Redskins in Bluecoats: A Strategic and Cultural Analysis of General George Crook's Use of Apache Scouts in the Second Apache Campaign, 1882-1886

General George Crook's initial experiences in Native American warfare were so profound that they shaped him in a way very much unlike his contemporary officers. During General George Crook's Second Apache Campaign (1882-1886), his unique approach to the use of Apache scouts and his culturally sensitive leadership were so misunderstood by his contemporaries that it eventually led to his resignation of command and the imprisonment of all Chiricahua Apache scouts who faithfully served the US Army following General Nelson Miles' successful completion of the Apache campaign. General Crook displayed the right balance of warrior determination and humanitarian awareness in his leadership of the Arizona Territory. He was the right man, in the right place, at the right time. General Crook's effectiveness as a war fighter and his cultural awareness in handling a successful counterinsurgency and pacification program provide lessons that are relevant to contemporary professional military officers engaged in twenty-first century operations.

General George Crook, General Nelson Miles, General Phillip Sheridan, Geronimo, Lieutenant Charles B. Gatewood, Captain Emmett Crawford, Assimilation, Arizona Territory, Chiricahua Apache, Apache Campaigns, U.S. Army, Scout, Afghanistan, Counterinsurgency, Irregular Warfare, Pacification, Three Levels of War, Cultural Awareness
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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REDSKINS IN BLUECOATS:
A STRATEGIC AND CULTURAL ANALYSIS
OF GENERAL GEORGE CROOK'S USE OF APACHE SCOUTS
IN THE SECOND APACHE CAMPAIGN, 1882-1886

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Executive Summary

Title: Redskins in Bluecoats: A Strategic and Cultural Analysis of General George Crook’s Use of Apache Scouts in the Second Apache Campaign, 1882-1886

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Thesis: During General George Crook’s Second Apache Campaign (1882-1886), his unique approach to the use of Apache scouts and his culturally sensitive leadership were so misunderstood by his contemporaries that it eventually led to his resignation of command and the imprisonment of all Chiricahua Apache scouts who faithfully served the US Army following General Nelson Miles’ successful completion of the Apache campaign.

Discussion: General George Crook’s initial experiences in Native American warfare were so profound that they shaped him in a way very much unlike his contemporary officers. Despite similar experiences fighting Indians, few commanders ever saw far enough beyond their own ethnocentric views of the Indian to be concerned with their personal welfare. General Crook had enough time and exposure with the Apaches that he went above and beyond the simple care, feeding, and security of the reservation Apaches.

Incorporating many years of experience in conventional and irregular combat, Crook’s second tour in the Arizona Territory differed from his first in that he relied more heavily on the use of Chiricahua Apache scouts to find and fight the hostile Chiricahuas. Additionally, his humanitarian efforts in trying to assimilate the Apaches into society through the aggressive use of scouts, and standing up for their rights later in his career, estranged him from his superiors which engendered a lack of trust in his leadership and ultimately led to his resignation of command of the Arizona territory. All he had hoped to achieve for the Apaches was tragically wasted when the US government moved all Chiricahua Apaches, to include Apache scouts who faithfully served the US Army, to Florida in order to refuse any possibility of support to those hostiles still resisting the Army. The Apaches were sent to a prison in Fort Marion, Florida and were not able to return to Arizona until 1913.

General George Crook displayed the right balance of warrior determination and humanitarian awareness in his leadership of the Arizona Territory. He was the right man, in the right place, at the right time. However, short of patience and overly-involved, Crook’s chain of command hastened to end the Apache Campaign. Trust was the missing link between the strategic and operational levels of war.

Conclusion: The use of Apache scouts as auxiliary forces during Crook’s second Apache campaign was extremely effective and unique in contrast to how the majority of Army officers deployed their scouts in relation to their troopers. His tactics, techniques, and procedures were criticized at the highest levels of government and ultimately became a point of contention still openly debated today in academic discussions. General Crook’s effectiveness as a war fighter and his cultural awareness in handling a successful counterinsurgency and pacification program provide lessons that are relevant to contemporary professional military officers engaged in twenty-first century operations.
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Preface

I can remember my first year of graduate school at the University of Southern California and reflecting upon the type of United States history I wanted to focus on in my studies. The nineteenth century US Army and the deserts Arizona and Mexico were just not an option at the time. I sought a topic involving the Marine Corps and an exotic locale... I decided on the "Banana Wars."

Fast forward to my second foray into graduate education and I am in the same position. This time it became instead the Army in Arizona and Mexico. So how did I come to General Crook in Arizona? My grandfather was a Marine in the Pacific during World War II and inspired me to become a Marine. In my adolescence, I associated him with the rugged individualist whom John Wayne epitomizes in many of his films—the quintessential American. As a western movie buff with an affinity for the outdoors and some Seneca/Susquehanna ancestry, I also became interested in westward expansion and its impact on Native Americans.

There is a plethora of literature on the topic of the Apache Wars, and Generals George Crook and Nelson Miles and their campaigns in Arizona. In this paper, I shall narrow my focus to Crook's second campaign and, more specifically, to an ethnological analysis of Crook's intimate knowledge of Native American warfare and his use of Apaches to fight Apaches. I will also address how this tactical method was held in contempt by his superiors at the strategic level which ultimately led to his failure and subsequent resignation of his command.

This analysis can be useful today as, much like then, the nation's armed forces have been plunged headlong into irregular warfare around the world with indigenous people whom we're engaged in combat in one instant yet providing humanitarian assistance the very next. The military, as an organization, is more understanding of the cultural dimensions of warfare today.
and how this makes a huge impact on the success of its current campaigns. During America's Indian wars, especially in the post Civil War era, the only cultural dimension with which American leadership was concerned was replacing Native Americans culture with its own in a process called Americanization. Grant's Peace Policy and the forced reservation system were its foundation. General George Crook was really the first Indian fighter in the US Army who used his scouts as policemen and auxiliaries in an attempt start the assimilation process early through military service and hopefully bring peace before force needed to be used as a last resort. This unique and culturally aware process of assimilation was slow and depended primarily on the trust of the Apaches. Thus, it was highly criticized by his superiors and peers. This ultimately led to his resignation and the unfortunate imprisonment of his faithful Apache scouts.

There are several areas that this paper will not explore. In particular, it will not address any campaigns against the Apaches prior to General Crook's arrival in 1871. Most commanders of the territory prior to that date either did not confront the extensive problems Crook faced when he arrived, or they did not adequately stem the tide of violence as effectively as Crook achieved by 1873. Also, I will only address his first campaign as a point of departure to show how his tactics, techniques, and procedures changed during his second tour of duty. And, lastly, I will only focus on Miles' campaign against the Apaches in the context of how he initially refuted Crook's tactics only to later adopt them in order to achieve success.

I would like to acknowledge the assistance and guidance of my faculty advisor, Dr. Donald F. Bittner, whose steadfast advice and professional experience both in the military and in the field of history have made an indelible mark on my own professional growth. Without his rudder steers, I would have surely gone off course. And, most importantly, I would like to thank my beautiful bride, Jennifer, and our three wonderful children, Julia, Jack, and Ava, who gave
me the time I needed to accomplish this task. With their loving patience and support, anything is possible in this world, but nothing is as rewarding.

Author's Note: The use of the term Redskin and Injun are being used in their then contemporary pejorative context to highlight the irony of different races and their interaction in the US Army, as identified by the colors red, white, and blue. The context of these words in no way reflects the view of the author. Additionally, the term Indians is often used interchangeably with Apaches to discuss the Apache tribes in Arizona with whom General Crook interacted. The term Chiricahua specifically denotes the band of Apaches who made up the predominance of those hostile Apaches under Geronimo during the period of 1882-1886. The hostile Chiricahua Apaches were those Indians whom Crook pursued and from which he attempted to recruit his most effective, yet controversial scouts.
Lt. Harry Garnett DeBuin:
How many are watching?
Ke-Ni-Tay:
One man see as many as ten.
Lt. Harry Garnett DeBuin:
Can we find him and kill him?
Ke-Ni-Tay:
You cannot.
Lt. Harry Garnett DeBuin:
But Ke-Ni-Tay can?
[Ke-Ni-Tay nods]
Lt. Harry Garnett DeBuin:
But will he?
Ke-Ni-Tay:
Lt. Harry Garnett DeBuin:
All right. Find him and kill him!

Lt. Harry Garnett DeBuin:
Well, killing I expect, Mr. McIntosh, but mutilation and torture? I cannot accept that as readily as you seem to be able to.
McIntosh:
What bothers you, Lieutenant, is you don't like to think of white men behaving like Indians. It kind of confuses the issue, don't it?

Ulzana’s Raid (1972)
Written by Alan Sharp
Directed by Robert Aldrich
Report reaches the US cavalry that the Apache leader Ulzana has left his reservation with a band of followers. A compassionate young officer, Lieutenant DeBuin, is given a small company to find him and bring him back; accompanying the troop is McIntosh, an experienced scout, and Ke-Ni-Tay, an Apache guide. Ulzana massacres, rapes and loots across the countryside; and as DeBuin encounters the remains of his victims, he is compelled to learn from McIntosh and to confront his own naivety and hidden prejudices.

Courtesy of http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0069436/
INTRODUCTION

Currently engaged in Operation Enduring Freedom (the war in Afghanistan), contemporary military professionals can find an overabundance of books, articles, essays and analyses regarding the importance of culture, irregular warfare, and counterinsurgency. It is critically important for them, regardless of rank, to study history in order to develop and enhance critical thinking skills, sharpen judgment, and broaden their perspectives on the three levels of war. The history of the Apache campaigns during the Indian Wars of the 19th century offers an opportunity to study culture, irregular warfare and counterinsurgency operations. These similarities and dissimilarities in the two theaters of war in Afghanistan and Arizona, separated by more than one hundred years, allow the critical assessor to examine tactics and personalities, such as General George Crook, and draw some valuable insights and lessons pertinent to the 21st century warfighter. In particular, the unorthodox, yet highly effective use of former hostile Apaches to become active members of the U.S. Army and participate and excel in its mission to hunt down their own people is one of those very important aspects of understanding the enemy and his culture, exploiting their weaknesses, and culturally enable indigenous persons to play a prominent role on the battlefield and achieve mission accomplishment.

From his commissioning at West Point Military Academy in 1852 until his return to the southwest thirty years later for a second command of the Department of Arizona, General George Crook (see Figure 1) served in only one conventional war. Based on other experiences fighting Indians, he had a very clear, strategic view of his higher headquarters' mission, his own personal goals in relation to the Apaches, and how he would carry this out as can be identified below:
General Crook’s instructions were communicated to both Indian scouts and soldiers at Camp Grant...they directed that the Indians should be induced to surrender in all cases where possible; where they preferred to fight, they were to get all the fighting they wanted...but in either case were to be hunted down until the last one in hostility had been killed or captured. When prisoners could be induced to enlist as scouts, they should be so enlisted, because the wilder the Apache was, the more he was likely to know of the wiles and stratagems of those still out in the mountains, their hiding-places and intentions.2

General Crook could fight and destroy like no other, yet he did so with purpose, conviction, and an envisioned end state. His end state was the cessation of hostilities between Indians and white men, followed by the eventual assimilation of Indians into white society.3 His goal for the Apaches evolved throughout his thirty years fighting Indians and was not seen or voiced by him publicly until near the end of his almost 40-year Army career. The illustrious General William T. Sherman, upon Crook’s death, said he was, “the greatest Indian-fighter and manager the army of the United States ever had.”4

General Crook did not invent the use of the Indian as a scout for the army, but over time his name had become synonymous with one of the most well documented approaches to the use of the Apache Scout (see Figure 2).5 His use of the Apache scout to find and fight the hostile Apaches, though not new, was unique in that he relied on them more heavily than he did U.S. troops to not only find the hostile Apaches but also to engage and destroy them.6 Crook believed in their loyalty to him and his preference to use them over his own cavalry and infantry...“Led to conflicts with civilian critics and his military superiors and created a division of opinion within the army which long outlived him.”7

During General George Crook’s Second Apache Campaign from 1882-1886, his unique approach to the use of scouts and his culturally sensitive leadership were so misunderstood by his contemporaries that it eventually led to his resignation of command and the imprisonment of
all Chiricahua Apache scouts who faithfully served the U.S. Army following General Nelson
Miles’ successful completion of the Apache campaign. The intent of this paper is to focus on
Crook’s aggressive use of Apache scouts and his culturally sensitive leadership, which ultimately
led to his controversial resignation as commander, and the ultimate failure of his immediate
assimilation goals of the Chiricahua Apaches by the U.S. Army. This paper will not examine the
leadership of General Nelson A. Miles, who is credited for ending the Apache campaigns with
the final surrender of Geronimo. However, it will touch on his ironic use of Crook’s tactics,
which he at first refused to employ, as well as the controversial actions he took against the
Apache scouts who had faithfully served the U.S. Army.

The use of Indians in American warfare is older than the country itself. They have been
used as scouts, auxiliaries, and allies. In 1754, George Washington “led Delaware Indians as
well as Virginia militia” in the French and Indian War to ambush French troops. When they
eventually deserted him, he was besieged and forced to surrender at Fort Necessity (now south of
Washington, Pennsylvania). During the Revolutionary War, the Continental Congress
“authorized Washington to recruit 2,000 Indians.” A veteran of the Revolutionary War, Andrew
Jackson used Cherokee and White Stick Creeks against Red Stick Creeks in order to overcome
their near impregnable position in the battle of Horseshoe Bend during the Creek War, 1813-
1814. His use of Indian allies became, “the decisive move of the engagement.” Yet in the end,
“the Lower Creeks [White Sticks] who had fought for the Americans against them [Red Sticks],
were forced to give up territory.” Jackson said the war “had been the fault of the Creek nation as
a whole” and they ceded 23 million acres of Creek land to the U.S. government. In the Second
Seminole War from 1835-1842, “the army found it necessary to call upon the Creeks and various
other tribes" to assist in fighting the Seminoles in a costly war that, "virtually closed the long
history of Indian-white warfare east of the Mississippi."12

General Crook first used "friendly" Indians to fight "hostile" Indians during the years of
the gold rush era along the Pacific Northwest coast. Four hostile Indians took refuge in a village
that Crook could not stealthily penetrate. While chasing them, he found a warrior nearby in a
friendly neighboring Indian village. He encouraged the warrior to bring back his chief. After
some conversation, the chief agreed.13 This is where Crook first used Indians to find Indians.
When possible, he would turn one tribe against another, or leverage the support of Indians who
were friendly to whites or the U.S. Army. General Crook, in his own words, "acquired
sufficient proficiency in language to be of immense benefit in understanding the Indian
character" such to the extent that he could "control his [Indian] baser part" in order to
"manipulate him to good actions."14 In his autobiography, Crook relates that he learned some of
the language of the Indians of the northwest but later in Arizona he mostly relied on his trusted
interpreters. In Arizona, he often used several to ensure accurate and comprehensive
translations. Crook understood Indians to have certain "bed rock" secrets that only one who had
gained their trust and confidence could understand.15 Part of the process of unlocking the secret
to understanding them was to communicate with them in their own language and develop mutual
trust. However, Crook was not the only officer in the Army to successfully employ the Indian.
Official policy reflected this when, "on July 28, 1866, President Johnson signed the Act to
increase and fix the Military Peace Establishment of the United States" which allowed for "one
thousand Indian scouts authorized as needed on the frontier."16
TOO MANY CHIEFS — It's Not What You Know...

It's important to start with an examination of the Apache campaign (1882-1886) from the perspective of the three levels of war (strategic, operational, and tactical) and the personalities who operated between those levels during that time. General Crook moved between all three levels of war and all other personalities discussed herein will be in regards to their relationship with him. This perspective will provide insight into the unfortunate events that transpired in the spring of 1886 when Geronimo broke the surrender agreement and Crook subsequently resigned under pressure from the U.S. Army.

Representing the strategic level of war, President Grover Cleveland (see Figure 3) took office on March 4, 1885. A year later he faced tough decisions regarding the Indian question that the Apache problem in the southwest and all of the attendant political pressure associated with it. On a personal level, President Cleveland had no military service. His lack of understanding and experience for what occurred in the field against combatants and the subsequent negotiations that ensued did not help him in making reasonable decisions regarding the outcome of hostilities or the eventual assimilation of Apaches into society. So, for a man who regarded himself as “an Indian reformer” and who “sought to assimilate them into white society by means of education, private land ownership, and parental guidance from the federal government,” he failed. However, Cleveland was no different in his views of Native Americans than his predecessor, President Rutherford B. Hayes, who happened to be a close personal friend of Crook. Both presidents proceeded with the enforcement of the reservation policy and promoted the ideas of turning Indians into good citizens with a proper education at the Carlisle Indian School as well as agricultural training in the methods of the farmer. However, they differed somewhat in that President Hayes, who did not lack personal military experience,
was supported by his progressive and efficient Secretary of the Interior, Carl Schurz. President
Cleveland sought the military counsel of General Sheridan, the veteran Indian fighter and
Commanding General of the Army. His advice on the Apache problem may have been biased;
particularly when statements such as “The only good Indians I ever saw were dead,” were
attributed to him. Serving in Washington D.C., Sheridan was far detached from ground truth
reporting in Arizona. Perhaps more civilian or humanitarian counsel would have been
appropriate.

Historians refer to Sheridan as “Crook’s old classmate and sometime rival.” Crook and
Sheridan graduated from West Point just one year apart and served together briefly as young
lieutenants in the Pacific Northwest during the Rogue River War against the Shasta and other
Rogue River Indians from 1855-1857. During the Civil War, Sheridan (see Figure 4) rose to
prominence and commanded the Army of the Shenandoah as a Major General while Crook, a
Brigadier General, commanded Sheridan’s subordinate 8th Army Corps. A significant
perspective of their relationship can be seen in the writing in Crook’s diary about an incident at
the Battle of Cedar Creek in 1864. As he privately confided to paper, he “never forgave
Sheridan for what appeared to be deliberate withholding of proper credit and assumption of
honor not due him.”

President Rutherford B. Hayes (1877-1881) was one of Crook’s division commander’s
(see Figure 5) during the battle of Cedar Creek. Crook thereafter maintained a significant close
friendship with the Hayes family throughout his life. Often caught between what he was trying
to accomplish in the field and pressure from Washington and the media, Crook was not hesitant
to offer his point of view on matters for which the powerful Hayes family might provide political
support. In this fashion, Crook could work, and perhaps manipulate, within all three levels of
war in order to accomplish what he was trying to do in Arizona - which was to subjugate all hostile Apaches and assimilate the remainder of them living in peace on the reservation. Crook, like his friend President Hayes, hoped to reform Apaches in the image of the white man. With President Cleveland, however, no personal relationship existed between them and no possibility for leverage, particularly with Sheridan standing between them.

At the operational level of war, General Crook has a significant amount of authority as the commander of the Department of Arizona. He often speaks directly to the highest levels of the Army during his campaigning and for the most part, has complete autonomy. One unique aspect of this level of war is that for such a large area of operations he is responsible for, he has very few troops with which to manage this territory. Therefore he is heavily involved at both strategic and tactical levels.

At the tactical level of war, General Crook was a subject matter expert in fighting Indians. With a long career on the frontier, Crook provided the "best example of the Army’s approach to the Indian question" as Andrew Birtle points out in his history of U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine. Because of his success in Arizona during the 1870s, Crook was controversially promoted to the permanent rank of brigadier general and the political pressure was enough to get him moved back to Arizona a second time in 1882 when Indian troubles re-emerged. Along with him came many of the same soldiers and practices that he used in his first campaign.

Men like the civilian Albert Sieber (see Figure 6), who "was chief of scouts for most of Crook’s major actions in Central Arizona." Like Crook, "Sieber claimed his success was due to his always keeping his word to the Indians." The general’s most trusted aide de camp, Capt
John Gregory Bourke (see Figure 7), served with him “for more than 15 years...as a member of his military staff.” Following his retirement, Bourke would pen a biography of Crook in which he shared his intimate knowledge of him and all of the dynamics of his personality in dealing with the Apaches. Lastly, Crook actively sought out junior officers to lead his scout units. He looked for men like Captain Emmet Crawford (see Figure 8) and Lieutenant Charles Gatewood (see Figure 9), who “developed an abiding personal interest in the welfare and the culture of the people with whom they served.”

**REDSKINS IN BLUECOATS – A Unique Approach**

The use of Apache scouts was not new to the U.S. Army or to Crook. During the Tonto Basin Campaign in the winter of 1872-1873 (see Appendix A), Crook utilized his scouts, mostly White Mountain Apaches, and mule trains to logistically penetrate the Sierra Madre mountain range of Mexico which served as the sanctuary for the hostiles. The tactics, techniques, and procedures he used then were effective and proven. Still, Crook took a slightly different and unique approach to the use of Apache Scouts during his second campaign in Arizona. Unlike the first one, he now used Chiricahua Apaches to track down their own people, the hostile Chiricahuas. Crook said, “Nothing breaks them up like turning their own people against them...an enemy of their own blood...as foxy, and as stealthy and familiar with the country.”

Thomas Dunlay, in his book about Indian scouts, notes that General Crook’s ability to take “formerly hostile Indians” and use them as “instruments of white conquest and assimilation” was the paramount reason for successfully ending the Apache wars. However, it was not Crook’s use of the scouts alone that ended the Apache wars. General Miles, eventually utilizing Crook’s unique methods, brought Geronimo and the remainder of his small band in from the warpath. In this fashion, the Apache scouts were successfully used for white conquest of all hostile Apaches.
who had refused to live on a reservation, where the slow process of assimilation was beginning to occur.

Over many years of listening, observing, and talking to the various Indians he encountered, Crook came to understand the warrior culture and embrace it, harnessing its power as a tool to work for him in chasing down hostiles. From the views toward Indian warriors in Crook’s time until today, not much has changed. Then, perceptions were formed by sensationalist newspaper reports from afar and dime store novelists. Today, perceptions are formed by movies, such as Ulzana’s Raid, which continue to impact views of the Indian over the last 70 years. Contrary to how Hollywood might have depicted all Indian males as savage and bloodthirsty “warriors” in a constant state of warfare, Native American culture valued the “warrior” and his involvement in “social and political life...religious ceremonies...hunting and other provisioning,” as well as “a family to love and care for.” Crook did not condone Apache raiding, but he understood it was a part of their means of survival and he actively sought more “civilized” options for them in his pacification program on the reservations. Despite his latter view, Crook also turned their desire to raid and make war to his advantage. “Yet the Indians were never simply acted upon by whites....Some tribes saw the whites as useful allies against a strong Indian enemy” such that can be seen when Crook enlisted Western apaches to fight the Chiricahuas in his first Apache campaign.

The Western Apache tribal group had five major sub-tribes of which the White Mountain and Tonto Apaches were only two. The White Mountain and Chiricahua Apaches clashed often before the arrival of the whites “and were often enmeshed in long-running blood feuds.” These Indians became the predominant bands of scouts when Crook first employed them out of Fort Apache under the leadership of Lieutenant Gatewood in his first campaign.
The theater environment was the primary reason the U.S. Army needed scouts. The Arizona territory (see Appendix B) was so vast and expansive that it was impossible for the soldiers to know it all and to survive for long periods of time in its harsh environment. An officer in 1868 addressed the problems by asserting, "I defy anyone to make his way over this country without the aid of profanity... piled-up rocks and slippery precipices... utterly impassable for myself and my men if we had not literally cursed ourselves over." Crook figured this out during his first tour of duty and did three things to overcome this challenge: he scouted the country on his own, then he hired both government scouts and local Indians from the surrounding reservations, and finally he brought in mule packers (see Figure 10) to organize logistic trains that would extend his operational reach into the areas used by the hostiles.

Crook resumed command of the Department of Arizona on September 4, 1882 and he methodically did the same thing as when he first arrived in Arizona in the early 1870s. As editor Martin Schmitt noted in Crook's autobiography, "His first move was to see for himself. He rode about his department on his mule, Apache (see Figure 11), and talked with the Indians on the reservation." What did he learn?

He discovered that the Apaches did not trust those who had been placed in charge of them. They had been made fat with lies to the effect that they were going to be disarmed and sent away to Indian Territory, that they were to be attacked by troops on the reservation. They had been robbed of their supplies and cheated by almost every one of their agents. Crook's comments claimed that the Apaches "had displayed remarkable forbearance in remaining at peace." Crook wrote that "one officer of the govt. would tell them one thing and another, something else, until finally they lost confidence in everybody and not knowing who or what to believe lent a credulous ear to every story which Mexicans or other irresponsible parties throughout the country concocted." Crook believed that the Apaches knew the power of the white man's
government and they knew that the whites could not be beaten. So if war occurred it was because of other reasons, even if they embarked on a futile warpath which would invariably lead to their annihilation; thus, he was determined to find out the problem.

Crook found that he had two problems to deal with simultaneously: one on the reservation, and the other off it. On the reservation, he had to immediately attack the problem of the “Indian Ring” and begin his pacification program of the Apaches that remained there. The pacification efforts would coincide with his long term goals of their assimilation through the exchange of the Apache culture for that of the white man. Off the reservation, Crook had to deal with the hostile Apaches who had fled the reservation and were raiding in Arizona and across the border into Mexico. Following his understanding of the problems with the Apaches, Crook, like most commanders with Indian fighting experience, brought with him some of his old government scouts from previous campaigns in order to build a strong team to face these challenges, e.g., Archie McIntosh, Sam Bowman, and Al Sieber, as well as his trusted mule packer, Thomas Moore.

Once understanding the problem, Crook identified three major objectives according to noted historian Robert Utley: “To bring the reservation Indians under control, to give protection to the lives and property of citizens, and to subjugate the hostiles operating out of the Sierra Madre.” In order to surmount these challenges he had to divide the Indians into two groups: those living on the reservation in peace and accepting U.S. Government policy, and the hostiles that defied all manner of assimilation. The U.S. government was simply satisfied to have the Apaches on the reservation, out of sight and out of mind. If an Indian agent was not crooked, he might have been one of the few white men in all of the Arizona territory who believed in assimilation because public outcry against the Apaches was quite vehement. Crook, unlike many
of the military commanders in his day, truly believed in the assimilation process of transforming the Apache culture to the white man’s and he was not afraid to take on that responsibility, personally and without the aid of the Bureau of Indian affairs. John Bourke said of Crook in an obituary, “The story of his administration of Indian Affairs in that, as in every other department in which he had control, is the brightest and most honorable chapter in the history of our relations with the American aborigines.”

Regardless of how the assimilation process failed or succeeded, one thing was for sure: the Apache way of life as they had known it was going to end. Once they could be identified into one of the two aforementioned groups, peaceful or hostile, Crook would enlist the help of friendly Apaches to serve as scouts and perform their two-fold mission. Not only would the Apaches patrol in order to hunt down their hostile brethren in the traditional role of scouts and auxiliary forces, but they would also serve as reservation police. The first step in the assimilation process was this position as scout or policeman. They found much prestige, authority, and an economic incentive in this role. It also provided Crook and the reservation supervisor’s with intelligence and situational awareness.

The scouts were hired under six month contracts and given the requisite identification papers, uniform, rifle, pay, and allowances. The duty of a scout, following the end of the Indian wars in 1890, would be the closest in comparison to life as a warrior prior to the arrival of the white man. Some Apaches lived their entire lives as warriors, never assimilating to the ways of the white man in any fashion. While other Apaches during the same period, like John Rope, lived their entire lives as a government scout in the service of the U.S. Army. John Rope never knew what it was like to be a hostile Apache and truly free from the bonds of western society. Then there was Geronimo caught in between; one of the last warriors to take a stand against the
encroachment of whites, yet one who lived his dying days as an enemy prisoner of war and who, ironically, eventually served as and wore the uniform (see Figure 12) of a scout before his death.⁴⁷

Archie McIntosh, the Chief of Scouts whom Crook brought from the Department of the Platte, did not know this particular area well, though he had worked with many Indians and understood the ways of the frontier. Therefore, Albert Sieber was hired as his assistant. Sieber was very familiar with the area, having moved there following the Civil War. More importantly, he knew the Apaches well and could speak their language.⁴⁸ The type of leader required to command these Scout units was the most important aspect of utilizing them, especially Chiricahuas who were enlisted to fight their own tribe. As historian Robert Utley explains:

Crook selected four officers he thought possessed special aptitude for dealing with Indians. Modest, efficient Capt. Emmet Crawford headed the group. Lt. Britton Davis aided him at San Carlos Agency. Lts. Charles B. Gatewood and Hamilton Roach worked with the White Mountain bands... These officers applied methods tested in Crook’s previous Apache experience—scouts companies whose men lived with their people when not on assignment, a system of identification tags keyed to census records, a network of “Confidential Indians” reporting attitudes and intentions in the scattered camps, and, above all, the judicious exercise of firmness tempered by honesty, justice, tact, and patience.⁴⁹

Essentially, Crook was identifying officers who bore innate characteristics he had developed in himself over many years fighting on the frontier: “ambition, dedication, sensitivity, and above all rapport with their men.”⁵⁰ These young company grade officers had to become cultural experts if they were not already. They needed to have courage, both mental and physical; be tolerant; flexible and adaptable to change; and comfortable in unorthodox situations. They were challenged on a daily basis and many of them suffered greatly, often dying “in their forties, their health broken or their resistance lowered by the hardships they had undergone.”⁵¹
With Crawford and Gatewood on the reservations, they carefully assembled their scout units which enabled Crook to prepare for a campaign against the hostile Apaches now hiding in the Sierra Madres. Once the hostiles began raiding across the border into Arizona in 1883, he could unleash his offensive into the deserts of Mexico in “hot pursuit.” The agreement signed between the United States and Mexico in 1882 allowed “regular federal troops of the two Republics” to “reciprocally cross the boundary line of the two countries, when they are in close [hot] pursuit” and demonstrated the use of the diplomatic element of national power in order to solve the Indian problem. With this agreement, the hostiles were denied sanctuary and this eased the diplomatic difficulties he had experienced during his first campaign in the 1870’s.

With excellent leadership in place as the first step, Crook knew exactly what he needed to hunt down the hostile Chiricahuas in their seemingly impenetrable lairs. And it was not more cavalry and infantry, which the Army had given him. Rather, he needed Indians that were formerly hostile, “the wildest [he] could get,” and “Crawford and Gatewood recruited about 250 such warriors and organized them in five companies.” For example, Tsoe, a Cibicue Apache nicknamed Peaches (see Figure 13), captured on the San Carlos reservation during a raid and who had been married to a Chiricahua, now agreed to guide Crook’s forces. This hostile-turned-scout was the key to their success. When Crook stepped off across the Mexican border on May 1, 1883, with a small staff of “forty-two enlisted men” from the 6th Cavalry, and “193 Indian scouts,” he quickly located the hostile’s encampment. Surprised, they soon surrendered. Again, Crook had successfully employed his unique “tested methods - Indian scouts as the chief tactical arm and pack trains for logistical support.”
The key to Crook’s successful employment of the scouts against the hostiles can be found in cultural awareness that was integral to his leadership. More importantly, he found leaders within his ranks who reflected those same traits so valuable in accomplishing the short term goal of defeating the hostiles through one of two choices: destruction or surrender. Regardless of the outcome, his long term goal of assimilation would begin. Even though the government (Sheridan, Miles, and President Cleveland) wanted assimilation for Native Americans, they were not patient enough or willing to pursue the sometimes frustrating attempts at a peaceful resolution with the hostiles. Assimilation would be a multi-generational process as opposed to a one or two year army campaign. Apaches could not quickly transform themselves from a primitive society to contemporary citizens of Arizona overnight. A change of clothes and a haircut was a completely different transformation from that of a shift in cultural values or mindsets. Officials in the U.S. government were aggressive and eager, in part due to political pressure generated by Arizona officials and the press, to simply subjugate the Indians with little to no concern for their future - letting the Bureau of Indian Affairs handle the Indian issue.

Crook’s attitude towards the use of scouts was not based solely on destroying the hostiles. He had an interest in seeing them become productive members of society. While fighting against the Sioux, Nelson Miles (see Figure 14) and Crook served together under Sheridan. Crook had the foresight and lucidity to know that there was a peaceful and better way to bring in the hostiles and avoid a campaign – he did this by offering the Indians terms such as peace and “a reservation in their own country.” He was receiving pressure from Sheridan to campaign immediately or be left with fewer troops as the Army was preparing to reduce the Army by 2500 men, even though public outcry from the east was vociferous. Therefore, he
tried diligently to get them to surrender on peaceful terms prior to engaging in a fighting campaign. Assimilation was going to begin either haphazardly or on more diplomatic terms with their unconditional surrender.

Crook was willing and able to do either - with the help of the Apaches themselves. If the Apaches were going to be faced with forced assimilation or temporary imprisonment from any other officer in the U.S. Army, General Crook was the one they wanted. To the Apaches, assimilation meant nothing - it was simply a term. For them, it was how they were treated by the figureheads of the U.S. government, Indian agents or Army officers. Eugene Chihuahua, son of Chief Chihuahua who died in captivity at Fort Sill, expressed an Apache view of Crook saying, "The one bit of hope was our faith in the promise made by General Crook. For though he was our enemy, he was an honest enemy. Chihuahua told us that Nantan Lupan did not speak with a forked tongue, and that we could rely upon the word of the Tan Wolf." Simply stated, Crook was respected by the Apaches.

General Crook earned respect because he did not command from a desk. Rather, he took to the field immediately upon reassignment to Arizona as Captain Bourke so eloquently wrote in his biography of Crook:

Crook was in the saddle in a day, and without even stopping to inquire into the details of the new command...started across the mountains to Camp Apache. Not many of the Apaches were to be seen...All the young men who could shoot were hiding in the mountains...among all people whose opinion was worthy of consultation...the blame did not rest with the Indians...No one had ever heard the Apaches’ story, and no one seemed to care whether they had a story or not. Crook made every preparation for a resumption of hostilities, but he sent word out to the men skulking in the hills that he was going out alone to see them and hear what they had to say, and that if no killing of white people occurred in the meantime, not a shot should be fired by the troops...Therefore he set out to meet the Apaches in their own haunts and learn all they had to say, and he learned much.
By making himself available to the Apaches, General Crook tried to employ every diplomatic means available to him before resorting to military force. His other option was to move straight into a campaign, which higher headquarters and the press expected, since he had been hand-selected to clean up escalating violence in the territory. His methodical nature allowed him to absorb the problems at hand, identify Apaches' grievances, and address them accordingly. In his view, this would lead to the successful long-term assimilation of the hostile Chiricahuas. If Crook could avoid violence, he would.

During the second campaign in Arizona, he revisited the problems he had come to learn all too well on other Indian reservations. During his time in the Pacific Northwest as a young lieutenant and dealing with the Shasta Indians, he correctly believed they were "generally well disposed, but more frequently forced to take the warpath or sink all self-respect, by the outrages of the whites perpetrated upon them... He blamed much of the problem on greed by the white settlers and indifference by the federal government." In Arizona the challenges Crook had faced with the "Indian Ring" during his first campaign had seemed to worsen since then. Therefore, he sought to limit the power of the Interior Department within the reservation system in his territory by acquiring control of two reservations from the Interior Department to the War Department, and then established a system of American jurisprudence and accountability that gave back to the Apaches some measure of self-sustainment.

Crook's battle with the Indian Ring, known in Arizona as the Tucson Ring, and reservation agents dated back to his first tour in Arizona and became, as he stated in a personal letter, a constant "fire in his rear" throughout the second campaign. It pervaded his thoughts and he often referred to it in letters and correspondence to friends, fellow soldiers, superiors, and even Mexican officials with whom he dealt on a regular basis in prosecuting his campaign.
order to mitigate the trouble and confusion caused by too many entities in control of the
Apaches, he adamantly sought to obtain control over the San Carlos reservation where the
Chiricahua Apaches would settle. For years Crook had espoused the fundamental principle of
“The hand that feeds should punish;” however, such pleas for the most part had fallen on deaf
ears. Eventually he went to Washington where he conferred with the Secretaries of Interior and
War as well as the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. Crook succeeded in 1883:

Apache Indians recently captured by General Crook under existing methods of
administration, it is determined by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the
Interior, after consideration, that the Apache Indians...shall be kept under the
control of the War Department on the San Carlos Reservation...to be fed and
cared for by the War Department...shall be entrusted with the entire police
control of all the Indians...keeping peace on the reservation...preventing the
Indians from leaving it, except with the consent of General Crook, or the officer
who may be authorized to act under him...The War Department shall protect the
Indian agent in the discharge of his duties.67

This was a clear example of how General Crook focused on a peaceful process of resolution of
identified Indian grievances. In doing so, he was a step closer to furthering the process of
assimilation with the Apaches. In Crook’s own words, “ninety-nine hundredths” of Indian
troubles were caused by Indian agents and traders, by their mismanagement...or else a tardy and
broken faith on the part of the general government.68 In the 1880s, Crook “favored giving full
citizenship and the vote to the Indians within a short time” which was much bolder than most
civilian assimilationists would have proposed and was definitely not a commonly held view in
the Army.69

Additionally, General Crook established a system of accountability that served two
purposes. It called for, “every male Indian able to bear arms was to wear a tag...Roll calls would
be held often to make sure that everyone was still on the reservation,” and it helped the soldiers
distinguish “between good and bad Indians, between those who were peaceful and those who
wanted to fight.” The peaceful Apaches would continue to move toward assimilation by participating in Crook’s new programs and adopting the culture of the white soldiers. The hostiles would be hunted down and destroyed, or forced to surrender on terms that would place them back on the reservation and ideally working towards becoming a productive members of society.

Crook identified one challenge in this system which he eventually changed to benefit the Indian. The constant roll calls kept them close to the agency buildings in order to draw rations, but away from the land they were supposed to be working. General Crook put the onus onto his subordinate commanders by relieving the Indians of the head count and making them “accountable to Captain Crawford at San Carlos and Lieutenant Gatewood at Apache.” The Apache would now be free to roam each of these separate reservations and take advantage of every opportunity to self-govern themselves. This was all a part of Crook’s strategy in reforming these Apaches in the image of American citizens. Many of the scouts, not enlisted for campaigning, took jobs as reservation police which also gave them a uniform and a rifle. This status symbol not only provided extra rations, a rifle with which to hunt, and a little prestige that the power of the badge lent, but it was an additional opportunity to occasionally leave the reservation. This was significant to Apaches who held the common view that the “reservation is a prison.”

Thomas Dunlay’s aptly titled chapter, “The White Man’s Road” in Wolves for the Blue Soldiers, ends with the following quote that succinctly captures the assimilation process Crook used by employing his scouts on and off the reservation:

The army gave many Indian men their first real introduction to the culture that would soon dominate their lives. By providing them with a mode of assimilation congenial to their inclinations, their talents, and their self-respect, scouting may have made that introduction a good deal less painful than any planned by either humanitarians or exterminationists.
UNORTHODOX – Not Doing It the Army Way

General Crook did not always do things the way the Army wanted them done. In Arizona, he moved slowly and gave Geronimo (see Figure 15) many options. In so doing, Crook was misunderstood by his contemporaries and questioned by his superiors. His use of the scout as an auxiliary was unorthodox, not in keeping with commonly held ethnocentric view of the abilities of the “white” man versus the “red” man, despite previous Army use of Indian “scouts.” General Sheridan, Commanding General of the United States Army at the time, General Miles, his contemporary, and others assumed they could do Crook’s job better than he was doing it. At the time, the Commanding General of the Army, sometimes referred to as General-in-Chief, was an operational command whereby all of the geographical division commanders reported to him from the field. Not until major Army reform following the turn of the century and the creation of the General Staff that the position of Chief of the United States Army was created which subsequently relegated the position to administrative vice operational duties. Examining the correspondence between these officers provides insight into the misconceptions that occurred and the resulting actions that drove a wedge amidst the senior leadership of the Army. The Apache scouts, who had served these Army officers and the nation faithfully, became collateral damage from this fallout.

Sheridan’s experience as an Indian fighter, in a way, paralleled Crook’s since they served in several campaigns together and eventually had a senior/subordinate relationship during the second Apache campaign. Both were successful Indian fighters. However, the sheer vastness of the territory and the complications that arose when dealing with cross border operations in such an environment led to two significant differences between their views on the use of the Apache scouts. By this time, Sheridan had become Commanding General of the Army and this meant
that Crook was obliged to report the details of his operations to him. During Sheridan’s tenure in office, he observed the interminable hostilities in Arizona. This was frustrating to him, especially when he didn’t approve of Crook’s heavy reliance on scouts over the employment of infantry/cavalry. Even though he employed scouts himself, Sheridan’s ethnocentrism was so pronounced that it did not allow him to view Crook’s unorthodox use of the Apaches as anything more than a wasted effort:

I doubt if any process whatever can, in one or two generations, develop the qualities necessary for the rank and file of our army....Soldiers should possess the attributes of civilized men....They [Indians] do not possess stability or tenacity of purpose....They cannot appreciate responsibility or the sacredness of an oath....a race so distinctive from that governing this country that it would be neither wise nor expedient to recruit our army from their ranks.  

The Act of 1866 allowed for 1,000 scouts on the Army’s rolls and Sheridan, while in command of the Missouri division, allowed “nearly 700 scouts” of which 494 were in Crook’s Department of the Platte. Sheridan also declared that “he allowed this large number of enlistments in deference to officers in the field.” The way Sheridan, like Miles and many of Crook’s other peers, employed scouts emulated how Crook originally employed them in his first campaign: “The whole command moves in single file with the Apache scouts generally in front, then the commanding officers, then the troopers, and finally the pack train.” The majority of the forces present in the column were white soldiers with Apaches utilizing their tracking skills to lead the soldiers to their target, who would then promptly destroy it. During his first campaign against the Apaches in Arizona, Crook realized something that his friend and successor in the Arizona Territory, Colonel August Kautz (see Figure 16), succinctly pointed out: “One scout company [was] more efficient than half a regiment (six companies) of cavalry in pursuit of the Apaches.” Undoubtedly, the change in the use of scouts was driven by the terrain and “the difficulties of Indian warfare in the Southwest.” Never having actually served
in the Arizona Territory however, this was something Sheridan had little understanding of, especially since he was stationed back east.

After arriving in 1882, Crook was fully engaged on the reservation dealing with the Indian problem yet wasted no time in sending his forces to the border, and beyond. By May 1, 1883, he had a force of nearly 250 in the field, of which 193 were scouts under Captain Crawford, in what would be called the Sierra Madre Campaign. Hunting down a majority of the hostile Apaches met with success, due in large part to Peaches, the hostile-turned-scout. A few quiet years on the reservation ensued, but Geronimo eventually returned to the warpath in late 1885 with a small band. This time, Crook would have the assistance of a more formidable hostile-turned-scout, Chatto. Chatto came from the same tribe as Geronimo (see Figure 17), where he was equally respected. In 1884, he returned to the reservation because he was tired of being on the run from the Army and away from his family, he became one of Crook’s most trusted scouts, saying “I am willing to lay down my life [for Crook].” Yet he still ended up at the Fort Marion prison in Florida when the campaign ended; when Geronimo escaped, Chatto was in Washington DC receiving a medal from President Cleveland. It was not possible for Chatto to have aided Geronimo in his escape, nor could he have had anything to do with aiding his hostile band, as Sheridan and others wanted to believe.

Sheridan and Crook’s disagreement on the use of scouts came to a culminating point when Geronimo failed to return to the U.S. from the Sierra Madres after surrendering to Crook (see Figure 18) in March 1886. In a detailed report of what happened, Crook related that on the last night of council where surrender terms were worked out, “a man named Tribolet...began selling to them...large quantities of liquor.” This unfortunate incident plus lies by the bootlegger Tribolet, frightened them as “to what would happen to them when they finally got into my
power.” Geronimo fled back to Mexico with a band of 38 Apaches, 20 of whom were warriors, after Tribolet told him he would be killed when he crossed the border to the United States.\(^{83}\) Crook attributed this misfortune to Tribolet’s connection to the Tucson Ring.\(^{84}\) This episode sparked the open criticism between Sheridan and Crook, with the former’s indicting comment, “It seems strange that Geronimo and party could have escaped without the knowledge of the scouts.”\(^{85}\) To this Crook responded:

That the operations of the scouts in Mexico have not proved as successful as was hoped is due to the enormous difficulties they have been compelled to encounter from the nature of the Indians they have been hunting, and the character of the country in which they have operated, and of which persons not thoroughly conversant with both can have no conception.\(^{86}\)

Sheridan’s comments were loaded with obvious frustration and disagreement with Crook’s policy that could potentially end Apache resistance. Sheridan’s lack of confidence in support of Crook’s decisions led to his request to resign his command and seek reassignment. The disagreement between these two general officers on how to handle the Indian problem lay with General Sheridan.\(^{87}\)

Sheridan had an advantage over Crook since he was in Washington and his position gave him access to the President. Cleveland overruled Crook’s decision to allow Geronimo and his hostile band to serve two-year prison terms with an eventual return to their homelands in Arizona.\(^{88}\) Crook’s terms conflicted with the Cleveland administration’s policy which sought reformation of the Native American under the guise of cultural assimilation; the politics of this culminated in the Dawes Act of 1887. As Robert Utley points out, the Dawes Act was “a measure long championed by reformers as essential to civilization and self-support” but in reality was a means to open “remaining reservation land to white settlement.”\(^{89}\)
Trust was at the heart of this problem. Trust needed to be in place between the President, Sheridan, and Crook - as much as it had to be in place between Crook and Geronimo. General Crook was a man of his word for he “prided himself on the trust he engendered among the Indians” and had built a career on that attribute. Trust helped induce Geronimo to initially surrender. Trust is what he had between himself, at the operational level of war, and his subordinate officers Crawford and Gatewood operating at the tactical level of war. The same could not be said between the personalities at the strategic and operational levels of war, Sheridan and Crook. Perhaps if Sheridan had listened to the former Commanding General of the Army, General Sherman, who once said, “If General Crook is permitted to manage the Apaches in his own way, all wars will cease in Arizona,” the outcome would have been less controversial and damaging for the U.S. Army. General Crook’s views of a long term solution to the Apache problem were not imbedded with the strategic views of Sheridan and President Cleveland; hence they failed to trust him. To date, there had been no Army doctrine published on how to fight Indian wars. More importantly, there was no manual for how to assimilate hostile Indians. Thus, Crook drew upon his successful experiences in dealing with the Apaches, but they differed from everyone else’s for the most part due to his unique situation in Arizona. Andrew Birtle, in summarizing Captain John Bigelow’s strategy for a pacification program, states that there were “no hard and fast rules...officers must govern their pacification campaigns largely by their judgment of the particular situation, the temper and nature of the population, and the climate of opinion.”

Once Crook was relieved, General Nelson A. Miles assumed command. Drastic and controversial changes occurred immediately, some of which served to validate General Crook’s service against the Apaches. First, Miles immediately discharged the Chiricahua scouts as “he
was sure they were in communication with the hostiles.\textsuperscript{93} Although Miles had extensively used recently surrendered hostiles as scouts in the northern Plains, he disbanded the Apaches because Sheridan disapproved of Crook’s use of the scouts.\textsuperscript{94} Thomas Dunlay, in his comprehensive study of Indian scouts, references Miles’ report to the Secretary of War in \textit{Annual Report, 1886} to show that Miles alludes to Crook’s naivety in allowing reservations to become “a place of refuge for the hostiles for years” where “a more turbulent and dissipated body of Indians...had never been disarmed or dismounted.”\textsuperscript{95} General Miles understood well that he was sent to Arizona for one reason: To do exactly what Crook was not doing while also achieving victory over the hostile Apaches. Miles’ ethnocentric views allowed him to believe that Apache stealth in the field could be matched by the Army because of the white man’s superior intelligence.\textsuperscript{96}

Secondly, Miles employed the Army’s latest technology for communications, the heliograph. His troops manned stations all along the borders and in the territory in hopes of utilizing this communications system for command and control in order to move quicker than his prey in the vast expanses of the theater of operations. Technology, however, did little against the Apaches in this instance...it would take men and will to capture Geronimo.

Third, he re-energized the cavalry and infantry to take on the mission of hunting down Geronimo’s band as Sheridan had envisioned. He formed “an elite force of cavalry, mounted infantry, and Indian auxiliaries under the command of Captain Henry W. Lawton.”\textsuperscript{97} With all of this new, cutting edge technology, and traditional tactical approach, Miles sent his forces forward in pursuit of Geronimo and his band. The result - five months passed and “virtually every man was exhausted” and no one “came in contact with or killed a hostile.”\textsuperscript{98} Captain Lawton (see Figure 19) wrote to his wife, “General Miles will never catch the hostiles with half-equipped and half-organized expeditions.”\textsuperscript{99} Miles’ assumption that his “new” approach to an old problem
would work, soon faded. Thus, he moved to his predecessor’s proven methods and “summoned [Lt] Gatewood to his office...and ordered him to find Geronimo.”

Gatewood was one of the few officers left with “whom Geronimo was well acquainted and whom he would trust.”

Gatewood would go forward with two scouts, Martine and Kayitah, who “were related to members of the warring band” and would allow them to open “the door for negotiation without being shot.” In this, they succeeded.

Prior to Geronimo’s surrender, Miles took the initiative to develop a “novel stratagem” of removing the Chiricahua population from the zone of operations thus denying Geronimo a base of moral and logistical support.”

As this was underway, Geronimo finally surrendered to Gatewood, who “had promised Geronimo his life.” Miles was placed in a similar situation as Crook and he acted accordingly. Miles “intended to honor his pledge” despite knowing that the President, under advice from Sheridan, wanted to try Geronimo in a civil court that they knew would surely end in his death. Unfortunately that is where the similarities ended between Miles and Crook. Along with transporting Geronimo and the remainder of the hostiles to a prison in Fort Marion, Florida (see Figure 20), he arranged for all of “the Indians of San Carlos, friendly and otherwise” to be sent along with them; this included the Apache scouts, like Chatto, who “had been in Washington conferring with the President,” and Martine and Kayitah, “who had facilitated the final surrender.”

According to Crook, this outrage against the Chiricahua Apache scouts “was a constant source of irritation and anger” to him. Crook would spend the rest of his life looking out for the welfare of the imprisoned Apaches. He wrote a report on the Chiricahuas for Senator Dawes, who then “introduced Senate Joint Resolution 42, granting authority for the removal of the Apache Indian prisoners to Fort Sill, Indian Territory.”

It wasn’t until August 6, 1894, over
four years after Crook’s death, that “Congress enacted legislation allowing for removal to Fort Sill of all the Chiricahua Apaches.” Though some Chiricahuas stayed in Oklahoma, most finally settled on the Mescalero Apache reservation in eastern New Mexico, north of Fort Bliss, Texas.

CONCLUSION

General Crook had a very intimate relationship with the Apache Indians. Whether he was fighting for or against them, in every instance he did it with passion and conviction in his leadership and approach. Crook did this much the way he conducted counterinsurgency operations in West Virginia during the Civil War, selecting “some of the most apt officers...and scattered them through the country to learn it and all the people in it, and particularly the bushwhackers, their haunts, etc.” Some of the leadership traits that he used during the Civil War, such as endurance, initiative, and knowledge, were critical for him in other theaters of war. From one engagement to another, he learned through application and experience. The counterinsurgency fight that Crook conducted in Arizona would be referred to today by noted leadership and counterinsurgency expert Dr. Mark Moyar as leader-centric warfare. Crook consistently displayed the key leadership attributes of initiative, flexibility, empathy, dedication, and integrity so essential in this type of conflict. General Crook, “Nantan Lupan” or the “Gray Fox” as he was called by the Apaches, was a professional in every sense of the word and history has come to define the man as such.

During General George Crook’s Second Apache Campaign from 1882-1886, his unique approach to the use of scouts and his culturally sensitive leadership were so misunderstood by his contemporaries that it eventually led to his resignation of command and the imprisonment of
all the Chiricahua Apache scouts who faithfully served the U.S. Army following General Nelson Miles’ successful completion of that Apache campaign. General Crook developed and implemented a unique approach to the use of scouts by enlisting Chiricahua Apaches to find and fight against hostile Chiricahua Apaches from 1882 to 1886. Despite the negative discourse that transpired between the headquarters of the U.S. Army and Crook, this method proved very effective. In fact, one of the more vocal critics, General Miles, finally ended the campaign by employing his predecessor’s methods. Even more telling is the interview of Eugene Chihuahua, by Eve Ball as he recalls General Miles use of the scouts:

General Miles, who had been contemptuous both of Crook’s use of the mule pack train and his use of Apache scouts, had failed to accomplish anything by methods taught him at West Point and had been forced to adopt the use of devices used by his predecessor whom he had surreptitiously connived to supplant. 112

Crook’s culturally sensitive leadership, reflected in effective junior leaders such as Crawford and Gatewood, provided them with significant success at the tactical level of war. Leader-centric warfare developed and overcame Apache resistance through dogged determination, empathy, and flexibility. His subordinate commanders comprehended his approach and goals; hence linkage occurred between the operational and tactical levels of war. Crook designed the operational plans with goals that he knew his tactically-proficient subordinates could accomplish. Gatewood’s in-depth understanding of the Apaches and Crawford’s personality and professionalism ensured both could accomplish their missions knowing their commander’s intent alone. This single mindset between senior and subordinates resulted in strong unity of effort between the operational and tactical levels of war.

However, Crook’s unorthodox techniques alienated his superiors and they sought to micromanage his actions at the operational and tactical levels of war. Unfortunately, Crook’s
hasty resignation of command created a vacuum in which all his previous efforts regarding assimilating the Apaches were wasted. Crook's faithful Chiricahua Apache scouts, despite their loyal service to the U.S. Army, were imprisoned and the Apache wars concluded in a disgraceful manner. Crook's short term goal of peacefully reigning in the hostile Apaches was eventually accomplished several months later by Miles. Crook's long term goal of assimilation failed to materialize. It started when Miles, under orders, relieved all Chiricahua scouts of their duties and shipped the entire population of peaceful Chiricahuas to a military prison... indefinitely.

The Indian question of "What to do with the Apaches?" was answered, but the Indian problem of "How to assimilate them into white society?" was not. Charles Lummis, city editor of the *Los Angeles Times*, was sent to Arizona to cover the story when Geronimo broke his promise to Crook and failed to return to the United States. His insight as an imbedded reporter was profound. In his book, *General Crook and the Apache Wars*, he described the response of the Apaches resulting in the departure of Crook and the arrival of Miles:

Grave complications incident to the change of department commanders have arisen upon the reservation. Crook's name was not only a terror to the renegades, it was also a bulwark of restraint and protection to the eight thousand Apaches on the reservation.... The tale of the steals and swindles by which they have suffered will fill a volume.... The foundation of his [Crook] policy has been that the Apache... was still a human being... we must win his confidence. It has been Crook's creed to make few promises, but to keep those few sacredly. He has given years of tedious work to instructing the Indian in the principles of civilization, self-support, and self-government.... The only barrier between the Apache and the white sharks of the Territory is gone. The government is no protection.... I may remark in passing, however, that the long-current tales that Crook's recently discharged scouts have gone upon the war-path are and have been willful lies. The scouts are not out.

Lummis' candid point of view did not come from a city far away such as Los Angeles, New York, or Washington. It originated in the front lines, "after" Crook had departed. It reflects Crook's cultural awareness that was not common in high-ranking officers of the Army or
government; the ability of Apaches to serve as loyal scouts, even under a hypocritical and indifferent government; and the failure of the U.S. government to assimilate and protect its “future” citizens.

The significance of this study for contemporary war fighters is this: The second Apache campaign includes aspects of counterinsurgency that may be comparable to the campaign in Afghanistan. Like Arizona, Afghanistan is a vast expanse of land with a harsh terrain and challenging climate, ringed with several porous borders. The nature of the participants, in relation to non-indigenous forces, exemplifies a series of barriers or challenges: language, culture, tribal system, absence of stable government, religion, and lack of security. Equally significant, there are huge dissimilarities in population numbers between the two locations. In Afghanistan, the indigenous population outnumbers outsider forces, thereby making less of an impact culturally. Also, the two competing cultures are not vying for the same land – the foreign presence is temporary with a goal of achieving security and various political objectives. Crook’s second Arizona campaign also provides useful insights for future commanders in regards to the importance of culture to leaders at all levels of war, the use of indigenous forces as auxiliaries, and the importance of clear, defined policy.

In Crook’s Resume of Operations Against Apache Indians, 1882-1886, he provided a soldier’s “Apologia pro Vita sua” (A defense of one’s life). It summarizes his approach and provides a take away for contemporary war fighters facing future counterinsurgencies. The word Apache and Indian can be substituted for Afghan, or any other indigenous person in a counterinsurgency situation:

The use of Indian scouts was indeed a feature of my policy in dealing with the renegade Apaches, and one which my own experience in former campaigns...
well as that of soldiers the world over, afford convincing proof that it is a feature of great value, and that results are obtained by the use of these auxiliaries, that cannot be obtained in any other way. As a military principle, it is not the part of wisdom to neglect an auxiliary force which has proved always useful and at times indispensable. In the military service universally, men have been, so far as possible, assigned to the work they are best qualified to perform. The Chiricahua Apache, both by nature and education, is beyond cavil, better qualified than any one else for the warfare which for years past has been carried on in the mountains of Arizona and Mexico. The use of Indian scouts is therefore dictated by the soundest principles of military policy.
General Crook and the Western Frontier (University of Oklahoma Press). George Crook, upon commissioning, was stationed in northern California and Oregon till 1861 before heading back east to fight in the Civil War, his only service employing conventional warfare. He took command Ohio's 36th Voluntary Regiment and eventually served under General Philip Sheridan in the Army of West Virginia. Following the Civil War, he returned to the Pacific Northwest on frontier duty and battled the Palute Indians before President Ulysses S. Grant looked to him to solve the Apache problem in Arizona in 1871. General Crook brought peace to Arizona after bringing all the hostiles back onto the reservation, though the Chiricahuas were exempt from this round-up because of a previous treat between the Apache leader Cochise and the United States. In 1875, he was transferred to the Department of the Platte during the Sioux uprisings. He eventually returned to Arizona in 1882 where he fought his last battle against the Apaches in 1886. Before his death in 1890, he fought for the transfer of Apache prisoners of war to an environment similar to their native Arizona and for the rights he believed they had earned through their loyal service as scouts.


The term assimilation is defined for this paper as the process whereby the Apaches (minority group) gradually adopt the cultural customs and attitudes of the Americans (prevailing culture). Assimilationists of the era were progressive reformers stereotypically ethnocentric in their view of other cultures.

A memorial statue to the Indian scouts is located at Fort Huachuca, Arizona— in Apacheria.

The term hostile is defined as Indians not living on, or having left, the reservation to raid American or Mexican settlements through theft, violence and intimidation.

On the Border with Crook

Bruce Vandervort, Indian Wars of Mexico, Canada, and the United States, 1812-1900 (New York: Routledge, 2006), 120.

Vandervort, 121. This occurrence would foreshadow the actions taken by Generals Crook and Miles over seventy years later with regards to the use of splintering a tribe to fight against itself and the US government forsaking their Indian allies immediately after accomplishing their own objectives.


ENDNOTES

1 Charles M. Robinson III authored a recent biography (2001) of General George Crook entitled General Crook and the Western Frontier (University of Oklahoma Press). George Crook, upon commissioning, was stationed in northern California and Oregon till 1861 before heading back east to fight in the Civil War, his only service employing conventional warfare. He took command Ohio's 36th Voluntary Regiment and eventually served under General Philip Sheridan in the Army of West Virginia. Following the Civil War, he returned to the Pacific Northwest on frontier duty and battled the Palute Indians before President Ulysses S. Grant looked to him to solve the Apache problem in Arizona in 1871. General Crook brought peace to Arizona after bringing all the hostiles back onto the reservation, though the Chiricahuas were exempt from this round-up because of a previous treat between the Apache leader Cochise and the United States. In 1875, he was transferred to the Department of the Platte during the Sioux uprisings. He eventually returned to Arizona in 1882 where he fought his last battle against the Apaches in 1886. Before his death in 1890, he fought for the transfer of Apache prisoners of war to an environment similar to their native Arizona and for the rights he believed they had earned through their loyal service as scouts.

2 John Gregory Bourke, On the Border with Crook (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1891), 182.

3 The term assimilation is defined for this paper as the process whereby the Apaches (minority group) gradually adopt the cultural customs and attitudes of the Americans (prevailing culture). Assimilationists of the era were progressive reformers stereotypically ethnocentric in their view of other cultures.

4 Bourke, On the Border, vi.

5 A memorial statue to the Indian scouts is located at Fort Huachuca, Arizona— in Apacheria.

6 The term hostile is defined as Indians not living on, or having left, the reservation to raid American or Mexican settlements through theft, violence and intimidation.


8 Dunlay, 14.

9 Ibid, 14.

10 Bruce Vandervort, Indian Wars of Mexico, Canada, and the United States, 1812-1900 (New York: Routledge, 2006), 120.

11 Vandervort, 121. This occurrence would foreshadow the actions taken by Generals Crook and Miles over seventy years later with regards to the use of splintering a tribe to fight against itself and the US government forsaking their Indian allies immediately after accomplishing their own objectives.

12 Dunlay, 15.


15 Ibid, 69.

17 From the Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, the levels of war are doctrinal perspectives that clarify the links between strategic objectives and tactical actions. Although there are no finite limits or boundaries between them, the three levels are strategic, operational and tactical. Understanding the interdependent relationship of all three helps commanders visualize a logical flow of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks. Actions within the three levels are not associated with a particular command level, unit size, equipment type, or force or component type. Instead, actions are defined as strategic, operational, or tactical based on their effect or contribution to achieving strategic, operational, or tactical objectives.

18 The Indian Question is also known as the Indian Problem; the terms can be used interchangeably. It is defined as the question of what to do with the Indians that were seen as impeding westward expansion of America. In the 1830s, the US government dealt with the Indian problem by passing the Indian Removal Act which pushed all tribes east of the Mississippi into the vacant lands of the west. It was a widely held belief that the two cultures (Indian and white) could not live together. When Americans were moving past the Mississippi and Missouri rivers, the question or problem of what to do with them rose again. It then shifted to the reservation system, whereby tribes were being forced from their ancestral lands onto government created tracts of land known as reservations, or agencies. The responsibility of these agencies fell on the Bureau of Indian Affairs which was originally under the War Department before it moved to the Department of the Interior in 1849, where it is today.

19 During the Civil War, he paid a Polish immigrant to serve in his place when he was conscripted, which was legal at the time due to the passage of the Conscription Act in 1863. For a more detailed review of his two non-consecutive terms in office or his avoidance of service, see Henry F. Graff, Grover Cleveland, (New York: Times Books, 2002), 14-15.

20 University of Virginia, Miller Center of Public Affairs, cited on 11 January 2010.  
http://millercenter.org/academic/americanpresident/cleveland/essays/biography/4

21 Dee Brown, Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee: An Indian History of the American West (New York: Henry Holt and Company, LLC), 170. The quote has changed somewhat over time and is often cited as “The only good Indian is a dead Indian.”

22 Aleshire, 196.

23 Crook, Autobiography, 134. The incident in question had to do with Sheridan and General Wright not picketing Crook’s lines as he was short men in his defensive perimeter. This allowed the Confederates to attack and push back his lines significantly before his forces were eventually able to recapture their position and defeat the Confederates on the third and final day of battle. Much of the credit went to Sheridan though he privately admitted to Crook that the honors were due him.

24 President Hayes named one of his children George Crook Hayes, though the boy died at a very young age. Crook was also the godfather of President Hayes’ second son, James Webb Cook Hayes and they became close friends often taking hunting trips together twice a year when possible. When Crook died in 1890, Webb Hayes served as one of his pallbearers.

25 One example is in a letter from Crook to Hayes during his first tour of duty in Arizona on November 28, 1871. In discussing the “gigantic fraud this Indian Ring is” he also mentions “Vincent the Good” who had been “virtually decapitated.” General Crook learned the hard way that many of the government contractors, often in concert with the civilian humanitarians from the Department of the Interior, were cheating the Indians out of supplies and money as well as defrauding the US government. His point: To let the influential Hayes family know that government corruption was rampant in the territories, especially in and around reservations like his in Arizona.

27 Crook, *Autobiography*, 183. The term “controversially” is used to refer to an anonymous letter that was written to the President of the United States on March 29, 1882 by 86 officers of the Army regarding Crook’s selection and promotion to the rank of Brigadier General. In effect, this promotion jumped entirely the rank of Colonel. The anonymous officers stated that it was Crook’s own staff officers (most likely Bourke) that penned such glowing praise of Crook that the President believed it and was fooled. The circular was filed and nothing ever came of it, except for perhaps animosity amongst the Colonels and general officers of the Army.


29 Dunlay, 101.


31 Dunlay, 107.

32 Utley, 55.

33 Dunlay, 165.

34 Ibid, 5.

35 Ibid.

36 Aleshire, 116-117.


38 Utley, 172.


40 Ibid, 243-244. See also Secretary of War, *Annual Report*, 1883, 160.

41 Robinson, 254-255.

42 The “Indian Ring” was comprised of crooked businessmen and Indian agents. Companies who had licenses to trade with Indians on the reservations would often cheat them and the government by improperly weighing beef with rigged scales or weighing corn or seed that was soaked in water to provide less than the authorized daily rations. The supplies would then be sold on the open market, usually in an adjacent town for profit.

43 Crook, *Autobiography*, 245. Thomas Moore was assigned Chief Packer and took responsibility “of all pack trains and transportation operating with troops” according to Field Order No. 3, dated June 24, 1885. National Archives, RG 393, I, 212, volume 1. It was also noted he would report directly “to the Department Commander [Crook] for Instructions.” Crook maintained a strong relationship with his packers and often traveled with them in the rear of the column, occasionally playing card games with them.

44 Utley, 377.
45 United States Military Academy, **Twenty-First Annual Reunion of the Association Graduates of the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, June 12th, 1890** (Saginaw, Mich: Evening News Printing and Binding House, 1890), 42.

46 For a more anthropologic viewpoint on the relationships between scouts (employee) and military and civilian personnel (employer), see Nicholas Clinton Laluk's **"An Integrative Approach to interpretations of an Historical-period Apache Scout Camp at Fort Apache, Arizona," Master's thesis, University of Arizona, 2006.**

47 For a detailed account of John Rope's life as a government scout, see chapter 4 of Grenville Goodwin and Keith H. Basso's **Western Apache Raiding and Warfare** (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1971).

48 Robinson, 111.

49 Utley, 377-378.

50 Utley, 55.

51 Dunlay, 92-93.

52 Frederick T. Frelinghuysen and Matias Romero, United States Department of State, **Reciprocal Right To Pursue Savage Indians Across The Boundary Line, July 29, 1882** [Microfilm], National Archives, RG 663 AGO 1882.

53 Utley, 378. Crook believed that "The nearer an Indian approaches to the savage state the more likely he will prove valuable as a soldier." Dunlay, in **Wolves for Blue Soldiers**, states on page 48: "When Crook needed to enlist new scouts, he made a successful attempt to obtain them from the very hostiles who had just surrendered. Indeed, he made this proposal at the end of the peace talks, and found several young fellows ready and willing to put on the uniform."

54 Dunlay, 175.

55 John Gregory Bourke, **An Apache Campaign in the Sierra Madre** (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), 56.

56 Utley, 378.

37 Crook, **Autobiography**, 215.


59 Eve Ball, **Indeh, An Apache Odyssey** (Provo: Brigham Young University Press, 1980), 125. Nantan Lupan was an Apache nickname for Crook and translates to Tan Wolf - because of his tan uniform or civilian clothes, he typically wore in Arizona.

60 Bourke, **On the Border**, 433-435.

61 Robinson, 17-18.

62 An event occurred a year prior to Crook leaving in 1875 when the Interior Department had moved all of the Indians from the Verde and Apache reservations onto the San Carlos reservation. Crook wrote in his autobiography, page 184, how Indians acclimatized to their ancestral mountainous homeland were relocated to a desolated and malarious outpost [San Carlos] immersed in unbearable dust, heat, and humidity.

63 Birtle, 83-84.

64 Crook, **Autobiography**, 249.
General Crook letter to Brigadier General B. Topete, Commanding Mexican Forces in Sonora, November 22, 1883. George Crook Papers, Rutherford B. Hayes Presidential Library, Fremont, Ohio.

U.S. Secretary of War, Annual Report, Record Group 107, 49th Cong., 1st sess., 1885, 170.

Crook, Autobiography, 249-250.

Ibid, 229

Dunlay, 195.

Crook, Autobiography, 244.

Ibid.

Dunlay, 123. In chapter 11 of Dunlay’s Wolves for Blue Soldiers, he focuses on scouts and reservation police as the most significant technique for using a necessary military occupation to initiate the assimilation process in Native Americans.

Ibid, 198.

General Sheridan became General in Chief of the US Army in November 1883 after spending fourteen years as the Missouri division commander. At this point, Geronimo had been captured by Crook and was living peacefully on the reservation. In his role, Sheridan was also an operational commander and it was common for him to receive reports from his commanders in the field.

Dunlay, 66.

Ibid, 52.


Dunlay, 53. Colonel Kautz served under Crook and was the commander of the Arizona Territory between Crook’s first and second Apache campaigns.

Crook, Autobiography, 264.

Bourke, Apache Campaign, 56.


As described in Utley’s Frontier Regulars, pages 385-386: Crook met with Geronimo on March 25, 1886 at Cañon de los Embudos to negotiate Geronimo’s desired surrender. After an agreement was reached, Crook left for Fort Bowie to wire the good news to Sheridan while Lt Maus brought the hostiles to Arizona. Sometime on the night of 28 March, Geronimo and 33 others became drunk on mescal provided by an itinerant trader and fled back into the mountains.


For a more detailed examination of this link between Tribolet and the Tucson Ring, see C. L. Sonnichsen’s Tucson: The Life and Times of an American City (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987), 117.
Crook, *Autobiography*, 263. Charles Robinson, *General Crook and the Western Frontier* (p.282), wrote that Sheridan initially penned the statement "I feel ashamed of the whole business" on the end of this quotation and deleted the last sentence before sending the dispatch.

Ibid, 264.


This whole series of telegrams exchanged and the ensuing disagreement between the two leaders (Crook and Sheridan) was the subject of much debate throughout the Army. Feeling that Sheridan and Miles have the upper hand at getting their side of the story published in the official record before Congress, General Crook published his views in 1887 with a short pamphlet entitled *Resume of Operations Against Apache Indians, 1882 to 1886*. With its publication, Crook hoped to vindicate his personal embarrassment after being replaced by General Miles.

Utley, 411.

Robinson, 255.


Birtle, 91.

Dunlay, 180-181.

Ibid, 180.

ibid.


Birtle, 75.

Dunlay, 181.


Dunlay, 181.

Gatewood, 123. Additionally, Gatewood brought a fourth person, George Wratten. Wratten was a young Apache interpreter who "spoke and understood their language better than any other White Eye.... [with] the accuracy he needed if and when a meeting took place."

Birtle, 90.

Robinson, 284.

Dunlay, 181-182.

Dunlay, 291.
Lieutenant Lyman W. V. Kennon, Crook's aide, did the actual writing of the report as Crook dictated it to him.

Mark Moyar, A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 18.

Leader-centric warfare, as a lens to view counterinsurgencies, is a contest between elites in which the elite with superiority in certain leadership attributes usually wins. These attributes are initiative, flexibility, creativity, judgment, empathy, charisma, sociability, dedication, integrity, and organization.

Nantan Lupan, or Gray Fox, referred to the color of Crook's eyes as well as his ability to track the Indians down to their most remote strongholds. Robinson quotes Crook's former adjutant general Azor Howitt Nickerson's manuscript "Major General George Crook and the Indians" in the Walter Scribner Schulyer Papers. In Eve Ball's book Indeh: An Apache Odyssey, she quotes Eugene Chihuahua, son of Chihuahua, on page 125-126, in saying that Nantan Lupan meant Tan Wolf, not Gray Wolf. The Apaches called him Tan Wolf because it represented the tan color of the clothes the General wore all the time.


Figure 1. Major General George Crook (between 1870 and 1880) dressed in uniform, which for him was the exception and not the rule.

(Courtesy of the Library of Congress, LC-DIG-cwpbh-03770)
Figure 2. *The Scouts of General Crook* [1985] by Howard Terpning. Crook developed the idea of identifying his government scouts by having them wear red bandanas when they were operating across the border in Mexico so that they would not be mistakenly killed.

*(Courtesy of Howard Terpning)*
Figure 3. Pres. Grover Cleveland [1888] regarded himself as an Indian reformer but maintained strong ethnocentric views about them and eventually signed the Dawes Act of 1887 which robbed them of much of their lands. Photograph by C. M. Bell.

(Courtesy of the Library of Congress, LC-USZ62-91490)
Figure 4. Sheridan and his generals. From L to R: Generals Wesley Merritt, Philip Sheridan, George Crook, James William Forsyth, and George Armstrong Custer gathered around a table. Photographed by Alexander Gardner [1865].

(Courtesy of the Library of Congress, LC-DIG-ppmsca-24021)
Figure 5. Pres. Rutherford B. Hayes [between 1870 and 1880] by photographer Matthew Brady.

(Courtesy of the Library of Congress, LC-DIG-cwpbh-03606)
Figure 6. Al Sieber, Chief of Scouts, in Arizona [February 1874]. He served in both of Crook’s Apache campaigns. Sieber was portrayed by Robert Duvall in the film *Geronimo* in 1993. Charleton Heston’s character in the 1953 film *Arrowhead* was supposedly modeled on Sieber-type character. Photograph by Flanders & Penelon.

Figure 7. Captain John Gregory Bourke, Aide-de-camp to General Crook and recipient of the Medal of Honor during the Civil War [1896]. He kept several detailed and chronological diaries of his time on the frontier and from them he produced extensive writing on the American soldier in the west, in particular George Crook.

Figure 8. Captain Emmet Crawford, Apache Scout leader and Military Commandant, San Carlos Reservation [1876]. Captain Crawford was killed by Mexican irregular forces while chasing Geronimo through Mexico in January 1886. His scout, Dutchy, killed the Mexican who mortally wounded Crawford.

Figure 9. Lieutenant Charles B. Gatewood, Apache Scout leader and Military Commandant of Fort Apache Agency. (US Military Academy photo, 1877)

(Courtesy of White Sands Missile Range Museum, http://www.wsmr-history.org/Photos/Gatewood.jpg)
Figure 10. Mule packers during one of Crook’s campaigns in the Department of the Platte
[Photograph by S. J. Morrow, 1876]

(Courtesy of the National Archives, 165-FF-2F-14)
Figure 11. General Crook with his mule 'Apache' and two scouts, Dutchy and Alchesay. [May 1885] Dutchy (on the left) was the Apache scout who killed the Mexican who mortally wounded Capt Crawford. Alchesay was a White Mountain Apache chief and was awarded the Medal of Honor during Crook’s Tonto Basin Campaign in 1873 and was trusted by Crook immensely. In total, ten Apache scouts were awarded the Medal of Honor for gallant conduct during campaigns and engagements with Apaches from 1871-1873. Alchesay was one of two scouts Crook sent in to Geronimo’s position to convince him to come to council with Crook at Cañon De Los Embudos.

(Courtesy of the Arizona Historical Society, 106-BAE-251 7A)
Figure 12. Apache Indians Chihuahua, Natchez, Loco, Nana, and Geronimo at the Mount Vernon Barracks in Alabama. Note the western clothes and scout uniforms. [1890-1899] Geronimo met Miles in 1898 at the Trans-Mississippi International Exposition, Omaha, Nebraska. Photograph by Silas Orlando Trippe.

(Courtesy of Alabama Department of Archives and History http://216.226.178.196/u?/photo,3777)
Figure 13. Tsoe aka 'Peaches,' hostile Cibicue Apache who fled the Chiricahua tribe to scout for Crook after his wife died while living in Mexico with the rest of the hostiles. Photographed by Ben Wittick (1885).

(Courtesy of National Archives, #156)
Figure 14. Gen. Nelson Miles as General-in-Chief, US Army [1902] – Awarded the Medal of Honor for actions at the Battle of Chancellorsville, 1863 (Note the medal around his neck).

(Courtesy of the Library of Congress, LC-DIG-ggbain-23781)
Figure 15. Geronimo, full-length portrait standing, faces left, with an 1873 U.S. Springfield Trapdoor Rifle at port. Scene in Geronimo's camp...before surrender to General Crook, March 27, 1886. [1886 April 17] Photograph taken by C. S. Fly.

(Courtesy of the Library of Congress, LC-USZ62-46637)
Figure 16. Colonel August Kautz was a classmate of Crook at West Point; they served in the Pacific Northwest during the same time; and served under Crook as a regimental commander before taking command of the Department of Arizona between Crooks 1st and 2nd Apache campaigns. [between 1855 and 1865]

(Courtesy of the Library of Congress, LC-DIG-cwpbh-00805)
Figure 17. Chatto [1884] was one of the most important Chiricahua warriors to transition from hostile to scout under Crook’s command in 1884. He was a 40-year old chief who remained on the reservation and he came to believe, like Cochise eventually, that accommodation was the future for the Apaches and he served Crook faithfully. Under Miles’ command, he was shipped off to Florida as a prisoner of war.

(Courtesy of the Library of Congress, LC-USZ62-86457)
Figure 18. Geronimo surrenders to Crook at Cañon de los Embudos [March 1886]. Photograph by C. S. Fly.

(Courtesy of Sharlot Hall Museum, ina156ph)
Figure 19. Captain Henry Lawton [1870] was awarded the Medal of Honor for gallantry during the Civil War in 1864 and he received much credit for Geronimo’s surrender. He eventually served prominently during the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars.

(Courtesy of the Library of Congress, LC-USZ6-1698)
Figure 20. Band of Apache Indian prisoners at rest stop beside Southern Pacific Railway, near Nueces River, Tex., [September 10, 1886]. Among those on their way to exile in Florida are Natchez (center front) and, to the right, Geronimo and his son in matching shirts. Photograph by A. J. McDonald.

(Courtesy of National Archives, 106-BAE-251 7A)
APPENDIX A

General George Crook - Significant Career Events

1852 Commissioned a Second Lieutenant at West Point; service in northern California and Oregon
1856, Mar 11 Promoted to First Lieutenant
1857 Leads Pitt River Expedition and is severely wounded by an arrow
1861, May 14 Promoted to Captain
1861 Transferred back east for service in the Civil War; 36th Ohio Volunteer Infantry
(South Mountain, Antietam, Chickamauga, Cloyd's Mountain, Opequon, Fisher's Hill, Cedar Creek, Appomattox); Crook reverts to LtCol from his Civil War rank of Brevet Brigadier General of volunteers; Bascom Affair occurs in AZ
1866 Transferred to the Pacific Northwest (Idaho) for frontier service (Paiute Wars)
1871 Takes command of the Dept of Arizona to handle the Indian Problem
1872 Initiates his winter Tonto Basin Campaign (Arizona)
1873 Concludes the Apache campaigns; promoted to Brevet Brigadier General
1875 Appointed Commander of the Department of the Platte (Sioux Wars)
1876 San Carlos reservation established; Crook loses the battle of the Rosebud (Sioux Wars)
1877 Geronimo captured and placed in the San Carlos reservation
1881 Geronimo flees the reservation
1882 Geronimo liberates many of the San Carlos reservation Apaches, flees back into Mexico
1882, Sep 4 Takes command of the Department of Arizona
1883, May 1 Campaigns against the Apaches and brings Geronimo back onto the reservation
1883, Nov General Sheridan assumes command of the US Army
1885 Geronimo escapes from San Carlos reservation
1886 Geronimo surrenders to General Crook and subsequently escapes; General Crook resigns and is replaced by General Miles; Geronimo is captured by General Miles and imprisoned in Florida; Crook takes command of the department of the Pacific
1887 Promoted to Major General; assumes command of the Department of the Missouri
1889 Begins fight with Miles over relocation of the captive Apaches - conducts site inspections and visits Apache at Mt Vernon Barracks - chooses relocation site of Ft. Sill, Oklahoma Territory
1890, Mar 21 Major General George Crook dies at his HQ in Chicago, IL after 42 years of service

List of Indians that General Crook fought throughout his career:
Rogue River, Klamath, Shasta, Modoc, Pit River, Pi-Ute, Bannock, Nez Percé, Apache, Hualpai, Navajo, Sioux, Shoshonee, Ute, Cheyenne, Arapahoe, Crow, and Pawnee.

Note 1: Compiled from General George Crook: His Autobiography and The Harper Encyclopedia of Military Biography
Note 2: Battles and wars fought are in parentheses
Note 3: Boxes outline the first and second Apache campaigns
APPENDIX B

APACHE CONFLICTS IN THE SOUTHWEST (with modern boundaries, 1985)

(Courtesy of the Atlas of the North American Indian, by Carl Waldman and Molly Braun (Illustrator), Facts-On-File Inc.)
Annotated Bibliography

PRIMARY

Ball, Eve. 1980. *Indeh, An Apache Odyssey*. Provo: Brigham Young University Press. A seminal anthropological work on the Apaches. It provides interesting personal narratives and does not emanate from a military perspective which keeps the information uncorrupted. This is the reference book for an Apache perspective.


Bourke, John Gregory. 1980. *An Apache Campaign in the Sierra Madre*. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. A biographical account that describes the experiences of Capt Bourke and his fellow soldiers as they pursued the hostile Apaches in the Sierra Madre Mountains of Mexico in 1883. Bourke served as aide-de-campe to Crook during his time in the Department of the Platte and the Department of Arizona. Bourke was decorated in the Civil War (Medal of Honor recipient) and fought in various Indian campaigns in the West before publishing his detailed and insightful memoirs. A prolific writer, his first-hand experience and knowledge captures the significant challenges of frontier life for the American troopers during the Indian Wars.


Crook, George. 1960. *General George Crook: His Autobiography*. Edited and annotated by Martin F. Schmitt. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. This is Crook’s own autobiography though he died in 1890 before he was finished and only wrote about his career from commissioning to the end of the Sioux Wars. The remainder, until his death, is
ghost-written from primary sources by Schmitt. It is a typical autobiography that aggrandizes the greatest Indian fighter of all time. Valuable for a perspective on his career, his personal views on issues in warfare and the Native Americans, and factual biographical information.

Crook, George. 1971; 1886. Resumé of Operations Against Apache Indians, 1882 to 1886 (1 reprint), ed. London: Johnson-Taunton Military Press. This is Crook’s “Apologia pro Vita sua” which covers the issue of his being relieved of command and his grievances as to that case. It provides very specific information regarding the telegrams between him and Sheridan as well as his distaste for Miles. Ultimately, Crook’s effort to clear the record was invaluable to my research because of his personal defense against the events in question as well as it providing copies of his more important telegrams between him and Sheridan during that period.

Gatewood, Charles B., and Louis Kraft. 2005. Lt. Charles Gatewood & his Apache Wars Memoir. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. The memoirs of Lt. Gatewood, with editing to fill in the context of his story. Another fine example of cultural anthropology that some of the officers collected within their memoirs. Valuable resource for the study of the Apache and an insight into the mind of a real cultural warrior.

George Crook Papers, GA-13. Rutherford B. Hayes Presidential Library. Fremont, Ohio. Personal letters and correspondence between George Crook and significant personnel with whom he interacted, including President Hayes. Some of these manuscripts are not in the National Archives and most are catalogued on the library website.

Geronimo, and S. M. Barrett. 1991; 1906. Geronimo’s Story of his Life. Native American Voices. Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life Books. Geronimo’s autobiography, as told to Stephen Barrett just after the turn of the century. Provides good insight into his mindset although his perspective is skewed and often fanciful when placed in perspective to the rest of the literature on the Apache Wars.

Goodwin, Grenville, and Keith H. Basso. 1971. Western Apache Raiding and Warfare. Tucson: University of Arizona Press. An anthropological work on Western Apaches with significant narratives that portray Apache ways and provide a better cultural understanding of their sacred language and traditions, in particular their raiding parties.

Letters Received by the Office of the Adjutant General (Main Series), 1881-1889, M689, National Archives, Washington D.C. These records provide first-hand accounts of the correspondence between Crook and various members of his chain of command such as his division commander and General Sheridan. Additionally, includes correspondence between him and various Mexican diplomats and generals.

campaign, specifically the surrender of Geronimo. Opinionated, he gave a unique standpoint from a media perspective of the campaigns against the Apache.

Miles, Nelson A. 1992; 1896. *Personal Recollections and Observations of General Nelson A. Miles*. 2 vols. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. With an introduction by Robert Wooster, this two volume collection is Miles autobiography of his service in the Army and is very self-aggrandizing in many respects, especially since it was written while he was serving as the General-in-Chief. Miles provides a fairly good description of the Apache wars in the second volume, at least his small part in it. The volumes contain a large amount of Frederic Remington’s illustrations.

Records of the United States Army Continental Commands 1821-1920, Record Group 393, National Archives, Washington D.C. There were several documents, letters and copies of ledgers with all the correspondence and orders which transited between Crook’s Arizona command and various others in regards to prosecuting the Apache campaign.

United States Department of State, Frederick T. Frelinghuysen and Matias Romero, *Reciprocal Right To Pursue Savage Indians Across The Boundary Line*, July 29, 1882, Record Group 663 AGO 1882, [Microfilm], National Archives, Washington D.C.. This is the microfilm copy of the “hot pursuit” treaty referred to during the second campaign.

United States Military Academy. *Twenty-First Annual Reunion of the Association Graduates of the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, June 12th, 1890*. Saginaw, Mich: Evening News Printing and Binding House, 1890. These alumni records are available online through the USMA website and contain a list of obituaries for those former West Point cadets who died in the year that the annual reunion was published.

U.S. Secretary of War. *Annual Reports*, 1882-1886. Record Group 107. These reports provide an excellent summary of all the significant reports and telegrams from the field, broken down from the Secretary of War to the Commanding General of the Army, Division Commanders, and Department Commanders, through to some of the lieutenants in the field. An excellent source that cannot be overlooked in regards to this study.

**SECONDARY**

Aleshire, Peter. 2000. *The Fox and the Whirlwind: General George Crook and Geronimo: A Paired biography*. New York: John Wiley. A biography that briefly covers the lives of the two adversaries and their respective approaches to warfare: soldier and shaman. Most of the information can be found with more detail in other biographies, particularly their autobiographies.

Birtle, A. J. 1998. *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941*. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army. This study provides a military analysis of the counterinsurgency efforts the US Army from the Civil War to before World War II, to include operations conducted against the Apaches. Written from a specific military perspective which addresses tactics, techniques, and procedures.
Brandl, Thomas. “A Historical Perspective on Operations Other Than War: The U.S. Army's Campaign Against the Apaches, 1881-1886.” Master’s of Military Studies paper, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1994. http://65.114.145.226/isysquery/78d55460-00ad-48ab-a57b-8a5dbd56532d/1/doc/. This paper is a study of the second Apache campaign from the perspective of its significant operations other than war (OOTW). Brandl argues that professional military officers should study the Apache campaigns as they provide relevance to 20th century warfare.

Brown, Dee. 1970. *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee: An Indian History of the American West*. New York: Harry Holt and Company, LLC. This national bestseller has been made into a movie and translated into several languages; it has become a popular history of the Native Americans struggle in America. The book uses primary source material from the Native American viewpoint to share their story of the struggle to survive in the expanding American west.


Dunlay, Thomas W. 1982. *Wolves for the Blue Soldiers: Indian Scouts and Auxiliaries with the United States Army, 1860-90*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. An in-depth study of the use of Indian scouts and auxiliaries in the US military during the period of the Indian wars. This book was an essential research tool and was excellently written. The author uses many perspectives to examine the use of scouts, all of which were most relevant to this project.

Dupuy, Trevor N., Curt Johnson, and David L. Bongard. 1992. *The Harper Encyclopedia of Military Biography*. 1st ed. New York, NY: HarperCollins. A comprehensive list of famous military leaders and figures from around the world from all historical periods. Most entries only denote the battles or engagements that the subjects were participants.


Graff, Henry F. 2002. *Grover Cleveland*. New York: Times Books. A short biography of President Grover Cleveland, who was the nation’s 22nd and 24th Presidents. The book concentrates on elevating his status as the President as it seems history has overlooked a man whom held office during some very formidable years in American history.

Gatewood, Charles B., and Louis Kraft. 2005. *Lt. Charles Gatewood & his Apache Wars Memoir*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0708/2005005556-d.html. A biographical account of one of Crook’s most trusted lieutenants whose first-hand knowledge of the use of scouts and knowledge of the enemy was second to none. This was an invaluable resource for this study.
Holden, Water. “Captain Lawton’s Pursuit of Geronimo.” *Wild West*, October 1999, 28-34, 78. An article that covers Capt Lawton’s pursuit of Geronimo in the second campaign through private letters to his wife as well as other primary source material.


Jones, Archer. 1996. *Elements of Military Strategy: An Historical Approach*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger. An analysis of military strategy and how it was conducted during three Indian Wars. A good review of the levels of war and how they did or did not work in the respective campaigns he analyzes.


http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&sid=1&srchmode=1&vinst=PROD&fmt=6&startpage=1&clientid=32176&vname=PQD&RQT=309&did=1240709221&scaling=FULL&ts=1264166364&vtype=PQD&rqt=309&TS=1264166368&clientld=32176. This is an ethnological study blending anthropological and theoretical frameworks to understand why so many Apache men joined the Army as scouts. Laluk states that the intolerable reservation conditions and the unique economic opportunity the military provided were motivating factors in their decisions.

Lancaster, Burt, Bruce Davison, Richard Jaeckel, Alan Sharp, Robert Aldrich and Universal Pictures. 1972. *Ulzana’s Raid*. Burbank, Calif.: Universal Studios Home Entertainment. A graphic depiction of life as a trooper facing the Apaches in the desolate reaches of the southwest. This film has the requisite detail to bring to life the tactics, techniques and procedures utilized by the US Army and the hostile Apaches they faced in Arizona and Mexico. The film was shot on location in Arizona.


http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=10&sid=1&srchmode=1&vinst=PROD&fmt=6&startpage=1&clientid=32176&vname=PQD&did=813844491&scaling=FULL&ts=1263590009&vtype=PQD&rqt=309&TS=1263590015&clientld=32176. A significant source of information because of the subject of this paper. Lynch focused on the use of Scouts, how it alienated Crook from his higher headquarters, and focused on the lasting controversy it sparked.
Moyar, Mark. 2009. A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq. New Haven: Yale University Press. This is a new study of counterinsurgencies through the lens of command and leadership. Moyar argues that small unit leaders hold the keys to winning this type of war.


Prucha, Francis Paul. 1968. The Sword of the Republic: The United States Army on the Frontier, 1783-1846. New York: MacMillan. This book provides an overview of the role of the US Army on the frontier and how it was used by the government in many roles beyond the scope of a fighting force. In particular, it concentrates on the Army’s role in the expansion of the United States westward and how military policy reflected and executed domestic policy.


Robinson, Charles M. 2001. General Crook and the Western Frontier. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. A biography of Crook that covers his military career and debunks the myth that Crook was the greatest Indian fighter. Robinson asserts that Sherman and Sheridan lost confidence in him after the Rosebud, despite his initial success in Arizona.


Steinhilber, Major Chris T., USMC. “A Study of the Apache Wars in Arizona.” Master’s of Military Studies paper, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2004. http://65.114.145.226/isyquery/78d55460-00ad-48ab-a57b-8a5dbd56532d/2/doc/. This paper is a study of the Apache wars and how it relates to 21st century warfare in terms of a large and technologically advanced force (US) fighting a smaller and technologically inferior one (Apaches). It attempts to draw out lessons on understanding cultural aspects of an enemy before engaging them in warfare in order to limit the hostilities.
Sweeney, Edwin R. “Geronimo & Chatto: Alternative Apache Ways.” *Wild West*, August 2007, Vol. 20, Issue 2, 30-38. This article provides an unique perspective between the two warrior leaders of the Chiricahuas. Chatto represents the Apaches who gave in to white domination of their culture and remained on the reservation, while Geronimo stands with fewer Apaches resisting white assimilation. It also discusses their personal relationship as well as how they served their people.

Thrapp, Dan L. 1971; 1972. *General Crook and the Sierra Madre Adventure*. 1st ed. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. This is a study focused on the second Apache campaign in 1883 based on a perspective developed from an old map (which also comes with the book). Through a terrain analysis, Thrapp takes the reader through the events along the trail of Crook’s troops as they moved into and out of Mexico and discusses significant events along the way.


Wooster, Robert. 1995; 1988. *The Military and United States Indian Policy 1865-1903*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. This is a good primer on understanding the policy towards Indians in the nineteenth century, which is to say that there really was no coherent policy. Nevertheless, Wooster provides an overview of America’s struggle with assimilation of the Native American.