“I am a Soldier, I fight where I am told and win where I fight.”

“War is simple, direct, and ruthless.”

“You shouldn’t underestimate an enemy, but it is just a fatal to overestimate him.”

“Many Soldiers are led to faulty ideas of war by knowing too much about too little.”

*General George S. Patton*
**Title:** Sometimes War is Just War

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Sometimes War is Just War

COL Tunnell
27 Aug 2007
References

- FM 1 *The Army*
- FM 3-0 *Operations*
- FM 3-13 *Information Operations*
- FM 3-24 *Counter Insurgency Operations*
- FM 7-1 *Battle Focused Training*
- FM 90-8 *Counter Guerrilla Operations*
- Commander’s Notes
Tasks, Conditions and Standards

- **Task:** Establish baseline concepts among leaders for developing SBCT warfighting proficiency; understand relevant terms.

- **Conditions:** Classroom environment.

- **Standards:** Successfully complete a written examination (open notes).
Agenda

• Commander’s Philosophy
• Introduction—The Nature of War
• Information Operations
• Counter Insurgency Operations (COIN)
• Myths About COIN
• Counter Guerrilla Operations
• Training Management
• Conclusion
Commander’s Philosophy

• **Background.** We deploy to defeat an armed and aggressive enemy. There are five areas central to meeting our obligation: readiness, training, fitness, ethics, and victory.

• **Readiness.** Be ready for an early deployment to combat—do not compromise readiness. Readiness means maintaining and understanding the advanced networks that help us close with the enemy. We must be experts at these systems.

• **Training.** Our training will stress LFXs, maneuver training, and field craft. Concentrate on basic “blocking and tackling” to ensure that we can perform our mission in a variety of conditions.

• **Fitness.** Make sure that you and your Soldiers are fit enough to get the job done. We must be able to move rapidly to a point of decision, dismount, and fight for long periods of time. Our job is to close with and kill the enemy.

• **Ethics.** Live Army Values and the Warrior Ethos. I will underwrite an honest mistake, but do not confuse mistakes with negligence because I will not condone deceit, neglect, inattention, or carelessness. Only you can compromise your integrity.

• **Victory.** A focus based on readiness, training, physical fitness, and high ethical standards prepares us to win our first battle. Once in action, we mass elements of combat power to ensure the absolute destruction of our enemy. Whatever the task, we will emerge victorious.

• **Conclusion.** In 1970 Charles Black wrote in *Infantry Magazine* that “Men will go anywhere despite anything, except opposition by better willing men to anywhere despite anything.” Terrorism is a plague in our society and our country men are counting on us to do our duty in this time of national peril.
Introduction—The Nature of War
As the Philistine moved closer, David ran quickly toward the battle line to meet him. Reaching into his bag and taking out a stone, he slung it and struck the Philistine in the forehead. The stone sank into his forehead, and he fell facedown on the ground.

I Samuel 17:48
One Indian was killed in the back part of Captain Geiger’s tent, while he was attempting to tomahawk the Captain. The Indians made four or five fierce charges on our lines, yelling and screaming as they advanced, shooting balls and arrows into our ranks. At each charge they were driven off in confusion, carrying their dead and wounded as they retreated.

**SGT Isaac Naylor, Company of Riflemen, Indiana Territory 1811**
The Nature of War

Sergeant Weaver, alone and unaided, charged a body of 15 insurgents, dislodging them, killing 4 and wounding several.

MOH Citation, Philippine Insurrection 1899
SSG Ehresman threw a hand grenade and led his small group in an assault on the enemy position. SSG Ehresman’s group killed three of the enemy in the position and then killed two more and wounded another immediately outside of the position.

SFC Oakes dismounted from the vehicle and shot and killed a man 10 meters to his front who was preparing to fire a Rocket Propelled Grenade.
Instruments of National Power

• All of the means available to the government in the pursuit of national objectives:
  – Diplomatic
  – Informational
  – Military
  – Economic.
Levels of War

- **Strategic**—National Policy (POTUS).
- **Operational**—Ensures That Combat Achieves Strategy (MNF-I).
- **Tactical**—Engagements, Battles, and Skirmishes (MNC and Below).
Full Spectrum Operations

Offensive Operations Are Considered the Decisive Operation.

The Most Popular Model

The Simultaneous and Continuous Conduct of These Operations.
Popular Mythology

• The IO LLO may often be the decisive LLO.

• By publicizing government policies, the actual situation, and counterinsurgent accomplishments, IO, synchronized with public affairs, can neutralize insurgent propaganda and false claims.

How does this effect enemy freedom of maneuver?
Information Operations is the employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to affect or defend information and information systems, and to influence decisionmaking.
• IO are enabling operations that create and present opportunities for decisive operations.

• At the tactical level, IO focuses on an adversary’s use of information and information systems. Lethal and nonlethal fires may be a significant contributor in offensive and defensive operations. PSYOPs and CMO may be significant contributors in support and stability operations.

• Information Operations (IO) encompasses attacking adversary command and control (C2) systems (offensive IO) while protecting friendly C2 systems from adversary disruption (defensive IO).
Offensive Information Operations

- **Offensive IO** destroy, degrade, disrupt, deny, deceive, exploit, and influence, adversary decision makers and others who can affect the success of friendly operations. Offensive IO also target the information and information systems used in the adversary decision making process.

- **Offensive IO** facilitates seizing and retaining the initiative by creating disparity between the quality of information available to friendly forces and that available to enemy forces.
Defensive Information Operations

- **Defensive IO** ensure timely, accurate, and relevant information access while denying adversaries the opportunity to exploit friendly information and information systems for their own purposes.

- **Defensive IO** seeks to limit the vulnerability of C2 systems to adversary action and to prevent enemy interference with friendly information and information systems. *Defensive IO* includes protection, detection, restoration, and response.

- **Effective Defensive IO** assure friendly commanders an accurate Common Operating Picture based not only on a military perspective, but also on non-military factors that may affect the situation.
Counter Insurgency
Counterinsurgency

- **Insurgency** is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 1-02)

- **Counterinsurgency** is military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. (JP 1-02)

- Counterinsurgents use all instruments of national power to sustain the established or emerging government and reduce the likelihood of another crisis emerging. (FM 3-24)

*COIN is the larger framework into which military operations fit. Military leaders do not define the framework—politicians do!*
Counterinsurgency

- Long term success in COIN depends on the people taking charge of their own affairs and consenting to the government’s rule. (FM 3-24)

- COIN thus involves the application of national power in the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure fields and disciplines. Political and military leaders and planners should never underestimate its scale and complexity; moreover, they should recognize that the Armed Forces cannot succeed in COIN alone. (3-24)
Myths About Counter Insurgency Operations
Popular Mythology

- Counterinsurgency is not just thinking man’s warfare—it is the Graduate level of war.

  Special Forces Officer in Iraq, 2005

- That’s something the State Department is supposed to handle, but I was the Marine platoon commander, and I had to decide [whether or not to support a local Mullah and distribute fresh water to a neighborhood].

  May-June 2007 Military Review “Counterinsurgency Diplomacy”

- The nonmilitary arm of the U.S. Government has yet to fully support our armed forces with effective economic engagement so that security, once established, can be sustained.

  July-August 2007 Military Review “A Cause For Hope”

- The TF-BSO’s mission is to revitalize Iraqi industry by restarting factories whenever possible. This should restore economic vitality and hope to the workforce and simplify the job of our armed forces by lessening economically motivated violence.

  July-August 2007 Military Review “A Cause For Hope”
GC IV, Articles 47-78 (Occupied Territories)

• “... the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring the food and medical supplies of the population; it should, in particular, bring in the necessary foodstuffs, medical stores and other articles if the resources of the occupied territory are inadequate.” (Art. 55)

• Commencement of Occupation a Question of Fact. A state of occupation exists when two conditions are satisfied: first, the invader has rendered the invaded government incapable of publicly exercising its authority; and second, the invader has successfully substituted its own authority for that of the legitimate government (FM 27-10).
... subordinate commanders and officers are spending a lot of time engaging the local population in security, political and economic efforts. It's clear from the briefings by colonels and lieutenant colonels at various forward operating bases that they have internalized ... counterinsurgency doctrine. Occasionally you'll hear a leftover Rumsfeld-era talking point about how our job is to get out of the way and transition everything over to the Iraqis as quickly as possible. And I did see a brigade commander who, when asked by an Iraqi shopkeeper why electricity was so sporadic, replied politely that electric power wasn't his job.

10 Aug 07 Early Bird "Inside Iraq"

Commanders focus on the enemy; select a subordinate to be your expert in other types of engagements.
• “The objective in fighting insurgents isn’t to kill every enemy fighter—you simply can’t—but to persuade the population to abandon the insurgent’s cause.”

• “The first tenet is that the best weapons don’t shoot. Counterinsurgents must excel at finding creative, nonmilitary solutions to military problems.”

• “Victory is achieved when the people of Afghanistan consent to the legitimacy of their government and stop actively and passively supporting insurgency.”

12 Aug 07 Early Bird “Fight Less, Win More”
Guest Instructor, Afghanistan COIN Academy
Who Really Provides Services?

- Who is the provider in Washington State?
  - Arlington, Virginia—Dominion Power
  - Columbus, Georgia—Georgia Power
  - Leavenworth, Kansas—Westar Energy

- Does Fort Lewis get service from the Department of Energy?
  - $698,626 to Tacoma Power for July!
Who Really Steals Services?

• “Armed groups increasingly control the antiquated switching stations.”

• “… ministry officials have been trying to control the flow of electricity … by calling local officials.”

• “… the officials refuse to follow those orders when the armed groups threaten their lives.”

• “… blackouts deeply undermine an Iraqi government whose popular support is already weak.”

23 Aug 07 Early Bird

“Militias Seizing Control of Electricity Grid”
Talking Points About Energy or Anything Else

• Saddam Hussein used energy in a system of punishments and rewards.

• Energy is a commercial activity—the electricity you want is bought and sold like tea, food, cigarettes or anything else you want.

• An area has to be safe enough for a business to produce and distribute the electricity.

• We are here to find the terrorists and militias who want to prevent production of energy so they can control it like Saddam Hussein did.

• You must help us find the enemy so people can safely produce energy and sell it to you.
Popular Mythology

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  *Special Forces Officer in Iraq, 2005*

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  *July-August 2007 Military Review “A Cause For Hope”*
Counter Guerrilla Operations
SBCT Top 5

• We are going to be victorious.

• The enemy is not ten feet tall.

• The enemy can and will be beaten.

• Don’t worry about what you don’t have or can’t get—apply your capabilities against the enemy. (Mass 3 BOS/Warfighting Functions and you will win every time.)

• Review rules 1-4 everyday.
Types of Conflicts

• Conventional Conflict:
  – Implies a state of open belligerency between nations and a direct confrontation of military forces.

• Insurgency:
  – A country is threatened by an internal attempt, frequently assisted by external support, to overthrow the legitimate government.

• Counter Guerrilla situations:
  – May occur in conventional conflict, but are more likely to occur as part of an insurgency.
Counter Insurgency vs. Counter Guerrilla

• The COIN program is designed to counter the whole insurgency. It does this through alleviating conditions which may cause the insurgency.

• Counter Guerrilla operations are geared towards the active military element of the insurgent movement only. To this end, counter guerilla operations are viewed as a supporting component of the COIN effort.
Counter Insurgency vs. Counter Guerrilla

- The COIN mission includes a full range of measures to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. They are actions taken by a nation to promote its growth by building viable institutions that respond to the needs of the people.

- Generally, the purpose of counter guerrilla operations is to provide enough internal security to enable the host country to initiate COIN programs and pursue national objectives.

Countering subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency does not equate to merely providing essential services. Don’t “put the cart before the horse,” establish security first.
Requirements for an Insurgency

• Vulnerable Population

• Leadership Available for Direction

• Lack of Government Control

The lack of government control may be real or perceived. The greater the control the government has over the situation, the less likely the chances of an insurgent success. The opposite is also true.
The government must win back the support of the people by providing them security and showing an honest effort to correct those conditions which caused dissatisfaction.

*Security is the top priority!*
... tribal leaders gathered at the governor’s fortified office here berated him for talking about development projects when insurgents still terrorize outlying roads and villages ....

“What you are talking about are dreams,” said Sheik Hamid Anbagiya. “First we have to stop the insurgency. Then we can talk about civil services and projects.”

13 Aug 07 Early Bird “Work in Progress”
Six Major Operations

The military assists the COIN program by conducting six major operations:
- Intelligence
- PSYOPs
- CA
- Populace and Resources Control
- Advisory Assistance
- Tactical Operations.
Terms

Civil Affairs:

- Civic Assistance—providing advice and assistance to indigenous civil and military authorities in the sociological, economic, and political aspects of a civic emergency.
- Civil Action—in the short range, civil actions attempt to resolve social and economic problems; in the long range, civil actions attempt to gain and retain the loyalty of the population.
• **Operational Support Bases:** The primary function of an OSB is to support tactical operations. It may provide a staging area for operations; a C2 and communication center; a limited logistics base; a fire support base; or a combination of all these functions.

• **Saturation Patrolling:** Patrolls conducted by many lightly armed, small, fast moving units to provide thorough area coverage.

• **Patrol Bases:** The primary function of a patrol base is to support tactical operations for units at or below the company level.
• **Strike Operations** include offensive tactics such as raids, reconnaissance in force, hasty or deliberate attacks, and pursuit and are intended to:
  - Harass Guerrilla forces to prevent the buildup of personnel and logistic resources
  - Destroy the guerilla force and its base complexes
  - Demonstrate support for the government and for the populace in the local area
  - Expand consolidation areas.
Terms

- **Populace and resources control**: Populace and resources control is government action to protect the populace and its materiel resources and to deny those resources which would further hostile objectives against the government.

- The objective of populace and resources control operations is to assist in preserving or reestablishing a state of law and order within a nation or area. There are three main tasks involved in reaching this objective:
  - Providing security for the populace
  - Detecting and neutralizing the insurgent apparatus
  - Severing any relationship between the insurgent and the populace.
• **Population and resources control**: Non-tactical police type operations. (Populace = military operations while population = police enforcement.)

• Kinetic vice non-kinetic.

• Lethal vice non-lethal.
Sociological Factors

The more fragmented the Society is, the greater the opportunity for dissatisfaction among the populace. The guerrilla will attempt to increase friction between different groups in society. These groups may be aligned along racial, ethnic, religious, and social lines. Language differences or tradition may also be a reason for alignment. Religious influences may play a significant role in the sociological factors that affect the guerrilla.

This is Nothing New!
Enemy Formations in Iraq

- Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)  Sunni
- Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM)    Shia
- Ansar Al Sunnah (AAS)  Sunni
- Islamic Army in Iraq   Sunni
- 1920 Revolutionary Bde Sunny
- New Ba’ath Party       Sunni
- Mujahadeen Shura Council  Sunni
- Badr Corps/Organization Shia
- Sheibani Network       Shia
- Rafadin Army           Sunni
The Enemy

• The guerrilla must be understood before he can be defeated.

• The guerrilla is the overt combat element of the insurgent organization.

• The guerrilla tries to gain support for the insurgent movement through propaganda, coercion, and terror. If he cannot gain active support he will seek passive support.
The Enemy

• The guerrilla may use terrorism if it fits a given situation and accomplishes his goals. Terrorist techniques include bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, threats, mutilation, murder, torture, and blackmail.

• It must be recognized that all guerillas do not use terrorism as a tool. It is usually for coercion, provocation, or intimidation.
The Enemy

• The guerrilla normally lacks the personnel and logistics to decisively engage his opponent.

• As a result, the guerrilla force will exploit these weaknesses by interdicting supply routes and facilities, forcing desertion because of hardships; and by inflicting combat losses that are hard to replace.
Economic Factors and IPB

• Since the guerilla derives a major portion of his logistical support from the local economy, he will normally not disrupt it drastically. Guerrilla forces will destroy the local economy of an area as a lesson to the people living there to exact more support or obedience.

• In IPB, we can identify the economic resources which do not aid the insurgency. These will be the areas he targets.
The Population is important but \textbf{The Enemy is the COG}

- Determine who is your enemy.
- Determine where your enemy is located.
- Determine how to gain access to your enemy.
- Attack the enemy.
- Re-assess and refine information.
- Re-attack the enemy.
Counter Guerrilla Operations in the Framework of COIN

USA

Military

Traditional Direct Combat
Alienates Population
War Crimes
Collateral Damage

Intel

PSYOP

6 Major Operations

Tactical OPNs

P&RC

Advisory

Population, Culture, Religion, History

Government

Local and National Infrastructure

Geography

Economic

Diplomacy

Informational

Economic

Economic

Economic

Economic

Economic

Economic

Economic
How We Fight—Vision

• See First:
  – Bde network (patrol/sniper tm/UAS to CP’s via FBCB2/ABCS). Secure FBCB2-EPRS allows transmission of SECRET/C2 info, unlike FBCB2-BFT.

• Understand First:
  – Bde network, COP, leader intuition.

• Act First:
  – Companies/Platoons (Strykers) using wheeled, armored mobility to maneuver out of contact.

• Engage Decisively:
  – Platoons/Squads with maximum SA (FBCB2, Land Warrior, Mounted Warrior).

• Re-Engage at Will:
  – SSE through the secure FBCB2 network with rapid intel fusion and analysis at all levels, CO-BDE.
The Bottom Line for Brigades and Below

• No matter what political atmosphere prevails in the host country, the Brigade must engage the guerrilla with every asset available. We must realize that democratic principles may not be immediately applicable.

• It is the US Government’s responsibility to influence the host government’s attitude towards democratic principles. It is not the responsibility of the Brigade, nor its’ leaders.
Training Management
Principles of Training

- Commanders are responsible for training:
  - Brigade Commanders train Battalion Commanders and staffs.
- NCOs train individuals, crews and small teams:
  - NCOs conduct standards-based, performance-oriented, battle-focused training.
- Train as a Combined Arms and Joint Team.
- Train for combat proficiency:
  - Realistic Conditions
  - Performance Oriented.
- Train to standard using the appropriate doctrine.
- Train to adapt.
- Train to maintain and sustain.
- Train using multi-echelon techniques.
- Train to sustain proficiency
  - Battle focused training is training on wartime tasks
  - Sustainment training enables units to operate in a Band of Excellence through appropriate repetition of critical tasks.
- Train to develop leaders.
Commanders and Training

- Commanders train their own unit and one echelon below and evaluate two echelons below.
- Commanders are present during the conduct of training, and provide timely, experienced feedback to all participants.
- Commanders create a climate that rewards subordinates who are bold and innovative trainers and offer support for honest mistakes.
- Senior Commanders must support subordinate commanders’ efforts to train effectively by managing training distracters and reinforcing the requirement for all assigned personnel to be present during prime training time.

Train subordinates to train independently!
METL Development

- Wartime Operational Plans
- Enduring Combat Capabilities
- Operational Environment
- Directed Missions
- External Guidance

Crosswalk subordinate tasks/training to make sure it is METL focused.
Execution

- Train the Trainer
- Conduct Pre-Inspections
- Execute Training
- Conduct After Action Reviews
- Conduct Retraining
- Conduct After Action Reviews During Recovery
Band of Excellence as a Training Gate

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- **Initial Marksmanship**
- **Marksmanship Retrain**
- **2nd Marksmanship**
- **Marksmanship Retrain**
- **3rd Marksmanship**
- **Marksmanlship Retrain**

**Range of Proficiency**

- **Sustained Training Proficiency**
- **Unsustained Training Proficiency**

**Key Points**

- **Squad LFX**
- **PLT LFX**
- **Company EXEVAL**
- **BN and BDE FTXs**

- **Individual Marksmanship**
- **PLT EXEVAL**
- **Company EXEVAL**
- **BN and BDE FTXs**
Summary

- **Assessment.**
- **Pre-deployment.**
- **Training During Deployment.**
- **Training Objectives:**
  - Keep them Battle Focused
  - Leader—don’t waste time on SL 1/2
  - Team Building—soundly executed training
  - Modify audience (Time)
  - Create innovative PL/PSGs and independent companies
  - Personal training preferences must be subordinate to the needs of the organization
  - Not a relief from enforcing standards.
Conclusion
Warrior Ethos

• I will always place the mission first.
• I will never accept defeat.
• I will never quit.
• I will never leave a fallen comrade.
Army Values

- Loyalty
- Duty
- Respect
- Selfless Service
- Honor
- Integrity
- Personal Courage
Code of Conduct

• I am an American, fighting in the forces which guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense.

• I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command, I will never surrender the members of my command while they still have the means to resist.

• If I am captured, I will continue to resist by all means possible. I will make every effort to escape and aid others to escape. I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy.
Code of Conduct

• If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give no information or take part in any action which might be harmful to my comrades. If I am senior, I will take command. If not, I will obey the lawful orders of those appointed over me and will back them up in every way.

• When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am required to give name, rank, service number, and date of birth. I will evade answering questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause.

• I will never forget that I am an American, fighting for freedom, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles which made my country free. I will trust in my God and the United States of America.
In Combat

- Be a Quiet Professional.
- Live the Warrior Ethos and Army Values.
- Know the Doctrine—Modify Whenever Required.
- Leaders Must Always Emphasize Ethics.
- Always Focus on the Enemy.
- Develop and Sustain Ethical, Smart, Hard, and Disciplined Soldiers—They Will Make the Right Decisions.

Sometimes War is Just War!
“The art of war is simple enough. Find out where your enemy is. Get at him as soon as you can. Strike him as hard as you can and as often as you can, and keep moving on.”

General Ulysses S. Grant
Back Up Slides
The Fundamental Question for the SBCT at War

Since the competencies of the remaining instruments of national power are not available do we perform these tasks or focus on our core competency?

Since the enemy is the COG we must focus on our core competency to defeat or destroy them.