**Mission Command: Reconciling the ARFORGEN Model with Training Doctrine and the Current Operating Environment**

The US Army’s Mission Command Doctrine, published in 2011, emphasizes the “centrality of the commander” and the use of mission orders in order to address the decentralized nature of the contemporary operating environment (COE). Within the precepts of the new doctrine, the intent of Mission Command is to permeate the operations process as well as the management and the execution of training. However, current processes used to manage unit readiness (Army Force Generation - ARFORGEN) inhibit lower level initiative and prevent units from achieving a greater degree of proficiency; completely antithetical to spirit of mission command. The centralized control of the ARFORGEN process produces a “good enough” mentality, compromising quality for quantity in an effort to support a high operational tempo. As a result, the principles of mission command have collapsed under the weight of the ARFORGEN process. Addressing this gap, this paper advances the position that the current ARFORGEN process does not support Mission Command doctrine as defined in ADP 6.0, Mission Command nor does it capture the spirit of ADP 7.0, Training Units and Developing Leaders.
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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Mission Command: Reconciling the ARFORGEN Model with Training Doctrine and the Current Operating Environment

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AUTHOR:
Major Michael C. Haith, USA

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: “Mission Command: Reconciling the ARFORGEN Model with Training Doctrine and the Current Operating Environment”

Author: Major Michael C. Haith, United States Army

Thesis: The current Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) and training management systems employed by the US Army do not support Mission Command and training doctrine as defined in ADP 6.0, Mission Command and ADP 7.0, Training Units and Developing Leaders.

Discussion: The US Army’s Mission Command Doctrine, published in 2011, emphasizes the “centrality of the commander” and the use of mission orders in order to address the decentralized nature of the contemporary operating environment (COE). Within the precepts of the new doctrine, the intent of Mission Command is to permeate the operations process as well as the management and the execution of training. However, current processes used to manage unit readiness (Army Force Generation - ARFORGEN) inhibit lower level initiative and prevent units from achieving a greater degree of proficiency; completely antithetical to spirit of mission command. The centralized control of the ARFORGEN process produces a “good enough” mentality, compromising quality for quantity in an effort to support a high operational tempo. As a result, the principles of mission command have collapsed under the weight of the ARFORGEN process. Addressing this gap, this paper advances the position that the current ARFORGEN process does not support Mission Command doctrine as defined in ADP 6.0, Mission Command nor does it capture the spirit of ADP 7.0, Training Units and Developing Leaders.

Conclusion: The long term efficacy of mission command as the foundation of the Army’s operating concept is contingent upon the ability to imbue commanders at all levels with the confidence to operate in a decentralized operating environment. In order to foster the required trust and adaptability required to exercise mission command, leaders must approach training with the same approach as combat operations. The current reliance on training metrics and data points deemphasizes the traditional dialogue between commanders and subordinate leaders and creates a culture that places too much intrinsic value on statistics. Applying a layer of statistical indicators to drive decisions denies a commander the ability to exercise judgment and the development of intuition to govern an inherently human endeavor. The fundamental problem with ARFORGEN is the reliance on macro level models to drive the delivery of resources. As with any macro level model, the compounding anomalies that occur at the micro level create a persistent friction that can only be overcome by tactical solutions to manage the greater impact on the system. If subordinate commanders are not empowered to exercise the initiative required by mission command, then commanders will be less capable to do so in the current or future operating environment.
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PREFACE

The purpose of this paper is to inspire a professional discussion about the way the Army trains and, by extension, the way it prepares and develops leaders. Serving as a Company Commander during both Surges to Iraq and Afghanistan, I observed a significant gap between the US Army’s training management doctrine and the Army’s Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process. As I conducted my research, I gained a greater appreciation for the complexity of the US Army’s macro level processes. In an effort to restrict the scope of this paper, I only included an overview of the processes and regulations that govern mission command, training management, and the ARFORGEN process. By limiting the paper to only the issues germane to my argument, I attempted to avoid a pedantic discussion of doctrine and regulations.

I am grateful to the individuals who assisted and mentored me through the publication of this work. My USMC Command and Staff mentor, Dr. John Gordon, played an integral role in the development of my topic and demonstrated great patience as I plodded through the writing process. I also owe thanks to Lt Gen Paul Van Riper whose class and capstone paper heavily informed my thesis. Additionally, I received a substantial amount of assistance from COL Thomas Guthrie, the Director of the Center for Army Leadership. COL Guthrie’s articles and advice significantly shaped the direction of this paper. Finally, I would like to thank my family. Both my wife and my father demonstrated significant tolerance during the entire ordeal and I owe them both a significant debt of gratitude.
Mission command must be institutionalized and operationalized into all aspects of the joint force – our doctrine, our education, our training, and our manpower and personnel processes. It must pervade the force and drive leader development, organizational design and inform material acquisitions.¹

- Gen Martin Dempsey, CJCS, Mission Command White Paper

INTRODUCTION

Published in 2011, The US Army’s Mission Command Doctrine emphasizes the “centrality of the commander” and the use of mission orders in order to address the decentralized nature of the current operating environment (COE).² Within the precepts of the new doctrine, the intent of Mission Command is to permeate the operations process as well as the management and the execution of training.³ However, current processes used to manage unit readiness (Army Force Generation - ARFORGEN) inhibit lower level initiative and prevent units from achieving a greater degree of proficiency; completely antithetical to the spirit of mission command. The centralized control of the ARFORGEN process produces a “good enough” mentality; compromising quality for quantity in an effort to support a high operational tempo. As a result, the principles of mission command have collapsed under the weight of the ARFORGEN process. Addressing this gap, this paper advances the position that the current ARFORGEN process does not support mission command doctrine as defined in ADP 6.0, Mission Command nor does it capture the spirit of ADP 7.0, Training Units and Developing Leaders.
In support of this argument, this paper identifies three flaws in the ARFORGEN process and current training management practices within the US Army. First, the US Army is not growing operational artists because the Army is not developing tactical practitioners capable of managing training through mission command. Second, the processes and systems that support training management and ARFORGEN reinforce a centralized training methodology. Lastly, the current system fails to seize the opportunity to prepare leaders for the complexity and decentralized nature of the current operating environment. ARFORGEN replaces mentorship and mission command with detailed orders and directed training that is antithetical to the needs of COCOMs.

This paper also proposes three recommendations to address the gaps in the current ARFORGEN process. First, focus less on quantitative training statistics and emphasize a qualitative, holistic analysis of training management. Second, decentralize decision-making authorities and resource management in order to provide tactical commanders the ability to adjust the pace and scope of their training. Lastly, exercise mentorship and empower tactical leaders instead of management through metrics and data points in order to develop critical thinkers for the complexities of the COE.

METHODOLOGY

In order to frame the issue, this paper reviews the existing doctrine for Mission Command and Unit Training Management (UTM), and the Army Force Generation Process as defined in Army Regulation (AR) 525-29, ARFORGEN. To give context to the doctrinal overview, this paper also includes a literature review of professional works published in support of mission command, training management, and the ARFORGEN process. Next, this paper will briefly review examples of force generation models and training studies to provide a historical
perspective. During the analysis, this paper will use current training management practices and other evidence to support the central thesis. The paper will conclude with recommendations to better integrate mission command within the ARFORGEN process with the intent to spark a wider professional discourse on the proper relationship between mission command and the ARFORGEN process.

**DOCTRINAL REVIEW**

GEN Martin Dempsey reinvigorated the concept of mission command in 2010 in order to address the increasingly decentralized battlefield as well as the need to build proficiency across a full spectrum of conflict. Under the Army’s doctrinal hierarchy, the Army published Army Doctrinal Publications (ADP) supported by Army Doctrinal Reference Publications (ADRP) that collectively delineate the guiding principles that support the Army’s operating concept. Accordingly, the Army has restructured and emphasized mission command through the publication of ADP and ADRP 6.0, *Mission Command*. The newly published mission command doctrine emphasizes the “centrality of the commander” within Unified Land Operations. The term “mission command” replaces “battle command” as the Army’s central command philosophy and also replaces “command and control” as one of the six warfighting functions. According to ADP 6.0, mission command is defined as:

… the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.

The intent of mission command is to support the Army’s concept of Unified Land Operations through decentralized execution in order to keep pace with the evolving COE. By pushing responsibility and resources “to the edge,” mission command emphasizes that “the best understanding comes from the bottom up, not from the top down.”
As a mutually supporting concept, the US Army also published ADP and ADRP 7.0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders*. ADP and ADRP 7.0 outlines the US Army’s training management philosophy and the supporting architecture that defines the responsibilities of commanders and leaders to plan, prepare, and execute “progressive, challenging, and realistic training.”

Like mission command, training management emphasizes the prominent role of the commander in the implementation of training. The following quote from ADP 7.0 highlights the role of the commander:

> Commanders are responsible for training units and developing leaders. Commanders exercise this responsibility through formal and informal chains, assisted by other officers and noncommissioned officers, through the development and execution of progressive, challenging, and realistic training. Commanders are responsible for the objective, professional assessment of the results of unit training and leader development.11

The passage above describes the vital link between the Army’s concept for mission command and training management. Furthermore, ADP 7.0 advances the concept that “unit training and leader development are inextricably linked—that good training can help develop good leaders and good leaders are the key to good unit training.”12 Training management doctrine also advocates the concept of mission orders in the form of training guidance resembling the same procedures that the US Army employs to drive the operations process.13 Furthermore, the current practices described in the Unit Training Management Manual, employ the identical planning procedures and tools used to plan deliberate operations – principally the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) and Troop Leading Procedures (TLPs).14
According to Army Regulation (AR) 525-29, the Army’s Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process is the method by which the US Army develops the necessary resources and capabilities required to meet national security objectives. The US Army implemented the ARFORGEN process to address capability and capacity shortfalls following continuous deployments in support of OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). ARFORGEN is a “process of systems” that is both a “supply based model” and a “demand based process” that attempts to deliver the required resources to units to regenerate the required capability within the operating force (See Figure 2: Army Force Generation Model). The process is divided into three “pools” operating in cyclical progression: the RESET force Pool; the Train/Ready force pool, and the Available force pool (See Figure 3: Doctrinal Training Template for a US Army Brigade Combat team-BCT). A series of “Aim Points” within the each phase of ARFORGEN governs the progression of units across a 27 month timeline. These “Aim Points” provide prescriptive readiness benchmarks designed to support a logical training progression. At each “Aim Point,” Unit Status Reports...
provide metrics that outline the unit’s readiness in terms of equipment, Mission Essential Task List (METL) training proficiency, and personnel. These metrics trigger the delivery of resources to match the progression of the unit through the ARFORGEN process (See Figure 4: Unit Status Report Metrics).

LITERATURE REVIEW

GEN Martin Dempsey’s 2010 Army article “Mission Command” represents a watershed moment in the development of mission command. GEN Dempsey’s article presents a compelling argument for the need to establish mission command as a warfighting function. 21 Subsequently, the Joint Staff white paper on mission command and the publication of Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) and Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 6.0, Mission Command initiated a number of professional articles and discourse on the efficacy of mission command. Eitan Shamir’s Transforming Mission Command: The Pursuit of Mission Command in the US, British, and Israeli Armies, published in 2010, is an important piece outlining the implementation of mission command and presents a number of observations on its possible future success.

Additionally, a number of works address the theoretical underpinnings of mission command. The Command and Control Research Program’s The Agile Organization: From Informal Networks to Complex Effects and Agility includes an excellent overview on the theoretical foundations of mission command, to include a detailed discussion of self-organization and the importance of commander’s intent.

However, with respect to the relationship between mission command and training management, the professional discussion is limited. 22 Until the publication of “Building the New Culture of Training” by the current commander of US Army Training and Doctrine Command...
(TRADOC), GEN Robert Cone in January 2013, there has been no detailed discourse on mission command and training management since the publication of “Dynamic Training” by GEN Paul Gorman in 1971. Professional dialogue addressing the relationship between mission command and the ARFORGEN process is also notably absent. With the exception of a few after-action reviews, the profession has largely been silent since the implementation of ARFORGEN. While the tension between mission command and ARFORGEN is highlighted in a number of surveys conducted by the US Army, no scholarly effort examines the relationship outside informal blogs and internet chat boards. While this paper highlights a number of important sources in the bibliography, the aforementioned works, in conjunction with published doctrine, formed the basis of this paper.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Mission command is not a new philosophy. Rebranded into US Army doctrine in 2010, the theoretical underpinnings of mission command begin with advent of the Prussian-German concept of auftragstaktik during the 19th century. Acknowledging the tactical success of the German army during the final battles of World War I and the blitzkrieg doctrine of World War II, scholars and military thinkers recognized the value of decentralized command during the US doctrinal revolution of the 1970s. Recognizing the advantages of the Soviets in Europe and the lessons of the Yom Kippur War, Generals William DePuy and Donn Starry initiated a transformation toward a mission command centered doctrine, AirLand Battle. In order to defeat the numerically superior Soviets, the US Army determined that initiative through decentralized command was imperative.

Parallel to the transition to AirLand Battle, the US Army also transformed the way it trained and prepared for combat. Following the findings of the “Board for Dynamic Training”
chaired GEN Paul Gorman in 1971, the US Army determined that the previous models for training and force mobilization did not prepare the force for the Soviet threat. Capturing the observations of General William Depuy, Major Paul Herbert writes:

While the Korean and Vietnam Wars did not require mobilization on the scale of World War II, the training experience for soldiers in both conflicts was much the same as their World War II elders: large numbers of conscripts being hustled through a series of exercises in which minimum competence was the goal.24

Recognizing the detrimental effect of a centralized, cookie cutter training progression, General DePuy changed the training culture of the US Army. Identifying the need for paradigm shift, General DePuy realigned training and mobilization with the doctrinal shift to maneuver warfare.

In place of the previous training program, GEN DePuy instituted “performance based training.”25 In an article describing the training changes under DePuy, GEN Paul Gorman writes:

Training management changed from a commander’s scheduling classes to his developing a Mission Essential Task List (METL), and then required his or her troops to perform each METL task under combat-like conditions until judged proficient.26

This passage captures the transition to a standards based Army that recognizes the central role of the commander in the training environment. Furthermore, Gorman highlights that DePuy recognized that decentralized execution will characterize the future battlefield, and, therefore, tactical leaders should control the direction of their training.27

**CURRENT TRAINING PRACTICES**

Under current policies and directives, the US Army governs unit training through a series of directives, Army Regulations (ARs), training circulars and pamphlets, and quarterly and annual training guidance. The current Army Training Strategy (ATS) prioritizes training to support the needs of the Combatant Commander (CCDR) and identifies the responsibilities of
supporting commands in the Army’s Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process. Under the ARFORGEN process, the lead proponent for training is Forces Command (FORSCOM) and the Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs). In accordance with FORSCOM Regulation 350-1, the Army manages training using echeloned Mission Essential Task Lists (METL), Doctrinal Training Templates (DTT, See Figure 3: Doctrinal Training Template for a US Army BCT), Event Menu Matrices (EMMs, See Annex A: Event Menu Matrix for a US Army BCT), and Standards in Training Commission (STRAC) to form the basis for a unit’s Single Integrated Training Plan (SITP).  

The SITP is also influenced by higher headquarters (HQ) training guidance and pre-deployment training directives from COCOMs. The SITP becomes the base document that drives the ARFORGEN unit training calendar. Subsequent commands use the higher HQ SITP to guide the development of a SITP for their respective unit using MDMP or TLPs. A list of training metrics that assess proficiency govern the process of training management between command levels in order to provide training oversight and feed the progression of the ARFORGEN process through a series of milestones, or “Aim Points.” Commanders use the Unit Status Report (USR) and any training specific commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR) to capture the required metrics in order to gauge the progression and proficiency of their subordinate commands.

Installations manage training resources and enablers like training areas, ammunition, mobile training teams, schooling, etc., and prioritize these resources based on a unit’s placement within the ARFORGEN process and the availability of the resources. Units and organizations typically forecast resources annually and program quarterly. Because of the limited availability
of certain training resources and enablers, installations (Corps or Divisions) play an integral role in the programming and progression of training at the Brigade, Battalion, and Company levels.

ANALYSIS

Framing the Problem: The “Say-Do” Gap

The US Army’s Force Generation process creates an inconsistency between the principles of mission command and the way the US Army trains under the ARFORGEN Model. The current ARFORGEN process attempts to meet theater requirements in an era of “persistent conflict” by employing a centrally administered, “just-in-time” resource model. While a centralized force generation model satisfies these acute requirements, the adoption of ARFORGEN as the Army’s “enduring force-generation construct” fails to appreciate the lasting impacts of a centralized process on a force that doctrinally emphasizes mission command. Implementing “top down” training solutions and training requirements inhibits initiative and ingenuity, both critical elements within mission command. Subsequently, centralized training diminishes the role of the commander and eliminates one of the Army’s most effective tools for developing mission command within the force. By reducing the role of commanders in the training management process, the US Army is developing generations of officers that are accustomed to centralized control and less prepared for a decentralized form of warfare. The reliance on a rigid, supply based “push” system to manage the complex delivery of resources and training demonstrates a cultural overconfidence in quantitative decision-making and a fundamental incongruence between ARFORGEN and the US Army’s war fighting doctrine.
Current Application of Mission Command within the Training Environment

The US Army’s doctrinal emphasis on mission command is inconsistent with the training management systems employed under the ARFORGEN model. The US Army is not growing operational artists and effective future commanders because the Army is not developing tactical practitioners capable of training management through mission command. The inability to apply mission command within the training environment translates to diminished performance within the operational environment. Additionally, the training guidance within the ARFORGEN process is too prescriptive; inhibiting efforts to inculcate and practice mission command at the tactical level. Not allowing commanders to assess and design training to meet the specific needs of their organization erodes trust between levels of command and discourages lower level initiative.

Operational art is inextricably linked to training management. The ability to link the execution of battles and campaigns to achieve a strategic objective is equally applicable to designing successive training events to achieve a desired readiness outcome. Training management at the operational and tactical levels develops the judgment, confidence, and trust necessary for effective execution in the current operating environment. According to ADP 6.0, “Commanders use experience, training, and study to inform their decisions.” Under ARFORGEN, the finite number of collective training opportunities limits the capacity to develop leaders capable of developing, issuing, and executing mission-type orders. Subsequently, without the ability to apply mission command to training management, commanders lack the experiential touchstone to build a climate that understands and supports the execution of mission command in an operational setting.
Arguably, the complexity and fluidity of the current operating environment demands a balanced, integrated, and synchronized effort across the US Army. However, the degree of control imposed by Army Service Component Commands and installation commanders fails to achieve this balance. The Department of the Army (DA) approved Doctrinal Training Templates and Event Menu Matrices (see Annex A), demonstrate the prescriptive nature of the ARFORGEN training progression and highlights operational overreach into the traditional prerogatives of tactical leaders. The compulsory training requirements under ARFORGEN and theater training guidance is too inflexible and discourages a rigorous intellectual analysis of training necessary to fulfill specific, evolving CCDR requirements. The proliferation of training directives in the absence of a clear intent has effectively overwhelmed subordinate commanders and prevented them from applying meaningful analysis to their training strategies. The Army recognized this shortfall in the *US Army Professional Campaign Annual Report*:

> Task prioritization has become increasingly difficult as a result of too many competing requirements, all seemingly requiring immediate attention. Leaders are failing to set clear priorities as to what must be done and where risk can be assumed. This failure is negatively affecting training management systems, which are, in any event, not well understood or enforced.\(^{34}\)

The passage above reveals an absence of intent and a crisis of mission command within the training environment. Unable to decipher what is important and critical from merely routine or lower priority, tactical units experience the “training squeeze” under the weight of incessant compulsory training.\(^{35}\)

The current trends in training management indicate an erosion of trust within the chain of command. Attempts to centralize and synchronize resources and critical skills training (e.g., Noncommissioned Officer Education System -NCOES, Mobile Training Teams -MTT, New Equipment Training-NET) across broad formations create a ripple effect within the chain of command. Because of increased requirements to satisfy directed training and the overreliance on
a centralized method of execution, leaders are increasing unable to protect lower level training.

This reality is captured below in the *US Army Profession Campaign Annual Report:*

...junior leaders do not believe that they have adequate control over training schedules. The training schedule is meant to be a contract between junior and senior leaders. When it is changed on a regular basis that contract is broken, causing detrimental effects throughout the unit.\(^{36}\)

Instead of planting the seeds in training that translate to successful execution of mission command during operations, the tendency to micromanage training has had an adverse impact the current generation of rising commanders who potentially place diminished faith in the concept of mission command. Furthermore, the incongruence between what the Army advocates in doctrine and how the Army actually operates has resulted in a measurable level of cynicism within the force.

*Training Systems and Processes Reinforce Centralization of Training*

ARFORGEN attempts to overcome a perceived lack of experience at the tactical level, limited training resources, and time constraints with a process intended to ensure quality control. Triggered by demand signals generated from Unit Status Report (USR) metrics, ARFORGEN uses a centralized supply based model to address equipment, personnel, and training shortfalls.\(^{37}\) For these reasons, ARFORGEN inherently promotes a centralized method of control and oversight. Subsequently, the centralized management of assets and withholding the authorization to direct these resources skew the balance between the
requirement to standardize training and training management. Coupled with existing training systems outside the scope of ARFORGEN (e.g., safety and risk management, installation training resources, US Army ammunition regulations), installation and DA level involvement has inhibited the ability for units to effectively manage training at the tactical level.

The focal point for the ARFORGEN process is the installation command. The ARFORGEN process requires installations, under the direction of the Army Service Component Commander (ASCC), to synchronize the delivery of required training. For example, this training includes Mobile Training Teams (MTTs), Professional Military Education (PME) courses, New Equipment Training (NET), and annual certification training (See Annex C: Training Courses Managed by Installations). Installations also manage the distribution of funds, personnel, ammunition, fuel, ranges, pre-deployment training equipment, and a number of other critical resources. Phasing the distribution of training resources and support across a multitude of maneuver and functional units presents a “wicked” problem for any installation, division, or BCT staff. Because of the limited availability of resources, the process to prioritize and administer training support reinforces a centralized method of command and control. The installation process for forecasting and scheduling resources becomes an intractable and interactively complex system for tactical leaders to effectively implement meaningful training. The training management processes used to supervise and allocate resources further limits the ability to manage the direction and predictability of tactical unit training plans. The competition for these consolidated resources and the bureaucratic training policies effectively restrict tactical initiative. The influence of budgetary constraints, deployment dates, equipment fielding, training cancellations, weather, and unit personnel turnover create a web of interactions that supersede the capacity of tactical leaders to plan, prepare, and execute training.
Briefly describing the process that governs training “forecasting” reveals the high level of complexity that commanders face. Depending on the installation and the ARFORGEN time horizon, training budgets are processed at the division level two to three months before the start of the fiscal year.42 The budgets are based on historical analysis, STRAC allocations, Corps and ASCC training guidance, and annual training and spending plans submitted by subordinate units.43 Additionally, ASCC planning conferences forecast and schedule combat training center (CTC) rotations and installation MTT courses, for example, one to two years in advance.44 The necessity to project training and resources over a long time horizon has a limiting effect on tactical level training management (See Figure 5: Company Deployment Critical Skills Tracker & Annex B: FORSCOM Pre-deployment Training Tasks). Prioritizing, scheduling and synchronizing an expanding list of required and centrally administered training creates an irreversible momentum that overwhelms tactical level training plans. Tactical formations have limited ability to exercise initiative when conditions change within their formations. Hypothetically, if a battalion commander recognizes that his training strategy does not address an emerging enemy trend, he is constrained in his ability to change course given limited discretionary time and the weight of the bureaucratic processes required to change committed resources. Similarly, if the battalion commander determines that the unit is not proficient in the a directed or core METL task, the commander cannot change the pace of the

Figure 5: Company Deployment Critical Skills Tracker
unit’s training progression because the training calendar may not accommodate additional training events, key personnel are unavailable due to MTT or PME courses, or the existing allocation of resources cannot accommodate additional training events.

The Army does have procedures to address training shortfalls through un-forecasted requirements conferences, resource sharing, etc. However, the tendency to centralize the delivery of training within ARFORGEN and the inclination to provide macro level solutions limits flexibility and the ability to exercise initiative in response to the complex interactions within the training system. Additionally, the supporting systems that drive home station training reinforces centralized control at the expense of developing tactical combat leaders capable of exercising mission command. GEN Cone, addresses this dilemma in a recent article in Military Review:

“...we centralized training and training resources, and our commanders became experts in creating readiness for missions they faced in Iraq and Afghanistan. But they did so by following cookie-cutter templates at the expense of seeing their traditional roles in designing and creating training programs marginalized. By maximizing unit readiness, fundamental training skills were allowed to atrophy. Commanders lost ownership of their training— the warrior’s art during times of peace.”

GEN Cone captures the tension between the current norms within training management and the “centrality” of the commander. Unfortunately, implementing centralized training in support of the ARFORGEN cycle has influenced a generation of officers who lack an appreciation for training design and its correlation to the execution of mission command on the battlefield.

**The Implications of ARFORGEN**

The tempo of the COE requires flexible and adaptive leaders capable of executing operations within the commander’s intent. However, the current training management systems under ARFORGEN limit opportunities to prepare leaders for the complexity of the COE.
Contrary to the principles of mission command, ARFORGEN’s top down approach discourages mentorship and mission orders in favor of prescriptive guidelines. In order to achieve the command climate that allows for lower level initiative, mission command must be the cornerstone of the Army’s training philosophy. Unfortunately, the current centralized method of training management creates a training culture that emphasizes high level supervision and avoids risk. Preventing leaders from exercising meaningful training management creates a gap in leader maturity and professional growth, and fosters a lack of trust within the force. Furthermore, ARFORGEN inhibits the realization of mission command as the doctrinal underpinnings of Unified Action.

The underlining foundation of mission command is the principle of self-organization. As defined in systems theory, a self-organizing or self-regulating organization is a unit that is capable of maintaining equilibrium through a series of defined feedback mechanisms. In a military context, a well-defined commander’s intent provides the feedback mechanism necessary to empower units with the authorization and responsibility to recognize and seize opportunities. The idea of self-regulating forces provides subordinate commanders the flexibility and the agility to see and act first. The pace and uncertainty of the COE requires a self-regulating and decentralized execution of command; denoting a high degree of trust and confidence between commanders and their subordinate leaders. Additionally, mission command requires disciplined initiative, competence, mentorship, and an appetite for risk. The training environment provides an excellent laboratory to develop these elements of mission command within leaders.

By providing commanders ownership of training and establishing a climate of trust to execute within a higher commander’s intent, subordinate commanders develop judgment and
experience. However, the current culture within the US Army draws a distinction between command in garrison and command during operational deployments. Centralized training systems reinforce this conflict and fail to learn from historical lessons. In a 1971 report evaluating the status of Army training in the closing stages of the Vietnam War, General Paul Gorman highlighted the important relationship between leadership and training management by stating, “Decentralized management of training is thoroughly consistent with requirements for training leaders for the battlefield.” In a later speech, General Gorman added:

An Army should train as it will fight. On any future battlefield, as was the case in Vietnam, a degree of dispersion and decentralization will characterize tactical command, and battalion and company commanders will manage their own battle. Hence they should manage their training themselves, per a mission type order.

General Gorman correctly captures the timeless lesson that training should mirror the conduct of battle. In an age of persistent conflict, the environment necessary to prepare leaders for the depth and breadth of responsibility cannot be replicated without relinquishing the ownership of training to tactical commanders.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the preceding critique of the ARFORGEN process and supporting training systems, this paper proposes three critical changes that will allow commanders the freedom of action to exercise meaningful ownership of training. First, focus less on quantitative training statistics and emphasize a qualitative, holistic analysis of training management. Second, decentralize decision-making authority and simplify resource management. Lastly, mentor and empower subordinate commanders to exercise judgment instead of bureaucratic management through metrics and data points in order to develop critical thinkers for the complexity of the COE.
**Consolidate Training and Synchronize Delivery**

As discussed in this paper, centralized decision-making and centrally controlled resources have a crippling effect on tactical training management. Attempting to synchronize and deliver centrally administered training (like MTTs, NET, PME courses, etc) restricts the commander’s ability to manage training. Moving these required training events to the RESET phase and consolidated blocks within ARFORGEN will allow subordinate commanders to more effectively control training. These training events are vital and cannot be replicated at the tactical level. However, these training events are too often spread throughout the ARFORGEN progression without regard to the continuity of training. This requires a substantial effort to synchronize the delivery of personnel and leaders earlier in the ARFORGEN process so that tactical commanders can program collective training and maintain freedom of action without persistent interference.

**Decentralize Decision-Making Authority and Simplify Resource Management**

The current training support systems and the limited nature of training resources have removed decision making authority away from tactical leaders. Delegating control of training resources to commanders is critical to reinforce the premise of the mission command as an operating concept. The competition between units for pre-deployment training and equipment, ranges, and training aides has become the principal driver of training schedules. When coupled with other training requirements, the resulting chaos resembles an interactively complex system that can only be addressed through micro level solutions. Removing bureaucratic obstacles and pushing control of resources to the tactical level allows commanders to devise unique and creative methods to synchronize and share these resources across a smaller field. Additionally, pushing direct control of ammunition, training areas, training aides, and training authorities to
subordinate commanders provides brigades, battalions, and companies the flexibility to change
direction to meet the inherent friction of the ARFORGEN process.

_Empower Commanders with the Ability to Exercise Judgment_

The long term efficacy of mission command as the foundation of the Army’s operating
concept is contingent on the ability to imbue commanders at all levels with the confidence to
operate in a decentralized operating environment. In order develop the level trust and
competence prescribed under mission command, leaders must approach training with the same
mentality as combat operations. The current reliance on training metrics and data points
deemphasizes the traditional dialogue between commanders and creates a culture that places too
much intrinsic value on statistics. Applying a layer of statistical indicators to drive decisions
denies the commander the ability to exercise judgment and develop the intuition to govern an
inherently human endeavor. The fundamental problem with ARFORGEN is the reliance on
macro level models to drive the delivery of resources and direct training. As with any macro
level model, the compounding anomalies that occur at the micro level create a persistent friction
that can only be overcome by tactical solutions to manage the greater impact on the system. If
subordinate commanders are not empowered with the ability to exercise initiative then
commanders will be less capable to do so in a combat environment.

**CONCLUSION**

ARFORGEN provides commanders a narrow solution space to achieve the specified
readiness outcomes. Restricted by the lack time and predetermined resource support, tactical
commanders are unable to exercise meaningful ownership of their training between the margins
of a scripted ARFORGEN training progression. The training squeeze resulting from centrally
mandated training removes freedom of action and discourages innovation and adaptability. Macro level solutions to training cannot succeed within a mission command philosophy and does not translate to success in an era of uncertainty and persistent conflict. Diminished ownership of training aggravates the experience gap and precludes commanders from growing and maturing as professionals. While decentralized control of training presents significant risks, operational effectiveness and the successful practice of mission command doctrine presents a compelling counter argument.

The exercise of mission command in training does not imply unlimited discretion by subordinate commanders and does not remove the larger obligation to identify and establish training standards. Using the Combined Arms Training Strategies (CATS), commanders must ensure subordinate leaders train within a common framework. Additionally, commanders still have the duty to provide subordinate commanders with supervision as well as external evaluations and training assessments. Commanders guide training through a well-defined commander’s intent and endstate. This distinction achieves the necessary balance between prescriptive and descriptive training guidance that accounts for the level of experience, and also the subordinate’s broader professional development.

4 “Mission Command,” 43.
5 Unified Land Operations refers to the US Army’s operating concept replacing Full Spectrum Operations and is detailed in ADP/ADRP 3.0, Unified Land Operations.
6 “Mission Command,” 43.
8 ADP 6.0, ii.
9 “Mission Command,” 44.
The Unit Training Manual is a product published by the Army Training Network, a virtual training resource established by TRADOC.


US Forces Command, “Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Overview,” (PowerPoint Presentation, HQ, G3, US Army Forces Command, 08 February 2011). The “process of systems” is used in several TRADOC and FORSCOM briefings to denote the effort to synchronize the multitude of US Army programs to support the generation and regeneration of combat power.

US Forces Command, ppt.

ARFORGEN is predicated on a 36 month cycle in which units receive 27 months reset at home station and 9 months deployed. However, the US Army altered this ratio to accommodate the surge of deployments in support of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts.

AR 525-29, 2.


This may change as a larger number of company and field grade officers arrive at professional military education institutions and begin reflecting on ARFORGEN.


Gorman, 8.

Gorman, 8.


FORSCOM CIR 350-1, 15.


ADP 7.0, 4.

ADP 6.0, 7.


Army Profession (AP) Campaign Annual Report, 15.

Army Profession (AP) Campaign Annual Report, 15.


Installation command is dictated by the senior installation command either a Corps HQ or Division HQ.


The term “wicked problem” is a term used in systems theory to denote a complex problem that is too difficult to solve using systematic, analytic models. Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper describes “wicked problems” as the result of complex interactions within an open, dynamic system.

Interactively complex systems cannot be understood by the summation of its components. According to Lieutenant General Van Riper, the dynamic and unpredictable interactions within the system produce “multifaceted, rich, and potentially volatile behavior,” posing unique and “wicked” problems. Examples of interactively complex systems are reflected in the fields of political science, economics, and any human endeavor in which the element of
free will exists. Subsequently, the emergent properties of nonlinear systems can only be appreciated from a holistic, or systemic, approach.


43 STRAC is the acronym used to abbreviate the Standards in Training Commission. STRAC, as outlined in DA PAM 350-38, provides guidance that articulates the “Army's training strategy and the amount and type of training ammunition that is authorized for each weapon system and training event.”

44 AR 525-29, 8.

45 Moss, PowerPoint.


47 Headquarters United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, The United States Army Operating Concept, TRADOC PAM 525-3-1 (Fort Eustis, VA: Training and Doctrine Command, August 19, 2010), 12.


49 Kewley, lecture.

50 Kewley, lecture.


52 Dynamic Training, 5.
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Guthrie, COL Thomas P. “Mission Command: Do We Have the Stomach for what is Really Required?” *Army*, June 2012, 26-28.


Headquarters U.S. Army Forces Command. Forces Command Training and Leader Development


Headquarters U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, The United States Army Operating Concept, TRADOC PAM 525-3-1 (Fort Monroe, VA: Training and Doctrine Command, August 19, 2010), 12.


Annex A: Event Menu Matrix for a US Army BCT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Matrix</th>
<th>Training Environment</th>
<th>5 mos</th>
<th>6 mos</th>
<th>7 mos</th>
<th>8 mos</th>
<th>Event Matrix</th>
<th>9 mos</th>
<th>10 mos</th>
<th>11 mos</th>
<th>12 mos</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event/Unit</td>
<td>Training/Unit</td>
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<td>Event/Unit</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

# Annex B: FORSCOM Pre-deployment Training Tasks

## FORSCOM Required Pre-Deployment Training Tasks by Deployment Category

### CAT 1: Contingency Operating Base/Forward Operating Base Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual Soldier Tasks</th>
<th>Additional Individual Soldier Tasks</th>
<th>CAT 2: COB/FOB Units w/Travel Off Base (*Includes All CAT 1 Tasks)</th>
<th>CAT 3: COB/FOB Units w/Travel Off Base (*Includes All CAT 1 &amp; 2 Tasks)</th>
<th>CAT 4: Maneuver Units with an Area of Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contingency Operating Base/Forward Operating Base Units</td>
<td>Additional Individual Leader Tasks</td>
<td>Units that would rarely, if ever, travel off a COB/FOB</td>
<td>Units that will potentially travel off a COB/FOB for short duration</td>
<td>Maneuver Units with an Area of Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>FORSCOM Pre-deployment Training Tasks</em></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
## Annex C: Training Courses Managed by Installations (Maneuver Only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functional MTIs</th>
<th>NCOES</th>
<th>Installation Courses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Biometrics Course</td>
<td>Warrior Leader Course</td>
<td>Brigade Combat Team Trauma Training (BCT3) Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Awareness and Tactical Questioning Course</td>
<td>Basic NCO Course (BNCOC)</td>
<td>MRAP Driver’s Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-RCIED Electronic Warfare (CREW) Course</td>
<td>Battle Staff NCO Course</td>
<td>Air Assault School</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tactical HUMINT (S2 - Teams) Courses</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sling Load Inspect Cert Course</td>
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<tr>
<td>Police Transition Team Course</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISR TOPOFF Course</td>
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<tr>
<td>Raven (UAS) Operator Course</td>
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<tr>
<td>Master Raven (UAS) Trainer Course</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joint Fires Observer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intel Foundry Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>Company Intel Support Team (CoIST) Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>Long Range Marksmanship Course</td>
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<tr>
<td>Squad Designated Marksman Course</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tactical Electronic Warfare Course (TDY)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Consolidated G3/5/7 - DPTMS NOTES, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) & Fort Campbell, As of 17 October 2009*

*Source: Headquarters 101st Airborne Division, “Consolidated G3/5/7 - DPTMS NOTES,” (Fort Campbell, KY: Headquarters, Directorate of Plans, Training, Mobilization and Security, 101st Airborne Division, October 17, 2009).*