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Green-on-blue attacks by members of the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) against International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) personnel have claimed 144 lives between 2007 and 2013. The possible solutions to the joint ISAF and ANSF problem will require continuous assessment in order to mitigate the green-on-blue threat, reduce potential adverse effect on ISAF exit strategy, and maintain confidence in the campaign. The green-on-blue threat will remain, whether through cultural indifference or as an insurgent tactic for propaganda. The rapid expansion, faulty recruitment, inadequate training and hasty operationalization of ANSF, has made the security situation in Afghanistan complex. |

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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

TITLE:

AFGHANISTAN: 'GREEN-ON-BLUE' ATTACKS

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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Executive Summary

Title: AFGHANISTAN: ‘GREEN-ON-BLUE’ ATTACKS

Author: Major David A. Arenas, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: The rise of green-on-blue attacks in Afghanistan is a disturbing development that can have serious implications for a peaceful transition to an Afghan lead security force.

Discussion: Green-on-blue attacks by members of the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) against International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) personnel have claimed 144 lives between 2007 and 2013. The possible solutions to the joint ISAF and ANSF problem will require continuous assessment in order to mitigate the green-on-blue threat, reduce potential adverse effect on ISAF exit strategy, and maintain confidence in the campaign. The green-on-blue threat will remain, whether through cultural indifference or as an insurgent tactic for propaganda. The rapid expansion, faulty recruitment, inadequate training and hasty operationalization of ANSF, has made the security situation in Afghanistan complex.

Conclusion: The further rise in green-on-blue attacks has eroded the trust between the ANSF and ISAF, adversely affected training and mentoring, and has led to the suspension or limited joint operations; as demonstrated in August of 2012 with the U.S. decision to suspend recruit training for Afghan Local Police and joint field operations. NATO allies have debated accelerated troop withdrawals, which could affect the 2014 NATO strategy. The continued emphasize on force size, rather than quality of forces will likely remain as the ANSF grows.
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In the last 12 months, Afghan forces killed one in every seven North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) soldiers serving in Afghanistan.\(^1\) Seventy-six green-on-blue attacks have taken place, the number of Coalition casualties from green-on-blue attacks for the period May 7, 2007 to the present is 144, and the number of Coalition wounded is 168.\(^2\) These attacks have provoked a lack of trust and confidence and have led to restricted and limited interaction between International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF). More than just insurgent infiltration into ANSF, indicators exist that many of the green-on-blue attacks result from cultural and personal differences. In an effort to bolster support, the Taliban usually claim responsibility for these attacks, though they account for few green-on-blue incidents.\(^3\) Estimates are about 40 percent of these incidents are caused by stress of various kinds, 15 percent are due to pressure from the Taliban, 10 percent are caused by Taliban disguised as ANSF members, and 35 percent has not been definitively determined.\(^4\)

Green-on-blue attacks in Afghanistan are a disturbing development that can have serious implications for a peaceful transition to an Afghan lead security force. The threat of green-on-blue attacks suggests that ISAF along with ANSF need to be discerning about recruitment into the Afghan security forces. The insurgent’s ability to carry out attacks through infiltration or co-option provides fuel for propaganda, in an effort to spread distrust between ISAF and ANSF members and erode confidence to the ISAF campaign strategy.
Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my MMS mentors Dr. Benjamin Jensen and Dr. Rebecca Johnson, for being patient with me and teaching me a tremendous amount about the value of research and clarity of the written word. You did not have to accept this challenge and yet you did. I can only hope my research helped you, although I acknowledge it will never compare to the amount of assistance you have given me. Thank you.

A special thank you to my wife, Isis and sons Andrew and Matthew, for their everlasting love and encouragement.
Introduction

A NATO conference in January 2013 identified Green-on-blue attacks as the number-one strategic risk in Afghanistan and training to mitigate the threat was the priority for the members of the International Security Assistance Force. General Dunford described the spike in green-on-blue attacks as an insider tactic to create a seam between ISAF and the ANSF, sowing mistrust between partners and undermining domestic support for the campaign. The current rise in green-on-blue incidents, reflect the decision of several coalition partners, most notably of France under its new President Francois Hollande, and of New Zealand, to withdraw their combat troops before the previously declared deadlines.

During the month of August 2012, these attacks were the leading cause of US deaths. “I’m mad as hell about them, to be honest with you,” Gen. John Allen said on CBS’s ‘60 Minutes’. “We’re going to get after this. It reverberates everywhere, across the United States. You know, we’re willing to sacrifice a lot for this campaign. But we’re not willing to be murdered for it.” These attacks question the administration’s strategy, to train and build a capable and dependable Afghan force able to maintain security and prevent the return of the Taliban and al–Qadea once forces have departed. “These attacks are sad. This is something that I’ve discussed in detail, something I bear responsibility to correct,” Karzai said on “60 Minutes.”

The rise of green-on-blue attacks in Afghanistan is a disturbing development that can have serious implications for a peaceful transition to an Afghan lead security force. The threat of green-on-blue attacks suggests that ISAF along with ANSF need to be discerning about recruitment into the Afghan security forces. The insurgent’s ability to carry out attacks through infiltration or co-option provides fuel for propaganda, in an effort to spread distrust between ISAF and ANSF members and erode confidence to the ISAF campaign strategy.
**Research Question**

The purpose of this study is to gain insight into the motivations behind green-on-blue attacks and its effect on the NATO mission in Afghanistan. The researcher has analyzed ISAF reported attacks from 2007-2013 in order to determine underlying themes and links related to green-on-blue incidents. The goal of this study is to conceptualize, further understand, and unify the various underlying factors to the rise of green-on-blue attacks. The ultimate goal of the study is to assess the potential impact to the ISAF campaign strategy, while also revealing fundamental commonalities, such as ethnicity and affiliation with the Afghan security force that will offer a more profound understanding into the rise of green-on-blue attacks.

This study deals with the impact in the rise of green-on-blue incidents and its implications for a successful transition the Afghan lead security. It aims in determining if cultural grievances influence or lend to the rise of green-on-blue attacks. Identifying cultural based grievances that support feelings of humiliation and the drive to restore honor as a cause of for an attack. Cultural grievance incidents appear to elicit a more intense emotive reaction suggesting that ‘acts of rage’ rather than a carefully planned or calculated process drive the attacks.

This study plans to look at the rapid growth of the ANSF, especially comparing and contrasting ethnic makeup of the security forces. In addition, the study analyzes how green-on-blue attacks affect current ISAF and ANSF interactions and the transition to an Afghan led security force.

An empirical analysis of patterns and trends in reporting of green-on-blue attacks in relation to data on the growth of ANSF indicates a possible connection between ethnicity and attacks. Specifically, Pashtuns in the ANA account for a disproportionate number of attacks.
These attacks predominantly occur on base further implying that the attacks are a sign of successful insurgent infiltration into the ANSF.

This study relies on variety of outside military resources and ISAF unclassified reports, due to the relatively recent nature of green-on-blue incidents there is a lack of military research and writing on the topic. In order to understand the definition and parameters that contribute to green-on-blue attacks, the researcher studied on attacks conducted between 2007 and 2013. This study will include a qualitative analysis of reported green-on-blue incidents in order to identify motives and compare to criteria determined necessary to conduct a green-on-blue attack.

There is no doubt that many such incidents may relate, to personal grievances or personal hostility, but there is equally no doubt that in many cases the attackers are Taliban planted in the rapidly expanded ANSF. This report will concentrate on the methods and tactics used by insurgents to infiltrate into the ANSF. The possible solutions to the joint ISAF and ANSF problem will require continuous assessment in order to mitigate the green-on-blue threat, reduce potential adverse effect on ISAF exit strategy, and maintain confidence in the campaign. The green-on-blue threat will remain, whether through cultural indifference or as an insurgent tactic for propaganda. The rapid expansion, faulty recruitment, inadequate training and hasty operationalization of ANSF, has made the security situation in Afghanistan complex.

**Scope and Methodology**

There are limited ISAF reports on green-on-blue attacks or data on the background of attackers to show how the attackers many have been influenced by extremist propaganda, and how many have been encouraged by insurgents as a target-of-opportunity or inserted as infiltrators. ISAF reporting does not prove a distinction between killings due to Taliban infiltration and killings due to personal disputes and other reasons. While cultural and personal differences may play a role in the rise in green-on-blue attacks, infiltration and defections by
Afghan security personnel who have decided to ingratiate themselves with the Taliban by attacking ISAF members likely play a far more significant role in the green-on-blue attacks. Without a complete study of the attacks, including those that do not result in casualties, it is impossible to have a full understanding as to what motivates Afghan security personnel to turn on their ISAF partners. The research draws to several definitive reasons behind each green-on-blue attack with the resources available for study.

The researcher conducted the study to determine the contextual information and background data that evolved into the current green-on-blue threat. A summary of data will show the number of attacks, the affiliation of the attacker (if known), the location/province where the attack occurred, the number of security forces killed or wounded in the attack, the affiliation of those killed or wounded, and fate of the attacker. This research examines the ISAF view of green-on-blue incidents in order to achieve greater understanding of these attacks and determine what courses of action the ISAF should pursue to mitigate further attacks. Analysis will further determine the effects of historical ethnic alliances with the Pashtun tribes and the effects of recruitment into the ANSF. There will be a focused examination of the impact of NATO operations in Afghanistan the potential influence to the NATO 2014 exit strategy. By obtaining data from ISAF press releases, foreign and US press reports, and information obtained from ISAF personnel, further analysis will determine if the threat or mitigation practices put in place is improving or degrading the relationship between ANSF and ISAF. The comprehensive analysis within this study concludes by providing a series of viable recommendations for future ISAF policies and strategies that could positively strengthen the ISAF and ANSF relationship and enable both forces to continue towards a secure Afghanistan.

Literature Review
This brief review of the literature provides an overview of the research focused on the study of green-on-blue incidents and the impact towards the NATO mission in Afghanistan. The literature reviewed primarily includes numerous news articles and studies centered on the analysis of green-on-blue attacks. A review of the literature conducted gained an understanding of factors that may motivate a member of the ANSF to commit a green-on-blue attack. Additional references such as published reports and online sources concerning green-on-blue or insider threats and how attacks erode trust, weaken mutual confidence between the ANSF and ISAF, and should the rise in attacks raise questions about the NATO exit strategy.

From 2007 to 2013, there have been 78 documented green-on-blue attacks. It is difficult to draw definitive conclusions about the principal causes of these attacks given the small total number of incidents, but there seems to be some discernible trends. Based on available information, there were two green-on-blue attacks in 2007, two green-on-blue attacks in 2008, five in 2009 and 2010 each, 16 in 2011, 44 in 2012, four in 2013. The rise in Green-on-Blue attacks in Afghanistan, have eroded the trust between ISAF, and the Afghans they are training and mentoring. These attacks pose a clear threat to the U.S. and NATO exit strategy for the Afghan security forces to assume security and stability for their country. U.S. and NATO forces suspended joint field operations with the Afghans and suspended training for new recruits for a month while Afghan officials, working with U.S. Special Operations forces to "re-vet" 8,000 Afghan commandos and 3,000 Afghan army special forces soldiers operation alongside American Special Operations forces. Even after 2014 withdrawal of U.S. forces, trainers and advisers will remain embedded with 352,000 Afghan Forces. If the interpersonal trust vital to that strategy breaks down, so will the military partnership. Given the significant risk to U.S. and NATO mission posed by green-on-blue attacks, it is important to establish the cause and context of these deadly attacks. One of NATO’s goals in Afghanistan is to enable ISAF conduct security
and stability operations throughout the country together with the ANSF and train and develop the Afghan forces. 13

Green-on-blue or insider attacks are when Afghanistan National Security Forces, or those disguised as security forces, attack International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) personnel serving in Afghanistan. The ISAF conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population. Personnel affiliated with US, ISAF, or NATO security forces, including interpreters and civilian contractors, are "blue." All attacks in Afghanistan in which a person purporting to be affiliated with the Afghan security forces, Afghan National Army, Afghan Local Police, Afghan Border Police, Afghan Uniformed Police, Afghan Air Force, other branches, or security personnel hired by Afghan authorities, are "green."

**Table 1 Total KIA per month and year and total Green/Blue KIA per year and percentage**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total ISAF</th>
<th>Total Afghan Security Forces</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Due to Green on Blue</th>
<th>% due to G/B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>41,741</td>
<td>125,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>51,356</td>
<td>147,910</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>84,146</td>
<td>195,089</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>130,930</td>
<td>266,389</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>131,933</td>
<td>323,410</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>53</td>
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<td>53</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>7.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>102,052</td>
<td>337,187</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>16.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>102,052</td>
<td>343,362</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12.50%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


The month of August 2012 had the largest increase of attacks, 11 attacks across five provinces killed 15 coalition members. Other surges of green-on-blue incidents were in April 2011 and March 2012. The underlining cause to the rise of green-on-blue attacks in 2012 has not
been determined and will be impossible to determine given that the assailant has died during the attack. Seventeen attacks in 2012 occurred within 48 hours of a previous attack; however, there is no hard evidence to conclude that these subsequent attacks were inspired by a previous event.14

**ANSF Recruitment**

In 2009, Afghanistan’s Defense Ministry, with assistance from NATO, launched a recruiting effort to double the size of the ANSF. Between 2009 and 2012, the ANSF grew from about 195,000 to over 343,000 members. Due to a lack of volunteers, Afghan Army recruiters promised generous compensation to young, desperate, and jobless Afghans, who often gathered in town roundabouts in search of work. The Taliban also targeted these same young Afghans for recruitment as Taliban infiltrators and promised them the opportunity to become martyrs by killing infidels in their land. In order to mitigate attacks within the ANSF embedded Afghan intelligence agents to watch for any ANA soldier or ANP officer who may be inclined to commit an attack. Government agents are vetting Afghan recruits carefully in the hope of weeding out Taliban operatives who try to join the security forces. An Afghan colonel points out, it will be impossible to do an adequate job of vetting the tens of thousands of recruits needed if the Afghan military and police are to reach their target strength of 350,000 by 2013. He stated the Afghan government does not, “realistically have the time to study the case of each applicant,” he says. “We look them over, have short interviews, and make background checks. But who knows what is really in the young man’s heart and soul?”15 The Taliban has successfully infiltrated the ANA, ANP, and other Afghan security forces through faulty recruitment. What is currently unknown is the actual extent of infiltration, the Taliban inflate their perception of presence within the ANSF. This achieves several objectives to erode trust between the ISAF and the ANSF in the eyes of international community and local population, demoralize the ANSF and
Afghan population, and as a propaganda victory in the local and international media outlets. Both the Government of Afghanistan and NATO believe that the infiltration is overstated, although information suggests the problem may be more substantial than is publicly admitted by the pro-government forces.\textsuperscript{16}

Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) consists of 178,501 Afghan National Army (ANA) troops and 148,536 Afghan National Police (ANP) officers. The Afghan National Police (ANP) include 25,000 border police, 12,000 civil order police (ANCOP), and 2,200 special forces.\textsuperscript{17} The annual attrition rate is 27\% for ANA and 15\% for ANP.\textsuperscript{18} Attrition and retention continues to be a challenge due to poor leadership and accountability, separation from family, denial of leave or poor leave management, high operational tempo, and ineffective deterrence against soldiers going absent without leave.\textsuperscript{19} Consistently high attrition negatively affects ANSF capabilities, resulting in a force composed of many inexperienced soldiers. Over 1,800 women serve in the ANSF and women represent approximately 3\% of new recruits. There has only been one green-on-blue attack committed by female member of the Afghan National Police. ANSF have taken a progressively more vital role in combat operations as the transition shifts to Afghan security force lead. Afghans participate in nearly 90\% of operations with the coalition, and lead more than 80\% of conventional and Special Forces operations with coalition advisors and assistance.\textsuperscript{20} The ANSF remains reliant on ISAF for key enabling capabilities and will remain so until the ANSF they have full capability to act independently. Among the ANSF, the members of the ANA account for 54\% of the green-on-blue attacks.

Insider attacks are also affecting the Afghan Local Police (ALP), a key component of the Afghan government and coalition strategy to secure rural areas ahead of the 2012 transition.\textsuperscript{21} The ALP established in July 2010 to fill security gaps by supporting armed locals in providing security within their own villages, though they retain no police power. As of December 2012,
the ALP consisted of over 16,300 officers in 46 districts and will eventually to a force of 30,000 nationally. Since its establishment, the ALP accounts for four separate green-on-blue attacks resulting in five KIA and five WIA.

### Number of KIA and Attacks per month between 2007-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<td>144</td>
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<th>Apr</th>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>76</td>
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Assuming the sample is representative, the majority of attackers are Pashtun, the Afghan ethnic group closely aligned with the Taliban insurgency. The representation of Pashtuns from Taliban-dominated provinces in the south and east is about three per cent of the ANSF. The success of green-on-blue incidents is likely to inhibit further recruitment from these areas, exacerbating the ethnic disparity in the ANSF. Pentagon officials have information on the ethnicity of the attackers in only 17 of the 76 incidents reported since 2007; 12 attackers were Pashtuns, two were Tajik, two were Uzbek and one was Hazara.\(^{22}\) Attacker identity is difficult to verify, as there is limited reported data to support proper identification. The growing number of incidents has the potential to create turmoil in the village of the attacker since it requires two notables from the village to certify the bona fides of each potential recruit, this may led to the whole village coming under suspicion after an attack. The Pashtun representation in the Taliban dominated provinces in the south and east regions are about three per cent of the ANSF. Continued attacks
are likely to hinder further the recruitment from these areas, exacerbating the ethnic imbalance in the ANSF.

**Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police Ethnicity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pashtun</th>
<th>Tajik</th>
<th>Hazara</th>
<th>Uzbek</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>43.1%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>39.5%</td>
<td>49.0%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>ANA</td>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>ANA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>49.6%</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
<td>41.3%</td>
<td>55.0%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>ANA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldier/Patrolman</td>
<td>42.6%</td>
<td>47.0%</td>
<td>30.9%</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>ANA</td>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>ANA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Force</td>
<td>44.8%</td>
<td>42.0%</td>
<td>35.2%</td>
<td>42.0%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Avg</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANA</td>
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</table>

ANA numbers as of September 2012, ANP as of December 2011.


The entire ANSF force-building effort is under stress and forced to recruit lower-quality personnel, men with less-known backgrounds, men motivated only by the desire for employment and money, and men from areas where their culture is more traditional and less adaptable to encounters with U.S. and ISAF personnel. The original intent of U.S. and Afghan planners was for each Kandak of the Afghan Army to have officers and men recruited in proportion to the ethnic groups of the land. Desertions presented a problem for the start when establishing the ANA Kandaks, so the Pashtun became the majority-minority. The rapid expansion of the ANSF with less than qualified recruits, has added pressure and created tension, as do constant U.S. and ISAF withdrawals, rotations of personnel and trainers, base closings and realignments. Coupled with problems in providing ANSF forces with adequate leave and recovery time, all of these interact to create sources of turbulence within the ANSF.

Understanding the underlying motivation behind a green-on-blue attack is difficult to determine and assess due to the reliability of incident reporting, what events are reported as a green-on-blue attack, and the attacker is often killed. General Joseph F. Dunford Jr., commander of the International Security Assistance Force and U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A),
identified several factors attributing to rise in green-on-blue attacks as insurgent infiltration, impersonation, co-option as a means to commit an insider attack, inter-personal disputes and as a means to foment extremist views through propaganda and messaging.\textsuperscript{25} The Inside the Wire Threats handbook quotes Dr. Bordin’s report as to factors that fueled the most animosity included convoys not allowing traffic to pass, reportedly indiscriminant return of direct and indirect fires that caused civilian casualties (CIVCAS), use of flawed intelligence, ISAF/CF conducting night raids/home searches, violating female privacy during searches, road blocks, publicly searching/disarming ANSF members as a standing operating procedure (SOP) when they enter bases, and past massacres of civilians by ISAF/CF (i.e., the Wedding Party Massacre, the Shinwar Massacre, etc.).\textsuperscript{26} Green-on-blue attacks are a troubling development that can pose serious implications for the transfer of security to the ANSF.

In May 2011, Dr. Jeffrey Bordin, a behavioral scientist under US Army contract, issued a report warning that green-on-blue or insider attacks were not only a systemic problem, but also that the problem would get worse unless the International Security Assistance Force took measures to address the problem.\textsuperscript{27} Dr. Borodin’s report contained recommendations, from the treatment of Afghan civilians during combat operations to understanding of cultural relations between ISAF and ANSF. Dr. Bordin concluded his report by stating, "The research completed here shows that there is a great deal of deep seated anger, distrust and cultural incompatibility between US and ANSF personnel that is precluding further development of the ANSF as well as greatly endangering the lives of US and other ISAF soldiers."\textsuperscript{28} Portions of Dr. Bordin’s report are in the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) handbook titled Inside the Wire Threats – Afghanistan Green-on-blue, Observations, Insights, and Lessons. The handbook is a training aid used for operational and institutional purposes that contribute to the overall success of United States, coalition, and allied efforts.\textsuperscript{29}
Dr. Bordin’s May 2011 report titled, "A Crisis of Trust and Cultural Incompatibility", he conducted over 600 interviews with ANSF personnel, his findings warned of an increasing threat from ANSF to ISAF personnel, based on his conclusions of cultural incompatibility. In his report, he presented numerous recommendations for educating and improving cultural awareness between forces. The report originally released as “unclassified”, but later classified as "secret" by military officials from the U.S. Central Command in Florida at the request of coalition officials in Afghanistan. Government personnel dismissed his report and Dr. Bordin was eventually relieved of his duties as Red Team research leader. Coalition officials disputed the report's conclusions. "The findings are not consistent with our assessment" of Afghan forces, said coalition spokeswoman LCDR Colette Murphy. The study, she added, "was systematically flawed, and suffered from generalizations, narrow sample sets, unprofessional rhetoric, and sensationalism." The military is now listening, touting new programs to promote cultural understanding among Western troops and using Bordin’s report to come up with solutions to a crisis that is undermining the very foundations of the coalition effort to transition the country to Afghan control.

The report warns that “unfortunately, the rapidly growing fratricide-murder trend committed by ANSF personnel against ISAF members is a valid COIN [counterinsurgency] measure of the ineffectiveness in our efforts in stabilizing Afghanistan; developing a legitimate and effective government; battling the insurgency; gaining the loyalty, respect and friendship of the Afghans; building the ANSFs into legitimate and functional organizations; and it also challenges the efficacy of the ‘partnering’ concept.”

The study concludes that although “assumptions and official pronouncements that the continuing pattern of fratricide murders by ANSF personnel are 'isolated' and largely being committed by insurgent infiltrators, the research shows that there is a great deal of deep seated
anger, distrust and cultural incompatibility between U.S. and ANSF personnel that is precluding further development of the ANSF as well as greatly endangering the lives of U.S. and other ISAF soldiers.”

Dr. Bordin’s study appears to support his thesis that well-planned infiltration is less common than spontaneous fratricide. The international forces' emphasis on “quantity over quality with regard to the ANSF’s buildup has been self-destructive” because ISAF soldiers “have to train Afghans who are illiterate, unmotivated (with an annual attrition rate of 25% mostly due to desertion), often drug-addicted, who very often come from the least desired segments of Afghan society, and are somewhat prone to turning on and murdering their Western trainers.”

The assumption is that green-on-blue attacks against ISAF personnel is a threat, which the ISAF must mitigate, as green-on-blue attacks are "isolated" and "extremely rare." In a brief to reporters at the Pentagon, U.S. Marine Gen. John Allen was asked how he accounted for the recent increase in so-called “green-on-blue” attacks, and replied that it “may have something to do with Ramazan.” “And so the daily pressures that are on some of these [Afghan] troops, compounded by the sacrifice associated with fasting, the nature of our operational tempo – remembering that Afghan troops have gone to the field and they have stayed in the field, and they’ve been in combat now for years – we believe that the combination of many of these particular factors may have come together during the last several weeks to generate the larger numbers [of insider attacks] that you point to.”

ANSF member regard the use of profanity U.S. personnel disrespectful. An Afghan Major said, “Americans use the word f--k all the time.” Many Afghan troops take the meaning sexually, not as a meaningless expletive, the understanding is lost in translation. The Major explained of an incident during a joint patrol where a U.S. soldier who saw some Afghan women
carrying heavy loads of firewood on their heads and who remarked: “Those f--king Afghan women really work hard.” The next day I heard a number of complaints from my men saying that these U.S. soldiers are lusting after our women and abusing our culture.” The major said his soldiers hate when U.S. troopers urinate on rural trails used by village women or when they stare at local women.

Afghanistan’s top military commander said his officers also shared blame for the so-called insider attacks for not giving their men a better understanding of why they should fight against the Taliban alongside their Western allies. Gen. Sher Mohammad Karimi, the Afghan National Army’s chief of staff, said “We neglect, we ignore, we do not know our soldiers. We do not communicate with them. We do not advise and instruct them,” and “They don’t know why we are fighting.” The Defense Ministry has no numbers or a breakdown of the Afghan troops held as suspected traitors vs. those dismissed for insufficient documentation and proof of loyalty. He did not specify if any Afghan troops received any disciplinary action. “Hundreds were sacked or detained after showing links with insurgents,” ministry spokesperson Zahir Azimi said at a news conference. “In some cases, we had evidence against them; in others, we were simply suspicious.”

The ISAF Insider Threat Mitigation Team, break the motives into three main categories. First, approximately 20% are due to insurgent involvement, to include infiltration, influence, cooption, or impersonation. Infiltration in which an insurgent member joins the ANSF through recruitment process then supports the insurgency by collecting intelligence, committing sabotage or an attack. Cooption recruits a member of the ANSF through ideological pressures, monetary incentives, intimidation, extortion, or family or tribal affiliation, to commit or assist in attacks on behalf of the insurgency. Impersonation the attacker poses as an ANSF member in order to conduct an attack against ISAF personnel. The attackers obtain ISAF uniforms and
identification cards through cooption or purchased at local bazaar and may receive support 
ANSF personnel who have access to base facilities or information to support the attacker.
Second, 40% of the attacks are the result of inter-personal disputes and extremist views between 
an ISAF and ANSF member who acts as an independent perpetrator without outside influence or 
command from external agencies. 
Third, the motive for about 40% of attacks is unknown 
because the attacker is killed or escapes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
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<th>G/B Attacks</th>
<th>Total AOG Initiated Attacks 2010-2012</th>
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<td>Capital</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>350</td>
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<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5864</td>
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<tr>
<td>Southwest</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>4639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>144</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>28140</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

AOG- Armed Opposition Groups Taliban, Haqqani Network, 
and Hezb-i-Islami Source: www.ngosafety.org/reports.html, Quarterly Data Report Q 4 2012
Insider attacks were largely concentrated in the Southern, Southwestern, and Eastern 
regional commands. These are provinces where ISAF troop concentration is high, Taliban 
presence is at its strongest, and where the highest levels of opium poppy production in the 
country. More than half of all attacks in 2012 occurred in Kandahar and Helmand, which were 
the focus of the counterinsurgency campaign during the "Surge.” Areas where attacks have 
occurred are broken down into three categories: 1) Military controlled ISAF bases 40 attacks 
(54.8%), patrols, raids, and other operations in the field 19 attacks (26%), and Police 
station/checkpoint under Afghan control 14 attacks (19.2%). 
Attacking military controlled 
ISAF bases is a successful tactic for the insurgency because it has the potentially to effect both 
the domestic and the international community’s willingness to stay involved in the campaign.
ANSF casualties reduce the number of volunteers and demoralize new recruits, with every ISAF casualty the coalition casualty aversion increases.

The Taliban, Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), and the Haqqani network groups fighting in Afghanistan have adopted the same green-on-blue tactics for similar purposes of eroding trust and questioning the security efforts provided by the ANSF. The Taliban and HIG have the deepest penetration into the Government of Afghanistan structure, while the Taliban has the most extensive network within Afghan security forces. The Haqqani network may be the most dangerous insurgent group, due to its organization, training, and equipped members. The Haqqani network has now managed to infiltrate into the ANSF and the Government of Afghanistan.

A Taliban statement by Mullah Omar included 33 specific points regarding the infiltration of Taliban members into Afghan security forces. He stated that this would allow them to gain entrance to secure bases where they would be able to “easily carry out decisive and coordinated attacks, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy both in life and equipment.” Omar also invited members of the military and police to stop their support of the coalition invaders and “join the ranks of the Mujahedeen like your heroic colleagues.” Attacks aboard military installations have the most affect both politically and as a source insurgent propaganda.

In 2012, the Taliban solicited a member of the ANP by offering him 2.5 million Afghani ($50,000 U.S.) for assistance in committing an attack against ISAF members. The ANP Officer informed his commander who allowed him to continue to meet with the insurgents to gain intelligence. This led to the arrests of six suicide bombers, of which three were junior police recruits with issued uniforms. The operation provided ISAF and Afghan commanders invaluable information regarding how the Taliban recruits and handles operatives within Afghan government organizations leading up to an attack.
Coalition Response

Creating an Afghan force needed to bring security and stability has proven to be far more difficult challenge than many realize, and poses major challenges that will endure long after U.S. forces depart. The effort to train Afghan forces that can replace the role of U.S. and allied forces, must overcome a legacy of more than eight years of critical failures in both force development and training. These attacks have triggered a loss in confidence and trust amongst the ISAF and civilians with ANSF personnel, ultimately effecting ANSF training and operations. The political impact associated with green-on-blue attacks is very significant. The Taliban and insurgents are fighting a political war to influence and dominate the Afghan people and to drive out U.S. and other ISAF forces, as well as aid efforts. The insurgents know that the actual numbers involved are not the issue; what counts are the political impacts and the effect it has to influence media coverage of the war. This changes the U.S. Congress, the American public, and the attitudes of other ISAF and donor countries to support the war effort. High profile Taliban
and insurgent attacks on Afghan officials or other major targets in Afghanistan, and the pervasive insurgent effort to infiltrate and influence the Afghan populace, are having a major impact on overall support for the war in what is now a war of political attrition.

As green-on-blue attacks rise public support for the ISAF mission drops with many of the troop-contributing nations, even if the connection between Afghanistan and terrorism is widely understood and the Taliban remain unacceptable to citizens of democracies. The public see its military forces continue to take casualties in a long and expensive operation to boost security in a faraway country, while public spending is being cut at home in many countries. Philip Hammond, British Secretary of State for Defence, stated, “ISAF recognizes that the incidents of insider attacks are sapping public opinion, public morale, in the ISAF home countries”. Political leaders of troop contributing nations must strongly and regularly, make their case to citizens, that the mission in Afghanistan remains necessary. Though ISAF and ANSF are winning tactically, the threat of a green-on-blue attack, has given the insurgents some momentum to a political war of transition. The threat of a green-on-blue as a valid concern by troop contributing to the countries, both ISAF and the ANSF must coordinate to undermine factors leading to the rise to these attacks.

In response to green-on-blue attacks, the French government in December 2011 and January 2012 threaten withdraw troops. French President Nicolas Sarkozy suspended French military operations in Afghanistan and said that such attacks would trigger acceleration in the French withdrawal from Afghanistan. French Defense Minister Gerard Longuet said the troops that were killed and wounded in these two incidents were victims of trust, as they considered the Afghan soldiers to be their comrades. France and other troop contributing countries stressed that their concerns are valid and ISAF and NATO officials along with Afghan government must manage the causes leading to these attacks.
The Taliban thrives on the propaganda of green-on-blue attacks, as a tool to demonstrate its capacity to inflict damage on the ISAF and Afghan forces. The Taliban have utilized green-on-blue attacks in their propaganda: Mullah Omar, leader of the Taliban faction known as the Quetta Shura, claimed the Taliban had "cleverly infiltrated in the ranks of the enemy" and encouraged Afghan government officials and security personnel to defect to the Taliban as a matter of religious obligation and "join the ranks of the Mujahedeen like your heroic colleagues.". By inciting higher levels of violent protests and depicting a weaker U.S. position in Afghanistan, they seek to find a place at the negotiating table and in future power sharing arrangement. The Taliban claim responsibility to all green-on-blue attacks, in order to exaggerate its effects on ISAF troops and fuel its propaganda message. Taliban, representative said it had "forced" NATO commanders into the decision by sowing distrust among Afghan and foreign troops. "This is the result of the mujahideen's operations and tactics that forced the enemy to abandon their plans," Zabihullah Mujahed said. "This is an achievement for the mujahideen who have managed to create mistrust among the enemy forces and, God willing, this is the start of their overall defeat in Afghanistan," said Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahed.

Understanding the cultural aspect of the threat

The Pentagon states the majority of green-on-blue attacks are a result of cultural grievances. They occur because of cultural misunderstandings between ISAF and Afghan troops, possible revenge for perceived insults or provocations. Cultural misunderstandings and mistranslations on both sides can damage and form resentment between ANSF and ISAF members. Issues related to honor and dignity, insults, profanity and vulgarity to ANSF members, publicly searching and disarming ANSF members when they enter Coalition military bases. Cultural issues such as indecent exposure while urinating in public or urinating in streams
of water, arrogance, violating female privacy during searches, searching them and taking their photographs.

National incidents that have cause outrage among the Afghan population include the burnt copies of the Quran in a garbage dump at Bagram Air Base that sparked several days of anti-American riots in February 2012. An Afghan soldier shot and killed two U.S. Army Soldiers at an outpost in eastern Afghanistan’s Nangarhar Province and then, fled into the large crowd of demonstrators outside the base. An U.S. Army Sergeant killed 16 women, children, and men as they slept and then attempted to burn their corpses in March 2012. In addition, the video of U.S. Marines urinating on the corpses of dead Taliban fighters and the photos of U.S. posing with body parts taken from dead insurgents. It made no difference that the bodies were insurgent fighters in Afghanistan; you do not desecrate the dead. In 2012—almost once every two weeks—Afghan soldiers, policemen, or security guards, largely in units being trained or mentored by the US or its NATO allies, have turned their guns on those mentors, the people who are funding, supporting, and teaching them, and pulled the trigger.

**Coalition steps to mitigate green-on-blue**

Senior ISAF and Afghan commanders and government officials attended conferences in August and September 2012 to discuss the rise of green-on-blue attacks and an effective means to counter the ongoing threat. The ISAF developed a program of tasks and a variety of countermeasures to mitigate green-on-blue threats. They also created two Insider Treat Action Groups (ITAG) comprised of ISAF and ANSF personnel, to manage and oversee established programs, one headed by a three-star and the other by a one-star. The one-star level joint board is further tasked to ensuring policies set by the ITAG are properly implemented. Also established, an Insider Threat Mitigation Team, an executive oversight group of senior Afghan and Coalition leaders, tasked with monitoring, directing, and initiating the new threat mitigation
initiatives. A joint assessment commission will study incidents and identify lessons and required actions for the future.  

General Karimi, directed the Religious and Cultural Affairs (RCA) Department of the ANA to develop and train all Afghan Soldiers on the cultural practices of their ISAF partners to mitigate further attacks. RCA developed a training program and package, which included a twenty-eight page booklet with guided discussion questions titled “A Brochure for Comprehending the Cultures of the Coalition Forces,” approved by General Karimi. He directed that all ANA soldiers receive the training and incorporate the program into selected courses at the various Afghan training institutions. The training booklet identifies the supporting ISAF nations and highlights the cultural diversity that exists among them. It addresses diversity as a source of ISAF strength and compares coalition diversity to the diversity that exists within Afghanistan, suggesting that each of the various Afghan ethnic groups offers something essential to the strength of the Afghan nation just as the various ISAF nations combine to form a strong coalition. It highlights the need to look for shared values or common interests that can bring them back together with their ISAF partners in pursuit of victory. The RCA implemented the training on September 5, 2012.  

There are no reported numbers of trained ANSF members or if any have committed any attacks.

**Preventive Measures against Green-on-Blue Attacks**

With the continued presence in Afghanistan, green-on-blue attacks will remain a constant threat to ISAF personnel throughout the drawdown and transition from combat role to assisting Afghan forces maintain security. Among the available training resources that identify best practices for mitigating the insider threat is a recent training video, prepared jointly by the Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG), the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Culture Center, and the TRADOC Intelligence
Support Activity (TRISA), entitled Insider Threats in Afghanistan. The video points to the majority of insider attacks attributed to personal grievances as the most likely cause, although co-option appears to be an escalating threat. The video highlights four real attacks in 2012 to serve as the basis for discussion for on best practices in order to mitigate insider threat.

In addition, the CALL published the Inside the Wire Threats - Afghanistan Green-on-blue handbook and the pocket smartcard entitled Insider Threats in Partnering Environments, A Guide for Military Leaders. The AWG identified the need for developing an insider threat handbook to “help educate and train forces on the behaviors, beliefs, customs, norms, and values of the Afghan people”. Together these assist deploying personnel to understand when to act and report suspicious insider threats, particularly in a partnering and deployed environment like Afghanistan.

The smartcard splits the observable indicators into three categories, as seen in figure 1, depending upon when action is required. In Category I Indicators, an individual can take several actions such as seeking legal consultation, reporting the behavior or asking the suspect for clarification rather than observing to see if the behavior worsens before becoming a Category I
or III behavior. In the Category II or III Indicators, the observer should report the conduct and take immediate action. Immediate actions include reporting to counter-intelligence and Chain of Command. The Observable Indicators attempts to differentiate between the high-risk individual and the insider threat individual, as a category one behavior signifies high-risk behavior. There are seventeen preventive tools troops can implement to deter an insider threat, prior any behavior reaching a Category II or III threat.

A concerted effort between the Afghan government and military and the Coalition lead to several concrete measures to defeat the insider threat. Among the new initiatives being implemented are improvements to the vetting process for new recruits (Fig); increasing the number of counterintelligence teams; introduction of interview procedures for ANA soldiers returning from leave; a new warning and reporting system for insider threats; enhanced intelligence exchange between the ANSF and ISAF; establishment of an anonymous reporting system; improved training for counter-intelligence agents; establishment of a joint investigation commission when insider threats occur; and enhanced cultural training to include visits to Coalition home training centers by Afghan Cultural and Religious Affairs advisers, which were authorized by President Karzai.63

There has been an update to Insider Threat training guidance for troop contributing nations across three tiers: National pre-deployment training, reception training upon arrival in-theater, and continuation training throughout their tour in Afghanistan. The content of this training is to hone training objectives based upon theater procedures, absorb lessons learned from recent green-on-blue attacks, accommodate input of Afghan Religious and Cultural Affairs officers for course content, and build Afghan counterintelligence capacity and capability.64

The professionalism and reliability of the nearly 350,000-plus Afghan security forces members is essential if ISAF is to have any success. The introduction of several new measures
to deal with attacks: is adding addition counterintelligence teams, instituting new interview procedures for soldiers returning from leave, establishing a warning system for insider threats and enhancing cultural training for Afghan and ISAF personnel. It remains unclear how or if these measures will effect further incidents of green-on-blue.

**Conclusion**

Members of ISAF’s Insider-Threat Mitigation Working Group said Gen. John R. Allen, ISAF commander, recognizes insider attacks as a top risk and has leveraged “brainpower” and leadership to mitigate the threat and “ISAF is doing everything it can to protect coalition forces”. Incidents like the bombing of mosques and madrassas, desecration of the Holy Qur’an, indiscriminate killing by the U.S. soldiers during night raids, and urination by Marines on the bodies of dead Taliban, do nothing but further fuel the hatred amongst Afghan populace and Afghan security forces against the foreign forces.

Infiltration is one of the insurgents’ key strategies in their fight against the ISAF. The use of infiltrators and insiders is now more organized and systematic than in previous years, and therefore poses a significant threat to NATO exit strategy. In 2012, the rise in infiltration-related attacks targeting ISAF members has become more frequent. This trend is predicted to continue until ISAF exit Afghanistan.

Review of threats posed to ISAF shows green-on-blue attacks as a problem and is on the rise, with seeming no end. A surge in green-on-blue attacks is certainly has far-reaching effects insofar as NATO’s strategy and strategic ends in Afghanistan are concerned. Under current circumstances, Afghan security forces assuming complete security responsibility in the country beyond 2014 without U.S. support seems questionable. If they do it with some American support, common Afghans as well as the Taliban would question their legitimacy, and it would remain as the Taliban versus the U.S. conflict in the main. The ANSF and ISAF members
must implement preventive measures to address infiltration issues just as it is vital that ISAF members show respect for the cultural norms and sensitivities of the Afghan population and the ANSF members they are working with. The rapid growth of the ANSF from 200,000 to over 350,000 in just two years suggest that more attention is paid to numbers than to the quality and size of these forces. The doubling of the ANSF with no clear vision of quality, effectiveness, and efficiency of forces has inevitably led to compromises.

As incidents or the threat of green-on-blue attacks increases and is directed against the ISAF, it is appropriate to continue to examine the motivations of the attacker in order to determine the insider threat. Lessons learned from past attacks provide material for indicators in order to detect and recognize the possibility of an attack before it happens. Green-on-blue attacks originating from social and cultural disputes between ISAF and ANSF may occur, but it has now moved to a standard Taliban Tactic, Techniques, and Procedure, which they have proven to very successful.
APPENDIX A- DATA SUMMARY

Data covers green-on-blue attacks in Afghanistan from May 7, 2007 through 7 April 2013, there have been a total of 78 attacks.67

Total number of attacks per year:

Total number of attacks per province:
Badghis – 4  Baghlan – 1  Balkh – 2  Farah – 1
Faryab – 2  Helmand – 19  Herat – 2  Kabul – 5
Kandahar – 14  Kapisa – 2  Kunar – 1  Laghman – 3
Nangarhar – 3  Paktia – 2  Paktika – 3  Uruzgan – 4
Wardak – 3  Zabul – 2

The total number of Coalition deaths from green-on-blue attacks for the period May 7, 2007 to the present is 144. The total number of Coalition wounded is 168.

Green-on-blue deaths per year, and percentage of Coalition deaths caused by such attacks:
2013 – 1 – 12.5%  2011 – 39 – 7.2%  2009 – 12 – 2.3%  2007 – 6 -2.6%
2012 – 66 – 16.7%  2010 – 16 – 2.3%  2008 – 2 – less than 1%

Green-on-blue wounded per year:
2012 – 81  2010 – 1  2008 – 3

Total number of green-on-blue deaths per province:
Badghis – 5  Baghlan – 3  Balkh – 4  Farah – 2
Faryab – 2  Helmand – 35  Herat – 3  Kabul – 12
Kandahar – 21  Kapisa – 7  Kunar – 1  Laghman – 11
Nangarhar – 8  Paktia – 2  Paktika – 3  Uruzgan – 6
Wardak – 6  Zabul – 5

Total number of green-on-blue wounded per province:
Badghis – 3  Baghlan – 6  Balkh – 2  Farah – 1
Faryab – 2  Helmand – 25  Herat – 1  Kabul – 0
Kandahar – 43  Kapisa – 15  Kunar – 2  Laghman – 6
Nangarhar – 5  Paktia – 5  Paktika – 0  Uruzgan – 7
Wardak – 10  Zabul – 4

Reported fate of the attacker(s):
Killed (includes death by suicide attack and killed after fleeing) - 33
Captured - 22* (* Includes 11 suspects detained in an incident on Feb. 20, 2012.)
Wounded (not known if also captured) - 6
Fled - 29
Unknown – 2
### APPENDIX B - AREAS OF ATTACKS ON ISAF BY ANSF

#### Regional Command: Capital
1. **Province: Kabul**
   - Total Insider Attacks: 6
   - Total Killed: 16
   - Total Wounded: 4

#### Regional Command: East
2. **Province: Paktika**
   - Total Insider Attacks: 3
   - Total Killed: 3
   - Total Wounded: 0
3. **Province: Paktia**
   - Total Insider Attacks: 2
   - Total Killed: 2
   - Total Wounded: 5
4. **Province: Wardak**
   - Total Insider Attacks: 4
   - Total Killed: 6
   - Total Wounded: 18
5. **Province: Kapisa**
   - Total Insider Attacks: 2
   - Total Killed: 7
   - Total Wounded: 15
6. **Province: Laghman**
   - Total Insider Attacks: 3
   - Total Killed: 11
   - Total Wounded: 8
7. **Province: Nangarhar**
   - Total Insider Attacks: 3
   - Total Killed: 8
   - Total Wounded: 5
8. **Province: Kunar**
   - Total Insider Attacks: 1
   - Total Killed: 1
   - Total Wounded: 2

#### Regional Command: North
9. **Province: Baghian**
   - Total Insider Attacks: 1
   - Total Killed: 3
   - Total Wounded: 6
10. **Province: Balkh**
    - Total Insider Attacks: 2
    - Total Killed: 4
    - Total Wounded: 3
11. **Province: Faryab**
    - Total Insider Attacks: 2
    - Total Killed: 2
    - Total Wounded: 2
12. **Province: Badghis**
    - Total Insider Attacks: 4
    - Total Killed: 5
    - Total Wounded: 3
13. **Province: Herat**
    - Total Insider Attacks: 3
    - Total Killed: 7
    - Total Wounded: 12
14. **Province: Farah**
    - Total Insider Attacks: 1
    - Total Killed: 2
    - Total Wounded: 0
15. **Province: Ghor**
    - Total Insider Attacks: 1
    - Total Killed: 0
    - Total Wounded: 2

#### Regional Command: Southwest
16. **Province: Helmand**
    - Total Insider Attacks: 20
    - Total Killed: 35
    - Total Wounded: 31
17. **Province: Kandahar**
    - Total Insider Attacks: 14
    - Total Killed: 21
    - Total Wounded: 43
18. **Province: Uruzgan**
    - Total Insider Attacks: 4
    - Total Killed: 6
    - Total Wounded: 7
19. **Province: Zabul**
    - Total Insider Attacks: 2
    - Total Killed: 5
    - Total Wounded: 4
## APPENDIX C - REGIONAL COMMAND AREA TOTAL GREEN/BLUE KIA PERCENT COMPARED TO TOTAL KIA 2007-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Total KIA Per Province 2007-2013</th>
<th>G/B KIA</th>
<th>Percent of G/B to total KIA</th>
<th>Regional Command</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kabul</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14.04%</td>
<td>Capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapisa</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11.67%</td>
<td>East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunar</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.84%</td>
<td>East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laghman</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nangarhar</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20.51%</td>
<td>East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paktia</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.52%</td>
<td>East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paktika</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.97%</td>
<td>East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wardak</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.42%</td>
<td>East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghlan</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18.75%</td>
<td>North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkh</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23.53%</td>
<td>North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faryab</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11.76%</td>
<td>North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4.90%</td>
<td>South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruzgan</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13.04%</td>
<td>South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zabul</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.88%</td>
<td>South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helmand</td>
<td>961</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3.54%</td>
<td>Southwest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badghis</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14.29%</td>
<td>West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farah</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.26%</td>
<td>West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herat</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22.58%</td>
<td>West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2274</td>
<td>144</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX D- SCOPING THE INSIDER THREAT

**Scoping the “Insider” Threat (U)**

**Insurgent “Insider” Threats**
- **Infiltration**
  - Insurgents who join the ANSF with the intent to conduct an attack, collect information, obtain material, or create distrust/confusion.
- **Co-opting**
  - Insurgents who recruit or persuade existing ANSF members to conduct an activity by using intimidation, blackmail or connections.
- **Mimicking**
  - Insurgents who impersonate ISAF or ANSF personnel to conduct a quick attack by using uniforms or forged ID cards.
- **Destabilizers**
  - Factors such as stress, mental instability, or drug use that cause an ANSF member to conduct a violent act against a member of ISAF or ANSF.

**ANSF “Insider” Threats**

**Mitigation**
- Screening: May help identify attempts by **known** insurgents.
- Review of all ANSF records allows for cross-checking, may identify suspect ties.
- Remove ANSF and ISAF uniforms from bazaars.
- Screening or counterintelligence may identify past history.

**Recent Events**
- 4 April 11: Kandahar CDO
- 5 Dec 10: FOB Lightning, Paktya
- 6 Apr 11: Laghman KLE
- 10 Nov 10: Khas Uruzgan
- 29 Nov 10: Nangarhar

**Assessment:** The screening and monitoring of the ANSF has begun to create barriers to the insider threat posed by the insurgency and from within the ANSF. Continued shortfalls and the lack of universal application are vulnerabilities that will allow some insider attacks to continue to occur against the ANSF and the ISAF.
Countering Inside the Wire Threats

**Personal Factor**
- Provide ANSF and CF adequate cultural sensitivity training in order to better understand one another
- Ensure ANSF receive R&R to reduce combat fatigue
- Enforce ANSF unit rotation to decrease OPTEMPO

**Co-option Factor**
- Field CI elements to spot vulnerable personnel
- ANSF NCO/Officer courses to recognize indicators
- Establish an anonymous reporting mechanism to notify leadership of suspected INS sympathizers with units

**Impersonation Factor**
- Enforce ban on uniform sales
- Ensure accountability of ANSF-issued equipment
- Ensure proper ID inspection at ECPs at ANSF/CF bases

**Infiltration Factor**
- Fill CI billets with trained personnel
- 8-Step Vetting/Screening Process
- Improve multi-agency background investigative process

**Multilayered defense posture is essential to protect coalition and Afghan forces from the insider’s threat**

Educate, Train, Prevent

**APPENDIX E- COUNTERING INSIDE THE WIRE THREATS**
APPENDIX E- SCREENING OF NEW ANA RECRUITS

Screening of New ANA Recruits

ANA Approach to Screening: No Single Step Will Do....

Recruits must join at the location where their identity card was issued.

Guarantors will be identified and interviewed.

Valid Tazkera

Two Letters from Elders

Personal Info

Biometric collection

Medical Screening

Drug Screening

Criminal Records Check

Application validated w/ stamp from recruiting authority

Supported by:
- Cultural Norms
- ANSF Recruiting Policies
- MoD/MoI Records Checks
- Information Sharing
- Coalition Oversight

MoD, MoI, NDS, and the Medical Department will interview the applicant at the provincial/district level.

Full background checks on new recruits conducted by G2.

ANA recruits are subject to an eight-step screening process, supported by information sharing and coalition oversight.
APPENDIX F- OBSERVABLE INDICATORS

**Category I indicators** – closely monitor situation and/or discuss problems with individual

- Complains about other nations and/or religions.
- Advocates violence beyond what is the accepted norm.
- Abrupt behavioral shift.
- Desires control.
- Socially withdraws in some occasions.
- Appears frustrated with partner nations.
- Experiences personal crisis.
- Demonizes others.
- Lacks positive identity with unit or country.
- Reclusive.
- Strange habits.
- Peculiar discussions.

**Category II indicators** – refer to counterintelligence (CI) and/or chain of command

- Verbally defends radical groups and/or ideologies.
- Speaks about seeking revenge.
- Associates with persons who have extremist beliefs.
- Exhibits intolerance.
- Personally connected to a grievance.
- Cuts ties with unit, family, or friends.
- Isolates self from unit members.
- Intense ideological rhetoric.
- Attempts to recruit others.
- Choice of questionable reading materials in personal areas.

**Category III indicators** – requires immediate action, such as removing weapon or detention, as last resort

- Advocates violence as a solution to problems.
- Shows a sudden shift from “upset” to normal.
- Takes suspicious travel or unauthorized absences.
- Stores or collects ammunition or other items that could be used to injure or kill multiple personnel.
- Verbal hatred of partner nation or individual from partner nation.
- Exhibits sudden interest in partner nation headquarters or individual living quarters.
- Makes threatening gestures or verbal threats.

Source: Inside the Wire Threats - Afghanistan Green-on-blue, U.S. UNCLASSIFIED, REL NATO, GCTF, ISAF, ABCA, For Official Use Only
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