Making the Marine Corps Reserve Truly Operational: A Case Study in the Reorganization of the Marine Corps Reserve

The Marine Corps Reserve has been an integral part of the Marine Corps force structure during Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The ground and air units of Marine Forces Reserve provided critical operational manpower for the active duty Marine Corps during both campaigns over the past decade. Despite conducting operations while integrated with active duty units as part of the operational rotation plan in theater, the Marine reserve is still organized as a strategic reserve. This organizational template is no longer valid in the current operating environment and will only hinder the operational interoperability of the reserve during future contingencies. Marine reserve units should be task organized to support the active component as an operational reserve in order to ensure their ability to be a continued viable force for future contingencies and operations. The current Table of Organization for the Marine Forces Reserve should be reorganized to make a true operational reserve that is easily capable of integrating with its active duty component units.

Marine Forces Reserve, operational reserve, integrated reserve, Marine Corps reorganization of reserves, manpower, active duty, operational rotation, future contingencies, task organization of Marine Reserves.
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Making the Marine Corps Reserve Truly Operational: A Case Study in the Reorganization of the Marine Corps Reserve

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

AUTHOR

Major J.L. Riggs, Major, USMC

AY 11-12
Executive Summary

Title: Making the Marine Corps Reserve Truly Operational: A Case Study in the Reorganization of the Marine Corps Reserve

Author: Major Jonathan L. Riggs, Major, USMC

Thesis: Marine reserve units should be task organized to support the active component as an operational reserve in order to ensure their ability to be a continued viable force for future contingencies and operations. The current Table of Organization for the Marine Forces Reserve should be reorganized to make a true operational reserve that is easily capable of integrating with its active duty component units.

Discussion: The Marine Corps Reserve has been an integral part of the Marine Corps force structure during Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The ground and air units of Marine Forces Reserve provided critical operational manpower for the active duty Marine Corps during both campaigns over the past decade. Despite conducting operations while integrated with active duty units as part of the operational rotation plan in theater, the Marine reserve is still organized as a strategic reserve. This organizational template is no longer valid in the current operating environment and will only hinder the operational interoperability of the reserve during future contingencies.

Conclusion: The current structure of Marine Forces Reserve, the 4th Marine Division (Reserve), and the 4th Marine Air Wing (Reserve) will not facilitate an operational reserve. The Marine Corps needs to eliminate the current command structure above the regimental/group level and place these units under the administrative, operational, and tactical control of the active Marine Expeditionary Forces and the active Divisions. This will facilitate the operational reserve being a much more viable part of the active duty missions around the world. The current organization for Marine Forces reserve will continue to hinder the operational mindset and employment. The additional administrative requirements for the individual augmentation and frequency of reserve unit deployments will need to be re-visited as well as the Title X requirements. The active force with this construct will better understand employ the reserves while the reserves will grow in capability and a seamless transition into operations due to their command relationships, training, and working relationships with the active forces. For all the reasons listed, for the challenges of the future to the force and the increased need and responsibility of reserve integration to future missions, the proposed model should be followed for the command relationship between the reserves and the active component.
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The Marine Corps Reserve has been an integral part of the Marine Corps force structure during Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The ground and air units of Marine Forces Reserve provided critical operational manpower for the active duty Marine Corps during both campaigns over the past decade. Despite conducting operations while integrated with active duty units as part of the operational rotation plan in theater, the Marine reserve is still organized as a strategic reserve. This organizational template is no longer valid in the current operating environment and will only hinder the operational interoperability of the reserve during future contingencies. Marine Forces Reserve infantry battalions, air wing squadrons, and Marine logistic units are currently operating as an operational reserve as part of the global war on terrorism. Marine reserve units should be task organized to support the active component as an operational reserve in order to ensure their ability to be a continued viable force for future contingencies and operations. The current Table of Organization for the Marine Forces Reserve should be reorganized to make a true operational reserve that is easily capable of integrating with its active duty component units.

In order to understand how the Marine Corps Reserve should organize for the present and in the future, it is important to understand the nature of its history and how it became organized with the current strategic makeup of a reserve Division and Wing construct. The history of Marine Forces Reserve is complex and tumultuous from its inception to its current organization. MFR was continually under scrutiny and change through its first fifty years of history during the 20th Century (1916-1966). This period gives the most clarity when examining the current Marine Reserve structure.

From 1776 until 1915 reserve Marines had no official status. In July of 1915, The Department of the Navy issued General Order 153 which created Marine detachments to protect
On 29 August 1916, Congress passed an act making appropriations for a Marine Corps Reserve. Navy Department General Order no. 231 stated “A Marine Corps Reserve, to be a constituent part of the Marine Corps and in addition to the authorized strength thereof, is hereby established in all respects as those providing for the Naval Reserve Force.”

The Marine Corps Reserve was officially formed.

The Marine Corps Reserves would augment the active component and conduct combat operations during World War I, World War II, and the Korean War. Their presence was an integral part of the total force during all three conflicts. The current strategic reserve model was not established until 1962. The Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara directed that he wanted a Marine Corps ready to fight with a four division-wing supported concept (one of which would be a Marine Corps Reserve Division and wing). In 1963, the Marine Corps was allocated by Congress (in the 1963) budget the funds to form the four Division concept. General David Shoup, Commandant of the Marine Corps, instituted the changes to make the Marine Corps Reserve organize as an active division supported by and Air Wing. The 4th Marine Division and the 4th Marine Air Wing were stood up within the reserves. The new structure gave individual reservists a stronger sense of identification with the regular Marine Corps, and a “division pride” that they had been lacking under the old system.

Marine reservists now had a command structure and could identify themselves with a Marine infantry regiment as an infantryman, or with a Marine artillery regiment as an artilleryman. The model was also seen to help the division quickly activate and deploy as a unit vice augmenting the active component as individual augmentees. This model would stay in place from 1963 until the present.

The Marine Corps Reserve would be directed to mobilize several times after the current strategic construct was built in 1963. The Marine Reserves would not be employed or mobilized
in large numbers during the Vietnam as were in the Korean War. This was related more to McNamara’s construct that the reserve would deploy as a division and only in the need of a national emergency. The Vietnam War was viewed as a low intensity conflict with the United States needing a large reserve to be ready to deploy in the advent of issues with the Soviet Union or other potential issues around the world. The entire division nor an entire regiment would not deploy in support of the active component in future contingencies as projected. The smaller units would be designated from the 4th Marine Division and mobilized on active duty to support and integrate as battalions or squadrons with the active force. It was not until after the end of the Cold War, that the reserve would be mobilize again in mass. This would occur during the invasion of Kuwait in 1991. The Marine Corps Reserves were mobilized but not as the entire 4th Marine Division or the 4th Marine Air Wing. Battalions and squadrons were mobilized and augmented the active force. The units were mobilized with unit integrity in contrast to the individual augment model used during the Korean War. It also was still in the mindset of a strategic reserve in that they were brought up only in the case of a national emergency. However, they were mobilized in and detachments and units smaller than a regiment or division.

The Marine Corps Reserves would be called upon again during Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom in 2003. The reserves would augment the active force as in the past by providing forces for the initial invasion. The change, however, would come with the longevity of both campaigns. The active duty Marine Corps, and the other services, were smaller (than they had been during Desert Storm/Desert Shield in 1991) due to cuts to the military during President Bill Clinton’s Administration. In order to give a rotational capability to the active duty force by helping ease the troop to task requirements, the reserves would become an integral part of the unit composition in both theaters. The need for the reserve to be used operationally and
continuously made the Department of Defense revisit the current way the reserves are organized and employed across all four services.

The operational reserve concept is defined as the reserve forces routinely and regularly participate in ongoing military missions. The strategic reserve concept is one in which the augmentation and reinforcement of the active forces during major contingencies. This is similar to the mindset that established the 4th Marine Division in 1963 and stayed within the Division until OIF and OEF. The operational concept is now part of the DOD policy in Directive 1200.17, “Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force.” It stated purpose is “prevailing in today’s wars requires a reserve component that can serve in an operational capacity-available, trained, and equipped for predictable routine deployment.” This mandate is a vast difference from the reserve mentality that has been part of the DOD and the Marine Corps Reserve for the past fifty years. The strategic organizational construct and mentality had dominated the DOD’s vision for the employment of the Marine Corps reserve until OIF/OEF. The troop to task requirements (that were straining the active duty) during OIF/OEF forced the Marine Corps and the other services to re-visit the frequency and utilization of the reserve force (as a more integral piece of the operational force engaged in combat operations).

The Marine Corps and the sister services of the Army, Navy and the Air Force have relied heavily on the reserves during OIF and OEF as well. This “need” for manpower to fight a protracted war has forced the DOD to re-examine its force structure and policies. The last significant mobilization of reserve forces was in the Korean conflict was from 1950-1953. The U.S. military is dealing with a much more protracted conflict that requires more stress and strain on the active forces. For example, from 1990-2001, the reserve component support to the active duty mission globally was 13 million days. From 2001-2005 the total augmentation was a five
times increase to 63 million days. By 2005, 40% of the U.S. military personnel in the Iraqi theater of operations were reserve personnel from all services.\textsuperscript{12} This data articulates the necessity of the reserve force to augmenting the global mission. The mobilizations also have been longer for reservists during this time period. During Operation Desert Storm, mobilizations averaged 156 days. Now the average mobilization is 300 days for reservists per mobilization period.\textsuperscript{13} This data also shows the need to restructure the reserves which is identified through the DOD directive 1200.17.

The numerical data for the employment of reservists during OIF and OEF has made the DOD examine re-organization of the reserve component across the services to meet the operational demands. In addition, there were several other points that made DOD examine the organization of the reserves forces. There were eight key points that has forced the DOD to re-examine the organization of the reserves:

- The recognition of the size of the current active force and projected size of the force in the future due to further budget cuts will require more reserve employment to meet demands.
- The need to augment homeland defense and support civil authorities as part of NORTHCOM.
- The reserve forces across its organizational structure have a lot of subject matter experts (SME) in its ranks that may not reside in the active force due to their civilian job affiliations or other skill sets.
- The necessity for integration of the reserves due to numerous deployments and continual integration with active duty units.
- Re-examining the laws such as Title Ten provisions that govern the reserves.
• The time between deployments and mobilizations due to the civilian careers of reservists and budgetary considerations.

• The Marine Corps Reserve administration manual, which governs mobilizations, pay, and drill for reservists, for example, will need to be re-evaluated with the changes to DOD directives for the reserves.\textsuperscript{14}

In addition to operational tempo, another justification for having an operational reserve that is committed to supporting the active mission is the growing economic problems within the United States and around the globe. The United States and the global community have been dealing with a global economic downturn during the current and previous administrations. The United States national deficit in 2011 is currently at 13 trillion dollars. The defense budget has now become targeted by U.S. lawmakers for cuts in spending as a way to attack the deficit. The cuts to defense spending are projected to be near 500 billion dollars as outlined by President Obama and the Congress over the next ten years.\textsuperscript{15} These cuts could reach one trillion dollars if a budgetary compromise is not reached within 2012. The National Security Strategy addresses the economic crisis by stating “At the center of our efforts is a commitment to renew our economy, which serves as the wellspring of American power. The American people are now emerging from the most devastating recession that we have faced since the Great Depression.”\textsuperscript{16} This recognition of the economic downturn serves to transition to the point that despite economic issues, the United States will still need to meet its strategic goals in the future. Due to deep budget cuts in the defense industry, the size and capability of the active force will diminish. The need to rely on the reserves to meet strategic goals for the U.S. will become even more important due to defense cuts, even past OIF/OEF. This fact alone describes the necessity to build a viable operational reserve for the future.
The employment of an operational reserve is also a more cost effective employment of personnel. This was outlined in the Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component published in April 2011. Congress in 2010 authorized 844,500 selected reservists on a baseline budget of 41 billion dollars. In the same year for 1,425,000 Active Component personnel it cost the U.S. government 218 billion dollars. The cost to mobilize 119,000 reservists in the same year was 12.7 billion dollars. The mobilization and augmentation of the active force by reserve components was a much more cost effective employment of resources the study found. However, this model is based on a model that the reserves must stay on a consistent non-deployment cycle or dwell time. If this model is continually broken, the cost of utilizing an operational reserve overtime will exceed the budget allocated for the reserve forces. The model that the comprehensive review board provided suggested that for every year deployed there should be five years in dwell, or a 1:5 ratio. As articulated in the study, if the cost effectiveness of the dwell cycle is not utilized, then the operational reserve construct overtime will not be cost effective and exceed the cost of active component forces during the same time period. It will comprise a 2% savings despite the need to deploy twice as many reserve units to active components over the same period of time (with a 1:5 deployment/dwell).

The non-deployment or dwell time is also important for recruitment in the reserves due to the nature of the culture. Unlike the active component, reservists have civilian careers to maintain in addition to their reserve careers. The 1:5 deployment ratio for deployment to dwell time is important to keep the reserve component viable and competitive in their civilian careers. If this cycle can be kept for future contingencies, this will help keep a predictable deployment cycle for the reserves and further the ability to keep qualified, experienced personnel in the reserves. The Soldier’s and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940 and the Uniformed Services
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 are pieces of Federal legislation that are geared to protect mobilized reservists civilian jobs when called to active duty. However despite this legislation that protects reserve members jobs while mobilized, the effect on their civilian careers would be immense if they are mobilized every other year or more. The ability to sustain the Staff Non-Commissioned Officer and Officer corps would potentially suffer as well if the dwell cycle continues to be broken. This will potentially affect the ability to keep experienced personnel in the reserves and affect the operational reserve model.

The United States’ traditional coalition partners are currently dealing with the issue of the global economic downturn. Many North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies are dealing with cuts in their defense budgets. Great Britain, for example, by 2015-2016, defense spending will only make up 2% of their Gross Domestic Product, down from 2.7% in 2010. France is also looking at cuts in their defense budget over the next three years ranging from 5 billion to 6 billion dollars. These significant cuts will affect both members of NATO’s ability to project military power as well as other NATO allies. The situation with global security continues to be a problem with rise of state and non-state actors. Without the traditional NATO and other U.S. allies operating around the globe, the United States military will have to take on more missions. With a reduction to the U.S. military force internally, this will increase the need for an operational reserve with the global security issues.

The past ten years of operational commitments, the growing instability of the global security situation and issues with cuts to the United States military and coalition partners will continue the need for an operational reserve. Despite these evident statistics and the calls for the operational reserve by the DOD, an effective operational reserve will not be possible if the mindset of the active and reserve forces is not changed. The strategic reserve concept must be
adjusted and the view of the reserves by the active force to ensure that the integration is seamless. Despite the amount of operational commitment by reserve forces, there is still the “them” mentality that the reserves are nice to have only in a national emergency. This mindset is based on the theory that active forces due to their full time training and experience are superior in their abilities and capabilities compared to their reserve counterparts. That mentality is also seen in the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps can change its table of organization for the reserves in order to try to change the mindset of the Marine Corps toward the reserves. However, without the total “buy in” by the DOD and the Joint services chiefs across the board, integration of joint reserve service entities will not meet the operational mindset.

The Marine Corps and the Air Force are structured and postured to quickly institute the operational reserve model into their global operations. The Air Force currently relies heavily on the Air Force reserve and Air National Guard. However they have been sourcing nearly 50% of their missions from the Guard and reserve going back to prior to OIF and OEF. The Marine Corps Reserve with nearly 39,000 personnel does not have the issues of trying to coordinate between the state agencies like the Army National Guard or even the Air National Guard. However, it is apparent the Air Force has de-conflicted issues between the state and the DOD to utilize the Air Force reserve more frequently. However, the Army consistently has to deal with the National Guard being pulled for national disasters and the states retaining more control. The majority of the Army reserve combat units reside in the National Guard. The U.S. Army reserve is comprised mainly of combat support elements. With the states retaining the majority of the Army’s combat arms, it makes the Army Reserve a much more disjointed force when the need utilize a “total force” concept in the future for the reserve. The state control makes another bureaucratic layer that can be problematic when relying on the National Guard for the combat
arm element of the Army Reserve. The Marine Corps does not have to deal with this problem. The Navy views their reserve system mostly as reservists are mobilized as individual augmentees. This is counter to the true operational reserve model. However, it is something to consider for the Air Wing and pilots augmenting active squadrons. The Marine Corps initially does not have some of the obstacles that the other services will have to address in the establishment of a true operational reserve. However, fighting the perceptions of the reserves and changing the nearly fifty year structure (that has been part of the Marine Corps Reserves) will be difficult.

The Marine Corps Force Structure Review, published in April 2011, outlined what the Marine Corps force structure would compose during post OEF/OIF. The new structure, proposed from the review, focused on how to make the Marine Corps still operationally viable with a reduced force size due to future budgetary cuts. The strategy, as outlined by the General James Amos, Commandant of the Marine Corps, stressed a reliance of continued augmentation of the active force with reserve forces, namely “a fully integrated operational reserve.” This ideology focuses on a need to continue to meet operational requirements with a reduced force structure. This is a continuation of the augmentation of reserve forces post OIF/OEF. The active force would be cut from 202,000 to 182,000. The Marine Reserves (that currently consists of 40,000 personnel) would remain at 39,600. Thought the active force is being cut significantly, the reserves will retain about the same force structure. This is a reinforcement of the Commandant’s focus on continued utilization of the reserves and more importantly the need for an operational reserve.

The prior content of this paper has focused on the history of the Marine Corps reserve and the current DOD view of the operational reserve and the framework for the joint community,
which will dictate and could affect the future organization of the Marine Corps Reserve, and the manner in which the joint services view and employ their reserve force. This information sets the conditions for discussing what the operational reserve of the Marine should look like and how it should be employed. The historical context of the reactivation of the 4th Marine Division in 1963 and subsequently the establishment of Marine Forces Reserve was formed with a strategic reserve mindset. Secretary McNamara tasked the Marine Corps with structuring itself with four Divisions and a supporting wing component. During the Cold War, the view that a reserve Division maybe needed to mobilize was a relevant thought due to the nature of the size and scope of what the active military would potentially face in a conventional conflict with the Soviet Union or China. However, even during Vietnam, it became evident that the mobilization of a division size force was problematic not only from a logistical and manpower standpoint, but also politically. President Johnson, when it was offered to mobilize the reserve for Vietnam, decided against this idea. The employment of a reserve force brings the nature of the warfare to every community across every state. In addition, the military had enough manpower for global contingencies due to the draft. An operational reserve always has to contend with the political implications of casualties because all of the Marines or service members are usually from that area. Mobilizing an entire division would encompass almost every major community in the United States since that is the way the geographic distribution is done for recruiting. In the Marine Forces reserve this is a true implication if the entire division should ever be mobilized.

In order to make the Marine Corps Reserve a truly operational reserve, Marine Forces Reserve and the 4th Marine Division and the 4th Marine Air Wing need to be reorganized. The current structure only reinforces the old strategic mindset and establishes a bureaucratic headquarters that only hinders the integration of the reserve units within the active force. The
headquarters of the division and wing are irrelevant if the Marine Corps want to build an operational reserve and move away from a strategic mindset. The Marine Corps cannot establish an operational reserve without first removing an archaic structure that was built almost fifty years ago. However, the regimental units and below on the ground side and the group units and below on the wing side should keep their organizational structure. This will facilitate the reserve regiments and the groups to be absorbed into the active force model. For example, all ground units east of the Mississippi would fall under II MEF and the all others units to the west would fall under I MEF control. This would facilitate better command and control between the active forces and the reserve forces. The current construct does not facilitate the ability for the active force to understand the reserve force. The perception is, much like the strategic model, this will force a mindset in the active force that here comes the reservist that is only deployed during a national emergency. It does not matter how many times the reserve unit has deployed the current structure will only continue to facilitate this mindset. It is disjointed at best and does not allow for an optimal command relationship between the reserve units and the active force. It also helps to perpetuate ignorance throughout the active ranks of the reserve force and its capabilities.

If the reserve infantry regiments or the groups of the Air Wing are reporting to the respective active division or MEF’s in their chain of command, this will quickly help facilitate the operational mindset and employment of the reserve forces much better. The active Generals will have a better knowledge of the capabilities, personalities, and leadership of the reserve elements in their respective commands. This allows for much more seamless employment when the reserves are mobilized. It also defeats the ignorance of the active forces to the reserve forces. If the active forces (outside the Inspector and Instructors) now are responsible for the training,
equipping and mobilization of the reservists it will make the ability to integrate the reserve forces better during operational commitments around the globe.

The logistics combat element (LCE) of MFR and the other combat arms units (that do not break up well evenly from east to west) such as the tank battalion or engineer battalion would be organized to augment the active and reserve component. A liaison headquarters, much like a smaller MFR headquarters, would supervise the requests for these units to augment the active component. This smaller headquarters could be located at HQMC or as a reduced headquarters in New Orleans. It would much like currently augment the active and reserve component for these enablers upon request. The other option would be to make the regimental headquarters (reinforced) with these units falling under that headquarters. The divisions would still retain control and these units could as part of the regiment when mobilized or with a battalion (reinforced) when mobilized. This keeps unity of command under the active division and these elements could continue to augment the active component and fall under their chain of command.

The training of the reserves would be enhanced by this model as well. During the monthly drill cycles depending on the geographic location, some reserve units could drill and train regularly with active component forces. For example, some companies from 23rd Marine Regiment could regularly be integrated into training with 1st Marine Division infantry regiments on drill weekends due to their proximity to Camp Pendleton. For the units further away the three day standard drill period would not facilitate this. However, during annual training exercises, which take place once a year for usually a two week period, the AT’s would be conducted in conjunction with active battalion and regimental training. This would build cohesion between reserve and active forces and would establish good command relationships and enhance the
training opportunities for the reserve forces with the active duty units. Additionally, when an active duty Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) (is tasked to deploy) the restructured operational reserve construct provides the ability to reinforce the active component with a credible, capable reserve force that has a working relationship with active division units.

The same model should be used for the Marine Air Wing groups. Due to their use of aircraft and the ability to fly to training installations, drill weekends, depending on distance, could much more easily focus on training with active squadrons. The annual training period as well should be conducted in concert with the active squadrons. This, again, will build good command relationships and in the event the active force goes forward, the reserve squadrons can augment the active forces much more easily because of the command structure and relationships that have been built.

The model of placing the reserves in the direct command and control of the active force also allows for more joint training. The active commander will be able to coordinate and employ reserve units much easier in joint exercises if they do not have to coordinate through MFR to task training with joint forces. As discussed before, the ability to conduct operations in a joint environment will continue to be essential due to the reductions in the size of the active U.S. forces and its coalition partners. The necessity to coordinate joint training for the reserves will increase. In this model the active force will be force to recognize and augment reserve forces into joint exercises within the U.S. and around the globe. This will only help to increase the reserves ability to operate in more environments and help ensure the ability to augment joint forces.

The operational reserve model of the reserves being part of the active table of organization also enhances the number of personnel and equipment ready to support training and operations. For example, the ability to task a reserve Cobra squadron (to support an active close
air support exercise) is much easier to task and coordinate when the unit reports to the active headquarters. The current structure facilitates the active unit having no relationship with the reserve units. They currently have to go through MFR to try to request reserve support for training. This would only enhance training opportunities for the active force and the reserves. Due to the constrained budgets ahead for the Marine Corps and the military, there will not be as many training opportunities, especially when ordnance and fuel and other commodities are not as abundant. However, giving the active force another avenue to utilize other training resources will only enhance training and give more opportunities. Even in a larger military budget of today, there are many times when active units would like to train with aviation or augment their training with more personnel. However, these units cannot train with these units because of the dwindling window with deployments and not enough aircraft or personnel to go around. The operational model proposed would give those active commanders the ability to request training and support from the reserves in coordination with drill periods and annual training exercises.

The supply and logistical support for Marine Reserve units would be streamlined with a re-organization with the active divisions. The issues with the supply system were highlighted when reserve units mobilized during OIF/OEF. The units were sent to different installations but usually on the west coast. During the units’ pre-deployment training they were put in an administrative command relationship with the active division. The administrative command relationship meant that the supply and equipping of these units would now fall under the active division. Most units however found that this was not the case. They would show up to their mobilization site to draw gear (for Marines may have been missing gear or for recently added augments) only to be told that the responsibility rested with Marine Forces Reserve in New Orleans. The 4th Marine Division G-4 would then tell the battalion that the responsibility rested
with the active division. This lead to Marines in many cases losing out on training because in the many reserve units had to reach back to their regimental headquarters (or unit equivalent) or MFR for supplies and equipment for their Marines going to combat. If the reserve units were assigned to the active divisions this inefficiency would be streamlined. The process and line of accounting for units when they mobilized would be already in place to accept these units at the active installations. There would be an established relationship much like the tenant units assigned to the active installations and division.

Mobilized reserve units during OIF/OEF also experienced issues with training areas and facilities. The units were often seen by the division headquarters (who were engaged in preparing their units for combat deployments) as a nuisance. If the reserve units were integrated through their command relationships with the active component much of this would be avoided. The G-3 and G-4 through the integrated staff would have these units augmented and planned for in the divisions Training and Exercise Employment Plan (TEEP). This would act as a forcing function to ensure that reserve units are integrated appropriately because the active component that is utilizing them would be responsible for their training, equipment, and employment as part of the division when mobilized to augment their active division.

The ability for the active force to capitalize on the skill sets of the reserves also will increase with a direct command relationship. As has been seen in counterinsurgency training, levying the number of police officers in the reserves would be easier to build police training teams (PTT) (not just for the active force) but around the world to train coalition partners. This has been done in the past, but due to the current command structure a naval message would have to go through MFR to try to request this. The proposed command structure would allow the active Division to go right to the reserve regiments and requests the SME that is needed.
The current reserve structure also is already built to quickly absorb the reserve regiments with the requisite command structure and staffs to run the regiment. Each reserve regiment is currently commanded by an active command screened Colonel. The battalions have the active duty staffs and Inspector and Instructors to help facilitate the battalions training and integration. The promotion opportunities for the reserve officers after O-5 would remain the same. The difference is that their assignments would be based on augmentation to the active divisions as the staff or for the few reserve General Officers, the Assistant Division commander billet would be a reserve General Officer position.

The addition of reserve component Marines to the active duty table of organization will bring added necessity for more officers to manage reserve affairs at the division and MEF staff level. This will be accomplished by constructing a cell in the G-1 and G-3 to handle reserve personnel and operational issues. For example, the G-1 will have a reserve personnel cell that reports and handles reserve personnel issues. Reserve administration issues for mobilizations, pay, and other issues will have to be handled separately since they fall under the MCRAAM. However integration will be achieved with this cell working for and reporting to the active G-1. The G-3 will consist of a cell that handles reserve operational employment and issues. Much like current plans and future plans, subset cells in the G-3 currently, the reserve cell will work to handle reserve training and operational employment issues and report directly to the active G-3 (See Appendix I). This will achieve good synchronization across the force. This is much better than the separate G-3 (for the 4th Marine Division) trying to coordinate issues with mobilizations, training, and other issues with the active force currently. The manpower to fill these billets would come from within the Active Reserve component and individual augment construct that currently fills 4th Marine Division’s staff from the reserve force.
The consolidation of Marine Forces Reserve into the active component also will save facility costs and personnel costs for the MFR and Division Headquarters. The Marine Corps Support Facility New Orleans (situated next to the Federal Complex or “Federal City”), which houses both headquarters in New Orleans Louisiana, was built for 166 million dollars. The Federal Complex opened in 2011 at a cost of 115 million dollars to the state taxpayers of Louisiana and 56 million dollars to the Marine Corps. Despite being a new facility, consolidating the reserve personnel to support the operational reserve in both active divisions would save money on facility and personnel costs. The savings associated with maintenance costs and personnel would be significant. The Federal city currently has 1300 Marines and 600 civilians assigned to that support MFR activities which would be transferred to support the active divisions.

The personnel support would significantly be reduced if MFR units were consolidated under the active component. Some of these personnel would be transferred to support the division staffs which would be necessary for integration and manpower requirements with the added reserves. The movement of these personnel would however bring political pressure. The Marine Corps has a long relationship with New Orleans. This relationship dates back to 1804 when Captain Daniel Carmick commanded a detachment of 122 Marines at the Marine Barracks, Navy Yard, New Orleans. In addition, the money that the state of Louisiana donated for the construction of the Marine Support Activity facility would meet significant political pressure.

There are two ways that the Marine Corps could address the potential political problems associated with re-organization and movement of MFR personnel: 1) The portion of the Marine Support Activity could be given back to the state of Louisiana for state use. This ensures tax dollars are not wasted. The state due to its proximity to the Mississippi River and New Orleans
could use this for the state national guard or disaster relief (hurricanes). 2) The Marine Corps could retain a certain portion of the facility (for local reserve units) while giving a majority back to the state. This would keep a Marine Corps presence in the city of New Orleans and please the political constituents in the local area.

The current structure of MFR, the reserve division, and the wing will not facilitate an operational reserve. The Marine Corps needs to eliminate the current command structure above the regimental/group level and place these units under the administrative, operational, and tactical control of the active Marine Expeditionary Forces and the active Divisions. This will facilitate the operational reserve being a much more viable part of the active duty missions around the world. The current organization for Marine Forces reserve will continue to hinder the operational mindset and employment. The additional administrative requirements for the individual augmentation and frequency of reserve unit deployments will need to be re-visited as well as the Title X requirements. The active force with this construct will better understand employ the reserves while the reserves will grow in capability and a seamless transition into operations due to their command relationships, training, and working relationships with the active forces. The active component should seek to ensure this transition occurs because in the end they are “the customer.” In the times of need, it ultimately is the active component that is requesting reserve units for augmentation. For all the reasons listed, for the challenges of the future to the force and the increased need and responsibility of reserve integration to future missions, the proposed model should be followed for the command relationship between the reserves and the active component.
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3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., 228.
5 Ibid., 229.
6 Ibid., 228.
8 Ibid., 15.
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10 Ibid.
12 Ibid., 3.
13 Ibid.
14 Winkler, 17-18.
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26 Transforming the Reserves, 22-23.
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