The New Zealand and Australian Governments have clearly defined the requirement to provide stability operations and disaster relief to islands within the South West Pacific in order to maintain regional security. Both countries have well-aligned defence policies in this particular area. New Zealand has a functional amphibious capability that allows the deployment and sustainment of a company group in a permissive environment while Australia is in the process of developing a much larger force projection capability. Ultimately, both countries will be able to conduct independent and combined amphibious operations in the region. The current weaknesses of the NZDF amphibious capability are its approach to logistical support of ground forces from naval platforms, the design and execution of command and control arrangements, and operational planning. These weaknesses require command identification, inter-service understanding, mindset change, and deliberate education in order to improve them.
CREATING A JOINT APPROACH TO NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCE CONTEMPORARY AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH WEST PACIFIC

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Executive Summary

**Title:** Creating a Joint Approach to New Zealand Defence Force Contemporary Amphibious Operations in the South West Pacific.

**Author:** Major Neville Mosley.

**Thesis:** The New Zealand Defence Force’s (NZDF) amphibious capability can become more effective within the South West Pacific by improving logistics planning, command and control, and operational planning.

**Discussion:** The South West Pacific largely comes under the security umbrella of both Australia and New Zealand. This region is extremely vulnerable to commercial resource exploitation, corruption and unstable governance. As a result, some islands are becoming more reliant on external aid and political and military intervention in order to prevent collapse of their tenuous political and economic structures.

New Zealand’s security picture takes into account the roles of both Australia and the United States (US). The US focus in the Pacific region remains further north on China, India, and North Korea. This leaves the relatively smaller issues of the South West Pacific for Australia and New Zealand.

New Zealand and Australia’s security responsibilities within the South West Pacific region require the ability for the military to conduct Non Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), security operations, surveillance, search and rescue, and Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief (HADR). Both countries have shaped their amphibious capabilities towards achieving these likely tasks.

Based on experience from recent amphibious operations, the New Zealand Defence Force’s amphibious capability requires a more joint approach to operations planning and a greater inter-service understanding.

**Conclusion:** The New Zealand and Australian Governments have clearly defined the requirement to provide stability operations and disaster relief to islands within the South West Pacific in order to maintain regional security. Both countries have well aligned defence policies in this particular area.

New Zealand has a functional amphibious capability that allows the deployment and sustainment of a company group in a permissive environment while Australia is in the process of developing a much larger force projection capability. Ultimately, both countries will be able to conduct either independent or combined amphibious missions within the South West Pacific.

The current weaknesses of the NZDF amphibious capability are its approach to logistical support of ground forces from naval platforms, the design and execution of command and control arrangements, and operational planning. These weaknesses require command identification, inter-service understanding, mindset change, and deliberate education in order to improve them.
Two fallacies periodically emerge within the New Zealand political environment. One of these ideas is that if the military is not able to handle a given situation, the United States or Australia will come along and help out. While all partners and friends help each other in times of need, New Zealand should not expect our friends to cover a shortfall as a result of unpreparedness or irresponsibility. The very idea neither constitutes a robust defence strategy, nor does it form the basis of the current defence strategy. The first part of this paper outlines what New Zealand’s true responsibilities are within the South West Pacific region and shows that the US focus is not necessarily in our part of the Pacific. The second fallacy is that as a small Defence Force we do not have enough equipment to carry out the tasks required of us. While we continue to be challenged with larger scale war fighting roles and have to take risk in some areas, we are currently reasonably well placed to carry out the immediate amphibious operations required of us in the Pacific.

I wanted to research and write a paper that linked our current responsibilities within the South West Pacific to our emerging amphibious capabilities with the view to using United States Marine Corps (USMC) experience and resources to enhance what we do. In researching this, what I found was that as an organisation, the New Zealand Defence Force is already well into a cycle of learning, and that as time goes on and we become more comfortable with our own amphibious capability, our focus needs to shift to one of inter-service, governmental and international interoperability.

I would like to thank the Marine Corps University for the opportunity to study at this facility. The faculty and resources reach far beyond what is available in my own country and I will forever be indebted to both USMC and the New Zealand Army for this opportunity.
Introduction

The South West Pacific is bounded by New Zealand to the south, Australia to the west, Kiribati to the north and Pitcairn Island to the east. (See Appendix 1) This area largely comes under the security umbrella of both Australia and New Zealand. An initial examination sees these islands as beautiful, tropical havens rich in cultural traditions with a similar historical background of indigenous migration, colonial control, World War II occupation, and post war independence. On closer examination, these islands with their limited population bases and small economies are extremely vulnerable to commercial resource exploitation, corruption and unstable governance. In times gone by, these islands would have been able to survive on their internal produce and subsistence culture, however in a globalised world, some of them are becoming more reliant on external aid and political and military intervention in order to prevent collapse of their tenuous political and economic structures.¹

New Zealand’s security picture takes into account the roles of both Australia and the US. The US focus in the Pacific region remains further north on China, India, and North Korea. This leaves the relatively smaller issues of the South West Pacific for Australia and New Zealand. This paper will outline both New Zealand and Australia’s security responsibilities within the South West Pacific region and will describe the amphibious capability available to support the execution of these responsibilities. It will show that both New Zealand and Australia have committed to the procurement of the necessary military hardware to support this capability and that the immediate challenges remain the effective introduction and operation of it. For New Zealand, the new capability requires a more joint approach to operations and a greater inter-service understanding. This paper will specifically outline areas of logistics, command and
control, and planning that need improvement, in order to use this amphibious capability to best effect within a joint and combined environment.

**New Zealand Security Picture**

New Zealand's security responsibilities are divided by region into the following employment contexts (ECs):

- EC 1 - Security challenges and defence tasks in New Zealand and its environs.
- EC 2 - Security challenges to New Zealand’s interests in the South Pacific.
- EC 3 - Challenges to New Zealand and Australia common security interests.
- EC 4 - Security challenges to New Zealand’s interests in the Asia-Pacific region.
- EC 5 - Security challenges to New Zealand’s interests in global peace and security.

In terms of regional responsibility, New Zealand’s primary security focus remains on ECs one and two. (See map in Appendix 2) The Pacific Ocean itself provides a large physical security buffer to adversarial threats. Because of this natural isolation along with relatively limited land mass and land based resources, New Zealand presents an unlikely location for large scale military conflict. Conversely, given the large coastline to land ratio, the largest security issue for New Zealand as with many of the South Pacific islands, is the protection of the surrounding Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) from illegal fishing and other illegal resource extraction. In conjunction with Australia, New Zealand’s secondary focus is on the wider South West Pacific area which presents a more diverse set of problems.

The wider Pacific region presents many problems that collectively create the conditions for instability, unrest, and internal violence. Bad resource exploitation policy has led to corruption and unviable economic situations. This in turn has created an unhealthy welfare culture, with most of the Pacific requiring significant international aid money simply to continue
existence. The overlap between systems of traditionally controlled lands based on strong racial and family loyalties and new central governments has led to disproportionately large central governments that are not necessarily conducive to economic development. Lack of economic activity and employment opportunity has created perfect conditions for dissatisfied people and instability. These conditions specifically create internal civil unrest beyond the control of indigenous security forces, and in some cases such as the Solomon Islands, government institutions that require continued mentoring and assistance. Unfortunately, the underlying political and economic reform required to improve these conditions is unlikely to occur in the immediate future. The islands will therefore require continued reactive assistance and intervention from New Zealand and its regional partners.

From a military perspective, the specific tasks required in these environments are Non Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) of expatriates where security has badly declined, security interventions in support of local law and order, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations, maritime surveillance and support to maritime search and rescue. In conjunction with this military support, there is also a wide range of other government agency support required to provide more complete assistance. The military tasks required both in New Zealand and the South West Pacific are the starting point for choosing the military capabilities of the NZDF. The logic behind that capability selection and the tasks required of it are also aligned with Australia’s defence outlook.
The Australian White Paper defines Australia’s strategic environment and associated defence related tasks. The Primary Operational Environment (POE) for Australia extends from the Eastern Indian Ocean to the island states of Polynesia and from the equator to the Southern Ocean. It contains all Australian sovereign, off shore and economic territories, such as Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Christmas Island, Heard and McDonald Islands, Macquarie Island, Norfolk Island and waters adjacent to the Australian Antarctic Territory. (See Appendix 3) The Australian Defence Force (ADF) is postured to operate across its defined POE.\textsuperscript{10} The key tasks for ADF are to deter and defeat armed attacks on Australia, contribute to stability and security in the South Pacific and East Timor and contribute to military contingencies in the Asia Pacific region.\textsuperscript{11} These tasks align well with New Zealand’s focus in the South Pacific and in practice lead to many bilateral military operations in the region such as the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) and current stability operations in Timor Leste. Along with Australia and New Zealand, the US also has responsibilities to security in the Pacific although with a different focus.

US involvement in the Pacific

In 1951 the US signed a treaty with Australia and New Zealand commonly referred to as the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, US) treaty. It established a trilateral framework not only for security arrangements but for practical cooperation in the Pacific.\textsuperscript{12} Due to New Zealand's nuclear free policy of the 1980's, New Zealand's defence relationship was distanced from the US. In recent years, New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy has fallen into the shadows of the original intent of the treaty and a closer defence relationship between the US and New Zealand has
ensued. Australia has continued to maintain its bilateral relationship with the US in line with the original ANZUS treaty.

US Pacific Command (US PACOM) oversees a large territory centred on the Pacific Ocean. (See Appendix 4) This territory is becoming a larger focus for the US with an emphasis on China, India, and North Korea. Therefore, the South Pacific is not a priority for US PACOM. The US does however conduct annual exercises such as Pacific Partnership that provide some naval presence patrolling, aid, and multinational training opportunities in the South Pacific, with countries such as New Zealand, Australia, Vanuatu, Tonga, and France. As identified by the respective white papers, the issues and responsibilities in the South West Pacific lie with Australia and New Zealand, with the US postured to provide training support and operational support should a given situation require it or should the Australia and New Zealand not possess requisite capability. The capability that New Zealand has been working towards over the past 10 years will sufficiently support the tasks required of it in the South West Pacific.

New Zealand Amphibious Capability

The NZDF must be able to deploy to the Pacific Islands, across shores into unstable, potentially hostile but not high intensity environments, and sustain force elements there until the required tasks of it have been accomplished. This requires a mix of amphibious forces and tactical airlift capable of projection, logistical sustainment, and aforementioned task specific roles. In order to achieve this, New Zealand has already committed itself to the capability that it will have for the next 25 years. This largely consists of a small supply ship HMNZS Canterbury, an oil tanker HMNZS Endeavour, two offshore patrol craft, Sea Sprite and NH90 helicopter craft, and a brigade sized ground force. In addition, C130 aircraft provide tactical lift to support operations within the Pacific. (See Appendix 5) In essence, this capability gives New
Zealand the ability to project a company sized group onto land and sustain it from the sea for 30 days and beyond, dependant on distance from New Zealand and the nature of the operation. Up to a battalion sized group can also be deployed using several moves. When matched against the likely tasks, the size and nature of this capability is about right. This capability does not pretend to be able to achieve amphibious lodgment within a contested environment and does not come with appropriate close air support assets or offensive landing capability to support such operations. Many of the movement platforms such as landing craft and NH90 helicopters are currently still being introduced into service. As it stands, the NZDF capability ideally supports company sized operations in a permissive environment. The New Zealand capability will be able to integrate with Australia’s future amphibious capability to produce an effective means to address the likely security issues within the South West Pacific.

**Australia's Amphibious Concept**

Proportionately to New Zealand, Australia requires a much larger land army, however in terms of operations in the South West Pacific, the capability requirements are very similar to those of New Zealand but scaled to accommodate the larger land force. As such, the ADF has put particular emphasis on developing an amphibious capability based around the acquisition of two amphibious Landing Helicopter Dock ships, one large strategic lift Landing Ship Dock, six ocean going heavy landing craft, associated lighterage, equipment, and ship to shore connectors. (See Appendix 6) The larger ship capacity that the Australians will possess will provide more flexibility to project force and sustain an operation without necessarily committing to land based operations.16

The specific tasks that Australia is building its amphibious forces around are amphibious operations (demonstrations, raid, assault and withdrawal), military support operations, (civil aid
tasks, HADR, NEO, peace operations, civil enforcement duties, and interagency and Non Government Organisation liaison and support) and sea lift (administrative movement of personnel and/or equipment to and within the Joint Force Area of Operations.) Because of the strongly aligned defence policy and capability with respect to the South West Pacific, New Zealand can expect to exercise and operate closely with these new Australian capabilities as they are brought on line. In the short term, New Zealand has been able to cover the shortfall of amphibious capability within the South West Pacific with its vessels while Australia plans for the introduction of their new assets.

In introducing the new capability, one of the issues identified by Australia is the ability to train for and man the Expeditionary Battle Group to be embarked on the amphibious craft. There will need to be a change in military culture to focus some units on amphibious operations rather than just land operations. Habitual relationships between land units and naval vessels is likely to be the answer although at some stage the trained units that have this habitual relationship will have to impart their amphibious knowledge to other units. For Australia, a firm decision on this issue remains forthcoming; however the question of habitual relationships with land units has also been raised in New Zealand. Of the New Zealand brigade, one option would see one battalion focused on Light Armoured Vehicle operations, one battalion related to airmobile operations and one battalion related to amphibious operations. This theoretical balance is easily upset when the brigade is focused on a particular international operation which entails none of those capabilities. This may result in the temporary loss of a particular specialised skill set and the requirement to reestablish that skill in the future. In addition to the New Zealand Army working with the Royal New Zealand Navy, there will also be opportunity for NZDF units
to work with Australian naval vessels as New Zealand is doing in many of its current operations in the South West Pacific.

**Current Operations in the South West Pacific**

Currently there is a wide range of training and operations that the US, Australia, and New Zealand are involved in within the South Pacific. Longer term stability operations continue in Timor Leste and Solomon Islands. In addition, many of the other recent operations and recurring exercises highlight New Zealand’s commitment to its security responsibilities. These operations have required the use of New Zealand’s joint amphibious capability and have proven that the military hardware available is appropriate for the tasks required. They have also proven that between Australia, New Zealand and other nations, the needs of the South West Pacific are met time and again, often at very short notice. The current gaps in New Zealand’s capability are related to logistics support, command and control, and planning. The next section of this paper looks at some case studies of recent operations, focusing on these areas.

**Operation Sumatra Assist 2004**

In 2004 following the tsunami in Indonesia, a worldwide effort was mounted to provide HADR. While New Zealand sent medical support to Banda Aceh by air, the ADF sent a significant amphibious contribution in the form of *HMAS Kanimbla*. *HMAS Kanimbla* provided a range of capabilities such as an engineer regiment with heavy equipment, medical facilities and a sea base for equipment and personnel that would otherwise have had to be based ashore. Sea basing eliminated the requirement to increase the ADF’s footprint ashore and minimised the associated logistic support challenges. Like the *HMAS Kanimbla*, the Singaporean Armed Forces employed their logistics support ships in a similar fashion.20
While New Zealand looked to send more support to Banda Aceh, the lack of available land to base forces ashore became a limiting factor. At that time, New Zealand’s amphibious capability was reasonably new and untested. The mindset required in this situation follows the US Marine Corps doctrine of ship to objective maneuver. ‘Ship-to-objective maneuver reduces the footprint ashore, provides greater security to the force, and allows the force to sea base many of the command and support functions previously transitioned ashore.’ In 2004, the amphibious planning mindset of using the *HMS Canterbury* as a platform to base land elements from was almost nonexistent, but with more time, training, and disasters in the Pacific, this mindset would be forced to change.

**Samoan Tsunami 2009**

In September 2009, a tsunami generated by an 8.3 magnitude earthquake in the Tongan Trench hit the southern coast of Samoa and the northern islands of Tonga, causing considerable loss of life and damage to property. NZDF deployed a broad range of disaster relief capabilities to Upolu on Samoa and Nuitoputapu on Tonga thereby rehearsing a large part of what can be expected in the future. P3 Orions provided search support, C130s and *HMS Canterbury* delivered supplies, along with medical, engineering support personnel, police rescue teams, and helicopter assets. During the operation, *HMS Canterbury* provided support and ultimately extraction to force elements in several different locations. In all, the capability fielded by NZDF proved sufficient for such a disaster response especially when enhanced by other government agency and departmental contributions.

**Lessons Learned: Command and Control.** The NZDF National Command Element was set up ashore collocated with the NZ High Commission in Apia. This transformed what would be a traditional Commander Land Forces headquarters into a central multiagency
coordination centre commanded by an Air-force Wing Commander with all land elements, air elements, and *HMNZS Canterbury* reporting to the Senior National Officer. The after action report written by the commander reinforced the tactical and operational benefits of this particular command and control structure and outlined its success.\(^{23}\) While it would appear that this headquarters served inter agency coordination well, without a designated land force commander and with *HMNZS Canterbury* reporting directly back to New Zealand for its tasks, the true control of NZDF assets and their support requirements was less than satisfactory. This scenario presents two finite command tasks, firstly the command of all NZDF assets in support of the operation and secondly the coordination of the available capability with other agencies and countries. These two tasks require separate commanders. This scenario is one which is very likely to be repeated and therefore one which should have a standard command and control structure associated with it. This could be planned for and rehearsed as part of a standard contingency plan for HADR response in the South West Pacific.

**Operation Unified Response 2010**

On 12 January 2010, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck Haiti, destroying vast areas of the nation's capital, killing 230,000 people and displacing two million others. US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) deployed a joint task force in support of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) who was the lead US agency. This task force controlled the military response for the ensuing HADR operation. Elements of the 22nd and 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit took part in this operation as part of the US military response.\(^{24}\) Due to the magnitude of the disaster and the short notice response, the ability for the US military to deploy and respond quickly was well tested.
Lessons Learned: Logistics Support. There were no set agreements in place to use military assets to transport donated goods from NGOs and the private sector. This led to many missed opportunities. Transportation of such goods needs to be built into the existing contingency plans in order to take full advantage of the private sector in the future.25

Lessons Learned: Command and Control. The JTF staff had not been exercised in the lead up to the operation. Existing operational exercises can be used to stress the USSOUTHCOM headquarters on a more regular basis.26 The outpouring of multinational assistance required rapid deployment of a Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center in order to coordinate HADR activity. This key control capability was not deployed for three weeks which was too late for the critical response phase of the operation.27 Contingency planning and exercising for US military response did not include multinational considerations. There were therefore international capabilities that were not leveraged as well as they could have been if prior consideration had been given to them.28

Exercise Pacific Partnership 2011

Exercise Pacific Partnership is a US Navy-led annual exercise that provides both medical and engineering aid to Pacific Island nations. Both New Zealand and Australia typically participate in the exercise with the aim of achieving interoperability training outcomes. The capabilities required for such an exercise are the same that would be required for security and stability operations or major HADR operations. Exercise Pacific Partnership 11 involved USS Cleveland, HMA Betano and HMA Balikpapan from Australia, with HMNZS Canterbury providing the New Zealand contribution. Rotary wing (Puma) transportation from HMNZS Canterbury to shore was provided by FANC forces based in Noumea. The exercise scenario saw relief provided to Vanuatu and to Tonga with the overall effort commanded by US Navy.
Lessons Learned: Logistics Support. This exercise was a preplanned activity with aid supplies and a logistics support plan designed well in advance. Some minor issues were identified as follows:

- The lack of operational landing craft on HMNZS Canterbury forced reliance on Puma transport to provide ship to shore capability.
- Freight priority for follow on sustainment flights was determined by those loading the aircraft in New Zealand rather than those being supported. This is a reoccurring issue which is in the interests of the supported Service to follow up on.

There were no other major problems identified in this area as part of the after action reports. This would suggest that the deliberate logistics planning associated with this particular exercise was sufficient and that the arrangements for this exercise could be used as a blueprint for a standard response contingency plan.

Lessons Learned: Command and Control - Planning. The command and control arrangements for the exercise were simple. The Commander Land Forces (CLF) was designated as the senior national commander and the supported commander. The Commanding officer of HMNZS Canterbury was the supporting commander. There was however, an issue of conveying these arrangements to the subordinate commanders created by a late handover of the plan from those who made it to those who executed it at the operational level. ‘Due to late handover of Exercise Pacific Partnership 11 from J7 [planning staff] to J3 [operations staff] at the operational level, there was limited ability to embed processes with Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand (HQ JFNZ) J3 Staff.’ These arrangements therefore needed clarification into the first phases of the exercise. Various difficulties during the preliminary phase such as priority of space for
loading the ship dockside all had be brokered between services and commands rather than
ordered.

**Lessons Learned: Command and Control.** In Vanuatu, Commander Land Forces (CLF) of the NZ force element on board *HMNZS Canterbury* established his headquarters ashore with the permissive environment allowing for the bulk of the land elements to remain on the ship and move ashore on a daily basis for tasks. As all other nation’s command elements were embarked on their respective ships, the US Navy, ADF, NZDF and VMF tasks were coordinated by the NZDF land element ashore as this provided the best control node for monitoring and central reporting. This was not a prearranged control arrangement, simply a workable one that evolved with the situation. Also, in this case, the CLF liaison officer on board *HMNZS Canterbury* and Maritime Liaison Officer embedded with the CLF on shore worked extremely well.

**Interoperability versus Independent Action**

Exercises and operations such as those outlined above improve the interoperability and familiarity between nations. Operations such as the Samoan Tsunami relief effort show that in practice, it is most likely that New Zealand will continue to deploy its amphibious elements as part of a multinational response. However, while partnering with the US and Australia in providing aid and security is important, New Zealand must also maintain its own individual identity within the South Pacific. It is easy for a small nation to provide much support to the Pacific Islands as part of a larger multinational exercise or operation; however, it is also easy for these contributions to be subsumed by the larger nation or provider in the eyes of the country receiving the benefit.
In order to maintain a New Zealand profile, smaller more finite contributions may continue to help provide this delineation. The balance will be driven by the ability to deliver the effort required within capability constraints versus achieving efficiency through working with other nations. New Zealand will continue to leverage from other countries to assist with stability operations and aid delivery where New Zealand Defence Force lacks certain capability and mass. If New Zealand is to continue to provide unilateral aid, NZDF must work towards addressing and improving the logistics support and command and control issues that have been identified.

**Logistics Support**

When a military force departs New Zealand to conduct military operations, the logistical support requirements are reasonably straightforward and dependant on the number of people deploying and the type of equipment deploying. If the most likely force element to deploy within the South West Pacific is a company group, the associated logistical support is reasonably predictable. When disaster strikes and provision is then required for support to another nation, again the support requirements are largely quite predictable. In practice, these aid packages are usually provided by other government agencies and are in turn provided by contractors on a short lead time. One area that needs to be improved is the coordination between NZDF and these supply contractors. This coordination should be rehearsed as part of an annual exercise in order to reduce reaction time to a natural disaster. In the case of the response to the Samoan Tsunami in 2009, the contractor prevented Defence assets from deploying for up to several days as a consequence of poor coordination.31

In terms of aid relief, every hour is important. Typically, the first response to a disaster will be a P3 Orion for reconnaissance followed by a C130 with immediate aid and personnel, followed by *HMNZS Canterbury*. Once ground elements are deployed, follow on logistics
support will be provided by air or by *HMXNZS Canterbury*. Command and control arrangements become tenuous especially in the instance where the Naval commander onboard *HMXNZS Canterbury* is in command of the entire ground operation while concurrently conducting replenishment voyages back and forth to New Zealand. Many of these issues are as a result of poor joint planning and ineffective command and control arrangements.

**Command and Control**

**Joint Force Headquarters.** HQ JFNZ was established in 2001 to provide an operational level headquarters to deployed NZDF forces. Many aspects about the inner workings of the headquarters remain heavily influenced by single services, however over time; the outputs are becoming more ‘joint’ in their focus. For an individual, there is no career emphasis or incentive for serving on the joint staff. For some branches and services, the joint positions are the last to be filled in terms of manning priority which then reflects on the calibre of staff within the building. It is outside of the scope of this paper to prioritise manning across the organisation, however if improvement in the planning and execution of joint operations is to be achieved, the standard of staff officer within HQ JFNZ should be raised which can only be achieved by increasing either posting incentives or posting priorities. The direction for this would sit with the Chief of Defence Force based on a request from the Commander Joint Forces New Zealand.

**Joint Planning Tool.** Presently the HQ JFNZ planning process is based on the Australian Joint Military Appreciation Process (JMAP). This planning process is based on the Army’s Military Appreciation Process which is taught and used by New Zealand and Australian Army officers from the time they start training and throughout their professional military education and their careers. In New Zealand, the JMAP is taught at an introductory level to a portion of Air and Naval officers at the O-3 (Captain/Flight Lieutenant/Lieutenant) level, during the Joint Junior
Staff Course and again touched on during Staff College at the O-4 (Major/Squadron Leader/Lieutenant Commander) level. The process is not indoctrinated into the Air and Navy organisations and is therefore nebulous information unless an officer is posted to HQ JFNZ. Even if an officer is posted to HQ JFNZ, unless a planning process is lead by an O-4 or O-5 (Lieutenant Colonel/Wing Commander/Commander) level army officer for whom the process is by this stage natural, it is unlikely that the JMAP will be used as a planning tool.

When it comes to joint and amphibious operations, the ability for services to use the same planning tool would largely help in the understanding and execution of tasks. The J5 (Chief of Plans) within HQ JFNZ is an O-6 (Colonel/Group Captain/Captain) level appointment that typically changes in terms of service representation from Navy to Air Force to Army. If an officer from a service other than Army is in this posting, it is typical that the JMAP will not be used even though this is the approved doctrinal tool. There are two ways to improve this process. One is to enforce the use of this process in every planning activity that occurs within the HQ JFNZ building. The other is to indoctrinate the process into all three services far earlier than a cursory introduction on a junior staff or command and staff course. Harmony within a joint and amphibious culture cannot be achieved unless a joint planning process is used to underpin the execution of an operation. The experience of the US shows that for any joint operation, individual service planning processes are set aside and the Joint Operations Planning System is used. Discrete subordinate units of single service can then use their respective planning processes.

**Joint planning mindset.** If there is no realistic threat to consider, operational level planning largely becomes logistics planning. As these plans and movements become repetitive, the planning requirement decreases. Because the threats within the South Pacific are typically
land based, the air and naval portions of operations become logistical operations with orders issued based on procedure. This operational level mindset which is linked to the situation within the South West Pacific puts further pressure on the land portion of planning rather than the other two services. Regardless, this is a dynamic that must be acknowledged by the planning staff or rendered insignificant by use of a common planning process. One of the key outputs of the planning process is the command and control arrangements by which a specific operation is to be executed.

The most difficult part of bringing NZDF’s joint amphibious capabilities online and together is the command and control aspects of working together at the tactical level. History has shown the command and control arrangements for amphibious forces are a difficult thing to master and quite often it is individual leaders from Navy, Marines, or Army who ultimately shape successful outcomes rather than blind reliance on specified command and control arrangements. The process planning leading up to the landing at Guadalcanal highlighted a good example of friction between Marines and Navy. In this case, the Navy would not commit to providing sufficient air coverage from aircraft carriers to cover the landing of the amphibious force. Rather than a decision being made as part of the planning process, it was left to unfold as part of the operation, ultimately resulting in air coverage being withdrawn prior to the landing of the required logistical support being complete.\textsuperscript{32} Although ultimately this decision was a sound one, the lack of decision during the planning process only created friction between Marines and Navy which grew with time. In hindsight, if the same decision had been made during the planning process the resulting situation of lack of air cover to cover the disembarkation of logistical support, could have been both expected and mitigated rather than unplanned for and resented. In New Zealand’s case, the answer lies in the need for clear doctrine that is relative to
the needs of a small organisation. This can then easily be rehearsed as part of contingency planning and real time operations.

US Joint Doctrine makes these command and control relationships very clear.

‘The command relationships established among the Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF), CLF and other designated commanders of the amphibious force is an important decision. The commanders designated in the order initiating the amphibious operation are co-equal in planning matters and decisions. Any differences between commanders that cannot be resolved are referred to the establishing authority.’

Although doctrinally this is very clear, in practice it does not always work out well. As per the Guadalcanal example, there was much disagreement between the CATF and the CLF during the planning process, however there was no resolution provided by the establishing authority. It is this very reason that the establishing commander must be very aware of the guidance given, the mission conditions and the individuals who fill these roles.

In recent NZDF operations, the commander of HNZS Canterbury has often maintained control over ground elements even though there has been no naval threat and the main effect has been provided by ground elements ashore with Navy providing a purely supportive role. As earlier alluded to, this naval command of ground operations becomes worse when HNZS Canterbury has to leave a theatre to conduct replenishment operations. Again US Joint Doctrine is very clear on how these command and control relationships should be both planned for and executed.

'A supported commander may be designated for the entire operation, a particular function, or a combination of phases, stages, events, and functions…The supported commander has the authority to exercise general direction of the supporting effort…If not specified in the order initiating the amphibious operation, the CATF and CLF will determine who has primary responsibility for the essential tasks during the mission analysis in the planning process…Where there is no littoral threat to the amphibious task force (for example a NEO) the establishing authority may designate the CLF as the supported commander for the entire operation.'
A strong understanding of these conditions and situations is required by both Navy and Army commanders at all levels of the organisation. In New Zealand’s case, because so few assets are typically involved in an operation, this simple concept of supported and supporting commanders should be adopted as an operating norm.

The ability to work and command together while at the same time be very clear about who makes what decisions is critical to successful amphibious operations in the future. There are two methods by which this can occur. The most critical is the top down approach where the planning phase is used to design mission specific command and control arrangements. Quite often, the individuals who are writing and issuing the orders do not understand the importance of getting these relationships correct due to a generational gap in tactical experience between single service operations and joint operations. This can be remedied by staff education, command oversight and the development of effective contingency plans that are regularly exercised. The second method is the bottom up safety net where in executing plans and orders, individual commanders recognise what command and control guidance should be in place for a given task and have the ability to recommend adjustment as the situation changes. In both cases, experience and understanding of how command and control relationships affect operations is essential.

Individual command styles and personalities are also important.

Commanders who are issuing orders to force elements must know the commanders that they are issuing the orders to and take individual leadership profiles into account. The NZDF is small enough to be able to do this in order to improve. Directive influence aside, as many of these operations are going to involve both Navy and Army commanders, the two services must understand each other’s background.
Developing an Amphibious Leadership Culture

‘Developing an effective amphibious capability involves more than just acquiring amphibious landing ships, landing craft and helicopters. It requires close cooperation between Army and Navy at the basic procedural level – mastering the mechanics of embarking and disembarking under tactical conditions – and at the command level: understanding threats, operating environments and the sometimes-fluid interface between command responsibilities at sea and ashore.’

The roles of Navy and Army officers have clear delineation. Within a permissive environment such as the South West Pacific where there exists no naval or air threat, this delineation is able to remain clear. Given the capabilities being used, the Navy will generally use *HMNZS Canterbury* to lodge the ground element that will conduct the security or HADR operation. In some instances, all operations will be conducted directly from and to the ship without the landing of a ground force in line with ship to objective maneuver. The ship will provide sustainment support to that ground element and may provide either command or a command platform for the ground element. The most effective leaders of both organisations are those people who have a good understanding of each other’s roles, strengths and weaknesses. There are several ways that this understanding can be enhanced; firstly through Navy and Army exercises and joint planning processes which involve both Navy evolutions and Army objectives, secondly through existing professional development courses such as the Grade II O-4 level Army Staff and Tactics Course or the O-3 level Joint Warfare Staff Course. Planning activity could be conducted on board *HMNZS Canterbury* using the asset and sharing the joint planning process with Navy colleagues as part of these courses. At the same time Army officers can use the opportunity to understand the Navy processes and way of thinking as the most successful
operations are those where Navy and Army officers have a real understanding of each other’s roles. With added interaction during these professional development courses, the linking of operations and exercise planning to these courses and institutes would also enhance amphibious planning.

**Linking Current Operations and Exercises to Training Institutes**

NZDF places great emphasis on professional officer education and training. A large portion of the organisation’s middle management is taken away from the work force on an annual basis to instruct or complete various forms of individual and staff planning development activity. A large portion of the scenarios used in training are aimed at a higher intensity environment outside of the scope of the South West Pacific. Some of these course forums provide excellent opportunities to both provide links between contemporary lessons learned and training. There is also opportunity for these courses to provide staff planning effort towards design of both exercises and operational contingency plans within the South Pacific. Other military organisations have taken this approach in the past and continue to do so.36

**Interagency Coordination**

There are several government agencies that NZDF continually works with in New Zealand and the South Pacific. Most of these agencies currently maintain representation and some limited control functions within HQ JFNZ. New Zealand Customs and the Ministry of Fisheries use NZDF support to help protect New Zealand and its waters. New Zealand Police use NZDF support for both domestic operations and in support of police led stability operations in the Pacific such as Solomon Islands. The Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management take the lead for disaster relief within New Zealand and provide support for external operations, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade incorporating the New Zealand international
development aid programme coordinate New Zealand’s HADR responses within the South Pacific through respective embassies and foreign offices. Standard responses to domestic disasters, external disasters, and stability operations typically involve the same agencies and individuals. As NZDF often provides key enablers to any wider government response, there is much benefit in including agency response options as part of the standard military contingency plans. Continued improvement with New Zealand’s overall response within the South Pacific can be achieved by embedding wider governmental department responses and control arrangements into current contingency plans and by rehearsing these as part of associated exercises.

**Recommendations**

The following is a summary of recommendations made in this paper that will improve NZDF’s amphibious capability:

- Contingency plans for HADR in South West Pacific include standard logistics support plans for both the deployed force and HADR.

- Contingency plans for HADR in South West Pacific include command and control relationships for both NZDF force elements and interagency coordination.

- Contingency plans for HADR in South West Pacific are war gamed and exercised in a joint environment with emphasis placed on how the command and control relationships work.

- JMAP is properly inculcated as the standard planning process for HQ JFNZ.

- The concept of supported and supporting commander is taught and exercised as part of single service development and contingency planning exercises.

- Existing single service courses are leveraged for joint staff planning opportunity and inter-service war gaming of likely contingency plans within the South West Pacific.

While no contingency plan is ever going to be perfect, there are some key preliminary actions that can and should be included as part of the contingency plan. Further, there is no
substitute for rehearsing and exercising these very likely scenarios. While JMAP may not suit all services as part of their single service planning methods, currently it is the approved HQ JFNZ planning tool and should form the basis for planning being conducted within the joint environment. The command and control issues that exist between services both operationally and tactically will be naturally solved as part of a generational evolution; however the immediate improvement is reliant on conscious command and planning input.

**Conclusion**

The New Zealand and Australian Governments have clearly defined the requirement to provide stability operations and HADR to islands within the South West Pacific in order to maintain regional security. Both countries have well aligned defence policies in this particular area. The PACOM focus is centred on the Northern region of the Pacific with the view that Australia and New Zealand can look after the security requirements in their particular part of the world as responsible security partners. The US does remain engaged through multinational training and exercises and in addition is postured to enhance operations in the South West Pacific if required. New Zealand has a functional amphibious capability that allows the deployment and sustainment of a company group in a permissive environment, while Australia is in the process of developing a much larger force projection capability. Ultimately, both countries will be able to conduct either independent or combined amphibious missions within the South West Pacific. The current weaknesses of the NZDF amphibious capability are its approach to logistical support of ground forces from naval platforms, the design and execution of command and control arrangements for operations, and the limited use of the joint planning process. These weaknesses require command identification, inter-service understanding, mindset change, and deliberate education in order to improve them.


6 Hughes, *The Pacific is Viable*, 10.

7 Hughes, *Aid Has Failed the Pacific*, 2.

8 Hughes, *The Pacific is Viable*, 1.


17 Australia’s Amphibious Concept, 7.

18 Australia’s Amphibious Concept, 9.

19 Ash Collingburn, “Adaptive Army: Embracing the Concept of Operational Manoeuvre from the Sea.” (Master’s of Military Studies, Marine Corps University, 2010), 16-17.


23 After Action Review Samoan Tsunami 2009, 1.


25 After Action Review Operation Unified Response, J9, JLLIS #13996

26 After Action Review Operation Unified Response, J7, JLLIS #14070

27 After Action Review Operation Unified Response, J7, JLLIS #13903

28 After Action Review Operation Unified Response, J7 JLLIS #14071


31 After Action Review Samoan Tsunami 2009, 3.


34 Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, II-6.


Appendix 1

South West Pacific

http://www.maps-pacific.com/
Appendix 2

New Zealand Territories

Appendix 3

Australian Territories

Appendix 4

US PACOM Area of Responsibility

http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/pacc/cc/images/map.JPG
Appendix 5

New Zealand Military Capability

**Navy:**

2 x Frigates (Te Kaha, Te Mana)
1 x Logistics Ship (Canterbury)
1 x Tanker (Endeavour)
1 x Dive Tender (Manawanui)
1 x Hydrographic Ship (Resolution)
2 x Offshore Patrol Vessels (Wellington, Otago)
4 x Inshore Patrol Vessels (Rotoiti, Taupo, Hawea, Pukaki)

**Army:**

**1 NZ(BDE)**

- 1st Battalion
  - Light Armoured Vehicle
- 2nd/1st Battalion
  - Light Infantry
- Queen Alexandra’s Mounted Rifles
  - Light Armoured Vehicle
- 1 Signals Regiment
- 16 Field Regiment
  - 105mm artillery
- 2 Engineer Regiment
  - Combat and Construction
- 2 Combat Support Battalion
- 3 Combat Support Battalion
- 2 Health Services Battalion
- 1 Military Police Company
- 1 Military Intelligence Company

**1 NZSAS**

**Air Force:**

- No 5 Squadron
  - 6 x P3K Orion
- No 3 Squadron
  - 13 x UH-1H Iroquois (Will be NH90)
- No 6 Squadron (Naval Support Flight)
  - 5 x SH 2G(NZ) Seasprite
- No 40 Squadron
  - 2 x Boeing 757
  - 5x C130 Hercules
- No 42 Squadron
  - 5 x Beech King Air

Appendix 6

Australia’s Amphibious Capability

Amphibious Forces

2 x Landing Helicopter Dock amphibious ships
1 x Landing Ship Dock amphibious ship
12-24 Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters/Medium and Heavy Utility Helicopters
8-10 Landing Craft
Landing Force Battle Group of 2200 pers

Escort and Strike Forces (Task organised)

SSK Submarines
Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft
1 x Auxiliary Oil Replenishment tanker
2 x Frigates
1 x Destroyer
F/A-18 Sqn
SH60B Helicopters
## Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Australian Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CATF</td>
<td>Commander Amphibious Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLF</td>
<td>Commander Land Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Employment Context</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEZ</td>
<td>Exclusive Economic Zone</td>
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<td>FANC</td>
<td>French Army New Caledonia</td>
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<td>HADR</td>
<td>Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief</td>
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<td>HQ JFNZ</td>
<td>Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMAP</td>
<td>Joint Military Appreciation Process</td>
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<td>NEO</td>
<td>Non-combatant Evacuation Operations</td>
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<td>NZDF</td>
<td>New Zealand Defence Force</td>
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<td>POE</td>
<td>Primary Operational Environment</td>
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<td>RAMSI</td>
<td>Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands</td>
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<td>VMF</td>
<td>Vanuatu Military Forces</td>
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<td>United States</td>
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<td>United States Pacific Command</td>
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<td>USSOUTHCOM</td>
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Bibliography


