WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH: MAXIMIZING UNITY OF EFFORT BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD), DEPARTMENT OF STATE (DOS), AND THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (USAID)

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

OTHA J. HOLMES, MAJ, USA
B.S., East Carolina University, Greenville, North Carolina 2002

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2013-02

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Whole of Government: Maximizing Unity of Effort between the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DoS), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
Name of Candidate: Major Otha J. Holmes

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Approved by:

________________________________________, Thesis Committee Chair
LTC Paul F. Schmidt, MSIR

________________________________________, Member
Joseph Babb, Ph.D.

________________________________________, Member
Russell B. Crumrine, M.A.

Accepted this 13th day of December 2013 by:

________________________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH: MAXIMIZING UNITY OF EFFORT BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD), DEPARTMENT OF STATE (DOS), AND THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (USAID), by MAJ Oltha J. Holmes, 109 pages.

The USG has not effectively managed interagency collaboration in recent decades. The USG will face complex challenges in the future where it will be necessary to utilize all instruments of national power to their capacity. A coordinated interagency effort must be established and supported prior to U.S. intervention to ensure success. The purpose of this study is to identify challenges and shortfalls in interagency collaboration in order to recommend changes and implementations. The literature supports the concept of expanding interagency organizations like the JIACG to conduct pre-conflict training, execute strategic objectives through tactical means, and maintain reachback capabilities to assist collaboration between DoS and DoD. Using a qualitative method to determine positive and negative aspects of interagency actions, processes, and policies, the selected case studies illustrate the enduring nature of interagency challenges. The results of the case studies show gaps in the whole of government approach that are rectifiable but does not yet have the essential governmental support which is untenable considering the alternative of prolonged interventions, waste of funding, and loss of personnel to conflict. It is prudent for the USG to become more efficient by increasing interagency collaboration to gain maximum utility from the instruments of national power.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILLUSTRATIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Need for Unity of Effort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whole-of-Government Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD and DoS Interagency Relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Research Question</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Research Questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Directives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint and Army Doctrine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allison’s Models</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model I (Rational Actor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model II (Organizational Behavior)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model III (Bureaucratic Politics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# CHAPTER 4 CASE STUDIES AND ANALYSIS .................................36

- Primary Research Question.................................................................36
- Whole of Government Approach in Vietnam........................................36
- Overview of the CORDS Program.........................................................40
- PATs, DATs, and CATs ........................................................................44
- Analysis..................................................................................................47
- Operation Iraqi Freedom........................................................................51
- Overview of the ORHA Programs ..........................................................53
- Creation of the Coalition Provisional Authority.....................................56
- Provincial Reconstruction Teams ............................................................61
- Analysis..................................................................................................63
- Summary...............................................................................................64

# CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION..................................................................66

- Way Ahead: JIACG ..............................................................................66
- Recommendations................................................................................67
  - Doctrine..............................................................................................69
  - Organization ......................................................................................72
  - Training ..............................................................................................74
  - Material ..............................................................................................78
  - Leadership and Education .................................................................80
  - Personnel ............................................................................................82
  - Facilities ............................................................................................83
- Summary...............................................................................................84
- Recommendations for Further Study .................................................85

- Glossary...............................................................................................87

- BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................91
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAT</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCDR</td>
<td>Combatant Commanders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCO</td>
<td>Complex Contingency Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDCS</td>
<td>Country Developments Cooperation Strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>United States Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>Command and General Staff College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDG</td>
<td>Civilian Irregular Defense Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMOC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Operations Centers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COCOM</td>
<td>Combatant Commands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORDS</td>
<td>Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Coalition Provisional Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAT</td>
<td>District Advisory Teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOTMLPF</td>
<td>Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education, Personnel, and Facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ePRT</td>
<td>Embedded PRTs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSI</td>
<td>Foreign Service Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GVN</td>
<td>Government of Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HN</td>
<td>Host Nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSC</td>
<td>Homeland Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPI</td>
<td>Indigenous Populations and Institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRRF1</td>
<td>Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITEA</td>
<td>Interagency Training Education and After Action Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCIDS</td>
<td>Joint Capabilities Integration Development System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIACG</td>
<td>Joint Interagency Coordination Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIATF</td>
<td>Joint Interagency Task Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>Joint Publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MACV</td>
<td>Military Assistance Command, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDU</td>
<td>National Defense University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLF</td>
<td>National Liberation Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTHCOM</td>
<td>United States Northern Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSPD</td>
<td>National Security Presidential Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCO</td>
<td>Office of Civil Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIF</td>
<td>Operation Iraqi Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMB</td>
<td>Office of Management and Budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>Operational Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPR</td>
<td>Office of Primary Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORHA</td>
<td>Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PACOM United States Pacific Command
PAT Provincial Advisory Teams
PDD Presidential Decision Directive
PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team
QDDR Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review
SA Security Assistance
SASO Security and Stability Operations
S/CRS Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
SOCOM United States Special Operations Command
SOUTHCOM United States Southern Command
SSTR Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction
TSCP Theater Security Cooperation Plan
TTP Tactics Techniques and Procedures
UJTL Universal Joint Task List
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USD(P) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
USG United States Government
USJFCOM United States Joint Forces Command
VC Viet Cong
ILLUSTRATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne) (Special Operations)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5</td>
<td>Structure of U.S. Mission Showing Position of CORDS, May 1967</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6</td>
<td>Notional Joint Interagency Coordination Group Structure</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 1. Allison's Models for Government Decision Making Summary Outline of Models and Concepts</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

xii
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

I believe the military should be wary of diplomacy until war is declared; then the State Department should keep its nose out and let the military do whatever is necessary to win.

— Stuart Symington, Brainy Quote

The problem is, when you're working with orchestras, you only get the orchestra for about two hours before the performance to pull it all together, and that doesn't sound like a real collaboration.

— Andrew Bird, Quote Library

The United States Government (USG) has been involved in limited and total wars for over 200 years. The Obama Administration instituted a whole-of-government’ approach in the 2010 National Security Strategy because of the lessons learned from the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars. “The strategy calls for integrated government agency participation to ensure national security.” Planning at the strategic level has since become well integrated and documented but how does the USG operationalize this strategy to the lowest level to ensure instruments of national power have been maximized and vulnerabilities have been mitigated?

“To move ahead in whole-of-government collaboration, civilian, and military designers and planners must gain familiarity with each other’s learning methodologies, understand the common assumptions underlying all of them, and work together to employ the most relevant parts of each to create hybrid problem-solving schemes for

each unique set of circumstances they confront.”2 “After 9/11, immediate recognition developed within the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) that non-DoD agencies would play major, if not primary, role in Global War on Terrorism. The goal of this study is to illustrate a framework to improve interagency cooperation though the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) or equivalent organization3 to achieve unity of effort between the DoD and DoS equities in order to maximize the Whole of Government approach. First, the study traces developments in interagency cooperation, including the initial obstacles faced, between DoD, DoS and USAID during the U.S/Vietnam War and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Second, the study highlights the most significant obstacles facing DoS’ and DoD’s cooperative efforts in the current environment. Finally, to achieve lasting unity of effort between DoD and DoS, the study concludes with a recommendation for an interagency policy directive that includes strategic guidance for future JIACGs.

Background

President Barack Obama afforded three pages of the 2010 NSS to the importance of updating, balancing, and integrating all of the tools of American power within a whole-of-government approach; this elucidates the importance his administration places


3Hereafter any mention of JIACG includes and is synonymous to any interagency organization at the operational level.
on the subject. The National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44 recognized the need for improvement in coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization efforts for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife. This directive established the Secretary of State as the lead to coordinate and integrate USG efforts involving all US Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities to plan, prepare, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities. It also directed Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense to integrate stability and reconstruction contingency plans and activities and harmonize efforts with US Military plans and operations when relevant and appropriate.

A look at NSPD 44 and the DoD Directive 3000.05 illustrates the dangers of a piecemeal approach to reform. Issued in December 2005, NSPD 44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, established the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization in the Department of State. NSPD 44 established a focal point to coordinate the multiple entities of the government in order to achieve maximum effect in our efforts to assist foreign states and regions facing the threat of civil strife or recovering from conflict. However, the directive failed to provide


6 Ibid.

the Coordinator with clear authority over other government entities and did not provide
the resources necessary to implement the concept. Attempts by the Coordinator to obtain
the authorities and appropriations from Congress that would put meat on the bones of the
directive were unsuccessful and after nearly 18 months, there had been only minimal
progress. In November 2005, a month prior to the launch of NSPD 44, the Secretary of
Defense approved DoD Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security,
Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations. For the first time, this directive
established stability operations as a core mission of equal priority to combat operations
within DoD. The directive states “Many stability operations tasks are best performed by
indigenous, foreign, or US civilian professionals.” The directive acknowledges that this
mission is best performed by civilian professionals but requires our military to be
prepared to perform these tasks when the civilians cannot do so. So two separate entities
are attempting to build the capacity to perform stability operations, DoS as the US
government’s primary effort and DoD as a second or temporary option. However, many
USG civilian agencies lack the capability and capacity to respond to the level that is
necessary for these types of operations. Building partnership capacity within the civilian
agencies and integrating military activities with civilian activities is critical to ensure

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8Dahl, 5.
9Ibid.
10Ibid.
11USJFCOM, Military Participation in the Interagency Management System.
12Ibid.
unity of effort in such operations.\textsuperscript{13} Given the progress made with NSPD 44 to date and the ability of DoD to respond to this new mission there is a real danger that the civilian capability will never materialize.\textsuperscript{14}

The tremendous manpower and massive budget of the DoD provides great flexibility and the ability to manage risk in some areas in order to provide resources for unforeseen requirements.\textsuperscript{15} As compared to DoS, the Pentagon has significantly greater resources available to implement their directive and it will outpace NSPD 44.\textsuperscript{16} Furthermore, DoD will incorporate this new mission into their legislative agenda and in a wartime environment is far more likely than DoS equities to obtain the authorities and resources from Congress. The legislative affairs apparatus of Defense dwarfs that of State and their relationship with lawmakers is stronger, more positive and yields better support.\textsuperscript{17} The fact of the matter is that the Secretary of Defense has put more energy behind this second option than the Secretary of State has put behind the primary effort. There is a real danger that NSPD 44 will never achieve a robust capability and that, by default, DoD will become the lead agent for stability operations. We should not launch independent initiatives in separate departments that are not tied to a larger holistic package. The bottom line is a piecemeal approach will not work.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{13}USJFCOM, \textit{Military Participation in the Interagency Management System}.

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{16}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{17}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{18}Ibid.
In early 2006, the DoD recognized the deficiencies in interagency cooperation at the combatant command level where the confluence of interagency coordination and operational planning and execution takes place.\textsuperscript{19} The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) tasked the Commander of United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) to present a plan of action to the Secretary of Defense to improve interagency planning within combatant commands.\textsuperscript{20} The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) directed the plan of action to recommend improvements in stability operations, building partnership capacity, and planning for IW.\textsuperscript{21} The Secretary’s guidance to the Combatant Commanders stated, “JIACGs will be organized to provide interagency advice and expertise to Combatant Commanders and their staffs, coordinate interagency counterterrorism plans and objectives, and integrate military, interagency, and host-nation efforts.”\textsuperscript{22}

USJFCOM produced a plan of action based on a series of experiments conducted by the Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Directorate (J9). Their recommendations proposed that commands establish Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) to “coordinate with U.S. government civilian agencies conducting

\textsuperscript{19}David S. Doyle,” Interagency Cooperation for Irregular Warfare at the Combatant Command” (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 2009), 7.


\textsuperscript{21}Ibid.

operational planning in contingency operations” and support “day-to-day planning at the combatant commander headquarters.” The plan also stated that JIACGs should advise military planners regarding civilian agency operations, capabilities, and limitations.23

OSD received these recommendations and directed military efforts toward better interagency coordination by placing the USJFCOM recommendations into joint doctrine but did not force Combatant Commanders to standardize JIACG structure or functions.24

As a result, individual Combatant Commanders placed varying amounts of emphasis on JIACG effort and received varying amounts of support from interagency partners in the United States Government.25 Joint Publication (JP) 3-08 defines the JIACG as:

An interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of US Government civilian and military experts accredited to the combatant commander and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported joint force commander, the joint interagency coordination group provides the joint force commander with the capability to coordinate with other US Government civilian agencies and departments.26

USJFCOM describes JIACG as a full-time, multifunctional advisory element of the combatant commander’s staff that facilitates information sharing throughout the interagency community. Through habitual collaboration, it provides a means to integrate


24Ibid.

25Doyle, 7.

campaign-planning efforts at the strategic and operational levels and throughout all U.S. government agencies. The JIACG represents an important capability; thinking and operating collaboratively using networked systems and providing an interagency perspective in response to the operational environment. The vision of the JIACG is to improve relationships and leverage technology to enable analysis, understanding, coordination, and execution of unified actions. The JIACG is set to be the means for enhancing combatant command readiness by improving the pace and quality of interagency coordination and execution at the operational level.

The Need for Unity of Effort

According to JP 3-08, meeting the challenges of current and future operations requires the concerted effort of all instruments of US national power plus foreign governmental agencies and military forces and civilian organizations. Within the USG alone, achieving unity of effort is often complicated by organizational “stovepiping,” crisis-driven planning, and divergent organizational processes and cultures. These differences have certain benefits, but are not well suited for addressing the range of conventional and irregular challenges that cut across available organizational expertise. Problems arise when each USG agency interprets National Security Council (NSC) and

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27 USJFCOM, “USJFCOM Fact Sheet.”


29 Ibid.

30 JCS, JP 3-08, I-4.
Homeland Security Council (HSC) policy guidance differently, sets different priorities for execution, and does not act in concert. These issues are exacerbated by the competing interests and practices of participating foreign governments and military forces, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and private sector entities. Because USAID does not fall under the DoD’s chain of command or vice versa, DoD and USAID have a coordinating relationship vice a direct command relationship.

Consequently, there is a need to conduct integrated planning to effectively employ the appropriate instruments of national power. A comprehensive approach seeks to stimulate a cooperative culture within a collaborative environment, while facilitating a shared understanding of the situation. In its simplest form, a comprehensive approach should invigorate existing processes and strengthen interorganizational relationships. This approach should forward the respective goals of all parties; ensuring stakeholders do not negate or contradict the efforts of others.

31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
34 JCS, JP 3-08, I-4.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
Whole-of-Government Approach

Within the USG, elements aspire to a whole-of-government approach. This approach implies the integration of USG efforts with a plan that identifies and aligns USG goals, objectives, tasks, and supporting structures, with designation of lead, primary, coordinating, cooperating, and supporting federal agencies. This approach may also be used to refer to formally USG-agreed structures and processes intended to facilitate whole-of-government efforts. Well-integrated USG operations and relationships, preferably using a whole-of-government approach, will facilitate USG engagement with non-USG stakeholders, fostering a broader comprehensive approach to security.

This study focuses on how DoD collaborates with DoS equities under a Whole of Government approach to solving conflicts. JP 3-0 points out that presidential directives guide participation by all U.S. civilian and military agencies in operations requiring civil-military integration. In December 2005, National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44 designates the Department of State (DoS) as the lead agency

(i) to coordinate and strengthen efforts of the United States Government to prepare, plan for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization assistance and related activities in a range of situations that require the response capabilities of multiple United States Government entities and

(ii) to harmonize such efforts with U.S. military plans and operations. The relevant situations include complex emergencies and transitions, failing states, failed states, and environments across the spectrum of conflict, particularly those

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37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
involving transitions from peacekeeping and other military interventions. The response to these crises will include among others, activities relating to internal security, governance, and participation, social and economic well-being, and justice and reconciliation.40

Presented with the presidential directive, DoS established an Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), which was given a mandate by the National Security Council Principals to be the focal point for the U.S. Government on stabilization and reconstruction planning and operations.41 The S/CRS was seceded by the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) in 2011. The CSO increased DoS’ reconstruction and stabilization and its ability to synchronize government agencies through whole of government planning. While this research will focus specifically on interagency cooperation between DoD and DoS equities, it is important to note that USAID is an agency that falls directly under the DoS (see figure 1); thus any discussion of USAID will likely have an implicit reference to the DoS. The DoS and USAID share a common mission statement to—create a more secure, democratic, and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people and the international community.42


Although the DoS and USAID share a common mission statement, USAID is an agency with different capabilities than that of the DoS. While the DoS’ expertise is in diplomacy, USAID’s expertise is in disaster response, humanitarian assistance and development.\(^{43}\)

\(^{43}\)Nguyen, 8.
USAID is an autonomous agency under the policy direction of the Secretary of State. As of March 2012, the total estimated number of USAID employees stood at 3,909. USAID administers and directs the U.S. foreign economic assistance programs and acts as the lead Federal agency for U.S. foreign disaster assistance. It manages a network of country programs for economic and policy reforms that generates sound...
economic growth, encourages political freedom and good governance. Response to natural and manmade disasters is one of its primary missions.45

USAID coordinates with the DoD to address complex challenges in fragile states, particularly in conflict situations, to ensure that diplomatic, development and defense efforts are mutually reinforcing.46 Through a robust personnel exchange, the Agency hosts military officers at its headquarters, while USAID Foreign Service Officers are

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45 JCS, JP 3-08.

embedded at the Unified Combatant Commands and the Pentagon. USAID also staffs civilian Humanitarian Assistance Advisors at each of the Unified Combatant Commands and within the Joint Staff.47

DoD and DoS Interagency Relationship

US forces robust logistic and command and control (C2) capabilities are often essential to stability operations.48 Normally other agencies such as DoS or USAID are responsible for USG objectives, but lack logistic and C2 capabilities. Because of the imbalance between capability and responsibility, stability operations will likely support, or transition support to, US diplomatic, IGO, or Host Nation (HN) efforts.49 Military forces support the lead agency. US forces should be prepared to operate in integrated civilian-military teams that could include representatives from indigenous populations and institutions (IPI), IGOs, NGOs, and members of the private sector.50

47 Ibid.


49 Ibid.

50 Ibid.
Requests for DoD assets may originate with DoS equities such as the Ambassador, defense attaché, or security assistance (SA) organization chief, who passes the requests through the appropriate geographic combatant command to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The CJCS ensures proper interagency coordination.\textsuperscript{51} If the forces are available in theater from theater-assigned forces and there are no restrictions on their employment, the GCC can approve and support the request. If

\textsuperscript{51}JCS, JP 3-57, II-2.
insufficient Civil Affairs (CA) forces are available in theater, the GCC requests additional forces through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to either USSOCOM to validate requirements in support of SOF or to the Service components to validate requirements in support of conventional missions. SOF elements will generally fulfill the requirements of a Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) along with supporting enablers from the conventional forces.

**Primary Research Question**

What positive or negative aspects of previous interagency coordination exist that can be applied to the improvement of the current JIACG structure?

**Secondary Research Questions**

How can an expansion of a JIACG improve unity of effort between DoD and DoS?

What are the most significant obstacles facing the DoD and DoS cooperative efforts?

**Assumptions**

The U.S. will continue to engage in combat operations and stability missions for the foreseeable future. The need for improved interagency cooperation and use of soft power will continue to be at the forefront of the USG’s use of its instruments of power. Adequate U.S. government resources can be made available to support interagency

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cooperation and programs. Historical studies and their lessons are relevant and can be used to improve interagency cooperation.

**Limitations**

1. This study only addresses issues in the unclassified domain.
2. A second limitation is the willingness of military or DoS personnel to supply the research information.
3. A third limitation is a general lack of access to DoS personnel. This limitation was mitigated with access to public and private professional studies, Congressional testimonies, and professional journals that included firsthand accounts from DoS personnel.

**Summary**

There must be improved unity of effort between DoD and DoS equities. Despite recent publication of DoD, DoS, policy directives, interagency cooperation between these complementary agencies of hard and soft power is ad hoc and has room for improvement. Given the continued cooperation shortfalls and stove-piped efforts, these agencies must actively pursue additional measures to better coordinate efforts. An expansion of JIACG’s role and responsibilities must be pursued to enhance interagency cooperation between the DoD and DoS. Chapter 2 reviews the copious amount of literature written on unity of effort, whole of government and interagency coordination to identify issues and challenges with integration, interdependence, and execution between DoD and DoS. This will form the basis for addressing why an improved JIACG will enhance interagency cooperation.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Close cooperation with our interagency and international partners is an important element of success . . . Our Joint Interagency Coordination Group within the headquarters is an example of this new wave of integration.
— General John Abizaid, Commander, Annual Posture Statement

There has been extensive research on interagency collaboration analyzing the performance and effectiveness of interagency integration and interdependence during several military campaigns, most recently Iraq and Afghanistan. The thesis research includes Department of Defense doctrine, journals, policy directives, Congressional legislation, and scholarly research papers. While the literature identifies benefits and shortfalls of interagency collaboration at the strategic and operational levels of conflict, it fails to identify the feasibility of interagency cooperation at the tactical level. Most of the literature identifies issues or benefits from a collaboration strategy not tactical missions that support military operations and strategic objectives. Currently there are no examples that explain how to integrate interagency elements at the tactical level. This paper includes an examination of the most difficult steps involved in interagency collaboration at the lowest level and offers some ideas and examples to help the collaboration process using an improved JIACG structure.

National Strategy

A foundation for interagency collaboration has been established in order to streamline department policies and government reform. Interagency collaboration has been included in Presidential Directives as early as the Clinton Administration.
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, “Managing Complex Contingency Operations,” mandates reform in the joint/interagency coordination process. It recognizes that the United States will continue to conduct complex contingency operations (CCOs). Greater coordination is required to appropriately bring all instruments of national power to bear on all such operations.  

PDD 56 establishes the directive to conduct interagency cooperation but the process did not reach the initial desired end state until NSPD-1 was signed during the Bush Administration. “NSPD-1 was intended to improve the interagency structure, thereby addressing some of the shortcomings of previous attempts to institutionalize interagency coordination.” Joint doctrine for the coordination of military operations with US Government agencies can be found in JP 3-08. Its purpose serves to provide the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations.

**Policy Directives**

In December 2005, National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44 designates the DoS as the lead agency to coordinate and strengthen efforts of the United States Government agencies. This important initiative provided presidential direction for DoS. Its purpose was to use the whole of government approach to integrate the efforts of USG agencies to prepare, plan for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization.


assistance and related activities in a range of situations that require the response
capabilities of multiple USG entities and to harmonize such efforts with U.S. military
plans and operations.55

Three essential policy directives were found to be prominent among the
discussions involving interagency cooperation during stability operations for the
Department of Defense and the United States Agency for International Development
and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, 28 November 2005, is the current policy
directive for the DoD. While this directive establishes DoD policy and assigns
responsibilities within the Department of Defense for planning, training, and preparing to
conduct and support stability operations pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary
of Defense,56 it does not specifically address cooperation with USAID. On the other
hand, an important document with respect to USAID and DoD cooperation is USAID’s
PD-ACL-777, *Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy*, July 2008, which establishes the
foundation for specific cooperation with the DoD in the areas of joint planning,
assessment and evaluation, training, implementation, and strategic communication to
facilitate a whole-of-government approach.57 In 2009, under the direction of then
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, DoS published the Quadrennial Diplomacy and
Development Review (QDDR) in order to identify departmental capacities, challenges,
and resource shortfalls. More importantly, the QDDR outlined how DoS should fit into

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55 Binnendijk and Johnson, 106.

56 Ibid.

57 JCS, JP 3-08, K-1.
the whole of government approach support the USG’s foreign policy. The QDDR serves as the new State-USAID Joint Strategic Plan (JSP), and sets institutional priorities and provides strategic guidance as a framework for the most efficient allocation of resources. The QDDR also includes directives for improving how Posts do business, from strengthening interagency collaboration to increasing State and USAID engagement with civil society, the private sector, and others.58

Joint and Army Doctrine

Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 defines interagency coordination as “within the context of DoD involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of DoD, and engaged USG agencies and departments for the purpose of achieving an objective.”59 Joint Publication 1-0, Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the United States, provides the basic framework for unified direction and effort of the armed forces. The clear delineation of supported and supporting command relationships is important.60 Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, addresses the need for military forces to work with other government agencies, international government agencies and nongovernmental organizations, regional organizations, and elements of the private sector in the operational area as part of a strategic security environment and in the context of irregular


60Ibid.
warfare, defined as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population requiring the employment of the full range of military and other capacities.61

Joint Publication 3-07, Stability Operations, provides context for the whole of government approach by stating that USG agencies should collaborate to plan, prepare for, and conduct stability operations through interagency cooperation and unity of effort.62

Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol II, offers an important discussion on—“considerations for effective cooperation,” and—”managing stabilization and reconstruction operations.”63

JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, is the DOD encyclopedia for civil-military coordination, and it provides an in-depth examination of the interagency, as well as IGOs and NGOs that DOD personnel may work with.64

Planning considerations are referenced using Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. Joint Operation Planning is defined as the overarching process that guides joint force commanders (JFCs) in developing plans for the employment of military

61HQDA, ATP 3-57.80, 3-22.


63Ibid.

64HQDA, ATP 3-57.80, 3-7.
power within the context of national strategic objectives and national military strategy to shape events, meet contingencies, and respond to unforeseen crisis.65

Summary

The research material displays a growing emphasis on the need for interagency collaboration in support of Reconstruction and Stabilization efforts. The Whole of Government approach is easily understood and accepted by various agencies yet difficult to execute and manage at each of the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The concepts for interagency coordination are present, but there is still a lack of cohesiveness that could exist with an effective JIACG framework. Such a framework will be recommended at the end of this study. The next chapter will address the research design of this thesis.

65HQDA, ATP 3-57.80, 5-25.
We are going to need more effective coordination of our military efforts with diplomatic efforts with developmental efforts with more effective coordination with our allies in order to be more successful.
— President Barack Obama, “Remarks at White House Press Conference”

The ensuing chapters compare and contrast DoS’ and DoD’s structures and capabilities during operations or conflicts, and reporting processes in accordance with the approved structure disseminated by Director of Graduate Degree Programs, US Army Command and General Staff College.66 This thesis relies on qualitative analysis. It studies a problem that requires collection of information from a variety of sources that does not support using an empirical approach to collection and analysis. I will also compare case studies of the Vietnam War and USG interaction during Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq utilizing Graham Allison’s Bureaucratic Politics Model67 to examine DoS and DoD cooperation, integration and interdependence. Graham Allison’s book, Essence of Decision, is widely regarded as the authoritative work for studying the complexity of governmental decision-making. Set against the backdrop of the Cuban missile crisis as a case study, Allison develops three theoretical models for examining

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governmental organizations.  

68 He named these models the Rational Actor (Model I), Organization Behavior (Model II), and Governmental Politics (Model III). Each model offers a different prism through which to view organizational decisions. 69 Allison makes the point that all three levels of analysis are useful. However, he claims that the second and third models provide the analyst with greater explanatory and predictive power. 70 Allison's models help explain why agencies may at times appear to be reluctant to pool their efforts and assets in support of a stated U.S. policy. 71 Combining these three separate views into a particular situation gives insight into the factors that influence organizational decision-making processes; explains the dynamics of the decision processes in light of the organization’s interaction with other agencies; and the non-tangible effect of organizational culture on its decisions. 72 These models have significant utility when applied together for attempting to understand why organizations make decisions and behave in a particular manner. 73 The results of the analysis of each case study will further be applied to the current JIACG framework to recommend improvements, which will lead to more effective interagency coordination.


69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.


72 Ibid.

73 Ibid.
Table 1. Allison's Models for Government Decision Making
Summary Outline of Models and Concepts

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<tr>
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<td>Goals (objective function)</td>
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<td>SOPs and programs</td>
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**Basic unit of analysis**
- Governmental action as choice
- Governmental action as organizational output
- Governmental action as political resultant

**Organizing concepts**
- National actor
  - The problem
  - Decision formulation
  - Action as rational choice
  - Goals and objectives
  - Options
  - Consequences
  - Choice

- Organizational actors (constellation of which is the government)
  - Factions, problems, and factions
  - Perceptions, goals, and priorities
  - Actions as organizational output
  - Goals, constraints, defining acceptable performance
  - Sequential action at goals
  - Standard operating procedures
  - Programs and reports
  - Uncertainties, avoidance, and negotiated environments
  - Political action, problem-directed search
  - Organizational learning and change
  - Central coordination and control
  - Decisions of government leaders

- Players in positions
- Parochial priorities and perceptions
- Goals and interests
- Stakes and stands
- Deadlines and facets of issues
- Power, Action-channels, Rules of the game
- Action as political resultant

**Dominant interference patterns**
- Governmental action = choice with regard to objectives
- Governmental action = output largely determined by present SOPs and programs
- Governmental action = output largely determined by organizational goals, SOPs, etc.

**General propositions**
- Substitution effect
- Organizational implementation
- Long-range planning
- Organizational options
- Long-term incremental change
- Goals and feedback
- Imperatives
- Options and organization
- Administrative flexibility
- Direc change
- Political results
- Action and intention
- Action and structure
- Where you stand depends on where you sit
- Chain and circles
- The 5-1-49 principle
- Inter- and intra-national relations
- Misconception, misrepresentation, miscommunication, and teleness
- States of play


Model I (Rational Actor)

The first model, the Rational Actor, treats governmental action as the result of rational choice. Model I describes a state's behavior as that of a perfectly rational individual or in this case government entity, who is normally assumed to have perfect situational knowledge, and who attempts to optimize whatever values/goals are sought in...
a given situation. The actions of states are analyzed by assuming that nations consider all options and act rationally to maximize their utility. Under this model:

1. Governments are treated as the primary actor.
2. The government examines a set of goals, evaluates them according to their utility, then picks the one that has the highest “payoff.”

The choice is made in response to problem that carries a threat to the organization’s goals and objectives if no action is taken. The rational action, or deliberate choice of a particular course of action over another, comes after weighing alternatives, evaluating the consequences of the choices, and ensuring that the chosen action is the best of all available options.

Among the questions posed by Model I are:

1. What is the problem?
2. What are the alternatives?
3. What are the strategic costs and benefits associated with each alternative?
4. What is the observed pattern of national (governmental) values and shared axioms?
5. What are the pressures in the “international strategic marketplace”?

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75 Allison and Zelikow, 26.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Conley, 102.
Model II (Organizational Behavior)

The second Allison Model, the Organizational Behavior, built on concepts from organizational theory and economics to assert that such actions can be described as the output of organizational processes.\textsuperscript{79} From a Model II perspective, it is irrational for an agency to be altruistic at the expense of turf, longevity, or power. Organizations tend to protect themselves by distributing power and responsibility for making decisions among various internal mini-bureaucracies. When standard procedures are not followed and routines break down, bureaucracies are susceptible to paralysis. Therefore, bureaucracies routinely avoid change and uncertainty.\textsuperscript{80} Model II describes an “organizational process” model in which the decision maker operates under time and information constraints, and does not seek an optimal solution. Instead, the decision maker engages in “satisfying” behavior and attempts to find a solution that achieves a set (minimum) goal, and minimizes risk of failure.\textsuperscript{81} Model II views the same set of rational choices seen through the previous model as being products of organizational outputs, or actions, which derive from the decision-making processes present inside each organization. Thus, the rational decisions are made “less as deliberate choices and more as outputs of large organizations functioning according to standard patterns of behavior.”\textsuperscript{82} This model identifies several factors that influence decision-making processes within organizations. These factors include attention to parochial priorities, reliance on solving problems by enacting fixed

\textsuperscript{79} Conley, 2.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{81} Allison and Zelikow, 48.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid.
routines, limited flexibility for addressing problem solving in a manner different from the established routines, and desire to avoid uncertainty. The model suggests that understanding the internal factors that influence the decision-making process within an organization and the organization’s pattern of behavior will explain why it acted or will act in a particular manner.

As Allison notes, understanding the organization requires understanding all of the factors that weigh in on the decision-making process. Each organization exists to provide a specific set of capabilities that define its mission. Along with this mission is a set of interests and goals that it seeks to protect from outside influence (i.e. other agencies). To function more efficiently, the organization institutionalizes procedures, or programs, for accomplishing all facets of the organization’s duties and responsibilities. The compilation of these programs forms repertoires, or “tools,” that can be employed against a particular problem. Any problem is then addressed through routine application of programs if the problem can be solved through the employment of the organizational repertoire and is deemed administratively feasible where the benefit of action outweighs the choice of doing nothing. Organizational flexibility for problem solving is then limited by reliance on established programs that are created for a particular set of problems. For increased efficiency, organizations fractionate power while maintaining the optimum

83Jones, 22.
84Ibid.
85Ibid.
86Ibid.
87Allison and Zelikow, 48.
level of centralized control over how the organization acts in response to a problem. An organization is also comprised of numerous personalities that reflect the organizational culture. This culture shapes how an organization will view a problem by first taking into account its own perceptions and parochial priorities. To protect its own priorities, organizations will coordinate with others to reduce uncertainty into how other organizations acting in response to the same problem will impact these priorities. Thus, the level of attention an organization will invest into a problem depends on where it falls in relation to the organization’s sequential attention to goals.

Model II leads one to ask:

1. Of what organizations (and organizational components) does the government consist?
2. Which organizations traditionally act on a problem of this sort and with what relative influence?
3. What repertoires, programs, and SOPs do these organizations have for making information about the problem available at various decision points in the government?
4. What repertoires, programs, and SOPs do these organizations have for generating alternatives about a problem of this sort?
5. What repertoires, programs, and SOPs do these organizations have for implementing alternative courses of action?

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88 Jones, 23.
89 Ibid.
90 Conley, 4.

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Model III (Bureaucratic Politics)

Finally, Model III, the Bureaucratic Politics model, held that governments act in ways that reflect bargaining by players with different stakes and objectives. According to Model III, adaptability to new and changing circumstances rests with the people who constitute the organizations. Individuals breathe life into the bureaucratic process. They may enable workarounds to meet a common goal, to enhance their feelings of power, or to cope when they conclude that the stakes warrant nonstandard behavior. This realization highlights an area of interagency coordination worth developing: the pursuit of vetted working relationships and frequent sharing of perspectives.

A bureaucratic politics model in which state actors seek to achieve separate goals, which may conflict with each other. In this case, various individuals, representing various organizational interests, engage in a process to achieve a negotiated group decision that will represent the policy of the state. The agreed upon policy may erode over time, as the situation changes dynamically, as organizational interests evolve, and as individuals gain and lose bureaucratic power, status, and access to critical information. “Where you sit determines where you stand.” Allison proposed the following propositions for this model:

91. Allison and Zelikow, 59.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid.
1. A nation's actions are best understood as the result of politicking and negotiation by its top leaders.

2. Even if they share a goal, leaders differ in how to achieve it because of such factors as personal interests and background.

3. Leaders have different levels of power based on charisma, personality, skills of persuasion, and personal ties to decision makers.

4. Because of the possibilities of miscommunication, misunderstandings, and downright disagreements, different leaders may take actions that the group as a whole would not approve of.\textsuperscript{97}

Allison’s third model considers organizational behavior and the outcomes that emerge as a matter of maneuvers made by principal players in a “zero sum” game. In this game, there are winners and losers in the pursuit of influential decision-making with the next higher decision-maker and over other organizations in the conduct of an operation.\textsuperscript{98} These principal players, leading their respective organizations, maneuver through a process stressing bargaining and consensus with other players as a means to secure or protect their organization’s goals, interests, stakes, positions and power in the decision-making process. This model acknowledges that the leaders of these power organizations cannot act autonomously.\textsuperscript{99} To be successful in terms of pursuing their organization’s interests, they must rely on a process of give and take with other organizations that defines bureaucratic bargaining. Another aspect to this model that separates it from

\textsuperscript{97} Allison and Zelikow, 64.

\textsuperscript{98} Jones, 23.

\textsuperscript{99} Ibid.
Model II is the matter of a principal player’s perception of a problem being formed by the subordinates in his organization. At each level of an organization, representatives interact with their counterparts from other organizations. Through these interactions, problems are identified which are pushed up the organizational chain of command for final consideration and decision by the principal. Accompanying the problem description rendered by the subordinates to the principal is recommended solutions that take into account the organization’s interests and motivations. In this light, the principal’s personality, position in the game, degree of power enjoyed in the decision-making process, and bargaining skills are determining factors in whether the resulting governmental action is favorable to his respective organization.

Model III is the governmental politics; it also posed five questions:

1. What are the existing action channels for producing actions on this kind of problem?
2. Which players in what positions are centrally involved?
3. How do pressures of job, past stances, and personality affect the central players on the issue?
4. What deadlines will force the issue to resolution?
5. Where are foul-ups likely?

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100 Jones, 24.
101 Ibid.
102 Conley, 13.
**Summary**

Allison's models help explain why the whole of government approach may not currently be executed in the most efficient manner and suggest which method would be more feasible. The author will assess the organizational level of interagency by analyzing how well it addresses the key tasks spelled out in emerging joint doctrine and other interagency guidance through the analytical paradigm of Allison’s three models.

Chapter 4 will provide an analysis whole of government collaboration efforts in Vietnam and Iraq. These case studies will highlight the strengths, weaknesses, and potential vulnerabilities or opportunities in future interagency collaboration, ultimately leading to the improvement of the JIACG framework. This will assist in defining how to improve the whole of government approach in order to mitigate friction in future conflicts through the organization approach at the strategic/policy-making, operational/policy-implementing and tactical/policy-execution levels. This examination adheres to the scientific methods of research.
The purpose of chapter 4 is to identify and analyze factors that lead to the
disjointness between Departments of State and Defense that delayed stability efforts.
These breaks, identified through the case studies, hinder establishing unity of effort at the
operational level. By analyzing the ad hoc collaboration of these organizations for
interagency planning and coordinating, the differing methods by which agencies
approach planning, interagency process shortfalls, and whether greater initiative
bestowed upon the interagency representatives will remedy the problem of poor
coordination, enough evidence combines to answer the primary research question.

Primary Research Question

What positive or negative aspects of previous interagency coordination exist that
can be applied to the improvement of the current JIACG structure?

Whole of Government Approach in Vietnam

In the early days of American involvement in the Vietnam war, General
Westmoreland, Commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
(MACV), prioritized stopping the National Liberation Forces (NLF) from gaining any
more ground in South Vietnam and chose to rely on civilian agencies to win the
allegiance of the South Vietnamese in order to negate the Viet Cong (VC) threat.\textsuperscript{103} The
population became a source of power for the VC as they relied on the local populace for,

\textsuperscript{103}Jeremy Patrick White, \textit{Civil Affairs in Vietnam} (Washington, DC: Center for
Strategic and International Studies, January 2009), 1.
financing, replenishing their food stock, human intelligence, and recruits. The VC coerced the local population to do their bidding through fear such as terrorist acts and popular appeal.

As a counter strategy to the VC’s, the U.S. military focused on developing a population-centric strategy in which clear and hold operations replaced search and destroy operations. In February 1966, President Johnson met with the leaders of the South Vietnamese government in Hawaii and developed the new strategy based on three broad components; military pressure, negotiations and Pacification. The new strategy also tasked the South Vietnamese Army with area security, which would allow the US military to concentrate on seeking out enemy forces.\textsuperscript{104} Rather than focusing on the destruction of enemy forces, Pacification sought to counter the insurgency by cutting off it’s' access to the population.

However, prior to 1967, U.S. stability operations were entirely uncoordinated with different civilian agencies all running separate operations. While they were theoretically coordinating with the military through the U.S. embassy, this was not the reality. For the military, battlefield realities forced pacification strategies to take a backseat to war fighting operations.\textsuperscript{105} Johnson reemphasized the need to coordinate the Pacification program. President Johnson, his advisors, and their South Vietnamese counterparts all believed the biggest hurdle to implanting the Pacification program was

\textsuperscript{104}White, 4-5.

the decentralized nature of the effort, the disjointed command structure, and the competition between the military and civilian agencies working Pacification.\footnote{Ronald B. Frankum and Stephan F. Maxner, \textit{The Vietnam War for Dummies} (New York, NY: Wiley, 2003), 27.}

The State Department continued to resist efforts to consolidate ‘their’ civilian programs under military control. The State Department’s counter-solution to subordinating, and thus synchronizing, Pacification efforts under the US military was the Office of Civil Operations (OCO). The OCO, created in November 1966, combined the personnel and activities of USAID and several other civilian organizations under Deputy Ambassador William Porter.\footnote{Donald M. Brown, “Vietnam and CORDS: Interagency Lessons for Iraq” (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2008), 29.} President Johnson gave the OCO 90-120 days to improve pacification efforts or be absorbed by MACV. OCO was however, doomed from the outset because of the military’s lack of coordination with it, which denied OCO direct access to the military’s immense resources. In June 1966, President Johnson sent Robert Komer, a trusted member of the National Security Council, to Vietnam to assess the situation. Komer wrote that the U.S. Embassy “needs to strengthen its own machinery” for pacification. Komer met with Westmoreland, and the two agreed on the need for a single manager. “My problem is not with Westy, but the reluctant civilian side,” Komer told the president.\footnote{Lyndon B. Johnson, Memorandum to Komer, “Second Komer Trip to Vietnam, 23-29 June 1966,” 1 July 1966, 6, Historians files, CMH, Fort McNair, Washington, DC.} Komer also found himself unable to hire an adequate number of civilian advisers to fill the ranks of the OCO in the limited time he was allotted.\footnote{White, 1.}
March of 1967, President Johnson officially disbanded the OCO and announced that Komer would be elevated to the rank of Ambassador and become the sole manager of pacification programs in Vietnam, a position Komer had long been advocating. On 9 May 1967, President Johnson signed the National Security Action Memorandum 362, “Responsibility for U.S. Role in Pacification (Revolutionary Development),” which established Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, or CORDS. CORDS was the primary mechanism to organize, resource and lead the effort to legitimize the South Vietnamese government by being responsive to the needs its own people, especially to influence those in rural areas against its rival government from the North. At the direct decision of the president CORDS accomplished nearly all that it was expected to achieve despite initial objections from the State Department and USAID.

CORDS was thus an ad-hoc experiment in placing nearly all the interagency assets (civilian and military) involved in the pacification struggle under one civilian manager and then placing that civilian within the military hierarchy as a deputy commander of military assistance command Vietnam (MACV), the military headquarters in Saigon. This bold, indeed unprecedented, move provided the pacification support effort nearly unfettered access to military resources, personnel, energy, organizational skill, and logistics. By centralizing planning and management in one headquarters, then replicating that management structure at each level of the government of South Vietnam (military region, province, and district), CORDS built and operated a truly effective interagency headquarters.

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110 White, 2.

111 Andrade and Willbanks, 77.


113 Ibid., 453.
Overview of the CORDS Program

In order for CORDS to be effective, Robert Komer knew that he had to successfully integrate civilian and military personnel into a single functioning organization. Komer acknowledged in an early memo to President Johnson that the civilian agencies operating in Vietnam were nothing short of a “mess.” According to his assessment they were simply incapable of operating at the “high tempo that the war required.” Komer’s goal was to completely remove the VC’s influence from South Vietnam and to do this he would need to instill the civilian agencies with a military...
efficiency. In order to accomplish this objective, Komer was permitted for the first time ever to place military personnel under the direct command of civilians. Invariably, when civilians were assigned to key positions within the CORDS program they would always be assigned a military deputy and vice versa. This merger not only paired civilians and military personnel with comparable skills, but also helped dissolve much of the home agency loyalty that had prevented civilians from effectively working together under the OCO.115 CORDS was divided into four major staff elements:

1. Research and Analysis Division: Established quantitative and qualitative measurements to evaluate the effectiveness of pacification projects. Data from the Hamlet Evaluation System was used to develop metrics to determine the general level of security in each of South Vietnam’s hamlets.

2. Reports and Evaluation Division: Analyzed the accuracy of reports from the field by conducting independent studies of all aspects of the pacification program.

3. Plans and Programs Division: Worked with the South Vietnamese Ministry for Revolutionary Development to coordinate the pacification plans of CORDS and the South Vietnamese Government. Komer hoped to have the Vietnamese take on as much responsibility as possible.

4. Management Support Division: Assisted a variety of civil agencies by managing contracts, telecommunications, training, hiring and general administrative work.116

In the course of the first six months, Komer nearly doubled the CORDS staff from 4,980 to 8,327 and by 1968 CORDS advisors were working in all 44 provinces of South Vietnam.117 CORDS did not suffer from the same civilian personnel shortages that had contributed to the failure of the OCO as Komer was permitted to hire third country

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116 Ibid.
117 Andrade and Willbanks, 83.
nationals and Vietnamese to make up for the deficit.\textsuperscript{118} The heads of the civilian agencies in Washington were reluctant to surrender control over their personnel and programs in Vietnam, however, Komer had the full support of the President, and it was not long before he had earned himself the nickname “Blowtorch Bob.”\textsuperscript{119}

The first and most basic requirement for pacification had to be security, because the rural population had to be kept safe from the main enemy forces. If this was achieved, the insurgents’ forces had to be weakened both by destroying their infrastructure among the population and by developing programs to win over the people’s sympathy for the South Vietnamese government and the U.S. forces. The third point emphasized by Komer was that the new strategy had to be applied on a large scale in order to significantly turn around the situation.\textsuperscript{120}

Organizationally, these goals implicitly required that efforts were concentrated under a single command. Against initial reservations from civilian organizations like USAID, CORDS was eventually implemented under the military’s command.\textsuperscript{121} This also had the crucial advantage of bringing massive financial resources to the civilian pacification programs that would not have been available without the military’s involvement. In addition to Komer, “each of the four American corps commanders had a

\textsuperscript{118}Stewart, 7.

\textsuperscript{119}White, 5.

\textsuperscript{120}Andrade and Willbanks, 77-91.

deputy for pacification; the ‘cutting edge’ of CORDS, however, was the unified civil-military advisory teams in all 250 districts and 44 provinces.”

CORDS was eventually implemented in 1967 in all 44 South Vietnamese provinces, headed by a native province chief who was supported by an American province senior adviser. The advisor’s staff was divided into a civilian part that supervised area and community development, and a military part that handled security issues.

As former CIA Director William Colby (who had led the Phoenix Program, a major component under CORDS) wrote later:

President [Nguyen Van] Thieu quickly understood that a major strategy of pacification required the kind of unified management structure the Americans had finally produced in the CORDS machinery. In response, he set up a Central Pacification and Development Council to direct the campaign and the work of all the Ministries and agencies of the government involved in it . . . All of the government ministries, including Defense plus the Joint General Staff, were represented in the council, so that its directives were specific and binding on all the local organs involved in the pacification campaign.

The success of CORDS was to achieve unity of effort by creating interagency unity of command at the operational level for the American involvement in the pacification campaign. President Thieu’s parallel action achieved unity of command on the Vietnamese side and the parallel organizations worked effectively together to achieve

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124 Gabriel, 420.
a significant degree of unity of effort. Even though CORDS is well remembered in the Special Operations community and those who have thought seriously about stability operations and despite its mention in both Joint and Army doctrine, the lesson has never been internalized either by the conventional military or by the civil bureaucracy. As both Richard Downie and John Nagl point out, the Army has great difficulty becoming a true learning organization—even when all the necessary mechanisms are in place. American civil bureaucracy has even greater difficulty since it has no built in “lessons learned” functions or procedures. Thus, there has been no effort within the civil government to formally capture the lessons of CORDS and, therefore, unlike the military, there is no institutional memory of what it was or what it accomplished.

**PATs, DATs, and CATs**

In addition to the creation of CORDS, detailed organizations were developed to functions at each level of governance. At the regional level, a single regional director position was established to supervise the formulation and execution of all military and civilian plans, policies, and programs that supported the Government of Vietnam’s (GVN) reconstruction and development programs to include civic action performed by US units. At the provincial and district level, advisory team were implemented, aptly

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125 Gabriel, 420.

126 Ibid.

127 Ibid.

128 Ibid.

named Provincial Advisory Teams (PAT) and District Advisory Teams (DAT) respectively. The PATs/DATs were responsible for civil/military advice to their corresponding GVN organization for the implementation of all US civil and military support programs.\textsuperscript{130}

The PATs were comprised of three parts, a province-wide area development section, a plans and operations section, and the DATs. The area development section included public health experts, engineers, community development experts, education specialists, and agriculturists. In addition to these civilian experts, area development included the CIA’s Rural Development cadre, military civil affairs teams (CAT), the Joint US Public Affairs Office’s field psychological operations teams, and any other agencies operating in the province.\textsuperscript{131} The DATs worked for the province senior advisor, and advised the Vietnamese District Chief. They coordinated the area development programs with the district chief, and advised the chief on civil and military programs within the district. Any military advising teams that trained Vietnamese military forces in the district were also assigned to the DAT.\textsuperscript{132}

Small groups of U.S. Army CA personnel had been deploying to South Vietnam since 1960 on temporary duty assignments to help Special Operations forces better train and communicate with the South Vietnamese military. However, the first formal regular

\textsuperscript{130}Ellsberg.

\textsuperscript{131}Andrade and Willbanks, 9-22.

\textsuperscript{132}Ibid., 16.
duty deployment of CA units did not take place until the winter of 1965. While CORDS was the primary military civil affairs mission in Vietnam following 1967, it is important to note that not all of the military personnel working under CORDS were trained civil affairs soldiers. However, since all civil affairs programs in Vietnam were consolidated by Robert Komer under CORDS in 1967, the term should be considered synonymous with civil affairs for the remainder of the paper.

CA Missions in Vietnam had three primary objectives:

1. Eliminate the Viet Cong Insurgency in South Vietnam
2. End the VC’s ability to recruit in Southern Vietnam
3. Recruit indigenous tribes to take up arms against the VC and the NLF

When CA personnel first started to be deployed to Vietnam, they were originally tasked to provide support to the III Marine Amphibious Force and 1st Infantry Battalion. This early mission took on two important forms. The first of which was to provide relocation assistance to the hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese civilians displaced by the fighting. Their second mission was to provide civil support to Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG), which were established to win the loyalty of the aboriginal tribes living in Vietnam’s Central Highlands. CA personnel were ordered to improve the lives of these indigenous peoples through the building of schools and the teaching of

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134 White, 4.

135 Ibid., 355.
modern agricultural techniques in the hopes that the local tribes would take up arms against the NLF and the VC out of loyalty to the U.S. Military.

While civilian assistance programs like CIDG were the primary mission of CA units for the first two years of their regular deployments to Vietnam, the overall concentration of CA missions became focused on CORDS following its creation in 1967.

The U.S. civil affairs mission in Vietnam was the most extensive civil action program ever undertaken by the U.S. military surpassing the enormous CA operations carried out in Italy during World War II.\textsuperscript{136} CA personnel from both the active and reserve component took part in CA missions in all 44 provinces of South Vietnam. As noted, the majority of CA personnel engaged in CORDS related projects following the consolidation of civic actions programs in Vietnam in 1967.\textsuperscript{137}

Analysis

Model I would suggest that not having an organizational structure focused on reconstruction and development generated the need for the creation of the CORDS program. Given the operating environment and the Pacification objectives, had CORDS existed at the onset of the Vietnam War, there is evidence that it would have been a successful strategy. The U.S. could not have lessened popular support for the NLF and VC without establishing programs like CORDS to provide humanitarian assistance and mitigate drivers of instability. The U.S. pacification program had succeeded in degrading the VC’s ability to recruit and infiltrate. However, the North Vietnamese could always

\textsuperscript{136}Sandler, 358.

\textsuperscript{137}In addition to the 29th and 42nd CA Companies, the 51st, 52nd, 53rd, 54th, 97th and 2nd Civil Affairs Companies also played a significant CA role in Vietnam.
reconstitute forces killed or captured by the U.S. military by sending fresh troops down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The consequences of this choice include leaving the coordination process open to the individual leads from Departments of State and Defense without a forcing function to ensure execution. Once CORDS was established under Komer, he became the rational actor for this case study model. His actions and choices were constrained by things such as the availability of time, resources, and lack of relevant information. However, as the rational actor, he was able to make sound decisions by clearly defining his problem, integrating State and Defense Department’s expertise where they were needed, and utilizing the resources he had available.

Model II provides reasoning for the structural differences between multiple stakeholders with diverse perspectives, authorities, capabilities, and objectives. Integrating civilian and military efforts to achieve unity of effort in Vietnam is valid in order to achieve Pacification objectives and tasks. The greatest success of the CORDS program was that it not only established effective interagency coordination, but also succeeded in convincing the military to incorporate development projects into its overall security strategy. After creating a unified command structure incorporating all U.S. personnel operating in Vietnam, General Westmoreland was able to delegate responsibility for countering the VC insurgency to Komer and his several thousand civilian and military advisors, while utilizing the bulk of his military forces to fight a more conventional war against the North Vietnamese.

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138Andrade and Willbanks, 78.

139White, 11.
The DATs and PATs of CORDS possessed the ability to take operational control (OPCON) of ARVN units as the mission required. This was possible in accordance with military doctrine since both the CORDS Advisors and the Combat Advisory Teams fell under the operational control of a Corps-level commander. Coordination, advisory relationships, and operational control all played a significant role in the coordination structure used by CORDS and the Advisory team leaders were vested with decision-making ability at the lowest level. Since CORDS was interagency at the operational level as well as the tactical level, decisions would only travel up one chain of command, and remain within the coordination structure.

Model III analysis justifies that the creation of CORDS provided each individual organization involved in the interagency process the ability to achieve its respective objectives while simultaneously achieving unity of efforts goals through resources such as manpower, logistics, and communication. The most observable collaboration of civil military operations were through civic action programs. DoS equities and Civil Affairs soldiers partnered on various quality of life improvements such as land reform, economic development, health care reform, and building democratic institutions.

Komer chose to consolidate all of the former military and civilian pacification projects into six distinct CORDS programs. Every project undertaken had to be

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141 Ibid.

accompanied by a metric for measuring success in order to justify its continued existence. All projects that were deemed viable were then folded into the following six programs:¹⁴³

1. New Life Development: Provided economic aid to villages.
2. Chieu Hoi: Program encouraged VC to defect.
3. Revolutionary Development Cadre: Encouraged good governance programs at the local level.
5. PSYOP: Provided support for the Chieu Hoi program as well as other anti VC campaigns.
6. Public Safety: Focused on increasing the size and capabilities of the National Police Force.¹⁴⁴

CORDS would never have been as successful as it was had it not been for Robert Komer’s relentless pursuit of efficiency. Komer had the full backing of both President Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, without which his plan of placing military personnel under the command of civilians and vice versa never would have survived. Komer’s direct access to the President also quickly won him the respect of General Westmoreland and made him an effective liaison to the South Vietnamese government.¹⁴⁵ Komer’s elevated position within the military command structure combined with his authority over all civilian pacification programs meant that he was


¹⁴⁴White, 5.

finally able to merge civilian expertise with the unmatched logistical capabilities of the U.S. military.146

Operation Iraqi Freedom

The origins of U.S. reconstruction policy in Iraq are rooted in a series of debates that occurred during the fall of 2001, when President Bush ordered the Pentagon to revise its plans for deposing Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein.147 On 27 November 2001, the Secretary of Defense directed U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) to develop a plan to remove Saddam Hussein from power.148 What was later designated OPLAN 1003V laid out four phases of American engagement: securing foreign support and preparing for deployment; shaping the battle space; conducting combat operations; and engaging in limited post combat operations. The last component was accordingly referred to as Phase IV.149 It was only on 20 January 2003, however, that President George W. Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive 24, which gave the Department of Defense lead responsibility for postwar Iraq and directed it to form a new office to take charge of planning and subsequent implementation of the nonmilitary tasks involved.150

146Jones.
149Ibid.
CENTCOM divided Phase IV into three overlapping stages—Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie. During Alpha, the military would have the lead; during Bravo, a U.S. civilian authority would move to the forefront; during Charlie, the Iraqis would take charge. “None of this was exclusive,” CENTCOM’s chief of war plans explained. “It was who dominated and who had the lead during those phases.” The “A-B-C” approach was a way for the military to conceptualize what and when certain tasks would have to be performed, given that planners did not yet know whether U.S. policy ultimately would call for a rapid handoff to Iraqi leaders or to a civilian transitional authority of longer duration. The phases were set; their duration was not.

All the interagency Iraq planning groups worked in secret. Few knew the others existed. Officials justified the extreme secrecy because ongoing diplomatic negotiations would be undercut if Saddam knew that postwar planning was well underway. “There was a reluctance to pull that all together,” Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith, explained, “because, while you’re saying that you want to resolve this dispute through non-military means, there’s a sense that you’re contradicting yourself if you’re

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152 Fitzgerald interview.


154 Ibid.
not only planning for the war but planning for the postwar.”155 While postwar planning
efforts progressed under strict secrecy, the build-up of troops and materiel around Iraq’s
borders continued—a necessary threat to make diplomatic negotiations credible in the
eyes of Saddam. The structure of postwar administration and the mechanics of political
transition remained undecided through the fall. A revised version of the strategy paper,
*Iraq: Goals, Objectives, Strategy*, issued in late October 2002, reflected the lack of a
clear decision on these matters. Rather than articulating a detailed timetable for transition
to Iraqi control, the memorandum spoke only of an interim administration that would
provide for “external and internal security,” “humanitarian assistance,” and “the
country’s political, economic, and security reconstruction.”156

**Overview of the ORHA Programs**

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld asked retired Army Lieutenant General
Jay Garner to lead what became known as the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian
Assistance (ORHA), asking Garner to “horizontally connect the plans” for postwar Iraq
across a range of U.S. government agencies and “find out what the problems are and
work on those problems and anything else you find.”157 ORHA officials discovered that
the administrative hurdles necessary to set up the organization left little time for serious

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planning. The initial staff members were crowded into a small space in the Pentagon, which had few desks, phones, or computers.\textsuperscript{158} New staff members arrived almost daily, which posed ever-increasing requirements for office space and supplies, and required time for orientation and training. In addition, ORHA had to prepare for deployment to the theater on short notice, which involved medical exams, weapons training and certification, and personal arrangements.\textsuperscript{159} The staff was able to accomplish some work while juggling its administrative demands, but they lacked the time and senior-level attention required for real strategic planning.\textsuperscript{160} A U.S. Army review later observed that Garner had 61 days between the announcement of ORHA’s creation and the start of the war to build an organization, develop interagency plans across the administration, coordinate them with CENTCOM and the still undetermined military headquarters that would assume the military lead in post-Saddam Iraq, and deploy his team to the theater. It proved to be an almost impossible set of tasks.\textsuperscript{161}

The relatively small number of U.S. forces on the ground and their slowness in assuming responsibility for public security opened a power vacuum when the old regime collapsed and resulted in widespread and largely unchecked looting.\textsuperscript{162} US planners assumed that Security and Stability Operations (SASO) would require approximately the same force level that was needed to oust the Saddam regime. Whilst there was some

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{158}Dobbins et al., 6.
\item \textsuperscript{159}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{160}Bensahel et al., 56-58.
\item \textsuperscript{161}Donald P. Wright and Colonel Timothy R. Reese, \textit{On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign} (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 71.
\item \textsuperscript{162}Bensahel et al., \textit{After Saddam}, 68-69.
\end{itemize}
concern regarding large-scale retribution by the Shia and Kurds against their former Sunni oppressors, it was assumed that post-Saddam Iraq would be relatively stable.\textsuperscript{163} Two key assumptions drove this assessment. The first was that the Iraqi population would welcome its liberation from a brutal and oppressive regime. The second was that most units of the Iraqi military and security forces would remain intact and shoulder the brunt of the local security mission. Neither assumption proved to be correct.\textsuperscript{164} The consequent physical destruction of key Iraqi public buildings made it difficult for ORHA to identify ministry personnel, since they had nowhere left to work. American advisors to Iraqi ministries were forced to rely on word-of-mouth to locate ministry staff.\textsuperscript{165} Overstretched coalition forces were tasked with conducting post-conflict SASO, but lacked clear guidance regarding the role they were to play in restoring order and re-establishing civil society.\textsuperscript{166} Military commanders expected guidance and direction from ORHA, which they had been told was to take the lead in the re-establishment of civil institutions.\textsuperscript{167} ORHA had far too few people to carry out its many responsibilities. It numbered only 151 staff in Kuwait by 16 March. This number grew to nearly 300 over the next few


\textsuperscript{164}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{165}Bensahel et al., 68-69.

\textsuperscript{166}Graeme et al., 5.

\textsuperscript{167}Ibid.
weeks, most of whom were active-duty or retired military personnel. On Garner’s first night in Baghdad, Rumsfeld called to inform him that the President would be appointing L. Paul Bremer to form and take over the Coalition Provisional Authority.

Creation of the Coalition Provisional Authority

On 16 April 2003, General Tommy Franks, the commander of U.S. Central Command, issued a “Freedom Message to the Iraqi People,” in which he noted “I am creating the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to exercise powers of government temporarily.” Three weeks later, on 6 May, President Bush announced the appointment of L. Paul Bremer III to head that organization. President Bush said that the CPA would establish “an orderly country in Iraq that is free and at peace, where the average citizen has a chance to achieve his or her dreams.”

The administration never issued a formal order dissolving ORHA. A briefing to Bremer on 25 May 2003, noted that the ORHA staff “is not designed to separately support the Coalition Provisional Authority” and was too “military heavy.” Bremer fundamentally restructured and reorganized U.S. reconstruction efforts in Iraq. Some ORHA staff were integrated into the new organization, but others felt unwelcome and

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168 Wright and Reese, 71; Bensahel et al., 58.

169 Feith, War and Decision, 418.

170 Office of the Press Secretary, “President Names Envoy to Iraq” (Remarks by the President in Photo Opportunity After Meeting with the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC, 6 May 2003).

decided to leave. Bremer asked Garner to stay on in a senior capacity, but the latter agreed to remain only briefly.  

The search for unity of effort in Iraq is, unfortunately, reminiscent of the problems of Vietnam. On the positive side, this does not apply to the command and direction of military forces. In Iraq, there is unity of military command both with U.S. and coalition forces. Goldwater-Nichols has been institutionalized and internalized by American military leaders at all levels. The most difficult problems of military unity of effort revolved around the fact that for much of 2004, American military leadership was shared among three 3-star Army generals under the command of USCENTCOM Commander General John Abizaid. Although Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez was the commander of U.S. ground forces in Iraq, having two other commanders of equal rank ostensibly subordinate to him made for a degree of confusion. The problem was remedied when General George Casey (with his 4-stars) replaced Sanchez as commander of U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq. Neither has the problem been one of command, control, or coordination with the Iraqi forces since we have been in the process of creating them, equipping them, and training them. Rather, the problems with those forces have more to do with the dimension of legitimacy than with that of unity of effort.  

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172 Dobbins et al.


174 Ibid.

175 Ibid.
problems of unity of effort do not have much relation to military or even security force command and control. The central problem of unity of effort for the United States and the Coalition has been that no one American is in charge of the American effort. This was true from the initial planning for the war through the moment that Ambassador Paul (Jerry) Bremer took charge of the CPA to December 2005.\textsuperscript{176}

Despite the Defense Department’s substantial personnel resources, the CPA was never adequately manned. One early CPA document asserted that the “CPA is best supported by an experienced, largely civilian interagency team,” although a “military liaison cell is required to bridge between CPA and military.”\textsuperscript{177} Within five days of his arrival in Iraq, Bremer made two major decisions (contrary to Garner who had been working to recruit the Iraqi army in the reconstruction of the country) that did not seem to be coordinated with the Bush administration.\textsuperscript{178} Order Number 1 called for the de-Baathification of Iraqi society, and Order Number 2 disbanded the Iraqi army and security forces. Bremer was under the impression that he was simply following orders from above.\textsuperscript{179}

The U.S. government was not prepared to provide the personnel and money necessary for supporting the CPA’s extensive occupation and major rebuilding effort in Iraq. Thus, throughout its fourteen-month tenure, the CPA struggled to develop and retain

\textsuperscript{176}Fishel, 427-428.

\textsuperscript{177}Dobbins et al., 20.


\textsuperscript{179}Ibid.
the capabilities and capacities needed to achieve evolving U.S. policy objectives.\textsuperscript{180} Funding for Iraq reconstruction came from an initial tranche of supplemental U.S. appropriations and from Iraqi money. In April 2003, the Congress approved $2.4 billion for the newly created Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF1). The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) apportioned this money among five implementing agencies, with USAID receiving over 70 percent.\textsuperscript{181}

The CPA was an odd duck of an organization. It belonged to DoD; Bremer was subordinate to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. However, the CPA was not part of CENTCOM, and Bremer was not subordinate to General Abizaid. Equally important was that neither Abizaid nor his principal subordinates like Lieutenant General Sanchez who commanded all U.S. military forces in Iraq, were subordinate to Bremer.\textsuperscript{182} Yet, Bremer was responsible for the reconstruction (political, economic, and physical) of Iraq, a mission that it was impossible to carry out without the full support of Coalition military forces. As in Vietnam, there was no unity of command within the theater.\textsuperscript{183} Therefore, even though there was little or no conflict reported between Bremer and Sanchez, there is little evidence that any kind of effective unity of effort was achieved. Indeed, the creation

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item\textsuperscript{182} Fishel, 427-428.
\item\textsuperscript{183} Ibid.
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of the CPA as an independent entity was clearly a regression from the relatively clear command relationship between CENTCOM and ORHA.\textsuperscript{184}

The demise of the CPA following the creation of the Iraqi interim authority at the end of June 2004 only further complicated the interagency coordination picture. The senior American civilian was now the U.S. ambassador (initially John Negroponte—very senior, very tough, very competent) but without any authority over U.S. and Coalition military forces.\textsuperscript{185} The ambassador was, and remains, equal to the commander of forces in Iraq whether that was Lieutenant General Sanchez or General George Casey. The additional complication was because whereas under the CPA civil military conflicts could be adjudicated by the Secretary of Defense, since the departure of the CPA the only person who could adjudicate those conflicts became the President.\textsuperscript{186} The consequences of this remain unclear, but they are certainly less than optimal. Another problem for interagency coordination is that, unlike Vietnam, there has not been any American agency comparable to CORDS. Thus, there have been no simple means of creating task organizations to undertake combined security and reconstruction missions. Civilian agencies from non-DoD departments did not work for General Casey, and military forces did not work for the U.S. ambassador.\textsuperscript{187} At the same time, the Iraqi government has had no incentive to create the kind of CORDS parallel structure established by Vietnamese President Thieu. The outcome of all of this has been a structure that makes interagency

\textsuperscript{184} Fishel, 427-428.
\textsuperscript{185} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{186} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{187} Ibid.
coordination more difficult than it needs to be resulting in very questionable unity of effort.  

Provincial Reconstruction Teams

The U.S. Government faced huge challenges with synchronizing efforts during stability operations in conflicted environments. In order to address the unity of efforts issues, the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) concept was imported from Afghanistan into Iraq in 2005. PRTs were originally developed in Afghanistan due to the need for military and civilian personnel involved in reconstruction missions to stem the increasing security threat. Facing a similar dilemma, 10 PRTs were established in Iraq. In January of 2007, President Bush, during his address to the nation illustrating “The New Way Forward” in Iraq, called for a doubling of PRTs deployed in Iraq. As part of the Iraq War troop surge of 2007, the number of PRTs was expanded to cover every province in the country. Additionally, Embedded PRTs (ePRTs) were rolled out to work with the sub-provincial levels of government. By 2008, there were 31 PRTs, including 13 ePRTs, located throughout Iraq.

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189 President George Bush, “Presidents Address to the Nation,” White House Library, 10 January 2007.


191 Ibid.
PRTs were a unique example of cooperation between the U.S. military and civilian government agencies. In a conflict zone, the military’s ability to provide security, manpower and resources was joined with the ability of civilian agencies to provide technical expertise in areas ranging from increasing agricultural yields to police training and budget preparation. Initially PRTs suffered from a lack of clear program goals and a concept of operations.\(^{192}\) In time, however, PRTs were able to focus on assisting newly elected provincial governments to prepare budgets and development plans, to obtain funding from the central government and to implement effective programs. PRTs were the U.S. government’s ‘eyes and ears’ in every corner of Iraq representing U.S. interests and reporting to the U.S. embassy on local conditions and political developments.\(^{193}\) This capacity was critically important during the Iraq conflict and was missed when the PRTs closed down. ePRTs demonstrated that civilian personnel could work in tandem with their military counterparts at the village level in a conflict environment. Finally, PRTs demonstrated that a whole-of-government approach involving the military and civilian agencies, while difficult, could pay dividends in helping countries recover from conflict.\(^{194}\)


\(^{193}\)Ibid.

\(^{194}\)Ibid.
Analysis

Using Model I, the organizations, ORHA, CPA, and the PRTs are treated as primary actors. The ORHA and CPA did not maximize their goals and objectives due to the ad hoc approach to organizing their efforts. Examining Ambassador Bremer’s deliberate course of action to disband the government and security institutions in Iraq, demonstrates that his decision carried a high risk of failure and was not the best of choice of available options. The success of the military’s mission in Iraq hinged in part on the success of the CPA in stabilizing the country’s government and infrastructure to a point where it was self-sufficient. The rational choice then is to coordinate closely so that the operations of each are complementary. The alternative is deliberately choosing to work in isolation to maintain absolute control of the situation in terms of pursuing interests, but at a cost of expending ever-increasing organizational resources.

Model II suggests that the ORHA and CPA, through their individual processes and outputs, thwarted coordination with other agencies. Conversely, PRTs developed a breakthrough approach, essentially bringing together interagency organizations to maximize reconstruction and stability efforts. Each organization focused its efforts on accomplishing sequential goals within the confines of an operation that may differ from those of other agencies.

As shown through Model III analysis, unlike ORHA and CPA, the PRTs combined the differing interests and stakes amongst DoS and DoD into strategy which contributed to how well the organizations coexisted and achieved unity of effort. The

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195 Nguyen, 57.

196 Ibid.
bureaucracy within each organization reflected its culture and its determination to see organizational goals fulfilled.

Summary

This chapter identified two separate case studies attempt interagency coordination between multiple entities during times of war. Utilizing aspects of Graham Allison’s Bureaucratic Models and criteria of the Rational Actor, Organizational Behavior, and Bureaucratic Politics. The next chapter will synthesize conclusions and recommendations.

With respect to the Rational Actor Model, organizations were evaluated according to their ability to make decisions in response to a threat or opportunity during time-sensitive situations. Disjointness between DOD and DoS hindered the decision making process severely in the ad hoc organizations of OCO, ORHA, and the CPA. Interagency coordination improved considerably after a more structured, formal organization was created such as CORDS and PRTs.

Considering Graham’s second model, Organizational Behavior, the process is less determined by individual choices but through integration which create more efficient outputs. Interagency leads must become more comfortable utilizing supported/supporting relationships to create unity of effort to support the USG national policy and strategic direction. The fractured structure of OCO, ORHA, and CPA did not allow maximum output of efforts whereas CORDS and PRTs fostered greater focus on unity of effort that resulted in more positive results.

In terms of Allison’s third model, Bureaucratic Politics, individual organizations can be fused under one umbrella organization to achieve success without losing its own
identity. OCO’s, ORHA’s and CPA’s refusal to incorporate their shared attitudes and efforts prevented optimal outputs. Conversely, in CORDS and PRTs, interdependence was created, purposely or fortuitously, to maximize the complementary and reinforcing effects of both.

The next chapter will provide conclusions and recommendations based on the analysis provided above to support restructuring the JIACG framework in improving interagency cooperation.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

“If it’s raining, you can’t fix the roof; if it isn’t raining, you don’t need to fix the roof. The need for a JIACG is most recognized in crises situations when you don’t want to have coordination problems, but it’s too late to avoid them; but implementing the concept in non-crisis environments lacks the imperative needed to make it possible.”

― William J. Olson, “Interagency Coordination The Normal Accident or the Essence of Indecision”

Way Ahead: JIACG

The primary research question asked what positive or negative aspects of previous interagency coordination exist that can be applied to the improvement of the current JIACG structure. The evidence found through analyzing five interagency organizations during two distinct periods of war involving the U.S. highlighted a few reoccurring traits. Lack of interagency integration in planning stages and interdependence during execution stages cause USG efforts during reconstruction and stability operations to remain stagnant. The USG has not yet orchestrated all of its capabilities to maximize results. It will take a coordinated effort of all the USG interagency assets to synchronize the instruments of national power. Different responsibilities distributed among different agencies and departments needs to be managed more efficiently in order to enhance interagency interdependence. Efficiency at strategic, operational, and tactical levels of stability operations minimizes waste of funds and manpower but more importantly it reduces the risk to personnel losses.
Recommendations

As the U.S. prepared for the Global War on Terror in response to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, planners and policy makers in the Defense Department recognized the complex nature of the counterterrorism mission and many came to believe a “whole of government” response using all elements of national power would be required. To facilitate this, the Joint Staff requested, and in February 2002, the Deputies Committee of the National Security Council (NSC) approved a JIACG concept, directing the combatant commands to each establish a JIACG “to provide interagency advice and expertise to combatant commanders and their staffs, coordinate interagency counterterrorism plans and objectives, and integrate military, interagency, and host-nation efforts.”

By the time the NSC and Joint Staff issued their guidance, all of the combatant commands had already established some form of counterterrorism office and for the most part renamed whatever structure they had already created as a JIACG for counterterrorism (JIACG/CT).

While the JIACGs all started from the same concept, they have diverged greatly due to bureaucratic pressures and different approaches by individual combatant commanders. They were originally conceived and organized to support the DoD

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198 Edward Marks, PACOM, JIACG, and the War on Terror (Camber Corporation, on contract to the Joint Interagency Coordination Group on Counterterrorism, United States Pacific Command, 18 August 2005), 7; Pope, 7.
counterterrorism mission, but have since morphed into supporting the full-spectrum of military operations. As they evolved since 9/11 each has followed a different path: from robust to essentially non-existent at Pacific Command (PACOM); to simply a means of communication and coordination in the event of a national disaster in Northern Command (NORTHCOM); to integrating U.S. government activities in an active combat zone in Central Command (CENTCOM); to exploring a completely new paradigm in Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) analogous to a mega-embassy where day-to-day operations of many agencies functioning in the region are closely coordinated with each other.

In order to apply a structural level of analysis to the comprehensive study, the author will utilize DoD’s joint concept method of DOTMLPF to propose a way ahead for interagency operations through maximizing organizations like the JIACG. Organizations such as JIACGs interagency coordination directorates, special staff offices, civil-military operations centers (CMOC), Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATF), and other recognized structures and processes are organizational elements focused on enabling interagency, IGO, NGO, and private sector coordination and shared situational awareness. For the purpose of this research, each of these organizations will be considered equivalent organizations for operational and tactical level operations.

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200 Ibid.

201 JCS, JP 3-08, II-13.
DOTMLPF is an acronym used by the United States Department of Defense and is defined in the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) Process as doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities. DOTMLPF is a problem-solving construct for assessing current capabilities and managing change. DoD applies DOTMLPF to appraise performance, address capability gaps, and to chart the course for the future operations.

Doctrine

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directs preparation of joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for U.S. military involvement in multinational operations. Joint doctrine is considered authoritative and applies to the joint staff, commanders of combatant commands, sub-unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands and the services. It is expected joint doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. Joint Publications (JPs)

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204 JCS, JP 3-08, 1.

205 Ibid.

206 Ibid.
3-0, 3-05, 3-08, 3-16, 3-57, and 5-0 stress the critical importance of joint and interagency unified actions across the full spectrum of military operations.

From the standpoint of doctrine, the U.S. military has embraced integration and interdependence through collaboration of different entities. The military’s cornerstone doctrine for interagency collaboration, JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*, emphasizes the whole of government approach recognizing the threats to our National Security Strategy cannot be dealt with through military use alone. Now the JIACG is not a doctrinally based organization. However, as envisioned by USJFCOM’s Joint Warfighting Center, the JIACG concept fills the void of insufficient organizational structure for interagency and military interaction at the COCOM level.207

Though JP 3-08 presents major aspects of enhancing interagency coordination at the strategic and operational levels through the JIACG (or equivalent organization) at the combatant commands, it fails to identify the policy and procedures for tactical level stability operations. A separate but equivalent manual to JP 3-08 should be developed for DoS equities. DoS equities may be reluctant to incorporate the military’s doctrinal structure, therefore, expanding the JIACG’s role that has been outlined in JP 3-08, will be necessary. Commonly appreciated interagency doctrine or protocols (vice exclusive military doctrine concerning interagency coordination and cooperation) are worthy of

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consideration to facilitate organizational appreciation, responsive information sharing, moderation of bureaucratic obstacles, timely decision-making, and unified action. 208

The development of a common language must be developed to facilitate integration and cooperation between interagency partners. The Universal Joint Task List, more commonly known as UJTL, is a comprehensive list of joint mission tasks in a common language, supporting all levels of the DoD in executing the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and the National Military Strategy. An Interagency Joint Task List should be established to collate words, phrases, and/or new ideas into a document for future reference.

Appendix D of JP 3-08 presents major aspects of enhancing interagency coordination at the strategic and operational levels through the JIACG (or equivalent organization) at the combatant commands. 209 It is intended to provide sufficient detail to help combatant commanders (CCDR), subordinate JFCs, their staffs, and interagency partners understand the JIACG (or equivalent organization) as a capability to enable the coordination of all instruments of national power with joint operations. 210 JP 3-08 fails to outline how the JIACG will operationalize a strategy at the tactical level. An expansion of doctrine needs to be produced in order to address this deficiency.

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209 JCS, JP 3-08, app. D.

210 Ibid.
Organization

Unlike the military, most USG agencies are not equipped and organized to create separate staffs at all levels of war. Whereas the military is prepared to coordinate at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, USG agencies and departments are more apt to operate at the strategic level in Washington, DC, and in the field at the tactical level.\footnote{Joint Advanced Warfighting School, Operational Art and Campaigning Primer AY 09-10: Joint Operation Planning Process (Joint Forces Staff College, National Defense University, 2009), http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/schools_programs/jaws/Campaign_Planning_Primer_2010v-4.pdf (accessed 25 October 2013), 334.} For example, although some regional coordination and projects occur to some extent within the bureaus of the DoS and USAID, detailed regional operational planning is less common.\footnote{Ibid.} This disparity complicates coordination efforts at the operational level and may require military staffs interacting with interagency representatives at multiple levels. The JIACG at the operational level can potentially mitigate the effects of this problem.\footnote{Ibid.}

The JIACG, with its tools, processes, and procedures, is an important organization supporting the overall DoD effort to strengthen its capability to conduct joint operations.\footnote{JCS, JP 3-08, app. D.} The JIACG supports the entire range of military operations. Representing USG agencies at the combatant command HQ, the JIACG is a multifunctional, advisory element that facilitates information sharing across the interagency community.\footnote{Ibid.} The JIACG provides each CCDR with a standing capability to enhance situational awareness

\begin{itemize}
  \item \footnote{Ibid.}
  \item \footnote{Ibid.}
  \item \footnote{JCS, JP 3-08, app. D.}
  \item \footnote{Ibid.}
\end{itemize}
of interagency activities and keep the military and other USG agencies and departments informed of each other’s efforts to prevent undesired consequences and uncoordinated USG activities.

The JIACG currently provides the CCDR with the primary and readily available integration venue for coordinating interagency efforts with joint force actions at theater strategic and operational levels.\(^{216}\)

After the dissolution of U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), DoD reassigned critical USJFCOM organizations, such as the JIACG, and other functions to designated combatant commands, military services and the Joint Staff. An organization with roles and responsibilities similar to the USJFCOM should be created to serve as the sole joint trainer and integrator of the armed forces and assist in the development of a larger JIACG organization model. However, because the JIACG is located in one agency (the DoD) and has no Presidential directive or legislative backing, other agencies are under no obligation to participate. Indeed, the initial JIACG concept was not well received across the agencies and departments asked to participate, as many agencies perceived a military-led JIACG as an erosion of their autonomy or authority.\(^{217}\)

Department of State should identify a lead position to serve in accordance with the JIACG Commander in order to nest efforts. However, the relationship between joint forces and USG agencies should not be equated to command relationships.\(^{218}\)

\(^{216}\)USJFCOM, Joint Interagency Coordination Group.

\(^{217}\)Pope, 16.

\(^{218}\)JCS, JP 1-02.
Figure 6. Notional Joint Interagency Coordination Group Structure


Training

When President Clinton signed PDD 56 in 1997, the intent was to reduce clashes between civilian and military methods, incorporate into the interagency process proven planning processes and implementation mechanisms, and address the lack of training and
expertise in interagency work across the government. PPD 56 stressed the importance of incorporating lessons learned into future planning processes and training plans in order to achieve unity of effort. The Combatant Commands (COCOMs), however, did not have an archetypal organization to model for their respective interagency training. USPACOM, USSOUTHCOM, and USSOCOM do not currently maintain similar JIACG training programs which increases the difficulty of streamlining training methodologies.

In 2009, the Contingency Planning Policy Coordination Committee of the National Security Council directed the National Defense University (NDU) to serve as the lead agent for interagency training and education. In accordance with the guidance, the NDU is “developing an educational program for US government executives, in the area of multi-Agency and Department planning and coordination for overseas emergencies.” The NDU program, named Interagency Training Education and After Action Review (ITEA) focuses training and education programs for both national interagency participants and theater level members of JIACGs.

Continuous training and exercise support is essential to the success of the CCDR’s readiness to plan for and respond to various contingencies. Training focuses on applying lessons learned, improving use of collaboration and decision-support tools,

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220 Doyle, 57.

understanding command relationships, and improving lines of communication.\textsuperscript{222} Mission-based training improves vertical and horizontal communication, identifies seams and friction points, ensures combat readiness of individual and collective skills in the event of a contingency, and develops and maintains key staff and component informational relationships necessary for effective joint operation planning and execution.\textsuperscript{223}

Training takes place not only within the headquarters, but also as part of the CCDR’s exercise and engagement activities throughout the AOR. Integration of the JIACG and linkage to interagency partners with the combatant command staff provides an opportunity to train together and develop working relationships essential to efficient staff work and successful joint operations. Training opportunities include:

1. Participating in exercises with the combatant command staff, component headquarters, and USG agencies and departments. These exercises provide the CCDR the opportunity to assess the value and currency of the procedures in use, as well as to build stronger relationships among those military commands and USG agencies that might be utilized when organizing and responding to contingencies.

2. Training JIACG members on processes and procedures for joint operation planning, their responsibilities, staff relationships, collaborative tools, and interagency coordination and integration with military operations.

\textsuperscript{222}USJFCOM, \textit{Joint Interagency Coordination Group}.

\textsuperscript{223}Ibid.
3. Training selected personnel external to the JIACG on the use of communication and collaboration tools to optimize mutually supportive decision-support systems of participating USG agencies and departments.²²⁴

4. Training USG agency partners that would potentially augment JIACG planning and operations. This augmentation may be on-site, virtual, or deployed. The training is aimed at developing a coherent team requiring minimum pre-deployment training with emphasis on the CCDR’s contingency planning and implementation processes.

On the job training appears to have been a primary mechanism employed by all elements of the interagency working within the combatant commands and their JIACGs. U.S. Pacific Command in Hawaii has implemented its own training program.²²⁵ The training challenge transcends the development of a military solution. It, like the JIACG itself, must become an interagency undertaking. DoD, as the principal architect and host of the JIACGs, is the logical lead agency for developing appropriate training programs. However, it is prudent that the venture include the input and participation of all primary or “core” interagency partners.²²⁶ This can ensure that the scope of the training is comprehensive, and it can promote corporate “buy-in” for the concept by the major interagency contributors. The NDU is presently involved in addressing the training challenge.²²⁷ Increasingly, interagency, IGO, and NGO training is available through the

²²⁴Ibid.
²²⁵Tomlin, 29.
²²⁶Ibid.
²²⁷Ibid.
senior Service schools (including the DoS’ Foreign Service Institute [FSI]) and other civilian institutions. For example, the United States Army War College’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute provides courses on interagency and whole-of government planning. Interagency training is also provided on the job through exchange programs between DOD and other USG agencies.\textsuperscript{228} Consideration and funding should be garnered towards establishing an interagency curriculum similar to USAID’s Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation Training Team in order to streamline expertise and lessons learned.

Material

U.S. government federal departments and agencies operate with funds appropriated by the Congress. There are statutory limitations concerning the use and exchange of appropriated funds that affect upon JIACG operations. Likewise, nongovernmental organizations and multinational interagency representation and activities are also subject to the provisions of law.\textsuperscript{229} Regardless of the plan or supported mission, resources from each respective interagency asset should be collated and specified in advance, with the interagency lead pre-nominated to utilize the resources through the JIACG.

The DoD budget dwarfs that of all other federal agencies and departments, and it is DoD that is soliciting agency representation in the JIACGs. This may suggest that DoD

\textsuperscript{228}JCS, JP 3-08, II-28.

\textsuperscript{229}Tomlin, 29.
should bear the financial obligations associated with all JIACG requirements.\textsuperscript{230} However, a balanced perspective concerning the mutual benefit of this enterprise should emerge over time that facilitates reasonable burden sharing. Soliciting and maintaining interagency interest and presence in the JIACGs should reflect anticipation of these fiscal realities.\textsuperscript{231} A sound return on the investment of finite resources should be evident. The boundaries should be clarified within DoD concerning the prerogatives of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and those of the combatant commanders in securing resources, committing funds, and making agreements with various agencies.\textsuperscript{232}

At present, DoD has agreed to provide funding for “core” agencies within the JIACGs. This is typically in the form of per diem and travel expenses. Formal mechanisms are being developed that will enable the combatant commanders to request interagency support and appropriate funding through an office of primary responsibility (OPR) within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.\textsuperscript{233} If the JIACGs maintain their regional focus, their resource allocation should maintain these processes as well. In support of their respective T SCPs, the funding should be directed to regions and countries in support of regional objectives that will strengthen the overall interagency process and achieve better results.

\textsuperscript{230}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{231}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{232}Tomlin, 29.
\textsuperscript{233}Ibid
Leadership and Education

Formal professional education must become a standard practice and a prerequisite for senior members of interagency staffs. NDU is responsible for providing interagency, IGO, and NGO training for civilian and military personnel assigned or pending assignment to a combatant command JIACG. The NDU provides educational events including policy simulations and exercises to members of the Executive branch strategic decision-making community in the National Capital Region and at the combatant command JIACGs. The Institute for National Strategic Studies uses simulations that stress regional and functional crisis management and conflict resolution issues, as well as after-action review, to provide participants a nonthreatening environment in which to discuss and test innovative approaches to complex crises and encourage interagency cooperation.

Getting this part right is the center of gravity of the JIACG concept. From the top-down, the DoD and non-DoD leadership should visibly embrace and endorse “interagency cooperation” and “unified action” that represents all elements and instruments of national power, and the JIACG concept. The NDU has been given the lead in developing interagency education. Such education should be instituted in all

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234 Peter Halvorsen, “Reforming the Interagency at the Operational Level” (Research paper, Joint Military Operations Department, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, 2005), 14.

235 JCS, JP 3-08, II-29.

236 Ibid.

237 Tomlin, 29.
Command and Staff College, Senior Service College, and Joint Professional Military Education curriculums.\textsuperscript{238}

The senior national military leadership drives the development of joint doctrine, the articulation of defense strategic guidance, the provision of resources, and the mechanism for interagency-military connectivity at the national level. The theater leadership “operationalizes” the JIACG concept, and the combatant commanders set the tone for its visibility and viability.\textsuperscript{239}

Since DoS has the lead for Reconstruction and Stabilization, for what the military calls Stability Operations, the agencies of DoS are not subordinate to the DoD. During military operations, the DoD is the lead agency; after the cessation of hostilities, when the focus has shifted to Reconstruction and Stabilization, the DoS has the lead.\textsuperscript{240} There must be a mechanism to hand over the role of lead agency; and there must be a mechanism in place such that military operations remain under the control of the military, with civilian assistance as necessary; and there must be a mechanism in place such that civilian operations remain under the control of civilian agencies, with military support as necessary.\textsuperscript{241}

The Command and General Staff College (CGSC) offers interagency exchange and fellowships programs that allows military officers and DoS representatives to

\textsuperscript{238}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{239}Ibid.


\textsuperscript{241}Ibid.
identify training, education, and cultural differences in a learning environment. Students that attend CGSC have the opportunity to receive an advanced understanding of non-Defense interagency perspectives and problems inherent in the interagency system. Developing interagency cooperation at CGSC by merging DoD and DoS ideas would be a huge step towards establishing unity of effort. DoD’s Joint Professional Military Education system should deliberately educate and cultivate an interagency mentality from CGSC through general officer and Senior Executive Service levels just as it did to inculcate “jointness” since 1986. As with the training component of DOTMLPF, professional interagency education should be the product of an interagency enterprise, not a homegrown military concoction.242

Personnel

Cohesion is the most important factor when combining personnel from different agencies and departments to collaborate to solve issues together. Assembling the right mix of military and non-military manpower challenges the JIACGs. The absence of a joint manning document that lays-out and legitimizes the organization, and the stress of providing the military staffing from internal resources and transient Reserve Component personnel presents obstacles to JIACG effectiveness. Identifying the right mix of non-DoD interagency representation is even more challenging.243

As a minimum, the senior positions within these relatively small staff elements should be coded for Active Component Senior Service College graduates. Combatant

242Carlson.

243Tomlin, 29.
commands might consider filling the equivalent of the Deputy Director position with a “Title 10-like” civilian employee.\textsuperscript{244} This would enable the recruitment of a senior civilian with a level of education, experience, and exposure to national security strategy, theater strategy, the mechanics of a joint theater headquarters, multinational relations, and the interagency that is rarely resident in the military officer corps.\textsuperscript{245} The continuity would be beneficial, and having a DoD civilian deputy might offer indirect returns when operating in the predominantly civilian interagency.\textsuperscript{246} Absent formal interagency mechanisms and given the myriad of cultural, funding, C2, and other issues that will arise among partners, these personal relationships are essential to melding a cohesive comprehensive approach to stabilization efforts.\textsuperscript{247}

Facilities

Maintaining a centralized location of an interagency operation center in garrison and austere environments to enable DoS and DoD interaction is a necessity. Presumably, with its immense budget, size of personnel, and regionally aligned structure, DoD should take the lead for developing an interagency center within each COCOM to allow a joint interagency unit to function. A huge challenge for interagency is that it is primarily utilized as a reactionary force. Providing a location will consolidate personnel, equipment, communications, and ideas will foster active problem solving solutions and

\textsuperscript{244}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{245}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{246}Tomlin, 29.
\textsuperscript{247}JCS, JP 3-07, II-17.
mitigate drivers of instability. Providing the right physical location and compatible information technology (IT) architecture is extremely important to interagency collaboration. The facilities issue also raises fiscal questions pertaining to the mechanics of paying the bills and burden sharing within the JIACG.

Summary

Multiple U.S. Presidents and policy makers have stressed the need for interagency cooperation yet we have not maximized our full capabilities in our whole of government approach. The central argument presented in this thesis is increased collaboration between DoD and DoS is vital to our nation’s, allied partners’, and supported countries’ interests. In support of our National Security Strategy, we must understand that the U.S. is more likely to be involved in nation building, reconstruction, and stabilization missions more than conventional warfare in the future. Meeting the challenges of current and future operations requires the concerted effort of all instruments of US national power plus foreign governmental agencies and military forces and civilian organizations.248 Problems arise when each USG agency interprets policy guidance differently, sets different priorities for execution, and does not act in concert. Consequently, there is a need to conduct integrated planning to effectively employ the appropriate instruments of national power.249

In order to alleviate the nuisances of having to merge DoD and DoS during a conflict, we must improve an existing organization like JIACG. DoD and DoS have a

248 JCS, JP 3-08, I-4.
249 Ibid.
myriad of structural differences with diverse perspectives, authorities, capabilities, and objectives. Integrating their competencies and experience to achieve unity of effort is imperative for future complex environments.

Through an expansion of JIACG’s structure, funding, role and responsibilities, DoD and DoS will be able to integrate more effectively and synchronize their assets. The Once cohesiveness JIACG framework will solidify the USG’s ability to capitalize on every element of national power.

Recommendations for Further Study

There are some gaps in this research that must be acknowledged and should be further analyzed. They have been mitigated as best as possible, however some limitations could not be overcome. Additionally, continuous research in interagency collaboration will improve the in solving the issues and challenges associated with coordination.

Future research in interagency collaboration will be beneficial in improving the DoD and DoS methods of conducting training, funding, and executing operations. Additional analysis towards DoS and USAID’s perspective would be beneficial to the whole of government approach. Limitations to this research topic included access to information above unclassified. Information sharing and techniques could be addressed with the appropriate documentation above the unclassified level.

Access to DoS personnel and JIACG members would facilitate more fidelity towards the hypothesis. Analysis of the interaction between interagency personnel was mitigated through scholarly journals and professional studies, however, direct contact with interagency operators or access to lessons learned would increase additional research synthesis.
Additional research towards the causality and methodology of forming organizations in DoD and the DoS, respectively would be beneficial to whole of government approach. Assessing the QDDR in order to define DoS priorities in comparison to the QDR and DoD priorities will be practical.
Glossary

Assessment.1. (DoD): (a). A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing joint force capability during military operations. (b). Determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective. (JP 1-02) 2. (USAID): The analysis and critical evaluation of pre-existing environmental, political, sociological, cultural or other conditions or situations which would have an effect upon or influence the success of a program or achievement of a Development Objective. 250

Civil Affairs. Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations, also called CA. See also civil affairs activities; civil-military operations.

Civil Affairs Activities. Activities performed or supported by civil affairs that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present; and (2) involve application of civil affairs functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, to enhance conduct of civil-military operations. See also civil affairs; civil-military operations.

Civil-Military Operations. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces, also called CMO.

Civil-Military Operations Center. An ad hoc organization, normally established by the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander, to assist in the coordination of activities of engaged military forces, and other United States Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and

intergovernmental organizations. There is no established structure, and its size and composition are situation dependent, also called CMOC.

Civilian-Military (Civ-Mil). Describes a relationship between U.S. uniformed military forces and U.S. governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the government and civilian populace of a foreign nation; most often applied at the tactical/country level and used frequently at the operational/regional level.

Civil-Military Cooperation. A broad term that covers a variety of collaborative relationships between civilian and military actors in a conflict environment. Civilian actors may include government officials, staff from international organizations, and representatives of nongovernmental organizations. Civ-mil cooperation ranges from occasional informational meetings to comprehensive programs where civilian and military partners share planning and implementation. Cooperation can be controversial, as the military may see civilians as unduly complicating their mission, and civilians—especially in the humanitarian field—may think that any association with the military will compromise their impartiality and threaten their personal safety. However, most experts see civ-mil cooperation as necessary to provide the security, knowledge, and skills needed to help transform a conflict into an enduring peace. (USIP)

Civil-Military Operations (CMO). The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. (JP 1-02)

Instruments of National Power. All of the means available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives. They are expressed as diplomatic, economic, informational, and military.

Interagency. Made up of, involving, or representing two or more government agencies: interagency cooperation.

Interagency Coordination. Within the context of DoD involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of DoD, and engaged USG organizations for the purpose of achieving an objective.
Official Development Assistance. Facilitate the efforts of the people of developing countries to achieve self-sustainable economic and social development in accordance with their needs and environment, in cooperation with them in the developing activities; and to provide humanitarian assistance. There are six developmental goals to be pursued through bilateral foreign assistance programs: the encouragement of broad-based economic growth and agricultural development; the strengthening of democracy and good governance; the building of human capacity through education and training; the stabilization of the world population and the protection of human health; the protection of the world's environment for long-term sustainability; the providing of humanitarian assistance and the re-establishment of conditions necessary for political and/or economic development.

Planning. The process to identify appropriate results, develop approaches to reach them, assign needed resources, organize to achieve results, and identify the means to measure progress.

Stabilization. The process of bringing about stability; or the process by which underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in violence and a break-down in law and order are managed and reduced, while efforts are made to support preconditions for successful longer-term development.

Stability Operations. Military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions.

Strategy. 1. (DoD): A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives. 2. Views of where strategy ends and tactics begin differ between organizations. USAID views its basic strategic planning unit to be at the country level through the CDCS.

Soft Power. The ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced.

Unified Action. The synchronization, coordination and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort.

Unity of Command. 1. (DoD): The vesting of a single commander with the requisite authority to direct and coordinate the actions of all forces employed toward a common objective. Unity of command obtains the unity of effort that is essential to the decisive application of all available combat power. Subordinates are then focused on attaining the overall objectives as communicated from a single commander. In turn, this fosters freedom of action, decentralized control, and
initiative. 2. (Common Usage): Hierarchical organization principle that no subordinate should report to more than one boss.

Unity of Effort. 1. (DoD): 1. Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization—the product of successful unified action. 2. (State): A cooperative concept, which refers to coordination and communication among USG organizations toward the same common goals for success; in order to achieve unity of effort, it is not necessary for all organizations to be controlled under the same command structure, but it is necessary for each agency’s efforts to be in harmony with the short- and long-term goals of the mission.

1. Common understanding of the situation
   Unity of effort is based on four principles:

2. Common vision or goals for the R&S mission

3. Coordination of efforts to ensure continued coherency

4. Common measures of progress and ability to change course if necessary

Unity of Purpose. 1. Coordination and cooperation among civilian and military actors from one or more nations toward mutually agreed, common objectives or outcomes. 2. Authorities, institutions, processes, and other means that can be used to direct all elements of national power in pursuit of a common understanding of the situation and common vision or goals for the mission.
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