detail made the editing process significantly easier. Thank you to my wife and children for helping me through this process. Your patience and support, as always, means that any success I achieve is in reality yours.
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INTRODUCTION

The Canadian Forces (CF) participated in combat operations in Kandahar province, Afghanistan between 2005 and 2011. During this period, the Canadian military’s use of private security contractors (PSCs) rose appreciably as evidenced by the numbers of contracts, the value of contracts, and the scope of contracted duties. The underlying question is why did Canada turn to increased use of PSCs? The common answer of supply and demand is not sufficient to address this complex issue. The availability of PSCs did not force the Canadian Government or the CF to use them. In fact, perhaps the opposite is true. Namely, that Canada’s use of PSCs as an instrument of military or foreign policy was a consequence of deliberate policy decisions of successive governments. In other words, the government-imposed conditions forced the CF to use PSCs. Dr. Bruce Stanley, a professor at the United States Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies, posited this theory in his doctoral dissertation in the context of United States increased use of PSCs. He has advanced eight hypotheses that attempt to explain this phenomenon that will be tested in this paper in the context of Canada’s intervention in Afghanistan.

The public openly questioned the Canadian Forces increased use of private contractors in Afghanistan in 2008 after the media broke the story. The concept of PSCs was in many minds synonymous with mercenaries, commonly defined as armed personnel with no particular allegiance other than profit. The Canadian public was concerned about Canadian interests in Afghanistan, in particular the accountability and control over contractors. The idea that the CF needed help conducting security tasks went against the primary mission of the Canadian Forces. Due to all of these reasons, public opinion and the media forced the government to provide

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answers under great scrutiny. Media, opposition parties and the public demanded to know why the government had made the decision to allow operational commanders to use PSCs to augment and in some cases replace what society often considers traditional military tasks. The maelstrom created was not productive to help understand the existence and rise of PSCs in modern operations.

The purpose of this study is to determine if the increased use of PSCs in Afghanistan by the CF was a foreseeable consequence of cumulative political and military decisions. The hypothesis is that when governments make decisions to decrease force size and decrease military budgets yet do not adjust for tasks or environment, the tendency will be towards increased usage of PSCs. This study will fill the gap in knowledge of addressing why Canada chose to employ PSCs in greater numbers. This paper examines the conditions that the government created which affected the capability of the Canadian Forces. Previous studies have not fully answered the question of why the CF turned to the use of PSCs in Afghanistan with a clear methodology that can inform future decisions.

The paradigm that is most prevalent in western countries concerning security on the battlefield is that it is the purview of a nation’s military. A core duty of the military is the need to provide for their own security as well as that of the civilian population whilst defeating opposing forces. The increasing use of PSCs may challenge this paradigm and ultimately result in a change in the way countries view mercenaries under international law. A more limited significance of this study is that Canadian military leaders will be able to appreciate more fully the impact of their decisions if they understand the reasons for the rise of PSCs. Further, in planning future operations, the integration of PSCs into operational plans can enhance existing capabilities.

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The term private security contractor (PSC) occurs frequently in this study; therefore, its precise definition as the author uses it needs to be established. A Swiss Peace paper in 2007 provided a useful discussion of the difference in a PSC or private military company. The authors noted that the approach used by Peter Singer, a widely recognized authority on the private security industry, to differentiate PSC or private military companies by the work they performed and their location on the battlefield was useful. This will be further developed in section two but in order to provide a framework at this time, the term PSC will be used to refer to a for profit company or group that provides a service related to increasing security. This service may be in the form of armed guards or escorts for convoys. On the other end of the spectrum, it encompasses the provision of logistics to build bases and infrastructure. It also includes the provision of explosive detecting canines as well as static observation personnel. It is beyond the scope of this paper to try to add to the terminology debate surrounding the privatization of security. PSCs as used in this paper thus a deliberately broad term.

The general theory of supply and demand is the common basis for explaining the increase of the use of PSCs. By definition, PSCs are for profit companies. There is a correlation between the demand for product, the production capability, and the cost. This interaction of supply and demand is not static which is critical to the theory that explains the increased use of PSCs in Afghanistan. The varieties of factors that can result in changes to level of demand include societal values, expectations, technology, and changes in cost. The theory of supply and demand holds that there exists an economic equilibrium, reached where the price and the demand intersect. In

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5Paul Krugman, Robin Wells, and Martha Olney, Essentials of Economics (Macmillan, 2007), 56-84.
the case of PSCs in Afghanistan, the security sector has not reached equilibrium and the conflict has created increased demand for PSCs. The availability of PSCs to provide services is thus a reaction to the environment. As this paper will demonstrate, the existence of conflict is not the sole determinant of an environment where PSCs might be used. Decisions made by the Canadian government, driven by international and national imperatives, have affected the supply and demand requirement of PSCs.

If the rise of the use of PSC is a result of decisions made by government or military policy, there should be trends that would indicate this conclusion. These trends were used by Dr. Stanley as his eight hypotheses. The first trend for examination is when military outlays decrease there is an increase in the use of private military contractors. Secondly, when the size of a national military decreases there is an increase need in the use of private military contractors. Third, when the number of military disputes, military engagements, and militarized conflicts increases there is an increase in the use of private security contractors. Fourth, when the duration of a military conflict increases there is an increase in the use of private security contractors. Fifth, when there is a decrease in bureaucratic controls and regulations there is an increase in the use of private security. Sixth, when there is a force cap placed on the size of the military force there is an increase in the use of private security. Seventh, when there is no host nation supporting the intervention there is an increase in the use of private security. Lastly, when the security environment is non-permissive there is an increase in private security. This study tests these hypotheses to determine their validity.

These research questions will guide the data collection to determine which, if any, of the hypothesis were supportable by evidence. First, how many PSCs did Canada use in Afghanistan? In order to determine if the hypothesis is valid, the evidence must show that the Canadian Forces increased use of PSCs in Afghanistan. Second, what role did they play? This question seeks to determine if there is a growth in PSCs in quantity, is the scope of duties of PSCs changing as
well. Third, what laws, regulations, and controls were in place regarding PSCs? This question looks at the nature of regulatory control to determine if changing regulations within the industry or national laws affect the use of PSCs. Fourth, what was the duration of the conflict? Fifth, what was the scope of the conflict? The scope of the conflict refers to not only the nature of conflict but also the duties and tasks assigned to the intervention force. Sixth, what other conflicts or deployments were ongoing? This question seeks to determine the demands on the Canadian Forces outside the commitment to ISAF. Seventh, how many troops were participating in other conflicts or deployments? Eighth, what was the size of the military? Ninth, what percentage of the national budget do the military outlays in Afghanistan represent? Tenth, did policy makers or military leaders have choices other than using the private security industry? Following directly from this is the question did they use them? The twelfth question is was the security situation permissive or non-permissive. Finally, what was the role of the host nation in supporting the intervention?

The data used in this study has been limited to open source material. Due to the timeline of the research period, no new access to information requests were able to be completed, thus, it relies on previously completed requests. Finally, the author did not consult any first hand government sources that may have been privy to national decisions on the use of PSCs.

It is outside the scope of this study to examine the theoretical issues that arise from the use of PSCs: namely their legal status and ethical issues of employing PSCs. Further, this study is not comparative of any other CF operations where the CF used PSCs. The study will focus on CF employed in Kandahar, Afghanistan under OEF and then ISAF between 2005 and 2011. For clarification, the year 2005 was not when the CF entered into Afghanistan. It was when CF operations shifted from Kabul to Kandahar province and when the CF took responsibility for all
of Kandahar.\textsuperscript{6} Similarly, the end date is not arbitrary. In 2011, the Canadian combat mission ended in Afghanistan, shifting to a training mission in 2012 in Kabul.\textsuperscript{7} These dates bracket the period when CF operations and infrastructure began and grew to its zenith, thus, a period marked by when PSCs were first employed through to mission termination.

This study assumes that, in the future, Canada will choose to commit forces to international operations in a similar fashion as has been done for all periods less declared war or crisis. That is, tactical level troops approximating brigade size or less will be committed in support of national interests. It therefore assumes that the CF will remain an all-volunteer force, which continues to be limited by fiscal restraints, and personnel limits. Finally, this study assumes that under the construct of CF deployments, PSCs will again be an option to augment capacity or capability.

The author has organized this study into six sections. Section one is the introduction which includes background of the study, statement of the problem, purpose of the study, theoretical framework, research questions, limitations, delimitations and assumptions of the study. Section two presents a review of the literature, which includes operational art theory as applied by the CF. Section three describes the methodology used for the study. Section four presents the findings of the study that tests the research questions. Section five is the analysis. Section six provides a summary of the findings, implications of the findings for the future use of PSCs, recommendations for future study and conclusions.


\textsuperscript{7}Ibid.
LITERATURE REVIEW

This section provides the logic for conducting research on the link between government decisions and the increase of the use of PSCs by the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan. Academic works on the reasons for the use of PSCs by nation states began to emerge in the 21st Century. Peter Singer’s seminal work on the rise of private security companies followed by Deborah Avant’s analysis on the impact of using private security contractors are two of the most influential of these works. Prior to this there was a great deal written on the moral issues of using PSCs and the typologies of PSCs but these included limited objective analysis that examined the actual data. Dr. Stanley examined three case studies: Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Operation Joint Endeavor and, Operation Iraqi Freedom.8 Dr. Stanley examined these studies against his original five hypotheses, stated as hypothesis one to five in the last section. A student at the School of Advanced Military Studies, Major Kevin Clarke, furthered Dr. Stanley’s hypotheses by examining the U.S. involvement in Operation Enduring Freedom. This study will test all of Dr. Stanley’s hypotheses using a Canadian context to see if there is cross-nation validity. The literature and completed case studies are useful in framing the scope of this current research. The following review of literature represents the literature pertinent to this research study. Specifically this section will address the terminology surrounding PSCs, theories on why they have grown in numbers and in use. It will then address the variables of duration, bureaucratic controls, and permissive environment as used in the hypotheses. It will then summarize the Canadian specific work to date. This section will conclude with a summary of Dr. Stanley’s and Clark’s findings.

A large part of the confusion in discussing PSC stems from the terminology that surrounds the field. Those that study the private security industry conflate terms of military, security, and protection and intersperse words like service, combat and non-lethal. It seems each author does so partly out of a different interpretation of the industry and partly out of a desire to coin a new classification for attribution purposes. In the end, the lack of consensus serves to muddy the waters and forces any discussion on the topic be prefaced by establishing agreement on the terminology.

Some examples of the lack of consensus follow. Sarah Percy, a professor of political science and international relations has classified the private military industry as combat private military companies, mercenaries or security private military companies. Singer provides a useful typology based on differentiation of scope of work provided in relation to the battle space. His classification of the industry into military provider, military consultant or military support firms, clearly delineates the armed nature and limitations of each group. A military provider firm according to Singer is at the forefront of the battle and provides security for installations, personnel, or equipment that may include engaging in direct combat. Avant takes this model further and looks at not only what service the firm provides, but sub-typifies them by type of contracts and by internal or external providers.

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11Singer, 64.

Avant’s terminology and definition best serve this study. Because of the rigor in Avant’s work as well as her credibility in the field, the term PSC is more widely recognizable. By defining the type of company by the type of contract as well as the relationship of the private company to the payee nation, the definition becomes broader and more useful for discussions.

Using supply and demand theory as the overarching explanation of the rise of PSCs, Elke Krahmann, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Bristol, stated three primary causes that have triggered the rise of and use of these companies: the end of the cold war, the end of apartheid, and the war against terrorism. Of these, Singer supports only the first one. He substitutes a transformation in the nature of war and the privatization revolution as the other main causes. Avant explored the idea of a privatization revolution and presented a less simple cause and effect chain. For Avant, the primary causes by themselves should not have led to an inevitable growth in the use of PSCs. There is more going on that influences decision makers. Say’s Law from supply and demand theory explains part of this influence. In short, Say’s law would state that the very existence of PSCs demonstrates a viable market that fuels the creation of other companies. One explanation for this that would blend these myriad of factors is that the niche market of private security expanded due to changing world conditions. The opportunity this presented for PSCs to turn profit both encouraged their use and gave rise to more companies.

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14 Singer.

15 Avant, 32.

16 Say’s Law is frequently understood as supply creates its own demand. That is, the simple act of supplying some good or service on the market was sufficient to call forth demand for that product.
From this understanding, PSCs are a response to changing conditions in which the desire to make profit drives the tailoring of a capability to fill a gap.

What the above discussion lacks is the impact governments have, or more precisely, their responsibility, in the creation of conditions that gave rise to the niche market being able to expand. The intermediate cause of this gap is the decisions taken by governments in reaction to the primary causes. Dr. Stanley’s hypotheses provide a possible answer to how this occurred. It is therefore necessary to define the terminology found in the hypotheses.

**Permissive Environment**

A way to visualize the operating environment is through the spectrum of conflict. Military graphics often depict the spectrum as a horizontal rectangle with a blending of colors from green on the left through orange to red on the far right. The colors green and red respectively correlate to permissive or non-permissive environments. A permissive environment is defined as, “an operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct.” By contrast a non-permissive environment is one in which the host nation does not have control. This term has become mostly associated with full-blown war or high intensity conflict. Semi-permissive is somewhere in between where there is risk to security forces but it is

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17 With ADP 3-0, Unified land operations has superseded the term full spectrum operations that was in previous versions of FM 3-0, Operations. It is still used by some NATO countries.

less than full blown war.\textsuperscript{19} Semi-permissive is a term used to describe the upper limit of the PSC operating environment. It describes an environment where the security forces of the host nation can exert influence for a limited duration thus permitting a PSC to operate.

PSCs typically operate in a permissive or semi-permissive environment where a capability gap exists in the contracting nation’s ability. This does not mean that PSCs cannot operate in non-permissive environments or take a leading role in combat operations. If this occurs, the PSC begins to enter the realm of mercenaries or private armies. The employee-employer link, as well as the goals of the country that contracted the PSC, bind the limits of what services the PSC will provide. This limitation explains why governments commonly contract PSCs for use in permissive and semi-permissive environments. When the situation becomes non-permissive, the role of PSCs changes due to a variety of factors. The first of these reasons is that nations expect that the level of conflict between nations should be limited for the armed forces of the nation. In high intensity conflict, freedom of movement of civilians decreases while level of risk increases. Both of these reasons result in the PSC who arguably takes calculated risk for profit to apply a business model that becomes disadvantageous. The more risk employees of PSCs are under, the greater is their expectation for remuneration. The contractor transfers increased risk to the PSC. Since PSCs have a profit line below which it is not good practice to operate, these costs are rarely to the economic loss of the PSC. In a business where the commodity is the labor force, increased costs due to risk have a maximum profit limit.

Duration

A second term used in Dr. Stanley’s hypotheses is that of the duration of conflict. In the context of all military operations, duration is the commitment of forces to operations through to the termination of that combat mission as evidenced by the withdrawal of troops. A military force usually begins by accepting austere conditions. Either because of demands for comfort, or the desire to establish conditions approximating social norms in the host nation, the austere conditions changed. The full range of how different countries translate the effects of increased duration to permanency is beyond the scope of this discussion. However, in the Afghanistan context for the Canadian Forces, the result of increased duration meant that the CF needed to bring more supplies to bases. In a semi-permissive environment, soldiers or PSCs needed to provide the security for the supply convoys.

Bureaucratic Controls

The level of bureaucratic controls imposed by the host nation and the troop contributing country refers to both the formal controls as well as informal control. Formal controls are the body of international laws that regulate the use of PSCs at home and abroad. Within Canada, the use of armed security companies is closely restricted. Firms must be registered, all employees screened and licensed and most importantly, the carry of weapons must be in accordance with a legitimate protection function.20 In practice, this translates to the employment of PSCs for the transport of money as employed by financial institutions. When it comes to regulating the use of PSCs abroad, Canada has taken a more liberal view. With the signing of the 2008 “Montreux Document on private military and security companies,” Canada acknowledged that the rule of law

should bind PSCs actions.\textsuperscript{21} This document laid out guiding principles and best practices but fell short of strengthening international regulation of PSCs.\textsuperscript{22} Prior to the Montreux Document there was no international document regarding how nations would control PSCs. Within the host nation of Afghanistan, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) decreed in August 2010 that all PSCs operating in country must register within four months or be deported.\textsuperscript{23} This was a direct result of incidents involving PSCs as well as the realization by GIRoA that controlling PSCs would amount to a lucrative form of taxation. The fact was that PSCs had operated within Afghanistan prior to 2010 without an official host nation policy of regulation. It was up to contracting countries to employ PSCs as they deemed appropriate and only in extreme cases were they not permitted to operate by the host nation or ISAF. Lack of Canadian bureaucratic controls therefore played a role in legitimizing and permitting the employment of PSCs within Afghanistan.

Students from the Canadian Joint Command and Staff Program have written on the topic of the Canadian Forces use of PSCs in no less than ten master’s theses since 2001.\textsuperscript{24} The majority of these papers tackle the question of whether or not the use of PSCs is an advantage or a detriment to the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan. The historical use of PSCs, the rise of PSCs and the cautions that arise from their use are consistent themes. Commander Tim Addison traces the

\begin{itemize}
    \item \textsuperscript{21}United Nations General Assembly 63\textsuperscript{rd} Session, Agenda Item 76, \textit{Status of the Protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and relating to the protection of victims of armed conflict.}
    
    \item \textsuperscript{22}Elke Krahmann, \textit{Private Security Companies and the State Monopoly on Violence: A case of Norm Change?} (Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, 2009).
    
    
\end{itemize}
current use of PSCs to the policy decisions made in the 1994 Defense White Paper that saw cuts to budget and personnel.\textsuperscript{25} Lieutenant-Colonel Denis Bouchard supports this assertion and clearly outlines a policy of having to do more with less due to successive national Defense policies.\textsuperscript{26} The context in which Bouchard discussed PSCs is in support to the Canadian Forces operations in the arctic so while his study is useful, it does not attempt to look at the reasons for Canada’s use of PSCs. Of all the papers discussing Canadian use of PSCs, it is only Major Hobbs who devotes a section of his thesis to the reasons for the increased use of PSCs.\textsuperscript{27} He gives several possible reasons for the use of PSCs including the changing nature of warfare, political reasons, lack of capacity or to save money. However, his discussion is largely qualitative, as he is not attempting to answer the question why has the rise occurred. All of this previous research into the use of PSCs by Canada is relevant and provides context for this study’s attempt to discover definitive links between national policies and the rise of the use of PSCs.

The existing theories on the rise of PSCs and the work done at the Canadian Forces College indicate a complex relationship between variables. Dr. Stanley suggests that significant correlation exists amongst all five of his original hypotheses as well as a sixth hypothesis that emerged from his data analysis. Specifically he found that as the number of disputes, the duration of the conflict, and the level of non-permissive environment increased, there was a corresponding increase in the use of PSCs. Further, as the bureaucratic controls decreased, the use of PSCs

\textsuperscript{25} Commander Tim Addison, “Contractors on the Battle Field: Have We Done Our Homework?” (AMSC paper, National Securities Program 4, 2001), 5.


increased. He also found a correlation in the military outlays and the size of the military force employed that suggests PSCs increase or decrease in accordance with either variable.28 From Dr. Stanley’s research emerged two other hypotheses that were not tested. He proposed that if there was a force cap, there would be an increase in the use of PSCs. Additionally; Dr. Stanley suggested that when there was no host nation support for the intervention, there would be an increase in the use of PSCs. These findings reflected U.S. case studies analyzed using a qualitative and quantitative methodology.

Major Kevin Clarke used Dr. Stanley’s original five hypotheses to examine the case of the U.S. Army in Operation Enduring Freedom from 2001 to 2012.29 He found that evidence supported two of the hypotheses, namely when duration and the number of conflicts a country is involved in increased, the use of PSCs increased.30 Clarke noted that the rise of PSCs followed a pattern of relatively linear growth followed by exponential growth and plateau and finally decay. He concluded that there is a link between the demands for PSCs, the duration of the conflict and the number of other conflicts requiring resources.31

This section has presented a review of literature pertinent to this study. The multitude of references that have used terms similar to PSC can have the effect of detracting from the discussion. This study will use the term PSC consistently throughout as it is the best descriptor based on the role and function of security companies. The section discussed terminology as used in the hypotheses in order to establish the foundation of how the author will use the terms in this study.

28Stanley, 168.


30Ibid., 48-50.

31Ibid., 52.
study. Specifically the author defined the terms of duration, bureaucratic controls, and permissive
environment. Finally, this section concluded with a summary of research on PSCs first from a
Canada centric perspective followed by the cases studies conducted by Dr. Stanley and Major
Clark. The next section will present the research methodology.

METHODOLOGY

The primary goal of this study was to test research questions that relate to the increased
use of PSCs as detailed by Dr. Stanley which were stated in section one. The author will present
the methodology used to test the research questions in this section, which also provides the
rationale for using the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan as a case study. This section is organized
into four parts; selection of case, instrumentation, data collection, and data analysis.

George and Bennett’s widely used book on case studies state that a case study method is
the detailed examination of a historical episode to determine if there are generalizations or
explanations that may be applicable to other events.\textsuperscript{32} They also state that the strongest method of
analysis is within case and cross case analysis within a single study.\textsuperscript{33} The three case studies used
by Dr. Stanley were the United States use of PSCs in Iraq (1991), Bosnia (1995), and Iraq (2003).
Clarke looked at the United States in Afghanistan (2005-2012). Those case studies provided
results for each hypothesis, which the evidence either supported or displayed mixed outcome.
Each case added validity and robustness to the study by using the same test variables. By
examining a case study outside of the United States, the abstractness and empirical validity of the
study can more rigorously test the theory.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{32} Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, \textit{Case Studies and Theory Development in

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 17.

\textsuperscript{34} Paul Davidson Reynolds, \textit{A Primer in Theory Construction} (Pearson Education Inc.,
The Canadian Forces engagement in Afghanistan is a valid case to apply in this study because of the similar challenges that the CF and the U.S. military faced. Like the cases examined by Dr. Stanley and Clarke, Canadian involvement in Afghanistan was a result of choices made by the national government. There was no direct threat to Canadian national interests requiring an immediate military response in Afghanistan, thus there was a range of options that could have and may have factored into the decision to commit forces. One of these options may have been the use of PSCs to supplement capability. Secondly, in 2005, Canada was just finishing a decade long commitment in the Balkans and the commitment to Afghanistan came at the cost of an already tired military. The personnel and budget cuts as implemented by the 1994 White Paper were still in effect. The Canadian Forces saw the first planned increases to personnel and budget in the 2005 Canada First Defense Strategy. Fiscal restraint and personnel restrictions affected the government’s use of PSCs from the start of the operation. Thirdly, the case of Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan is valid due to the duration of the study. The period of 2005-2011 is sufficiently long for the mission to mature and for the in theatre logistics to reach a peak to sustain a mature theatre.

The subject of contractor employment will be limited to Afghanistan. As Singer and Avant note, the classification of PSCs is difficult for many reasons; therefore, the range of duties performed by PSCs will be broad. This study will use open source information to examine the

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2007), 14. Defines the terms abstractness and empirical validity as used here.


36Government of Canada, Canada First Defense Strategy: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 2005), 1. There was an unplanned increase to defense in 2001 of $8 billion.

37Singer, 88. The typologies of the Private Military Industry are based not just on what functions the company provides but on how the company is internally regulated.
number of contractors used by year in Afghanistan. Where the author cannot obtain exact data—
due to the vastly different types and services provided—the subset of armed PSCs used over the
period as well as total money spent on contractors will be used. This data has been more reliably
reported and will serve to allow trends to be analyzed.

The study will be a mix of qualitative and quantitative analysis based on the research
questions presented in section one. The questions are derived from the hypotheses so that a
maximum of two questions will suffice to answer any one hypothesis. Base on the evidence, it is
anticipated that each of the hypotheses will be either supported, not supported or demonstrate
mixed results. The number of hypotheses that the evidence supports will then determine the
robustness of Dr. Stanley’s theory in the context of Canada in Afghanistan. If at least four (50
percent) of the hypotheses are supported by the evidence, it will be sufficient to conclude that
there exists significant correlation between the case study presented and those examined by Dr.
Stanley. Questions for which the author can collect quantitative data will reflect the period of
2005 to 2011 using the Canadian International Security Assistance Force as a case study.

CASE STUDY: INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE CANADA

There are many aspects of the mission here in Afghanistan, many security
aspects that are performed by private security firms which, if they were turned over to the
military, would make our task impossible. We just don't have the numbers to do
everything.

—Brigadier-General Denis Thompson,
Commander Task Force Kandahar

This section introduces the case study and contextualizes the Canadian Forces (CF)
involvement in Kandahar. Throughout the deployment of the CF to Kandahar, the mission did not

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38Gloria Galloway, “Military Investigating how Canadian Soldier Died,” The Globe and
remain static. It evolved in scope, scale, and task over time. A key component of this evolution was basing, which affected operational reach. As the Canadians expanded into new areas, they created forward operating bases—in some cases they tore them down to build new ones or turned them over to other forces. With the evolving focus of the mission and the need for extended operational reach, the requirement for support changed. The CF filled this gap by the use of PSCs. As will be discussed later, this was not an ordained case of increased use of PSCs. What the case study of the CF in Kandahar demonstrates is the interdependence of the variables under study. For example, the ability to project forces to interact with the population in a counterinsurgency is linked closely to the expectation of mission success. This complex interplay makes the Kandahar case study particularly relevant for the examination of the idea, that Canada’s use of PSCs as an instrument of military policy or foreign policy, was a consequence of deliberate policy decisions of successive national governments.

Kandahar province is approximately 54,000 square kilometers in area and is comprised of 17 districts. The population is overwhelmingly Pashtun who have been the most ardent supporters of the Taliban.39 The reason for Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan as outlined in the “Manley Report” was to deny the region as an operating base to terrorists, to show support for the UN resolution, to show solidarity within NATO, and to show commitment for human rights.40

The story of the CF involvement in Kandahar is not contiguous. In 2002, Canada deployed a battle group from the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry into Kandahar as part of the U.S. led Operation ANACONDA.41 The 850-person unit redeployed by the end of the year.

39 John Manley, Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan (Ottawa, Queen's Printers, 2008), 15.
40 Ibid., 25.
41 Ibid., 14.
and in 2003 the Government of Canada decided to develop a long-term footprint in Afghanistan. Initially the capital of Kabul was the Canadian area of operations. An infantry battle group received this mission.\(^{42}\) The CF established a base in Kabul, Afghanistan and operated from there for the next two years.\(^{43}\) However, in 2004, the Canadian Government decided to return to Kandahar initially as lead for the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (KPRT).\(^{44}\) The CF drew down operations in Kabul and, by the summer of 2005, the government announced that a battle group would be responsible for all of Kandahar province.

Research question one asks how many PSCs Canada used. The exact number is difficult to determine due to the way the CF classified contracts. Additionally, the CF does not release details of contracts for reasons of security.\(^{45}\) The CF contracted PSC support in the areas of logistics, strategic lift, theatre aviation, and private site security.\(^{46}\) The most accurate data is the armed PSCs contracted for static defense. Figure 1 (below) depicts the value of these contracts from 2005 to 2011. The number of armed PSCs grew from a single company at one site in 2005, to five companies over nine sites in 2011.\(^{47}\) The number of PSCs providing logistics services

\(^{42}\) 3rd Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment operated in Kabul from September 2003 to March 2004 as part of Operation APPOLO, Rotation 0.

\(^{43}\) Manley, 15.


went from one costing $1.14 million in 2005, to three valued at over $200 million in 2006. Strategic lift contracts cost the CF $11 million per month in 2005 and 2006 until the CF purchased aircraft in the summer of 2006. Finally, the CF contracted theater aviation support for $36 million per year between 2008 and 2011. In summary, the number of dollars spent on contractor support during 2005 to 2011 increased each year. This dollar increase was connected to an increase in the number of PSCs used by the CF.

Table 1. Value of CF Contracts with Armed PSC: Kandahar 2005-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Value of Armed PSC Contracts ($ Millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>500000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1500000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2500000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>3500000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Created by author.

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48Mayeda indicates that contracts with Gul Agha Sherzai as of fall 2006 cost $1.14 million but the CF was relying on the US LOGCAP program from 2005 to 2006. In early 2006, CANCAP was extended to Kandahar and initially 80 contractors were deployed which continued to rise. See David Perry, “Contractors in Kandahar. Eh? Canada’s ‘Real’ commitment to Afghanistan,” *Journal of Military Studies*, 9, no. 4 (Summer 2007): 12-14.

Research question two asks what role PSCs played during the intervention. The use of PSCs by the CF began in the mid-nineties to support the operational deployment in Bosnia. The award of camp infrastructure contracts to Calgary based ATCO Frontec of $10 million for Operation ABACUS and $83 million for Op PALLADIUM demonstrated the Canadian Government’s willingness to turn to contractors in operational theatres. The contracts provided for the transport of supplies, engineering, accommodations, and infrastructure and in theatre transport of personnel. Thus, the precedent of using PSCs was well established when Canada established bases in Afghanistan in 2005. The CF contracted logistics resupplies to arrive at the main operating base in Kandahar from routes through Pakistan. Companies were responsible for the provision of convoy security if they deemed it appropriate. The scope of duties for PSCs however was to grow as was the number of dollars spent on PSCs.

The use of armed PSCs by the CF to guard bases and installations in Afghanistan began with an Afghanistan PSC providing security to the KPRT in 2005. By 2009, the use of PSCs had expanded to armed security at forward operating bases throughout Kandahar province. The contracts initially were with local Afghan companies which either had to be armed and equipped by the CF or come with their own equipment. In 2010, the Government of Afghanistan

50LCdr Macarena Barker and Captain Pam Hatton, “Contractors in Support of Operations: A Canadian Perspective,” (PASOLS LOG, 20, August 2000), 13. Operation ABACUS was Canada’s Y2K contingency operation and Operation PALLADIUM was Canada’s commitment to the stabilization mission in Bosnia, 1996-2003. ATCO Frontec is a Canadian based company that has been operating for over 60 years and specializes in the manufacture of workplace accommodations.

51Ibid., 15.

52The author was the Operations Officer for the KPRT from August 2007 to February 2007. The contract existed for local security at the KPRT since at least 2005.

recognized a need to control PSCs operating in country and at that time, Canada had nine such contracts that were under review.\(^{54}\) As the mission evolved, the CF awarded security contracts to multiple international companies. Commanders augmented FOB security with their own personnel as the situation dictated, and no situation was the same.\(^{55}\)

Armed PSCs were not the only growth areas for PSCs contracted by Canada in Afghanistan. An example of this was in contractor support to conduct aerial resupply of forward operating bases. In 2008, the CF contracted a private firm in Canada to use MI 8 helicopters to deliver supplies to forward operating bases.\(^{56}\) At the time, Canada did not have any of its own helicopters in theatre and relied on the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to provide aerial resupply and troop movement. As the Canadian task force extended into more remote areas of Kandahar province and the threat of improvised explosive devices (IED) increased in Kandahar, the theory that consumable supplies were not worth the risk for convoys to guard evolved.

In 2009, a further development occurred in security contracting with the contracting of counter IED canines. An existing contract established by U.S. forces that supported the CF resulted in the CF establishing its own contract. The CF recognized the need to leverage other capabilities but did not have the mechanism to initiate contracts quickly. This modification of a


\(^{55}\)During Operation APOLLO Roto 10, The CF contracted FOB security at FOB Ma’sum Ghar to Blue Hackel. Canadian soldiers worked with contractors to augment camp security.

PSC contract that was already in theatre, led to separate Canadian contracted canines for the purposes of vehicle and personnel search as well as patrolling as part of CF missions.\textsuperscript{57}

Other government departments contributing to the mission also contracted PSCs. As a part of the whole of government approach, projects managed by the Canadian International Development Agency used private security on specific projects. For these projects, security was part of the project contract as a responsibility of the contractor so it was not included as a separate security contract. The most commonly known example of this was the signature project for the Canadian Government—the Dhalla Dam reconstruction project.\textsuperscript{58} CIDA awarded SNC-Lavalin, a Canadian company, the contract for $50 million dollars. CIDA expected that SNC-Lavalin would need to hire 120 local Afghans to provide security for the dam workers. Estimates are that the contractor spent at least $10 million on project security. Further, the contractor never completed the project due to allegations of corruption by the security provider.\textsuperscript{59}

The evidence suggests that the use of PSCs by the CF in Afghanistan did in fact increase over the period in question. This supports the hypothesis that as duration of a military conflict increases the use of PSCs increase. What is significant is that the growth in the use of PSCs over time was not just in dollars spent or numbers of contractors employed. There appeared to be a growth in the scope of PSCs used.

\textsuperscript{57}Government of Canada, Access to Information Request 00626.


Research question three seeks to answer what regulations for the use of PSCs existed. There is no comprehensive convention that governs the use of PSCs. Thirty-two countries signed a UN draft resolution, but this draft lacks the legal basis to establish international law.\textsuperscript{60} Although 464 PSCs have signed a ratified international code of conduct, this amounts to an information operation campaign in which companies pledge to do honorable things.\textsuperscript{61} As identified from the research, the corporate nature of PSCs is one characteristic, which differentiates them from mercenary companies. The regulatory policies that exist in Canada and Afghanistan regarding PSCs should theoretically provide controls for the industry. Regulations should make the use of PSCs less frequent, whereas in a less restricted environment PSCS would be expected to thrive.

As noted by Caroline Holmquist from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the private security sector’s capacity to be a legitimate global actor rests with the ability of states to regulate the industry.\textsuperscript{62} Canada, despite being a signatory to the Montreux document, has no specific laws regarding the use of PSCs outside the country and it did not sign the U.N. Convention against the use of Mercenaries.\textsuperscript{63} It is for this reason that a relatively large number of PSCs have established headquarters in Canada. Paradoxically, there are a number of national laws that regulate the employment of PSCs within Canada. These laws force PSCs to be registered and to ensure that companies screen all employees with background checks. Federal and provincial laws restrict the carrying of weapons. The result of the lack of laws governing PSCs


\textsuperscript{61}Ibid, 274.


internationally is that the CF contracting policies became the only legal mechanism to control PSCs. These contracting policies provide for termination of contracts based on sub-standard performance or for performance outside the scope of duties.

Research question four asks what was the duration of the conflict. The Canadian Forces participated in the conflict for 6 years. Canadians formally took command of Kandahar Province as its area of operations on 15 August 2005 and the last handover to American forces occurred on 5 July 2011.64

Research question five asks what was the scope of the conflict. In 2004, when Canada made the decision to put soldiers back into Kandahar it was initially to take ownership of the KPRT. The move south began in the fall of 2004, and the transfer of command of the KPRT formally occurred in August 2005.65 The mission in the south evolved a short time later to include ownership of the entire Kandahar province and the battle group was relocated from Kabul to Kandahar by February 2006. The Canadians consolidated in Kandahar province with the provincial reconstruction team, an infantry battle group, and a small group of Afghan Army mentors. The size of the mission was approximately 2,200 soldiers.66

The Afghanistan Compact Strategy, to which Canada was a signatory in 2007, influenced the role the CF was to play in Kandahar. Notably, this mission fit with Canada’s newly coined whole of government approach to deployed operations.67 The 300-person KPRT would operate

64Government of Canada, Canada’s Engagement in Afghanistan.
65Ibid.
67Government of Canada, Canada First Defense Strategy (Ottawa, Queen’s Printers, 2008).
along the three lines of operation of development, support to governance and security with a mandate to operate throughout the province. The civilian department members of the KPRT had movement restrictions imposed on them for security reasons. CF soldiers had to provide security for their movement and the minimum requirement was three armored vehicles and twenty soldiers per convoy. The government regulations therefore limited operational reach by directing the employment of available resources. The battle groups’ mission was to conduct counter-insurgency operations throughout the province. In practical terms, this meant that the commander prioritized districts based on a myriad of factors. The strategy that the CF employed was population centric, which led them to focus on the population centers of Kandahar City, Zharey District Center, Arghandab District Center, and Panjwayi District Center where over two-thirds of the near one million Afghans lived. In order to do this, the CF needed to live amongst the population so new operating bases were constructed. In 2006 alone, three new FOBs were constructed. As boundaries changed, FOBs were either torn down or handed over to partners in addition to others being constructed so that by 2010, the Canadians were operating out of five


69 John Manley, *Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan,* 2008. Additionally, the author served as the Operations Officer for the KPRT from August 2006 to February 2007 and was involved in the movement of other government department personnel in the operating environment which was required to follow these rules.

70 Department of Defense, JP 1-02, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,* 277. Operational reach is the distance and duration across which a unit can successfully employ military capabilities.

71 LCol Patrick as quoted in Drew Brown, “Canada Hands Off Part of Kandahar Province to US,” *Stars and Stripes,* 17 August 2009. LCol Patrick was a staff officer at Joint Task Force Afghanistan Headquarters and said “Fully 10 of 17 districts were not covered in force. This reality is a limit of geography, troop density and priority.”

FOBs and more than a dozen other platoon or larger patrol bases. The level of contractor support that was required to establish and maintain these forward operating bases increased. The other piece of the security mission that Canada supported included the mentoring and partnership with the Afghan Security Forces. Initially started as a partnership with the Afghan National Army, the observer, mentor, and liaison team (OMLT) evolved to the police observer, mentor, and liaison team (POMLT)—further decentralizing CF members and increasing requirements for support.73

To support the changing scope of the mission, the number of CF grew throughout the mission in Kandahar as depicted in Figure 2. The Canadian Parliament initially authorized 300 troops to the KPRT in 2005, which they expanded the same year to an additional 1,200 strong battle group.74 A vote (the vote was 149-145 in favor of) in the Canadian parliament on 13 May 2006 authorized 2,300 troops to Afghanistan in addition to the KPRT until 2009 most of which would be deployed to Kandahar.75 This growth reflected the Canadian Brigade Headquarters that stood up in Kandahar and the Strategic Advisory Team that the CF established in Kabul. Additionally, the mission expanded to create OMLT and POMLT to mentor Afghan Army and Police so that the authorized number grew to a high of 2,830 in 2010.76

73Government of Canada, History of Canada’s Involvement in Afghanistan.


Table 2. Size of Canadian Forces and Deployed Forces in Kandahar 2005-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>CF in Kandahar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by author.

Research question six asks what other conflicts or deployments were ongoing. The CF trend towards increasing demand versus falling capacity between 1980 and 2004 carried on throughout the period 2005 to 2008. This trend is illustrated in Figure 3. The CF has had a greater frequency of deployment on domestic operations and with greater numbers of troops. On international operations, the CF has remained close to 5,000 continuously deployed on...


operations, nearly 3000 of which deployed in Afghanistan. Based on the number of personnel deployed to Afghanistan, this was the main effort of the Canadian Forces during the period 2005 to 2011. However, it was not the only mission. The roles of the Canadian Forces are national, regional in the form of Defense of North America and international operations. The CF has a standing mission to be prepared to support Canada under the auspices of support to civil authority. The Canadian Government has used the CF to support domestic emergencies such as floods, ice storms, or hurricanes as well as during accidents such as aircraft crashes. As well, the CF augments national security provided by police forces to such tasks as international summits and Olympics. Internationally the CF maintains a high readiness Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) that can rapidly deploy anywhere in the world on short notice.

Research question seven asks how many troops were participating in other conflicts or deployments. The most labor intensive were the Vancouver 2010 Olympics and the G20 summit in 2010. The Olympics security task necessitated the establishment of a Joint Task Force and the allocation of thousands of CF personnel. Regionally, the CF deployed a task force comprising 1,000 CF personnel to support the U.S. in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Internationally, the DART consisting of approximately 200 personnel deployed to Sri-Lanka and Pakistan in 2005 and to Haiti in 2010. The ongoing UN missions that Canada supported were

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79 In 2006, the CF instituted restrictions on soldiers deploying outside of Canada to ensure that the field forces would share the operational tempo. Any soldier who did not have 365 consecutive days inside Canada following a deployment, required the Chief of the Land Staff to sign off on a waiver permitting that soldier to deploy.

80 Canada First Defense Strategy, 7.

global and stretched from Haiti to the Middle East. As Bill Robinson notes, the support to standing UN deployments in 2005 was just 83 CF members and decreased to 56 by 2010.\(^{82}\)

Table 3. Personnel Operational Tempo to Overall Strength 1980-2004\(^{83}\)

\[\text{Table 3. Personnel Operational Tempo to Overall Strength 1980-2004}\]

Source: Government of Canada, Canada’s International Policy Statement.

Research question eight asks was the size of the military. The Canadian Armed Forces has been decreasing since the fall of the Berlin Wall from a high in 1989 of 88,000 service personnel to a low of just over 60,000 regular forces in 1996.\(^{84}\) By 2005 when the Canadian


\(^{83}\)Government of Canada, Canada’s International Policy Statement, 7.

\(^{84}\)Government of Canada, Canada First Defense Strategy, 12.
Government announced the plan to increase the force, the numbers had stabilized at 65,000 regulars and the reserve component was 20,000. These numbers increased slightly from 66,992 in 2009 to 67,742 in 2011.85 As the distinguished Canadian historian Jack Granatstein noted, the force was essentially frozen. The then Chief of the Land Staff noted that this small increase was marginal due attrition almost balancing the intake.86 Of the 82,000 total service personnel, the Canadian Army accounted for 20,000. This pool accounted for the vast majority of deployed CF personnel in Afghanistan.87 This number of deployed forces represented almost fifteen percent of the total field force. Due to the CF adopting a six-month deployment operational cycle, the operational tempo was high. Further, the deployment rotation included only infantry battalions from the regular force, of which there are nine. Barring any other deployments, the CF maintained a deployment tempo of the equivalent of two battalions per rotation. With the rest and reset cycle factored in, this amounted to a dwell of twelve months prior to beginning the next workup period.

Research question nine seeks to answer what percentage of the national budget the military outlays in Afghanistan represented. Since 1971, Canada’s Defense budget has been consistently below 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and on average has been closer to an average of 1.21 percent of the GDP.88 From the period of 2005 to 2010, the percentage of GDP


spent on Defense increased gradually to 1.5 percent.\textsuperscript{89} The effect of all these increases in the
Defense budget was that Canada had $30.9 billion extra spending for the period 2001 to 2011.\textsuperscript{90}
The Department of National Defense’s annual Report on Plans and Priorities estimates that of this
incremental increase, approximately $8 billion was due to the Afghanistan mission. This
represents approximately six percent of the total defense outlay.\textsuperscript{91} From 2005 to 2011 the amount
Canada spent on Defense increased from $15.9 billion to $22.3 billion as depicted in figure 4.\textsuperscript{92}

\textsuperscript{89}Bill Robinson, Canadian Military Spending 2010-11, Canadian Center for Policy
Alternative: Foreign Policy Series, Ottawa, Ontario, 4.

\textsuperscript{90}Robinson, 6.

\textsuperscript{91}This may be a low estimate and according to Robinson, the real figure could be between
$13 and $16 Billion. Other sources say the cost of the Afghanistan mission is $18.1 billion as of
well see Matthew Fisher, “Afghanistan Mission Price Tag Passes $525,000 per soldier”, Canwest

\textsuperscript{92}Brian MacDonald, “The Canada First Defense Strategy of 2008 and the 20 year
Defense Budget,” CDA (28 July 2008). The Canadian Government has increased the defense budget every year since 2002, and it is now 30 percent greater than it was at the end of the 1990s. The planned increased spending was expected to rise from $13 billion in 2004 per year to between $30 and $50 billion per year by 2030.
Table 4. Canadian Defense Spending 2005-2011\textsuperscript{93}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{lcccccccc}
\hline
\textbf{Billions} & 10 & 15 & 20 & 25 & 30 & 35 & 40 \\
\end{tabular}
\caption{Canadian Defense Spending 2005-2011}
\end{table}

Source: Created by author.

Research questions ten and eleven ask if there were any alternatives to using PSCs and if so did Canada employ them. As in any discussion of options, the concept of risk and benefit form the foundation of any viable option. The CF use of private security in Afghanistan to the extent they were used was not a preordained conclusion. In 2005, the CF was limited by fiscal, personnel, and equipment realities affected by two decades of force and budget reductions as well as an increase in operational tasks. The operating environment in Afghanistan drove the other reality. In choosing to establish in Kandahar Province, the Government of Canada created operational challenges for the CF. The most obvious of these challenges was that of troop density. Due to the size of the operating environment, the CF tacitly accepted that large areas of the province would not enjoy a permanent presence of CF. The operating bases that the CF

\textsuperscript{93}Robinson, 2. The base data comes from, “Canada’s Economic Action Plan Year 2, Budget 2010,” which does not include increased spending from Afghanistan.
established in areas like Sperwan Ghar, Ma’Sum Ghar or Zharey were more than 80 kilometers from the main operating base of Kandahar Airfield making ground resupply difficult. The presence and ability to use PSCs influenced the choice of force laydown in the province. Logistics was not the only challenge. Force protection at these locations reduced labor, specifically the ability to patrol and to conduct combat operations, by one-third the force at each location. The task forces had the option to establish the bases where they did, which would have created issues with the operational approach of people centric operations.  

An option that the Canadian Government exercised was to grow the CF and to provide needed equipment. The CF implemented the growth but as noted, this did not happen overnight and its effect was limited. Equipment, particularly helicopters that arrived in 2009 increased the ability of the CF to project and sustain forces. This reduced the need for contract support in some areas.

Research question twelve asks whether the security situation was permissive or non-permissive during the focused period of the study. As defined earlier, an indicator of a non-permissive environment is the absence of control by the legitimate authority. The security situation in Kandahar was non-permissive in 2005 and remained that way as of 2011. There are a number of ways to support this determination and no single way is definitive, as experts do not agree on the typology of conflict. An early attempt by David Singer and Mel Small in the Correlates of War Database established the threshold of 1,000 combat deaths per year as the demarcation of warfare. Statistics for Kandahar or for Afghanistan vary depending on the

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95Meridith Reid Sarkess, The COW Typology of War: Defining and Categorizing Wars, (Version 4 of the Data), 16.
source, particularly in determining civilian and insurgent deaths. The number of deaths of ISAF
and Afghanistan Security Forces is more reliable. Another difficulty is distinguishing between
combat related deaths versus non-combat related deaths. The cumulative deaths in Afghanistan
per year exceed 1,000, which could support the COW threshold as indicating a non-permissive
environment. Another way to view a non-permissive environment is by the aggregate number of
attacks in the CF assigned regions. Within Afghanistan, Helmand and Kandahar provinces lead
the country in number of insurgent attacks. These attacks have led to the depiction of Kandahar
as “red” meaning it is one of the most volatile regions. The PRT instability scale further
supports this. On a scale of 1-to-10, with 10 being full “open” war, Markus Gauster, in a thesis
from the Austrian Defense Academy, classified the KPRT in 2007 as a “level 9.” He described
this environment as a situation similar to civil war, where combat operations are prevalent, and
where provision of humanitarian aid is impossible.

Perhaps the most obvious way to view an environment as non-permissive or permissive is
by looking at what security measures are required to operate. In 2006, the Canadian Government
withdrew all its other government department agents working in Kandahar due to the situation
being non-permissive. This resulted from the death of a Department of Foreign Affairs employee

15 June 2013).


99Markus Gauster, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: An Innovative
Instrument of International Crisis Management Being Put to the Test, Austrian National Defense
Academy, November 2007, 32.
caused by a suicide IED attack.\textsuperscript{100} The government allowed other government department civilians to return to Kandahar in the summer of 2006 with several caveats. Among them were strict controls for movement outside of camps including pre-approvals, types of vehicles that they could travel. This was in addition to existing force protection policies.

Research question thirteen asks what the role of the host nation was in the intervention. The Government of Afghanistan initially accepted that PSCs came as part of the security environment when the international community began operating throughout the country. Competing demands of allowing PSCs who facilitated intervention operations vice the government controlling the private security industry soon arose. Firstly, Afghans and parts of the international community saw PSCs as unregulated guns for hire. Secondly, PSCs were hiring Afghans who would be potential recruits to the Afghan National Security Forces. Thirdly, imposing regulations on PSCs could be an economic benefit to the national government. Therefore, in 2008, the Karzai government created a regulatory law that PSCs had to register by 2010 in order to operate within the country.\textsuperscript{101} In August of 2010, GIRoA outlawed all PSCs operating in the country—less those working for the International community as long it was in the role of static Defense tasks.\textsuperscript{102} The host nation regulations regarding PSCs mirrored the international regulations during the period 2005-2011. Both increasingly focused on controlling the industry.

\textsuperscript{100} A suicide IED attack killed Glynn Berry on 15 January 2006. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International trade determined that Canadian non-military government personnel be removed from Kandahar until the security situation improved.


The support of the host nation with the allocation of security forces increased throughout the period. The fielded strength of the Afghan National Army in 2005 was just under 50,000 soldiers. This was far short of the 70,000 soldiers that were agreed upon at the December 2002 Bonn Agreement. The CF in Kandahar began conducting partnered operations in 2005 with a brigade of ANA in Kandahar Province. In 2006, the Afghan Compact established the target date of 2010 to reach 70,000 soldiers. Due to training provided by the international community, with heavy reliance on PSCs, the ANA recruited and trained 26,000 soldiers per year in 2007 and 2008. The Afghan Government increased the authorized size of the Army to 82,000 in 2008 with a plan to grow to 134,000 by 2013. The target increased again in 2010 to 171,000. Throughout this period, the Afghanistan National Police also increased in size demonstrating commitment and support of the host nation to supporting the intervention. Figure 3 depicts the growth of the ANA from 2005 to 2011.


106 Ibid, 16.

107 Ibid.
To summarize the evidence as presented in this section, the size of the CF grew marginally over the period 2005-2011, as did the number of troops deployed to the mission, and the number of domestic and international tasks. Alongside these increases, the budget of the CF increased. Throughout the operations in Afghanistan, Canadian regulatory laws for PSCs operating outside the country were non-existent. This regulatory absence occurred until 2008 in Afghanistan, however, as the host nation, the Government of Afghanistan was supportive of ISAF. Afghan police and military, which assumed increasingly independent tasks, demonstrated the support of partnered security forces. In the non-permissive environment of Kandahar, the number of PSCs used by the CF in Afghanistan during this period increased. The reasons for this increase, based on the evidence from the research questions, indicate that something more complex is happening than the existing literature indicates.

This section presented the case study and the focused research questions necessary to conduct an analysis of the political decisions that affect the use of PSCs in Afghanistan. The data
suggests that there was an increase in the use of PSCs during the CF involvement in Kandahar between 2005 and 2011. The next section will provide an analysis of the initial hypotheses presented in the first section based on the discussion of the case study.

ANALYSIS

The previous section provided the evidence framed by the research questions. This section will determine if the evidence supports the original hypothesis, displays mixed outcomes, or if no support for the hypothesis exists. A brief analysis will follow each of the hypotheses outcomes.

Hypothesis one states that when military outlays decrease there is an increase in the use of private military contractors. The evidence does not support this hypothesis. The CF budget did increase during the period. The increase in outlays due to operations in Afghanistan ranged between $8-13 Billion dollars throughout the intervention.

Hypothesis two states that when the size of a national military decreases there is an increase in the use of private military contractors. The evidence shows that this hypothesis is not supported. Despite the planned growth that the CF announced in 2005, the 1.5-year time to enroll and train a soldier as well as the limited growth of the forces demonstrates a marginal growth during the 2005 to 2011 period. The CF in such a short time could not reverse the cuts in personnel that had been ongoing for two decades prior to 2005. Force restructuring that had gone on through the 1990s and 2000s led to the CF removing from the order of battle combat support platoons. Likewise, the CF downsized support personnel and replaced them with CANCAP contractors. In this environment, and due to operations like Bosnia where the CF used contractors

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108 A hypothesis is supported if the evidence is sufficient to justify the hypothesis otherwise, it is not supported. Mixed results indicate that the research is sufficient to answer the hypothesis under certain conditions but acknowledges that there is something else going on that makes the evidence incomplete.
to augment logistics support, the turn to PSCs was a logical move to account for a smaller force size.

Hypothesis three states that when the number of military disputes, military engagements, and military conflicts increases there is an increase in the use of private security contractors. The evidence shows support for this hypothesis. Under the umbrella of downsizing and the mantra of “do more with less,” the CF operational tempo on domestic and international operations increased since 2005. The CF was barely out of Bosnia and Kosovo when Canada established what would be a six-year presence in Kandahar. Deployment on international humanitarian missions increased, and at the same time, Canada maintained its involvement with U.N. missions, albeit, with minimal numbers. Domestically, military support to civil authority was varied and common. The effect of this operational tempo and limited resources was that the prioritization of capabilities occurred.

Hypothesis four states that when the duration of a military conflict increases there is an increase in the use of private security contractors. The evidence shows that this hypothesis is supported. As the operation in Kandahar continued, the number of PSCs increased. The requirement and expectation for improved quality of life items as the mission progressed partly explains this. A second factor is that as the CF projects in support of development were established, PSCs were employed to secure projects due to the security situation.

Hypothesis five states that when there is a decrease in bureaucratic controls and regulations there is an increase in the use of private security. The evidence shows that this hypothesis is supported. Canada has the fewest regulations on establishment and employment of PSCs of western industrialized countries. As a signatory to the Montreux Convention, Canada has recognized the need to establish controls for PSCs; however, it is not a signatory to the U.N. convention against the use of mercenaries. As discussed in the introduction, the definition of PSCs connotes a provision of service by a professional company. The term mercenary connotes
an illegal group that is not restricted by any professional or morale ethic. It may be the
terminology in the U.N. draft that Canada had difficulty overcoming. Likewise, GIRoA did not
enforce regulations in Afghanistan to regulate PSCs until 2010. The policies of ISAF largely left
individual nations responsible for the contract of PSCs and if nations found PSCs to behave
unethically, ISAF could enforce their eviction from theatre.

Hypothesis six states that when there is a force cap placed on the size of the military
force there is an increase in the use of private security. The evidence shows support for this
hypothesis. The force cap that was established by the Canadian Government for CF participation
in the mission began at approximately 1,500 (battle group plus KPRT) in 2005 but grew to an
authorized participation of just over 2,800 by 2011. This troop cap was a reflection of other
commitments both international and domestic. It was also a reflection on two decades of CF
personnel decreases. Based on the CF forecast of what the military will be expected to do and
where the CF needs to accept risk, a decrease in personnel translates to a shift in priorities and
possibly a reduction or omission in capabilities.

Hypothesis seven states that when there is no host nation supporting the intervention
there is an increase in the use of private security. The evidence does not show support for this
hypothesis. However, a point open for debate is what level of support GIRoA provided to ISAF
and the CF. The friction that existed between GIRoA and the international community was
evident throughout the mission and often challenged the way in which ISAF conducted
operations. The Afghan Government did however agree to the mission and provided support at
multiple levels including the complete acceptance of PSCs until 2008. Under these conditions of
host nation support the use of PSCs increased. In 2010 when GIRoA decided to strictly regulate
PSCs, there is no indication that the number of PSCs decreased. Some PSCs became part of the
MOI, but there were others who paid the registration fees and agreed to operate within the new
regulations.
Hypothesis eight states that when the security environment is non-permissive there is an increase in private security. The evidence shows that this hypothesis is supported. Kandahar remained one of the top two volatile provinces in Afghanistan. The relationship between non-permissive environments and the rise of PSCs is an interesting one. Supply and demand theory is one possible explanation. If an organization is willing to pay the price for the service of the PSC then essentially all options are open. What may be going on could be a reality of force protection measures and priorities of effort. With limited numbers of forces engaged in a COIN operation and the policy of being people centric, it may be a deliberate decision to maximum concentration of troop. Tasks like static protection of camps and security for convoys could be the lower priority where the risk of employing PSCs is worth the payoff. Another possibility is that the skill sets needed in a non-permissive environment like Kandahar just are not existent in the force and contractors fill this gap. The relationship of non-permissive environment and increased use of PSCs is a complex combination of these and perhaps other factors.

This section has provided an analysis of the data with respect to the original hypotheses. Table 6 summarizes the findings. The evidence supports six of the eight hypotheses—one was not supported, and one demonstrated mixed results.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Stanley’s Findings</th>
<th>Clarke’s Findings</th>
<th>Noel’s Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>When military outlays decrease there is an increase in the use of private security.</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>Not Supported</td>
<td>Not Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When the size of a national military decreases there is an increase in the use of private military security.</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
<td>Not Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When the number of a military disputes, military engagements, and militarized conflicts increases, there is an increase in the use of private security internationally.</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When the duration of a military conflict increases, there is an increase in the use of private security.</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When there is a decrease in bureaucratic controls and regulations there is an increase in the use of private security.</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>Not Supported</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When there is a force cap placed on the size of the military, there is an increase in the use of private security.</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td></td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When there is no host nation supporting the intervention there is an increase in the use of private security.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When the security environment is non-permissive, there is an increase in private security.</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td></td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Created by author.*
CONCLUSION

The author framed this study around the question of how decisions on national defense affect the use of PSCs. The theory was that the rise in the use of PSCs in Afghanistan was not as simple as the majority of the literature on PSCs would suggest. The literature cites three conditions that have given rise to the use of PSCs. Firstly the decline in the number of forces globally since the end of the Cold War. Secondly, the increase in operational tempo caused by smaller intra-state and inter-state conflicts. Thirdly, supply-demand theory explains the increase in PSCs as a response to global need. Dr. Stanley theorized that these conditions were necessary but not sufficient to explain the industry’s growth. The author tested his hypotheses in the context of the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan from 2005 to 2011. The result from this case study supports Dr. Stanley’s findings in all but three of the eight hypotheses he proposed.

The significance of this study and its potential use for operational planners is the assumption that PSCs will continue to be an important part of modern military operations for the near future. In the synchronization of operations in time and space, PSCs may continue to be a significant part of enhancing or delivering capabilities. Operational planners may be able to leverage the private security industry’s range of services to promote greater synergy. By understanding how decisions that affect national defense may influence the private security industry, planners can be more aware in two respects. Firstly, they may be able to influence the decisions that governments make. Secondly, they may better understand how the proliferation of PSCs came to happen and could therefore better inform planners on the use of PSCs to support operations.

The findings of this research suggest that the underlying influences to the increased reliance and use of PSCs by the CF are more complex and varied than the literature on the subject would suggest. The data suggests that defense spending, the size of the military, number of
conflicts or operations that the country is committed all contribute to the employment of PSCs. Further, the operational environment as described by the permissiveness of the conflict, establishment of a force cap, and bureaucratic controls also contributes to PSCs use. Finally, when a conflict exceeded the initially planned duration and scope, PSCs assumed larger roles. The implication of this last point is particularly important for operational planners who make assumptions based on a series of conditions. It shows that the chances of getting everything correct are slim thus, PSCs may offer support to a branch plan. The findings of increased PSCs use also demonstrate something about the interaction of the CF and the Canadian Government. Because the government was willing to accept increased use of PSCs, the political risk of doing so was less than admitting policies passed by the government set conditions where the CF might not be able to achieve the assigned mission. This complex interplay by itself is worthy of future study.

The research conducted by the author for this case study may exhibit errors. Based on the literature and the open source material referenced, the author drew conclusions that seemed to be logical. There may be other factors that have not been considered which may be of more significance than those cited. Additionally, while the evidence indicates support for a number of the hypotheses in this particular case study, it may not apply to all Canadian operational deployments in the past or future.

Future research in the Canadian context could look at other conflicts or other periods to see if the hypotheses are valid. This would lend the study greater validity. The same would be true if a researcher tested the hypotheses against similar western democratic militaries that have turned to the increased use of PSCs. To date, Dr. Stanley and Clarke have looked at the U.S. military in four case studies. With another departure from the U.S. centric study, a researcher could validate the hypotheses against another countries use of PSCs.
As demands on the CF continue to increase, the need to understand and leverage emerging phenomena that affect how a military conducts operations is required. That is not to say that PSCs are new, only that the unparalleled use of PSCs and their growth in the last decade is. The focus of research is broad in the private security industry field. Attempts to classify the industry, regulate it, or understand its boundaries are increasingly found in books, think tank studies, and reports. However, few are asking if we understand what effect our national decisions play on enabling PSCs. It would seem that because of the inability to achieve successfully any of the former attempts, people have accepted as fact that we possess clear understanding of why the industry has grown. This first step, if nations and the international community have not gotten it completely right, seems the obvious place to retrace initial assumptions.
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