Great Britain has a long history in counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare. In the summer of 2003, as the Coalition in Iraq began post-conflict operations, many in Britain were keen to present the British experience (particularly recent experience in Northern Ireland) as a model for success in stability operations. However, 4 years later, as the British pulled back to Basra Airport, it was clear that reality had not matched expectation. The question remains as to whether the British experience in other COIN operations was so different that it was not relevant in Basra, or whether the British did not learn and apply the right lessons from other COIN campaigns. Intuitively, the operation in Basra felt different to that in Northern Ireland; the differences in force numbers, weapon systems used, and approaches to detention in Basra and Belfast were all examples that encourage this view. One can explain these away as different responses to different problems. Whether it is fair to do so is the subject of this thesis. This thesis will examine whether the different approaches in Northern Ireland and Southern Iraq were symptoms of a more fundamental difference in the way the British approached domestic and foreign COIN operations. If so, did the seeds of contemporary UK failure in overseas COIN operations lie in this differing approach?
HOME AND AWAY: DID THE UK ADDRESS COUNTERINSURGENCY IN BASRA SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENTLY TO HOW IT ADDRESSED IT IN NORTHERN IRELAND?

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

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ABSTRACT

Great Britain has a long history in counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare. In the summer of 2003, as the Coalition in Iraq began post-conflict operations, many in Britain were keen to present the British experience (particularly recent experience in Northern Ireland) as a model for success in stability operations. However, 4 years later, as the British pulled back to Basra Airport, it was clear that reality had not matched expectation. The question remains as to whether the British experience in other COIN operations was so different that it was not relevant in Basra, or whether the British did not learn and apply the right lessons from other COIN campaigns. Intuitively, the operation in Basra felt different to that in Northern Ireland; the differences in force numbers, weapon systems used, and approaches to detention in Basra and Belfast were all examples that encourage this view. One can explain these away as different responses to different problems. Whether it is fair to do so is the subject of this thesis. This thesis will examine whether the different approaches in Northern Ireland and Southern Iraq were symptoms of a more fundamental difference in the way the British approached domestic and foreign COIN operations. If so, did the seeds of contemporary UK failure in overseas COIN operations lie in this differing approach?
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DEDICATION

To my wife and children, for putting up with the late nights and missed weekends required to finish this work.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 1

CHAPTER 2: THE TRINITARIAN MODEL ...................................................................................... 8

CHAPTER 3: NORTHERN IRELAND - 'THE TROUBLES' ............................................................. 16
   Part One - Creating an Insurgency .......................................................................................... 16
   Part Two - It Got Worse Before It Got Better ..................................................................... 23
   Part Three - Balancing the Trinity to Shape for Success ...................................................... 25

CHAPTER 4: IRAQ - SECOND TIME AROUND ........................................................................... 33
   Part One - Creating an Insurgency ....................................................................................... 33
   Part Two - The Growth of the Insurgency .......................................................................... 37
   Part Three - An Embedded Insurgency ............................................................................... 41

CHAPTER 5: SYNTHESIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................... 49

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 66

BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................................................... 70
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Helplessness induces hopelessness, and history attests that loss of hope, not loss of life, is what decides the issue of war.¹

It is self-evident that Basra and Belfast are very different places. A British soldier walking through Belfast would recognize the familiar sights and sounds of a large regional town in the United Kingdom. He would feel as comfortable with the language, climate, commercial branding and fashions on the streets in Belfast as he would in his hometown. However, the same soldier walking through Basra would probably feel as foreign as it is possible to feel. Assaulted by sounds, smells and sights deeply alien to him he would probably feel ill at ease and uncomfortable. Despite the differences between these towns, the same British soldier may well have fought the same kind of warfare in each in the last 10 years.

Based on extensive counterinsurgency (COIN) experience, Britain perhaps considered itself well placed to succeed in Iraq. In 2003, the year the Coalition invaded Iraq, the British anticipated a successful end to operations in Northern Ireland. Institutionally, they perhaps felt that post conflict stabilization operations in Southern Iraq played to their strengths, and would prove to be a model for such operations across Iraq.²


² Lt. Gen. Sir Graeme Lamb, Oral Evidence to the Iraq Inquiry, December 9, 2009, Transcript of Sir Hilary Symondt, Lt Gen Lamb & Maj Gen Andrew Stewart hearing, The Iraq Inquiry, 12. [http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/npcia/41379/20091229amsynott-lamb-stewar-final.pdf](http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/npcia/41379/20091229amsynott-lamb-stewar-final.pdf) (accessed January 5, 2014) mentions this view, and the American reaction to how it was being expounded at the time. Certainly, some (like Gen. Petraeus) felt that the Americans could benefit from British experience, as shown in Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster's, "Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations," Military Review (November-December 2005), 2-15. Such was the depth of this view, and the confidence that the British held in it, that it was also sometimes interpreted as arrogant by others, for example in
The reality six years later was that the COIN campaign in Basra had both looked and ended differently to that in Northern Ireland. Though the internment, heavy-handed tactics and heavy conventional weapons seen in Basra did perhaps have parallels with the early days of Northern Ireland, the British had long since consigned them to the trash heap of experience in its domestic campaign. Furthermore, the British Army left Northern Ireland at the end of a long (thirty-seven year) operation that left a secure and increasingly integrated society in its wake. They left Basra having played only a relatively minor role in providing the stability and security they had gone there to deliver. This thesis will examine whether the different approaches in Southern Iraq and Northern Ireland were symptoms of a more fundamental difference in the way the British approached domestic and foreign COIN operations and, if so, whether the seeds of contemporary UK failure in overseas COIN operations lay in this differing approach.

However, one can only compare the conflicts if a meaningful comparison is possible. Confirming that both conflicts were insurgencies is a good starting point. British military doctrine describes an insurgency as, “an organized, violent subversion used to effect or prevent political control, as a challenge to established authority.”

Similarly, American military doctrine defines insurgency as, “the organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority.”

Furthermore, so as not to rely purely on military definitions,


the Oxford English Dictionary describes an insurgent as, "a person fighting against a
government or invading force. . . ."5 A common notion of violence against governance
exists in all three definitions, to which the British and American military definitions add
the notion of organization. Therefore, the definition used here will be, "organized violent
opposition to established governance." Though separated by ideology, methodology and
sociology, both the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland and the Jaish al-
Mahdi (JAM) in Basra conform to this definition in their campaigns against the British.
Consequently, both were insurgencies, and therefore the British operations against them
were COIN campaigns. As COIN campaigns are distinct forms of campaign, some
degree of comparison must be possible.

Also, from the definitions above, we can see that insurgency is primarily about
political power and therefore is national, not purely military, business. So any
comparison made between COIN in Basra and Northern Ireland must be at the national
strategic level. It is worth clarifying this. Some commentators refer to the use of all the
elements of national power as 'grand strategy'. For example, Bartlett, Holman and
Somess see grand strategy as providing "... a clear concept of how economic, diplomatic,
and military instruments of national power will be used to achieve national goals and
policy."6 Also, Basil Liddell-Hart defines the role of grand strategy as being "... to
coordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the
attainment of the political object of the war-the goal defined by fundamental policy."7

http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199571123.001.0001/m_en_gb0414880?rskey=c
WhQUQ&result=5 (accessed November 29, 2013).
6 Henry C. Bartlett, G. Paul Holman, Jr., and Timothy E. Somess, "The Art and Strategy of Force
19.
7 Liddell-Hart, 335-336.
However, there can be a difference in definition between grand and national strategy. This difference generally revolves around a strategy that is designed for the world in the absence of specific issues or enemies (sometimes termed grand strategy), or one that is designed to address the world as it is (sometimes termed national strategy). For this thesis, national strategy is defined as the use of all elements of national power by a state to address a specific issue or circumstance. To avoid any confusion between the two concepts, the term grand strategy will not be used. This thesis will therefore examine how Britain employed all of her elements of national power to achieve her goals in these conflicts.

To enable a meaningful comparison of British national strategy in Northern Ireland and Basra, the thesis will examine both conflicts through the same theoretical lens to ensure focus at the right level. The lens used is an adaption of Karl Von Clausewitz’s ‘paradoxical trinity’, overlaying the concepts of force, will and governance\(^8\) on the campaigns. By considering all the elements of the Clausewitzian trinity and their relationships, the balance of all the elements of national power are considered, both internally and against the opposing trinity, and how this balance may have contributed to success or failure in each case. However, this thesis is not primarily about what Clausewitz originally meant by his trinity. It only seeks to define and apply a practical version of the trinity to our historical case studies to allow a degree of comparison. Therefore, the thesis will begin with an explanation of how the concept of the trinity will act as a descriptive framework for the two conflicts.

\(^8\) The terminology used in model was developed partly through discussion with Lt Col P Zeman, USMC.
The thesis will then describe the British COIN campaigns in Northern Ireland and Basra using the analytical framework of the trinity. Too short to cover either in detail, it will focus on key events from each conflict that describe the origin of the counterinsurgency and the turning point towards success or failure. This covers only up to 1972 and Operation Motorman in Northern Ireland, but from beginning to end in Basra. Such a choice is, of course, entirely subjective and open to discussion. However, this thesis uses Operation Motorman as a turning point in the Northern Ireland conflict because other literature, to some degree at least, supports it as such. 9

Having analyzed the two case studies, the thesis will then examine the national strategic conditions the respective governments created to deal with the conflicts. Such a synthesis will assume that success born of sound national strategy relies on certain conditions both for its inception and for execution and, conversely, that the absence of such conditions is likely to lead to failure.

The final assumption is that, on a spectrum of success in COIN, Northern Ireland lies towards the successful end and Basra towards the unsuccessful end. This assumption is debatable. The Real IRA killed two soldiers in Northern Ireland in 2009, 10 indicating that Republican elements still seek to use violence to achieve the political aim of

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9 UK Ministry of Defence, *An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland*, prepared under the direction of the Chief of the General Staff (DGS Publications: London, 2006), 1-3, asserts that, "The largest of these [operations] was Operation MOTORMAN, which was conducted from 31 July to 1 December 1972. It marked the beginning of the end of the insurgency phase." M. L. R. Smith & Peter R. Neumann, "Motorman’s Long Journey: Changing the Strategic Setting in Northern Ireland," *Contemporary British History* 19, no. 4 (August 2006): 413, asserts that, "... Motorman shattered the IRA’s military bargaining strategy, the long-term effect of which was eventually to propel the republican movement down a path that would ultimately lead it to question the value of its armed struggle. This view is supported in Huw Bennett, "From Direct Rule to Motorman: Adjusting British Military Strategy for Northern Ireland in 1972," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 33, no. 6 (May 2010): 511-532.

secession from the Union. Similarly, in Basra, Muqtada al-Sadr (MAS), the insurgent leader against the British, ordered a halt to armed operations in 2008 and then went on to win 40 seats in the Iraqi Parliament in the 2010 elections. In the case of Northern Ireland, there are still elements at work that meet the definition of an insurgency used earlier. In Basra, MAS called for an end to violence and began to work purely within the political system while the British were still in control. These assumptions of success and failure are therefore contentious.

However, Northern Ireland was broadly successful and Basra was broadly unsuccessful for the British. For a country to claim success in COIN, with the implication that success is a result of its actions, the definition must include the concepts of intention and cause and effect. The definition for success in this thesis therefore is that the British achieved success as a direct result of national intent and strategy. According to this definition, there can be successful outcomes to insurgencies in spite of the strategy a country uses to get there. In such cases, a country cannot claim that it waged a successful COIN campaign. Basra is one such case. If one assumes that the British aim was to leave Basra a stable and secure city, integrated with the rest of Iraq, then this was achieved. However, the British did not achieve it, or have a strategy to achieve it, as the thesis will show in the Basra case study. The Iraqis ultimately achieved it with American and British assistance.

As for Northern Ireland, the British policy was clear from the Downing Street Declaration of 19 August 1969. Northern Ireland would not cease to be a part of the United Kingdom without the consent of the people of Northern Ireland or the consent of

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the Northern Irish Parliament.\footnote{United Kingdom, *Northern Ireland: Text of a Communique and Declaration issued after a meeting held at 10 Downing Street on 19 August 1969*, Cmd. 4154 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, August, 1969). \url{http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/hmso/bmi190869.htm} (accessed November 28, 2013).} This meant that the British were only interested in a solution that saw all sides discussing an outcome politically and without any side bringing the pressure of violence to bear. The British achieved this, and it was a direct result of British strategy and intent. That a minority has not accepted this does not distract from British success: the minority currently does not have the constituency or capability behind them to threaten the government. Britain therefore achieved its aims in Northern Ireland as a direct result of its policy there, at least for the time being.
CHAPTER 2: THE TRINITARIAN MODEL

In each succeeding war there is a tendency to proclaim as something new the principles under which it is conducted. Not only those who have never studied or experienced the realities of war, but also professional soldiers frequently fall into the error. But the principles of warfare as I learned them at West Point remain unchanged.¹

In the last section of his first chapter of On War, Clausewitz brings together his preceding thoughts to tell us that,

As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity - composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of sub-ordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.

The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government. The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people; the scope which the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and the army; but the political aims are the business of government alone.²

These paragraphs form the core of Clausewitz’s theory of war. From them comes the idea of ‘trinitarian war’, and prolific discussion of what Clausewitz meant by this concept. To apply the notion of ‘trinitarian war’ to contemporary conflicts requires broad interpretation of the concept, as the character of war changes with time. Using such interpretation, this analysis explores the significance of the trinity as a framework in describing war, how to interpret the elements of the trinity and how the trinity applies to


COIN. An interpretation both of what Clausewitz meant, and contrary views, will help to define and defend the model. The trinity is an interesting and significant concept in Clausewitz’s theory. The term has obvious religious symbology, of which Clausewitz was aware, so it is fair to gain an understanding of Clausewitz’s trinity from the concept of true Holy Trinity. The key point is that the three ‘hypostases’—the attributes of God (in the Christian sense) or war (in the Clausewitzian sense)—are all distinct, and all necessary to the higher concept. The consequence of this for the model is twofold. Firstly, any analysis must consider all the elements of the trinity together in order to provide a meaningful notion of ‘war’; and secondly, no single element is sub- or super-ordinate to the others.

The second interesting consequence for Clausewitz’s theory of the concept of a trinity lies in the notion of interaction and non-linearity. The only simple shape that it is possible to draw between nodes where all nodes affect all others is a triangle. Assuming some degree of systemic relationship where a change in one can effect a change in the others, one can see the potential for introducing and magnifying complexity. Any input that changes one node could have an effect on the other two. The other two may change, resulting in the possible creation of a feedback loop that can introduce an inherent instability and state of permanent change in to the system. The inputs, both to the system and within the system, are often unpredictable themselves and can have unpredictable effects. Further, if the nodes within the system are not connected directly, it is possible that inputs or feedback loops may never be identified, leading to a system of unknown complexity.

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4 More nodes can be used and lines drawn between them connecting every node to every other, but the lines no longer form part of the external, and therefore defining, shape. Similarly, a single interconnecting line can be drawn between two nodes, but this then represents a purely linear relationship.
consequences. As Alan Beyerchen, Emeritus Associate Professor of History at The Ohio State University, argues, "Clausewitz's message is not that there are three passive points, but three interactive points of attraction that are simultaneously pulling the object in different directions and forming complex interactions with each other." This notion of interaction is fundamental to the model: the individual and necessary elements that define the total character of a war also affect each other, sometimes in unpredictable ways, and so contribute to defining each other. This also introduces the notion of 'balance' to any model based on Clausewitz's trinity. As Clausewitz himself remarks, "Our task therefore is to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets." Any effective strategy, therefore, will balance the three elements. As Rupert Smith puts it, "[Clausewitz] put forward the triangular relationship, one in which all three sides are equally relevant-and in which all three must be kept in balance if war is to succeed."

Having identified the notion of 'balance' as being fundamental to the model, the conditions under which a trinity might become unbalanced, and what this might mean, must be determined. The three elements of his trinity do not necessarily attach to one state or another, but may describe both or all governments, armies and peoples involved in a single war. However, Clausewitz refers to 'the people...the commander and his army...[and] the government...[emphasis added]' when he seeks to attach the elements of his trinity to physical groups as exemplars. Consequently, the trinity plausibly refers

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to one 'side' in a war, rather than 'the war', and that war itself is a clash of trinities. This is clearly how Smith understands the concept of the trinity when he discusses the role of the media in modern conflict; "[The media] has become the medium that connects the people, government and the army, the three sides of the Clausewitzian triangle. In the simple situation of two states at war the medium in one triangle could be considered as independent of the medium in the other." Though this model does not interpret the elements of Clausewitz's trinity definitively as people, government and army (see below), the notion of war as a clash of trinities is useful. The concept of 'sides' acting on one another naturally fits the intrinsic notion of warfare and is therefore easy to grasp. Furthermore, if a well-balanced trinity is likely to prevail over a poorly-balanced one, then the concept can describe not only how well each individual trinity is balanced, but also what effect each has on the other.

So what are the elements of a trinity? Many interpret them to be the people, the government and the army. Clausewitz appears to support this interpretation when he writes of the three 'dominant tendencies' which make up his trinity that, "the first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government." Theorists such as Lt Gen Rupert Smith, Col Harry Summers and Martin van Creveld take such a view with varying degrees of interpretation. Where almost no interpretation is allowed, for example by van Creveld, then we must accept that we have moved beyond trinitarian warfare, and that

9 Smith, 288.
10 Clausewitz, On War, 101.
11 Smith, 59.
14 Van Creveld, 41-2.
Clausewitz's trinity has no utility as a model in looking at COIN campaigns. To avoid the problems van Creveld presents, we might abstract the concepts of the people, government and army to a degree, as Smith does. However, though the model of the people, government and army is useful when abstracted to allow for non-state conflict, it can tend to a hierarchy in conceptualizing warfare, with the government at the top and people at the base, as Herberg-Rothe points out. Therefore, one must further abstract the elements of Clausewitz's trinity to remove them from specific physical entities. Such an abstraction is possible, and it is in accordance with Clausewitz's desire to create a universal theory, applicable outwith structural constraints necessarily rooted in certain historical paradigms.

Significantly, Clausewitz himself did not directly equate the elements of his trinity to the people, government and army. He rather wrote that “The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government [emphasis added].” He was rather intending to make his ‘dominant tendencies’ of “primordial violence, hatred, and enmity...of the play of chance and probability...and of its element of sub-ordination...” more accessible by attaching them to contemporary physical entities as exemplars. So the question remains: what, then, are the entities that make up Clausewitz’s trinity?

Take the notion of “primordial violence, hatred, and enmity” first. According to Clausewitz there are, “Two different motives [that] make men fight against one another:

15 Smith, 305.
17 Clausewitz, On War, 101
18 Ibid., 101.
Though Clausewitz sees ‘hostile intentions’ as being the universal motive in war, and though he does claim that hostile intentions can exist without hostile feelings, he also clearly connects the motive of ‘hostile intentions’ to a ‘passionate hatred’ in war. They are an integral part of war for Clausewitz. As he explains,

\[
\text{...[I]t would be an obvious fallacy to imagine war between civilised peoples as resulting merely from a rational act on the part of their governments and to conceive of war as gradually ridding itself of passion, so that in the end one would never really need to use the physical impact of the fighting forces-comparative figures of their strength would be enough. That would be a kind of war by algebra.}^{21}
\]

This quote highlights two important aspects of Clausewitz’s ‘tendency’ of ‘primordial violence, hatred and enmity’. The first is that, “If war is an act of force, the emotions cannot fail to be involved”.\(^{22}\) The second is that an enemy’s ‘power of resistance’ is the product of “the total means at his disposal and the strength of his will”.\(^{23}\) Clausewitz appears to view the passions involved in war, the motivation to fight and the will to prevail as connected. Therefore, for the model, the first of the elements of Clausewitz’s trinity is simply ‘will’. In a contemporary context, this is more accurate than referring to ‘the people’, though will can reside in the people. However, one must also consider the will of the politicians and the military, and how all affect each other.

The next of Clausewitz’s ‘tendencies’ is that of, “...the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam...”\(^{24}\) usually identified with the army. As Clausewitz sees war as, “...an act of force to compel our enemy to do our

\(^{19}\) Clausewitz, On War, 84.
\(^{20}\) Ibid., 84.
\(^{21}\) Ibid., 84.
\(^{22}\) Ibid., 85.
\(^{23}\) Ibid., 86.
\(^{24}\) Ibid., 101.
will," we can assume that what differentiates war from other forms of self interested political discourse is the use of violence to contribute to achieving one's ends. However, it is the nature of the violence that is significant in a theoretical study of war, more than the organizations engaged in it. As the exercise of violence is no longer the preserve of the state and her army, as Smith argues, the second element of the trinity is 'force' in the model; in particular, its use in exploiting circumstances and how it affects the other elements of the trinity to bring about a change in the whole. In this sense, 'force' does not mean a military force, but is the conceptual notion of 'violently compelling'. It is the concept one learns about in physics lessons rather than the notion of soldiers, weapons and uniforms. All of that said, our notion of force may well reside exclusively in, and be exercised solely by, the military bodies involved. However, this is not necessarily so, and the distinction between the two notions of force is key to this model.

When Clausewitz writes of war being, "a political instrument", he is expanding on an earlier thought that, "when whole communities go to war-whole peoples, and especially civilized peoples-the reason always lies in some political situation, and the occasion is always due to some political object. War, therefore, is an act of policy." However, he later expands on this, writing that, "War is not merely an act of policy, but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means." This is significant to an understanding of this third element. It highlights the wider meaning Clausewitz gives to government by connecting the political situation that gives rise to war with communities. It also emphasizes that war is not just an act of

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26 Smith, 305.
27 Clausewitz, *On War*, 98.
28 Ibid., 99.
policy, which intuitively removes it from the community, but rather a continuation of political intercourse. This statement implies that war is more about an interaction of communities than a governmental decision. In this respect, the final element of Clausewitz’s trinity refers to the expression of a particular community’s notion of governance. As a collective expression of how a community is ordered, how it views the interests of its constituents and how it interacts with others, this element is ‘governance’ in our model.

So, the model for this thesis relies on Clausewitz’s trinity, though this itself is an interpretation of Clausewitz and his applicability to contemporary COIN. For the model, all elements are essential and equal to the overall concept of the war. There is no hierarchy of elements. Furthermore, all elements affect each other and, as concepts rather than physical entities, can exist across a number of entities depending on the situation. As a theory of the nature of war, the trinity applies to any notion of war by abstracting the elements to the concepts of will, force and governance rather than entities. In addition, any war is a clash of two trinities that will both affect each other in turn throughout the course of the war. If we define war as Clausewitz does as “…an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will”29 it is easy to see how these three elements exist, and affect each other in accordance with the principles of a trinity as described above. More to the point for this thesis, however, this is also true for the definition and analysis of COIN given in the introduction.

29 Clausewitz, On War, 83.
CHAPTER 3: NORTHERN IRELAND – ‘THE TROUBLES’

The condition of affairs suggested by the term ‘the Irish Troubles’ was already some three centuries old when Columbus discovered America.¹

Part One – Creating an insurgency

In 1608, the British began to pursue a policy of ‘plantation’ to quell resistance to British rule in the Northern Irish province of Ulster. English and Scottish settlers, Protestant by religion, arrived to settle land that had been confiscated from the native, Catholic, Irish. By 1703, the Catholic Irish owned less than five per cent of the land of Ulster.² By the 1971 census of Northern Ireland, 1,519,640 people lived in the 5,461 square miles of the six counties that had remained in the Union with the United Kingdom after the partition of Ireland in 1921. The census recorded that 362,082 of these lived in Belfast, and 52,205 lived in Londonderry. Of the total population, 477,921 were identified as Catholic, and 811,270 were identified as Presbyterian, Church of Ireland or Methodist.³ Between partition in 1921 and the imposition of direct rule in 1971, this Protestant majority ran Northern Ireland in its favor with unremitting partiality.⁴


⁴ Bell, 6.
The violence that killed ten and injured 899 in Northern Ireland in July and August 1969 should not have come as a surprise in either Stormont or Whitehall. The British Army’s report on Operation Banner, published in 2006, records that,

By the early 1960s discrimination had become institutionalized. In 1969 Londonderry was the most deprived city in the United Kingdom. 33,000 of the 36,000 Catholics were crowded in to the Victorian slums of the Creggan and the Bogside. Unemployment in Londonderry was the highest in the UK. By the late 1960s poverty and social depravation in the catholic enclaves of Londonderry and Belfast was appalling. This deprivation and discrimination was well known in Stormont.

The roots of an insurgency lay in this situation. In Clausewitzian terms, the deprevation and inequality suffered by the Catholics was starting to create a ‘wondrous trinity’ to oppose that of the Northern Irish state. By the 1960s, popular will against the (overwhelmingly Protestant) establishment had found real coherence. The ‘otherization’ of the Catholic by the Protestant community gave the Catholics shape and coherence. The Catholic community had real definition as another ‘people’ in Northern Ireland in the

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6 Alan Sked and Chris Cook, *Post-War Britain: A Political History* (Brighton: The Harvester Press, 1979), 307-308. Sked and Cook explain governance in Northern Ireland at the time, “Northern Ireland was governed under the scheme of devolution embodie[d] in the Government of Ireland Act, 1920. This created the Northern Ireland Parliament (generally known as Stormont, after its eventual location).”

7 An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland, 2-2.

8 Different authors use different terms to describe the communities in Northern Ireland. It is hard to be entirely accurate with a general descriptor, but equally any descriptor can quickly become nonsensical if it tries to be accurate in all situations. Though the Catholics and Republicans often overlap as groups, there is a distinction that means the two cannot be used interchangeably. The same is true for Unionists and Protestants. In an attempt to be as accurate as possible, ‘Catholic’ or ‘Protestant’ as terms are used here to describe the constituencies, whereas ‘Republican’ or ‘Unionist’ are used to describe the dominant political manifestations of the communities.

9 B. Kumaravadivelu, *Cultural Globalization and Language Education* (Yale: Yale University Press, 2008), 16, describes otherization as, “...a crudely reductive process that ascribes an imagined superior identity to the Self and an imagined inferior identity to the other. There is a general tendency among individuals and communities to portray themselves as having an identity that is desireable and developed while presenting the identity of people who are racially, ethnically, or linguistically different as undesireable and deficient. Most often a significant power differential is involved in the process of otherization, particularly cultural otherization.
1960s because the Protestant community so effectively excluded it from the governance of Northern Ireland.

The Catholic grievances in Northern Ireland in late 1969 that helped define the community also gave it a political shape. As a community, the Catholics were seeking a degree of self-governance, a political voice that Stormont was actively denying them.

Tim Pat Coogan records that,

The population of Derry was roughly two-thirds Catholic and one third Protestant, and the Catholic population kept growing. Nevertheless, the population increase did not mean that the Catholics could ever overtake the Protestants. Successive gerrymanders repeatedly redrew the electoral boundaries, so that the unionist one-third was able to control the city. The results were that Catholics could not get municipal jobs or houses. Unemployment was rife. . . .

Consequently, Stormont was also creating an opposing notion of governance as well as will. Its focus on representing the Protestant community at the cost of the Catholic community inevitably created political as well as social cohesion in the Catholic community. This cohesion was not around one issue, but across a range of fundamental issues that were firmly the responsibility of the government. Opposition was therefore to governance, not just isolated policies or issues. In the late 1960s, this idea of different governance most popularly found voice in the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA), founded in 1967. However, Sinn Fein also had a voice and a continuing desire to change the situation by forcing the British out of Ulster.

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10 Coogan, 29.
12 Founded in 1905, Sinn Fein is the Northern Irish Republican political party seeking to end British rule in Northern Ireland.
The NICRA, and its more radical and student based group, People’s Democracy,\textsuperscript{13} stirred deep insecurities in the Unionist community.\textsuperscript{14} This insecurity was as fundamental as the Catholic’s disenfranchisement. Northern Ireland’s first Prime Minister, James Craig, said in 1934, “All I boast is that we are a Protestant Parliament and a Protestant State.”\textsuperscript{15} Following Home Rule, the Civil War in the Irish Free State and economic stagnation in the South,\textsuperscript{16} the Unionists perceived the political control they exerted over the Catholics in the North as a cultural defense.

The significance of this to the Clausewitzian model lies not simply in the attitude of the people themselves, but in the way in which it affected the balance between the other elements of the trinity. Stormont represented, almost exclusively, the Protestant population. The consequence of this was that Stormont was both unwilling and politically unable to respond effectively to Catholic demands. Had Stormont offered significant concessions to the Catholics in the late 1960s, there was every risk that a separate Protestant trinity would have broken off. Though the Protestant community was able to govern itself largely as it wanted through Stormont, the genesis of shadow paramilitary structures existed in Protestant organizations such as the Ulster Volunteer Force.\textsuperscript{17} The relationship between the Protestant population, Stormont and the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) compounded this situation. It was largely RUC partiality that kept wider Protestant militarism at bay. As the 1969 Protestant marching season started,

\textsuperscript{13} Christine Kinealy, \textit{War and Peace: Ireland since the 1960s} (London: Reaktion Books, 2010), 41.
\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Disturbances in Northern Ireland}, Ch 16, para. 229(a)(7).
\textsuperscript{16} \textit{An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland}, 2-2.
\textsuperscript{17} Kinealy, 44.
Christine Kinealy records that, "The violence seemed to be getting out of control, and again the RUC were at the forefront of the attacks on Catholics. Consequently, had Stormont responded effectively to Catholic needs at the expense of Protestant insecurity, either Stormont alone or they and the RUC would have lost their legitimacy in the eyes of the population. In either respect, there would have been a fracturing of the existing Protestant trinity and the likely creation of a new and more militant Protestant trinity.

The 1969 Protestant marching season exacerbated the frictions between the Protestant and Catholic communities. The new Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, James Chichester-Clark, banned civil rights marches, but continued to protect Protestant marches through highly sensitive areas. On 12 August 1969 the RUC used tear gas against Catholic protestors in Londonderry for the first time, starting a two day battle that became known as 'The Battle of the Bogside.' These riots were triggered by a Protestant Apprentice Boys' march in the area. As the violence escalated and the RUC lost control of the situation, the British Government deployed 80 soldiers from the First Battalion, the Prince of Wales's Own Regiment of Yorkshire on 14 August 1969.

Though the Catholic community initially welcomed the arrival of the soldiers, their presence soon made the violence worse. In the late 1960s, Whitehall did not understand Northern Ireland well. In 1922, a ruling by the Speaker prohibited Members of Parliament from raising Northern Ireland matters in the House of Commons, and when James Callaghan took over at the Home Office in 1967, as the problems were developing,

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18 Kinealy, 46.
19 Ibid., 46-47.
there was not one word in his dispatch box about the issue.\(^{21}\) The political aim for the deployed troops was to quash the violence in short order and return home, not to support political change in Northern Ireland as the Catholics hoped.\(^{22}\) With no change in either the political view from Stormont or the social view among the Protestants of the problem, what it effectively achieved was a huge imbalance in the Protestant trinity towards ‘the fight’, which prompted a response in the Catholic trinity.

By the end of 1969, a split in the republican movement, largely over abstentionism\(^{23}\), became public. Out of it came the Official Republican movement and the Provisionals. The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) sought to force the British Government to impose Direct Rule, which they believed was a crucial step towards a united Ireland.\(^{24}\) They also anticipated a breakdown in the cordial relationship between the Catholic community and the British Army, and renewed attacks by the Protestants.\(^{25}\) In preparation, they developed a military capability\(^{26}\) and increased their support base in Belfast and Londonderry.\(^{27}\)

Stormont’s introduction of government force into the equation, first through the RUC and then through the British Army, created legitimacy in the opposing community for a violent response. While Stormont was using formal organizations to conduct its fight, there was justification in the Catholic community to place the protection of the community in the hands of a similarly controlled organization. The split between the

\(^{21}\) Coogan, 34.
\(^{22}\) Sanders and Wood, 3.

\(^{23}\) Coogan, 95, describes how the policy of abstention meant that Sinn Fein representatives would not take up their seats in the Irish Dail, Stormont or Westminster if elected.

\(^{24}\) Kinealy, 65.
\(^{25}\) Ibid., p65

\(^{26}\) Sanders and Wood, 6.
\(^{27}\) Kinealy, 65
Official Republican movement and the PIRA partially facilitated this response. As powerful elements of these organizations separated themselves increasingly from the existing structures of governance, the need for a symmetrical force emerged at the same time as the ability to create one.

As the violence surged in the summer of 1970, the Army responded in an increasingly heavy-handed way. Christine Kinealy describes one operation (known as 'the Balkan Street Search')\(^{28}\) as the turning point in the relationship between the British Army, nationalists and republicans,

At the beginning of July [1970] a curfew was imposed on the Falls Road area of Belfast, so that the houses could be searched for weapons and members of the IRA. The curfew lasted 36 hours, during which three Catholics were killed by the army. A Polish photographer was also shot and killed when taking pictures of the British Army. The curfew was only brought to an end when 3,000 Catholic women, on hearing reports of families not having enough to eat, marched on the lower Falls to bring them food. Apart from the attacks on people, many homes had been destroyed gratuitously during the curfew period. Three hundred 'republicans' had been arrested.\(^{29}\)

By that stage in the conflict, it was clear that two separate trinities had developed, one Unionist, clothed in the paraphernalia of state, and one Republican, revolutionary in nature. The British Army felt it was fighting a classic insurgency in Northern Ireland from the early 1970s,\(^{30}\) the time at which this opposing trinity emerged and solidified. The British would need to re-balance the British trinity to de-legitimize and diminish this opposing trinity, and reabsorb it back into the legitimate state.

\(^{28}\) *An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland*, 2-5.

\(^{29}\) Kinealy, 63.

\(^{30}\) *An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland*, 1-3.
Part Two – It Got Worse Before it Got Better

Change did not come in time to forestall the growing insurgency. On 9 August 1971, the British Government reintroduced Internment in Northern Ireland under the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland), 1922, or ‘Special Powers Act’. In the early hours of 9 August 1971, the Army launched Operation Demetrius, arresting 342 suspects. Internment proved to be both a blunt and partisan tool. Operation Demetrius relied on a list of 450 names provided by the RUC Special Branch. However, the intelligence was outdated and of the 342 arrested, the security forces released 118 within 48 hours. Furthermore, the security forces interned no Protestants until February 1973. In fact, by the end of internment in 1975, of the 1,981 people interned, only 107 had been Protestant or Unionist.

The effects on the Catholic population were instant and deep. From the 9 to 12 August, 21 people were killed across the Province, 17 by the British Army. One was a priest, Father Hugh Mullen, who was going to the aid of a wounded man. He was one of twelve people killed in Belfast that day. Two thousand Protestants moved out of the largely Catholic Ardoyne area of Belfast, having set fire to their homes. Around 3,000 Catholics fled Belfast and Londonderry to the Republic and there was a marked increase in bombings in the Province. In his quantitative analysis of violence in Northern Ireland, Dominic Beggan asserts that,

32 Kinealy, 77.
34 Kinealy, 76.
... [I]nternment acted as a triggering effect increasing the level of violence due to the heightened feeling of alienation and injustice... the triggering effect of internment increased the ranks of the paramilitaries while at the same time causing polarization towards extremism.\textsuperscript{35}

The impact of internment on the Catholic community was devastating to the British government. As Beggan points out, it acted as a powerful recruiting sergeant in the community for the PIRA. It also forced the community, through the politicized groups that existed, to start thinking about how to achieve governance outwith the legitimate state. By embracing violence against the existing state as a way of achieving political independence, the PIRA and Sinn Fein offered a potential roadmap. The Unionist trinity was forcing the Republican trinity to balance against it: by making no realistic political concessions, but at the same time placing more emphasis on state violence, the Republican trinity was being pushed to balance itself by solidifying its own structures and relationships in opposition.

It was in this environment that NICRA organized a march in Londonderry on 30 January 1972. In contravention of a government ban on marching, some 10,000 people marched in Londonderry that day. NICRA's aim was peaceful, "...to reclaim the political high ground and transform the violence of 1971 back into peaceful protests."\textsuperscript{36} However, by the end of the day, the British Army had shot dead thirteen people and mortally wounded another.\textsuperscript{37}

The immediate effect was an escalation of violence in Northern Ireland, on the British mainland and in the Republic where a mob torched the British Embassy. As the Republicans and Unionists became increasingly polarized, and the British Government

\textsuperscript{36} Kinealy, 81.
\textsuperscript{37} Coogan, 134.
began to realize that Stormont was not able to govern, Prime Minister Ted Heath decided to step in and impose Direct Rule. The government made the announcement on 24 March 1972.

Part Three – Balancing the Trinity to Shape for Success

Direct Rule was potentially the move that could start to re-align the two opposing trinities that had developed in Northern Ireland. By opening up the possibility that central government could represent the entire population of Northern Ireland, it stood a chance of encompassing the political aspirations of both communities. As a first step, it was bold, resting on the belief that a better political situation could drive improved security. The creation of a single, non-partisan political space would, the British hoped, reduce some of the ‘hatred and enmity’ felt in the Republican community by depriving it of its object, Stormont. With a non-partisan political space, the Catholics could achieve many of the political ends denied them by Stormont. However, to achieve these ends they would have to accept the requirement for legitimacy and moderate the activity of the Republican militia they effectively sponsored. At the same time, this more restrained process would encourage the Protestant community to moderate their own militias. This, in turn, would then help to de-legitimize the PIRA as protectors of the Catholic community.

Initially, Direct Rule appeared to deliver. The PIRA sought a dialogue with the British Government and the British Government accepted. At a press conference on 13 June 1972,\(^38\) Sean MacStiofan, the PIRA Chief of Staff, offered ‘safe conduct’ to William Whitelaw, the first Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, to enter Free Derry to discuss

http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p00w5n29 (accessed October 3, 2013).
peace terms. Keen to find a way forward, the British Government offered key concessions to the IRA. The first was an acceptance of political status for PIRA prisoners and the second was the release of Gerry Adams, a prominent Sinn Fein member, to take part in the negotiations. With these concessions, the PIRA declared a truce from midnight on 26 June 1972, and six PIRA members met with Whitelaw in London on 7 July 1972.

The meeting did not achieve the immediate aims of either the PIRA delegation or the British Government. As well as an end to internment and British Army operations in general, the PIRA sought an immediate declaration from the British that they would leave Northern Ireland by 1 January 1975. The British were prepared to, “...concede reform within the system and to work sincerely for it, but the Government of Ireland Act was the keystone of the arch.”

Though possibly politically naïve, one can clarify the PIRA’s position in reference to the Republican trinity. The PIRA was the predominant Republican military force, but Sinn Fein competed for political primacy with other republican parties, and its community base existed only for as long as it could offer something to the community. Buoyed by what it saw as its success in achieving Direct Rule, and with a frame of reference that indicated the British would not commit to fighting to win a colonial counterinsurgency campaign, the PIRA made demands they realistically felt could deliver both political dominance and value to the community. Success would give them political

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39 Coogan, 146.
40 Ibid., 146.
41 Ibid., 146-147.
42 The Government of Ireland Act 1920 partitioned Ireland under two separate home-rule parliaments, those of Southern Ireland and Northern Ireland. In this respect, the British saw reform as possible, but within the system of a Northern Ireland continuing under home rule from Westminster.
43 Ibid., 149.
pre-eminence and unite a beleaguered community behind them. Failure would inevitably lead back to escalation, but it would at least allow them to retain a degree of pre-eminence; they would remain valued by a community under threat and could claim to offer the only feasible political exit strategy to end the violence. The PIRA was absolutely balancing ‘primordial violence, hatred and enmity; ... the play of chance and probability... and an element of subordination’ to achieve its ends.

Consequently, the strategy could only go one way for the PIRA after the meeting in London. Following the collapse of the ceasefire, the PIRA detonated twenty-two bombs in Belfast city center in the space of seventy-five minutes on 21 July 1972. On ‘Bloody Friday’ the PIRA killed nine people and injured 130.45

The British response to ‘Bloody Friday’ was Operation Motorman, an Army operation to clear the ‘no-go’ areas that existed in Belfast and Londonderry at the time. They saw that the ‘no-go’ areas were central to the PIRA’s strategy. As Michael Rainsborough (writing as M. L. R Smith) and Peter Neumann, of King’s College, London, put it,

Using their footholds in the no-go areas the IRA ‘shifted to an offensive campaign of resistance in all parts of the occupied area’ in October 1970. In 1971 the level of violence rose gradually, with 1756 and 1515 shooting and bombing incidents respectively, resulting in 174 deaths. The scale of the violence escalated dramatically the following year with 10,628 shootings and 1853 bombings. The death toll for 1972 was 467 dead, 208 of whom were the result of known Provisional IRA actions.46

‘Bloody Friday’ stretched the PIRA’s legitimacy too far. On the back of increasing violence, the implication of such a concentration of terror attacks on the

45 Coogan, 151.
doorsteps of those who would have to bear the consequences of the future conflict was too much. As the BBC records on its 'Search for Peace' website about the Northern Ireland Troubles,

The horrific and terrifying nature of the attack led many nationalists to conclude that even if they had previously understood-and perhaps accepted-the emergence of a defensive organisation, the Provisional IRA had passed far beyond what could ever be deemed as a justifiable action in the name of the Catholic community. 47

With 'Bloody Friday', the IRA lost support and legitimacy in the Catholic community and fractured the essential connection between force, governance and will. The Republicans’ trinity became unbalanced against that of the British. The Republican will was rooted in the Catholic community’s desire for equality and self-protection. Catholic community will influenced and supported the governance they sought to assert and the force they endorsed. The governance and force the Catholic community endorsed most closely found physical representation in the PIRA. However, the PIRA’s use of force to achieve the Republican aim of secession from the Union shifted the governance and force elements of the Republican trinity away from the will of the Catholic community, losing the PIRA legitimacy.

The British seized on this sudden loss of PIRA legitimacy. As Smith and Neumann explain,

At Cabinet level, there was an immediate realization that the event had the potential to fundamentally change the political and military parameters within which the strategy operated. Whilst noting that Bloody Friday had provoked Protestant anger on an unprecedented scale, Whitelaw was keen to stress that the bombings had aroused feelings of extreme revulsion... in the Roman Catholic community also. 48

47 BBC, "Bloody Friday," The Search For Peace, 2005.

48 Smith and Neumann, 425.
The change in fortune for the British was significant. Prior to 'Bloody Friday' the British faced a dilemma: as long as the ‘no-go’ areas existed, there could be no hope of a political settlement in Northern Ireland. However, the British government would probably lose legitimacy in the eyes of the Catholic community if they tried to retake them in the face of inevitable PIRA and community resistance. 'Bloody Friday' solved this dilemma for the British government by allowing it to increase its own use of force to meet the force used by the PIRA, and to do so in support of the will of the Catholic community.

At 4 a.m. on 31 July 1972, the British Army established an outer cordon around Londonderry and Belfast. Soldiers then moved in to clear the Bogside and Creggan estates in Londonderry and the Andersonstown and Ballymurphy estates in Belfast. All areas were secure by 7 a.m. A massive troop reinforcement enabled the operation: over 30,000 armed service personnel had taken part in total, making Operation Motorman one of the largest British military deployments since the Second World War, and the largest troop concentration in Ireland in the twentieth century.

Though the operation was military, its aim was political. The British did not undertake Operation Motorman to destroy the PIRA, but instead to facilitate constitutional talks. There was, therefore, no attempt at surprise. The Government issued public warnings prior to the operation, and the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) called Catholic priests to pass on information about the extent of the deployment. In this way, force was not being used ‘on force’, but rather as a way of balancing the British

50 Smith and Neumann, 414.
51 Ibid., 425.
trinity against an unbalanced Republican trinity. The Operation supported the will of the Catholic community by creating a political environment in which both they and the Protestant community could engage without the prospect of imminent civil war. It also had a direct security effect. As the PIRA pushed its own agenda, it became increasingly apparent how far that agenda was from that of the wider Catholic community. This weakened the will of the Catholic community to support them, which allowed the British to seize the advantage. The PIRA lost its military freedom of action with the ‘no-go’ areas, which forced it down a road the British strategy could cope with politically and militarily.

Operation Motorman was not the end of the insurgency in Northern Ireland, but it was a turning point in the campaign. In 1972, there were 10,63152 shooting incidents in Northern Ireland, 2,71853 of them in July alone. In 1973, the number had nearly halved to 5,019 and in the 29 years between 1974 and 2003 the annual number only rose above a thousand incidents a year five times.54 The PIRA had to change tactics from an insurgent to a terrorist campaign. With this campaign, the PIRA sought to defeat the will of the British by targeting British troops and, when they could, mainland targets. However, what they perhaps underestimated was that the will of the British to remain in Northern Ireland did not lie with the British people. With a cross-party political consensus on strategy in Northern Ireland, a history that had long placed a premium on Irish affairs over the rest of the Empire and a Northern Irish population that wanted to remain in the

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54 Melaugh, McKenna, and Lynn.
Union, the mainland population brought little will to bear on the government. In 1988, a survey found that 57% of the mainland population favored withdrawal from Northern Ireland. However this show of will from the mainland population to withdraw only formed a small part of the overall British will, which was to remain engaged with the problem. This meant that the Republican trinity had much diminished force that the PIRA largely wasted when it used it on the mainland or against British soldiers.

As Smith and Neumann claim in their analysis of Operation Motorman, "... it would be simplistic to attribute all the subsequent events in Northern Ireland to the effects of this operation." However, they also cite Operation Motorman as a turning point in Northern Ireland. Their analysis explains that the PIRA did not comprehend the informal boundaries within which the British Government was prepared to tolerate their violent activities before August 1972. However, Operation Motorman imposed boundaries on violence and, in doing so, led to "the establishment of the overall strategic setting that informed the backdrop which ultimately led to the Belfast Agreement."

What brought the parties to this point was the skillful management of the British trinity by British politicians. Over time they developed a degree of understanding of the problem that allowed them to build a successful strategy. This began with the reform of governance in the Province to create a fairer system for Catholics and Protestants alike. At the same time, the politicians asserted legitimacy and protected the population as a whole, rather than attempting to defeat a nebulous organization. They supported these actions by using force in a very deliberate and controlled way. Both of these actions

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55 An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland, 2-11.
56 Ibid., 8-13.
57 Smith and Neumann, 431.
58 Ibid., 431.
served to undermine the governance and will of the PIRA's trinity and helped to generate will in the British trinity. At the same time, the British managed the problem in such a way as to ensure that British domestic opinion, though it was not in support of a British presence in Northern Ireland, was not strong enough to interfere with British commitment to solving the problem. Finally, the British dealt with the problem using all of the elements of national power, coordinated through the NIO by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.
CHAPTER 4: IRAQ – SECOND TIME AROUND

One of the best touchstones of the success of the colonial state in winning the hearts and minds of the civil population was their ability to achieve security sector reform. Not only would locally raised troops, policemen and home guards reduce the need to deploy British soldiers, but they would also associate the civil population with the counter-insurgency effort in ways that really mattered.¹

Part One – Creating an Insurgency

The violence that foreshadowed the insurgency in Basra was, like in Northern Ireland, not insurgent violence but civil unrest. In the period following the invasion of Iraq in 2003 by Coalition forces, Basra was without meaningful security. In a report published on 3 June 2003, Human Rights Watch found,

...[T]hat more than six weeks after the fall of Basra, the security situation remained poorly addressed by coalition forces. Despite efforts by the British military to deploy their relatively small number of troops to improve security conditions in the city, the population continued to live in fear of violent crimes and with growing concerns about the failure of the coalition forces to provide them with greater security.²

According to the Human Rights Watch report, British reaction to crime seemed to be either startlingly disproportionate, or entirely absent. Looting, perhaps inevitably, was widespread after the invasion. What was not inevitable, or perhaps expected, was the British response to it. The same report cited numerous examples of the British standing and watching as businesses, hospitals and government buildings were ransacked by both organized gangs and opportunistic individuals. One example in the report describes how “Basra University was looted and gutted in plain view of British troops during the first


few days after British forces entered the City.” However, when weapons were involved, the British did intervene if they were nearby. The Human Rights Watch report describes one such case,

An extended gunfight on 8 April between two groups of looters fighting over access to the banks promoted a rapid British response. In the ensuing firefight, several looters were killed; the bodies of four looters shot and killed while attempting to escape in a Toyota remained in an intersection for several days thereafter. Apparently, even this grim reminder did not deter looters from continuing their work—armed only with clubs and knives.4

Unsurprisingly, the report found that “The extent of the looting in the first week, and British failure to respond to it, convinced many residents of Basra that their security was not a priority for British forces.”5

Of greater concern was perhaps the finding in the same report that, “As conditions gradually calmed down, the ongoing lack of a strong British presence on the streets and the complete absence of any police force further cemented this conviction.”6 A brief increase in crime was perhaps inevitable after the invasion. However, six weeks later, Human Rights Watch described Basra as “[continuing] to suffer from a lack of security and a serious crime wave.”7 The British also appreciated the deteriorating situation in which they found themselves. In 2009, the Iraq Inquiry asked Maj Gen Lamb, the British Military Commander in Basra in 2003, what the causes of the deterioration were in 2003. He told them,

The first was obviously that we were not delivering what I think by way of an expectation — you might say it was a ridiculous expectation, but an expectation in their eyes nonetheless — that we were failing to

3 Iraq: Basra: Crime and Insecurity under British Occupation.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
deliver. And that was principally on the essential services, so water, power... At the same time you had people in fact using the opportunity or to challenge us and to change the dynamics, and that was from a range of criminal — and one should not underestimate that, you know, in chaos the criminal and corrupt fraternity do rather well. 8

The British soon faced the reality of the situation. On 9 August 2003, riots broke out in Basra over a lack of fuel. In 50°C heat, power cuts meant that fuel stations could not pump fuel to power air conditioning and refrigerators. As the BBC correspondent in Baghdad at the time, Jonathan Head, commented, “...the mood in Basra remains ugly. Patience is wearing thin, the promised reconstruction in Iraq desperately slow.” 9

In trinitarian terms, the situation in Basra in the summer of 2003 was similar to that in Northern Ireland in 1969. A will was building in opposition to that of the established governance. The newly established governance was not meeting the most basic needs of a large and cohesive population group. This alone could generate the will behind an insurgency, but the imbalance in the British trinity perhaps made it inevitable. From the perspective of the Basrawis, the Coalition trinity in the South was unbalanced and weak. The will of the Coalition trinity from the summer of 2003 became primarily dependent on the population of the UK. However, polling in the UK indicated that following a high as the Coalition invaded Iraq, support for the Iraq war dropped off markedly over the summer and in to autumn. 10 UK national will was beginning to wane.


Furthermore, the ability of the British to use force was palpably weak. Commitments elsewhere limited the British military capability that could be used for stabilization operations in Basra even before the invasion had taken place. In a letter from the British Foreign and Defence Secretaries to the Prime Minister on 19 March 2003, they wrote, “It will be necessary to draw down our commitment to nearer a third [to around 15000 troops] by no later than autumn in order to avoid long term damage to the Armed Forces.”\(^{11}\) In addition, the announcement on May 23, 2003 that the Coalition was to disband the Iraqi Army,\(^{12}\) and the natural dispersal of Iraqi Army elements after the invasion\(^{13}\) meant that there would be no credible indigenous force to represent any new government in the short term. In the words of Thomas L Friedman, “The first rule of any Iraq invasion is the pottery store rule: You break it, you own it. We break Iraq, we own Iraq.”\(^{14}\) In other words, the British Government and the Coalition were making policy decisions that would take security out of the hands of the Iraqis at the same time as the British ability to provide security declined.

There may have been some hope for Basra if the population could have been engaged in the new Iraq politically and given hope that they themselves could resolve their own problems, but this did not happen either. Basrawis felt that they had little political representation. Having been promised democracy, the Iraqis found themselves


protesting against the British for appointing a city council of technocrats. As one of the sheiks leading the protests, Ahmed al-Maliki, reportedly said in an interview on the day of the protests, “The British shouldn’t choose our leaders. . . . The people should. We’re looking for a democratic government, but one based on Islam.” The disparate ways in which the Coalition was creating local governments across the South perhaps compounded this issue. The uneven distribution of power helped to fuel resentment of the British in Basra. At the same time, de-Ba’athification and the lack of a functioning Iraqi Civil Service or functioning Coalition Civil Service in its place meant that there was no mechanism for governance that the population could relate to, regardless of who held the power. The immediate consequence of such a weak Coalition trinity and developing opposition trinity was a descent to chaos.

Part Two - The Growth of the Insurgency

The chaos in Iraq was fertile ground for emerging leaders such as Muqtada al-Sadr. Sadr was the son of Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, a revered cleric and victim of Saddam’s Regime. After years of oppression, the Shia community finally felt their time had come. With power inherited from his father, Sadr began to establish himself as a significant Shia leader as the Ba’athist government fell to the Coalition invasion.

16 Ibid.
17 Blair, 470.
Sadr's initial actions were to call for resistance to the Coalition and to create the 'Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM)', a militia under his control. Though ostensibly formed to protect Shi'ite religious shrines, JAM added the capacity to Sadr's organization for armed violence. Though JAM did clash with Coalition forces in Baghdad in 2003, there was a period of quiet between October 2003 and March 2004. However, on 12 March 2004, JAM razed a gypsy village, Qawliya, near Diwaniyah in Southern Iraq. Sadr had effectively used the period up to March 2004 to improve his military capability. As the Washington Institute reported,

Sadr used the period of quiet between October 2003 and the present to expand his capabilities. His Mahdi Army, which consists of some six to ten thousand militants, now seems better organized, better armed, and more capable. These improvements were highlighted on March 12 of this year, when Sadr's forces conducted a well-prepared and coordinated strike on the gypsy village of Qawliya, attacking it with mortars and infantry, occupying and razing it, and dispersing its population. Sadr also expanded the nonmilitant portions of his faction, establishing new offices, religious courts, and prisons in southern Iraq.

The attack on Qawliya was a significant indicator of Sadr's bid for leadership of the Shia. The apparent motivation was not military or criminal, it was political.

According to 'The Telegraph' newspaper, the JAM Commander who ordered the raid said,

I sent a group of my men to Qawliya because a young girl had been abducted by pimps and we wanted to rescue her. But they were fired at by the villagers and one was martyred. So we went back later in larger numbers and with local tribesmen to confront them... In Diwaniya, the

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21 White and Phillips, 22.
22 Ibid., 23.
Mahdi Army is restoring peace and order. We have sharia courts, they are run by judges sent from Najaf and we impose 80 lashes for stealing and drinking alcohol. The punishments are carried out by court police.\(^{24}\)

Sadr was responding to the will of the Shia community by creating elements of force and governance that could and would challenge those of the Coalition for the Shia constituency. In short, the opposing Sadrist trinity had coalesced under the noses of the Coalition.

The attack on Qawliya was a clear challenge to Coalition authority. The Coalition responded by closing one of Sadr’s newspapers, al-Hawza, on 28 March 2004 and arresting one of Sadr’s lieutenants, Mustapha al-Yacoubi, on 3 April 2004 in Najaf. The Sadrist response to the arrest of al-Yacoubi in particular was large and coordinated across a wide area.\(^{25}\) Jeffrey White, a defense fellow at the Washington Institute, and Ryan Phillips, a research assistant at the Washington Institute, report that,

A combination of Mahdi Army assaults on Coalition posts, Iraqi government offices and police stations, violent demonstrations and attacks on lines of communication placed the Coalition position in the south at risk... Al-Sadr’s supporters rapidly seized control of Kufa, Kut, portions of Najaf and Karbala, and contested control of key points in Nasiriyah, Hilla, Al-Amarah, Diwaniyah, Basra and other locations.\(^{26}\)

White and Phillips also cite evidence of “advance preparation” and claim that, “...a substantial proportion of Iraqi security forces in the south were either actively or passively supporting al-Sadr...”\(^{27}\) The implications of this are clear: not only was Sadr making a clear political challenge to the Coalition, but he was doing so with capable force behind him and in so doing provided an option around which the will of the Shia

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\(^{25}\) White and Phillips, 23

\(^{26}\) Ibid., 23.

\(^{27}\) Ibid., 23.
could form. Sadr used Hizballah’s social welfare model further to strengthen this will.

Through this, Sadr appealed directly to the Shia poor, his principal aims being to

“provide security and stability in Shia neighborhoods; help to maintain law and order in
the absence of effective law enforcement institutions; educate youth in spiritual values
and drill them in basic military skills; promote and enforce Islamic values; promote basic
services in the urban community; and to aid displaced Shia families escaping from mixed
neighborhoods.”

On the 6 April 2004, violence in Basra exploded, taking the British by surprise.

As Maj Gen Andrew Stewart, Commander of Multi-National Division South East
(MND(SE)) at the time, recounted at the Iraq Inquiry,

Maj Gen Andrew Stewart: . . . I woke up on the morning of the 6
April and I moved from probably third gear to way over six. . . . [T]his
was a completely different day and it was like a switch had been flicked.
We woke up on the 6th there were 35 shooting incidents and attacks in
Basra before 7.30 in the morning. Nasiriyah had been taken over by the
Mahdi army, they had taken all the bridges, they had control of the city.
In Al Amarah, there were running battles going on with the security
forces.

Sir Lawrence Freedman: Did you have any indication that this
was being done?

Maj Gen Andrew Stewart: None whatsoever. We had not had
any indication at all.

The degree to which this came as a surprise to the British in itself indicates a lack
of understanding of the situation the British found themselves in. JAM had emerged to
challenge the Coalition some 3 weeks earlier. With strong legitimacy in the south, and
particularly Basra with its hugely disaffected Shia community, JAM was always likely to


29 Maj. Gen. Andrew Stewart, Oral Evidence to the Iraq Inquiry, December 9, 2009, Transcript of
Sir Hilary Synnott, Lt Gen Lamb & Maj Gen Andrew Stewart hearing, The Iraq Inquiry, 68.
29, 2013).
assert itself against the Coalition where it felt strong. In this case, its strength came largely from the weakness of the British trinity in Basra. The British understood that they were failing to meet the expectations of the Shia in Basra, but they do not appear to have identified the emergence of an opposing trinity and translated this into an understanding of the possible consequences they faced as a result. Maj Gen Stewart referred to the situation in Basra turning “into an insurgency overnight.” This is perhaps dismissive of the context, largely created by the Coalition, that had allowed the insurgency to develop after the invasion a year earlier.

Part Three - An Embedded Insurgency

Despite early and widespread gains, Sadr’s direct confrontation with the Coalition could not last. The Coalition contained the uprising both with direct military action and an appeal to the wider Shia population and leaders, and Sadr’s appeal was not broad enough to generate the Shi’ite uprising he had desired. This second point is revealing about the nature of the insurgency.

Shia support was split along religious, tribal and political lines. However, no single grouping seemed to be able to gain an upper hand. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the senior Shia Marja in Iraq, held great influence over the Shia population and some political authority, but with no force he could not afford to challenge outright the control that the militias could bring to bear. The two main militias, JAM and the Badr Brigades, had their constituencies, but neither could challenge the Coalition directly. Local

31 Ibid., 69.
32 White and Phillips, 23.
political control was fractured between organizations and individuals more intent on monetary gain than serving the population.

Following the containment of the Shia uprising by the Coalition, and Sadr’s realization that no Shia entity had the ability to confront the Coalition directly and represent the Iraqi Shi’ite community, Sadr became more circumspect in his methods. Instead of seeking to challenge Coalition forces directly, he shifted to targeting them indirectly, both literally and metaphorically.

According to the BBC, IED explosions in Basra and rocket attacks on Basra airport where the British HQ was located dropped slightly from 127 in 2004 to 90 in 2005, before soaring to 244 in 2006 and 696 in 2007. On 30 May 2006, Iraq’s President Maliki declared a State of Emergency in Basra. The tactics used against the British represented those of the militarily weak against the militarily strong. If, as Maj Gen Stewart claimed, the insurgency had been born in the spring of 2004, then the more asymmetric tactics used by JAM in 2006 and 2007 were its coming of age. Sadr appeared to be showing a better understanding of the situation than the British through the campaign he was waging.

Popular support in the UK for British involvement in Iraq was low, and continued to diminish after the kidnapping of two British soldiers in Basra on 19 September 2005. Though he may not have explicitly recognized it, Sadr exploited the fact that the British will to prevail in Basra was directly linked to British public opinion at home. Success in

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34 Ibid.  
Basra might have positively influenced public opinion at home, but success depended on political influence and military investment. The British were unable to bring either of these elements of its own trinity to bear to diminish the strengths of Sadr's trinity. At the same time, Sadr was using the lack of security in Basra to consolidate his own trinity. JAM controlled the Serious Crimes Unit in the Basra police that, as a 'Death Squad', was methodically killing its way through its opponents in Basra. There was also an increase in violence against Sunni Basrawis, effectively forcing them out of the city to render it wholly Shia. Politically, though Sadr had declined to stand in the 2005 Provincial Council elections, JAM had managed to carve out commercial fiefdoms that generated revenue for their social programmers. Furthermore, Maliki recognized Sadr's influence and power and chose not to disturb the Sadrist hornets' nest. The Sadrist trinity was strong, while the British trinity it opposed was weak.

It was in this environment that Maj Gen Richard Shirreff, MND(SE) Commander from July 2006 to January 2007, decided to use British force to support an attempt to unbalance the Sadrist trinity. Shirreff described to the Iraq Inquiry the problem as he saw it when he visited Basra prior to taking command,

I think I went out on my recce in May 2006, the single battalion commander responsible for a city of 1.3 million people told me that he could put no more than 13 half platoons or multiples on the ground... The result of all that was what I call a cycle of insecurity. No security meant no reconstruction and development, it meant a loss of consent, the militia filled the gap and, effectively, the militia controlled the city. So my objective was to re-establish security in Basra.

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The ‘decisive operation’\textsuperscript{39} Shirreff designed to restore security was Operation Sinbad. Sinbad was an Iraqi led operation that ‘pulsed’ force into areas of Basra to allow reconstruction to take place. At the same time, it dismantled the Basra Serious Crimes Unit and surged police training teams.

Despite support from Basrawi and National Shia leaders, Operation Sinbad inevitably failed to achieve the re-establishment of security that Shirreff had intended. Its failure was inevitable because beyond deploying the theatre reserve Battalion, the UK provided no significant uplift in troops to enable them to hold ground, and refused an offer of US troops to support the operation. The lack of commitment was fatal. The Iraqis disbanded the Serious Crimes Unit, but it was fully operational again by mid-2007.\textsuperscript{40} This was representative of the lack of security that Operation Sinbad delivered. If anything, Basra was now more firmly under JAM control as the British had shown they were unable or unwilling to commit the means to defeat the Sadrist insurgency.

The failure of Operation Sinbad left the British with few options. It was clear that they could not establish security themselves so they had to create a system whereby the Iraqis could. They sought an early transition to Iraqi leadership. The aim was to hand security in Basra off to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and withdraw to a position of overwatch in Basra Airport. From here they could surge to support ISF if needed. The understanding underpinning this was that the violence in Basra was “... self-limiting competition for power and resources rather than an ideological struggle.”\textsuperscript{41} This


\textsuperscript{40} Frank Ledwidge, Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015), 41.

\textsuperscript{41} Storrle, 18.
understanding framed the view that the Coalition’s presence was exacerbating the problem of security in Basra and that the militias, in the absence of the Coalition, could work with the ISF to deliver stability to Basra. Looking to the history of Northern Ireland, the British felt that no political solution for Basra could ignore the Sadrists and so they sought their inclusion in the process to draw back to Basra Airport. The assumption was that the Coalition could undermine the will in JAM’s trinity by departing, which would allow the ISF to exert legitimate force to regain security. JAM would then have to engage in the Iraqi trinity to retain a share of the power as their own trinity would lose a great proportion of its own will and force. Following negotiations with JAM interlocutors, the British withdrew to the Airport and achieved Provincial Iraqi Control on 16 December 2007.

Though attacks on the Airport did reduce, the ISF continued to struggle for control of Basra from JAM. Though things were better for the British after the withdrawal, JAM control was not broken in Basra. The British released JAM prisoners in exchange for continued peace, but the ISF was too weak and the police too penetrated to capitalize on the engagement in Basra itself. As Col Iron remembers,

In early January 2008, some of General Mohan’s troops found a lock-up in Basra filled with rockets and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), the weapons of choice for Jaish Al-Mahdi attacks on Coalition forces. The Iraqi Army confiscated them and arrested two people. Within two hours, an Iraqi Army convoy was hijacked and two police stations were overrun by Sadrist fighters. Almost immediately the head of the Office of the Martyr Sadr, the political wing of the Jaish Al-Mahdi, phoned General Mohan to demand the release of the prisoners and weapons in exchange for the convoy and the police stations. Mohan felt he had no choice but to comply.

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42 Storrie, 18.
43 Ibid., 19.
JAM retained its control over both the will and governance in Basra itself.

The situation eventually came to a head in March 2008. Resolved to act, Prime Minister Maliki flew to Basra on 24 March 2008 and ordered Mohan to implement a plan, Charge of the Knights, developed with the British who were discussing its execution with General Petraeus. The plan did not go well initially, but this was the first major Iraqi security initiative since 2003 and so the Coalition could not countenance its failure.\(^{45}\) Resources flooded in from both the Iraqis and the United States, including the Iraqi 1st Division with its US mentors. The tide turned against JAM, and Iraqi governmental control eventually returned to Basra.

The Iraqis and Coalition won Basra through a drastic rebalancing of the Iraqi trinity against that of JAM. Maliki, a Shia, was convinced that Sadr was a threat and decided to act against him. This not only connected Basra to legitimate Iraqi politics, but it gave the Basrawis a political replacement for Sadr. Furthermore, Maliki flooded resources into the city: he gave $100 million for redevelopment and several government ministries established themselves in Basra Palace.\(^ {46}\) The Iraqis put the mechanisms of governance in place to allow the people to feel enfranchised. At the same time, force representing this legitimate governance successfully delivered security. This act alone showed how weak Sadr’s trinity was. Though Sadr had gained a degree of will through Coalition inability to provide security or reconstruction, he had also used force to coerce and had provided little in the way of accessible and open governance that the people wanted. The strength of his trinity was therefore tenuous at best, and folded completely

\(^{45}\) Iron, 57.

\(^{46}\) Ibid., 57.
when faced down by greater force that promised more inclusive governance and funding for the kinds of national projects that Sadr couldn’t hope to match.

It is not true to say that the British played no part in this success. The plan was essentially British and, after the Iraqis and Coalition established security in Basra, the British mentored the Iraqi 14th Division based there. However, Iron cites a significant factor in the success of the plan as being the presence of US mentors in the Iraqi 1st Division that turned the fight around after the first week. As Iron points out, the British had decided not to mentor the Iraqi Army in 2005-06. Furthermore, the British had no control over the implementation of the plan, nor of the reassertion of Iraqi political control or development that followed the plan. In other words, Charge of the Knights was not simply a successful British COIN strategy hijacked by the Iraqis. It was a good operational plan that the Iraqis and Americans developed into a COIN strategy. As Tony Blair remembers in his memoirs,

... [I]n March 2008, Iraqi and US forces, with British support, mounted the biggest and most successful security operation in Basra since 2003, which the Iraqis called Charge of the Knights, and effectively ousted the Iranian-backed and criminal militia from the city. It was an important moment, but I was left with the feeling that had we believed in our mission more and not despaired so easily—as indeed the soldiers on the ground showed—we would have had a far greater part in the final battle. Our relatively small role in cleaning up Basra in 2008 left a bad aftertaste for our forces.

In short, the United Kingdom had failed to flow Coalition, Iraqi or national elements of power across its trinity to prevent the emergence of an opposing trinity, or defeat that trinity after it emerged.

47 Iron, 57.
48 Ibid., 57
49 Blair, 467.
Though such a failure is easy to identify after the event, it is nevertheless possible
to argue that the British could have avoided it, to some extent at least. The British
military clearly had a plan. However, it is hard to identify any national or Coalition
strategy that informed the plan. Consequently, the British never orchestrated the coherent
use of all the elements of national power to solve Basra's problems in a coordinated and
effective fashion. In Basra itself there was no effective governance. As a result, will was
lost both in Basra and at home that, in turn, sapped military and political will to remain
engaged.
CHAPTER 5: SYNTHESIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

It is necessary to develop a strategy that utilizes all the physical conditions and elements that are directly at hand. The best strategy relies on upon an unlimited set of responses.¹

A comparison of British COIN campaigns and their strategies in Northern Ireland and Basra shows that the British conducted them differently, to different ends. Both campaigns began with a coalescence of popular will apart from the governing trinity. In both cases, this generated opposing governance and force structures over time. However, in Northern Ireland the British learned to balance their trinity to regain legitimacy and reintegrate the opposing trinity. In Basra, the British did not manage to achieve this, either on their own or by enabling the Iraqis. The question, then, is why they did not manage to flex elements of national power across the trinity successfully in Basra as they had done in Northern Ireland.

To enable the British to balance their trinity in Northern Ireland, certain strategic conditions were met that can be seen to have contributed significantly to success. These conditions were understanding, coherence of the national elements of power in a single strategy, and national commitment. Their impact on success in Northern Ireland, and absence in Basra, leads to the conclusion that success in Basra was probably not possible without them.

The UK military defines understanding as, "...the ability to place knowledge in its wider context to provide us with options for decision making..."² This very much

² United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, Understanding, Joint Doctrine Publication 04, (London: Chiefs of Staff, December, 2010), iii.
fits with the Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of ‘understand,’ which is to,
“... perceive the significance, explanation or cause of...”³ Both of these definitions
imply that understanding is about processing information to develop a perception of a
situation. However, neither of them mentions the requirement for accuracy in perception
to best support sound judgment. Therefore, the definition this thesis will use for
understanding is that of, “...the ability to process information correctly to give an
accurate perception of a particular situation to allow judgments to be made.”

Under this definition, the British did not understand the conflict in Northern
Ireland well initially, as we have seen. Neumann is explicit on this. Referring to British
government understanding in 1969 and quoting both the Home Secretary and the Defence
Secretary at the time he says, “...[T]here was a feeling amongst Cabinet members that
they did not possess the necessary knowledge about Northern Ireland to take over
political responsibility.”⁴

This lack of understanding contributed to a desire to disengage as quickly as
possible from Northern Ireland that, in turn, led to a conceptualization of the security
situation echoed in Basra over thirty years later. As violence began to escalate in the
mid-1970s, Neumann describes the British Government as preferring "...to rationalize
the renewed outbreak of violence as a series of isolated incidents with few (if any)
political implications."⁵

⁴ Peter R. Neumann, Britain’s Long War: British Strategy in the Northern Ireland Conflict, 1969-98 (Gordonsville, GA: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 44.
⁵ Ibid., 53.
However, the fundamental difference between Basra and Northern Ireland is that understanding of the problems in Northern Ireland developed to inform a change in strategy. Understanding that a military defeat of the IRA as a pre-condition for political progress was not going to deliver success, the British changed to a strategy of ‘twin objectives’. These ‘twin objectives’ were, "...countering effectively and impartially, the use of force. . .by extremists of whatever kind. At the same time government is working towards a new form of administration in Northern Ireland." 7

However, to describe the strategy as having ‘twin objectives’ does not paint the whole picture. For example, at the same time as the ‘essential link’ between the military instrument and its overall political objective was being re-established, the government was improving the economic situation in the Province. 8

The British government’s understanding that manifested itself in Operation Motorman was strong evidence of the change in British understanding of the character of the conflict. The ability to connect the military ‘means’ and ‘ways’ to the political ‘ends’ while managing the ‘risk’ involved was clear. However, perhaps more significant was the ability of the government to achieve this in conjunction with a small window of opportunity provided by Black Friday. The British could only have understood the significance of the opportunity and have acted upon it if they understood the trinitarian context (though perhaps not explicitly in trinitarian terms). Deploying 30,000 troops into a highly volatile situation at short notice could only ever be successful if the British had a sound understanding of the situation.

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6 Neumann, 77.
8 Neumann, 78.
Political desire shaped British understanding in Iraq, just as it did in Northern Ireland between 1969 and 1972. Even before the operation, the political paradigm dictated how information shaped understanding. Maj Gen Tim Cross was the Liaison Officer on behalf of the UK’s Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Commitments) to the post-war planning organization established in Washington. He records that,

\[\ldots\] argued that post-war Iraq would require a lot of ‘Time, Treasure and Talent’. This did not go down well, to put it mildly. It was pretty obvious that not many were putting such a case to Rumsfeld, or any of the other senior players within the DOD/OSD – the leadership had made up their minds that everything would go well and that was that. \ldots Back in the UK things didn't appear to be much better.\]

However, in Northern Ireland, as the situation worsened, understanding developed. In Iraq, this did not happen.

The most illustrative example of the lack of understanding shown by the British in Basra was the characterization of the insurgency they faced. Gen Sir Richard Dannatt told the Daily Mail in October 2006 that the British should, “\ldots get ourselves out sometime soon because our presence exacerbates the problem.”\]

The British narrative at the time was that the British were a large part of the problem. A figure quoted at the time apportions 90% of all attacks as being against British rather than Iraqi targets.\]

Also, decision makers saw the problem as being essentially criminal, intra-Shia and therefore self-reconciling rather than the nihilistic Sunni-instigated terrorism seen elsewhere in

Iraq. The phrase given to the press that Basra was "...more like Palermo than Beirut"\textsuperscript{13} encapsulated this understanding.

This understanding was not accurate, as Col Richard Iron, the British mentor to Iraqi commanders General Mohan and General Mohammad in Basra from 2007 to 2008, indicates,

Jaish Al-Mahdi was not a criminal enterprise whose principal aim was to make its leaders rich. It was an Islamicist insurgent group that used violence for political purposes, and enjoyed widespread loyalty and support from the mass of impoverished Shia in the South of Iraq.\textsuperscript{14}

Furthermore, Col Iron makes the point that,

...90 per cent of attacks were against us because we were the only ones contesting control of the city on behalf of the government. Once we left we ceded not just British control, but also that of the Government of Iraq.\textsuperscript{15}

This misunderstanding means the British would not have flexed national power (British, American or Iraqi) quickly or accurately between the elements of its own trinity to counter that of the insurgents, even had it enjoyed unlimited resources. As long as British strategy rested on the belief that the problem was criminal, self-limiting and mostly caused by the British themselves, the insurgents could use their force to exert power and control popular will with relative impunity.

The lack of understanding shown by the British in Basra was as much due to the processing and perception of information as it was to the availability of the information itself. As Maj. Gen. Tim Cross recalled above, there was clearly a strong political paradigm in existence on both sides of the Atlantic that shaped an 'acceptable'

\textsuperscript{13} Iron, 61.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 61.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 61.
understanding. This paradigm was that the Coalition would simply enable the Iraqis to secure and reconstruct their own country after removing Saddam's regime, taking little in the way of Coalition military resources to secure and stabilize the country.\(^{16}\) This paradigm then shaped the British view that Basra's problems were criminal and self-limiting, rather than more fundamental. Politicians and senior military commanders discarded information that did not fit this paradigm, strengthening the paradigm each time it happened.\(^{17}\) This occurred in Northern Ireland initially and in other conflicts as well.\(^{18}\) Initially at least, the way states want to fight conflicts defines their understanding of them. However, the difference between success and failure, at least in the case of Northern Ireland and Basra, lay in the ability to discard one paradigm for another.

The ability to discard old paradigms for more accurate ones, or even discount paradigms that explain how states would like to see problems, is not easy, but must be pursued for any strategic problem. The idea that being able to shift paradigms when the situation requires is a pre-condition of success supports the idea that a state, and particularly its military, should organize to understand. In his essay, “Counterinsurgency Intelligence in a ‘Long War’”, Brian A. Jackson of RAND suggests,

> In the context of an insurgency, intelligence must deliver the strategic insight needed to know what actions will be effective and what levels of commitment are required, the tactical insight to hit the insurgent

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\(^{17}\) Bob Woodward, State of Denial, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 128, gives an example of this. Two key members of Jay Garner's post-war planning team were removed from the team by Rumsfeld because they disagreed with the opinions Ahmed Chalabi was giving to Vice President Cheney.

\(^{18}\) Lt. Gen. Sir John Kiszely, "Learning About Counter Insurgency" The RUSI Journal 151, no. 6, December 2006, 16-21, points out that the British regarded both Malaya and Cyprus as strictly security problems to begin with, and enjoyed little success in either while they did so.
targets when military action is taken, and the context needed to understand
the broader political and other effects of potential security activities. 19

Integrating national and tactical level collection efforts through the Tactical
Coordination Group achieved this in Northern Ireland over time. Furthermore, the focus
on intelligence collection by the Army was clear. In phase three of Operation Motorman,
the Army prioritized intelligence collection operations over all other activity. In his
direction to Brigades in Northern Ireland in December 1972, Maj Gen Ford, Commander
Land Forces, set three priorities, the first of which was, "...to degrade the IRA's morale
and capability by focusing on intelligence gathering." 20 So successful was the resulting
structure (eventually) that it was more than just a mechanism to collect and feed accurate
information to decision makers. It was, on its own, a major part of the defeat of the
insurgency. As the IRA themselves admitted, it was largely British intelligence efforts in
Northern Ireland that brought IRA activity to a standstill. 21 The British organized
themselves to understand in Northern Ireland, and failed to do so in Basra.

Governments and agencies must develop the notion of 'organizing to understand'
at all levels for future interventions. The military notion of 'supported' and 'supporting'
commands is useful here. By designating the leader of the intelligence effort as the
'supported' commander (at any level), the organization would be taking firm steps
towards organizing to understand. Furthermore, organizing to understand must be a
pervasive notion; it should not apply only when engaged in specific problems. Career

19 Brian A. Jackson, Ph. D., "Counterinsurgency Intelligence in a "Long War": The British
http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p12420coll1/id/159/rec/2 (accessed March 26,
2014).
20 Huw Bennett, "From Direct Rule to Motorman: Adjusting British Military Strategy for Northern
Ireland in 1972," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33, no. 6 (May 2010), 525-526.
21 Jackson, 75.
structures that rely on conformity are not conducive to coping with challenging paradigms. If organizations maintain conformity as part of their institutional DNA, they are unlikely to be able to overcome this when faced with challenging circumstances.

The lack of understanding shown by the British in Basra overlaps the second strategic condition for success that was not achieved: coherence. Coherence came to Northern Ireland with better understanding and a change of paradigm that led to a new strategy. Again, though it took time, the British Government did deliver coherence in terms of both structure and strategy in Northern Ireland. Under the Northern Ireland Office (NIO), it developed a strategy to deliver security while at the same time working to deliver a political solution and alleviate core grievances. British policy was laid out in the Downing Street Declaration of August 1969 stating that, “...Northern Ireland should not cease to be a part of the United Kingdom without the consent of the people of Northern Ireland...” and, “...every citizen of Northern Ireland is entitled to the same equality of treatment and freedom from discrimination as obtains in the rest of the United Kingdom irrespective of political views or religion.”

Though this may not have led to the explicit ‘campaign plan’ that the military would have liked, it did ultimately lead to a strategy that evolved throughout the campaign, flexing national power across the elements of the British trinity in response to developments in the Republican trinity.

Political engagement, economic investment and social change were the drivers to success in Northern Ireland, with security only one of a number of strands closely controlled by  

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the NIO. Success in Northern Ireland was not military, but it was not possible without the military.

The cross-governmental approach to Basra was half a world away from that towards Northern Ireland, both literally and metaphorically. Though it was inevitable that the military would shoulder the majority of the burden for rebuilding Iraq after the invasion, the failure of this part of the operation was political rather than military, and a result of a lack of coherence between both. As Gen Sir Mike Jackson, Chief of the Defence Staff from 2003 to 2006, told the Iraq Inquiry in 2010,

This [nation building], of course, is not a job purely for soldiers. Far from it. It does need all the sinews of Government to come together to a single purpose. We are not as good at that as we ought to be, but I don't suppose we are very much worse than any other country either, but getting the interdepartmental Whitehall piece together seems to be very difficult, for reasons about which I can speculate, but I don't know. Indeed, I recall on one occasion going so far in the late summer of 2003, when it was becoming clear that Phase IV was messy, as to making the suggestion there is only one way to do this, and that is to appoint a Minister for Iraq. I didn't find a great deal of favour I fear.24

This lack of coherence was not just a military perception. Roderic Lyne of the Iraq Inquiry questioned Sir Hilary Synnott, the Regional Coordinator of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Southern Iraq, on how Government should organize to face tasks such as the British faced in Basra after the invasion of Iraq:

**Roderic Lyne**: So what lesson would you draw from that in terms of the kind of machinery that the British Government needs to do this sort of job properly, if it arises again in the future?

**Hilary Synnott**: I think theoretically such machinery, certainly, used to exist. When I was a more junior officer, I was involved in something which involved it and which is essentially a Cabinet committee, where you have a group -- a small number of Cabinet ministers will look at an issue and it will be taken forward by a single Cabinet minister, who

could knock heads together. It was quite clear to me that Whitehall as a whole was not mobilised. When I wrote to the Permanent Secretary in the Department of Health, praising a team of four who were just leaving and asking for them to be replaced, I got no reply and no replacement. So that suggested to me that Whitehall wasn’t mobilised.25

The implications of such a lack of coherence were dire. Just as in the early days in Northern Ireland, the failure to flex all elements of national power across the elements of the trinity in a coherent strategy resulted in an opposing trinity breaking away and presenting an opportunity to the insurgents.

As with understanding, coherence and strategy failed to develop right up to the end of the campaign in Iraq. Where understanding had allowed strategy to develop across all the arms of government in Northern Ireland, it had been absent in Basra.

There are a number of reasons why Britain failed to achieve Governmental coherence in Basra. One reason may be the way that the British conceptualize overseas COIN campaigns. In ‘Countering Insurgency’, the British Army’s doctrine for COIN written in 2009, the phrase ‘Counterinsurgency is warfare’ is the first line, in bold, of the first paragraph of the first chapter.26 Conversely, the British Army’s 2006 analysis of military operations in Northern Ireland describes phases of the conflict as ‘insurgency’, but not once as a ‘war’ or ‘warfare’.27 However, the analysis did describe it as “military assistance to the civil power”.28 This perhaps indicates a subtle difference in the way in which domestic versus overseas COIN operations are conceptualized. Any government


27 An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland.

28 Ibid., 4-2.
is likely to perceive domestic COIN campaigns as political problems with a security element for a number of reasons: the enduring and primarily political nature of engagement in areas experiencing domestic COIN, the degree of national interest involved in domestic COIN, and the desire to project domestic COIN as a political problem on the world stage. Conversely, overseas COIN campaigns are likely to be seen as military problems for an equal number of reasons: the fact that it is predominately the military who are there and dealing with the problem, the fact that there is no pre-existing British political infrastructure or history of intimate involvement, and the fact that the level of violence, at least at some point, is such that only the military can deal with it. Because of these factors, government strategy is steered towards relying on a military strategy, with its more limited range of options, rather than a politically based strategy that can employ all the elements of national power.

The recommendation, therefore, is simple: conceptualize COIN as a political problem from the start. What will such a solution look like? It will have a political leader with the power and responsibility for drawing all the elements of national power together in a coherent strategy to develop a political solution. At the national strategic level, this will likely be a cabinet minister who can directly link national policy to a COIN strategy and deliver the coherence and resources to deliver it. Equally importantly, however, the government must mirror this structure on the ground. Kurt Amend, a US Foreign Service Officer, discusses how diplomats might achieve this in his article, “The Diplomat as Counterinsurgent”. He asserts that

... [T]he diplomat should work to ensure that every activity of every participant in a counterinsurgency-military, diplomatic, development, intelligence, NGO, host government-is in some way linked to achieving political progress. In other words, no action should be
undertaken in a counterinsurgency if it does not somehow support the campaign’s overarching political goals.\textsuperscript{29}

Such a role rests naturally with diplomats as national political representatives overseas.

The final strategic condition that was present in Northern Ireland but not in Basra is that of commitment. Initially, this commitment was not apparent in Northern Ireland. As Neumann explains,

> The assumption was that - once politically drawn in to Ireland - the British Government would take over an open-ended commitment in a conflict to which there was no solution... Westminster’s objective was to restore a reformed status quo ante, so that the troops could be withdrawn and Northern Ireland be re-insulated from Great Britain.\textsuperscript{30}

Based largely on a poor conceptualization of the problem, informed by a perception of history that indicated that British involvement in Northern Ireland caused ‘more harm than good,’\textsuperscript{31} the British sought to limit their involvement. However, when it became apparent that this strategy would not work, the strategy changed and with it the resources that could flow within the British trinity.

The first, and perhaps most significant, resource that was brought to bear was that of time. As Neumann writes,

> ... [The imperative of facilitating agreement] reinforced London’s conviction that there could be no ‘military solution’, and that it was the security forces’ task to ‘buy time’ for a political settlement in achieving an ‘acceptable level of violence’... In that sense, it was the British government rather than the IRA, which had first embarked on a ‘long war’.\textsuperscript{32}

The British Government represented this commitment of time politically in the effective granting of a ‘mutual veto’ to the sectarian sides of the conflict. The only

\textsuperscript{30} Neumann, 44-45.
\textsuperscript{31} ibid., 44.
\textsuperscript{32} ibid., 180-181.
acceptable form of political power in the Province would be one acceptable to both Unionists and Nationalists, over which the British government would act as neutral arbiter. By stating its end, along with the implication of commitment that this contained, the government made it clear that it was intent on pursuing its policy in Northern Ireland, hence strengthening its own trinity and eroding that of the insurgents. This must have had an effect on the will of the Republican trinity as they wondered whether they could exact a high enough price from the British through terrorism alone.

Britain also committed to Northern Ireland with physical and political resources. A good example of this is Operation Motorman itself. Not only the numbers involved, but the speed with which they were deployed and the risk taken with the NATO commitment in Germany to free them up were all the hallmarks of a significant British commitment to rebalancing the British trinity in Northern Ireland.

In Basra, from the outset force commitment levels were defined largely by what was available, rather than what might be needed. However, Britain was unlikely ever to meet the force levels required to secure and stabilize a city of 1.3 million people. Furthermore, as was often said to justify the British withdrawal from Basra in 2007, the solution in Iraq had to be an Iraqi one. So from the outset, a successful military strategy had to focus on the Iraqis. However, the British did not commit to this until after Charge of the Knights. As Col Iron recalls,

The British had previously decided in 2005-06 not to embed MiTTs [Military Transition Teams] in the Iraqi Army in Basra. The argument against MiTTs at the time was that their protection, and dedicated support, could not be guaranteed at the same time as running the operation.

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British-led operations, due to our shortages in the number of troops available.\textsuperscript{34}

The significance of extra troops was therefore perhaps not so much to enable the British to run operations, but to allow the Iraqis to lead operations with British assistance.

Though the British needed more troops for a military strategy to succeed, Britain was facing another national commitment that cut across Iraq. In May 2005, Britain decided to commit the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps Headquarters to Afghanistan and redeploy its military commitment from the North of the country to the South. So in 2005, as the situation was deteriorating in Iraq, the UK was committing military force to stabilization operations in Afghanistan. Sir Kevin Tebbit, Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Defence from 1998 to 2005 told the Iraq Inquiry of the decision that he was, “...apprehensive and felt that this could be a mission too far...”\textsuperscript{35} At the same time, the Secretary of State for Defence, Dr. John Reid, held similar concerns and sought reassurance from the Chiefs of Staff that the British commitment to Afghanistan would not be affected if the drawdown in Iraq was delayed. He was told by the Chief of the Defence Staff that, “...our plans for Afghanistan are deliverable, even if events slow down our Iraq disengagement.”\textsuperscript{36} However, as Gen. Dannatt, then Commander-in-Chief of the Army, told the Iraq Inquiry,

In Headquarters Land we have a briefing chart we use for any visitors we can persuade to come down to Wiltshire to see us, which showed projected fall in force levels in Iraq with a projected rise in force levels in Afghanistan. From the Ministry of Defence’s point of view we overlaid on that our best estimate of how force levels would continue to

\textsuperscript{34} Iron, 57.


stay high in Iraq and possibly increase and for us that was the perfect storm. We could see that perfect storm coming to fruition in about the middle of 2006, late 2006, and I would contend that it did.\textsuperscript{37}

The storm hit and the effect, along with the decision not to accept an additional Battalion from the US Corps Reserve,\textsuperscript{38} was to reduce the ability of the British to flex force in their trinity to balance that of the opposing trinity. In other words, the British national strategic decision to deploy to Afghanistan defeated the ability of the British to use force to exert legitimate power and regain will in Iraq.

However, this lack of commitment was not a purely military problem. In his evidence to the Iraq inquiry, Sir Hillary Synnott made it clear that he was getting high-level political support in principle, but that this political support was not resulting in action at either the political or the administrative levels.\textsuperscript{39} Similarly, Gen Lamb, who was in Basra at the same time as Synnott, recounted that he believed that Ambassador Bremer had tried to fire him because he (Lamb) had recommended that Basra needed a rapid “20 billion”\textsuperscript{40} investment in the South.\textsuperscript{41} Had real political will been apparent, such attitudes would not have existed.


\textsuperscript{40}Gen. Lamb did not specify the currency in his evidence.

The nature of commitment to COIN campaigns is perhaps hardest of the three strategic conditions to quantify and against which to make recommendations. Resources are never limitless and, one would hope, no government deploys troops to a conflict that they and the nation do not intend to win. Psychology is therefore the most significant factor in commitment.

The British Government was committed to achieving its end state in Northern Ireland. This meant that when a strategy was not working, it had to change. Paradigms had to be discarded and strategy changed or failure, or at best a continuation of the insurgency, would be inevitable. However, the British Government predicated commitment in Basra on erroneous understanding, to which the military tied its operational military planning. So established was this understanding that Government departments made other national strategic decisions around it that then cemented it even further. Even as it became more apparent that the paradigm, plan and commitment needed to change for success, such changes became impossible to make because the government was making other strategic decisions based on these paradigms. Consequently, the end state to which the British became committed was perhaps rather ‘withdrawal with dignity’ than ‘a secure and stable Iraq’.

This is where the psychological dimension of commitment comes in to play. Had the British been committed to their original end state in Basra, this commitment might have helped balance the lack of will in the UK in the short term, to deliver success and increased will in the longer term. Commitment to success might have allowed the British to accept the offer of an extra Battalion from the US Corps for Operation Sinbad. It might have encouraged them to take greater risk with MiTTing the ISF earlier, enabling
them to deliver security themselves. It also might have encouraged them to accept that they were facing an insurgency earlier in the South, giving more time for paradigms to change and solutions to work.

Such psychological commitment is not just a matter of outlook. A government can take practical measures to focus on the end state in a COIN campaign. At the top end, and as with coherence, there must be a Minister in charge to give any campaign focus and to take responsibility for ensuring that other national strategic decisions do not cut across the COIN campaign. Equally, the government must maintain this focus down to the lowest levels through political, not military, channels. These channels must take primacy in the conduct of any COIN campaign. Furthermore, there must be organizational commitment, primarily to enable understanding. In Basra, soldiers tended to serve six-month tours. Such short tours did little to bring understanding of the problems to bear. Other government departments would serve much longer in theatre, but with more regular breaks, some doing six weeks in theatre followed by two weeks off. Similarly, though roulement Battalions served six month tours in Northern Ireland, some soldiers, including many intelligence specialists, would routinely serve in the Province for two years or more at a time. Such commitment had clear benefits for understanding that the military was unable to match in Basra.
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and the commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.¹

While it is self evident that Basra and Belfast are very different places, they have, in recent years, both hosted a British COIN campaign. Though the same nation fought the same kind of conflict in both places, the outcomes were unexpectedly different. The British could, with cautious optimism, claim to have been successful in Belfast, whereas their adventure in Iraq is widely regarded as a failure. Though the two campaigns appear, at face value, to be entirely different, they can be compared. The value in such a comparison lies in the consequent assessment that can be made of why one was a failure and one a success. Furthermore, such an assessment can identify wider lessons to try to increase the chances of success in future COIN campaigns.

Looking at the campaigns through the lens of Clausewitz’s trinity shows that the British failed to manage their elements of national power between the elements of the trinity in Basra as they had done in Northern Ireland. In Northern Ireland, the British applied all the elements of national power in a coherent strategy informed by national policy. They managed to do this because they understood the problem and they succeeded because they committed to solving the problem. Conversely, it is hard to determine any clear national or even Coalition strategy for Basra around which the

British government could cohere while the British were there. Two contributing factors explain this. The first is that the British did not understand the situation they found themselves in and were therefore unable to make accurate and timely judgments on which to base a winning strategy. The second is that the British never committed to success in Basra in a way that allowed them to question and change their paradigms, and develop a winning strategy. It is these two factors, and the resulting inability of the British government to cohere around a single strategy, that show how differently the British approached COIN overseas in Basra compared to domestically in Northern Ireland.

The differences in approach essentially amount to a set of strategic conditions that a state must address before engaging in any kind of violent conflict. The strategic conditions are those of understanding, coherence and commitment. The questions a state should ask itself before committing are simple: have we done enough to ensure the best possible understanding of the situation? Do we have the strategy and structures in place to achieve our desired outcome? How committed are we to solving the problem? The consequences of asking these questions are not so simple.

First, it is a state’s responsibility to do everything it can to understand a situation before it intervenes. This involves not just collecting and analyzing information, but also a determined and honest attempt to identify the paradigms through which decision makers view the information. That is not to say that a state cannot excuse faulty understanding. It is to say that a state cannot excuse a failure to make full and honest attempts to understand. Decision makers who filter information to fit paradigms, fail to resource information collection and processing adequately or fail to organize and operate
to understand must be held accountable when understanding fails. The Clausewitzian notion of offsetting understanding with mass and a Commander’s skill cannot succeed in a ‘war amongst the people’. However, deep understanding informing sound judgment can offset the move to violence.

Sound judgment based on accurate understanding pervades everything the state does in conflict. However, the understanding itself can only ever be the best a state can make it, and errors in judgment are likely at some time in a conflict. Therefore every decision is a turning point. The best way to reduce the impact of single decisions across the problem is to develop a strategy that is as broad as possible, cohering as many different elements of national power towards a single outcome as possible. Against this single broad strategy, a state must create structures to unify effort. These will almost certainly be bespoke, as happened with the Northern Ireland Office in Northern Ireland. No solution will be wholly military, or diplomatic, or economic. It will be governmental, with all departments sharing, and diluting, the burden.

Finally, a state will never bring all of its elements of power to bear on a complex or ‘wicked’ problem if there is no commitment to achieving the outcome. Such a commitment is perhaps the hardest thing to achieve, and can only be done with a combination of strong leadership and sound management, articulated in a clear strategy. It has to make plain the desired outcome, the priority in national terms, and the resources available. However, a state must always base its strategy on understanding. If the understanding changes, then the strategy must be re-examined. Fitting the understanding to a resource or time-based strategy, as the British initially did in Northern Ireland and
did throughout in Basra, is simply a commitment to the existing strategy, and not to solving the problem. It is therefore likely to fail.

Had the British sought to understand the problems they faced in Basra, designed a comprehensive strategy to solve them and committed to solving them, they may well have been more successful there. They did this in Northern Ireland and it is the presence of these strategic conditions in one campaign and their absence in the other that defines the difference in approach between the two. Every effort must be made in future interventions to ensure that these strategic conditions are met to give the best chance of success.
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