The Separation of Southern Sudan: A Possible American Response

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THE SEPARATION OF SOUTHERN SUDAN:
A POSSIBLE AMERICAN RESPONSE

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: The Separation of Southern Sudan: A Possible American Response

Author: Major Cory Cook, United States Air Force

Thesis: Regardless of the results of the 2011 referendum election on the status of Southern Sudan, the United States must be prepared to utilize all the instruments of national power, while primarily focusing on the nation’s diplomatic, informational, and economic capabilities.

Discussion: In its recent history, Sudan has fought two bloody civil wars between the primarily Islamic north and Christian south. In 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the National Congress Party (NCP) in the north and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) in the south ended the second civil war. The CPA ended this twenty two-year struggle by implementing a six-year ceasefire and making provisions for a referendum vote in the South, carried out in January 2011. The referendum vote gave Southern Sudan the ability to either remain in union with the North or separate into an independent nation.

The United States, as a principal broker and guarantor of the CPA, is intrinsically involved in the Sudanese peace process. Should the peace process continue as planned, America’s interests in Sudan and Africa warrant a continuance of high level engagement with both the Northern and Southern governments. However, the history of both Sudanese governments is marred by support for terrorists, military coups, and acts of genocide. Therefore the U.S. must carefully calculate its response when it comes to diplomatic, informational, and economic engagements with the respective governments.

On the other hand, if violence erupts again, the American response should be constrained primarily to civilian channels. The response should be civilian because the introduction of combat forces increases the probability of entangling the U.S. in a protracted conflict. Additionally, utilization of combat power increases the likelihood of being viewed as imperialist by Africans or engaging in a war against Islam. Furthermore, the response should be primarily civilian because American government agencies and NGOs are already in place and are specifically designed to handle the tenets of the American mission in Sudan, i.e. reconstruction, outreach, and nation building.

An alternative to the civilian approach is a military course of action. Some strategists and policymakers have suggested that the United States should either ally with the Government of Southern Sudan or plan to use military force if referendum implementation results in another civil war. However, the use of combat power is inappropriate and if utilized could destroy American credibility in Africa. Other factors, including America’s debt, the political context, and military readiness also weigh against intervening with American combat forces.

Conclusion: The U.S. must use all of its instruments of power to assist the Sudanese governments in maintaining an environment where peace can flourish. However, if violence erupts, a peace agreement brokered under pressure from American combat forces will fail to be enduring and will destroy U.S. credibility in Africa.
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PREFACE

As a pilot in the U.S. Air Force, I have had the opportunity to see many parts of the world. Despite my experiences with different peoples and cultures, Sudan has had the most profound effect on me. I wondered how human beings could sink to such levels of social disorder and despair. Between the famine, genocide, and poverty it was amazing that people woke up in the morning. Fortunately, I don’t feel that all is lost. While researching this paper, I concluded that the prospects of independence, political and economic reform, and lasting peace have given Sudan, as one nation or two, the motivation to right itself and reintegrate into the international community. However, the Sudanese cannot achieve this peace by themselves. Inevitably, greed, the desire for power, and social differences will challenge any fragile progress made and the Sudanese will need the support of the international community to fend off those that would drag it back to the depths of human suffering.

As the singularly most capable nation on the planet, I feel that the United States bears a responsibility when it comes to enabling nations such as Sudan to rebuild themselves. So long as Sudan’s peace process remains unfettered by violence, the United States will almost certainly continue engaging with the North and South to secure a lasting settlement. What is not certain is how the U.S. will respond if the situation deteriorates into fighting, chaos, and disorder.

To determine how the United States should respond to a violent outcome, this paper will utilize Nuechterlein’s National Interest Matrix and the DIME construct to determine the best use of the nation’s diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power. In doing so, it will also counter the notion that combat power is a feasible option for reestablishing peace in Sudan should violence break out. (Note: Throughout the course of this paper, the term “military power” and “combat power” are both used. For the sake of clarification, the term military power refers to the full spectrum of military capability, i.e.
logistics support, humanitarian aid, medical support, etc. References to combat power specifically refer to utilization of combat forces in the form of airstrikes, attacks, deployment of combat forces, etc.)

Due to the dynamic and changing nature of the Sudanese political environment, a significant challenge in writing this paper has been to keep it current. To avoid endless adjustments aimed at keeping the paper up to date, I have purposely excluded minute policy changes and technical data in an effort to focus on America’s overarching strategic policy towards Sudan. For readers interested in the most current policy events, that information is available on the U.S. State Department’s website and in various media reports and analyses. For example see Rebecca Hamilton, “Abyei, Sudan’s Potential Tinderbox,” The Washington Post, 24 January 2011; Rebecca Hamilton, “For Nascent Nation, Oil both Boon and Burden,” The Washington Post, 12 February 2011; and “South Sudan Votes,” The Fredericksburg Free Lance-Star, 22 February 2011.

Finally, I would like to thank a couple people for their assistance with this paper. First, I must thank my wife, Erin - without her support, sacrifice, and editorial expertise this work would not have been possible. I would also like to thank Dr. Bittner - his guidance, cooperation, and thoughtful critiques helped me to develop my ideas and put them on paper.
Prologue: Setting the Stage

Six years after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 ended two decades of fighting in Sudan, a lasting peace may finally be within the country’s grasp. However it is not yet assured. The agreement separated the belligerents and allowed Southern Sudan to vote for independence. However, several issues were left unresolved, and any of them could reignite another civil war.

On 9 January 2011, the people of Southern Sudan began flooding polling stations to make their voice heard. In the wake of these historic elections, several questions remain unanswered: How will the North react to the election’s outcome? Will it relinquish control of the South peacefully? How will some four million internally displaced persons be repatriated to their homelands? Where will the border be drawn? How will Sudan’s precious oil revenues be split?

In the middle of this chaos and the ensuing efforts at resolution, the United States must ask itself, “What are the implications of American foreign policy in the region? What are America’s options in the future? What do we do if violence erupts again?”

That is the focus of this study.
INTRODUCTION

“We must start from the simple premise that Africa’s future is up to Africans.”
-- President Barack Obama

On 9 January 2011 the people of Southern Sudan held a referendum vote that will in all likelihood, divide Sudan into two separate states. After five decades of civil war, genocide, and ethnic fighting, the prospect of a lasting Sudanese peace is viewed as the Holy Grail to some and a failure or disaster to others. In the coming months, the United States, a principal broker of the current peace agreement, will choose if and how it intends to support the new peace agreement.

In order to determine how American support to the peace process should unfold, the United States must continue to assess its strategic interests in Sudan and in Africa. It must examine its relationships with both parties in Sudan, with regional actors, and it must take into account the current economic, political, and military environment. Most importantly, it must continue to remember President Obama’s words to the Ghanaian Parliament in 2009, “Africa’s future is up to Africans.”

The Sudanese peace process ultimately belongs to the peoples of Northern and Southern Sudan. If the people of Sudan decide they are ready to embrace a peaceful solution, the United States is well prepared to support the transition from one nation to two. If the North and South fall back into armed conflict, the United States must be prepared to use its diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) instruments of national power to persuade the parties to return to the negotiating table. However, the use of combat power (use of force or introduction of combat troops) would be inappropriate and if utilized could destroy American credibility in Africa.
BACKGROUND

"This place could go down in flames tomorrow. The probability of failure is great."
-- Scott Gration, Special Envoy to Sudan

Sudan, the largest nation in Africa, has a long and protracted history of violence and instability. In order to fully understand the current situation, it is critical to have an understanding of the pertinent history of Sudan, the origins of the current conflict, and a working knowledge of the American – Sudanese diplomatic relationship.

Beginning at the turn of the 20th century when Northern Sudan was effectively a British colony, the British focused their attention on the north until acquiring what is now Southern Sudan from France and Belgium. Consequently, British investments in governance and development were primarily executed in the north and largely excluded southern participation in this colonial process, perceiving the South as incapable of being managed by a western government. Overall, British rule cemented the North-South divide in Sudan across the economic, political, geographic, religious, and cultural lines that continue to plague its people today.

In 1953, the governments of Egypt and the United Kingdom granted Sudan its sovereignty and Sudan became an independent nation in 1956. Prior to achieving nation status, in 1955 the North and the South plunged into the first of two civil wars. Due to its lack of representation in Khartoum, the South did not view the North as a legitimate government and feared it would not be treated fairly under Northern governance. The result was a brutal seventeen-year war that was settled with the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972. While the Addis Ababa Agreement ended the fighting, it did not reconcile the belligerents and the North and the South rearmed themselves during ten years of uneasy peace.
In 1983 a second civil war ignited between North and South. Again, this war was fought predominantly between Muslim Arabs in the North and Christian blacks in the south. Over the next 22 years, two million people were killed and another four million were displaced. After an international outcry for peace, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in 2005. The CPA separated the two parties, but like the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, it did not reconcile their differences. However, the CPA contained a new agreement between the North and South: it gave the South the right to hold a referendum vote in January 2011 where it could choose to reunify with the North or separate and become an independent nation. (See Appendix F: Summary of the January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement)

Even after the January 2011 referendum vote, several contested issues will remain between the National Congress Party (NCP) in the north and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) in the south. One of the most prevalent issues concerns oil revenues. The majority of Sudan’s oil reserves are extracted in the south and then pumped through a northern pipeline to Port Sudan on the Red Sea. Another pressing issue is border demarcation. The current border between the North and South replicates the colonial border that existed between the former British, Belgian, and French colonies. Over the past fifty years, the artificial border between North and South has blurred from its colonial origins as populations have migrated and intermingled. Consequently, there are several states with populations that are torn between the two parties. The border issue is further complicated by the preponderance of oil resources that exist in border states, such as Abyei, which held its own referendum election on whether to align with the North or the South. Other issues that have the potential to reignite the conflict are displaced persons on both sides of the border, water rights (specifically the Nile headwaters),
citizenship issues, and debt apportionment, i.e. how Sudan's current $35 billion debt will be divided between the two exceptionally poor nations.\textsuperscript{10}

While any of these issues has the potential to escalate into violence, the one that will most likely incite conflict is the implementation of the referendum results. Given the South's overwhelming vote for independence, there are three possible outcomes:

(1) The first, which is arguably the least likely: The South votes for independence. The North willingly concedes. The contested issues are settled diplomatically, and the divorce between the two parties is amicable.

(2) The second, which is also highly unlikely: Implementation of the referendum vote is denied by Northern resistance or military force. The South retaliates, and the two sides wage a third civil war.

(3) The third, which is the most likely: The South votes for independence. The North willingly concedes. The contested issues that fail to reach diplomatic resolution result in varying levels of violence.

The question is, will the split be civil and, if not, what level of violence will ensue and what is the United States willing to do about it.

Since Sudan gained its independence, its relationship with the United States can be classified as cool at best. In 1967, the Sudanese government broke diplomatic relations with the United States over the issue of American support of Israel. By the mid-1970s relations between the two countries had gradually started to improve, but then in 1989 Omar Al-Bashir seized the country in a military coup. The United States responded to this event by levying economic sanctions against and cutting off diplomatic relations with the Bashir government.\textsuperscript{11} Starting in the late 1990's, after observing years of bloody conflict, the United States became increasingly involved in peace negotiations aimed at ending the second civil war. Between 2001 and 2005, the second Bush administration played a key role in negotiating the CPA by providing financial, technological, and diplomatic support to the peace process.\textsuperscript{12}
In 2009, the Obama administration inherited the CPA from its predecessors and has subsequently made Sudan a top priority. The current U.S. policy is focused on three strategic objectives:

1. A definitive end to conflict, gross human rights abuses, and genocide in Darfur;
2. Implementation of the North-South CPA that results in a peaceful post-2011 Sudan, or an orderly path toward two separate and viable states at peace with each other; and
3. Ensuring that Sudan does not provide a safe haven for international terrorists.

In addition to these objectives, the U.S., through its Special Envoy to Sudan, is working with other countries and the United Nations (UN) to prepare for post-referenda scenarios. The United States has made it clear that the international community stands to benefit from a peaceful and stable Sudan, hence the burden of establishing peace in Sudan is a global responsibility.

WHY THE UNITED STATES MUST DO SOMETHING

"...the United States Government should continue to engage with local and international partners in contingency planning, especially to consider ways to help prevent or respond to possible large-scale violence, dislocation, or other humanitarian emergencies"

-- Sudan Peace and Stability Act of 2010

After examining Sudan's violent history and given the current precarious situation, it is obvious that American support to the Sudanese peace process is essential. However, if the peace process falls apart Washington's continued support for it may come into question. The reasons why the United States should remain involved in a new bid for peace are straightforward. First, the danger of Sudan becoming a failed state is real and the possible effects on U.S. national security are severe. Second, America's role in brokering the CPA has permanently associated the U.S. with the peace process in the eyes of the Sudanese people. Finally, Sudan's influence on the rest of the Sahel makes Sudan a strategic interest for the United States.
The first reason why the United States should continue its involvement with the Sudanese peace process is to prevent Sudan from becoming a failed state. Prior to the CPA, Sudan was an internationally recognized state whose population did not agree on its polity, violence ensued, and it teetered on the edge of becoming a failed state for decades. Since 2005, the first year that Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy Magazine published the Failed States Index, Sudan has ranked first, second, or third on the list of countries most likely to fail. 17 (See Appendix H: The Failed States Index, 2007 – 2010)

Sudan is at risk of becoming a failed state for several reasons. First, Sudan is struggling to manage over four million internally-displaced persons while coping with widespread poverty and inequality. In addition, the legitimacy of President Bashir’s government combined with a poorly trained army and a corrupt police force have led to extensive ethnic and religious violence. It is important to remember that these challenges face a single unified Sudan. In the event that Sudan splits into two sovereign countries, the challenges will not only transfer to both countries, they will be exasperated by the split. In sum, the prospect of a large area in which order and authority have collapsed becomes very realistic.

Because a united or a divided Sudan is so perilously close to failing, it is worth analyzing the United States’ policy towards weak or failing states. In the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS), President Obama articulated the United States’ position when he stated, “our diplomacy and development capabilities must help prevent conflict, spur economic growth, strengthen weak and failing states, [we must] lift people out of poverty…and strengthen institutions of democratic governance.” 18 The logic for preventing states from failing is easy to follow. Based on past experiences, (i.e. Somalia, Afghanistan, and Yemen) the United States has determined that failed
or failing states pose a significant risk to the security of the United States and the international community. This idea is further refined by the 2011 National Military Strategy:

States with weak, failing, and corrupt governments will increasingly be used as a safe haven for an expanding array of non-state actors that breed conflict and endanger stability, particularly in Africa and the broader Middle East. Terrorists, criminal networks, and pirates undermine the rule of law, perpetuate and accelerate violence in the international system, and challenge states' ability to respond. 19

When assessing Sudan, this risk to American security is certainly applicable given Sudan’s history with terrorism. For example, in the 1990s Sudan was accused by the U.S. of hosting al-Qaida operatives, including Osama bin Laden, who sought to incorporate African Islamists into their network of global jihadists. Consequently, in 1993 the U.S. State Department placed Sudan on the State Sponsors of Terror List. Currently, terrorist groups such as the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) are basing operations out of Southern Sudan in order to launch attacks on the neighboring governments of Uganda, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. 20 Because Sudan is hampered by instability and the threat of terrorism, the U.S. must work with both Sudanese governments to prevent either state from failing and becoming a base for terrorists.

In addition to the prospect of Sudan becoming a failed state, the United States’ leadership role in brokering the CPA has indelibly linked Washington to the Sudanese peace process. As a guarantor of the CPA the U.S. played a pivotal role in bringing representatives from the North and South together to end the second civil war. 21 Since the CPA was signed, the U.S. has remained a key player in maintaining Sudanese peace by donating nearly $1 billion per year in aid to Sudan and by being one of the largest financial contributors to the UN peacekeeping force assigned to monitor the CPA’s implementation. 22 If the 2011 referendum results not in a peaceful solution but in violence and the United States abandons the peace process, it would be a grave
political error. Such an act would not only isolate America from the Sudanese people, it would also severely damage U.S. credibility as a peace negotiator across the African continent.

The final reason why the United States should maintain its involvement in the Sudan peace process revolves around Sudan’s impact on the rest of the Sahel. In the Sahel, the nomadic nature of the people, the history of Trans-Saharan trade, and the porous borders allow ideas, people, and influence to rapidly spread across an area that stretches from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea. This interconnectivity, combined with the fragile nature of several governments within the Sahel, means that a catastrophic event in Sudan could lead to a domino effect that would cripple nations across the North-African continent.23

Preventing the spread of terrorism throughout the Sahel is consistent with America’s security interests, specifically defeating al Qaida. Al Qaida’s leaders have made their intentions for Africa clear: “liberation” of the African Muslim population from apostate regimes, actively opposing international peacekeeping efforts in Muslim countries, destabilizing oil-producing areas in order to disrupt the global economy, and the targeting of African governments that are politically tied to the west.24 If Sudan were allowed to fail, it would give terrorist networks such as al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) an opportunity to gain a significant foothold in the region. If AQIM is able to establish itself in Sudan, the permissive nature of the Sahel would allow al Qaida’s radical theology to potentially take root and spread further across the region.

In addition to the Sahel’s terrorist elements, the ethnic and religious similarities between countries within the Sahel mean that Sudan’s neighbors are watching Sudan’s peace process with an eye on their own population. Many African countries, including Chad, Mali, Western Sahara, and Nigeria, realize that Sudan is the proverbial “canary in the coalmine” when it comes to self-determination and religious/ethnically-based conflict.25 Because Sudan’s neighbors and regional
non-state actors have a stake in the outcome of the Sudanese peace process, it is to be expected that they will attempt to influence the process in favor of their respective desired outcomes. This phenomenon was captured by Dr. Andre Le Sage, Senior Research Fellow for Africa at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, when he noted, “Neighboring states with ethnic brethren or financial interests across their national borders intervene in each others’ crises with stark regularity.”

WHY A CIVILIAN RESPONSE IS THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION

"It is hoped the presence of international observers will preclude violence or interference in referendum. There is never any guarantee on those but usually it is a help." — Robert Loftis, Acting Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

If the 2011 referendum elections result in violence, Sudan’s strategic context will likely compel the United States to continue its involvement in the North-South peace process. What is unclear, however, is in what form America’s support will be. In light of the current strategic situation both in Sudan and in the United States, that response should be civilian in nature and must be thoroughly coordinated with the international community and regional actors.

Perhaps the most important reasons why American engagement with Northern and Southern Sudan should be principally civilian hinges on the fact that civilian organizations are already in place, coupled with the perceived and actual implication of direct military measures “on the ground.” Since the CPA was in its infancy, the American face to local populations and government officials has been almost exclusively civilian, primarily through the offices of the U.S. State Department and USAID. Since then, a variety of civilian institutions have made significant political inroads while developing a range of contacts, resources, and cultural expertise. If the peace process does fall apart, institutions such as the State Department, USAID, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, and a host of NGO and for-
profit companies already have the personal relationships and the experience required to lay the foundation for a new peace agreement. (See Appendix I: Non-Government and Non-Profit Organizations in Sudan)

Another reason why American engagement should be primarily civilian concerns the nature of the work that must be accomplished. Several of the contentious issues facing Northern and Southern Sudan require specific expertise that fall outside the scope of the military services. For example, border demarcation, internally displaced peoples, natural resource rights (primarily oil and water), debt apportionment, census taking, and citizenship arrangements are current issues that American civilian agencies are helping the NCP and the SPLM negotiate. While the military certainly has some capability when it comes to these fields, these are not core military capabilities. Hence, if the situation in Sudan allows it, they should be left to the civilian experts.

A final reason why a civilian-led response best suits the interest of the United States concerns the legacy of imperialism in Africa. Sudan’s history is littered with colonial powers such as the British, French, Belgians, and Egyptians, all of whom temporarily imposed their will on the Sudanese people through military force. By using diplomacy instead of armed force to stabilize relations between the Northern and Southern governments, the United States avoids the possibility of being perceived as a neo-colonial power fighting to protect its interests in the area. General William “Kip” Ward, USAFRICOM Commander, clearly articulated this idea when he stated, “Imposing peace from the outside through military force or coercion is not a recipe for success; in fact many of the embattled nations would resist. Life under colonialism is still well remembered and leaves a bitter aftertaste. Instead, keeping the hotspots cool is better left to the Africans.”
This “non-imperial” posture can be seen throughout the structure of AFRICOM. Instead of maintaining a large combat ready force on the continent of Africa, AFRICOM consists of a relatively small headquarters and staff element in Stuttgart, Germany. Unlike other geographic combatant commands, AFRICOM’s mission is focused on building host nation military capability and cooperation with those forces. In addition, AFRICOM directly supports the U.S. State Department in its achievement of American foreign policy objectives in Africa. Consequently, AFRICOM’s command structure has an equitable distribution of civilian leadership positions that help shape and guide American civil-military affairs in Africa.\(^{31}\)

If referendum implementation results in violence, regardless of how the United States shapes its support for a new peace process, it is imperative that the nation’s response be coordinated with the international community, the UN, and regional actors such as the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Government (IGAD). Acting in concert with these different players will achieve several purposes. First, it shares the burden of cost and responsibility by acknowledging that regional security is in every country’s best interest. Second, it shows a unified front to both the North and the South during negotiations. Finally, it gives negotiated agreements the legitimacy they need to be enduring.

The first benefit, sharing cost and responsibility, is especially significant. Coordinating efforts gives the United States an occasion to show members of the international community the economic, security, and political benefits of preventing states from failing. It also gives countries an opportunity to hold each other accountable for ensuring stability when their interests are involved. For example, since the 1990’s China has invested heavily in Sudan’s oil industry. Presently, it is Sudan’s largest oil consumer, and it maintains a 47% interest in Sudan’s two biggest oil consortiums.\(^{32}\) Because China has significant natural resource interests in Sudan, it
has a vested interest in maintaining Sudan’s stability. By implication, if China benefits from a stable and peaceful Sudan, then the Chinese should be partly responsible for the costs associated with ensuring that peace. Likewise, countries that have significant financial interests in Sudan should also be held accountable for their share of the peace process. For instance, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia hold over one quarter of Sudan’s $35 billion debt and have much to gain from Sudanese peace. Therefore it is reasonable to expect them to contribute equitably to the peace process in Sudan.

Another benefit of coordinating American efforts with the international community and regional countries such as Chad, Libya, Uganda, Egypt, and Kenya is that it shows a unified front to the NCP and the SPLM. Acting as a unified body that delivers a coherent and consistent message is essential to the peace process because it preserves leverage on both the Northern and Southern Sudanese governments. Furthermore, it prevents disenfranchised parties from establishing side-bar alliances. Thus far, coordinating positions amongst all interested parties has proven to be especially difficult. Several American ambassadors, politicians, and aid workers have learned the hard way that negotiators from the North and the South have grown adept at “incentive shopping” between American agencies in an effort to secure as much aid or support as possible. This predicament becomes more complex when countries with differing strategic goals and operating principles are part of the process. This problem was exemplified by the sale of fighter aircraft, weapons, and tanks to both the GoS and the GoSS by China, Russia, and Belarus shortly after the United States and UN passed Security Council Resolution 1591 banning the sale of weapons to Sudan.

A final benefit of coordinating American efforts with the international community and regional actors is the legitimacy gained by doing so. Ensuring regional stakeholders such as the
UN, AU, and IGAD are committed partners who will hold the negotiating parties accountable, giving settlements the strength and legitimacy they need to be enduring. For the United States, additional benefits of partnering with regional actors include increased access to civilian populations, localized expertise, and a degree of separation from the conflict that allows American diplomacy to stay impartial. (See Appendix E: UN Agencies in Sudan)

Overall, the current posture maintained by the United States through organizations such as the U.S. State Department, USAID, AFRICOM, and the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization appear well prepared to handle the challenges posed by referendum implementation. As such, the current levels and methods of interaction with the NCP and the SPLM governments have created an environment in which peace can take root. If it does not, then the lessons learned over the past six years will serve the engaged civilian offices well in their follow up attempts to secure peace.

WHY COMBAT POWER SHOULD NOT BE USED IN SUDAN

"...military options would be costly for the United States at a time when military resources and political capital, particularly in the Muslim world, are stretched thin." ³⁶

-- Katherine Almquist,
Council on Foreign Relations

Despite what would appear to be all the reasons for a non-military U.S. response to an outbreak of violence in Sudan, some strategists have argued that the United States should or will ally itself militarily with the GoSS. In their view, a third civil war may ensue that would necessitate American military action in the form of airstrikes, combat forces on the ground, or some combination of the two.³⁷ However, regardless of these assertions, the use of military force would be the wrong course of action in Sudan and would be inconsistent with America’s strategic objectives. Four fundamental reasons demonstrate why a military option would be untenable:
• Sudan is neither a survival nor a vital interest to the U.S.

• Following the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. forces need to be re-trained and re-fit

• It does not make economic sense.

• In the wake of Iraq and Afghanistan, American voters will not support an elective war – making it politically infeasible.

The first reason why the combat option should be discarded is that the North-South Peace Agreement is only a major interest to the United States. During their professional military education, American military leaders are taught the four basic levels of national interest. This is a concept based on Donald Snow and Dennis Drew’s interpretation of Donald Nuechterlein’s national interest and strategy matrix. The four levels of interest are:

(1) Survival – those interests that threaten the nation’s physical existence;

(2) Vital – those that cause serious harm to the nation;

(3) Major – a county’s political, economic, or social well-being may be adversely affected, the adverse outcome is painful but tolerable; and

(4) Peripheral – national interests are involved, but the country as a whole is not particularly engaged and the impact is negligible.

Snow and Drew conclude that combat forces should only be committed when the nation’s interests involve survival or are vital. In the case of Sudan, despite the dangers associated with failed states and terrorist elements, the outcome of the peace agreement does not constitute a survival or vital interest to the United States, no matter how catastrophic the results there. The fact remains that Sudan is an extremely poor country that is geographically and economically isolated from the U.S. with comparatively miniscule military capability. As such, there are virtually no peace agreement outcomes that warrant military action in the form of direct combat operations.
Another reason why the use of combat forces would be unwise is that it prevents the DoD from re-training and re-fitting. Because of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the consequent surge in operations tempo, the DoD is experiencing an over-commitment of its forces. Despite the inevitable drawdowns in Iraq and Afghanistan, the requirement levied on the military to maintain a sizeable presence across multiple theaters for nearly a decade has come at a significant cost to training and capability. General Martin Dempsey, Commander of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command and nominee to be the next Chief of Staff of the Army, in a February 2010 letter to the current Chief of Staff of the Army wrote that due to training shortfalls, the Army’s “ability to successfully perform its core competencies and functions is increasingly at risk.”

Sending military forces to Sudan further delays the required re-training and re-fitting of DoD forces at the expense of taking on an additional mission.

Economically, engaging in large scale combat operations simply does not make sense. Given the global recession and the current fiscal reality of shrinking government and defense budgets, committing American forces to a Sudanese peace mission is not financially judicious. America’s current debt levels have been identified by senior officials from all branches of the government as a national security threat, including President Obama who stated, “We must grow our economy and reduce our deficit.” Engaging in an elective conflict directly contradicts the President’s vision. This concept was captured by Brookings Institution senior fellow Michael O’Hanlon in his December 2010 essay, Defense Budgets and American Power. In it he notes that major deficit reduction is required to secure the nation’s long-term strength, and in order to achieve that end, the relative desirability of “wars of choice” will be reduced as Americans embrace a less assertive foreign policy in a post-Iraq/Afghanistan world.
This truth becomes even more prescient in light of the fact that a ten thousand-man UN peacekeeping force (UNMIS) is already in Sudan. UNMIS troops are currently mandated by the UN to oversee implementation of the CPA and to protect civilians threatened by violence. If further military intervention were required in Sudan, studies have found that international military intervention under Chapter VII of the UN Charter is the most cost effective means of preventing a return to war in post-conflict countries.42 Susan Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the UN testified that when it comes to peacekeeping missions, “for every dollar that the United States would spend, the UN can accomplish the mission for twelve cents.”43

This final reason why combat operations are undesirable is very simple: the American public would not support it. At a time when the military is fighting the longest war of its history, convincing citizens that the U.S. should arbitrarily engage in another conflict would be challenging. This is especially true since Sudan has been mired in a civil war for 39 of the past 55 years. If the U.S. decides to enforce peace by engaging in combat operations, it is reasonable to expect a public outcry and political reaction. Granted, the President can commit military forces under the War Powers Resolution for a short period of time. However, ignoring the will of the people would be politically indefensible both initially in Congress and later in elections.

Thus, if the North-South peace agreement breaks down and violence ensues, it is obvious that American involvement in a new peace process should not consist of combat operations. However, eliminating the combat option from the list of available alternatives does not mean that military forces cannot or will not become involved. The military is arguably the nation’s most capable asset when it comes to providing aid or logistics support in a distressed environment. As such, DoD forces are ideally suited for the provision of humanitarian aid and disaster relief supplies, such as in Haiti in 2010 and in Georgia following the Russian invasion in 2008.44 Not
only would these types of military actions be consistent with Sudan’s position as a major
national interest, they are more economically feasible than combat operations. In addition, by
appealing to the American public’s sense of humanity they are politically viable. Overall, when
assessing the strategic, economic, and political climate faced by today’s political leaders it is
plain to see that the situation in Sudan is not conducive for carrying out an elective use of combat
forces in the area. Hence, any military option should be restricted to a humanitarian aid and
logistical support.

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY’S ABILITY TO KEEP THE PEACE

“Although protection of civilians is the responsibility of the sovereign Government of Sudan,
UNMIS military is mandated to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence,
within the force’s capability.”

-- UNMIS Military Factsheet

Unfortunately, the history of armed conflict in Sudan coupled with a historical propensity
for violence necessitate having a military force in place that is capable of protecting the fragile
peace and preventing further atrocities. This begs the question: If the U.S. will not commit its
combat forces to ensure the Sudanese peace, then who will? Currently, peacekeepers from the
UN are deployed to Sudan while the AU has taken on a supporting role in this especially
challenging environment.

In March 2005, UNMIS was created and tasked with supporting the implementation of
the CPA under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. UNMIS was mandated to monitor the NCP and
SPLM ceasefire, the disarming of both sides, and to assist with elections and referendum voting.
Having learned its lesson during past ethnic conflicts in Africa, notably those faced by UNAMIR
in Rwanda, the UN also mandated UNMIS under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to protect
civilians under imminent threat of violence. In order to achieve these objectives, UNMIS
presently has 10,592 total uniformed personnel from 62 countries including 9,451 troops, 486
military observers, and 655 police officers.\textsuperscript{47} (See Appendix D: Overview of UNMIS Forces) However, these forces are charged with maintaining peace over an immense space and have historically struggled in their mission. Critics of UNMIS, notably Refugees International and other humanitarian relief agencies, argue that UNMIS has been given the authority but not the capacity to protect civilians. They argue that the deployment of inadequately mandated forces creates a baseless expectation among local people that they will be protected if violence should erupt.\textsuperscript{48}

The criticisms of the UN peacekeeping force are further exasperated by the challenges posed by UNMIS' tactical situation. The personnel that comprise UNMIS originate from 62 different countries and are hampered by language barriers, cultural differences, and a lack of centralized command/unity of effort. In addition, several of the troop supplying-nations are unable to adequately supply and/or train their military personnel, creating a daunting challenge for UNMIS' military leaders. Furthermore, in a disturbing parallel to the UN mission to Rwanda, repeated calls by UNMIS for additional personnel have been summarily ignored by the UN Security Council.\textsuperscript{49} This lack of adequately trained and equipped personnel severely limits UNMIS' capability, especially given the expansive terrain and the lack of modern infrastructure.

Unfortunately, the criticisms of UNMIS thus far are valid. For example, in May 2008 violence broke out in Abyei, a state located on the border between Northern and Southern Sudan. The violence erupted when UN peacekeepers were unable to prevent a checkpoint skirmish from escalating into a full scale battle between the Sudan People's Liberation Army and the Sudanese Armed Forces.\textsuperscript{50} In 2010, during an apparent attempt to instigate a retaliatory attack, peacekeepers were unable to prevent the NCP from launching air attacks against civilian targets in Southern Sudan.\textsuperscript{51} Overall, the annual number of fatalities since implementation of the CPA
spiked in 2010 to approximately 2,500. These occurrences, combined with the low UNMIS troop-space ratio, strike directly at the credibility of UNMIS to carry out its mandate to protect civilians north and south of the border. GoSS Speaker of the House, James Wani Igga, succinctly summarized the general view of UNMIS when he compared the peacekeeping body to “a leopard without teeth. Once the sheep know this, they will play around.”

In addition to the UN, the AU has also played a role in Sudanese peacekeeping missions. However, due to a lack of military capability, their role has been primarily diplomatic. The AU mission to Sudan (AMIS) originated as a peacekeeping force designed to prevent further conflict in Darfur. Eventually, the Darfur mission transitioned into a joint UN-AU mission (UNAMID) and AU peacekeepers have been focused on that region ever since. Presently, there are two distinct UN missions in Sudan: UNAMID, which is focused on Darfur; and UNMIS, which is focused on the peace agreement between the North and South. With regard to both missions, AU peacekeeping capability is limited at best. In 2002, the AU set out to create the African Standby Force (ASF) with the intent of having forces trained and ready to deploy as a rapid reaction force by 2010. Currently, the readiness of the five regional brigades is suspect and, as such, they have not been utilized in peacekeeping between the North and South in Sudan.

Together, the UN and AU provide a foundation on which to build. However, the lack of effective military capability is an unsettling reality. Where UN troops are deployed, their presence is generally effective at ensuring compliance with CPA protocols. On the other hand, there is only so much that the small forces can do. Those in place are hindered by language and cultural differences, poor command structure, long logistical lines, expansive terrain, and most importantly, a non-existent stake in the outcome. How this will affect the durability of the Sudanese peace process remains to be seen.
CONCLUSION

...there are no simple answers to the extraordinary challenges that confront this part of the world. But now is the time for all of us to come together, and to make a strong and sustained effort on behalf of a better future for the people of Sudan.

-- President Barack Obama\textsuperscript{56}

Sudan’s history is characterized by a host of post-colonial issues that have resulted in two civil wars and years of violence. The U.S. backed CPA ended the most recent civil war, created a fragile peace, and gave the South the right to hold a referendum vote for independence. In response to this peace, Washington has utilized its diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of power to prevent further violence from erupting and to ensure the tenets of the CPA are implemented. However, if violence does break out in Sudan, how the U.S. will respond is still unclear.

To determine its response, the United States must assess its interests in Sudan and in Africa. Overall, American interests in the area are varied and significant. They cover a wide spectrum and range from defeating the threat posed by Islamic extremists, to building diplomatic collateral, to preventing Sudan from becoming a failed state. While America’s strategic interests are varied, when viewed in sum they make a persuasive argument for continuing to engage with the North and South if the referendum process derails.

If violence does erupt between the North and South, American policymakers must refer back to President Obama’s words to the Ghanaian Parliament in 2009, “Africa’s future is up to Africans.”\textsuperscript{57} To do this, Washington should continue utilizing its diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of power in an effort to compel the disparate parties to make peace. However, they must avoid the temptation to “fix” Sudan’s problem with unilateral combat power. Doing so may force the two governments to accept a temporary peace, but this would not be enduring for two reasons. First, the peace agreement will lack the legitimacy that comes with
an internationally negotiated and recognized settlement that takes regional actors and their requirements into account. Second, both Sudanese governments realize that the United States does not have the capacity to maintain and enforce a long-term peace agreement. Hence, they can effectively “wait out” the United States and reassert their will once the U.S. military presence has departed.

Most importantly, American policymakers must remember that when it comes to conflict and peace agreements in Sudan, that peace is the Sudanese’s to make. Incentives, disincentives, and military capability can persuade and coerce to a degree, however, if the North and South cannot reconcile their differences, the international community cannot do it for them. Nevertheless, what the U.S. can do is seize this unique opportunity to demonstrate that American foreign policy in Africa is aimed at enabling Africans to solve their own problems. In Sudan, by skillfully employing its instruments of national power, the United States must continue to build an environment that not only allows, but encourages, the Sudanese people to choose a peaceful alternative to their historic struggles with violence.
APPENDIX A

Country Data

Area 967,500 sq miles (approximate size of the U.S. east of the Mississippi River)
728,215 sq miles in Northern Sudan
239,285 sq miles in Southern Sudan

Cities
Khartoum (1.4 million) * Capital
Omdurman (2.1 million)
Port Sudan (450,000)
Juba (165,000) * Capital of southern region

Population 41,087,825; 43% urban
~ 31,000,000 in Northern Sudan
~ 8,000,000 in Southern Sudan (census disputed)

Ethnicity Black 52%, Arab 39%, Beja 6%

Religion Sunni Muslim 70% (North), Christian 5% (South & Khartoum), indigenous 25%

Budget $9.201 billion

Defense 3% of GDP

GDP $92.81 billion; $2,300 per capita

Resources Oil, natural gas, gold, iron ore, copper, and other industrial metals

Agriculture Cotton, peanuts, sorghum, sesame seeds, gum arabic, sugarcane, millet, livestock

Industry Motor vehicle assembly, cement, cotton, edible oils and sugar refining

Exports 8.464 billion f.o.b.: crude oil and petroleum products, cotton, gold, sorghum, peanuts, gum arabic, sugar, meat, hides, live animals, and sesame seeds

Markets China 58%, Japan 15%, Indonesia 9%, India 5%

Imports 6.823 billion f.o.b.: oil and petroleum products, oil pipeline, pumping and refining equipment, chemical products and equipment, wheat and wheat flour, transport equipment, foodstuffs, tea, agricultural inputs and machinery, industrial inputs and manufactured goods

Suppliers China 22%, Saudi Arabia 7%, Egypt 6%, India 5%, UAE 5%

APPENDIX B

1 Data assimilated from Sudan Background Notes (www.state.gov) and The World Factbook (www.cia.gov).
APPENDIX C

Map of Sudan by Region

APPENDIX D

3 http://www.unsidanig.org/library/mapcatalogue/south/data/admin/SS_0004_Sudan_Regions_A4_20091123_200_2
Overview of UNMIS Forces – Force Laydown

APPENDIX D

Overview of UNMIS Forces

Mission Mandate

In March 2005, UN Security Council Resolution 1590 authorized the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and tasked it with supporting the implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, ending a 22-year civil war between the North and South. On April 29, 2010, the Security Council extended the UNMIS mandate for one year.

UNMIS Commander

Major General Moses Bisong Obi (Nigeria) is the UNMIS Force Commander. General Obi has served in two previous UN peacekeeping missions, as Platoon Commander in the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and as Deputy Sector Commander in the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). He was also Commanding Officer of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), Commanding Officer of the Multi-National Joint Task Force Operation in Lake Chad, and Acting Commander of the ECOMOG Ground Task Force in Liberia. General Obi attended the Armed Forces Command and Staff College and the Nigerian Defense Academy.

Troop Strength

The military component of UNMIS, with its strength of over 9,500 personnel, constitutes the bulk of UNMIS staff. This multinational force, which combines soldiers from 62 nations, is engaged in diverse peacekeeping activities in keeping with the terms of the Security Council resolution.

Force Alignment

UNMIS military forces are deployed across the ceasefire area as delineated in the CPA as follows:

Sector I: The Equatoria Area, includes Western, Central, and Eastern Equatoria states.

Sector II: The Bahr El-Ghazal Area, includes Western Bahr El-Ghazal, Northern Bahr ElGhazal, Warrap and Lakes states.

Sector III: The Upper Nile Area, includes Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile states.

Sector IV: The Southern Kordofan State Area.

Sector V: The Blue Nile State Area.

Sector VI: The Abyei Area.

APPENDIX E

UN Agencies in Sudan

Map and list of UN organizations in Sudan obtained from www.unsudanig.org.

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6 Map and list of UN organizations in Sudan obtained from www.unsudanig.org.
### APPENDIX E

*UN Agencies in Sudan*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCSO</td>
<td>Resident Coordinator’s Support Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAIDS</td>
<td>Joint UN Program on HIV/AIDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>UN Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDSS</td>
<td>UN Department of Safety and Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>UN Population Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>UN Refugee Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>UN Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIDO</td>
<td>UN Industrial Development Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFEM</td>
<td>UN Development Fund for Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNJLC</td>
<td>UN Joint Logistics Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMAO</td>
<td>UN Mine Action Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>UN Mine Action Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>UN Missions in Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOPS</td>
<td>UN Office for Project Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFO</td>
<td>World Food Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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7 List of UN organizations in Sudan obtained from www.unsudanig.org.
APPENDIX F

Summary of the January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement,⁸

Machakos Protocol

A six-year interim period commencing 9 July 2005 is established during which the Southern Sudanese will have the right to govern affairs in their region and participate equitably in the national government.

After the interim period, southern Sudan will have the right to vote in an internationally monitored referendum either to confirm Sudan’s unity or vote for separation.

Shari’a law is to remain applicable in the North and parts of the constitution are to be re-written so that shari’a does not apply to any non-Muslims throughout Sudan. The status of shari’a in Khartoum is to be decided by an elected assembly.

Power Sharing

Sudan will have two governments: a national government with representation from both sides of the North-South conflict, and a separate Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS).

A Government of National Unity will be formed. This government will be decentralized, thus granting more power to individual states.

Positions in the state governments are to be split 70:30 in favor of the NCP in the North (20% for other parties and 10% for the SPLM) and 70:30 in favor of the SPLM in the South (15% for other southern parties and 15% for the NCP). In Abyei, the Blue Nile State and Nuba Mountains the division will be 55% for the NCP and 45% for the SPLM.

The executive will consist of the President and Council of Ministers. Two Vice-Presidents will be appointed by the President. The First Vice President is the Chair of the SPLM.

A bicameral national legislature will be established: the National Assembly will be comprised of specific percentages: NCP 52%, SPLM 28%, other northern parties 14%, other southern parties 6%; each state will have two representatives in the Council of States.

Wealth Sharing

The following commissions will be established: National Land Commission, Southern Sudan Land Commission, and the National Petroleum Commission.

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APPENDIX F

2% of oil revenue will go to oil-producing states in southern Sudan in proportion to their output. The remaining net revenue will be divided evenly with 50% allocated to the GoSS and 50% allocated to the National Government.

The National Government is able to collect revenue from personal income, corporate and customs taxes; the GoSS can collect revenue from personal income taxes, luxury taxes, and business taxes in Southern Sudan.

The Bank of Southern Sudan will be formed as a branch of the Central Bank of Sudan. National and Southern funds for reconstruction and development will be established along with two multi-donor trust funds.

**Abyei, Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile States**

Abyei will be accorded special administrative status during the interim period. At the end of the six-year interim period, Abyei residents will vote in a referendum either to maintain special administrative status in the north or to become part of Bahr al-Ghazal (Warap) state in the South.

Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile will be represented at the national level in proportion to the population size of each respective party.

Governorship of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile shall rotate between the NCP and SPLM during the interim period.

**Security**

During the six-year interim period, Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) of 21,000 soldiers are to be formed with equal numbers from the North and the South. They are to be deployed to sensitive areas such as Abyei, Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile.

The North and South may maintain separate armies with both considered part of Sudan's National Armed Forces. Each army is to be downsized and the parties are to implement demobilization, disarmament and reintegration programs. No other armed group will be tolerated.

A permanent cessation of hostilities is provided for, detailing disengagement and the creation of various committees for enforcement and oversight.

Monitoring is to be carried out by a UN mission to support implementation, as provided for under Chapter VI of the UN Charter.
## APPENDIX G

*Timeline of Events, 1983 – 2011*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Civil war breaks out between Sudanese government forces and the SPLM, led by John Garang.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-1986</td>
<td>After widespread unrest President Numieri is deposed and a Transitional Military Council is set up to rule the country with Sadiq al-Mahdi as prime minister.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989 – 1994</td>
<td>Bashir directs the Sudanese Army into Southern Sudan, resulting in high levels of casualties among the Christian and Animist populations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 1993</td>
<td>Sudan is added to the U.S. State Department’s State Sponsors of Terrorism List.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 1993</td>
<td>Bashir disbands all political parties in Sudan and appoints himself president.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>SPLA rebels campaign against the Sudanese Army, releasing propaganda labeling the Sudanese Army an Islamist tool designed to impose the Islamic faith and Arabic language on the South.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-2002</td>
<td>Civil war rages between the North and South, both sides inflict mass casualties on each other through the use of modern Russian and Chinese weaponry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Bashir runs as the sole candidate in Sudanese presidential elections and creates the National Congress Party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 1998</td>
<td>The U.S. launches cruise missile attacks on the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum, alleging that it was making materials for chemical weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999- 2000</td>
<td>Hassan al-Turabi, a one-time ally of Bashir, introduces a bill to reduce Executive power and is subsequently jailed. Bashir reacts further by declaring a national state of emergency and dissolving parliament in the middle of the 2000 presidential elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2004</td>
<td>Peace talks commence in earnest between the Government of Sudan and the Southern rebels. In the Machakos Protocol, both parties agree to recognize an independent and interim Southern Sudanese government.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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9 Chronology compiled from [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/827425.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/827425.stm) and [http://www.insightonconflict.org/conflicts/sudan/conflict-profile/timeline/?gclid=CN2huPb20qYCFqcqC5OodAh7eTw](http://www.insightonconflict.org/conflicts/sudan/conflict-profile/timeline/?gclid=CN2huPb20qYCFqcqC5OodAh7eTw)
APPENDIX G

Sep 2004  The United States officially refers to the Darfur killings by Janajaweed militants as genocide.

Jan 2005  The CPA is signed between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM. (See Appendix F: Summary of the January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement)

Mar 2005  The UN Mission in Sudan is established under UNSCR 1590 to support implementation of the CPA.

Aug 2005  John Garang, serving as Sudan’s co-vice president from the South, dies in a helicopter accident, inciting riots in Southern Sudan.

Oct 2007  SPLM withdraws its personnel from government positions in the Government of National Unity in protest of the North’s failure to implement CPA policy.


Mar 2008  Intense fighting between the Northern and Southern armies, focused on the area of Abyei and its oil producing regions.

Jul 2008  The International Criminal Court (ICC) calls for the arrest of President Bashir for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.

Mar 2009  The ICC issues an arrest warrant for President Bashir on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

May 2009  Fighting renews between the North and South when nomadic groups battle over grazing and cattle rights in Southern Kordofan.

Apr 2010  President Bashir is re-elected as President.

Jul 2010  The ICC issues a second arrest warrant (genocide) for President Bashir.

Nov 2010  Voter registration begins for the January 2011 Referendum vote. North and South accuse each other of massing troops in border areas.

Dec 2010  Forces from Northern Sudan allegedly launch air raids against civilian targets in the South aimed at inciting conflict and de-railing referendum voting.

Jan 2011  Southern Sudanese people participate in referendum voting where they are given the option to either reunite with the North or declare their independence.
The Failed States Index assesses countries based on the following twelve categories: Demographics, Refugees, Government Legitimacy, Intellectual Retainment, Public Services, Inequality, Group Grievances, Human Rights, Economic Decline, Security Forces, Factionalized Elites, and External Intervention.

Of the twelve categories, in 2010 Sudan placed lowest in Human Rights, Group Grievances, and Inequality.

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10 The Failed States Index is available in its entirety on Foreign Policy magazine’s website: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/failedstates.
APPENDIX I

Non-Government and Non-Profit Organizations in Sudan

ACTED *
Action Against Hunger/USA *
Action Contre la Faim/France *
Adventist Development and Relief Agency *
American Refugee Committee *
Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development (AAAID)
Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa
Arab Bureau for Consultation and Implementation of Agricultural Projects
Arab Centre for Agricultural Documentation (ACADI)
Arab Centre for Information and Early Warning (ACIEW)
Arab Company for Agricultural Production and Processing (ACAPP)
Arab Cooperation Council (ACC)
Arab Institute for Forestry and Range (AIFR)
Arab Organization for Agricultural Development (AOAD)
CARE *
Catholic Relief Services *
Children Sans Frontiers
Concern Worldwide US *
Darfur Tears
Equatoria Rehabilitation And Dev. Association (ERADA)
Family Federation for World Peace and Unification, Sudan
Food for the Hungry, U.S. *
GOAL (Ireland) *
Gurafi Trans
HME
International Medical Corps *
International Rescue Committee *

Data assimilated from World Association of NGOs (www.wango.org) and The U.S. Agency for International Development (www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/sudan/ngolist2.html)
APPENDIX I

International Sisterhood Charity Organization
Local Action
Mercy Corps *
National Organization for Human Development
Merlin (England) *
Norwegian People's Aid *
Rahma Charity Fund
Rahma Charity Fund (RCF),
Samaritan's Purse *
Save the Children *
Solidarites (France) *
Street Children Rehabilitation Organization
Sudan Council of Voluntary Agencies (SCOVA)
Sudanese Animal Care & Environmental Organization
Sudanese Data Bank
Sudanese Environment & Animal Welfare Organization
Tearfund (England) *
Vétérinaires Sans Frontières (Belgium) *
World Vision *
Zarga Organization for Rural Development

* Many international organizations provide relief and humanitarian assistance to Sudan. Organizations listed with an asterisk (*) are non-profit organizations that currently receive USAID funds and accept contributions to help the Sudanese people.
### APPENDIX J

**Acronyms and Abbreviations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AEC</td>
<td>Assessment and Evaluation Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMIS</td>
<td>African Mission in Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>APG</td>
<td>Associate Parliamentary Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIME</td>
<td>Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic (instruments of national power)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoNU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoSS</td>
<td>Government of Southern Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoS</td>
<td>Government of Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCP</td>
<td>National Congress Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLA</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLM</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAF</td>
<td>Sudan Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ENDNOTES


2 President Bashir has been charged by the International Criminal Court with three counts of genocide: genocide by killing (article 6-a), genocide by causing serious bodily or mental harm (article 6-b) and genocide by deliberately inflicting on each target group conditions of life calculated to bring about the group’s physical destruction (article 6-c), http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations/Situation+ICC+0205/, (accessed January 14, 2011).


11 U.S. Department of State, Background Notes: Sudan, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5424.htm


15 The Sahel extends from Senegal eastward to the Red Sea and forms a transitional zone between the arid Sahara to the north (Libya, Tunisia) and the humid savannas to the south (Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo).

16 A strategic interest should not be confused with a vital interest in the context of Nuechterlein’s National Interest Matrix. The U.S. has varied strategic interests around the world that would not be considered vital interests in this context. A detailed explanation of this distinction is available in Nuechterlein’s essay “America Recommitted: A Superpower Assesses its Role in a Turbulent World,” (Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 2001) or at his website, http://donaldnuechterlein.com/2000/major.html.


20 It is worth noting that the U.S. Department of State has recognized the achievements Sudan has made in the immediate past working with the U.S. to expel terrorist elements from Sudan. However, it appears that the U.S. is keeping Sudan on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism as a bargaining chip to compel Sudanese compliance on areas such as the CPA implementation and Darfur. For more information see U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2009, Chapter 3: State Sponsors of Terrorism, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2009/index.htm.


26 Le Sage, 59.


30 William E. Ward and Thomas P. Gavin, “‘Africa’s Future is Up to Africans’: Putting the President’s Words into Action,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* 58, (3d Quarter 2010): 8.


32 Dagne, 24.

33 The effect of increased responsibility for other states in Sudan is an increase in Chinese influence in Sudan. However, the Chinese economic and natural resource interests already give it significant influence in the region. For more information on China’s influence on Sudan, see Jonathan Holslag, “China’s New Security Strategy for Africa,” *Parameters*, Summer 2009, 23-37.


35 In 2005 China sold arms and ammunition worth 12 million UK pounds to Sudan, along with spare parts worth 30 million pounds. In the same year, Russia sold helicopter gunships worth almost 7 million pounds to the Khartoum regime. China also sold six K-8 training aircraft to Sudan's air force and has been accused of training fighter pilots from the North. In 2010, 32 Soviet tanks were commandeered by Somali pirates enroute to Southern Sudan. These tanks were in addition to the 67 T-72 tanks already believed to be delivered to Southern Sudan.


46 Chapter VI of the UN Charter specifically addresses the pacification of disputes. Chapter VII addresses UN actions (to include the use of military force) in response to threats, breaches of peace, or acts of aggression. Chapter VI and VII can be viewed at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml.


54 UNAMID is composed of 22,061 total uniformed personnel (17,050 troops, 264 military observers, 4,747 police officers) from 49 countries. In addition, it has 1,121 international civilian personnel, 2,658 local civilian staff, and 468 United Nations Volunteers (current as of 31 October 2010). These forces are independent from those that comprise the UNMIS mission. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/background.shtml


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Ismail, Omer. “Sudan: Regional Implications of Post-Referendum Scenarios.” Center for Complex Operations Presentation, National Defense University, Washington, DC, December 16, 2010. Omer Ismail is a policy advisor to several agencies working in crisis management in Africa. During the CCO presentation he spoke about the Sudan’s impact on the rest of Africa and the relationship that exists between nations in the Sahel.

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Natsios, Andrew. “Sudan: Regional Implications of Post-Referendum Scenarios.” Center for Complex Operations Presentation, National Defense University, Washington, DC, December 16, 2010. During his remarks at the CCO presentation, Ambassador Natsios shared his wisdom and several insightful anecdotes with the audience. However, he also advocated allying the U.S. military with the GoSS in order to assure it that the U.S. would support them in the event that the North launched an attack against the South.


succinct look at nations that are at risk of failing. In addition to presenting tabular data, it allows the user to further examine the results by country or by category.

**U.S. Government Resources**

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U.S. Department of State, *Background Notes: Sudan*. [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5424.htm](http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5424.htm) (accessed December 15, 2010). The U.S. State Department provided a significant amount of information for this paper. The documents referenced summarize U.S. policy towards Sudan, U.S. diplomatic actions in Sudan, and discuss the effects of Sudan’s history on the current strategic situation.


**UN Resources**


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