# Master of Military Studies Research Paper

## Standing Strong: A Leadership Analysis of General David M. Shoup, USMC 22d Commandant of the Marine Corps

**Power, Michael J., Major, USAF**

**USMC Command and Staff College**

**2076 South Street**

**Quantico, VA 22134-5068**

---

**Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.**

---

**Shoup, Leadership, Commandant**

---

The strength, perseverance, vision, and courage developed through a life of hard work and combat experience eventually proved essential to General Shoup’s exemplary effectiveness as the 22d Commandant of the United States Marine Corps. An assessment of his career reveals many leadership traits that are pertinent to military officers of the 21st Century.
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

Standing Strong: A Leadership Analysis of General David M. Shoup, USMC
22d Commandant of the Marine Corps

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

Maj Michael J. Power, USAF

AY 12-13

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member:
Donald F. Bittner, Ph.D., Professor Emeritus of History
Approved: 
Date: 27 March 2013

Oral Defense Committee Member:
Approved: 
Date: 27 March 2013

MARK A. STRONG, COL, USA
DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE.
Executive Summary

Title: Standing Strong: A Leadership Analysis of General David M. Shoup, USMC
22d Commandant of the Marine Corps

Author: Major Michael J. Power, United States Air Force

Thesis: The strength, perseverance, vision, and courage developed through a life of hard work and combat experience eventually proved essential to General Shoup’s exemplary effectiveness as the 22d Commandant of the United States Marine Corps. An assessment of his career reveals many leadership traits that are pertinent to military officers of the 21st Century.

Discussion: General David Monroe Shoup (1904-1983) was born in humble surroundings in Indiana in 1904 and went on to serve as the Commandant of the Marine Corps during a particularly turbulent period in the history of the United States, 1960-1963. A diligent worker beginning in his youth, he worked his way through college and earned a commission in the United States Marine Corps. He had a formative experience as a Lieutenant serving abroad in China in the late 1920s and then in the 1930s served in various positions where he was not involved directly in leading Marines into battle. In World War II, then-Colonel Shoup displayed courage and leadership in the Battle at Tarawa, receiving the Medal of Honor for his efforts. After the war, Shoup served in several different key command and staff billets as a Colonel and General Officer which prepared him for the responsibilities of leading the Marine Corps.

This self-proclaimed “plowboy” from Indiana turned war hero was particularly well suited to serve during this time when the Marine Corps needed firm leadership and a reinvigoration of its purpose and esprit de corps. His advice and decisiveness, coupled with his steady hand in guiding the Marines, were important for Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson as they led the nation through a nuclear weapons build-up, the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, the deployment of forces to South Vietnam, and the aftermath of the Kennedy assassination. Identified by many as President Kennedy’s favorite general, Shoup so impressed Kennedy that the President offered him another four-year term as Commandant—General Shoup selflessly refused the honor, but many indications led to the belief that General Shoup would play an important role in a possible second Kennedy administration after his extremely successful tour as Commandant. However, this never occurred. In retirement, Shoup was most noted for his public outspoken criticism of the war in Vietnam.

Conclusion: General Shoup was well prepared through his life experiences for his tour as Commandant, and his exemplary ability to work with all parties in and out of the Marine Corps led to a successful term as the Commandant of the Marine Corps. General David Shoup’s determination and selflessness, combined with his boldness and decisiveness are leadership attributes worthy of study and apply directly to military officers serving in the 21st Century.
# Table of Contents

PREFACE .................................................. iv

GENERAL DAVID M. SHOUP, OFFICIAL COMMANDANT PHOTO (1960) ............... vi

FOUNDATIONS AND CAREER LEADING UP TO THE COMMANDANCY (1904-1959) ... 1

COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS (1960-1963) ..................................... 6

HANDS ON THE PLOW AND END OF EISENHOWER ERA .................................. 6

KENNEDY ERA: OVERVIEW OF USMC ISSUES .............................................. 16

BAY OF PIGS ............................................... 18

CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS AND THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY ....................... 21

LAST YEAR IN UNIFORM – VIETNAM BUILD-UP ............................................ 23

EPILOGUE (1964-1983) .................................................................................. 26

RELEVANCE OF GENERAL SHOUP TO THE 21ST CENTURY ......................... 30

APPENDIX A: Chronological Timeline ......................................................... 35

APPENDIX B: Official Biography (nd) ............................................................. 38

APPENDIX C: Award and Citations ................................................................. 39

APPENDIX D: Pictures .................................................................................... 46

APPENDIX E: Tarawa Photocopies ................................................................. 55

APPENDIX F: Commandant Nomination Press Release ............................... 60

APPENDIX G: Personal Notes Upon Nomination as Commandant ................ 62

APPENDIX H: Cow Path Poem .................................................................. 64

END NOTES ..................................................................................................... 66

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................. 72
Preface

At the start of my year of study at the United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College, I resolved to pursue a Master of Military Studies degree and immediately decided to select a Marine Corps subject. It would have been all too easy for me, as an Air Force Officer, to choose an air, space, or cyberspace power topic and focus on my service only. However, I wanted to ensure I had a full and complete Marine Corps experience at the Command and Staff College and set out immediately to find a Corps-related topic. As a student of leadership and a reader of many modern leadership books, I knew the topic would be a leadership analysis of some sort.

When, during the first week of Command and Staff College (the “sister service” orientation week) I went on a tour of the National Museum of the Marine Corps, just outside the base at Quantico, a short film about the Battle of Tarawa enthralled me. The video highlighted the exceptional leadership of then Colonel David M. Shoup, United States Marine Corps, who received the Medal of Honor for his leadership in that operation. After an initial “Google research,” I learned that he later rose to be the 22d Commandant of the Marine Corps and earned some notoriety after his retirement for speaking out publicly against the Vietnam War. Thus, deducing that there would be voluminous amounts of information on the subject matter, I chose General Shoup as the subject of my Master of Military Studies paper.

Studying leaders like General Shoup is important to all military officers. We must constantly seek out and learn from those who went before us in service to the nation. General Shoup’s amazing life and career is full of memorable episodes during which he took charge, remained determined, and pursued a tasking through to completion. Due to the limitations of space and time inherent in any one-year Master’s program, I decided to focus on General
Shoup’s four years as the Commandant of the Marine Corps, while also briefly addressing both his career prior to heading his service and the legendary General’s post-retirement role as a critic of the war in Vietnam. For me, it is particularly enlightening to research the actions and motivations of a service chief much respected by President Kennedy, especially during such a critical time in our nation’s history as 1960-1963, when Shoup served as Commandant. My hope is that the reader finds this analysis interesting and useful in studying military leadership and applying it to situations military leaders face in the 21st century, especially in the military-civilian interface at the policy and strategic levels.

I would like to thank Ms. Annette Amerman at the Marine Corps History Division at Quantico, who went above and beyond in helping me find information on General Shoup (including a true “gold mine” in acquiring his entire folder of Officer Fitness Reports). Also, thanks are due to Mr. Chris Ellis at the Marine Corps Archives who patiently allowed me to pour through several folders of information and make copies of important documents for my research. Additionally, I must thank my Master of Military Studies mentor, Dr. Donald Bittner (LtCol USMCR, Retired) for his guidance and insights, especially in light of my ignorance on the topic of General Shoup—thank you for your time and patience, Sir.

Finally and most importantly, I would like to thank my beautiful wife, Courtney, and our two wonderful children, Joey and Claire—without your love, support, and understanding of why I had to spend many weekend hours in the library, this paper would not have been possible.
General David Monroe Shoup was born near Battle Ground, Indiana on December 30, 1904, in very humble surroundings. This unassuming start to a highly successful and tumultuous life was never lost on General Shoup, as he always referred to himself as “just an Indiana plowboy.”

Shoup’s determination in rising from an underprivileged background served as the strong foundation for a life spent serving and, as needed, fighting for the country he loved. The strength, perseverance, vision, and courage developed through a life of hard work and combat experience eventually proved essential to General Shoup’s exemplary effectiveness as the 22d Commandant of the United States Marine Corps. An assessment of his career reveals many leadership traits that are pertinent to military officers of the 21st Century.

General Shoup enrolled at DePauw University in 1922 on a scholarship given to the 100 outstanding high school students in Indiana. At DePauw, he majored in Mathematics and excelled in sports to include marathon running, wrestling, and football. The young Shoup also enrolled in the Army Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) for two years as required at the time, then continuing to the Senior ROTC program solely for the monthly monetary stipend. Lacking money, he worked his way through college waiting tables, washing dishes, and working in a cement factory. In his senior year, a fellow cadet went to New Orleans for a ROTC fraternity conference and returned with exciting news—Major General John Lejeune, then Commandant of the Marine Corps, spoke to the conference and stated that anyone interested in a Marine Corps commission should write him a letter. Cadet Shoup, excited upon hearing the description of the experience, immediately wrote a letter to General Lejeune and subsequently earned a commission in the Marine Corps in July 1926 after a brief period as a commissioned Army Reserve officer.
As a young officer, Shoup spent six years as a Second Lieutenant. His service included such often assigned duties as football player, shooting competitor, and morale officer, not unusual in the pre-World War II Marine Corps. One of the most formative experiences of young Shoup’s life, one that had tremendous impact later on his approach to irregular warfare and counterinsurgency, occurred during this time. The Marine Corps pulled Shoup and nine other Lieutenants out of the Philadelphia-based The Basic School in April 1927 and sent them to China for a year. There, they witnessed how employing military forces in an unfamiliar environment, with no clear mission or knowledge of the culture, could be frustrating and debilitating to trained soldiers and Marines. Ostensibly sent to protect the American missionaries in Shanghai and Tientsin from Chinese rebels who were attacking foreigners, Lieutenant Shoup discovered that the actual mission involved defending American business interests in China, which had increased $27 million in the years after the Marines’ arrival.

Shoup had misgivings about the Americans in China, writing in his journal that: “China has many Americans, or those who propose to be Americans, inhabiting her country and in many cases exploiting her people. Yet they claim their right to protection from the U.S. some 10,000 miles away.” The destitute nature of the Chinese soldiers (i.e., sporadic receipt of paychecks and little support from leadership) and the public exploitation of the local Chinese by missionaries, businessmen, and diplomats left lasting marks on the young future Commandant.

In his first 14 years of service, Shoup’s duties varied but, according to Howard Jablon’s biography of Shoup, “often seemed unrelated to the task of leading troops into harm’s way.” Despite the odd duties, then-Lieutenant Shoup stood out among his peers from the beginning, with then-Brigadier General J.C. Breckinridge, the Commanding General of the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico, praising him early on as an officer with “spirit” and “constructive
originality” in a Memorandum for Record to Colonel R.B. Sullivan on 1 June 1933 after Shoup served briefly on a special project in the topographic section at Quantico. In fact, in Shoup’s first fitness report as a Second Lieutenant at The Basic School, his reviewer, Colonel H.C. Snyder, prophetically said, “His manner and bearing and general conduct have been such as to mark him as a very promising young officer.” Lieutenant Shoup briefly attended naval flight school in 1928-1929; however he did not complete the course though his commander said he had “shown himself to be a hard worker, conscientious and willing.” Though he never publicly spoke of his failure to complete flight school (his fitness report May 27, 1929 does not explain the reason, other than he “failed to meet the requirements of the primary landplane course”), the experience most certainly was another character-building experience for the young officer.

David Shoup’s years as a Captain were spent as a Company Commander in several units and as an instructor at the Platoon Leaders’ Course at Quantico, where he excelled and the commanding officer, Colonel Archie Howard, said “this officer’s knowledge and enthusiasm make him valuable to any organization.” As a Major, Shoup served in Iceland in 1941-1942 with the 1st Marine Brigade, another formative experience as he served as the Operations Officer for the 6th Marines and led one of three planning teams for the defense of Iceland. Shoup worked with future Generals O.P. Smith and William Worton on this team, which developed a joint functional defense (to include integrated air) of the island, the best plan of the three teams. Transferred to the 2d Marine Division in 1942, now-Lieutenant Colonel Shoup served as Operations Officer and led the planning for Operation GALVANIC, the seizing of the Gilbert Islands, scheduled for 1943-1944. Lieutenant Colonel Shoup also served as an observer at the battles of Guadalcanal and New Georgia; whilst in the South Pacific, he learned of the new capabilities of LVTs (Landing Vehicles, Tracked), commonly known as “amtracs.” Shoup
emphasized modifying LVT-1 Alligators with armor plating and forward firing machine guns. He then incorporated the use of these new vehicles in the planning of GALVANIC, insisting on senior leadership’s involvement in the acquisition of the assets in time for the invasion of Betio Island in the Tarawa Atoll.¹⁸

Prior to the invasion of Tarawa in November 1943, the commander of the 2d Marines suffered a nervous breakdown and Shoup immediately assumed command and earned promotion to the rank of Colonel, a decision made by Major General Julian Smith, 2d Marine Division Commander, despite Shoup’s “limited command experience and fleeting exposure to combat.”¹⁹ This twist of fate put Colonel Shoup at the forefront of one of the bloodiest battles of World War II, one in which he displayed exemplary courage and leadership, and earned the Medal of Honor while leading Marines in battle for the first time. In doing so, he also suffered wounds whilst in combat from enemy fire.²⁰ Despite 3,318 casualties in the 76-hour battle, the Marine amphibious assault (the first of the war against a heavily defended beach) defeated the Japanese and secured the island, due in no small part to Colonel Shoup’s gallant leadership.²¹ At one point in the battle, with bullets flying by his command post, Colonel Shoup stood in the open and yelled at some scurrying Marines, saying, “What are you running for? Take cover, then move up and kill the bastard (sic).”²²

On another occasion on D-Day at Tarawa, frustrated by the progress of the Regiment, Colonel Shoup led a charge yelling, “Are there any of you cowardly sons of bitches got the guts to follow a Colonel of Marines?” again showing his mettle as a combat leader.²³ Many of the lessons learned at Tarawa, such as a need for intense aerial bombardment before an amphibious invasion, the criticality of possessing appropriate vehicles and equipment for an invasion, and the need for studying the enemy in detail in order to know how he will fight, stayed with Colonel
Shoup as he moved up in positions of responsibility following World War II. The future Commandant always held the experience of Tarawa close to his heart, never forgetting the “terrible cost of victory.” An amateur poet, General Shoup poignantly wrote of Tarawa:

Drag from my sight this
Blear-eyed
Thing
Return all to mother earth
That was my friend
Except
That ring
To prove his end
On Tarawa

Following Tarawa, Colonel Shoup served as the Chief of Staff for the 2d Marine Division during the invasions of Saipan and Tinian, earning a Legion of Merit with Combat “V” for valor. There, he again stood his ground in combat and “never seemed afraid of anything.” Colonel Shoup then returned to the United States for 15 years of further professional developmental assignments which would culminate in his selection as the 22d Commandant in 1959. In Colonel/General Shoup’s various command and staff assignments during this period, including command of two Marine Divisions, none was perhaps as consequential as the four years he spent in the fiscal office of Headquarters, United States Marine Corps: first as the assistant fiscal director, then (after promotion to Brigadier General) as its director. General Shoup started the implementation of a modern programmatic system, bringing the Marine Corps into the Joint Chiefs of Staff planning process, a centralization effort Corps leaders previously had resisted. In the process, he established an independent fiscal office at Marine Corps Headquarters, wrestling control away from the “powerful” Supply Department and left a lasting legacy on Marine acquisition and finances.
In the years leading up to General Shoup’s appointment as Commandant, three key assignments helped prepare him for this duty. He served in a newly created position of Inspector General of the Marine Corps for Recruit Training in the wake of the 1956 Ribbon Creek recruit drowning tragedy (six Marine recruits drowned during a night forced march ordered and led by their Drill Instructor). Shoup thus became a “driving force to end recruit abuse,” as then the Commandant elevated him to the position of Inspector General of the Marine Corps later that year. He served as 3rd Marine Division Commander in Okinawa, then assumed what he then believed to be his final posting, Commanding General of the Marine Corps Recruit Depot at Parris Island. General Shoup had a lasting impact on recruit training and the raising of standards for physical fitness, amongst other improvements, while serving in these important positions. In 1959, during his tour as Commanding General of Parris Island, President Eisenhower selected Shoup over nine more senior General Officers to be the 22d Commandant of the Marine Corps.

**COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS (1960-1963)**

**HANDS ON THE PLOW AND END OF EISENHOWER ERA**

Entering 1960, the selection of the next Marine Corps leader was a vital decision. The recruit training incident, a largely ineffective outgoing Commandant, and the focus on a nuclear strategy marred the Marine Corps. General Randolph McCall Pate exited the Commandancy in 1960, and though “dedicated subordinates protected the Corps’s reputation and advanced its interests” during his tenure, he rated as possibly the “most controversial” and “least effective” Commandant of the twentieth century, according to Marine Corps historian Keith Fleming’s essay in *Commandants of the Marine Corps*. Pate tarnished his own reputation and that of the Corps through his mishandling of the Ribbon Creek training accident (proclaiming the Drill
Instructor not guilty before a formal investigation occurred) and his rumored alcoholism and womanizing. 37 Pate’s multiple public relations errors, including stressing a “no dependents” policy in Okinawa while his wife accompanied him on a trip there and his admission that Marines afloat in the Mediterranean had nuclear artillery shells on board did not endear him to the Eisenhower administration. 38 President Eisenhower thus looked to “clean house” in the Marine Corps with the selection of the next Commandant. 39

In addition to General Pate’s sullying of the Marine Corps in the late 1950s via his own shortcomings, the Eisenhower administration’s “New Look” strategy emphasized a strong nuclear deterrent through large strategic weapons programs for the Air Force, Navy, and Army. This strategy limited the procurement of weapons and supplies for limited wars—the specialty of the Marine Corps—and forced a dramatic reduction in manpower for all services with the exception of the Air Force. Thus, the Marine end strength fell from 200,780 personnel in June 1957 to 170,621 three years later, while the budget shrank from $942 million in Fiscal Year 1958 to $902 million in Fiscal Year 1961. 40 The National Security Act amendments of 1958 protected the Marine Corps as a service, preventing the Secretary of Defense from transferring “statutory” roles and missions without Congressional approval, but the popularity of the new Strategic Army Corps (a “streamlined and modernized” air-transportable force) threatened again the viability of the Marine Corps. 41 It was in this era of austerity for the Marine Corps, in money, manpower, and mission relevance, that President Eisenhower selected a new Marine Corps Commandant.

Immediately upon assuming the duties of Commanding General of the Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, South Carolina, two officers (unidentified by Shoup in his Eisenhower administration oral history interview) informed General Shoup that President Eisenhower would likely appoint him as Commandant, replacing General Pate who was reaching
the end of his four-year term. This was a surprise to the relatively junior Major General Shoup, whom to that point had never met Eisenhower. Additionally, there was a strong push amongst the general officers in the Marine Corps to elevate the higher ranking Lieutenant General Merrill B. Twining, then serving as the Commanding General of Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, to the Commandancy. Though President Eisenhower likely did not participate directly in the selection process, other than having his staff research General Shoup’s political leanings (there were none, due to Shoup’s apolitical nature), Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates and Navy Secretary William Franke (who stated he “personally selected” Shoup) knew what type of officer the President wanted in the position. At a critical time in the nation’s and Marine Corps’ history, the President and Secretary of Defense wanted a proven combat veteran willing to speak his mind (i.e., “speak truth to power”) and not beholden to any constituency—in General David M. Shoup, they achieved this.

Major General Shoup’s reaction to his selection was one of humble pride. When President Eisenhower announced on August 12, 1959 from Gettysburg, Pennsylvania his selection of Shoup as the next Commandant of the Marine Corps, the General penned his initial thoughts that show his true nature as a servant leader (copy of original notes at Appendix G):

1. One can scale great heights in this life, with an angel for a mother and an angel for a wife (may God bless both of them).

2. Lightning has surely struck me but as I consider who controls where lightning shall strike, I am comforted.

3. I hope those responsible for my selection were influenced by a Divine guidance.

4. This is the first pot I ever won without having a hand in the game.

The selection of Shoup resulted in turmoil within the Marine Corps general officer ranks. All of the Lieutenant Generals whom Eisenhower skipped over in selecting Shoup immediately retired.
from the service, though they did earn “tombstone promotions” to four-star rank upon their retirement, due to a soon to expire outdated regulation permitting this for those with personal combat awards. These generals, organized as a faction of dissidents constantly working against the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Department of the Navy, in particular with regards to the level of personnel within the Marine Corps, frustrated the Pentagon and White House leadership. Administration officials wanted these senior Marine Corps leaders to cease and desist in their push for more personnel—a not small reason for Eisenhower’s bold decision to promote a junior general. General Shoup was able to manage the assignments and appointments of the new three-stars (only the Commandant then wore the four stars of a full General), with the most important move making Lieutenant General Wallace M. Greene, Jr. his Chief of Staff (see Table 1). Greene, a highly capable leader and staff officer, served as a perfect balance to Shoup in regards to personality and temperament, an important facet in the effectiveness of Shoup’s commandancy.
While the normal process involved nominating a Commandant for a four-year term, the initial request by President Eisenhower was only for a two-year term, perhaps because he had only one year remaining in his Administration (the precise reason is not specified in the documentation of the nomination). Whatever the reason, Congress did not support a two-year term and therefore insisted on a four-year term for General Shoup. This administrative debacle was settled quickly, and General Shoup moved to Headquarters Marine Corps in November 1959, first as a three-star Chief of Staff, then on January 1, 1960 assuming the position of 22d Commandant of the Marine Corps. Immediately, the “plowboy from Indiana” took charge and let the Marine Corps know that he was in charge.

General Shoup’s dynamic and forceful leadership of the Marine Corps started immediately upon assuming the position of Commandant. On January 4, 1960, General Shoup issued his initial guidance to the Corps, titled “Remarks by Commandant of the Marine Corps to Staff.” This “manifesto” emphasized re-instilling the pride of Marines in the aftermath of the Ribbon Creek incident and General Pate’s Commandancy while focusing on honing a trained, fit fighting force. General Shoup made apparent his humble nature in stating, with regards to his

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LtGenerals—Retired</th>
<th>Billet</th>
<th>LtGenerals--Incoming</th>
<th>Billet</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Robert Hogaboom</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, HQMC</td>
<td>Wallace Greene</td>
<td>Deputy CoS, Plans</td>
<td>Shoup temporarily CoS before CMC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verne McCaul</td>
<td>Assistant Commandant, HQMC</td>
<td>John Munn</td>
<td>Director of Aviation, HQMC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vernon Megee</td>
<td>CG, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific</td>
<td>Thomas Wornham</td>
<td>CG, MCRD San Diego</td>
<td>Sec Navy pick over Shoup's objection—Shoup recommended Wornham for 2-star billet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edwin Pollock</td>
<td>CG, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic</td>
<td>Joseph Burger</td>
<td>CG, 2d Marine Division</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merrill Twining</td>
<td>CG, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico</td>
<td>Edward Snedeker</td>
<td>CG, 1st Marine Division</td>
<td>Twining was Pate’s and establishment’s pick as next CMC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. USMC Senior Officer Changes, 1960

50

51
new position, “I am mindful of this great burden and I know that I cannot properly discharge these responsibilities alone.” In the wake of the Ribbon Creek drowning incident and the aforementioned budget cuts and force reductions of the late 1950s, General Shoup wanted to make clear that working within the Department of the Navy and Department of Defense system was the approved method rather than acting defensively as a “minority,” and “running scared” in a “they’re sniping at us” mentality. These comments were in direct response to the senior Marine Corps generals’ decision to not accept the Eisenhower “Second New Look” strategy and their lack of tact in dealing with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Department of the Navy and the Joint Staff. In a symbolic gesture to the desired Navy-Marine Corps concept of a combined maritime service, General Shoup selected a Navy Commander, Alan Dougall, as his first Aide-de-Camp, the first Navy Aide to a Commandant in Marine Corps history.

General Shoup, in his initial letter, shared with the Corps his personal viewpoints on many issues that bothered him about the current actions of the force. He expressed his concern about the organization of the Marine Corps headquarters, focusing on eliminating redundancies and promoting efficiency by cutting the number of staff offices; for example, developing a single department for personnel matters compared to the “seven distinct personnel departments and a few fuzzy ones” he witnessed in his last Headquarters assignment. The new commandant clearly stated that the officer assignment processes of the past would not continue, with Generals keeping staff officers in the same positions year after year, following the General around to different duty assignments. The by-name request system also faced elimination, as General Shoup expressed his belief that Headquarters could review records and assign officers accordingly throughout the force. In practice, commanders could still choose individual
Marines for key command and staff positions, but the emphasis on centralization of assignments led decades later to the command screening boards currently used.58

Another major personnel decision General Shoup made immediately: the elimination of the “Supply Duty Only” category of officers in the Corps.59 This meant that supply officers would now assume other functions in Marine Corps, be re-designated as line officers, and compete for positions and promotions with other line officers. This met with some immediate resistance, but proved effective in the long-term health of the officer force, by making more officers available for other duties, with Shoup emphasizing that “Marine Corps Supply functions and financial management extend[ed] beyond the duties” of the so-called “Supply Duty Only” officers.60 General Shoup also emphasized immediately the importance of training within commands, stating “the end purpose of all our training is to place a combat-ready Marine on the battlefield imbued with the will to fight” and made commanders accountable for focused training.61

Near the end of his initial remarks to the operating forces, General Shoup also addressed another personal pet peeve: the swagger stick. He asserted his “definite opinion” on the swagger stick for officers, saying it was optional and “if you feel the need of it, carry it.”62 This effectively ended its presence in the Marine Corps.63 Of note, as a young Second Lieutenant, Shoup witnessed the beating of Chinese coolies by British officers using swagger sticks, no doubt an image he recalled throughout his life and forming his opinion on the uniform item.64 General Pate, the previous Commandant, interestingly staked out the opposite point of view, encouraging Marine officers to “improve their military appearance” by carrying the swagger stick—thus, this was another situation where Shoup set the Corps on a new course.65
General Shoup closed out his January 4, 1960 remarks to the Marine Corps in typical Hoosier fashion. He thus wrote:

It is good to feel the grips of the plow in my hands. I have every confidence that with both the regular establishment and the reserve forces in direct support, the furrow will be straight and true and the years ahead for the Marine Corps will be ones of progress and accomplishment.66

General Shoup established an immediate rapport with President Eisenhower, a man with a farm boy background like himself.67 President Eisenhower had not been fond of General Shoup’s predecessor, and the similar backgrounds of the two men helped make the relationship natural.68 Shoup and Eisenhower also shared the belief that the “military-industrial complex” could cause damage to the nation, as the defense industry moved closer and closer to the Defense Department. Shoup, in his oral history for the Eisenhower administration, stated the problem succinctly: the weapons manufacturers aligned with Congress and “the next thing you know you’ve bought a God damned piece of hardware that…wouldn’t be but a small percentage better than what you had.”69 A lone Shoup criticism of Eisenhower was the lack of clear, published national security policy:

If the Commander-in-Chief of the government doesn’t tell the armed forces what to be prepared to do, then when he says “Send three divisions down here right quick,” they say, “Hell, we haven’t got three divisions for that,” and then the cat’s on the President’s back, because he didn’t tell them what to be prepared to do.70

Without delay, General Shoup also established a good working relationship with the Secretary of the Navy William Franke, Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army General Lyman Lemnitzer, with whom he had similar negative views
on counterinsurgency and training of foreign forces. The Commandant’s philosophy in dealing with the Navy and Defense Departments was to work within the system, building relationships and ensuring Marine Corps advocacy remained tempered, stating in his 1960 remarks to the Corps, “let us sell our own product, but without belittling or degrading the other services by thought or speech or deed.” In General Shoup’s four years as Commandant, he worked with five different Secretaries of the Navy, two Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, two Secretaries of Defense, and three Presidents—thus, General Shoup provided continuity in the upper echelons of the military structure. When the “Flexible Response” strategy of the incoming Kennedy administration came into effect in 1961, Shoup’s relationship-building skills proved vital, showing his skills as an effective leader within the bureaucracy of the Pentagon and Washington’s political structure. Importantly, Headquarters Marine Corps Chief of Staff Wallace Greene’s long relationships with power players in the Pentagon, Capitol Hill, and the White House (built through many years of Headquarters staff work) greatly assisted in ensuring Shoup’s priorities—real readiness in the Fleet Marine Forces, better fiscal and supply management, more honest cooperation with the other services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and fewer parochial arguments over roles and missions--reached the proper audiences.

The style of General Shoup in running the Marine Corps Headquarters Staff was in stark contrast to his predecessor, General Pate, who did not have “the strength the Marine Corps needed or deserved,” according to historian Keith Fleming in his General Pate essay in Commandants of the Marine Corps. Staff officers described Shoup as “extremely demanding, impatient, brutal in his language and behavior towards slack senior officers.” In taking command, Shoup made it clear that he believed in high standards and he expected Marines to act
unselfishly in serving the Corps and their country. Any notion of “we’ve always done it this way” was quickly discounted, usually with General Shoup showing the individual the “Cow Path” poem by Sam Walter Foss he always kept on his desk (see Appendix H). This poem, describing how people blindly follow the same paths laid out before them, showed that General Shoup preferred decisive and innovative leaders who sought the best way to develop a solution, regardless of precedent.

General Shoup promoted efficiency within the Headquarters and made sure all efforts directly supported Marines in the operating forces, even cutting his own household staff and ending much of the pomp and circumstance, including fancy welcoming ceremonies, normally attached to his visits to operating forces. He said in a letter to the forces, “I want as little vibration as possible which might be related solely to my being present.” General Wallace Greene, the new Headquarters Chief of Staff (who had shared a foxhole with Shoup on Saipan and Tinian), firmly ensconced himself as the counterweight to Shoup’s personality in dealing with the Marine Corps staff via using a milder approach. This tremendous leadership team, with Shoup’s demanding nature and Greene’s diplomatic but cajoling style, proved quite effective in running the Marine Corps during the four years of Shoup’s commandancy. As Alan Millett writes in *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps*, the balance was essential as “where Shoup’s style annoyed his associates and constrained Corps negotiations on sensitive policies, the tireless, methodical Greene filled the gap.” It showed how different leadership styles can coalesce in an effective team. The Greene appointment was, without a doubt, a deliberate and genius move by the skilled leader Shoup. Significantly, Greene would eventually succeed Shoup as Commandant of the Marine Corps.
THE KENNEDY ERA: OVERVIEW OF USMC ISSUES

President John F. Kennedy entered office in January 1961, and already admired General Shoup based on his reading of the book *Tarawa* by Robert Sherrod, a close friend of the President. On Inauguration Day, Kennedy immediately established a warm relationship with Shoup, smiling in the receiving line at the White House and saying “I’ve read about you, General.”\(^{82}\) This relationship remained strong for the duration of the administration, with many even saying that General Shoup was Kennedy’s favorite general.\(^{83}\) Shoup was equally impressed with President Kennedy, stating in his oral history interview for the Kennedy administration that “the intensity of his thought and his desire and obvious ability to comprehend the many many (sic) factors that he had to pursue so he could logically make an intelligence (sic) decision” was impressive.\(^{84}\) General Shoup had a great impact on many of Kennedy’s decisions throughout 1961-1963, always providing honest and forthright advice when asked. The Kennedy administration’s “Flexible Response” strategy, emphasizing utilization of forces across the spectrum of warfare and not solely focused on massive retaliation, would greatly amplify the role of the Marine Corps. This also contributed to generally friendly relations between Marine Corps Headquarters and the political establishment, a direct result of General Shoup’s leadership.\(^{85}\) The increases in budget and personnel during Shoup’s Commandancy are detailed in Figure 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Budget</th>
<th>Manpower End Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY1961</td>
<td>$902M</td>
<td>175,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY1962</td>
<td>$1B</td>
<td>178,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY1963</td>
<td>$1.15B</td>
<td>190,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY1964</td>
<td>$1.11B</td>
<td>190,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite Shoup and Kennedy’s close relations, another factor entered--with the Kennedy administration also came a polarizing figure: Robert McNamara as Secretary of Defense.
General Shoup and the other Joint Chiefs immediately resented many of the information requests from the Secretary, who had little knowledge of military matters despite previously serving as an military officer (though mostly in Air Force statistical analysis jobs with the 8th Air Force during World War II). After General Lemnitzer, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, repeatedly did not bring up the Generals’ concerns about the Secretary’s overreach, Shoup personally confronted Secretary McNamara, privately articulating his dissatisfaction with the Secretary regarding the information requests, in particular that the Joint Chiefs “resented [Secretary McNamara’s] attitude of trying to determine what the organization of a squad ought to be and a mortar platoon…things that were reserved…strictly for military men who had military experience in combat.” Secretary McNamara welcomed the feedback and thanked General Shoup saying “if you find anything else, you please come up and tell me”--from then on, the two enjoyed a very good working relationship and the questioning on specific military organizational issues ended.

General Shoup’s “Remarks by Commandant of the Marine Corps to Staff” issued in January 1961 largely echoed his guidance from the year earlier. Reasserting his leadership of the Corps, he emphasized improvements in the evaluation system, better management of the Civil Service members serving Marine Corps units, and appropriate wear of the uniform. Shoup stated that “we are aiming to improve the promotion system for advancement to the rank of Sergeant” and eliminated technical tests for NCOs [non-commissioned officers] while continuing a general test on Marine Corps-wide military subjects. Shoup stated he wanted to “devise ways to ensure maximum productive results” from the integrated Civil Service-Marine Corps team, aiming to better manage the 14,000 civilians then employed by the Marine Corps. Pointedly, and showing a sincere simplicity in language while addressing a perennial issue, he called out to the “NCO
whose uniform looks like it belonged to someone who retired in 1940; the officer with yellow socks…” to change their ways or find themselves no longer in the Marine Corps. He also introduced his thoughts on making sure Marine families lived in adequate base housing, pushing for Capehart and Wherry housing construction and improvements which greatly enhanced the quality of life for the Marine Corps.89

BAY OF PIGS

The first major national security incident of the Kennedy administration occurred in April 1961: the Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba, a plan with origins in the Eisenhower administration.90 This tested the limits of all involved and showed the naivete of young President Kennedy in utilizing non-military advisors for military-like operations. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) led the failed operation, with the Joint Chiefs of Staff only brought in at the very end of planning.91 General Shoup, years later, complained about the process and blamed the CIA, stating that “any blame had to be leveled at the CIA for not consulting with the military when the Agency was planning the invasion” that “if the Marine Corps were (sic) given the job for something like that, we would have done it a lot differently.”92

A few months before the Bay of Pigs operation, the CIA requested one Marine for temporary duty, a Colonel handpicked by Shoup, though Shoup was not informed of this Colonel’s specific duties (General Shoup had difficulty pinpointing the exact timeline for the Bay of Pigs planning and invasion in his Kennedy administration oral history years later).93 The planning construct of the invasion disappointed Shoup in that the CIA had authority in requisitioning supplies, weapons, and equipment from the Marine Corps without even notifying senior leadership of the plans or what they were specifically requisitioning. Shoup said in the Kennedy administration oral history: “The CIA had carte blanche on anything you had. They
could take your tanks, your artillery, or your any other thing, and you [had to] put ‘em on the dock in accordance with the document they had in their hands.”

When, at the last minute before the planned invasion in Cuba, President Kennedy decided not to provide air cover, the Marine Colonel in Cuba with the CIA’s leadership frantically called General Shoup at his quarters in the middle of the night asking him appeal to the President to provide air support. Shoup did not make any calls, accepting the President’s decision and not feeling he could change any minds at that late hour, especially since he was not in the operational chain of command as Commandant. Years later, General Shoup admitted he still did not know the whole story, that “it was all so mixed up that I never got it straightened out from [the Colonel in Cuba],” and was disappointed in not having a larger role for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the planning of the operation.

Shoup said he tried to relate to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the aftermath of the unsuccessful invasion, that “if that’s the way you could do it [aka, with the CIA in the lead] and be successful, then the Marine Corps has been wasting a lot of time and effort” as an amphibious force. Shoup believed that the President publicly saying “I’m at fault” should end the discussion of who in the end was to blame for the failed Cuba operation. After the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Army General Maxwell Taylor assumed the role of military advisor to the President; many thought Taylor’s appointment showed Kennedy’s lack of trust in the Joint Chiefs, but General Shoup believed that was not the case. He believed that Taylor was there to educate the President on military matters and in Shoup’s opinion, “what [Kennedy] wanted was somebody right there because if something comes into his mind, he wants to ask about it.”

General Shoup spent much of 1961 writing, speaking, and advocating the capabilities of the Marine Corps in fighting the nation’s wars as an integral part of the Navy-Marine Corps
team—“A Force in Readiness.” Within the first six months of 1961, the Kennedy administration’s new policies regarding the armed forces and their mission proved a boon to the Corps, raising projected manpower from 175,000 to 190,000 and increasing the Marine budget by $67 million to implement the force increase. General Shoup openly voiced his opinion to the President regarding counterinsurgency operations, an issue at the forefront due to insurgencies in Southeast Asia. He disagreed with Kennedy and said that Marines could operate in such a capacity “but they preferred not to train other people.”

Utilizing the good-natured, “harmonious relations” with the White House, the Marine Corps under Shoup generally paid lip service to the counterinsurgency mission focus, with the exception of allowing Marine Major General Victor Krulak to serve as a special assistant to the Joint Chief of Staff for counterinsurgency and increasing formal instruction in counterinsurgency at all levels of Marine Corps schooling. According to historian Alan Millett in his book *Semper Fidelis*, “the counterinsurgency movement did not budge the Corps from its commitment to amphibious warfare,” even as the “special warfare” concept “found enthusiastic supporters in the Army,” in response to Kennedy making counterinsurgency a key element of his national security policy. General Shoup explained years later in the Kennedy administration oral history that he made it clear to the leadership what his thoughts on counterinsurgency were early on his Commandancy:

> General Lemnitzer [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] and I, I think, both told the President that a Marine or Army squad, properly trained for what they’re supposed to be able to do and perhaps under certain circumstances augmented by a linguist or a radio man, could do any anti-guerrilla job that there was to do.

Despite the counterinsurgency disagreements, the Marine Air-Ground teams had a much larger role in the “Flexible Response” strategy than in the defunct Eisenhower “New Look,” nuclear-focused concept. In early discussions on the United States’ involvement in Laos,
General Shoup provided the “best thought-out idea” from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (non-intervention with air strikes as a first step if needed, followed by ground troop involvement if air strikes were ineffective), according to Presidential advisor Walt Roskow, and immediately earned the respect of the President and his staff.\textsuperscript{107} Despite General Shoup’s best efforts to prevent a deployment to Southeast Asia, a Marine expeditionary force of 3,500 men was sent to Thailand in May 1962 to prepare for operations in Laos; the task force was withdrawn in July of that year as diplomatic talks improved before implementing its “full force goals,” though it would not be the last deployment of Marines to Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{108} Often praised for the “scope and high level” of his thinking, General Shoup earned a reputation at the White House as a reliable source of quality advice.\textsuperscript{109}

**CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS AND THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY**

The Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 was another situation where General Shoup’s leadership proved vital in assisting the decision making of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\textsuperscript{110} The veteran of Tarawa immediately believed that invading Cuba would cost many thousands of American lives. Though he did not oppose the invasion, he insisted on making sure the military and political leadership knew what the situation, i.e. the cost, would really entail.\textsuperscript{111} At a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the build-up for a potential invasion of Cuba, General Shoup made an unforgettable presentation. He placed, on an overhead projector, a map of the United States with Cuba superimposed on it. This showed the immense size of Cuba, whose width stretched the equivalent of New York to Chicago. Then, placing a transparency with a small red dot on top of the picture, he told the Joint Chiefs that the dot represented Tarawa--which took three days and eighteen thousand Marines to conquer.\textsuperscript{112} General Shoup eventually agreed with the President on establishing a blockade (technically, a “quarantine”), though he did complain
early on about “piecemeal” operational projections with regards to an attack. The Commandant even launched a tirade after one Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting saying:

Somebody’s got to keep them [the administration] from doing the goddam thing piecemeal. That’s our problem. Go in there and friggin’ around with the missiles. You’re screwed. Go in there and friggin around with the lift. You’re screwed. You’re screwed, screwed, screwed. Some goddam thing, some way, that they either do the son of a bitch and do it right, and quit friggin’ around.113

The Fleet Marine Forces performed well in preparation for the possible invasion of Cuba, assembling over 40,000 Marines in eight days and preparing 100,000 more, a result of General Shoup’s focus on readiness and training. General Shoup, in his 1963 “Remarks” to the Marine Corps described the emotions he felt in observing the Marines preparing for invasion, “I saw it in their eyes; heard it in their voices; felt it from their hearts.”114

Following the Cuban Missile Crisis, the President made a momentous decision on nuclear testing when the nuclear test ban treaty came into question. Kennedy asked each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to each meet with him on this issue. After all of the Chiefs except General Shoup met with Kennedy, the President sent for Shoup and queried why he had not come by the White House. Shoup informed Kennedy that the Marine Corps Commandant by law was not a full-fledged statutory member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and no one told him to meet with the President. Kennedy found this humorous and showed great interest in General Shoup’s support of the test ban treaty. Shoup said later in the Kennedy administration oral history that, “I supported [the test ban treaty] very definitely and felt that the President of the United States, with his responsibility to posterity, had to do everything he could to get a test ban treaty” and that it was the first chance “to see whether the Russians were really headed toward where they were heading.”115 The nuclear test ban treaty achieved ratification in 1963.
LAST YEAR IN UNIFORM—VIETNAM BUILD-UP

The final year of General Shoup’s term as Commandant of the Marine Corps was marked by the beginnings of the controversial increase of United States forces in South Vietnam. General Shoup continued to speak out forcefully against an involvement in Vietnam, courageously defying the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Maxwell Taylor. In Shoup’s view, the real “lesson” of the Korean War was that the United States did not fight well in protracted limited wars and that no intervention was needed because American interests were not at stake. General Shoup’s defiance, joined in spirit by Air Force Chief of Staff General Curtis LeMay, frustrated Taylor at a time when the requirements on the Chairman were to present the views of all the Joint Chiefs when making recommendations to the President.

Following a September 1962 visit to Vietnam, General Shoup returned greatly dismayed, telling a member of his staff that the United States should not “piss away resources in that rat hole.” His visit to Vietnam confirmed what he thought all along and previously addressed in the Laos situation—engaging in a land war in Southeast Asia was a monumental mistake. Shoup grudgingly agreed to some Marine involvement early on in the American commitment to South Vietnam and allowed the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing to participate in Operation Shufly, ferrying troops and later use as gunships, but he did not agree with the overall strategy or the use of helicopters in such a role. As he stated in Congressional testimony in 1963 “the helicopters, to do this job in an area where the enemy is actually present, makes a poor platform and is not as good as an attack airplane.”

By September 1963, the President began to move away from the Kennedy administration’s “Secretary McNamara-General Taylor commitment” to assisting South Vietnam and Kennedy reportedly even told his secretary and Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon that he
would pull the advisors out by March 1964, according to Howard Jablon in his essay on Shoup in *Commandants of the Marine Corps*. General Shoup’s impact on these possible policy decisions is unclear, though he did make his views widely known. The tragic assassination of the President in November 1963 ended the possible change in Kennedy policy. More important, General Shoup did not influence President Lyndon Johnson enough in the final month of his Commandancy to affect any of the new President’s policies and decisions with regard to Southeast Asia.

As he neared retirement at the end of 1963, General Shoup wanted to ensure continued progress in the raising of standards in the Marine Corps. After praising the Marine Corps efforts in the Cuban Missile Crisis, in his annual “Remarks,” he immediately returned to the business of improving the force. In classic blunt fashion he stated “too many fatties are still around,” emphasizing the continued need for physical fitness. In early 1963, President Kennedy issued a challenge to General Shoup to test the physical fitness of Marine Corps officers, reviving an Executive Order signed by President Theodore Roosevelt in 1908. Thirty officers were identified and marched 50 miles in 48 hours from Camp David to Washington, D.C. with one member of the President’s staff also marching—Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, the President’s brother.

Reflective of his many years of service, General Shoup also wrote what amounts to a leadership primer in his final “Remarks” memorandum to the Marine Corps. First he said, “Know Your People—know everything you can about them, personally and professionally…attain[ing] this knowledge by personal observation.” Next, he said “Be Objective—reputations should be assessed in terms of here and now.” He continued, “Be Professional—you cannot and must not tolerate a mediocre performance…set a high standard.”
Finally, he emphasizes that leaders in the Corps should “Teach self-reliance and practice it—most people thrive on responsibility…give your people a chance to thrive,” i.e. let them do their jobs. General Shoup clearly wanted to leave his lasting mark on the Marine Corps in his final yearly “Remarks,” particularly as he emphasized the importance of taking care of and motivating young Marines. Also, as Commandant of the Marine Corps, time honored standards had to be emphasized, stressed, and maintained.

Prior to Kennedy’s assassination, the President requested a meeting with General Shoup on September 18, 1963 to discuss the selection of the next Commandant of the Marine Corps. General Shoup previously informed the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of Defense, who asked him to stay on as Commandant, that he could not do so. Shoup wanted to give the opportunity to someone else, despite Secretary of the Navy Fred Korth’s praise on his final Marine fitness report that “General David M. Shoup is not only one of the greatest Commandants of the Marine Corps, he is also one of the finest military leaders of our time.” In the meeting at the White House, the President told General Shoup that he planned to appoint him to another four-year term as Commandant, citing a “paragraph of reasons.” During repeated questioning from the President, the selfless Shoup expressed his reasons why he could not accept, including that it would “prevent ten or eleven other general officers with varying degrees of service from twenty-five to thirty [years] from ever being considered for the job,” as stated later in his oral history for the Kennedy administration. He repeatedly told the President no and stated: “I can’t be that selfish. This is not the image those officers and the whole Marine Corps have of me, and I don’t want to change the image.”

General Shoup may have stayed in the Kennedy administration in some capacity after his retirement. Such indications appeared; for example, President Kennedy remarked in an October
1963 news conference that “I would like to have him stay” in another capacity (perhaps even as his personal military advisor) and Kennedy’s own remarks during their final meeting, discussing basic training and expecting Shoup to play a large role in somehow expanding recruit boot camp-type training. As Karl Glenn stated in a 2010 article in *Leatherneck* magazine: “[Shoup’s] manner, straight talk, and his unusual compassion made him widely known as President Kennedy’s favorite general.” Though rumors abounded as to what General Shoup’s role might be in a new Kennedy administration, he refuted many of them publicly. Colonel Robert Heinl, a Marine historian, insisted that Shoup just “never got the call,” a fact Shoup disavowed. Regardless of the many possibilities, General Shoup said farewell to the Marine Corps he loved on December 31, 1963, writing “The plow is scouring well now. Soon my active service ends. But forever, I shall be devoted to my country and my corps. Well done for the past, good luck for the future. Good bye.” General Shoup then departed into what would be a not so quiet retirement.

**EPILOGUE (1964-1983)**

General Shoup never assumed another formal role in government after retiring from the Marines. Though President Johnson used his name at times in consideration of bringing him back into government for difficult and demanding positions, this never occurred. A lifetime warrior and leader, General Shoup did not, however, stay away long from the public eye and controversy. In 1966, retired General Shoup’s actions put him back at the forefront of the then most controversial issue in American politics, the Vietnam War.

In a speech at the Junior College World Affairs Day at Pierce College in Los Angeles in May 1966, which was later reprinted in the Congressional Record, General Shoup re-entered the
Stating his violent opposition to the Vietnam War, Shoup’s remarks showed no signs of restraint:

I want to tell you, I don’t think the whole of South East Asia, as related to the present and future safety and freedom of the people of this country, is worth the life or limb of a single American…I believe that if we had and would keep our dirty, bloody, dollar-crooked fingers out of the business of these nations so full of depressed, exploited people, they will arrive at a solution of their own…at least what they get will be their own, and not the American style, which they don’t want and above all don’t want crammed down their throats by Americans.

General Shoup’s comments were turned into North Vietnamese propaganda and many believe that the comments helped the enemy; they certainly were controversial. General Shoup insisted that the press misquoted him and said:

As usual, I was misquoted—just as I was misquoted in the press here…What I said was that…Southeast Asia isn’t worth a single American life. But I added that maybe the people are, and that’s what the administration has been saying all along—that we don’t want territory there but we are just helping the people there.

Many found Shoup’s defense insincere and wondered aloud how the hero of Tarawa could possible aid and abet the enemy.

On March 20, 1968, General Shoup testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s forum on “The Present Situation in Vietnam.” He openly discussed his disagreement with the Johnson administration’s policies with regard to Vietnam and articulated and cited the so-called communist “domino theory” espoused as a reason to engage in Vietnam. As he said, “it is ludicrous to think that just because we lose in South Vietnam that very soon somebody is going to be crawling and knocking at the doors of Pearl Harbor.” Emphasizing his point further, General Shoup claimed that, with regard to the South Vietnamese people, “if we leave them alone to solve their own problems in the manner that they want to solve them they would be proud of their solution.” A Washington Post article on March 21, 1968, the day after
Shoup’s testimony, emphasized the former Commandant’s suggestions that the United States cease all offensive operations and encourage negotiations with the North Vietnamese government in Hanoi. General Shoup’s credibility as a Medal of Honor recipient and former Commandant made his remarks widely known to the nation and the Johnson administration, as at that time the administration’s Vietnam strategy was not working and the issue had become politically volatile.

Though many general officers assumed an anti-war stance and protested against the Vietnam War, General Shoup clearly went beyond the others in his fervent public dissent. The zenith of Shoup’s anti-war mission occurred in 1969, when he published an article (co-written by retired Marine Colonel James A. Donovan) in the Atlantic Monthly in which he railed against a growing “militarism” in the United States. In the article, Shoup commented on the insertion of forces into Vietnam: “With these initial deployments the Army-Marine race to build forces in Vietnam began in earnest and did not slow down again until both became overextended, overcommitted, and depleted at home.” Additionally, and perhaps why it ended up being General Shoup’s final foray into the protester movement, he openly criticized senior military officers, calling them an “influential, nucleus of aggressive, ambitious professional military leaders who are the root of America’s evolving militarism.” Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, in his 1995 mea culpa tome In Retrospect disagreed with Shoup, believing the image of the senior U.S. military leaders as “trigger-happy warmongers” was inaccurate and that most of military leaders of the 1960s had “an iron will, extraordinary toughness of mind and spirit, and a fierce integrity.”

Forthright and direct to the end, General Shoup always reiterated, with regard to Vietnam, that he “had opposed the idea that such a small country in that remote part of the world
constituted either an economic interest or a strategic threat to the welfare of the United
States.”143 Unfortunately, as Doris Kearns wrote in *Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream*,
President Johnson,

Admittedly, unlike his predecessors, did not choose to be
confronted with the need to decide whether the assumption that
Vietnam was vital to our security—an assumption that was part of
the still more encompassing world view—must now be acted upon
to the full extent of its furthest implications.144

Thus, Johnson’s choice to intervene and continue the conflict in Vietnam was a foregone
conclusion, despite the views of the anti-war movement building in the United States.

Interestingly, in 1964, Johnson had suggested General Shoup accompany Secretary
McNamara on a trip to Saigon designed to evaluate the situation in Vietnam, hoping that Shoup’s
“credibility” would help the cause and that he could give McNamara candid advice. For reasons
unknown, though probably because General Shoup would not want a retired Commandant going
on military evaluation trips if he were the sitting Commandant, Shoup refused.145 In 1965,
President Johnson, frustrated at the situation in Vietnam, seriously contemplated sending General
Shoup to take over the entire military operation, but later changed his mind.146 Despite these
indications, Shoup did not play a role in the Johnson Presidential administrations. He thus
remained a private citizen but articulate anti-Vietnam commentator.

In the years after the Vietnam War, General Shoup did not publish any more articles and
faded from the public scene. He started, but did not finish, an autobiography about his
extraordinary life; according to historian Howard Jablon in *David M. Shoup: Warrior Against
War*, he did not write much, just “a title and short outline,” with an interesting title, “The Cat Has
But Nine,” and emphasizing that he was a lucky man who narrowly escaped death many times. From the “Indiana plowboy” to the hero of Tarawa to the Commandant to his anti-Vietnam criticisms, General David Monroe Shoup always led from the front, persevered, and stuck true to his values in working hard for the causes he believed in. Though many of his fellow officers disagreed with Shoup’s anti-Vietnam stance, or if concurring disliked his public criticism, few doubted his success as Commandant. General Wallace M. Green, Jr., the foxhole mate and Headquarters Marine Corps Chief of Staff who succeeded Shoup as Commandant, perhaps puts it best:

A sundowner or a bastard as you may choose to term him, he was worth every ounce of support because of his loyalty to the Corps for which he was quite prepared to die (witness Tarawa). Extremely shrewd, the best poker player of his time (both in cards and the military), a fine judge of men and their motivations and behavior, he came to the commandancy at a time when such a driving force was sorely needed. Truly a great man! Let us remember that!

General David Shoup passed away in Alexandria, Virginia on January 13, 1983 at the age of 78. His leadership legacy redounds to subsequent generations who study him, and today’s military officers can learn much from the 22d Commandant of the United States Marine Corps.

RELEVANCE OF GENERAL SHOUP TO THE 21ST CENTURY

In a world filled with leaders, some would ask “Why, in the 21st Century military, is studying General David Shoup important?” The 22d Commandant of the Marine Corps, although he passed away 30 years ago, is a unique study in that he started from the humblest of beginnings and rose to the top of his profession as a combat leader and head of his service. As Secretary of the Navy Fred Korth wrote in General Shoup’s final fitness report in 1963, he was one of the “finest military leaders of our time.” His determination and selflessness, traits he combined with his boldness and decisiveness, make General Shoup stand out as a military leader
to emulate. Even his anti-Vietnam War position is worthy of study as it illustrates how a retired officer can publicly assess and critique policies.

A determined individual from the beginning, General Shoup showed that the first step to success as a leader is developing a good work ethic. His plowboy upbringing and poor finances made him work diligently to earn a college scholarship and stay in college by working menial jobs. The lessons learned in working at the lowest levels with his “hands on the plow” always stayed with General Shoup, even as he ascended to the highest ranks. Leaders should never forget that it is the work ethics of the “plowboys” that make the mission happen. Any time one can spend doing blue-collar work, especially with the hard-charging enlisted force, will make an NCO or officer a better leader.

General Shoup always clung to the tenets of selflessness and humility as he rose in responsibility in the Marine Corps hierarchy. As a Colonel at Tarawa, Shoup poetically wrote, “I realize that I am but a bit of small chaff from the threshes of life blown into the pages of history by the unknown winds of chance.” He understood that so much of life is beyond one’s control, fate places an individual where needed, and thus presents an opportunity for men to rise to prominence in challenging situations. When President Kennedy told General Shoup he was reappointing him as Commandant in the fall of 1963, the selflessness of the General in turning down the offer was extraordinary. Looking out for his fellow officers and realizing that many of them could execute the Commandant’s responsibilities in effective fashion, his repeated refusal to accept another four-year term shows the altruistic nature of the man from Indiana. He was truly a “Marine’s Marine.”

General Shoup was bold, decisive, and at times brash in leading the Marine Corps. Leaders such as Shoup rise to the top by achieving great results. As a regimental commander at
Tarawa, his troops were amazed at his decisiveness in the heat of battle, saving many Marines and assuring accomplishment of the mission, i.e. seizure of the atoll—in that savage battle, the young men he led looked to Shoup at times as “their only hope.”¹⁵⁴ Military leaders of today need to possess a boldness and decisiveness, especially as operations occur at a faster pace both in garrison and in combat. In projecting confidence and making timely decisions, today’s military officers, like Shoup, can ensure the effective leadership of the Marines, Soldiers, Sailors, and Airmen they lead.

Throughout his life, General Shoup was known for speaking his mind (i.e., “speaking truth to power”) and being direct with both superiors and subordinates.¹⁵⁵ Even as a young Second Lieutenant, Shoup earned praise for “excellent bearing in dealing with both seniors and juniors.”¹⁵⁶ As Commandant, Shoup’s confrontation with Secretary of Defense McNamara early in the Kennedy administration set the tone for their relationship—the Secretary knew that Shoup would speak his mind as needed and never shy away from difficult conversations.¹⁵⁷ Though McNamara does not specifically mention the Shoup confrontation in his memoirs, he does cite Shoup as a leader he admired.¹⁵⁸ Having a forthright and direct manner in all dealings with senior officers and subordinates can have lasting impacts on military organizations and displays confident leadership.

It is important that General Shoup had a deep and undying love for the United States Marine Corps. This love of the organization, for which he was “quite prepared to die,” meant he always had a focus that was on the larger team and not himself. Leaders who truly believe in their organizations can have a lasting impact on their subordinates, particularly in spreading the enthusiasm that comes with loving one’s service and the men and women who serve in it. Military officers in particular need to study and know the history of their respective services, and
share that knowledge and love of it and the personnel in it with their subordinates. In an all-volunteer military, those who do not enjoy their organization, or what they are doing, can and should depart and seek other endeavors.

General Shoup always emphasized high standards for his Marines, none more so than his immediate staff. Though difficult at first, many later saw how setting high standards improved the Corps during General Shoup’s tenure as Commandant. His berating of senior officers in public, though not perhaps the most tactful technique available, was necessary in his mind because of the state of the Marine Corps when he assumed the Commandancy (i.e., in the wake of the Eisenhower New Look strategy, the Ribbon Creek drowning incident, and the lackluster leadership of General Pate). Selected to run the Marine Corps, he followed through in identifying and fixing many administrative problems, staffing issues, and issues involving the Marine Corps role in the national security policies of three different Presidents, many times just through the force of his will. Military officers of today need to set high standards and expect top-quality products and performances from both their subordinates (and superiors, for that matter)—in setting higher standards than expected. In so doing, individuals will succeed at higher levels than expected.

General Shoup’s leadership as the Commandant of the Marine Corps in the early 1960s made a lasting impact on the Marine Corps. A staunch advocate for his service who was also able to work well professionally with the sister services, General Shoup brought the Marines out of the challenging times of the late 1950s and into prominence as the “first to fight” force of choice. The General who had Kennedy’s ear rose to distinction by commanding and leading the fighting men at Tarawa, and did them justice in his leadership as Commandant. He steered the United States Marine Corps ably and earned the deserved respect of the Eisenhower, Kennedy,
and Johnson administrations. General Shoup’s perseverance and courage enabled the Marines to rightly keep their place in the most powerful armed forces in the world, and leaders should study his methods and utilize them in the 21st Century military.
APPENDIX A

CHRONOLOGICAL TIMELINE

30 Dec 1904    Born in Battle Ground, Indiana

May 1926       Graduates from DePauw University, Greencastle, Indiana

20 Jul 1926    Commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the United States Marine Corps

Apr-Dec 1927   Service in Tientsin, China

21 Jul 1928    Graduates from Marine Corps Basic School at Philadelphia Naval Yard

Oct 1928-May 1929   Attends Naval Flight School at NAS Pensacola, Florida (eliminated from training)

Jun 1929-Sep 1931  Sea Duty aboard USS Maryland (BB-46)

1932           Promoted to First Lieutenant

1933-1934      Temporary Duty with Civilian Conservation Corps in Idaho, New Jersey

Nov 1934-Jun 1936  Duty with 4th Marines in China and at American Legation in Peking

June 1936      Assigned to Puget Sound Naval Yard, Washington

October 1936    Promoted to Captain

Jul 1937-May 1938   Attends Junior Course, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico

May 1938-June 1940  Instructor, Platoon Leaders Course and Reserve Officers’ Course, Quantico

June 1940      Assigned to 6th Marines, San Diego

April 1941     Promoted to Major

May 1941       Service in Iceland with 2d Battalion, 6th Marines

October 1941   Assumes duties as Operations Officer, 1st Marine Brigade, Iceland
February 1942    Assumes command of 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, Iceland

July 1942        Assumes duties as Asst. Operations and Training Officer, 2d Marine Division, San Diego

August 1942      Promoted to Lieutenant Colonel

Sep 1942-Nov 1943 Serves as G-3, Operations and Training Officer, 2d Marine Division, Wellington, New Zealand

October 1942     Serves as Observer with 1st Marine Division on Guadalcanal

Summer 1943      Serves as Observer with 43d Army Division on Rendova, New Georgia

9 Nov 1943       Promoted to Colonel and assumes command of 2d Marines

20-23 Nov 1943   Battle of Tarawa

December 1943    Assumes duties as Chief of Staff, 2d Marine Division (serves at Saipan and Tinian)

October 1944     Returns to United States, serves as Logistics Officer, Division of Plans and Policies, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC

22 Jan 1945      Presented with Medal of Honor by Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal

August 1947      Assumes command of Service Command, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

June 1949        Chief of Staff, 1st Marine Division, Camp Pendleton, California

Jul 1950-Apr 1952 Commanding Officer, The Basic School, Quantico, Virginia

April 1952-July 1953 Assistant Fiscal Director, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC

April 1953       Promoted to Brigadier General

July 1953-May 1956 Fiscal Director, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC

Sep 1955         Promoted to Major General

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sep 1956-May 1957</td>
<td>Inspector General of the Marine Corps, Washington, DC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1957-March 1958</td>
<td>Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, Camp Pendleton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1958-May 1959</td>
<td>Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division, Okinawa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1959-October 1959</td>
<td>Commanding General, Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, South Carolina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Aug 1959</td>
<td>Nominated by President Eisenhower to be 22d Commandant of the Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Nov 1959</td>
<td>Promoted to Lieutenant General and assigned as Chief of Staff, Headquarters Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Jan 1960</td>
<td>Promoted to General and assumed duties as 22d Commandant, United States Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-19 Apr 1961</td>
<td>Bay of Pigs Invasion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-28 Oct 1962</td>
<td>Cuban Missile Crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Sep 1963</td>
<td>President Kennedy informs Shoup he will be re-appointed for another 4-year term as Commandant; Shoup refuses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Nov 1963</td>
<td>President Kennedy assassinated; President Johnson sworn in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Dec 1963</td>
<td>Retires from Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Jan 1964</td>
<td>Awarded Distinguished Service Medal by President Lyndon B. Johnson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 May 1966</td>
<td>Now-retired General Shoup gave anti-Vietnam speech at Pierce College, Los Angeles, California</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 March 1968</td>
<td>Testified at Congressional Hearing on “Present Situation in Vietnam,” openly disagreed with Johnson administration strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 1969</td>
<td>Co-writes (with Col James Donovan, USMC(Ret.)) article in <em>Atlantic Monthly</em> on rising militarism in United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Jan 1983</td>
<td>Dies in Alexandria, Virginia at age of 78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B

Official Biography (nd)\textsuperscript{161}

General David M. Shoup, USMC (Retired), (1904-1983)

David Monroe Shoup was born on 30 December 1904 in Battle Ground, Indiana. Graduating from DePauw University in Indiana, he was appointed a Second Lieutenant in the U.S. Marine Corps from that state in July 1926. Completing the Basic School at Philadelphia Navy Yard, Pennsylvania, he was assigned to various Marine Barracks until reporting to the Marine Detachment on board USS Maryland in June 1929. After a brief assignment at the San Diego Marine Barracks, he was transferred to the Puget Sound Navy Yard at Bremerton, Washington in May 1932 and promoted to First Lieutenant a month later. While at this duty station, he had temporary duty with the Civilian Conservation Corps until serving abroad in China with the Fourth Marines in November 1934. Returning to Puget Sound in June 1936, he was promoted to Captain in the fall.

Following instructor duty at the Marine Corps School at Quantico, Virginia in June 1940, Shoup was assigned to the Sixth Marines at San Diego, California. In April 1941, he was promoted to Major and departed a month later to Iceland with the First Marine Brigade. After commanding Second Battalion, Sixth Marines, he transferred to the Second Marine Division in June 1942. In August 1942, he was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and departed to the Pacific war zone, serving as an observer at the Guadalcanal and the New Georgia campaigns. Promoted to Colonel in November 1943, Shoup commanded all the Marine Corps troops landing on Betio Island at the Battle of Tarawa Atoll, Gilbert Islands. Wounded in the leg upon landing on 20 November, he fearlessly led his troops for two days under constant enemy fire and was largely responsible for the enemy's defeat. For his "conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity" on this occasion, he was awarded the Medal of Honor. In December 1943, he became Chief of Staff of Second Division, participating at the Battles of Saipan and Tinian.

Completing duty at Marine Headquarters in June 1947, Shoup served as Commanding Officer, Service Command, Fleet Marine Force. In June 1949, he had staff duty with the First Marine Division at Camp Pendleton, San Diego and commanded the Basic School at Quantico a year later. Returning to Marine Headquarters in April 1952, Shoup was the Assistant Fiscal Director. Promoted to Brigadier General in April 1953, he assumed duties as the Fiscal Director of the Marine Corps three months later. In September, 1955, he was promoted to Major General and was the Inspector General of the Marine Corps the following year. In June 1957, he became the Commanding General of First Marine Division at Camp Pendleton and transferred in March 1958 to command Third Marine Division. Two years later, he served as Commanding General of the Marine Corps Recruit Depot at Parris Island until returning to staff duty back at Marine Headquarters. In November 1959, he was promoted to Lieutenant General. In January 1960, Shoup was promoted to General and became the Twenty-Second Commandant of the Marine Corps, serving on the Joint Chiefs of Staff until his retirement in 1963. David M. Shoup died on 13 January 1983 and is buried at Arlington National Cemetery, Arlington, Virginia.
APPENDIX C

Award and Citations

1. Maj David M. Shoup, Commendation Ribbon, 15 February 1942

2. LtCol David M. Shoup, Gold Star in lieu of second Legion of Merit, 7 November 1943.

3. Col David M. Shoup, Medal of Honor, 22 January 1945

4. Col David M. Shoup, Legion of Merit with Combat “V”, 1 August 1944

5. Gen David M. Shoup, Distinguished Service Medal, 21 January 1964

6. List of Campaign Medals (following citations for the above)
The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending
MAJOR DAVID M. SHOUP,
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS,
for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

"For meritorious service as Operations Officer of the First Marine Brigade (Provisional), on Iceland, from 7 December 1941 to 15 February 1942. Despite extremely adverse conditions, Major Shoup, by his brilliant planning, supervision and coordination of training, and cooperation with our Allies, the British, and the United States Army, exhibited outstanding professional skill that contributed immeasurable to the defense of Iceland. With his tireless efforts, and unusual courage and determination, he was constantly a source of inspiration to his subordinates. Major Shoup's outstanding conduct throughout was in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

A copy of this citation has been made a part of Major Shoup's official record and he is hereby authorized to wear the Commendation Ribbon.

/s/ JAMES FORRESTAL
Secretary of the Navy.
The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the GOLD STAR in lieu of a second LEGION OF MERIT to

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DAVID N. SHOUP,
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS,

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

"For exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services to the Government of the United States as Operations and Training Officer of the Second Marine Division, during the planning of the assault on Tarawa, from 15 September 1942 to 7 November 1943. Exercising a thorough knowledge of the tactics and logistics of both land and amphibious operations, Lieutenant Colonel Shoup effectively planned and coordinated the training of the units of the division. As head of the Operations Section of the Division Staff, he prepared and submitted plans for the attack on Betio. By his initiative, organizing ability and untiring efforts to procure the best weapons and equipment available, he contributed materially to the high state of training and efficiency of the Second Marine Division and to its decisive victory at Tarawa. Lieutenant Colonel Shoup's leadership throughout this period reflects great credit upon himself and the United States Naval Service."

For the President,

JAMES FORRESTAL
Secretary of the Navy.

COPY
The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR to

COLONEL DAVID MONROE SHOUP, USMC

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

"For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his own life above and beyond the call of duty as commanding officer of all Marine Corps troops in action against enemy Japanese forces on Betio Island, Tarawa Atoll, Gilbert Islands, from November 20 to 22, 1943.

"Although severely shocked by an exploding shell soon after landing at the pier, and suffering from a severe painful leg wound which had become infected, Colonel Shoup fearlessly exposed himself to the terrific relentless artillery, machine gun and rifle fire from hostile shore emplacements and, rallying his hesitant troops by his own inspiring heroism, gallantly led them across the fringing reefs to charge the heavily fortified island and reinforce our hard-pressed, thinly-held lines. Upon arrival at the shore he assumed command of all landed troops and, working without rest under constant, withering enemy fire during the next two days conducted smashing attacks against unbelievably strong and fanatically defended Japanese positions despite innumerable obstacles and heavy casualties.

"By his brilliant leadership, daring tactics, and selfless devotion to duty, Colonel Shoup was largely responsible for the final, decisive defeat of the enemy and his indomitable fighting spirit reflects great credit upon the United States Naval Service."
The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the LEGION OF MERIT to

COLONEL DAVID M. SHOUP,
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS,

for service as set forth in the following CITATION:

"For exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services to the Government of the United States as Chief of Staff of the Second Marine Division, prior to and during operations against enemy Japanese forces on Saipan and Tinian, Marianas Islands, from 15 June to 1 August 1944. Skilled and tireless in the performance of duty, Colonel Shoup welded the various units of the division into a highly cooperative organization and thereby contributed materially to its outstanding combat record. With his post frequently under intense enemy fire during this critical period, he continued to direct personnel under his command with outstanding ability and, by his forceful initiative and thorough knowledge of the tactical situation, was in large measure responsible for the smooth functioning of the numerous and varied activities of the Second Marine Division. His resourceful leadership and unwavering devotion to duty were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

Colonel Shoup is authorized to wear the Combat "V"

For the President,

/s/ JAMES FORRESTAL
Secretary of the Navy.
The President of the United States takes pleasure in awarding

the DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL to

GENERAL DAVID W. SHOUP
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following:

CITATION:

For exceptionally meritorious service to the Government of
the United States in a position of great responsibility while serving
as Commandant of the Marine Corps, from 1 January 1960 to
31 December 1963. General Shoup, a brilliant career Marine and
one of the great battle commanders of World War II, performed his
duties in a superb manner in one of the most responsible positions
in the Department of Defense. As the chief of a military service,
world renowned for its valor, esprit, devotion to God and Country,
and professional competence, he has set an example of leadership
of the highest order. Under his capable and forceful guidance, the
United States Marine Corps is the greatest military force of its
kind in the world today and has attained a level of unsurpassed com-
bat readiness as demonstrated on many occasions during recent
Cold War Crises. This readiness to defend the Nation was best
exemplified when in October of 1962 a vast number of highly trained
and well-equipped Marines, embarked in amphibious shipping, were
standing off the coasts of Cuba prepared to fulfill their mission.
General Shoup has demonstrated, among other qualities, the ca-
pacity for dealing objectively—without partisanship—with matters of
the broadest significance to our national security. Time after time
he has shown that his devotion to the Government and to the Nation
transcends strictly service interests in favor of national interests
and security. By his strong character and unimpeachable integrity
he has set a high standard for the Marine Corps and served as an
inspiration to all who served with him. General Shoup's outstanding
contribution to the United States Government during more than
thirty-seven years of devotion to duty reflects the highest credit
upon himself, the Naval Service, and his Country and has brought
a distinct honor to the United States Marine Corps.

Originating document for presentation at White House

Ceremony: 22 Dec 1963

Document presented unto

21 Jan 1964 by Adm Johnson
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award</th>
<th>Dates/Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medal of Honor</td>
<td>11-20 to 12-43, Tarawa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legion of Merit with Combat &quot;V&quot;</td>
<td>6-15 to 8-1-44, Saipan &amp; Tinian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold Star in lieu of a 2nd Legion of Merit</td>
<td>9-15-42 to 11-7-43, Tarawa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple Heart Medal with Gold Star in lieu of 2nd Purple Heart</td>
<td>New Georgia, WIA 7-6-43; Gilbert Is., WIA 11-20-43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Unit Citation with two bronze stars</td>
<td>Tarawa, 1943; Saipan, 1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yangtze Service Medal</td>
<td>Shanghai, 1927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expeditionary Medal</td>
<td>China, 1927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Defense Service Medal with Bronze Clasp</td>
<td>Iceland (1941), 1939-41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European African Middle-Eastern Campaign Medal</td>
<td>Iceland, 1941-42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal w/four bronze stars</td>
<td>New Georgia Operation, 1942-44; Gilbert Islands Operations, Marianas Operations and the Tinian Operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Campaign Medal</td>
<td>United States, 1942 &amp; 44-46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victory Medal (World War II)</td>
<td>1941-45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Service Order (British)</td>
<td>Tarawa, 11-20 to 12-43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX D

Pictures

1. General Shoup as 2d Marine Division Chief of Staff at Tinian (1944)

2. General Shoup seated outdoors with President Kennedy (undated)

3. General Shoup (in dress white uniform) standing with President Kennedy (undated)

4. General Shoup and CNO Admiral Anderson with President Kennedy (undated)

5. President Johnson shaking Mrs. Shoup’s hand after awarding Gen (ret) Shoup the Distinguished Service Medal (January 21, 1964)

6. General Shoup political cartoon (circa 1968, after March 20th testimony before Congress)

7. General Shoup political cartoon (Gen Shoup throwing grenade), May 31, 1969

8. General Shoup grave at Arlington National Cemetery
'Believe me, General, it's easier said than done!'
Assault From the Home Front

IRRESPONSIBLE ATTACKS FROM HOME

NEWSPAPER: San Diego Union
DATE: March 34, 1969 PAGE: B-6
APPENDIX E

Tarawa Photocopies

1. Photocopies of Col Shoup Tarawa Notebook\textsuperscript{164}

2. Map of Tarawa\textsuperscript{165}
All are cowardly except for the brave.
beautiful and majestic
presence on the
background of virtue
rendered courage
which shall never
dim the light
of our nation.
I realize that I am but a small chaff
from the threshings of life blown into the
pages of history by the unknowing winds of
chance.

/s/David M. Shoup
APPENDIX F

*Official Nomination Message of Maj Gen Shoup’s Appointment as 22d Commandant of the Marine Corps (14 Aug 59)*\(^{166}\)
WASHINGTON, D. C., August 14 -- President Eisenhower has
nominated Major General David M. Shoup, holder of the Medal of Honor for
heroism at Tarawa, to be the 22nd Commandant of the Marine Corps.

General Shoup will succeed General R. McC. Pate, whose second
two-year appointment as Commandant expires Dec. 31, 1959.

The President announced his choice of the Corps' next leader from
Gettysburg, Pa., at about 4 p.m. Wednesday (Aug. 12). General Shoup
was introduced to the Washington press and held his first news conference
in the office of the Secretary of the Navy at the Pentagon immediately
following the announcement. Secretary of the Navy William B. Franke and
General Pate were also present for the conference.

Currently the Commanding General, Marine Corps Recruit Depot,
Parris Island, S. C., Gen. Shoup has served 33 years as a Marine officer.
He earned the Medal of Honor while commanding the 2d Marines on Tarawa.
He also fought in the Salpa and Tinian campaigns during World War II.

General Pate told newsmen that he plans to retire and settle in
Beaufort, S. C., upon completion of his present term.

- USMC -

(official biography and portrait attached)
APPENDIX G

General Shoup’s Personal Notes Upon Notification Of Selection as

22d Commandant of the Marine Corps\textsuperscript{167}
my first four thoughts after Mr. Har
advised me of my selection to be the
next Commandant of The Marine Corps

1. One can scale great heights in this
life, with an Angel for a
brother and an Angel for a wife
pray God bless both of them.

2. Lightning has surely struck me but
as I consider who controls whose
lightnings shall strike, I am comforted.

3. I hope those responsible for my selection
were influenced by a divine guidance

4. This is the first shot I ever won
without having a hand in the
game.
COW PATH

One day thru the primeval wood
A calf walked home, as good calves should,
But made a trail all bent askew,
A crooked trail, as all calves do.
Since then three hundred years have fled,
And I infer, the calf is dead;
But still behind he left his trail,
And thereon hangs my mortal tale.

The trail was taken up next day
By a lone dog that passed that way,
And then a wise bell-weather sheep
Sliding into a rut now deep,
Pursued that trail over hill and glade
Thru those old woods a path was made.

And many men wound in and out,
And dodged and turned and bent about,
and uttered words of righteous wrath
Because “twas such a crooked path”
But still they follow-do not laugh-
The first migrations of that calf.

The forest became a lane
That bent and turned and turned again;
This crooked lane became a road
where many a poor horse with his load
Toiled on beneath the burning sun,
And traveled some three miles in one.

The years passed on in swiftness fleet,
The village road became a street,
And this, before the men were aware,
A city’s crowded thoroughfare.

And soon a central street was this
In a renowned metropolis;
And men two centuries and a half
Followed the wanderings of this calf.
Each day a hundred thousand strong
Followed this zigzag calf along;
And over his crooked journey went
The traffic of a continent.

A hundred thousand men were led
By one poor calf, three centuries dead.
For just such reverence is lent
To well established precedent.

A moral lesson this might teach
Were I ordained and called to preach.

For men are prone to go it blind
Along the calf paths of the mind;
And work away from sun to sun
To do what other men have done.

by Samuel Walter Foss 1895
Endnotes


10BrigGen J.C. Breckinridge, Commander, Marine Corps Schools, memorandum for record, 1 June 1933.


13Shoup, 27 May 1929 Fitness Report.

14“Captain David M. Shoup Fitness Report,” Col Archie Howard, USMC, 2 August 1939, Marine Corps History Division.


16Donald Bittner, Ph.D., in conversation with the author, 4 March 2013.


19Zimmerman, review of *Warrior Against War*, 273.

20Zimmerman, review of *Warrior Against War*, 274.


32 Zimmerman, review of *Warrior Against War*, 274.
37 Fleming, “Pate,” 352-54.
38 Fleming, “Pate,” 357-59.
39 Fleming, “Pate,” 360.
41 Millett, *Semper Fidelis*, 543.
43 Fleming, “Pate,” 358-59.
44 Shoup, Eisenhower Oral History, 3.
46 David M. Shoup, Papers, Archives and Special Collections Branch (Library of the Marine Corps), Quantico, Virginia, Collection #2972.
47 Jablon, “Shoup,” 368-69; see also Fleming, “Pate,” 360.
48 Millett, *Semper Fidelis*, 543-44.
50 Compiled from various sources.
53 General David Shoup, Commandant, United States Marine Corps, General David Shoup to United States Marine Corps personnel, memorandum, 4 January 1960. This document, and similar documents in succeeding years were a precursor to today’s “Commandant’s Planning Guidance,” 1-2.
54 Millett, *Semper Fidelis*, 543-44.
55 Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, “Navy Commander New Aide to Commandant,” service information release, September 20, 1960, Shoup Biographical Reference File, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, Virginia.
56 Shoup, 1960 Memo to USMC, 3.
57 Shoup, 1960 Memo to USMC, 7.
58 Donald Bittner, Ph.D., in conversation with the author, 4 March 2013.
59 Shoup, 1960 Memo to USMC, 3.
61 Shoup, 1960 Memo to USMC, 9.
62 Shoup, 1960 Memo to USMC, 12.
63 Donald Bittner, Ph.D., in conversation with the author, 4 March 2013.
64Jablon, *Warrior Against War*, 70.
65Fleming, “Pate,” 357; see also Millett, *Semper Fidelis*, 544.
66Shoup, 1960 Memo to USMC, 16.
67Shoup, Eisenhower Oral History, 10.
68Fleming, “Pate,” 358.
70Shoup, Eisenhower Oral History, 22.
73Compiled from various sources.
74Millett, *Semper Fidelis*, 544.
75Fleming, “Pate,” 352.
76Millett, *Semper Fidelis*, 544.
84Shoup, Kennedy Oral History, 27.
85Millett, *Semper Fidelis*, 545.
86Compiled from *Department of Defense Appropriations Hearings 1960-1963*.
89General David Shoup, Commandant, United States Marine Corps, General David Shoup to United States Marine Corps personnel, memorandum, 4 January 1961, 3-6.
90Shoup, Kennedy Oral History, 17.
95Jablon, *Warrior Against War*, 80.

Millett, *Semper Fidelis*, 545.

Shulimson, *Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam*, 38.


Millett, *Semper Fidelis*, 553-54.

“Major General David M. Shoup Fitness Report,” General Randolph Pate, USMC, 16 April 1959, Marine Corps History Division.


Shoup, Kennedy Oral History, 37-38. Note: Shoup was the third Commandant of the Marine Corps to participate in Joint Chiefs of Staff meetings, purportedly only those that involved issues directly relating to the Marine Corps. However, Shop attended every meeting. In 1978, the Commandant of the Marine Corps became by law a permanent member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty*, 32.

Shulimson, *Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam*, 275.

McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty*, 44.

Jablon, *Warrior Against War*, 94.


Shoup, 1963 Memo to USMC, 2.


Shoup, 1963 Memo to USMC, 3.

Shoup, Kennedy Oral History, 40.

“Gen David M. Shoup Fitness Report,” Secretary of the Navy Fred Korth, 1 Nov 1963, Marine Corps History Division.

Shoup, Kennedy Oral History, 40-41.
Shoup, Kennedy Oral History, 42.
Glenn, *Leatherneck* 2010 article, 52.
Shoup 1966 speech entered into the Congressional Record in 1968, *Present Situation in Vietnam: Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 47* (1968) (General David M. Shoup, USMC, Retired)
McNamara, *In Retrospect*, 176.
McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty*, 68.
Shoup Fitness Report, 1 Nov 1963.
David M. Shoup, Tarawa Notebook, Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps.
Shoup, Kennedy Oral History, 41.
McNamara, *In Retrospect*, 176.
Compiled from General Shoup fitness reports, Marine Corps History Division.
Shoup Biographical Reference File, Marine Corps History Division.
Bibliography

Primary Sources

Breckinridge, Brigadier General J.C., Commander, Marine Corps Schools. Memorandum for Record, 1 June 1933.


Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, “Navy Commander New Aide to Commandant,” service information release, September 20, 1960, Shoup Biographical Reference File, Marine Corps Historical Division, Quantico, Virginia.

Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, “Remarks by CMC Upon His Retirement 31DEC63,” Naval Communications System Release, December 31, 1936, Shoup Biographical Reference File, Marine Corps Historical Division, Quantico, Virginia.

Colonel Archie Howard, USMC, “Captain David M. Shoup Fitness Report,” 2 August 1939, Marine Corps Historical Division, Quantico, Virginia.

Korth, Honorable Fred, Secretary of the Navy, “Gen David M. Shoup Fitness Report,” 1 Nov 1963, Marine Corps Historical Division, Quantico, Virginia.

Pate, Gen Randolph, USMC, “Maj Gen David M. Shoup Fitness Report,” 16 April 1959, Marine Corps Historical Division, Quantico, Virginia.

Shoup, David M. *The Marines in China: 1927-1928.* Edited by Howard Jablon. Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1987. General Shoup’s journal, written when he was Second Lieutenant serving in China, is an interesting piece in that it describes the first overseas deployment of this future Marine Commandant. He gains first-hand experience in a part of the world where Americans are not particularly welcome and serving in an ill-defined mission. Even as a young officer, Shoup realizes that American intervention in far-flung places without clear goals was a costly mistake. The book is simple in form and describes in detail the travails of rail and ship travel in the 1920s, but also gives amazing insight to the early experiences of a future senior leader. Finally, it documents one of the most formative experiences of young Shoup’s life which provides foreshadowing to how he would access situations (Vietnam in particular) when serving as the Commandant more than three decades later.

Shoup, David M., Papers, Archives and Special Collection Branch, Library of the Marine Corps Quantico, Collection #2972. Since General Shoup’s personal papers are at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, the Archives Branch at the Marine Corps Gray Research Center has only one box of Shoup papers. This includes then-Colonel Shoup’s Tarawa notebook. The Marine Corps History Division’s Shoup Biographical Reference File is extensive and includes all the officer fitness reports from Shoup’s career.
Shoup, Gen David, Commandant, United States Marine Corps. Gen David Shoup to United States Marine Corps personnel. Memorandum, 4 January 1960. General Shoup’s remarks to the entire Marine Corps upon taking over as Commandant in January 1960 display the type of leader he was—a take charge leader with clear goals. In these remarks, he addresses practically every major issue facing the Corps and his ideas for addressing those issues. Notably, he admits at the beginning that he needs the Marine Corps working together as a team to make his term successful and at the end harkens back to his plowboy roots, saying he’s certain the furrow will be straight and true.


Shoup, David M. Oral History Transcript—Eisenhower Administration. Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps. Oral Histories Collection. Oral History interview from 1972. Describes how General Shoup had no previous relationship with Eisenhower prior to his selection as Commandant, and includes a couple of anecdotes about how the two men got along well, both being farm boys. Interesting discussion on the military-industrial complex is included, along with General Shoup’s views on Vietnam—mainly, that the mistake was to put any combat units in Vietnam and that once this was done the United States just kept adding to the forces thinking Ho Chi Minh would eventually negotiate. Obvious from the interview that General Shoup loathed talking about himself and his career, as he was asked to do at the beginning of this interview.

Shoup, David M. Oral History Transcript—Kennedy Administration. Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps. Oral Histories Collection. Oral History interview from 1967. Excellent discussion on initial interactions with Kennedy and the Bay of Pigs landing, including JCS exclusion from the planning, a frantic phone call from the Marine liaison officer the night of the attack, etc. Discussion regarding General Maxwell Taylor’s appointment as the personal military advisor to the President is also interesting, as well as General Shoup’s high praise for Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara.

Shoup, David M. Letter to the Editor, The Detroit News, May 14, 1969. General Shoup refutes an article written by Colonel Robert Heinl, Jr. a few weeks before which stated that General Shoup was a bitter and ambitious man who never received an expected “phone call” from the President to return to service. General Shoup’s states that he did not buy any new uniforms after 1961 and that Heinl’s use of some quotations are completely out of context.
Shoup, David M. Tarawa Notebook. Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps. Illegible in parts, General Shoup’s notebook from the battle contains poetry, tactical battle calculations, and descriptions of the scene on the beach at Tarawa.


U.S. Congress. House. Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 86th Congress, 1960, 42-48. Shoup’s first testimony to Congress on the Marine Corps budget. He emphasized that the personnel drawdown of the previous years meant the Marine Corps had significantly fewer personnel, but with the same missions to accomplish. Shoup also comments on supply shortages, saying, “we do not have enough stocks to support prolonged combat operations.”

U.S. Congress. House. Department of Defense Appropriations for 1962: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 87th Congress, 1961, 297-301. Significantly more positive than the previous year’s budget testimony. Shoup mentions that the battalion landing teams previously reduced to cadre status in 1959 are now reestablished, and that funding had increased training exercises at the battalion/squadron level.

U.S. Congress. House. Department of Defense Appropriations for 1963: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 87th Congress, 1962, 388-391. There is nothing especially noteworthy in this testimony, as budget increases provided enough financial assets for the Marine Corps to meet all training requirements while investing in weapons and equipment modernization.


U.S Congress. Senate. Present Situation in Vietnam: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 90th Cong. 2, 1968. This Congressional testimony is insightful, as it shows the esteem in which General Shoup was held. Many of the questions in the testimony revolved around a “General Shoup, how you would win the Vietnam War?” line, but also focused on the General’s public comments regarding the lack of a clear mission and purpose in Vietnam. The session occurred at a time when President Johnson had stated that the United States would achieve “victory” in Vietnam, and Shoup answers honestly throughout that he’s not exactly sure what the President means. Useful as documentation of how retired Generals can later testify before Congressional committees when they disagree with a Presidential administration’s policies.

U.S Congress. Senate. Present Situation in Vietnam: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 90th Cong. 2, 1968 (Included in 1968
testimony, for the record) Remarks by Gen. David M. Shoup, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), at the 10th Annual Junior College World Affairs Day, Pierce College, Los Angeles, California, May 14, 1966. The Senate testimony includes General Shoup’s speech from 1966, his first real speech in public following his retirement a few years earlier, in which he spoke out against the Vietnam War. His powerful speech includes the famous line about how the “whole of South East Asia…isn’t worth the life or limb of a single American” and how the U.S. should keep its “dirty, bloody, dollar-crooked fingers out of the business” of nations such as Vietnam. The last third of the speech is dedicated to those soldiers who died in our nation’s wars and how we can respect them by speaking up and protesting unjust wars, but also by proclaiming how important military service is and how it is not the soldiers who are to blame for unsuccessful conflicts like Vietnam.


Secondary Sources


Anderson, David L., ed. The Human Tradition in the Vietnam Era. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 2000. Contains excellent article by Robert Buzzanco and Leigh Fought entitled “David Shoup: Four-Star Troublemaker” highlighting General Shoup’s protesting of the Vietnam War, along with fellow retired U.S. Army Generals Matthew Ridgway and James Gavin. Excellent look at how General Shoup was unique in his credibility (Medal of Honor, former Commandant, etc.) with Congressional leadership and the American public when speaking out against involvement in Southeast Asia. It makes the point that, while most officers today are probably not familiar with General Shoup, his legacy continues today in officers that question why we involve forces in conflicts as the routine solution when other diplomatic options may be more appropriate.


Cosmas, Graham A., ed. The Joint Chiefs and the War in Vietnam: 1960-1968, Part 1. Washington: Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011. Outstanding volume highlighting the very interesting 1960s and the JCS involvement in Vietnam. Good source of information for showing the leadership of General Shoup in often being the one-man minority on major decisions and a reluctant provider of forces for Laos,
Vietnam, etc. The book shows the tension between Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson with the JCS. It also highlights the interesting personnel moves made by Kennedy in switching out JCS leadership, creating General Taylor as personal military advisor position, and shows how he retained General Shoup as Commandant of the Marine Corps throughout such turmoil.

Donovan, James A. The United States Marine Corps. New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1967. Donovan’s The United States Marine Corps is a simple, concise history of the Corps up to 1967. Overall an easy read, it contains a few good passages regarding General Shoup and his strategy as Commandant, his opposition to Vietnam, and his work in removing the “persecution complex” of Marine officers. This book is not as useful as Millett and Moskin’s works, but the passages on General Shoup make it worthwhile for this leadership analysis study.

Donovan, James A. Militarism, U.S.A. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1970. General Shoup (retired six years at this point) wrote the forward to this provocative book, published as the United States fought in Vietnam. General Shoup’s essay sums up his opposition to the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, emphasizing his opinion that fighting in Vietnam was not in the United States’ economic or strategic interests. This book also includes an excellent vignette on Marine Corps participation in Vietnam, describing how the Marines wanted to be in the fight even as if committed to counterinsurgency operations was outside their operational specialty. This book has limited value to the leadership analysis of General Shoup as Commandant, though it does show his unique perspective and demonstrates his personal need to speak out against the Vietnam War.

Fleming, Keith. The U.S. Marine Corps in Crisis: Ribbon Creek and Recruit Training. Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1990. Well-written book describing the events surrounding the Ribbon Creek incident, where six Marines drowned on a nighttime march led by their Drill Instructor. Highlights the role of then-Major General Shoup during his brief stint as the Inspector General for Recruit Training in May-Sep 1956, and how he and then-Brigadier General Wallace Greene worked as a team in reforming Marine Corps recruit training in the wake of the terrible drowning incident. Gives good insight into the culture of the Marine Corps in the 1950s.

Freedman, Lawrence. Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Freedman provides an updated version of Halberstam’s The Best and the Brightest, utilizing declassified government documents and tapes. Generals Shoup’s tirade after the Cuban Missile Crisis is spelled out from the Kennedy tapes of the time, and he is also mentioned elsewhere as a supporter of the nuclear test ban treaty. Excellent book detailing the foreign policy decision of President Kennedy’s administration.

Glenn, Karl J. “David M. Shoup: Courage, Character, Culture and the U.S. Marine Corps.” Leatherneck, March 2010, 50-53. Well-written short article by Karl Glenn, who served in the Marine Corps Band during the period when General Shoup was Commandant. Emphasizes Shoup’s willingness to learn from all Marines, regardless of rank, and details his heroism at Tarawa and disagreement with the Vietnam War.
Halberstam, David. *The Best and the Brighest.* New York: Random House, 1972. This book details the origins of the Vietnam War, focusing particularly on the personalities involved in American foreign policy in the early 1960s. Halberstam describes General Shoup’s Cuban Missile Crisis “Tarawa overlay” moment in detail and makes reference to Shoup as “Kennedy’s favorite general.” Additionally, Halberstam emphasizes Shoup’s reluctance to think of the Marines as an anti-communist force, and that they really are a fighting force ready to go wherever and whenever at the President’s command.

Haley, J. Frederick. “A Marine’s Marine.” *Marine Corps Gazette,* Nov 1983, 99-102. Poignant article in praise of General Shoup. Haley was with Shoup in New Zealand prior to Tarawa and describes Shoup’s command abilities, always instructing and motivating the enlisted troops. In turn, Haley says, the enlisted men trusted then-Colonel Shoup, who was a very visible commander, always participating in training events and discussing his thoughts with them. The article also tells of some interesting personal habits of Shoup, including always “chomping” on a dry cigar and playing cards for many hours at the Officers’ Club in New Zealand.

Heinl, Jr., Robert D. *Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 1775-1962.* Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1962. Heinl’s history is well-written and contains detailed descriptions of Tarawa and other major Marine Corps battles. The book contains a good summary of lessons learned at Tarawa and includes a rare quote from General Shoup at Saipan (where he was Chief of Staff, 2d Marine Division). Also, it details the organizational changes General Shoup implemented as Commandant and his focus on “economy, austerity, the merciless pursuit of efficiency.” This is a good resource as it gives context to the time period leading up to General Shoup’s appointment as Commandant, though it ends in the middle of his tour (1962). The standard history of the Marine Corps until Allan Millett’s *Semper Fidelis.*

Heinl, Jr., Robert D. “His Recall Never Came.” *Armed Forces Journal,* April 12, 1969. Colonel Heinl, certainly an adversary of General Shoup’s since Shoup berated him in the early 1960s for being irresponsible in his writings from Haiti critical of the Duvalier regime (from which he was expelled after being declared persona non grata), here tells of how he believes General Shoup is a bitter man who never received “the phone call” to come back into government service “promised” him by President Kennedy. He details how he heard that General Shoup even bought $3,000 in new uniforms in the fall of 1963 (perhaps for future service as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff). Shoup refutes all of Heinl’s main points in a separate letter to the editor.

Hickey, Neil. “Top Leatherneck.” *The American Weekly,* May 14, 1961, 4. Short article praising General Shoup as a motivational combat-proven warrior who brought back some vitality to the Marine Corps, even after serving only one year as Commandant. This article glamorizes Shoup’s combat exploits, but emphasizes his humble approach to the job of Commandant.

summary of Gen Shoup’s life and career. The essay provides interesting background on how he entered the military (financial issues), his drive even at a young age, and a chance meeting with Major General John A. Lejeune, then Commandant in 1925 (Shoup himself says he never met Lejeune, that a friend did and relayed the information to him). The essay discusses his rise in the Marine Corps, punctuated by the Medal of Honor events at Tarawa in November 1943. The post-war grooming of General Shoup for higher positions is discussed, including the important years as assistant fiscal director and then fiscal director of the Marine Corps. Finally, it well chronicles the four years General Shoup served as Commandant under Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy. Some important tracts include insights into his personal leadership style, his emphasis on training, and his dissenting views regarding Vietnam involvement.

Jablon, Howard. *David M. Shoup: Warrior Against War.* New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005. Howard Jablon’s short biography (141 pages) of General Shoup provides valuable insight into the rise of General Shoup from “Indiana plowboy” to 4-star General and describes in detail some situations Gen Shoup faced as Commandant and beyond. In particular, the book chronicles the important Marine Corps positions Shoup held in the period of 1944-1959, leading up to President Eisenhower selecting him as Commandant. Additionally, the book emphasizes that as Commandant Shoup was President Kennedy’s “favorite chief” and that the President even asked him to continue to serve a second tour as Commandant, before the assassination that changed everything. Finally, the book discusses Gen Shoup’s actions regarding Vietnam protests following his retirement from the Marine Corps in 1963, including the ostracization of Shoup by many in the military establishment when his comments spread throughout the media and even surfaced in North Vietnamese propaganda. This book is vital in understanding General Shoup, since no autobiography exists.


Kearns, Doris. *Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream.* Harper & Row: New York, 1976. This is an excellent biography of President Johnson, though it focuses on the President only. The book only mentions the Joint Chiefs of Staff twice, inferring that they were war-hungry and anxious for President Johnson to commit to the war. It does not mention General Shoup by name.

Kytle, Ray. *Confrontation Issues of the 70s.* New York: Random House, 1971. Included in this book is General Shoup’s essay from an April 1969 issue of *Atlantic Monthly.* Very thought-provoking, General Shoup describes how World War II, Korea, and Vietnam helped created a militaristic culture in America, with millions of Americans having served in uniform. General Shoup also criticizes the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations for their execution of the Vietnam War and notably calls the bombing efforts and attempts to win through airpower as a “wasteful and expensive hoax.” This article is very interesting because it shows General Shoup’s frame of mind in the late 1960s, and is striking when compared to today, where the military-industrial complex is still alive and well, the country still seeks the “easy” military solution to many problems, and yet now very few Americans have ever worn the uniform. Also unique in
that he places blame on senior military leaders and each of the services (including his own Marine Corps) for the errors of involvement in the Vietnam War.


McMaster, H.R. Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNama ra, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam. New York: HarperCollins, 1997. A significant resource on everything about the beginnings of the Vietnam War and how it happened. Well written, this book chronologically details the discussions, meetings, and planning for Vietnam through 1965. Keen insight into the role of General Shoup in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including his sometime frustration with the first Chairman with whom he worked, General Lyman Lemnitzer and the use of his name by President Johnson in later years as a threat to the JCS, i.e., considering bringing General Shoup out of retirement to command the forces in Vietnam.

McNamara, Robert S. In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam. Random House: New York, 1995. McNamara’s mea culpa, he describes how the Joint Chiefs of Staff had differing opinions on the use of ground and airpower in Vietnam, and that these differences were never fully debated as they should have been. He briefly mentions General Shoup in a foot note, describing him as one of the great military leaders of the time who deserves respect.

Millett, Allan R. Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps. New York: The Free Press, 1991. Millett’s work is a detailed, yet readable, one-volume history of the Marine Corps. It of course covers the Tarawa saga (in detail), and also the highlights of General Shoup’s time as Commandant. This is a useful source in providing excellent context of the time period when Shoup was Commandant, the major issues then churning in the Corps, and a good description of the various policies he implemented that revitalized the service during a challenging time. Of particular interest is the description of General Shoup’s lack of enthusiasm for counterinsurgency doctrine and his avoidance of open bureaucratic warfare, especially with the Navy. Overall, the book provides good insight of General Shoup’s Commandancy from the larger Corps perspective. This is now the standard history of the Marine Corps.

Moskin’s book is written at a simpler level than Millett’s *Semper Fidelis*; it also is not as useful as a primary source. One interesting note describes the Marine Corps experience in World War II and how General Shoup’s heroics, along with others, contributed to a boost in esprit de corps in the Marines and validated the amphibious warfare focus of the interwar years. Included are a few General Shoup quotes regarding the 1965 Dominican Republic engagement and Vietnam.

Poole, Walter S., ed. *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: Volume VIII 1961-1964.* Washington: Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011. Walter Poole’s work is an outstanding text, covering the inner working of the JCS and its interactions with the White House in descriptive detail, using the transcripts of the actual meetings. Poole provides excellent insight into General Shoup’s role in the JCS and how, although still not technically a full-fledged member, he was involved in all major joint decisions during his time as Commandant. Of note is General Shoup’s somewhat confusing Bay of Pigs testimony and his contradictory statements during the Cuban Missile Crisis deliberations. Overall, this is a helpful and interesting text for understanding the JCS in the early 1960s.

Ricks, Thomas E. *The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today.* New York, 2012. Important work detailing the generals who led American forces from World War II through Iraq and Afghanistan. This is an easy read and very critical of many of our modern general officers, accusing them of lacking strategic depth. Ricks does not mention General Shoup.

Shaw, Henry, Bernard Nalty, and Edwin Turnbladh. *Central Pacific Drive: History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II.* Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, 1966. Contains detailed description of planning and execution of the Battle of Tarawa, recounts some of then-Colonel Shoup’s exploits. Since it is part of the official history, it does not go as deeply into the personalities of those involved, but serves as an excellent historical document.

Sherrod, Robert. *Tarawa: The Story of a Battle.* New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pierce, 1944. The detailed, definitive account of Tarawa (rivaled today by Alexander’s *Utmost Savagery*), written during World War II. Highlights Shoup’s heroic leadership, and this volume was the source of President Kennedy’s mutual acquaintance with General Shoup. Like *Utmost Savagery*, makes the reader feel like he/she is there at Betio island in the Tarawa Atoll.


disagreement with the U.S. involvement in Vietnam is clear, though the authors deduce that he is, at times, “incoherent” with regards to strategic issues. It emphasizes, however, that President Kennedy kept only Shoup when reassigning Generals and Admirals after the Bay of Pigs and Cuban Missile Crisis, again showing that Shoup was perhaps Kennedy’s favorite General.


