**Title:** Marines in the Interagency: Are We in the Right Places?

**Abstract:** Marine Corps interagency participation insufficiently integrates into Marine Corps strategy to facilitate accomplishing the most likely Marine Corps missions in the coming years. This paper highlights that the Marine Corps' future will consist of joint and multinational forces operating in austere environments, focused on engagement activities to build partner nation capacity, essential services, and counterinsurgency missions. The most likely lines of operation that Marines will be responsible for leading or implementing are civil security, essential services, and economic development. Intelligence will be a critical factor in that success. The Corps’ will most frequently do this partnered with the Departments of State, Justice, and Homeland Security, The Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and their subordinate agencies and administrations. To succeed in future missions the Marine Corps must first and foremost maintain its core capabilities and expeditionary nature while increasing and realigning assignments/fellowships within the identified government departments and key civilian organizations.

**Subject Terms:** interagency; fellowship; manpower; future missions; Marine Corps
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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

Marines in the Interagency:
Are We in the Right Places?

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

By

Major B.J. Grass

AY 11-12

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Approved: [Signature] Date: 1 May 2012

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Executive Summary

Title: Marines in the Interagency: Are We in the Right Places?

Author: Major Benjamin J. Grass

Thesis: Marine Corps interagency participation is insufficient because it fails to enhance the Corps’ ability to operate and it runs counter to what is called for in extant Marine Corps strategic documents.

Discussion: While the Marine Corps has made tremendous progress in the past few years integrating with the interagency, there is still significant room for improvement. This paper highlights that the Marine Corps’ future will consist of joint and multinational forces operating in austere environments, focused on engagement activities to build partner nation capacity, stability and reconstruction operations, and counterinsurgency missions. The most likely lines of operation that Marines will be responsible for leading or implementing are civil security, essential services, and economic development. Intelligence will be a critical factor in that success. The Corps’ will most frequently do this partnered with the Departments of State, Justice, and Homeland Security, The Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and their subordinate agencies and administrations. To succeed in future missions the Marine Corps must first and foremost maintain its core capabilities and expeditionary nature. All the while, they must increase and realign assignments/fellowships within the identified government departments and key civilian organizations and increase advanced civilian educational opportunities to learn more about the impending lines of operation that will make Marines successful in the future.

Conclusion: The Marine Corps should:

1) Identify an entity or organization that synchronizes interagency integration efforts to benefit of the Marine Corps as a whole. This organization should further develop the Marine Corps interagency integration strategy discussed in Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025 and The Commandant’s Planning Guidance;

2) Develop a manpower management system to better identify what interagency organization(s) has Marines assigned;

3) Formalize current billets with the Department of State into Marine Corps Structure;

4) Start interagency assignments/fellowships at the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration, Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, or the U.S. Coast Guard for the active duty community;

5) Reinstate the CMC National Fellowship billets at USAID, U.S. Chamber of Commerce and realign the associated billet responsibilities that existed in 2006 to meet current Marine Corps requirements;

6) Review the relevancy of current think-tank fellowships to free up manpower for newly recommended fellowship opportunities;

7) Start an assignment/fellowship with a city/county manager/public works office; and

8) Better leverage national trade/professional organizations.
DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT. QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE.
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Preface

As any author knows, the completion of a monograph requires the assistance and sacrifice of many others. While the below list is not all-inclusive, I would like to thank some of those who helped me along this journey. First Dr. Marlo who spent numerous sessions helping me shape, then reshape, and finally refine the topic for this paper. His guidance and vision were tremendously useful, thanks Doc. Second is my mother, Sally. Throughout the past eight years of school and the countless papers I have written during that time, she has always found time to read them with a keen eye. Thanks once again for reviewing and providing feedback on this paper. Next are the Marines from Manpower and Reserve Affairs and George Meehan from Marine Corps Combat Development Command who took time out of their busy schedules to meet with me and provided great data for this paper. A special thanks to LtCol Bob Rice, and Maj Amy McGrath from PP&O; Rebecca DeGuzman, from the Marine Corps Center for Irregular Warfare; and Mike Cooper (Col, USMC Retired), from Marine Corps University. All of these folks gave up significant portions of their time while providing me valuable guidance, counsel, and data in support of my efforts. Thanks to the women from the Leadership Communications Skills Center at Gray Research Center. Their recommendations and feedback on earlier drafts was invaluable. Finally, I have to give thanks to my wife Jenn. She spent innumerable extra hours with our kids during this paper writing process. Without her unprecedented efforts with a newborn and a two year old, I would have never been able to spend the numerous hours hold up in the basement behind the computer.

While all these people played a tremendous role in helping shape this paper, the ideas, recommendations, and inevitable mistakes contained within are my responsibility and not necessarily supported by these people or their organizations.
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Introduction

One need not search very hard to find the call for the military to *play* more in the interagency. While a decade ago this interdependency was rare, today any Marine Officer or Noncommissioned Officer can tell stories about interacting with the wide range of departments and agencies that are conducting operations alongside today’s military. The Marine Corps Service Campaign Plan 2009-2015 tasked the Marine Corps Center for Irregular Warfare to look within the force to identify “key interagency skills” that were already organic within the Marine Corps.¹ Near simultaneously, Headquarters Marine Corps, Plans, Policy, and Operations (PP&O) led an Operational Planning Team to address the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) task to increase Marines Corps integration in the interagency.² This planning team, using the latest CMC Planning Guidance and building upon work done by PP&O in 2009 captured in a document titled “Vision and Strategy 2025 Implementation Planning Guidance Task #27,” confirmed a significant shortfall of Marine integration in the interagency and recommended seven billets that would benefit the Marine Corps.³ These billets, while unquestionably beneficial to the Marine Corps, are not adequate to address the lack of Marine Corps integration in the interagency.

This paper argues that Marine Corps interagency participation is insufficiently integrated into Marine Corps strategy to facilitate accomplishing the most likely Marine Corps missions in the coming years. Using a combination of archival research, current formal Marine Corps leadership guidance, and original research and analysis, this paper highlights likely Marine Corps missions in the future and provides recommendations beyond those mentioned above to increase Marine Corps interagency integration. To do this the paper will first review the contention that Marine Corps integration in the interagency will greatly increase the likelihood of mission
success in the future by looking at what those future missions will be. From there this paper will identify the lines of operation that will increase the probability of success. Next, the paper will show that even after implementing the recommendations of the 2010-2011 PP&O Operational Planning Team, current Marine Corps interagency integration does not adequately support likely future missions. The paper will conclude with some recommendations to help ensure that the United States Marine Corps interagency participation sufficiently integrates into Marine Corps strategy to facilitate accomplishing the most likely Marine Corps missions in the coming years. While there are numerous things that can and should be done to fix Marine Corps-interagency integration (increased and better focused interagency participation in military education programs, increased interagency representation within the Marine Corps structure, etc) this paper focuses on where the Marine Corps needs to be to better accomplish likely future missions.

Future Missions and the Operating Environment

In his 2010 *Commandant’s Planning Guidance*, (CPG) General James Amos unequivocally stated that the Marine Corps will improve integration with the interagency.\(^4\) Today’s economy will continue to cause tremendous resource constraints on not only the entire nation, but also the entire world. Based on these constraints there is no doubt that interagency integration is a necessity to achieve mission success in the future. Key questions that must be addressed are: what are these likely missions, where will they take place, and which departments, agencies, or other entities will be leading or assisting the Marine Corps during those missions. Once identified, the Marine Corps can better plan on where it needs to be in order to learn from, coordinate with, and influence those organizations.

The Marine Corps will return to its amphibious roots and again focus on operating from the littorals.\(^5\) While the Corps must continue to conduct the four core competencies that are
reflective of legislative direction and codified in public law (persistent forward naval
engagement as the Nation’s force in readiness, employing integrated combined arms across the
range of military operations as part of a joint or multinational force, providing forces for service
aboard naval ships on stations or for operations ashore, and conducting joint forcible entry
operations from the sea and developing amphibious landing force capabilities and doctrine),
these will not be the most likely missions. Instead the Marine Corps will likely spend the
preponderance of its efforts conducting noncombat missions such as engagement activities –
training, mentoring, and advising foreign militaries; irregular warfare, including
counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism (CT) missions; stabilization and reconstruction;
Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs); and Humanitarian Aid/Disaster Relief (HA/DR).
Another important consideration is the fact that these missions will likely take place in austere
environments, as opposed to the built up forward operating bases of Iraq and Afghanistan. This
fact should cause Marines to reevaluate their expeditionary readiness levels.

The CPG identifies that “the future will not be like today” but that Marines will continue
to conduct operations from the littorals. MCVS 2025 also states that, based on the Corps
persistent forward naval engagement mandate, the force is required to be “deployed with our
Navy shipmates and engaged in the littorals.” Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025 (MCVS
2025) continues by reaffirming the four enduring core competencies that are public law. Those
four core competencies will continue as directed by law but Dr. Thomas Barnett, a widely
published author and speaker, noted that he thought there would be a decreasing need for forcible
entry missions in the future. The benefits of an interagency presence on these traditional
military missions, requiring traditional military skill sets, is minute compared to the substantial
impact interagency skill sets can have on less conventional military missions.
This paper argues that the Marine Corps will increasingly focus on engagement activities such as training, mentoring, and advising foreign militaries. Both the *MCVS 2025* and the *CPG* highlight “Engagement Activities,” specifically training, advising, and mentoring, as future missions the Marine Corps will execute.\(^\text{11}\) These missions routinely include host nation security forces that frequently execute homeland security/homeland defense missions within their country. While this homeland security mission is more closely aligned with other federal agencies than it is with the Marine Corps, the Marine Corps will none-the-less help to train these individuals. Major Seth Anderson, while a student at the School of Advanced Warfighting, noted that “Building Partner Capacity” missions were likely to increase in the future. Acknowledging a military aspect of these types of missions, he argues these missions are best accomplished when leveraging interagency partners or non-governmental organizations’ (NGOs) knowledge, skills, and abilities.\(^\text{12}\)

Aside from training domestic security forces, the Marine Corps will likely find itself conducting irregular warfare missions. Irregular warfare, including both counterinsurgency operations and counterterrorism operations, is specifically addressed in both the *MCVS 2025* and the *CPG*.\(^\text{13}\) While traditional military core competencies are useful for those missions, even more important to America’s international partners are those homeland security skill sets maintained by U.S. government departments and agencies other than the Department of Defense. Dr. Barnett also argues that the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps should focus on growing and developing a small wars force.\(^\text{14}\) Academic thought within the military agrees with this point. In his 2008 Future War paper, Major Kevin Hutchinson talks about future warfare, including counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency, he argues, requires an “indirect” approach using “soft” skills that are traditionally absent from even our most highly trained special operations forces.\(^\text{15}\)
Think tank publications such as the RAND Corporation’s *Developing U.S. Army Officers’ Capabilities for Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Environments*, also highlight the “irregular challenges” in the current security environment.  

Stabilization and reconstruction missions will also increase in the future. *MCVS 2025* mentions using the “routine, rotational deployments of special purpose MAGTFs” for stability missions. The *CPG* uses a quote from former CENTCOM Commander Marine Corps General Anthony Zinni, which highlights that stable and unstable worlds are colliding. The inclusion of this quote leads one to believe that the Marine Corps will have a role in dealing with this instability in the future. This instability frequently leads to NEOs and HA missions. The U.S. Army has gone so far as to create doctrine to deal with these increasingly likely stabilization missions. In the foreword of *U.S. Army Stability Operations* FM 3-07, Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell IV calls FM 3-07 “a milestone in Army doctrine” and he says it is “charting a path for tomorrow.” Dr. Barnett agrees with this view of the future because he forecasts that a resource constrained world coupled with rising demand will cause “more destabilizing civil strife” instead of “great power conflict.” A growing number of think-tank publications including, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* by the United States Institute for Peace highlight their belief in the likelihood of future stabilization and reconstruction missions. These reconstruction missions are occasionally the result of natural or man-made disasters and take the form of disaster relief missions. The RAND Corporation believes this mission is so likely that it drafted *The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building*, a 330 page monograph that defines how to conduct stability and reconstruction missions.

Finally, the austere nature of the future operating environment will have a tremendous impact on operations. Both the *MCVS 2025* and the *CPG* discuss the physical environment
future missions will take place in rather than just dwelling on the missions themselves.\textsuperscript{23} Emphasizing the austere environments, rather than just a specific mission, highlights useful skill sets Marines lack and organizational partners the Marine Corps could collaborate with to make the mission a success. While the austerity of these environments might prevent some of the Corps’ interagency partners from operating there, other organizations have unique capabilities the Marine Corps would find useful, particularly related to energy efficiency.

Based on the above discussion, this paper concludes that the preponderance of future Marine Corps missions will be less forcible entry – combat and more complex expeditionary – non-combat operations (see Figure 1). These “softer” missions require skill sets across the

![Figure 1: Range of Military Operations\textsuperscript{34}](image)

Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence, and Law Enforcement (DIMEFIL) elements of national power, not just hard military power skill set. The military frequently addresses these other elements of national power in terms of \textit{Lines of Operation}.\textsuperscript{24}
Lines of Operation and the Operating Environment

The ideal interagency partner would be an organization that 1) the Marine Corps will work with during overseas operations and 2) has capabilities that do not exist within the Marine Corps. Recognizing that not every interagency partner will be operating overseas, this paper argues that there is still value in working domestically with departments and agencies that have skill sets not organic to the Marine Corps. By learning the basics of these skill sets the Marine Corps will better posture itself for success in the above-mentioned future missions. Based on these most likely missions, engagement activities, irregular warfare, stabilization and reconstruction, NEOs, and HA/DR--multiple lines of operation become apparent. Good intelligence and energy efficiency are two capabilities that will enable the Marine Corps to succeed in the future. From these lines of operation and the crosscutting capabilities, the Marine Corps can better identify which interagency partners will be most critical to future mission success.

FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency identifies Governance, Civil Security Operations, Essential Services, and Economic Development as lines of operation needed in a counterinsurgency campaign. The U.S. Army Stability Operations FM 3-07 also identifies Civil Security, Essential Services, Governance, Economic and Infrastructure Development, and adds Civil Control as lines of operation for stability operations. RAND Corporation’s James Dobbins et al. in their guidebook The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building highlight many of the same lines of operation. They similarly identify Security, Governance, and Economic Stabilization, while adding Humanitarian Relief, Democratization, and Development. While the author is not arguing that nation-building is a future Marine Corps mission, many of the activities mentioned in The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building are also valuable during
irregular warfare missions and non-combat Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).

Finally, in the *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, Beth Cole from the United States Institute for Peace argues that the *Guiding Principles’* end states are safe and secure environment, rule of law, stable governance, sustainable economy, and social well-being.

![Strategic Framework for Stabilization and Reconstruction](image)

*Figure 2: Strategic Framework for Stabilization and Reconstruction*²⁸

(see Figure 2).²⁹ These lines of operation consist of capabilities that do not traditionally exist within military skill sets and are many of the things that U.S. Departments and agencies, other than the Department of Defense, frequently provide within the United States.

Recent operations in Afghanistan and Haiti both provide an idea as to what interagency partners the Marine Corps will likely see in the future and the type of austere environment Marines will encounter. At least nine other federal government departments and agencies, along with urban search and rescue teams from the county and city level, and numerous U.S. based non-governmental organizations, including the Red Cross, Salvation Army, World Vision, and
Grass, 9

International Organization for Migration supported operations in Haiti. A review of U.S. departments and agencies working in Afghanistan reveals many of the same organizations and many more non-governmental organizations (see Table 1).

**Table 1**

| U.S. Departments and Agencies, and Non-governmental organizations working in Haiti (post 2010 earthquake) and in Afghanistan |
|-----------------|-----------------|
| **Haiti** | **Afghanistan** |
| U.S. Department of State | U.S. Department of State |
| U.S. Department of Health and Human Services | U.S. Department of Health and Human Services |
| U.S. Department of the Interior | U.S. Department of Justice – FBI, DEA |
| USAID | USAID |
| Office of Personnel Management | Federal Aviation Administration |
| Federal Communication Commission | U.S Department of Agriculture |
| National Aeronautics and Space Administration | Office of the Director of National Intelligence |
| Red Cross | Red Cross |
| Salvation Army | World Vision |
| World Vision | World Food Program |
| World Food Program | International Organization for Migration |
| International Organization for Migration | *For a more complete listing of NGOs in Afghanistan see [http://afghanistan-analyst.org](http://afghanistan-analyst.org)* |

The recurring themes in these operations are security/civil security, governance, essential services, and economic development. Based on the impending downsizing of the military due to economic constraints, the complexity of the governance line of operation as experienced in the Iraq and Afghanistan nation-building missions, and the likely future missions discussed earlier, the author believes the governance line of operation is not a requirement for likely future missions. Of the other three lines of operation, the military will frequently find itself as the security lead, and a supporting effort for the reestablishment of essential services and economic development of a particular location. As such, those three areas should be the Marine Corps’ focus for interagency partner development.

In the United States, the U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of Homeland Security are the two agencies that are primarily responsible for civil security at the federal
government level. Specifically the Federal Bureau of Investigation; Drug Enforcement Administration; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; Bureau of Prisons; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Transportation Security Administration; U.S. Customs and Border Protection; and the U.S. Coast Guard, handle this line of operation domestically. At the state and local level there are state police and highway patrol, county sheriffs, and city/town police departments who provide the bulk of civil security services.

Within the United States, state and local institutions (public and private) traditionally manage essential services.* Frequently, city and county public works directors or city and county managers oversee and work with these service providers in their jurisdictions. Within the federal government, the Department of Health and Human Services oversees many essential services, and during emergencies, the Federal Emergency Management Agency often has statutory authority. The U.S. Department of Energy also operates in the essential services category; however, its operations and oversight within the line of operation is rather limited.

The U.S. Department of Commerce “promotes job creation, economic growth, sustainable development and improved standards of living…” while addressing the economic line of operation within the United States. Additionally the “Department of Labor fosters and promotes the welfare of the job seekers, [and] wage earners, … by improving their working conditions, … [while additionally] helping employers find workers.” Finally, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s mission is to “maintain a strong economy and create economic and job opportunities.” Below the federal government, many states also have a commerce department or state economic development agencies along with a state labor department. Outside of government agencies, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and its state and local affiliates

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* For this paper essential services are defined using the using the FM-07 Stability Operations concept of Sewer, Water, Electricity, Academics, Trash, Medical, Safety, Other (SWEATMSO).
are probably the best-known business federations that deal with the economic line of operation on a daily basis.37

The first theme that cuts across all lines of operation is intelligence. Good intelligence is frequently a key component determining whether missions are a success or failure. While the term *domestic intelligence* frequently conjures up more fright than any person is capable of containing in the United States, domestically focused organizations make up a significant portion of the Intelligence Community and play a very important role.† Additionally, while many of these organizations primarily focus domestically, all of them operate internationally as well. Marine Corps intelligence skill sets are best used against foreign military enemies whereas the domestic organizations expertise is in the internal security, stability, law enforcement missions that the Corps will frequently be training its overseas partners to conduct. Having reliable access to these domestically focused organizations’ foreign-intelligence and developing relationships with their intelligence personnel would be tremendously valuable.

The second crosscutting theme is the austere environment the Marines will encounter. As discussed above, all of the documents and discussions highlight the austere environment Marines will face in the future. As technology becomes more prevalent on the battlefield, so too does the Marine Corps’ need for fuel and energy increase to support and maintain that technology. As Marines continue executing distributed operations in less developed areas around the world, the energy footprint required to sustain those operations will multiply. In recent conflicts, this increasing demand for energy has required larger numbers of Marines to go into harm’s way to

provide the logistical support (fuel and battery resupply, corrective and preventative maintenance, etc.) necessary to sustain this growing energy appetite. General Amos especially mentions, “The future security environment requires a mindset geared toward increased energy efficiency.” The austerity of the future environment and the asymmetrical threats the Corps will face demand a more energy efficient force to lessen the logistical burden. With expeditionary energy outside of the Corps’ core competencies, this provides a great opportunity to leverage interagency expertise. The Corps Expeditionary Energy Office does not have any formal partnerships but it does interact with interagency partners including the Department of Energy’s National Renewable Energy Laboratory and USAID to “raise mutual awareness.”

This section first established the lines of operation Marines are likely to be dealing with in future operations (see Figure 3). Next, it identified the federal departments and agencies responsible

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**Figure 3: Likely Lines of Operations and Intelligence, U.S. Departments and Agencies, Civilian Organizations, and non-governmental organizations**
for the security, essential services, and economic lines of operation within the United States and it reviewed some of the state and local government and nongovernmental organizations that are key players. Additionally, the section discussed the importance of intelligence partnerships with domestically focused departments and agencies. Finally, it highlighted some of the unique aspects of the future operating environment that also identified some likely interagency partners. The next logical step is to review the placement of Marines within these interagency organizations.

**Marine Presence in the Interagency**

Earlier this paper identified that interagency partnerships should be based on Departments and agencies that 1) the Marine Corps will work with during overseas operations and 2) have capabilities that do not exist within the Marine Corps. Given this, the ideal partner for the Marine Corps would be that organization that meets both of these, while a good partner would be departments or agencies that meet at least one of the above criteria. Having identified what those partner organizations do, this paper will now review where Marines are within the interagency. It is first important to understand the ways the Marine Corps places Marines in the interagency.

The Marine Corps’ Manpower and Reserve Affairs Section uses three approaches to place Marines in the interagency. The first process is via assignment, which typically lasts between 24-36 months. This process is twofold; the first process involves assigning Marines to places where formal structure exists and assigning Marines to places where the Commandant has decided to over-staff for a short term while determining if the billet is worth formally incorporating into the Marine Corps structure. The second process is via fellowships, handled by Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Marine Corps University, and Headquarters Marine Corps.
Intelligence Department. These fellowships traditionally replace Intermediate and Top-Level school for Marine Officers. The final process is via Manpower Evaluation Requests. This process involves an interagency partner formally requesting a Marine to fill a billet within its organization and requires annual revalidation. This process is very infrequently used, and when it occurs, the Marine counts as an over-staff.

The Total Force Structure Division at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command manages the official Marine Corps structure. This structure is the allocation of every Marine Corps billet that exists within the Marine Corps’ authorized end-strength. A search of the Marine Corps structure in December 2011 identified 14 Interagency billets outside of the

Table 2
Total Force Structure Division Marine Billets in Interagency Organizations (Assignment).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department/Agency</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>National Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>Federal Aviation Administration</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Enforcement Administration (Intelligence Billet)</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Aeronautics and Space Administration</td>
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</table>

Department of Defense (not including the Marines assigned to the Marine Security Guard program or Defense Attaché program) (see Table 2). The billets identified by the Total Force Structure Division have remained unchanged since at least 2005.

In addition, there are eleven additional over-staff billets (see Table 3). While this number is close to being exact, it is highly probable that it does not completely capture the Marine Corps interagency presence. While Manpower and Reserve Affairs, specifically the

Table 3
Manpower and Reserve Affairs Marine Over-staff Billets in Interagency Organizations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Agency for International Development (USAID)</td>
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</table>
Officer and Enlisted Assignments-Distribution Sections, maintain visibility on Marine assignments Corps wide, they traditionally use a decentralized approach. These sections track Marines assigned to a particular Marine Corps Command (MCC) code; however, due to the decentralized nature of the Marine Corps, once a Marine arrives at that command he/she could subsequently be detailed to an interagency billet without Manpower and Reserve Affairs knowing exactly where this Marine is working. For example, within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence there are five Marine billets. However, when reviewing Marine Corps manpower management data, it shows these Marines assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency, not the actual office in which they are working. Without knowing exactly which commands have moved Marines to other departments or agencies, a complete picture of where Marines are working is not possible using the tools currently available.

Starting in 2000 the Marine Corps began the CMC National Fellows Program (frequently referred to as the Year-Out Program). This program, modeled after the Secretary of Defense Corporate Fellowship Program, consisted of 10 majors assigned to corporations for a year. In 2006, this program ended due to the increasing numbers of individual augments required for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. When it ended, it consisted of one Marine assigned to each of the organizations in Table 4. Several of these organizations are important to future missions, and this paper will revisit them in the recommendations section.

Table 4
CMC National Fellows Program 2005-2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wyser-Pratte Company</th>
<th>U.S. Chamber of Commerce</th>
<th>Center for Security Policy</th>
<th>Exxon Mobil</th>
<th>IBM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Office of Foreign Disaster (USAID)</td>
<td>Sears Holdings Corporation</td>
<td>The Home Depot</td>
<td>Boeing</td>
<td>Dell Inc.</td>
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</table>

What has continued is a conglomeration of interagency, civilian education, and “think tank” fellowships that serve as formal professional military education replacement. During
Table 5
Academic Year 2012-2013 Marine Corps University and Intelligence Department Marine Fellowships in Interagency Organizations.50 ‡

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department/Agency</th>
<th># of Billets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brookings Institution</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Center for Strategic and International Studies</td>
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<td>JFK School of Government, Harvard</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics Fellowship, Penn St</td>
<td>1-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoover Institution, Stanford</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SecDef Corporate Fellowship</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Studies Program, MIT</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Center for New American Security</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Intelligence Fellowship (ODNI)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
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<td>Department of Justice</td>
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<td>Tufts, Fletcher School</td>
<td>0-1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Post-Graduate Intelligence Program (PGIP)</td>
<td>0-0-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>22</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Academic Year 2012-2013 the Marine Corps will have 25 non-Department of Defense fellowships, up from 13 during the 2007-2008 academic year (see Table 5). (For a listing of all non-Department of Defense fellowships from Academic Year 2005-2006 through the present, see Appendix A.) In Academic Year 2012-2013, the Marine Corps expanded by adding Top Level School Fellowships at the U.S. Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, and State. The Junior Officer Strategic Intelligence Program (JOSIP), which accounts for six of the new billets, began in 2008. This large increase in numbers since 2008 paints a slightly distorted picture based on the addition of the JOSIP. While JOSIP has tremendous potential it was created, and has since been run, in a vacuum. JOSIP is not tied to the Marine Corps’ formal structure, the Marine Corps University fellowship program, or the manpower interagency over-

‡ Where “# - # - #” exists the first number reflects TLS Fellows, the second ILS Fellows, and the third Captains in the Junior Officer Strategic Intelligence Program. Three JOSIP billets are not yet slated for 2012.
staff process discussed previously. This lack of synchronization is further addressed in the final section.

When comparing the departments and agencies responsible for the civil security, essential services, and economic lines of operation in the United States and the non-Department of Defense Intelligence Community partners with the current alignment of Marine assignments and fellowships, it is clear that the Marine Corps is not adequately integrated into the interagency (see Figure 4). Considering the existing structure, over-staffs, and fellowships identified above there are currently 50 billets Marines fill within the interagency. While not directly addressing any of the likely lines of operation, the Department of State frequently is in the lead for overseas operations. Additionally, properly placed intelligence personnel can frequently leverage a disproportionate amount of support. Recognizing these two key points, the Marine Corps has staffed nine billets (one structure, five over-staff, three fellowships) within the Department of State, and 13 within the Intelligence Community (outside of the Department of Defense

![Figure 4: Marine billets within likely partner organizations](image_url)
Agencies). Add those 22 billets to the four billets currently filled within the line of operation partner organizations identified above in Figure 4, and only 26 of the 50 interagency Marine billets are with departments and agencies that the Corps will operate with overseas or that have skill sets the Marines are lacking. Over the past year, the Marine Corps has added several billets and fellowships at the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Justice and USAID, but there is still significant room for improvement. Recently the focus was increasing the Marine presence at the Department of State; however, it is time to expand the Corps’ focus to other departments and agencies relevant to future Marine Corps missions.

**Recommendations**

The combination of the impending resource-constrained environment, and the most likely future missions discussed above, will require the Marine Corps to integrate both effectively and efficiently with key interagency partners. As such, the recommendations that follow recognize the need for a coherent strategy and identify billets within the interagency organizations the Marine Corps will most likely operate with, as well as billets that can help develop skill sets that do not exist within the Marine Corps. These recommendations are not a silver bullet rather they are only part of the solution. A more complete solution will also require interagency partners to better integrate within the Marine Corps.

The Marine Corps needs a unifying document that could serve to synchronize the Corps’ interagency presence toward defined goals. Similarly, the Corps lacks a lead agency for interagency integration. Numerous personnel from, and products created by, Headquarters Marine Corps-PP&O, Headquarters Marine Corps-Intelligence Department, Marine Corps Combat Development Command (Total Force Structure Division), Marine Corps Center for Irregular Warfare, Manpower and Reserve Affairs (officer assignments, enlisted assignments),
Training and Education Command, and Marine Corps University demonstrate a knowledge of the *Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025* and the *Commandant’s Planning Guidance*. The disharmony is created because each of these organizations has a different interpretation and different outside influencers playing a role in their decision-making. As such, the current system for coordination is very disjointed and *ad hoc*. What should exist is an entity or organization that synchronizes these different organizations’ interagency integration efforts to benefit the Marine Corps as a whole. This organization should further develop the Marine Corps interagency integration strategy beyond that which appears loosely defined in the *Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025* and the *Commandant’s Planning Guidance*. Additionally, this organization could serve as an interagency skill set occupational field sponsor working with monitors and fellowship coordinators to match the right person for the right fellowship or follow-on assignment.

While the Marine Corps appears to be attacking the problem from many directions (Formal Structure, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Marine Corps University, Intelligence Department), these “attacks” appear to be loosely tied to requirements, and poorly coordinated by the service. On a positive note, the author found the respective “managers” very knowledgeable about their “front,” and working to make their managed billets as beneficial to the Marine Corps and the individual Marine as possible; however, the manpower tools they have do not facilitate this effort. The Marine Corps must develop a system to better identify what interagency organizations have Marines assigned.

While the recent work done by the PP&O OPT (for the *Commandant’s Planning Guidance* task to better integrate Marines in the interagency) has made improvements to the Marine presence in the interagency, its results were primarily within the Department of State.
After serving in two different interagency organizations (Drug Enforcement Administration, Office of the Director of National Intelligence) and been responsible for Marines assigned to two other organizations (Department of State, USAID) during the previous two years, the author believes the Marine Corps now has the right mix of personnel (the overall number, appropriate ranks, and in the correct offices) assigned to the State Department and should turn its focus elsewhere. Additionally, at least one of the billets the Marine Corps is filling at the Department of State has been on a Memorandum of Understanding for nearly ten years. To demonstrate their desire for a long term commitment with the State Department, the Marine Corps should look to formalize that billet, along with the recent additions coming out of the PP&O “USMC Integration with the Interagency” OPT, by updating the existing Marine Corps Structure instead of relying on recurring Memorandums of Understanding.51

The Commandant’s recent comments regarding the creation of a “reserve law enforcement battalion” highlight an additional area that the Marine Corps should be exploring within the interagency.52 As noted in the above discussion, the civil security line of operation will be present in future Marine Corps missions. While the Marine Corps occasionally sends Marines to formal law enforcement training schools, and Marines frequently attend professional military education with numerous interagency law enforcement partners, this line of operation is completely unaccounted for in the Marine Corps interagency assignment and fellowship process.53 In recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Marine Corps has outsourced law enforcement advisors to defense contractors instead of utilizing its own Marines; despite having a large number of military police officers. Some interagency exposure via assignments or fellowships at the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration, Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, or the U.S. Coast Guard would be tremendously
valuable for the active duty community. While this interagency exposure will not eliminate the need for defense contractors serving as law enforcement advisors for large scale or long-term Afghanistan/Iraq-like missions, it would provide the Marine Corps an active duty cadre to serve as law enforcement advisors for the smaller scale and more likely stability and building partner-nation capacity missions the Corps will soon see. Another alternative, should assignments or fellowships not be available with the civil security organizations or if manpower permits the Marine Corps to do both, would be to leverage respected national associations. Examples of these organizations include the Major Cities [Police] Chiefs Association and the Major County Sheriffs’ Association.

There are tremendous opportunities within the essential services line of operation that will be critical in likely future missions, such as stability, reconstruction, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, and counterinsurgency operations. Beyond the Department of State billets that Marines are currently in, the Marine Corps should consider reinstating the CMC National Fellowship at the USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. When reinstating this fellowship, originally canceled to meet the increasing demands of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom Individual Augments, the Marine Corps must also realign the associated billet responsibilities that existed in 2006 to meet current Marine Corps requirements. One Marine strategically placed in the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance can provide a significant impact on Marine Corps humanitarian assistance/disaster relief efforts.

Another opportunity within the essential services line of operation would be an assignment or fellowship with a city/county public works office. Here, the assigned Marine could learn some particulars about identifying, managing, and coordinating the essential services needed to run a city for future stability and reconstruction missions. An alternative to city/public
works assignments or fellowships could be leveraging national organizations similar to the ones mentioned above in the civil security line of operation. Within the essential services line of operation, an organization such as the International City/County Management Association could provide tremendous learning opportunities to future essential services “LOO managers.”

Within the economic development line of operation, the Marine Corps’ options are numerous. First, the Marine Corps should reinstate the CMC National Fellowship at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. This fellowship location conceptually aligns with the economic line of operation for future Marine Corps missions discussed earlier; however, similar to the USAID fellowship discussed above, the Marine Corps must realign the associated billet responsibilities that existed in 2006 to meet current Marine Corps requirements. Additionally, numerous other billets from the CMC National Fellows Program, if scoped differently, could provide tremendous opportunities for Marines to learn about economic development. Increased educational fellowships at business schools would also boost Marines’ awareness within the economic development line of operation.

Discussions with the Marine Corps Expeditionary Energy Office highlight some other unique opportunities to explore. Partnerships with some of the above-mentioned interagency organizations could prove useful because organizations such as USAID or various NGOs face many of the same expeditionary energy, water, and waste challenges. Additionally, the Marine Corps could explore some “out-of-the-box” concepts. The research and development efforts/technology of companies like GM/Ford/Toyota, ExxonMobill/Shell/BP, or Siemens/Waste Management-WM (waste and waste water treatment divisions specifically) could

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§ Most of the 2006 billet descriptions for the CMC Fellows Program for fellowships at U.S. businesses were very logistics-best-practice focused (product distribution, supply chain management, shipping security, inventory management) instead of economic development line of operation focused (business development, economic trends analysis, investment opportunities, business sustainment, marketing, etc).
be beneficial to the Marine Corps expeditionary efforts. If the Marine Corps could develop or in some cases, like ExxonMobil, expand upon previous fellowships/relationships they have had with these companies it could prove very valuable to its expeditionary energy endeavors.

The final recommendation is to revalidate the Marine Corps billets with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) along with think-tank fellowship locations. As noted above only 26 of the 50 billets within the interagency tie into future lines of operation, intelligence organizations outside of the Department of Defense, or into the likely leader of many overseas missions, the Department of State. Based on the poor economy and impending downsizing of the Marine Corps, the ten billets at FAA and NASA appear to be less useful than they may have once been. Additionally, the Marine Corps should reconsider “think-tank” fellowships. While these opportunities undoubtedly broaden the horizons of future Marine Corps leaders, formal educational opportunities at places like Harvard, Yale, Stanford, and fellowships at future Line of Operation partner organizations, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation or a city/county manager office would be more relevant for future Marine Corps operations.

While the Marine Corps has made tremendous progress in the past few years integrating with the interagency, there is still significant room for improvement. This paper has highlighted that the Marine Corps’ future will consist of joint and multinational forces operating in austere environments, focused on engagement activities to build partner nation capacity, stability and reconstruction operations, and counterinsurgency missions. The most likely lines of operation that Marines will be responsible for leading or implementing are civil security, essential services, and economic development. The Corps will most frequently do this partnered with the Departments of State, Justice, and Homeland Security, The Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, and those organizations’ subordinate agencies and administrations. To succeed in future missions, the Marine Corps must first and foremost maintain its core capabilities and expeditionary nature. All the while, the Marine Corps must increase assignments/fellowships within the identified government departments and key civilian organizations, and increase advanced civilian educational opportunities to learn more about the impending lines of operation that will make it successful.
### Appendix A

**Top Level School Selections AY 2005-2006 to 2012-2013**

**Intermediate Level School Selections AY 2006-2007 to 2011-2012**

**Junior Officer Strategic Intelligence Program**

<table>
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<th>08-09</th>
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Where “# - # - #” exists the first number reflects TLS Fellows, the second reflects ILS Fellows, and the third reflects Captains in the Junior Officer Strategic Intelligence Program.

(##) reflects CMC National Fellows program.

*Three JOSIP billets are not yet slated for 2012.


4 Commandant’s Planning Guidance , 13.


6 MCVS 2025, 9-10

7 Commandant’s Planning Guidance, 3.

8 MCVS 2025, 9.

9 MCVS 2025, 9-10.

10 Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee Testimony, 26-27.


17 MCVS 2025, 15.

18 Commandant’s Planning Guidance, 3.


20 Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee Testimony, 9.


28 Cole, 2-8.

29 Cole, 1-6.


35 U.S. Department of the Treasury, [http://www.treasury.gov/about/role-of-treasury/Pages/default.aspx](http://www.treasury.gov/about/role-of-treasury/Pages/default.aspx).


37 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, [www.uschamber.com/about/history](http://www.uschamber.com/about/history).

38 *Commandant’s Planning Guidance*, 9.

39 LtCol Richard Schilke, personnel communications.

40 LtCol Mark Schroeder, MMOA-6, Interview by author on December 1, 2011. (Hereafter cited as LtCol Schroder interview).
41 LtCol Schroeder interview; Mike Cooper, Marine Corps University Fellowship Manager, personnel communications with the author November 2011-January 2012. (Hereafter cited as Cooper communications)

42 LtCol Schroeder interview.

43 George Meehan, Total Force Structure Division, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, interview with the author on December 14, 2011 and personnel communications with the author December 2011-January 2012. (hereafter cited Meehan communications)

44 Meehan communications; Cooper communications.

45 LtCol Orille, MMOA-3, interview with the author December 14, 2011; Maj Mark McCarroll, MMEA-1 interview with the author January 10, 2012; (Hereafter cited as Maj McCarroll interview). Capt Harry Reifschneider MMOA-5 interview with the author January 10, 2012. (Hereafter cited as Capt Reifschneider interview).

46 Maj McCarroll interview, Capt Reifschneider interview.

47 Maj McCarroll interview, Capt Reifschneider interview.


49 Cooper, “The CMC National Fellows Program”

50 Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, “Academic Year (AY) 12-13 Top Level School (TLS) Selection Board Results,” MARADMIN 739/11, Quantico, VA, December 20, 2011. The author was one of the first two Marines selected for the Junior Officer Strategic Intelligence Program and has remained involved in the program ever since. These billets are not formally captured in documents and the opinions are his based on leading the program since 2008 while it was under the purview of the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity. Major Amy McGrath, email message to author.

51 Rice, “DRAFT USMC Plan to Improve Integration with the Interagency as of 11 February 2011,” 1. LtCol Rice interview. Capt Reifschneider interview.


53 Rice, “DRAFT USMC Plan to Improve Integration with the Interagency as of 11 February 2011,” 5. The author has attended formal professional military education at the National Defense Intelligence College and the Marine Corps Command and Staff College with members of the U.S. law enforcement community.


The author was one of the first two Marines selected for the Junior Officer Strategic Intelligence Program and has remained involved in the program ever since. These billets are not formally captured in documents.
Bibliography


