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The Political and Military Impact of the Spanish-American War

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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Spanish-American War in 1898 was a watershed event for the United States, yet when asked, most Americans may only remember the phrase ‘Remember the *Maine!*’ Regretfully, many military members, whose professional military education involves the study of military history, cannot do much better in recalling the basic details of the war. The Spanish-American War has several lessons that should be studied to gain a better perspective of the reasons why the U.S. entered the war, the way the war was conducted, and the effects of the war.

My interest in the Spanish-American War was brought about by an assignment in Operational Art. As a result of my research, I realized that some of the foreign and defense policy concerns the U.S. faces today can be traced back to this period in American history. Although the country’s political and defensive posture has changed since 1898, I contend that the war provides lessons that are still applicable and should be reviewed. I am a firm believer that history repeats itself, so individuals need to educate themselves and be prepared to face similar dilemmas that our political and military leaders confronted at the turn of the century.

My betterment in this subject was a result of individuals offering their expertise in international relations, operational art, and professional military education. I would like to thank my mentor, Dr. Pauletta Otis, for her motivation, support, and encouragement in assisting me with completion of this study. Likewise Lieutenant Colonel John Dobes assisted me with review of precursor material in preparation for my analysis. The staff from the Gray Research Center provided me with invaluable research and editorial assistance, for which I am truly thankful. Most importantly, to my wife Sandra and children Anyssa, Ernest, and Evan who have always supported me and sacrificed so much that I may become a better Marine Corps Officer, thank you. *Todo es para la familia.*

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: The Political and Military Impact of the Spanish-American War

Thesis: The Spanish-American War was a significant event in American history because it thrust the U.S. into the role of a global power. Despite its ultimate success, the war exposed political and military weaknesses in planning, coordination, and execution; as a result these issues should be studied because of their applicability to U.S. foreign affairs and joint military operations.

Discussion: The Spanish-American War is a watershed event in U.S. history; yet, many Americans know little about the war or its significance. From April 22 to August 12, 1898, the U.S. and Spain fought a war over Cuban independence. Initially both countries attempted to avert war; however, U.S. public outrage over Spanish atrocities sensationalized through yellow journalism and the sinking of the *Maine* ultimately led to U.S. intervention in Cuba. President William McKinley desired a quick war with limited conflict to avoid wasting American lives. Military strategists realized that Spain's Navy was its center of gravity, so the U.S. targeted the Spanish fleets in the Caribbean and in the Pacific. On May 1, 1898, the U.S. Navy struck the first blow and destroyed the Spanish fleet in the Philippines. However, Commodore George Dewey required an invasion force to seize Manila. Similarly Admiral William Sampson successfully blockaded another Spanish squadron in Santiago, Cuba, but he too required an expeditionary force to assist him in destroying these ships. Consequently, an ill prepared and undermanned Army, consisting of Regulars and State Militia, quickly mobilized and deployed to Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. In Santiago, Admiral Sampson and Major General William R. Shafter struggled in conducting joint military operations as a result of their lack of cooperation, coordination, and unity of command. Likewise Admiral Sampson and Major General Nelson Miles initially experienced some contention over transportation resources during the Puerto Rico campaign. On the other hand, Commodore Dewey and General Wesley Merritt were able to execute joint military operations with few issues in the Manila.

In short, Spain capitulated because it lacked the resources and will to fight. With the elimination of the Spanish threat, the war turned from a struggle of freedom to one of territorial expansion. In some aspects, *Manifest Destiny* was used to justify the new American Empire. As a result of its victory over Spain, the United States became a recognized world power and gained possessions in the Pacific and the Caribbean.

Conclusion: In the end, the Spanish-American War launched the U.S. into the role of a global power. The abbreviated war was filled with consequences in diplomacy, leadership, information operations, mobilization, and joint military operations. In any case, the war the U.S. initially supported as a humanitarian crusade for Cuban liberty turned out to be a defining moment in the Nation's history. Many pundits believed that *Manifest Destiny* set the conditions for the U.S. to forge a new empire from the Far East to the Caribbean. Others supported a pacific course and believed that the U.S. should avoid becoming an imperialist Nation. Nevertheless, the Spanish-American War produced a revolutionary change in U.S. foreign policy and the long-range effects have impacted the U.S. throughout the past century. Careful study of the war with Spain is warranted for its historical value and significant contributions to warfare and foreign affairs.

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INTRODUCTION

“We had the city under our guns...But naval power can reach no further ashore. For tenure of the land you must have the man with a rifle.” – Commodore George Dewey¹

The Spanish-American War was a significant event in American history because it thrust the United States into the role of a global power. Despite its ultimate success, the war exposed issues in Army-Navy planning, coordination, and execution. This paper discusses the Spanish-American War and the political and military consequences of the war. The purpose is to contribute in better understanding the events and issues brought forth during the conduct of the war. The Spanish-American War occurred between April 22, 1898 and August 12, 1898, which is relatively a short period of time; however, its significance in American history should not be overlooked simply because of its brevity. It should be considered an event of great significance because the United States emerged as a world power. America’s foreign and defense policies changed: the need for a large Navy was confirmed; the Army was restructured and modernized. Expansionism was accepted through domestic adherence to the belief in *Manifest Destiny*. In addition, there were important changes for the Army and the Navy relating to diplomacy, leadership, information operations, mobilization, and joint military operations. The Spanish-American War forever changed the United States and its outlook on geopolitics.

This paper is designed to introduce “the splendid little war”² to the reader by examining the causes of the war, the conduct of the war, its aftermath, and finally the outcomes of the war. It is comprised of five sections. Section One provides information on the importance of studying the war in terms of diplomacy, information, military, and economics. Section Two examines the causes for the war and the efforts to avoid it. Section Three discusses the preparations for war, the strategic and operational settings, and the military campaigns in the Caribbean and Pacific

theaters. Section Four reviews the peace negotiations and the struggle to keep the Philippines as a U.S. possession. Section Five provides ten observations about the preparation and conduct of war. The intent is to demonstrate the importance of the war as it relates to U.S. foreign policy and its ability to make warfare.

SECTION 1: BACKGROUND

In order to support this analysis, an explanation is necessary to demonstrate the importance of studying the Spanish-American War. By the end of the 19th century, the United States was positioned for expansionism. After recovering from a Civil War and the Reconstruction Period, military visionaries and economic elites promoted expansion of the United States territory for trade purposes and supported the building of a larger naval force. However, some politicians considered expansionism a form of imperialism, counter to American founding principles, and instead wanted to remain a relatively isolationist country. Nevertheless, in 1898, many politicians used *Manifest Destiny* and the Monroe Doctrine as catalysts to promote United States involvement in Cuba and the Philippines. These ideas were the political and ideological foundation in supporting diplomatic actions against the Spanish throughout the war.

Information operations were key in promoting the drum beat for war. Media moguls, such as William Randolph Hearst of *The New York Journal* and Joseph Pulitzer of the *New York World*, sensationalized the atrocities Spain inflicted on poor Cubans who sought independence. Their yellow journalism tactics provided ammunition for Americans to support the war.³ As the newspaper war gained momentum, so did American attitudes toward supporting some type of intervention in Cuba. Policy makers paid attention. Although the press could not sway the United States into a war with Spain, a clear message was sent to indifferent European powers

that the United States would defend the Western Hemisphere against foreign influence. From a distance, Europe observed America's increasing influence on international affairs and its stated objectives to defend against tyranny.

Prior to the war, the U.S. Navy was better prepared than the U.S. Army in terms of strategic leadership and resources. Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, a naval theorist, emphasized the importance of having a strong forward Navy based on the "battleship concept," which placed the battleship as the centerpiece for the fleet. Likewise, Theodore Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, grasped this concept and made dramatic changes to support this idea. Conversely, the War Department had a frontier-constabulary Army inadequate to meet the demands of a war on foreign soil.⁴ Moreover the Army would be challenged to mobilize, deploy, and fight in two different theaters: the Caribbean and the Pacific. Both services would need to conduct joint operations in order to meet their military objectives, a challenge that had not been done since the Civil War.

Economically the country was well prepared to support its military. By the turn of the century, the economy was approaching industrial maturity, with advanced technology widespread, the modern corporation established, and consolidated economic power emerging as a means for maintaining U.S. stability and international trade.⁵ However, instability had plagued Cuba for quite some time and by 1895, American businessmen were genuinely concerned. Investments in Cuba amounted to between \$30 and \$50 million, and the annual export-import trade reached \$100 million.⁶ (President William McKinley took notice and shortly after the sinking of the *Maine* Congress authorized \$50 million in defense spending to prepare the military for war against Spain.) America's economic posture greatly assisted the war effort and in turn,

the war helped American business by supporting Cuban political stability, opening up new trade routes in the Philippines, Guam, and Hawaii.

By the time President McKinley entered office in 1897, the country was poised for war politically, militarily, and economically. The elements of national power were aligned and contributed to the success of the United States over Spain. Although brief, the Spanish-American War was significant because prior to intervention, the United States was only a marginal force in world affairs. Afterwards the United States had a stature equal to the other world powers and would continue to expand its involvement in geopolitics.⁷ Despite the U.S. success, the war exposed weaknesses that required attention. The consequences of the war demonstrate the importance of studying this war.

SECTION 2: PRELUDE TO WAR

On February 25, 1895, the *grito de Baíre* signaled the resurgence of Cuban insurrection (Cubans had never been satisfied under Spanish rule and had risen up before in 1868-1878). Poor Cubans, suffering from economic hardships, called for armed rebellion against Spanish authority. Cuba's unfortunate economic situation was directly linked to the United States' economic policies. The previous year, Congress levied a 40 percent tariff on sugar imports, which created a significant decrease in U.S. demand.⁸ The U.S. enacted an economic policy shift in response to the economic downturn caused by the Panic of 1893 (U.S. over speculation, the collapse of the railroad industry and ultimately, bank failure). Cuban economic problems escalated because the island depended heavily on U.S. markets to import sugar, Cuba's chief export. The effects of the economic tariff severely impacted the impoverished, but not the Spanish elite or Cuban loyalists. Economic desperation and intolerable living conditions helped

revitalize the quest for independence since reforms implemented after the Ten Years' War did not resolve certain economic problems.⁹

The cry for independence did not have immediate results in Havana. The insurgent leaders were quickly arrested and imprisoned. However, Cuban *juntas* in New York and Florida provided support to other Cuban insurgents led by Dominican Máximo Gómez. General Gómez applied lessons learned from the Ten Years' War and pursued a scorched-earth policy, specifically targeting the sugar industry, in order to gain the attention of wealthy Cubans to accept the revolution. Ultimately, Gómez thought Spain would “concede independence because the cost of maintaining control would exceed the yield of imperialist exploitation.”¹⁰ He also believed that American invention was required to achieve ultimate victory against Spain.¹¹ Spain sent over 150,000 men to pacify the insurrection, but the insurgents were able to avoid capture by living off the land and continually harassing Spanish forces on the island.

In 1896, after a year of failing results and continued resistance, Spain instituted a reconcentration policy under the military leadership of General Valerian Weyler y Nicolau. Essentially, reconcentration meant that rural farmers were forced to leave their homes in the district outskirts and relocated to areas near military headquarters. Additionally, travel was restricted and anyone caught assisting insurgents was subjected to military law. This action denied the insurgents assistance from the countryside and restricted movement.¹² General Weyler believed this tactic would bring pacification quickly because it would deny the insurgent leadership support and further recruitment from poorer, rural Cubans.

Pacification did not occur as expected because the insurgents continued to resist and move about freely in the districts not controlled by the Spanish Army. Furthermore, the reconcentration policy caused an estimated two hundred thousand *reconcentrados* deaths in

reconcentration camps because of the overcrowded and unsanitary conditions.¹³ This general outcry of human rights violations caught the attention of the United States public. Spain's reconcentration policy failed to produce the desired results for Cuba, and America's outrage at the atrocities grew as lurid newspaper accounts sensationalized the events.¹⁴

By March 1897, both President McKinley and Spanish Prime Minister Antonio Cánovas del Castillo wanted to avoid war between the United States and Spain. Prime Minister Cánovas had two concerns regarding the possibility of war. First, Cánovas required the support of the military and Catalan businessmen in order to keep the Conservative Party in power. Conceding to American foreign influence would have negative effects on his party. Second, he understood the historical significance Cuba, the Pearl of the Antilles, had within the waning Spanish Empire.¹⁵ Cuba's loss would mean an end to prestige of the Spanish Empire.

When President McKinley entered office, he was focused on domestic economic recovery. His plans were overshadowed by the Cuban crisis, which gained public attention through the press and a Congress that called for intervention. As a result, McKinley sent General Stewart Lyndon Woodford, newly appointed Foreign Minister to Spain, to broker a deal with the Spanish government under Queen María Cristina. While traveling through Europe, Woodford gained a sense that the other European powers would not intervene on behalf of Spain. Prime Minister Cánovas was assassinated before Woodford could engage him. General Woodford's mission was delayed until the fall of 1897 when Cánovas' successor was appointed.

Prime minister Práxedes Mariano Mateo Sagasta y Escolar was Cánovas' successor. He believed that independence was out of the question for Cuba; however, he was much more flexible in dealing with the rebels and the Americans.¹⁶ In order to appease the protagonists, he recalled Weyler and offered Cuba a degree of autonomy. This included a crown appointed

governor general to wield international relations and placed Cubans in charge of domestic affairs. The Spanish Army remained in place until pacification was complete. On November 15, 1897, Queen María Cristina signed the autonomy decrees for Cuba and Puerto Rico.

The insurgents did not respond favorably to home rule measures for Cuba. Both the Cuban *junta* and General Gómez rejected the deal and continued to fight for independence. Despite Spain's combination of military muscle and political concessions, pacification in Cuba was not attained.¹⁷ By the end of 1897, progress towards a solution to the Cuban situation stalled as human atrocities mounted; war between the United States and Spain seemed inevitable.

As 1898 began, the crisis further intensified as tensions heightened and international diplomacy deteriorated. On February 9, 1898, the *New York Journal* published an unauthorized letter from Spanish Minister Enrique Dupuy de Lôme. The letter discussed the political climate in Washington and Dupuy's opposition to negotiations with rebels. But the most damaging part of the letter openly criticized President McKinley and contained disparaging remarks calling the President a "weak bidder for the admiration of the crowd..." and "...a would-be politician, who tries to leave the door open behind himself while keeping on good terms with the jingoes of his party."¹⁸ Political outrage ensued and Dupuy resigned and returned to Spain. The Spanish government issued a letter of apology, but this was overshadowed by the catalyst event that would be the start of the war.

As protests and violence escalated in Havana, U.S. Consul General Fitzhugh Lee requested protection for American citizens. The *Maine* deployed to Havana as a "show of force." On February 15, 1898, the *Maine* exploded while anchored in Havana harbor and 266 of its crew perished. Newspapers and the public called for action. The public demand intensified when the U.S. Navy court of inquiry published its findings on March 21, 1898 and determined

that “the Maine was destroyed by the explosion of a submarine mine setting off the forward magazine.”¹⁹ Almost simultaneously, a separate Spanish commission (the U.S. rejected a joint commission proposed by Spain) concluded that the source was internal and the sinking was thus a horrible accident.²⁰ Nevertheless, the McKinley administration demanded indemnity for the *Maine* and independence for Cuba. Spain stalled for time in order to gain international support in hopes of mediation to adjust the differences of opinion. The international community recommended settlement, so Sagasta’s government finally agreed to compensation for the *Maine*, termination of *reconcentración*, and an armistice, but not independence for Cuba. By this point, U.S. intervention seemed unavoidable.

As a result of Spain’s failure to grant Cuba independence, continued instability in the region, embarrassing Spanish diplomatic errors, sensational media coverage of the rebellion, and the sinking of the *Maine*, the Spanish-American War commenced. On April 11, 1898, President McKinley asked Congress for armed intervention authority to support Cuban rebels. Following this request, annexation of Cuba became a political issue for the President. In order to avoid diplomatic recognition of the provisional government of the Cuban Republic, the Teller Amendment disclaimed any intention of the United States to annex Cuba.²¹ The joint resolution passed on April 19, 1898. Consequently, on April 22, 1898, McKinley ordered a naval blockade of Cuba. Spain, without international alliances, declared war on the United States on April 23, 1898. Two days later, the United States declared war on Spain; however, it was made retroactive to April 22, 1898 to coincide with the naval blockade.

From 1894 to 1898, a combination of political, economic, and military events led to the Spanish-American War. President McKinley was pacifically inclined and attempted to use diplomatic means to settle the Cuban dilemma, but events were beyond his control. Congress

recognized the need for U.S. intervention in Cuba and directed use of armed force to compel the Spanish evacuation of Cuba.²² Military intervention was a defining moment for the United States because it catapulted the country into war with a European power. In the past, wars were fought over independence for the oppressed rather than fought over national interests. The war required the Administration and the military to work together in order to meet the political objectives. Despite the positive outcome, each clumsily struggled through the planning, coordination, and execution of the war.

SECTION 3: CONDUCT OF WAR

The conduct of war requires the alignment of the people's will to support the war, the military's will to fight the war, and the politicians' will to win the war. There is little doubt that the support of the American people was the prominent factor in the initiation and sustainment of the war. Likewise, once war was declared, most politicians fell in line and lobbied to have their state militias join the fray. The military had a positive reaction, but its readiness posture was disproportionate. The Navy was better prepared than the Army in terms of mobilization. Although all three factors in the conduct of war were not always aligned, synched, and coordinated, the U.S. was still victorious and recognized as a major power in the aftermath because it defeated an imperialist power.

Preparations for War

Although the war started in April 1898, preparations, at least for the U.S. Navy, had taken place twelve years earlier with the start of a series of Congressional legislation and the ideas of Mahan and Roosevelt. In 1886, Congress required American naval vessels to be made from domestic material instead of imported from foreign suppliers whose governments prohibited export of advance technologies.²³ Consequently, by the mid-1890s, American ships were

considered “world class.” Congress then passed the Navy Act of 1890, which called for three sea-going coastline battleships instead of a passive coastal defense strategy. These provisions supported Mahan’s naval strategy by creating a “Great White Fleet” (the battle fleet) to project sea power. Captain Mahan saw the Caribbean as key to American power protected by its Navy as “the role of naval power in the rise and fall of great nations.”²⁴ As a result, the Navy was well prepared to defeat the Spanish Navy.

After the sinking of the *Maine*, war preparations and planning increased at a rapid pace. Military strategists realized that Spain’s Navy was its center of gravity, so the United States needed to defeat it both in the Caribbean and in the Philippines. To do otherwise left the Eastern seaboard vulnerable to coastal attacks and naval blockades. On February 25, 1898, Roosevelt, temporarily in charge, sent a message to Commodore George Dewey, Commander of the Asiatic Squadron aboard the flagship *Olympia*, and ordered him to concentrate his squadron at Hong Kong. In the event of declaration of war with Spain, he was to destroy the Spanish squadron located in the Philippines.²⁵ This bold move by Roosevelt demonstrated the strategic leadership the Navy had within its ranks.

On the other hand, the Army was not in the same position as its sister service. The War Department did not have an organization and leadership capable of taking decisive steps and consequently did not take initiative in preparation for war.²⁶ Army leadership believed a diplomatic solution would prevail, and if not, that the Army’s role would be subordinate to the Navy’s. However, this was not to be the case at the outbreak of the war. On March 9, 1898, Congress passed a \$50 million dollar bill to prepare the services for the war. The Department of the Navy received \$31 million, which it used to acquire additional ships and personnel to prepare the fleet for combat. The War Department only received \$19 million of which \$15.5 million was

spent on improving coastal defenses. The remainder was distributed to Medical, Quartermaster, and Signal Departments.²⁷ This fiscal disparity demonstrates the United States neglect in adequately preparing the Army for expeditionary combat operations.

Besides adequate funding, the Army had other deficiencies. First, it lacked sufficient strength. By 1898, the regular force numbered nearly 28,000 but was raised to 66,000 during the months leading up to war. After the declaration of war, McKinley issued a call for volunteers, which increased the ranks to 216,500.²⁸ However, those who volunteered joined the state militias (National Guard) instead of the regular Army because the militias had fewer restrictions, such as two years federal service. Second, the Army lacked sufficient training for a major war. The regulars had been more of a constabulary army after the Civil War and the state militias were completely untrained and led by politically appointed officers. These untrained volunteers only served to complicate the Army's problem of forming an efficient fighting force.²⁹ Third, the Army had degraded equipment and few support units. Most supplies and equipment on hand were either inadequate or insufficient to support the surge of troops.

On the eve of war, a disparity existed between the Navy and the Army. The Navy Department was well prepared to defeat the Spanish fleets in the Caribbean and the Pacific. On the other hand, the War Department was unprepared to deploy two expeditionary forces to two different theaters of war as would be required. Consequently, the invasion force lacked cohesiveness, training, experience, and logistics support for an overseas expedition. Although these deficiencies would impede combat operations, the Spanish military was less inclined to fight, which led to a default victory for the United States.

Strategic and Operational Setting

At the beginning of the war, the military objectives were unclear because the command structure did not exist at the outset of the crisis. It evolved over the course of the war. President McKinley, at the top, lacked strength of character and tended to waffle on policy as events unfolded. However, he was certain that he wanted to fight a limited war against the Spanish Empire. He relied heavily on his naval advisors, but his military advisors provided little value. Military scenarios were based on war studies and presented as options to McKinley. All plans involved a fight overseas, which was new for America. What began as an effort to stop inhumane practices in Cuba erupted into a war that would be fought across half the globe, from the Philippines in the far Pacific to the Caribbean Sea.³⁰

The grand strategy for both the U.S. and Spain called for a limited war through the use of naval operations. Once committed to war, President William McKinley's strategic end state was to both limit the conflict and end the fighting at the earliest opportunity -- with the least expenditure of blood and treasure.³¹ The President, a veteran of the Civil War, did not want the country to endure the military horrors it experienced during its last war. Military planners had generally discussed scenarios of naval blockades near Cuba and Puerto Rico, land operations on Havana, an attack on Manila, and possible naval operations in Spanish waters. It was also assumed that the Navy would bear most of the operational burden.³² As soon as war was declared, the McKinley administration relied on Mahan's naval theory and set its sights on seizing Cuban and Philippine waters. Secretary of the Navy John Long ordered Commodore Dewey to proceed to the Philippines while a blockade of the north coast of Cuba was in effect. The Spanish fleets were targeted in those areas of operation, and the U.S. Navy set conditions in motion for their swift defeats.

Ironically, Spain's strategic plan also involved maritime operations. Minister of Marine Rear Admiral Sigimundo Bermejo's plan required a Spanish squadron to sail to Cuba and join other vessels in Havana in an attempt to destroy Key West. If successful, they would attempt a blockade of the Atlantic coast.³³ This strategy was doomed from the beginning because the Spanish Navy had obsolete ships, inadequate naval guns, insufficient coal and ammunition supplies, and poorly trained Sailors. However, national pride and honor were at stake, so Admiral Pascual Cervera executed his orders and sailed for Cuba in mid-March. Accordingly, in true Mahan fashion, command of the sea was thought to determine the outcome of the war; Spain was at a complete disadvantage in every respect as compared to the United States. This was evident even at the outset of the war.

On April 25, 1898, Commodore Dewey and his Asiatic Squadron sailed for the Philippines. His mission was to capture or destroy the Spanish fleet in Manila commanded by Admiral Patricio Montojo. There were two issues Dewey faced in completing his mission. First, his superiors failed to provide further guidance to him once he destroyed the enemy's ships.³⁴ Would he be required to invade and seize the Spanish garrison in Manila? His second challenge was inadequate logistics support. The Asiatic Squadron was 7,000 miles from home port in San Francisco and without a resupply means for coal and ammunition. This meant a long siege in the Philippines was out of the question. These challenges steered the Commodore towards defeating the Spanish fleet quickly and decisively.³⁵ This is an important point because Dewey's independent initiative reinforced his decisive actions in defeating Montojo at Manila Bay.

Upon arrival in northern Luzon on April 30, 1898, Navy reconnaissance showed no sign of the Spanish fleet. Dewey directed his ships to Manila Bay that evening despite intelligence reports indicating the bay was mined. This was a daring move on Dewey's part because he ran

the risk of attacking a defended enemy position. The Asiatic Squadron confronted little trouble entering the bay and in the early morning hours attacked the Spanish ships. Caught off guard because the Spanish believed the Americans action in the Philippines would begin with a blockade, Montojo's squadron was decimated.³⁶ Commodore Dewey's aggressive actions gave him the initiative, and on May 1, 1898 Dewey defeated Montojo in a one-sided battle.³⁷ Two days later, Marines landed in Cavite and seized the arsenal as a foothold for the next phase of the campaign. Although significant, this decisive victory was short-lived as the administration focused on Spain's Caribbean Squadron.


On May 19, 1898, Admiral Sampson's North Atlantic Squadron successfully blockaded Admiral Cervera's ships in Santiago Harbor, Cuba, but unlike Commodore Dewey, Sampson would not risk his fleet against significant harbor defenses. Admiral Cervera's squadron had departed the Cape Verde Islands in mid-April en route to Cuba to defend the Spanish possession, but lacked adequate supplies and fuel to reach Havana. Consequently, the squadron was trapped by the U.S. Navy in Santiago Harbor.³⁸ Unable to exploit his success, Sampson realized the harbor defenses needed to be destroyed before he could engage Cervera's squadron. This required a land invasion force. The U.S. Army, unprepared and unmanned for this stage of the war, was required to provide an expeditionary force to support the Navy.

On May 26, 1898, President McKinley convened a war council to discuss the Santiago campaign plan and its operational end state, the destruction of the Spanish fleet. Based on McKinley's strategic goal, destruction of the Spanish Caribbean Squadron increased the likelihood of a quick war because this action would deny Spain the ability to project sea power and degrade her military capabilities.³⁹ The council consisted of Secretary of War, Russell A. Alger; Secretary of the Navy, John Long; Commanding General of the Army, Major General

Nelson Miles; and members of the Naval War Board. Accordingly, McKinley decided that General William R. General Shafter's expeditionary force would proceed to Santiago under Sampson's naval escort and conduct an amphibious landing. Once ashore, the invasion force, with the assistance of Cuban insurgents in the east led by General Calixto García, would destroy the Santiago harbor defenses.⁴⁰ Then Sampson could sail in the harbor to defeat the Spanish fleet. This plan called for unity of effort, unity of command, and close coordination between the joint and coalition forces. As the Santiago campaign unfolded, these basic warfighting principles were severely tested.⁴¹

The Santiago Campaign

Without a designated Joint Force Commander assigned and only general guidance provided from the President, the U.S. military commanders were at odds even before they engaged the enemy. From May 19 to July 17, 1898, the services executed a joint campaign against the Spanish in Santiago in order to destroy Spain's Caribbean Squadron. Although Miles directed Shafter to destroy the Spanish garrison and cover the Navy's movements against Cervera's squadron, Shafter thought his central objective was the ultimate capture of Santiago as this would lead to the surrender or destruction of Cervera's squadron.⁴² Conversely, Sampson's military objective was solely the destruction of Cervera's squadron. In order to rectify this operational dilemma, clear direction should have been provided from senior military leadership, but instead, ambiguous orders proved to be the starting point for what would later be an example of ineffectual joint operations.⁴³ Map 1 displays the principle dates and battles in Santiago.



Map 1: Principle Battles in Santiago Campaign 25 April – 10 December 1898.⁴⁴

On June 14, 1898, General Shafter's Fifth Army Corps quickly mobilized and departed Tampa albeit with forces inadequately trained in amphibious landings, as well as insufficient supplies and equipment to conduct a prolonged expedition. The Fifth Army Corps consisted of approximately 17,000 men and was made up of three divisions, an independent brigade, and a volunteer brigade. Problems with the expedition arose early since the Army was unsuccessful in procuring enough transports for the operation, so resources were not properly managed from the start.⁴⁵ Furthermore, the Army did not provide sufficient lighterage for the amphibious landing, which took longer than anticipated. Reluctantly, the Navy supported the Army by providing amphibious landing craft and a beach master even though they were initially informed that only escort was required.

With the arrival of the expeditionary force, the land invasion was set in motion. On June 20, 1898, General Shafter, Admiral Sampson, and General García met ashore and finalized the campaign plan. The plan called for a landing of Shafter's forces at Daiquirí. Afterwards Sampson's task was to transport 3,000 insurgents from Asserraderos to Daiquirí and Siboney to support Shafter. Once enough combat power was ashore, Shafter would advance on the Socapa

and the Morro shore batteries located near the entrance of the harbor. After the fortification heights were seized, Sampson would sail into the harbor, conduct countermine operations, and engage Cervera's ships in decisive battle.⁴⁶ The end result would be the successful destruction of Cervera's squadron and Spain's likely capitulation. Despite consensus, the actual execution of the campaign changed drastically after Shafter conducted his amphibious landing. This modification led to a series of inter-service squabbles during the remainder of the campaign.

Once ashore, General Shafter changed the plan and rapidly moved his force inland with the intent to seize Santiago city. Santiago province was defended by a disbursed Spanish force of 36,000 troops under the command of Lieutenant General Arsenio Linares y Pombo; however, only 12,096 soldiers and 1,000 augmented sailors provided by Cervera actually defended the Santiago garrison. General Linares' objective was defense of the city in order to avoid destruction of his forces and allow the U.S. a base of operations.⁴⁷ The expeditionary forces moved unopposed from Daiquirí to Siboney, and set up a logistics node for follow-on landings. It was only after Shafter proceeded inland did he inform Sampson of the new plan.⁴⁸ General Shafter's actions significantly changed the course of the campaign because he attempted to seize Santiago, thereby protracting the war.

On June 24, 1898, while moving toward Santiago, Major General Joseph Wheeler independently moved his division toward Las Guásimas to conduct a reconnaissance in force in order to develop the Spanish position.⁴⁹ A battle ensued against General Antero Rubín's forces, but there were few casualties on either side. Although later considered a success, this engagement placed Shafter's forces on a path toward Santiago that did not allow him to adequately supply his forces because of the tenuous lines of communication running inland from

Siboney. Despite limited combat power ashore, Shafter moved his forces inland toward San Juan Heights.

On July 1, 1898, Shafter, concerned over approaching Spanish reinforcements from Manzanillo, divided his forces and hastily attacked El Caney, Kettle Hill, and San Juan Hill while the Navy and Brigadier General Henry M. Duffield's volunteers conducted a demonstration at Aguadores to deceive the enemy. Conversely, Linares dispersed 4,760 troops along defensive strong points instead of concentrating his forces at those key defensive areas. Although poor command and control and lack of indirect fire support caused Fifth Army Corps to struggle during the engagements, the Corps captured the San Juan Heights resulting in a partial victory.⁵⁰ Heavy casualties resulted on both sides, yet Santiago was not seized. With a stalemate in effect, Shafter requested reinforcements from Alger. Shafter was preoccupied with his own army's difficulties instead of appreciating the enemy's degraded disposition. As a result, he threatened to withdraw his forces if he did not receive support. While the War Department scrambled to acquire suitable transports to send reinforcements, the Administration realized it had little leverage over Shafter to move forward and expediently exploit his success against the Spanish garrison.⁵¹ The result was the President's loss of confidence in General Shafter's inactions and inabilities.⁵²

On July 3, 1898, a fortunate turn of events occurred for the U.S. Navy when Admiral Cervera's squadron attempted to escape the naval blockade. The naval forces were unevenly matched, and the naval battle of Santiago eventually led to disastrous results for Spain.⁵³ Admiral Cervera's flagship, the *María Teresa*, led the squadron of four armored cruisers and two destroyers out of the harbor. Admiral Cervera attempted to ram the battleship *Brooklyn* to allow the remaining vessels to pass westward along the coast.⁵⁴ Commodore Schley aboard the

Brooklyn maneuvered away from Cervera with a looping action to avoid being struck. This move was later criticized by his superiors because he allowed the other ships to escape the harbor.⁵⁵ A naval battle ensued and because of inferior coal and degraded ship capabilities, the Spanish fleet was destroyed, ran aground, or surrendered to American naval power.⁵⁶ With the annihilation of Cervera's squadron, the final stages were set for the campaign.

Following the actions of San Juan Hill, General Shafter and General José Toral declared a truce. General Toral became involved after Linares was incapacitated as a result of the battle. Although reinforcements arrived for both sides, they only complicated matters. The Spanish situation worsened because the garrison could ill afford to feed all its soldiers and its citizens, meanwhile tropical disease and insufficient medical support for 1,600 casualties took its toll on the American troops.⁵⁷ In a series of communications between Alger, Miles, and Sampson, Shafter desperately called for the Navy to force the harbor and bombard the city into capitulation. Although Sampson attempted limited bombardment from afar, he would not risk his ships being subjected to the harbor shore batteries and mines; besides, he had met his military objective. Several disputes followed and the resulting deadlock soured inter-service relations, both at the front and in Washington.⁵⁸ After a series of negotiations, Toral formally surrendered to Shafter on July 17, 1898, and ended the Santiago campaign; however, neither Sampson nor García were part of the negotiations leading up to the capitulation.⁵⁹ This event reinforced the schism between the services in the Caribbean.

The Santiago campaign provided insights for the services in the conduct of joint operations. Despite the challenges in leadership, logistics, and unity of command, all of which led to a breakdown of cooperation, the services were able to accomplish the mission. As in any war, these deficiencies were not without costs of men and material. Yet, these resources could

have been spared had the execution of the joint operation been better coordinated by the leaders. Fortunately, the enemy was ill-equipped and less prepared than the American expeditionary force, so victory was achieved somewhat by default. Nevertheless, it is imperative that commanders avoid the same pitfalls experienced during the Santiago campaign by conducting well planned and well executed joint military operations. The Puerto Rico campaign fared better in terms of military leadership and execution of joint operations, but the services were still plagued by inter-service rivalry.

The Puerto Rico Campaign

Both the Army and the Navy favored an attack on Puerto Rico, Spain's other colony in the Caribbean Sea, to prohibit the Spanish government from projecting power in the Western Hemisphere. From July 21 to August 13, 1898, the services conducted joint operations against the Spanish military in Puerto Rico in order to deprive the Spanish of a useful forward operating base in the Caribbean. Prior to the start of the war, Puerto Rico was considered a primary target for McKinley since both General Miles and Captain Mahan advised him that it was better to attack Spain's peripheral spheres and closest supply lines instead of her principal and strongest colony.⁶⁰ Priorities changed as a result of Dewey's success in the Philippines and the uncertainty of Cervera's squadron in the Caribbean, so invasion plans for Puerto Rico were shelved. In late May, with Cervera's squadron contained, General Miles renewed his efforts to initiate the Puerto Rico campaign.

While in Tampa assisting General Shafter to ready his expedition for Santiago, General Miles contacted Secretary Alger and recommended he lead an attack on Puerto Rico prior to the Santiago campaign. The President denied his request as his priority was Santiago; however, McKinley planned on invading Puerto Rico immediately thereafter. Politically, he had planned


the cession of Puerto Rico to the United States at the conclusion of the war in lieu of demanding a cash indemnity from Spain.⁶¹ The President's response did not deter Miles and he continued to advocate for the Puerto Rico campaign during the entire month of June. After the Administration lost confidence in Shafter, General Miles was ordered to Santiago to assist him.

On July 8, 1898, General Miles departed from Charleston with 3,500 men on the *Yale*, accompanied by the cruiser *Columbia*. The first contingent of the Puerto Rico expeditionary force went to Santiago to support General Shafter. However, upon arrival, Miles quarantined his men aboard the ships in fear they would be exposed to tropical disease that affected Shafter's Fifth Army Corps. By mid-July, Santiago was secure and the Army Quartermaster General acquired transports for the Puerto Rico expeditionary forces' main body. Although General Miles only required naval escorts to initiate his movement to Puerto Rico, Admiral Sampson opposed the use of armored vessels as escorts because he was busy conducting de-mining operations at Nipe Bay, Cuba and readying a portion of his fleet, the Eastern Squadron, for deployment to Manila to reinforce Dewey.⁶² What ensued was inadequate cooperation between the War and Navy Departments over what naval strength to send, as well as intra-service infighting between Secretary Alger and General Miles over what course of action was best for the expedition. In the end, the Administration stepped in and instructed the Navy to support Miles' expedition.

While General Miles and Admiral Sampson readied the expedition, Puerto Rico prepared for the invasion. Unlike Cuba, anti-Spanish agitation did not erupt in Puerto Rico, as the island was granted home rule and had a functioning autonomous government since November 1897. However when war broke, Governor General Manuel Macías y Casado declared martial law. In defense of the island, Spain had an estimated 8,000 regulars and from 7,000 to 9,000 volunteers,

which were poorly trained, ill equipped, and unreliable. Similar to the situation in Cuba, the regular forces were dispersed throughout seven military districts within Puerto Rico. The naval forces were even less imposing than the Army, since there were only 368 Sailors aboard six inadequate ships.⁶³ Nevertheless, Macías had advance warning from the Spanish ministry that Puerto Rico would be invaded, so he prepared to resist the invasion as best he could. Although severely outmatched, Spain continued to hold out against the U.S. instead of conceding and retaining some semblance of her empire. Consequently, these actions benefited the U.S. in creating its empire.

On July 21, 1898, General Miles departed Guantánamo, Cuba with a well-armed naval escort, which sailed for Fajardo, Puerto Rico. The battleship *Massachusetts* and the cruiser *Dixie* led the transports *Columbia*, *Yale*, and *Macon*, which transported a force of 3,415 men. General Miles contingent joined Major General James H. Wilson and his 3,600 troops, which sailed from Charleston the previous day. En route, Miles changed the landing site to Guánica on the south coast near the city of Ponce. He reasoned that it was less well defended and the change would surprise the Spanish as they had expected a landing in Fajardo. Captain Francis Higgenson, commander of the naval escort, initially objected to the change because Guánica's waters were too shallow for some naval escorts, which were supposed to provide naval surface fire support to the amphibious landing and the Army's interior advance.⁶⁴ Once again this demonstrates friction between the Navy and the Army with regard to coordination and unity of command. In the end, Miles convinced Higgenson that capturing both Guánica and Ponce, would grant the fleet a secure port on the south coast. Map 2 displays actions in Puerto Rico.



Map 2: Principle Battles in the Puerto Rico Campaign 25 July – 12 August 1898.⁶⁵

The convoy arrived off the coast of Guánica at dawn on July 25, 1898, and by day's end Higgenson had secured the harbor and landed forces ashore unopposed. Capitalizing on this success, General Miles had regular and volunteer forces under General Wilson seize Ponce. By July 28, 1898, Ponce had surrendered to American forces and the Spanish regulars retreated to San Juan while the Puerto Rican militia deserted en masse.⁶⁶ As the Spanish force decreased, the American force expanded by 15,000 with the arrival of Brigadier Theodore Schwan's and Major General John R. Brooke's forces. With Ponce and Guánica secure, General Miles instituted marshal law and planned the next phase of his campaign to end Spanish resistance.

In order to advance on the Spanish stronghold in San Juan, General Miles developed an elaborate plan to send four columns north toward San Juan from Guánica, Ponce, and Arroyo. General Schwan's regulars would advance to Mayagüez on the west coast. Brigadier General George A. Garretson's volunteer brigade and cavalry would go north and link up with Schwan's

forces at Arecibo. Once united, the combined forces would constitute a provisional division for assault on San Juan. General Wilson's column would move north to Aibonito, a Spanish strongpoint, while General Brooke's forces would move just east of Aibonito and unite with Wilson's forces on the military road leading to San Juan. Although tactically sound, the complicated design stressed maneuver to isolate and outflank enemy positions.⁶⁷ Furthermore, it excluded the Navy, which had designs of its own.

On August 2, 1898, Commander Charles H. Davis contacted Admiral Sampson and proposed that San Juan be captured from the sea without the assistance of the Army. Essentially, Admiral Sampson could lead his Eastern Squadron in an assault against San Juan and land Marines to secure the city. The plan gained merit within the Department of the Navy and may have been executed if it were not for General Miles becoming aware of the proposed plan, which he quickly protested to Secretary Alger. Although General Miles reasoned that noncombatants would be unnecessarily injured if the Navy bombarded the city, in actuality he did not want the Navy to take the glory and seize Puerto Rico. Emphatically, Miles stated, "the control of all military affairs on the land of this island can be safely left to the Army."⁶⁸ Consequently, Secretary Alger supported General Miles and prevented Admiral Sampson's plan from being executed. Although resolved, the issue points to the inter-service rivalry held between the services.

As the American offensive initiated, Governor General Macías clearly understood the desperate predicament his forces faced. In true Mahanian fashion, the United States had control of the sea so not only would Spanish reinforcements be unlikely to penetrate their naval defenses, but the American forces could be easily and rapidly transported to various locations around the island. Although Macías kept most of his forces north to defend San Juan, he

dedicated battalions to Ponce and Mayagüez, with the remainder scattered throughout the island in defensive postures. Outmatched, his forces would most likely make an honorable retreat and so Puerto Rico would be lost before an armistice.⁶⁹ The Spanish government would have little bargaining room at the peace table, and the U.S. would exploit this weakness to its favor.

General Miles's offensive began on August 5, 1898, when the four columns advanced to their objectives. The American forces experienced little resistance during their advance. In fact, the most serious engagement was fought near Coamo on August 7, 1898, when General Wilson inflicted heavy casualties on Spanish defenders.⁷⁰ Afterwards, General Wilson prepared for an assault on a well-defended garrison in Aibonito; however, by August 13, 1898, a peace protocol was signed and all operations were suspended. Although San Juan remained in the hands of the Spanish when the campaign ended, General Miles' success in Puerto Rico paved the way for the U.S. to claim the island as part of the peace settlement.⁷¹

The Puerto Rico campaign demonstrated inadequate cooperation between the departments, as well as service infighting for the Army. Ultimately, the Administration directed the Navy to provide direct support for the expedition, but this issue should have been resolved at a lower level. The services should have conducted joint planning prior to the initiation of this campaign to define supporting and supported relationships. Military objectives could have been agreed upon by all involved and executed more smoothly. Again, the enemy was propitiously less inclined to fight, which contributed to the United States benefit in saving resources and gaining territory. Nevertheless, military success in the Caribbean demonstrated America's will to defend its foreign policy in the Western Hemisphere. Similarly, military success occurred across the globe in the Philippines.

The Philippines Campaign

The victory over the Spanish squadron at Manila Bay created a strategic situation for the United States because it needed a capable expeditionary force to project power a greater distance from home. From May 1 to August 13, 1898, the U.S. Army and the Navy executed a joint campaign against the Spanish military in Manila in order to compel Spain to surrender the Philippine archipelago. Unlike the Santiago and Puerto Rico campaigns, the services generally cooperated and achieved their military objective with good relations. Commodore Dewey's success could not be exploited without boots on the ground. Although First Lieutenant Dion Williams and his detachment of Marines had taken Cavite on May 3, 1898, the Marines did not have sufficient numbers to influence Manila's surrender. Consequently, Dewey consulted with Washington and requested a well-equipped force of 5,000 troops to deal with an estimated 10,000 Spanish forces under Governor General Basilio Augustín.⁷² Until Washington responded, Dewey concentrated his efforts in dealing with the Spanish military, European navies, and Filipino insurgents.

The War Department had given little thought to the Philippines because its focus was on supporting operations in the Caribbean; however, that quickly changed when President McKinley supported Dewey's request for forces. Major General Wesley Merritt, Commander of the Pacific Department, was selected to lead the Philippine expeditionary force, the Eighth Army Corps. Much debate between Merritt and leadership within the War Department ensued over the size of the force required for the expedition because there was uncertainty on the mission, the holding of Manila, or the seizing of the entire archipelago. In the end, Secretary Alger decided to provide 20,000 men (mostly volunteers) because the president's intent was to send an "army of occupation for the twofold purpose of completing the reduction of the Spanish power in the Philippines and of giving security and order to the islands while in the possession of the United

States.”⁷³ Within a month, the U.S. Army quickly mobilized, equipped, and trained regulars and volunteers who had assembled in San Francisco. Unlike the fiasco at Tampa, managing the men and materiel converging on San Francisco was a much smoother process because the city was an Army general supply depot supported by excellent embarkation infrastructure, and first-rate rail and port facilities.

On May 25, 1898, Brigadier General Thomas Anderson departed San Francisco with a force of 2,500 men, the first contingency of the Philippine expeditionary force. The three vessels steamed to Pearl Harbor where they refueled and linked up with Captain Henry Glass aboard the *Charleston*. The convoy sailed to Guam as Glass’s orders were to seize the island as the Navy’s new coaling station in the Pacific prior to arriving in Manila. On June 20, 1898, the expedition arrived and seized the San Luis D’Apra Harbor without incident as the Spanish Governor Lieutenant Colonel Juan Marina had not been informed of the war. The following day, Marina formally surrendered Guam and Marina to Lieutenant William Braunersreuther accompanied by a detachment of Marines and two companies from the 2nd Oregon.⁷⁴ Afterwards, the convoy quickly departed for the Philippines leaving a small detachment of Marines under Navy Commander Seaton Schroeder to govern the new American possession. The real fight was in Manila.

While Admiral Dewey (promoted as a result of his victory) awaited reinforcements, he wrestled with two external naval threats. The first threat was from neutral European and Japanese naval powers that arrived in Manila Bay without signaling their intentions to the U.S. naval commander. This was a concern because the array of foreign ships from Great Britain, Germany, France, and Japan significantly outmatched the strength to that of Dewey.⁷⁵ Moreover, Germany appeared to be the biggest threat because it specifically sent Vice Admiral

Otto von Diederichs, Dewey's German counterpart, to Manila to get a sense of the Philippine situation and the influence of neutral powers on the political change in the region. Germany desired new coaling stations in the Pacific, which would assist its commerce with China. After a brief disagreement over communication procedures, Diederich assured Dewey that Germany had no intentions of interfering with his operations. The second external threat was Spain's Flying Relief Column under Admiral Manuel de la Cámara. These powerful Spanish warships were sent from Cadiz to defeat Dewey; however, the naval expedition returned to Spain after crossing the Suez Canal because Spain's coastal waters were left unguarded from possible U.S. attack. With external threats under control, Admiral Dewey focused on internal threats from Filipino insurgents.

Without reinforcements, Governor General Augustín recognized his situation was desperate so he created a Filipino militia and assembly to help defend and govern the city. These organizations quickly dissolved under the influence of the Philippine independence movement led by Emilio Aguinaldo (like Cuba, the Philippine insurrection was well underway before U.S. involvement). To complicate matters, the insurgents attacked Spanish garrisons throughout Luzon despite having fewer forces than the Spanish. Since Augustín dispersed his forces instead of concentrating them at key areas, Manila was quickly surrounded and his forces were cut off unable to support each other.⁷⁶ This put Aguinaldo in a power position as he met with Dewey to discuss Filipino independence.

Admiral Dewey was directed by the Administration not to have political alliances with Aguinaldo because McKinley wanted to avoid entanglements with the insurgents until the situation developed. Dewey did provide a few small arms and ammunition to the insurgents because he thought they had a common enemy and figured they would harass the Spanish. By

the end of May, Long informed Dewey to avoid entanglements with Aguinaldo in order to avert embarrassment for the U.S. with its future plans for the Philippines. With the success of the insurgent campaign, Aguinaldo declared the Philippines' independence on June 12, 1898; however, the United States did not recognize this act or his self-proclaimed independence. The general concern for the McKinley administration was not only that the "insurgents represent a significant component of the military equations in the Philippines but it was probable that their presence would influence the postwar settlement."⁷⁷ The political and military environment changed with the arrival of General Anderson on June 30, 1898 because he opened relations with the insurgents.

Upon arrival in Manila, Anderson set out to establish a working relationship with the insurgents until General Merritt arrived. Aguinaldo was cooperative, but elusive in his plans to seize Manila before the remainder of American forces arrived. The Eighth Army Corps second contingent of 3,500 troops arrived on July 17, 1898, under the leadership of Brigadier General Francis V. Greene. General Merritt arrived with the last contingent of 4,800 men under Brigadier General Arthur MacArthur by the end of July. In addition, two monitors, the *Monterey* and the *Monadnock*, arrived and increased Dewey's naval squadron capabilities. Thus, the Philippine expedition assembled on Manila with a force of around 11,000 soldiers and a powerful naval presence with sailors and Marines to end the siege. Map 3 displays these

Alvarez, Augustín's deputy and replacement, through a Belgian consul.⁷⁹ By the first week of August, conditions were set for surrender to the Americans.

Although General Jáudenes was willing to surrender, he would face discipline actions upon his return to Spain. Therefore, he refused capitulation until attacked, but eventually negotiated on the rules of battle to minimize destruction and loss of life. A prearranged plan of attack was formulated where Merritt's forces would attack Jáudenes' outer lines and kept the Filipino insurgents out of the fray. Meanwhile Dewey's flagship would steam toward the inner city and demand surrender by flag signals.⁸⁰ Following this, General Jáudenes would surrender and allow entrance to the citadel. All parties agreed, and this was a good example of the Army and the Navy successfully working together to plan the attack. This joint operation was set in motion and Merritt issued his orders. While Greene and MacArthur's brigades attacked the southern Spanish defenses, Dewey would provide naval surface fires support ahead of their advance. Oregon Volunteers would remain aboard naval warships with Merritt's headquarters until the white flag appeared. Merritt also convinced Aguinaldo to keep his forces out of the battle and instructed his brigade commanders to restrict Filipino movement in the suburbs after the battle commenced. On August 13, 1898, the battle ensued with minimum casualties, and by the end of the day Merritt's troops controlled the citadel and most of the suburbs. The following day, General Jáudenes formally surrendered as promised; however, the Spanish government had already capitulated.

On August 12, 1898, unbeknownst to the forces in the Philippines, the Spanish government agreed to a peace protocol, which had taken place in Washington. Technically, by international law, the Philippines were not conquered because the victory took place after the signing of the peace protocol. Although General Jáudenes protested the terms of surrender, it

was too late and would be a point of contention at the Paris peace conference in October.⁸¹ Additionally, Aguinaldo felt betrayed because he was not allowed to enter the citadel nor take part in the surrender proceedings. He called for a joint occupation of Manila, but McKinley clearly denied this demand. Essentially, Dewey proclaimed the “rebels and all other parties must recognize the military occupation and authority of the United States and the cessation of hostilities proclaimed by the president.”⁸² As a result, Aguinaldo sent an emissary to Paris, while the rebels quietly planned and prepared for an uprising against their new foe.

The Philippine Campaign bore no resemblance to the Caribbean campaigns. There was sufficient time to organize the expedition, and the services did a much better job conducting joint operations. Limited fighting took place, so resources and lives were spared compared to Cuba. General Merritt and Admiral Dewey successfully mixed diplomacy with force to accomplish the mission.⁸³ The Philippines fell under the protection of the United States, and the Spanish-American War concluded with the surrender of Manila.

Although the outcome of the war was successful, its conduct was less than stellar. Poor leadership, lack of military preparedness, and inter-service rivalry negatively affected the campaigns. As Commander-in-Chief, President McKinley exercised less personal control over the conduct of the war.⁸⁴ He was deficient in providing guiding action to the military. The lack of inadequate military preparation could have resulted in a series of defeats, but the Spanish military was even less prepared and could not sustain the will to fight. The services initially stumbled through the conflict because of infighting and personal ambitions, but by the end conducted effective joint operations. The United States was able to project its military might in the Far East and in the Caribbean, and the imperial powers recognized the new player on the world’s stage.

SECTION 4: CAPITULATION

Capitulation signaled the degradation of a formerly powerful empire of the Old World and the emergence of a formidable power in the New World.⁸⁵ By July 18, 1898, Spain indicated its interest in negotiating for peace with the United States through French diplomats. Additionally, Queen María Cristina contacted President McKinley on July 26, 1898, and asked for terms. Essentially, Spain was to evacuate Cuba, and cede Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines to the United States. Although the liberal Spanish government protested, its fate was sealed and Sagasta accepted a peace protocol through a French proxy that ended hostilities on August 12, 1898.

The Paris Peace Treaty conference was held from October 1 to December 10, 1898. Spain lacked bargaining power, so it humbly asked for American magnanimity at the outset. The American commission, stacked in favor of the expansionist point of view, remained steadfast in not ceding to Spanish concessions. Emilio Aguinaldo's representative was not allowed to take part in the peace negotiations. Ironically, the only real issue during peace negotiations was possession of the Philippine Islands. The result had a significant strategic impact for the United States.

President McKinley struggled over annexation of the Philippines because he was unsure of how the public would react. However, after receiving enthusiastic popular support, he instructed the commission to negotiate the annexation of the entire archipelago. President McKinley justified the acquisition as a humanitarian concern for the well-being of Filipinos, national duty to serve the general interest of civilization, and the destiny of the United States in world affairs.⁸⁶ Of course, Spain countered with delaying tactics and threatened suspension of peace negotiations in hopes of favorable anti-expansionist results during the U.S. mid-term

elections in November. This did not happen, and despite protests Spain eventually agreed to the conditions and payment of \$20 million for the Philippines. The American delegation forced the settlement to its complete advantage. The United States gained possessions in the Caribbean and the Pacific, along with the annexation of Hawaii in July 1898. An American empire was created.

The treaty's articles as submitted to the respective governments for ratification were:

1. Spain to relinquish sovereignty in Cuba, with the United States to discharge obligations under international law for the protection of life and property so long as it occupied the island.
2. Spain to cede Puerto Rico and Guam to the United States.
3. Spain to cede the Philippine Islands to the United States for a payment of \$20 million, to be tendered within three months of ratification.
4. Spain to receive ten years of commercial treatment in the Philippines equal to the United States.
5. The United States to return at its own expense all Spanish troops in the Philippines, together with their arms.
6. Spain to release all political prisoners and prisoners of war in the theaters of conflict, with the United States using its power to persuade the Filipino rebels to do likewise.
7. Each nation to renounce reciprocal indemnity claims.
8. Spain to receive the public records and archives of its former colonies.
9. Spanish citizens to have freedom to remain in ceded or relinquished territories with the provision of declaring permanent citizenship within one year.
10. Freedom of religion guaranteed in all ceded or relinquished territories.
11. Spanish citizens in ceded or relinquished territories to be subject to local laws.
12. Court proceedings pending at the time of ratification to be completed.
13. Spanish copyrights and patents to be protected.
14. Spain to have consular offices in the lost territories.
15. Each country to assess the same amounts of customs duties subject to six months' notice of termination.
16. The United States to assume all financial obligations for Cuba during its period of occupation.
17. A seventeenth clause spelled out the ratification procedure.⁸⁷

In the end, both countries' governments debated the conditions, but ultimately ratified the treaty by April 1899. The Spanish-American War was over, and the United States was recognized as a world power. As America turned the corner into the 20th Century, it would examine its conduct during this period and make improvements where shortfalls existed. The

consequences of the war would assist in preparation for America's new role as a power to be reckoned with globally.

SECTION 5: WEAKNESSES EXPOSED AND CONCLUSION

In the aftermath of the Spanish-American War the United States became a world power with new responsibilities for protecting her new overseas possessions and trade routes. This meant that America's foreign policy changed from isolationism to expansionism to promote and protect its national interests.⁸⁸ Diplomacy always trumped physical engagement, but when this failed, the United States no longer wavered from military intervention. The new century was on the horizon and the United States needed to prepare. There were several political and military consequences of the war.

The following is a list of weaknesses exposed as a result of the conflict:

1. Executive leadership is paramount during wartime.
2. Foreign policy requires strategic thinking and vision.
3. Increased power means increased responsibility.
4. Media wars energize public opinion, political actions, and the economy.
5. The media has its place in war and will influence the battlefield.
6. Unity of command is essential in joint military operations.
7. Indecisiveness on the battlefield unnecessarily wastes blood and treasure.
8. Military planning, preparedness, and execution are vital through all phases of war.
9. Joint military operations require planning, cooperation, and coordination.
10. Powerful nations rely on modern navies and armies to defend them.

Discussion of each of the above points is as follows:

(1) Executive leadership was paramount during the conduct of the war. Although McKinley opposed war and attempted to avert it through diplomacy, it would not be possible after the sinking of the *Maine*. His aversion initially impacted the early stages of the war. Deliberate direction should have been provided from McKinley, but instead, ambiguous orders proved to be the starting point for what would later be an example of ineffectual joint operations in the Caribbean theater.⁸⁹ The confusion stems from McKinley's desire for a quick war and

settlement for peace negotiations. Instead of the services working cooperatively to meet the President's intent, they each sought different objectives and only convoluted the issues they each faced. However, it should be noted that some historians believe despite his early ambiguity towards war, McKinley demonstrated sound strategic insight during the conflict and full awareness of the need to relate to the use of force to basic political objectives.⁹⁰ The bottom-line is that strong executive leadership is required throughout the entire course of warfare.

(2) Strategic thinking and vision is required to support U.S. foreign policy.

Visionaries, such as Mahan and Roosevelt, believed that *Manifest Destiny* did not end at the Nation's continental borders. As a result of the new possessions in the Far East, both Germany and Japan's expansionist goals would be checked.⁹¹ Furthermore, they paved the way for the Open Door policy with regard to China. In the Caribbean, defense of the Atlantic maritime approaches through the yet to be built Panama Canal became a reality. Control and defense of the Panama Canal obligation called for an aggressive foreign policy in order to protect this vital waterway from hostile foreign powers. Theodore Roosevelt believed that readiness to use force was a vital element of foreign policy and that everyone should understand that.⁹² A strong and ready maritime power was required to support foreign policy abroad and this remains true today.

(3) Increased power means increased responsibility. New responsibilities for the U.S. were only natural as a result of victory and credibility as a major power. These new obligations in the Pacific and the Western Hemisphere ensured U.S. engagement in geopolitics. Commodore Dewey's actions during the Manila blockade demonstrated this commitment. Consequently, European powers and Japan took notice of America's new presence and realized that unwarranted influence in those regions would not be tolerated – as demonstrated in the Boxer Rebellion, Central America, and World War II. This new ideology hastened America's

acceptance of international responsibilities commensurate with its power.⁹³ Over the next century, the United States became deeply engaged in world affairs. Hegemonic powers maintain the balance of power in their regions.

(4) Media wars energize public opinion, political actions, and the economy. Media sensationalism played a significant part in influencing the cry for war. Although Hearst and Pulitzer battled over newspaper sales in New York, the whole country was mesmerized by the media. Correspondents influenced average citizens, industrial elites, Congress, and the Administration with their unfiltered coverage of the Cuban insurrection. Further, the press scooped the President by reporting the cause of the *Maine* catastrophe even before he informed Congress.⁹⁴ It was only a matter of time before McKinley called for intervention leading to war; otherwise Congress would have acted on its own thereby diminishing McKinley's presidential power. Consequently, some historians believe that had the President been more forceful in the early stages leading up to war, and spoken out against it providing some semblance of executive guidance, it might have been averted.⁹⁵ The media will always play a part in foreign relations; however, executive leaders should have a message campaign to steer their supporters in the direction they see best for the overall situation.

(5) The media has its place in war and will influence the battlefield. Wartime correspondents influenced military and information operations in the field. Several papers chartered press boats so correspondents could report on naval engagements in Santiago and Manila, which only muddled the area of operations. Newspaper men followed the troops but some actually led them into battle during the battle of El Caney. Furthermore, initial reports on the Spanish inadequacies during their skirmishes with Cuban insurgents and American naval vessels provided a false sense of security for the Army in Cuba, which changed once they fought

at El Caney.⁹⁶ At times, the press mixed up its roles and interfered with military operations, which caused confusion on the battlefield and discontent with military leadership. Although correspondents should be allowed to cover the war, they have a responsibility to follow the guidelines set by the commander to avoid added friction.

(6) Unity of command is essential in joint military operations. During the Santiago campaign, the expeditionary force was negatively affected by the lack of command guidance and structure, especially in the failure to dictate unity of command. Since the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not exist at this time, President McKinley was responsible for assigning a unified commander for the joint operation. He failed to do so and as a result, the commanders worked against each other, which delayed actions in the conduct of the campaign. Additionally, the President should have provided clear guidance, but did not do so. Thus, the commanders based their plans on their own interpretation of military objectives and prolonged the situation in Cuba.⁹⁷ A joint operation under a unified commander from the start quite probably would have resulted in a shorter campaign and with possibly fewer casualties. Roles and responsibilities of the services should be defined at the outset of the conflict.

(7) Indecisiveness on the battlefield unnecessarily wastes blood and treasure. Both Navy and Army leaders demonstrated indecisiveness during the Santiago campaign. Commodore Schley was the first to show signs of being an indecisive leader when he conducted a looping maneuver which drew him away from the enemy during Cervera's attempted escape. He appeared to have lost his composure and displayed a deficiency in leadership, which might have had catastrophic results for the American fleet.⁹⁸ General Shafter also demonstrated indecisive leadership after the battles at San Juan Hill. After being surprised by stiff resistance and taking heavy losses, Shafter's confidence was shaken. Effects of tropical disease, poor

logistics support, and his lack of cooperation with the Navy left Shafter's forces ill-prepared to continue the momentum.⁹⁹ General Shafter's indecisive actions resulted in further delay and unnecessarily expended lives, time, and resources, which could have been avoided. Leadership means making decisions in a timely manner with the best possible outcome in mind.

(8) Military planning, preparedness, and execution are vital through all phases of war. Overall, the Navy Department was quite successful in both the Philippines and the Caribbean, since the Spanish naval threat was disposed of relatively quick. However, the Navy realized it needed new and improved vessels, adequate communications for naval stations, and improved operational performance, especially in naval gunnery, if it was to maintain its superiority.¹⁰⁰ The Army, on the other hand, required significant changes to meet the demands of the 20th Century. Since the end of the Civil War, Congress had ignored and neglected the Army so that by 1898 soldiers were neither ready, nor trained to fight an overseas war.¹⁰¹ Furthermore, from mobilization to deployment, the Army stumbled over logistics planning and execution. The War Department, in order to keep pace with the Navy, made short-term improvements by restructuring and reorganizing the Army and the Department's various bureaus.¹⁰² A ready and capable military force is what the American people expect when called upon to do the Nation's bidding.

(9) Joint military operations require planning, cooperation, and coordination. In spite of each service's organizational and operational problems, joint military operations suffered as well. Joint military operations require planning, cooperation, and coordination. The Army and the Navy planned simultaneously but not jointly, and their efforts suffered from the secretaries' squabbles and the lack of presidential direction.¹⁰³ The Caribbean Campaigns, although successful, served as examples of disconnected operations. Each service had different

priorities and concept of operations in achieving those military objectives. Disputes between the Navy and the Army commanders ensued during execution and only widened the inter-service schism. In an effort to address these deficiencies, a Joint Army-Navy Board was created a few years after the war, but the joint task force with unity of command issue would not be resolved for generations. Even more so, the Army continued to be wary of naval support while the Navy realized it required its own land force to seize the initiative, and this force was the U.S. Marine Corps.¹⁰⁴ Integrated joint capabilities and coordination are required to face emerging challenges in a complex environment.

(10) Powerful nations rely on modern navies and armies to defend them. In some ways, the Spanish-American War was a practice war for the United States. Despite their issues, the Army and the Navy were in a much better position to defeat a weak adversary such as Spain. However, in order to maintain its status as major power, the United States needed to modernize its military. To do otherwise was to risk its international credibility and overseas possessions. The war served to ensure continued growth for the Navy and an expanded role for it in American diplomacy.¹⁰⁵ With an increase in naval demand, the military-industrial complex grew and so did an offensive fleet. Secretary of War Elihu Root reformed the Army instituting the chief of staff-general staff system, fully rationalized its system of postgraduate education, and championed the Militia Act of 1903. Root also tackled the Army's inefficient logistics operations; however, by 1917, the War Department was still not quite prepared for the national economic mobilization effort that modern warfare required.¹⁰⁶ Ultimately, the Quartermaster Corps required more attention and resources. Modern armed forces cannot conduct high-tempo, effective operations without reliable equipment, systems, and networks.¹⁰⁷

In summary, the political and military impact of the Spanish-American War was significant. Each of the aforementioned points illustrates the central tenets of this thesis: the Spanish-American War thrust the United States into the role of a global power, and the abbreviated war was filled with consequences in diplomacy, leadership, information operations, mobilization, and joint military operations. Some deficiencies were easily corrected while others required additional time, resources, and support throughout the 20th Century. In actuality, these shortcomings require constant refinement and acknowledgement in order to avoid the pitfalls in conducting war.

The war Americans initially supported as a humanitarian crusade for Cuban liberty turned out to be a defining moment in the Nation's history. Some believed that *Manifest Destiny* set the path for the United States to forge a new empire that stretched from the Caribbean to the western Pacific.¹⁰⁸ Others supported a pacific course and believed that the United States should avoid becoming an imperialist Nation. Nevertheless, the Spanish-American War produced a revolutionary change in U.S. foreign policy, and the long-range effects and consequences have impacted the Pacific and the Western Hemisphere throughout the past century. As the United States goes forward into the 21st Century and turns its attention to new challenges in foreign policy and military readiness, careful study of the war with Spain is warranted for its historical value and its significant contributions to foreign affairs and warfare. Lastly, one should remember that as a result of the Spanish-American War, the international community acknowledged the United States as a major power and the Nation accepted its international responsibilities commensurate with its power.

ENDNOTES

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- ⁷ Ivan Musicant, *Empire by Default: The Spanish-American War and the Dawn of the American Century* (New York: Henry Holt and Co, Inc., 1998), 626-627.
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- ¹⁰ David F. Trask, *The War with Spain in 1898* (New York: Macmillian Publishing Company, Inc., 1981), 3.
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- ¹³ Albert A. Nofi, *The Spanish-American War, 1898* (Pennsylvania: Combined Books, 1996), 31.
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- ¹⁹ Geoffrey Perret, *A Country Made by War: From the Revolution to Vietnam-The Story of America's Rise to Power* (New York: Random House, 1989), 279-280.
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- ³¹ David F. Trask, *The War with Spain in 1898* (New York: Macmillian Publishing Company, Inc., 1981), 478.

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- ⁴⁶ Ivan Musicant, *Empire by Default: The Spanish-American War and the Dawn of the American Century* (New York: Henry Holt and Co, Inc., 1998), 362.
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- ⁶⁴ Miguel Hernandez, "San Juan Under Siege," *Military History*, April 1998, 49-51.
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