**14. ABSTRACT**

The Joint Forcible Entry capability, which is arguably the most complex and risky joint military operation, has not been validated since the wars began. The U.S. diplomatic efforts with its future adversaries and its ability to project power to achieve strategic objectives will be dramatically different once the U.S. loses its ability to conduct forcible entry. There is nothing to suggest that the requirement for forcible entry will disappear. It is incumbent upon the joint force to find tactical and technological means to counter the challenges that the current and future threat environments present to a forcible entry operation. Solutions to emerging threats will take the form of various parts of the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Personnel, Leadership, and Facilities spectrum. The training and acquisition programs of the individual services need to be coordinated to create forcible entry exercises that simultaneously conduct airborne and amphibious forcible entries with the introduction of follow on forces. The creation of a Joint Operational Forcible Entry Concept would create a framework for the development of the forcible entry capability in the Department of Defense.

**15. SUBJECT TERMS**

Forcible Entry, Joint Doctrine, Joint Operating Concepts, Amphibious Operations, Airborne Operations

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# Abstract

Current combat operations have rightfully been the focus of effort for the U.S. military for the past nine years. The Joint Forcible Entry capability, which is arguably the most complex and risky joint military operation, has not been validated since the wars began. The U.S. diplomatic efforts with its future adversaries and its ability to project power to achieve strategic objectives will be dramatically different once the U.S. loses its ability to conduct forcible entry. There is nothing to suggest that the requirement for forcible entry will disappear. It is incumbent upon the joint force to find tactical and technological means to counter the challenges that the current and future threat environments present to a forcible entry operation. Solutions to emerging threats will take the form of various parts of the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Personnel, Leadership, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) spectrum. The training and acquisition programs of the individual services need to be coordinated to create forcible entry exercises that simultaneously conduct airborne and amphibious forcible entries with the introduction of follow on forces. The creation of a Joint Operational Forcible Entry Concept would create a framework for the development of the forcible entry capability in the Department of Defense.

# Subject Terms
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Executive Summary

Title: Joint Forcible Entry in the Future Threat Environment

Author: Major Matthew D. Lundgren, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: The complexity of joint forcible entry operations requires a deliberate and holistic effort on the part of the U.S. military in order to provide the capability to the joint force commander.

Discussion:

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have rightfully been the focus of effort of the U.S. military for the past nine years. The intellectual, resource, and human capital that has been devoted to the current fight has come at the expense of other capabilities. The Joint Forcible Entry capability, which is arguably the most complex and risky joint military operation, has not been validated since the wars began. The U.S. diplomatic efforts with its future adversaries will be dramatically different once the U.S. loses its ability to conduct forcible entry. A failure to look at forcible entry from a joint perspective by all four of the armed services has led to the questioning of the individual part of the whole.

There is nothing to suggest that the requirement for forcible entry will cease to exist or disappear. Accepting this proposition, it is incumbent upon the joint force to find tactical and technological means to counter the challenges that the current and future threat environments present to a forcible entry operation. Solutions to emerging threats will take the form of various parts of the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Personnel, Leadership, and Facilities (DOTMPLF) spectrum. The creation of a Joint Operational Forcible Entry Concept would create a framework for the development of the forcible entry capability in Department of Defense.

The armed services must ensure that their efforts to restructure themselves to achieve efficiency do not prevent them from fulfilling their part of the nation's forcible entry capability. The training programs of the individual services need to be coordinated to create forcible entry exercises that simultaneously conduct airborne and amphibious forcible entries with the introduction of follow on forces. This type of actual graduate level training exercise is the only way to truly validate the joint capability. The acquisition process for each of the services needs to air mobility and amphibious shipping maintain levels that will support joint forcible entry.

Conclusion: The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps must increase their efforts to form a legitimate joint (and as appropriate combined) forcible entry capability in order to meet the requirements of future joint force commanders.
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Preface

On several occasions over the past year, United States Secretary of Defense Robert B. Gates has proposed questions about the future viability of the amphibious assault. I began my research for this paper with the intent of answering the question of how to conduct an opposed amphibious landing against enemies possessing new anti-access and area denial capabilities. What I learned was that the amphibious assault and the Marine Corps’ role in it are only two parts of what would be a much larger joint operation. Answering the questions about amphibious assault without first developing a joint concept for forcible entry creates the potential for stove pipe capabilities that do not complement each other when put to the test in combat.

There is a need for an overarching joint concept for forcible entry. This would provide the emphasis on the capability for the services to prioritize resources and train together. As my MMS Mentor commented about the Marine Corps’ innovation in amphibious warfare during the 20’s and 30’s, “It was more than just doctrine!” The composition of a joint capability requires the development of the appropriate doctrine, organization, training, material, personnel, leadership, and facilities (DOTMPLF). As the spirited discussions regarding the optimal composition and capabilities of the U.S. military continue, defense leaders must ensure piecemeal cancellation of individual service programs do not have the unintended effect of negating overarching joint capabilities. Forcible entry and operational access capabilities are critical elements of the U.S.’ ability to project power overseas in order to protect and further its interests.

My intent for this paper is to demonstrate the need for a joint approach to the concept of forcible entry. The examples of capability gaps are biased towards amphibious forcible entry because of my experience and access to research material. This is not to suggest that there are
not similar issues with the airborne capability. The reality is that both capabilities need to be resourced properly so that the U.S. military has the ability seize lodgements for follow on forces in a variety of situations.

I am indebted to my Masters of Military Science mentor Dr. Donald Bittner for his guidance and insight which was invaluable to the completion of this paper. I would also like to thank my family and especially my wife for her unwavering support during the development of this project.
Some Thoughts on Forcible Entry: Past, Present, and Future

"The United States remains the only nation able to project and sustain large-scale military operations over extended distances. We maintain superior capabilities to deter and defeat adaptive enemies and to ensure the credibility of security partnerships that are fundamental to regional and global security. In this way, our military continues to underpin our national security and global leadership, and when we use it appropriately, our security and leadership is reinforced."
---President Barrack Obama, *National Security Strategy 2010*

"America’s interests and role in the world require armed forces with unmatched capabilities and a willingness on the part of the nation to employ them in defense of our interests and the common good. The United States remains the only nation able to project and sustain large-scale operations over extended distances. This unique position generates an obligation to be responsible stewards of the power and influence that history, determination, and circumstance have provided."
---*Quadrennial Defense Review 2010*

"Today only the United States and Britain (and possibly France) are capable of mounting independent operations of any scale overseas. This is not solely because of the armies’ capabilities: overseas campaigns are joint operations, involving army, navy, and air force. Nor is it just a matter of size: there are many larger armed forces Britain’s…. It is the range and balance of capabilities within a nation’s armed forces that determine whether or not they are able to mount an independent campaign far from home. A force must be able to acquire intelligence on the enemy; manoeuvre against him; bring fire support to bear (from land, sea, and air); protect against the enemy’s own fire; and sustain itself. And when all these capabilities are lined up, a further capability – to command them – becomes key, for as Montgomery’s American counterpart in Normandy, Omar Bradley, said, ‘Congress can make a general, but only communications can make him a commander.’"

"Large-scale amphibious operations such as those in Sicily and Normandy will never occur again." (11 months before the amphibious landings at Inchon)
---General Omar Bradley in testimony to the House Committee on Armed Services, 19 October 1949.
INTRODUCTION

As a nation with global interests, the United States needs to be able to project its power throughout the world. The increasingly interconnected planet will require the U.S. to continue to use its influence to protect and further its interests. President Barrack Obama reiterated the importance of U.S. influence in the National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2010. “Going forward, there should be no doubt: the United States of America will continue to underwrite global security through our commitments to allies, partners, and institutions; our focus on defeating al-Qaeda and its affiliates in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and around the globe; and our determination to deter aggression and prevent the proliferation of the world’s most dangerous weapons.”5 The commitment of U.S. forces across the range of military operations will require the military to project power over great distances. One of the fundamental capabilities required to do this will be forcible entry operations. Joint Publication 3-18 Forcible Entry of 2008 defines forcible entry as, “Seizing and holding of a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition.”6 Without access to a secure lodgement near the area of operations to use as a base of operations, U.S. forces must be able to seize one by either air or sea.

Doctrine is only one part of what makes up a capability. This is especially the case with forcible entry which requires the coordination of multiple service capabilities to execute successfully. The Department of Defense has Joint Operating Concepts to serve as guidance for the development of multi service capabilities. Current overseas contingency operations have been the focus of effort for the last ten years to the expense of many conventional capabilities. In order to prepare for deterring and winning the wars of tomorrow, the U.S. must develop a legitimate joint capability to conduct a forcible entry operation.
The economic crisis in the U.S. has led to a spirited discussion in the U.S. defense community regarding the capabilities required for the 21st century. While a constant review of capabilities in terms of equipment and tactics is always healthy, the need for a joint forcible entry capability will remain an enduring requirement for the U.S. military. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has initiated efforts to dramatically reduce defense spending. In addition to cutting programs, he has posed some serious questions to the services in order to get them to evaluate their future structure and capabilities. At the Navy League Sea-Air-Space Exposition in May of 2010, he stated, “We have to take a hard look at where it would be necessary or sensible to launch another major amphibious landing again – especially as advances in anti-ship systems keep pushing the potential launch point further from shore. … In the 21st century, what kind of amphibious capability do we really need to deal with the most likely scenarios, and then how much?” The answer to this question is an important one but it is only a small piece of what will be a joint answer to the question of how the U.S. military will conduct a forcible entry operation.

The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have rightly been the focus of the services for the last nine years. As the withdrawal from Iraq is completed and the end of significant combat operations in Afghanistan comes into focus, it is imperative that the U.S. military take a holistic look at how it will conduct forcible entry operations in the decades to come. Forcible entry requires the coordination and cooperation of at least two services. Neither the Army nor the Marine Corps is capable of self-deploying itself from the United States to a conflict area overseas. While the Air Force and the Navy have the mobility, they do not have the ground combat forces required to seize and hold a lodgment until follow on forces arrive. This interdependence between the services requires that forcible entry be evaluated as a holistic capability and not a sum of the parts. A reductionist approach that does not assess all of the
capabilities required for forcible entry will fail to adequately answer the question of whether or not the joint force is capable of executing one of these missions. It is not enough that the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps are capable of executing their roles individually. All four capabilities must be trained and evaluated together to ensure that the doctrine, organization, training, equipment, and personnel can work together during all phases of the forcible entry operation.

**THE NEED FOR JOINT FORCIBLE ENTRY**

The National Security Strategy of the United States lists the following concepts as U.S. interests: The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners; a strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity; respect for universal values at home and around the world; and an international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges. In order to protect and further these interests, the U.S. government employs all four of the elements of national power (diplomatic, information, military, and economic). The use of the military to pursue these ends can be categorized as prevention (building alliances, partnerships, and security assistance), deterrence (the threat of force), or reaction (the use of force or other military means). The viability of the U.S. military as an instrument of national power is contingent on its ability to be employed. Without a forcible entry capability, the U.S. dramatically reduces its ability to project power and deter adversaries because it no longer has the ability to unilaterally deliver its military to a conflict area in order to achieve a decision.

Forcible entry provides the nation’s leadership with a conventional deterrence option beyond airstrikes and the means to unilaterally project power onto foreign soil. The credible
forcible entry capability is necessary across the range of military operations because it enables all other follow on missions. Without it, the nation is dependent on the willingness of a sovereign state adjacent to its intended adversary to act as a staging area for an invasion. The U.S. will not be able to guarantee that this will always be the case. The concept of deterrence has been traditionally associated with nuclear weapons. This quotation from the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review illustrates the role of conventional forces in deterrence: “Our deterrent remains grounded in land, air, and naval forces capable of fighting limited and large-scale conflicts in environments where anti-access weaponry and tactics are used, as well as forces prepared to respond to the full range of challenges posed by state and non-state groups.”10 The capability to deliver a ground combat force to a contested area is an essential element of the U.S. military’s deterrence of threat actors across the range of military operations.

The debate over the regular or irregular nature of the U.S. military’s future adversaries does not negate the need for a conventional forcible entry capability. Regardless of whether or not the conflict is conventional or irregular, a key element of the U.S. military’s response will be the closing of the force to the area where the operation will take place. Without a nation willing to grant U.S. forces access adjacent to the area of operations, a forcible entry operation from the sea and/or air will have to be conducted. Joint Forces Command addressed this requirement in its assessment of the future threat environment titled The Joint Operating Environment 2010:

In America’s two recent wars against Iraq, the enemy made no effort to deny U.S. forces entry into the theater. Future opponents, however, may not prove so accommodating. Hence, the second constraint confronting planners is that the United States may not have uncontested access to bases in the immediate area from which it can project military power. Even in the best case, allies will be essential to providing the base structure required for arriving U.S. forces. But there may be other cases in which uncontested access to bases is not available for the projection of military forces. This may be because the neighborhood is hostile, smaller friendly states have been intimidated, negative perceptions of America exist, or states fear giving up a measure of sovereignty. Furthermore, the use of
bases by the Joint Force might involve the host nation in conflict. Hence, the ability to seize bases in enemy territory by force from the sea and air could prove the critical opening move of a campaign.\textsuperscript{11}

This excerpt illustrates just how important a viable forcible entry capability will be for the nation's security in the future. There is a compelling argument to re-evaluate the methods and equipment that will be used for forcible entry but the requirement to conduct it will endure as long as the U.S has interests outside of its borders. Regardless of the conventional or unconventional nature of the threat, the U.S. will need to be able to close forces to the area where the conflict will occur, seize an area to operate from, and provide support to the follow on mission.

\textbf{LESSONS FROM HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF FORCIBLE ENTRY}

A review of past forcible entry operations illustrates how complex they are. The largest and most famous example is the Allied invasion of northwestern Europe in 1944. The Normandy landings combined amphibious and airborne forcible entry. Due to its size, it was the most complex forcible entry operation in history. Planning for the invasion took over a year and numerous rehearsals were conducted by subordinate units. Over three million men took part in the invasion. On D-Day thousands of ships and aircraft delivered 176,000 troops across the beach and into the drop zones. Without the detailed planning, preparation, and coordination between the air, sea, and ground forces this operation would not have been a success. Another key element was the unity of command exercised by General Eisenhower as the Supreme Allied Commander.\textsuperscript{12} It is unlikely that a future forcible entry operation will reach the same scale as the Normandy invasion. Nevertheless, the coordination and planning for future airborne, amphibious, or combined forcible entry operation will be extensive. The complexity of friendly command and control architecture, sustainment requirements, force protection considerations,
and offensive capabilities will prevent a successful ad hoc combination of service specific forces in a time competitive environment. These factors point to the need for a trained and equipped forcible entry capability prior to the emergence of the crisis.

An historical example for the uncoordinated execution of a forcible entry operation would be the assault on Gallipoli during World War I. The poor coordination and preparation were significant contributors to the failure that attackers experienced. Gallipoli serves as a warning for those who believe that a forcible entry capability can be pieced together when a crisis occurs. A contemporary example of this is the U.S. invasion of Grenada, codenamed Operation URGENT FURY. This operation was conducted on very short notice by a very small force. A carrier strike group, an amphibious ready group with an embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit, Army airborne and ranger units, Air Force attack and transport aircraft, as well as several special operations units conducted the operation with almost no planning or coordination. Fortunately, a small and inept enemy force prevented disastrous results from occurring. Many of the lessons from Operation URGENT FURY are still valid for operational planners today. A thorough intelligence picture, joint planning and coordination, unity of command, and compatible communication architecture are essential elements to rapidly executing crisis response missions.

The lessons that were learned from the Grenada operation provided some of the energy that spurred the reforms of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. This legislation streamlined the operational command structure for joint forces deployed overseas and better facilitated unity of command under the geographic combatant commander. It also created a more integrated process for the procurement of equipment and levied joint duty
requirements on the personnel system for officers. These reforms strengthened the joint force but they did not address any requirements for joint training or exercises.

For a period of time before 2001, the four services did conduct large scale forcible entry exercises but the operational tempo created by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq prevented them from being continued. These events combined amphibious and airborne assaults to seize a lodgment for follow on forces to exploit. Resource constraints and an increased operational tempo have subsequently prevented the U.S. military from conducting these large scale exercises since 2001. The Army and Marine Corps still maintain rapidly deployable forcible entry units but they do not train together or as a part of a JTF.

**CURRENT JOINT FORCIBLE ENTRY CAPABILITIES**

*Joint Publication 3-18 Forcible Entry Operations* outlines U.S. doctrine for conducting forcible entry. The manual provides the broad doctrinal construct for conducting forcible entry. It lists nine principles for conducting a successful forcible entry. They are:

- **Achieve Surprise.** Planners should strive to achieve surprise regarding exact objectives, times, methods, and forces employed in forcible entry operations

- **Control of the Air.** Air superiority should be achieved in the operational area to protect the force during periods of critical vulnerability and to preserve lines of communications

- **Control of Space.** Space superiority allows the joint force commander access to communications, weather, navigation, timing, remote sensing, and intelligence assets without prohibitive interference by the opposing force

- **Sea Control.** Control of the sea in the operational area enables the joint force to project power ashore in support of the joint forcible entry operation and to protect sea lines of communications

- **Isolate the Lodgment.** The joint force attacks or neutralizes any enemy capabilities with the potential to affect the establishment of the lodgment

- **Gain and Maintain Access.** Gaining and maintaining access is a critical precondition for successful forcible entry
Neutralize Enemy Forces Within the Lodgment. The joint force must neutralize enemy forces within the lodgment to facilitate the establishment of airheads and beachheads within the operational area and to provide for the immediate protection of the force.

Expand the Lodgment. The joint force quickly builds combat power in order to: enhance security and the ability to respond to enemy counter attacks; enable continuous landing of troops and materiel; and, facilitate transition to subsequent operations.

Manage the Impact of Environmental Factors. Managing the impact of environmental factors refers to overcoming the effect of land and sea obstacles; anticipating, preventing, detecting, and mitigating adversary use of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive weapons; and, determining the impact of climate, weather, and other natural occurring hazards.

Integrate Supporting Operations. Intelligence, IO, civil-military operations, and special operations are key to setting the conditions for forcible entry operational success.

This list of principles demonstrates the complexity of a forcible entry operation. The successful coordination and execution of the diverse capabilities and tasks to achieve maximum efficiency in such a complex environment requires a joint task force headquarters which has conducted an extensive amount of training in preparation for such an undertaking. Doctrine does not prescribe a training regimen for such a joint task force. The creation of a legitimate forcible entry capability is achieved by addressing the implications of all of the elements of DOTMLPF.

Even though forcible entry is a critical capability for the U.S. military, the Quadrennial Defense Review (February 2010) and the National Military Strategy (February 2011) only briefly mention it in their discussions of operational requirements. The lack of attention to forcible entry in the Defense Department’s strategic guidance documents detracts from a unified approach to forcible entry by the services. As evidenced by the operations in Gallipoli and Grenada, the friction created by an in-extremis integration of these forces will represent a
challenge that will rival the enemy threat to the mission. An ad hoc approach to conducting a forcible entry operation will not suffice against a legitimate threat that is prepared to contest U.S. forces as they arrive by sea or air.

Without a valid joint capability, the U.S. military will face significant issues throughout the planning and execution of a highly complex real world operation. Lieutenant General Frank Helmick, the Commanding General of the XVIIth Airborne Corps, highlighted the need for closer integration between the amphibious and airborne forcible entry capability during his brief regarding forcible entry to the Army’s Infantry Warfighting Conference on 15 September 2010. The need for a joint forcible entry concept was also identified at the 2009 Army and Marine Corps Staff Talks and the 2010 Army and Marine Corps Warfighter Talks. Lieutenant General Helmick also discussed the absence of forcible entry in the strategic guidance from DOD and the impact that it creates in the requirement process. By not articulating the need for forcible entry, DOD fundamentally handicaps the resourcing of forcible entry as a capability.

In an article in Army Magazine from 2009, retired Generals Carl Stiner and Daniel Schroeder highlighted how little emphasis the joint community has placed on forcible entry. Doctrinal language about forcible entry is found in Joint Publications 3-17, 3-18 and 3-31, and the Army Field Manuals 3-0 and 3-92. In Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) documents, however, there has been no mention of forcible entry since the 2001 QDR. The 2002 edition of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) was the last mention of forcible entry as a required capability. There is no joint integrating concept on the subject. Thus we now find a divergence of approaches being taken unilaterally to what are probably the most complex and complicated joint operations, and no comprehensive statement of the requirement in Department of Defense documents. Worse, the approaches are ad hoc in that there is no forcing function such as mandated joint airborne air trans- portability training (JAAT) or joint amphibious /airborne training. The Global Response Force (GRF) executive order makes no mention of forcible entry capability, training or exercising. Joint Publication 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry Operations, cites three primary forcible entry operational capabilities: amphibious assault, airborne assault and air assault. These are not trivial evolutions, and they require formal statements of requirements in defense planning documents.
General Stiner was the former commanding general of the 82d Airborne Division, the XVIII Airborne Corps, and the United States Special Operations Command. Schroeder served as the Chief of Staff for the XVIII Airborne Corps.

The generals’ article relates to the Army’s forcible entry capability but their comments apply equally across the services. There is not a single service that is capable of conducting a forcible entry operation on its own yet there is very little in the way of joint training to conduct one of these missions as a four service joint task force. The Navy and the Marine Corps have conducted limited amphibious training since 2001. The Army and Air Force, on the other hand, have conducted Joint Forcible Entry Exercises in conjunction with their Global Response Force training approximately four times a year. These events involved roughly 1000 paratroopers and an assortment of equipment. Despite these exercises, the most glaring absence in joint training is an exercise involving all four of the services which would evaluate a force large enough to seize a lodgment from a significant conventional threat.

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have occupied the Army’s training and resources for the last nine years. This has resulted in an atrophy of its forcible entry capability. Generals Stiner and Schroeder highlighted this in their article.

What used to be called strategic brigade air drop was a joint capability specified in the JSCP that was jointly trained through the formal JAAT program. It was through that program and Department of Defense guidance that sufficient air drop-qualified aircrews were trained to provide the capability to conduct a brigade-sized drop from 500 feet at night, as would be required in a joint forcible entry. That capability has not been trained in at least seven years. Projection issues from 20 years ago persist today, such as secure en route communications for the airborne element of the joint force. Station-keeping equipment issues make the trail of aircraft so long that it precludes a BCT sized air drop at night. A dual-row air-drop system from the C-17 - a capability the Army asked for years ago - is still not demonstrated. Those three capabilities were conceived to allow the rapid build-up of combat power on the ground.
The Joint Forcible Entry Exercises conducted by the Army and the Air Force have maintained the airborne capability but only at the brigade minus level. Lieutenant General Helmick also noted in his brief to the Infantry Warfighting Conference that many of the new pieces of equipment such as up-armored HMMWVs have not been certified for airdrops. This represents a significant deficiency in the training and capability of the Army to conduct a brigade sized airborne drop.

Amphibious forcible entry capability has also declined. Naval surface fire support is currently limited to the five inch guns onboard destroyers which will not be sufficient for a large scale amphibious forcible entry operation. This deficiency was highlighted by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General James Amos during Congressional testimony in 2011.

Planned reductions in the procurement of certain naval ships along with cancellation of specific weapons programs over the past few years have led to a deficiency in systems available for naval surface fires. Completed in 2009, the Joint Expeditionary Fires Analysis of Alternatives identified the optimum U.S. Navy programs to support Marine Corps naval surface fire support requirements. This study established the baseline capabilities of the current naval surface fire support program of record (13nm projectile of the 5-inch gun and the Advance Gun System of the DDG-1000) to be insufficient in mitigating fire support gaps. The study determined that extended range 5-inch munitions would serve as a complementary alternative to the three DDG 1000s. Dramatic improvements in 5-inch projectiles can extend the naval surface fire support maximum range, across the 106 guns in the surface fleet, from 13 to 52 nautical miles with precision, high angle attack for use in operations in urban terrain, and potential effectiveness against moving targets.

The cancellation of the Army's Non-Line of Site Launch System (N-LOS LS) due to cost issues has also impacted the Navy's ability to provide naval surface fire support to amphibious landing forces. This precision weapons system was being developed by the Army but was also going to become a mission package for the Navy's Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). There continues to be a need for a more robust capability to deliver fires to ground units from the surface combatants off shore. This will have to be filled in the future by the DDG-1000 class destroyer or a replacement for the N-LOS LS for the LCS.
From an amphibious lift perspective, the *Naval Operations Concept 2010* outlines the requirement to move a forcible entry force by the sea. “Generally, an ESF in support of the assault echelon of a single amphibious Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) will total 17 amphibious ships; a second MEB would require the surging of all remaining U.S. Navy amphibious ships.” The present plan for amphibious ships accepts risk with a fleet of 31 ships in 2010 and 34 ships by 2021. The identified requirement for amphibious ships is 38. Rising ship building costs and budgetary constraints have called into question the ability to maintain the current fleet. As the entire joint force assesses its requirements for the future, it is important that DOD articulates the requirement for forcible entry to ensure that ship building plans and other naval capabilities account for the systems that will be needed to deliver and support an amphibious landing force.

The complexity of amphibious operations requires careful coordination and a mutual understanding between the landing force and the amphibious task force. This can only be achieved through a close working relationship developed by actually working together. The *Naval Operations Concept 2010* states, “Effective aggregation of maritime forces relies on common tactics, techniques and procedures associated with intelligence, C2, fires, maneuver, logistics and force protection. This underscores the importance of sufficient joint and combined training, and of interoperable systems, to achieving and sustaining operational readiness.” The demands of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have prevented the Navy and Marine Corps from conducting large scale amphibious training. There has been momentum in late 2010 and into 2011 to return to amphibious training. Exercises such as Bold Alligator 11 and Dawn Blitz 2010 signal a return to amphibious training by the Navy and Marine Corps. The Marine Corps’
Title 10 Wargame, Expeditionary Warrior also covered forcible entry with a joint force. It is important that these efforts continue with increased participation by all of the services.

**FUTURE JOINT FORCIBLE ENTRY**

In the forward to the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations version 3*, Admiral Michael Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, describes how the joint force will operate in response to a wide variety of security challenges in 2016-2028. He proposes that future joint force commanders will combine and subsequently adapt some combination of four basic categories of military activity -- combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction -- in accordance with the unique requirements of each operational situation. This document serves as the vision for future operations by the joint force. It begins by affirming the role of the military as an instrument of national power. “The fundamental purpose of military power is to deter or wage war in support of national policy. In these capacities, military power is a coercive instrument, designed to achieve by force or threat of force what other means cannot.” These statements validate the continuing need for a substantial forcible entry capability in the U.S. military.

While the need for forcible entry is an enduring requirement, the environment in which these operations will be conducted has changed significantly. The *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations Activity Concept v 1.0* describes the conditions that will need to be met for a U.S. force to successfully close with an enemy force on a foreign shore:

To react globally despite the diminished access to overseas bases projected in the CCJO, as well as to deny enemy forces the opportunity to harden or reposition between a U.S. decision to commit joint forces and their arrival in theater, some joint forces must be able to maneuver from strategic distances directly into combat without the need for staging bases in the operational area -- possibly conducting forcible-entry operations in the process against increasingly powerful enemies. This applies equally to land forces deploying by air or sea; self-
deploying aircraft conducting strike, reconnaissance or other missions; or naval forces conducting a variety of missions.\textsuperscript{36}

The future threat environment envisioned in this document requires all four of the armed forces to work together at every level. To counter the anti-access and area denial capabilities, U.S. forces will mitigate the risk to the force by reducing their exposure to enemy capabilities.

The \textit{Major Combat Operations Joint Operating Concept}, which outlines how a joint force will fight a conventional enemy, responds to the evolving threat to U.S. forces as they close with the objective area with this statement:

Ideally, forces and capabilities are rapidly employable; most requiring little or no reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI) support. By design, these forces are adaptive, modular, scalable, and highly mobile. Operational movement and maneuver from inter-theater distances and from the sea, as well as intra-theater maneuver occur in a distributed manner to create continuous pressure and multiple dilemmas that enemy leaders find hard to combat.\textsuperscript{37}

Airborne and amphibious units conducting forcible entry will need to be able to move from the Continental U.S. directly into the fight. The surprise that is needed to accomplish a forcible entry operation will be one of the most significant force protection factors for the joint forces against the enemy's anti-access and area denial capability. This threat is already present on today's battlefield as evidenced by this statement from a Congressional Research Report regarding the now cancelled EFV: "There are concerns that the 25-mile over the horizon operating capability may no longer provide the protection to the fleet that it once did. One example is the 2006 Hezbollah C-802 cruise missile attack against an Israeli ship where two missiles were fired, with one hitting the Israeli warship, which was about 10 miles from shore, and the second missile striking an Egyptian ship 36 miles from shore."\textsuperscript{38} By moving from outside of the theater to the objective, U.S. forces will require enemy defenders to account for multiple potential drop zones and landing sites in the desired lodgment area.\textsuperscript{39}
To unify the numerous capabilities that will play a role in gaining access to a contested area, the Department of Defense (DOD) is developing a Joint Operational Access Concept. This concept will contain forcible entry as one of the capabilities required to gain operational access. The entire paper deals with the total efforts of the joint force to achieve access to operational areas in the face of armed opposition. The purpose of the paper is to establish “a common intellectual framework for the challenge of opposed access, will inform subsequent joint and service concepts, and will result in doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMPLF) solutions.” By working to establish this mental model for operational access, the U.S. military has taken an important step towards developing a holistic capability for forcible entry.

The conceptual thought regarding forcible entry is complimented by several service initiatives to address in functional terms the requirements and doctrine for future forcible entry operations. The Under Secretary of the Navy, Robert Work outlined the concept of Operational Maneuver from Strategic Distances (OMFSD) during a briefing to the 2010 National Defense Industrial Association’s Expeditionary Warfare Conference. He defined the concept as,

Operational maneuver from strategic distance combines global force projection with maneuver against an operationally significant objective. It requires strategic reach that deploys maneuverable land power to an operational area that provides a position of advantage… Success demands full integration of all available joint means. Thus, it combines force projection with land maneuver to operational depth in an integrated, continuous operation.

This concept provides a response to the emerging anti-access and area denial threats and corresponds with the concept of employment for the joint force that is suggested in Joint Forces Command’s Major Combat Operations Joint Operating Concept 2006. Under Secretary Work’s brief outlines the closure of the amphibious force to the objective area, the seizure of the
lodgment, and the sustainment of the force in preparation for follow on operations. These stages are graphically depicted in Appendices B, C, and D respectively.

The closure of the force to the objective area will only be accomplished after the enemy's anti-access capabilities have been neutralized. Anti-access capabilities are defined as "those capabilities, usually long range, designed to prevent an enemy from entering an operational area." These emerging threats are a common theme in the new joint literature concerning future conflicts. It is broadly addressed in the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations Activity Concept version 1.0 of 2010. Under implications for the joint force, it states:

Improve the capabilities required to defeat advanced anti-access capabilities and to conduct forcible-entry operations. Given the combination of the United States' continuing global interests and the CCJO's projection of decreasing overseas basing, joint forces increasingly will find it necessary to project combat power into a hostile operational area from afar without the benefit of staging bases in the region. Joint forces therefore may find it increasingly necessary to defeat an enemy's anti-access measures, to include executing a forcible entry of land forces, as a prerequisite to accomplishing the assigned mission. Lacking the capabilities to conduct such operations, joint forces will be limited in their utility as strategic instrument. The capabilities required for such operations are specialized and will have broad implications for force development.

Enemies across the range of military operations will have access to technology such as integrated air defenses, anti-ship cruise missile, mines, and other weapons that will present a serious challenge to the joint force.

Potential adversaries around the world have invested heavily in technology and tactics that would prevent U.S. forces from gaining access to the operational area. There is a realization that the most likely area to successfully counter U.S. capabilities is during the arrival of forces into theater. The Joint Operating Environment 2010 describes this future threat.

Given the proliferation of sophisticated weapons in the world's arms markets, potential enemies - even relatively small powers - will be able to possess and deploy an array of longer-range and more precise weapons. Such capabilities in the hands of America's enemies will obviously threaten the projection of forces.
into a theater, as well as attack the logistical flow on which U.S. forces will depend. Thus, the projection of military power could become hostage to the ability to counter long-range systems even as U.S. forces begin to move into a theater of operations and against an opponent. The battle for access may prove not only the most important, but the most difficult. One of the major factors in America’s success in deterring potential aggressors and projecting its military power over the past half century has been the presence of its naval forces off the coasts of far-off lands. Moreover, those forces have proven of enormous value in relief missions when natural disasters have struck. They will continue to be a significant factor in the future. Yet, there is the rising danger with the increase in precision and longer range missiles that presence forces could be the first target of an enemy’s action in their exposed positions.44

Defeating these capabilities will fall mostly to the Navy and Air Force. In order to accomplish this task, these two services have begun to develop the Air Sea Battle Concept.

The complex nature of these matters will require intensive integration throughout the joint force. While the development of the Air Sea Battle Concept is classified, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CBSA), a Washington based national security think tank, has produced literature outlining the need for and potential make up of this emerging idea. In order to defend against U.S. power projection capabilities, future adversaries will employ weapons systems across all of the domains to exploit friendly vulnerabilities. In a 2010 paper titled “Why AirSea Battle”, Andrew Krepinevich, the president of CBSA, outlines the A2/AD threat.

Anti-access/area-denial operations can include coordinated operations by an enemy’s air forces and integrated air defenses to maintain a degree of air parity or superiority over its territory and forces. Land-based A2/AD operations might include short- to medium-range artillery, rocket, or missiles strikes against US forward-based forces and forward-deploying forces (which can include forcible entry forces) at either their littoral penetration points or at air-landing points. These enemy forces can also be employed against friendly maritime forces, and may also include anti-ship cruise, or even ballistic, missiles and submarines armed with torpedoes or anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs). Closer to shore, sophisticated mines, coastal submarines, and small attack craft could be employed against US forces.45
The paper itself deals primarily with the threat posed by a peer competitor in the form of China but the capabilities that will be required to gain access apply to all of the threat scenarios that the U.S. may face in the future. Krepinevich compares the applicability of AirSea Battle to the applicability of AirLand Battle. While developed to counter the threat posed by the enormous Soviet military in Europe, AirLand Battle was used in the desert to defeat Iraq in 1991. So too will AirSea Battle apply to not only the Western Pacific Theater of Operations but also to other potential conflict areas like the Straits of Hormuz.

Once access is gained, the next issue will be the seizure of the lodgment. The traditional concept of waves of Marines riding towards an opposed beach has become obsolete due to the proliferation of anti-access and area denial weapons throughout the world. A Congressional Research Service Report on the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) stated,

Some analysts contend that the operational environment has changed so significantly since the EFV’s inception that both the fleet and the EFV face greater risks than anticipated. The Navy and the Marines envision that future conflicts will require a “persistent presence in littoral areas” characterized by land-based anti-ship cruise missiles, mines, and small, fast suicide boats. Twenty years ago, when the EFV was conceived, some defense officials suggested that the fleet could operate 25 to 30 miles from shore, debarking EFVs for amphibious operations. However, with the advent of these new enemy weapons and tactics, this is no longer possible. Instead, in order to sufficiently protect the large amphibious ships that transport Marines and EFVs, it has been suggested that the fleet might need to operate at least 100 miles from shore—beyond the EFV’s range. If there are new developments in enemy weapons and tactics between now and 2025—when the EFV is scheduled to reach full operational capability—the vulnerability to the fleet could increase further.46

Taking these new threats into consideration, the joint force must retain its capability to project combat power ashore. This calls for innovation in technology, tactics, or more likely both.

The EFV program was cancelled in February of 2011 due to cost over runs and questions about its capability. The problems presented to amphibious forces are not insurmountable.
Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus discussed the cancellation of the EFV and the future of amphibious operations in an interview with the *San Diego Union-Tribune* on 25 February 2011.

It is critical not to confuse the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle and combat assault capability. We absolutely have to have an amphibious force in readiness, and that absolutely has to be the Marine Corps. And they have to have the capability of putting two brigades across the beach in a contested environment. The EFV is a poster child for a program that wasn’t working. It started in ’88. The world is very different now. The Marine Corps simply couldn’t afford it. If you want to hollow out the Marine Corps, buy the EFV. Plus the world has changed so much. Then, putting a Navy ship 25 miles offshore and Marines in the water – you don’t want to keep Marines in the water and at risk for more than an hour. So you had to have something over 25 knots. The Navy and the Marine Corps have war-gamed this. The Navy can come in much closer with the defensive systems we’ve got now, somewhere between 12 and 16 miles offshore. Once you’re in that close, you don’t have to have this brick do 25 knots. We are committed to a new tracked vehicle for the Marine Corps that doesn’t have to have the same capabilities and ought to be significantly cheaper. …. Nothing has changed in terms of the Marine Corps mission by canceling this, except it has been enhanced.

The development of the new amphibious vehicle for the Marine Corps is a key technological element to the future of forcible entry. The movement from ship to shore will continue to be a challenge for amphibious forces but adversary anti-access capabilities can be overcome by innovations in equipment and tactics.

Once the joint force is delivered to the area of operations it must seize the lodgment from the enemy. Airborne and amphibious forces will need the firepower and mobility to contend with enemy threats that range from guerrilla elements to conventional armored units. Innovation in training and technology will play an important role in creating this capability. The Marine Corps is developing Enhanced MAGTF Operations (EMO) concepts that will allow smaller units to increase their lethality and mobility. The concept is explained in the 2010 *Naval Operating Concept*:

To ensure that future MAGTFs are equipped with the capabilities and capacities appropriate to the evolving security environment, the Marine Corps is exploring *enhanced MAGTF operations* (EMO). The EMO initiative is examining
refinements to current tables of organization and equipment, as well as to select tactics, techniques, and procedures. These refinements seek to improve the ability of naval forces to overcome challenges to access and mobility, employ, support, and sustain dispersed, subordinate maneuver units at extended distances or in compartmentalized terrain that creates physical separation from higher and adjacent units.48

In order to survive, these units will need to be able to employ surface delivered fires very early on in the operation. This capability is traditionally provided by naval surface fire support. Current naval fires fall short of the range and volume requirements for a large scale amphibious operation. The optimum requirement was outlined by the Commandant of the Marine Corps during 2011 comments to the Senate Armed Services Committee.

The Marine Corps has an enduring requirement for fire support from naval vessels in the range of 41-63 nautical miles to support amphibious operations in the littorals. These fires are needed by tactical commanders to maneuver towards battlefield objectives once ashore, contributing to joint doctrine for assured access. They serve as a component of the balanced and complementary joint triad of fires. Yet, unlike tactical aviation and ground fire systems, naval surface fires are unique and vital for their volume, lethality, accuracy and all-weather capability.49

Without the ability to leverage joint fires, ground combat units from the Army and Marine Corps will not be able to fight outnumbered during the initial stages of a forcible entry. This is one example of the reliance by the ground combat units on the naval and air components of the joint force.

A joint training and exercise program in forcible entry operations is a glaring deficiency with the force. The need for joint training prior to the crisis is identified in the Capstone Concept for Joint Operation Activity Concepts version 1.0: “Design Service capabilities from the outset to operate in a joint context. Pushing jointness down to lower echelons implies that the Services develop all their combat capabilities within a joint context – that is, designed to interoperate with other Services at the lowest expected level of employment rather than only within Service formations. Policy changes on the approval authorities for lower acquisition
categories may result. This is the only way to ensure that the parts of the whole fit together to provide the required capability. There are initiatives under way to address these deficiencies. Wargames by the Navy, Marine Corps, and Army have been conducted to start developing the joint forcible entry capability.

CONCLUSION

If the U.S. does not possess a credible forcible entry capability, its conventional deterrence potential will be significantly degraded. The failure to look at forcible entry from a joint perspective by all four of the armed services has led to the questioning of individual parts of the whole. There is nothing to suggest that the requirement for forcible entry will ever disappear. Accepting this proposition, it is incumbent upon the joint force to find tactical and technological means to counter the challenges that the current and future threat environments present to forcible entry operations. Solutions to emerging threats will come from multiple elements of the DOTMLPF spectrum. The creation of a Joint Operational Access Concept begins to create a framework for the development of the forcible entry capability in DOD.

However, while it is an important step, it is too broad of a document to provide the required guidance for the services. There is still a need for a Joint Operational Concept for Forcible Entry. The services must ensure that their efforts to restructure themselves to achieve efficiency do not prevent them from fulfilling their part of the nation's forcible entry capability. The training programs of the individual services need to be coordinated to create forcible entry exercises that simultaneously conduct airborne and amphibious forcible entries with the introduction of follow on forces. This type of actual graduate level training exercise is the only way to truly validate the joint capability. The acquisition process for each of the services needs to ensure that air mobility and amphibious shipping capabilities maintain levels that will support
joint forcible entry. All of these factors demonstrate the extraordinarily joint approach that must be taken to training, manning, and equipping for a forcible entry mission. The development of a Joint Operational Concept for Forcible Entry will provide the common mental model for the services to develop a viable capability to seize a lodgement in support of a combatant commander's campaign. Forcible entry is and will continue to be a military capability that has strategic implications to both the conduct and prevention of the nation's wars.
Appendix A

Definition of Terms

**Advance force** — A temporary organization within the amphibious task force which precedes the main body to the objective area, for preparing the objective for the main assault by conducting such operations as reconnaissance, seizure of supporting positions, mine countermeasures, preliminary bombardment, underwater demolitions, and air support. (JP 3-02)

**Air assault** — The movement of friendly assault forces (combat, combat support, and combat service support) by rotary-wing aircraft to engage and destroy enemy forces or to seize and hold key terrain. See also assault. (JP 3-18)

**Airborne** — In relation to personnel, troops especially trained to effect, following transport by air, an assault debarkation, either by parachuting or touchdown. (JP 3-17)

**Airborne operation** — An operation involving the air movement into an objective area of combat forces and their logistic support for execution of a tactical, operational, or strategic mission. The means employed may be any combination of airborne units, air transportable units, and types of transport aircraft, depending on the mission and the overall situation. (JP 3-18)

**Airhead** — A designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile operational area that, when seized and held, ensures the continuous air landing of troops and materiel and provides the maneuver space necessary for projected operations. Normally it is the area seized in the assault phase of an airborne operation. (JP 3-18)

**Amphibious assault** — The principal type of amphibious operation that involves establishing a force on a hostile or potentially hostile shore. See also assault; assault phase. (JP 3-02)

**Amphibious breaching** — The conduct of a deliberate breaching operation specifically designed to overcome anti-landing defenses in order to conduct an amphibious assault. (JP 3-02)

**Amphibious lift** — The total capacity of assault shipping utilized in an amphibious operation, expressed in terms of personnel, vehicles, and measurement or weight tons of supplies. (JP 3-02)

**Amphibious objective area** — A geographical area (delineated for command and control purposes in the initiating directive) within which is located the objective(s) to be secured by the amphibious force. This area must be of sufficient size to ensure accomplishment of the amphibious force's mission and must provide sufficient area for conducting necessary sea, air, and land operations. (JP 3-02)

**Amphibious operation** — A military operation launched from the sea by an amphibious force, embarked in ships or craft with the primary purpose of introducing a landing force ashore to accomplish the assigned mission. (JP 3-02)
**Amphibious task force** — A Navy task organization formed to conduct amphibious operations. The amphibious task force, together with the landing force and other forces, constitutes the amphibious force. (JP 3-02)

**Beachhead** — A designated area on a hostile or potentially hostile shore that, when seized and held, ensures the continuous landing of troops and materiel, and provides maneuver space requisite for subsequent projected operations ashore. (JP 3-02)

**Deterrence** — The prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction. (JP 3-40)

**Forcible entry** — Seizing and holding of a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition. (JP 3-18)

**Lodgment** — A designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile operational area that, when seized and held, makes the continuous landing of troops and materiel possible and provides maneuver space for subsequent operations. (JP 3-18)

**Power projection** — The ability of a nation to apply all or some of its elements of national power – political, economic, informational, or military – to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain forces in and from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises, to contribute to deterrence, and to enhance regional stability. (JP 3-35)

**Seabasing** — The deployment, assembly, command projection, reconstitution, and reemployment of joint power from the sea without reliance on land bases within the operational area. (JP 3-02)

**Sources:**

JP 3-02 Amphibious Operations 2009  
JP 3-17 Air Mobility Operations 2009  
JP 3-18 Forcible Entry Operations 2008  
JP 3-35 Deployment and Redeployment 2007  
JP 3-40 Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction 2009
Joint Lodgment

Supported by Joint fires, including USAF bombers, Marines and Army air assault/airborne assets gain access and secure joint lodgment for follow on forces.

Initial Landing Zone(s)
(incl. engineers, force protection, logistics)

Initial HLZ

Littoral maneuver force must secure/clear lodgment against projected G-Ramm threat

Appendix D.

Endnotes

14 Dupuy and Dupuy, 1557.
20 Helmick 2010.
22 Helmick 2010.
23 Stiner and Schoeder 2009
24 Helmick 2010
30 Department of the Navy, Naval Operations Concept 2010, 16.
35 The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations Activity Concept is subordinate to the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations and serves to provide further detail with respect to how the joint force will be employed.
39 Gatchel 1996), 208.
42 Joint Forces Command, (Draft) Joint Operational Access Concept v0.3. 2011, ii.
44 Joint Forces Command, Joint Operating Environment 2010, 63.
47 Ray Mabus, interview by Jeannette Steele. *Q&A with Secretary of the Navy* San Diego Union Tribune, (February 25, 2011).
49 Amos, 2011 Report to the HASC on the Posture of the USMC, 11.
Bibliography

Primary: The doctrinal concepts and publications below outline the future threat environment and U.S. military’s concepts for operating in it. They serve as excellent sources for analyzing how the joint force will be employed in the future. The strategic documents such as the National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, and the Quadrennial Defense Review demonstrate the priorities that the nation’s leadership place on certain interests and resources. The after action reports, Congressional testimony, and Congressional Research Service Reports outline some specifics of the service’s initiative with respect to forcible entry.


Mabus, Ray, interview by Jeannette Steele. *Q&A with Secretary of the Navy* San Diego Union Tribune, (February 25, 2011).


Secondary:
Gatchel, Theodore L. *At the Water's Edge.* Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1996.


