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THE CASE FOR COMMITMENT TO HAITI

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTERS OF MILITARY STUDIES

MAJOR SEAN P. CONNOLLY

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: The Case for Commitment to Haiti.

Author: Major Sean Connolly, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: The purpose of this paper is to explore the reasons the US should commit to a long-term reconstruction effort in Haiti and some possible methods of doing so. The reality is that any investment in Haiti for the short-term must be an enduring investment in Haiti as decades of fleeting solutions by well meaning institutions have resulted in long-term stability problems for Haiti. There are four distinct reasons that the US should commit to Haiti in order to attempt break this cycle: 1) the GOH cannot do it alone; 2) the US has the resources and expertise to contribute to the effort; 3) the extent of the current crisis has provided a unique window of opportunity; and 4) the US, as the predominant power in the region, can ill-afford a failed state in its own back yard.

Discussion: On 14 January 2010, a massive earthquake hit Haiti killing hundreds of thousands, displacing many thousands more, and creating a humanitarian crisis that the Government of Haiti (GOH) alone has no possible chance of successfully addressing. Progress made during a century of US intervention in Haitian affairs and billions of dollars spent in aid have been wiped away. The earthquake heavily damaged the country’s infrastructure and institutions and created a humanitarian crisis worse than Haiti has seen in a long time. The extent of the damage and the attention the world has focused on Haiti has actually created an opportunity for helping Haiti escape its history. By coordinating and focusing the reconstruction effort, the diverse efforts being focused on Haiti can help Haiti grow beyond the status quo ante and build it back better than it was before.

Conclusion: The US has the resources, the expertise, and the desire to assist Haiti. Doing so in the short-term and the long-term is an investment in regional stability and advances US strategic interests in the LAC. By offering up the resources of the US government, partnered with the UN and the GOH, the US can help Haiti to escape its history and rebuild itself into a vibrant, stable country.
The author is greatly indebted to Doctor Bradford Wineman, Doctor Robert Bruce, and Doctor Rebecca Johnson, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, for their assistance in writing this paper. Miss Rachel Kingcade of the Marine Corps University Research Center provided invaluable assistance in finding reference material and resources for this paper. Any and all errors or omissions are solely the responsibility of the author.
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**Bibliography**
On 13 January 2010, in the wake of a massive earthquake that devastated the capital of Haiti, Dr. Ray Walser, former Economic Counselor of the United States (US) Embassy in Haiti called for a massive US involvement in the recovery effort and a long-term commitment to rebuilding Haiti's economy.¹ He is not the first US official in history to assert that Haiti is ruined and in need of a strong foreign presence to help it recover. The multiple disasters that have befallen Haiti in the last fifty years alone are almost too numerous to list. Rampant government corruption and inefficiency, failed agricultural reforms, and natural disasters have destroyed the Haitian economy, denuded its land, and pushed its people to the brink of despair.

The US government has directly intervened in Haitian affairs with military forces in 1915, 1994, and most recently in 2004 (See Appendix A and B for more in-depth analysis). The United Nations (UN) has deployed multiple missions over the last several decades to Haiti in order to assist in stabilization and reform. Despite all of these efforts, Haiti has once again descended into chaos and faces a disaster unprecedented in Haitian history. In 2008, a series of four hurricanes killed hundreds of Haitians, dislocated many more, and disrupted Haiti's agriculture and nascent economic stabilization. Most recently, the January 2010 earthquake has killed hundreds of thousands, displaced many thousands more, and created a humanitarian crisis that the Government of Haiti (GOH) alone has no possible chance of successfully addressing. Since 1945, the US has spent several billion dollars in Haiti with little appreciable result.² The limited progress made in the last few years (2005-2009) has just been eliminated by the earthquake and the effort is back to the pre-2004 level. There is no question that Haiti's infrastructure and economy must be rebuilt, the security of the population must be maintained, and as Dr. Walser correctly asserts, the time is now for the US to commit its full attention and resources to Haiti.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the reasons the US should commit to a long-term reconstruction effort in Haiti and some possible methods of doing so. The reality is that any investment in Haiti for the short-term must be an investment in Haiti for the long-term. Decades of short-term solutions by well meaning institutions have resulted in long-term stability problems for Haiti. There are four distinct reasons that the US should commit to Haiti in order to attempt to break this cycle: 1) the GOH cannot do it alone; 2) the US has the resources and expertise to contribute to the effort; 3) the extent of the current crisis has provided a unique window of opportunity; and 4) the US, as the predominant power in the region, can ill-afford a failed state in its own back yard.

In a conversation with Haitian President Rene Preval following the earthquake, US President Barrack Obama "pledged the full support of the American people for the government and people of Haiti as it relates to both the immediate recovery effort, and the long-term rebuilding effort." It is time for the United States to commit to both an immediate disaster relief effort and a long-term rebuilding effort in conjunction with the UN under its Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1908. By offering the resources of the whole of the US government to partner with the UN and the GOH to implement the goals of UNSCR 1908, the US can help the GOH to break the cycle of instability that has existed since its independence. By effectively employing its resources and bringing recent reconstruction methodology and experience from Iraq, Afghanistan, and around the world, the US can assist a struggling neighboring nation at a unique moment in its history, counter the influence of regional destabilizing forces, and prevent a failed state from emerging in its own back yard.
UN role in Haitian Affairs

UN involvement in Haiti began in 1947 when it sent a development team to survey Haiti, producing a 327-page document detailing Haiti’s problems. The team devised a plan for fixing these issues as part of a UN test case on how to bring technical development to undeveloped countries. In the last two decades, the UN has focused on the restoration of democracy to Haiti, starting with the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) from 1993 to 1996. UNSCR 867 established the original mission to monitor the Governor’s Island Agreement of 1993, but its mandate could not be fulfilled when the military junta governing Haiti refused to allow the UN forces into the country. UNSCR 940 and 975 reestablished the mission and extended its mandate until democratic elections could be held. Once those elections concluded, UNMIH stood down.

In 2004, when Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide left office, UNSCR 1529 established a Multinational Interim Force to immediately intervene in Haiti and provide security until the long-term United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) force could be formed. UNSCR 1542 established the UN force and a series of follow-on resolutions extended the mandate of the mission and increased the size of the force. The most recent UNSCR, 1908 calls for an increase in size of the military component by 2,000 and the police component by 1,500 in order to assist with the 2010 earthquake recovery. The UN recognized that security and stability capacity established during the mandate of UNSCR 1542 has evaporated in the face of the damage caused by the earthquake.

US Relations with Haiti

The US and Haiti are the two oldest democracies in the Western hemisphere and their intertwined history dates back hundreds of years. The US gained its independence first, but
because of tensions within the US government over the issue of slavery, official recognition of Haiti was withheld until 1863, during the US Civil War. Although the level has varied, the US and Haiti have been trading partners for two centuries and Haitian stability has long been a concern of the US government. Instability in Haiti leading to European intervention was not acceptable and forced the US to take steps to safeguard its interests in the Caribbean. This included the direct US intervention of 1915-1934, support for the Duvalier regime (1957-1986), and the aforementioned missions in both 1994 and 2004.

The US military organization responsible for safeguarding US security interests in the Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region is the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). According to Colonel Daniel Tomlinson, US Military advisor to the Department of State, USSOUTHCOM has been forward thinking with the use of the interagency compared to the other combatant commands. The command motto is “Partnership for the Americas” and its approach to security reflects that motto. USSOUTHCOM relies on the use of soft power, diplomacy, security cooperation, humanitarian aid, and peer to peer military cooperation to achieve its goal vice relying on military power. In his 2006 book The Battle for Peace, General Anthony Zinni stated that “The keys to success on the ground are, first and foremost, a single coordinated policy that guides development of integrated programs...The policy should involve and include partners from international, regional, local, and private organizations.” Based on his experiences and successes as a Combatant Commander, General Zinni argued that this was the winning solution to diffuse the crisis before it begins. USSOUTHCOM has embraced this strategy of prevention through utilization of the softer elements of national power and has achieved some remarkable successes.
US Security Interests in the LAC

Regional destabilizing elements in USSOUTHCOM’s area of operations include the nations of Venezuela and Cuba, as well as transnational criminal groups. These elements engage in illicit trafficking of weapons, drugs, humans, and other contraband and actively seek to thwart US interests in the region. The military disparity between the US and the nations of LAC is such that a conventional conflict is highly unlikely to happen. Instead, nations like Cuba and Venezuela will attempt to engage the US in asymmetric warfare, as outlined in Colonel Max Manwaring’s article in the Military Review, “[Venezuelan President Hugo] Chavez seems to have decided that asymmetric warfare is a logical means of expression and self-assertion. That is, this kind of holistic conflict is based on words, images, and ideas. It is about perceptions, beliefs, expectations, legitimacy, and the political will.”

Chavez has already characterized the US earthquake response as “manipulating the tragedy to install North American troops in Haiti” and stipulated, disingenuously, that Venezuela was the first country to send aid to Haiti. Chavez, through his strategic information campaign, is attempting to drive the dialogue on the nature of the US involvement in the Haitian disaster relief effort by framing the US assistance as an imperialist venture reminiscent of the turn of the 20th century interventions. Those statements are not as outrageous to the target audience as it might seem as US regional policy in LAC has centered on the “war on drugs” and in recent years has fallen out of synch with LAC security concerns. While most members of the LAC region are not actively campaigning against the US efforts in the region, many have rejected the unilateralism that often accompanies those efforts.
Why should the US get involved

General Zinni succinctly stated that the problems in the unstable regions of the world will come to affect everyone in the stable part of the world. The last time that the Haiti received such a severe blow to its economy, during the UN sanctions in the 1990’s, thousands of Haitians took to the sea and tried to flee their country. Neighboring countries and the US bore the economic burden resulting from intercepting, caring for, and repatriating thousands of Haitian refugees. The 2010 Haitian earthquake has become the event that has destroyed the GOHs and UN’s ability to provide stability and the problems related to the flux in Haiti will directly affect the US and the LAC. For this reason, the US should assume a larger role in the reconstruction of Haiti for a number of reasons.

First, the GOH does not have the capacity to confront this crisis unilaterally. One-third of Haiti’s population has suffered death, injury, displacement, or disruption as a result of the earthquake. Disruptions in nationwide food distribution, governance, and development are affecting the remaining population as well. Haitian Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive estimates that a return to steady state for Haiti is four to five years.

Second, the US has the resources and expertise to significantly contribute to the effort. The US has committed millions of dollars and thousands of personnel already, making it the largest donor nation in terms of physical participation and financial contribution. The expenditure of US resources was given willingly to support the Haitian people in their time of need. As the international community has come together, there has been an overall sense that the underlying situation in Haiti must change. Stephen Johnson’s opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal summed it up best. “As the humanitarian relief effort unfolds in Haiti and plans are
drawn up for repairing the capital city of Port-au-Prince, it would be a mistake to think it is enough to restore the hemisphere's poorest country to the status quo ante.”16 This disaster has wrecked the infrastructure and the way of life of most Haitians. All that having been said, it has also presented an opportunity to reset some previously disrupted patterns and build new, stronger patterns. As the GOH, partnered with the UN, US, Canada, France and other organizations, presents a plan for reconstruction, US experts in executing national reconstruction should play a significant role in that endeavor.

Third, this is a unique moment in Haitian history. The world, for a fleeting moment, has its attention focused on Haiti. The inertia against change is lower than ever before due to the very nature of the emergency. The earthquake damaged Haiti’s infrastructure, rendered it main port barely operational, compromised its road network, and destroyed many of its federal buildings. Donor conferences and international financial institutions have promised funds for reconstruction and UN development agencies and individual nations have pledged their expertise for its execution.

The physical and institutional destruction in Haiti is so great that inertia against change is at its lowest point in a very long time. There are a number of long-term trends that are correctable due to the situation. Over the last half-century, the disruption of farming patterns due to economic crisis, mismanagement, and natural disasters resulted in farmers moving to Port-au-Prince in search of jobs. Many of these urban poor have moved back to the countryside in the wake of the earthquake, and with the proper support, can be induced to stay there and resume farming thus helping Haiti feed itself. Outdated and inadequate power infrastructure can be modernized to support the textile and light manufacturing industry that was growing prior to the
earthquake. US experts armed with the experience of Iraq and Afghanistan and reinforced with Haitian Diaspora expertise, working within the UN mandate can partner with the appropriate Haitian national stakeholders and correct decades old imbalances in the Haitian economy tying all of the efforts together vice haphazard efforts of the past. The US should partner with MINUSTAH’s military forces and both provide security and continue the work of Security Sector reform, violently disrupted by the earthquake. In every aspect of the UNSCR 1908’s mandate, the US has experts and resources to contribute.

Lastly, the US, as the predominant regional power, can ill-afford a failed state in the LAC region. Haiti holds not one strategic mineral or critical resource that the US cannot do without. The entire output of the Haitian economy represents a small fraction of the US economy and its loss would have a negligible effect if those goods were to disappear. Haiti has ranked in the top 15 on the Fund for Peace’s Failed States Index since its inception in 2005 and the recent devastation will not help to move Haiti into a better position on that list.17 As the predominant power in the region, the cost of doing business in the LAC is to help Haiti recover and this sentiment is best expressed by President Obama: “But above all, we act for a very simple reason: in times of tragedy, the United States of America steps forward and helps. That is who we are. That is what we do. For decades, America's leadership has been founded in part on the fact that we do not use our power to subjugate others, we use it to lift them up.” 18

Lifting Haiti up helps both Haiti and the US. Allowing Haiti to collapse into anarchy would have immediate and long-term effect on the LAC, reducing US prestige and increasing that of the regional destabilizing elements. Recent prominent US interventions around the world, such as the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, have factored heavily into the Venezuelan
propaganda message. Venezuelan Foreign Minister Nicholas Maduro has complained publicly about the “hegemonic, abusive form in which U.S. military has sought to address the issue of Haiti.” Venezuela will continue to attempt framing the US aid response as a military venture aimed at establishing dominance over the Haitians. The US military delivered the post-earthquake humanitarian assistance peacefully, not forcefully. The 1915, 1994, and 2004 interventions involved conflict, the use of force, and regrettably, dead Haitians. Allowing Haiti to spiral into disorder now will likely result in US intervention later that will once again involve the use of force, and most likely, dead Haitians. Those images will give Venezuela and Hugo Chavez a major advantage in the propaganda campaign they are currently waging.

**How can the US participate**

The US is a nation of riches in both intellectual and physical capital. Participation in the reconstruction needs to follow a proven model, such as the post-tsunami Indonesia, with improvements to increase the likelihood of success. In addition, the long-term results must be worth the cost of long-term reconstruction vice providing short-term disaster relief only.

**Indonesia Case Study**

There are a large number of parallels between Indonesia post-2004 tsunami and Haiti post-2010 earthquake. In 2004, a powerful tsunami smashed into Indonesia resulting in 130,000 killed, 40,000 missing, and 700,000 left homeless. The infrastructure, agriculture, and governmental structures were heavily damaged and a humanitarian crisis loomed in the aftermath. The Government of Indonesia (GOI) was fighting a separatist insurgency in the province of Aceh but by and large, was a functioning government in with institutions capable of handling a “normal” crisis. The scope of the damage and the number of people affected by the
tsunami overwhelmed the Indonesian government’s ability to respond to the crisis and the world community responded with compassionate aid and assistance.

The total humanitarian response for immediate and long-term assistance came to more than $7 billion, with $950 million coming from the US. The UN secretary-general estimated that it would take five to ten years for the reconstruction and rehabilitation to be complete and his estimate has been spot on.\textsuperscript{21} US AID has been the primary US agency in relief and recovery in Indonesia and has completed its first five year reconstruction plan. That plan focused on critical projects to facilitate recovery and the effort is now moving on to a second set of projects designed to build capacity.\textsuperscript{22}

The initial US reaction to the 2004 tsunami included a large military footprint that brought a robust capability for distributing humanitarian aid and accessing remote communities. Over 12,000 US military personnel from the USS Theodore Roosevelt Battle group and the 31\textsuperscript{st} Marine Expeditionary Unit assisted in distributing aid in Indonesia.\textsuperscript{23} Maintaining a large US military presence in the world’s most populous Muslim country had the potential to become a polarizing issue and those forces were withdrawn quickly as local capacity grew and the day to day administration of relief aid was handled by the US country team in Indonesia. US AID’s five year plan to continue the relief and recovery effort has been nested with the efforts of the GOI and the other relief agencies operating in the region. Building a relief and recovery plan for Haiti utilizing those same principles will greatly enhance the chances of success in that country as well.

One of the difficulties facing reconstruction efforts in Indonesia was the thirty year old insurgency in the Aceh province. Immediately after the tsunami devastated the area, the Free
Aceh Movement (GAM) declared a cease fire in order to de-escalate the security situation and remove barriers to humanitarian aid. As the emergency relief built and the threat of immediate starvation and disease receded, both the GAM and the Indonesian military accused each other of cease-fire violations. A return to the status quo ante of civil unrest and an intensified insurgency was building. Fortunately, much like Haiti, the widespread destruction provided a window of opportunity to reset the security situation and the massive influx of reconstruction aid provided a window of opportunity to reset some underlying causes of the conflict. Instead of providing a fertile ground for a renewed insurgency fueled by the lack of governmental response, the disaster resulted in reconstruction aid flowing through the GOI, reducing the rampant poverty and dissatisfaction that had fueled the insurgency. Negotiations between the GAM and GOI generated a political governance agreement further reduced the underlying causes for political conflict and strengthened the government’s prestige. There are some imbalances in the reconstruction effort such as a poor transition strategy from aid to self-sustainment and imbalances in reconstruction between the conflict-devastated areas and tsunami-devastated areas that must be studied and improved for the Haitian reconstruction plan to work. The Indonesian example, however, illustrates the benefits of providing reconstruction aid through governmental institutions vice uncoordinated unilateral efforts.²⁴

The Security Cooperation Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF)

UNSCR 1908 has authorized an increase of 2,000 military members and 1,500 police advisors to MINUSTAH. Deployment of a security cooperation MAGTF with a joint and interagency component to it will support the goals of the resolution and deploy the type of unit that can best fulfill the US goals. The core elements need to be augmented with civilian
contractors drawn from the Haitian expatriate community in the US. There should be liaison officers on the MAGTF staff from the various governmental agency stakeholders in the region (USAID, State Department, DEA, Coast Guard, etc) and the Security Cooperation MAGTF should be the gateway through which USSOUTHCOM synchronizes its efforts with MINUSTAH. The UN effort in Haiti is the key to successful reconstruction. Robert Maguire of the US Institute of Peace contends that “Haiti’s fragility will continue until security gains are matched by improvements in the socioeconomic status of the country and all its citizens. Helping to achieve and sustain these gains is now the U.N.’s greatest challenge.”25 Policy experts, such as the Brookings Institution, share this opinion and both emphasize that all international assistance to Haiti should be conducted under the aegis of the UN.26 Therefore, partnering with the UN and the GOH is the path to success for US efforts in Haiti.

Since 2001, the United States has been involved in the reconstruction of the countries of Iraq and Afghanistan. Thousands of Department of Defense and other Executive Branch personnel have been participating in the planning and execution of the largest US reconstruction effort since the Second World War. The US rebuilding plan in Iraq, initially poorly developed and executed by the Coalition Provisional Authority, suffered from security issues and lack of host nation input. A revision of the original concept coupled with an effective security plan, enhanced by the Anbar awakening in 2006-2007, led to mission success. While there is not a direct correlation between the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, the techniques, tactics, and procedures developed there can be drawn forward to Haiti, modified accordingly, and greatly enhance the mission and its possibility of success. Taking the lessons of establishing security
and governing capacity, empowering small businesses, and developing infrastructure at the local level to compliment those efforts and applying them to Haiti will have positive results as well.

Cost

Despite the current economic downturn, the US is still a resource rich nation. The US assistance budget for Haiti from Fiscal Year (FY) 07-10 alone totaled $1 billion dollars. This amount is for the regular US foreign assistance budget and does not address the 2010 earthquake. The day after the earthquake, President Obama pledged $100 million in US aid to Haiti, not including $48 million in food assistance. The international donor community is also bearing a portion of the burden and pledging a great deal of money, $365 million in additional direct contributions from ten other countries, two banks, and the UN. With a total of $465 million, the US contribution equates to twenty-one percent of the total contribution. With an estimated 230,000 dead, several hundred thousand injured, and over a million homeless, the rebuilding effort in Haiti will, according to former Peace Corps Director Mark Schneider, take decades and cost more than $6 billion dollars over the next five years alone just to get started. The Canadian Government hosted a donor conference in Montreal on 25 January 2010 and the responding nations pledged a 10-year commitment to Haiti. The follow-on conference held in March resulted in $5.3 billion in support for the next 18 months, including a $1.15 billion pledge from the US. These pledges echo the efforts of the international community in 2004 that raised pledges totaling $1 billion in assistance in the wake of the 2004 instability following the ouster of President Aristide.

One argument against funding long-term recovery and rehabilitation in Haiti is that with the downturn in the US economy, money going to Haiti will not help the US economy recover.
and that the US government should instead funnel those dollars into recovering the US economy. That would certainly be the case if the US economy were not interdependent on the world economy. Haiti exports 70% of its products to the United States and imports 34% of its products from the United States. These imports of food and apparel to the US and exports of food, manufactured goods, machinery, and oil are not vital to the US, but they do represent an interdependence of the two economies. The foreign aid budget of the US represents soft power and using it to build stability is less expensive in the long run than waiting to react to the crisis once it occurs. Allowing the Haitian economy to collapse would only serve to restart the migration north of its poor citizens. The UN embargo of the 1990’s wrecked the Haitian economy resulting in thousands of Haitians in overloaded boats sailing north looking for better economic opportunities in the US and Jamaica. Halting and repatriating those fleeing Haitians was a costly endeavor as the 1994 intervention, counting expenditures from 1991-1995, cost $1.6 billion in support of UN alone.\(^3\) Spending money now will help guard against long-term intervention later by building Haitian capacity. The cost of intercepting and returning a fleeing population would be high in dollars and in unplanned deployments of US Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) personnel and the money allocated will never be recovered. At least a percentage of the dollars spent directly in Haiti can come back to the US economy in terms of goods purchased from US companies.

The Haitian Diaspora consists of several million people residing within the US and Canada. The Diaspora’s financial remittances to family members in Haiti account for a significant portion of the Haitian economy and signify a willingness to do something for their country and community. The majority of the Diaspora was born in Haiti, but their children are
rapidly becoming a much larger percentage of that number. While relying on an expatriate community has its inherent difficulties, the skill base that they bring to the reconstruction effort, coupled with their language skills, cultural knowledge, and sense of ownership will be invaluable during reconstruction. According to the International Crisis Group, a non-profit, non-governmental advisory group, more than money shortages, knowledge gaps in public and private sectors continue to be one of the main obstacles to stability and development in Haiti.\textsuperscript{34} By leveraging existing programs, recently retired and unemployed members of the Haitian Diaspora can be enlisted to bring their experience to Haiti. Building from the success of programs such as the Florida Association of Voluntary Agencies for Caribbean Action (FAVACA) which sought to match technical experience of the Diaspora with shortfalls in the Haitian government, translators, cultural advisors, and technical professionals can be brought into the effort and increase drastically the likelihood of success in supporting UNSCR 1908.

Sending a force of 750 MAGTF and interagency personnel to participate in Haitian reconstruction efforts would cost approximately $600 million dollars or three times the current yearly US aid budget to Haiti. For the five to ten years of rebuilding necessary in Haiti, that would equate to $3-6 billion additional to deploy troops and interagency professionals in support of MINUSTAH.\textsuperscript{35} During the same period, expecting aid budgets to remain relatively unchanged, the US is already going to spend $2.5 billion in its regular aid budget. Deploying the Security Cooperation MAGTF to Haiti will double, and possibly triple, that expenditure in the short-term. The advantage comes in the long-term as this is an investment in the future. The more stable Haiti becomes, the less direct assistance would be necessary and likelihood of future intervention reduced. Once the Haitian economy recovers, the bilateral trade agreements
between the US and Haiti will come back into force and the mutual flow of goods can resume. Indonesia’s example illustrates how this process can work. The US aid budget for Indonesia is equivalent to that of Haiti and in return, the US is one of Indonesia’s top five trade partners and exports to Indonesia are valued at over $5 billion. The Indonesian model for reconstruction proved effective in the multinational environment and that approach can work for Haiti was well.

Strategic Interest

There is no natural resource or strategic location in Haiti that the US needs or desires. The US interest lies outside of the physical confines of Haiti and in the wider LAC. The character of the commitment to Haiti will reflect overall perception of the US. Venezuelan efforts to question US motives and cast the intervention in the poorest light have been underway since the day of the earthquake. The best way to discredit that effort is to avoid unilateralism and engage in the multinational and multiagency effort. Building capacity in Haiti through partnering with the GOH and the UN builds US prestige in the LAC and reduces that of Venezuela. By acting contrary to the Venezuelan stereotype of the US advocated by Hugo Chavez and reinforced by US-LAC engagement during the first part of the 20th century, the US can safeguard its strategic interests, reduce the effectiveness of Venezuelan propaganda, and improve the US image.

Rejecting Isolationism

Organizations such as US-First argue that the leadership of the US should “have as their one-and-only concern that these UNITED STATES get the best possible deal in our relations with other nations and with external and multi-national organizations.” While this group is certainly not a mainstream organization, the sentiment expressed by US-First is echoed in more
moderate groups as a December 2006 CNN poll reported that two-thirds of Democrats believed the US should mind its own business internationally.\textsuperscript{38} This argument has been advanced for a very long time in the US politics and has not been an effective one, based on US engagement in the world since 1945. Despite repeated calls for isolationism, the US has grown into a leader in the world community. The US is a global superpower, has been one for quite some time, and has the choice to stay engaged in the world or cede control to the UN, China, or other players on the world or regional stage. Specifically, if the US fails to lead in the LAC, then Chavez will and the US’s ability to influence other nations will decline. From his experiences as a Combatant Commander, General Zinni concluded that “We must be active and engaged in the world...we need to deftly use all our elements of national power in an integrated and intelligent manner to generate stability in parts of the world.”\textsuperscript{39} Engaging in Haiti as restoring stability will accomplish this goal but it must not be seen as a unilateral endeavor else it plays into the hands of the US critics in the LAC.

US leadership in the LAC cannot be demonstrated by aircraft carriers and US Marines imposing US policy in Haiti. It will only be demonstrated by applying USSOUTHCOM’s soft power approach to solving these security and policy issues. This is not to say that military forces have no role, just that they must work with and through the host nation to solve the security and policy issues present in Haiti. USSOUTHCOM has made a concerted effort to create partnership opportunities such as CONTINUING PROMISE, an exercise that deploys ships of the US Navy embarking joint, interagency, and international medical, engineer, and transportation personnel for stops tours throughout the LAC region conducting Medical Readiness Training Exercises (MEDRETE). The comments such as “some of you say that this
was an invasion. Sure, the United States invaded us, but they invaded us with medicines, with surgical equipment, with medical care, and with cooperation” by the Peruvian Defense Minister underscore the positive effects that such endeavors can have in the region. 40 US governmental response to the 2010 Haitian earthquake has been very careful to frame the response as a US government effort, led by US AID vice the US military, centered on the Haitian people and their protection vice yet another military imposition. Continued involvement in Haiti’s reconstruction and recovery must build on this framework and not be seen as a long-term military occupation reminiscent of the 1915 intervention.

**Avoiding Previous Failures**

Retired Marine and author Robert Heinl wrote one of the most comprehensive and balanced histories of Haiti titled *Written in Blood*. According to Heinl, the first US intervention was part success overcome by a lack of institutional buy in by the Haitian elite, part disaster by subverting the vibrant democracy of a free people. The US intervention in 1915 failed because it did not address some of the underlying dysfunctions of Haiti at the time, mainly economic reform. The 1994 and 2004 interventions were chartered differently by the UN and did not address these issues either and UNSCR 1908 only obliquely addresses these issues. The character of the 2010 and beyond US commitment must be different than the earlier interventions and must focus on partnership with the GOH and international organizations vice unilateral US actions. In a recent press conference discussing the US response to the 2010 earthquake, Cheryl Mills of the Department of State expressed that:

> the US was there to be: a partner to Haiti and ensure Haiti’s long-term sustainability and success for the Haitian people, for the GOH, because they are entitled to that. And we know that, in order to do that well, we can only do that in partnership, not by taking over. We have no intentions of doing so. 41
By not insisting on being in control and simply doing its part under the UN, the US involvement this time can bring all elements of US national power, coupled with the full weight of the UN, to focus on the problem without being overbearing.

**Over commitment of US Resources**

Fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has stretched the capacity of the US military and the interagency. With recent draw downs in US troop strength in Iraq, coupled with troop increases in Afghanistan, operational tempo should decrease overall. That having been said, creating a Security Cooperation MAGTF with a joint and interagency component can be done without taxing the military or the interagency to the breaking point. By creating a standing task force under USSOUTHCOM, the US military can source the MAGTF globally through all of the services. US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) has gained a significant amount of expertise in creating such organizations through innovative use of the DOD manpower pool. The majority of the MAGTF personnel will come from DOD, but experts and contractors from the other Executive Branch organizations will make up the remainder and will not face many of the same security concerns that are inherent in Iraq and Afghanistan.

**Conclusion**

Despite the recent setbacks in Haiti, there is both a sense of ‘enough is enough’ and a sense of optimism. In the press conference announcing the bipartisan Clinton Bush Haiti Fund, President Clinton stated that:

I believe before this earthquake Haiti had the best chance in my lifetime to escape its history...I still believe that. The Haitians want to just amend their development plan to take account of what's happened in Port-au-Prince and west, figure out what they got to do about that, and then go back to implementing it. But it's going to take a lot of help and a long time.42
The devastation inflicted upon Haiti, from both the natural disaster of 2010 and the cumulative effects of other natural disasters and years of mismanagement have brought Haiti to a pivotal point in its history. Rebuilding that which was lost can help catapult Haiti onto a path, as President Clinton stated, to escape its history. Haiti cannot rebuild alone and the US cannot provide such assistance without tying it into the larger rebuilding plan. Unilateral efforts in other parts of the world have reduced the image of US altruism and would lead to charges of imperialism if the US goes it alone. Haitian President Préval has asked for US assistance in a joint communiqué of the US and GOH stating:

on behalf of the Government and people of Haiti, [President Préval] welcomes as essential the efforts in Haiti by the Government and people of the United States to support the immediate recovery, stability and long-term rebuilding of Haiti and requests the United States to assist as needed in augmenting security in support of the Government and people of Haiti and the United Nations, international partners and organizations on the ground.

The US has the resources, the expertise, and the desire to assist Haiti. Doing so in the short-term and the long-term is an investment in regional stability and advances US strategic interests in the LAC. By offering up the resources of the US government, partnered with the UN and the GOH, the US can help Haiti to escape its history and rebuild itself into a vibrant, stable country.

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2 Author's estimate. The figure takes into account military assistance provided to Haiti since 1945, support to UN operations in Haiti during the 1990's, USAID expenditures (USAID docs), hurricane relief, and earthquake relief ($100 million plus $48 million in food assistance), and the FY2007-2010 US budget.
3 The White House, Readout of the President's Call with President Préval of Haiti. (Washington, DC, Office of the Press Secretary, 15 January 2010), http://merlin.ndu.edu.
35 Estimated data. The cost of deploying troops to Iraq for the surge was $140,625 per servicemember, per month. Deploying 750 personnel to Iraq for 12 months would cost $1.2 billion. Troops deploying to Haiti have significantly reduced costs associated with deployment of the force as well as maintenance of the force. There is no requirement for high cost equipment such as tanks and fixed wing aviation. See Congressional Budget Office, “Troop Increase Memo”, (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, 1 Feb 2007) http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/77xx/doc7778/Trooplncrease.pdf (accessed 18 February 2010)
42 The White House Press Office, Remarks by President Obama, Former President Bill Clinton, and Former President George W. Bush on the Recovery and Rebuilding Effort in Haiti (Washington, DC, Office of the Press Secretary, 16 January 2010) http://merlin.ndu.edu
43 The White House Press Office, Joint Communique of the Governments of the United States and Haiti, (Washington, DC, Office of the Press Secretary, 17 January 2010) http://merlin.ndu.edu
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Christopher Columbus landed in Hispaniola in 1492 and claimed it in the name of Spain. He found a native population of Carib Indians that were soon decimated by smallpox and other European diseases and while there was no gold to be found, there was suitable land to establish sugar plantations. With the destruction of the native population, the increased labor demands of the plantations could not be fulfilled by the islands local inhabitants. Other Caribbean Indians were imported, but they too succumbed to disease. The solution was to use African slaves and in 1510, the first shipments of these unfortunate souls arrived on Hispaniola. The French and English soon moved into the area and established their own colonies, challenging Spanish hegemony on Hispaniola.

By 1659, the French had established dominance over Western Hispaniola and began importing new crops such as cocoa to the island. These cash crops required large labor forces as well and by 1633 the first African slaves were imported by the French. For the next century and a half, abysmal conditions for the slave population resulted in numerous slave uprisings that were characterized by savagery on both sides. The last slave revolt that resulted in the independence of Haiti began amid the backdrop of the French revolution and a war between France, England, and Spain. Out of this three cornered war raging throughout the island of Hispaniola came Toussaint L'Overture, a black Haitian general initially in the service of Spain. At the height of his victories, he turned on Spain and their desire to reinstitute slavery and drove them from Eastern Hispaniola. In 1798, the British left Haiti to the Haitians, and by 1799, a civil war between the black Haitians and the mixed blood mulatres had begun. By November, 1800 Toussaint had defeated the mulatres and taken possession of Santo Domingo from the Spanish.
These triumphs were to be short-lived, however, as in doing so he had incurred the ire of Napoleon.

As soon as France and England signed a peace treaty ending the war, Napoleon sent 20,000 troops to regain control of Hispaniola. By 1802, the French captured Toussaint and exiled him to France where he died shortly thereafter. Disease, the enemy of most of Haiti's invader's, reduced the French army drastically and on 1 January 1804, Toussaint's successor Jean-Jacques Dessalines declared Haitian independence. The captured French wounded were thrown into the sea and the remaining French citizens, with few exceptions, were rounded up and slaughtered. The revolution to free Haiti had resulted in killing half of the black population, almost all of the white population, and a large percentage of the mulatre population. The educated whites and Haitians died birthing the nation, leaving only an illiterate general and few skilled administrators to build the country.

By 1806, assassination claimed Dessalines and the cycle of violence, revolution, and destruction continued unabated for the next century. In the first 111 years of its existence two of the twenty-six presidents changed office peacefully. The Haitian presidents ruled by decree, the mulatre elites made their living off of the public treasury, and the poor blacks were left with next to nothing. European banking interests maintained a presence in Haiti and US trade continued. The US contemplated intervening in Haiti on several occasions, both politically and militarily, but never actually did until 1915. In an effort to counter European attempts at establishing a naval station in the North of Haiti, US Marines and sailors landed at Port-au-Prince and seized control. For the next 19 years, US military and civilian officials occupied key offices in the
Haitian government and attempted to stabilize the country. US officials ran the customs service and ensured that the revenues went to the national treasury instead of the pockets of the elites. They stabilized the currency, enacted financial reform, paid off Haiti’s debts and made the country solvent again. Military officials put down two uprisings by the Caco’s, bandits from the north of Haiti, and established the Gendarmerie to replace the highly politicized army. The occupation provided infrastructure improvements, financial solvency, and improved the lives of the majority of the Haitian people. It also ran counter to the fierce independence of the Haitians and infringed on the livelihood of the elites who soon tired of the American presence. With political pressure in the US mounting and the world economy worsening, the US withdrew its officials in 1934. By 1936, the president of Haiti had re-written the constitution and declared himself president for life. Revenues fell with the great depression, the Gendarmerie (now named the Gaurde d’Haiti) politicized, and things looked bleak.

World War II saw a stabilization of Haiti resulting from US guarantees to buy Haiti’s cotton (abandoned by the British) and provide lend-lease military equipment to modernize the armed forces. In 1946, that modernized military seized control of the country in a coup and called for new elections. Communism raised its head for the first time as disorder reigned, but a new constitution was written, elections held, and a new president installed. The Gaurde returned power to the elected officials and stood behind the new president. The new president quickly nationalized the Standard Fruit Company’s banana monopoly and mismanagement rapidly destroyed the second-largest source of revenue for Haiti forcing the government to go looking for loans. In 1947, this quest brought them to the UN where Haiti became a test case for solving the problems of bringing technical aid to underdeveloped countries. None of these programs
brought the revenue needed and the cycle of presidents failing to make the economy work continued until 1957 with the election of Francois Duvalier. When his term ended in 1961, he illegally ran for reelection (the Haitian constitution only allows for one term) and won, 1.3 million votes to zero. As many of his predecessors had before, he declared himself president for life and consolidated his grip on Haiti after an aborted coup attempt by former military officers. He gutted the army and established his own militia called Tonton Macoutes, named after legendary Voodoo bogeymen. Duvalier masterfully struck a foreign policy course with the US by at times appearing staunchly anti-communist and at times hinting that Haiti might have to turn to the Warsaw Bloc to get what it needed. Internally, Duvalier arrested dissidents, raided the treasury and consolidated his power using his paramilitary Macoutes. When his health failed in 1971, he held a national plebiscite to pass control over to his son, and surprising no one, Jean-Claude was elected 2.3 million to zero. Duvalier continued the policies of his father but did not have the same abilities and was forced out by growing internal pressure from the military and external pressure from the US in 1986, paving the way for new elections. In 1990, Jean Bertrand Aristide was elected as president of Haiti, but the military soon ousted him and once again ran the country. The UN took exception to the coup and enacted economic sanctions against the regime that mainly resulted in wrecking the always fragile Haitian economy. Sanctions ended in 1994 with the return of Aristide to Haiti, guaranteed by US forces and the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). Aristide once again disbanded the army and established the Haitian National Police (HNP). UNMIH ran from 1993-1996 and focused on democratic presidential elections which were completed by 1996 with Rene Preval was elected president. Preval set about privatizing many government enterprises and brought unemployment to its lowest level
since the Duvalier years. His programs were heavily contested by those who lived off of the
graft and corruption of the government enterprises and he ruled for his last year alone after
dissolving the legislature. In 2000, Aristide was reelected to the presidency in a contest marked
by heavy voter fraud and low turnout. His second reign was characterized by terrorizing his
opposition, turning Haiti into a narco-trafficking state, and embezzling funds out of the treasury.
In 2004, Aristide resigned and went into exile under pressure by former military members, the
US, and France. US Marines deployed to maintain stability during transition to a second UN
mission, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which is still ongoing.
Préval was once again elected in 2006 and has changed the direction of Haitian diplomacy. He
has engaged heavily with other Latin American nations, including an agreement for Venezuela to
build an oil refinery and several power plants in Haiti. Under his reign, the Haitian economy
began to grow slowly and infrastructure projects were started. This growth was severely
interrupted by the 2008 Hurricane season and the January 2010 earthquake.

1 Robert Debs Heinl, Jr. and Nancy Gordon Heinl Written in Blood: The Story of the Haitian People 1492-1971
(Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1978). For a great number of years, this book was considered the definitive
history of Haiti. See also Harold Davis Black Democracy and Thomas Madiou Histoire d’Haiti for early Haitian
history and Amy Wilentz The Rainy Season for 1970-2005 history.
Problem Framing

The first step in the Marine Corps Planning Process is problem framing. Per the Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 5-1 Functional Working Draft, the purpose of Problem Framing is to gain an enhanced understanding of the environment and the nature of the problem.¹ To frame this particular problem I have chosen to use the systems approach to understanding the operational environment outlined in the Commander’s Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations published by the Joint Warfighting Center.² This approach defines the key indicators of the system as Political, Military, Economic, Security, Infrastructure, and Information. In this instance, Security and Military have been combined as Haiti’s armed forces still exists in the written law but does not have any physical structure.

Political

The US has been committed to a partnership with Haiti since before Haiti was a country. That partnership has ebbed and flowed according to US domestic politics but the partnership has been a constant factor in US Caribbean policy. President Obama reaffirmed that partnership by confirming “my administration’s steadfast commitment to come to the aid of those in Haiti working to ensure that Haiti’s future is stable, sustainable and prosperous”³ prior to the January 2010 earthquake. In a press briefing after the earthquake, the president stated that

this is a time when we are reminded of the common humanity that we all share. With just a few hundred miles of ocean between us and a long history that binds us together, Haitians are neighbors of the Americas and here at home. So we have to be there for them in their hour of need.⁴

Two previous US Presidents, William Clinton and George W. Bush, have both committed US forces to Haiti in an effort to stabilize the country and to provide much needed security in order
for the Government of Haiti (GOH) to concentrate on providing for her people. While the US as a nation is committed to helping Haiti in principle, the methodology remains less clear.

Haitian political views are a little less clear. The President of Haiti has favorable views toward the US and is supported by the US. Unfortunately, efforts at stamping out corruption in the Haitian government have met with only limited success. Keeping the government weak allows for greater financial opportunities for those who are corrupt. The Haitian government is well aware of the economic and social ties between the US and Haiti and that prior to the earthquake, seventy percent of Haitian exports were to the US. Additionally, the Haitian Diaspora is heavily represented in the US. An estimated two million Haitians live in the US, the largest population outside of Haiti.\(^5\) Roughly one-third of Haiti’s income base comes from remittances from the Diaspora. These elements of Haitian society look to the US to support Haiti and would likely support an increase in the US presence partnering with MINUSTAH.

There is another vocal portion of the population that does not support a US or UN presence in their country and want to see both ended immediately. Former President Aristide’s *Fanmi Lavalas* has repeatedly called the 2004 transfer of power a coup d’etat orchestrated by the US, France, and Canada and that the UN presence is illegal. They have asserted that the UN occupation has murdered innocent Haitians and that the UN is preventing the lawfully elected leader of the country from returning. These elements of Haitian society would not look favorably upon an increase in the US presence in support of UNSCR 1908.

**Military/Security**

Haiti’s security concerns have both an internal and an external element. Internally, the population does not view the Haitian National Police (HNP) as a neutral actor, the justice system
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as unbiased, and the prison system effective or humane. Externally, drug trafficking coupled with the violence and instability it brings are serious concerns in Haiti. There is no external military threat to Haiti’s sovereignty.

Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a vital part of the UNSCR establishing MINUSTAH. The initial composition of MINUSTAH was twenty percent law enforcement in an effort “to assist the Transitional Government in monitoring, restructuring and reforming the Haitian National Police, consistent with democratic policing standards, including through the vetting and certification of its personnel.” The target goal of the HNP is 14,000 trained officers and one of the biggest hurdles is vetting the force. There are significant concerns that personnel who have committed human rights abuses in the past will become a part of the rebuilt HNP. With a long track record of militia groups, military coups, and gang violence, ensuring that vetted, certified personnel fill the ranks of the HNP is an important factor in the reform.

The most recent UNSCR has increased the police component of the mission to 3711 in an effort to regain momentum lost to the earthquake.

Haiti’s legal system is confusing, in conflict with international law, out of date, and in serious need of overhaul. First, the basic legal code has been augmented with a series of presidential decrees and most legal entities do not have copies of all of the laws. Second, a large part of Haitian law predates the development of the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights and violates several of those principles, such as freedom of speech. Lastly, the written law is out of date, excluding concepts such as cybercrime, torture, or child pornography. Justice sector reform was well underway with a scheduled roll-out of the new legal code in 2011 and an implementation in 2013. The status of that entire project is in doubt as the 2010 earthquake has
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disrupted the entire government and decimated the UN headquarters. How many of those personnel were part of the justice system reform is unclear, but it can be reasonably assumed that the project is now stalled for the immediate future.

Haiti has a growing illicit drug trade that under Aristide had state sponsorship. Due to the weak security situation, endemic corruption, and crushing poverty, the financial power of illicit drugs is a very real threat to Haiti’s security. Haiti’s president has called drug trafficking the major threat to political transition, to police and judicial reform, and to clean political campaigns. SSR directly addressing the growing drug trade was well underway with joint raids by the HNP and UN forces that, as of January 2010, had put a large number of criminals in jail.11 One of the structures that was destroyed in the January 2010 earthquake was the central prison. To date, the number of prisoners killed versus the number who escaped is not known, but it can be reasonable expected that these individuals will exploit the weakened security situation and attempt to reestablish their networks.12

Economic

Haiti and the US have close economic ties that have deep roots. After the American Revolution, Northern Merchants traded fish, meat, gunpowder, and consumer goods with Haiti for sugar, molasses, rum, and coffee. By 1790, 11 percent of US exports were bound for Haiti.13 This trade relationship is still very evident today. 70 percent of Haiti’s exports go to the US and 35 percent of its imports come from the US. Haitian coffee still flows north as do apparel, mangoes, cocoa, and assembled manufactured goods.14 Unfortunately, Haiti’s economy relies heavily on agricultural exports, which can be disrupted by natural disasters such as hurricanes and earthquakes, and apparel exports, which are contingent on a stable security environment.
UNSCR 1908 calls for establishing a secure and safe environment that will facilitate the apparel trade and for continuing the terms of the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper established by the Haitian Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation, aimed at growing agriculture, infrastructure, and tourism.\textsuperscript{15} These reforms are vital to Haiti's stability due to historic and recent upheavals in the agricultural sector. In 1954, in the wake of Hurricane Hazel, peasants turned the thousands of fallen trees into charcoal and boosted that industry.\textsuperscript{16} During the UN sanctions in the mid 1990's, the use of charcoal instead of cooking oil completed the work of the previous decades and some parts of Haiti are now heavily deforested.\textsuperscript{17} In 1994, Haiti entered into an agreement with the International Monetary Fund for a loan whose terms included a cut on food import tariffs. The resultant cut from a 500\% to a 3\% tariff flooded the Haitian market with cheaper rice from the US and drove prices down far enough to seriously upset the domestic rice industry. This sent thousands of farmers from their fields and into the capital to find work.\textsuperscript{18} All of these past solutions to contemporary issues have created the current set of problems. With the massive disruption of Haiti due to the 2010 earthquake, there is a window of opportunity to reset some of these imbalances. With the lack of safe housing, economic upheaval, and security concerns, many poor Haitians are moving out of the capital and back to the towns from whence they came. There is an opportunity to revitalize the agricultural sector at a time when there is a great deal of labor moving back to the production fields.

**Information**

Haiti does not have a large external threat to its sovereignty. As such, Haiti does not have a government structure designed to collect information on its neighbors or perceived adversaries. Narcotrafficking and government corruption represent the greatest threats to Haiti.
and the HNP is the primary agency to gather information on those activities. As discussed in the Security section, the HNP’s progress toward ending drug trafficking and corruption have been promising, but those gains will have been severely disrupted by the earthquake.

Public information systems are severely lacking in Haiti. The telephone system hardware has suffered from neglect and abuse over the years and the recent availability of inexpensive cellular phones has created an upsurge in the number of Haitian phone users to the extent that there are over 3 million cell phones. There are nine internet providers and one million internet customers as well. Both the phone system and internet system suffer from a lack of reliable power source and locally generated power is a large factor in whether or not a Haitian has access to either.

**Infrastructure**

Haiti’s infrastructure before the 2010 earthquake was poor at best. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton specifically mentioned building infrastructure such as roads to help improve the Haitian economy in a 2009 visit. Google Earth (google.earth.com), the Google satellite website, has updated its coverage of parts of Haiti affected by the earthquake and the damage to public buildings, roads, and key infrastructure appears to be extensive. The international port servicing the capital included a large amount of reclaimed land that has collapsed into the ocean, taking the cranes at the port with it. This has created submerged hazards to navigation that will make it more difficult to get ships into the port. Without those cranes, unloading ships filled with trade or relief goods will take exponentially longer. Once those relief goods are unloaded, they have to be distributed through a road network that is poor in good times and currently choked with rubble. The UN headquarters building, national palace, and airport control tower...
are all either collapsed or condemned. The hospitals have suffered severe damage as have police stations, the main prison, and important public buildings. The public infrastructure is shattered and needs to be rebuilt from the ground up. Power generating capacity is woefully inadequate and any plan to revitalize the infrastructure of Haiti must include increased power generation and distribution hardware and perhaps alternative energy solutions to bring power to remote areas and reduce dependency on economy sapping oil imports. This presents an opportunity for extensive renewal and modernization if it is done correctly. The planned renovation of the road network outside of the capital must be undertaken as well as the 2008 hurricane season damaged degraded the ability of Haitian produce to make it to market. Poorly designed roads to the north and south of Port-au-Prince must be renovated and modernized to foster the economic growth of the country.

4 The White House Press Office, Remarks by the President on Rescue Efforts in Haiti, 13 January 2010 http://merlin.ndu.edu
9 Author’s personal conversation with local law enforcement and airport officials in Les Cayes, Haiti, May 2004. HNP from the capital would convoy to the remote airstrip outside of Les Cayes, meet the drug