DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
AD HOC COMMITTEE REPORT
ON THE
ARMY NEED FOR THE STUDY
OF MILITARY HISTORY

VOL. I
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

West Point, New York
May, 1971
Department of the Army Ad Hoc Committee Report on the Army need for the Study of Military History. Vol. I. Report and Recommendations

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15 May 1971
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1. **ADMINISTRATION.**

**Directive.** By Department of the Army letter (ANNEX A), an Ad Hoc Committee was appointed to ascertain the Army's need for the study of military history. This committee was directed to "determine the extent of that need, particularly in relation to the study of military history by commissioned officers and key civilian personnel, and develop recommendations on how any unfulfilled needs can be met."

**Committee Membership.** The following individuals comprised the committee:

- **COL Thomas E. Griess**
  - Professor and Head Department of History
  - United States Military Academy
  - West Point, New York
  - Chairman

- **COL James H. Short**
  - Chairman, Department of Strategy
  - U.S. Army War College
  - Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
  - Member

- **COL Walter R. Hylander, Jr.**
  - Director, Office of Doctrine and Training Development
  - U.S. Army Engineer School
  - Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
  - Member

- **COL John E. Jessup, Jr.**
  - Chief, Histories Division
  - Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army
  - Washington, D.C.
  - Member

- **LTC Leonard H. Fuller, Jr.**
  - Chief, Curriculum Evaluation Branch
  - Office of the Director of Resident Instruction
  - U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
  - Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas
  - Member

- **Dr. Brooks E. Kleber**
  - Chief Historian
  - United States Continental Army Command
  - Ft. Monroe, Virginia
  - Member

**Administrative Support.** The very heavy and exacting administrative load involved in the preparation and distribution of a report of this length and short time schedule and the numerous other duties connected with the assembling of a group of officers from various locations required an expert and devoted supporting staff. The committee wishes to recognize the outstanding
contributions of Mrs. Jane G. Nanartowich, Mrs. Sally L. French, Mrs. Dorothy H. Waterfield, Mr. Edward J. Krasnoborski and Mr. John M. Cerillo under the able direction of Captain Thomas W. Sweeney, TC, ex-officio secretary of the committee. Printing of this report was accomplished by the Printing Plant, United States Military Academy, under the direction of Mr. Orville Herbert.

Committee Sessions. The committee convened at West Point, New York and held its first meeting on 26 January 1971. It remained in session until 6 February when it adjourned for work by individual members on committee projects. The committee met again at West Point 1-26 March and 3-5 May. In the intervening periods, committee members worked individually on portions of the final report.

Methodology. At the outset, the committee considered methods of investigating the question it had been directed to study and the parameters which appeared to govern its work. It became obvious that the present national environment would necessarily affect the deliberations of the committee. This consideration helped shape the decision to perform a threefold analysis of each pertinent element: historical background, present situation, and potential for future development. The committee also decided that its investigation should be addressed primarily to the question of the study and teaching of military history; only peripheral attention would be devoted to the uses of military history. At the same time, the decision was taken to restrict the study to the needs of commissioned officers, the assumption being made that key civilian personnel would be treated within this category, as required. The committee discussed at considerable length the fact that it was charged with examining only one aspect of the educational requirement in the Army schools system. How effectively this can be done is questionable because of the consideration which should be given to the relative importance of other educational requirements. The committee concluded that it would attempt to weigh other elements of the curricula at the various schools while concentrating on the military history element.

The committee used a variety of sources to obtain information upon which to base its study. The reports of the Haines and Gavin Boards were perused for background purposes. Major General Frank Norris, USA was consulted concerning the Department of the Army study of the Army service schools which he was making at the time the committee was in session; the committee also consulted Brigadier General Henry C. Newton, USAR Retired, who serves as consultant to the Commanding General, CONARC, on service school educational matters. Existing documents and directives concerning the teaching and use of military history were scrutinized, and pertinent studies, particularly those applicable to the ROTC program, were obtained and reviewed. In search of opinions or expert advice, the committee interviewed a number of officers (active and retired) and consulted civilians knowledgeable in the field of military history (ANNEX B). Among the officers was a sizeable group from the present faculty of the Department of History, USMA, representing several sources of commission and reflecting varying degrees of expertise and experience. The committee also queried Department of the Army agencies, CONARC, PMS's, and the service schools and colleges to obtain current information and statistics. Finally, a questionnaire was developed to solicit opinions from a broad range of officers concerning the several facets of the question under investigation. Because of the limited time available for collection
and evaluation of results (approximately one month), questionnaires were sent only to selected Army service school faculties and students, to ROTC faculty personnel, to a cross section of the officers at one CONUS post (Fort Bragg) and to fifty-three general officers, active and retired, who were chosen by name by the committee. The great majority of the respondents were stationed in the United States. A listing of questionnaire addressees appears in ANNEX C.

2. THE MILITARY HISTORY QUESTIONNAIRE.

A total of 4480 questionnaires were distributed; this figure included some excess for service schools to allow for uncertainties in the sizes of some classes and for some wastage anticipated to result during the administering process. A total of 3397 questionnaires were returned and evaluated, for an overall response of 76%. Of the general officers queried, 82% responded. A total of 1717 officers also furnished written comments in addition to their completed questionnaires. A copy of the Military History Questionnaire used by the committee appears in ANNEX C.

The questionnaire was developed to provide information that would help the committee answer the following questions:

a. How much military history has the officer corps studied, and what is the extent of its interest?

b. What is the usefulness of the study of military history to the officer corps?

c. How and to what extent should military history be taught in the Army school system?

d. Is a special career program for military historians needed?

Although hindsight indicates that certain questions could have been improved, the committee believes that the questionnaire adequately met its intended purpose. The results of the survey proved to be a veritable gold mine of information, and fully justified the time and effort that were devoted to its administration and evaluation. In particular, the wealth of reasoned comments and suggestions, many from very senior officers, was extremely valuable.

In addition to tabulation of responses to the various questions, a computer supported analysis was made to compare and correlate answers from different elements of the population surveyed--by rank, branch of service, source of commission, education, etc. Statistical tests for validity of all principal conclusions were also run, primarily by use of product-moment correlation coefficients and chi-squared techniques. These tests, and comparisons of the survey population with the cross section at Fort Bragg and with that of the commissioned officer corps as a whole, were adequate to establish validity of the results of the survey to the complete satisfaction of the committee.
Significant trends from the compilation and evaluation of questionnaire results are cited throughout this report while the complete evaluation of the Military History Questionnaire appears in ANNEX C.

3. THE ENVIRONMENT.

The committee visualized some factors and trends which it considers are now impacting or may be expected to impact on the Defense Establishment and the Army in the decade of the 1970's. These could influence the efficacy of any Army-wide military history program the committee might recommend. The Haines Board predicted that by 1970 the sum of human knowledge would be doubling every five years.¹ For this reason and because of increased national attention focused on military affairs, the study and use of military history by the Army can be expected in the 1970's to have at least as important roles as in the 1960's and quite likely will play an increased role.

Considering the flood of information pertaining to the war in Vietnam, military history certainly will need to keep pace with the general proliferation of knowledge. This situation creates increased problems in the uniform collection of field data and in its systematic storage for later retrieval. The committee briefly explored the possibilities of exploiting technology in this area and feels that computer science can help considerably with the storage and retrieval problem.

Budgetary actions comprise another environmental factor which the committee considered important to its deliberations. The defense budget can be expected to continue to decrease in relation to the other federal budgets and to the gross national product. With priority for the reduced defense funds going to strategic forces and to assistance to allies under the Nixon Doctrine, the Army will have stringent financial problems for some years to come.

The committee took note of the general state of unrest on college campuses which has seen a partial outlet in attacks on the ROTC programs. The unrest stems primarily from national commitments and involvement in Southeast Asia,² and although American withdrawal from Vietnam will moderate the unrest, it is unlikely that all agitation will cease. There is a spreading feeling of disillusionment nationally and a developing philosophical ruthlessness which have yet to run their courses. Peter Paret assessed the impact of this state of affairs on military history:³


²Committee interviews with Professors Russell Weigley (Temple) and Jay Luvaas (Allegheny), 8 and 11 March respectively. Both consultants indicated that the War in Vietnam, more than ROTC faculty qualifications or curricular deficiencies, was a prime cause of unrest.

Some questions that potentially may be the most rewarding are just beginning to be asked; but scholars have already succeeded in so shattering the sense of the United States as a peaceful giant that it will require years of different national policies before the image can safely reappear. Not that it has been completely blotted out. In the Universities resentment over the current war is certainly affected by the unhappiness with which some academics are at last compelled to recognize that historical and contemporary America contains many of the same tendencies that can be found elsewhere, that America the Beautiful has also always been America the Bellicose. Indeed, some continue to interpret the present situation as exceptional—an aberration. But who can doubt that those historians who saw themselves as guardians of the country's past and conscience, and scorned military history as un-American, have been overtaken by events.

The campus unrest which results in opposition to ROTC can and has taken the form of sharp criticism of the ROTC curriculum and qualifications of the military faculty. This is a repetition of the situation pertaining to a number of campuses before World War II and will probably persist for several more years. Since military history is one of the more academically challenging courses in the curriculum, how it is structured and taught can be important in countering criticism of the type mentioned. Moreover, because ROTC is of paramount importance to the viability of the Army, every reasonable effort should be made to continue to accommodate to the difficult campus environment. The committee recognized the uncertain outcome of the Army's accommodation efforts when it studied this critical area. The committee also believes that as U.S. participation in the war in Vietnam terminates, a larger pool of qualified officers will be available for ROTC assignments and their efforts should cause campus criticism to decrease.

Another important consideration is the decision by the President to try to create an all-volunteer Army. This, too, affects the ROTC program, as well as officer procurement in general. With the criticism of the military units on campus, there has been a decline in ROTC enrollment of over 50% since 1961. (Although it is difficult to determine factually why enrollments have declined, reasons which have been advanced include: shifts from compulsory to volunteer programs, faculty attitudes, the status of the draft, opposition

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4At least one officer, however, believes that this criticism is abating. See letter, Major M.D. Ernest, "Reader Forum", Military Review (April, 1971), pp. 111-112.

to the war in Vietnam, and a growing anti-military sentiment.) This trend, combined with alleviation of draft pressures and the end of U.S. participation in the war in Vietnam, may substantially reduce the ROTC source of officers.

To anticipate this critical situation, the Department of the Army has proposed legislation to increase ROTC Scholarships from the present 5500 to 10,000 (10% of the estimated strength of the officer corps, post-Vietnam). At the same time, it has asked that the subsistence for advanced course students be raised from $50 to $100 a month. If these proposals are favorably considered and prove successful upon implementation, an estimated 3700 cadets will be commissioned annually with a four year obligation to serve. The Army will require an additional 4000-5000 ROTC graduates with two year obligations in order to meet the annual officer input requirements for the Army from the ROTC source. Given today's climate on college campuses, this is an uncertain and complex situation. Shortfalls may well develop.

To meet these possible shortfalls, increased numbers of Officer Candidate School graduates would be required. Although efforts would be made to attract college graduates to OCS, it can be assumed that many would not have that level of education and would not have had military history instruction, as USMA and ROTC graduates now receive. In actuality, Department of the Army is now projecting for FY 74 an increase in OCS output from the present 1000 to 4000, to compensate for the expected shortfalls.

Considering the entire officer corps, regular and reserve, the educational disparity among younger officers may become a problem in the 1970's. Although ROTC is expected to be the primary source of junior officers, experience has been that greater percentages of OCS officers remain on active duty beyond the mandatory active duty period than do ROTC officers. (For the past ten years, the OCS retention rate has averaged 59% compared to the ROTC average rate of 21%.) Generally, if the OCS officer is not a college graduate, intensified efforts will be required to raise the educational level of the officer corps, possibly by expanding the "bootstrap" program. There are already indications that this decline in educational level is real rather than potential. Raising a question about qualifications for attendance at the Advanced Course in a recent speech, the Commanding General, CONARC, noted that the percentage of college graduates in the Armor Advanced Course has steadily declined from above 80% in FY 66 to above 40% in FY 71. More specifically applicable to the committee's deliberations, a considerable number of junior officers (OCS) will not have had introductory academic


7 General Ralph E. Haines, Jr., "Reorientation of Post-Vietnam Training" (Speech to Chief of Staff's Forum for Center Commanders), 23-24 March 1971.
in military history. If these officers are to be given the opportunity to catch up, military history instruction will have to be given either at the OCS course or preferably at the Basic Course (assuming OCS becomes branch immaterial and all graduates attend the Basic Course).

4. A DEFINITION OF MILITARY HISTORY.

Early Army View. As a generalization, it is correct to state that until World War II most Army officers thought of military history as being a systematic analysis of how the military forces of a country waged war. Indeed, a Fort Benning Reference Text on Military History (written shortly after 1935) referred to military history as "the professional analysis of events and operations." It was during this period, also, that Matthew Steele's excellent American Campaigns was used as an Army text for the teaching and analysis of campaigns and battles. This approach to the teaching of military history was well known to European students of war.

Historical Background. Jomini, the 19th Century Swiss theorist, observed that there were three kinds of military history. The first he categorized as the "pure version": the recounting in minute and pedantic terms of all aspects of the battle, including such details as hourly locations of small units—all done in an antiquarian way without much concern for useful analysis. The second form was that which used the account of a campaign or battle to examine the principles which apply to the waging of war; it involved analysis of the relationship between events and principles and, studied in broad context, it could reveal something of the evolution of the art of war. Jomini's third category was "political-military history"—the examination of war in its broadest spectrum through association of the military with the political, social, and economic factors. While Jomini was writing about strategy and war, the great Prussian military thinker, Carl von Clausewitz, was studying the entire problem in its broadest context. Seeking to develop a theory of war, Clausewitz considered and wrote about the basic aspects of conflict between nations (On War). In so doing, he was producing military history which can properly be classified under Jomini's third category. At the same time, he devoted considerable coverage to an examination of principles and generalship through the device of rigorous historical criticism. As noted earlier, it was Jomini's second form of military history with which the United States Army was most concerned until World War II.

The Broader Viewpoint. There are good reasons for a soldier studying military history in its more restrictive form (i.e., analysis of principles and the evolution of the art of war), but there are also shortcomings, particularly in more modern times. In the first place, it is only highly meaningful to the larger investigation of war as organized international violence if the contest on the battlefield is decisive and overriding in the conflict. For a time, this was often the case; but once the "industrialization of war,"8 to use Michael Howard's phrase, became an important consideration, it was seldom possible to bring about the decisive engagement. Secondly, this

view of military history slights the important institutional developments within an army and the important role it can play during times of peace or prolonged periods of international tension.

Probably for the above reasons, in some European countries about the turn of the 20th Century, a few individuals expressed interest in a broader view of military history. England's Sir John Fortescue, in a laborious dialectical examination of the term in a 1915 lecture at Cambridge, finally concluded that military history "is the history of the external police of communities and nations." Across the Channel in Germany, military history was prized and exploited as operational history—useful for its examination of principles and strategy. The German General Staff, interpreting Clausewitz narrowly, made extensive use of the discipline for this purpose. Hans Delbrück, however, was already questioning this approach. He was interested in the art of war, but more for general ideas and tendencies than for minute detail or practical principles. He wanted his history of the art of war to be an examination within the broader framework of political history. In France during this period, Jean Jaures, the prominent socialist political leader and theoretician, was articulating the theory that military endeavors could be successful only when the military institution accurately reflected the composition and aspirations of the entire nation. After World War I, the Russian military theorist, M. V. Frunze, following Marx and Lenin in their acceptance of Clausewitz's dictum that war was an extension of politics, reflected on his nation's experiences and accepted Jaures' theories as the foundation of a much broader definition of military history. Frunze noted that the actions of that portion of society actually under arms could not be understood without an investigation of the entire social context within which those actions took place. Lenin, in a number of writings, denied the purely military character of the First World War, stating in one instance that "Appearance is not reality. The more dominated by military factors a war may seem to be, the more political is its actual nature, and this applies equally in reverse." While Stalin attempted to refute Clausewitz in the anti-German atmosphere in the Soviet Union at the end of World War II, he did so only to the extent of the more antiquated technologic aspects of the earlier theses. To this day, the theory of the interrelationship of military activity and national activity is woven into the fabric of the Soviet approach to military history.

American Skepticism. By the time the Korean War broke out, Americans were critically reexamining the scope of military history. Indeed, Walter Millis believed that the nuclear weapon made the traditional American form of military history meaningless and inapplicable. Others noted that battle was only one element in the equation of war; man's use of war as an instrument now encompassed every aspect of his social, political, and economic order, as well as the purely military factor. The deterrence of war in the nuclear age became the primary U.S. military objective. This required

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extensive study of the psychological factors which move nations in the security sphere and of other specialized areas such as collective security and the strategy of arms control. General Robinett only partially accepted this broadened view and defined military history as "a systematic presentation of military facts, accompanied by an analytical explanation of their causes." 

A Definition—or Concept. At the time of this writing, the Dictionary of U.S. Army Terms does not list military history, but AR 870-5 recognizes the broader scope of the term. It defines military history as "an objective, accurate, descriptive, and interpretive record of all activities of the Armed Forces in peace and war." As one approach, one can interpret military history as being a coverage of: preparation for war, waging and terminating war, societal impact of both of the former, and peacetime functions of armed forces. The committee believes that the official definition encompasses the broader relationship between armed forces and society. Within the broad scope of the definition, moreover, the committee feels it can include the several categories of military history which it is convinced are important to the Army. Briefly described, these are:

a. Operational: purely combat or military aspects; encompasses logistics, tactics, military strategy and leadership; includes detailed campaign studies and operationally oriented biography. (Examples: Bigelow's Campaign of Chancellorsville; Freeman's Lee's Lieutenants; Liddell Hart's Strategy: The Indirect Approach).

b. Administrative and Technical: generally functional and professional activities of armed forces; includes studies of doctrine and organizational structure, the procurement and training of manpower, weapons developments, etc.; also involves peacetime and wartime developments. (Examples: Birkhimer's Historical Sketch of the Artillery, United States Army; Quimby's Background of Napoleonic Warfare).

c. The Military and Society: in an historical sense, considers the entire spectrum of military affairs throughout the cycle of war and peace; deals with national strategy and encompasses the relationship between the military, social, political, economic, and psychological elements at the national level; traces the development and role of military strategy in achieving national objectives; explores the relationship between civil and military authority. (Examples: Upton's Military Policy of the United States; Weigley's History of the U.S. Army; Ropp's War in the Modern World).

The committee recognizes that these arbitrarily established categories are not mutually exclusive. Any given work on military history can, and usually will, deal with all of the categories, although it may emphasize one. At the same time, the categories should probably be considered as representing more of a conceptualization than a strict definition. For this reason, they are broad, thus giving rise to a criticism on that basis alone. Such criticism did surface, in a very few instances, in the written replies to the committee's questionnaire. Accepting this possible shortcoming, the committee

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nevertheless prefers the broad scope for several reasons. First, broadness accommodates the increasingly peripheral interests of other disciplines in military history, a development which holds promise for interdisciplinary efforts (or, at least, for the historian's use of techniques from other disciplines). Secondly, the categories are reasonably functional and, at the same time, manageable. Finally, the broad scope accommodates all facets of Army interest in war and peace and should gain equal acceptance from military and civilian scholars alike.

5. THE VALUE OF MILITARY HISTORY.

Particularly in the present age, it is a common complaint that history is of little value because it has no relevance to the present. Such an argument is usually based upon a failure to think seriously about history and to ignore the everyday use man makes of the discipline--his thinking of and arguing about events of the past and his concomitant attempts to justify or to debunk the present in terms of those past events. As a bridge between the Humanities and the Social Sciences, history focuses on man in his struggles to solve the timeless problems of how to exist and what to think in an ever-changing world. It civilized the student by providing him with an appreciation of the past, sharpens his judgment and enhances his perspective. Such historical perspective makes man better able to judge the present in light of what the past reveals and what aspirations he has for the future.

Military history derives its usefulness from acceptance of the proposition that studying history as a discipline can benefit man. If sharpened judgment, improved perception, and a broadened perspective are valuable to any man, they are crucially important to the military man who is vitally concerned with problems of national importance and who, throughout his life, deals with the capabilities and limitations of men.

There are several reasons why military men should read, study, and contemplate military history. It has both an educational and a utilitarian value, but to reap its full advantages, an individual should study it in breadth, in depth, and in context. A knowledge of military history will make an officer more proficient in his profession. Although no one field of study will produce a guaranteed successful leader, the officer who knows what was attempted in the past, the conditions under which it was attempted, and what results followed, is more likely to deal positively with his own, immediate problems. As his thought process grows more sophisticated in reflecting on military history, he will also attempt, more and more, to analyze critically the events and historical courses of action he studies and to conceptualize creatively and to test theories. Military history also helps an individual formulate his own concept of professionalism. While he considers the ethic, he very likely will be developing a professional frame of mind--a mental attitude. In the leadership arena, the greatest contribution military history can make is to focus on the great importance of character and integrity, while honing the student's perspective and judgment. Finally, military history studied in depth trains an individual to see war, in Clausewitz's time-worn phrase, as a chameleon, a phenomenon which affects and draws its spirit from the society which spawns it.
Military history can also be misused. Although the above discussion outlines positive aspects of its study, the critical student must be on guard against attributing more to the discipline than is justified. Each historical event is unique; principles are not immutable; leadership styles vary; the old war can be refought instead of the contemporary one—all of these conditions can be magnified into pitfalls if one does not study military history objectively and critically.

Officers surveyed with the Military History Questionnaire were asked to cite specific examples of their use of military history in the performance of their duties (Question 13). Eleven percent indicated no specific examples came to mind; others indicated general enhancement of background knowledge; and many basic course students indicated they had had no opportunity to use it at all yet. Of the approximately one-third of those surveyed who did provide examples of their use of military history, most (14%) cited the preparation and conduct of instruction and training. Other uses that were cited included: lessons learned (7%); exercising leadership over subordinates (6%); decision making (3%); and preparing war plans and studies (3%). Responses are summarized on Charts C15 and C16, ANNEX C. Some interesting examples of combat use were described; four typical ones are reproduced below for illustrative purposes:

a. "I have used lessons learned to educate my soldiers in Vietnam. I have used the experiences of the British in Malaya to set up the jungle ambush station in the Tropical Training Center in Hawaii. I have used principles of Clausewitz, slightly modified, in training and in combat. I have gained insight into successes and failures of modern commanders by correlating their actions to certain historical battles and strategic ploys." (Infantry School Faculty)

b. "My judgment as a platoon leader in a divisional engineer battalion and particularly later as commander of an American-Vietnamese combined force was definitely favorably influenced by a self-acquired knowledge of Viet Cong tactics. In retrospect, however, I find it difficult to separate instincts acquired through experience from those achieved through study. The contribution made by study was most significant in providing me a feel for the entire conflict, beyond my small portion of it, from the standpoints of both space and time." (ROTC Instructor)

c. "The historical accounts of logistical operations in Europe and the Pacific were helpful in my job of operating an outside storage area for Class I, II, IV, VII and IX supplies in Vietnam. However, I think more examples of mistakes should be written into history to avoid repeating them." (CGSC Student)

d. "Street Without Joy by B. Fall had rather a profound effect on my duties as an advisor in Vietnam. I believe that through the comments of this author I gained a better insight into the problems of S.E.A. and he enabled me to temper the advice I gave with an understanding of the culture and background of my counterparts in the Vietnamese Army." (Ordnance School Faculty)

A more complete discussion of the importance of military history appears at ANNEX D.
6. THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE STUDY, PRODUCTION, AND USE OF MILITARY HISTORY.

The committee believes that the Army has a valid requirement for studying and using military history. It seems clear that the value of the subject, as outlined above, justifies careful consideration of methods to teach, produce, and use military history. That the Army recognizes the validity of this claim is evidenced by the existence of AR 870-5 (Military History - Responsibilities, Policies, and Procedures) wherein military history is credited with being "a basic source of knowledge for the solution of problems and the attainment of advances in the theory and the practice of military science."\(^{12}\) Moreover, this proclaimed objective of the discipline contributes to the Army's mission of organizing, training, and equipping land forces for the conduct of land operations in keeping with national security plans. The official regulation, however, is largely concerned with the preparation and use of military history, whereas the major determinant in the effectiveness of the overall historical program may be the viability of the teaching efforts. The committee, accordingly, focused primarily on the teaching and study of the subject.

The committee recognizes the danger of encouraging scholarship in an overly narrow way. A legitimate question is why just military history should be emphasized, since it is only a branch of one discipline. Moreover, it is doubtful that a case could be made which would sustain a claim that the careful study of military history is a requirement for success in the Army. It is granted that distinguished leaders have often urged the study of the subject, and the committee believes that its contribution to general background knowledge is useful. But this is not the same as proving unequivocally that military history adds to career development, helps solve crucial organizational or management problems, or makes commanders and staff officers more effective. It is precisely for these reasons that the contributions military history can make will be enhanced if the subject is viewed in its broadest context and studied in depth. Moreover, when a generation of Army officers has been engaged for years in actively preparing for or carrying out operational responsibilities with little time for reflection and study, the encouragement of serious intellectual activity (or scholarship) seems appropriate. Within this milieu, military history can justifiably claim a prominent place. This assessment provided the point of departure for the analysis of the problem by the committee.

There are several requirements for the teaching and use of military history in the Army which were considered by the committee. Each of these is briefly described below.

Provide for Teaching Military History in the Military Schools System. Among those considerations affecting the teaching of military history, the more important factors are the design of curricula, the availability of suitable and supporting instructional materials, and the assignment of qualified faculty at the schools. The design of curricula is a function of the school mission, the educational level of the student, and a determination of the relative importance (at a given school) of military history. It also

\(^{12}\)Department of the Army, Army Regulation 870-5, September 1968, p. 1-1.
involves the choice between requiring a course for all students or offering it as an elective. Finally, within these parameters, a determination must be made as to whether the course should be educationally or vocationally oriented in content and objective. The vocational, or utilitarian approach, applies data, concepts and methods to help solve problems confronting the Army; if falsely served, it can degenerate into the misuse of history to serve a preconceived purpose. The educational approach creates an intellectual challenge which can strengthen powers of reasoning, sharpen judgment, provide perspective, and temper the purely professional element in an individual's learning.

The matter of assigning qualified faculty is crucial to the meaningful teaching of military history. Not only must the teacher have a strong interest in performing the teaching role, but he must also have the necessary academic and disciplinary background. How he teaches (his enthusiasm, technique and imagination) is important, but his depth of knowledge of the subject is infinitely more critical, particularly when he delves into the more sophisticated aspects of the subject. Other considerations involving faculty are tenure (or stabilized assignments), repetitive teaching tours, use of both military and civilian teachers, and maturity and experience.

Supporting instructional materials are obvious teaching requirements, but they pose less of a problem when the faculty is highly qualified. Such teachers have the knowledge of the subject to devise suitable alternatives; but they must have flexibility to adapt course syllabi to exploit available materials within the limits of broadly established objectives. For more sophisticated offerings, and particularly where relatively detailed research is involved, an adequately stocked library is essential.

Provide for Collecting Data, Producing Official History, and Using It. The considerations involved in the production and use of military history are largely covered in AR 870-5. They include collection of source material; storage and organization of such material; preparation of historical works; and the use of history in staff work, training, and to enhance morale and esprit. Attainment of the latter, broad category can be directed but it seldom can be achieved unless the officer involved has a sense of historical mindedness—an ability to use historical examples honestly and to analyze objectively, all the while appreciating the enhanced perspective and sharpened judgment military history can partially provide. To be meaningful, training not only must be based on sound principles but it must be realistic. Few soldiers actually encounter on the battlefield experience in the many facets of combat. Consequently, all men rely on vicarious knowledge for some aspects of battle, while many rely entirely on the experience of others. This is why military history is so important—why it is the handmaiden of military training.

Encourage Scholarship and Self-Study on the Part of Officers. Support of this requirement fluctuates with the background and experience of the individual. Moreover, individuals have varying degrees of interest in military history; the objectives of self-study for some will be more substantive than for others. The considerations which contribute to this requirement, therefore, run the spectrum of furnishing guidance on reading materials and offering correspondence courses through providing adequate library resources to supporting graduate level schooling and encouraging research and writing.
Increased expertise in military history is simply one facet of the complex problem of education for Army officers. Social changes are multiplying largely because of the increased level of education of the populace. The Army cannot ignore this trend, else it may suffer isolation from an unsympathetic society. Through scholarship and self-study—military history is vitally important for the military professional in this context—the officer can prepare himself to deal with the generally well educated political and bureaucratic civilian leaders with whom he is inevitably associated, to give the lie to the frequent charge that soldiers are inflexible, militaristic, and narrow. The alternative, as Sir John Hackett pointedly notes, is for service members to accept the appellation of military mechanics and hired assassins.  

The above discussion bears upon an associated element in the overall requirement of providing for scholarship and self-study. It has at least two facets. First, in an Army—and nation—which has accepted the Puritan ethic of hard work in a given, sometimes mundane, task, the doer is considerably more widely admired than the intellectual. Genuine and productive scholarship will need to be recognized as a professionally rewarding accomplishment if this situation is to be brought more into balance. Secondly, the individual who desires to enhance his soldier-scholar potential faces a serious problem of time when his essential daily duties may require twelve hours a day.

Ensure that the Historical Program Fosters Suitable Relationships with the Public, Particularly Interested Civilian Scholars. The furtherance of this requirement depends to a large degree upon the Army's ability to implement a program which is credible and respectable in the eyes of the civilian community. Coping with this problem is partially a factor of the previously stated requirement, since it is necessary to have soldier-scholars who can produce work respected by the academic community and deal with its members as intellectual equals in the discipline. At the same time, high quality and scrupulous objectivity must be maintained in the Army's official histories to gain the support of civilians. Association and discussions at professional meetings with civilian counterparts is another factor in the formula. Finally, any feeling that the military audience is unresponsive to scholarly ideas must be countered. A concomitant of this consideration is a willingness to employ civilian expertise as appropriate and without undue catering or parochial sensitivity to honest criticism.

At the risk of stating the obvious, the committee notes that an essential element in all four of the above broad requirements is command interest. Within its narrower scope, AR 870-5 raises this point. It is equally important in the area of personnel management if highly qualified teachers are to be found to create meaningful courses of instruction. Similarly, it is crucial to the encouragement and recognition of scholarly attainments.

7. ADEQUACY OF THE PRESENT EFFORT OF THE ARMY TO MEET THE REQUIREMENT TO 
STUDY, PRODUCE, AND USE MILITARY HISTORY.

The analysis in this paragraph is developed by examining each of the 
categories set forth in paragraph 6 above in terms of existing programs. 
In most instances, more detailed discussions appear in supporting annexes.

a. Military History Taught in the Schools System. As the committee 
investigated curricula at the various service schools, it noted two general 
trends. First, there is no concerted and progressive program for the teaching 
of military history across the entire school system. In this regard, 
one must be careful to avoid treating the undergraduate educational experi-
ence in the discipline as the terminal rather than the starting point. 
Secondly, World War II appears to have been the critical point, historically 
speaking, after which military history generally lost its appeal to the de-
signers of the curricula at the various schools. Prior to that time, the 
subject received considerable attention at all levels, but after the war it 
continued to receive emphasis as a formal course only at the United States 
Military Academy (USMA) and, more recently, in the ROTC program.

(1) The Undergraduate Level (ROTC and USMA). It is at the under-
graduate level where a man's intellectual appetite is first stimulated and 
where, hopefully, the pattern is set for subsequent academic and intellectual 
pursuits. At this level, then, military history offerings should be first 
rate.

(a) Curriculum. In the ROTC program of instruction approved 
in November 1969, there is no separately prescribed course in military his-
tory. The key principle adopted by the Army is to provide flexibility to 
the Professor of Military Science (PMS) to allow him to devise a curriculum 
in conjunction with the host institution, ensuring that a minimum of 210 
hours is allocated to professional courses military in nature and taught by 
officers. Within this minimum required core, the "Fundamentals of Leader-
ship and Management" course (Freshman year) includes 15-20 hours on histori-
cal growth and development of the Army. Additionally, the student must carry 
four "enrichment" courses (180 hours) taught by the civilian faculty from 
the curriculum of the institution. It is considered highly desirable that 
two of these courses be in political science and military history.

Since the above curriculum has only been adopted recently, there are 
several other curricular options being used by many institutions as a result 
of past experience and earlier prescribed programs. One of these options 
includes a 30-hour course in American Military History while another has a 
60-hour course in World Military History. For none of the three options 
does CONARC prescribe a syllabus, although for the two shorter courses it 
has published Instructor Guides, whose use are not mandatory but which are 
likely to be followed by the inexperienced teacher. It does, however, 
insist, no matter how the course is structured, that it achieve a "desired 
learning outcome" of imparting a general knowledge of the history of the 
Army and of its role in support of national objectives. The committee 
gained the general impression, although no prescribed syllabus exists, that 
most of the courses being taught by military men emphasize broad operational 
military history with broader coverage of the subject as a whole being
included only minimally. At the present time, 88.6% of the ROTC units are offering the 30-hour American Military History course while the remaining 11.4% are equally divided between the other two military history options.

The ROTC program will continue to be of paramount importance during the decade of the 1970's because it is expected to remain the prime source of Army officers. As a consequence, every effort should be made to ensure that the ROTC educational program is viable and that the graduate is imbued with a sense of professionalism. The committee believes that the study of history can go far in producing the required professionalism in the officer corps and in increasing the depth of understanding so necessary in today's environment.

Given the number of contact hours in the overall ROTC program, the role of military history within these curricula seems generally to be adequate. The committee also endorses the flexible approach prescribed by CONARC in structuring the curricula. It believes, however, that the 15-20 hours allocated to the subject in the Example E option are too few; this becomes particularly important if this recently established curricular option, a minimal one in hours of instruction, becomes a popular choice with the universities. The minimum length of a course in military history is believed to be one semester. Moreover and even accepting the time limitation, such a course should include some coverage of world military history, particularly western European, even though the main emphasis may be on the American experience.

Military history offerings at USMA consist of a required course and several electives. The required course (102 eighty-minute periods for Seniors) is world wide in coverage and has as its objectives the examination of man in his role as a warrior and the tracing of the evolution of the art of warfare. (About ten percent of the cadets take an advanced version of the course which is more comprehensive and offers added academic challenge). Originally largely operationally oriented, the course is in the process of a sophisticated shift to a broader scope which will include greater coverage of social, political, and intellectual themes. The committee favors this shift to transform the course to military history in the broader context. At the same time, it believes, as does the Department of History, that there must be an operational history base and a logical treatment of the way in which the art of war has evolved. The departmental concept of identifying elements of continuity to permit the tracing of how warfare evolves appears to furnish a desirable and useful teaching device. It requires sophistication in application, however, and a very knowledgeable faculty.

Even without considering the overall curriculum requirements, the committee is convinced that the number of hours allocated to the required course is sufficient for the Academy graduate. In this regard, it recognizes the responsibility of the Academic Board for prescribing the instructional program and allocating time; that governing board must consider the overall education mission of the Academy. The committee, however, strongly believes that this required course in military history should not be reduced in length. The course, demanding but within the capability of the undergraduate, is well suited as a base on which the graduate can later build. The committee notes, moreover, that the department is aware of and is rectifying the present
tendency for the course to move along so quickly in some areas that the student does not often enough penetrate in depth in those areas. It also observes, although it appreciates the difficult rescheduling problem involving the entire curriculum, that teaching the course in the Junior year would probably enhance the learning experience in military history electives.

The emphasis which the USMA Department of History places on the necessity for understanding man and his methods of coping with problems is important. This philosophy reinforces the departmental belief that history is a discipline useful for its own ends, for the perspective it provides a student, for the historical mindedness it can bestow. It leads to caution in drawing shallow analogies and to the development of questioning attitudes which seek the truth. Pervading all the courses, this philosophy also sustains the specific objectives the department announces for its military history offerings. The committee believes that both the basic teaching philosophy and the course objectives are sound. It suspects, however, commendable and challenging as these objectives are, that they may be difficult of attainment.

Elective courses build upon the required course at USMA and treat such subjects as Revolutionary Warfare, 20th Century Warfare, War and Society, and War and Its Philosophers. The committee endorses the elective concept as a whole for the opportunity it provides the interested cadet and the concomitant greater expertise and depth in military history that graduate will bring to the Army. It believes, however, that to provide adequate choices and complementary support for the required course, another elective or two will ultimately be necessary. Finally, the committee notes that in the number of one semester military history courses offered in 1970-71, USMA offers five while USNA offers four and USAFA six.

(b) Faculty. As in the scope and coverage of the military history offerings, there is also some disparity in faculty qualifications between USMA and ROTC. In the Department of History, USMA, those officers teaching military history are generally graduates of CGSC and have the Master's Degree in History; by 1972, at least two of them (10%) will have the doctorate. The ROTC instructor is generally younger than his USMA counterpart. More often than not he does not have a graduate degree. As of November 1970, 94% of the Assistant PMS's had the baccalaureate, 4.6% the Master's, 0.1% the doctorate, and 1.1% no college degree. About 10% had attended CGSC.

In the past two years, efforts have been made to upgrade the educational level of the ROTC instructor. The Army has validated the Master's degree for the position of PMS and is currently implementing an advanced degree program for Assistant PMS's (DA Circular 621-7). This program, however, does not ensure that the officer who will teach military history obtains his degree in that discipline. A six-week Summer Workshop has also been presented the past three years by the Department of History, USMA, for selected ROTC instructors of military history. Finally, PMS's have been encouraged to enlist the aid of qualified civilian professors to teach, or assist in the teaching of, the military history course. The preponderance of the teaching load, however, is still being carried by uniformed personnel. A recent CONARC poll of 253 PMS's indicated that in 1970-71 26 units employed the team
(civilian-military) teaching technique, 5 units used civilians exclusively to teach military history, and 87 units used civilian guest lecturers (for 352 periods). Additionally, the enrichment course technique was used at seventy institutions with thirty of those being devoted to military history courses.

The committee notes that the policy of flexibility in structuring ROTC curricula places a premium on highly qualified faculty who will be able to improvise and structure courses suitable to local conditions. With this point in mind, the committee is concerned over the present general lack of graduate level education among the ROTC faculty. Better utilization of qualified officers will help correct this deficiency, as will the advanced degree program. Considering this latter program from the viewpoint of military history, however, the committee believes that refinements are necessary with regard to stabilization of tours, relationship of the subject area of the advanced degree to ROTC instruction, and the selection of the institution at which the advanced work is taken.

To provide further assistance to ROTC instructors, the committee believes that the USMA Summer Workshop should be continued as required. It notes, however, that the Workshop was designed partially to provide an experience similar to graduate-level education in the absence of an advanced degree program. As more ROTC instructors obtain graduate degrees, the necessity for conducting the Workshop may lessens and the requirement for an annual offering could be reduced to one every two or three years. Moreover, because the Workshop demands a sizeable effort from the USMA Department of History, the Military Academy must receive the necessary support to accomplish the undertaking and the effort must not be allowed to compromise unduly the department's accomplishment of its mission.

The use of civilian faculty members to assist in the teaching of military history is desirable. With the flexibility available to the PMS, this technique can be exploited if competent and properly motivated on-campus scholars are available and willing to assist. Based upon the limited information available, the committee is not very sanguine over the extent to which such faculty members can be expected to replace the officer instructor teaching military history. For this reason, it anticipates that the requirement for the officer teacher will not lessen materially in the foreseeable future and that enrichment courses, unless well established, should supplement rather than replace the militarily taught course in military history. Additionally, the committee strongly supports the use of officers as instructors, as the flexible option requires, because exposure of undergraduates to the military environment is essential.

The committee noted that the Professor of History, USMA, considers the selection and training of instructors as a crucial element in his entire program. It concurs in this assessment. The graduate level education these officers undergo is extremely important, given the educational level to which the courses are moving. Because of the growing sophistication of courses offered and their increasing number, there very likely will be a need for more doctoral level instructors than are now authorized. The selection and utilization of additional tenured personnel, as the department is doing, also appears wise. The committee interviewed many instructors, became
acquainted with others, and observed several teaching; it was impressed with 
their qualifications and manner of performance.

(c) Instructional Material. ROTC students are issued a 
reliable text on American military history which was prepared by OCMH. Other 
reading material an instructor might require is purchased by the student just 
as he purchases texts for other courses. For instructor reference, there 
are the CONARC instructor guides previously mentioned, limited funds to pur-
chase references for the unit's use, and a few books and periodicals budgeted 
for by The Infantry School. A commercially prepared set of vugraphs which 
broadly depict American battles ostensibly is available to each unit.

The committee generally feels that more instructional and reference 
material should be placed in the hands of the ROTC instructor in military 
history. One source of this material is USMA (texts and aids); ROTC instruc-
tors informally utilize this source occasionally now and others have expressed 
a desire to do so. To determine if this course of action should be formally 
developed for all units, a careful survey is necessary. It should consider 
the practical questions of copyright releases and printing costs and the 
more academically oriented question of the pertinency of texts which are 
specifically prepared for a course of unique scope and coverage. The careful 
use over the years of funds made available to ROTC units is another means 
of enlarging the instructor's reference library.

USMA cadets purchase two atlas-text sets on American and Napoleonic wars 
and are issued several other, locally-prepared pamphlet texts. Instructors 
have access to an adequately stocked departmental reference room, and both 
cadets and faculty are well supported by the excellent military history 
holdings in the USMA Library. The illustrative teaching support materials 
available for faculty use (slides, tapes, TV programs, movies, weapon exhibits, 
lightboard displays) are well conceived, expertly prepared, and skillfully 
integrated into instruction. They provide flexibility for the teacher and 
enliven the instruction.

Although acknowledging the fact that suitable commercial military 
history texts are very scarce, the committee believes that additional 
scholarly readings can be used on a selective basis in the USMA required 
course. Locally prepared texts solve some of the problems the department 
faces in this respect, but the use of other readings will expose the student 
to additional views and interpretations and broaden his perspective.

(d) Questionnaire Comments. The questionnaire reflected no 
criticism of the military history program at USMA, although it is interesting 
that 16% of the graduates indicated that they had not studied military 
history as an undergraduate. An overwhelming majority (74%) favored con-
tinuation of a mandatory course at USMA and 25% also favored elective 
offerings (Chart D1, ANNEX C).

The questionnaire reflected very little direct identification of short-
comings in the ROTC study of military history, but a startling 50% of ROTC 
graduates indicated they had not even studied military history as under-
graduates. Since this was true for all ranks from second lieutenant through 
colonel (Charts B8 and B11), it has been a continuing and generally
recognized shortcoming. Military history is commonly considered one of
the key subjects in the ROTC curriculum, even under flexible course options
authorized in the past few years. For some reason not identified in this
survey, military history is not being learned by half of the ROTC undergrad-
uates.

(e) The USMA and ROTC military history curricula and teaching
methods are described in more detail in ANNEXES E and F.

(2) The Branch Service Schools. In considering the adequacy of
the teaching of military history in the branch schools, the committee took
note of the impingement of its other deliberations and the results of its
questionnaire. For example, it considered the question of when a young
officer becomes convinced of the relevance of the study of military history.
The question has no accurate quantitative answer. For some officers, the
interest exists upon commissioning; for others it may not occur until a field
or combat challenge shakes their supreme confidence in the conviction that
the present has the solution; for some it may never occur. The committee
also kept in mind the disparity in educational level which is likely to
develop among advanced course students, and perhaps basic course students,
due to source of commission and opportunities for college level study (see
paragraph 3 above).

(a) Curriculum. The objective and scope of the officer
basic courses emphasize the practical training and duties of a second lieu-
tenant. There is little room for formal education, considering the short
duration of the course and the course objectives, and accordingly, military
history per se is not taught in any of the branch basic courses. There is,
however, integration of historical examples into instruction at several of
the schools. None of them offers electives.

Similarly, the prescribed objective of the officer advanced courses
stresses performance type training with the curricula structured to allow
for broadening education primarily in the elective portion of instruction.
Again, there are no formal, required courses in military history, although
extensive use appears to be made of historical examples in the instruction
and at least two of the schools present specific case studies taken from
modern historical examples. Two other schools already are teaching, or plan
to introduce, a few hours on insurgencies. Two of the schools also offer
elective courses of substantial length in military history generally oriented
toward the operational element.

Although a majority of the officers and civilian surveyed by question-
naire and interviewed by the committee recommended including the study of
military history as a required course of study at all levels of officer
education, the committee feels that a variety of circumstances militate
against significant expansion of the required study of military history in
the various branch school curricula at the present time. Specifically, the
objectives and scope of the officer basic courses together with the short
time duration of these courses allow for little more than "hands on" training.
Likewise, the objectives and scope of the advanced courses presently empha-
size acquisition of skills with the curricula structured to allow for broad-
ening education primarily in the electives portions of instruction. Finally,
in the basic course, the committee suspects that most students are desirous of learning the practical aspects of their profession and anxious to move on to join a unit as quickly as possible.

As is now partially the case, there are certain areas in which there should be required coverage in military history. The committee strongly concurs in the present use of historical examples at both the basic and advanced levels. But it urges that extreme caution be exercised to ensure that factually sound examples are properly used, good and bad, and that the technique is not prostituted merely to support a teaching point or to exploit a preconceived opinion. In this area, the expertness of the faculty is critical. The committee also believes that in each basic course there should be some instruction devoted to (1) orienting students on the need for a career-long study of military history in its broadest sense and (2) covering branch history to enhance esprit and to stimulate interest in branch-related military history.

If the committee is not convinced that military history courses are presently required at the branch schools, it does strongly advocate elective offerings at the advanced courses. Only two schools are now doing this and the courses offered thereat are probably less sophisticated than desirable. To compensate for disparity in student backgrounds and interest, at least two different elective courses should be offered at each school.

(b) Faculty. From the viewpoint of formal, graduate level education in history, all of the officers teaching military history electives at the branch service schools are deficient. The Infantry School military history elective is being taught by eleven resident instructors (ranging from captain to lieutenant colonel) assigned to the Division of Brigade and Battalion Operations. Operating under the committee system, each instructor teaches from one to three sessions of two hours each. Most of the instructors have bachelor's degrees and two are history majors. None have special backgrounds in military history, and none have been to CGSC. At the Artillery School, the military history elective is taught by three resident instructors (one 2d lieutenant, one 1st lieutenant, and one captain) who are occupying spaces in the Tactics Department calling for one lieutenant colonel and two majors. All of the instructors have bachelor's degrees but none are history majors. Presently, the instructors generally teach about eight to ten months before being lost on PCS. Occasionally the elective has been taught by an instructor possessing a Master's degree and it is hoped that a captain with a doctorate in history will be available to teach the elective beginning in the summer of 1971. The Armor School is not presently offering its military history elective due to the lack of a qualified instructor.

The committee believes that the most pressing immediate need for revitalizing the study of military history at the branch service schools is the provision for qualified faculty personnel. These individuals are required to teach military history electives at each advanced course and to provide faculty assistance in the instructional use of military history. Spaces should be validated for these faculty members and then be filled by qualified personnel possessing at least Master's degrees in history. The occupants should be tenured for minimum three year assignments. The possibility of using qualified civilians to teach the electives should not
be overlooked. The committee, however, is not optimistic that many college professors with the necessary academic background, an understanding of the military profession, and the interest, will be available at the proper time and place.

(c) Instructional Material. The texts used by students in those elective courses being offered are available commercially. As readings, they are reasonably adequate but should be supplemented with reading lists of good works hopefully available in the libraries of the schools. The committee became only generally familiar with the adequacy of teaching aids; but based upon earlier requests received by the USMA Department of History for assistance with slides and illustrative material, it is likely that such aids are barely adequate.

From data available to the committee, it is impossible to determine the proportion of library holdings (books and periodicals) devoted to military history. Very few of the schools indicated that annual funds for acquisition purposes were insufficient; but it appears that some schools may be in marginal positions, particularly if emphasis must be quickly shifted to expand military history holdings. (The Armor School ($7000) and the Signal School ($6500), for example, as compared to the Field Artillery School ($18,000), might face difficulties). Specific conclusions on this point must await detailed analysis of the military history holdings of each library in light of future military history course requirements. If such courses require extensive background reading and more than superficial research (from students as well as faculty), it can be expected that library holdings will require expansion. Particularly in this eventuality but even under present circumstances, the branch schools should enlist the assistance of the U.S. Army Military History Research Collection (USAMHRC) at Carlisle Barracks (guidance, loan of materials, microfilm, etc.). This agency, however, must have sufficient lead time to plan necessary support and determine budgetary implications.

(d) Questionnaire Comments. The questionnaire responses indicated a broadly spread opinion that military history should be taught formally at both basic and advanced officer courses as a required course or as an elective. Of all officers surveyed, 35% favored requiring it in basic courses, and 50% favored making it mandatory in advanced courses; for the basic course, 27% favored a military history elective, and for the advanced course 52% preferred electives (Chart D1, ANNEX C). Junior officers tended to favor electives; more senior officers favored a mandatory course (Chart D4). There was no significant variation by branch of service (Chart E4), or by educational level (Chart E5). Of students now in an advanced class, 70% indicated they would take military history if it were offered as an elective (Chart E3). The most common written suggestion for developing a military history expertise within the Army, was for more emphasis at all levels of instruction (Charts F11 and F12).

The questionnaire also disclosed that basic course officers have read less of military history than any other officer group in the Army, and that their interest in reading does not pick up until they reach the captain/advanced course level (Charts B1, B2, B4 and B7).
(e) A more detailed discussion of the branch service schools appears at ANNEX G.

(f) Anticipating the future, the committee is concerned that there may be a sizeable number of students in the basic course (OCS graduates) who will not have been exposed to the undergraduate level military history instruction. It believes that an accommodation must be made to provide minimal instruction in the subject for these officers at the basic course.

(3) The Command and General Staff College. In examining the question of the adequacy of the present teaching of military history at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), the committee gave careful consideration to the presently assigned missions and functions of the College; the historical background of the teaching of military history at the institution; and the impinging results of its other deliberations as they impact on the CGSC curriculum. Due to the key role assigned to CGSC in the Army educational system and its designation as the proponent for progressive electives programs in the Army, the committee necessarily gave attention to many factors of a general nature beyond the narrow confines of its study objectives in its deliberations. Two of the more significant of these factors were general pedagogical considerations affecting the Army educational system and present officer personnel policies affecting the assignment, education and utilization of officers.

While considering the question of the teaching of military history, the committee became aware of two dichotomous viewpoints and organizational concepts concerning the basic teaching philosophy in the Army educational system and the role of the Army educational system in the overall accomplishment of the Army mission. Specifically, the committee was struck with the seemingly incongruous and increasing demands for instruction oriented on the one hand toward the acquisition of on-going skills and on the other toward broad general education and intellectual development. Secondly, there is the situation whereby CGSC is given the doctrinal development mission while the actual functions are vested in the Combat Developments Command. This dichotomy of interests and functions pervades the present educational system of the Army and is in sharp contrast to the educational environment and institutional roles prevailing prior to World War II. While recommendations concerning the teaching philosophy and institutional role of the CGSC are beyond the purview of this committee, the seeming existence of such conditions as those outlined directly impact on the committee findings concerning the adequacy of the present military history program.

(a) Curriculum. The committee carefully considered the pre-World War II system of studying military history in the core curriculum at CGSC in comparison with the present method and mission of the College, with a view toward determining if the former system was now obsolete or if part or all of the old system was worthy of consideration for reimplementaton. Given conditions similar to those which existed prior to World War II, the committee would favor reinstitution of many features of the former system. The in-depth study approach established by Major Morrison (see ANNEX H) served as a valuable vehicle for developing the intellectual depth and analytical ability of officer students and faculty and provided the impetus for the evolution of new tactical and strategic concepts derived by deducing
principles from the analytical study of past operations. The committee feels that the in-depth study of military history played a particularly valuable role in the educational development of the officer corps between World War I and World War II and the evolution of tactical and strategic concepts which were applied to World War II operations. This view was substantiated by the comments of many senior officers in the survey conducted by the committee and the commentary of several consultants interviewed by the committee. In the abstract, then, the committee concluded that similar benefits would accrue from the inclusion of the study of military history by the former method in the present day CGSC curriculum; on the basis of this measure alone, the in-depth study of military history as part of the CGSC core curriculum is not obsolete. It is doubtful that the present method of studying military history by historical illustration and case study is adequate to serve as a vehicle for intellectual development and as a stimulus for tactical and strategic innovation. These abstract committee judgments, however, must be tempered by recognition of the fundamental transformations in policies for the education of officers, development of doctrine, and assignment and utilization of officers which took place during and after World War II.

A crucial element in this transformation occurred when the Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, directed the faculty at Leavenworth to begin the massive program of preparation and revision of training manuals for use in the training of the expanded Army. As a result of this process, much of what had evolved from the study of the military art prior to World War II and which existed largely in the minds of the officers educated by the Army educational system, was converted into written doctrinal principles and techniques for the training of the vast numbers of officers required. The emphasis of teaching in the Army education system shifted to the training of officers in the principles and techniques already derived, rather than to the education of officers in such a manner as to allow them to deduce principles and techniques for themselves, based on individual analysis of past and on-going events. To a large degree, this orientation of teaching philosophy has continued to the present day; and achievement of a proper balance between intellectual development vis-a-vis the acquisition of skills has elicited the concern of many CGSC Commandants, such as Major General Garrison Davidson (see ANNEX H). This question of the role of the CGSC core curriculum subjects in the intellectual development of officers was of concern to the committee in its deliberations to determine the proper place of the study of military history in the College curriculum. The question was particularly critical in view of the substantial changes in military requirements, impacting on officer education, resulting from World War II, and the subsequent large scale involvement of the Army in national security affairs.

In its examination of the post-World War II CGSC curriculum, the committee observed that regardless of the return to long courses of instruction, and various efforts to create a more leisurely academic environment conducive to broader intellectual development, the needs of the Army continued to dictate the allocation of the majority of the available curriculum hours to instruction which was—and is—essentially oriented toward the acquisition of skills. The vast growth in the body of military knowledge resulting from the impact of technological advances and U.S. world-wide commitments, simply
does not allow time for the narrow in-depth study of various aspects of the military art within the present framework of formal military education. In this regard, the committee finds that a "generalist"—an officer possessing a broad knowledge of the military art applicable to all fields of military endeavor—is not longer a "generalist" in the traditional pre-World War II context. Rather, the committee feels that today's "generalist" is an officer possessing sufficiently broad-based knowledge of skills to allow him to meet the specialized requirements of his arm or speciality field. This view was substantiated by the committee's examination of present and projected officer career programs and by interview with a DCSPER representative. This trend has affected both the overall system of military education and the involvement of officers in doctrinal evolution—and, consequently, the nature of the study of the military art in the Army educational system.

Since World War II the needs of the Army for specialized knowledge in various fields have been increasingly met by the schooling of selected officers in civilian institutions of higher learning with subsequent utilization in specialized assignments. In like manner, doctrinal development and policy-making functions have been increasingly vested in Department of the Army agencies staffed with personnel possessing specialized knowledge. Many officer assignments to these specialized areas require graduation from CGSC as a prerequisite for assignment; and many, in addition, require officers who have advanced civil schooling in various disciplines ranging from political science to computer science. Few of the assignments, however, require officers to have advanced training in military history, and no civil schooling program for military historians, other than for USMA instructors, presently exists. As the committee and other individuals surveyed feel, if the study of military history should occupy an important place in an officer's educational development and in the evolution of the military art, the question facing the committee with regard to the inclusion of the study of military history in the CGSC core curriculum under present conditions becomes one of determining what minimal studies should be undertaken by all officers, assuming that the opportunity for advanced study in military history study can be provided a few volunteer, selected officers by other programs in a manner similar to that now provided in other disciplines. In seeking an answer to this question, the committee was guided by its previously arrived at conclusion that current methods of study at CGSC were inadequate, and by its examination of the other subjects in the current core curriculum which presently offer suitable vehicles for in-depth study and intellectual development.

1. Required Instruction. At the present time, the committee believes that a lengthy course in military history is not feasible to introduce into the core curriculum. It notes that the present course offering which most nearly encompasses the desirable features of the pre-World War II study of military history is the thirty-six hours of strategic estimates instruction provided by the Strategic Studies Section of the Department of Joint, Combined and Special Instruction. This instruction includes nine hours in the methodology of the strategic estimate and twenty-seven hours devoted to practical work in the application of the methodology and strategy principles learning in previous instruction (see ANNEX H, Appendix 13). The students accomplish in-depth individual research and contribute to an estimate involving one of six areas: West Germany, Pakistan,
Israel, Brazil, USSR, and Communist China. The objectives of this instruction are: to review the interrelated, fundamental aspects of previous studies in strategic matters that are critical to an understanding of the estimate process; to provide the student with a recommended approach, a suggested format, and limited, controlled practice in preparing a completed estimate of a strategic situation; and to permit the student to prepare an actual estimate, allowing him to gain in-depth appreciation of a specific geographical area.

The committee endorses the instruction in strategic estimates and finds that it supports one of the precepts for the study of military history at CGSC which was enunciated in 1922, namely, that "...the course in Military History and Strategy is scheduled to proceed hand in hand with the course in Tactical and Strategical Studies, Corps and Army, for the purpose of illustrating the actual workings of the principles discussed...." (see ANNEX H). At the same time, however, the committee finds that a similar vehicle for the use of military history as a means of analysis of tactical considerations is not presently contained in the CGSC core curriculum.

The committee believes that the analytical study of military history is of general value to all officers in the understanding of both tactical and strategic principles. But it recognizes present demands for specialized utilization of skills, current reliance on other programs for specialized training in various disciplines, and the requirements on the present CGSC curriculum. Nevertheless, it is convinced that units of instruction for the analytical study of tactical considerations, approximating those cited for strategic analysis, should be included in the CGSC core curriculum. In this regard, the committee believes that a subcourse should be devoted to the analysis of selected tactical operations. The topics selected for in-depth analysis should offer a range of past and contemporary events encompassing the operational levels included in the College's instructional mission (Division, Corps and Army, Joint and Combined), with the curriculum hours for such studies made available from those presently allocated to theoretical instruction in the advanced applicatory phase of instruction. This minimal common instruction would then be augmented by instruction in other programs in a manner similar to that followed in other common curriculum subjects.

As an example, the formerly used Lorraine Campaign of World War II Case Study could be expanded to provide the basis for the critical analysis of the proper application of principles taught in Corps and Army to an actual situation using original source material. Students would be briefed on methodology, background, source materiel, and presentation and report formats; then they would be assigned individual in-depth research tasks ultimately contributing to a group report and presentation. Tasks would be assigned to individuals based on an analysis model designed to elicit critical examination of desired principles and study objectives. Students could be assigned research tasks in various ways, dependent upon study objectives. One method would be to assign students to research such general areas as generalship, application of tactics and strategy, logistics, and similar military considerations, with analysis made of both Allied and German sources. Another method could be to assign tasks along organizational and instructional lines, with individuals examining such aspects as
leadership, plans, orders, communications, logistics, intelligence, operations, fire support planning and other desirable instructional areas. Emphasis would be on critical in-depth research in the assigned study areas, leading to a balanced, realistic and comprehensive critique of the considerations examined.

Finally, the use of historical example (e.g., the 1944 Ardennes Offensive, World War II) should continue to be exploited in instruction at the College. The same caveat concerning this technique as was made above in the discussion on instruction at the branch schools is pertinent.

2. Elective Instruction. In considering the elective offerings at CGSC, the committee examined both the "in-house" military history electives presently offered by the CGSC faculty and the status of electives developed under the contract electives - Cooperative Degree Programs. As a general consideration, the committee finds that the present military history electives in theory are adequate for their intended purpose. They offer CGSC students the opportunity for additional studies of military history commensurate with their backgrounds, are enthusiastically taught by interested members of the CGSC faculty, and are well supported with instructional aids and library resources. The committee suspects, however, that the viability of the course offerings is inhibited by lack of in-depth instructor expertise. The committee feels this to be particularly true in the case of the R402, Topical Military History, where the scope of seminar discussions requires extremely extensive and broad knowledge of the subject on the part of instructors in order to guide discussions properly. The committee was also concerned with the level of the instruction provided in the present military history electives. The R401 Military History elective essentially provides operational history coverage similar in nature to that given at the undergraduate level at USMA, whereas the R402 elective is so structured as to assume an advanced degree of knowledge of military history as a prerequisite for beneficial development (see ANNEX H). In view of the fact that the committee ascertained that progressive programs for the study of military history by officers is generally nonexistent, the committee questions whether the present elective offerings are sufficiently suited to the backgrounds of officers attending CGSC.

In addition to retaining existing electives, the committee is of the opinion that CGSC should add a third elective which involves critical study and an in-depth study of the pertinent sources concerning an historical example of a strategic situation. Faculty expertise, source material availability, and student interest would determine the selection of the topic and subsequent development of other topics offered in later years.

A strategic study of the type envisioned should accomplish the following objectives:

a. Exercise the student's judgment by critique of actual historical situations and decisions.

b. Develop the student's understanding of the practice of generalship, the application of military tactics and strategy, the influence of logistics, and other related professional considerations.
c. Improve the student's oral and written expression.

d. Provide the student an enhanced appreciation of the value of military history.

Ideally, such an elective should be taught in a concentrated block of hours during which the student works at group and individual research, relying extensively on archival materials. Classroom participation would be limited to infrequent, though periodic, ten man seminar meetings. The focus of the program should be on the decision-making process at Army and higher level. The student would examine the evidence bearing on the problem in order to arrive at a balanced, realistic critique of the commander's actions. Within two weeks the formal concentrated phase could be completed; a month later, the student would be required to submit a written critique on some aspect of the problem.

As an alternative but poorer way to schedule the proposed elective, the two week (eighty hour) program could be spread out over a full (or half) academic year. This solution would entail utilizing the Individual Research Program. Under this alternative, it is felt that about twenty enthusiastic and carefully selected students could be accommodated, providing that three highly qualified faculty members were involved in directing the strategic study.

For an illustration of one way to apply the methodology described above, see Appendix 14, ANNEX H.

As previously noted, only minimal opportunities exist for students to undertake advanced studies in military history at the present time. Likewise, no progressive program of studies in military history has been delineated in the Army Educational System and no military history electives are presently included in the courses offered by the three civilian institutions included in the CGSC program, nor are any negotiations underway. This condition exists primarily because CGSC representatives have been rebuffed in their efforts to develop a military history program by negotiation with Kansas State University, which is the only nearby institution offering instruction in graduate level military history. The College should continue its efforts in this area, however, and broaden its discussions to include other universities near Leavenworth in search of viable courses in military history which can be offered as contract electives. (Conditions can change rapidly in the academic world because of the mobility of professors. Presently, suitable courses in military history may or may not be available for contract purposes; or they may not be considered acceptable by CGSC; but the situation can change as teachers and policies change.) If suitable contract electives can be developed, they can contribute to a progressive program in military history, as part of the Army Educational System. If not, the in-house military history elective offerings will become even more critical as concerns viability as graduate level courses. In any event, the combination of in-house and contract electives should span a range of studies from operational history to coverage of war and society, suitable both to the broadening general education of all officers and the specialized education of selected officers to meet the needs of the Army for military historians.
meet the needs of the Army for military historians.

(b) Faculty. A key factor affecting the viability of the present elective offerings in military history is the matter of faculty qualifications and availability of time to instructors. Eleven instructors in the Department of Command are presently assigned to teach the R401 and R402 military history electives (see ANNEX H, Appendices 11 and 12). Two of these instructors are designated as author/instructors of the respective electives, and the remaining instructors teach various classes utilizing a team-teaching approach. None of the assigned instructors have graduate degrees in history, although two of them have Master's degrees in other disciplines (Mechanical Engineering and English). All of the instructors have done extensive background reading in the subjects they are responsible for teaching. None of the instructors, including the two principal author/instructors, however, are assigned as full-time military history instructors. The preparation and teaching of military history lessons is accomplished as an additional duty to their primary assigned duties as author/instructors in the General Staff Section of the Department of Command; all are authors of one or more Department of Command core curriculum subjects. Of necessity, the preparation and presentation of core curriculum subjects takes precedence over the teaching of the military history electives. A similar situation exists in the R460 elective offered by the Department of Division Operations. Only one validated historian space is included in the CGSC manning table and this space is in the Strategic Subjects Section of the Department of Joint and Combined Operations which offers no history electives.

To support military history instruction, particularly in the elective area, qualified faculty with advanced degrees in history are essential. This consideration becomes increasingly important with any efforts made to develop a military history program as part of the Army Educational System. Accordingly, the committee believes that a minimal number of validated history spaces should be provided CGSC immediately. Due to the advanced nature of the studies which should be undertaken at the CGSC level, and the desire to conserve available officer resources, the committee feels that additional requirements for qualified faculty should be met wherever possible by negotiation with the civilian institutions to present suitable contract electives. In the event such civilian resources are not available, however, additional validated spaces for officer personnel should be provided to support future curriculum development.

(c) Instructional Material. The committee observes that present library and instructional aid resources at CGSC appear adequate to the support of instruction in military history. Texts to support electives programs may be either purchased with funds available for this purpose or printed locally. As in the case of the branch schools, the critical ingredient appears to be faculty qualifications. Qualified and tenured personnel will be able to devise programs and obtain necessary instructional support, including textual material. Less qualified personnel will require support and guidance from outside agencies. As noted in ANNEX H, the library holdings, particularly secondary sources, are peculiarly suitable for military history instruction. The committee notes, however, that positive safeguards will need to be maintained to ensure that documents presently available for faculty and student use are not prematurely culled and retired.
It also notes that the proposed new elective in strategic studies will increase the requirement for primary source material and the dependence upon the USAMHRC at Carlisle.

(d) Questionnaire Comments. Questionnaire responses indicate that interest in reading and studying military history at CGSC is high (Charts Bl, D1, and D5, ANNEX C). CGSC students favored having an elective course (74%) over required (62%) (Chart D1); the overall response of the officer corps, and particularly more senior officers, favored making it mandatory (Charts D1 and D5). Response by branches differed very little (Chart D6). Curiously, although 74% of CGSC students indicated a desire to have a military history elective, only 27% indicated they would enroll in it (Chart E3).

(e) A detailed discussion of the teaching of military history at CGSC appears at ANNEX H.

(4) The Army War College. For many years after its founding, the College presented military history in the traditional way (through formal courses in the discipline), but after World War II all instruction was carefully integrated and academic offerings became interdisciplinary. For a student body with great maturity and a high level of experience, the interdisciplinary approach is a superior one, but there must be adequate provision for all the necessary disciplines. The committee believes this to be the case presently at the Army War College (AWC). Clearly, the assumption is that by the time an officer reaches this level of schooling he has had formal or practical exposure to many of the academic disciplines—he generally has no need for a collegiate style treatment of specific disciplinary concepts and should be able to absorb integrated instruction on an interdisciplinary plane.

(a) Curriculum. An analysis of the core curriculum at AWC revealed that many of the courses include coverage in military history. This analysis was based upon educated estimates provided by the faculty after a review of the topics covered in the various courses. The course in Internal Defense and Development Operations (33%) and the Military Strategy Seminar (70%) include the most significant inputs of military history. This latter instructional block is thirty-six hours in length and devotes considerable coverage to the historical evolution of strategic concepts. Given the general method of instruction and the integration of academic material, the committee believes that coverage of military history in the core curriculum at AWC is adequate.

As in the core curriculum, several of the elective offerings include coverage of military history, and as high as 80% of the student research papers use a significant amount of history. Nevertheless, the committee is convinced that the subject of military history is so important that it should be available to AWC students as an elective, on a generally disciplinary but highly sophisticated level. For this reason, the committee applauds the AWC decision to introduce such an elective in AY 72. There is some concern among committee members, however, about the breadth of scope of the proposed elective. Moreover, there appears to be a danger of discontinuity of concept and historiography under a plan which relies upon guest lecturers.
to present much of the course material. In effect, the committee questions whether the normal AWC approach to instruction is desirable in a new elective which might better strive for an in-depth learning experience. At the same time, the committee appreciates that the AWC is experimenting this first year in this elective and that as faculty expertise grows and as a professor arrives to fill the newly created Chair in Military History, modifications can occur. The committee notes that the elective is to be directed by the USAMHRC which it assumes has the personnel resources to cope with the imposing task.

(b) Faculty. Because the College makes extensive use of the small group discussion and guest lecture methods of instruction, its faculty serve more often as moderators than teachers in the strict sense of the word. This fact, added to the way instruction is integrated, makes it difficult to assess how expert any one of them may be required to be in military history. His major functions are course construction and student advising. The College has one space validated in history which is assigned to the Military Strategy Seminar. The space is not presently occupied by an officer with graduate training in history, although an officer from another department with such training provides assistance.

Although the committee appreciates the matter of selectivity in faculty appointment and the important consideration of grade and experience, it is concerned that the history validated space at AWC is not occupied by an officer with graduate level education in history. Such an individual could contribute considerably to instruction in those courses which rely heavily on military history and he also could be highly useful to the personnel involved in the elective. In fact, the committee believes that there should be an additional validated space in history at the College.

The committee notes that guest lecturers are used in abundance at AWC. It urges that the faculty be alert to exploit the contribution distinguished military historians can make in this regard. Moreover, it believes, in a related area, that the activities and assets of the USAMHRC should be increasingly used to further the interest in military history among students and faculty.

(c) Instructional Material. The resources of the AWC Library and the USAMHRC, particularly the latter, are excellent in the field of military history. They should be able to support quite adequately the College's military history program. A coincidental advantage contributing to emphasis on military history, is the periodic activity of the USAMHRC in the field which draws student and faculty attention and participation.

(d) Questionnaire Comments. Questionnaire responses showed that AWC students were among the best-read officers in the Army; only AWC faculty and general officers had read more books from the list in the questionnaire (Chart B21, ANNEX C). AWC students favored a required course in military history (59%) slightly over an elective (56%) (Chart D1). Interest in having a required course at the AWC grows steadily with rank, with 91% of retired generals favoring it (Chart D5).
(e) More detailed treatment of the teaching of military history at AWC appears at ANNEX I.


(1) Collection of Records. The responsibility for establishing policy for retirement of historical records rests with The Adjutant General (TAGO). In general, he also exercises staff direction over records administration (AR's 345-210 and 345-215). The committee considered this subject at some length because of the vital importance of accurate and complete records to the writing of official history which may not follow for many years.

The Chief of Military History has regularly shown a great interest in the collection of complete records and has exercised his directive to advise the Adjutant General in this area as necessary. The war in Vietnam has generated a sizeable requirement in this area which is and will continue to be very important to OCMH. The committee understands that the concerned staff agencies are trying to ensure suitable collection and retirement of records. As the American build-up began in 1965, regulations for the keeping of journals, journal files, and operations reports were in effect. With the setting up of a USARV historical office in mid-1965, emphasis was on seeing that these records were properly prepared. This emphasis continued until late 1966 when considerable emphasis was shifted to an interview program. In 1967, TAGO issued a Pacific Records Directive which speeded up retirement of records from Vietnam. The regulation required that records be retired to Okinawa no later than the end of the year following their creation unless there was some specific operational need to retain them longer. The USARV Command Historian in 1969 had come to realize late in the year that records management was poor. He instructed the Military History Detachments to master the regulation and actually go to units and help them set up their files. He made the historian the records management technician, which precipitated the first real breakthrough toward improvement in the situation. Early in 1970, OCMH and TAGO representatives discussed the problems in records management in Vietnam and the implementation of the pertinent regulations. TAGO took steps thereafter to assign knowledgeable civilians to management positions in Vietnam and to conduct schools in Vietnam on management of records. An OCMH representative on a recent trip to Vietnam observed that the historians were emphasizing records management and were getting fair support from unit AG records management officers. The various headquarters are slowly becoming more conscious of the need for careful management of records.

Without deprecating the value of interviews, the committee suspects that from the date when this program achieved stature in Vietnam until 1969, there were deficiencies in records collection. Efforts since then have improved matters but OCMH still receives reports that problems exist. The committee believes that OCMH and TAGO must continue to devote attention to this matter, including simplifying regulations if this is a critical problem, in order to ensure completeness of records in the draw-down phase of the war.

Another facet of records management which the committee considered, is the impact which automated procedures and equipment will have on the keeping of records. As computer technology is increasingly applied to administration
and tactical operations, the loss of records of raw data may become sizeable unless provisions are made in the technical system to prevent such an occurrence. The military historian needs to have access to the information and reports which influence a commander's decision in order to best reconstruct it later. The committee understands that the Chief of Military History is well aware of this potentially serious problem. It strongly seconds the concern he voiced to Combat Developments Command a year ago.14

(2) Production of Military History. The Army's historical work today is the culmination of a century-long development, dating from a Congressional Resolution of 1864 which authorized the collection and publication of the military records of the Civil War. A half century later, the Army General Staff Act of 1903 recognized historical study as a proper staff function, and for the next fifteen years there was some historical activity both in the Army War College Division, General Staff and in the Adjutant General's Office. With the designation of an Historical Branch in the War Plans Division in 1914, there came into being the first of a series of offices which were the predecessors of the present Office of the Chief of Military History (OCMH). During the next half century, Army historical work was devoted essentially to documentary history. Plans for preparing major narrative histories of World War I came to naught, but some monographic works on strictly non-controversial topics were produced before the next great war. The historical function was also broadened by increasing demands for spot information about the Army's past, and by the added responsibility for determining the lineages and honors of Army units. Narrative historical writing came into its own during and after World War II, and it has remained the principal Army historical activity since 1945, not just in published books but also in classified monographs for internal Army use and in special studies prepared on demand to meet current needs. The historical service functions have also continued to grow: the provision of general reference and unit history information, the lineage work, and the most recently added responsibility for historical properties and Army museums.

In 1946, the Secretary of War approved the historical office's proposal to prepare a comprehensive narrative history of World War II of about 100 volumes. This ambitious project (UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II) served as the basis for recruiting a sizeable and expert staff of largely civilian historians. Although the project encountered obstacles and the work has taken longer than originally anticipated, it now appears that better than 90% of the volumes originally planned will be completed. These volumes have generally drawn praise from the academic community at large. They are factual and reliable narratives. The Korean War had some impact upon the World War II series and generated a new requirement--five narrative histories of which two have been published.

In January 1962, the Chief of Staff directed the Chief of Military History to take steps to ensure effective coordination and supervision of the whole Army historical effort, including strengthened staff supervision of historical properties and Army museums; to prepare new Army Regulations

for Army history; to develop a common Army annual historical program; and to
arrange for a redistribution of Army historical personnel to serve the com-
mands and the whole Army more effectively. The principal devices for strength-
ening the responsibility of the Chief of Military History for coordinating
and supervising all Army historical activities have been Army Regulation
870-5 (first issued in October 1962) and the Annual Historical Program,
developed for each year since FY 63. AR 870-5 brought together a number of
separate Army history regulations and directives, and it covered not only
the preparation but also the use of military history throughout the Army.

Since 1962, OCMH has continued to work on major publications— it expects
to send three major volumes to the Government Printing Office in March 1971—
and books continue to be viewed as the heart of the historical effort. Never-
theless, both in OCMH and in the rest of the Army, the bulk of the effort has
been devoted to current or very recent events and current historical support.
Such events as the Army's deployment in the Cuban crisis and civil disturb-
ance operations at Oxford, Mississippi and after the King assassination, and
such matters as the Army's responsibility for Civil Defense, have been treated
in carefully prepared historical monographs. With the expansion of the Army
and operations in Vietnam, the demands of the Army Staff for special, ad hoc
historical studies increased markedly. With the war apparently drawing to
a close, it appears that the Vietnamese War will be the major focus of Army
historical work for the next decade. OCMH is now deeply involved in this
series which is expected to consist of twelve or more volumes dealing with
the Army's role in relation to Vietnam. Work has started on the volumes,
with a goal of seeing them as published books by the late 1970's. To achieve
this goal, OCMH is collaborating with The Adjutant General and the National
Archives in expediting the retirement of records from Vietnam and ensuring
that they will be deposited in the Washington area. OCMH historians will
also have full access to the records of the Pacific Command and MACV head-
quarters.

Another important element of the Army's historical effort was the estab-
lishment of the U.S. Army Military History Research Collection on 12 June 1967
at the Army War College. This action resulted from recognition that extensive
library collections of great historical and monetary value had been dissipated
as military libraries found it necessary to make room for a flood of new
materials or as installations were closed; that others were in imminent danger
of dissipation; and that the personal papers of leading military figures were
either not being preserved or had been scattered in libraries or other deposi-
tories throughout the country where they were difficult to use. The reasoning
was that if a single center could be established for these materials that
might otherwise be lost, it would provide a facility of immense value to both
military and civilian scholars interested in the military arts and sciences.
The USAMHRC grew rapidly and in 1970 became a Class II Agency of OCMH. Its
holdings include more than 300,000 published items which relate to all phases
of military history. In addition, it has growing collections of personal
papers, photographs and maps, and taped interviews.

The committee believes that there must be careful coordination between
USAMHRC and the Army service schools. It commends the manner in which USAMHRC
has become an established depository and library, used by increasing numbers
of military and civilian scholars. But it also recognizes the great
importance of meaningful historical holdings to any viable teaching effort in military history which a service school makes. Indeed, the committee has indicated above that such efforts are essential to help revitalize the study of military history by Army officers. The USAMHRC depository role and the service school teaching role, however, do not necessarily need to be incompatible. Careful planning and cooperation between agencies can ensure that given materials are available to the individuals who require them most. Moreover, inter-library loan and document copying can be tremendously useful.

As noted earlier, the prime function of OCMH is to produce factual, historical narratives concerning the Army's role in national affairs. The committee notes that the office has encountered difficulties in meeting its publication schedule. There appear to be two primary reasons for this slippage. First, the heavy flow of staff support projects emanating from agencies both within and without the Department of Defense impedes the writing program. The committee notes that though these projects can be disruptive, OCMH believes they comprise an important contribution to the total historical effort. It concurs and additionally observes that this work serves to acquaint more Army officers with the important contribution history can make. It is important, however, for staff agencies and OCMH alike to resist strongly any inclination relative to such projects to use history narrowly to support preconceived positions. The second consideration affecting the slippage in production of histories is the personnel shortage and accompanying turbulence caused by reductions in force. The committee appreciates the necessity for stringency in budgetary matters, but it feels that at a time when historical efforts should be increasing, careful and selective consideration should be accorded the difficult position of OCMH.

According to questionnaire responses almost half (48%) of the officer corps does not really understand very fully the Army's requirements for the production of historical materials. Furthermore, of those who indicated they did know something of how the Army used its military history resources, most felt such use was poor (Chart G1, ANNEX C). Many suggestions for improvement were offered (Charts F11, F12, and F13); aside from more education for officers the most common suggestion was to use civilians (Chart F12).

A detailed discussion of OCMH appears at ANNEX J.

(3) Use of History.

(a) Training. The committee did not extensively investigate the degree to which military history is used to support training. It believes that such use has not materially lessened in recent years and that it can play a useful role in building pride in organization and esprit. In this regard, it is of the opinion that the Combat Arms Regimental System, with its exploitation of military history, can be useful to the Army as it moves toward volunteer status.

(b) Staff Analysis. The everyday use of military history to assist the staff officer is difficult to assess. As noted above, OCMH provides historical information to staff planners which aids their analysis. But it is much less this type of utilitarian application of military history than the development of historical mindedness—a perspective and sharpened
judgment—which the committee feels is important for Army officers to develop. The value of this type of mental outlook was attested to by many senior personnel who answered the questionnaire. The committee is convinced that such attributes are usually developed by an individual through relatively intensive study. For this reason, it feels strongly that the teaching of a progressively developing program in military history is an indispensable ingredient in the Army's historical program.

(c) Quantification and Computer Application. It is natural in a world now dominated by technology that attempts are made to use technical methods to predict future developments and to aid in the formulation of decisions. Operations research analysts, for example, work with operational data to study strategy and tactics in order to arrive at conclusions as independently as possible of intuitive thinking based on historical experience. The historian and the mathematician need not be in conflict, however, since their work can be complementary and useful for critical, comparative study. The difficulty the historian wants to avoid, however, is that of becoming simply a data feeder and making his discipline the handmaiden of pure application. At the same time, the historian of war, as Peter Paret notes, can benefit from techniques for formulating and carrying out research (e.g., quantification, simulation, and game theory) if he adapts these methods to his purposes and engages in interdisciplinary work.

The committee appreciates that increasing applications of the concepts of operations research/systems analysis (OR/SA) to military decision making and combat developmental processes have created a concomitant demand for the quantification of military historical data. A recent statement of that demand was made by Robert McQuie who charges that "neither Army operations research nor military history makes much use of the other" and urges that military historians develop programs for the collection of historical data and include it in their writings. When interviewed by the committee, Colonel Robert W. Samz, Associate Professor in the Department of Engineering, USMA, and an authority on the subject, supported this plea. Samz believes that within limitations it may be possible to transform the art of war into a science of war through the use of mathematical models of macrocombat. Refinement of the models, however, requires a major effort to extract statistical data from historical records. Colonel Samz further believes that the macrocombat war game model would be of instructional value in teaching students at CGSC how to fight large scale battles.

In considering the demand for quantification of historical data, the committee attempted to assess the current state of the art of systems analysis and its instructional applications to the Army schools system. In this


regard, Seth Bonder summarized developments in systems analysis as follows:17

The time has come to take stock and call systems analysis what it currently is—a purely intellectual activity. Those thoughts are not new to many, yet military systems analysis persists with the charade and operates as if systems analysis were a scientific activity. The facade is surely one of the main causes of a credibility gap and, if continued, will lead to the eventual demise of military systems analysis.

Its principal product is not quantitative evaluations, but, rather, insights and trends developed from broad parametric analyses that shed light on the murky future. The analyst's talent is not number generation, but perception and creativity that can identify problem areas, analyze complex situations, and invent reasonable solution alternatives. When data is available, analysts can perform and produce as scientists. In the meantime, there must be developed the proper intellectual environment needed to make the intellectual activity of systems analysis an effective planning vehicle.

The committee believes that Army historians will need to stay abreast of developments in quantification of historical data just as their civilian counterparts are doing. But it is convinced that trained historians should not become simply statisticians to provide data, without attendant analysis, to operations researchers at such time as the latter may develop specific requirements for the types of data needed. As the requirements are developed, the more crucial question of how one can legitimately quantify the qualitative factors (e.g., commander's will, morale of troops, weather) will be exposed to necessary hard and critical examination. In the meantime, consistent with the earlier discussion above on collection and preservation of records, historians will need to continue to ensure the collection of pertinent data for later screening and also increasingly to participate in interdisciplinary dialogue.

The committee also explored briefly the practicality of computer applications to the organization and handling of library materials used in teaching and research in military history. Computer support of historical research might appropriately be considered in the area of the secondary retrieval of information—that is, computers could be used to supply citations to the source of information (e.g., call numbers for books and document identification symbols). To store the entire text of materials of potential historical significance in memory cores, while theoretically possible, would be practically impossible. A system for secondary retrieval of historical data, however, must be preceded both by the development of a thesaurus of terms to standardize the language of retrieval and an authority file for descriptors to be used. While the language of pure and applied sciences is more flexible,

terminology used in indices published by historical societies and in Historical Abstracts might provide a useful beginning.

If a thesaurus of terms were developed to support computer storage of bibliographic information, it would be desirable, as a second step, to survey Army libraries in order to identify and locate the raw material for historical research within the Army. Automated network call systems might then be implemented at such time as all libraries were using a standard classification system (e.g., the Library of Congress system for call numbers).

(d) Development of Doctrine. The Army agency responsible for the development of doctrine is the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command (USACDC). The committee believes that history is not ignored by project officers who prepare doctrinal studies for USACDC. Although reference guide pamphlets used by these officers do not emphasize historiography but concentrate on use of references and thorough literature search, interviews with some of the action officers conducted by the committee and examination of bibliographies in several USACDC studies, indicate that military history is routinely considered in the preparation of doctrinal works. The committee also understands that staff historians of USACDC provide guidance and assistance to project officers during the research phase of studies. Although CGSC faculty are sometimes involved in the doctrinal developmental process, it appears that, in general, teachers who might be expected to have performed detailed research in military history are not involved directly in the development of doctrinal works. The committee strongly urges continued use of historical research in the preparation of Army doctrine; but in so doing, it stresses the need for in-depth research and unbiased assessment of the historical facts.

(e) Reliance on Military History. The directive to the committee states that "since World War II the Army has moved away from its traditional reliance on military history." As part of its overall study, the committee analyzed this assumption in an attempt at verification and understanding of underlying causes, if applicable. There appear to be three facets to the question: emphasis on teaching, outward signs of interest in the subject, and manifestations of usage of history.

A restrictive survey of journals which publish articles on military history revealed that officers have published only to a limited degree in the field. Between 1937 and 1970, of 483 articles published in Military Affairs only 40 historical essays were authored by military men. (Nineteen of these were published between 1944 and 1946.) From 1950 to 1968, Armor printed 838 historical articles of which about 10% were written by military authors. For the past three years, Military Review had a higher proportion of military contributors, but exact statistics on historical articles were not available to the committee.

It proved impracticable to make a meaningful assessment of the extent to which military history holdings of military libraries are used. Accurate circulation figures in such a restrictive category are not maintained. As a very rough guide, the Pentagon Library estimates that about one eighth of the books now in circulation are in the military history category. Based upon a narrow sample of officer opinion and the judgments of its members,
the committee doubts that the officer corps either has or is reading *The United States Army in World War II* as widely as this excellent series deserves. Moreover, two of the books from that series were included in the committee's questionnaire and evoked little response. This last, broad judgment was verified to some degree by another query in the questionnaire, the answers to which lead to the conclusion that most officers do not know what the Army's military history resources are. (Charts C1 - G4, ANNEX C). When they do learn through experience in service or in combat, the percentages indicating that the Army is using these resources poorly tends to increase (Charts G2 and G4).

In a similar area, the junior officer's appreciation of the value of history is hard to measure. Questionnaire responses indicate that most officers come to realize only gradually the value of history as a judgment sharpening device (insights gained) (Charts C2, C5, C6, C7, ANNEX C). Most of them apparently begin by looking for lessons to apply to specific situations (Charts C1 and C4). Combat experience accelerates appreciation of this value of history (Chart C7). One consideration that enters into an assessment of these data is that the lack of a progressive program for teaching military history in the schools system and the absence of a concerted effort to encourage and to guide self-study hinder the development of an appreciation for the worth of the subject. Another influencing factor is the likely inclination of the newly commissioned officer to lean toward the practical side of a lieutenant's duties. Several years of service, probably, bring him to the threshold of a realization that there are finite limitations to his personal experience which can be improved through the study of history.

The reception accorded the efforts and capabilities of OCMH comprises the major consideration in the area of use of history. The strengthening of the historical program in 1962 revealed the appreciation of the Department of the Army for the value of history. Similarly, the successful development of the USAMHRC shows a stimulating degree of farsightedness. The increasing number of staff support projects assigned OCMH is further indication that staff officers are seeking broadened perspective through analysis of the past, hopefully without prostituting the example for a foreordained position. In summary, the committee believes that the position and capabilities of OCMH have been increasingly recognized; its acceptance by the staff bodes well for the use of history. This judgment, however, requires tempering in the realization that since World War II the Army has been heavily involved in national affairs and wars which naturally encouraged documentation and the writing of narrative history.

The area in which the committee believes that there has been a move away from "traditional reliance on military history" is in the teaching of the subject in the military schools system as opposed to the use of the discipline. Before World War II most of the schools required instruction in the subject; today it is taught only as an elective, only in some of the schools, and only as a result of a relatively recent curricular development. At a time when civilian institutions have shown increasing interest in the subject, the Army has let academic emphasis on it decline. This probably came about as a result of mounting criticism of the militarily traditional way of teaching military history--by stressing purely operational aspects and lessons learned. It should not have deterred faculties from retaining the subject in curricula,
however; modifications in the operational approach were in order without jettisoning the approach altogether, and the devising of courses with broader scope was essential. It is through the schools system that interest in military history can be developed for many officers and impetus for self study generated in some. A broadening and intellectual maturing can begin and a sense of historical mindedness can take root. To differing degrees, to be sure, all individuals can begin to appreciate the self-instructive value of history.

c. Encouragement of Individual Study of Military History. At the present time, the Army makes no positive attempt to encourage independent study specifically in military history. The closest approximation to such an attempt is the Contemporary Military Reading List (DA Circular 1-26, 20 March 1970) which, however, is more oriented toward the category indicated in the title. (Of thirty-eight entries, about one third might be classified as military history.) In addition, the committee is not sanguine about the extent to which this list is accepted and used by the officer corps. The question naturally arises, also, about the validity of any program which might be modified or devised and which directs self study as opposed to one which carefully cultivates interest, encourages participation, and makes resources and opportunity reasonably available.

Analysis of questionnaire responses showed that intensive self-study, along with graduate level study, identified the really serious students of military history (Charts B27 and C6, ANNEX C). Home study increased with rank, except for generals presently on active duty (Chart B2); this group of officers also credited the greatest benefits (94%) to their efforts (Chart C6). Among the suggestions received for ways for the Army to develop more military history expertise, self-study (including use of correspondence courses) ranked fifth. If combined with recommendations for advanced degree programs (essentially another form of self-study), it would be ranked first (Charts F11 and F12).

Although its accuracy is debatable, the list of history validated spaces in use in November 1970 reflects either the paucity of requests for graduate training in history or the unwillingness of the Army to consider such requests favorably. Of the sixty-three positions validated, forty-eight are at USMA and of these only twenty are purely oriented toward military history (see ANNEX K). The cooperative degree program at CGSC will produce a few more officers with advanced level degrees, but experience with the program is too recent to predict large outfalls, and, it must be remembered, most of the degrees will be oriented toward history in general. Similarly, ROTC instructors who attend graduate school part time will increase the figure somewhat. The committee reluctantly concludes that there are presently very few officially sponsored opportunities for officers who have the desire and capability to earn graduate degrees in history. (This statement does not take account of the new "boot-strap" program for ROTC instructors which is not necessarily oriented toward history.) Such opportunities would surely contribute to an increased level of self-study among the officer corps. Although the unusually talented man might continue to study without the impetus of graduate education, more officers probably will develop a questioning, honestly critical approach to problems if they are exposed to such training. Carrying that reasoning a bit further and stressing the value of
the toughening of the mind which such education bestows, one of the civilian professors teaching an history elective at CGSC noted that if more officers entered the CGSC history program, the Army would develop men "better able to comprehend their own roles ... in the coming decade when criticism of the military may well not abate."

One useful result which often can be attributed to self-study and graduate level training is scholarly research and writing. Writing can be a frustrating but also highly instructive chore because it forces one to clarify his thinking. It can also lead to useful, open discussion of unsettled issues among officers and cater to the inherent desire of the individual to better the institution. In an area which is largely monopolized by civilian scholars, military men need to bring rigorous historical methods to bear on problems which require insight and careful analysis. As a general officer answering the questionnaire noted, however, the Army—and Department of Defense—must first become less sensitive to the publication of controversial, sometimes critical, but honestly held convictions. The other important factor, in the view of the committee, is the amount of time available to the average officer. Although this situation can be expected to improve with stability in tours of duty, it may not be alleviated for some time.

d. Military History and the Civilian Community. One of the major questions posed in the directive to the committee concerns the interest of civilian academicians in military history. In investigating this area, the committee explored several facets of the question.

Based upon a study made by OCMH a year ago, it appears to the committee that interest in the teaching of military history at civilian institutions has increased since World War II (see ANNEX L, Appendix 1). This might have been anticipated as a natural development, aided by an OCMH policy to confine its work to selective areas and leave much military history to be written by private enterprise. But it is also due to isolated instances of particular professorial interests, special library collections, endowments, and presidential libraries nearby campuses. Moreover, course offerings vary in scope, difficulty, length, and acceptance on campus. While there appears to be a sizeable number of schools offering military history, the professors of national stature are still relatively few in number. Additionally, two of the consultants interviewed by the committee were not optimistic about the number of schools which either now offer or can be expected in the future to offer viable graduate programs which include military history fields. In their view, the existing nucleus is likely to remain stable and small.

An analysis of doctoral dissertations concerning military history did not either support or refute a claim for increased civilian interest in the subject. Between 1873 and 1969, more than 675 dissertations on military

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18 See also Mark M. Boatner, III, "Seeing Ourselves As Others See Us -- First," Army (February, 1971), pp. 24-29.

19 Interviews with Professors Russell Weigley (Temple) and Theodore Ropp (Duke), 8 and 10 March 1971 respectively.
history were produced, a figure which approximates about 6% of the total number of history dissertations and which does not fluctuate noticeably by period. Moreover, although this number is fairly significant, the committee could not establish a correlation between dissertation topics and later fields of interest pursued by authors.

There are several ways in which the Army can encourage civilian scholarship in military history. Two of these which are already being exploited (visiting professorships at USMA and AWC and dissertation year fellowships) are discussed in detail at ANNEX L. Both of these proposals were enthusiastically endorsed by the professors consulted by the committee. As the USAMHRC grows, attracts attention, and assists scholars performing research, the effort of the Army to encourage civilian scholarship in military history should be enhanced. Similarly, fragmented though its impact may be, the present emphasis in ROTC units to enlist civilian aid in the teaching of military history can be expected to further the interest in the discipline. To the degree that graduate schooling in history for officers is developed, including the cooperative degree program at CGSC, a concomitant civilian-military relationship can be expected to form, may endure, and can be nourished on an individual basis in later years. This can lead to increased use of qualified civilians as guest lecturers at the various military schools, a facet of encouraging civilian interest in the subject which is not presently as widely exploited as it might be.

In the final analysis, the Army cannot force civilian interest in military history. The committee believes that there already exists considerable such interest which simply needs to be exploited intelligently. Reputable civilian military historians will probably be most impressed by reputable students of military history and the degree to which such students are intellectually honest in making use of the work of the historians. At the same time, the Army should continue to develop in-house expertise in military history, primarily through upgrading of faculty qualifications. This body of people will naturally cultivate a rewarding relationship with civilian scholars and they will also help counter an attitude among some officers, noted by committee interviews, that civilian assistance is denigrating to the program. It may be significant, in this regard, that only 11% of the officers queried on the questionnaire responded with the suggestion that the Army make more or better use of civilian expertise to enhance its military history program, in teaching as well as in other capacities (Charts F11 and F12, ANNEX C). A number of miscellaneous such suggestions also referred to or implied the use of civilians (Chart F13).

e. Summary of Apparent Shortcomings. As noted in the preceding discussion, there are some areas in the teaching and use of military history in which the Army is accomplishing less than is desirable. Grouped in broad categories, these shortcomings are summarized below.

(1) Teaching Military History in the Army Schools System.

(a) There is inadequate provision for ensuring minimum essential coverage of the subject at the undergraduate or precommissioning level, except at USMA.
There is inadequate attention to encouraging self-study and providing useful guidance relative to studying military history early in an officer's career.

Faculty members teaching military history, for the most part, have not had the opportunity to acquire the necessary academic qualifications, except for those at USMA.

There is no progressive coordinated program in military history which can be made a part of the Army Educational System. Not enough schools offer courses in the subject and some teach it at a level which is too unsophisticated.

It is possible that library resources at some schools may be inadequate to support the development of advanced level courses in military history.

In the personnel system, there is an inadequate number of history validated officer spaces and there is occasional improper use of existing ones.

The number of civilian spaces allocated to OCMH is very likely inadequate to ensure timely accomplishment of that agency's mission.

To more positively help develop a sense of historical mindedness in the officer corps as a whole, more emphasis is required on additional and better courses in military history, self-study, and research and writing.

There is a general lack of understanding among the officer corps as to the extent of the historical resources of the Army.

While it is important to encourage the development of the interested military scholar, it is also necessary to exploit more fully the qualified civilian in teaching, researching, and lecturing roles.

8. MILITARY HISTORY IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY AND UNITED STATES AIR FORCE.

Both the Navy and the Air Force recognize a need for teaching and using military history as it especially pertains to each branch of service. At the highest staff levels, special offices exist to coordinate service-wide historical functions, provide guidance to the service secretary and service chief, and to prepare and publish materials required in support of plans and policies involving historical materials.

The Naval History Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations is charged with the responsibility to perform research, write, and publish U.S. Naval history. It also maintains library and archival facilities which provide historical services to official users, visiting scholars, and the public. The Marine Corps has a separate Director of History who coordinates Marine historical programs, publication, research and reference services, archives and libraries, and unit lineage and honors.
The Air Force Staff historical functions are administered by the Chief, Office of Air Force History. These functions include general direction of world-wide Air Force historical programs.

In the educational system of both the Navy and the Air Force, the subject of military history plays a measurable part of the curriculum. Cadets and midshipmen at the service academies are required to take courses in the history of military forces and the special role of sea or air power. In addition to military history requirements, cadets and midshipmen are required to take additional courses in the history of western civilization. They are also provided the opportunity to major in history. Advanced civil schooling in history is available to Air Force Academy graduates.

In ROTC programs, students take courses in military history similar in substance to those of the service academies as part of the requirement for a commission.

The presence of military history in the curricula of Navy and Air Force service schools is difficult to measure, and it appears to be very slight in the Navy Postgraduate School and in the Air Force school system up through and including Air Command and Staff College. The senior service colleges, however, present a very different picture. Military history plays an important role in the basic curriculum of both the School of Naval Warfare and the Air War College. In both of these schools, military history is a clearly identifiable component of strategic studies. A number of elective courses in military history are available at the Naval War College to complement the basic curriculum.

It may be inferred from the wide presence of military history through the Navy and Air Force, that as a subject military history provides some contribution to the accomplishment of the Navy and Air Force missions. From the highest staff levels and senior service colleges, where recognition of the value of military history appears to be high, down through the entire officer education system, military history receives attention as a subject area important to the Air Force and Navy.

A more detailed treatment of the teaching and use of military history in the Navy and Air Force appears at ANNEX M.

9. MILITARY HISTORY IN SELECTED FOREIGN ARMIES.

Drawing primarily upon interviews of foreign officers (students or liaison officers at Army schools) and information at OCMH, the committee made a cursory examination of the military history effort of the USSR and the procedures for the study of military history by selected other armies. Time and lack of detailed information did not permit a thorough, in-depth analysis.
The committee noted that the methods of studying and teaching military history currently used by other nations closely parallels the pre-World War II experience of the U.S. Army. Military history is studied in depth progressively at all levels of military education and pervades the professional development of the officer. The study of military history is used as a vehicle for deducing tactical and strategic principles and their application, and as a means of gaining insight into the behavioral aspects of men and leaders in war and peace. Military history is also utilized by officer students in the derivation of new doctrinal precepts and as a means of enhancing morale and esprit and the understanding of the soldier's national and military heritage.

The committee observed that the formal study of military history was required as part of the course of study at the various staff colleges, with higher level studies required at the war college level. It further noted that the course content included in-depth research and placed much emphasis on individual research and on the writing of historical monographs. Most foreign armies also provide for a progressive program in the study of military history, combining both formal instruction and self-study as an adjunct of officer career development.

The experience of other armies, notably those of the Commonwealth nations, in using military history as a means of engendering group identity and esprit, is of particular significance to the U.S. Army during a period of transition to an all volunteer professional army. Every use of military history should be made to further improve the Combat Arms Regimental System and to further individual, unit, branch and professional pride.

A more detailed treatment of the teaching and use of military history in the foreign armies appears at ANNEX N.

10. CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING RECTIFICATION OF APPARENT SHORTCOMINGS.

a. Purpose of an Expanded Military History Program. The overriding objective of increased emphasis on the study and use of military history in the Army should be to cultivate an appreciation for the value of history among the officer corps as a whole. As officers reach increasingly responsible command and staff positions, they are called upon daily, often under great pressures, to render judgments which can be sharpened by an understanding of military history—in the ways described earlier in this paper at considerable length. Specialists, even if accepted on equal footing, cannot provide these insights on an habitual basis. It is primarily for this reason that some study of military history is desirable for all officers while the opportunity for greater specialization should be available for those few who have an interest in developing scholarly depth in the discipline.
Although it may appear inconsistent with the preceding rationale, the committee does not believe at this time that all officers should be forced to study military history formally at each of the service schools. It recognizes that the majority of officers answering the questionnaire favored this course of action, but it also believes that required instruction at the junior grades might discourage and stifle any dormant interest in the subject. (Although questionnaire responses indicate that there is a generally steady growth in appreciation by officers that the study and reading of history can be of benefit, there is a fairly sharp increase when an officer reaches the grade of captain. Charts B2, B12, B21, B22, B26, C2, ANNEX G. Until that time, junior officers fairly consistently lag below the average responses of the officer corps as a whole.) At the same time, the committee is convinced that there is a danger, over the long period, in sanctioning extensive instruction and requiring study in one, overly narrow area for all officers at the expense of more broadening academic exposure. The committee, however, strongly supports the offering of challenging military history electives at all service schools and a required, foundation course in the subject at the precommissioning level. In both instances, faculty qualifications are crucial. It also believes as experience is gained with these electives, as they are developed into challenging and rigorous offerings, and as continuing analysis of the overall curricula at service schools takes place, that careful consideration should be given to incorporating the offerings into the core curricula.

In the applicatory area, the military history program objectives should be to encourage self study and writing, to support OCMH in its endeavor to produce sound and scholarly history, and to enlist the aid of qualified civilian scholars in those areas where they can enhance the program.

b. Applicability of a Special Career Program. The case for a special career program in military history is predicated primarily upon a requirement for qualified faculty members to teach the subject. Undoubtedly, this is a legitimate and important requirement, and a special career program would ensure a pool of teachers trained at the graduate level, although the questions of other qualifications and uniformity of rank could complicate staffing the program. It is also possible that a specialist program would provide an incentive to remain on active duty for those officers who have some historical expertise now and desire to continue to develop it.

In regard to the matter of qualified faculty, however, the role of the specialist teacher can be overplayed. Because the study of history is essentially an individual task, the instructor is more a guide than a teacher in the conventional sense. The history instructor can advise the student and point out pitfalls to avoid, but the student himself must make the vicarious leap that puts him into the saddle alongside Bonaparte at Austerlitz or onto the Valley Pike with the Stonewall Brigade. No teacher can do this for him.
This being the case, the essential problem is to motivate the professional officer to study military history and to facilitate his efforts in that direction so that he develops the capacity to think analytically. And here it should be noted that the single most important resource the Army can provide the officer is sufficient time to study and think.

The whole question of a special career program must be viewed in the light of its impact on the officer corps in general. Indeed, ironic as it may seem, some of the most telling arguments in favor of a special career program are the same ones which would tend to downgrade the value of military history in the eyes of those who would profit most from its study--officers of the line. And in this connection it must be borne in mind that the study of military history is largely justified on the basis that it broadens the intellectual horizons and sharpens the perceptions of a wide range of officers, not just a few specialists. It is also apropos that the student learns history mainly by reading, synthesizing, and analyzing what he has read, and then discussing his thoughts with others. To be sure, lectures and other formal educational devices assist in the learning process, but only as auxiliaries.

One severe drawback to a special career program is that it would tempt commanders and staff officers to leave all historical matters to the staff historian, or worse, charge him with the mission of providing "historical examples" to justify present or future courses of action. For his part, the historian would find it extremely difficult to persuade the commander and other staff officers to study history themselves. In short, the presence of a professional staff historian might encourage line officers to ignore or misuse military history.

On the opposite face of the coin, the historian, like other professionals, tends to restrict his interest to certain discreet segments of his discipline at the expense of developing a broader, more catholic viewpoint. As a matter of fact, the very nature of history as an academic discipline strongly reinforces this tendency to specialize. A special career program, by institutionalizing the professional and isolating him from the mainstream of the Army, would exacerbate the situation even more and in the process reduce the capability of the historian to contribute to the military service. This could be very important in the doctrinal area.

Although the historical profession is sometimes reluctant to admit it, the study of history attempts to blanket distinct, if not disparate, functions: historical research and writing, on the one hand; and teaching on the other. This is not to say that the skills and talents requisite for writing history and those necessary for teaching it are mutually exclusive, since most competent professionals can do both; nonetheless, the fact remains that most historians lean toward, and markedly prefer, one of these two spheres of endeavor over the other. For this reason, it would be a near impossibility to design
and operate a special career program which could satisfy both of these desires and simultaneously meet the needs of the service, particularly since there is likely to be a large imbalance between the requirements for historical writers and teachers. Moreover, the historian in uniform, whose desire is to write, will probably face a great deal of frustration even when he is assigned to a position which nominally is oriented toward research rather than teaching. Most field assignments in military history entail gathering, collating, and recording historical information, but very little synthesis and analysis. Obviously such work is vitally necessary, but it is not sufficiently challenging to hold the interest of a professional historian. To make matters worse, the field historian cannot anticipate anything better, for the great majority of the professionally rewarding assignments are presently staffed by civilians at OCMH. At the other pole, the historian who desires to teach rather than research will also face frustrations. The chances of his obtaining a succession of assignments in his chosen specialty—say, Revolutionary Warfare or American Military Thought—are practically nil unless the personnel system is refined to the point that it can at all times keep the teaching specialty of every officer in the program in phase with the requirements for that specialty at the various service schools. This seems unlikely. It is much more realistic to assume that the professional teacher will have to anticipate a steady diet of surveys with only sporadic opportunities to instruct in and further develop his area of special expertise. Since teaching historians usually feel emotional as well as intellectual commitments to certain chronological periods and topics, they cannot experience full career satisfaction unless they are working in those areas.

Reference was made above to the fact that the historian in uniform whose interests lie in research and writing would eventually find these interests frustrated since the most rewarding and substantive work in his chosen area is performed by civilians in OCMH. A similar conflict could arise with respect to the officer whose desire is to teach, for he would find that civilian college professors who teach military history to ROTC students may have preempted a large segment of his chosen field. In order to prevent this, it would be necessary to discourage the use of civilians to assist in the teaching. Replacing civilians with historians in uniform would undoubtedly have deleterious effects. For one thing, it might sever ties which might exist between the military and the scholarly communities and encourage the former to lapse into narrow parochialism. Equally important, the complete absence of civilian inputs would lend credence to charges that officers are merely "court historians." At the very least, the historian in uniform might well find himself in an untenable position, having to choose between the search for truth, which is the sine qua non of the historical profession, and the risk of offending his military superiors.

The historian, unlike scholars in some fields, is not at his best when isolated from the real world. In fact, the most successful members of the guild are those who can bring to history a perspective gained from experience in the field. This is particularly true of the military historian; all things being equal, he is a better historian for having smelled gunpowder as a soldier. This being the case, restricting the military historian to the narrow confines of a special career field will rob his work of the realism and vitality it needs to be useful. In a slightly different vein, the historian teaching in a service school will undoubtedly find that his active military
service provides an ideal spring board for establishing rapport with his students. Conversely, the specialist who has primarily academic credentials, will have much more difficulty convincing students who have more military experience than he does that he knows his subject.

From the quantitative viewpoint, the committee doubts that there are sufficient space requirements to justify a special career program. Not including any staff positions for which specialization can seriously be questioned, the committee roughly estimated that there might be a requirement for approximately 500 spaces, 90% of which were in the teaching area and heavily weighted therein toward ROTC instructors. The desirable spread in rank is lacking. It appears unrealistic to expect that enough senior officer spaces would be provided to make a logical progression up the chain possible.

A special career program for military historians is not favored by experienced officers (Chart F2, ANNEX C). The consensus of those queried was that adequate military history expertise can be developed among those officers already possessing an educational background in history, by more emphasis at all levels of Army schooling, and by an expanded advanced degree program (Charts F11 and F12). If a special career program were to be established, however, enough junior officers appear interested to provide input (Charts F2, F6, and F8). From review of written comments received, "sidetracking" is a major deterrent to interest in the program.

The committee recognized that while it was in session the personnel management system of the Army was being analyzed. The impact of the new system (enunciated in the Chief of Staff’s Memorandum, subject: "Officer Personnel Management System," dated 1 April 1971) on its study cannot be predicted; it may further a special career program or it may provide more flexibility in the utilization of personnel resources. The committee notes, however, that the memorandum acknowledges the necessity for a middle position between the full time specialist and the generalist. This middle position appears to be appropriate for the military historian in uniform. Placing him in this category could be accomplished by validating the requirements for historians at the various levels, sending selected officers to graduate school in preparation for filling these positions, and then permitting them to return to the line upon completion of a utilization tour. Provisions could also be made for repetitive assignments in military history at periodic intervals for those qualified officers so inclined. Positions requiring a higher degree of expertise would continue to be filled by qualified civilians or military personnel with tenure.

c. Modifications Necessary in the Present System. To rectify the perceived shortcomings in the existing military history program some changes are necessary. The committee believes, however, that it is neither desirable nor practicable to create a special career program as the means of furthering these changes. Instead, the present system appears capable of modification to accomplish the necessary upgrading of the program.

The following changes, expressed in broad terms, seem pertinent to the committee:

(1) To accommodate the need for faculty with better academic qualifications in military history, the personnel management system must be
responsive to the overall requirement. This involves being thoroughly abreast of the Army's personnel resources in this area and utilizing the special skills most efficiently (see ANNEX K for more detailed comments). It also includes increasing the number of history validated officer positions, a greater requirement for graduate level education, reutilization of the better instructors on teaching tours without career stigma, and increased stability in assignments.

(2) Challenging elective courses in military history should be offered at all service schools. Comprising a progressive program of study, they should be developed into an integral part of the Army Education System. Together with efforts to encourage self-study and provide library resources, the educational structure would resemble:

(a) Required instruction at USMA, ROTC, and OCS.

(b) Elective courses from the Advanced Course through the AWC level.

(c) Use of historical example in required instruction at all school levels.

(d) Encouragement of self-study throughout an officer's career but particularly at all schools, beginning with the Basic Course where initial orientation and provision of guidance occurs.

(3) Provision of resources to OCMH to ensure the timely preparation of narrative history.

(4) Cultivation of existing civilian interest in military history by intelligent pursuit of present methods for encouraging participation. This involves visiting professorships, fellowships, lecture and consultant invitations, and development of relationships with ROTC units. At the same time, there must be provision for encouraging the occasional military man who has a bent toward serious, in-depth scholarship in the field; supporting his research and publication efforts, considering his temporary use at USAMHRC as a research fellow, and employing his expertise in OCMH, are examples.

d. Assessment of Cost. The complexity of the problem of estimating costs of changes made at institutions having differing resource requirements attendant on faculty, library, and curricula, precludes the committee determining detailed costs with accuracy. It is anticipated, however, that the cost of educating instructors at civilian graduate schools would be the major cost. The bulk of this requirement would lie in the ROTC area for whose instructors the Army now considers graduate degrees desirable but advocates a "boot-strap" program to obtain the degree. Assuming an additional requirement of 150 officers requiring education and a minimal cost for each of $2000, a budgetary increase of about $300,000 annually is anticipated. This figure is based upon having one officer with a history graduate degree in each ROTC unit and about sixty officers, each with the same degree, available for other requirements (primarily service schools and OCMH) which do not now exist. It
also envisions utilizing existing resources wisely, phasing in schooling gradually, and coordinating it with experience factors relative to the number of civilians assisting in ROTC instruction.

There are two other areas in which additional costs can be anticipated. Dependent upon the degree of elective sophistication and requirement for outside reading, the holdings of service school libraries will probably require expansion. This can be done on a planned and progressive basis over several years. In this same connection, USAMHRC may require additional resources, largely personnel, if the service schools levy sizeable requirements for course support. The other major item involves the preparation and printing of an envisioned pamphlet which would be utilized to encourage the study of military history. A rough estimate for the project is about $5 per pamphlet and the issuance of approximately 10,000 per year for a continuing annual cost of about $50,000. For the first year, however, if this proposal is favorably considered and distribution of the pamphlet is made to the officer corps at large, the cost would be considerably larger.

11. CONCLUSIONS.

The committee's conclusions are arranged in areas organized in the same manner as the foregoing discussion.

a. General. It is concluded that:

(1) There is a requirement in the Army for the study of military history to develop historical mindedness among the officer corps at large and to contribute individually to broadened perspective, sharpened judgment, increased perceptivity, and professional expertise.

(2) As evidenced by the number of courses being taught on campuses, civilian interest in academic military history in its broadest sense has increased in the past twenty years.

(3) While civilian interest in military history has increased, the Army has shown less interest in teaching the subject in service schools than it did before World War II.

(4) It is not feasible or desirable, at this time, to require the inclusion of comprehensive courses in military history in core curricula at all of the service schools. But it is desirable to structure and offer a progressive elective military history program in the service schools system which can be included in the Army Educational System under the mantle of a history program.

(5) It is necessary to make some provision to provide military history instruction to those men at Officer Candidate School who have not had a college undergraduate course in the subject.

(6) Sufficient need has not been demonstrated at this time for recommending creation of a special career program in military history.
necessary improvements in the present military history program can be made within the existing system but changes will be required, particularly in the personnel management system.

for the teaching of military history, the utilization of faculty with graduate level academic credentials and reasonable stability of assignment is essential. Their influence extends beyond the curriculum offering to careful guidance to school libraries on specialized holdings required.

a fruitful outlet for expertise gained in graduate level education, continued self-study, and serious research is careful and responsible writing. The inclusion of military history in this respect is important.

from the viewpoint of the use of military history to promote morale and esprit, the Combat Arms Regimental System affords valuable assistance to the Army's plan to move toward volunteer, more professional status.

the computer, with its concomitant requirement for quantification of historical data, is a potentially useful tool in historical research. Computer support of historical research has potential in the area of secondary retrieval of information at this time.

OR/SA requirements for the recording of quantified historical data relative to military operations are not yet defined clearly enough to justify recommendations concerning creation of historical data banks.

in recognition of the value of studying military history, the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force offer instruction in the subject throughout their school systems.

in the armies of several leading foreign nations, military history is studied in depth progressively at all levels of military education and pervades the professional development of the officer.

b. The Teaching of Military History. It is concluded that:

no major changes are necessary in the program of instruction in military history at USMA.

with regard to ROTC instruction:

(a) the number of hours allocated to military history is adequate except in the Example E curriculum.

(b) considering the varying situations at institutions and recognizing the increased educational demand placed on the military faculty, the flexible curricular approach, as prescribed by CONARC, is suitable.
(c) the service-taught military history courses emphasize coverage of the American experience.

(d) enlisting the aid of qualified civilian faculty in teaching military history is desirable, but this eventuality is not likely to occur to such an extent that the requirement for military instructors will be greatly lessened. Moreover, the need still exists to expose the undergraduate to the officer-instructor as a representative of the military.

(e) the graduate level of education among ROTC faculty is lower than desirable. While history as one area of study may not necessarily best qualify officers for their roles as ROTC instructors at large, such graduate work will best qualify them for teaching courses in military history.

(f) from the military history viewpoint, there are shortcomings in the recently established advanced degree program for ROTC instructors (i.e., discipline in which degree is obtained and method of selecting school to attend).

(g) the USMA ROTC Summer Workshop will need to be continued on a selective basis. To accomplish the undertaking, however, USMA requires fiscal and administrative support and the effort should not compromise the mission of the Department of History.

(h) the amount of instructional support material for courses in military history available to ROTC units appears to be inadequate.

(3) with regard to instruction at the branch service schools:

(a) at the present time, inclusion of a comprehensive offering in military history in the core curriculum is not feasible at the basic course level. If the length of the course is increased and the scope broadens, military history should be considered seriously for inclusion in the core curriculum.

(b) in the Basic Course, development of motivation for at least some study of military history is essential and instruction in the history of the branch is highly desirable.

(c) at this time, inclusion of a comprehensive offering in military history in the core curriculum is not appropriate at the advanced course level.

(d) careful integration of historical example in instruction at basic and advanced course levels is desirable.

(e) it is highly desirable to offer a minimum of two elective courses in military history at the advanced course level.

(f) the educational level of service school faculty teaching military history is lower than desirable.

(g) the ability of branch school libraries to support sophisticated military history courses requires study.
with regard to instruction at the Command and General Staff College:

(a) no lengthy, formal course in military history is required in the core curriculum at this time.

(b) units of instruction pertaining to strategic estimates (as now exist) and to critical, in-depth analysis of appropriate level tactical operations are required in the core curriculum.

(c) integration of historical example in instruction is desirable.

(d) it is highly desirable to offer a minimum of two electives in military history, and preferably three, at the College.

(e) members of the faculty teaching military history require graduate level education.

(f) library and instructional aid support for instruction in military history is now adequate but as offerings grow more sophisticated the library resources may be strained.

(g) contract electives taught by qualified faculty from universities near Leavenworth can upgrade the military history program of the College and contribute to the Cooperative Degree Program as well.

(5) with regard to instruction at the Army War College:

(a) the coverage of military history in the core curriculum is adequate.

(b) the recently approved military history elective fills a void which existed in the War College curriculum and rounds out the committee's concept of progressive electives at each level in the Army School System.

(c) library support for the military history program is adequate.

(d) there is a requirement for one or more additional validated spaces in history at the College and a need to fill the existing space with an officer holding an advanced degree in history.

(e) the Student Research Program affords an excellent opportunity for student research and writing on subjects in military history.

(f) the USAMHRC at Carlisle provides a useful research facility for the College.

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c. Collection and Preservation of Source Materials and Production of History. It is concluded that:

(1) the collection, retirement, and storage of accurate and complete Army records, in peace and war, is vitally important to the Army, its historical program, and historians in general.

(2) the application of computer technology to records management, administratively and tactically, requires advanced provision for preserving the data vital to the military history program.

(3) with regard to OCMH and the production of history:

(a) turbulence caused by personnel reductions is adversely affecting OCMH and the overall historical program.

(b) the incorporation of more military personnel and the recruitment of young civilian historians to replace those who will reach retirement age in the next five to ten years, require an increase in authorized spaces for OCMH.

(c) it is desirable to maintain the position of the Chief of Military History at the level of general officer to allow for selection of best qualified officers to head OCMH.

(d) it is singularly important for OCMH to retain its credibility because of present anti-military feeling vocalized by a segment of the population.

(e) while striving to fulfill the requirements of the Army, it is necessary for OCMH to maintain a flexible policy in its program planning.

(f) in extension of the previous conclusion, it is also necessary for Army commands to be responsive to requirements established by OCMH in carrying out its mission. Although one method of ensuring that trained historical personnel are used on history assignments is to establish command channels from OCMH rather than to use the present system of technical channels, such a reorganization is not in the best interest at this time.

(g) the USAMHRC can be expected to become a valuable asset to the military history effort, civilian and military.

d. Relationship with Civilian Academic Community. It is concluded that:

(1) methods presently employed or planned for implementation to encourage civilian interest in military history are excellent.

(2) it is not desirable for the Army to attempt to endow chairs in military history at civilian institutions at this time.
implementation of the concept of visiting professorships in military history at Army schools, financed through appropriated funds, will foster the relationship with the civilian academic community and enrich the teaching of military history in those schools.

(4) in view of the relatively small number of qualified candidates for chairs—-and their commitments—-the Army should restrict the number of its chairs to two or three.

(5) it is desirable for the Army to foster the Dissertation Year Fellowship Program as a useful means of continuing civilian interest in military history and as a means of maintaining a materially acceptable link with civilian academia, both in the broad sense and also as a means of recruiting young talent for OCMH.

e. Army History Personnel Resources. It is concluded that:

(1) the existing automated personnel information system is not accurate. Not only does it contain numerous errors, but comparison with the data generated by the committee's questionnaire makes it appear as considerably short of what may be the actual total personnel resources.

(2) based upon study of the DA print-out listing advanced degrees in history and the data from the committee's questionnaire, even considering the inaccuracies involved, there may exist a variety of backgrounds and a favorable grade spread which would give the Army the ability to fill the requirement of an expanded history program.

(3) for the purpose of a viable Army historical program, a special discipline code for military historians appears desirable. It is probable that all personnel eventually identified on future, more accurate print-outs will have to be polled as to their specific disciplines.

(4) granting the possibility that current resources may meet the needs of an expanded historical program, the question arises as to the future and whether the Army's continuing needs can be met through existing resources without some type of a graduate education program.

12. **RECOMMENDATIONS.**

a. General. It is recommended that:

(1) CONARC introduce a progressive coordinated history program into the Army Educational System. The military history electives taught at service schools should be refined, rigorously tested and recommended for inclusion under such a program.

(2) CONARC develop a method to provide military history instruction for Officer Candidate School students who have not had a college undergraduate course in the subject. The instruction should approximate the ROTC American Military History course in scope and coverage and should be given not later than the Basic Course.
(3) OPD accurately determine and continue to monitor existing personnel resources relative to graduate training in history in anticipation of assignment of graduate level trained officers to faculty positions to teach military history or subjects heavily related to history. As these resources prove inadequate or unqualified, consideration should be given to: educating more officers (after careful study of the impact of civilians teaching in ROTC), re-utilizing officers on second teaching tours, and extending length of tours of duty.

(4) necessary action be taken to ensure that future collection, retirement, and storage of accurate and complete Army records of historical value meet the needs of the Army's historical program.

(5) continued emphasis be placed on the USAMHRC program and that necessary support be rendered at all levels to achieve this goal. To this end, OCMH should study the impact on USAMHRC of the support requirements generated by educational programs contingent upon the proposals of this committee.

(6) OCMH continue to monitor the progress of automation and quantification of history and take necessary action to ensure that the needs of military history are included in any computer programs which might apply.

(7) OCMH continue to stress its principles of professional competency and integrity.

(8) OCMH study the practicality of developing a thesaurus of terms suitable for standardizing the language to be used through automated means in the secondary retrieval of military historical information.

(9) OCMH and Army historical offices, in general, be excepted from future personnel reductions.

(10) OCMH study its personnel requirements for the next decade and submit an optimum personnel requirement which will meet its needs.

(11) OCMH prepare and publish a guide for the study and use of military history which can be issued to all officers at the Basic Course and to others on request. This guide should outline the objectives for the study of military history by all officers; provide recommended reading lists; suggest progressive comprehensive programs of study encompassing self-study, off duty classes, service school electives, and cooperative degree - "boot-strap" degree programs; acquaint the officer with the available military history resources; and provide guidance on research and writing to stimulate interest in such activities.

(12) Department of the Army continue to assign a qualified general officer as Chief of Military History and that such assignment be for a minimum of five years in order to maintain the necessary level of continuity.

(13) additional command emphasis be placed on employing trained historians in spaces related to their skill.
an annual meeting of selected military faculty teaching military history be held for the purpose of discussing instructional methods and exchanging ideas and materials. The first such meeting should be held not later than 1 January 1973.

b. The Teaching of Military History. It is recommended that:

(1) with regard to ROTC instruction:

(a) the number of hours of military history in the Example E curriculum be raised to thirty.

(b) military history courses cover the American military experience as a minimum but, as possible, include some world military history.

(c) efforts continue to be made to enlist the aid of qualified civilians either to teach or assist in teaching the military history courses.

(d) at least one officer in each ROTC unit have a graduate degree in history as a requirement for teaching the military history courses.

(e) an officer selected and educated specifically for ROTC assignment to teach military history need not necessarily do his graduate work at the institution to which he will be assigned for ROTC duty.

(f) officers assigned to ROTC duty, whether or not previously connected with an ROTC oriented advanced degree program, be stabilized for a minimum tour of three years.

(g) CONARC study the requirement for the USMA ROTC Summer Workshop, particularly considering the impact of the advanced degree program for ROTC instructors, the impact of stabilized tours on the concept of an annual workshop, and budgetary questions.

(h) as soon as some pattern of curricular options among ROTC units forms but not later than 1 January 1973, CONARC survey the requirements for instructional and reference material for ROTC instructors, study alternative means of providing required materials, and implement plans for providing these materials.

(2) With regard to the branch service schools:

(a) a two hour orientation on the importance of and value in the study of military history be conducted at the Basic Course.

(b) two hours of instruction in the history of the branch be taught at the Basic Course.

(c) two elective courses be offered at the Advanced Course—one operationally oriented, the other emphasizing civil-military relations.

(d) historical examples be used whenever possible in instruction at all schools.
(e) a minimum of two spaces be validated for graduate level work in history for each school conducting an advanced course. These spaces should be filled by officers possessing at least MA degrees who should teach military history electives and advise the faculty on military history in general.

(f) each service school study the ability of its library to support instruction in military history contingent upon the proposals in this committee's report.

(3) With regard to instruction at the Command and General Staff College:

(a) historical examples be used whenever possible in instruction at the College.

(b) a thirty-hour unit of instruction in the critical analysis of selected appropriate level tactical operations along the lines developed in the committee's report be introduced into the core curriculum.

(c) from the military history viewpoint, the unit of instruction in strategic estimates be retained.

(d) the two military history elective courses currently offered be retained and upgraded as faculty expertise grows.

(e) a new elective course in strategic studies, as discussed in the committee's report, be introduced into the elective program.

(f) a minimum of three positions be validated immediately for advanced degrees in history and that they be filled by officers who possess at least an MA degree in history. They should be tenured for a minimum of four years. As military history offerings develop and consideration is given to more required instruction in military history, and experience is gained on the amount of assistance available from civilians, additional spaces may be required.

(g) the officers occupying validated positions be assigned first priority duty to plan and teach elective courses and advise faculty on military history in general.

(h) every opportunity be taken to utilize the facilities of universities near Leavenworth to offer history electives which supplement in-house military history electives and can contribute to the on-going cooperative degree program.

(i) in view of the proposals made by the committee for more military history instruction, the College restudy the question of a visiting professorship in military history.
(4) with regard to instruction at the Army War College:

(a) the existing validated space in history should be filled by an officer possessing graduate level education in history.

(b) more students should be encouraged to write papers in the Student Research Program which involve the critical use of military history.

(c) within its capability, the USAMHRC resources in military history should increasingly be exploited by the AWC faculty and student body.

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