WHERE ARE WE? FINDING A START POINT ON THE ETHICAL MAP

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Conflict, Security, and Development

by

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# Where are we? Finding a Start Point on the Ethical Map

How are mid-career U.S. military professionals postured ethically to think about non-combatants given pervasive ethical heterogeneity? The literature on professional military ethics education (PMEE) fails to suitably address this question. It encompasses a number of contrasting ways to teach ethics, but they each presuppose an ethical start point, which is unknown, and really, neglected. These shortcomings become evident with respect to an individual officer’s ethically constitutive beliefs, their military’s professional ethics, the world’s heterogeneity, and the obligations they have toward non-combatants. I conduct a two-part methodology. I first survey mid-career military professionals on their attitudes towards non-combatants. This survey will serve as the backdrop for my theorization of the nexus, implicit but inadequately developed in existing PMEE conceptions.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

WHERE ARE WE? FINDING A START POINT ON THE ETHICAL MAP, by Major Christopher M. Ellis, 95 pages.

How are mid-career U.S. military professionals postured ethically to think about non-combatants given pervasive ethical heterogeneity? The literature on professional military ethics education (PMEE) fails to suitably address this question. It encompasses a number of contrasting ways to teach ethics, but they each presuppose an ethical start point, which is unknown, and really, neglected. These shortcomings become evident with respect to an individual officer’s ethically constitutive beliefs, their military’s professional ethics, the world’s heterogeneity, and the obligations they have toward non-combatants. I conduct a two-part methodology. I first survey mid-career military professionals on their attitudes towards non-combatants. This survey will serve as the backdrop for my theorization of the nexus, implicit but inadequately developed in existing PMEE conceptions.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my wife and children for allowing me the time to complete this degree. They know the effort and frustrations that went into this thesis. To my Hamburg family I say, hopefully this paper is less streiten and more disputieren.
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<td>Center for the Army Profession and Ethic</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

We can easily forgive a child who is afraid of the dark. The real tragedy of life is when men are afraid of the light.

— Plato

Prologue

In the immediate days following the Thunder Run in Baghdad, Colonel David Perkins pulled his command track behind the Bradley Fighting Vehicle of one of his units. His men had spent months in Kuwait preparing for the invasion and had just completed hundreds of miles of movement, with heavy combat in the urban areas, incurring several casualties. With the Iraqi forces effectively defeated in the city, now he sat on a nondescript street as looting and chaos slowly began.

After a few moments, the rear hatch of the Bradley lowered and a single soldier exited, walked over to an abandoned Iraqi vendor shack and grabbed a few packs of cigarettes then returned to his vehicle. In the grand scheme of things, this was a non-issue. A combat weary soldier who probably had not eaten a hot meal, had a warm shower, or sat on a real toilet in weeks was just trying to find something to take the edge off and have a smoke. Besides, if he did not take the cigarettes, some looter eventually would, right?

However, this was not the proper ethical action for a soldier. As the Brigade Commander, Colonel Perkins called his Tactical Operations Center with the order to relay via the chain of command, for the soldier to return the cigarettes. After a few
moments, the rear hatch opened and a highly agitated soldier emerged once again and begrudgingly returned the goods to the store.

Was Colonel Perkins a micromanager or a stickler for the rule of law? Was he executing leadership, military ethics, his own personal morality, or just a practical sensibility of how this small event would look if captured by CNN? According to now Lieutenant General Perkins, Commander of the Combined Arms Center and responsible for the ethical instruction of officers in formal TRADOC courses from the Officer Basic Course to the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), the decision was a simple one. It was the right leadership call and the ethical thing to do. The soldier was not disciplined, just corrected.

News of the incident spread throughout the unit. Months later, the Company Commander approached Colonel Perkins about the event. The young Captain told him that this one small act set the entire ethical tone for the company for the rest of the deployment. It was a small yet symbolic event that was highly memorable. The message was simple: conduct yourselves as consummate professionals and soldiers of character.

Introduction

The United States (U.S.) military places tremendous emphasis on security cooperation, regional alignment, and cultural awareness. It follows that U.S. soldiers must prepare to work with persons who hew to a variety of deep beliefs about religiosity, secularity, and–especially–ethics. These entities can be external agents in other countries (e.g. civilians, politicians, foreign militaries) or internal U.S. interagency (e.g. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Agency, Department of Homeland Security) employees. How we think about pluralism, commonality, and indigenous others are
powerfully shaped by the most basic question: what are our own morals and ethics? The U.S. Army is not monochrome in any way. It is composed of different genders, races, religions, ethnicities, and socio-economic classes. Yet it does have what Robert Putnam terms bonding social capital. Within the services there are commonalities of baselines in education, income by rank and years of service, and a sense of duty and patriotism.

Upon arrival at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff Officers College (CGSOC)—a tier in Professional Military Education, referred to as Intermediate Level Education—much is already known about the incoming student body. Race, gender, age, educational achievement, military record, marital status, and performance on the most recent Army Physical Fitness Test are all part of the record. Student staff groups are composed meticulously by branch and sister service, and where possible international or interagency students. What we do not know is where these students are morally and ethically. An ethics curriculum at CGSOC has to navigate rough waters. Is it enough to do good, or does an officer need to, be good, also? Should we teach more reason to those of faith and more parables to those without? What is the purpose of teaching ethics? Is it to increase *esprit de corps*, combat efficiency, or baseline officers in the Army Ethic?

I cannot answer all of these questions, however will seek to find a start point that sheds light on at least one portion of this puzzle. My primary research question is: how are mid-career U.S. military professionals postured ethically to think about non-combatants given pervasive ethical heterogeneity? The literature on Professional Military Ethics Education (PMEE) fails to suitably address this question. It encompasses a number of contrasting ways to teach ethics, but they each presuppose an ethical start point, which is unknown, and really, neglected. These shortcomings become evident with respect to an
individual officer’s ethically constitutive beliefs, their military’s professional ethics, the world’s heterogeneity, and the obligations they have toward non-combatants. I conduct a two-part methodology. I first survey mid-career military professionals on their attitudes towards non-combatants. This survey will serve as the backdrop for my theorization of the nexus implicit but inadequately developed in existing PMEE conceptions.

**Format and Substance of the Paper**

This paper is organized into five chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the topic, the problem, and the question I am attempting to answer. It provides the scope of the paper, listing limitations, delimitations, and significance.

Chapter 2 is a multi-spectrum literature review. First, the difference between functional and aspirational ethics is introduced. Secondly, I bring forth the opinions of three practitioners of Professional Military Ethics Education, their comments on the current state of affairs, their recommendations for change, their outcomes or end states, and their comments on instruction towards the ethical regard of non-combatants. Next, are comparisons to other countries’ PMEE approaches, observations on the secular and religious connections to ethics instruction, and philosophical deliberations on targeting non-combatants apart from teaching ethics. The chapter is concluded with a pertinent review of modern Army doctrine, commentary on the Army Ethic, and an overview of past and present CGSC instruction.

Chapter 3 covers the survey methodology, response rate, and statistical limitations. A copy of the questionnaire is located in Appendix A. The survey itself was modeled off of a portion of the Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) IV survey from Iraq in 2006 which will be discussed in greater detail. I also introduce a study released by
the Center for the Army Profession and Ethic (CAPE) in 2010. Chapter 4 reveals the findings of my study and compares results to that of the MHAT IV and CAPE studies. Both quantitative and qualitative responses are included.

In chapter 5 I argue that the findings of this paper indicate an average start point for mid-career Majors as individuals who possess professionalism in behavior and an inculcation of Army values. However, they lack a challenging ethics curriculum which forces deep introspection and character development, especially in attitudes towards heterogeneity and the world’s pluralism. Based upon their training and experiences, they arrive at CGSC containing a mean ethical beginning called for by Peter Olsthoorn’s end state, but require the instructional exposure of Robert Wertheimer for further ethical advancement. In a related vein, I further contend that graduates of CGSC do not leave the schoolhouse with an instillation of the ethic called for by the new Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 6-22, *Army Leadership*. Final recommendations for further study are also listed in this chapter.

**Definitions and Acronyms**

**Aspirational Ethics**: The focus is on character development and internal values acceptance. External behavior becomes a function of the internal morality or virtue (Wolfendale 2008).

**CAPE**: Center for the Army Profession and Ethic.

**CGSC**: Command and General Staff College.

**CGSOC**: Command and General Staff Officers College.
CGSOC is the accurate reference for the resident course Intermediate Level Education conducted as part of Professional Military Education, but CGSC is the more common colloquial reference even though it includes other educational venues beyond CGSOC.

**Functional Ethics:** The focus is on proper behavior within the bounds of the law (i.e. do the right thing) (Wolfendale 2008).

**Indigenous Other:** The person who lives where soldiers are deployed (Perez, 2012).

**MHAT IV:** Mental Health Advisory Team IV.

**Non-combatant:** Shorthand for civilian non-combatants. It does not include military medical personnel or Chaplains, even though the strict definition would.

**PMEE:** Professional Military Ethics Education.

**Limitations and Delimitations**

The CGSC students were interviewed after completing all of their ethics education (Class 13-02). Therefore, their answers were influenced by PMEE received at the schoolhouse. This may have shifted where my research posits is the start point. As a point of full disclosure, I was a member of class 13-02 and had direct exposure to the material and presentations.

My study makes comparisons against the MHAT IV survey of 2006 and the CAPE study from 2010 but there are several caveats against direct linkages that are more fully explain in chapter 3. Also, due to survey length considerations, I did not feel confident that enough data was received to reach conclusive levels of evidence for thoughts on ethical heterogeneity. Therefore, some of my comments in chapter 5 on this point are theorized plausibility conjecture.
Significance

We do not know the ethical composition of the incoming or outgoing CGSC student bodies. These cohorts include members of the Army (encompassing Active Duty, National Guard, and Reserve), Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, International Students, and civilian Interagency partners. Because we do not know this information, the curriculum authors can only guess at what methodology to utilize. Yes, students gain an exposure to philosophical constructs, interact in moral and ethical discussions with their peers, and submit a self-awareness paper to their professors. However, their ethical transformation is not tracked. The anonymous end-of-course critique centers around understanding the material, how well they liked the curriculum, if their peers valued their input, and if their instructor appeared prepared to present the information.

My research helps to close this gap. It provides hard data on battlefield ethics, specifically attitudes and behaviors towards non-combatants. This information can be utilized to adjust curriculum, instructional methods, and even track changes to student attitudes as a whole. Also, it approaches the problem outside of the mainstream debates of philosophy (e.g. utilitarianism versus deontology) and instead utilizes the scholarly dichotomy of functional versus aspirational ethics instruction. While my paper incorporates the newest Army Doctrine 2015 manuals, the application is not limited strictly to Army or even military domains. Indeed multiple interagency partners may find value in the data gleaned here. At the very least, it begs further investigation.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Organization

How does one teach ethics to military professionals? Like all good inquires, the question is a basic one but the answer is highly disputed. This literature review is about developing context and must do so by citing theories, models, and pathways from an eclectic collection of sources. I start by explaining two dichotomous pairs: virtue versus duty-based ethics and functional versus aspirational ethical instruction. I then expound on the opinions of three PMEE authors, each of which when unpackaged, touches upon this chapter’s opening question.

Next, I move to a wider scope of views to truly add color to the debate’s physical map. This section incorporates how nations most similar to America engage ethics training within their own militaries, connections between ethics and theology, and additional thoughts by academics on non-combatants. In conclusion Army Doctrine is cited, with select commentary on the goals of ethics education at the U.S. Command and General Staff College.

Emerging from this chapter is both the gap and my primary research question: how are mid-career U.S. military professionals postured ethically to think about non-combatants given pervasive ethical heterogeneity? It is only by asking and answering this question that one can most effectively move on to asking how does one teach ethics to military professionals. However, since the literature mainly focuses on this latter point and is thus shooting behind the duck, I begin with it.
The Dichotomies

A typical framing of ethical discourse is virtue ethics versus duty-based ethics. Virtues ethics are those typically associated with classical sources such as Plato, St. Augustine, and Thomas Aquinas’ writings on the four cardinal virtues of Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, and Temperance. Duty-based ethics derive more from the musings of Immanuel Kant for deontology or John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham for utilitarianism. However, when translating these works from philosophy to education a new split occurs, that of functional versus aspirational ethical instruction.

Functional instruction focuses on the outward manifestation of ethical action. That is, it is most concerned with following the law (or the lawful orders given) and doing the right thing through proper behavior. Conversely, aspirational instruction focuses inward on the actual character of the agent. It is interested in “cultivating good moral character” so that outward behavior is an expression of the inner virtue (Wolfendale 2008, 164). While this may seem clean and tidy, it is not since one could teach virtues (which would seem an aspirational approach) but in a functional way. For example, I could teach a soldier the virtue of respect, not because I care about his character, but because I want him to follow my orders.

Because of these conflicts, there is struggle in the scholarly community over whether to teach one or the other or both and a dearth of data in the military to show which approach is best (Robinson, de Lee, and Carrick 2008, 199). Additionally, there is

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1In other writings, further divisions are made. Duty-based ethics are broken down into principle-based ethics (deontology) and consequence-based ethics (utilitarianism). Teleology then splits off from utilitarianism, etc. Since this paper is not about the various ethical philosophies, I maintain the bifurcation at the highest possible level.
a desire to avoid a type of “moral schizophrenia” where deeply held beliefs such as “do not kill” are replaced by the allowance of killing in combat without adequate explanation (Carrick 2008, 196). These “tensions” are expressed in both audience and age (cadets, junior enlisted, mid-career officers) where in practice it seems ethical education is functional for the first two and a blend for the latter (Wolfendale 2008, 166-168). Cadets and enlisted soldiers get codes and rules which seems appropriate given that this is their first exposure to the military ethic and their instructors must confront a heterogeneous group that has yet to coalesce. Two examples from U.S. service academies are given here as illustrations of these points.

Lieutenant Colonel Jeffery Wilson argues that West Point attempts to ascertain moral character in the method of Plato. Given the massive heterogeneity of the U.S. and that each incoming freshman class is drawn literally from every state in the Union, diversity of thought and ethical belief based upon experience, race, gender, micro-culture, geographic locale, and family occupation and income will produce a student body that is, well . . . diverse. Cadet applications are screened for signs of good moral character (Wilson 2008). This would seem to indicate a need to teach in a functional manner, although given a service academy is nearly all encompassing of a cadet’s life and the fact that it maintains a world class faculty, aspirational teaching is not excluded.

Martin Cook, based upon his experiences at the United States Air Force Academy cites habit formation as the “first and foundational component of military ethics” (Cook 2008, 58). This is based upon the teachings of Aristotle and the initial manifestations are with the Honor Code and the Air Force Core Values. Unfortunately, Cook notes, it seems as if volume of ethical exposure is being used as a substitute for depth. This “mere
lecturing” seems to be “formulaic, hortatory, and slogan driven” (Cook 2008, 60, 64). Although, he is hesitant to disagree with this method, citing the predicament of youth that Aristotle recognized. Cook pondered if following the Greek’s recommendation, to teach habit formation now and reason later, was after all, the best course of action. He seemed to conclude that it was.

Moving up the food chain, so to speak, officers, especially at the mid-grade and higher levels have begun both to engrain some of the ethics and values of their service and question the validity of others. At the field grade level, these officers are expected to now be the standard bearers of the military ethic and thus receive more breeding which they transfer through action and example to their troops. Since aspirational teaching is harder because it requires experts to administer and is more intrusive into what an individual holds as his or her core beliefs (Wolfendale 2008, 172), its teaching is usually delayed to this more senior level. So, scholars ask, what is the purpose of ethics education in the military, to change character or to change behavior (Robinson, de Lee, and Carrick 2008, 200)?

The Practitioners

To expound on this, I now turn to three practitioners of PMEE who I believe act as representative examples of the various forms of instruction illustrated above. Four questions were asked: What is the purpose or desired outcome of ethics education (i.e.)

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2This point will be expounded upon later.

3Although not exclusively as the two service academy examples above showed. More examples are forthcoming in this paper.

4This same question could be asked among interagency partners as well.
why teach it at all)? What is the current state of PMEE (i.e. what is observed)? What is wrong that needs changing (i.e. what is the recommendation)? Finally, in specific regards to this paper: What, if anything, is said on the subject of thought or action towards non-combatants? While each has his own opinion and style on answering these questions, I note that all of them presuppose a start point.

I lead off with Timothy Challans, a career officer and professor teaching from West Point to the Command and General Staff Officers College to the School of Advanced Military Studies. His methodology is functional. Producing moral autonomy, he argues, is the key to an ethical officer and should be the purpose of PMEE. In the current state, Challans sees the military as hewing to a model of teaching that is a mixture of stale indoctrination and a quasi-religious, specifically Christian, moral foundation of “received metaphysical and epistemological dogmas” (Challans 2007, 180). By sticking with the “predominant moral heritage” of most Americans and combining it with the military’s explicit authoritarianism, military ethics has grown “comfortable” (Challans 2007, 15).

To break free of this stagnant position, he argues for radical change across a broad spectrum. Individual moral error will occur because we are, after all, human. However, when institutionally, the Army fails in the area of proper moral instruction, it becomes an accessory—if not a direct cause—to the error and therefore at a minimum shares culpability for individual fault, if not downright full blame. The institution overrides the individual.

The first step is to break the link of “religious authority to morality” (Challans 2007, 41). He believes the most onerous example is placing Chaplains in the lead on
matters of moral counsel to commanders and ethics instruction to students. Doing so is an implicit if not explicit tipping of the scales in favor of religious (Christian) authority in moral thought and ethical action. My interpretation of his argument is that, in the age of lasers and GPS, this is the cartographical equivalent of handing a student a medieval map with fantasy creatures at the edges; it’s an anachronism.

So then, his next step is, rather than stacking the deck in favor of religionists, ethics should be thought of as philosophy, rooted in Kantian reason, with the goal of moral reflection. By utilizing reason, if one sees your actions as morally or ethically wrong, instead of trying to convince you that your religious beliefs are invalid, one merely has to present facts. “People are morally autonomous if they live as morally reflective people, if they live by beliefs based on rationale they understand, beliefs that are open to correction or abandonment in the presence of good reason” (Challans 2007, 24).

Third, Challans argues that obedience to authority must be part of the equation given the nature of the role of the military. He states that it “should balance the requirement for obedience with the requisite moral reflection necessary to prevent the simple, blind adherence to immoral or illegal practices” but should move to embrace “autonomy rather than authority” (Challans 2007, 25, 180). He acknowledges that students may not have enough time to fully immerse themselves in Kant, so that task should fall to the educators themselves. So what of his writing relates directly to treatment and thought towards non-combatants?

In this regard, he sees two main points. First, Challans argues that our current manifestation of ethical teaching equates our “global military superiority” with a “[m]oral
superiority” that is “one of the key features of the warrior ethos” (Challans 2007, 11).

The clear inference is that if we are morally perfect in our actions then the indigenous other must be somehow inferior. This then creates a psychological gap between them and us. This gap produces a very low connection with non-combatants and allowed for the nuclear bombings of Japan, the massacres in Vietnam, and the acceptance of high collateral damage in Iraq or Afghanistan. Secondly, going even further, Challans states that this belief is manifested in a “disdain toward international agencies and institutions” (Challans 2007, 2). We are always right . . . or at least better. Not only will we view ourselves as superior to the populace with which we are interacting, but also the coalition partners to our side. To sum up Challans: the pathway to proper teaching of ethics is one of moral autonomy and moral reflection using philosophy and reason. By seeing others as co-equal and protected by international norms, even if those entities are in absentia, we can address the problem of pluralism far better.

A second commentator on PMEE is Peter Olsthoorn who teaches at the Netherlands Defence Academy but habitually writes on U.S. military ethics. He believes the purpose of PMEE is to instruct soldiers in virtues, but primarily in a functional way that enhances their performance on the battlefield.\(^5\) Olsthoorn argues that modern militaries have older virtues, often dating back to Greek philosophies, which “are mainly beneficial to colleagues and the military organization, not to outsiders such as the local population” (Olsthoorn 2011). He contends that the answer is to modernize the

\(^{5}\)Olsthoorn’s book heavily emphasizes the outcome of virtue ethics education and is thus primarily functional in nature. However, if these virtues are truly inculcated by the soldier via personal acceptance, that is better. Thus, aspirational goals are secondary, but present.
interpretation of existing virtues (honor, courage, loyalty, integrity, and respect) to reflect the current state of war and conflict with a heavy eye toward the non-combatant.

According to Olsthoorn, virtues go further in instructing proper conduct in combat than duty-based ethics. One follows rules and regulations, but one through conscious choice and internal introspection accepts virtues. This setting apart is a reoccurring theme. In his reinterpretation of the virtue of honor, he argues that Americans have no aristocracy and the code of honor has slowly shifted away from society. Almost by default then, when a recruit joins the military, the teaching of honor does truly become an instillation of a new virtue. On the battlefield, an American soldier is different than his adversary. Quoting General David Petraeus: “Adherence to our values distinguishes us from our enemy. This fight depends on securing the population, which must understand that we—not our enemies—occupy the moral high ground” (Olsthoorn 2011, 2-3).

Secondly, he sees that there may be difficulty in teaching virtue ethics. One argument is the age-appropriateness of teaching virtue given that in our plural society, recruits come with their varying beliefs. Additionally, at this age the best that one may be able to hope for is knowledge of these virtues, not a possession of them (Olsthoorn 2011, 134). However, difficulty is not defeat. As alluded to earlier, he believes that the steady exposure to these new interpretations of virtues will slowly seep into action and military effectiveness and create a soldier that, over time, is truly something different (i.e. better) ethically, than the society from which he came.

While Olsthoorn does mention the Judeo-Christian heritage of America in passing, I do not see Challans objecting too much to Olsthoorn’s philosophy’s from a quasi-religious perspective. In fact, Olsthoorn’s concepts of virtues are far closer to Plato
and Aristotle than Moses and Jesus. As to moral autonomy, Olsthoorn’s virtue teaching seems to at least match that of Challans, as it challenges one for a deep moral introspection but at the pace of the individual. Finally, Olsthoorn’s methodology and recommendations on the virtues of honor, respect, and integrity does appear to view treatment of the non-combatant in a less sterile way than Challans does, with his international laws and norms viewpoint.

The final writer is Robert Wertheimer, former Distinguished Chair of Ethics for the U.S. Naval Academy who combines the approaches of functional and aspirational ethics. The purpose of ethics, he argues, is twofold, producing professionals and instilling character. While not delving too deeply into the current state of ethical instruction, based upon his experience, he saw things almost from a point of pity on the warrior. His “goal is victory in violence” where “proficiency is measured by efficacy in battle, contribution to victory, not by the validity of the cause” (Wertheimer 2010b, 134). War is “nasty, ghastly business” (Wertheimer 2010b, 135), a veritable moral and ethical minefield that seems to cry out for justification based simply on the fact that the warrior’s goal is to kill and destroy. Even when trying to be moral, for example by utilizing St. Thomas Aquinas’ Doctrine of Double Effect, the military writ large fails. It is okay to kill civilians as long as it was—wink, nod—“unintentional.” Based strictly upon the nature of combat, by mere participation, a soldier is morally suspect.

Professionalism is Wertheimer’s answer number one, but he admits this is far more difficult to do than to say and is fraught with dichotomies. On one hand, in the military there must be a shared foundation of “common core values and principles” but we also need officers who can engage in “independent, critical thought” whose base
assumptions and beliefs are challenged by “a liberal arts education” (Wertheimer 2010a, 6-7). Our military ethos must not be conservative, but must be adaptive to the changing desires of our civilian masters. PMEE must teach a responsibility that includes respect for individual freedoms and thoughts, but also teach that responsibility to the collective military mass must often subordinate individual desires.

This is, to use Wertheimer’s word: “schizoid,” he states: “a true professional internalizes the attitudes, values and principles appropriate for her occupation, so the military professional must somehow integrate a flexible, liberated intellectual spirit with the rigid, authoritarian mindset of militarism” (Wertheimer 2010b, 144). The problem lies not in teaching proficiency, but in teaching proper application of such proficiency. Everything in PMEE must drive towards this proper application. Here one sees an echo to Challans; it is the role of the institution to help mitigate individual moral error. He also agrees with Challans that this mission to instruct should be kept in the hands of those well versed in the philosophy of ethics.

The second solution lies in character development. Congress demands that the various service academies produce officers of “high moral character” (Wertheimer 2010c, 166). However, in contradistinction to Challans, Wertheimer does not see these cadets treated as automatons, but rather young men and women who are challenged to think on their own. He also fully disagrees with Challans desire to bring more Kant into discussions on ethics. Wertheimer’s experience is that cadets do not seek answers to right and wrong with Kant, but do so instead by consulting leadership examples, which Wertheimer argues is a valid response. Indeed, the words moral or ethical appear over 80
Thoughts on pluralism and the non-combatant come together in the synergy of professionalism and character. It is all distilled into one word: humility. Cadets and officers must engage ethics in the manner of Socrates. They must be exposed to thoughts, arguments, and facts that are different and even better than their own. They must see the “organizational imperative of maximization of military proficiency and the Enlightenment call for respect for persons” (Wertheimer 2010a, 9). Here I must quote Wertheimer at length. He states students of PMEE must be:

[...]

This then is the mark of the professional of character: to see, and possibly even too humbly respect, the views and thoughts not only of one’s fellow servicemembers, but the indigenous other as well. While at the same time, increasing one’s own military proficiency and challenging one’s own internal and deeply held beliefs to craft an experiential and battle-tested creation.

A rich expository of at least three practitioners commenting directly on PMEE was needed simply to set the table on current discussions. Does the answer to ethical instruction lie in the mind or in the heart? Or maybe even the soul as will be discussed later.
must be both taught and struggled with internally. However, there are a multitude of other commentators, authors, and practitioners whose voices must be surveyed, if only at wave-top level, to engage the fact of pluralism and to debate thinking on the non-combatant, all of which will show that at the mid-career officer level we have not identified a start point. So, I move now to these voices.

The Other Voices

America’s Kin

The three countries whose militaries share the greatest in common culturally, linguistically, and ideologically with America are Australia, Canada, and Britain. Surveying their approach to ethics instruction and thoughts on non-combatants is expository and thus necessary. Commentary primarily pertains to mid-grade education and below.

Australia had three recent incidents, Operation Morris Dance near Fiji in 1987, Operation Lagoon in Bougainville in 1994, and the “Children Overboard Affair” in 2001 where the ethics of its military were called into question in the presence of non-combatants (Cullens 2008, 79). Unfortunately, even with a revamped approach of ethical instruction to cadets and officers, criticism remains. At the Australian Defence Force Academy, the equivalent of West Point and Annapolis combined, “ethics is not done well . . . the curriculum development is haphazard” and there “are concerns about the self-awareness of the staff and their ability to teach military ethics” (Cullens 2008, 83). At the Australian Command and Staff College (a close equivalent to CGSOC), ethics is taught in a two day workshop utilizing methods recommended by the Harvard Business School. The instruction utilizes case studies and personal experiences to bring forth ethical
thought. It is heavy on peer discussion (Cullens 2008). Holistically, the analysis on cadet and officer PMEE is that it is “ad hoc” and there is no agreement to the purpose of ethics education (Cullens 2008, 88). PMEE appears to be strictly functional.

Canada’s ethical instruction seems to be far more advanced. They have an overarching Defense Ethics Programme that is mixed functional and aspirational. The Defense Ethics Programme is a “values-based approach, with a compliance component” (Desjardins 2008, 70). It recognizes that decisions on the battlefield will be made by humans who try to follow the rules, but cannot issue rules to cover every possible contingency and on the flip side centering an ethic strictly on values “cannot accommodate the values of all people” (Desjardins 2008, 70). It thus focuses on three core ethical rules: “respect the dignity of all persons; serve Canada before self; and obey and support lawful authority” (Desjardins 2008, 69). All cadets, regardless of commissioning source, receive the same ethics curriculum. At their CGSOC level of instruction, ethics are covered in a 15 hour module covering models, theories, and concepts such as *jus ad bellum* (Desjardins 2008, 73).

Finally, the British model is by far the most aspirational in nature. From the 16th century until the mid 1900s, the British military was “required by law to adopt the Christian religion” and used as its “obvious source of ethics . . . the Christian religion and the Bible” (Deakin 2008, 17). With proper education, the goal was to produce an officer who contained the greatest traits of Christianity, Plato, Aristotle, and gentlemanliness (Deakin 2008, 18). The purpose of ethical instruction was clearly one of character development, an officer who did good because he was good. However, in light of the fact of modern pluralism and society moving into a post-Christian age, the link to Christianity
became implicit, but unspoken. This steady shift has not been taken lightly by a British military that sees itself more and more as having its core virtues become a relic of a bygone age. General Sir Richard Dannatt, Chief of the General Staff summarized the issue in 2006 stating:

In the Army we place a lot of store by the values we espouse. What I would hate is for the Army to be maintaining a set of values that were not reflected in our society at large—courage, loyalty, integrity, respect for other; these are critical things. . . . I think it is important as an Army entrusted with using lethal force that we do maintain high values and that there is a moral dimension to that and a spiritual dimension. . . . Our society has always been embedded in Christian values; once you have pulled the anchor up there is a danger that our society moves with the prevailing wind. . . . There is an element of the moral compass spinning. I am responsible for the Army, to make sure that its moral compass is well aligned and that we live by what we believe in. It is said we live in a post-Christian society. I think that is a great shame. The Judaic-Christian tradition has underpinned British society. It underpins the British Army. (Deakin 2008, 27-28)

Attitudes towards non-combatants take on a far more aspirational approach as well. For example, while ethical instruction of national and international laws are discussed in a functional manner at Sandhurst, the internalization of the thought, beliefs and attitudes of the indigenous other are brought forth through role-playing exercises in an aspirational manner.

The Secular and the Religious

As can be seen from numerous examples above, another cleft in the teaching of morals and ethics derives from the divide between the religious and the secular. Practitioners of teaching ethics such as Challans reject entirely the need to mix theology with ethical philosophy and teaching whereas officers such as Dannatt see religion as indispensable to a solid moral foundation. This issue must be expounded upon a bit more as it touches upon both pluralism and finding a start point. I introduce here two authors,
Jürgen Habermas and Richard Rorty, both who talk about the reciprocity between religion and secularism. I then bring in a third author, C.S. Lewis, who addresses pluralism from a commonality perspective.

Habermas, although an avowed atheist, argued for the reciprocity of faith and knowledge. He asserted that tested and demonstrated science must be accepted by those of devout belief but that science was unable to discern truths within faith (Habermas 2010, 16). He maintained that religion, and the inherent morality within it, did a better job with stirring in the hearts of mankind over the natural rights violations of others. It is obligatory upon the state to therefore remain neutral to worldview, but guaranteeing the free exercise of faith was the surest path to protecting all faiths and encouraged communication among them. Rather than rejecting a secular government, people of faith should embrace it as a protectorate of all beliefs. Religion then to Habermas must be included in any discussion of ethics, especially after its resurgence to the political stage following the events of 9/11. Inferred from his work then, the start point is not one or the other (science or faith) but their complimentary resonance.

Rorty’s belief follows a similar vein. Scientific discovery gives us facts of the universe but cannot declare we have no right to believe in God. Religion gives us meaning but cannot declare what facts and science are (Rorty 2000). Scientists can easily declare what is or is not evidence, but declarations of evidence by religion are very difficult. However, science does have its limitations. What evidence you use to prove a mathematical model is different than what you use to prove—if it is even possible—to someone that you love them. According to Rorty then, the starting point is that the only
thing people should believe in is that which is supported by evidence, but the reality is we operate the vast majority of our lives on faith (Rorty 2000).

Some authors write on reason and function alone (Challans supra, Reiman infra), most argue for a mixture of reason and virtue and cite conflicting arguments over the merits, demerits, and challenges of so doing. Yet no author surveyed so far reflects a truly aspirational approach to teaching ethics. Enter C.S. Lewis. While known most commonly for his children’s books,⁷ he held distinguished professor positions at both Oxford and Cambridge. Rather than focus on what divides us and makes us plural, he approached the issue from the opposite direction: what unites us all? Lewis argued for a concept called the Tao and rooted it in pure virtue ethics.⁸

This thing which I have called for convenience the Tao, and which others may call Natural Law or Traditional Morality or the First Principles of Practical Reason or the First Platitudes, is not one among a series of possible systems of value. It is the sole source of all value judgments. If it is rejected, all value is rejected. If any value is retained, it is retained . . . We have been trying . . . to lay down our human prerogative and yet at the same time to retain it. It is impossible. Either we are rational spirit obliged for ever to obey the absolute values of the Tao, or else we are mere nature to be kneaded and cut into new shapes for the pleasures of masters who must, by hypothesis, have no motive but their own ‘natural’ impulses. (Lewis 2001, 43, 73)

In doing this, Lewis made his case for a start point in ethics. One that was not required to be based on a religion, but on commonalities among multiple religions and various philosophies: Greek, Babylonian, Egyptian, Confucianism, Jewish, Hindu, Norse,

⁷Various estimates place his Chronicles of Narnia: The Lion, The Witch, and The Wardrobe and related books at 85-100 million sales in multiple languages. This total does not include any of his non-fiction work.

Australian Aborigine, etc. Lewis acknowledge that his Tao could not be proven or deduced, but could only be accepted by faith. In this he echoed both Confucius and Aristotle’s commentary that only those immersed in the Tao either from youth or by choice could accept its teachings (Lewis 2001, 47). While this is notably the critical flaw, its unique approach could provide a powerful way to internalize thinking about non-combatants. Instead of looking at the heterogeneity of the indigenous other, Lewis asks us to look at the commonality.

Non-combatants: Lawful Targets?

There is literature in regards to thoughts on non-combatants that is irrespective of PMEE, but they are just as contentious as everything else so far introduced. Two authors exemplify this point. For example there are two claims by political philosopher John Rawls on the conduct of jus in bello specifically in regards to soldier conduct with non-combatants. First, professional soldiers must place actors encountered on the battlefield into one of three groups: “the state’s leaders and officials, its soldiers, and its civilian population” (Rawls 2006, 635). This is done to render proper responsibility and separate legitimate from illegitimate targets. Secondly, Rawls argues that people, regardless of whether they are combatants or non-combatants, always retain their rights as human beings. The purpose for this is first legal (they retain certain protections via law) and secondly as a democratic ideal (we show the enemy and the populace their rights by how we treat them).

This position however is opposed by Jeffrey Reiman, Professor of Philosophy at American University in Washington, D.C. Reiman’s argument is an interesting one. He theorizes that most people act in a Kantian fashion with regard to human life when the
numbers are low (i.e. it is wrong to deny someone their natural or legal rights to the
benefit of three other people). But, raising the stakes into what he calls a “calamity,”
people shift to utilitarianism if the numbers or risk benefits skew past a certain number
(i.e. killing one innocent life to save the lives of thousands more). If true, could Reiman’s
argument be the real basis for the institutional allowance of collateral damage? If so, then
Challans is validated on this point, the military overrides individual morality for the
greater good. But Reiman does not stop there.

He also argues that in normal circumstances when two strangers interact they
carry a “presumption of innocence” but in war “we confront an enemy people as a
people, then the whole people is viewed as dangerous and individuals lose their
presumption of innocence. Membership in the people is taken as evidence of guilt until
proven otherwise” (Reiman 2010, 100). This attacks pluralism and thoughts on the
indigenous other head on, but Reiman goes even further. In wartime there is a natural
suspicion of the other. While we would not accept a police officer randomly searching us
as we were shopping at the grocery store, we have no problem with a customs official
searching our luggage after an international vacation. At our borders then, we “try to
minimize dangers, using statistical likelihoods, as well as hunches and suspicions, to
justify invasion, restriction, and possibly injury” (Reiman 2010, 101). If Reiman is
correct, maybe the reason the professional military officer does not focus on the
indigenous other is because he is simply following a commonly held heuristic, reinforced
by a psychological desire to avoid harm.

Next, Reiman directly attacks Rawls points using Kantian reason. Civilian non-
combatants should not be labeled as pure illegitimate targets. Civilians, by paying taxes,
engaging in economic activity, or simply not opposing their government in open rebellion lose their full protective status. Rawls argues that soldiers—who at the lower ranks are really just conscripts—in despotic regimes are simply being exploited, but they are still lawful targets. By that same logic then, Reiman contends that civilians, even if duped by the state, may be justifiably targeted as well if it results in “extremely large reductions in the number of people killed overall” (Reiman 2010, 102). Reiman argues then for a stagger step of who can be targeted. True, civilians are at the bottom of the list, but they are still on the list. He concludes by stating this:

Finally, one consequence of my argument is that the difference between so-called normal warfare and terrorism (assuming they are done for equally just causes) shrinks to a vanishing point. I think this is correct. War is hell. Pretending that it can be carried on in a gentlemanly manner—that those who comply with its etiquette are noble and just while those who violate its etiquette are barbarians—is propaganda. This doesn’t mean that somehow terrorism is okay. It means rather that war is as bad as terrorism. All war is mass murder, or murderous retaliation against it. War can never be justified as anything but a necessary evil, and even when justified, it stays an evil. It must above all be carried out with an eye to minimizing harm. (Reiman 2010, 106)

This is diametrically opposed to Challans. He proffered that by using Kantian reason über alles, one would arrive at a point where targeting non-combatants was nearly without any justification whatsoever. Reiman concludes, through Kant, the exact opposite.

The U.S. Army

Finally, I turn to the Army. I cite foundational doctrinal texts to elucidate modern official policy on ethical instruction, the fact of pluralism, and attitudes towards non-combatants. I also introduce commentary on the military ethic and conclude by covering the curriculum of CGSOC, its intended purpose and goals.
Army Doctrine

Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 1, *The Army Profession*, is the cornerstone document of Army Doctrine 2015 and one of the most recently published with a print date of June, 2013. As the title suggests, one would expect to see an overview of what serving in the Army means as interpreted by the Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Army. That is exactly what one finds. References to morality and ethics are ubiquitous.

The Army Ethic is clearly declared. It is: “the evolving set of laws, values, and beliefs, deeply embedded within the core of the Army culture and practiced by all members of the Army Profession to motivate and guide the appropriate conduct of individual members bound together in common moral purpose” (Department of the Army 2013, 1-14). This is interesting. First, by stating that it is “evolving,” it rejects any fixed position. The ethic is not bound to religious canons and can fluctuate between Challans and Reiman on collateral damage. However, it also mentions that the ethic is “deeply embedded” which would indicate a resistance to change. Secondly, it is inferred that this Army Ethic must be taught so that individuals can be “bound” in commonality. The table below shows the framework of the Army Ethic.
Table 1. The Framework of the Army Ethic


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army as Profession (Laws/values/norms for performance of collective institution)</th>
<th>Legal Foundations (codified)</th>
<th>Moral Foundations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legal-Institutional</strong></td>
<td>The U.S. Constitution, Titles 5, 10, 32, U.S. Code, Treaties of which U.S. is party, Status-of-Forces Agreements, Law of Armed Conflict</td>
<td><strong>Moral-Institutional</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual as Professional (Laws/values/norms for performance of individual professionals)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Legal-Individual</strong></td>
<td><strong>Moral-Individual</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From this table one can see both the evolving standards (Rules of Engagement, Treaties, Status-of-Forces Agreement) and deeply embedded items (Declaration of Independence, Constitution). With the exception of the terms Warrior Ethos, Basic Rights, and Trust Relationships of the Profession, everything in this table is cut and dry.

Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 1 also supports a mixed instruction of virtue-based and duty-based instruction. “Simple or strict compliance with laws and regulations rarely generate a deeper understanding of why a prescribed behavior is right and good. The Army Ethic provides an additional moral dimension that aids in understanding the why behind right behavior” (Department of the Army 2013, 1-15). It also calls for “high moral character” so as not to “negatively affect mission effectiveness” (Department of the Army 2013, 3-11). Thusly, “[a]ccomplishing all missions while
adhering to the Army Ethic is the only acceptable outcome for Army professionals” (Department of the Army 2013, 5-1). This clearly indicates that the Army views ethical instruction in a fashion that heavily favors the functional. The goal is doing the right thing in combat.

The manual also addresses treatment of non-combatants. It speaks to the “inalienable rights of all persons,” the “basic rights of all people,” and avoiding the violation of individual rights during attempts to protect collective rights (Department of the Army 2013, 2-13, 20, 21). Listed within its appendices are the Soldier’s Rules which break down key elements of The Hague and Geneva Conventions. The rules cite probations on torture and theft, who can and cannot be attacked, treatment of civilians, and what to do if a violation of the rules occurs. In reading this manual, one derives a feeling that its discussion of ethics and morals is merely perfunctory. Even the Golden Rule is listed both in its positive form “one should treat others as one would want to be treated oneself” and in its negative form “one should not treat others as one would not like to be treated” (Department of the Army 2013, B-23).

This mechanical discussion of the non-combatant was criticized regarding earlier doctrinal manuals. When Field Manual (FM) 22-100 (Army Leadership, 1999 edition) addressed the indigenous other, it did so under the Army values, specifically Respect. The manual stated: “In the Army, respect means recognizing and appreciating the inherent dignity and worth of all people” (Perry 2005, 156). Professor David Perry of the Army War College took issue with this and argued that compassion for “wounded enemy soldiers and civilians, should really be listed explicitly” (Perry 2005, 157). However, the
updated version of this manual, ADRP 6-22, *Army Leadership*, published in 2012, seems to have taken much of this critique to heart.

In the new manual, Army leaders are implored to go beyond just the list of legal and moral codes cited in ADRP 1. They are asked to have empathy, cultural understanding, and respect for other beliefs and faiths. These characteristics manifest in learning about and having sensitivity towards other cultures, seeing other perspectives, and “genuinely relat[ing] to another person’s situation, motives, and feelings” to truly “enter into another person’s feelings and emotions” (Department of the Army 2012, 3-17). This empathy applies to everybody: fellow soldiers, civilians of all nationalities, prisoners of war, and enemy combatants. If ADRP 1 was superficial simply because of the necessity of brevity and FM 22-100 lacked compassion, ADRP 6-22 radically reduces the gap.

This manual appears to attack pluralism head-on, both within the Army itself and outwardly among indigenous others encountered while deployed. It even recognizes that respect for cultural diversity can have pre-adaptive benefits as exampled by Navajo Code Talkers. The manual also recognizes that army leaders are not just a military presence, but a diplomatic one as well, giving them yet another reason to understand in a more personal manner the diversity of the world. The intended outcome of the manual then is a better interaction of leaders both within their own ranks, recognizing the heterogeneity of its composition, and a deeper understanding or desire to understand the world in its complex formulation. Character is discussed, but the approach is still mainly functional. There is an aspirational aspect in the form of internalizing Army Values and providing an internal mooring in the absence of rules. But, nothing goes quite as far as Challans call...
for moral autonomy, Wertheimer’s humility, or more direct calls to religious adherence
like the British or Lewis. Nonetheless, doctrine does seem to move closer to Olsthoorn’s
reinterpretation of virtues to have a positive effect, not just within the ranks but to the
indigenous other as well.

Commentary Within the Ranks

There are other references to ethical and moral performance in Doctrine 2015
manuals, but the shift to a deeper perceptive of understanding also came forward in the
reissue of the Army’s foremost document on counterinsurgency, FM 3-24,
Counterinsurgency, in 2006. As analyzed by LTC Celestino Perez, there is an “embedded
morality” and an “ethical subtext” in the writing of the FM (Perez 2009, 24-25). It calls
for “proper behavior and respect for the sanctity of life” and a “[g]enuine compassion and
empathy for the populace” (Perez 2009, 27-28). Perez argues that FM 3-24 goes beyond
just a utilitarian—and functional—desire for a positive military outcome. The manual, he
posits, is also a call to protect the human dignity of combatants and non-combatants alike
because individuals in the Army are moral actors internally. Ethical conduct in war goes
far beyond just rule following. It must be struggled with inside of the military
professional long before he sets foot into the combat zone. Implicit in his argument then
is a move towards including at least some aspirational teaching methodology as part of
ethics instruction, or at the very least a robust character self-development.

Perez goes even further in his challenge on self-understanding, especially in
regards to the non-combatant indigenous other. In fact, he addresses the matter frontally
in a multi-part argument. In his first point, he cites former Joint Chief of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, General David Petraeus, and philosophers Avishai Margalit and Michael Walzer and uncovers a nexus in their opinions. Namely, that the “value on noncombatants’ lives requires that the soldier cultivate a certain interior stance toward noncombatants who are ‘brothers or others’” (Perez 2012, 181).

Secondly, Perez respectfully disagrees with Colonel Matthew Moten’s construct of an Army officer’s professional ethic. He states that Moten’s proposal is “patriotic” but not “cosmopolitan” and contains a “Spartan single-mindedness uninterested in cultivating care for the existence of diverse polities” with “no aspiration to be a world-civilizing force” but instead seems to “exist solely to advance American national security” (Perez 2012, 182-183).

Indeed, my own review of Moten follows a similar lode. After a section describing moral failures of torture, Abu Ghraib, and Mahmudiya, Moten sums up his solution by stating: “Officers, above all, must fight to maintain and safeguard the laws of war as a professional jurisdiction” (Moten 2011). His constructional ethic is meant to be “inspirational” and “demands selflessness to the point of self-abnegation” but never leaves the duty-based and functional realm (Moten 2011). In fact, his suggestion does not even reach the clinical state of ADRP 1’s call to explain the “why behind right behavior” (supra). As laid out, virtues are traditional, almost to the point of buzzwords. Unfortunately, nowhere does his ethic approach Wertheimer’s humility and it falls into the middle of both Perry’s critique of a lack of compassion and Olsthoorn’s appraisal that

\[9\text{Most of his argument is on the political, which I will discuss only in passing, but the other portion regards ethical behavior which I will explore more fully.}\]
the virtues of modern militaries “are mainly beneficial to colleagues and the military
organization, not to outsiders such as the local population” as quoted earlier.

Returning to Perez’s piece, he then lines up Moten’s proffered solution against
that of Petraeus’ counterinsurgency guidance for Afghanistan. This is not quite a fair
fight as Moten was writing an ethic for an Army in all its contingencies, whereas Petraeus
was writing specifically for counterinsurgency; a fight that is foreign civilian population
centric. With that caveat, there is still merit in looking at the guidance as analyzed by
Perez to glean ethical thought on non-combatants. Petraeus’ directive goes beyond
catchphrases and heavily emphasizes a deep partnership, almost to the point of what
would exist in a family business. This action served both a political and ethical end and
Perez argues that it “demands that the soldier cultivate and exercise a certain attitude”
where he “has a fundamental duty to serve the indigenous other directly” (Perez 2012,
185). This guidance by Petraeus still remains in the functional. It is outcome based, but
does go beyond mere regurgitation and does ask the soldier to wrestle with his own
internal thoughts and attitudes.

A word of caution is in order at this juncture. A potential critical flaw in the
attitude development of Petraeus and Perez is that we do not know what the unintended
outcomes are of a greater identification with the indigenous other. An apropos example
would be the Biblical imperative “Thou shalt not kill”\(^{10}\) juxtaposed against the mission of
the infantry which is “to close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver in order to
destroy or capture him, or to repel his assault with fire, close combat, and counterattack”
(Department of the Army 2007, 1-1). If an individual believed the former, before he

\(^{10}\text{Exodus 20:13 (KJV).}\)
could perform the latter he would have to either (1) ignore his belief or (2) learn or be taught that the Biblical proscription was against unlawful taking of life (i.e. murder) and that the Christian ethic allowed, in certain circumstances, the killing of an enemy or hostile actor. Psychologist and retired Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman wrote about the psychological separation needed for soldiers to perform the lethal aspects of their jobs in an efficient manner. Since there is often heavy overlap between the indigenous other who is a non-combatant and the indigenous other who is an insurgent, the pendulum may swing too hard in the opposite direction and cause an over identification and thus a hesitancy to utilize lethal force at all. If we see the populace as equal to our own citizens, it may be difficult to drop a 500-lb JDAM on Grandma Smith’s house, even if she is not at home and the enemy is using it as a Command and Control node.

CGSOC Curriculum

Coming full circle now to PMEE, I turn to the curriculum and instruction of mid-grade military officers at CGSOC. An interview with the E100 Theme Author, Mr. Ted Ihrke, and the Ethics instructor, Chaplain Major Sean Wead, provided the modern history, purpose, and composition of the course.

The genesis of the modern program happened under a 2010 review from Brigadier General Sean McFarland, then the Deputy Commandant of the School. Previous instruction revolved around case studies in the format of leadership courses at the school, but he wanted the lessons to center on theory and philosophy, returning to the original writings of classic authors like Plato and St. Thomas Aquinas. Due to the diversity of the student body, McFarland sought to “level the playing field” so students would be better
equipped to discuss the case studies in leadership classes (Ihrke 2013; Wead 2013), a view that harkens back to Wertheimer’s observation of cadets.

Secondly, he directed that students purchase books for their professional library. The first book selected was *Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong* which baselined the discussion by explaining basic moral and ethical premises (moral relativism, objectivism, deontology, teleology, virtue theory, etc) and relations to religion and law. The other book was *The Morality of War* which covered just war principles before, during, and after conflict. These books supplemented the original source classic writers.

The redesign had a threefold outcome basis. First, students should leave the schoolhouse knowing the difference between morals and ethics. Second, they would have an understanding of the principal arguments or structures within ethics; to include the foundational postulates of the Law of Armed Conflict and Just War Theory. Third, having been given the formal “vocabulary” students would become “self-aware” in understanding their own ethical “identity” (Ihrke 2013; Wead 2013). The overall future goal then was to have commanders who understood who they were so they could “set the ethical atmosphere for the unit” as required by ADRP 6-22. Ethics once again became interwoven with leadership.

The actual teaching methodology was a module of four two-hour blocks (termed E100) for the kaleidoscope of philosophies and a second module (termed E200) of equal time for just war. In the first hour of each block, all students would assemble for a lecture by a subject matter expert in ethics, and then return to their small group classrooms for additional conversation on the presented material. After approximately two years of teaching in this style, enough feedback was collected to show the style was not well
received by many of the professors or the students.\textsuperscript{11} For example, 58 percent of faculty teaching Class 12-02\textsuperscript{12} disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement: “As designed, E100 is appropriate for mid-career Army officers attending CGSOC” (Command and General Staff College 2012a) with too much reading as a common complaint. This number dropped to 27 percent for Class 13-01\textsuperscript{13} (Command and General Staff College 2012b).

Class 14-01, which began CGSOC in August, 2013 is the first batch of students to undergo a newly updated PMEE program. The threefold outcome remains the same, but the hours were reduced to eight for pure ethics instruction and supplemented with more ethics injected into leadership classes. Also the readings focus has changed. The first ethics book was replaced with \textit{The Elements of Moral Philosophy}. It covers much of the same ground but contains more scenarios to teach the vocabulary and theories. The new curriculum also contains ADRP 6-22’s chapter on “Character” which contains much of the manual’s positive push towards heterogeneity and hints of aspirational teaching.

Analyzing what a PMEE course should contain is, as shown by numerous examples above, up for debate. Interestingly, the CGSOC PMEE contains all five of the elements in the rubric designed for an article to be accepted by the \textit{Journal for Military Ethics}. Criterion One: “Firstly and most importantly, military ethics is a species of the genus ‘professional ethics’” (Cook and Syse 2010, 119). As exampled by McFarland,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11}Full disclosure, I was part of the last class to receive this format of ethical instruction.
\item \textsuperscript{12}This class term was from February 2012 to December 2012.
\item \textsuperscript{13}This class term was from August 2012 to June 2013.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
ethical study is a part of professional study. Criterion Two: understanding the Law of Armed Conflict. The Law of Armed Conflict is discussed in the first ethics module and is integrated throughout the course. Often one of the students in a staff section is a Major from the Judge Advocate General branch and typically provides Law of Armed Conflict advice in operations planning scenarios. Criterion Three: historical illumination with application for the present. While not part of the ethics module, ethical history is integrated into other courses. For example, Moten’s piece on the Army Ethic is included as required reading in a module on American Civil-Military Relations. His article traces some of the history of the military ethic from America’s founding and onward. Criterion Four: how religion has or can guide military ethics. In my subjective view, this is the weakest point among the five. Consulting theological theories or reading religious texts is not part of the common curriculum and discussion on this issue is student initiated. This is not to say that CGSOC turns a blind eye to the topic, only that there is no instruction within the common curriculum. Criterion Five: the “role of the hortatory” (Cook and Syse 2010, 121). This is also not part of the ethics module, but is often drawn out indirectly in leadership instruction or in the history sections. In summation, using the Journal of Military Ethics as a guideline, CGSOC is a near perfect match.

Summation: Bringing the Literature Together

Without surveying the student body, any institution choosing which educational methodology to use would all presuppose a start point. Honing down specifically to military mid-career officers, what if Challans is correct and the infusion of institutionalism is so pervasive that Majors will always toe-the-line in regards to norms? What if Wertheimer is accurate; are officers humble enough to change? What if Lewis
and Habermas are correct in asserting that religion is an integral part of ethics discourse, and—at least for Lewis—is foundational? I cannot answer these questions, but can attempt to pull up the curtain on at least one aspect of ethical thought: how are mid-career U.S. military professionals postured ethically to think about non-combatants given pervasive ethical heterogeneity? Answering this could provide CGSOC hard quantitative data to maintain or alter its current program.

Moral and ethical instruction is contentious to say the least. Opinions are diverse and often divergent. I have attempted to weave multiple strands together here to create an accurate tapestry. To begin with, when teaching to professionals some believe it is best to remain in the functional and concentrate on the outcomes and following the rules. But the comparison between Challans and Reiman, both who follow reason, show this is problematic as they come to diametrically opposed ends. Also, as FM 22-100 (and to a lesser extent ADRP 1) illustrated, there is an anodyne feel to this method. It may change behavior, but whether or not it changes how an individual truly feels about his own moral code or his thoughts on others is contestable.

C. S. Lewis would be an example of an individual who contends for an aspirational approach to truly change character. As a man who transformed from atheism to theism to Christian apologist, even he would acknowledge that it is impossible to separate his theology from his recommendations. His viewpoint would be fully supported in the modern British military as shown from the comments from General Dannatt. But a functionalist might argue that those with aspirational intentions play the game with loaded dice and that the Tao, however pluralistically constructed, is really just a front-man for religion, specifically Christianity.
The third grouping then would be those voices who argue for a mixture of behavior modification and character development. One could argue that after reviewing the CGSOC curriculum, current doctrinal manuals, and commentary on PMEE, a place or at the very least a debate, on this kind of instruction would be beneficial. Does CGSOC challenge, in this age of pluralism, an officer to mine his or her internal thoughts on the world’s heterogeneity and especially in contemplation of the non-combatant indigenous other? Yes, there is an element of self-awareness that is brought to light and banter among peers on ethical theories, but nothing that directly assaults, spars with, disputes, or causes constructive churning within the deeply held beliefs and creeds of the individual. Regrettably, this is one point of near constant agreement among almost all of the authors of the literature cited throughout this chapter; for ethical instruction to succeed it must induce rich, critical inward thought. Unfortunately, this is something that peers, observers, and instructors complain about, students “don’t have time to think” (Ihrke 2013; Wead 2013).
CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

To elicit data to find a start point on attitudes and behaviors towards non-combatants, I conducted an official survey through the CGSC Institutional Research Department. The survey was anonymously sent to 289 officers of Class 13-02, of which 73 responded. As such, it did not achieve a high enough n-level to be representative of the class, so the results therefore are not definitive, but indicative. Multiple variations of questions asked to increase construct (internal) validity of answers. When possible, answers were compared to other surveys to either show divergence or if comparable, show criterion (external) validity. A copy of my survey is included in Appendix A.

The survey template came from the Mental Health Advisory Team IV survey from Iraq in 2006, specifically the section on Battlefield Ethics (Office of the Surgeon 2006). However, there are a few key points of divergence. First, while the questions for my CGSC survey were taken from the MHAT IV questionnaire, many were modified after an ethical review by the CGSC Human Protections Administrator. For example, a question from the MHAT IV survey was “How often during this deployment did you do the following: Insulted and-or cursed at non-combatants in their presence?” This was modified to “Did you ever observe or experience the following: Military personnel verbally abusing non-combatants?” This expands and skews the responses allowing for a greater chance of an affirmative answer.

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14A sample size of 100 yields a sampling error of +/- 9.8 percent. Also, to achieve a representative sample of 300 individuals within a 95 percent confidence interval would have required 168 respondents (Berman 2007).
Another caveat is the location of the two surveys. The MHAT IV was done in Iraq during a deployment and asked questions regarding that deployment alone, whereas mine was done in a schoolhouse and queried experiences covering all deployments. Finally, there is a difference in the demography of the two surveys. The MHAT IV respondents were primarily junior enlisted soldiers (57 percent) with non-commissioned officers as the second largest group (37 percent). The modal age cohort was 20 to 24 years old (49 percent). By comparison, of the 73 survey respondents in my study, 71 were Majors, one was a Captain and one a Lieutenant Colonel. For ease of reading, students are referred to collectively as Majors. Although the MHAT IV queried both Army soldiers and Marines, for ease of data interpretation, only soldiers’ answers are included in chapter 4.

To bring in an additional level of comparison and plausible validity, results of my survey were also compared, where applicable, to the CAPE Excellence in Character and Ethical Leadership Study, itself partially based on the MHAT IV survey (Hannah and Schaubroeck 2010). The survey took place in Iraq in 2009. The modal age cohort for this study was also 20 to 24 (39 percent) and predominately junior enlisted (52.3 percent) with non-commissioned officers and warrant officers second (35 percent). Additionally, the CAPE survey heavily targeted the squad level. Any tables from the MHAT IV or CAPE reports were modified to present information in the same format as my own. In conclusion, chapter 4 provides the results and some interpretation. Chapter 5 pulls the data together and includes my theorization.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Organization

This chapter is broken down into five parts: Training, Behavior, Attitudes and Character (One), Attitudes and Character (Two), and a short summation of the data. All MHAT and CAPE data comes from the respective survey reports cited in chapter 3. As a final note, subjective terms are utilized, such as favorable or unfavorable, based upon my presumption that certain acts, attitudes, or behaviors are morally or ethically wrong.

Training

I begin with training. This section indicates levels of self-perceived ethical readiness levels, encounters, and thoughts on ethical instruction. Overall, respondents indicated a high level of received training regarding proper behavior or treatment of non-combatants (73 to 86 percent agree plus strongly agree) as shown in table 2. However, over a quarter (27 percent agree plus strongly agree) still encountered situations where they did not know how to ethically respond. This last point radically diverges from the CAPE study (table 3) where only 6.2 percent of soldiers stated they encountered such ethical situations (although CAPE’s report summation indicated answers as either “never” or “often or very often”).

42
Table 2.  Unit Training (I)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Total Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Members of my unit received training that made it clear how they should behave toward non-combatants.</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of my unit received training in the proper treatment of non-combatants.</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training in proper treatment of non-combatants was adequate.</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I encountered ethical situations on operations in which I did not know how to respond.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by author from the Ellis Battlefield Ethics Summary Report, November 8, 2013.

Table 3.  Ethical Situations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How often have you?</th>
<th>Percent (never)</th>
<th>Percent (often or very often)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Encountered ethical situations in Iraq for which you did not know how to respond?</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Retaining the caveats listed in chapter 3, there is apparent criterion validity with the MHAT IV (table 4). Answers are similar across the board for behavior toward non-combatants (86 percent CGSC vs. 86 percent MHAT IV), proper treatment of non-
combatants (86 percent CGSC vs. 82 percent MHAT IV), and ethical situation ambiguity (27 percent CGSC vs. 28 percent MHAT IV). Adequacy of training was nearly equivalent also (73 percent CGSC vs. 78 percent MHAT IV).

Table 4. Training Attitudes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Attitude</th>
<th>Percent Agree or Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Received training that made it clear how I should behave toward non-combatants.</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Received training in the proper treatment of non-combatants.</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training in proper treatment of non-combatants was adequate.</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encountered ethical situations in Iraq in which I did not know how to respond.</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


When question variations regarding training were reduced to a dichotomous scale, higher positive responses were achieved as indicated in table 5.

Table 5. Unit Training (II)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Total Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>My unit received training on professional military values and the importance of</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disciplined, professional conduct in combat.</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My unit received training in the proper (ethical) treatment of non-combatants.</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by author from the Ellis Battlefield Ethics Summary Report, November 8, 2013.
A majority of CGSC students also noted that ethical training in units was useful (69 percent) and nearly a fifth indicated that it changed the way they made decisions as shown in table 6.

Table 6. Effect of Ethics Training

| Source: Created by author from the Ellis Battlefield Ethics Summary Report, November 8, 2013. |

<p>| The ethics training that my unit received changed the way I made decisions. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There seems to be a small majority (53 percent) that want more training, specifically on the connection between military values and conduct in combat (table 7).
Table 7. Attitudes on More Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>My unit could have benefited from more training on professional military values and the importance of disciplined, professional conduct in combat.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by author from the Ellis Battlefield Ethics Summary Report, November 8, 2013.

To expound on ethics instruction in general, students were asked in open response format “at what level should training on professional military values and the importance of disciplined, professional conduct in combat be delivered?” Of the 50 written answers, 43 gave a reply of “all levels, from the lowest levels, or every level” or some derivation thereof. One student, echoing Aristotle and Lewis replied: from “childhood.”

In the same open answer format, students were also asked about how they wanted ethics instruction delivered at CGSC. Of the 53 responses, most fell into categories of greater integration (or subsumption) with leadership instruction, more discussion, or more case studies with application. As a reminder, this survey was given to Class 13-02 and did not include the updated 14-01 curriculum that does include more case studies and has a greater overlap with leadership courses. Of note, table 6 showed that approximately one-fifth of the students changed their ethical behavior based upon training. However, no
respondent indicated in written form from the two open answer question above why they changed.

Behavior

The second major category is behavior, either seen or participatory. CGSC students were queried on their observations or experience in various interactions with non-combatants. Results were tabulated and are presented in table 8.
Table 8. Behavior Regarding Non-Combatants (CGSC)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>During your deployments did you ever observe or experience the following?</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Once</th>
<th>A Few Times (2-4)</th>
<th>Several Times (5 or more)</th>
<th>Total Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military personnel verbally abusing non-combatants.</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military personnel damaging private property when it was not necessary.</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military personnel physically abuse a non-combatant when it was not necessary.</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Witnessed the mistreatment of a non-combatant by a unit member.</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know of a military member who stopped a fellow military member from mistreating a non-combatant.</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know of members of your unit who 'modified' the ROE in order to accomplish the mission.</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know of members of your unit who ‘ignored’ the ROE in order to accomplish the mission.</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source*: Created by author from the Ellis Battlefield Ethics Summary Report, November 8, 2013.

On the positive side, witnessing or taking part in poor behavior appears to be a minority occurrence. The vast majority of individuals had no involvement with unprofessional acts. Additionally, nearly one-fifth personally knew of someone who intervened in preventing non-combatant mistreatment. However, these numbers are
highly unfavorable as compared to both the CAPE study and the MHAT IV findings (table 9 and table 10).

Table 9. Behavior Regarding Non-Combatants (CAPE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rate the number of times you are aware that members of your squad . . .</th>
<th>Percent (once)</th>
<th>Percent (two to four times)</th>
<th>Percent (five times or more)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mistreated non-combatants</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unnecessarily damaged non-combatant property</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defied the ROE to accomplish the mission</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 10. Behavior Regarding Non-Combatants (MHAT IV)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How often during this deployment did you do the following . . .</th>
<th>Percent Reporting One or More Times</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Insulted/cursed at non-combatants in their presence.</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damaged/destroyed Iraqi property when it was not necessary.</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of unit modify ROEs in order to accomplish the mission.</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of unit ignore ROEs in order to accomplish the mission.</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For example, 10 percent of the soldiers in the CAPE study and 9 percent of MHAT IV respondents reported seeing unnecessary damage done to a non-combatants property, but more than twice as many CGSC students (23 percent) witnessed such acts. Over a quarter (28 percent) of MHAT IV respondents indicated verbal abuse toward non-combatants, but 50 percent of CGSC students reported the same. And there are other examples. What may explain this?

Proper context is absolutely vital here. In the CAPE study, soldiers were asked about ethical infractions only within their squad, which by Infantry doctrine is nine personnel (variations occur among other branches). The MHAT IV study asked soldiers if they “personally” partook in non-combatant mistreatment or for the two Rules of Engagement (ROE) questions if they witnessed it. However, MHAT IV demographics indicated that the modal respondent was a junior enlisted soldier (57 percent). What they considered the size of their “unit” may be smaller than what an officer would consider their unit. Also, MHAT IV referred to single deployment (versus a career of deployments for CGSC students) and personal involvement in the questioned acts. This CGSC survey, for reasons of culpability, was forced to expand the question to personal experience or observation of others. These facts may explain such higher rates of ethical infractions reported by CGSC mid-grade professionals.

Attitude and Character (Part One)

Section one of this chapter dealt primarily with training. Section two discussed reported incidents of behavior. This section now introduces actual attitude and possibly even insight into character. The difference between behavior and attitude (or character) is crucial. Behavior is what you did do, (i.e. your actions). Attitude is what you would do or
what you currently think and feel on a subject. What is important to note is that this survey occurred after CGSC students received all of the ethical training offered by the schoolhouse. I argue that this section (and part two) comes closest to revealing the ethical start point for students of CGSC as it best reflects on the internal position of mid-grade professionals.

Table 11 indicates levels of agreement on various statements. It reflects what an individual personally thinks and-or feels. Tables 12 through 15 pull out in bar graph format some of the questions for greater clarity. Table 16 shows related findings from the MHAT IV survey. My analysis will follow at the end of these six tables.
Table 11. Attitudes Summary (CGSC)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Please select your LEVEL of agreement or disagreement with the following statements:</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Total Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-combatants should be treated as insurgents.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I can distinguish non-combatants from insurgents.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torture is permissible if it will save the life of a Soldier/Marine.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torture is permissible in order to gather intelligence about insurgents.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-combatants should be treated with dignity/respect.</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would risk my own safety to help a non-combatant in danger.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The leadership in my unit made it clear that non-combatants must not be mistreated.</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source*: Created by author from the Ellis Battlefield Ethics Summary Report, November 8, 2013.
Table 12. Ability to Distinguish

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I can distinguish non-combatants</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from insurgents.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source*: Created by author from the Ellis Battlefield Ethics Summary Report, November 8, 2013.

Table 13. Willingness to Risk Safety

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I would risk my own safety to</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>help a non-combatant in danger.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source*: Created by author from the Ellis Battlefield Ethics Summary Report, November 8, 2013.
Table 14. Torture to Save a Life

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perception</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Torture is permissible if it will save the life of a Soldier/Marine.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by author from the Ellis Battlefield Ethics Summary Report, November 8, 2013.

Table 15. Torture to Gather Intelligence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perception</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Torture is permissible in order to gather intelligence about insurgents.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by author from the Ellis Battlefield Ethics Summary Report, November 8, 2013.
Table 16. Attitudes Summary (MHAT IV)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percent Agree or Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All non-combatants should be treated with dignity and respect.</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All non-combatants should be treated as insurgents.</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torture should be allowed if it will save the life of a Soldier/Marine</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torture should be allowed in order to gather important info about insurgents</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would risk my own safety to help a non-combatant in danger.</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Beginning again with the positive, none of the CGSC students believed that non-combatants *ipso facto* should be treated as insurgents, whereas 17 percent of MHAT IV respondents did. Related to this is the interesting standard distribution (table 12) for answers regarding the ability to distinguish non-combatants from insurgents. Perhaps the responses from CGSC students reflect an ambivalence born from a counterinsurgency experience of deciphering who is truly the enemy? Maybe their more seasoned experience over a longer period of service yields a greater respect for the ambiguity of realities on the ground?

Another positive is that nearly two-thirds of CGSC students believed they would risk their lives to save a non-combatant and only three percent stated they would not (table 13). The MHAT IV survey found that just one-quarter of the individuals would help the non-combatant in danger at personal risk (table 16). Maybe the Army Value of
selfless-service is more ingrained as a career progresses? Finally, a full 97 percent of CGSC students said that non-combatants should be treated with dignity and respect (table 11) as compared to half that number (47 percent) from the MHAT IV (table 16). Conceivably, this could be due to command influence, as 89 percent of the Majors agreed or strongly agreed that their leadership was clear in avoiding mistreatment of non-combatants (table 11).

From a negative standpoint, 14 percent of mid-career professional officers agreed that torture was permissible to save the life of a fellow Soldier or Marine (table 11 and table 14) and 8 percent thought it was okay to gather intelligence (table 11 and table 15). While this is far lower as compared to the 41 percent and 36 percent responses respectively from MHAT IV (table 16), the demographic issue once again comes into play. Again, MHAT IV was heavily skewed to the answers from junior enlisted, whereas my study surveyed CGSC students that had completed the PMEE of the schoolhouse. Even after this educational experience, roughly one-in-seven would condone torture.

Even worse, stripping out the number of neutral responses indicates that only a minority of mid-grade officers (48 percent) would disagree or strongly disagree with the utilization of torture to save the life of another Soldier or Marine (table 11 and table 14). And just a small majority (56 percent) would object to torture for purposes of intelligence (table 11 and table 15). Notably, the questions did not query torture of non-combatants, the recipient was not specified.

I next surveyed attitudes towards the reporting of violations of battlefield ethics. As shown in table 17 below, levels of agreement for reporting are all above 90 percent for each questioned scenario. CGSC students show a strong propensity for exposing
infractions, with the most common answer indicating “strongly agree.” Each of these answers is heavily favorable as compared to both the CAPE study and the MHAT IV. In the CAPE study (table 18), the highest level of reporting was 70 percent for the question regarding injuring or killing an innocent non-combatant and 55 percent for the same question from the MHAT IV (table 19). The lowest levels of reporting from CAPE were on non-combatant abuse (57 percent) and from MHAT IV were unnecessarily destroying private property (43 percent).

Table 17. Reporting Tendencies (CGSC)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Please select your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements:</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Total Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mistreatment of a non-combatant by a member of my unit should be reported.</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injuring or killing an innocent non-combatant by a member of my unit should be reported.</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unnecessarily destroying private property by a member of my unit should be reported.</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stealing from a non-combatant by a member of my unit should be reported.</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A member of my unit who violates the ROE my unit should be reported.</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A unit member who doesn’t follow General Orders should be reported.</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Created by author from the Ellis Battlefield Ethics Summary Report, November 8, 2013.*
### Table 18. Reporting Tendencies (CAPE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I would report . . .</th>
<th>Percent (Disagree or Strongly Disagree)</th>
<th>Percent (Agree or Fully Agree)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A buddy in my unit for abusing a non-combatant</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
<td>57.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A unit member if I saw them injuring or killing an innocent non-combatant</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>70.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A unit member if I saw them stealing from a non-combatant</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>64.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A unit member if I saw them mistreating a non-combatant</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>63.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A unit member if I saw them violating ROEs.</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>59.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A unit member if I saw them unnecessarily destroying private property.</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>58.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 19. Reporting Tendencies (MHAT IV)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I would report a unit member for . . .</th>
<th>Percent Agree or Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Injuring or killing an innocent non-combatant</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stealing from a non-combatant</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mistreatment of a non-combatant</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not following General Orders</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violating ROEs</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unnecessarily destroying private property</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Attitude and Character (Part Two)

As a final gauge on attitudes towards non-combatants, my CGSC survey offered a quote from two philosophers Michael Walzer and Avishai Margalit. It asked their levels of agreement or disagreement with it and then included a block to type up responses in an open-ended format. As shown in table 20, over three-quarters of CGSC students responded positively to agreement with the quote. It is their answers that are most intriguing. I will quote these officers at length to show how their thinking aligns with various authors brought forth in chapter 2.

15“Conduct your war in the presence of noncombatants on the other side with the same care as if your citizens were the noncombatants. . . . By wearing the uniform, you take on yourself a risk that is borne only by those who have been trained to injure others (and to protect themselves). You should not shift this risk onto those who haven’t been trained, who lack the capacity to injure; whether they are brothers or others. The moral justification for this requirement lies in the idea that violence is evil, and that we should limit the scope of violence as much as is realistically possible. As a soldier, you are asked to take an extra risk for the sake of limiting the scope of war. Combatants are the Davids and Goliaths of their communities.” (Walzer and Margalit 2009)

16Answers have been modified, but only to correct spelling or grammar for ease of reading.
Qualitative responses run the gamut. There is grist for the mill for nearly all of the authors’ arguments brought forth in chapter 2 and lines of distinction are blurry. I have selected what I believe to be illustrative examples of this by highlighting poignant answers and showcasing omissions.

Functional arguments predominate. One student echoed Carl von Clausewitz by stating: “Warfare is a battle of wills with the intent to kill or harm an enemy force. Noncombatants in a battlefield must be spared; however, the harming of noncombatants may be required to accomplish a mission.” Another stated that “civilians are not part of the threat, nor should they be treated as such” but “realistically” there is an “inevitable risk of civilians becoming harmed unintentionally.” These pragmatic answers seem most
in line with John Rawls and ADRP 1. There is the separation of who is and who is not a lawful target, a somewhat sterile sense of detachment from civilians, and an acknowledgement of reality that the ultimate goal of combat is to win “while adhering to the Army Ethic” (ADRP 1, *supra*).

Many student responses sound like Reiman’s sliding scale of ethics. One stated they agreed with the Walzer and Margalit quote, but were waiting, almost premeditating the time when civilian non-combatants might take “up arms in support of the enemy” thereby “abandon[ing] the protection” they once had. A second Major said war makes “normal people do random things.” A third demurred: “when elements of the population are mortaring, sniping, planting Improvised Explosive Devices, and conducting recon on you from the safety of the population, the patience and self-righteous attitudes begin to wear thin.” These quotes speak directly to Reiman’s “presumption of innocence” theory. Following Reiman’s argument it could lead to self-justification of actions and a de-pluralizing outlook on the indigenous other.

As indicated in chapter 2, Wertheimer argued that war is a “nasty, ghastly business” where participation alone made one morally suspect (*supra*). Perilously, Wertheimer understood that victory was the end state. A few CGSC comments fell in line with this thinking. A student indicated that “I agree that we should try to not involve noncombatants . . . [a]nd that we should limit the scope of violence as much as possible. However, sometimes these objectives are just not possible. Also, it is difficult to identify noncombatants from combatants, especially non-state actors or insurgents. Add to this mix the fog and friction of war, and inevitably, misidentification of a noncombatant will
occur.” Additionally Wertheimer’s “schizoid” dichotomies are illustrated by the following student’s thoughts:

I disagree with using the moral justification that violence is evil. That would imply that those who are trained and willingly engage in violence on behalf of the country are en mass violating personal, organizational and national mores on how we conduct our lives . . . In contrast we actually have established that there is a line between what we should do as military (combat following the rules of war, protect non-combatants, honor Geneva Conventions, no torture, no spying on American citizens, etc.), and what we cannot do. These mores are not always followed, or may be interpreted differently, at different times, by different parties, but nonetheless, military members following lawful orders should not be made to feel they are doing ‘evil’ or that will sap their will and conviction. (Ellis 2013)

These comments are mostly functional in nature, but reveal the struggle between mission accomplishment and abiding by the Army Ethic.

Responses that mixed aspirational and functional partially reflect Olsthoorn’s observation that one obeys rules and regulations, but internalizes virtues. From my survey a student wrote proper treatment of non-combatants is an “inherent responsibility of all soldiers, regardless of rank” and that this “differentiates warriors from barbarians.” Another noted that “[m]embers of the military assume an inherent risk when they agree to serve. They should, to the reasonable extent possible, take all steps to minimize civilian casualties on the battlefield. This will imply some additional risk to soldiers, but it is the moral thing to do.” And a final comment in this vein was that we “have a duty to protect those who cannot protect themselves” and “caring for noncombatants as if they were our fellow citizens is correct” but “[t]reating enemy or neutral civilians in a hostile manner is immoral in itself.

A further observation on the comments from this question seems to indicate the caveat given in chapter 2 towards over-identification with the indigenous other may be true. A CGSC student responded that “[p]art of the emotional rationalization that I need
to conduct my mission involves me thinking of noncombatants in ways that does not have them equal to U.S. citizens.” This seems to reflect Carrick’s worry about a “moral schizophrenia” developing within soldiers attempting to navigate the minefield of ethics on the battlefield.

As a final note, what is interesting about this qualitative feedback is what is missing. There is little mention of international governing bodies or codes (i.e. the Geneva Convention) which gives evidence to Challans claim that the military gives short shrift to these entities. But, responses do not regurgitate the party line either, indicating that CGSC students do grapple and struggle with ethical quandaries individually. There is neither mention of the humility that Wertheimer says is essential, nor any reference to what the student learned in the PMEE at CGSC. There is no cultivation as discussed by either Perez or understanding from ADRP 6-22. Where is the internal struggle on character? Where is the exposure to heterogeneity and challenging arguments that respect or churning on another’s (possibly superior) ethical argument? It is not reflected in the student comments.

Also missing are any remarks in the vein of Rorty or Habermas and their integration of reason and religion or purely aspirational remarks harkening back to Lewis. Statements related to or rooted in divine writ are completely absent even though the opening quote itself referenced the Jewish and Christian story of David and Goliath. Perhaps the survey is not the proper medium to elicit this kind of feedback.

**Summation: Bringing the Data Together**

In total then, what has my survey provided? Majors report high levels of unit training and high levels of experienced ethical quandaries also. This may explain a desire
for more training at the unit level and a greater connection to military virtues. These training data points suggest that Olsthoorn’s philosophy of updated virtues more closely matches what mid-grade professionals have and may identify where they are at currently. Responses also show these individuals want ethics training to be a reoccurring event from initial entry and throughout a soldier or officer’s career, seeing it as an integral function of leadership.

Secondly, CGSC students report higher levels of partaking in or witnessing unethical acts against non-combatants. However, with the exception of verbal abuse, these infractions are less than 25 percent. By itself, this does not seem cause for alarm as again, this survey covered the entirety of their career. What it does allow for is a rich body of case studies or hypothetical scenarios that at least a few members of a staff group can personally identify. Taking this fact, PMEE case studies could be an excellent start point (or in the parlance of the CGSC adult learning model: a concrete experience) to teaching ethics. Having this information then does not eliminate any of the philosophical models (e.g. deontology, teleology, virtue ethics), instructional methods (i.e. functional, aspirational, or a mix), or ethical roadmaps provided by the authors in chapter 2 (i.e. Challans, Wertheimer, Lewis, etc).

Finally, attitudes towards non-combatants provide what I believe to be the most important information towards locating a start point. Almost 90 percent received clear ethical instruction from their leadership prohibiting mistreatment of non-combatants. A full 90 percent or more of CGSC students agree with reporting various violations of ethical standards (rates far greater than the CAPE study or the MHAT IV study). This points to the plausible argument that these mid-grade professionals have integrated an
openness to functional instruction that is executing proper behavior based upon training. Yet, there is ample evidence that also suggests a need for aspirational instruction requirements due to “moral schizophrenia.”

As shown in section three of this chapter, while 14 percent believe that torture is permissible to save the life of a soldier, just 3 percent indicate they would not risk their own safety to help a non-combatant in danger. Additionally, as mentioned from table 12, Majors exhibit a standard distribution of responses on the ability to distinguish non-combatants from insurgents. Combining these statistics with the qualitative answers shows that CGSC students are indeed struggling internally with ethical action on the battlefield. But, given the feedback on curriculum provided in chapter 2, they have not been able to channel that struggle into growth. The “tensions” that Carrick mentions seem to still exist, but lie under the surface. Taking all of this into account, I move to my main supposition in chapter 5.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

We do not have an understanding of the ethical start point for students entering the Command and General Staff Officers College. We do not know how mid-career U.S. military professionals are postured ethically to think about non-combatants given pervasive ethical heterogeneity. We have philosophies on teaching, declared outcomes, a curriculum guided by ethics experts and the Deputy Commandant of the school, and faculty and student feedback. We do not know if students, be they American, international, or interagency, leave with an increased or decreased moral or ethical core. We only know if they understood and liked or disliked the course. This chapter contains my interpretations of the data presented in chapter 4 in light of my own personal and professional experiences and in the lenses of selected authors from the literature review in chapter 2. Shortfalls of my research are annotated, recommendations are made for further study, and I conclude with my own personal ruminations.

Interpretation of the Data

Perhaps the problem with PMEE at CGSC is that it does not go much beyond the functional instruction. Does it encourage an officer to “genuinely relate to another person’s situation, motives, and feelings” as called for in ADRP 6-22 (supra)? Does it demand “that the soldier cultivate and exercise a certain attitude” as noted by Perez? Does it combine the religious and the secular as Rorty and Habermas suggest? Does it call for an intrinsic value or a commonality that Lewis argues is essential? No, it does
not. Why? I proffer that Olsthoorn and Wertheimer are right, the former for junior soldiers and officers and the latter for Majors.

Looking at all of the data, from my survey, to the MHAT IV, to the CAPE study, it appears that Olsthoorn has categorized the current state of affairs very accurately for entry level soldiers and officers. Given the heterogeneity of incoming members of the military, instilling updated values such as honor must begin in a functional instruction way. If not already possessed, junior members are exposed to knowledge of ethics, but only time will transform this into inculcation. This explains common levels of reporting of received training between my study and the MHAT IV, but higher levels of Majors willing to report infractions. This also explains why Majors would be more than twice as likely to risk their lives for non-combatants and are twice as likely as MHAT IV respondents to indicate non-combatants are worthy of being treated with dignity and respect. The CGSC students have transformed from knowing about Army Values to living them.

But what of my initial finding in the summation of chapter 4 that CGSC students want Olsthoorn’s method of ethics instruction? I theorize they want this for their units and the data in the preceding paragraph supports this. However, not verbalized but inferred from data in chapter 4, they want or need Wertheimer for themselves. Experience and training has brought forth, at the mid-grade level, the professionalism that Wertheimer argues is vital, but the character development is lacking. This then is the true start point for mid-grade professionals.

How are mid-career U.S. military professionals postured ethically to think about non-combatants given pervasive ethical heterogeneity? Answer: the average CGSC
student is in line with Olsthoorn’s observation. They have accepted over time, choice, and experience a virtue education updated for a modern military, but primarily in a functional way that enhances their performance on the battlefield. They come with a modified behavior, but not a modified character. Thoughts on non-combatants or ethical heterogeneity are not in accord with ADRP 6-22’s empathy or Wertheimer’s struggle and humility.

Without abandoning the functional touchstones, a greater mixture of aspirational teaching appears to be needed. This is not without difficulty. Entering into the realm of aspirational brings in an unspoken religious component that the British generalship deems foundational but Challans regards as abhorrent. Both the curriculum and the instructors must be like Icarus. If they fly too high and reach to the heavenly and theological, some students will complain of religious indoctrination. If they fly too low, the instruction will be washed away without the deep introspection required. This testifies to Wolfendale’s observation that aspirational teaching is harder and requires experts to administer. Some faculty members feel uncomfortable teaching this material. Two-thirds of professors agreed or strongly agreed that they “felt qualified to teach ethics lessons to CGSOC students” (Command and General Staff College 2012b) but anecdotal conversations indicated that they were also uncomfortable teaching ethics; a question not surveyed.

As indicated, with the data both in quantitative and qualitative form, the overall message—with a few glaring outliers—from the CGSC survey is one of doing the right thing, but needing additional assistance in being the right officer. Over a quarter of CGSC students encountered ethical situations in which they did not know how to respond. Over
half desire more training on the connection between military values and conduct. However, their qualitative answers, while spanning an array of beliefs, indicate an inchoate character development.\(^{17}\) We have the professional, now we need to add the humility to produce character and erase—or minimize further—blatant infractions. CGSC clearly seems to be the right locale for this education. Since CGSC students rely on their own opinions and experiences, rather than current Army doctrine or curriculum instruction, applying Wertheimer’s model at this level then seems appropriate. Doing so would force students to explain and defend their beliefs and creeds. It would expose them to attitudes and philosophies far different from their own, possibly and even preferably in a very humbling way. It would mandate the kind of exposure that Habermas, Rorty, Lewis, Perez, and ADRP 6-22 contend is necessary; all in a fashion that Wertheimer acknowledges produces “surrender”. Not to the point of failure and giving up, but rather to forge and purify an ethic that can then lead others with confidence. One that truly postures them to think ethically about non-combatants in a manner beyond rote memorization of rules, but in a manner befitting an officer of character.

**Shortfalls and Recommendations**

More research is needed with a higher level of response to achieve statistical significance. Also, with a larger survey sample, correlations and better quantitative analysis could bring forth a richer understanding of where students are located on the ethical map, perhaps even further explaining how they got there. My survey did ask questions regarding exposure to death and combat but with such a low n-level, I did not

\(^{17}\) Of course absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.
feel confident in attempting quantitative correlation statistics since the sampling error
would be high (see footnote 14). Such analysis was conducted by the MHAT IV and the
CAPE studies. Further research utilizing CGSC students is necessary to test my
conclusions on a start point and theorizations. I would have preferred a stronger footing
to stand on in regards to claims on ethical heterogeneity and recommendations vis-à-vis
ethical instruction. Maybe, through added examination, other poignant observations, such
as Reiman’s opinion on psychological heuristics on the presumption of innocence could
be reinforced.

As a final note, Major Phillip Breton simultaneously conducted the same survey
that I administered, but with International Students of CGSOC (covering both 13-02 and
14-01). At the time of publishing, his analysis was ongoing, but the initial data seems to
indicate international officers, on the average, report higher levels of ethical situations in
which they do not know how to respond, but commensurate levels of training exposure
and inclinations to report infractions. Interesting while the sum total of positive
responses is similar (strongly agree plus agree), the intensity of responses for these two
categories is typically higher. For example in my study for the question “Members of my
unit received training in the proper treatment of non-combatants” 29 percent strongly
agreed and 57 percent agreed (total=86 percent) but the international response was 57
percent strongly agree and 33 percent agree (total=90 percent). For the question “Injuring
or killing an innocent non-combatant by a member of my unit should be reported”
American CGSC students responded 62 percent strongly agree and 32 percent agree
(total=94 percent) whereas international students responded 78 percent strongly agree and
20 percent agree (total=98 percent) (Breton, 2013).
International students also appeared, as a whole, to be less neutral in their attitudes towards torture. When asked if they approved of it to save the life of a fellow servicemember, 19 percent strongly agreed or agreed (versus 16 percent for American CGSC students) but 62 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed (versus 48 percent for American CGSC students). The split was even more pronounced with using torture to gather intelligence. From that question, 16 percent of the international students agreed (none strongly agreed) to its use, as compared to 8 percent of the U.S. students (agreed or strongly agreed), but 70 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed as compared to 56 percent of the U.S. students (Breton 2013).

If anything, his data complicates my analysis. At first glance, it appears that international students (again as an aggregate group) receive more functional instruction on the importance of following the rules. This would explain stronger intensities of response for training and reporting violations of rules. But they are more bimodal regarding attitudes like thoughts on torture. Perhaps the easiest answer is that this is a factor of home-country culture and government and has a geographic or political component, but the distinction is hidden due to surveying international students as a whole. However, just as my survey n-level was low, so was Major Breton’s so statistical significance could not be achieved. Additionally, as his data confirms, these surveys should be given to international and interagency students18 to test incoming and outgoing behaviors and attitudes.

18Although this would be admittedly difficult given the very small number of interagency scholars attending CGSC. Perhaps a solution would be to survey the population of interagency students that applied to CGSC?
Conclusion

During the first block of ethics instruction at CGSC, I vociferously protested the teaching of ethics arguing that, before knowing the terms, we were just teaching functional rules and not aspirational character change. I agree with many of the main points of Robert Wertheimer. Properly teaching ethics is difficult and liberating, professional and “schizoid”. But the internal churn, the external defense of your own ideals and creeds, the subjection to counterargument produces a beautiful word not heard much in professional circles: humility. CGSC should aspire to teach this growth, not just to Majors, but to their professors, to international and interagency students, and to the Combined Arms Center writ large. Recent front page headlines regarding transgressions of senior military personnel were not made because officers did not sufficiently understand Napoleons’ Battalion Carré or Kant’s Categorical Imperative. They were made because of errors in character. It seems Lieutenant General Perkins was right all along.
Thank you for taking the time to complete the survey on Battlefield Ethics. I am Major Chris Ellis. I am attending the US Army Command and General Staff Officer Course. I am conducting this survey to help the completion of my academic research and publication for the Local Dynamics of War Scholar’s Program.

The survey should take approximately 15 minutes to complete.

The purpose of this survey is to gain insight into a subset of ethical norms within the American portion of the CGSC student body. The results will be compared against the survey findings of the Military Health Advisory Team IV, conducted in Iraq in 2006. The purpose is to identify similarities and differences between the two sets of responses. The comparison will be used to make recommendations and identify opportunities for future research.

Your participation is voluntary and your responses are confidential. Only aggregate data will be reported.

Should you have any questions regarding the content of this survey, please contact me at (omitted). If you have technical questions about the survey, contact Ralph P. Reed, CGSC QAO, ralph.p.reed.civ@mail.mil.

For questions about the study itself or if you would like a completed copy of the study when complete, please feel free contact me at (omitted).

This survey has been reviewed by CGSC Institutional Research. The Survey Control Number is 14-10-018.
What is your gender?
{Choose one}
( ) Male  ( ) Female

What is your branch of service?
{Choose one}
( ) Army  ( ) Navy  ( ) Air Force  ( ) Marine

What is your primary component?
{Choose one}
( ) Active Duty  ( ) Reserve  ( ) National Guard
( ) Other [ ]

What is your rank?
{Choose one}
( ) Captain (O3)  ( ) Major (O4)  ( ) Lieutenant-Colonel (O5)
( ) Other [ ]

What is your MOS by war-fighting function?
{Choose one}
( ) Movement and Maneuver  ( ) Intelligence
( ) Fires  ( ) Sustainment
( ) Command and Control  ( ) Protection

What is your highest level of civilian education?
{Choose one}
( ) Bachelor’s Degree  ( ) Master’s Degree  ( ) Doctorate Degree

Page 3

How many times did you deploy for more than 30 days to any of the following?

Iraq (OIF)
{Choose one}
( ) Never  ( ) Once  ( ) Twice
( ) Three Times or More

Kuwait or Qatar (OIF)
{Choose one}
( ) Never  ( ) Once  ( ) Twice
( ) Three Times or More
Afghanistan (OEF)
{Choose one}
( ) Never ( ) Once ( ) Twice
( ) Three Times or More

Bosnia/Kosovo (Peacekeeping)
{Choose one}
( ) Never ( ) Once ( ) Twice
( ) Three Times or More

Korea
{Choose one}
( ) Never ( ) Once ( ) Twice
( ) Three Times or More

Training (JRTC, NTC, CMTC)
{Choose one}
( ) Never ( ) Once ( ) Twice
( ) Three Times or More

Other
{Choose one}
( ) Never ( ) Once ( ) Twice
( ) Three Times or More

Please identify the location(s) of your deployment(s).
{Enter answer in paragraph form}
[
]

Page 4

What is your LEVEL of agreement or disagreement with the following quote:
“Conduct your war in the presence of noncombatants on the other side with the same care as if your citizens were the noncombatants....By wearing the uniform, you take on yourself a risk that is borne only by those who have been trained to injure others (and to protect themselves). You should not shift this risk onto those who haven’t been trained, who lack the capacity to injure; whether they are brothers or others. The moral justification for this requirement lies in the idea that violence is evil, and that we should limit the scope of violence as much as is realistically possible. As a soldier, you are asked to take an extra risk for the sake of limiting the scope of war. Combatants are the Davids and Goliaths of their communities.” ~ Avishai Margalit & Michael Walzer, 2009
{Choose one}
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral
( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
What are your thoughts on the above quote?
{Enter answer in paragraph form}

Page 5

Please select your LEVEL of agreement or disagreement with the following statements:

Members of my unit received training that made it clear how they should behave toward non-combatants.
{Choose one}
( ) Strongly Agree   ( ) Agree   ( ) Neutral
( ) Disagree   ( ) Strongly Disagree

Members of my unit received training in the proper treatment of non-combatants.
{Choose one}
( ) Strongly Agree   ( ) Agree   ( ) Neutral
( ) Disagree   ( ) Strongly Disagree

Training in proper treatment of non-combatants was adequate.
{Choose one}
( ) Strongly Agree   ( ) Agree   ( ) Neutral
( ) Disagree   ( ) Strongly Disagree

I encountered ethical situations on operations in which I did not know how to respond.
{Choose one}
( ) Strongly Agree   ( ) Agree   ( ) Neutral
( ) Disagree   ( ) Strongly Disagree

Page 6

Please select your LEVEL of agreement or disagreement with the following statements:

Non-combatants should be treated as insurgents.
{Choose one}
( ) Strongly Agree   ( ) Agree   ( ) Neutral
( ) Disagree   ( ) Strongly Disagree

I can distinguish non-combatants from insurgents.
{Choose one}
( ) Strongly Agree   ( ) Agree   ( ) Neutral
( ) Disagree   ( ) Strongly Disagree

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Torture is permissible if it will save the life of a Soldier/Marine.
[Choose one]
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree  ( ) Neutral
( ) Disagree  ( ) Strongly Disagree

Torture is permissible in order to gather intelligence about insurgents.
[Choose one]
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree  ( ) Neutral
( ) Disagree  ( ) Strongly Disagree

Non-combatants should be treated with dignity / respect.
[Choose one]
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree  ( ) Neutral
( ) Disagree  ( ) Strongly Disagree

I would risk my own safety to help a non-combatant in danger.
[Choose one]
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree  ( ) Neutral
( ) Disagree  ( ) Strongly Disagree

The leadership in my unit made it clear that non-combatants must not be mistreated.
[Choose one]
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree  ( ) Neutral
( ) Disagree  ( ) Strongly Disagree

Mistreatment of a non-combatant by a member of my unit should be reported.
[Choose one]
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree  ( ) Neutral
( ) Disagree  ( ) Strongly Disagree

Injuring or killing an innocent non-combatant by a member of my unit should be reported.
[Choose one]
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree  ( ) Neutral
( ) Disagree  ( ) Strongly Disagree

Unnecessarily destroying private property by a member of my unit should be reported.
[Choose one]
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree  ( ) Neutral
( ) Disagree  ( ) Strongly Disagree

Stealing from a non-combatant by a member of my unit should be reported.
[Choose one]
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree  ( ) Neutral
( ) Disagree  ( ) Strongly Disagree
A member of my unit who violates the Rules of Engagement my unit should be reported. 
(Choose one)  
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree  ( ) Neutral  
( ) Disagree  ( ) Strongly Disagree

A unit member who doesn’t follow General Orders should be reported. 
(Choose one)  
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree  ( ) Neutral  
( ) Disagree  ( ) Strongly Disagree

Page 7

During your deployments did you ever observe or experience the following?

Military personnel verbally abusing non-combatants. 
(Choose one)  
( ) Never  ( ) Once  ( ) A Few Times (2-4)  
( ) Several Times (5 or more)

Military personnel damaging private property when it was not necessary. 
(Choose one)  
( ) Never  ( ) Once  ( ) A Few Times (2-4)  
( ) Several Times (5 or more)

Military personnel physically abuse a non-combatant when it was not necessary. 
(Choose one)  
( ) Never  ( ) Once  ( ) A Few Times (2-4)  
( ) Several Times (5 or more)

Witnessed the mistreatment of a non-combatant by a unit member. 
(Choose one)  
( ) Never  ( ) Once  ( ) A Few Times (2-4)  
( ) Several Times (5 or more)

Know of a military member who stopped a fellow military member from mistreating a non-combatant. 
(Choose one)  
( ) Never  ( ) Once  ( ) A Few Times (2-4)  
( ) Several Times (5 or more)

Know of members of your unit who ‘modified’ the Rules of Engagement in order to accomplish the mission. 
(Choose one)  
( ) Never  ( ) Once  ( ) A Few Times (2-4)  
( ) Several Times (5 or more)
Know of members of your unit who “ignored” the Rules of Engagement in order to accomplish the mission.

(Choose one)

( ) Never  ( ) Once  ( ) A Few Times (2-4)
( ) Several Times (5 or more)

Page 8

Please indicate if you have participated in the following activities:

My unit received training on professional military values and the importance of disciplined, professional conduct in combat.

(Choose one)

( ) Yes  ( ) No

My unit received training in the proper (ethical) treatment of non-combatants.

(Choose one)

( ) Yes  ( ) No

Please indicate the level of your agreement or disagreement with the following statements.

The ethics training that my unit received was useful during my deployment.

(Choose one)

( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree  ( ) Neutral
( ) Disagree  ( ) Strongly Disagree

The ethics training that my unit received changed the way I made decisions.

(Choose one)

( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree  ( ) Neutral
( ) Disagree  ( ) Strongly Disagree

Please indicate the level of your agreement or disagreement with the following statement.

My unit could have benefited from more training on professional military values and the importance of disciplined, professional conduct in combat.

(Choose one)

( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree  ( ) Neutral
( ) Disagree  ( ) Strongly Disagree

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In your opinion, at what level should training on professional military values and the importance of disciplined, professional conduct in combat be delivered?

(Enter answer in paragraph form)

[ ]
What kind of ethics training would you like to see delivered at CGSC?

{Enter answer in paragraph form}

[ ]

Please provide any additional comments (voluntary).

{Enter answer in paragraph form}

[ ]

As an International Officer attending CGSC, please share what, if any, ethics training is conducted by your nation’s military.

{Enter answer in paragraph form}

[ ]

Page 10

How often did you experience any of the following?

Being attacked or ambushed (including IEDs)

{Choose one}

( ) Never  ( ) Once  ( ) Two to Four Times  ( ) Five Times or More

Seeing destroyed homes and villages

{Choose one}

( ) Never  ( ) Once  ( ) Two to Four Times  ( ) Five Times or More

Handling or uncovering human remains

{Choose one}

( ) Never  ( ) Once  ( ) Two to Four Times  ( ) Five Times or More

Seeing dead or seriously injured Americans/Coalition

{Choose one}

( ) Never  ( ) Once  ( ) Two to Four Times  ( ) Five Times or More

Knowing someone seriously injured or killed

{Choose one}

( ) Never  ( ) Once  ( ) Two to Four Times  ( ) Five Times or More

Having hostile reactions from civilians

{Choose one}

( ) Never  ( ) Once  ( ) Two to Four Times  ( ) Five Times or More
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Choose one</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disarming civilians</strong></td>
<td>(Never) (Once) (Two to Four Times) (Five Times or More)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Being in threatening situations where you were unable to respond because of rules of engagement</strong></td>
<td>(Never) (Once) (Two to Four Times) (Five Times or More)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shooting or directing fire at the enemy</strong></td>
<td>(Never) (Once) (Two to Four Times) (Five Times or More)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Clearing/Searchng homes, buildings, caves, or bunkers</strong></td>
<td>(Never) (Once) (Two to Four Times) (Five Times or More)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Witnessing brutality/mistreatment toward non-combatants</strong></td>
<td>(Never) (Once) (Two to Four Times) (Five Times or More)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Being wounded/injured</strong></td>
<td>(Never) (Once) (Two to Four Times) (Five Times or More)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Seeing ill/injured women or children who you were unable to help</strong></td>
<td>(Never) (Once) (Two to Four Times) (Five Times or More)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Receiving incoming artillery, rocket, or mortar fire</strong></td>
<td>(Never) (Once) (Two to Four Times) (Five Times or More)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Being directly responsible for the death of an enemy combatant</strong></td>
<td>(Never) (Once) (Two to Four Times) (Five Times or More)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Observing abuse of Laws of War/Geneva Convention
Choose one
( ) Never ( ) Once ( ) Two to Four Times ( ) Five Times or More

Had a close call, was shot or hit but protective gear saved you
Choose one
( ) Never ( ) Once ( ) Two to Four Times ( ) Five Times or More

Had a buddy shot or hit who was near you
Choose one
( ) Never ( ) Once ( ) Two to Four Times ( ) Five Times or More

Informed unit members/friends of a Service Member’s death
Choose one
( ) Never ( ) Once ( ) Two to Four Times ( ) Five Times or More

Successfully engaged the enemy
Choose one
( ) Never ( ) Once ( ) Two to Four Times ( ) Five Times or More

Encountered grateful civilians
Choose one
( ) Never ( ) Once ( ) Two to Four Times ( ) Five Times or More

Provided aid to the wounded
Choose one
( ) Never ( ) Once ( ) Two to Four Times ( ) Five Times or More

Saved the life of a Service Member or civilian
Choose one
( ) Never ( ) Once ( ) Two to Four Times ( ) Five Times or More

Thank you for taking the time to complete the survey on Battlefield Ethics. In order to ensure that your results are registered, please select the “FINISH” button at the bottom of the survey page.
I am conducting this survey to help the completion of my academic research and publication for the Local Dynamics of War Scholar’s Program. The data and analysis are not authorized to be used for other research purposes.

Should you have any questions regarding the content of this survey, please contact me at (omitted). If you have technical questions about the survey, contact Ralph P. Reed, CGSC QAO, ralph.p.reed.civ@mail.mil.

If you would like a copy of the study once it has been completed, please feel free contact me at the above email address.
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