KOSOVO’S SUPPORT OF NATO STABILITY AND HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

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General Studies

by

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B.S., Pjeter Budi College–Institute for Studies, Pristina, Kosovo, 2009

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Kosovo’s Support of NATO Stability and Humanitarian Operations

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Kosovo as a new independent state in southeastern Europe is still in the phase of consolidation and building of its institutions. The Kosovo Security Force as one of the key security institutions in Kosovo has reached the required standards in the framework of its mission. The KSF engagement in NATO-led operations remains one of the strategic objectives of the Kosovo institutions.

This thesis examined how Kosovo can support NATO stability and humanitarian operations. The author chose this topic because it is a relevant topic within Kosovo and Kosovo Security Forces. The primary research question is “How can Kosovo support NATO stability and humanitarian operations?” The thesis identifies Kosovo’s political objectives related to participation in NATO-led operations and also the ways and means that the KSF can apply to participate in those operations. The thesis looks at the current Kosovo Security Force capabilities and compares those to the NATO requirements for stability and humanitarian operations.

The KSF’s initial engagement in these operations with individuals or small specialized units within other contingents is identified as the best option that will not produce secondary consequences such as negative impact on the budget.

Kosovo Security Force capabilities, stability operations, humanitarian operations, NATO requirements for stability and humanitarian operations

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

KOSOVO’S SUPPORT OF NATO STABILITY AND HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS, by Major Ejup Maqedonci, 87 pages.

Kosovo as a new independent state in southeastern Europe is still in the phase of consolidation and building of its institutions. The Kosovo Security Force as one of the key security institutions in Kosovo has reached the required standards in the framework of its mission. The KSF engagement in NATO-led operations remains one of the strategic objectives of the Kosovo institutions.

This thesis examined how Kosovo can support NATO stability and humanitarian operations. The author chose this topic because it is a relevant topic within Kosovo and Kosovo Security Forces. The primary research question is “How can Kosovo support NATO stability and humanitarian operations?”

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The KSF’s initial engagement in these operations with individuals or small specialized units within other contingents is identified as the best option that will not produce secondary consequences such as negative impact on the budget.
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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ARM</td>
<td>Army of The Republic of Macedonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>United States Central Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMKSF</td>
<td>Commander of Kosovo Security Force</td>
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<td>CPR</td>
<td>Civil Protection Regiment</td>
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<tr>
<td>EADRCC</td>
<td>Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre</td>
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<td>EOD</td>
<td>Explosive Ordnance Disposal</td>
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<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Manual</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOC</td>
<td>Full Operational Capabilities</td>
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<td>HN</td>
<td>Host Nation</td>
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<td>JP</td>
<td>Joint Publication</td>
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<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
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<td>KPC</td>
<td>Kosovo Protection Corps</td>
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<td>KSF</td>
<td>Kosovo Security Force</td>
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<td>LFC</td>
<td>Land Force Command</td>
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<td>MKSF</td>
<td>Ministry of the Kosovo Security Force</td>
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<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>OSB</td>
<td>Operational Support Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>PiP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMF</td>
<td>Political Military Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSF</td>
<td>Peace Support Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>RRB</td>
<td>Rapid Reaction Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>SARTF</td>
<td>Search and Rescue Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The aim of this study is to identify and justify Kosovo’s intention and capabilities to support NATO stability and humanitarian operations. This study will be based on several issues and data related to this topic, including: NATO requirements, NATO documents related to humanitarian and stability operations, and case studies of Macedonia’s and Armenia’s participation in NATO operations as Non-NATO countries. The study will also examine US doctrine, Kosovo Security Force (KSF) laws and regulations, and the stability and humanitarian operations in Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti.

The question often raised is whether Kosovo is ready to support these operations when we consider that this new state in the Balkans declared independence only five years ago and is still in the stage of consolidation of institutions. In January 2009, Kosovo established the KSF as an integral part of security structures in Kosovo. KSF performs under the Ministry of the Kosovo Security Force authority; this ministry is responsible for exercising civilian control over the KSF, including management and administration. It consists of a mixture of civilian and KSF personnel and is accountable, through the Prime Minister, to the Kosovo Assembly. According to the Kosovo constitution, “the Kosovo Security Force shall serve as a national security force for the Republic of Kosovo and may send its members abroad in full conformity with its international responsibilities.”¹ The Kosovo Security Force shall protect the people and Communities of the Republic of Kosovo, the president of the Republic of Kosovo is the

¹Constitution of Republic of Kosovo, Chapter XI, Article 126.
Commander-in-Chief of the Kosovo Security Force and shall always be subject to control by democratically elected civilian authorities.\(^2\) The Kosovo Security Force shall be professional, reflect the ethnic diversity of the people of the Republic of Kosovo and shall be recruited from among the citizens of the Republic of Kosovo. Based on the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, known as Ahtisari Plan (an international agreement regarding Kosovo’s independence) NATO forces in Kosovo, respectively the Kosovo Force (KFOR) is responsible to create, advise, and monitor the KSF until it reaches full operational capabilities.\(^3\)

In June 2013, a declaration from NATO of full operational capabilities (FOC) for the KSF enabled the Assembly of Kosovo (based on the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo) to delegate to the KSF additional defense and security tasks. Even though the KSF was a newly established force, it was deployed twice to the Republic of Albania for humanitarian operations in 2010.

Although Kosovo is internationally recognized by 105 member countries of the United Nations (UN), it is still facing many challenges and problems regarding diplomatic issues. Serbia's diplomatic campaign (with support from Russia and China) to present Kosovo as the source of conflicts has resulted in a negative perception from some countries, mainly in the Middle East and South America. In this aspect, non-recognition of Kosovo’s independence from Spain, Greece, Slovakia and Romania (all NATO member countries) is affecting Kosovo’s engagement in NATO-led operation. Except for

\(^2\)Ibid.

the Spanish, the other three countries participated in the building of the KSF and also gave a positive signal that in the next year it will recognize Kosovo as an independent country.4

The KSF’s commitment as part of NATO’s operations among other benefits, will help in supporting the creation of a positive image of Kosovo in the world as a stable and democratic country. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to examine if Kosovo, specifically the KSF, is capable of meeting the requirements arising from NATO, by which capabilities it is ready to support these operations, and whether or not Kosovo has legal coverage to support these operations. This study will deliver information and data related to the KSF and to stability and humanitarian operations in general to answer these questions.

In conclusion, since 2008, NATO forces, especially the United States, have provided the KSF with training, counseling, and mentoring programs. In addition to the successful operations conducted in Kosovo, that was mainly related to demining, search and rescue and hazardous materials operations, units of the KSF deployed to Albania in 2010 for humanitarian operations during floods in northern Albania. Since Kosovo is a newly created state, and still in the recognition process, the KSF support of NATO stability and humanitarian operations is of political and strategic interest for the creation of a positive image of Kosovo in the world. Despite internal and external challenges that may affect the realization of this strategic objective, the achievement of this objective remains an important issue for Kosovo. Thus, this study will describe the Kosovo’s

interest, political will and legal readiness to support NATO stability and humanitarian operations, the KSF’s capabilities and readiness to support these operations and the NATO requirements for participation in NATO-led stability and humanitarian operations. Furthermore, this study will examine U.S and NATO doctrine related to identify objectives, functions, and tasks related to stability and humanitarian operations in order to understand the KSF’s capabilities within its current mission to support NATO operations. Moreover the US and NATO doctrine for stability and humanitarian operation will serve as the basis for the KSF to create and develop its own doctrine prior to engaging in these operations. Descriptions of the stability and humanitarian operations in Somalia, Haiti and Iraq are included to illustrate the lessons learned from these cases and the complex environment that the KSF may face during such operations. Finally, the cases of Macedonia and Armenia described in this study are the best examples how Kosovo should shape its path toward participation in the NATO-led operations.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Preliminary research indicates there are sufficient materials and sources that can support this thesis. Most of the sources belong to the military, including: General Staff Publication, and publication of The War College, and Army Command and General Staff College. However, some sources (mostly books) express the personal opinions of the authors based on the data that they have collected and are mainly based on previous stability operations in places such as Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti. Most of the sources are based on US military doctrine, which is much richer and more comprehensive than doctrines of other countries.

Materials related to NATO requirements regarding stability and humanitarian operations have been difficult to locate because NATO only recently started to create its doctrine; however, were found two important documents related to these operations such as: Allied Joint Publication 3.4.1, *Peace Support Operations* and *Political-Military Framework* (which describes the Non-NATO countries procedures and requirements for engagement in these operations). Source information on topics such as protection against nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as some common standards of NATO, were mainly found within NATO Standardization Agreement (STANAG) documents. In order to complete this study with accurate and relevant data the researcher also identified some official websites that can support the requirements arising from the topic.

To have a clearer picture of the legislative aspect, several legal acts have been identified that can support the research such as the Kosovo Constitution, the Law on the Kosovo Security Force, and other laws dealing with the KSF. Additional efforts have
been made to determine sources that can help in identifying the capabilities that Kosovo has in order to support NATO operations and which are the key issues of the topic of this paper. Through this prism, several sources were identified, including the official website of the Ministry of the Kosovo Security Force, MKSF *Annual Report 2012*, the official newspaper of the KSF (*Our Strength*) and other unclassified documents of this Ministry. In general, it is the opinion of the researcher that the literature available meets the needs for the study of this topic in terms of data as well as in terms of the comparative study of cases such as Macedonia and Armenia.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study uses a multi-dimensional approach and covers a wide spectrum using the META study method (including descriptive, comparative, and case study methods). The descriptive method provides as much data as possible regarding Kosovo capabilities to support stability and humanitarian operations, including data for KSF units, the capabilities of the units, and if those are prepared to conduct deployment operations and to respond to domestic needs at the same time. Furthermore, through this method the researcher describes what a stability operation is in terms of meaning and definitions. Through a comparative case study method, the researcher identified requirements that arise from the doctrine of the US and NATO. This approach allowed for comparisons between Kosovo’s capabilities and the requirements arising from the US and NATO doctrine, for participation in stability and humanitarian operations.

Also through these methods, the study compares stabilization operations in Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti and the U.S and NATO doctrine related to the Stability Operations. The study of these cases provides a foundation for assessing the needs, difficulties, advantages, and disadvantages of these operations that will help to answer the question of how Kosovo could support stability and humanitarian operations and which can be some of the challenges that can face in the future. Furthermore, through the same method (case study) the researcher studied the cases of Macedonia and Armenia in order to gain as much information as possible about the ways these countries participate in NATO operations. To create a clear picture about the requirements in relation to opportunities, a comparative matrix will be used in which the needs and requirements of NATO are
mapped to the capabilities of Kosovo. META-study method therefore has created opportunities to delve deeply into the problem and to answer the question of how Kosovo could support NATO operations.
The purpose of this study is to identify and justify Kosovo’s intention and capabilities to support NATO stability and humanitarian operations. This study will be based on several issues and data related to this topic, including: NATO requirements, NATO documents related to humanitarian and stability operations, and case studies of Macedonia’s and Armenia’s participation in NATO operations without being NATO countries. The study will also examine US doctrine, Kosovo and Kosovo Security Force (KSF) laws and regulations, and case studies related to stability operations in Iraq, Somalia and Haiti.

This chapter aims to answer to the secondary questions of this thesis. This chapter is divided into three main parts, which are:

1. The past, the present and the future of the Kosovo Security Force, achievements and challenges of the KSF and the current capabilities of the KSF with which it can support NATO operations. Description of doctrine of stability and humanitarian operations based in the United States and NATO doctrine as well as Kosovo’s legal aspect for deployments. The challenges that the international community faced during stability operations in Iraq, Somalia and Haiti and KSF capabilities to cope with these kinds of challenges.

2. Cases of Armenia and Macedonia, specific measures that these countries took and requirements which these countries fulfilled to be part of operations led by NATO. Military operational capacities of these countries before they become part of the NATO joint operations and their capacities during the time when they were part of these
The systematic violence conducted by Serbian security forces since 1913 and finally the revocation of the Kosovo’s political autonomy by the Serbian regime in 1989 caused discontent among Kosovar Albanians.\(^5\) This act of the Serbian regime followed by other acts against Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia brought the Balkan wars and the dissolution of the Yugoslavia.\(^6\) The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) as an insurgent force began to undertake wide combat operations in 1998, after the failure of peaceful politics of Kosovo Albanians who peacefully but unsuccessfully, tried to persuade Serbia to withdraw troops and police who had occupied Kosovo and were conducting violence and genocide against the majority population in Kosovo.\(^7\) Professor Henry H. Perritt from the University of Illinois in his book *Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency* classifies “the KLA as one of the most successful insurgencies of the post-cold war period, although he says it engaged in a relatively short period of widespread


\(^7\)Ibid., 8, 14.
armed conflict." The Serbian police and military forces in 1998-1999 conducted genocide and state terror against the Albanian civil population in retaliation for KLA activities. Up to 10,000 Kosovo Albanians were killed and 900,000 displaced by fighting. On March 24, 1999, NATO launched air strikes against the Yugoslav National Army and Serbian police forces to stop this genocide. The war ended after the 78 days of NATO air strike in June, 1999 after an agreement reached with Serbia to withdraw its troops from Kosovo. Just days after the ceasefire, NATO deployed its ground troops to Kosovo. Since 1999, NATO has played a major role in security and stability in Kosovo as well as in support of wider international efforts to build peace and stability in the Balkan region. It has contributed to the demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) at the end of 1999 and allowed the transformation of the KLA into a civilian organization known as the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) under the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). After the Kosovo declaration of independence on February 17, 2008, NATO did not change its neutral role in Kosovo. However, on June 12, 2008, NATO agreed to start implementing its new tasks in Kosovo, which was to assist in the dissolution of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) and in the establishment of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF), and a civilian structure responsible to supervise the KSF, the Ministry of the Kosovo Security Force. The KPC ceased to be operational on January 20, 2009, and the KSF stood up began on January 21, 2009.10

8Ibid., 2.
9Phillips, 1.
In the post independence period, starting on February 17, 2008, the Kosovo Protection Corps was dissolved and the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) was established. The establishment of the KSF resulted from a proposal for a new security architecture in Kosovo, based on the Comprehensive Proposal for Kosovo’s status, known as the Ahtisaari Plan. According to this Plan, the KSF will have a maximum of 2,500 active members and 800 reserve members, without heavy weapons. Members of the KSF will be recruited from across Kosovo through a formal selection process developed jointly by Kosovo and the International Military Presence (IMP). As a new force separate and distinct from (and not associated with) the previous KPC, the KSF still has more than half of its active members from the KPC and KLA organizations.11 According to the Ahtisaari Plan the future mission and organizational structure of the Kosovo Security Force was to be reviewed five years after the independence which means this year (2013).

The KSF most likely will become a defense force similar to other sovereign countries, built up and developed in accordance with NATO requirements and standards.12 Currently, according to the constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, namely the law on the Kosovo Security Force, the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) is a new, professional, multi-ethnic, lightly armed and uniformed security force that is subject to democratic, civilian control. The mission of the KSF is to conduct crisis response operations in Kosovo and abroad; civil protection operations within Kosovo; and to assist the civil authorities in responding to natural disasters and other emergencies. Such duties will include search and rescue operations; explosive ordnance disposal; the control and

11Ibid., 17.

12Ibid., 21.
clearance of hazardous materials; fire-fighting; and other humanitarian assistance tasks.\textsuperscript{13} The KSF represents and protects all the people of Kosovo. The Ministry for the Kosovo Security Force (MKSF) is responsible for exercising civilian control over the KSF, including its management and administration. It is comprised of a mixture of civilian and KSF personnel and is accountable, through the Prime Minister, to the Kosovo Assembly. The mission of the MKSF, and also of the highest level KSF Headquarters, is to formulate, implement, evaluate and develop the policies and activities of the KSF within a framework of democratic governance and in accordance with the Constitution and laws of the Republic of Kosovo.\textsuperscript{14}

Currently, Kosovo is building up its security forces based on the conditions set out in the plan drafted by President Marti Ahtisaari, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo's future status. Kosovo’s security force is not currently a conventional armed force as it has a limited mandate and it does not play the same role as the defensive forces of its neighboring countries. However, Kosovo is working towards a NATO compatible force that will be able to respond to the humanitarian crises in and outside Kosovo and to participate in peace building operations led by the United Nations or NATO. Currently the Kosovo Security Force is run by the Ministry of the KSF, which is composed of civilian and military personnel who have responsibility for civilian control over the KSF. The KSF is composed of land forces and its subordinate units: Rapid Reaction Brigade, Operational Support Brigade and TRADOC. Also within the land

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{13}Official Gazette of the Republic of Kosovo, \textit{LAW No. 03/L-046 On the Kosovo Security Force}, Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, March 13, 2008.}

forces are acting specialized companies such as; communication, medical, force police, Crisis Response Liaison Unit and a helicopter unit.

The KSF is still in the initial stages of the creation of its doctrine. Mostly the KSF doctrine is adopted from the US doctrine and other NATO countries doctrine but normally adjusted to Kosovo circumstances.

The KSF is headed by a lieutenant general who, according to the constitution of the Republic of Kosovo is appointed by the president, based on the government recommendations.\textsuperscript{15} The KSF commander reports to the president of Kosovo (which according to the constitution is commander of the armed forces of Kosovo) and receives direction from him or her and from the Minister of Kosovo Security Force.\textsuperscript{16} As was mentioned above the MKSF is comprised of a mixture of civilian and uniformed personnel. The Directorate of Plans and Policy as well as most of the administrative sections are headed by civilians while the Directorate of Operations and Land Forces are headed by uniformed members of the KSF. The MKSF is headed by a minister and three deputy ministers. One deputy minister position is reserved for the representative of ethnic minorities. In the MKSF, like in the KSF units are assigned a NATO adviser team (NAT) members for advising and also to make sure that ministry plans and policy developed according to the NATO standards. The following organization chart (figure 1) shows a detailed structure of the MKSF, while the next organization chart (figure. 2) shows the organizational structure of the Land Forces Command (LFC).

\textsuperscript{15}\textit{Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Article 126.}

\textsuperscript{16}\textit{Ibid., Article 84(12).}
Since the establishment of the Kosovo Security Force, one of its main objectives was the partnership with NATO and preparation for participation in the framework of...
NATO operations in the world. This objective was made public many times by the political and military leaders of the Republic of Kosovo. The president of Kosovo during a meeting with the KFOR Commander (NATO Force in Kosovo) in April 2011 stated, "in preparation of the KSF troops, the KFOR is playing an important role, with its commitment to the training of KSF troops. All this effort is aimed at training and professional development of KSF for it to be part of the Partnership for Peace and an active part of NATO in the future. This is our aim and goal for the KSF."\(^\text{17}\) Also KSF Commander, Lieutenant General Kadri Kastrati has repeatedly made it publicly known that the KSF is focused and willing to participate in NATO operations. During his speech on the occasion of the departure of the two contingents to KSF participating in joint exercises with the armies of the region, he stated “we made our demands in NATO, and the United States, and to our the other international friends, that our goal for next year is to take part, alongside other armies in humanitarian operations, peacekeeping operations, led by NATO, the EU or the UN.”\(^\text{18}\) Lieutenant General Kadri Kastrati in a previous interview for Radio Kosovo declared that KSF has the capacity for missions abroad, and can especially contribute in areas such as: demining, search and rescue, medicine and logistics. But according to General Kastrati, the KSF can not be self-sustainable especially in terms of transportation of troops in distant countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and African countries due to the lack of military air transport. He believes that this

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problem can be solved only by making an agreement with any supporting country that will enable the introduction of the KSF troops in the framework of its contingent.\(^\text{19}\)

Despite the desire and willingness of the Kosovo political and military leaders to support a NATO stability and humanitarian operations that would not be possible without fulfilling the two basic conditions; declaration of full operational capabilities for KSF by NATO and the signing of the Stabilization and Association agreement between Kosovo and the European Union. The declaration of full operational capabilities of KSF was made official by the North Atlantic Council on July 9, 2013. The North Atlantic Council's declared, “NATO judges that KSF has reached the required level of self-sustainability in terms of recruiting, vetting, training of personnel, as well as equipping the Force. NATO considers that KSF is fully capable to perform the tasks assigned to it within its mission and to standards designated by NATO.”\(^\text{20}\) The council also noted, “KFOR will continue to support KSF to make sure that it remains a source of stability for the region.”\(^\text{21}\) The North Atlantic Council declaration not only shows the KSF as a professional force trained and prepared according to NATO standards, but this declaration also presented the KSF as a source of stability for the region. This statement besides other delivered to the regional countries the NATO message to those countries


\(^{21}\)Ibid.
that Kosovo is ready to participate just like other Balkan countries in the NATO operations which aim to produce stability and secure environment in the unstable regions.

The Stabilization and Association Agreement signed with the European Union is another important achievement for Kosovo. This agreement is a step forward and it is mandatory for the countries which expressed a wish to join the European Union. Besides political and other benefits that Kosovo can gain from this agreement, this step will mitigate the hesitant political position of a few NATO countries which are part of the European Union and which still did not recognize Kosovo. It is important to mention that this achievement came as a result of successful completion of the negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia for the normalization of the relations between them. On July 17, 2013, Euro Commissioner Stefan Fule, stated “Kosovo has made a big step toward the European Union. I welcome the political consensus in Kosovo in regards to the European agenda and its commitment with Serbia. These constant efforts have been crucial in achieving this success.”

Hence, in terms of domestic and international politics and also the will and desire of KSF leadership, it is clear that Kosovo is ready and prepared to participate as part of NATO or the EU stability and humanitarian operations. In this aspect also, the deployment of the KSF contingents in the Republic of Albania for the humanitarian operations during the floods of 2010 increased the reputation of Kosovo, and in particular of the KSF and increased reliability in the deployable capabilities of this force in the eyes of NATO countries, while also boosting the internal opinion in Kosovo. The

professionalism and dedication of the KSF contingent during these operations was rated very high by the host country, NATO and the Kosovo institutions. For these operations, the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Albania said “The Kosovo Security Force has shown professional character and extraordinary dedication, during the two challenges that Albania faced against the natural disasters in the north of the country. The professional capacity that your teams have demonstrated during this period shows that KSF is growing professionally at a very rapid pace. While thanking you for this contribution, I say that we will continue to insist that it should be made part of all the institutions and regional initiatives in the defense field as well as a member of NATO in a closer future.”

NATO praised, the KSF’s performance in Albania and considered it as the primary force in this operation and found the KSF’s personnel prepared in all ways to face these kinds of situations, at home and abroad.

Besides political readiness and professional achievements mentioned above, Kosovo, has also made an important step regarding the legislative aspect of deployments by approving the Law on Overseas Deployment of the Kosovo Security Force. The approval of this law on May 28, 2013, supplemented the gap that the KSF had related to deployments. Law No. 04/L-177 on Overseas Deployment of the Kosovo Security Force sets the authority and responsibilities of institutions when deploying the KSF contingent

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overseas as well as procedures for deployment to the peace support operations, humanitarian operations and overseas trainings and exercises, withdrawal and financing.25 This law also defines the peace support operations, humanitarian operations and overseas trainings and exercises. According to this law, Overseas Peace Support Operations are operations and activities, intent to establish the conditions for a sustainable peace. Overseas humanitarian operations are operations to provide assistance in cases of humanitarian disasters, technical, technological or natural disasters which endanger the health and lives of the people, property and the environment, as well as provision of assistance in cases of destructions due to a war or terrorism. The law also allows for overseas trainings and exercises and the participation of the KSF members in individual trainings and exercises or group exercises, the purpose of which is to achieve operational readiness.26 Furthermore, this law defines the procedures for those deployments. For participation in peace support operations this law states “Deployment of the KSF contingent to peace support operations shall take place on the basis of an agreement with the host country or by an invitation of an international organization, or by the request of any member country international organizations, as well as by the United Nations Security Council Resolution.”27 The same statement also applies to humanitarian operation with the only difference being that Humanitarian Operation takes place also on


26Ibid., Article 3.

27Ibid., Article 7.
the basis of direct request for assistance from the host country. The main difference stands in terms of the decision for the overseas deployment, for the peace support operations the decision shall be taken by the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo; for the Humanitarian Operations the decision shall be taken by the Government of the Republic of Kosovo. However, in both cases it is the president of the Republic of Kosovo who authorizes the deployment of the KSF contingent. This law also determines the MKSF and KSF responsibilities for overseas deployments. According to the Article 14 of this law “Minister for the KSF is responsible: to propose to the Government of the Republic of Kosovo plan and necessary finances for the KSF activities in overseas operations; to decide on initiation of the planning process, and if required, to report on the deployment process to the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo.” The same article describes the responsibilities of the KSF Commander for evaluating, organizing, training and equipping the KSF contingent in order to fulfill the requirements for overseas deployment. Regarding financing, this law specifies that the necessary financing for preparation, equipment, and deployment of the KSF contingent to overseas operations shall be provided by the Budget of the Republic of Kosovo. KSF members shall be provided with transportation, necessary equipment, health insurance, life insurance,

28 Ibid., Article 8.
29 Ibid., Article 7.
30 Ibid., Article 8.
31 Ibid., Article 14.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid., Article 15.
salaries, additional payments, food and accommodation as well as compensation for injury and death, however, the Minister for the KSF or the Minister for Foreign Affairs can negotiate with international organizations and individual countries for covering the expenses of the overseas operations.\footnote{Ibid.}

Despite the political will, professional achievements, and the proper legislation, there are some additional challenges that the KSF is facing that will have a direct impact on the ability of the KSF to support NATO stability and humanitarian operations. Limited budget, maintenance of equipment, creation of the doctrine and standardization of training and equipment are just some of the challenges that the KSF has faced since its founding.

After the declaration of full operational capabilities for the KSF, the Kosovo government began a strategic review of the security sector. This review is expected to result in increasing of security competencies for the KSF, which until now have been limited. After this review, the KSF is expected to increase the number of personnel, equipment and weapons, which also were limited. Besides the positive outcome that will produce the strategic review of the security sector, it will also have negative impact on the budget of the KSF and will overload its logistics system. MKSF budget for 2013 is 39,347,258 Euro\footnote{Assembly of Republic of Kosovo, \textit{Kosovo Budget 2013}, January 1, 2013, http://www.assembly-kosova.org/common/docs/ligjet/04-L-165\%20PL\%20per\%20buxhetin\%202013.pdf (accessed September 9, 2013).} (52,174,464 US Dollars) and growth trend of this budget does not promise any significant changes, at least until 2017 (see figure 3).\footnote{Geci, 7.}
Table 1. Assumption of Annual GDP Growth and Annual Budget Increase for KSF/Defense Force 2011–2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4.5% GDP annual growth in Kosovo</th>
<th>4.5% annual budget increase for KSF/Defense Force to reflect the GDP growth</th>
<th>16% annual budget increases by 2017 to nearly reach the average 1.8% of GDP of seven Western Balkan Countries military expenditures</th>
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Having considered the KSF budget and the challenges ahead, as well as considering the restrictions that Kosovo has in terms of transporting troops to the theater of operations, we can deduce that Kosovo will have difficulties supporting NATO operations with any significant force. However the KSF can support these operations with small specialized units. These specialized units have sufficient capacity to provide different specialist trainings for host country forces. The majority of specialized units that Kosovo can offer NATO in support of its operations, are concentrated in the Civil Protection Regiment, which is part of the Operational Support Brigade. According to the Law of the KSF the CPR mission is to support the Kosovo authorities with its specialized units in the case of various disasters or incidents related to the field of search and rescue, chemical, nuclear and biological protection, demining (EOD), and fire fighting. Within
the CPR are located specialized units such including: Search and Rescue Company (SAR), CBRN Company, Demining Company (EOD) and Support Company.

![Diagram of the KSF structure with CPR highlighted.]

Figure 3. Position of the CPR in the KSF Structure


The CPR has inherited a substantial part of specialized equipments and a high percentage of trained specialist staff from the KPC. Thus it was not difficult for this unit to adapt to the new circumstances created by the dissolution of the KPC and the establishment of the KSF.\(^{37}\) The CPR retained the overall format and structure of the

KPC Civil Protection Brigade, however it incorporated the NATO requirements for the standard unit structure and adopted the NATO operational standard procedures.

![CPR Organizational Chart](image)

**Figure 4. CPR Organizational Chart**

*Source: Created by author, data from Kadri Kastrati, “Natural Disasters Management System in Kosovo” (Master Thesis, Universum College Pristina, June 2012).*

Since the creation of the unit, training of CPR personnel for response to various emergency cases is conducted by NATO countries using training facilities within Kosovo as well as NATO training centers. The NATO and KSF instructors using the KSF ranges also conducted internal specialized trainings for the CPR units.

In order to prepare the KSF troops in general and CPR in particular to respond and to manage emergencies at the national level, in 2010, the Ministry of KSF planned
and organized joint exercises and coordinated with other agencies of the Kosovo government to conduct exercises such as Field Exercise “Agile Lion 3.” The field exercise was conducted in cooperation with other ministries and agencies such as the Secretariat of the National Security Council of Kosovo (NSCK), the Government Situation Centre (GSC), Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Local Government, International Airport of Pristina, Kosovo Red Cross and three municipalities: Podujeve, Lypjan, and Istog. This large field exercises intended to demonstrate the capabilities of the KSF to respond in crisis situations and natural disasters, as well as to demonstrate coordination skills with other institutional actors at the country level.

The CPR has consistently supported civil authorities as the first line and the second line of reaction in different civil emergency management, demining, search and rescue, hazardous materials inspection, EOD and firefighting cases. Those have been and remain areas in which the CPR continues to give its contribution. Given the CPR’s role in emergency management in the Republic of Kosovo, considerations of further training and adequate equipment remains a priority.

The Restelica avalanche case in early 2012 and many other cases showed the importance of this unit to the KSF and Kosovo. Besides involvement in disasters in the Republic of Kosovo, the case of reaction KSF units during floods in Albania in 2010,

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39 Ibid.
40 Kastrati, 31.
testified to the importance of the existence of a civil protection unit of the Armed Forces at the regional level.

During the floods in northern Albania, the KSF created a combined contingent based on the needs identified by the Albanian authorities, consisting of search and rescue, transportation, force police, and medical capabilities, in order to manage the situation there. During that operation, coordination with Albanian troops and other friendly troops from NATO countries who took part in the operation was excellent, enabling the KSF contingent to show professionalism, discipline and dedication. Due to the specialized tasks included on the CPR’s mission and also its location near Pristina airport, the CPR is also responsible for responding to any aircraft crash or accident where the airport’s capabilities are not sufficient to manage the situation.

In early 2012, the Ministry of Kosovo Security Force in cooperation with the US Embassy, specifically with the office of defense cooperation (ODS), evaluated the current search and rescue capabilities in the KSF and identified gaps to be addressed to bring them into full compliance with the international rules of the International Search and Rescue Agreement (INSARAG). Besides the evaluation and identification of needs for training, during those meetings the creation of a SAR Task Force was generated. This task force would be ready to react to different accidents within and outside the country and at the request of other institutions or state governments.

The SAR Task Force will be prepared and trained by US Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) instructors. The US assumed the responsibility to support

this unit in order for it be ready to conduct operations as a part of the NATO mission in
support of peace in different countries of the world and be prepared to participate in
rescue teams within the United Nations in cases of large-scale disasters around the
world.  

The second stage of this project is the creation of the Regional Training Center for
search and rescue within the KSF Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). This
center will train units and various agencies of the Republic of Kosovo and surrounding
countries, in the areas of civil protection. This training center will be accredited by
NATO and will be unique in Eastern Europe. The KSF currently has sufficient human
capabilities and adequate training ranges and with support from partners in terms of
training and equipment it is possible that this project will be accomplished within a
period of three years.

The final objective of this project is the establishment of an Urban Search and
Rescue Task Force (USAR) trained and accredited internationally, ready for deployment
in the region, completed with advanced level of training and equipment in order to
conduct wide spectrum SAR operations in Kosovo and the region.

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42 Kastrati, 32.
Besides the search and rescue capabilities, NATO (specifically the US) is helping to further the professionalism of the Demining and the CBRN Companies. US Army EOD teams located in Kosovo and KSF EOD teams cooperate for several years for clearance of mines and other unexploded devices throughout the Kosovo territory. Those units train, mentor and oversee the operation of the KSF EOD. Currently the US Army’s 62nd Ordnance Company, from Fort Carson, is the unit responsible for assisting the KSF EOD teams. US Army Specialist Kyle Wainwright, an EOD team member speaking for US Army website on the capabilities of the KSF teams said, “A lot of them [KSF] have
been de-mining for 10 plus years, so they are fairly experienced.”

Wainwright emphasized some of the problems the KSF teams are facing. He noted, “Getting KSF EOD the proper tools and equipment they need is crucial to their ability to run incidences without US aid, so it will ensure maximum safety that can be observed and their overall mission effectiveness.”

In three years the KSF EOD Company cleared over 70,000 square meters and destroyed thousands of unexploded ordnances. The US Embassy is the main supporter of this company in terms of logistics and training and evaluated this unit and its member's performance during real operations as high. During a visit to the KSF EOD team on the field, the US Ambassador, Tracy Jacobson, commended the excellent work that KSF deminers were doing to clear all dangerous areas from unexploded ordnances in Kosovo. Furthermore, Ambassador Jacobson said, “USA and the US Embassy are very proud of your courageous and dangerous work.”

In addition to the experience received in Kosovo, EOD Company members also have international experience. They participated in a 2008 operation in the Republic of Albania to clear unexploded ordnance in Gerdec village, Albania, following the explosion of an ex-military ammunition depot. The explosion resulted in 26 killed, 300 others injured and the destruction of hundreds of

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44 Ibid.

homes. The professionalism and the sacrifice of the members of Kosovo EOD teams was rated very highly by the Albanian government at that time.46

Likewise, over the years the CBRN Company set an example as a professional, disciplined and dedicated unit. CBRN enlisted soldiers and officers passed through several professional and specialized trainings and their performance was evaluated and rated very high. Besides trainings and exercises within Kosovo and abroad, the unit conducts many operations and inspections for hazardous materials. According to the MKSF Annual Report during 2012 this unit conducted 36 various inspections and operations.47

This company as well as other CPR units is seen as part of the priorities in the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the Government of Kosovo (GoK) and the US. The SOFA signed by Kosovo and US states, “The SOFA provides the legal framework within which American military and US Department of Defense civilian personnel who are not part of the NATO mission will operate in Kosovo. On that basis, these personnel will be working with members of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) to further develop the KSF’s capacity to perform its four core missions of Firefighting, Search and Rescue, Hazardous Material Disposal, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal.”48


In addition to the work of the CPR, the KSF members in general participated in many regional joint exercises such as; regional exercises “Crisis response” in Krivolaka (Macedonia) and “Joint Reaction 13” in Albania. Also to be noted is the support from the Turkish Army in preparing the KSF troops for deployments and peacekeeping missions. Turkey is already facilitating KSF’s readiness for peacekeeping missions by offering KSF members essential knowledge for successful participation in peacekeeping missions. So far 114 KSF members have completed their training in Turkish military academies; currently, 14 members are being trained including six cadets. Related to the cooperation and preparations for deployments abroad, MKSF set the priorities for 2013. Among others in the priorities are included: the creation of the legal framework for foreign deployment, to ensure deployment needs are established for organizations in the following order: EOD, SAR, CBRN, and to identify personnel, logistics, communications, operational, security, and medical requirements for deploying the identified self-sustainable units. The achievements of those priorities are closely related and depend on cooperation with partners, especially with US, NATO, and EU countries. Thus, MKSF has included among its priorities, the Sixth Priority, which is to make the KSF a committed partner to the US, NATO and EU countries. According to the MKSF the achievement of this priority can be reached by ensuring transparency and consultation in planning, budgeting and structuring, establishing NATO Standardization Agreement (STANAG), signing MOUs and implement annual bi-lateral plans, increasing the number


of accredited security attaches abroad, enhancing cooperation with attaches accredited to Kosovo, enhancing relationship with KFOR, lobby for a formal partnership with NATO, attending NATO familiarization trainings, participating in NATO led exercises and seminars, participating in the Airlift Planners Course, enhance relationship with US and develop plan for State Partnership Program activities.\textsuperscript{52} From the findings and analyzing of internal political circumstances and military capabilities as well as based on the priorities of the MKSF, and KSF Commander and on the MKSF budget we can conclude that EOD, SAR, and CBRN as well as medical units are some areas in which Kosovo can support NATO stability operations in the future. Besides the specialist engagement in support of operations, those units can also conduct trainings for the host nations military, police and emergency services. Based on their specialist skills and experience, these units can also support NATO, UN, or other organizations during humanitarian operations, especially during disaster relief operations. We can’t exclude here also the Rapid Reaction Brigade (RRB) operational capabilities. This brigade has sufficient capabilities and trained members to support NATO stability operations with units which can conduct protection in the area of operation. However, before going in depth in the conclusions which will be presented in chapter five, it is important to understand the NATO requirements for stability and humanitarian operations.

\textbf{NATO Requirements for Participation in Stability and Humanitarian Operations}

Prior to describing the requirements for Non-NATO countries' participation in stability operation or as its defined in NATO doctrine (AJP-3.4.1), Peace Support

\textsuperscript{52}\textit{Ibid.}
Operations (PSO), it is important to understand the key aspects of the Alliance’s involvement in peace support operations. Prior to approving support, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) takes into consideration such factors as legitimacy, North Atlantic initiating directive, voluntary participation by nations members, force contribution, and conditions for terminating the operation. For legitimacy there are legal, social and political components that may be taken into consideration.\textsuperscript{53} Under the legal considerations it is included that “All military operations must take into account both the letter and spirit of national and international law. The appropriate legal considerations will provide the framework for the conduct of military operations. The planning and mounting of Peace Support Operations raises some legal issues that are different from those raised by conventional military operations.”\textsuperscript{54} These include: the legal basis or authority for any given PSO, the legal status of personnel and equipment engaged in PSO, which is generally enshrined in a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), the Rules of Engagement (ROE), governing the conduct of personnel and the employment of equipment engaged in a PSO, the requirements of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) which is often referred to as the law of war or International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and legal obligations stemming from Arms Control Treaties.\textsuperscript{55} Under the social component it describes the necessity of the population and political leadership support for these operations:


\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 55.
Social legitimacy is therefore a major pre-condition for the successful initiation, continuation and conclusion of any PSO and contributes to the broad support and wider participation in the operation by international and non-governmental organizations. Support from the population in the conflict area is also critical to the long-term success of a PSO. Compliance and consent for the PSF enhances its freedom of movement and allows military aspects of the overall operation to move more quickly to a successful conclusion.56

Regarding political aspect of legitimacy, the overall political control of NATO participation in a PSO is the responsibility of the North Atlantic Council (NAC). In addition one or more UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) will usually mandate an operation. The conduct of PSO is based on an agreement with, or at the request of, the recognized government where one exists, and all the parties in the conflict. In the absence of consent for the PSF intervention or where there is an expectation that consent may be withdrawn, the conditions for NATO involvement and the use of force should be specified in the NAC Initiating Directive.57 Besides the legal considerations described above, the relations with neighbor countries play an important role especially when we consider the role that neighbouring countries may play in providing facilities for the Peace Support Force (PSF) to operate from, or transit over or through, their territory.58

Another important consideration is the North Atlantic Council Initiating Directive. According to the AJP 3.4.1. this directive should both define the strategic objectives that constitute a clear political end-state and allot organizations, resources and the responsibilities for the achievement of those objectives and the end-state. In this section it also states,

56Ibid.
57Ibid.
58Ibid.
The complex multi-functional nature of PSO requires that commanders understand that military objectives will generally be only milestones on the road to achieving the political end-state. It is therefore important that clear mission guidance is given which allows commanders, at all levels, to understand not just their senior commander’s military intent but where that intent fits into the broader political context of the operation. Military directives, orders and ROE should be drafted carefully so as to permit commanders the maximum latitude to respond to the multi-agency, multi-dimensional and dynamic nature of PSO while guarding against the potential for an escalation of violence and the destabilization of the ongoing political process.59

Also, the voluntary engagement by member nations is another consideration. In NATO the participation in the PSO should be voluntary, and member nations may choose not to participate.

Force contribution is also an important thing which should be taken into consideration especially during the planning process. Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) should be involved in the planning, preparation and decision-making procedures in operations to which they contribute. Non-NATO Troop Contributing Nations (NNTCN) will be involved in accordance with the Pol-Mil Framework for NATO-led Partnership of Peace (PfP) Operations (PO (99)28, 20 April 99). The type of personnel (professional, conscripts, or reserve) and units (standing or reserve) to be deployed are decisions left exclusively to contributing nations. However, implicit within a nation’s offer to support a PSO is the understanding that resources will be made available promptly. This includes the ultimate national responsibility for the necessary logistic support and may be discharged in a number of ways, including agreements with other nations or with NATO as set out in MC 319/1 “NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics.” Once contributed, resources should not be withdrawn or reallocated by nations without suitable notice being given.

59Military Agency for Standardization, AJP-3.4.1., 56.
given to the NAC through the chain of command. This section also states it is “essential that military contributions contain the required capabilities and meet the necessary standards of training and readiness for the tasks and organizational structure prescribed by the mission directive.” AJP-3.4.1 also describes the education, trainings, and exercises as an important part of the preparations for PSO. Traditionally, education and training of forces are national responsibilities, however may require additional combined, joint education and training beyond either normal national standards or capabilities. According to the AJ-3.4.1, “nations contributing military forces to a PSO should ensure that these forces are trained not only to a common basic level of military skills but also in PSO techniques.” These trainings should be based on common doctrine and designed to; develop a common understanding of PSO within the Alliance, disseminate NATO PSO policy and doctrine, offer a co-ordinated set of courses at appropriate times and to instruct a greater number of students than any one nation could accommodate, the Alliance encourages the integration of PSO training into all professional military career courses. Such education should focus on the broad aspects of peace support activities.

The educational objectives for potential commanders and key staff personnel should aim to enhance awareness of the principal aspects of a PSO and how PSO may differ from more warlike operations. Recommended subjects include: historical,

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60 Ibid., 57.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid., 70.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid., 71.
geographical and cultural background of the Joint Operations Area (JOA) and region, the principles of PSO, Negotiation, Rules of Engagement (ROE), Law of War, and other subjects necessary for specific operation.

AJP-3.4.1. also recommend a careful plan of training. Planners should take into account the significant time and non-training related resource requirements for service personnel preparing for movement, in terms of medical and administrative needs. This publication suggests that the use of force and ROE and other principles, culture of mission area, patrolling, mine awareness and clearance, basic language, relations with international organizations, communications, nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) defense procedures, operating checkpoints and roadblocks and other tactical trainings related to the mission assigned and the operational environment should be part of a predeployment training.

This publication also states that NATO-led PSO exercises should be conducted at all levels with a primary focus on joint and combined exercise activities. The exercises should cover the full spectrum of missions and tasks relevant to likely NATO-led PSO. Regarding this point, AJP-3.4.1. also states “Higher level seminars and CPX with PSO scenarios should include crisis management procedures and decision-making processes. The training and exercising of designated headquarters and possible CCs must cover: planning, deployment, sustainment, execution and redeployment.”

65 Military Agency for Standardization, AJP-3.4.1., 71.
66 Ibid., 73.
67 Ibid.
This publication also describes the relevance of the joint capabilities related to peace support operations including those capabilities Kosovo can offer for these operations. According to this publication, “Engineers and other ordnance clearance and disposal specialists, from whatever arm or service, may be required to conduct and supervise the location and area clearance of mines and other unexploded ordnance.”

For Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) AJP-3.4.1. states that those capabilities, “should be employed when there is the presence or threat or previous use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) or potential terrorist acts, or when the JOA contains civilian facilities containing toxic materials or research laboratories, chemical plants or waste deposits and stockpiles.”

Regarding to the Medical Services, this publication states “Nations are principally responsible for the medical support of their contingents tempering this principle by the need for co-operation, co-ordination and economy.

Military medical services are designed principally to provide medical services to the forces and not the indigenous population. However, in PSO they may also be used to support humanitarian operations and community relations projects, as well as provide direct support to military operations. In addition, the living conditions in PSO may be very basic and could pose a considerable health and hygiene hazard. Standard military medical units or facilities may not be appropriate for this task; thus, mission tailoring may be required. Environmental health and hygiene reconnaissance and monitoring are vital for troop health and welfare. The expectations of servicemen and women, the public,

68Military Agency for Standardization, AJP-3.4.1., 68.

69Ibid.
media and government will be higher than might be expected for the war. Standards of care must therefore conform, as closely as possible, to those expected in peace.”

While the NATO requirements for all participants in the NATO-led stability and humanitarian operations were described above, the following will describe the specific NATO requirements for Non-NATO countries that want to participate in these operations. The Political Military Framework (PMF) is an official NATO document that emerged from the meeting of the NATO Heads of States at the 2010 Lisbon Summit. The Political Military Framework sets out governing principles, procedures, modalities, and other guidance for partner involvement in political consultations and the decision process in both operations planning and command arrangements. It covers the participation of operational partners in NATO-led operations. It is developed in close consultation with NATO’s present operational partners in order to reflect significant developments, lessons learned, and progress made over recent years in terms of their involvement in NATO-led operations.

According to the PMF document “An operational partner is a country that contributes with forces/capabilities to a NATO-led operation, or supports it in other ways that the NAC formally accepts, on the basis of political-military advice, as a contribution.

The first stage of the involvement of the partners in the NATO-led operation is the recognition phase. Recognition, according to the PMF, can take place on any of the stages in an operation. PMF states “Prior to being recognized as an operational partner, countries that are prepared to contribute to a NATO-led operation can be recognized by

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70 Military Agency for Standardization, AJP-3.4.1., 82.

the NAC as potential operational partners. This recognition is without prejudice to later acceptance as an operational partner. It does not exclude the possibility that countries other than those previously recognized as potential operational partners could be accepted as operational partners.”

This document also emphasizes the importance that the joint trainings and exercises with NATO have for interested countries in order to be prepared for NATO-led operations as well as to increase their interoperability with NATO forces. It is the NAC’s responsibility to recognize a Non-NATO country as an operational partner for a particular operation. The NAC decides to recognize a Non-NATO nation as an operational partner based on Military Committee advice, after the successful completion of the following measures as required:

1. a formal statement of intent by the country that it is prepared to offer a contribution in support of a NATO-led operation;

2. provisional recognition by the NAC of the country as a potential operational partner;

3. completion of proper security arrangements with the potential operational partner to allow the sharing of operational classified information;

4. completion of participation and detailed financial arrangements with the potential operational partner;

5. signature, if required, of a technical memorandum of understanding between the relevant military authorities of NATO and of the potential operational partner; and

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72Ibid.

73Ibid., 2.
6. certification by SHAPE of the potential operational partner's contribution.

The next step described in the PMF is the decision process. Consultation, cooperation and transparency are aspects that characterize this step. During this step consultations taking the form of regular meetings, in the appropriate military and political bodies, including the Military Committee, and at Council level. Furthermore, during the decision process, operational partners will be involved in the discussion of documents, in particular Concepts of Operations, Operations plans, Rules of Engagement, and their revisions, and Periodic Mission Reviews. Another important aspect during this step is the sharing of information, according to PMF “Information sharing and distribution of documents will be done as promptly as possible to allow operational partners adequate time to provide their comments and proposals throughout this process. As a rule, documents on operational issues will be released to the Allies and operational partners at the same time.” The final step of the involvement of an operational partner in the NATO-led operations consist of three sub-steps such as; provisional Allied approval of a decision, formal association of operational partners with the decision, and final Allied approval. This decision-making can be conducted in the appropriate military and political bodies including the Military Committee, and at Council level. The PMF states that “The timing of the last two steps in this process can be streamlined, as long as operational partners have been fully involved in the elaboration of the documents in which the decisions are drafted. For example in the course of NAC ministerial or summit meetings,

74 Ibid.
75 Ibid., 3.
76 Ibid.
agreement by operational partners to associate themselves with a decision and final Allied approval could occur simultaneously.\textsuperscript{77} Thus, there are two main factors for the involvement of a country in NATO-led operations: the need of NATO for that country and the desire and willingness of the country to be part of those operations. However, besides these two main factors, many other (such as political and military will, military capabilities and trainings, and the ability to meet required standards) also exist.

Comparing doctrine and requirements from NATO documents with capabilities that Kosovo can offer is very important to determine if Kosovo is ready to support these operations. It is important to know the NATO requirements and Kosovo capabilities as much it is important to understand exactly what are stability operations, how US and NATO doctrine define these operations and what is the true nature of these operations. In the following part of this chapter the researcher will describe how NATO and US doctrine define stability operations, what the end state is, and the ways and means that should be used in these operations.

**Stability and Humanitarian Operations according to US and NATO Doctrine**

The purpose of describing the US and NATO doctrine related to the stability and humanitarian operations it is to identify objectives, functions and tasks that emerge from this doctrine for stability and humanitarian operations in order to understand the KSF’s capabilities within its current mission to support NATO operations. Moreover, Kosovo is still in the phase of creating of its doctrine, and the US and NATO doctrine for stability and humanitarian operation will serve as the basis for the KSF to create and develop its

\textsuperscript{77}\textit{Ibid.}
own doctrine prior to engaging in these operations. Lessons learned from history allowed the US the opportunity to continually develop its doctrine on stability operations. Lawrence A. Yates in his book *The US military’s experience in Stability Operations 1789-2005* states “If America’s armed forces have fought fewer than a dozen major conventional wars in over two centuries, they have, during that same period, engaged in several hundred military undertakings that would today be characterized as stability operations.” Even in the past these kind of operations could be defined as; peace operations, foreign internal defense, security assistance, humanitarian and civic assistance, support to insurgencies, noncombatant evacuation operations, however according to current US doctrine all of them fall under the rubric of stability operations.

Table 2, presents the major US stability operations identified by Yates. However, Roland Paris in *At War’s End* contends that- the Haiti and Somalia cases can not be considered as peace-building or stability operations because, in the case of Haiti in 1994, the international mission followed a political crisis and not an armed conflict. In the case of Somalia, the dimensions of a peace-building operation never developed because fighting in Somalia effectively never ended. This misconception comes due to different viewpoints that the authors have for stability operations. Whereas Paris sees the stability operations from the UN viewpoint that stability operations are conducted after an armed conflict between two parties, Yates sees stability operations from the US doctrine point of

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79 Ibid.

view, which does not necessarily connect the need for this operation with the conflict between two parties.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>US Stability operations</th>
<th>Duration</th>
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<tr>
<td>Second Seminole War</td>
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<td>The Mexican War and Mexico (Veracruz)</td>
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<td>Cuba</td>
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<td>China Relief Expedition</td>
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<td>Haiti</td>
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<td>Nicaragua</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
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<td>Beirut</td>
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<td>Panama</td>
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<td>The Balkans</td>
<td>1996 - continues</td>
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Stability operations in general are complex operations and require a multidimensional approach. Yates states “Stability operations have generally been highly complex undertakings, involving a myriad of tasks performed within several diverse but interrelated fields—political, economic, financial, social, humanitarian—not associated in
the traditional mindset with orthodox military operations, functions, or duties.”81 The complexity of stability operations and approach to these operations is described also in the book After the War Nation-Building from FDR to George W. Bush. In this book the authors state, “successful nation-building requires unity of effort across multiple agencies and, often, multiple governments. Decision making structures thus need to provide for a combination of common effort and unified direction.”82 In the same book the authors define nation-building “as the use of armed forces in the aftermath of a conflict to promote an enduring peace and the transition to democracy.”83 Other terms according to this book that are currently in use to describe this process include stabilization and reconstruction, peace building, and state building.84

From the UN perspective, stability operations are known as peace-building operations. The origin of peacekeeping operations conducted by UN began in 1989, when the United Nations launched its major peace building in Namibia.85 The author of the At War’s End describes in his book the difference between peacekeeping operations and peace-building operations. According to him peacekeeping operations are primarily military activities concentrated on cease-fire monitoring, whereas peace-building involves both military and nonmilitary functions including the administration of elections

81Yates, 26.

82James Dobbins, Michele A. Poole, Austin Long, and Benjamin Runkle, After the War Nation-Building from FDR to George W. Bush (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), xxiv.

83Ibid., 2.

84Ibid.

85Paris, 13.
and the retraining of judges, lawyers, and police officers. Moreover, peace building operations are also involved in the implementation of economic reforms; the reorganization of governmental institutions, the promotion of free media; and also in humanitarian and financial assistance.\textsuperscript{86}

The doctrine of the US Army is much richer than the NATO doctrine or UN documents related to the stability operations due to experience with these operations and also due to the leading role the US has played in numerous joint stability operations. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, defines Stability Operations as “an umbrella term for various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and to provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.”\textsuperscript{87} Furthermore, the JP 3-07 and Field Manual (FM) 3-07 further clarify the nature, design and planning, functions, tasks, and other aspects of stability operations.

JP 3-07 describes the nature of stability operations, emphasizes the difficult experiences from Iraq and Afghanistan and the lessons learned from there.\textsuperscript{88} The lessons learned from these two operations illustrated that success is not only defined in military terms but also require other engagements and involvements such as; rebuilding infrastructure, supporting economic development, establishing the rule of law, building

\textsuperscript{86}Ibid., 38-39.


accountable governance, establishing essential services, and building a capable host nation (HN) military responsible to civilian authority.\textsuperscript{89}

Although, the primary military contribution to stabilization is to defend the population, facilitate the personal security of the people and, and finally to create a platform for political, economic, and human security, the military also should be able to coordinate activities with other agencies, international organizations and HN.\textsuperscript{90}

Moreover, according to JP 3-07, “the requirements of the operational environment, and the capacity of the joint force may drive the Armed Forces of the United States to directly participate in other stabilization efforts during the conduct of stability operations.”\textsuperscript{91}

According to JP 3-07, the missions, tasks, and activities that make up stability operations are organized into three categories: initial response activities, transformational activities, and sustainment activities.\textsuperscript{92} Thus, initial response activities aim to provide a safe, secure environment, transformational activities are generally a broad range of security, reconstruction, and capacity building efforts, and sustainment activities aim to establish conditions that enable long-term sustainable development.

Related to the “Principles of the Stability Operations,” JP 3-07 states, “although the principles of joint operations apply to all aspects of any joint operation, emphasis on certain principles and their applicability during stability operations is appropriate.”\textsuperscript{93}

\textsuperscript{89}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{90}Ibid., I-2.

\textsuperscript{91}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{92}Ibid., I-3.

\textsuperscript{93}Ibid., I-16.
According to this doctrine stability operations within an operation are arranged in four phases: shaping, crisis action, stabilization and normalization; however during a major operation or campaign these phases may become sub-phases of major operations or campaigns. During major operations and campaigns, a six phase model applied: shape-deter-seize initiative-dominate-stabilize-enable civil authority. Stability operations are particularly emphasized in the stabilize and enable civil authority phases. However, the JP 3-07 states “major operation and campaign plans must feature an appropriate balance between offensive, defensive, and stability operations in all phases. Most importantly, planning for stability operations should begin when joint operation planning is initiated.”

The stability operations functions according to JP 3-07 are security, humanitarian assistance, economic stabilization and infrastructure, rule of law, and governance and participation. Two of these functions, security and humanitarian assistance, will be highlighted, as these two functions are activities that the KSF is able to conduct, as was emphasized when the KSF capabilities to support stability and humanitarian operations were described earlier in this paper.

Among the other fields of the security functions, military contribution to the clearance of explosive ordnance and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) hazards is of special importance, especially in an area already burdened by collapsed institutions of central government, the presence of land-mines and explosive

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94 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-07, II-10.
95 Ibid., II-12.
96 Ibid., III-1.
remnants of war and CBRN hazards inflicts stress that the surviving institutions may not be able to bear.97 For example in Iraq in the postwar period over 10 millions mines were already in the ground- 8 million antipersonal mines and 2 million antitank, and many of these mines and minefields are still unrecorded and unmarked.98 The military contribution to the elimination of these hazards will have a positive impact on the safety, security, and well-being of the local populace, allow freedom of movement for stability stakeholders and can avoid the risk of them being used by terrorists, criminals or insurgents.99

JP 3-07 describes the humanitarian assistance function as the function that “includes programs conducted to meet basic human needs to ensure the social well-being of the population.”100 The military forces can contribute to this function in fields such as: dislocated civilian support missions, preventing human trafficking, emergency food assistance and food Security, shelter, non-food relief, humanitarian demining assistance, public health, and education.101 The military can provide support for the local community in terms of camp organization, provision of care, placement, humanitarian demining assistance, provide public health services and other tasks related to humanitarian assistance. The US operation Unified Response in response to the Haiti earthquake in

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97 Ibid., III-11.


99 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-07, III-11.

100 Ibid., III-18.

2010 was a typical operation where US military contributed in humanitarian function. Among other governmental agencies, over 17,000 US military personnel were engaged in this operation and initial response included search and rescue, medical support, food and water assistance, and shelter.¹⁰²

Thus, in the strategic contest the endstate conditions of a stability operation include a safe and secure environment, established rule of law, social well-being, stable governance, and a sustainable economy.¹⁰³ Stability operations consist of five primary tasks: establish civil security, establish civil control, restore essential services, support to governance, and support to economic and infrastructure developments.¹⁰⁴ Stability operations planning is an ongoing process and requires to address some of the planning components that will help to shape the environment for effective execution. According to FM 3-07 planning stability operations must include reducing complexity; inculcating an offensive mindset; anticipating future events; balancing resources; capabilities and activities; shaping a positive future; recognizing time horizons and understanding the pitfalls.¹⁰⁵

The importance of detailed planning of stability operations it is described very well by Colonel Troy Anthony Clay in his research project “Stability Operations: Learning from Operation Iraqi Freedom.” According to Colonel Clay the difficulties that


¹⁰⁴Ibid., 2-9.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., 4-2.
the US had during the reconstruction process in Iraq came as a result of the exclusion of reconstruction activities from the Iraqi stability operation plan created by the CENTCOM planners. Colonel Clay states “CENTCOM planners assumed that the State Department would take the lead for reconstruction and thus its plan did not include reconstruction activities.”\textsuperscript{106} Thus the key piece that was missing during their planning was interagency coordination, resulting in failure to provide essential needs and services for Iraqi people which lead to population support for the insurgency and viewing of coalition forces as occupiers.\textsuperscript{107}

Although the importance of all planning considerations described in FM 3-07 are equally important, this paper will emphasize four of them:

Reduce Complexity: Stability operations are complex and each commander must plan and have in considering how to simplify the task and objective in order to facilitate the operational process. There are many factors which affecting the situation and environment: for the commander to be successful he/she must reduce complexity, enhance simplicity, share understanding about the situation and in a clear way express the solution in terms of tasks, time and space. Each commander on each level has to clearly understand the task and to be flexible according to the situation and changes that may characterize it.\textsuperscript{108}


\textsuperscript{107}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{108}Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-07, 4-1.
Balance Resources, Capabilities, and Activities: During the planning and execution process the commander will not have all the resources and capabilities to mitigate the requirements. It is up to the commander to decide how to employ those resources and capabilities in order to prioritize and to achieve unity of effort. In addition specific resources and capabilities must be synchronized by the commander to achieve the greatest possible effect not only to be focused on one line of effort, but also to support the other lines also.\textsuperscript{109}

Recognize Time Horizonts: During the planning process, each commander must understand the mission in time and space, and direct and guide planning process in terms of setting clear and feasible objective based on available capabilities and resources. These objectives have to synchronize achievability with the time available.\textsuperscript{110}

Understand Pitfalls: During the planning process, the commander has to be aware that plenty of frustrating and time-consuming problems can occur when cooperating with many different participants. These can create significant pitfalls to develop and integrate a plan. The basic pitfalls that the commander has to deal with are: attempting to forecast and dictate events too far into the future, trying to plan in too much detail, using planning as a scripting process that tries to prescribe the course of events with precision and institutionalizing rigid planning methods.\textsuperscript{111}

Thus, the US doctrine covers the strategic, operational and tactical levels of the stability operations. The NATO doctrine is not so rich as the US doctrine, regarding

\textsuperscript{109}\textit{Ibid.}, 4-2.

\textsuperscript{110}\textit{Ibid.}, 4-3.

\textsuperscript{111}\textit{Ibid.}.
stability operations doctrine: however, APJ 3.4.1 *Peace Support Operations*, covers many of the needed pieces for stability operations. APJ 3.4.1 describes PSOs as “multi-functional operations, conducted impartially, normally in support of an internationally recognized organization such as the UN or Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), involving military forces and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies.”

According to this APJ “PSO are designed to achieve a long-term political settlement or other specified conditions. They include Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement as well as conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace building and humanitarian relief.” According to this doctrine, the achievements of a number of pre-determined strategic objectives, determines the PSO success. The lack of pre-determined strategic objectives can seriously affect the mission accomplishment: this was seen during the operation *Restore Hope* in Somalia. The end state of this operation was defined in very general terms: it was the point at which the humanitarian efforts in the country became functional again in an environment that was stable enough to allow the US-led coalition to turn responsibility for security and relief operations over to the UN.

This generalized end state without clear defined strategic objectives, did not allow the planners to arrive at set of specific, measurable criteria and consequently did not allow the JTF commander to know with certainty that the end state had been achieved. Related to this case, authors of the book

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112 Military Agency for Standardization, AJP-3.4.1., 2-1.

113 Ibid.

114 Ibid., 2-2.

My Clan Against the World—US and Coalition Forces in Somalia 1992-1994 wrote, “Deriving these criteria and determining when they had been achieved, remain an issue that Johnston’s staff had to confront continuously.”

The achievement of the military objectives and the creation of a secure environment does not determine the PSO success: however, without security, the reconciliation, reconstruction, and development programmes necessary to create a self-sustaining peace are unlikely to be effective. Due to the achievement of the military objectives and further engagements, AJP 3.4.1 states “once the security related military objectives have been achieved, the attainment of the political end-state will require the mission’s main effort to be switched from the PSF to the peace building activities of the civilian components of the mission.”

The factors affecting success in peace support operations are mostly related to the non-professionalism of the PSF as well as to its ability to successfully transition to other forces. Other factors that can affect the success include the lack of support of the international community for the operation, the lack of support from the local populace and the leadership of the parties, the implicit tension between ‘normal’ military missions and those conducted during PSO, cultural aspects and also the complexity of PSO in general. Almost all these are factors affected the success of the operation in Somalia. The US-led coalition and UN transition failed because of the reluctance of the US to

116 Ibid.

117 Military Agency for Standardization, AJP-3.4.1., 2-2.

118 Ibid.

119 Ibid., 2-3.
engage long-term and also due to a UN delay to hand over the mission. Furthermore, on the date of transfer of the responsibilities the UN was composed of only 30 percent of planed staff.\textsuperscript{120} The UN during this operation, especially on the first phase failed to gain wide support from the local populace and leadership because of the creation of selective relations with particular leaders as well as due to its bureaucracy and slow response.\textsuperscript{121} Besides factors described above the cultural aspect also affected significantly the operation in Somalia. Describing this, Keneth Allard in his book \textit{Somalia Operations: Leason Learned} states, “Their culture stresses the idea of ‘me and my clan against all outsiders.’ Guns and aggressiveness, including the willingness to accept casualties, are intrinsic parts of this culture, with women and children considered part of the clan’s order of battle.”\textsuperscript{122} The unsuccessful transition, lack of local populace and local leadership support, culture and different interests of stakeholders made the Somalia operation complex and the complexity of PSOs as is described in AJP 3.4.1 are significant factors that affect the success of the stability and humanitarian operations.

AJP 3.4.1 describes the Joint and Multinational Operation’s principles, such as; impartiality, consent, and restraint in the use of force, as applicable and the basic principles for PSO as well.\textsuperscript{123} Related to this, AJP 3.4.1 states, “The conduct of PSO

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{121}Ray Murphy, \textit{UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo} (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 48-50.
\item \textsuperscript{123}Military Agency for Standardization, AJP-3.4.1., 3-1.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
requires an understanding of the complex concepts of consent and impartiality and how they constrain and guide the conduct of military activities, in particular the use of force.\textsuperscript{124} Other principles that should be applied in PSO: objectives/end-state (the military operation must be directed towards an attainable objective or end-state), perseverance/long term view (the achievement of the political end-state in PSO will require a patient, resolute and persistent pursuit of objectives), unity of effort, flexibility, legitimacy, security, credibility, mutual respect, transparency of operations, freedom of military movement, and civil-military cooperation and liaison.\textsuperscript{125} The preliminary planning considerations for the PSO are described by this AJP in the Section III - The NATO Planning Process for PSO. According to this at the earliest stage of planning the Alliance should establish legitimacy of the operation, nature of the operation, freedoms, constraints and restraints, and the end state.\textsuperscript{126}

In conclusion, Kosovo’s law on Overseas Deployment of the Kosovo Security Force describes the Peace Support Operation in accordance with NATO as well as US doctrine’s description for these operations. This law can serve as the basis, however there are other documents required to fulfill the KSF doctrine for the stability operations. In order to better understand how Kosovo may support NATO stability operations, the next section will describe Macedonia’s and Armenia’s engagement in NATO and US-led stability operations.

\textsuperscript{124}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{125}Ibid., 3-6 – 3-9.
\textsuperscript{126}Ibid., 4-5.
Macedonia and Armenia Cases

This study includes cases of Macedonia and Armenia to explore how these two countries became part of NATO operations and to compare to the way that Kosovo and KSF is currently preparing for participation in stability and humanitarian operations. Macedonia and Armenia can serve as examples for Kosovo considering the many common characteristics that these countries have with Kosovo, especially when we consider the internal and external political situation of these states, their military capabilities and demographic and economic factors.

For several years, the armed forces of the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Armenia have participated in various stability operations. The Macedonian army was engaged in Afghanistan, Iraq, the EU military operation in Bosnia, and the UN mission in Lebanon: the Armenian army, in addition to engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq, also remains engaged in Kosovo. Both countries are part of the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. The Republic of Macedonia joined the PfP in 1995, which was followed by membership of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in 1997.\(^{127}\) The Republic of Armenia joined the PfP in 1994 and since that time has contributed to Euro-Atlantic security alongside NATO Allies.\(^{128}\) To understand better the involvement of these countries in the PSO, it is essential to examine each of these two cases separately, from the beginning of their involvement in these operations until today.


The Republic of Macedonia’s participation in the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan in 2002 was their first contribution abroad. Macedonia later increased its contribution by taking part in the operation Iraqi Freedom, the EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the UN mission in Lebanon. The US Central Command (CENTCOM) official website, describing Macedonia’s participation in supporting the Coalition, states “The Republic of Macedonia, with the support of its political and civilian society, has been actively supporting the Coalition in the fight against terrorism with units contributed to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and by sending units to contribute International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.” According to this website, “The legal basis for sending the Army of The Republic of Macedonia (ARM) troops to participate in peace operations in Iraq and Afghanistan consists of Article 41, paragraph 3 of the Defense Law. Accordingly, any decision concerning ARM units’ missions abroad is taken by the Parliament.” The Republic of Macedonia began its participation in the NATO-led operation in Afghanistan in August 2002, with the sending of two officers as part of the Turkish contingent and increased its contribution in March, 2003 by sending one section from the 2nd Infantry Brigade as part of the German contingent. While the Republic of Kosovo signed MOAs and is conducting trainings with NATO countries related to the PSOs, Macedonia’s approach can be a good example

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131 Ibid.  
132 Ibid.
to be followed by Kosovo as well. The KSF engagement in stability operations could begin by sending individuals or small teams as part of any NATO contingent. Thus, this way of engagement can give time to the KSF to prepare the larger units for deployments and at the same time to be part of NATO-led operations. Furthermore, individuals or small teams engaged within any of the partner country’s contingent in operation could identify and assess needs as well as set the conditions for a larger deployment.

From August 2005 to July 2009 the ARM medical military personnel was part of the Combined Medical Team of the Adriatic Charter nations (Macedonia, Albania, and Croatia) and served in eight rotations at Kabul airport. In addition to this, “beginning from December 2008, in cooperation with the Kingdom of Norway, a Macedonian medical team is included through one Surgical team in the organizational structure of the surgical unit of the Norwegian Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Meymanah, Afghanistan.” As is mentioned in the paragraph which describes capabilities, the KSF participated in many joint exercises planed and conducted by the Adriatic Charter nations (Macedonia, Albania, and Croatia). The participation in exercises with these countries, such as “Joint Reaction 2013” conducted in Albania, field exercise in Krivolak, Macedonia and in the exercise “Shared Resilience 2013 (SR 13)” organized by the US European Command (EUCOM) helped familiarize the KSF with multinational and operational environments as well as to understand common procedures and its possible future tasks within combined teams. Furthermore, the KSF participation in regional

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exercises and activities with the Adriatic charter countries, may precede a future engagement of the KSF with these countries within NATO-led operations.

The engagement of any declared unit requires strict standards in the field of training and operational procedures, and in line with the Operational Capabilities Concept. The Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC) is designed to establish new means and mechanisms to reinforce PfP's operational capabilities through enhanced and closer military cooperation.\textsuperscript{135} The ARM capacity to meet these standards was assessed by the Alliance, thus, in June 2006, received approval for sending of one mechanized infantry company, in the composition of the British contingent in ISAF. In this aspect the trainings of the KSF members for the preparation for Peace Support Operations conducted (and which still continue in 28th Brigade of the third Corpus of Armed Forces of the Turkish Army and in the center of Partnership for Peace in Ankara) will help the KSF to meet required standards in a field of training.\textsuperscript{136} This ongoing training in Turkey, as well as individual trainings and education of the KSF’s officers and noncommissioned in the military schools and academies in the US, Germany, United Kingdom and Croatia will help the KSF to meet also required standards in the field of operational procedures.

The Republic of Armenia, started participating in international peacekeeping operations in 2004, by joining NATO-lead peacekeeping operation in Kosovo (KFOR). Unlike, Macedonia which started participation with individual officers, Armenian Armed

\textsuperscript{135}Ibid.

Forces joined NATO-led operations in Kosovo with a full platoon. This can be explained due to different circumstances in Kosovo and Afghanistan. In Kosovo, NATO troops since the beginning were welcomed by the majority of Kosovo population as liberators from Serb rule. Just as in the case of Macedonia, Armenia’s engagement can be a precedent for Kosovo. Initial participation of the KSF in low tensions operational environment would allow it to become familiarized with the military multinational environment as well as operational procedures without being in excessively stressful situations.

The Armenian peace keeping platoon was included in a Greek battalion and therefore direct control of the Armenian contingent was exercised by the Greek command in the framework of the operation. From January 2005 to October 2009 the units of the Armenian Armed Forces, joined the multinational peacekeeping operation in Iraq, participating mainly in demining, trucking and medical aid services. Since February 2010, one platoon of the Armenian Armed Forces has been included in the northern division of the Afghanistan International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) which is under German command. Prior to this deployment in Afghanistan, the Armenian unit passed through a three to four week pre-deployment training in Germany.

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140 Ibid.
Armenian contingents task is the security of the Kunduz airport but also five Armenian officers are participating in instructor’s training in Kunduz so as to work as instructors in the Afghan army in the future. Also in this aspect Kosovo can follow Armenia’s example, by engaging within the Turkish or Adriatic Charter contingents, and this will work, especially when we consider the PSO trainings that the KSF is attending in Turkey and exercises with Adriatic Charter countries. The joint trainings and exercises not only help the KSF in understanding procedures but also in understanding the culture, beliefs and costumes of units of these countries. This fact will make these countries more receptive to future KSF engagement in stability operation within deployment contingents of these countries. Furthermore, Armenia’s initial participation in stability operations with specialized units such as demining and medical units is an example that can be followed by Kosovo, especially when considering that this fits with the NATO-recognized operational capabilities of the KSF (which are demining, search and rescue and CBRN).

Besides the direct involvement in stability operations, Armenia also worked to enhance links with the NATO-based Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) in order to contribute to international disaster relief operations. According to the an article on the NATO official website “the Armenian Rescue Service is preparing two teams (search and rescue and chemical, biological, radiation and nuclear experts) to be made available for disaster relief operations.”¹¹⁴¹ This also can be a way that Kosovo can participate in international deployments. The KSF search and rescue elements already have been deployed twice in Albania and their performance and

professionalism was evaluated high by NATO. The experience and also the ongoing US and NATO project to establish an INSARAG accredited SARTF within the KSF will allow Kosovo to offer the EADRCC specialized search and rescue units for disaster relief operations. The KSF SARTF is currently being trained by the Louisiana Search and Rescue Task Force; the training will last five months. Related to the KSF member's performance in this training, author Ruel Douvillier, on the Lousiana Task Force -1 website states, “The Kosovo Security Forces (KSF) team has been absolutely fantastic.” At the end of this training the KSF SARTF members would be certified according to the FEMA standards and this will make the KSF participation in NATO (EADRCC) led operations easier, especially in terms of the professional and specialist readiness.

Finally, Macedonia’s and Armenia’s approach to supporting NATO-led operations can serve as examples for Kosovo on its way to participating in those operations; however, in the political aspect, especially in terms of international politics, the Kosovo case differs from both these countries and consequently in this aspect is a unique approach is required.

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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

For the last six years, Kosovo institutions and its security forces were engaged in numerous endeavors to meet NATO requirements for the establishment of a professional and disciplined force. Throughout the process, the KSF was assessed high for its performance, both by local and international institutions. For years, the opinion polls conducted by various agencies in Kosovo rated the KSF as a most credible institution.\textsuperscript{143} KSF engagement in stability and humanitarian operations has special importance for Kosovo, especially in terms of gaining international legitimacy. Participation in these operations within the framework of NATO in conjunction with diplomatic lobbying should influence and ultimately change the political position of some countries regarding the recognition of Kosovo's independence. In addition to this, by engaging in these operations Kosovo would provide a modest contribution to global peace. However, to achieve these objectives, such engagement in these operations requires careful selection of ways and means. The approach taken by Macedonia and Armenia serves as a good example for Kosovo. Participation by individuals or small specialized units in operations such as search and rescue, demining, CBRN, and medical provides a critical skill multiplier to any NATO partners while having minimal impact on Kosovo's budget. These units are prepared professionally as well as in terms of their equipment, so Kosovo would not have to invest more on training and supply to equip these units.

During exercises, as well as during real operations within Kosovo and abroad, the KSF has shown a high level of professionalism. Past experiences that have transferred knowledge to the KSF members along with ongoing training helped the KSF to reach a similar level of professionalism as other forces of the region. These achievements also came as a result of the United States and other NATO countries’s engagement to create a functional security force in Kosovo. The official declaration of the North Atlantic Council that the KSF has reached full operational capability and is fully capable of performing the tasks assigned to it within its mandate, to standards designated by NATO, not only created the conditions for Kosovo institutions to review its security sector but also to think about the KSF’s future deployment for stability and humanitarian operations.

Desire and willingness to participate in stability and humanitarian operations is expressed many times by the Kosovo leadership. This willingness was made public by Kosovo institutions and KSF leadership in various meetings and interviews. Besides declarations of willingness to be part of these operations, MKSF has also made an official request to NATO for participation within its framework. Furthermore, Kosovo’s assembly has made an important step regarding the legislative aspect of deployments by approving the Law on Overseas Deployment of the Kosovo Security Force. This law sets the authority and responsibilities of institutions when deploying the KSF contingent overseas as well as procedures for deployment for peace support operations, humanitarian operations and overseas trainings and exercises, withdrawal, and financing. Thus, a significant political willingness to support the KSF and its engagement in NATO-led stability and humanitarian operations exists in Kosovo. This political readiness comes
due to the desire of Kosovo institutions to contribute to global peace as part of the western alliance and also to present Kosovo as a source of peace and stability. Kosovo engagement in these operations will influence the creation of a positive image, especially to the nations that still hesitate to recognize its independence.

Diplomatically, the main barrier for KSF engagement within NATO-led operations is the political position against Kosovo’s independence of four NATO countries (Spain, Greece, Slovakia, and Romania). However, even though these countries do not recognize Kosovo as an independent nation, they participated in the creation of the KSF. Their hesitant political position on Kosovo's independence has begun to change recently, especially after a dialog between Kosovo and Serbia for normalization of relations. These countries have given clear signals that soon they could recognize Kosovo’s independence.

Most NATO countries have contributed significantly in building the KSF as an operational force. Officers and NCOs of the KSF, attended training both inside and outside Kosovo organized by these countries. Individual and collective training, intergovernmental and regional joint exercises and operations conducted in Kosovo and abroad increased professionalism and discipline within KSF’s members. These activities also developed the KSF unit's capabilities to operate in a multinational environment as well as to become familiar with and work with various governmental and non-governmental agencies. Furthermore, these activities enabled members of the KSF to learn about US and NATO doctrine and also to understand their operational procedures. This has a special importance in terms of future engagement of the KSF in the framework
of NATO operations, but also in the building of its doctrine based on the doctrine of the
US and NATO.

Lack of doctrine and procedures remains a challenge for the KSF, namely for its
participation in NATO operations. The law for deployment abroad for stability and
humanitarian operations was approved this year, nevertheless, there is a lot of work ahead
to complete necessary manuals, regulations and written procedures related to stability and
humanitarian operations. The KSF’s doctrine for stability and humanitarian operations
would serve as a basis for pre-deployment training programs and also as a guide for the
KSF’s units engaged in these operations. Of course, besides the specific doctrine for
these operations, the KSF should create the necessary overall doctrine and also update the
current doctrine in accordance with NATO standards.

The doctrine links theory, history, and best practice; therefore, its creation and
development is a necessary step prior to engaging in stability and humanitarian
operations. Beyond giving a better understanding of these operations, the doctrine gives
clear guidance on how to mitigate complexity during the stability and humanitarian
operations. This is a key issue for the KSF, especially when we consider that these types
of operation are usually complex from the outset or became complex over time. The
historic cases of Somalia, Haiti and Iraq have shown the complexity of these operations
and that of what the KSF’s units can face during these operations. Thus, a careful
examination of the strategic and operational environment, understanding multinational
operations, and becoming familiar with the culture of host nations is critical prior to
engaging in these operations. By creating the doctrine based on the US and NATO
doctrine, the KSF can mitigate the challenges that it may face during these operations as
the detailed guidance in the US doctrine based on lessons learned and long experience in these operations.

In addition, the approach of Macedonia and Armenia, can serve as an example for Kosovo for engagement in stability and humanitarian operations. Similarities that Kosovo has with these countries in terms of capabilities, demographics, size of forces, limitations on budget, and even foreign political challenges make these countries ideal example for Kosovo’s path toward engagement in NATO-led operations. The initial engagement of these countries with individuals or small-size specialized units is a roadmap Kosovo’s KSF with its restrictions in terms of mission, budget, and number of personnel, can follow. Kosovo can start its initial engagement in these operations with the KSF’s search and rescue, medical, EOD, demining, and CBRN units. These units are recognized officially by NATO as units that have reached the required professional level. Also, they have experience in operations in Albania as well as by participating in many joint regional exercises. In addition to this, the Macedonia’s and Armenia’s engagement in stability operation in Afghanistan within other NATO countries’ contingents or as a part of regional contingent is a pattern that Kosovo can follow to participate in these operations.

Regarding the humanitarian operations, Kosovo can provide to EADRCC (NATO) search and rescue capabilities. SARTF of the KSF has sufficient professional and logistics (equipment) capabilities to become included in EADRCC planning for disaster response in disaster cases. In addition, the creation of the political conditions and achievement of INSARAG standards can create conditions for this task force to be part of
the UN's humanitarian operations and also for its training centers to serve as a center for preparation of European southeastern forces for reaction in cases of disasters.

In addition, Kosovo can provide NATO-led stability and humanitarian operations, capabilities of demining (EOD) and CBRN, especially when we consider needs for these capabilities to clear the remnants of unexploded devices and chemical weapons in post conflict areas. The clearance of explosive and CBRN hazards is one of the stability operations’ essential tasks. Experience in operations in Kosovo and abroad, ongoing training and completion with equipment made these units reach FOC and be ready for operations within and outside the country. Also, KSF medical teams could support NATO operations as part of any contingent of any state or as was the case in Afghanistan as part of the medical contingent of Eastern Europe. Most KSF medical staff gained experience in the KLA during the Kosovo war, so work in war zones is not something new for them.

The KSF specialized units, specifically instructors of these units, can conduct training for HN forces as part of NATO-led stability operations. KSF instructors are licensed according to the NATO standards and these instructors have sufficient expertise and experience to conduct both theoretical and practical parts of training. The KSF’s TRADOC is also prepared and has instructors licensed to conduct basic military training for HN soldiers. Therefore the KSF can support NATO operations with individuals such as instructors in addition to specialized units.

Kosovo’s support of NATO stability and humanitarian operations is of special importance for Kosovo. Participation in these operations is the objective of the

144Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-07, 3-5.
Government and the leadership of the KSF. The realization of this objective therefore brings for Kosovo political benefits especially in terms of international legitimacy but also in creating a positive image as a country engaged in global peace. To achieve this objective, the Government of Kosovo should be involved together with international partners to identify areas that can support these operations but also to identify the contingents in the framework of which can operate the KSF. For the KSF, the commitment in fulfilling the NATO requirements for these operations remains an important objective. From the military perspective, preparation and training of the KSF units for these operations remains essential to achieve these requirements. In terms of preparations for these operations, the creation of doctrine for stability and humanitarian operations is a necessary step and the US doctrine can serve as a model for the doctrine of Kosovo. However, during the process of its creation is also important to take into consideration various factors such as: the Kosovo situation and capabilities, lessons learned from the various operations around the world and NATO requirements for such participation in humanitarian and stability operations. Kosovo can follow the examples of Macedonia and Armenia to engage in these operations, especially in sending of individuals or smaller specialized units during the engagement’s initial phase. In this way Kosovo provides to NATO qualified elements and at the same time reduces the impact of this engagement on Kosovo’s budget. Declaration of FOC for specialized units by NAC, means that these units need minimal preparation for participation in NATO-led operations. So the KSF possesses operational readiness for participation in stability and humanitarian operations. Also, institutions of Kosovo possesses the political willingness to participate in these operations. Thus, Kosovo has the political will, internal public
support and professional capabilities to support NATO stability and humanitarian operations.
US Doctrinal Documents


NATO Doctrinal Documents, Articles and Publications


US Articles and Publications


Dobbins, James, Michele A. Poole, Austin Long, and Benjamin Runkle. *After the War Nation-Building from FDR to George W. Bush*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008.


**Kosovo Government Documents**


MKSF Articles and Publications


Other Articles and Publications


