When U.S. forces departed Iraq on 15 December 2011 to return to the U.S., they did so much as General George B. McClellan had left the Peninsula to return to Washington, D.C. on 20 August 1862. The U.S. had lost a great deal of blood and treasure with little to show for its expenditure. This thesis addresses several aspects of the 1862 Peninsula Campaign and the 2003 Iraq invasion as well as the contemporary doctrine concerning risk. There were many contributing factors to the Army of the Potomac culminating in 1862 and U.S. failures in Iraq in 2003. A major contributing factor was reluctance for leaders at the strategic, operational, and tactical level to take risk. During the execution of these campaigns leaders focused on what might be lost instead of what could be gained. The 1862 Peninsular Campaign illuminates problems still with us despite 150 years of vast changes in the conduct of war. I contend that culmination in 1862, and culmination during the post 9/11 campaigns, resulted from inadequate responses to risk aversion by the government and military leaders, when faced with uncertainty.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
History, Risk Aversion, Campaign Planning, Campaign Execution

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:
   a. REPORT Unclassified
   b. ABSTRACT Unclassified
   c. THIS PAGE Unclassified
1. **REPORT DATE.** Full publication date, including day, month, if available. Must cite at least the year and be Year 2000 compliant, e.g. 30-06-1998; xx-06-1993; xx-xx-1998.

2. **REPORT TYPE.** State the type of report, such as final, technical, interim, memorandum, master’s thesis, progress, quarterly, research, special, group study, etc.

3. **DATES COVERED.** Indicate the time during which the work was performed and the report was written, e.g., Jun 1997 - Jun 1998; 1-10 Jun 1996; May - Nov 1998; Nov 1998.

4. **TITLE.** Enter title and subtitle with volume number and part number, if applicable. On classified documents, enter the title classification in parentheses.

5a. **CONTRACT NUMBER.** Enter all contract numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. F33615-86-C-5169.

5b. **GRANT NUMBER.** Enter all grant numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. AFOSR-82-1234.

5c. **PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER.** Enter all program element numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. 61101A.

5d. **PROJECT NUMBER.** Enter all project numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. 1F665702D1257; ILIR.

5e. **TASK NUMBER.** Enter all task numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. 06; RF0330201; T4112.

5f. **WORK UNIT NUMBER.** Enter all work unit numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. 001; AFAPL30480105.

6. **AUTHOR(S).** Enter name(s) of person(s) responsible for writing the report, performing the research, or credited with the content of the report. The form of entry is the last name, first name, middle initial, and additional qualifiers separated by commas, e.g. Smith, Richard, J, Jr.

7. **PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES).** Self-explanatory.

8. **PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER.** Enter all unique alphanumeric report numbers assigned by the performing organization, e.g. BRL-1234; AFWL-TR-85-4017-Vol-21-PT-2.

9. **SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES).** Enter the name and address of the organization(s) financially responsible for and monitoring the work.

10. **SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S).** Enter, if available, e.g. BRL, ARDEC, NADC.

11. **SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S).** Enter report number as assigned by the sponsoring/monitoring agency, if available, e.g. BRL-TR-829; -215.

12. **DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT.** Use agency-mandated availability statements to indicate the public availability or distribution limitations of the report. If additional limitations/ restrictions or special markings are indicated, follow agency authorization procedures, e.g. RD/FRD, PROPIN, ITAR, etc. Include copyright information.

13. **SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES.** Enter information not included elsewhere such as: prepared in cooperation with; translation of; report supersedes; old edition number, etc.

14. **ABSTRACT.** A brief (approximately 200 words) factual summary of the most significant information.

15. **SUBJECT TERMS.** Key words or phrases identifying major concepts in the report.

16. **SECURITY CLASSIFICATION.** Enter security classification in accordance with security classification regulations, e.g. U, C, S, etc. If this form contains classified information, stamp classification level on the top and bottom of this page.

17. **LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT.** This block must be completed to assign a distribution limitation to the abstract. Enter UU (Unclassified Unlimited) or SAR (Same as Report). An entry in this block is necessary if the abstract is to be limited.
AN AVERSION TO RISK; A WARNING FROM THE PAST

by

Jay Briggs

Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army National Guard
AN AVERSION TO RISK; A WARNING FROM THE PAST

by

Jay Briggs

Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army National Guard

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

Signature: [Signature]

1 March 2014

Thesis Adviser: Signature: [Signature]

Richard E. Wiersema, COL, Thesis Advisor

Approved by: Signature: [Signature]

Gregory Miller, PhD, Committee Member

Signature: [Signature]

Stirling Pavelec, PhD, Committee Member

Signature: [Signature]

Richard E. Wiersema, Colonel, US Army Director, Joint Advanced Warfighting School
ABSTRACT

When U.S. forces departed Iraq on 15 December 2011 to return to the U.S., they did so much as General George B. McClellan had left the Peninsula to return to Washington, D.C. on 20 August 1862. The U.S. had lost a great deal of blood and treasure with little to show for its expenditure. This thesis addresses several aspects of the 1862 Peninsula Campaign and the 2003 Iraq invasion as well as the contemporary doctrine concerning risk. There were many contributing factors to the Army of the Potomac culminating in 1862 and U.S. failures in Iraq in 2003. A major contributing factor was reluctance for leaders at the strategic, operational, and tactical level to take risk. During the execution of these campaigns, as uncertainty clouded the theaters, the common characteristic among leaders was their greater appreciation of what might be lost than what could be gained, and taking counsel of their fears, they sidestepped hazard, but also opportunity, and opened the U.S. to greater risks. The 1862 Peninsular Campaign illuminates problems still with us despite 150 years of vast changes in the conduct of war. There are obvious differences between then and now, but there is an unsettling similarity. I contend that culmination in 1862, and culmination during the post 9/11 campaigns, resulted from inadequate responses to risk aversion by the government and military leaders, when faced with uncertainty.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I visited The Richmond National Battlefield Park at Chimborazo Medical Museum and had the opportunity to speak with the National Parks chief historian for the Battles for Richmond, Robert E. Krick. He was instrumental in focusing my attention on several excellent primary sources to include the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion and the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies in the War of the Rebellion.

I would like to thank the Joint Advanced Warfighting School Director and my thesis advisor, Colonel Richard Wiersema, for his initial challenge to take on this topic, his detailed comments, and finally his patience as we worked through this interesting assignment.

I would like to thank the superb staff at the Joint Forces Staff College Ike Skeleton Library. They helped me secure all of Mr. Krick’s and Colonel Wiersema’s recommendations and assisted greatly in formatting the paper.
DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate this to my loving family. My wife, son, and daughter sacrifice a great deal. Being a geographic bachelor, my family was unable to see me on multiple weekends due to my obligations, this paper being one of them. I greatly appreciated their love and support throughout. They have no idea how much it meant to me when they took me to Gettysburg during my mid-tour leave from Afghanistan.

To my father, I would like to thank him for sparking my interest in the great Civil War as we huddled around the wood stove in the cold Adirondack air. I appreciate his willingness to provide multiple edits to this paper.
Intentionally left blank
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: Thesis ............................................................................................................ 1

CHAPTER 2: Context of the Peninsula Campaign
   The Strategic Environment in 1862 .............................................................................. 4
   McClellan's Background .............................................................................................. 8
   Geography .................................................................................................................... 14
   The Plan ..................................................................................................................... 16

CHAPTER 3: Execution
   Lincoln and Stanton ..................................................................................................... 21
   Goldsborough and Missroon ....................................................................................... 23
   McClellan .................................................................................................................. 30

CHAPTER 4: Contemporary Example ............................................................................. 37

CHAPTER 5: Synthesis / Conclusion ............................................................................. 50

APPENDICES:
   A: Maps ..................................................................................................................... 56
   B: Chronological Events ............................................................................................. 60
   C: Organization Tables ............................................................................................... 70

Bibliography: .................................................................................................................. 72
Intentionally left blank
CHAPTER 1: THESIS

On 4 April 1862, 35-year-old Major General George B. McClellan and his Army of the Potomac stepped off from Fort Monroe, Virginia towards Richmond, Virginia; he did so with the largest army ever assembled in North America up to that time. It had 121,000 soldiers, 14,592 animals, 1,150 wagons, 74 ambulances, and 44 artillery batteries.¹ A European advisor remarked that it resembled “the stride of a giant.”² Equally remarkable, 113 steamers, 188 schooners, and 88 barges floated McClellan’s army from the outskirts of Washington, D.C. to Fort Monroe to establish its initial staging area.³ As one Confederate officer noted, “the thick clouds of trouble were gathering.”⁴ McClellan’s Army was four times the size of the Confederate force directly to his front, and backed by a nation possessing economic, technological, and demographic superiority over its opponent. Despite this tremendous combat power, McClellan’s 1862 Peninsula Campaign ended in abject failure. The Army of the Potomac culminated eight miles from its intended objective, the Confederate capital of Richmond, even though it faced a weaker force commanded by an untried general. After six months and at the cost of 15,849 men,⁵ McClellan abandoned the campaign. The Army of the Potomac fell back to defend its own capital, and ultimately the Union interior itself, after the Confederate victory at Second Bull Run and subsequent invasion.

² Ibid.
³ Ibid.
⁴ Ibid.
of Maryland. How, given so many advantages, did operational stalemate, followed by strategic crisis, result in so short a time?

The 1862 Peninsular Campaign illuminates problems still with us despite 150 years of vast changes in the conduct of war. What are relevant for contemporary planners are not the obvious differences between then and now, but the unsettling similarities. In 1862, as in post-2001 operations, U.S. forces enjoyed material and organizational advantages over their opponents. They further exploited the strategic initiative through the use of uncontested approaches (at sea, in 1862 and by air and sea post-2001). Both campaigns featured new developments in intelligence gathering, strategic and operational movement, and weapons. There also maybe a parallel, in the strategic reversals that followed the collapse of McClellan’s campaign, and the ominous developments since the culmination of our recent military expeditions over the last ten years. Yet the campaigns share an additional characteristic in common. This thesis posits that culmination in 1862, and culmination during the post 9/11 campaigns, resulted from inadequate responses to risk aversion by the government and military leaders, when faced with uncertainty.

To examine this, this thesis describes the setting in 1862, McClellan’s background, geography, the Peninsular Campaign plan and how numerous leaders, faced with uncertainty, gradually lost their grip on the strategic initiative and ceded it to the Confederates. The thesis then examines a contemporary military campaign, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, that culminated short of its announced objectives. In testing for evidence of the presence and influence of risk aversion in the U.S. military leaders
involved, the thesis uses the *JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning* definition of risk:

"Probability and severity of loss linked to hazards."\(^6\) It further assesses decision-making with the common model that, when approaching culmination, the leadership faces one of three options: press on, fall back, or do nothing. Lastly, the thesis examines the premise that, despite great changes in the conduct of war across almost 150 years, neither effectively synchronizing joint forces, mastering emerging changes in technology, nor achieving situational awareness is as fundamental to avoiding culmination in a campaign as overcoming risk aversion. The inconclusive outcomes generated by our overseas expeditions since the 9/11 terrorist attacks suggest that overcoming risk aversion is to operational art what closing the last 100 yards is to infantry tactics: a decision space fraught with hazard and friction, which cannot be reduced by larger numbers, all-seeing intelligence, or full-spectrum dominance.

---

CHAPTER 2: CONTEXT OF THE PENINSULA CAMPAIGN

The Strategic Environment in 1862

By the spring of 1862, the American Civil War was little over a year old. In July 1861, the Confederates had defeated the Union army in the war’s first sizeable battle, at Bull Run, 25 miles southwest of Washington D.C. Following this reverse, instead of regrouping, reorganizing, and retraining, Major General Irvin McDowell’s defeated Union Army roamed the capital city’s streets and taverns.¹

A retrospective view from 1862 to eighteenth-century European warfare reveals the context for American military experiences at that time. Warfare up until the eighteenth-century featured small professional armies that conducted sieges or set piece battles. However, by the end of the eighteenth, and start of the nineteenth centuries, the wars of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars featured large, conscripted armies conducting distributed operations over considerable distances.

When thinking about war, the United States looked to Europe. With a common ancestry as well as an understanding of the European powers as potential threats, the United States measured itself against European standards, and had an interest in professionalizing its officer corps. Seeing deficiency in the American military performance during the War of 1812, Sylvanus Thayer, superintendent of the United States Military Academy at West Point, set about building a strategy linking ground war and maritime defense in 1817.² Thayer introduced a cadre of faculty who brought forth

principles from European (mainly French) military literature. By restructuring the curriculum, Thayer emphasized the importance of studying history and theory.\(^3\) West Point in turn served as the foundational experience in thinking about war for many notable Civil War officers. Among its graduates were Robert E. Lee, Benjamin S. Ewell, George G. Meade, John Sedgwick, George Henry Thomas, William T. Sherman, Ulysses S. Grant, Thomas Jackson, Ambrose P. Hill, Oliver O. Howard, and James E. B. Stuart to name a few.\(^4\)

European theory developed following the Napoleonic Wars and provided additional influences on American doctrine. While the now widely taught ideas of Carl von Clausewitz likely did not influence American strategy, as his writings did not appear in English until 1873.\(^5\) His contemporary military theorist, Antoine Henri, Baron de Jomini’s writings became the foundation for West Point instruction regarding strategy.\(^6\)

Jomini had affinity for the eighteenth-century Enlightenment and was interested in controlling geographic spaces. Jomini championed some characteristics of Napoleonic offensive warfare, namely with regard to flanking and turning movements. Jomini also advocated throwing the bulk of one’s force at a decisive point defended by a numerically inferior portion of the opponent’s force. One of Jomini’s general principles of war stated the following: “In imparting to the troops the greatest possible mobility and activity, so as, by their successive employment upon points where it may be important to act, to bring superior force to bear upon fractions of the hostile army.”\(^7\) He also stressed the

---

\(^3\) Ibid.


\(^6\) Ibid., 83.

importance of operating on interior (versus exterior) lines to maneuver one’s army quickly against the opponent. Jomini believed in using maneuver in an offensive strategy of attrition, not a strategy of annihilation. In short, he advocated deliberate, measured campaigning in the style of pre-Napoleonic armies that fought the dynastic wars of the 1700s.

Napoleonic theory, by contrast, appeared more force-oriented. Napoleon once wrote, “There are in Europe many good generals, but they see too many things at once. I see only one thing, namely the enemy’s main body. I try to crush it, confident that secondary matters will then settle themselves.”

West Point officers schooled to view European war through Jomini’s ideas and Napoleon’s experiences had more recent contemporary examples to contemplate by the outbreak of the Civil War. The 1853-1856 Crimean War offered examples of campaign design as well as insight into emerging technologies that would soon radically change the conduct of large-scale, state versus state wars. In particular, that war saw British, French, and Turkish forces use the Black Sea approach for a strategic flanking movement aimed at Russia’s naval base in Sebastopol.

In addition, the British and French used the latest technology such as the Minié ball rifle, battlefield telegraph, and ironclad warships. The transition to percussion cap, single-shot, muzzle-loading rifles, allowed both sides to exchange accurate fire from 500 yards. The increased range was significant because tactics had not evolved from the

---

9 Ibid., 79.
Napoleonic War era where smoothbore muskets were only accurate up to 100 yards. Infantryman had four times the standoff yet continued to fight from massed formations, which contributed to the horrific casualty rates. No less noticed was the grim tally of 100,000 casualties that resulted from the eight-month siege of Sebastopol, a high cost for the initially bold and largely bloodless strategic movement by sea against Russia’s southern flank.  

At the same time, the Industrial Revolution was producing new capabilities that American generals had to grapple with during the Civil War. Railroads and steamships were able to move larger armies at greater rates over larger distances efficiently. The telegraph allowed coordination of large bodies of men and for rapid intelligence report distribution. For the first time, hydrogen gas balloons floated above the battlefield.  

In fielding and employing these emerging capabilities, the North held the great advantages due to its factories, labor pool, and infrastructure. The North enjoyed a well-educated and well-trained workforce. With a steady supply of immigrants to fuel their mechanistic, labor intensive factories, northern cities cranked out a steady supply of cannon, shell, uniforms, rifles, and other physical tools required to wage war. The South was not as fortunate. The few industrial cities such as New Orleans, Atlanta, and Richmond were essential yet they were inadequate to compete with northern production. The less populated, agrarian South depended on exports.

that expanded as it passed through the rifling. This smaller round eased the task of using a ramrod to seat the bullet.

13 Rafuse, McClellan’s War, 31.
14 Keegan, The American Civil War, 7.
Its transportation infrastructure was immature in comparison. Plantations still depended largely on rivers to transport their agricultural goods.\textsuperscript{15} By contrast, the North had a robust rail infrastructure of 14,000 miles of track, against the South’s 8,783 miles.\textsuperscript{16} Also, by retaining most of the American pre-war Navy, the Union had more warships and therefore the strategic advantage at sea. In addition, northern coastal cities had most of the shipbuilding yards.\textsuperscript{17}

The Union further had an information advantage over the Confederacy, again due to its infrastructure. In 1847, there were only 2,000 miles of telegraph wire compared to the 50,000 miles strung by the outbreak of the Civil War, and most of this growth occurred in the North.\textsuperscript{18} As a result, the Union controlled five times the amount of the telegraph wire compared to the Confederates. The Union employed its Military Telegraph Service and U.S. Signal Corps to lay additional wire. Throughout the war, the Union laid an additional 6,500 miles of telegraph line compared to the 1,000 miles installed by the Confederates.\textsuperscript{19}

**McClellan’s Background**

Following McClellan’s success during a small campaign in western Virginia, Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton appointed McClellan to command McDowell’s defeated army in November 1861. McClellan quickly reversed the army’s poor morale through applications of discipline, organization, training, and leadership and eventually named it the Army of the Potomac. As the key figure in organizing and then employing

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 70.
\textsuperscript{17} Keegan, *The American Civil War*, 117.
this new army, McClellan’s background is of special interest. A glimpse into McClellan’s background reveals where he developed his ideas.

Despite the attempts to organize military thought described earlier, there was no formal army, navy, or joint doctrine available to the Army of the Potomac. McClellan had two waypoints to follow: his formal study of history, and his own military experience, especially during the Mexican War. Then as now, a professional military officer had some acquaintance with classic theories of warfare, and was exposed to Thucydides’ belief that studying the past would prepare leaders to act in the future when faced with similar choices.\textsuperscript{20} Today, planners also accept that the past has predictive value.

The evidence indicates that if McClellan was not a student of history, he drew on the experiences of others, mainly Jomini, through his formal education. He was academically talented. At 13 years-old, McClellan attended a prep school at the University of Pennsylvania and entered West Point at age 15. He graduated 2/59 in the class of 1846.\textsuperscript{21} Despite being two years younger than his peers, he excelled in his rigorous study and thrived in the hyper-competitive environment.\textsuperscript{22} However, West Point devoted little time to preparing its future officers to develop strategic thought. Students learned to think at the tactical level, maneuvering small units of soldiers appropriate to a small army operating across a vast continent, with the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans keeping large-scale foreign incursions at bay. Given the unlikely sudden appearance of a

\textsuperscript{22} Rafuse, \textit{McClellan's War}, 29.
mass invasion, West Point found itself justifying its existence in part by producing civil engineers who could contribute to the nation in ways other than just defending it.\textsuperscript{23}

At West Point, McClellan received deductive and formulaic education as an engineer. He did not receive an inductive education that valued creative thinking or arriving at new principles. Instead of looking at each problem as a unique situation and improvising a solution, McClellan learned to apply formulae using established paradigms. His education in this respect was very much in keeping with Jominian ideas.\textsuperscript{24}

West Point then did not offer much in the field of the liberal arts. McClellan took only one course that covered history, ethics, and philosophy.\textsuperscript{25} In his final year at West Point, McClellan did take one class from Dennis Hart Mahan, in military and civil engineering, which encouraged him to study of the art of war. Mahan’s book \textit{An Elementary Treatise on Advanced Guard, Out-Post, and Detachment Service of Troops, and the Manner of Posting and Handling Them in Presence of an Enemy. With a Historical Sketch of the Rise and Progress of Tactics} (also known as \textit{Out Post}) espoused Jomini’s ideas, and endorsed the Jominian view of offensive warfare.\textsuperscript{26} Among other insights, Mahan realized that politically active citizen soldiers would fill out the forces his cadets would one day command. As a result, Mahan emphasized protection and maneuver over frontal assaults due to the potential political repercussions from large

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{23} Weigley, \textit{The American Way of War}, 81.  \\
\textsuperscript{24} Rafuse, \textit{McClellan’s War}, 33.  \\
\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Ibid.}, 33, 36.  \\
\textsuperscript{26} Weigley, \textit{The American Way of War}, 87. 
\end{flushright}
casualty lists. He also advised his students to be flexible and keep pace with changing technologies.

During the Mexican War, McClellan’s engineer unit joined general-in-chief Winfield Scott for the Mexico City Campaign. McClellan participated in a successful amphibious landing and siege near Vera Cruz. He fought in successful battles around the Mexican capital, where he learned the value of avoiding frontal assaults and using maneuver whenever possible. McClellan witnessed Scott’s turning movement that won the Battle of Cerro Gordo. Overall, his Mexican War experience seems to have reinforced what Mahan had taught him about Jomini.

McClellan’s upbringing and relationship with General Scott also influenced his views about civilian-military relationships. General Scott was a friend of McClellan’s father, Dr. McClellan. The younger McClellan built a lasting relationship with General Scott. Ethan Rafuse holds that McClellan modeled his leadership after his Whig father, Daniel Webster, Henry Clay, and Winfield Scott, the cumulative effect of which led McClellan to distrust politicians.

The ignoble civilian-military issues that swirled through the Mexican War Theater also influenced McClellan. During the Mexican War, General Scott placed two politically connected subordinates under arrest for insubordination. President Polk dismissed the charges and relieved Scott of his command. McClellan wrote his brother, “You may imagine what utter disgust & anger we feel in having our old chief under whom we have so often fought and conquered taken away from us....I cannot dwell on

---

27 Rafuse, McClellan’s War, 38.
28 Ibid., 42.
29 Ibid., 46.
30 Rafuse, McClellan’s War, 123.
the subject without becoming outraged."\textsuperscript{31} This event may have helped McClellan form an opinion on what a field commander should tolerate from his civilian superiors, to include the Commander in Chief. "McClellan automatically presumed those who questioned him or his actions were motivated by ignorance, narrow-minded partisanship, or selfishness."\textsuperscript{32}

In 1855, McClellan earned a position on a three-man commission sent to Europe to observe the Crimean War and study military systems. McClellan was one of the few Civil War officers who traveled to Europe and benefitted from seeing massive armies in the field.\textsuperscript{33} He saw first-hand the sanguinary results of the siege at Sebastopol, and saw the benefit afforded the Russians by their entrenchments.\textsuperscript{34} He saw the technological advancements as earlier stated. After returning to the U.S., McClellan wrote a tactical manual for the U.S. Cavalry based on his experiences overseas. Sticking with existing paradigms, he looked at problems with American Indians through the same lens through which he had examined Russian Cossacks.\textsuperscript{35}

After resigning his commission as a captain and leaving the service in 1857, McClellan continued his success as a business executive in one of the most lucrative industries of the time. He became the chief engineer and later vice president of the Illinois Central Railroad. In 1861, McClellan served as the president of the eastern division of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad.\textsuperscript{36} Therefore, prior to the start of the war, McClellan experienced success at some level in every new thing he tried since attending

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 48.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 123.
\textsuperscript{33} Keegan, \textit{The American Civil War}, 98.
\textsuperscript{34} Cullen, \textit{The Peninsula Campaign}, 1862, 18.
\textsuperscript{35} Rafuse, \textit{McClellan's War}, 61-64.
\textsuperscript{36} Cullen, \textit{The Peninsula Campaign}, 1862, 18.
preparatory school. He excelled at West Point, served with honor in the Mexican War, received select and challenging post-war assignments, and rose to executive leadership in the private sector.

Upon assuming command of the Army, in July 1861, McClellan masterfully combined McDowell’s Department of Northeastern Virginia and Joseph K. Mansfield’s Department of Washington into one command, the Army of the Potomac. McClellan cleaned the stragglers off the D.C. streets, and then organized receiving stations for new recruits pouring into the city each day. These soldiers were clothed, armed, trained, and deployed in an orderly perimeter around the capital. He enforced standards and reassured the citizens. Be it on Capitol Hill or in the press, McClellan was heralded “hope of the North.”

McClellan reduced the army’s 25 brigades in size (thereby generating eight additional brigades) and from these formed eleven 10,000-man divisions. McClellan further organized each division so it had a cavalry regiment and four six-gun artillery batteries. He insisted his infantrymen all carry the .58 caliber Springfield rifle, thereby standardizing small arms within his army. (See Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix C).

McClellan had a good rapport with his men, who affectionately referred to him as “Little Mac.” He made a point to ride out among the men, and the Army of the Potomac saw McClellan daily. Stories of McClellan’s personal strength soon circulated among the troops. Allegedly, he could bend a quarter in half with his fingers and tear a deck of

37 Willam J. Miller and George F. Skoch, The Battles For Richmond, 1862 (Conshohocken, PA: Eastern National Park and Monument Association, 1995), 18. McClellan was able to organize, equip and train his force nine months prior to initiating the Peninsula Campaign.
38 Stewart, American Military History, Volume I, 216.
40 Stewart, American Military History, Volume I, 216.
cards in half. These stories are similar to the ones crediting George Washington with the ability to throw a rock across the Potomac River. His frequent inspections, mentoring, and reviews gradually restored his army's morale.\textsuperscript{41}

Therefore, by the standards of his day, McClellan's education and experiences seem to have prepared him well for the responsibilities of commanding the Army of the Potomac. He excelled at West Point, where Mahan introduced him to the theory of warfare. McClellan applied practical engineering solutions to problems. Judging by McClellan's later actions, Jomini's writings appear to have influenced him. He used Jominian flanking and turning movements to gain ground, or positions. McClellan did not appear to focus on destroying the enemy's army. Instead, he appears to have preferred a strategy of attrition, through a deliberate campaign against a decisive point, which in 1862, appeared to be the Confederate Capital of Richmond.

**Geography**

The salient physical characteristic of the bitter campaigning in the East during the Civil War was the mere 96 miles separating the Union capital in Washington, D.C. from the Confederate capital in Richmond, Virginia. At the onset of the Peninsula Campaign, both forces remained in positions much as they were following the Union defeat at First Bull Run. The Army of the Potomac occupied positions in and around Washington. The main Confederate force was at Centreville and Manassas, Virginia, but within striking distance of Washington (refer to Appendix A, Maps).

These dispositions left McClellan three possible approaches to Richmond. The most direct was overland from Washington to Richmond. While the land between Washington and Richmond is fairly flat, marching from one capital to the other meant

\textsuperscript{41} Rafuse, *McClellan's War*, 131.
crossing multiple river barriers lying perpendicular to the axis of advance. Each of these afforded opportunities for the defender to conduct delays, defend from successive positions, or defend in depth.

The second approach was from the west through the Shenandoah Valley. The Shenandoah Valley is located northwest of Richmond. It is a self-contained pocket nestled between the Blue Ridge and Alleghany Mountains. The Shenandoah River breaks into two forks tracing the two parallel mountain ridges. Numerous gaps and passes dot this complex terrain. The valley runs Southwest to Northeast, or away from Richmond but towards Washington, overall, its use as an approach favored the Confederates.

The third approach was from the east along the Chesapeake Bay. Large finger-like rivers run inland from the bay, and while these formed barriers to a direct overland approach, as noted earlier, the larger estuaries - the Rappahannock, York, and James - all were navigable far enough to form potential approaches for deep flanking movements, either behind the Confederate Army, or directly against Richmond.

Land on the peninsulas formed by these rivers - the Northern Neck, between the Potomac and Rappahannock, the Middle Peninsula between the Rappahannock and the York, and what was simply called the Peninsula, between the York and the James - was marshy, sandy soil that did not lend itself to growing food. Most roads were narrow and mainly served plantation owners transporting their tobacco or cotton to rivers. The few roads that existed were susceptible to flooding and washed out in the heavy spring rains. The land was relatively flat, with the result that even slight rises or local promontories had great tactical significance. Gloucester Point on the York River, Drewry’s Bluff

---

Keegan, *The American Civil War*, 144.
overlooking the James River, and the slight elevation outside of Williamsburg offered the Confederates excellent defensive positions. As we shall see, McClellan concluded that the Eastern approach was most favorable because the route did not require multiple river crossings or passing through a valley that led away from Richmond. The Chesapeake Bay led to navigable rivers from which McClellan could project his forces behind the Confederates or directly against Richmond.

The Plan

President Lincoln and McClellan disagreed on the campaign’s major objective (ends), how to defeat the Confederates (ways), and the force disposition (means). The two primary courses of action were defeat the Confederate Army or capture the Confederate capital. President Lincoln believed that defeating the enemy was the surest way to end the war. Later in the war, he told General Joe Hooker, “Lee’s army, and not Richmond, is your true objective point.” This contrasted sharply with McClellan’s thinking. As was the case with the Mexican War, General McClellan believed that the adversary’s capital was the end-state and by sacking Richmond and securing the Confederate naval shipyard at Norfolk, Virginia he would cripple the Southern effort.

This is evidence of Eighteenth Century Jominian conceptual thinking. Jomini said,

“In strategy, the object of the campaign determines the objective point. If this aim be [sic] offensive, the point will be the possession of the hostile capital, or that of a province whole loss would compel the enemy to make peace. In a war of invasion the capital is, ordinarily, the objective point.”

The two leaders also differed over how to strike the enemy. President Lincoln favored the direct approach by land. McClellan favored water and land. Lincoln wanted a large Union army presence between the Confederates and the United States capital.

McClellan wanted to move forces unopposed, by ship, and then directly advance on Richmond over land. McClellan believed Washington, D.C. was secure because Confederates would pull out of northern Virginia as soon as their capital was in danger.

On account of their disagreement on method, McClellan and President Lincoln also had differing views on force disposition. The president wanted a reserve force left in northern Virginia to defend the capital. McClellan, on the other hand, wanted the maximum number of troops to cast toward Richmond. He intended to protect Washington by offensive means. McClellan was willing to take operational risk by leaving Washington with a stay-behind force of 55,000 men. This number included Major General Nathaniel P. Bank's 35,000 in the Shenandoah and 20,000 in and around Washington. While Lincoln did not believe capture of the southern capital would end the rebellion, he intuited that it was an unacceptable risk for the southern armies to capture Washington. McClellan, for his part, appears to have believed something of the opposite: it was acceptable to leave smaller Union forces in defense of Washington, while the southern leadership would interpret the loss of Richmond as an unacceptable risk, and reposition their forces to prevent this.

McClellan developed a bold offensive plan for the capture of Richmond itself. His original concept, called the Urbanna Plan, named after a Rappahannock River landing west of Chesapeake Bay, called for sea movement followed by rapid marches through unfamiliar terrain. When McClellan sketched out the plan in December 1861, General Joe Johnston's Confederate force was at Manassas Junction in northern Virginia. McClellan's plan envisioned an amphibious turning movement from the Chesapeake Bay

---

46 Ibid., 173. This plan accepted risk.
flank. His intent was to land at Urbanna, cut off Johnston, trap General John B. McGruder on the Lower Peninsula, and then march 50 miles due west on Richmond.\textsuperscript{47} His plan required moving 140,000 inexperienced troops along three rivers to then flank the enemy.\textsuperscript{48}

Johnston thwarted McClellan’s initial plan though. On March 8, 1862, Joe Johnston destroyed over 750,000 tons of food at the Manassas supply depot, pulled south of the Rapidan and Rappahannock Rivers and then repositioned at Gordonsville. Gordonsville provided Johnston maximum freedom of movement due to its proximity to the Orange and Alexandria Rail Line.\textsuperscript{49}

In planning for the Urbanna operation, McClellan believed,

Should circumstances render it not advisable to land at Urbana, we can use Mob-Jack Bay or-the worst coming to the worst we can take Fort Monroe as a base, and operate with complete security, although with less celerity and brilliancy of results, on the Peninsula.\textsuperscript{50}

Now facing a new Confederate disposition, McClellan chose to execute the option he envisioned, and changed his point of entry from Urbanna to Fort Monroe, a Union-controlled stronghold at the southern tip of the Peninsula. Launching his land campaign further up the James River was not an option, as the new southern ironclad, C.S.S. \textit{Virginia}, lurked there, a menace to wooden shipping.\textsuperscript{51} From Fort Monroe, McClellan intended to have the navy transport his men up the York River, bypass the Confederate fort at Yorktown, and land at West Point, Virginia where the Pamunkey and Mattaponi Rivers converged. Instead of focusing on a land only approach, McClellan clearly

\textsuperscript{47} Miller and Skoch, \textit{The Battles For Richmond, 1862}, 7. 
\textsuperscript{48} Miller, \textit{The Peninsula Campaign of 1862}, 173. 
\textsuperscript{49} Miller and Skoch, \textit{The Battles For Richmond, 1862}, 7. 
\textsuperscript{50} Beatie, \textit{The Army of the Potomac}, 390. 
\textsuperscript{51} Rafuse, \textit{McClellan’s War}, 198.
favored a navy and army operation allowing him to turn the Yorktown position by using maximum mobility and surprise.52 From there, McClellan envisioned a two-pronged attack on Richmond. On the eastern prong, from West Point he could use the Richmond & York River Railroad to push west and capture Richmond 30 miles away.53 On the northern prong, McClellan wanted General McDowell’s corps to threaten Richmond.54

McClellan made planning assumptions based on the size of the enemy force he thought he faced. He also made assumptions about the size of force he would be allocated. McClellan’s campaign plan called for 180,000 men. He had 121,500 staged at Fort Monroe. He assumed Irvin McDowell’s 40,000-man corps, plus Louis Blenker’s 10,000-man division (both in Washington, D.C.), and General John Ellis Wool’s 10,000-man force stationed at Fort Monroe were available for the campaign.55 (See Tables 2 and 3 in Appendix C). However, on the eve of the campaign, McClellan’s assumptions about the enemy and friendly forces available were about to crumble.

Summary

By 1862, the North with her robust industrial base had the economic advantage over the South. It produced large war material stocks, and had a superior transportation and information infrastructure (more ships, rail, and telegraph lines). This infrastructure afforded the North more capability (intelligence and strategic maneuver) than the South. The Army of the Potomac was led by a bright, young leader who was West Point educated, a combat veteran, and had business acumen from a leading private sector industry of the time. McClellan, operating in accordance with Jominian theory,

52 Rowena Reed, Combined Operations in the Civil War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978), 122.
53 Miller and Skoch, The Battles For Richmond, 1862, 8.
54 John C. Waugh, Lincoln and McClellan, 85.
55 Ibid., 22.
possessing excellent organizational and garrison leadership skills, having developed a bold plan, and 121,500 soldiers seized the strategic initiative by using an uncontested sea approach, and was poised to defeat the Confederacy with a single, decisive blow.
CHAPTER 3: EXECUTION

McClellan had developed what U.S. doctrine would now recognize as a joint campaign. Joint Publication 1 says the following:

A campaign is a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. Planning for a campaign is appropriate when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major operation. Thus, campaigns are often the most extensive joint operations in terms of time and other resources.¹

Given the scope and ambition of this nascent joint campaign, it is necessary to consider the strategic oversight the commander received.

Lincoln and Stanton

By 1 April 1862, when McClellan boarded the USS Commodore to leave Washington and join his army at Fort Monroe, President Lincoln had serious qualms about the new military plan. As described earlier, the Shenandoah Valley offered an open door from the west to Washington. With the disorderly withdrawal of General Irvin McDowell’s dazed Union soldiers after the defeat at Bull Run still fresh in his memory, evidence suggests that Lincoln wanted a substantial force to protect the capital.

Furthermore, in response to the 121,500 Union soldiers now staged on the Peninsula, the Confederates had created a successful diversion. In the Shenandoah Valley stalked one of the finest corps commanders in either army. Eight days prior to McClellan’s departure from Washington, to Fort Monroe, the formidable Confederate savior at the First Battle of Bull Run, Major General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson, launched his audacious Valley Campaign in the Shenandoah Valley.

In Lincoln’s mind, McClellan left him too few forces to protect the capital. As discussed, much of the friction between McClellan and Lincoln stemmed from differing views about a key strategic factor. Lincoln wanted to have a force protecting Washington while McClellan wanted to bring as many soldiers to bear on Richmond as possible. By McClellan’s count, the Union troops in the Shenandoah Valley, Warrenton, Manassas, lower Potomac, and in the encircling forts around Washington were adequate to defend the capital if a credible threat presented itself.\(^2\) Prior to leaving Washington for the Peninsula, McClellan missed an opportunity to clarify in person with President Lincoln the forces he required. McClellan could have explained that his offensive would cut the Confederate line of communication, thus forcing them to abandon a move on Washington, D.C.\(^3\) Although McDowell’s 40,000-man corps was a part of the Army of the Potomac, on 3 April 1862, Secretary Stanton diverted their departure from Alexandria, Virginia to join McClellan on the Peninsula. Instead, Stanton sent them from Alexandria to Fredericksburg, Virginia to have a Union force in place to move on Jackson from the east.

President Lincoln and Secretary Stanton stared in the face of uncertainty, while Jackson executed a plan that “mystified, mislead, and surprised the enemy.”\(^4\) Jackson’s “foot cavalry” marched 350 miles in 30 days causing much angst in the Lincoln White House.\(^5\) Facing this uncertainty, the Lincoln administration chose the cautious course of action- pull men from the main effort (Peninsula Campaign) to protect the capital from

\(^3\) Ibid., 80.
\(^4\) Keegan, *The American Civil War*, 144.
\(^6\) Kevin Dougherty and Michael J. Moore, *The Peninsula Campaign of 1862 a Military Analysis* (University Press of Mississippi, 2005), 65.
Jackson. With only 15,000 men, Jackson caused the Lincoln Administration to pull 10,000 men of Louis Blenker’s Division and McDowell’s 40,000-man corps out of McClellan’s force structure. Using knowledge of the Shenandoah Valley’s complex terrain, and his inexhaustible will, Jackson defeated soldiers from three separate Union corps at Kernstown, McDowell, Front Royal, and Winchester.\(^6\) To make matters worse for the Union army, by 26 June 1862, Jackson reinforced the Confederates in time to fight in the Seven Days Battle outside Richmond.\(^7\)

**Goldsborough, Missroon, and McClellan**

Much like the Shenandoah terrain favoring Jackson’s rapid marches and countermarches, the riverine approaches to the Peninsula favored the Confederate defenders. The *Virginia* in its lair at Norfolk blocked the James River approach, and Gloucester Point provided excellent fields of fire for Confederates to defend Yorktown at the mouth of the York River.

In early March 1862, to accompany Lincoln’s unsettling situation to the north, the U.S. naval fleet commander (in Hampton Roads), Captain Louis M. Goldsborough faced a revolutionary threat. On 8 March 1862, armed with a ram, twelve guns (6.4, 7, 9, and 12-inch) and protected by twenty four-inch wood and four-inch armor plating, Commodore Franklin Buchanan took his *Virginia* into Hampton Roads to challenge Goldsborough’s blockading squadron, and sank the U.S.S. *Cumberland* and *Congress*. The U.S.S. *Minnesota* was forced aground while the U.S.S. *Roanoke* and *St. Lawrence*

---


were driven away. Initially, the Lincoln administration was concerned that the Virginia would thwart McClellan's landing at Fort Monroe. The U.S.S. Monitor effectively neutralized this threat on 9 March 1862 during an ironclad duel, but for the next 34 days, despite the Union navy having an equal capability (a comparable ironclad) and a numerically superior naval force, the Virginia controlled the main approach to Richmond along the James River. This solitary Confederate ship also kept the Confederate Gosport Navy Yard open, and neutralized the Union navy in the Hampton Roads area. When faced with the uncertainty of prevailing against the Virginia, Goldsborough choose the cautious course of action. At a safe distance, he opted to continue to enforce the naval blockade and avoid further contact with the Virginia for fear it would eviscerate his fleet. He was not alone in this fear. Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles applauded Goldsborough for not risking his fleet to the Virginia.

Goldsborough’s reluctance to open the James River was not the only problem; there was no unity of command among the disparate Union army and navy forces now operating in and around the Virginian Peninsula. With Union ships already in position to execute the naval blockade, McClellan assumed that he would have operational control of all naval assets in the area. Goldsborough, positioned to blockade Confederate maritime commerce, and McClellan positioned to advance on Richmond, in fact had two competing, not complementary missions, and no formal command relationship existed between them. With the James River closed, McClellan’s scheme of operational movement required naval ships to float his army up the York and Pamunkey Rivers and

---

9 Reed, *Combined Operations in the Civil War*, 151. In 34 days, the Union had defeated the Confederates at Williamsburg, VA and the Confederates evacuated Hampton Roads forcing the C.S.S. Virginia's crew to scuttle her (11 May 1862).
10 Ibid., 141.
land forces east of Richmond. Goldsborough believed his primary duty was to enforce the blockade while protecting his fleet from the *Virginia*. When the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Gustavus Vasa Fox, asked Captain Goldsborough if he would serve under McClellan, his response was, “he would never under any circumstances place himself under the orders of an officer of the army.”\(^\text{11}\) As a result, McClellan could only make “requests for cooperation.”\(^\text{12}\) Goldsborough said he would gladly cooperate with McClellan though.\(^\text{13}\) As evidence, he sent the following telegraph to a subordinate commander of the supporting fleet, Captain John S. Missroon, on 4 April 1862:

> Cooperate with the Army at and about York River, and thus [to] execute the service which I have fully explained to you in person, I wish you to keep yourself in as easy communication with General McClellan and his authorized officers as practicable, so that by the information he or they may afford from time to time your steps maybe made correspondingly with those of the Army. The first Object in view, as you are aware, is the reduction of Yorktown and Gloucester Point, and thus to open the navigation of York River and its tributaries to our Army transports and Navy vessels. The next is to keep those streams clear of the enemy to every necessary and practicable extent. In the landing and covering of our Army forces, and in protecting its transports, you will afford every assistance in your power.”\(^\text{14}\)

As Goldsborough’s larger warships hovered in the Chesapeake Bay watching the Confederate fleet, Captain Missroon, and seven ships were sent to support McClellan.\(^\text{15}\) Captain Missroon’s arrival did little to help McClellan. Despite Goldsborough’s orders, Missroon refused to meet McClellan in person. McClellan wanted to bypass the Confederate strongpoint at Yorktown by pushing up the York River at night. Captain Missroon and McClellan’s men failed to reconnoiter the key terrain overlooking

---

\(^\text{12}\) Reed, *Combined Operations in the Civil War*, 137-138.
\(^\text{14}\) Ibid.
\(^\text{15}\) Reed, *Combined Operations in the Civil War*, 153.
Yorktown (Gloucester). The Confederate works were well constructed and situated on excellent terrain. The defensive works had few troops and guns though, and Gloucester only had eight guns (32-pound and below). There were nine old smoothbore guns in coastal batteries at the foot of the over-watch. There was a Revolutionary War redoubt facing southeast down the river with only one 32-pound gun. The guns they did have were poor in quality and inaccurate.\textsuperscript{16} In short, the batteries posed little risk to Missroon's ships.

Missroon decided his ships could not support the mission unless land forces took out the shore batteries first.\textsuperscript{17} Due in part to the command relationship, McClellan could not order Missroon to run the defenses at night and Goldsborough would not. In the face of these convoluted command relationships, and fears of Confederate firepower, McClellan needed a courageous naval commander like David Farragut, who on April 29, 1862 boldly ran past Forts Jackson and St. Philip at night braving their batteries on the Mississippi River.\textsuperscript{18} Captain Missroon was no David Farragut.

McClellan had a solid plan to use naval fires to reduce the Confederate artillery on and at the foot of Gloucester Point. This would enable his force to use the York River and swiftly turn General John B. Magruder's Confederates out of Yorktown and place his force northwest of the Confederates and in between them and their capital. After Missroon's naval delay and subsequent removal on 30 March 1862, McClellan altered his plans. The modified plans had General William B. Franklin's division (arriving from Fredericksburg) conducting an amphibious landing at Gloucester Point as army siege

\textsuperscript{16} Reed, \textit{Combined Operations in the Civil War}, 155, 156.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 141.
\textsuperscript{18} Symonds, \textit{Union Combined Operations in the Civil War}, 143.
guns pounded the Yorktown defenses. The newest ironclad, U.S.S. *Galena*, had arrived and it was to move up the York River and take the shore batteries from the east.\(^{19}\)

McClellan was aware of the risks associated with an amphibious landing. The Union attempted its first amphibious assault the prior August in Hatteras, North Carolina. Even against a small, poorly equipped enemy force, General Benjamin Butler’s forces missed their planned landing locations, and units were intermingled after the surf destroyed many of their landing vessels. Troops were also unable to locate their follow on ammunition.\(^{20}\)

McClellan mitigated this risk by having Franklin’s division rehearse landing operations. Franklin’s troops practiced moving from ships to landing craft by using gangplanks and soon they became proficient. The challenge was moving field guns ashore. McClellan placed an engineer, Lieutenant Colonel Barton Alexander, in charge of figuring out how to do this efficiently. Alexander was an excellent choice. In prewar years, he had a great deal of experience using heavy equipment and shipping to build lighthouses.\(^{21}\)

On 30 April, the siege guns shelled Yorktown. Commander William Smith took Missroon’s command. Smith was more aggressive and immediately sent Lieutenant Commander Nicholson and the U.S.S. *Marblehead* up the York River to engage the Yorktown batteries. On 1 May, the *Marblehead* shelled Yorktown with her one 11-inch, two 20 and 24-pound guns. She crippled the Confederate wharf, and thus cut off resupply by water to the besieged force.\(^{22}\) Buoyed by the limited success, McClellan

\(^{19}\) Reed, *Combined Operations in the Civil War*, 153.
\(^{20}\) Ibid., 149.
\(^{21}\) Ibid., 149.
\(^{22}\) Ibid., 155, 157.
planned to run a squadron of ships and the 210-foot ironclad U.S.S *Galena*, with her four, nine-inch and two, 100-pound guns to run past the Yorktown batteries and up the York River the following day. Goldsborough was adamantly opposed to the operation fearing his ships did not have enough armor. With the exception of Nicholson, the navy was reluctant to act.

By 2 May, the Confederate army had evacuated Yorktown and moved west up the peninsula to Williamsburg. Franklin’s division was not required to make an amphibious landing at Gloucester. Even with Franklin’s division uncommitted, and trained for amphibious operations, and with naval transport assets available, McClellan did not push up the York River to seize West Point, Virginia. He missed the chance to block the entire Confederate force from their capital.

Instead, McClellan sent the U.S.S. *Chocura*, an equivalent ship to the *Marblehead*, up the York to see if there were any obstructions. On 5 May, the *Chocura* reported that the Rebels had vacated West Point. Still McClellan refused to send forth Franklin’s division. McClellan wanted to keep Franklin in reserve due to the fight at Williamsburg. Finally, on 6 May McClellan steamed Franklin’s division up the York River to West Point.

His amphibious-trained men quickly disembarked and took Etham’s Plantation on the opposite of West Point. It was too late; Franklin did not have enough time to cast his division out to snare the retreating Confederates. The Rebels squeezed by and returned to Richmond to bolster their defenses. The Union’s operational initiative was gone, never to reappear for the rest of the campaign.\(^{23}\)

\(^{23}\) Reed, *Combined Operations in the Civil War*, 158, 159.
This series of events highlights three leaders facing three different unclear situations in which all three were unwilling to act decisively. First, Goldsborough failed to reengage the *Virginia* with the *Monitor* and the numerically superior ships he had at his disposal in the fleet. As the Union Navy grew in size, it actually became more cautious. As Reed said,

> By mid-April Goldsborough’s nerves were so bad that, having discovered an enemy plan to shell the important Federal naval station at Newport News, he assured Welles that his squadron would not be drawn into the Roads to protect it, justifying his decision with the extraordinary statement that ‘the place is no longer of any material consequence to us.’

This reluctance to establish control over the James River approach deprived McClellan the most advantageous riverine route to Richmond.

In the second example, 19 precious days had elapsed since Goldsborough ordered Captain Missroon to support McClellan’s movement up the York River until Missroon was relieved of command. Missroon’s timidity stalled McClellan’s attack. Instead of executing a bold flanking movement around Yorktown, McClellan had to methodically resort to siege warfare, and slowly pry McGruder and Johnston out of their defenses.

In the last example, McClellan, after clearing the Rebels from their Yorktown defenses on 4 May 1862, failed to quickly envelope the Confederate flank by way of the York River. He had a fresh, amphibiously trained division with committed ships and a free passageway up the York and Pamunkey Rivers but opted to hold them in reserve.

---

24 Dr. Gregory Miller, (Thesis Feedback, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, Joint Forces College, Norfolk, VA, May 8, 2014). Dr. Miller contends this falls in line with the “Prospect Theory” where individuals are more risk averse when facing losses, and more risk acceptant when facing gains.

25 Reed, *Combined Operations in the Civil War*, 152. Dr. Gregory Miller contends this falls in line with the “Prospect Theory” where we tend to be more risk averse when facing losses, and more risk acceptant when facing gains.
McClellan took the safe course of action and the outnumbered Confederates took advantage of his caution.

**McClellan**

McClellan faced a daunting situation. Executing his adventurous plans continued to be a slow process, due to inaccurate maps, crushing logistical constraints, his character, poor military intelligence, and cautious leaders (both military and those in the War Department).

McClellan’s understanding of his physical environment was limited. The Union and Confederate forces lacked accurate maps of the Peninsula area. For example, McClellan’s map showed the Warwick River flowing in the wrong direction. He had no idea where the Warwick’s tributaries flooded the surrounding area. With distorted cartographical information, McClellan had to “grop[e]” his way up the Peninsula.\(^26\)

McClellan had to feed at least 100,000 men each day. By the Seven Days Battles (26 June), the number swelled to 127,327.\(^27\) While on the Peninsula, the Army of the Potomac was as large as the seventh largest city in the United States.\(^28\) McClellan’s army consumed 600 tons of supplies each day (food, forage, ammunition).\(^29\) The logistics tables called for providing an average Union soldier three pounds of food and allotted 26 pounds of fodder for each horse. A total of 25,000 horses and mules were required for the cavalry, horse artillery, caissons, and supply wagons. Besides forage, the horses needed tack and shoes.

Unlike General William T. Sherman who boldly moved without logistical support

---

\(^26\) Dougherty and Moore, *The Peninsula Campaign of 1862*, 68.
\(^27\) Miller, *The Peninsula Campaign of 1862*, 132, 134.
\(^28\) Ibid., 134, 135, 137. This was larger than Chicago’s population at the time.
\(^29\) Miller and Skoch, *The Battles For Richmond, 1862*, 10.
during his famed “March to the Sea,” McClellan was unable to forage off the land. The Virginia Peninsula was unable to sustain an army the size of the Army of the Potomac. This is partly because timber made up three-quarters of the land and the other one-quarter of it had depleted soil due to tobacco farming. McClellan had to import every scrap of food from the north.30

James McPherson contends that McClellan also purposely inflated enemy estimates due to his personality.31 From his privileged upbringing, private schools, early attendance at West Point, moderate fame in the Mexican War, and prosperous positions in the railroad industry, McClellan had experienced only success. When confronted with the daunting task of commanding the Army of the Potomac in light of uncertainty, McClellan wanted to continue to thrive. Fear of failure paralyzed him. He believed the surest way to guarantee victory was to have overwhelming numbers relative to the enemy. Without a favorable force ratio, McClellan preferred to wait.32

The Union had a fleet of hydrogen balloons for daily reconnaissance. These provided a marked technological advantage, but it did not help with intelligence gathering and dissemination. Despite having the ability to see the enemy from a distance and transmit messages by telegraph, McClellan nonetheless greatly overestimated Confederate force dispositions.33 McClellan also failed to utilize his cavalry effectively. Given his enmity for citizen soldiers, he believed his volunteer cavalry could only be trusted for picket and courier duty. Meanwhile he used three squadrons of regular cavalry as a personal escort, while the Second U.S. Cavalry served as his provost.

30 Miller and Skoch, *The Battles For Richmond, 1862*, 10. McClellan had planned for this logistical constraint.
32 Ibid.
marshal. In contrast, Lee had superb intelligence (mainly garnered from Major General J.E.B. Stuart’s famed cavalry). Lee knew this and was able to get inside of McClellan’s decision-making cycle, thereby stalling McClellan’s momentum and initiative.34

It is hard to fault McClellan for trying to protect his force. While it is axiomatic that speed of movement can offer an army a form of protection, McClellan opted for the control, concentration, and pace afforded by trading speed for troop strength, methodical basing, and siege work. Instead of speed, McClellan favored waiting for his force to increase in size. At every turn of the campaign, McClellan believed he faced a much larger army. McClellan erred on the side of caution and waited for the War Department to increase his force strength. As the campaign progressed, the Army of the Potomac grew in size. In theory, this should have given him an ever-increasing advantage, but his ever-larger force never massed or moved effectively enough to take Richmond.

Instead of providing accurate Confederate numbers, the Allan Pinkerton Detective Agency only confirmed McClellan’s fears.35 Part of the problem was Pinkerton counted enemy regiments as if they were at 100% strength. In reality, the actual number of men per regiment was about half as much as the paper number.36 Prior to the campaign, Pinkerton only had three intelligence reports on the Lower Peninsula. He relied heavily on spies to generate data. Pinkerton had some inroads with the Confederate high command. For example, he relied heavily on single source intelligence from a spy who was close to Confederate Secretary of War, Judah Benjamin.37 When the Pinkerton agency interrogated Yorktown prisoners, the deception grew, which distorted the

34 Dougherty and Moore, The Peninsula Campaign of 1862, 67, 68.
35 Dougherty and Moore, The Peninsula Campaign of 1862, 65.
36 McPherson, Tried by War, 47.
37 Dougherty and Moore, The Peninsula Campaign of 1862, 66.
intelligence picture. Captured Confederates convinced the intelligence agency that Johnston had arrived with his full contingent of men. Enemy estimates swelled to 100,000. During the campaign, General Johnston said, “No one but McClellan could have hesitated to attack. The defensive line is far better for him than for us.”

McClellan seemed content with the information he received from his intelligence chief. Some accused Pinkerton of providing information his clients wanted. For McClellan, a larger enemy justified more troop requests to Washington. Requesting more troops bought McClellan more time. With the benefit of knowing McClellan at Antietam later in the year, one could argue McClellan’s default was to ask for more troops regardless of enemy estimates.

In May 1862, when the Union had secured the White House landing, the Pinkerton agency told McClellan that the enemy collapsing on Richmond could number as many as 250,000 strong (100,000 from the Lower Peninsula and the 150,000 pulled from Manassas). McClellan believed he was outnumbered two to one, with his enemy entrenched. The net result from McClellan’s habitual overestimation of enemy forces was that he delayed his attack while waiting for the War Department to provide more troops. More forces meant less risk. Instead of bold maneuver, McClellan painstakingly inched up the Peninsula, in preparation for the siege of Richmond. This slow process allowed newly appointed General Robert E. Lee to organize a series of counter offensives. McClellan was losing operational initiative.

On 11 May, McClellan had the opportunity to regain the initiative. By then, with the Virginia no longer a threat (she was scuttled to prevent capture), the Gosport Navy

---

Yard in Union hands, and the James River now open, McClellan faced a decision. Instead of attacking Richmond from West Point, he could launch a new attack from the James River.\textsuperscript{41} Due to the convoluted command structure, McClellan had to telegraph Stanton that he needed a naval presence to go up the James River. Stanton passed the message to Welles who instructed Goldsborough to send the vessels up the river. Five ships commanded by John Rogers steamed up the James River, which was open all the way to Drewry’s Bluff.\textsuperscript{42} At Drewry’s Bluff, Union ships encountered a Confederate fort that forced their ships to pull back. Goldsborough said, “Without the army, the navy can make no real headway towards Richmond.” Beyond the fort, there were underwater obstructions.\textsuperscript{43} Still, the Union Navy was eight miles from Richmond.

Confederate, General Joe Johnston considered the James River approach to be the enemy’s most dangerous course of action. He said,

“I suspect that McClellan is waiting for iron-clad war vessels for James River. They would enable him to reach Richmond three days before these troops... (the ones evacuating from Williamsburg) Should such a move be made the fall of Richmond would be inevitable.”\textsuperscript{44}

General Lee added it was McClellan’s “best policy” to switch his lines of operation to the James River.\textsuperscript{45} McClellan was amenable to switching his lines of operation to the James River. The Union had the advantage in troop, naval, and artillery strength. Unfortunately, the Union also had a conservative War Department.

Stanton instructed McClellan to extend his right wing north from Eltham’s Landing (where the Pamunkey and Mattapony River converge on the York River) to

\textsuperscript{41} Rafuse, \textit{McClellan’s War}, 213.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 213.
\textsuperscript{44} Rafuse, \textit{McClellan’s War}, 213, 214.
\textsuperscript{45} Rafuse, \textit{McClellan’s War}, 214.
receive McDowell’s I Corps marching south from Fredericksburg. Stanton wanted a
corps of troops between Washington and the Confederates and for McClellan to tie in
with the arriving unit.\textsuperscript{46} This operational order arriving from Washington D.C. reduced
McClellan’s freedom of movement. He had two options. The Army of the Potomac
could remain anchored to the York River for supplies and receive McDowell’s Corps, or
McClellan could split his forces and make a combined approach on Richmond from both
the York and James Rivers. Instead of splitting his forces, McClellan decided that the
Army of the Potomac would launch its attack on Richmond from West Point via the York
River.

McClellan had to repair the Richmond and York Railroad to move his supplies
west. This required more time. It also allowed the Confederates to retract to Richmond
and prepare their defenses. As it happened, it took him three weeks to move 14 miles
from Eltham’s Landing to White House Landing farther west on the Pamunkey River.\textsuperscript{47}
Stonewall Jackson ensured that McDowell’s Corps would never reach McClellan. The
War Department diverted McDowell to pursue Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley.\textsuperscript{48}

As McClellan pleaded to the War Department for forces, the same forces that tied
him to the York and Pamunkey Rivers provided a ripe target to the Confederates.
Instead, Stanton, faced with uncertainty, buckled to caution and insisted that McClellan
move east and link up with McDowell’s forces. Stanton was concerned about having a
force in between the Confederates and Washington, D.C. His actions actually placed the
Union in a more dangerous position. Less than four months after the failed Peninsula
Campaign, the Confederates had pushed the farthest north in the war (to that point) when

\begin{footnotes}
\item[46] Ibid.
\item[47] Sears, \textit{To the Gates of Richmond}, 103.
\item[48] Miller and Skoch, \textit{The Battle for Richmond, 1862}, 19.
\end{footnotes}
they crossed into Maryland on 3 September 1862. When McClellan reflected on the Peninsula Campaign 20 years after the war, he blamed part of the failure on the Lincoln Administration for forcing him to use this line of operation.49

There were many contributing factors to the Army of the Potomac culminating in 1862. A major contributing factor was reluctance of senior leaders to accept risk, and their actions in avoiding risk threatened, and then compromised the campaign. Lincoln and Stanton did not want to leave the capital unguarded. Stanton did not want McClellan to change his lines of operation from the York River to the James River for fear the Confederates would have an unguarded approach to Washington. One ship paralyzed Goldsboro’s fleet, effectively blocking the most advantageous waterway to Richmond. Missroon and Goldsboro were too cautious to run their ships past Gloucester Point. McClellan habitually believed he was outnumbered. His concept of protection valued force size over speed. That combined with his deliberate methodical engineering approach sapped strategic initiative from his army. During the execution of the campaign as uncertainty clouded the theater, the common characteristic among these five leaders was their caution, an almost textbook adherence to the narrow understanding of risk on display in our current doctrine: “...severity of loss linked to hazards.”50 With greater appreciation of what might be lost than of what could be gained, and in taking counsel of their fears, they sidestepped hazard, but also opportunity, and opened the Union cause to greater risks, as was demonstrated during Lee’s counteroffensive into Northern territory during the Battles of the 2nd Bull Run and Antietam, which followed McClellan’s withdrawal from the Peninsula.

49 Miller, The Peninsula Campaign of 1862, 131.
CHAPTER 4: CONTEMPORARY EXAMPLE

The American Military in 2001

The Peninsula Campaign did not founder on defects unique to McClellan; there are some unsettling indicators that the incapacity for risk-taking on evidence in 1862 survived for at least 141 years. Much like the 1862 Army of the Potomac, our modern well-equipped, well-trained, expeditions have fallen short in achieving their stated objectives. Despite advancements in joint doctrine and education, training and equipping, and technology itself, in 2001 the U.S. still could not bring overwhelming power to bear on its enemies, and the evidence strongly suggests that risk aversion was the problem.

Much like the professionally trained military officers streaming into the Civil War from West Point, contemporary officers receive extensive education and military training. Like Sylvanus Thayer’s passion to improve the U.S. military in 1817, the Goldwater-Nicholas Department of Defense Reorganization Act passed in 1986 comprehensively restructured the Department of Defense. Among its many mandates, it forced the military services to focus on joint warfare.\(^1\) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ensured that contemporary officers receive Joint Professional Military Education, have the ability to serve in joint assignments, and have doctrine codified in Joint Publications. As the 2013 preface of *JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* says, the Services and United States Special Operations Command have specific responsibilities under Title 10, United States Code (USC), to organize, train, equip, prepare, and maintain their force. The National Guard has similar, specific responsibilities under Title 32, USC, and includes domestic operations. These forces are employed under Joint Force Commanders.\(^2\)

---
\(^2\) *JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, ii.
Like the Army of the Potomac, the U.S. military in 2001 enjoyed material overmatch against current and potential enemies due to its supporting economy. The U.S. still develops a well-educated and a well-trained workforce. Compared to many European and Asian countries, the U.S. birth rate remains high. Immigrants still supply a steady source of labor to fuel a service-based economy. Robust U.S. technological industries develop a reliable supply of innovative weapon systems that are relatively unmatched.

As McClellan had access to secure and superior rail lines and naval transport, today’s U.S. infrastructure and industry still affords American commanders the ability to project forces anywhere in the world by land, air, or sea. No other nation has the strategic reach and sophisticated supply networks to maintain combat operations. Like the telegraph infrastructure the Union army enjoyed in 1862, today’s U.S. military has a very sophisticated information network supported by satellites and fiber-optic lines.

Beside U.S. organizational and training improvements and continued economic prosperity, military transformation has occurred. In 2000, Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld wanted fundamental change in the Department of Defense so it was relevant in a post-Soviet Union world. After 9/11, he and the George W. Bush Administration had the opportunity to launch a new form of warfare. On 19 October 2001, a small force consisting of CIA paramilitary officers, special forces, and a small contingent of marines, with the support of U.S. air power, waged air and missile attacks against al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan. With the assistance of a coalition of various Afghan ethnic groups (Pashtun, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras) supplying fighters, the small U.S. force
eventually grew to 50,000 to include those manning ships in the Arabian Sea.³ By 13 November 2001, U.S.-led coalition forces had secured Kabul (Afghanistan capital).

Rumsfeld believed he had ushered in a paradigm that superseded the 1990-1991, Desert Storm model. Desert Storm required six-months and 600,000 troops, (mainly in armored formations) staged in Saudi Arabia before a one-month air campaign preceded the 100-hour ground war.⁴ The Bush Administration broke new ground with their foreign intervention in Afghanistan.⁵

The Bush Administration was also wary of embarking on an open-ended peace keeping mission, of the type that President Bill Clinton initiated in the Balkans. This aversion extended to military leaders, also. In 2002, the CENTCOM commander, General Tommy Franks, was a combat veteran from Vietnam who did not deploy to Bosnia or Kosovo and experience the Clinton-era nation building. Had he, his instinctive dismissal of such operations might have been tempered by face-to-face experience with the complexity of reestablishing governments and separating sectarian fighting.⁶

**The Plan**

In 2002, the Bush Administration and Rumsfeld had another opportunity to test its new paradigm. As Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda fighters escaped U.S. forces by fleeing into the Tora Bora Mountains south of Jalalabad Afghanistan, General Franks, with Rumsfeld's close oversight, developed a plan to invade Iraq. This concept was as audacious in its scope and scale, for 2001, as McClellan's Peninsula Campaign plan had

---

⁴ Ibid., 481.
⁶ Ibid., 25.
been in 1862. Unlike McClellan’s plan, the invasion of Iraq, as executed, depended on fewer troops than the planners envisioned, but, like McClellan’s plan, required an innovative deployment sequence from a narrow point of departure, (referred to in 2002-3 as “uncoiling”) – Kuwait was to CENTCOM’s attack what Fortress Monroe was to the Army of the Potomac’s. Unlike 1862, the CENTCOM campaign plan required an innovative way to secure the population.

General Anthony Zinni, Franks’ predecessor as CENTCOM commander, constructed a pre-2002 plan (OPLAN 1003-98) for invading Iraq with 380,000 troops. A force footprint of this size was unacceptable to Rumsfeld. Like the Afghanistan model, instead of deploying large field armies, Rumsfeld believed a small number of men, armed with technologically advanced systems, could use the element of surprise to overcome the Iraqis. The demography of Afghanistan is much different from Iraq. In Afghanistan, 82% of the population live in rural areas whereas 75% of the Iraqi population lives in urban areas. Urban areas require a large force presence to control populations.

Unlike the 1990-1991 Gulf War, in which the U.S. slowly stockpiled men and material, Rumsfeld wanted the U.S. to strike quickly from Kuwait before Iraq could react. The second war planned to deliver a near simultaneous ground and air attack to catch the Iraqis off guard while decapitating their command and control through precision bomb and missile strikes. The tyranny of distance required a minimum 60 days to flow forces and material into theater. This new plan gambled on launching the attack with a small forward force. As follow on forces flowed into theater they were to join the

---

9 Ibid., 104.
10 Ibid., 36, 37.
ongoing operation.

The C.I.A. believed that instead of just giving up as they had in 1991, entire Iraqi divisions and brigades would surrender, turn in their equipment, and then be available as whole units to provide security assistance once Phase III, major combat operations were over. CENTCOM’s plan called for disbanding the loyal Republican Guard but assumed regular Iraqi divisions would be willing to assist the U.S. effort. These “capitulated” units were supposed to protect Iraq’s borders and provide security in the urban areas. This was a bold assumption more suitable for the 1200s when Genghis Khan and his Mongols built their force progressively, using soldiers they captured from armies as they swarmed the Asian steppe into Baghdad. Tommy Franks was no Genghis Khan, and CENTCOM’s force no horde.

Similar to McClellan’s plan bypassing Yorktown, Franks’ plan called for bypassing southern Iraqi cities to reduce the threat of bogging down in urban fighting. Planners designated Saddam Hussein’s regime, which was ensconced in Baghdad, as the “center of gravity.” Baghdad had over six million people in it. Saddam’s handpicked Special Republican Guard maintained control of the city. At the time of the planning, it was widely believed that they had weapons of mass destruction at their disposal and were prepared to use them.

The plan called for troops to advance on multiple fronts. Two-hundred thousand U.S. and U.K. marines and soldiers (140,000 U.S.) from Kuwait in the south, and the U.S. Army’s most technologically advanced division (4th Infantry Division) from Turkey

---

12 Gordon and Trainor, *Cobra II*, 79.
in the north, were to close on Baghdad, with the support of 1,600 combat aircraft.\footnote{Stewart, \textit{American Military History Volume II}, 481.} It is worth noting that Rumsfeld’s lean force of 140,000 U.S. troops in Kuwait was very similar in size to what McClellan had assembled in Ft. Monroe in the spring of 1862. U.S. planners made a failed assumption that Turkey would allow a U.S. ground force to stage and deploy through their country.\footnote{Gordon and Trainor, \textit{Cobra II}, 306. Even though Turkey denied the 4\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division access, Franks would later make the call to launch the ground attack without them. Meanwhile the ships loaded with 4\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division’s equipment floated suspended in the Mediterranean Sea outside of Turkey waiting for diplomatic efforts to open up the northern front. Franks would later comment that the 4\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division poised outside of Turkey provided an excellent operational diversion.} As in 1862, the cumulative effect of failed second efforts distant from the main axis of advance would prove decisive, and led to culmination.

The plan called for British forces to secure Basra and U.S. ground forces to reach the outskirts of Baghdad, cordon the capital with numerous bases, deny egress routes for the Republican Guard, and provide secure Forward Operating Bases (FOB) for U.S. forces to launch armored vehicle strikes at key nodes within the capital.\footnote{Gordon and Trainor, \textit{Cobra II}, 79, 80.} A post-combat reconstruction team led by Lieutenant General (retired) Jay Garner was to coordinate with non-governmental organizations and Iraqi exiles to provide emergency food, water, and electricity. Later, a politically appointed state department chair would handle the rest of the post-combat operations.\footnote{Ibid., 150.} With little support from Rumsfeld to engage in nation building, the post-combat stability operations depended on former Iraqi military and police organizations to resume their pre-war duties.

In all, the CENTCOM staff spent 18-months planning for major combat operations. The same staff only dedicated two months planning for operations that would
follow the capture of Baghdad, and the expected capitulation of Saddam’s Iraq

**Execution**

On 19 March 2003, the CIA was 99.9% certain that Saddam Hussein and his two sons were at Dora Farms, Iraq. President Bush authorized two combat air sorties to decapitate the leadership. The F-117s and the Navy Tomahawk Cruise Missiles destroyed their target but the Iraqi dictator had not visited there since 1995.

The U.S. Marines advanced up the Tigris River as the 3rd Infantry Division pushed up the Euphrates River. Both forces rapidly secured bridgeheads as they bypassed pockets of resistance. They used speed to their advantage and dealt viciously with any Iraqi military contact as they advanced. By 5 April 2003, Colonel Dave Perkins led one of his 3rd Infantry Division battalions in a daring “Thunder Run” from the outskirts into the central part of Baghdad. Two days after the 1st United Kingdom Division attacked Basra, Colonel Perkins (with his 2nd Brigade Combat Team) repeated his armored thrust into the heart of Baghdad. This time he stayed. The U.S. had closed the noose around Baghdad. Twenty-three days later, President Bush, aboard the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln, announced that major combat operations in Iraq were over.

Much like McClellan at Mechanicsville, Virginia on 25 June 1862, on the eve of the Seven Days Battle, on 1 May 2003, the U.S. forces in Baghdad, Iraq had just lost their strategic initiative. Unbeknownst to the American leadership, the swift run up to Baghdad, bypassed the true center of gravity, the decentralized, fanatical Sunni Fedayeen

---

17 Ibid., 503.
18 Ibid., 169, 177.
19 Ibid., 177.
20 Ibid., 553.
21 Ibid., 554.
and the Iraqi population. The U.S. military had stumbled into an insurgency and did not know it.

Urban insurgencies require large numbers of security forces to maintain stability and to restore basic services. Due to the limited number of troops, the U.S. failed to execute timely stabilization operations and enable civil authority to restore peace. L. Paul Bremer, a politically appointed State Department official (and former ambassador), replaced Jay Garner. In contradiction to CENTCOM assumptions regarding the Iraq plan, Bremer decided that no one belonging in Saddam’s Army could serve in a post-Baath Iraq, and disbanded the Iraq Army. In effect, Bremer turned 300,000 armed men into potential insurgents only adding to the Fedayeen problem. To complicate post-war Iraq, the oppressed Kurds in the North and the Shiite majority clamored for power in the absence of a strong government.

It took time, but U.S. leadership gradually accepted it was embroiled in a counterinsurgency. To defeat a counterinsurgency, large number of troops should have been living amongst the Iraqis. To build rapport with the Iraqis, troops should have been in the streets providing security, assisting with reconstruction efforts, and allowing the nascent post-Saddam Iraqi government to develop. “As local Iraqis were quick to note, the Americans could put a man on the moon but could not provide electricity.” In simplistic terms, Iraq needed American beat-cops, not firefighters living in a protected fortress only responding to emergencies.

Fighting a counterinsurgency required more people in theater and that was

22 Ibid., 499.
23 Ibid., 475.
24 Ibid., 506.
26 Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 506.
difficult to do with an all-volunteer force fighting in both Afghanistan and Iraq. It became clear that U.S. military forces would have to deploy on multiple tours. As Kalev Sepp, a counterinsurgency expert warned General George Casey in 2004, the U.S. was failing in its occupation to win the hearts and minds of Iraqis due in part that “military units concentrated on large bases for protection.”

Military leaders were in a conundrum. To make multiple deployments palatable to their all-volunteer force, large, super FOBs equipped with creature comforts such as Post Exchanges, fast food restaurants, and internet cafes sprung up.

With American public support slipping, commanders feared large casualty rates. Many well-meaning junior and mid-level officers had to fight the bureaucratic forces on their FOB just to get permission to conduct patrols. As Thomas Ricks highlighted in *Fiasco*, a Special Forces (SF) soldier said:

> The big Army is like a mammoth elephant trying to squish the mouse. It is slow, bureaucratic, and fearful of loss. The enemy has freedom of action, decentralized operations, and care little about the political or environmental impacts of the actions as long as it gets on CNN or CBS. The more we go to bunker mentality and pull away from the people, the harder it will be. We are making this war longer than it has to be. Every day the big Army tries to get more operational control over the only forced trained and ready for the FID [foreign internal defense] mission needed here – SF. They want us to stay in the wire and coordinate to the BCT/DIV [brigade combat team/division] level for every action.

Lower ranking non-commissioned and commissioned officers were not that only ones who held disdain for the conservative military leadership above them. A colonel expressed this opinion about the generals he worked for: “They are organization men.

---


28 Ricks, *Fiasco*, 369.
They are extremely careful.\textsuperscript{29}

In Leavenworth, Kansas, in 2006, General David Petraeus had his staff drew up plans for a new counterinsurgency manual. Some of the themes appeared in an article for Military Review. The article stated:

The more you protect your force, the less secure you are. If military forces stay locked up in compounds, they lose touch with the people who are the ultimate arbiters of victory. The more force you use, the less effective you are. Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction.\textsuperscript{30}

An Australian Lieutenant Colonel, David Kilcullen, gained Petraeus’ attention in an essay titled “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency.” In it, Kilcullen listed:

“Not everyone is good at counterinsurgency. Many people don’t understand the concept, and some can’t execute it. It is difficult, and in a conventional force, only a few people will master it. Anyone can learn the basics, but a few naturals do exist. Learn how to spot these people, and put them into positions where they can make a difference. Rank matters far less than talent—a few good men led by a smart junior noncommissioned officer can succeed in counterinsurgency, where hundreds of well-armed soldiers under a mediocre senior officer will fail.”\textsuperscript{31}

Once taking command of Multi-national Force Iraq in 2007, Petraeus (through the help of retired General Jack Keane) was able to “surge” more forces into Iraq to defuse the insurgency. Numbers alone did not quell the unrest. Petraeus pushed U.S. forces out of their safe FOBs, forcing them to interact daily with Iraqis and slowly gaining their trust and respect. With this trust, Iraqis came forward with actionable intelligence for U.S. forces.\textsuperscript{32}

U.S. forces departed Iraq on 15 December 2011 to return to the U.S., much as

\textsuperscript{29} Ricks, \textit{Fiasco}, 373.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 28.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid.
McClellan left the Peninsula to return to Washington, D.C. on 20 August 1862. McClellan’s bold plan required not only audacity to execute, but a willingness to press the objective in spite of the risk of a major battle against the Confederate Army. To respect risk, by avoiding major battles altogether, meant abandoning audacity, the essential element of the 1862 campaign’s success. In 2003, another bold plan was executed with dash that would, at first glance, appear to have embraced audacity and eschewed the Army of the Potomac’s legacy of caution. Instead of feckless maneuvering in the face of a weaker opponent, and falling short of securing his capital, the joint force smashed the opposing army before it, and seized Baghdad. Yet aversion to other necessary risks – of protracted campaigning, of country building, and of the nature of insurgent warfare – caused the leadership to err in favor of avoiding these altogether, and in so doing not understand what in the end was required in order to transform and stabilize Iraq, and would force an unsatisfactory culmination to the U.S. expedition. Much like Stanton’s fear of leaving Washington, D.C. unguarded in 1862, Rumsfeld was afraid of fighting a protracted war in 2003. Rumsfeld’s actions placed the U.S. in a more dangerous position for it would take another four plus years to start to quell the insurgency that raged through Iraq.

After the terrorist attacks in 2001, the military, people, and government were motivated to strike back at al Qaida. There was overwhelming international and national support to conduct operations in Afghanistan. In 2003, this overwhelming support to attack Iraq was not present. Despite his service chiefs’ and other cabinet secretary concerns, Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, compelled resourcing and conducting the Iraq War with a small U.S. ground-force footprint. On the surface, the Secretary of
Defense appeared to show courage by insisting on using a lithe military force. He tried to overthrow a regime risking the least amount of personnel and resources. By invading Iraq with the smallest possible force package, Rumsfeld sought to move on Iraq before Saddam Hussein, international, or domestic pressure could derail the invasion.

Unlike the Peninsula Campaign, Operation Iraqi Freedom did not culminate within operational reach of its objective. U.S. forces successfully defeated the Republican Guard in Baghdad. Franks appeared at first to have planned and executed one of the most successful joint campaigns in U.S. history, yet it ultimately failed. Franks failed to understand he had just bypassed an enemy, and a casus belli for the insurgents, who would prove to be very adaptive for the next eight years. With limited forces on the ground and few within the mobilization pipeline, the Fedayeen had taken the initiative.

Having lost the initiative and unsure of the true threat, the next two Combined Joint Task Force-Iraq commanders (General Ricardo Sanchez, and General George Casey) did not retreat from the battlefield like McClellan; instead, they stayed. In 1862, in the face of uncertainty on the Peninsula, McClellan's force culminated. He opted to pull his forces back. In 2003, the U.S. forces in Iraq also faced uncertainty and culminated. Instead of pulling back, U.S. forces passively stayed in place. Reluctance to put their troops in harm's way only prolonged the occupation, and permitted the rapid evolution of hostile elements that would undo whatever success had been achieved with the fall of Saddam Hussein. With Iraqis left without governance, basic infrastructure damaged, raw sewage flowing into the Tigris River, and electrical grids still not working, the insurgency only grew. The growing insurgency resulted in more American combat
deaths, with the added bitterness that now, with no enemy army to defeat or capital to
seize; there was no apparent objective to justify these losses. While it is perhaps an
oversimplification to say that, the American public always has a hard time accepting
casualties, it is perfectly reasonable to understand that they, or any engaged citizenry, will
grow weary of war without purpose, and without end.
“History may not repeat itself but it does rhyme.” Despite many technological innovations and changes, there are threads running from the past to the present, and their continuity in this case should give us pause. Some communities appear resurging: the U.S. remains economically robust, its military continues to have organizational advantages over its competitors, and maintains the ability to project forces through operational movement to achieve strategic ends. The U.S. also has made advances in the conduct of war within the last 150 years, and contemporary commanders demonstrated they can synchronize joint forces, master changing technologies, and achieve great situational awareness. However, one can also trace the symptoms of a failed campaign in 1862 forward, and find them in similar contemporary military shortfalls.

In 1862, the North definitely had the economic advantage over the South. Riding the innovation of the Industrial Revolution, Northern cities out produced the South in railroads, steamships, iron clad ships, cannon, shell, uniforms, and rifles. The northern infrastructure allowed for better lines of communication. Immigrants and populous cities supplied the labor to keep the economy operating and enough military aged males in uniform to sustain a lengthy war.

In 2003, the U.S. had an overwhelming economic advantage over the sanction riddled Iraq government. Instead of the Industrial Revolution, U.S. factories had embraced and retooled in concert with the Information Revolution and produced the finest military hardware in the world. From F-117 and B-2 stealth fighters and bombers

---

1 Vardell Nesmith, “Column, Line, and Shock” (lecture, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, Joint Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA, August 13, 2013). Note on sourcing: this quote or something similar is attributed to Mark Twain. Mark Twain scholars cannot identify where or when the quotation was used however.
to the most advanced information surveillance and reconnaissance assets, the U.S. clearly had the material advantage.

Organizationally, both the Army of the Potomac and the 2003 joint force shared additional similarities. McClellan received the best academic instruction and training available to an officer of his time. His education and experiences in the Mexican War and working for the railroad prepared him for the complex training, reorganization, and reequipping he had to accomplish after taking command in 1861. The joint force assembled in Kuwait in 2003 on the eve of the second Iraq War was similarly well educated and organized. No nation has ever fielded a more educated force. Expertly trained, organized, and equipped with the best weapon systems available, the 2003 force had much in common with the men assembled on Ft. Monroe 141 years earlier.

When McClellan’s forces boarded 301 ships and left Washington, D.C. on 17 March 1862 for Fort Monroe, they had operationally projected their force behind the Confederates and achieved the strategic initiative. In under a month the largest ground force assembled in the Northern Hemisphere was only 80 miles from their objective. Likewise, on 19 March 2003, the U.S.-led coalition had seized the strategic initiative by using an uncontested sea approach to mass their forces in Kuwait only 420 miles from their objective.

Unlike the Army of the Potomac, U.S. leadership organized the 2003 troops into a synchronized joint force. This paper has highlighted the friction McClellan experienced with the navy. Today, McClellan could have been designated a joint force commander and would have had the command and control relationship to direct Goldsborough and Missroon’s warships. The 2003 force was truly a joint organization. The US Army and
Marines (and their equipment) arrived in theater by way of the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Civil Reserve Air Fleet. When calling in indirect fire, any service could and did provide assistance. U.S. military service integration and cooperation had been improved thanks in part to the 1986 Goldwater Nicholas Act.

Unlike the Army of the Potomac, the 2003 military force had mastered the technological advancements of the day. Despite having the infrastructure to move forces by rail, utilize hydrogen gas balloons for intelligence reports, and communicate the reports by wire, the Union failed to utilize the technological advancements at their disposal. In 2003, the U.S. expertly employed a multitude of military tools available to them. From the M1A2, 120mm battle tank to stealth aircraft utilizing state of the art electronics and precision munitions, U.S. forces mastered the best technology available. Technology afforded these troops greater situational awareness. Commanders, utilizing Blue Force Tracker, could see their dispersed, converging armored columns on a digital display, cutting down on fratricide incidents.

However, both campaigns surrendered the strategic initiative evident at their outset, and eventually culminated short of their stated objectives. The outcome in both cases resulted from risk aversion. In 1862, Lincoln and Stanton were afraid Jackson would do to Washington as he had done to three separate Union commands. The Virginia prevented Goldsboro’s fleet from opening a key waterway. His subordinate Missroon refused to risk his warships on the other river approach to Richmond. Although outnumbering his opponent on every engagement of the campaign, McClellan’s fear of losing his army materialized when his force stalled at the gates of Richmond.

In Iraq in 2003, despite having a synchronized joint force with the technological
advancements, and situational awareness, U.S. leaders experienced a hauntingly similar crisis; risk aversion had crippled the force. Despite taking Baghdad and neutralizing the Baath party, the force did not achieve war-winning objectives, and the war would not end. The mixed public support gradually deflated when it became clear (despite the rhetoric), that the U.S. was trapped in a quagmire. Commanders, afraid of taking friendly causalities retracted from the streets into the cocoon of their walled compounds, HESCO barriers, and concrete T-walls. Instead of defeating the insurgency headlong by providing security and basic needs to the Iraqi people, U.S. commanders fretted about bringing their people home as the Iraqi insurgents controlled the population. Jointness, technology, numbers – none of these enabled the U.S. leadership to overcome their aversion to risks in the campaign, with consequences that resulted, not only in the loss of advantages on hand at the outset, but an inferior strategic position at its conclusion.

This risk aversion among our leaders has implications for the future, and the relatively staid nature of our military operations has led some to posit that the recent failures stem from aged, unimaginative generals unable to understand the 21st Century. A provocative opinion piece by Adrian Bonenberger in The Washington Post on 21 February 2014 suggested that the military should downsize some cold war generals and make room for some younger more flexible leaders. Bonenberger went on to say,

At a time when billion-dollar start-ups are developed and sold by 20-somethings, it’s not such a stretch to imagine that suitable service members in their 30s — three or four among 1,000 — could accept a level of responsibility far beyond the military’s usual promotion progression. After all, Amazon’s chief executive is 50 years old, Microsoft’s is 46, Google’s is 40 and Facebook’s is 29.²

Anyone advancing such an argument must acknowledge some uncomfortable, even eerie parallels: George B. McClellan was 35-years old, and like the start-up billionaires today, had just left the 19th Century equivalent of Silicon Valley (the immensely profitable and revolutionary railroad industry), when he took command of what was at the time America’s largest army and went to war for far higher stakes than were present in any of our recent campaigns in Central Asia or Mesopotamia. At the very least, this suggests that panaceas such as youth and an understanding of the hottest business trends will not solve the problem.

An October 2013 article, “Building Better Generals,” suggests that U.S. general officers are not equipped with the right skill sets because today’s senior military officers came of age in the last 12 years of fighting. Instead of attending professional military education schools and taking broadening assignments, these officers were fighting in two combat zones. The article suggests that the personnel system is inadequate to properly vet and place general officers so the most innovative and creative military leaders will be at the helm in the coming years. Fixing an antiquated personnel system seems logical. Pay heed human capital management officers. This may not be enough though.

At the most mundane level, there should be a comprehensive assessment process, much like a secret or top-secret clearance investigation, combined with the 360-degree peer and subordinate feedback assessments. The investigator and feedback assessment


4 Ibid.
should focus questions to peers, acquaintances, and subordinates to see what the core character of the person really is. Perhaps a good garrison commander with excellent academic bona fides that is politically connected is not the right leader to do the “bloody work.” Why is it that “company men” continue to rise to the top and occupy positions of increased responsibility? Maybe we can do better in honing a personnel system to select the next Grant or Farragut.

There is a larger failing in our thinking however. A doctrine which characterizes risk as a relationship between hazard and loss cannot help but imbue its practitioners with an excess of caution - if all we are to measure is the dangers and the costs - we are unlikely to understand the opportunities or gains. Risk is never inherent, but derivative, and so changes with the myriad changes in an operation. The doctrine must teach not aversion to hazard and loss, but an understanding of what is hazarded, what might be lost, against what is on offer to be gained. A resolute McClellan before Richmond might or might not have ended the American Civil War in 1862; a resolute U.S. administration and military leadership bold enough to bear the burden of stabilizing Iraq in 2003 might or might not have succeeded in transforming that country into a democratic polity. What should have been obvious in both cases is that irresolution, caution, taking counsel of fears, or risk aversion to coin a phrase, was certain to doom both operations.

This thesis explored the tendency of leaders when facing unclear situations and approaching culmination either pull back or do nothing. The U.S. needs leaders who can see through the cloud of uncertainty, have the fortitude to press on, close with, and overcome the crippling uncertainties of risk, or what is for operational art, the “last 100 yards.”
APPENDIX A

Maps

Map 1

Map adapted from MapQuest
APPENDIX B

Chronological Events Prior to the Peninsula Campaign

July 21, 1861: The Army of the Potomac lost its first major battle at Bull Run after it unsuccessfully tried to make an overland approach to the Confederate capital (Richmond).¹

November 1, 1861: President Abraham Lincoln turned over command of the entire Union Army to McClellan who already commanded the Army of the Potomac. Lincoln feared the burden was too great for one man. McClellan assuaged Lincoln by saying “I can do it all.”²

Fall 1861: McClellan proved to be masterful at organizing, training, equipping the Army of the Potomac. The men called him “Little Mac.” The Washington D.C. public praised him as the “Little Napoleon.” The Lincoln administration pressed McClellan to act in Virginia.³

Fall 1861: General Joseph E. Johnston commanded a Confederate Army 30 miles west of Washington D.C. at Manassas and Centreville, Virginia. He withdrew his forces on March 8, 1862.⁴

March 8, 1862: The Confederate ironclad, CSS Virginia sank the USS Cumberland, forced the USS Congress to run aground and surrender. During the attack the USS Roanoke, Minnesota, and Brandywine also ran aground.⁵

March 9, 1862: The ironclads, USS Monitor and CSS Virginia fought to a standstill at the Battle of Hampton Roads.⁶

March 11, 1862: Lincoln relieved McClellan as command of general-in-chief of the Union because he believed it too burdensome to command both it and the Army of the Potomac.⁷

Chronological Events During the Peninsula Campaign

March 17, 1862: The first elements of the Army of the Potomac departed Alexandria, Virginia by ship to move to Fort Monroe.⁸

¹ Cullen, The Peninsula Campaign, 1862: McClellan and Lee Struggle for Richmond, 17.
² Miller, The Peninsula Campaign 1862, USA COM J3 Staff Ride, E1.
³ Ibid.
⁴ Ibid.
⁵ Ibid., E3.
⁶ Ibid.
⁷ Ibid.
⁸ Ibid.
March 23, 1862: General Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson attacked Union soldiers at Kernstown, Virginia in the Shenandoah Valley starting his "Valley Campaign." On March 31, President Lincoln withheld sending General Louis Blenker's division to McClellan.  

March 27, 1862: Confederate President Jefferson Davis ordered General Johnson to reinforce the Peninsula.

April 3, 1862: Lincoln withheld General Irvin McDowell's corps from joining the Army of the Potomac thinking Washington D.C. was unprotected. Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton placed the corps at Fredericksburg to cover any Confederate movement against the capital.

Battle of Yorktown

April 4, 1862: The main body of the Army of the Potomac started movement up the peninsula in order to seize the confederate capital 65 miles to the northwest.

April 5, 1862: To deceive McClellan as to his troop strength, Confederate General John B. Magruder, marched his 4,000 men along McClellan's front behind the Warwick River and Yorktown fortifications. The deception worked. McClellan believed he faced a larger army. McClellan outnumbered Magruder by 117,000 men.

April 6, 1862: Johnston sent men from Richmond to reinforce Magruder at Yorktown.

April 9, 1862: Richmond passed the Conscription Act. The Confederates prepared for the Union onslaught. Lincoln admonished McClellan "...But you must act."

April 11, 1862: McClellan petitioned the Lincoln Administration for General William B. Franklin's Division (McDowell's Corps) in order to use it against the Confederate works located on the York River at Gloucester Point. Stanton approved the request.

April 14, 1862: Against Johnston's recommendation, Davis ordered the Confederates to hold the Yorktown line. Davis needed more time to bolster Richmond's defense.

May 3, 1862: Under the cover of darkness and a deceptive bombardment, Confederates withdrew from Yorktown. The Army of the Potomac occupied Yorktown the following day.
Battle of Williamsburg

May 5, 1862: Johnston ordered General James Longstreet to fight a retrograde. Longstreet’s men occupied prepared defenses at Williamsburg, Virginia. They stopped the Union Third Corps. 19

May 6, 1862: Union troops occupied Williamsburg. Franklin’s division arrived at Eltham’s Landing near West Point where the York met the Pamunkey River. 20

Eltham’s Landing Engagement

May 7, 1862: Franklin conducted an amphibious landing at Eltham’s Landing. Confederates under General W. H. C. Whiting’s Division attack Franklin. 21

May 8, 1862: Jackson attacks and defeats Union Forces in McDowell, Virginia (Valley Campaign). 22

May 9, 1862: Confederates evacuated Norfolk after destroying Gosport navy yard. Union took Norfolk and Portsmouth the following day forcing the Confederates to scuttle and burn the CSS Virginia on May 11. 23

Engagement at Drewry’s Bluff

May 15, 1862: Union Commander John Rogers led the USS Monitor, Galena, Port Royal, Naugatuck, and Aroostook up the James River. Confederates forced them to reverse course at Drewry’s Bluff. 24

May 16, 1862: Johnston’s Confederates moved to the south side of the Chickahominy River. 25

May 20, 1862: Army of the Potomac started crossing the final geographic barrier en route to Richmond; the Chickahominy River. 26

May 22, 1862: Johnston had established his headquarters on the Williamsburg Road two days. 18

18 Ibid., E7.
19 Ibid., E8.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Stewart, American Military History, Volume I: The United States Army and the Forging of a Nation, 1775-1917, 224.
23 Miller, The Peninsula Campaign 1862, USACOM J3 Staff Ride, E8.
24 Ibid., E8-E9.
25 Ibid., E9.
26 Ibid.
miles southeast of Richmond. McClellan established his headquarters at Cold Harbor (North of Chickahominy River). North of the Chickahominy River, McClellan’s men waited for McDowell’s corps to march down from Fredericksburg while rebuilding and defending the Richmond and York River Railroad.27

May 23, 1862: Dysentery forced McClellan to remain in quarters. Jackson’s Confederates attacked Banks’ men at Fort Royal (Shenandoah Valley). Skirmishers opened fire near Mechanicsville (Ellerson’s Mill).28

May 24, 1862: Union government revoked McDowell’s order to join McClellan due to Jackson’s attack on Banks. Skirmishers fought at New Bridge, Mechanicsville, and Seven Pines. Johnston spoke to President Davis but never mentioned a Confederate counter offensive.29

May 25, 1862: Jackson defeated Banks in northwest Virginia at Winchester. Army of the Potomac marched toward the James River from Bottom’s Bridge.30

May 26, 1862: Unaware about McDowell’s revoked orders (keeping him at Fredericksburg), McClellan ordered Fitz John Porter to attack the Confederates at Hanover Court House and then link up with McDowell’s I Corps.31

Engagement at Hanover Court House

May 27, 1862: Porter’s Union troops defeated General Lawrence O. B. Branch’s men at Hanover Court House. Further down the Peninsula, the Richmond and York River Railroad started pushing Union supplies on the repaired railroad.32

May 28, 1862: Union cavalry burned highway bridges and the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad Bridge on the South Anna River.33

May 29, 1862: Union forces destroyed the Virginia Central Railroad Bridge on the South Anna River. Union engineers finished building the Grapevine Bridge over the Chickahominy River. McClellan still suffered from dysentery.34

May 30, 1862: Johnston planned to attack portions of the Army of the Potomac on the south side of the Chickahominy River. His orders were unclear to his subordinates. McClellan was still bed ridden. Skirmish began near Fair Oaks.35

27 Ibid., E9.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., E9, E10.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid., E11.
Battle of Seven Pines

May 30, 1862: Confederate columns failed to converge. Johnston fell severely wounded during the action. Davis informed Lee that he would take command June 1. Still weak from his sickness, McClellan eventually rode out to the battlefield in the afternoon.\(^{36}\)

June 1, 1862: Fighting continued at Seven Pines. At days end, the battle was still undecided. Lee took command.\(^{37}\)

June 2, 1862: The Union march to Wormley’s Ferry on the Pamunkey River.\(^{38}\)

June 3, 1862: Lee had the Richmond defenses resurveyed. He wanted to strengthen the defenses so he could pull men off the line and use them for a counteroffensive. The Union started a four-day expedition to move to the James River and open communications with the Union Navy.\(^{39}\)

June 5, 1862: Lee informed Davis that McClellan would cautiously move in daylight under the cover of his siege guns from one fortified position to the next. Lee was advocating a counteroffensive.\(^{40}\)

June 6, 1862: McClellan was bedridden again due to illness.\(^{41}\)

June 8, 1862: Having failed to subdue Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley, Halleck ordered McDowell to attack Richmond while keeping his force between Lee and Washington D. C.\(^{42}\)

June 9, 1862: Jackson’s troops defeated General Erastus B. Tyler’s men at Port Republic concluding the Valley Campaign.\(^{43}\)

June 10, 1862: Lee decided to reinforce Jackson’s Corps so the Lincoln Administration would pull Union Soldiers out of the Peninsula.\(^{44}\)

June 11, 1862: McClellan’s Army remained divided on either side of the Chickahominy River.\(^{45}\)

June 12, 1862: Lee sent General J.E.B. Stuart’s cavalry to learn more information about

\(^{36}\) Ibid.
\(^{37}\) Ibid.
\(^{38}\) Ibid.
\(^{39}\) Ibid.
\(^{40}\) Ibid., E12.
\(^{41}\) Ibid.
\(^{42}\) Ibid.
\(^{43}\) Ibid.
\(^{44}\) Ibid.
\(^{45}\) Ibid.
the Union’s right flank. McClellan moved his headquarters near to Alexander's Bridge. 46

June 12-13, 1862: General Lafayette McCall’s Division reinforced the Army of the Potomac. 47

June 12, 1862: Lee sent General J.E.B. Stuart’s cavalry to learn more information about the Union’s right flank. McClellan moved his headquarters near to Alexander's Bridge. 48

June 14, 1862: J.E.B. Stuart’s cavalry fight engagements at Haws’ Shop, Old Church, and Garlick’s Landing. 49

June 15, 1862: J.E.B. Stuart completed his ride around the Army of the Potomac. Stuart reported to Lee about McClellan’s troop disposition, supply situation, and the conditions of the roads. McClellan’s right flank was exposed. 50

June 16, 1862: Lee ordered Jackson to bring his Valley Army to Richmond. 51

June 17, 1862: Jackson started moving towards Richmond. 52

June 18, 1862: McClellan ordered some of their supplies moved from White House Landing to the James River. 53

June 20, 1862: Skirmish broke out at New Bridge. 54

June 21, 1862: Jackson’s Army reached Gordonsville moving toward Richmond. 55

June 22, 1862: Jackson’s Army rested at Fredricks Hall Station on the Virginia Central Railroad. 56

June 23, 1862: Lee held a council of war at his headquarters at Dabbs House. Longstreet, D. H. Hill, A. P. Hill, and Jackson (50 miles ahead of his troops) attended. They decided to launch a counteroffensive on June 26. 57

June 24, 1862: Jackson linked back up with his men at Beaver Dam Station on the Virginia Central Railroad. 58

46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., El3.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
June 25, 1862: McClellan ordered Heintzelman’s Corps to attack the Confederate positions west of the Seven Pines crossroads. After the attack began, he sent his chief of staff forward to counter the order. Later, McClellan pushed Heintzelman to continue the attack. Lee was concerned that McClellan’s had uncovered his plan and ordered the attack. Washed out roads and unclear directions delayed Jackson’s march.  

The Seven Days Battle

June 26, 1862: (Battle of Mechanicsville). Lee’s attacks north of the Chickahominy were poorly coordinated. Jackson’s late arrival and poor communication to other Confederate commanders led to A. P. Hill impatiently attacking a reinforced McCall’s division. Lincoln appointed General John Pope as the commander of the newly formed Army of Virginia to operate in central Virginia and relieve pressure from McClellan.

June 27, 1862: (Battle of Gaine’s Mill; Engagement at Garnett’s Farm). After a hard fight, the Union V Corps and General Henry Slocum’s division withdrew in the afternoon. Confederate General D. R. Jones’ division struck W. F. Smith’s division south of the Chickahominy River. Smith was able to repulse the Confederates in what would be the bloodiest day of the Seven Days Battle.

June 28, 1862: (Battle of Gaine’s Mill; Engagement at Goldings’s Farm). As the combatants resumed their fight at Garnett’s and Golding’s Farm, McClellan ordered the rest of his Army to pull back south of the Chickahominy River and retreat toward the James River. In haste, his men burned most their supplies at White House Landing. Lee dispatched J.E.B. Stuart to see if the Army of the Potomac was retreating to Yorktown. Lee later ascertained that McClellan was pushing his men to the James River.

June 29, 1862: (Battle of Savage’s Station; Engagement at Allen’s Farm). Lee ordered his men to pursue the fleeing Union Army and intercept them prior to reaching the James River. A sharp fight broke out west of Savage’s Station. The Union reformed at Savage’s Station. Jackson failed to cross the Chickahominy River and Magruder tentatively attacked. Heintzelman’s Union Corps unexpectedly left Sumner’s Corps to face Magruder. Sumner’s Corps withstood Magruder’s attack and the Union was able to pull south of the Chickahominy River under the cloak of darkness.

June 29, 1862: (Battle of Glendale; Engagement at Frayer’s Farm). Lee’s plan to envelope the Army of the Potomac at Glendale failed due to the inability to pressure the Union rear guards. McClellan left the field with no overall commander. The fight devolved into an artillery duel. In the afternoon, Longstreet and A. P. Hill failed in a

59 Ibid., E14.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid., E15.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., E15, E16.
final frontal assault. Though bloody, the rear guard protected the Army of the Potomac's retreat. This was Lee's last opportunity to cut off the retreating Union Army. At dark, the Union rear guard pushed southward to join the others at the James River.64

July 1, 1862: (The “Seven Days Battles” End; Malvern Hill). McClellan’s men held strong positions on Malvern Hill. They repulsed uncoordinated Confederate frontal attacks. The Confederates suffered grievous losses (5,650 men).65

July 2, 1862: McClellan’s men continued to retreat to Harrison’s Landing on the James River.66

July 3-4, 1862: Skirmishes occurred near Harrison’s Landing.67

July 4, 1862: Skirmishers collided at Westover. Seeing that the Union had protective fire from their naval gunboats, Lee did not launch a frontal attack.68

July 5-6, 1862: Confederate artillerymen shelled Union ships on the James River.69

July 8, 1862: President Lincoln met with McClellan at Harrison’s Landing. Lee aborted the counteroffensive. He moved his Confederates up the James River closer to Richmond awaiting the next Union move.70

July 9, 1862: Lincoln was pleased with the Army of the Potomac’s morale. McClellan conferred with his subordinate leaders. Most of his officers wanted to remain on the Peninsula. McClellan gave Lincoln his lengthy “Harrison’s Landing Letter.” Lincoln read the letter in McClellan’s presence. In it, McClellan informs the president that he should be a stronger more effective letter. Lincoln thanked McClellan and left.71

July 10, 1862: The Army of the Potomac sent out reconnaissance from Harrison’s Landing to White Oak Swamp where skirmishers engaged one another.72

July 11, 1862: Lincoln appointed General Henry W. Halleck general-in-chief. The Army of the Potomac continued to conduct reconnaissance. They reached the Charles City Court House.73

July 13, 1862: Lee sent Jackson to Louisa and Gordonsville. Union General Pope was

---

64 Ibid., E16.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
advancing into central Virginia.  

July 13, 1862: Lee sent Jackson to Louisa and Gordonsville. Union General Pope was advancing into central Virginia.  

July 22, 1862: Skirmishers fought at Westover.  

July 23, 1862: Halleck arrived in Washington, D.C. to take command of all United States armies.  

July 25, 1862: Halleck met with McClellan at Harrison’s Landing. McClellan told Halleck he wanted to attack the transportation hub at Petersburg (30 miles south of Richmond). Halleck dissuaded him. McClellan then said he could strike Richmond from Harrison’s landing. McClellan asked for 30,000 reinforcements believing that the Confederates had 200,000 rested troops in Richmond. Halleck said there were only 20,000 available men and if McClellan could not take Richmond with 110,000 men then he should return to northern Virginia and combine his forces with Pope.  

July 26, 1862: After meeting with his officers, McClellan told Halleck that he would accept the 20,000 available men and attack Richmond. McClellan said he “was willing to try it.”  

July 27, 1862: Halleck returned to Washington, D.C. to find a telegraph message dated 26 July from McClellan. McClellan requested an additional 35,000 - 55,000 reinforcements in addition to the agreed upon 20,000 men. Lincoln directed Halleck to order the Army of the Potomac back to northern Virginia. Lee ordered A. P. Hill to join Jackson at Gordonsville to move against Pope.  

July 29-30, 1862: The Army of the Potomac continued with their reconnaissance. McClellan received orders to pull his sick and wounded from theater.  

July 31-August 1, 1862: Confederates attack Union shipping and camps between Harrison’s Landing and the Shirley Plantation.  

August 2-8, 1862: The Army of the Potomac reoccupied Malvern Hill.  

August 3, 1862: Skirmishers clashed at Sycamore Church on the south side of the James
River. Halleck ordered McClellan to withdraw his men from the Peninsula and move to Aquia Creek near Fredericksburg.\(^\text{84}\)

**August 4, 1862:** McClellan ultimately followed orders but argued to Halleck that withdraw would be disastrous.\(^\text{85}\)

**August 6, 1862:** Skirmishers clashed on Malvern Hill.\(^\text{86}\)

**August 9, 1862:** (Battle of Cedar Mountain) In Culpepper County, Jackson fought and won small engagement against Pope.\(^\text{87}\)

**August 14-15, 1862:** Lee ascertains McClellan’s forces were moving north. Lee planned to join his forces with Jackson at Gordonsville. The Union III and V Corps departed Harrison’s landing to move to Aquia Creek.\(^\text{88}\)

**August 15, 1862:** Lee reached Gordonsville and met with his lieutenants.\(^\text{89}\)

**August 14-19, 1862:** From Harrison’s Landing to Williamsburg, Union cavalry covered the rest of the Army of the Potomac’s withdraw.\(^\text{90}\)

**August 20, 1862:** The Union V Corps embarked on ships at Newport News.\(^\text{91}\)

**August 21, 1862:** The Union III Corps steamed from Yorktown.\(^\text{92}\)

**August 23, 1862:** The Union VI Corps embarked from Yorktown.\(^\text{93}\)

**August 25, 1862:** Jackson marched around Pope’s flank enabling his forces to destroy a large Union supply base at Manassas.\(^\text{94}\)

**August 26, 1862:** The Union II Corps left from Fort Monroe.\(^\text{95}\)

\(^{84}\) Ibid.
\(^{85}\) Ibid.
\(^{86}\) Ibid.
\(^{87}\) Ibid.
\(^{88}\) Ibid.
\(^{89}\) Ibid., E20.
\(^{90}\) Ibid.
\(^{91}\) Ibid.
\(^{92}\) Ibid.
\(^{93}\) Ibid.
\(^{94}\) Ibid.
\(^{95}\) Ibid.
APPENDIX C
Organizational Tables

Components of a 10,000-Man Union Army Division

Table 1

Army of the Potomac, June 1861

11 Divisions (10,000 Men per Division)

Table 2
Attny of the Potomac, March 1862

*In II Corps, Blenker's Division was sent to Shenandoah Valley*

Table 3

Army of the Potomac, May 1862

Table 4
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Spruill III, Matt, and Matt Spruill IV. *Echoes of Thunder: A Guide to the Seven Days*


VITA

Lieutenant Colonel Jay Briggs is currently a student at the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in Norfolk, Virginia. He has most recently served as a Branch Chief in the Department of Army, G-37/Training Directorate (Leader Development) at the Pentagon. Lieutenant Colonel Briggs received his commission as an infantry officer in western New York. He has served in every infantry position at the company-grade level in a mechanized infantry brigade. He has commanded both an Abrams and a Bradley Infantry Company. He served as an XO/Assistant Professor of Military Education in Washington State. He has led two branches in the Training Division at National Guard Bureau in Arlington, Virginia. In 2010, he commanded a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan as a part of the 86th Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Mountain). Lieutenant Colonel Briggs is a Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Seminar XXI fellow. He has a Bachelor of Science in Business Administration, Bachelor of Arts in History, and a Master of Arts in Strategic Studies and National Security Affairs from the Naval War College.