Integrated Operations

National War College 60th Anniversary

Interagency Dialogue: Strategic Planning for U.S. National Security
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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
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The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government.

ABOUT THE COVERS

The cover shows U.S. Army specialist from the 1st Armored Division conducting a combat security patrol with Iraqi police in Tal Afar (1st Combat Camera Squadron/Aaron Allmon). The table of contents depicts Special Forces in Afghanistan (DOD). The back cover features Guatemalan soldiers saluting Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld in Guatemala City (1st Combat Camera Squadron/Cherie Thurlby); Multinational convoy operating in the Pacific, Exercise Panamax ’05 (4th Combat Camera Squadron/Rick Sforza); Mariners securing area along Amazon River, Exercise UNITAS ’04 (Pier Combat Camera, Atlantic/Dave Fliesen); F-35 Short Take-off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) variant; and Navy’s F-3F-1 during test operations (U.S. Navy/Rachel Bousil).
Looking back on my first 6 months as Chairman, I am impressed with the ability of our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coastguardsmen, who confront challenges such as counterinsurgency and nationbuilding operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, earthquake relief in Pakistan, and hurricane relief in our own Gulf States. Though seemingly disparate, these operations share an important characteristic: they all require the coordinated efforts of a wide range of interagency, coalition, and nongovernmental partners to succeed.

My predecessor, General Richard Myers, coined the term *integrated operations* to emphasize that the military must act in concert with a wide variety of actors to attain national objectives. Indeed, we must seek out new partners—governmental agencies, nongovernmental organizations, allies, industry, and the private sector—to defeat modern transnational threats. I wholeheartedly endorse this approach. As I stated in my guidance to the Joint Staff (published in *JFQ*, issue 40, 1st quarter 2006), we must marshal the enablers of organizational agility, collaboration, and outreach if the Nation is to win the war on terror.

Although the opening examples come from recent contingencies, integrated operations are not new. Counterdrug operations in Latin America provide a more mature look at integrated operations in that they enjoy the strength of established relationships and standing organizations, such as the Joint
Interagency Task Force–South (JIATF–S). This task force formally links diverse interests from the Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, and other Federal agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency. Furthermore, JIATF–S works with regional partner countries on a day-to-day basis. These habitual relationships and shared experiences facilitate a comprehensive approach to containing the illicit drug problem and integrating all the instruments of national power and a variety of partners to help achieve national objectives. We should look for ways to use this benchmark to guide our efforts in prosecuting the war on terror and in other operations.

Cultivating and leveraging broader partnerships are crucial for several reasons. First, we recognize that the nonmilitary aspects of an operation may define the ultimate success or failure of a national effort. We have long recognized the importance of integrating the instruments of power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (and more recently financial, infrastructure, and law enforcement). While providing more than 70,000 Active and Reserve Component troops and immense resources from all the Services in support of Hurricane Katrina relief efforts in late 2005, economic and infrastructure recovery considerations clearly dominated the effort. In fact, most national-level concerns fell squarely on other agencies with portfolios such as health, housing, transportation, energy, and the environment. Beyond disaster relief operations, diplomatic, informational, and economic considerations often determine success in preconflict and postconflict operations abroad.

Second, mission requirements often dictate the need for diverse skill sets and authorities. The Intelligence Community offers an excellent example of this point. The Central Intelligence Agency, for example, provides intelligence collection and all-source intelligence analysis (centered on human intelligence), while the National Security Agency was chartered to supply primarily technical intelligence collection (signals intelligence). The Services also employ intelligence assets specifically tailored to their operational needs and missions.

Finally, other groups—even those outside the formal Intelligence Community—may enjoy expertise and relationships that impart valuable information. Each of these diverse partners reveals a piece of the larger intelligence puzzle. In Iraq, we have brought them together to enhance the intelligence picture from the tactical to the strategic level.

Similarly, the success of JIATF–S flows from an ability to harness the agency with the right expertise and authority to accomplish a particular aspect of the larger counterdrug mission. For example, the law-enforcement components of JIATF–S retain greater authority to conduct search and seizure operations, unlike the supporting military components. Providing the right authorities and leveraging the agency or organization with the appropriate authority also played a key role in hurricane relief efforts in the fall of 2005, in postconflict operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in the war on terror.

Third, integrated operations allow the United States to leverage a wider array of resources and expertise in supporting national goals and objectives. For example, our Dutch partners sent an “un-watering” team to assist the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers with the removal of floodwaters from the New Orleans area in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Thanks to the geography of its native Netherlands, this team provided unmatched expertise and specialized equipment to the effort. Other partners helped
reduce the load on already stressed resources; during Katrina recovery operations, the Republic of Singapore Air Force flew more than 80 sorties, transporting more than 800 personnel and moving 540 tons of material. These cases represent two of the countless examples of international support in the wake of Katrina.

Perhaps the most striking example of leveraging resources comes from Iraq. We collaborated closely with industry in our punch-counterpunch fight to limit the effectiveness of improvised explosive devices, helping to save lives by bringing cutting-edge technology to the field quickly. In all these cases, external expertise and resources positively affected outcomes.

Over the last 20 years, the Armed Forces met the challenge of establishing a joint perspective and building joint warfighting organizations. In many ways, we now face a similar challenge as we seek to integrate better a wider community of partners in our operations. Because integrated operations promise greater effectiveness than disjointed efforts by individual agencies, we must look for ways to formalize these relationships and response procedures in the national security structure. Organizations such as JIATF–S represent the first step in this process, but more must be done. We should explore cross-agency planning guidance, much like our own Unified Command Plan and Contingency Planning Guidance, which provides the framework for interdepartmental planning and execution. Habitual relationships in education, training, and exercises should also follow. As you read the JFQ Forum articles, consider the questions they raise and the implications for our organizations and operating procedures as we seek to achieve unity of effort in future operations.

This issue also provides an opportunity to recognize the National War College on the occasion of its 60th anniversary. Established in October 1945, the college filled an important role in capturing the operational and strategic lessons of World War II, providing for the postwar joint education of our Armed Forces. Today, that mission remains essentially unchanged: to prepare future leaders of the Defense Department, State Department, and other civilian agencies for high-level policy, command, and staff responsibilities by conducting a senior-level course of study in national security strategy and national security policy.

As a National War College graduate and former President of the Marine Corps University, I firmly believe the professional military education system serves as an important source of strength for the Armed Forces. I am encouraged by efforts to expand interagency and multinational participation and dialogue in our schools, and I encourage you to seek out these nonmilitary and coalition participants and engage them in the classroom or in the field during exercises or contingency operations. These partners...
bring a wealth of experience and unique insights that often challenge our conventional wisdom and lead to new and innovative approaches to the operational and strategic problems we face daily. To the faculty and staff of the National War College, thank you! Your service remains key to our successes in the war on terror and in meeting the future tests in this demanding security environment. Your expertise and instruction are unparalleled and your results proven.

Joint Force Quarterly provides a powerful venue to explore the mission, roles, and organization of our forces to meet the challenges of a dynamic security environment. I encourage you to read the articles, think about them, question them, and build on them. Debate these ideas within your organizations and with other security professionals, regardless of uniform or agency. Your insights, as well as lessons identified in the field, will help shape departmental and even broader national initiatives to strengthen integrated operations and enhance the ability of all partners to contribute fully to the achievement of national objectives.

Again, my thanks to you, military professionals and interagency partners; it is through your efforts that we will prevail in this long war while simultaneously shaping tomorrow’s force. JFQ

PETER PACE
General, United States Marine Corps
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

New Titles from NDU Press...

McNair Paper 69
Reassessing the Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran
Judith S. Yaphe and Charles D. Lutes conclude that Washington may have little choice other than to live with a nuclear-armed Iran. Revisiting an earlier (pre-9/11) study, this reexamination takes into account the 2001 terrorist attacks, U.S. interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the 2005 elections in Iran, and new evidence of Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons-related technology.

Available from the U.S. Government Printing Office at $8.50 per copy. Stock number 008-020-01552-1

Strategic Forum 219
Restructuring Special Operations Forces for Emerging Threats
David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb make a case for restructuring U.S. special operations forces to improve their strategic capability to defeat current and emerging global threats.

Available from NDU Press only

Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction Occasional Paper 4
Defining “Weapons of Mass Destruction”
In this extensively researched study, Dr. W. Seth Carus summarizes how the term weapons of mass destruction has been used differently in disarmament talks, U.S. security policy, Soviet and Russian military doctrine, and American political discourse. He assesses the key policy issues associated with alternative definitions, and proposes a definition appropriate for the Department of Defense.

Available from NDU Press only

Institute for National Strategic Studies Occasional Paper 3
A Euro-Atlantic Strategy for the Black Sea Region
The Black Sea region is increasing in importance as an energy supply conduit and a barrier against transnational threats. However, as Eugene Rumer and Jeffrey Simon point out, some littoral state agendas conflict with NATO member interests. The authors argue that the Alliance could engage these states by identifying common security concerns and ideas for cooperative activities, including better integration of Partnership for Peace and European Union programs.

Available from NDU Press only

Institute for National Strategic Studies Occasional Paper 4
China Goes Global
Phillip C. Saunders notes that economic imperatives and strategic challenges are driving China to expand its international activities into different regions of the world. His study examines the rationale, drivers, and extent of this phenomenon, and assesses the implications for the United States.

Available from NDU Press only

Visit the NDU Press Web site for more information on publications at ndupress.ndu.edu
We have a rare hail and farewell at National Defense University (NDU) Press this quarter. In late 2005, Colonel David Gurney, USMC, came to NDU Press as Deputy Director and JFQ Managing Editor—the first Marine on the JFQ staff. Colonel Gurney just completed an eventful tour at U.S. Southern Command as Deputy Director of Operations and commanding officer of its Marine Corps element. He is a former Harrier squadron commander, an Industrial College of the Armed Forces graduate, and the man who turned out the lights in Panama as J-3 of Joint Task Force–Panama. We are already dazzled.

JFQ also bids farewell to our NDU Press Managing Editor, Colonel Debra Oliver Taylor, USA, who is retiring after 26 years as an intelligence leader. A 2001 National War College graduate, Colonel Taylor has been critical to Joint Staff J–2 efforts in Operation Enduring Freedom, held an important O–6 command in the Republic of Korea, and was an integral part of the postwar stability team in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom. We wish Colonel Taylor and her family the best and look forward to a long association with her as a JFQ contributing editor.

This issue presents a unique theme for our Forum section: integrated operations. JFQ introduced this term in the first quarter of 2005, and attentive readers will notice that the thread has run through each issue since. There is nothing magical about integrated operations. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of Defense, and the President have all suggested that in today’s complex, post–Cold War strategic environment, the U.S. military must cooperate closely with new partners to accomplish national objectives. These partners include interagency, international, private sector, industry, nongovernmental organizations, and charities to synchronize security efforts among the various instruments of national power. The term integrated operations recognizes these new partners and the need to cooperate closely and effectively, from planning through execution to whatever comes next.

In the 20 years since the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which established much of the joint organization and training within the Armed Forces, joint operations have become the baseline. Although each Service retains unique core competencies and maintains pride in its colors, the Armed Forces as a whole have embraced the concept of joint warfighting and are actively working to improve and transform to be more effective. Though necessary in the new American way of war, joint operations alone are not sufficient to address the entire panorama of warfare, national security, humanitarian affairs, training, planning, and acquisition responsibilities facing today’s combatant commanders and Service chiefs. No one Service, no one instrument of national power, and no one country can defeat all threats in isolation.

The confluence of rogue states, ease of international travel and communication, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (or at least mass effect), interdependency of the world economy, and religious extremists with an unprecedented arsenal of highly destructive weapons have created a critical junction. The stakes are as high as ever. Fortunately, America and its allies believe in the free exchange of ideas and are willing to consider new and unprecedented strategies to ensure liberty and security. Thus, this quarter’s JFQ Forum is designed to provoke debate on integrated operations and the complexity of integrating new partners across organizations, borders, and instruments of power.

JFQ emphasizes people over things and provocative, reasoned strategy writing over dogmatic opinion. We are adding shorter articles to increase readability while continuing to demand the same high-quality, postgraduate level of scholarly research. Please look for two new departments in this issue: Executive Summary and Security Studies Notes. Remember, too, to bookmark our Web site, ndupress.ndu.edu, where you will find a useful source of additional online content, access to many other NDU Press publications, and information on special events such as the Chairman’s Strategic Essay Competition, scheduled for May 2006. JFQ

Colonel Merrick E. Krause, USAF
Director, National Defense University Press
Editor, Joint Force Quarterly
To the Editor—Chuck Harrison’s article, “How Joint Are We and Can We Be Better?” (Issue 38, 3rd Quarter 2005), which appeared as a link on the Army Knowledge Online homepage, is right on the mark. LTC Harrison’s thoughts on the lack of a system to enforce joint training echoed my experiences as a junior officer.

Harrison evaluates an operational level joint exercise and notes, “We should ask just how joint the exercise was and at what level.” Different levels of leaders see training through their own lenses and their own positions. What looks joint to general officers or brigade commanders is far different than what appears joint to an Army or Marine company commander or platoon leader/commander at the tactical level. As Harrison points out, tactical training should “not become entangled with the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which addressed strategic issues and joint operational level training.” Put more bluntly, Goldwater-Nichols means little to sergeants, lieutenants, and captains focusing on joint tactical training. Senior officers who point to Goldwater-Nichols for joint training should ask sergeants and lieutenants what they know about Goldwater-Nichols. I believe they would get blank stares more than half of the time.

Harrison points out that “what has not been created is a system to ensure that joint training is taking place at the brigade and battalion level.” A building block in creating that system is to identify and broaden the definition of the joint mission essential task list (JMETL) and gates that we expect small units—platoon and companies—to be proficient in. We know that we need to train in close air support, but there is much more that we need to be proficient in, joint-wise, prior to deploying. However, our leaders at the division and brigade levels cannot necessarily define all of these tasks for us at the tactical level; these must be bottom-up tasks that platoon sergeants, platoon leaders, company and even battalion commanders identify. A good example is my Army infantry support platoon’s experience in Operation Enduring Freedom-V while our battalion, 2nd Battalion, 5th Infantry Regiment, was attached to the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) for 6 weeks in Uruzgan province. My platoon worked shoulder to shoulder with the Marine landing support platoon to rig and hook up external loads to CH-53E (Marine) and CH-47D (Army) aircraft. We had different unit SOPs, terminology, and equipment, but we figured out how to get the job done at our level (helped by the fact that the services use the same field manual for external hookups).

Once the 22nd MEU left, my platoon became responsible for the Tarin Kowt field landing strip as well, and received, unloaded, and uploaded USAF C-130 aircraft. Working with Marine CH-53Es and Air Force C-130s was not a mandated predeployment JMETL task. Junior leaders from all Services are figuring out this and hundreds of other joint tasks on the ground while deployed.

In summary, LTC Harrison’s article is right on target. A system to enforce joint tactical training needs to ensure that junior leaders have input into training needs other than close air support. Our joint experiences while deployed can help units—from the bottom up—identify JMETL tasks that need to be trained on back at home station. From there, senior leaders are back to LTC Harrison’s focus: building a system that is in place to ensure that the joint training actually happens.

CPT Mike Baskin, USA
2nd Battalion, 5th Infantry
3rd Interim Brigade Combat Team
25th Infantry Division
Schofield Barracks, Hawaii

To the Editor—In “Defining Integrated Operations” (Issue 38, 3rd Quarter 2005), Richard Downie provided definitions for what he considered integrated operations, which included integrated operations, combined integrated operations, and multinational integrated operations. Each definition included a set of Services, agencies, and other elements that would be engaged in operations. To buttress his definitions, Colonel Downie appealed to statements from General Richard Myers, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

With all due respect, we believe that Colonel Downie’s effort fails in several respects. To be sure, operations he described as integrated do contain the elements he included. Recent operations, particularly those that are often categorized under the catch-all phrase military operations other than war, have involved the participation of every Service in the U.S. military, forces from other nations, American governmental agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and international governmental organizations (IGOs). To call the tsunami relief effort an “integrated operation,” however, is a considerable misuse of the word integrate.

Indeed, all of the entities involved in a mission may have the same goal. But their cultures and capabilities differ in degrees, sometimes considerably. Moreover, the term integrated operations, as defined by Colonel Downie, connotes a degree of command or control over these organizations, especially NGOs and IGOs, that exists neither by definition nor spirit. Thus, while there may indeed be unity of effort, achieving the desired end-state through an “integrated operation” may well be chimerical.

The concept of integrated operations becomes even more remote when one moves to the operational level of war. The differences in warfighting cultures and doctrines (or the lack thereof), and the presence of coalition partners whose national interests will at some point detract from both unity of command and unity of effort, serve to render integration impossible. This is often exacerbated by the personnel policies of the various Services. Varying rates of personnel turnover can result in instability and personality clashes that could detract from the proper coordination of operations, let alone integration.

Humanitarian operations render the notion of integrated operations even more fanciful. Downie used General Myers’ defini-
tion of multinational integrated operations and cited the tsunami relief effort in Indonesia as an example. Experience throughout the post–Cold War period, ranging from Somalia through stability operations in Iraq, indicates that at best one may achieve a degree of coordination that will contribute to the success of the operation.

Integration, or more realistically simple coordination, becomes virtually impossible to achieve with NGOs. The radical differences in organizational culture, methodology, and purpose, not to mention the sheer mutual distrust between NGOs and military organizations, render even the most rudimentary type of cooperation hard to attain.

We suggest that coordinated operations is a much more useful term to define the activities Colonel Downie described. Although understandably Service-centric in its orientation, Air Force Doctrine Document 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, provides a good baseline for understanding the types of operations Downie spoke of: “The proper application of a coordinated force can produce effects that exceed the contributions of forces employed individually.” From this, perhaps we can develop more useful definitions of the types of operations we will be conducting in at the least the near future.

LtCol Roger L. Morin, USMC
Dr. Richard L. DiNardo
USMC Command and Staff College
Quantico, Virginia

To the Editor—Congratulations to John Hurley for so eloquently describing what is emerging as a key element in the revolution in military affairs: cross-functional working groups (“Cross-Functional Working Groups: Changing the Way Staffs Are Organized,” Issue 39, 4th Quarter 2005). As the senior analyst at Battle Command Training Program Operations Group Delta, I have witnessed working groups emerge over the past 5 years acting as key enabling components of information-sharing and knowledge management. Integrated working groups, combining expertise from multiple staff sections, have enabled a marked increase in both the velocity and veracity of information used to make decisions within military organizations. Technological enhancements in the form of Web portals for sharing information—especially for posting critical updates or changes, coupled with real-time collaboration tools that allow coordination in virtual meeting rooms—have freed us from many of the shackles imposed by time and space.

One statement in LTC Hurley’s article, however, raises a caution flag. He states, “Each action officer receives identical guidance, so there is no opportunity for a primary staff section officer to miscommunicate it.” Don’t believe it! Experience tells us that individuals interpret inputs differently, even if their inputs are exactly the same. Just look at the differences in accounts of eyewitnesses to an accident. Differing interpretations of an event is a part of human nature, so we must take them into account and mitigate their effects. Good staff work and strong management of meetings are not obsolete.

All in all, Hurley’s is an excellent article. He managed to capture in just a few pages some real nuggets that others should study and consider implementing in their own organizations.

Thomas E. Ward II, PhD
Senior Analyst, Operations Group
Delta Battle Command Training Program
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

NEW from NDU Press for the Center for Technology and National Security Policy

Defense Horizons 52
Creating a NATO Special Operations Force
David C. Gompert and Raymond C. Smith suggest the time has come for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries to work together to develop a small, selective special operations forces capability for the Alliance.

Defense Horizons 51
Custer in Cyberspace
David C. Gompert and Richard L. Kugler reexamine the Battle of the Little Bighorn using the new concept of battle-wisdom—the blending of reliable intuition with timely reasoning in complex, dynamic, time-critical, and information-rich environments. They find implications for today in the recruitment, development, retention, training, and education of military leaders.

For more information on these and other CTNSP publications, visit ndupress.ndu.edu or <http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/publications.html>.
few of our readers know that Joint Force Quarterly is delivered to every general and flag officer within the Department of Defense, as well as to senior leaders throughout the executive branch of the U.S. Government. For decisionmakers, executive summaries are an essential daily element of time management in the face of heavy responsibilities and tight schedules. JFQ is mindful that national security professionals at every level face competing demands for their attention. The purpose of this executive summary is not to reduce the Forum’s content to a few summarizing bullets, but rather to address the So what? question behind the editors’ assessment that these submissions are truly worth readers’ time.

Like Generals Shelton and Myers before him, General Pace has placed great emphasis on the importance of U.S. military leaders integrating their plans and operations “with a wide variety of actors” in an effort to achieve national objectives in a more holistic fashion. Whether this involves military organizations from more than one country combined with one or more U.S. or foreign governmental agencies, private volunteer organizations, international nongovernmental organizations, and private or public local agencies is not as important as the intent: to maximize efficiency and legitimacy in achieving national security objectives. While this has been done in an ad hoc fashion for years, the potential value added is so great that, like “jointness,” this concept is in need of formal approaches, starting with institutional adaptation.

Our first Forum article, “Planning Lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq” focuses on the contemporary security threat and the way in which leaders plan and orchestrate...
dissipative and military instruments of power to meet this threat. Hailing back to the Clausewitzian admonition to understand the nature of the war in question, Joseph Collins focuses on the critical importance of interagency partnership in planning for, and subsequently addressing, the fractured environments produced by blunt military power contests. Dr. Collins argues that involving the interagency community in the military aspects of the planning process is essential to achieving security objectives in the postconflict (or postcrisis) return to normalcy. He concludes with eight practical recommendations to improve mid-range planning.

The second Forum article, “Combating Terrorism: A Socio-Economic Strategy,” addresses the economic instrument of national power in the war on terror and the relationship between economic prosperity, stability, and terror. Memie Winn Byrd posits that the traditional argument that “market-based solutions cannot lead to poverty reduction and economic development” is no longer plausible and that collaborating with nontraditional partners is a necessary component of a successful counterterrorism strategy. Major Byrd criticizes inflexible planning and other traditional military organizational problems as enemies of innovation in the economic arena. Regional combatant commanders must anticipate a future in which more businesses find competitive arenas in underdeveloped nations and seek to cultivate their partnership in defeating terror.

Our third Forum feature, “Integrating Partner Nations into Coalition Operations,” outlines the techniques, mechanisms, and integrated operations successes used by the U.S. regional combatant command with the fewest resources to perform its mission: U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). This dearth of assets and a perceived absence of strategic threat have inspired great interagency and partner nation coordination to bring, as General Pace noted in his message earlier, a greater array of resources and expertise to bear on the increasing transnational threat. As in other regional areas of responsibility, USSOUTHCOM is working with its partners to mitigate a growing panorama of security threats that exploit vast ungoverned territories and border seams. Major Barbara Fick addresses the deliberate training and exercise activities that pay dividends in smoother integrated operations during crisis. Notably, USSOUTHCOM is the first regional combatant command to incorporate the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization in its exercise program. For his part, the coordinator is working with the Western Hemisphere Affairs Bureau on Cuba to develop a framework for U.S. strategy for the period immediately following Fidel Castro’s death. Events will clearly demand even more efficient integrated operations in the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility, and the implications for state, Federal, and international agencies who deal with mass migration, foreign disaster assistance, and even homeland defense, are legion.

In the fourth article, “Are We Ready for an Interagency Combatant Command,” Christopher Naler argues that, because the National Security Council (NSC) is not optimized for daily strategy implementation, every regional combatant command should be reorganized as an integrated combatant command. In this serial debate, previous authors have opined that the National Security Council should serve as an aggressive arbiter of interagency equities in the war on terror and force greater synergy on Federal agencies with contrasting cultures, incentives, and perspectives. In the aftermath of the 1986 Tower Commission’s investigation of the Iran-Contra affair, many drew the lesson that the NSC should serve only as staff and never as an operational agency, closing the door on any suggestion of a standing integrated combatant command headquarters. Colonel Naler points out that the immediate chain of command for such an organization is a contentious issue, but so is leadership of the command itself.

Henry Stratman’s case study, “Orchestrating Instruments of Power for Nationbuilding,” concludes the Forum and takes the opposite approach by focusing on individual leaders organizing staffs and liaison elements to overcome myriad impediments to integration and coordination (the “clash of cultures”). In this case, the dual challenge is nationbuilding in parallel with counterinsurgency operations. General Stratman suggests that perhaps separate but equal agencies with clear mandates and cooperative leadership can achieve better results through careful interaction than a single integrated agency with organic interagency expertise. The general is careful to point out that the successes he reports were not attributable to doctrine, but were products of age-old unity of effort between the chief of mission and the combined force commander. Should we draw the conclusion that multiple independent agencies working cooperatively outperform a single, truly integrated combatant command? Unity of effort is essential to successful integrated operations.

In his guidance to the Joint Staff, General Pace underscored the need to “harness elements of national power” by integrating and coordinating Defense Department efforts with the work of others. The challenge of integrated operations is to build trust, synergy, and momentum in realizing national security objectives, but the devil is in the details, and efforts to complement and strengthen other elements of national power depend on leadership, habitual interagency relationships, and reliable vehicles for communication.
For planners and bureaucrats, Afghanistan and Iraq appear to present a puzzle. In Afghanistan, on one hand, we had little time for planning; we did lots of innovative things on the cheap; our relatively small, international force has taken few casualties; we have had great local and international support; and we are, by most accounts, on the way to a good outcome.

On the other hand, in Iraq, we had over a year to plan; our national policy has been expensive and often unimaginative; a relatively large, primarily American force has taken over 18,000 casualties, most of them in the so-called postconflict phase; we have had severe problems with local and international support; and the outcome, although looking up, is still in doubt.

A wag might conclude from the above that Americans should avoid planning at all costs. It brings bad luck, stifles creativity, and interferes with our penchant for achieving success through our normal standard operating procedure: the application of great amounts of material resources guided by brilliant improvisation and dumb luck.

While the wag’s conclusion is flawed, problems in planning indeed contributed to serious shortcomings connected with Operation Iraqi Freedom. With 3 years of hindsight, it was clear that these shortcomings included:

- ineffective planning and preparation for stability operations
- inadequate forces to occupy and secure a country the size of California
- poor military reaction to rioting and looting in the immediate postconflict environment
- slow civil and military reaction to a growing insurgency
- problematical funding and contracting mechanisms that slowed reconstruction
- failure to make effective use of former Iraqi military forces

Colonel Joseph J. Collins, USA (Ret.), is a Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College. He was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations from 2001 to 2004.
- slow initial development of Iraqi security forces
- inability to provide enough trained civilian officials, diplomats, and aid workers to conduct effective stabilization and reconstruction activities
- slow creation of an interim Iraqi authority that could have minimized the perception of occupation and enhanced the perception of liberation.²

Successful innovation and favorable circumstances on the ground made the war in Afghanistan markedly easier than the one in Iraq, but the planning problems in both cases have had much in common with other complex contingencies in recent years (Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo).

All of these cases have demonstrated the limitations of our stovepiped, single agency planning systems. Thus, in the future, we will have to adapt planning to a dynamic security environment and numerous challenges. Not only will we have to do better in mid-range interagency planning, but we will also have to develop and refine new capabilities to deal with the nonmilitary aspects of contingencies. In turn, this will require changes in the organizational cultures of the Armed Forces and the Department of State.

The first step in understanding this challenge will be to appreciate the environment in which it will take place.

Security Environment

First, U.S. conventional military power is unparalleled. No country or nonstate actor in its right mind seeks conventional battle with the United States. Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrated that the Armed Forces, with minimal allied help, can attack a significant opponent at a 1:6 force ratio disadvantage, destroy its forces, and topple a mature, entrenched regime, all in a few weeks. Iraqi Freedom also showed that victory in war is much larger and more dearly obtained than success in military operations.

For our enemies, guerrilla tactics and terrorism (preconflict, postconflict, and outside of conflict situations) are the order of the day. At the same time, the Armed Forces, innovative but oriented on conventional operations, have been slow to adapt to this new kind of war, a problem we have seen many times in our history, albeit under different circumstances. In Iraq, some of our combat divisions had no plans for what to do after major combat operations ceased.

Complex contingencies in recent years have demonstrated the limitations of our stovepiped, single agency planning systems.

In Afghanistan, it took over a year to adapt to the requirements posed by stabilization and reconstruction in a counterinsurgency environment.

In general, not only are American planners often surprised by the “What kind of war is this?” questions, but they also find it hard to think beyond the last bullet of a climactic battle. In the Cold War and thereafter, the United States has consistently done poorly at bridging success in battle and victory in war.

Second, in recent years, the United States has only entered into conflicts in areas that were undergoing some sort of humanitarian crisis, which has either been a focal point of the war effort or a critical factor in winning the hearts and minds of the local populace.

In these operations, winning the war and solving the humanitarian crisis both had to be first-priority activities, especially since the armies of developed nations have the will and technology to protect civilian populations. A humanitarian disaster—a human tragedy in its own right—could create the perception of a Pyrrhic victory or an insensitive policy. Intense media scrutiny, moreover, raises the stakes.

Today, interagency solutions are needed for problems that involve armed forces. The military has also become a player in what are normally civilian activities, such as humanitarian assistance, stabilization activities, civil governance, and reconstruction. The dividing line between civil and military enterprise is further blurred by the presence of contractors who may be performing formerly military functions.

Third, in Afghanistan and Iraq, unlike in Bosnia and Kosovo, there was no discrete postconflict phase. In both of the current conflicts, conventional war A was followed by unconventional war B. In turn, war B was complicated by the need to conduct simultaneous stabilization and reconstruction activities. Neither soldiers nor diplomats were ready for this development. To be ready in the future, they will have to change how they organize, plan, and train for conflict.

Fourth, both in Iraq and Afghanistan, the insurgents decided after a few months that they had to defeat reconstruction in order to force the evacuation of coalition forces and discredit the people who had worked with the coalition. In both conflicts, counterinsurgency, stabilization, and reconstruction have become threads in the same cloth. This requires a combined, interagency approach in theater, not just in Washington.

Fifth, for the soldier, the media have gone from intrusive to omnipresent, if not embedded. In this respect, conflicts such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq are much more
affected by the media than the small wars of the early 20th century. The ugly realities of low-intensity conflict continuously stream into Western living rooms. The sense of gain or loss, or the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of operations, is magnified by the work of relentless journalists, whose editors and producers freely admit that “if it bleeds, it leads.” Activities such as police training or well digging lose out to grisly combat scenes.

The nature of media coverage makes policy execution more difficult and time-sensitive. With intense media scrutiny, governments have to get it right early and keep things moving in a positive direction. Where governments once had years to experiment with solutions to overseas problems, they now have months or weeks before the steady drumbeat of “all is lost” begins to sound. Better mid-range planning is essential for a media environment that is intolerant of missteps.

The future is likely to present a set of challenges that will require significant institutional and cultural adaptation. In the next decade, the United States must prepare to:

- continue stability operations, as well as stabilization and reconstruction activities, in Afghanistan and Iraq for at least another 5 years
- execute counterterrorist operations in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia
- support international peace operations in the Middle East (Gaza? Golan Heights?) and Africa (Darfur?)
- manage system shocks from regime failure or radical changes in some regional powers (North Korea? Cuba?)
- deter or manage traditional threats, state proliferators of weapons of mass destruction, and future peer competitors
- improve homeland defense against terrorist groups, including those who might use weapons of mass destruction.

In the next decade, the need for effective joint, combined, and interagency planning will remain significant. Major institutional planning changes will require complementary changes in organizational cultures.

**Improving Mid-Range Planning**

The U.S. Government has already begun improving mid-range planning. The aftermath of 9/11 saw the creation of a Department of Homeland Security, a Homeland Security Council, and a National Counterterrorism Center, as well as a set of Intelligence Community reforms. There are joint interagency coordination groups in some regional commands, and the Department of State now has a senior Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to improve planning. In the Department of Defense (DOD), a new directive on stability operations is being implemented under the close supervision of an energized Secretary of Defense. The 2006 Defense budget was amended to emphasize counterterrorist and stability operations at the expense of high-tech conventional warfare. In Iraq and Afghanistan, there have been highly successful improvements in counterinsurgency and security assistance operations. The elections in both countries were major accomplishments in themselves. Military and diplomatic teams in both Afghanistan and Iraq are working together much more closely than even a year ago.

The following eight recommendations will build on these improvements and help planning in the future.

First, we need a new charter for complex contingency planning. The Clinton administration’s oft-ignored bible on planning for complex contingencies, Presidential Decision Directive 56, was headed in the right direction. Early in the first term of President George W. Bush, the Pentagon blocked a National Security Council (NSC) staff attempt to publish a new contingency planning policy, all in the name of preserving the freedom of action of Cabinet officers and keeping civilians out of the contingency planning business. More input into contingency planning from civilians, of course, is not the problem; it may be a key part of the solution.

War plans are rarely briefed outside military channels. Inside the Pentagon, only a handful of civilians have access to them. This prohibition may make sense for major conventional war plans, and it certainly makes sense for security purposes. However, when conflicts do not end when the last hill is taken, and include activities such as stabilization and reconstruction that we want civilians to lead, there must be a broader sharing of contingency planning responsibilities. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review’s recommendation for a new interagency document called “The National Security Planning Guidance” is clearly a step in the right direction.

Second, every executive department should insist on interagency experience for its most senior civilians and make it mandatory for promotion to the senior executive or foreign service. Interagency experience should count as the equivalent of joint experience for military officers.

Too often, the best and brightest avoid interagency assignments where the hours are terrible and the rewards are less than those at the home agency. Too many junior and inexperienced personnel occupied the NSC
staff in the last two administrations. National Security Council personnel at the director level should optimally be members of the senior executive service or at least colonel or GS-15–level personnel.

It is often said that we need a Goldwater-Nichols reform for the interagency community. The first step would be to improve the quality of agency personnel across the board and increase the number of the best and brightest who have lived and worked in the interagency world.

Third, we need a better system for exporting interagency groups to the field. Interagency coordination in Washington is possible, but in the field during complex contingencies, it usually results in either a system in which one cabinet department in Washington is nominally in charge, such as the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance or the Coalition Provisional Authority, or a more cooperative system, such as we have in Kabul and Baghdad. This cooperative system features a senior military officer and a senior diplomat working together, with neither having overall charge of U.S. policy, and both answering to their respective superiors in Washington. Today, in both Kabul and Baghdad, the arrangements are working well.

Other arrangements are possible. Getting this issue right should be the subject of wargames and experiments conducted by cooperating agencies and supervised by Joint Forces Command and the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. The United States is not likely ever to favor a “vicereoy” system, but more effective and efficient arrangements that offer more unity of command are possible. We cannot afford situations where ad hoc arrangements on the ground or in Washington stand in the way of effective national policy.

For its part, S/CRS at State—which will have the national lead in reconstruction and stabilization operations—must have an Active and a Reserve response corps, full of interagency and civil specialists. This will take hundreds of millions of dollars per year, which Congress has thus far been unwilling to appropriate.

Fourth, the military establishment needs to focus its planning more on victory in war, not on success in climactic battles. This is cultural change, and it will be difficult. It is folly to pretend that success in the final battle leads directly to victory. Particularly in cases of regime change or failed states, postcombat stability operations (Phase 4 in war plan lingo) are the key to victory. They are every bit as important as the ability to move, shoot, and communicate in battle, the normal preoccupations of the soldier. However, studies of postcombat planning in Iraq show that Phase 4 planning did not receive the attention it deserved.

This recommendation will entail a major change in training and culture. Occupation, stabilization, reconstruction, and other issues associated with nationbuilding must be better integrated into the curriculum of staff and war colleges. Language and cultural studies will become more important for military officers. Wargames and experiments also need to focus more on stability operations. None of this is meant to imply that the military should take over critical postcombat activities from the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); the opposite is true.

Fifth, the Department of State and USAID personnel and organizations need to become more operational (that is, able to lead in the management of grand enterprises in unsafe and austere environments).

General Tommy Franks had it right: after the battle, you need lots of “boots” and lots of “wingtips” on the ground. Absent the wingtips, the boots in Iraq have had to do
much more than they should under optimal circumstances. This problem continues to the present day, where, for lack of civil presence, there is still too much military supervision of reconstruction and governance issues. In Afghanistan, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, which include State and USAID personnel, have mitigated the “too many boots, too few wingtips” problem that hampers coalition operations in Iraq.

While there have been significant exceptions, State and USAID personnel have generally been restricted to relatively secure compounds in Afghanistan and Iraq. This fact is often attributed to the “tyranny” of the local Regional Security Officers (RSOs), who appear determined to apply peacetime rules to conflict situations. RSOs will likely blame the rules that come down from Washington. In any case, there are too few foreign service officers and USAID professionals in field locations. The personnel strength of State and USAID is clearly inadequate to meet their expanded roles in the war on terror.

At the national level, the Bush administration recognized this problem and established the neophyte Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization. It must now follow through and ensure that this good idea becomes a powerful center of excellence. This office should also become the centerpiece for interagency planning and exercises throughout the Government. Interagency staffing has begun and should be increased. It needs a healthy budget, which will be a problem in a poorly funded department that is usually focused on current policy, not mid-range contingency planning.

Sixth, for the State Department and USAID to become more operational, they must be better funded across the board. Their systematic underfunding is the single greatest impediment to effective planning, diplomacy, developmental assistance, reconstruction, and stabilization. State cannot be equipped only with good ideas while Defense has all the money and hard assets. This is a prescription for an unbalanced national security policy.

As long as there are few wingtips on the ground, the boots will be forced to move into the vacuum. As long as State is a budgetary midget, it will play second fiddle to the Pentagon colossus. If we want to fix planning for complex contingencies, we must fund State and USAID as major players and not poor relatives.

Seventh, to get better at planning and executing complex contingencies, we will have to untangle the legal authorities that hobble the Departments of State and Defense. This will be especially important now, if State begins to operate in the field on large-scale postconflict stabilization and reconstruction problems. Many of these legal provisions serve only to protect congressional committee prerogatives. Still others are meant to prevent human rights abuses. It is tempting to say that these dysfunctional legal provisions should be waived or eliminated. This should only be done, however, after a full assessment of the rationale behind each of them.

Eighth, to gain legitimacy and promote better burdensharing, the United States should make its most powerful allies full partners in complex operations. We have run two operations in which many allies were brought into the plan after the action began. This did no great damage in Afghanistan, where the international perception of legitimacy has been high. In Iraq, however, the United States continues to pay a stiff price for its decisive actions in 2003. History will judge the wisdom of these decisions, but in the future, bringing the allies in before the takeoff may make for a more complicated flight but a smoother landing. **JFQ**

### Notes

1. For a negative view on stability operations in Afghanistan, see Kathy Gannon, “Afghanistan Unbound,” *Foreign Affairs* 83 (May/June 2004), 35–46.


3. Even without CNN and other media outlets, misbehavior and scandal in past conflicts caused problems for the military. See Max Boot, *Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 120–125, for the story of how U.S. war crimes in the Philippines embarrassed the Armed Forces and helped end the early 20th-century military operations there. However, the media’s daily impact on today’s operations has no precedent.


5. For a negative view on stability operations in Afghanistan, see Kathy Gannon, “Afghanistan Unbound,” *Foreign Affairs* 83 (May/June 2004), 35–46.


The increased risks and uncertainties of terrorism reduce consumer willingness to spend, particularly on discretionary items and major consumer durables, thereby reducing investment in consumer goods industries and depressing growth. The travel, tourism, accommodation, restaurant, postal services, and insurance industries are particularly susceptible. Regions and economies where these industries are concentrated suffer most, both in falling output and employment, but the threat of terrorism reduces overall investment and retards economic growth across the board.

While uncontained terrorism is costly for all economies, it could impose a disproportionate cost in trade and income growth in Asia-Pacific countries. Most developing economies in the region depend heavily on trade flows, particularly with the United States. Many of these economies rely on foreign direct investment inflows. Insurance companies may impose higher premiums on cargoes and vessels traveling to and from these countries due to the inadequacy of local security. For instance, Lloyd’s of London...
recently increased its premiums on ships traveling through the Malacca Strait. Currency exchange rate volatility can devastate the whole region’s economy. A case in point is the Asian financial crisis in 1997, initiated by a sudden Thai baht depreciation.

**Combating Terrorism**

New counterterrorism measures require one-time investments, which lead to short- to mid-term increases in the costs of doing business. These costs should be viewed as an investment that will pay dividends through reduced risk premiums and increased trade efficiency. In addition to the advantages of reducing exposure to terrorism, technological advances that enhance security are likely to boost the efficiency of cargo handling and people movement, lowering trade costs and making trade flows more efficient. The benefit of preventing reduced trade flows and encouraging investment is continued regional and global economic growth.

Expansion and prosperity would enable nations and organizations to fund economic development policies and activities, which would create opportunities and expand a new middle class in communities that have traditionally supported terrorist groups. As the population recognizes the economic benefits of peace, they hopefully will work to inhibit local support for terrorist activities.

Cooperating among cross-disciplinary organizations such as the United Nations Development Program, governmental aid agencies and militaries, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and private businesses is vital. Although economic development can inhibit terrorism, it alone cannot eliminate the problem.

**The Bottom of the Pyramid**

In the words of General Charles F. Wald, USAF, Deputy Commander, U.S. European Command:

*The tools of businesses are often better suited to diminishing the causes of terrorism and influencing the democratization of key regions by providing investment and employment that lead to long-term improvement in quality of life.*

“Eradicating poverty through profits” involves finding a way to alleviate poverty for those at the bottom of the economic pyramid through collaboration among the poor themselves, civil organizations, governments, and private firms. This approach is widely known as the bottom of the pyramid (BOP) concept. The successfully built BOP markets are a sustainable way to improve economic conditions that in turn will alleviate poverty. As C.K. Prahalad states:

*Historically, governments, aid agencies, non-governmental organizations, large firms, and the organized business sector all seem to have reached an implicit agreement: Market-based solutions cannot lead to poverty reduction and economic development. The dominant logic of each group is different, but the conclusions are similar.*

The private sector’s increased participation in a BOP-oriented market is dismantling this old paradigm. Such U.S. business institutions as the University of Michigan Ross School of Business, University of North Carolina Kenan-Flagler Business School, and Cornell University Johnson School of Management are actively monitoring and tracking case studies associated with sustainable enterprises servicing and operating at the bottom of the economic pyramid. These schools are extracting and developing lessons learned, best practices, and business principles that make these enterprises successful and teaching this thinking to a new generation of undergraduate and graduate students.

What are the incentives for the private sector and large firms to service the BOP? According to Prahalad, “The BOP market potential is huge: 4 to 5 billion (80 percent of humanity) underserved people and an...
The military also furnishes disaster preparedness mitigation assessments for many countries throughout the Asia-Pacific region and relief efforts in areas prone to natural disaster such as Bangladesh—the most recent being for the 2004 tsunami. The rapid tsunami response was possible in part because an Army civil affairs team was in the Banda Aceh area conducting an assessment for water sanitation projects.

During the tsunami relief effort, the military worked hand in hand with the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, an arm of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the lead agency for helping countries to recover from disaster, fight poverty, and initiate democratic reform. The agency supports long-term and equitable economic growth and advances foreign policy objectives by supporting economic growth, agriculture and trade, health, democracy, conflict prevention, and humanitarian assistance. The combined effort during the tsunami relief demonstrated the significant benefits derived from interagency coordination, combination of resources, and applying differing core competencies toward a common problem.

U.S. Pacific Command sought to create a formal partnership with USAID to synchronize humanitarian and civic activities at a strategic level in January 2004. As the command began to realize the importance of environmental aspects of the war on terror, it saw routine activities as a partial solution (that is, providing some basic needs for the local populace). Moreover, command efforts were isolated, one-time occurrences in these communities. For example, the command constructed a school in a remote village, but it remained empty because the villagers could not afford supplies, teachers, or building maintenance. Therefore, the local populace failed to benefit. USPACOM approached USAID, with its long-term vision and expertise in building community and development programs. Admiral William Fallon, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, stated in a congressional hearing on March 8, 2005, “We are working to build a relationship with the U.S. Agency for International Development . . . with the intent to coordinate our civil affairs activities with USAID programs.”

On March 30, 2005, USAID announced that it had created the Office of Military Affairs (OMA) to synchronize with the military. Until then, the agency was ambivalent about such coordination due to the differing organizational cultures and a perceived ideological gulf. The dominant logic in the past was that military activities were incompatible with USAID humanitarian efforts. However, the creation of the OMA and Admiral Fallon’s statement point toward the loosening of the mindsets within these two organizations.

Based on the new cooperation between the Armed Forces and USAID, the Economic Advisor’s Office at USPACOM now recognizes an opportunity to alleviate poverty and create sustainable economic growth in areas that are vulnerable to terrorist influence. Ways must be found to consolidate and synchronize command efforts, USAID programs, NGO charitable contributions, and the private sector’s need for new markets to improve economic conditions at the BOP in areas vulnerable to terrorist recruitment, such as Bangladesh, Indonesia, and the Philippines. This will require fresh thinking by all parties. The 9/11 Commission criticized U.S. Government agencies for their lack of imagination prior to the attacks in New York and Washington. In the post-9/11 world, we have no choice but to think creatively if we are to win the fight against rising terrorist threats.

Organizational Challenges

The military faces significant challenges to fostering innovative thinking. It suffers from all the obstacles that most bureaucratic organizations confront in regard to systems, structures, entrepreneurial thinking, policies and procedures, people, and culture. The current organization has rigid systems, top-down management, absence of innovation goals, long and complex approval cycles, short-term orientation due to frequent personnel turnover, and paralysis resulting from a risk-free culture within the ranks of decisionmakers.

Systems. Military organizations have a rigid formal planning system with long cycles in combination with inflexible budgeting systems. Once a plan is approved, it is difficult to change. Budgets are set at least 2 years in advance, and redirection is close to impossible. Funding streams and categories are
Based on congressional budget allocations, so funds designated for specific purposes cannot be redirected without congressional approval. For example, USPACOM staff components have been struggling to change existing policies and procedures to focus on strengthening everyday operational needs of the organization. The approval cycle is long and requires many managerial layers. Action officers at USPACOM often complain that they spend much time presenting what they plan to do and obtaining approval from various layers of management and little time actually accomplishing goals. Therefore, initiatives to fight a new kind of war, such as the war on terror, get bogged down by existing policies and procedures. Short windows of opportunity are easily missed.

**People.** Generally, military personnel have a short-term perspective because most rotate every 2 to 3 years. Not only is it costly to destabilize an organization purposefully, but it also causes individuals to favor objectives that will show concrete results during the time of their assignments. Accordingly, it is difficult for the military to focus its people on such long-range concerns as shaping the environment or confronting the underlying causes of terrorism.

**Culture.** Across the U.S. Government, every agency, including the military, is acknowledging that innovation is needed. The military clearly recognizes that the non-traditional counterterrorism tools required to “deny sanctuary” and “diminish underlying conditions” are nonmilitary. According to General Richard Myers, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we must transform our military competencies from joint operations to integrated operations that reflect the new partners we must coordinate with to defeat terrorists, such as other U.S. agencies, allied militaries and governments, nongovernmental organizations, and private industry.9

General Wald recognizes that a nontraditional military solution to the root causes of terrorism, while “outside the military’s lane,” is necessary to fight the war on terror.10 Yet the military is not willing to use it, reflecting a mindset and culture that prevent thinking outside the box.

Other examples could be given under each of these categories of obstacles. The bottom line is that the Armed Forces have an uphill battle to initiate the search for ways for a nontraditional/nonmilitary partnership to address the environmental and other conditions that are the root causes of terrorism.

**Using the BOP Concept**

Until now, the U.S. Government has not tapped into the power and capabilities of the private sector in the war on terror. Indeed, most businesses are unlikely to engage in any activities unconnected with profits. Yet a handful of companies such as FedEx, Western Union, America Online, and Wal-Mart have been voluntarily assisting Federal agencies since the 9/11 attacks. For example, FedEx has mobilized its 250,000 employees to watch for threats, developed an internal computer system to report suspicious activity directly to the Department of Homeland Security, installed radiation detectors to sniff for dirty bombs at overseas facilities, and opened its vast international shipping database to the U.S. Customs Service. If three more such companies participated, a million more people would be actively looking for threats.

Agudas de Amazonas, a subsidiary of Suez Environnement, a world leader in water-related services, teamed up with French and Brazilian NGOs for a pilot project called Water for All to demonstrate that the company can serve poor communities and grow its customer base at the same time. Raising the community’s awareness of the need for safe water was the key social dimension of the project. The NGOs’ experience with the community and understanding of the local social structure and culture proved essential in achieving this objective. The NGOs showed that they could bring value to the company as facilitators in the process of adapting water services to the specific characteristics of low-income communities.11

The company’s goal was to provide water and sanitation services to the 1.5 million inhabitants of the remote city of Manaus, Brazil. That was considered an ambitious goal, considering that 60 percent of the people live in “informal settlement” on an income of less than $1 per day. Most lacked access to clean water, while some used treated water from pirated connections. Leveraging the core competencies of partner NGOs, the company worked with the targeted communities, assessing the needs as well as the ability and willingness of the populace to pay for services. Considerable effort was made to help people understand the value of treated water and to appreciate that paying for legal connections would
ensure a reliable supply at lower prices than they paid to independent providers.

The success of the project largely depended on the genuine mobilization of the inhabitants in favor of the initiative and the development of effective community management of water services. The results were surprisingly good both for the community and the company: 74 percent of the targeted 5,000 households were connected to a water network. There was an 80 percent bill collection rate, compared to 54 percent for the rest of Manaus.

The U.S. military could easily fit into a similar project. Civil affairs units are conducting well construction and water sanitation projects in remote villages in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Bangladesh. With innovative thinking and imagination, the partnership among the private sector, NGOs, USAID, and the military could work together in targeted areas that are vulnerable to terrorist recruiting to improve living conditions, provide foundations for a sustainable economic stability and growth, and create hope and opportunities. Such partnership with businesses can provide continuity to many aid and humanitarian projects and hinder terrorist recruiting over the long term.

The above case studies show that teaming up with unlikely partners such as the private sector can be an effective component of the war on terror strategy.

**The Way Ahead**

The military must mobilize to seize opportunities in the private sector. Companies need not take drastic and proactive actions like the FedEx exercise; they can simply do what they do best—create products, services, and jobs. Leveraging the emerging BOP concepts and the multinational corporations’ need to expand their markets could inspire the business sector to operate in areas where economic development is desperately needed.

Government agencies, including the military, should participate in business association meetings and conferences. Civil affairs and USAID personnel must be educated regarding these emerging concepts and trends in the business sector. Conversely, the military should invite business leaders and decisionmakers to counterterrorism conferences and seminars.

For instance, USPACOM cosponsored a conference with the U.S. Army War College and the National Intelligence Council in June 2005 to explore ways for Federal agencies and the private sector to address the underlying causes of terrorism. Stuart Hart, an expert on the BOP, introduced the concept and explained how it can help address the underlying conditions of terrorism by providing sustainable, grassroots-level economic development.

U.S. Pacific Command plans to continue exploring this concept in counterterrorism conferences and other forums. The command will invite business leaders to spawn new thinking throughout the military and among decisionmakers about the connection between the war on terror and the private sector. The private sector must understand that the U.S. Government and the international community need their business expertise in creating products, services, and jobs for those at the bottom of the economic pyramid.

As businesses become more aware of how their efforts at operating successfully in the BOP arena could contribute to fighting terror, we will be able to mobilize this untapped opportunity. The business sector can provide grassroots-level, sustainable microeconomic development and create a needed force multiplier. **JFQ**

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**NOTES**

4. Ibid., 9.
5. Ibid., 21, 61.
Within 48 hours of Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s resignation and departure on February 29, 2004, Chilean forces deployed and integrated into a multinational interim force to help secure and stabilize the small, impoverished island nation. Days after the passage of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1529, Chile, Canada, France, and the United States established a multinational force responsive to and capable of coordinating with international authorities and aid efforts in Haiti. The rapid reaction, deployment, and integration of coalition forces saved the lives of many Haitians, prevented mass migration during a time of rough seas, and facilitated transition to the process of re-stabilization. Chile continues to deploy forces as a member of the UN Stabilization Force Haiti (MINUSTAH), led by Brazil and comprised mostly of Latin American troops. While many challenges continue in Haiti, the success of initial security and stabilization operations, continued support to MINUSTAH, and the significant contribution of Latin American and Caribbean nations to peacekeeping operations around the world demonstrate a growing capability in the Western Hemisphere for participation in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations, such as those currently required in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) has been a key enabler of this growing capability, supporting a tailored exercise and theater security cooperation program that has encouraged partners such as Chile, Brazil, and El Salvador to develop skills in the conduct of integrated operations. The fruits of this program, borne out through examples such as the mission in Haiti and support to Operation Iraqi Freedom, also provide valuable lessons and extensive
partner nation experience that may be drawn upon as the United States develops doctrine for integrated operations.

**Emerging Doctrine**

The attacks on September 11, 2001, led to a general consensus in the U.S. Government regarding the need to reform national security architecture to meet current and emerging 21st-century threats, particularly in the areas of interagency coordination and coalition operation capabilities. Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have further highlighted the need for new doctrine and mechanisms to facilitate interagency coordination, as well as cooperation with other nations. This has led to new directives and multiple efforts within the Federal Government to explore such concepts. Each of these efforts gives rise to its own set of terms, structures, procedures, and doctrine. For the purposes of this article, *combined integrated operations* are those that include multiple military services and government-level entities from more than one sovereign country, and *multinational integrated operations* are those that include military forces and governmental agencies from many nations, nongovernmental organizations, international governmental organizations, and private industry partners.¹

Current U.S. Government approaches to the development of doctrine, organization, and procedures for combined and multinational integrated operations emphasize American structures and processes across agencies, rather than the multinational aspects of integration. Little work has been done formally to incorporate representatives, perspectives, and practices from potential partner nation military, civilian, and nongovernmental entities who may offer significant insight on the process of integration into coalition efforts led by or involving the U.S. Government and its forces. This is particularly the case with respect to developing nations, who may contribute unique experiences and approaches to operations in less stable and underdeveloped parts of the world.

**Latin American Experience and Partners**

El Salvador is an excellent example of a nation that has lately achieved democracy, having emerged from a 12-year civil war in 1992. In a visit to the United Nations, President Antonio Saca explained his country’s troop contribution to Operation *Iraqi Freedom* to the General Assembly, stating, “El Salvador suffered a prolonged internal conflict, and thanks to the support of the international community, it achieved a lasting peace… We believe it is time for us to put our experience to the service of other peoples.”² In addition to having lived through a period of conflict, negotiated peace, and transition to democracy, El Salvador has maintained close military-to-military relationships with the United States since 1992.

**Current U.S. Government approaches emphasize American structures and processes across agencies rather than multinational aspects of integration**

Long-term participation in international military education and training and other training and exercise programs sponsored by USSOUTHCOM have been central to enhancing interoperability and coalition capabilities for participation in multinational peacekeeping or stability and reconstruction efforts.

A tangible return on the U.S. investment in this relationship has been the continued support of El Salvador in Operation *Iraqi Freedom*. In August 2003, for example, 360 soldiers of El Salvador’s Cuscatlán Battalion deployed to become part of a Central American Battalion within the Spanish-led Plus Ultra Brigade. Since then, the country has deployed more than 1,600 troops in support of *Iraqi Freedom*. The Salvadoran troops are assigned reconstruction and humanitarian duties. They have overseen over 130 humanitarian projects worth in excess of $7.6 million and ranging from a medical center, to potable water treatment facilities, and to schools, bridges, roads, and electrical projects.

Operationally, they have been instrumental in checkpoint and convoy security, unexploded ordnance disposal, and security detail duties, including the protection of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Najaf, as well as training and equipping the Iraqi Civil Defense Forces in Najaf and Al Hillah—all to increase the security and internal development of Iraq. As a testimony to El Salvador’s contribution, six Salvadoran soldiers earned Bronze Stars, presented by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in November 2004.³

Advances in regional interoperability, as demonstrated through support to operations in Haiti, Iraq, and around the globe—paired with a growing tendency in Latin America and the Caribbean toward international cooperation—show the enormous potential of these nations as partners and contributors to the development of integrated operations doctrine, procedures, mechanisms, and training for future crises. The security environment today in Latin America and the Caribbean coincides with what most refer to as the new 21st-century global threat environment. It encompasses transnational terrorism, narco-terrorism, illicit trafficking, forgery, money laundering, kidnapping, urban gangs, radical movements, poverty, corruption, natural disasters, and mass migration. Many of these threats have existed in the region in some form and to varying degrees long before the United States shifted its focus from the Cold War bipolar paradigm to transnational terrorism and the elements that support it.

Recognizing the post-9/11 security context, Honduran Minister of Defense Federico Breve Traveso has cited the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch (November 1998) and an increase in illicit trafficking within the region to frame regional security challenges from the Central American perspective:

We have had to redefine the term security as we know it, for it is no longer simply a matter of winning on the military battlefield. The new battlefield is ungoverned spaces being exploited by illicit traffickers; the new battlefield is poverty and lack of opportunities that draw our youth towards international gangs; the new battlefield is the international criminal cartel that seeks the legal seams that exist between borders. For these reasons, I feel confident in saying the nation must rally together to protect our sovereignty and national interests—but in coordination and cooperation with our neighbors, who are also facing these same transnational and elusive threats.⁴

Greater collaboration toward integrated approaches in support of common security interests, as expressed by Minister Breve, is recognized by many nations in Latin America and the Caribbean, and this recognition coincides with more recent developments in the U.S. focus on global security.

**American Interests**

The U.S. focus on Latin America and the Caribbean has shifted through-
out history. In the second half of the 20th century, the region was viewed as a Cold War battleground. After 1989, U.S. concerns and resources there focused more on counterdrug initiatives and humanitarian action. By 1998, many saw the region as a success in terms of an increase in democratically elected governments, perceived stability, and lack of state-on-state violence. Notwithstanding positive trends, Colombia’s 40-year insurgency-turned-narcoterrorist conflict persisted in the countryside; counterdrug initiatives continued and expanded; and emerging democratic institutions struggled to consolidate, in spite of the poverty, inequality, and corruption threatening to undermine the elements of good governance. During this period, U.S. Government priorities and resources continued to concentrate on counterdrug activities, necessitating continued and greater cooperation between the interagency community and the governments of those nations plagued by an increasingly transnational threat.

The perceived stability and lack of strategic threats Washington attributed to the region, and consequent lack of attention and resources available, have led to increased interagency and partner nation coordination to use limited resources more efficiently. U.S. and partner nation entities have been cooperating and strengthening the relationships necessary to develop procedures for working together on such problems as drug-trafficking, mass migration, and natural disasters for some time. Current data indicate that these threats have intensified, become more interconnected, and grown beyond the region in scope and reach. They are no longer transnational within subregions of the hemisphere, but transnational with a global impact.

U.S. and partner nation entities have been cooperating on drug-trafficking, mass migration, and natural disasters for some time

Regional and Subregional Integration

Many leaders in Latin America and the Caribbean have recognized that regional cooperation must link the efforts of all nations, creating a system for regional level coordination of the governmental and non-governmental approaches undertaken within each country. Bilateral, multilateral, and subregional organizations, agreements, and initiatives for political unity, and economic integration throughout the Latin America and the Caribbean, are fairly well known.

Cooperation for security, stability, and the well-being of citizens, on the other hand, is less familiar.

Within Central America, however, there is one notable example of a subregional integration effort to address these issues. The Central American Integration System, created in 1991 to develop common policies and strategies to serve the Central American public, includes all seven nations of the subregion. In recent declarations during summits held in February and December of 2005, the presidents of member states agreed to take concrete steps to deal with a broad range of transnational issues in a transnational way—from health, to trade, to security. Most notable is the commitment expressed by the national presidents to the development of a regional security model and mechanisms to provide for democratic security, including further study of the gang issue, a regional border security strategy, and the creation of a regional rapid reaction force to deal with narcoterrorism and other emerging threats. The leaders and citizens of these nations have shown the will for integration and laid the foundations for cooperation to address common security concerns.

Additionally, the governments of four Central American countries chartered the Conference of Central American Armed Forces (CFAC) in 1997 to develop confidence-building measures and promote regional military integration. The CFAC mission is to “contribute to the security, development, and military integration of the region with an end result of realizing permanent and systematic cooperation, coordination and mutual support among the armed forces, and collegiate study of areas of common interest and to provide an optimum level of defense against threats to democracy, peace, and liberty.” Since its inception, the conference has worked closely with the Coordination Center for Natural Disasters in Central America and other local, national, and international organizations to provide collective support for flood and hurricane relief, as well as assistance in combating outbreaks of dengue fever that have plagued the area. The CFAC was quick to show its collective solidarity after September 11 and has since taken steps to enhance regional cooperation in the war on terror. Most recently CFAC has developed a plan of action to strengthen its
capacity to support international peacekeeping operations through the U.S. Global Peacekeeping Initiative.

**Exercising for Integrated Action**

The current regional posture toward integrated approaches to the shared challenges in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as the experience derived from operations and exercises in a traditionally asymmetrical threat environment, represents a substantial return on the security cooperation investment in the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility. It also presents an enormous opportunity for the evolution of strategic and operational approaches to combined and multinational integrated operations with developing partner nations. The U.S. Southern Command exercise program has been a particularly effective security cooperation tool for working within existing regional mechanisms to leverage common security interests and develop or enhance collective capabilities for multinational integrated operations geared toward the current regional and international environment. USSOUTHCOM humanitarian assistance/disaster relief missions, peacekeeping operations, and counterterrorism exercises, in particular, have provided opportunities to train both U.S. and international forces and organizations for the stability and security mission.

**Partner Nation Preparedness**

_Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarias_ (FA-HUM), or Humanitarian Allied Forces, is a regionally oriented disaster relief command post and staff exercise, involving military and civilian agencies from throughout the Caribbean and Latin America. These agencies include the Coordination Center for Natural Disaster Prevention in Central America (which falls under the umbrella of the Central American Integration System) and the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency, two organizations with a long history of participation in the U.S. Southern Command’s Humanitarian Assistance Program and disaster relief exercises. The participating nations and these sub-regional organizations are exceptionally well developed for multinational integrated operations, providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The FA-HUM exercise paid significant dividends during 2005, when hurricanes and tropical storms affected millions of people in Mexico and Central America.

In Guatemala, Hurricane Stan affected 960 towns, leaving over 1,500 dead or missing and 390,877 displaced. Immediate relief included support to 647 operational shelters for 108,183 occupants, delivery of 331.5 tons of relief supplies, and search and rescue. Joint Task Force Stan, charged with executing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in Guatemala, achieved seamless integration with U.S. and Guatemalan interagency efforts, working closely with local and national government officials, Guatemala’s national disaster coordination agency, and...
The Guatemalan military, police, and first responders.

The success of multinational integration was a direct product of partner nation preparedness resulting from opportunities to train and operate together as a part of FA–HUM exercises and other regional initiatives such as the Humanitarian Assistance Program sponsored by USSOUTHCOM. The FA–HUM exercise began showing tangible benefits in 1998, when the drill’s scenario simulated a hurricane in the region. The exercise allowed the Guatemalan interagency, local nongovernmental organizations, and private organizations to meet (in some instances for the first time), share contact information, and discuss organizational capabilities in a humanitarian assistance/disaster relief scenario. Shortly thereafter, Mitch, the second deadliest hurricane on record, followed the track of the exercise storm and made landfall in Central America. The Guatemalan president cited the FA–HUM exercise as being a significant factor in his government’s ability to respond.

Since Hurricane Mitch, the FA–HUM exercise has incorporated efforts of U.S. Southern Command’s Humanitarian Assistance Program to review National Emergency Operations Center humanitarian and disaster plans and establish prepositioned supplies throughout the hemisphere. A semiannual Central American Disaster Preparedness Seminar was conducted in Guatemala City and focused on national and regional plans.

The program has also funded software for national and regional coordination center connectivity and information-sharing to come online in June 2006. This year, FA–HUM (April 2006) will include interagency policymaker-level participants from 21 countries—as well as regional disaster coordination centers, the Coordination Center for Natural Disaster Prevention in Central America, and the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency—to improve regional crisis response procedures, humanitarian information-sharing, and coordination with the international community.

Keeping the Peace

Participation in peacekeeping operations (PKOs) is a source of immense national pride in the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility and a testimony to the capabilities return on investment in peacekeeping exercises in the region. The command has sponsored multinational peacekeeping exercises in the form of situational and field training exercises and staff and command post exercises since 1996, when the first Cabañas exercise was executed with a multinational peacekeeping focus. PKO North (Central American and Caribbean nations) and PKO South (South American nations) have been held since 1997, alternating each year between situational and field training and command post formats and including up to 23 nations and 7 international, regional, and nongovernmental organizations. Last held in 2003, Cabañas focused on operational and tactical level tasks. The discontinuation of this exercise represents its success in having enhanced partner nation unit capabilities to train national forces and maintain proficiency in UN peacekeeping tasks.

Current PKO North and PKO South exercises focus on operational and strategic level planning and execution of multinational integrated operations, with emphasis on UN integrated logistics, communications interoperability, information flow, decision-making, and directives within a UN multinational peacekeeping framework. Thirteen nations, all of which have participated in USSOUTHCOM exercises, contribute military and/or police personnel in 14 of 17 UN peacekeeping operations around the world, comprising almost 10 percent of the total number of peacekeepers operating under a UN mandate. Nine of the 20 nations that make up the MINUSTAH force in Haiti are from Latin America and the Caribbean, comprising over half of the total manpower. The CFAC nations are working together to form an integrated peacekeeping battalion for future participation in multinational operations. Coalition participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom by the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua (and continued support by the El Salvador contingent) have demonstrated not only the value of peacekeeping exercises to prepare partner nation forces for future operations, but also their value in training the U.S. interagency community and forces to integrate with diverse nations and capability sets. Regional forces have brought a high level of multinational integrated operations experience to the USSOUTHCOM exercise program, where lessons learned in real-world operations are incorporated and exchanged among participants.

Security Operations

Tradewinds and Panamax are integrated multinational exercises designed to improve regional interoperability for contingencies that may involve terrorist attacks on symbolic targets or key infrastructure. They represent a trend toward operationalizing multinational exercises while more fully incorporating interagency and nongovernmental entities. Caribbean nations have participated in the Tradewinds exercise for 20 years, demonstrating a long history of cooperation. This exercise trains and prepares maritime and ground
forces to coordinate with civil authorities in response to man-made or natural disasters. In 2005, the exercise was operationalized by linking it to a real-world event. During 3 years (2005, 2006, and 2007), the exercise is being used to train and prepare specific regional forces for security operations in support of the 2007 World Cup of Cricket. This multinational event will test the region’s collective ability to conduct security and disaster response operations. Tradewinds also integrates joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational participants, including 19 countries, the U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and Caribbean organizations, such as the Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System.

Panamax, an integrated multinational exercise focused on maritime interdiction and security of the Panama Canal, is designed to exercise the interoperability of nations with a critical interest in the Panama Canal. Chile, the fourth largest user of the canal, has taken an active leadership role in developing the exercise, which includes military and security forces from at least 15 nations. The exercise scenario poses a terrorist threat from sea and land to the canal’s critical infrastructure, whereby the Panamanian government requests international assistance through the United Nations. Formed under the authority of a UN Security Council resolution, a combined joint task force of 14 nations is led by the commander, U.S. Navy South (a component of USSOUTHCOM), and a Chilean deputy commander. Subordinate combined joint task forces, operating within the territorial waters and landmass of Panama, are commanded by Peru, Colombia, Panama, and the United States. The Panamax exercise, like Tradewinds, provides tangible benefits to the United States and the region through the enhancement of collective capabilities for multinational integrated operations applicable to a wide variety of contingencies within the region and around the world.

Security threats in the U.S. Southern Command area of responsibility have generally been considered unconventional or, in some cases, nonmilitary. Ranging from insurgency, drug and illicit trafficking, and natural disasters, to the more recent recognition of transnational terrorism, these threats have necessitated close interagency coordination for many of the command’s activities in the region. Building on its inherent interagency experience, USSOUTHCOM is the first combatant command to incorporate fully the Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) into its operational exercise program. Through participation in a 3-year series of command exercises, the office (as well as the combatant command staff) has been able to gain experience, knowledge, and lessons learned that will impact integrated operations development. The USSOUTHCOM partnership with S/CRS has been at the forefront of developing planning and execution procedures within the U.S. Government for future multinational integrated operations. Through this cooperation, the two partners have been implementing the principles and guidance set forth in the recently published National Security Presidential Directive 44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, and the related Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, Military Support of Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations.

The U.S. Southern Command theater security cooperation and exercise programs have greatly enhanced regional partner nation capabilities for combined and multinational integrated operations in real-world contingencies. They have also been tailored to incorporate the unique integrated operations experience of partner nation regional and global experience from coalition operations for peacekeeping and reconstruction. This focus—combined with the forward-looking inclusion of the S/CRS and other agencies into the command’s exercises, theater security cooperation, and operations—offers significant contributions and relevance for further development of combined and multinational integrated operations to meet the needs of today’s security environment.

The examples described above offer models for other combatant commands and suggest the likelihood of similar experiences in other regions. The next step in this evolution is to expand the effort across geographical combatant commands and the international interagency community, much in the way the Joint Staff–sponsored Multilateral Planning Conference for Coalition Operations has brought together potential coalition partners from around the world. A similar forum for multinational development of doctrine and training would present an opportunity for collective approaches to the development of future multinational integrated operations. Current and emerging 21st-century threats will demand increased global cooperation not only for stability, security, transition, and reconstruction in a postconflict environment, but also for conflict prevention. The United States must therefore continue to cultivate partnerships and capabilities for joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations. JFQ

NOTES

1 These terms are defined by Richard D. Downie, “Defining Integrated Operations,” Joint Force Quarterly 38 (3rd Quarter 2005), 10.
3 Information provided by U.S. Military Group, San Salvador, El Salvador.
As the United States conducts the war on terror, it is evident from experience, doctrine, and strategy that the conflict will not be resolved solely through either military strength or diplomatic maneuvering. The combination of all instruments of national power allows the United States and its allies the full spectrum of options to respond to and deter terrorist and conventional threats. Is the Nation agile enough to respond globally, short of a major theater war? The operations conducted after September 11, 2001, in the Philippines and Central and Southwest Asia prove that we can respond, but are we postured to sustain this war and, at the same time, prepare for future conflicts? This article argues that an integrated civil-military combatant command is the model for the United States to deter and defeat adversaries and engage regional partners in the 21st century. Properly structured to include interagency representation, a combatant commander’s headquarters and associated staff would provide the nucleus for interagency reorganization.

The Interagency Process

The Armed Forces routinely participate in interagency operations in the United States

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Are We Ready for an Interagency Combatant Command?

Army civil affairs interaction with Iraqi tribal leaders

(© Digital Corby/Alex Fradley)
and abroad. Early inclusion of interagency considerations in military assessments, estimates, and plans would facilitate civil-military integration of effort. The interagency process in the United States, under the National Security Council, focuses on the appropriate functions for military and non-military participants and facilitates unified action in pursuit of national objectives.

Deterrence and engagement are dynamic responsibilities tasked primarily to unified combatant commanders through the National Military Strategy and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. The Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and other agencies are the key players; each can become lead Federal agencies in the National Security Strategy (NSS). The single entity that coordinates these efforts is the National Security Council (NSC), the President’s principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters with his senior national security advisors and cabinet officials. The NSC also serves as the President’s principal arm for coordinating these policies among various government agencies.1

This 1949 construct may have been sufficient in the Cold War, but the 21st century requires greater agility to respond to both domestic and foreign threats. The NSC is the correct model for planning and assessing our national security strategy, but it is not optimized to coordinate and implement this strategy on a daily basis. General Peter Pace, USMC, as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pointed out that there was no one underneath the President who could follow through on decisions and order different agencies to accomplish what must be accomplished. He asked, “Do we then need a Goldwater-Nichols—like event for the interagency?”2

The success of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 is evident when an empowered unified combatant command leads a coalition of over 40 countries in multiple regions executing the war on terror. The intent of the act has come to fruition in less than 20 years. In Iraq, for instance, “the capabilities and capacities of the U.S. military on that battlefield were finally the realization of the dream that was the Goldwater-Nichols Act.”3

The U.S. Government is now ready to follow the DOD lead and embrace unifying legislation that extends this integration beyond the military. General Pace continues his challenge to the interagency through the lens of 30 years of observation: “In the 1980s, we had the best Army, the best Navy, the best Air Force, and the best Marine Corps in the world, but they did not work jointly. Arguably today, we have a great State Department, a great Department of Defense, a great Department of Treasury”4 that are not working jointly. General Anthony Zinni, USMC (Ret.), former commander of U.S. Central Command, offers a corresponding perspective: “In Washington there is no one place, agency, or force that directs interagency cooperation. The only such cooperation is on an ad hoc, person-to-person or group-to-group basis. So if you have a problem like putting Iraq back together after Saddam . . . there’s nowhere to start.”5 General Zinni’s comment coupled with General Pace’s challenge coalesce the observations of two former combatant commanders on where problems exist and potential remedies might be found.

An integrated civil-military combatant command is the model for the United States to deter and defeat adversaries and engage regional partners.

Instruments of National Power

As a direct result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, the National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism outlined an expanded version of the instruments of national power:

The struggle against international terrorism is different from any other war in our history. We will not triumph solely or even primarily through military might. We must fight terrorist networks, and all those who support their efforts to spread fear around the world, using every instrument of national power—diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, financial, information, intelligence, and military. Progress will come through the persistent accumulation of successes—some seen, some unseen.”

The traditional diplomatic, information, military, and economic instruments are listed, but the USA PATRIOT Act expanded the role of the Department of Justice and this is evident in the purpose of the legislation: “To deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and for other purposes.” This expanded horizon for the Justice Department illustrates the acknowledgment of capabilities that have historically existed but were not stated in the NSS.

Absent from the list is the acknowledgement of U.S. health care and environmental capabilities. As a leader in these areas, the United States provides a breadth of knowledge to assist regional partners in preserving life and natural resources. This capability is beyond the common perception of deterrence, but it could serve critical needs if coordinated with other instruments of national power. This is the heart of regional engagement, and it could be the vanguard for U.S. engagement in Africa and Asia.

A more inclusive list of instruments of national power should include diplomatic, information, military, economic, law enforcement, financial, and health and environmental. Recognizing the additional instruments of power would bring supplemental agencies into the overall effort for both domestic and foreign activities. The
representation of each instrument in an integrated combatant command would link the operational headquarters to the individual agencies’ strategy within a regional construct.

Equipping regional combatant commanders with the full spectrum of interagency representation would create agile, engaged, and responsive organizations. The ability to interpret and execute strategy at the operational level headquarters would provide continual engagement through all agencies represented in the headquarters and afford all participants a role in responding to conflicts and contingencies. Representatives or teams would maintain communication with their respective agencies and communicate relevant information through the integrated staffs to the combatant commanders, which would lead to greater agility and diversity of perspectives on the combatant commanders’ staffs and increase problem-solving capabilities accordingly.

Headquarters and Staff Concept

A typical unified combatant command headquarters, circa 2005, has a traditional structure that reflects the principal staff directorates. Using this structure as the baseline, I propose the staff concept shown the figure above, which would incorporate interagency representation into the directorates. Each of these new staff sections is described below.

Command Group. The combatant commander would be retained in the current structure with a four-star general or admiral. The commander’s responsibilities would remain as written in Title 10, United States Code. Who the commander reports to is contentious. One solution is legislation authorizing the Secretary of Defense oversight of agencies outside of his department, allowing the chain of command to remain intact and provide unity of effort. The commander’s oversight would be similar to a tactical control relationship, directing the other agencies only in the roles and missions prescribed by their cabinet level secretaries.

Deputy commanders are congruent with the Army model of an assistant division commander (support) and assistant division commander (maneuver). The civilian deputy commander is drawn from the State Department’s Senior Executive Service (SES). The deputy is an experienced State executive or, in the case of U.S. Northern Command, a Department of Justice executive. The State Department position fulfills the prerequisite to assignment as a bureau director. The deputy is concurrently the ranking State representative and the director of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group. In the absence of the commander, the deputy would fill the billet and operate within Title 10 parameters.

The military deputy commander is a DOD O–9 and would serve in accordance with current Title 10 requirements. He would be required to perform the duties of the commander in the event of vacancy.

Principal Staff. Principal and deputy directors would include a combination of civilian and military personnel. The command group, in conjunction with the assistant departmental secretaries from the various agencies, would provide nominees to maintain parity in the staff composition (see figure).

The Directorate of Personnel and Resources would combine the functions of traditional J–1 and J–4 sections. The director is a DOD Human Resource SES–2 and the deputy is a DOD O–7. The directorate conducts joint and interagency billet management as a primary function similar to the current supervision of joint billets within DOD. Each agency is responsible for recruiting, selecting, and managing qualified personnel. The directorate works with the military components and participating agencies in prioritizing resources with a foundation stemming from the traditional categories of military supplies. The prioritization of these resources, in support of the commander’s engagement strategy or crisis response, provides the interagency staff and subordinate units a unified effort at the regional headquarters.

The Directorate of Financial/Economic Development and Requirements/Acquisitions would combine the J–7, J–8, and J–9 staff functions in current unified combatant command structures. The director is a Department of the Treasury or Department of Commerce SES and the deputy a DOD O–7. Experimentation, transformation, and research and development would reside at U.S. Joint Forces Command. The directorate maintains the traditional budgeting requirements of the command, but economic development is its key function. The directorate has the expertise and ability to communicate with regional partners to engage all facets of the economic environment (such as infrastructure, agriculture, banking, market economy, currency valuation, and trade imports/exports) that assist the Nation in regional and potential global market participation. This economic element is a core capability that complements the daily engagement strategy of a combatant command. As a barometric instrument that measures the economic environment, the directorate provides a wealth of information to the commander, his staff, and the associated agencies as they monitor the AOR.

The Directorate of Strategy and Operations would merge the J–3 and J–5 responsibilities. Its director is an O–8 and the deputy is a DOD SES–2. The directorate contains the traditional current operations, future operations, and plans sections as well as an exercise division. Additionally, it possesses the hub for staff action in the Operational Planning Element, which facilitates all planning requirements pertaining to exercises and operations. The element is a cross-func-
tional planning cell of military and civilian expertise. Each directorate would have representation in planning and execution of the command’s mission, directed by Strategy and Operations and orchestrated through the Operational Planning Element.

The Directorate of Information and Intelligence would combine the J–2 and J–6 functions. The director is a CIA SES–2 and the deputy an O–8. Intelligence is fused from multiple sources and authorities:

- Title 10, Armed Forces (DOD)
- Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure (Justice)
- Title 22, Foreign Relations and International Law (State)
- Title 50, War and National Defense (CIA) intelligence resources.

Combining information and intelligence into one directorate would provide efficiency in the analysis and dissemination to decisionmakers. Management of bandwidth is collocated with the highest volume consumers.

The Directorate of Cultural Communications would employ a State SES–2 career diplomat as director, with a DOD O–8 as deputy. The director is a unique feature of this integrated staff. The Secretary of State appoints this position as a capstone for grooming executive leaders and Ambassadors. The ability to combine regional expertise with mature diplomatic relationships provides unmatched access for engagement in the AOR. Subordinate staff directors fill such billets as coalition support groups, political advisers, and religious and tribal envoys. The director coordinates with area Ambassadors and chiefs of mission and conducts liaison with nongovernmental, private volunteer, and international organizations to balance the regional network and information exchange.

The Directorate of Legal and Environmental Health would focus on legal and health issues in the AOR. The director is a Department of Health and Human Services SES–1 assisted by a DOD O–7 staff judge advocate or a Justice Department SES. The deputy director has oversight of U.S. legal issues in conjunction with regional requirements through close coordination with the director of cultural communications. The deputy’s primary duty consists of the traditional staff judge advocate and legal adviser roles.

The Standing Joint Force (SJF) Headquarters Core Element would be an additional duty for one of the Directorate of Strategy and Operations deputies. The director is a DOD O–7 and leads the SJF headquarters to augment the designated Service component command to form the initial nucleus for the joint task force (JTF) staff. Interaction with the integrated staff provides unmatched synergy for the JTF commander through direct access to all appropriate personnel.

**combining information and intelligence into one directorate provides efficiency in the analysis and dissemination to decisionmakers**

*State Department representative and Marines working with citizens in Al Anbar*
agencies in one headquarters. This core element corresponds with current joint doctrine, but staff representation would allow the JTF commander to focus on operational and tactical issues by reducing some strategic layers in the current staff model.

The Joint Interagency Coordination Group would be organized in accordance with current doctrine. Staff representation provides the JTF commander with resident expertise in the headquarters and facilitates unity of effort throughout the command by integrating interagency members into the staff and eliminating the necessity for multiple reach-back nodes once deployed. The interagency composition of the headquarters allows the group to focus on tactical coordination and direct support of the JTF. The combatant headquarters works the seam between operational authorities and strategic diplomacy. This affords the JTF commander a strategic shield and allows a focused effort on the current crisis.

Professional Education

The organization of the staff as shown in the figure would provide the framework for interagency integration. Sustaining the billets and grooming the right individuals for various positions would be the responsibility of individual agencies. Recruiting and selecting could thus require personnel to depart from traditional career paths. DOD, within the interagency construct, would need to broaden its intermediate and top-level Service schools to ensure that its personnel appreciate the newly included agency’s cultures, roles, and mission within the NSS. All agencies would need to adjust their formal education, and, ideally, civilian undergraduate and graduate schools would follow suit as they prepared candidates for civil and military professions.

Similar to current requirements to educate DOD personnel, the interagency community would call for additional quotas to established Service and joint schools, such as the Army Command and General Staff College and Joint Forces Staff College. Selection of candidates for a combatant command would focus on personnel who, like their military counterparts, are in mid-level management, providing seasoned individuals confident in their agencies’ capabilities and who are recognized experts in their agencies’ communities. Completing tours in combatant commands would furnish occupational designations for civilians similar to the military qualifications of joint specialty officers. Prospective directors would take a capstone equivalent course to prepare for SES-level service in a regional or functional combatant command.

A complementary solution to interagency education, similar to the National Defense University, would be a National Security University that mirrors the format and intent of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. Students from the interagency community, instead of other nations, would participate in tailored, professional education and research and dialogue, and in thorough examination of issues confronting client agencies. Students would have an opportunity to identify common values, create interagency friendships, work toward common understandings, and build a more peaceful and cooperative political and security environment. The National Security University structure would allow an open forum for security development, as opposed to the focus of defense-oriented institutions.

Budget Wars

Aligning multiple agencies within the Government should create efficiencies and reduce redundancy. Each agency would need
to review its roles and missions, a process similar to the Quadrennial Defense Review. The entire interagency community would highlight seams and overlaps. Infrastructure, communications, and redundant personnel skills would be the first candidates for consolidation. In a study at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a team of 190 experts concluded:

*The U.S. national security apparatus requires significant reforms to meet the challenges of a new strategic era. As part of its transformational efforts, the Department of Defense must adapt not only to the post–Cold War, post-9/11 security environment but also must cope with many “hidden failures” that, while not preventing operational success, stifle necessary innovation and continue to squander critical resources in terms of time and money. Many organizational structures and processes initially constructed to contain a Cold War superpower in the Industrial Age are inappropriate for 21st-century missions in an Information Age.*

DOD, as the largest budget consumer, would gain capabilities through increased unity of effort. This type of change is feasible, and all participants must recognize that their historical contributions to the Nation, while valued, may not be efficient going forward. Various actions would help implement this construct:

- A legislative watershed event similar to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 would serve as the catalyst for the interagency community to adopt this integrated construct.
- Achieving balance in the command positions, key principal staff billets, and action officer positions throughout the agencies would maintain viable parallel career tracks.
- Incorporation of agency policies and procedures into the combatant command’s standard operating procedures would facilitate synthesis of agency cultures and perspectives.
- Recruitment and selection of personnel through professional education must target unity of effort.
- Shifting resources throughout the interagency community by capitalizing on the efficiencies gained through combining capabilities would eliminate redundancy.

**An Investment**

The Goldwater-Nichols Act helped move the Department of Defense toward a more effective joint approach to warfighting, where instead of merely deconflicting, the Services were to work together in ways that created power beyond the sum of their individual capabilities. To achieve that joint warfighting capability, each Service had to give up some turf, authorities, and prerogatives. Today, one could argue that the executive branch of Government is stovepiped much like the four Services were 20 years ago.

In 2004, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld emphasized to the 9/11 Commission the success of military institutions that looked beyond their hallowed pasts and gained more than they invested. Such landmark legislation as the Goldwater-Nichols Act adopted today could similarly unify the interagency community. The effect of Goldwater-Nichols on DOD has proven the resourcefulness of its authors in thinking beyond Service cultures and traditions. Using this construct as an interagency model provides the type of internal transformation required for external integration. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry Shelton, USA (Ret.), in his congressional testimony following operations in Kosovo, highlighted the need for interagency integration before and during conflict resolution:

> We all must move forward with our efforts to achieve increased levels of integrated interagency planning now. To better support other agencies, DOD needs to give greater consideration to political, diplomatic, humanitarian, economic, information, and other nonmilitary activities in defense planning. In addition, the U.S. Government must establish dedicated mechanisms and integrated planning processes to ensure rapid, effective, well-structured, multiagency efforts in response to crises.

An investment in personnel and education would allow agencies to communicate and coordinate in an unprecedented manner. It is not enough to synchronize during complex contingency operations; the interagency community must integrate into a team with a common focus and complementary capabilities. The entity that could conduct this type of coordination is an integrated, interagency unified combatant command.

The headquarters and staffing model outlined here provides a framework for effective deterrence and engagement. Empower-

one could argue that the executive branch is stovepiped much like the Services were 20 years ago.

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3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
8 Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Posture Statement before the 106th Congress, U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, February 8, 2000.
According to the former senior adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), Larry Diamond:

Any effort to rebuild a shattered, war-torn country should include four basic components: political reconstruction of a legitimate and capable state; economic reconstruction, including the rebuilding of the country’s physical infrastructure and the creation of rules and institutions that enable a market economy; social reconstruction, including the renewal (or in some cases, creation) of a civil society and political culture that foster voluntary cooperation and the limitation of state power; and the provision of general security, to establish a safe and orderly environment.¹

He goes on to say that all these components are interrelated, serving as the pillars upon which a new nation and government must be built.

Following the transfer of authority from the Coalition Provisional Authority to the Iraqi Interim Government on June 28, 2004, the orchestration of these four components became the responsibility of two new organizations: the U.S. Embassy Baghdad, which replaced the CPA, and the Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF–I), which replaced Combined Joint Task Force–7. MNF–I was established as a combined, multinational, and joint four-star headquarters to exercise the command, control, and integration of political and military efforts at the strategic level. Coordinating and synchronizing efforts between the U.S. Embassy and the multinational force—given “philosophical and operational differences of civil-military institutions” (the clash of cultures)—was one of the greatest challenges facing the leaders of these organizations, Ambassador John Negroponte.
and GEN George Casey, USA, respectively, on their arrival in June 2004.2

Both Ambassador Negroponte and General Casey recognized the need to nurture the fledgling government, reestablish an infrastructure capable of providing essential services to the people, and prepare the Iraqi Security Forces to take on increasing responsibility for domestic security while dealing with a persistent and ruthless insurgency. Meeting these needs and building the four pillars necessary to support a secure, stable, and democratic nation would require an extraordinary level of teamwork and cooperation between the U.S. Embassy and MNF–I to ensure that efforts were coordinated and complementary, not in competition.

This article describes the situation in June 2004 and the means by which General Casey organized his staff to overcome these challenges and ensure integration and cooperation between the U.S. Embassy and the multinational force. Furthermore, it highlights the ongoing interaction and synchronization of efforts between the two to build a stable and secure Iraq while concurrently conducting counterinsurgent operations against a multifaceted enemy intent on derailing these efforts. This is not a doctrinal solution, as the situation defies a lockstep approach. Rather, it is presented as a case study that might inform interagency planning and cooperation for future efforts in the war on terror.

Synchronization before Transfer

Published accounts have noted the significant problems and challenges that plagued the predecessors to the U.S. Embassy and MNF–I in dealing with nationbuilding challenges during the occupation phase. Anthony Cordesman, for instance, was particularly critical of the management of the postconflict period and ad hoc nature of the coordination between the various agencies of the U.S. Government. He observed that many of the problems facing Iraq are the legacy of its formation as a state, exacerbated by the negligent and oppressive rule of Saddam Hussein.

*While the invasion did expose the ethnic, political, economic, and infrastructure problems, it did not create them. [The U.S. Government, however,] did much to make things worse. It did not prepare for stability operations before the war, did not carry them out as needed during the war, and had to improvise both nation building and counterinsurgency operations once the war was over.3*

The pre-war planning effort showed that the Department of State could coordinate an analysis of Iraq’s problems with reasonable competence, but it had almost no operational capability to develop effective plans for nation building and was unready to coordinate such activity with military security and counterinsurgency activity. Both the Department of Defense and [U.S. Agency for International Development] staffs of the State Department dealing with political and economic aid lacked expertise . . . in dealing with the planning, analysis, program development, contracting, and management burdens of a large country.4

These criticisms, along with observations from other national security pundits, did not fall on deaf ears. In the months before the transfer of sovereignty to the Interim Government and the concurrent dissolution of the CPA, the Departments of State and Defense established an Interagency Transition Planning Team to lay the groundwork for the shift of sovereignty from a Department of Defense (DOD)-led effort (through the CPA) to a State Department lead and the establishment of a traditional Embassy. The team’s main goal was to ensure “a close and mutual partnership between the Chief of Mission . . . and the Commander, Multinational Force–Iraq . . . Furthermore, the team was to continue the spirit of ‘jointness’ as it support[ed] implementation of the plan within the [State Department] and DOD.”5

The Interagency Transition Planning Team’s work informed the development of the U.S. Embassy and the initial Joint Manning Document of MNF–I while also establishing policies and procedures for clear and effective command relationships and rapport between the Embassy’s Chief of Mission and the commander of the newly formed multinational force.6

Organizing for Integration Effects

In recognition of the fact that security efforts were linked to diplomatic, informational, and economic efforts, Ambassador Negroponte and General Casey in July 2004 chartered an interagency strategy review to perform a strategic assessment of the nature of the insurgency in order to refine the MNF–I Campaign Plan and the U.S. Embassy’s Mission Performance Plan.

In July 2004, the team reported: the insurgency is much stronger than it was 9 months ago and could deny the Iraqi Interim Government legitimacy over the next 9 months. In response, the coalition must find ways to strengthen the Iraqi Interim Govern-
ment in all dimensions of national power (political/economic/security) and facilitate political reconciliation. Otherwise the insurgency will grow more violent and the election and constitutional process will be endangered.  

The assessment team recognized that MNF–I was more mature than its political and economic capabilities and that all three were hampered by the lack of a unifying strategy, inadequate intelligence, ineffective strategic communications support, and the embryonic nature of [Interim Government] counterparts.  

The team also found that the economic and governance plans developed by the Coalition Provisional Authority had assumed a much more permissive security situation; however, the nature of the insurgency radically changed the operating environment. As a result of the new environment and the fact that no element of the CPA or the Embassy was organized to integrate military support for the planning of political and economic effects, the team concluded that the various economic and reconstruction programs planned or under way were not likely to achieve the desired results.  

Finally, the team determined that American civilian agencies had limited penetration into Iraq’s social infrastructure, while the military had substantial penetration into Iraq’s political and social landscape at regional and local levels. The military, however, had little insight into the political process in Baghdad. In short, internal systems and processes aimed at producing certain political and economic benefits were proceeding without overall integration. The Ambassador and Commanding General of MNF–I published a Joint Mission Statement that articulated shared vision and goals and specified political, security, and economic tasks that would be the focal point of integrated efforts mounted by the U.S. Embassy and the multinational force.  

A follow-on analysis by a U.S. Joint Forces Command team, led by General Gary Luck, USA (Ret.), in August 2004, further examined how the multinational force could best advance implementation of the MNF–I Campaign Plan. This team determined that there was a key role for the military in overall political and economic effects planning to support the establishment of a legitimate permanent government, but found that the mission was not well understood and that there were no traditional mechanisms or organizations to manage this important area. The team also concluded that such an organization could support the commander’s campaign plan by identifying the effects MNF–I forces were generating in strategic cities, conducting coordination and analysis of efforts to achieve desired effects, and facilitating an interagency process to coordinate economic and governance efforts of both the force and the U.S. Embassy.  

Based on these strategic assessments, General Casey reorganized the MNF–I staff to achieve greater integration and coordination of diplomatic and economic strategies between the force and the Embassy, creating a new staff element to that end: the deputy chief of staff, political military economic (DCS PME). The purpose of this organization was to oversee MNF–I policy develop-
ment, political-military interactions and integration of governance and economic lines of operation with coalition embassies, the Embassy's Iraqi Reconstruction Management Office (IRM0) and Project and Contracting Office, the Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division, and the Iraqi government.

General Casey charged commanders with supporting reconstruction and committed resources for it. The Gulf Region Engineers, in coordination with the IRMO, integrated efforts to support the $18.4-billion Iraq Recovery and Reconstruction Fund program. At the strategic level, DCS PME worked to fill the gaps in this program, recommending the use and prioritization of other funding sources, where feasible and acceptable, to support the execution of priority projects. As security became an increasing emphasis, difficult reprogramming decisions for the project appeared. DCS PME played an integral role in establishing the priorities for reprogramming funds from electricity and water to security and justice requirements. The teaming relationship was critical to integrating MNF–I reconstruction efforts and maximizing the benefits to the Iraqi people and economy.10

In addition to the DCS PME, the reorganization of the MNF–I staff included the formation of a deputy chief of staff for strategic communication to create synergy between public affairs and information operations and to integrate coalition information operation efforts with those of the Iraqi government. Additionally, the deputy chief of staff for operations was relocated to the Embassy compound to synchronize effects within the multinational force and to provide an interagency strategic operations center. With these new organizations, General Casey would achieve the integration of MNF–I actions with those of the U.S. Embassy. The Embassy, in turn, would have a single coordinating point for a wide variety of issues at the MNF–I, corps, and major subordinate command levels.

**Factors Influencing Integration**

Since the founding of the Embassy and MNF–I, the Iraqi people and the Interim and Transitional Governments have enjoyed many accomplishments through their coordinated efforts, not the least being the successful election in January 2005. That level of integration between two inherently disparate organizations is attributable to three key factors: the high-level commitment to teamwork given tangible expression by the chief of mission and the Commanding General working together, the establishment of forums for robust information exchange and planning, and the optimal organization and integration of large staffs.

Of these factors, the commitment between General Casey and Ambassador Negroponte to establish a close working relationship is the most important. General Casey acknowledged as much in testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 24, 2004:

*The Commander, MNF–I, and the U.S. Ambassador will work closely in formulating strategic direction and ensuring unity of effort in support of the Interim Government of Iraq. Creating a secure and stable Iraq requires careful coordination of military operations and objectives with other elements of U.S. national power, including economic, political, diplomatic, and informational objectives. Establishing a close and effective working relationship with the new Ambassador and the government agencies working out of the U.S. Embassy is a priority goal for me. I will also serve as his principal military advisor.*

These were not hollow platitudes, but a commitment to a “one team, one fight” approach that General Casey instilled in the multinational force.

Complementing this high-level commitment to integration was the professional relationship established between the Embassy’s political-military counselor, Ambassador Ron Neumann, and the DCS PME, Major General Hank Stratman, USA. In addition, PME developed a working rapport with the Embassy’s political and economic counselors and the IRMO director. Their frequent contact and coordination have enabled a high degree of integration and synergy between MNF–I and Embassy actions. This relationship was enhanced when the Embassy populated its political–military section with experienced political officers who were comfortable working with the military and by the placement of a liaison officer from DCS PME within the staff. Additionally, the Embassy established a two-person State embedded team for each division to liaison with the Embassy and work directly for the division commander.

Although a commitment to teamwork is vital to an environment of integration, the real mechanics of interaction take place at the action officer level, which requires robust forums for information exchange and planning. As with any large organization, there are recurring meetings in the daily routine. Both the Embassy and MNF–I staffs were able to integrate, synchronize, and coordinate issues, ideas, and actions by inviting participants from the other organization. Not only did this promote inclusion and build teamwork between Embassy and MNF–I staff
sections, but it also fostered ownership for actions and decisions resulting from these meetings.

The most notable of these routines include the MNF–I daily Battle Update Assessment, chaired by the multinational force Commanding General and attended by the deputy chief of mission, the political/military counselor, and the IRMO director; the Embassy Country Team meetings, chaired by the chief of mission and attended by the DCS PME and his policy division chief; and the IRMO daily senior consultant meetings and weekly program reviews, attended by the

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**PME policy division. These forums provide the senior Embassy leadership and the MNF–I situational awareness of operations and actions across all lines of operations: security, governance, economics, and communicating.**

As the Iraqi governing body evolved from interim to transitional, the campaign plan for Operation *Iraqi Freedom* grew increasingly complex, requiring an even greater degree of integration in the governance and economic lines of operation. Two new forums were established to facilitate information exchange and planning between the Embassy and MNF–I. In February 2005, the IRMO director, economic counselor, and DCS PME began meeting twice a month to assure situational awareness on the issues, strategies, and priorities regarding the reconstruction of key infrastructure and the provision of essential services to the Iraqi people. Starting in March 2005, the chief of mission and the Commanding General established a Strategic Mission Council forum to enhance unity of effort, which provides a forum for issue resolution on matters impacting the political and military situation in Iraq. Both of these forums have proven effective bridges between the civil/diplomatic and military cultures of the Embassy and the MNF–I and are important venues for stimulating strategic decisionmaking, communication exchange, and integration.

**Key Outcomes**

One of the first products of the teamwork and integration between the U.S. Embassy and MNF–I was the publication of the Joint Mission Statement on August 16, 2004. While it remains classified, the document was crucial to Embassy and MNF–I efforts and probably unprecedented in its scope. As General Casey noted in his letter transmitting the document to subordinate commands:

**Recognizing that the Multinational Force’s effort in Iraq is inextricably linked to that of the U.S. Embassy... this document is intended to facilitate unity of effort by focusing all elements of U.S. and coalition power and influence in the theater on executing our counterinsurgency effort.**

While the title of the document might suggest a missive of limited scope, the Joint Mission Statement was much broader. It focused Embassy and MNF–I priorities and identified the political, security, and economic tasks required to achieve the desired strategic effects detailed in the campaign plan and mission performance plan.12

Due to the evolutionary nature of the operating environment, the Ambassador and the Commanding General revised the Joint Mission Statement following the election in January 2005. The chief of mission and the Commanding General recognized the need to articulate the way ahead in order to build the government’s capacity to lead the nation. Entitled "A Plan for the Year Ahead: Transition to Self-Reliance" and published in February 2005, this second Joint Mission Statement communicated the primary and mutually supporting goals of helping the Transitional Government diminish the insurgency and prepare Iraqi Security Forces and the government to begin accepting the counterinsurgency mission lead and to complete the timetable laid out for achieving a “federal, democratic, pluralistic, and unified Iraq, in which there is full respect for political and human rights.”13

Perhaps the most substantive demonstration of interagency integration and teamwork between the Department of State and DOD is found in a classified cable from the Secretary of State titled “U.S. Government Position on Political/Security Principles, and Priorities for Iraq Reconstruction.”14

Although drafted in Washington, the political and security objectives and priorities aligned precisely with the priorities of the chief of mission and Commanding General.

**Integration and the Government**

A capable and representative government is clearly priority one for Iraq. Thus, there has been a logical shift of MNF–I focus to the governance and economic lines of operation. During its existence, the Interim Government, with assistance from the coalition, worked to form the basics of a government and prepare for elections. Reconstruction and economic development were modest as the insurgency increased in intensity, and now the Transitional Government faces much greater challenges. Not only must it continue the efforts of the Interim Government, but it also must take the lead in the counterinsurgency fight while learning how to deal with an increasingly influential parliament, drafting a constitution, and preparing for another constitutionally-based national election.

Building capacity and helping the Interim Government succeed will require continued coordination and engagement with the government. The centerpiece of the U.S. Embassy and MNF–I engagement strategy is to work with the various leaders and ministries of the Iraqi government. The Embassy and the force maintain frequent contact and work closely with the prime minister, deputy prime minister, and cabinet-level ministers and ministerial advisers. This work can only succeed if the actions of both bodies are fully integrated and their interlocutors are speaking with one voice to the Iraqi government.

The interaction with the government is highlighted by the actions of the Embassy and the Multi-National Force–Iraq in providing guidance and mentorship to the deputy prime minister and the national security adviser. The Embassy and MNF–I have developed recommended policy guidance on a variety of significant security, governance, and economic issues. The DCS PME has prepared numerous coordinated
talking papers for the Commanding General to help Iraq’s political leaders analyze issues and promulgate the policy decisions to address the problems and challenges facing this burgeoning democracy, thereby putting an Iraqi face on the solution while building the capacity to govern. Working together, the U.S. Embassy and MNF–I promote management strategies to enable the government to assimilate the multitude of issues and information commensurate with the establishment of governmental capacity in the security, governance, economic development, and communication realms.

Integration with the Interim Government was particularly noteworthy in the battle to eradicate insurgents in Fallujah in November 2004. Forces on the ground communicated to MNF–I that various security measures restricting movement and enforcing curfews on the citizens of Fallujah were needed to protect military and civilian lives and to ensure mission success. MNF–I worked with the Embassy to refine these requirements and obtain Iraqi government approval of emergency decree restrictions, which provided the optimum operational flexibility. The government’s commitment to see politically sensitive operations such as the elimination of the Fallujah safe haven through to completion set the conditions for a free and fair election.

Dialogue, cooperation, and teamwork are necessary elements of the relationship between the U.S. Embassy Baghdad, Multi-National Force–Iraq, and the Interim Government in order to achieve the vision of a vibrant and democratic Iraq. That teamwork resolved many of the difficulties cited prior to the transfer of authority on June 28, 2004, and established the foundation on which to ensure mission success.

There was no doctrine outlining the steps to accomplish this team relationship. It was achieved through initiative and a high-level commitment to teamwork, through robust forums for information exchange and planning, and by organizing for integration. This cooperation did not occur simply by throwing the organizations together, nor did it happen overnight. With the exception of the resolve for teamwork by many, all had to be built from scratch and refined over time as capacity grew and new challenges surfaced.

U.S. Embassy and MNF–I organizations will continue to adapt to provide nation-building requirements to Iraq’s transitional and constitution-based governments while serving U.S. Government interests. The lessons learned from the Iraqi experience apply to future endeavors requiring the inter-agency efforts of a U.S. Embassy staff and a joint or coalition force headquarters. JFQ

integration with the Interim Government was particularly noteworthy in the battle to eradicate insurgents in Fallujah

6 Ibid.
8 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division Organization and Budget brief, June 27, 2005.

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4 Ibid., 27.
5 Marc Grossman, “The Iraq Transition: Obstacles and Opportunities,” testimony before the


Photograph

The Battle of Fallujah November 2004


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In the summer of 1946, Roosevelt Hall, named for President Theodore Roosevelt, changed from the Army War College to become the home of the National War College (NWC). Beginning in fall 2005, the National War College’s 60th Anniversary began by commemorating the events of the fall and winter of 1945 when military and Federal officials decided that military education needed to include the study of “grand strategy.” The initial cadre set about creating a “high level school to prepare selected ground, air, and naval officers for the exercise of command and the performance of joint staff duties in the highest echelons of the Armed Forces, and to promote the development of understanding between high echelons of the Armed Forces and those of other agencies of government which are an essential part of a national war effort.” It is fitting, therefore, that 60th Anniversary special feature occur in an issue of Joint Force Quarterly focusing on “integrated operations,” since joint has become the baseline for the United States military, and security strategies that integrate other agencies and international partners are essential for America and its allies in the current dynamic strategic environment.

The National War College is comprised of students and faculty representing all the U.S. military Services, Coast Guard, Reserve Component, senior civilians in the Department of Defense and other agencies,

Major General Teresa Marné Peterson, USAF, is the 25th Commandant of the National War College.
as well as international fellows. Students are senior military officers and government officials—leaders all—who spend 10 months studying, reflecting, and debating security strategy and the most relevant issues of the day. This unique learning facility’s mission is as critical as ever. The current curriculum contains classical history, which, through constant update of articles and speakers, is tied to understanding how the United States is making history today in Afghanistan and Iraq, globally in the war on terror, and through international security cooperation.

Graduates of NWC have risen to the highest levels of the Armed Forces and government and include Senators, Service Secretaries, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Service Chiefs, Combatant Commanders, and Ambassadors. Those currently serving or who have recently left the government include Senator John McCain (1974), General/Secretary of State Colin Powell (1976), General John Jumper (1982), General Hugh Shelton (1983), General Peter Pace (1983), General Joe Ralston (1984), General Jim Jones (1985), General Eric Shinseki (1986), General Ed Eberhart (1987), General Peter Schoomaker (1989), General Norton Schwartz (1989), General Mike Moseley (1990), Ambassador to Thailand William Itoh (1991), and Admiral Bill Fallon (1992). Since 1986, the college has also had a hand in educating international military officers, under the National Defense University International Fellows Program. Many of these students have returned home to serve as Ministers, Chiefs of Defense, and Chiefs of Service, and are honored in the International Fellows Hall of Fame.

In commemoration of our 60th Anniversary, my predecessor, Rear Admiral Richard Jaskot, USN (Ret.), launched the celebration with a series of distinguished lectures beginning with Colin Powell in September and concluding with a lecture program marking the anniversary of D-Day in June. We also launched the George F. Kennan evening series, which will be three lectures in the area of foreign affairs and national security, and National War College is continuing the noteworthy Empires evening series, which examines historical imperial powers with an eye toward the strategic security issues now facing the United States.

I hope readers enjoy the essays by current faculty and an international alumnus in this 60th Anniversary National War College joint professional military education special feature. They should provide an appreciation for the professional, graduate-level programs that prepare future leaders to succeed with tomorrow’s most demanding national security challenges. JFQ

MARNÈ PETERSON
Major General, USAF
Commandant, National War College
Washington was in a season of “transition and uncertainty.” Emerging as the unmatched global power, supreme in military accomplishments and technological dominance, America was caught short by the emergence of a menacing adversary, one that did not mirror the characteristics of past opponents.

While there was little shared knowledge about the enemy, there was a unique determination among senior military and political leaders to study and carefully analyze the character and conduct of this threat. There was also a determination to consider grand strategy and assess the “interaction of military and nonmilitary means in the promulgation of national policy” to meet this challenge.

It was early spring 1946, and the Nation was relaxed in the postwar glow of victory and returning troops. It was a time to anticipate peace and prosperity and savor the reward for years of sacrifice and loss. Yet by that same spring, some key military, diplomatic, and political officials had already come together to prepare a new generation of leaders to meet the next challenge to international stability and America’s position in the world.

General Dwight Eisenhower, Army Chief of Staff, Admiral Chester Nimitz, Chief of Naval Operations, James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy, General Hap Arnold, and Vice Admiral Harry Hill had proposed the creation of a new senior-level college. This National War College would:

- prepare selected ground, air, and naval officers for the exercise of command and performance of joint staff duties in the highest echelons of the Armed Forces
- promote the development of understanding between high echelons of the Armed Forces and those other agencies of government which are an essential part of a national war effort.

Building on the work of the Army and Navy Staff College, established in 1943, the new school would have a unique structure and mission. Both its faculty and student body would represent all Services and the Department of State. A tenth of the students would be assigned from State, and the Deputy Commandant would be a senior Foreign Service officer.
Study would focus on strategic/political doctrine—the interplay of the military, economic, and political policies of a state. As the first Deputy Commandant for Foreign Affairs, George F. Kennan, noted, “It was the first time the United States Government had even prescribed this area of inquiry for study in an official academic institution.” As the Secretaries of War and the Navy wrote to James Byrnes, Secretary of State, in 1946, “We both feel that the recent war has demonstrated a necessity for close coordination between the State Department and the Armed Forces. Accordingly, we have included in the curriculum, in addition to the military aspects of joint operations, a study of the integration of our foreign policy with the capabilities of our Armed Forces.”

As the National War College marks its 60th year, the commitment to this core mission distinguishes it from the maze of the national security institutions. The program developed in 1946 is remarkably respected today. Debate, openness to new ideas, and interagency and interservice interaction mark the vitality of the college. As the Nation faces a new global threat, a reflection on the creation and early years of the college is timely. In the War College tradition, it offers a lesson on the interplay of personality, institutions, and bureaucratic politics. It is also a reminder of how government came together to educate and organize to meet a strategic challenge.

The Idea

Calls for “joint” professional military education began following World War I and intensified during World War II, when the most senior military leadership was seized with this need. General Hap Arnold, Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, General George Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, and Fleet Admiral Ernest King, Chief of Naval Operations, were early architects of the idea. Initially, the Joint Chiefs established the Army-Navy Staff College in April 1943 to train selected officers for command and staff duty in unified or coordinated commands. By 1944, the Joint Chiefs endorsed proposals for joint education at the highest levels to develop officers capable of formulating strategic concepts and commanding large-scale operations. These proposals came on the heels of the larger effort to rethink and restructure the institutions of national security. Both Congress and the executive branch were reviewing suggestions to consolidate the Departments of War and Navy, create an independent air force, improve and centralize the intelligence function, and provide the President with a National Security Council.

Achieving institutional change in the form of government reform is a challenge that can weary the most courageous warrior. Studies can be done and recommendations can be received, but without strong leadership and agreement among critical players, the result is stillborn.

But the confluence of shared experience in World War II, the prospect of America’s new role in the postwar world, a need to study strategy, and the importance of interservice coordination and international cooperation were acknowledged by key leaders. The power of these shared experiences and conclusions overcame conventional stumbling blocks to change.

The creation of the National War College required exquisite timing, personal leadership, and a delicate balance of institutional interests. The Army War College had been closed during the early years of the war, and plans for reopening were in limbo. Eisenhower agreed not only to suspend the college, but also to remove it from Fort McNair, take over the building, and use the appropriated funding for that school to establish the National War College. It was a remarkable feat in the rough political terrain of Washington power politics.

General Eisenhower and Admiral Nimitz were able to negotiate balancing arrangements to protect the interests of all Services. The National War College was initially commanded by Navy flag officer, with Deputy Commandants representing the other services. The Armed Services Staff College, for mid-level officers, was located on the Naval Base in Norfolk, Virginia, while the War College was on an Army post.

But the concept behind the college went beyond teaming the Army and Navy training efforts. As stated earlier, the school was also to have the active participation of the State Department. There was an acknowledgment that, in Eisenhower’s words, the military needed “a little training in diplomacy.” This was echoed by Vice Admiral Hill, the first Commandant, at the opening ceremonies in 1946: “Never before had the need for mutual understanding and teamwork between the
State Department and the Armed Forces been so necessary.”

The Early Years

Planning for the structure and instructional content of the War College began in earnest by early 1946. The Joint Chiefs’ support was clear. The Commandant was to be a lieutenant general or vice admiral, serving a 3-year term, with two deputies at the two-star level, representing all Services in the mix. The Deputy Commandant for Foreign Affairs would be a senior Foreign Service officer.

To reinforce the value of this joint command tour, many senior leaders at the college went on to distinguished careers within their home Services, achieving superior ranks, including Chief of Staff of the Army and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The student body selected for the first class was also remarkable. Almost 80 percent of the military students went on to earn flag rank. They were similar accomplishments for the civilians from the State Department and other agencies.

The National War College admitted its first class within 12 months of the conclusion of World War II. Its 100 students included 30 Army colonels, 24 Navy captains, 6 Marine colonels, and 30 Army Air Force students, of which 8 were general officers. Students had a wide range of backgrounds, from infantry officers, to Marine fighter pilots, to political officers in the Foreign Service. The youngest was 36 years old and the oldest was 48. The first class also included two observers from Great Britain and one from Canada.

From the outset, the intention was to enhance interservice and interagency exchange. Five years into this experiment, the annual report of the War College concluded that “the mixing of students from different departments and agencies, with their wealth of experience, results in an obvious growth in understanding, tolerance, and objective judgment.”

Understanding the value of networking relationships, the architects of the War College organized a student experience that included seminar and committee study groups, social activities, and an active sports program. Students were rotated between committee and seminar groups and traveled together to domestic military bases and on overseas field studies. This emphasis remains, and the intention is that each student would have some working relationship with every other student in each year’s class.

There was an active community of learning at Fort Lesley J. McNair. Seven members of the command team resided on post. The Commandant and deputies hosted frequent “at home” luncheons and dinners

almost 80 percent of the military students went on to earn flag rank

for faculty, students, and outside speakers. There were monthly dinner dances for the college leadership, faculty, and students. Beginning with the class of 1946, team sports and intercollege competition with the Industrial College of the Armed Forces became an important part of the War College experience.

The faculty has always mirrored the mission and nature of the school. Civilian and military instructors were selected for their ability to “lecture effectively, handle discussion groups and seminars, and supervise and direct research on all phases of power factors.”

The faculty initially included 16 officers from all 4 Services, a number of Foreign Service officers, and 4 visiting professors from other universities and colleges. The first group of civilian academics included Professors Hardy Dillard of the University of Virginia, Bernard Brodie and Sherman Kent of Yale, and Walter Wright, Jr., of Princeton.

This was not to be a traditional research university; there would be no office hours and absent faculty engaged in off-campus study. The faculty would be practitioners and operators, as well as educators. The War College was not to be a setting for conventional instructor/student roles. As Vice Admiral Hill asserted in his opening address to the class in 1946:

The college is a collection of men engaged in common pursuits. . . . It is not the intention that a group of men here with more knowledge will teach a group of men with less knowledge. Instead, it is our wish that all of us as a group will, by consultation and discussion, develop the best wisdom of the entire group.

If developing “the best wisdom,” thereby producing wise policymakers, was the goal, the faculty had to be adept in the subtleties of adult professional education. If this was to be “a community of soldier/statesmen,” the faculty had to share the desire for the best wisdom.

Although hampered by the constant turnover of both military and civilian personnel, the college was able to provide faculty continuity by carrying over a number of visiting professors in the early years. The key to stability, however, was in the structure of the educational program and the content of the curricula.

The Curriculum

Admiral Hill began a process of outreach and consultation, sending a proposed curriculum to experts selected “because of their competence in the general field of education, their knowledge of world affairs, and their expressed interest in the betterment of understanding between the military and civilian world.” This group first provided advice on the college program and then was formed into the first Board of Consultants. The first group included James Baxter, President of Williams College, Arnold Wolters of Yale, Calvin Hoover of Duke, Walter Wright of Princeton, and William Langer of Harvard.

The board met yearly to review the total War College program and make recommendations to the Commandant. By 1955, it included the Chancellor of the University of California, the Presidents of Brown and Purdue, the Deputy Under Secretary of State, Bernard Brodie of RAND, and General Omar Bradley, USA.

The initial 10-month instruction was divided into 2 semesters. The fall term was designed to “increase knowledge on general matters of international political importance, [and] to examine problems of U.S. foreign policy and its making.” The second term program considered “military elements of national power as a means of attainment of United States policy objectives.” Throughout the year, the class was confronted with a series of foreign policy or military problems. Working on those strategic dilemmas culminated with a consideration “of the general problem of security of the United States and the nature of a future war.”

In the first year, the War College offered the following courses: Security in the Atomic Age, Basic Economics and Domestic Politics, Basic Factors in International Relations, Objectives and Capabilities of the Principal
Powers, Strategic Area Studies, Strategy Analysis, Strategic Concept of Operations, Science and the Armed Forces, the National Military Establishment, and Future War and the Security of the United States. No matter what the course mix, "the school's academic program has always centered on a core curriculum taken by all students. National security strategy provided the organizing principle of the core, though the components of that study have varied."  

Methods of Instruction

Although outside lecturers dominated the early program, work in seminars and committees had the most lasting impact. By the end of the 1940s, the Commandant concluded:

First, the outstanding quality of the student body demands an unusual technique, affording the students an opportunity to develop themselves rather than providing a predetermined and predigested course of instruction. Second, the nature of the studies, being of current matters very much alive and subject to change, requires a flexibility and adaptability in course planning which precludes long-range academic establishment of course schedules and coverage and further requires the utmost alertness on the part of the permanent staff and faculty.

As the mix of lecture, readings, exercises, and seminars evolved, there was constant concern with student development: “The basic philosophy of the National War College has always been to increase students’ capacity to think broadly, conceptually, analytically, and critically as they involve themselves in the grand strategy and the United States national security policy—its formulation and implementation.”

Indeed, there was electricity in the air during that first year at the War College. George Kennan describes a period of experimentation and intellectual engagement: “Senior officials from both the military and civilian echelons of the Government as well as people from the legislative branch attended our lectures and occasionally lectured themselves.” He noted that the Secretary of the Navy and, later, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal regularly sat in, and even President Harry Truman attended a lecture on the Soviet Union. “The college came to provide a sort of academic seminar for the higher echelons of governmental Washington generally,” recalled Kennan.

To maintain candor and intellectual rigor, the college cultivated a unique professional climate. The leadership wrote in 1954, “This institution has always taken great pride in the fact that it has no ‘party line’ and will...
He concluded that “man would have to rec-...
A lone warrior, recently returned from his post in war-torn Moscow, sat reflectively at his solid oak desk in the northwest corner of Roosevelt Hall, set quill to parchment, and, with great deliberation, wrote concerning the “The Soviet Way of Thought and Its Effect on Foreign Policy.” Drawing on years of operational experience tempered by service as Deputy Commandant of the National War College, he explained the expansionist threat of the Soviet Union and suggested military-political measures to contain it. Over the next hour, he crafted a 5,000-word draft, which would undergo at least 2 revisions. The date was January 24, 1947, and the essay was one of 17 works that prolific writer composed during a 7-month period at the National War College.

A later version of that treatise was published in the July 1947 edition of Foreign Affairs, attributed to an anonymous Mr. X. That article, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” propelled its author, the warrior and statesman George F. Kennan, to the center of the debate among policymakers concerning the Nation’s strategic course during the early Cold War. By then, Kennan had departed the National War College to rejoin the policy-making arena as the head of the new Office of Policy Planning at the Department of State, an assignment to be sought by future graduates of the college.

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For the next six decades, Kennan would remain intellectually engaged in the art and science of grand strategy, filling senior positions in government and academia with great dedication, and steadfastly setting a noble course for future strategists.

The Next Mr. X

Since 1946, National War College student warriors have indeed pursued Kennan’s strategic trail, offering variations on the policies of ways to win the peace. Their essays have addressed such issues of the day as nationbuilding, peacekeeping, humanitarian missions, multiple uses of the military, and ways to design interagency decisionmaking entities of the first order. If students have needed inspiration, a bronze plaque on the hallowed wall summarizes in short shrift the deeds of George F. Kennan. New students note it in passing and wonder if there really is anything new in their universe about which they can write as they consider the challenge of becoming the next Mr. X.

Sixty years of strategic thinking in peace and war is a long time in the life of a national security institution such as the National War College. Kennan was around for 59 of those years and remained influential until his death in 2005 at age 101. Because of his contributions to the strategic thinking of his time—to the concept of containment and the...
Truman Doctrine—Kennan will always have a presence at the War College. He was there at the commencement of academics, helped design a relevant curriculum, and unilaterally set the standard for intellectual contribution. Writing in his 1967 memoirs, he described at Roosevelt Hall with many operational experiences and a number of profound if unfocused thoughts and transitioned into the consummate strategist: “I realize now that it was at that time—in the background reading, in the attendance at lectures by distinguished outsiders, in the agonizing over my own lectures—that some of the ideas were conceived that have been basic to my views on American policy ever since.”

Newfound clarity enabled Kennan to articulate his thoughts on the topical issues of the day, which he did with great zeal. “The seven months of residence and work at the War College, from September 1946 to May 1947, were the occasion for a veritable outpouring of literary and forensic effort on my part. I look back today with a slightly horrified wonder on the energies this frenzy reflected.” He found that by immersing himself in the academic mix of the college, he could simultaneously contribute to it and benefit from it. The strategic atmosphere he created transformed him even as he was laying the foundation for others to do the same.

Since that exciting first year of intellectual synthesis, hundreds of distinguished students have partaken of the experience in strategic thinking. Modern warriors arrive as operators and leave as strategists 10 months later. They deal with the pressures of retaining operational and tactical expertise for their next assignment while seeking the intellectual foundation for the longer voyage to senior flag and ambassadorial rank. Their rise to the strategic level of thinking causes them to contemplate the state-building capacity of the United States, the future of the nation-state, and the nature of governance overall.

Following In His Footsteps

Kennan returned to the War College 46 years after he wrote the X article. Traveling by train from Princeton, arm in a sling, he appeared for the last time, taking the stage in Arnold Auditorium to celebrate the creation of an academic chair in his name and to state again what he considered one of the essential missions of the institution. His thoughts on that day, September 8, 1993, were characteristically direct, as he challenged others to follow his footsteps in thinking about the nature of war and the role of the military instrument of statecraft.

There remained a significant role for the military, Kennan concluded, but its traditional use would no longer work. Interned for months by the Germans, then serving as the Charge d’Affaires in Moscow during World War II, he knew first-hand the power of that violent instrument of statecraft. It was his hope, even in 1946, that the War College would become a major center for not just teaching alone but for wide-ranging, conceptual thinking about war itself as a feature of the international life of our time, about the role of the Armed Forces as institutions of our national life, and about the relationship of these forces, whether actively employed or only in being, in the national interest and to the remainder of our national life.

After 46 years, the need was greater than ever to consider that “war itself, conducted under the concepts that have prevailed in the past, can no longer serve as a rational and useful alternative for anyone at all.”

The Kennan Chair recognized the accomplishments of a statesman and scholar. But, more importantly, it represented Kennan’s commitment to going beyond mere teaching and learning by faculty and students alike. There was an implicit promise, which he clearly articulated on the stage in 1993, that the college would engage in conceptual thinking about war. He explained that developments in... the nature of our international environment and in the qualities and potential uses of modern weaponry have fundamentally altered the basis for much of the traditional thinking about the ways we can or cannot employ our Armed Forces and about the relationship of these forces to the problems of the remainder of our national life... there is now a lot of hard thinking to be done on these subjects. This thinking will of course have to go on in a great many places other than this one, but, for many of the aspects of it, I can think of no place more suitable than this college.2

But how does one maintain and cultivate an institution of strategic thinking? It takes an engaging faculty and a receptive student body, each with both an academic
and operational mix. And it requires space for thinking beyond the strategic to the visionary level. It further requires students to think beyond how to use current instruments of statecraft in their next assignments and to write the next Mr. X strategic essay on using military capabilities, along with diplomatic, economic, informational, and legal means, to achieve homeland security and otherwise make a better world. Kennan would contain the temptation to revert to tactical or operational discussions and urge that practitioners do what he did: come from an operational experience directly relevant to the cause of the day and conceptualize those operational insights. For instance, envisioning initiatives against terrorism in the framework of their personal experiences, added to experiences and insights from peers and faculty, students must then make specific proposals to contain terrorism, attack it, and defeat it. And guardians of the current curriculum need to keep it on a trajectory to enable that level of strategic thinking.

Part of Kennan’s distant yet abiding impact is that he did not overstay his tenure. He arrived a warrior, did intellectual battle, and left a strategist. He had an answer for his time and found a way to deliver it. That tactic should resonate well for any period, and his life achievements and legend should evoke varied responses. The contrast between Kennan’s status as a War College founder and his potential relegation to obscurity is manifest in the fact that his chair, still symbolically located in that corner office but now next to a synthetic desk with a word processor, stands empty. Kennan’s final words to the college were, “I can assure you that no one will follow the further course of this innovation with higher hopes . . . than the man by whose name, deservedly or otherwise, the new Chair is to be known.”11 JFQ

NOTES

2 Ibid., 307.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 George F. Kennan, remarks at the National War College, September 8, 1993.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
International Colleagues at the National War College

By MIGUEL RICARDO REYES CORDERO

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Carl von Clausewitz proposed that the study of the nature of war be approached in three parts—the people and their emotions, the militia with its tactical creativity, and the government with its politics. In this article, I use a similar three-part analogy to examine the international fellows program at National Defense University (NDU), and specifically at the National War College (NWC): first, the U.S. civilian and military instructors and students; second, American society as a whole; and third, the international students themselves.

Each of the three elements interacts with the others, generating an interdependency that has yielded important and surprising results during the two decades of international student participation. To gain a better understanding of the great benefits and successes achieved by all the components of this modern strategic triad, it is appropriate to examine each in turn.

The program of international student participation at National Defense University began in 1984. To date, 522 officers from different parts of the world have been trained at the component colleges. About half have studied at NWC. As the college is celebrating 60 years of educating U.S. military and civilian leaders, it should be noted that a third of its life span has included the participation of international military and
civilian personnel. These guest students have enjoyed academic exploration with their U.S. colleagues, shared life experiences, and exchanged opinions in the classrooms, all of which have generated brotherhood among all involved.

American Instructors and Students
The first element of the triad, the American instructors and students, is the most important since the curriculum is a basic part of the professional career training of both military officers in each of the Armed Forces and of civilian leaders from various U.S. Government agencies and institutions.

friendships U.S. students have cultivated with their international colleagues have facilitated undertakings the Armed Forces have conducted around the world

All U.S. participants arrive with extensive and unique experience and knowledge to share with a diversity of people who, from the first day of instruction, will be their colleagues in the classroom, seminars, research tasks, field trips, and other academic, social, athletic, and cultural activities throughout nearly a year of intense work. This combination tests many qualities—such as willingness, patience, leadership, a capability for synthesis, judgment, and many others—that will enable students to emerge as leaders capable of handling the delicate responsibilities demanded by future duties and assignments.

American students and instructors share unity and friendship with their U.S. colleagues and even more with the international students. Arriving in a new environment, the international students, with the help and collaboration of their U.S. peers, are able to advance in their studies and complete them. It has become clear that through the international students program, strong, long-lasting ties of friendship are formed between the U.S. and international students.

The interaction that occurs during seminar sessions, with the contributions of all participants, makes the international students feel like valued members of the group who can share their knowledge and opinions about the various subjects that make up the NWC curriculum.

Many of the friendships U.S. students have cultivated with their international colleagues have facilitated training events, operations, and other undertakings that the U.S. Armed Forces have conducted around the world. The contribution of an international colleague, whether a classmate or a graduate of another class year who has maintained close ties with instructors, is often able to satisfy an American friend’s need. Many Ambassadors, technicians, specialists, and other personnel from various government agencies and institutions have had the good fortune to obtain assistance in their duties in another country through the help of an international colleague.

Many U.S. officers and their families have shared pleasant experiences with foreign colleagues and their families, creating friendships that will endure for generations. Visits, lasting correspondence, and other examples of affection and fellowship strengthen ties not only between individuals and families, but also between the respective armed forces and countries.

Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard B. Myers, USAF, congratulates Col Salah Affi, Egyptian Army, at the 2005 NDU graduation

In parallel, the entire staff of executives, professors, advisors, and personnel who handle NDU’s administrative, teaching, and academic tasks deserve gratitude and admiration for their effort, dedication, and impartial devotion to the benefit of all students. Full-time guidance and assistance make it possible for all participants to advance in the learning process with sufficient clarity and comprehension of the subjects covered daily. The staff and faculty are a fundamental element in the solid structure and prestige earned over many years by NDU in general and NWC in particular.

U.S. Society
Since the international students program emanated from the Department of Defense (DOD), it has enjoyed the collaboration and participation of all the entities under DOD jurisdiction and many other institutions and agencies that are involved in the program to varying degrees.

But the greatest contribution is from American society as a whole since the curriculum includes numerous visits into the interior of the United States, where foreign officers have the unique opportunity to become acquainted in detail with various facets of political, economic, industrial, tourist, business, social, and military life. Even more intimate insights come when the officers live with host families as part of a magnificent effort by the Defense Orientation Conference Association, which does an unparalleled job of supporting and strengthening relations between the United States and the countries represented by the students.

The opportunity to thoroughly study each industry, business, farm, household, or tourist location enables the foreign officer to see first-hand and properly understand the U.S. citizen’s philosophy of life, from...
the farmer to the executive, from the high-ranking soldier to the young recruit. This apprenticeship, in addition to that gained academically at the university, serves as a very real point of reference to the hopes, objectives, and goals of the American people, as well as to the negative aspects that must also be analyzed. International students thus get to see both sides of the coin.

These experiences with the broader U.S. society make foreign officers more confident in relating to their American friends, and in turn, U.S. citizens see officers from other parts of the world as being not unlike themselves, with qualities and flaws and feelings of friendship that are common to all nationalities, even when customs, religions, and cultures are diametrically opposed. This fosters a climate of camaraderie, openness, and sincere and lasting friendship. Above all, it generates a commitment from both sides to cement fraternal ties, not only with individuals, but also with their countries.

As an international student, I found it interesting to observe how deep inside the United States, perhaps in the homes of hosts, souvenir plaques were displayed, some many years old, with photographs of international friends who were participants in the program. This was very encouraging and clearly showed the appreciation and fondness achieved in multiple contacts between extremely different cultures. These friendships are a multiplier of good will that may one day unite the world in a single entity of peace and harmony.

The International Students

As stated above, over 500 foreign guests have graduated since the beginning of the international student program. Each acted as a student ambassador, representing his country to colleagues, professors, and authorities throughout NDU.

Insecurity and lack of knowledge of the United States and its customs make foreign students seek out the support and understanding of their U.S. colleagues when they first arrive. In most cases, Americans have shown great willingness to guide their visitors in performing academic and other exacting tasks effectively in a language other than their own.

Participating in trips around the country, personally experiencing many aspects of American life, being helped everywhere in an extraordinary manner, and having many concerns satisfied have all created in each foreign student a respect and admiration for the achievements of the United States in all aspects of its national development.

In addition, NDU allows foreign students to participate in athletic, cultural, and social events individually and often with their families, enabling them to always find friendly faces and doors open to any concerns. In this respect, the university’s International Students Management Office, with its excellent staff of highly trained and friendly professionals, plays a major role; tirelessly helping in the varied and often exacting requests of the students under its responsibility.

After completing an exhausting school year and graduating from their respective colleges, international students retain in their minds and hearts this fond and professional tie with everything that involves NDU and U.S. society as a whole. Back in our own countries, the moments we experienced continue to live in memory, and we seek to multiply these positive effects by reciprocating where we can, and making any effort when the opportunity arises as a show of gratitude for everything received during our stay as students.

This article is part of an initiative aimed at capturing the experiences of international students at the colleges of the National Defense University. It is difficult to interpret the feelings of each individual, but the effort has been made to present thoughts that are generally common to all participants.

In addition, this article is intended to express admiration and appreciation to the National War College on celebrating 60 years of institutional life as a guide and a trainer of military and civilian leaders, a source of excellent professionals, and a teacher of the strategists of new generations who, in common with their international friends and colleagues, will attempt to make the world a more harmonious place, free of the egotisms and problems that so greatly affect humanity.

As long as there is a former NDU student in any country in the world, there will be a friendly heart beating, one ready to be of use to its college, its university, and its eternal American friends. This is the sentiment of all of us who have traveled America’s roads and worked conscientiously in its classrooms to obtain the education needed to face the challenges of the future in each of our nations. JFQ
Effects-based operations (EBO) are a spin-off of network-centric warfare (NCW). Hence, many of its premises are largely unproven, if not outright false. EBO and NCW proponents essentially see war as a business. They do not share the Clausewitzian view of the nature of war and have also embraced a deeply flawed systems approach for assessing situations and identifying centers of gravity.

The effects-based approach to warfare is heavily dependent on mathematical methods for predicting and measuring effects. This increasing trend toward using various metrics to assess essentially unquantifiable aspects of warfare only reinforces the unrealistic views of many that warfare is a science rather than both an art and a science. EBO proponents also claim that their concept is based on the tenets of operational warfare. However, EBO is in fact the antithesis of operational thinking and practice. Operational terms are used as ornaments rather than in ways that articulate their true meaning. Worse, various well understood and commonly accepted terms are redefined to emphasize effects in lieu of objectives and tasks.

Objectives and Tasks
The terms aims, goals, and objectives are often used interchangeably. Aims and
goals are by nature ambiguous, open-ended, and difficult or impossible to measure. Accordingly, military planning and execution cannot be based on them. Moreover, they lack elements that can be used to measure progress toward their ultimate accomplishment. Aims and goals must therefore be replaced with something much more specific: objectives (or objects).

An objective is composed of component parts—called tasks—that collectively lead to its accomplishment. Tasks are those measurable entities that allow the commander to determine the rate of progress. A task answers the question of what needs to be done, while the objective (or purpose) answers the why. The linkage between the objective and its constituent tasks cannot be arbitrarily severed without serious consequences to the ability to accomplish the objective. Because of their large scope and complexity, operational or strategic objectives are usually divided into groups of related main tasks, each of which is composed of component (or partial) tasks. Determining too few tasks is bound to lead to the failure to accomplish the objective. Adding new tasks without changing or modifying the objective or having larger resources leads to so-called mission creep, which, in turn, leads to a disconnect between ends and means and could have fatal consequences.

One of the most important tenets of operational warfare is having an unwavering focus on accomplishing the objective. Almost all aspects of operational warfare are related either directly or indirectly to the objective to be accomplished. Therefore, reducing its importance or arbitrarily changing its content will reduce warfare to simply firing at selected targets or target sets. It would ultimately not only eliminate operational art but also tacticize both policy and strategy. This negative trend is well under way in the U.S. military today.

In determining a military objective, the enemy’s factors of space, time, and force must be fully taken into account. Once the objective is chosen, it must be properly balanced with one’s own factors of space, time, and force, collectively called operational factors in planning a campaign or major operation. The objective to be accomplished—not the level of command, as is often assumed—determines whether the war is fought at the tactical, operational, or strategic level. The objective is the principal factor in determining the method of combat force employment (tactical actions, major operations, and campaigns). Operational and strategic objectives are normally accomplished through major operations and campaigns, respectively. The objective also determines the content of, and mutual relationships among, individual elements of operational warfare, such as concentration, critical factors and centers of gravity, maneuver, fires, point of culmination, deception, sequencing, synchronization, branches and sequels, and reserves.

Effects versus Objectives

In contrast to the objective and tasks, effects are far less specific; thus, like aims and goals, they cannot serve as the basis for military planning and execution. For instance, effects to be attained cannot be used as the basis for planning when one intends to seize a geographic location such as a capital, island, or territory. Nor do effects have attributes that are associated with objectives, such as destroying, neutralizing, annihilating, defending, controlling, seizing, capturing, or maintaining. These attributes in combination with tasks are reliable indicators of whether actions are unfolding as planned and the objective is being accomplished. EBO proponents also ignore the fact that any military objective, once accomplished, would generate certain effects, in terms of space and time, on enemy, friendly, and neutral sides.

Proponents differentiate between direct and indirect effects. Direct effects can be physical, functional, collateral, and physiological. Indirect effects can be functional, collateral, cascading, systemic, cumulative, and physiological; they can also be second-, third-, or fourth-order effects. Predicting direct first-order effects is difficult enough; going several steps farther to try to predict second-, third-, or fourth-order effects, as EBO proponents do, is a practical impossibility. There are simply too many variables.

A slight change in the conditions of a single entity can generate unpredictable effects, desired and undesired.

Advocates explain that the first step in effects-based operations is to determine objectives, and the next is to designate the effects necessary to accomplish the objectives. The last step is to determine tasks, variously defined as actions that generate effects or as directing friendly actions. To make room for effects, EBO advocates have arbitrarily changed what is commonly understood as the task. Another problem is the insertion of effects between the objective and what they call actions. The logical thing to do after—not before—the accomplishment of the objective (see figure 1).

The most difficult prediction is what physical actions must be accomplished to generate desired behavioral effects over a period of time. This is especially complicated at the operational and strategic levels of war because of the dynamic mix of tangible

**Figure 1**

**Effects-Based Approach**

1. **Object**
2. **Effects**
3. **Causal Link**

**Objective-Based Approach**

1. **Object**
2. **Action**
3. **Component (Partial Tasks)**

**Actions**

**Strategic/Operational Objective**

**Component Link**

**EFFECT**

**Main Tasks**
and intangible elements. The effect of one’s actions on the enemy’s political leadership or operational commander cannot be predicted accurately. Neither can one precisely anticipate the psychological effect on the enemy’s will to fight or the attitude of the populace, particularly when the enemy’s political and military culture is different from one’s own, as seen in Afghanistan and in the postcombat phase of the war in Iraq. Intelligence simply cannot predict key aspects of the enemy’s strategic behavior.

The duration and intensity of the effects cannot be easily determined, much less measured. Like operational and strategic surprises, the duration of effect is relatively short. But unlike most surprises, planners will most often be unaware of the effect of a certain action at the time when quick and decisive action is needed to take advantage of the newly created situation. Even when the objective is used as the basis for operational planning, the effects of actions on the adversary are highly unpredictable and can be detrimental to one’s strategic purpose, as with the German invasion of Poland in September 1939 and the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941.

The effect of the physical destruction of the enemy’s infrastructure or military power is hard to anticipate and even harder to measure. In the American air bombing of North Vietnam from February 1965 to October 1968 (Operation Rolling Thunder), there was a disconnect between predicted and actual effects, indicators, measures, analysis, and feedback. The desired effect was to compel the North, under the pressure of aerial bombardment and hindering the flow of men and materiel through attacks against the transportation system, to cease its support to the Vietcong insurgency. Some 90 percent of the effort was against transportation-related and interdiction targets. Yet despite all the efforts, in January 1968 an estimated 70,000 North Vietnamese and Vietcong launched the Tet offensive. Operation Rolling Thunder had failed to effectively reduce the flow of men and supplies the enemy needed to support operations in the south or to compel the North Vietnamese leadership to cease its support of insurgents there. The operation damaged the North’s small industrial base and rudimentary transportation system, but it did not achieve its stated objective. Both the civilian and military leadership miscalculated the effect of Rolling Thunder. They believed the threat of industrial devastation would compel Hanoi to end the war.

The biggest problem with effects at the operational and strategic levels is that they are the levels where intangible elements are the most critical for success. Tangible elements of the situation are normally (although not always) possible to quantify. Intangibles are hard or impossible to quantify with certainty. Nowhere is that more true than at the operational and strategic levels, where intangibles encompassing not only military but also nonmilitary sources of power abound. At the strategic level, the degree and robustness of public support for the war, the leadership’s will to persevere, and alliance or coalition cohesion cannot be satisfactorily quantified.

**Traditional versus Systems Approach**

The tactical, operational, and strategic military situations are differentiated based on the scale of the objective. Any military scenario consists of three overlapping and interrelated situations: the enemy’s, one’s own, and the neutrals’. The larger the objective, the larger and more complex the situation. Furthermore, the military situation is composed of tangible and intangible elements. Nonmilitary aspects of the situation are always present, especially at the operational and strategic levels (see figure 2).

In contrast to the traditional approach, EBO advocates insist that the best way of evaluating the military situation is what they call a systems approach. They do not distinguish situations based on the objectives to be accomplished. Instead, they use the term *operational environment*, as defined in Joint Publication 5−0, *Joint Operation Planning (OE):* “the air, land, sea, space, and associated adversary, friendly, and neutral systems (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, legal, and others), which are relevant for specific joint operation.”

Currently, an operational environment is composed of political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII) systems. Each system, in turn, is broken into two primary elements, nodes and links. Nodes are defined as tangible elements (people, materiel, facilities) within a system that can be targeted. Links are the behavioral and functional relationships between nodes, establishing interconnectivity between them,
Operational Decisionmaking

EBO proponents are also drastically changing the methods traditionally used to reach a sound decision. Many advocates rarely consider the proven process of the commander’s estimate of the situation. By inserting and then highlighting effects, the content of several steps of the estimate has been significantly changed. To make matters more complicated, proponents have added what they call system-of-systems analysis (SoSA) to the joint intelligence preparation of the battlefield (JIPB) process as part of the commander’s estimate of the situation.

Proponents claim that JIPB and SoSA have identical purposes: to give joint force commanders sufficient situational awareness of the operational environment to accomplish their missions. The differences encompass a detailed analysis of both military and nonmilitary elements of the situation. Adding SoSA while at the same time retaining the JIPB process will make decisionmaking processes not simpler and more effective, but just the opposite.

Supposedly, depicting node-link relationships graphically helps planners discover decisive points against which the joint force can act. Actually, the nodes are these decisive points, a fact that apparently escapes the EBO proponents. By depicting a system’s capabilities as a combination of interconnected nodes and links, analysis can enhance joint force commanders’ understanding of which capabilities are most critical to system performance or behavior and, in turn, which are most vulnerable to friendly influence. However, the nodes might be wrongly determined; such a mistake might affect the use of one’s power against other nodes, or it might not generate a ripple effect. In addition, the strength of the links could be improperly assessed initially, or links and nodes might undergo changes during combat that are not noticed by the planners in timely fashion.

In the effects-based approach, a major part of the mission analysis seems to center on determination of effects. This step is made unnecessarily complex and difficult. Moreover, many elements of the mission analysis have nothing to do with it. For instance, the mission analysis, as the title implies, should not include determination of the friendly and enemy’s (or “adversary”) centers of gravity. Proponents highlight the need to use language that clearly distinguishes effects from objectives and tasks. Yet they define objectives for “prescribing goals” while tasks “direct friendly action.” However, both definitions differ from those traditionally accepted and commonly known. They also confuse the purpose and objective as two different things, when they are in fact identical.

Another major problem with adopting the effects-based approach is that the traditional content of the mission statement is fundamentally changed. Normally, any well-written mission statement is composed of two parts: the tasks, followed by the purpose (objective). By redefining tasks as actions and inserting effects, EBO advocates make the mission statement far more dif-
difficult to articulate concisely and clearly. The mission will be composed of a mix of a specific purpose with far fewer specific elements—effects. In short, advocates would fundamentally change the principal product of the mission analysis—the restated mission, as well as the commander’s intent, which is based on the restated mission. Articulating a sound mission statement and commander’s intent is often poorly done. The effects-based approach will not make it easier. This problem is compounded by the apparent confusion on the part of many EBO proponents on which elements are tasks, effects, and objectives; they are often understood and expressed almost identically.

In the effects-based approach, course of action development encompasses not only the development of friendly courses of action, but also the analysis (wargaming of friendly and enemy courses of action), comparison, and selection of the most optimal course of action. Clearly, too many steps of the estimate of the situation are crammed into a single step, complicating the process significantly.

**Systems Approach and Center of Gravity**

EBO advocates apparently believe in the great value of the concept of center of gravity for sound planning. The third draft of Joint Publication 5-0 correctly defines center of gravity as comprising “the characteristics, capabilities, and/or sources of power from which a system derives its freedom of action, physical strength, and will to fight.” Despite this sound definition, EBO proponents’ understanding of what constitutes center of gravity is deeply flawed. They have essentially adopted the systems approach of Colonel John Warden, USAF (Ret.), and his “five-ring model.” Like Warden, EBO proponents, with their PMESII construct, believe that there are multiple centers of gravity in any system. The purpose of SoSA is to identify what they call adversary and friendly centers of gravity, to include key systems, nodes, and links and their relationships to each other. In the view of EBO proponents, centers of gravity in a given system may consist of what they call a key node, but typically they will encompass a number of key nodes and links that comprise a subsystem within a system. The EBO proponents assert that key nodes are related to “a strategic or operational effect or center of gravity.” To make the situation more confusing, they claim that key nodes “may become decisive points for military operations” (see figure 3). In short, they imply that effects, centers of gravity, and decisive points have the same meaning. Proponents also explain that a center of gravity would typically encompass a number of key nodes and links that comprise a subsystem within a system. The number and strength of links to a node or set of nodes can be indicators of a potential center of gravity. They also clearly imply that there are numerous centers of gravity.

Nowhere do EBO proponents link the objective to be accomplished with the corresponding center of gravity. Yet a center of gravity cannot be considered in isolation from the objective. It is the objective that determines the situation and subsequently the level and scope of the analysis of enemy and friendly critical strengths and weaknesses. A center of gravity is invariably found among enemy or friendly critical strengths, not critical weaknesses or critical vulnerabilities. Hence, a center of gravity is not location/place, some critical weakness/vulnerability, or decisive point. Nor is it found among those critical strengths that lack the ability to physically or otherwise endanger the enemy’s center of gravity, such as logistics; command, control, communications, computers; and intelligence; and nodes.

If center of gravity is disconnected from the objective to be accomplished, as in SoSA, there is no larger purpose to which everything must be subordinate. In fact, objectives serve to limit the number of centers of gravity against which major parts of one’s efforts must be directed. The higher the level of war, the fewer are the objectives to be accomplished and the fewer the centers of gravity. In a campaign, there is a single theater (or military) strategic center of gravity because there is a single ultimate strategic objective. For each intermediate-operational objective in a campaign, there is a single operational center of gravity. The entire concept of center of gravity loses its meaning when a major part of one’s effort is not focused against specific centers of gravity. The proper application of this concept also ensures the application of the principle of economy of effort.

**Operational Planning and Execution**

EBO advocates propound a different approach to campaign planning. The regressive (or inverse) method used for planning campaigns and major operations based on the objectives to be accomplished is, for all practical purposes, abandoned. The focus is given almost exclusively to effects, not to

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**Figure 3**

![Concept of Critical Factors and Centers of Gravity](image)

![SoSA and Centers of Gravity](image)
intermediate (operational or major tactical) and ultimate (strategic or operational) objectives and other elements of operational design, such as balancing operational factors and identifying enemy and friendly critical factors and centers of gravity. Normally, for a campaign or major operation intended to end hostilities, the highest political leadership issuing a strategic guidance should also include the desired strategic endstate. The latter is defined as a set of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic aspects of the strategic situation that the Nation’s or alliance/coalition’s leadership wants to see after the end of hostilities. Expressed in EBO terms, the desired (strategic) endstate is in fact the strategic effect that should be achieved to bring political victory in a conflict (see figure 4). The desired endstate, in turn, serves as a starting point to determine strategic objectives, which are also part of strategic guidance. The combatant commander normally determines theater-strategic objectives based on the military strategic objectives determined by the national leadership. However, experience shows that the politico-military leadership in issuing its strategic guidance rarely if ever provided the theater commander what can be understood as the desired (strategic) endstate.

In contrast, EBO proponents intend to use a different logic in the planning process. They say that in designing a campaign, a combatant or component commander provides objectives that describe the desired effects. Once these effects are defined, planners devise a framework consisting of the elements comprising each effect. After the quantifiable measures have been applied to the effects, tasks are assigned to subordinates. Campaign phasing will be based on the effects achieved not dependent on the accomplishment of the intermediate–operational objectives. Effects identified for enemies, friendlies, and neutrals would supposedly be used as criteria for entering the next phase of a campaign. Normally, accomplishing intermediate objectives in a campaign determines phasing. Why the effects on neutrals should be a major factor in phasing one’s campaign is difficult to explain or understand.

**Effect Assessment**

The principal methods used for the analysis of PMESII systems is the so-called operational net assessment (ONA)—a process and product that integrates people, processes, and tools by using multiple information sources and collaborative analysts to build a shared holistic knowledge based on the operational environment. ONA supposedly provides a more comprehensive view of the commander’s area of responsibility; it allows the commander to gain better insight into complex relationships, interdependencies, strengths, and vulnerabilities within and throughout the adversary’s political structure, military capabilities, economic system, social structure, and information and infrastructure networks. ONA relies on a comprehensive system-of-systems understanding of the operational environment’s PMESII analysis. ONA uses various quantitative and qualitative measurements to assess whether predicted effects are actually achieved and one’s actions are progressing as intended. Quantitative measurements are actually preferred because they are supposedly far less susceptible to subjective judgment. Yet the fact is that both quantitative and qualitative measurements are equally subject to political manipulation, mirror-imaging, and biases. A more serious deficiency of the assessment concept is its almost total lack of sound intellectual framework. EBO proponents assume that the effects of one’s actions could be precisely measured and almost instantaneously known to decisionmakers. This is highly unlikely. This heavy reliance on various quantifying measurements and fast feedback raises the issue of the utility of the effects-based approach, especially at the operational and strategic levels of war.

An effects-based approach to warfare in its essence represents application of the targeteering approach to warfare across all levels. It has proven highly successful in attacking various components of the enemy’s infrastructure, such as the land transportation network, maritime trade, and the electricity grid. It makes perfect sense to attack not all potential tangible elements of a certain network, but only those nodes that, if destroyed or neutralized, would cause a ripple or cascading effect throughout the network. The effects-based approach can also be highly effective in attacking enemy information systems, and computer networks in particular.

However, things are significantly more complex when using the effects-based approach at the operational and strategic levels of war. The mix of tangible and intangible elements, combined with ever-present uncertainties, friction, and the unpredictability of the human element, makes the effects-based approach largely irrelevant. Tactical methods and procedures cannot be successfully applied at the operational and strategic levels. The accomplishment of a
strategic or operational objective requires different methods of combat force employment and, therefore, different methods of planning and execution.

By inserting effects along with procedures for their prediction and measurement between the objective and the tasks, EBO advocates have in effect weakened the importance of objectives in the decisionmaking and planning process. Yet unless the link between objectives and subordinate tasks is maintained at all times, there is no proper way to measure progress toward mission accomplishment. Hence, it is simply wrong to sever that link by inserting effects and redefining the task as an action. Based on logic and common sense alone, it is hard to see the value of placing inherently ambiguous effects between far more specific and measurable objectives and tasks.

The highly complex situations found at the operational and strategic levels of war cannot be arbitrarily and artificially reduced to six or more systems, with these systems further reduced to what EBO enthusiasts call nodes, links, vulnerabilities, and interdependencies. As with any machine, any errors in determining nodes or links (and errors are inevitable) would cause ripples and largely undesired effects throughout the so-called system. An attack against a specific node carried out at the wrong time or in an inappropriate way could also generate unwanted consequences. Moreover, the enemy has a will of his own and could react independently, unpredictably, and even irrationally. EBO proponents apparently ignore these well-known facts.

Properly applied, traditional decision-making and planning processes incorporate all the supposed advantages of the effects-based approach. EBO proponent claims that operational planning as currently applied cannot ensure the synchronized employment of both military and nonmilitary instruments of power are only partially true. Current planning procedures are designed to ensure that all instruments of national power are properly sequenced and synchronized in a campaign. Because these procedures may not be followed or may be poorly applied does not mean they need to be abandoned.

The increasing emphasis on metrics and indicators is a trend in the wrong direction. Even at the tactical level, it is difficult to predict, much less precisely measure, effects because of the mix of tangible and intangible elements in the situation and human actions and reactions. The progress of a major operation or campaign cannot be precisely measured by using various quantifiable methods, no matter how advanced the methods might be. Apparently, advocates of effects-based operations learned little from the pitiful experiences of the United States in using various mathematical methods to assess the progress of the war in Vietnam. To be sure, there is value in applying mathematical analysis in many areas, but that is primarily true in the design of weapons and sensors, and, to some degree, at the tactical level. The higher the level of war, the more difficult it is to apply these methods as a guide for the commander’s decisions and subsequent planning.

**NOTES**

1 Joint Warfighting Center, USJFCOM, Commander’s Handbook on an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations, draft version (Norfolk, VA: Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Directorate, forthcoming), III–5.


3 Proponents define a system as a network of nodes and links within a battlespace that represents any combination of people, material, facilities, and information and their relationships to one another. A system is also understood as any organized assembly of resources and procedures united and regulated by interaction or interdependence to accomplish a set of specific functions. A system of systems is defined as grouping assemblies of resources, methods, and procedures regulated by interaction or interdependence to accomplish a set of specific functions. Vulnerability is described as the characteristics of a system that cause it to suffer a definite degradation or inability to perform the designated mission because of being subjected to a certain level of effects in a manmade hostile environment. A model is described as the intellectual construct, composed of sets of categories, assumptions, and postulates, that helps one to sort and examine the relationship between elements of data and predict the course of events. However, if a model does not somehow correspond to what it claims to represent, it will have limited utility because it fails to mirror reality faithfully. Lewis Ware, “Some Observations of the Enemy as a System,” *Airpower Journal* (Winter 1995), 87–93, available at <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/wate.html>. 2. A system is a functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related group of elements that interact as a whole; Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Doctrine Series, Pamphlet 7, *Operational Implications of Effects-based Operations (EBO)* (Norfolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command, November 17, 2004), 2.


Dear JFQ Readers:

National Defense University (NDU) has started a more aggressive international and domestic outreach program. We did so to share ideas with global counterparts and to help combat terrorism with ideas and information. The importance of this rapidly growing program is reinforced by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace, in his guidance in\textit{ Shaping the Future}:

\textit{We can both learn from and help others through a proactive outreach program to nontraditional partners. Academia, industry, think tanks, and a host of other organizations possess a wide range of expertise and insights invaluable to finding solutions to our most pressing problems.}

\textit{Our Coalition partners have significant insights to share with us as well. Our friends at home and abroad are our natural allies in this war, and we should seek to partner with them at every opportunity.}

My goal as president of NDU is to communicate worldwide with every military educational institution and other great organizations via email and to facilitate better and more open dialogue. By doing so, we will improve not only subject matter expertise but also the ways in which we educate military officers and civilian officials in defense and security matters. This network, with approximately 10,000 members—and growing rapidly—will be an important tool for promoting global strategic thinking by disseminating research and publications.

Also, we have begun an innovative program called Communities of Practice (COP), which links professional educators from military academic institutions around the world in order to share ideas, news articles, curricula, and educated opinions on nearly 30 relevant topics, such as countering and combating terrorism, leadership and ethics, multinational operations and issues, and Islamic radicalism.

While we started with only U.S. institutions, we now have many organizations from other countries that have joined. To date, we have connected some 300 institutions in 90 countries. We have also expanded the list of subjects (listed below). Many American educational institutions have up to 12 people in a single subject area or community and there is no limit to the number of participants.

The rules I established were simple and straightforward:

\begin{itemize}
    \item build a forum of experts among various institutions around topical subject areas
    \item create opportunity for an informal, nonattribution network to exchange ideas and curricula and to discuss current issues
    \item serve as a sounding board for topics of discussion
    \item collaborate on new ideas and integration of topic areas into existing curricula
    \item participate in the network voluntarily
    \item feel no obligation to respond
    \item encourage network growth—that is, spread the word.
\end{itemize}

The expanded COP list now totals 27 topics and will continue to grow as our global participants desire. There is virtually no limit on subjects or membership to this dynamic program. Our current list:

\begin{itemize}
    \item Acquisition
    \item Africa
    \item Asymmetric Warfare
    \item China
    \item Civil-Military Relations (foreign and domestic)
    \item Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction
    \item Command and Control
    \item Consequence Management
    \item Corporate Risk Management
    \item Countering/Combating Terrorism
    \item Effects-Based Thinking/Operations
    \item Energy
    \item Environment
    \item Homeland Defense/Security
    \item Information Operations and Information Assurance
    \item Insurgency/Counterinsurgency
    \item Intelligence
    \item Interagency
    \item Islam and Islamic Radicalism
    \item Leadership/Ethics
    \item Logistics
    \item Military History
    \item Multinational Operations and Issues
    \item National Security Law
    \item North Atlantic Treaty Organization
    \item Postconflict/Stability Operations
    \item Transformation
\end{itemize}

I encourage you to take part in this effort and help us widen the network. We would welcome all of you to join one or more of the COPs and to identify other individuals or groups who should be on the list.

My point man at NDU for this project is Alan Roberson. Please contact him for assistance at RobersonM1@ndu.edu or call him at 202–685–3032.

All the best,

Michael M. Dunn
Lieutenant General, USAF
President, NDU
The Joint Advanced Warfighting School: Creating World-Class Joint Planners

In April 2004, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) announced establishment of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) at the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia. The decision followed months of study and discussions involving the Joint Staff, Services, and members of the military education community. The first class ended June 2005, and the second cohort is under way in its unique 46-week joint professional military education experience.

The mission of the program is to produce conceptual, adaptive, and innovative graduates who can create campaign-quality concepts, employ all elements of national power, accelerate transformation, and succeed as joint force operational/strategic planners. JAWS is an essential component of the Chairman’s efforts to create skilled warfighters who are “strategically minded” and adept at “critical thinking.”

As JAWS matures, it will populate the Joint Staff and combatant commands with officers trained in joint planning processes who can perform critical analysis in applying all aspects of national power across the full range of military operations. Graduates will be capable of synergistically combining existing and emerging capabilities in time, space, and purpose to accomplish operational and strategic objectives. Of the 25 graduates from the inaugural class, 18 were immediately assigned to key billets at combatant commands and on the Joint Staff. Several are already leading campaign planning efforts at various joint headquarters. These graduates will bring their education and broad experience to the joint community and contribute their talents throughout their careers. In essence, they will be agents for innovation and transformation.

JAWS educates selected O–4s and O–5s in the art and science of joint, interagency, and multinational planning and warfighting at the strategic-operational nexus of war as directed by the CJCS Officer Professional Military Education Policy. The students, who are all carefully chosen by their Services, must be eligible to fill joint planning billets on graduation, possess appropriate clearances, and be able to perform in a demanding academic environment. JAWS qualifies as a Service intermediate- or senior-level college as well as single-phase joint professional military education. It is also accredited to award a Master of Science degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy.

Two seminars contain about 12 students apiece. Each seminar normally consists of about four Army, four Air force, three Navy, one or two Marine Corps, and two interagency students. In the next academic year, it is anticipated that multinational students will join the student mix. The small “purple” seminars are supported with high-quality faculty, first-class instructional technologies, and a complete collaborative information environment. Significant facilities modernization was completed to support the JAWS educational approach with a true “seminar collaborative learning platform” classroom. The location enables a high degree of ongoing collaboration with nearby Joint Forces Command, the Joint Warfighting Center, Allied Command Transformation, and a host of other joint, Service, support, and contractor activities in the Tidewater area.

The curriculum focuses on high-end operational art and transformational thought. This specific and concentrated emphasis allows in-depth immersion and applied rigor. The curriculum further endeavors to strike a balance between operational and strategic studies, and between warfighting and war preparation. The interrelated core courses—Foundations in Theory of War, Strategic Foundations, and Operational Art and Campaigning—constitute the developmental framework. By emphasizing problem solving and decisionmaking within the specific context of the joint operations concepts, emerging transformational ideas, and adaptive planning, JAWS will strive to produce world-class joint planners prepared to operate in tomorrow’s fast-paced, often chaotic, and multitasking environment.

Exercises, simulations, case studies, extensive readings, and several research visits are key components of the program. Students have multiple opportunities to analyze and apply joint doctrine, emerging concepts, and recent lessons learned, while honing planning and decisionmaking skills. In addition, they conduct individual research, write a formal thesis examining a contemporary joint issue, and defend their findings as part of a final oral comprehensive exam.

JAWS is envisioned to provide joint headquarters with planners and warriors who understand the 21st-century battlefield and view warfare through a joint, multinational, and interagency lens. Graduates should become a nucleus of joint planners in much the way the advanced military studies programs of the Services generated highly skilled and sought-after planners and thinkers. As JAWS expands beyond its two-seminar construct, it will contribute more skilled innovators and joint planners to the joint specialty officer population and more agents of transformation. If the reports received from graduates are any indication, the need for JAWS-educated personnel will increase sharply in coming years. The future of the program promises to be one of learning, growth, and innovation. JFQ

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Continuous improvement in immediate, life-saving treatment on the battlefield is an institutional obsession within military medicine. Combat medics, corpsmen, nurses, and surgeons return from contingency missions determined to save lives in future wars that were just beyond their reach in the last. At the heart of that conviction is the standard to which the entire brotherhood of military medicine must hold itself personally accountable: the golden hour, broadly the first 60 minutes following trauma or the onset of acute illness. The chances of survival are greatest if surgery or advanced trauma life support can be provided within that hour. While this standard may have formed the foundation of the Nation’s civilian emergency medical service, it is forever rooted in the battlefield experiences of the military health system (MHS) in the previous century.

Military medicine’s commitment to high standards and its mission, along with the experience derived in combat, has consistently produced major contributions to the larger body of medicine and increased understanding in advanced trauma care, burn
therapy, and emergency surgery. According to the U.S. Surgeon General, Vice Admiral Richard Carmona, a former Special Forces medic in Vietnam:

Military medicine has led civilian medicine in many ways; particularly since World War II, when the generation before us first developed ways to provide combat casualty care as close to the battlefield as possible. . . . Military surgeons in all branches since the Civil War have led the way in improving the health of the Nation through their wartime experiences. From sanitation to infectious disease and combat casualty care, this country owes the military a huge debt of gratitude.1

More recent MHS efforts have emphasized advancements in communications, information technologies that facilitate decisionmaking, the miniaturization of diagnostic and therapeutic equipment to increase our capabilities in austere environments, and the advanced training of combat medics to enable them to function more independently in saving lives. Despite these profound enhancements in military medicine, however, there remains a disconnect between the increased sophistication of our treatment capabilities and the combat health support (CHS) system that employs them.

The current CHS architecture is generally planned and arrayed in five distinct levels for a contingency operation, which may extend from the forward line of troops (FLOT) all the way to the “brick-and-mortar” military and Veterans Affairs hospitals located in the United States. Each higher level represents an increased sophistication in treatment capability, but a decreasing capability with regard to tactical mobility and survivability. Joint and Service doctrinal definitions for each level of care vary marginally due to Service-specific support requirements, but they essentially complement one another. Each level is characterized by the features listed in figure 1.2

The CHS system is represented by this architecture and the sum total of all the military’s structures, personnel, assets, and equipment organized for the purpose of maintaining a fit force, preventing casualties, and treating the wounded.3 Ideally, this system should be able to exploit technologies and advanced practices—both medical and otherwise—and apply them in battlespace at the appropriate point and time to most effectively reduce mortality and morbidity. Unfortunately, we have yet to achieve the attributes of a genuine joint system that takes full advantage of all Service capabilities. Despite incremental improvements, the medical forces in the Services continue to function more as a composite, contingency organization rather than a single, seamless, interoperable CHS system.

The Current System
Creating this transformed joint CHS system must begin with a common vision and a standard objective. First and foremost, there remains a disconnect between the increased sophistication of our treatment capabilities and the combat health support system that employs them. It should emphasize structuring our operations and doctrine around the golden hour as the center of gravity, because the 60 minutes following trauma remain the principal standard that dictates the system’s ultimate success or failure. Historically, wound data and casualty rates indicate that more than 90 percent of all casualties die within the first hour of severe wounding without advanced trauma life support. Actually, 67 percent die within the first 30 minutes, creating even more urgency for rapid access of the wounded by level I and II medical personnel.4 An estimated half of the total die due to exsanguination (bleeding to death). Success remains firmly affixed to bringing the full measure of medicine to bear within that first 60 minutes.

We continue to collect and process the medical lessons learned from Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, but both themes are clearly emerging. First, in spite of the outmoded design and structure of the CHS system, we are gradually migrating toward increased emphasis on deliberate joint operational planning and execution. Second, our Service operational planners are organizing medical resources with increasing regard to the actual point of injury and adopting a philosophy of far-forward placement of assets—in essence, to beat the golden hour. Both of these evolved...
tions, however, can be largely credited to the creativity of commanders at the tactical and operational levels, who must often plan around the inefficiencies of the present CHS system design.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in a speech on transformation at the National Defense University in January 2002, cited the success of the German military, which was technically only “10 or 15 percent transformed,” with its use of Blitzkrieg in World War II: “What was revolutionary and unprecedented about the Blitzkrieg was not the new capabilities the Germans employed, but rather the unprecedented and revolutionary way that they mixed new and existing capabilities.”

The essential components for a revolutionary change in the combat health system are similarly achievable today. In instances during Iraqi Freedom where units were thinking far-forward and joint, the successes were monumental and were responsible for a died-of-wounds rate of about 1 percent. The Air Force changed its doctrine to configure any available airframe in theater to transport casualties and went so far as to conduct aeromedical evacuations directly from level II facilities in the brigade area of operations. Far-forward surgery enjoyed unprecedented success. Forward Resuscitative Surgical Squads supporting the Marine Corps lost none of the casualties they received. For the first time ever, the Army attached a forward surgical team with every brigade committed. In certain circumstances, surgical assets were collocated with battalion aid stations. Some Army medical evacuation aircraft were positioned closer to maneuver units to facilitate immediate launch and movement of casualties from collection points to definitive care facilities. Information systems were fielded as far forward as the level I and level II units to provide surveillance against emerging medical threats throughout the theater. Improved equipment and therapeutics, including the use of fibrin-impregnated bandages, were credited with saving lives that once would have been lost.

Unfortunately, doctrine continues to work in contradiction to these innovations. It is possible to arrive at a point in every system where the value of modernizing each component is maximized. Genuine transformation means changing the shape, design, and even functional processes to respond to global shifts in technology, environment, and geopolitics. The charge against the military has always been that we continue to fight the last war. Transformation requires the vision to see the next war and the boldness to pursue the changes necessary to ensure success.

As Lieutenant General George Taylor, the Air Force Surgeon General, has stated, we have to become “light, lean, and responsive.” Over recent years, this has become a euphemism for force reduction. Yet a strong case can be made within the context of current strategic requirements that medical personnel (along with military police, engineers, and civil affairs) should expand. Whether the requirement is for humanitarian assistance, stability operations, or intense combat, a robust medical capability has become indispensable for every contingency.
Nonetheless, the present system has not changed remarkably since World War II. Largely designed by Colonel Edward Churchill, USA, around his concept of wound management, the medical support system "allowed forward hospitals to be more mobile, and concentrated more resource-intensive casualty care far to the rear in secure base areas where evacuation hospitals [would not be] required to move with changing tactical situations." The primary objective of this concept was to maximize the number of Servicemembers we could return to duty in theater and was embedded in an operational precept that valued mass over speed as a principal of war. Today, we need medical units that are capable of rapid force projection and, once in theater, can enjoin an operational tempo that adversaries cannot sustain. We need flexible and adaptable units that can morph and function as commanders choose to dictate conditions and tempo on the battlefield. By creating this high-velocity environment, we can control the enemy’s decision cycle and force him to wage a war he ultimately cannot win. To accomplish this, every battlefield operating system must be able to meet these preconditions of speed and adaptability. Without substantial change, the current combat health support system will not meet that challenge.

In 2003, RAND completed a study that followed several Army transformation exercises to assess "the medical risks associated with emerging Army operational concepts and the capacity of the Army Medical Department to mitigate these risks." In essence, RAND’s charter was to determine if the envisioned CHS system was adequate for future Army combat operations. Their conclusion was, “Probably not.” In the exercises they followed, the CHS system was overwhelmed with scenarios that introduced only modest casualties. Critical capabilities such as surgical capacity, evacuation assets, and logistics were quickly exhausted. Further, the health service architecture evaluated represented a “best-case scenario,” and under more realistic circumstances the outcomes would have been even worse. In fact, the exercises required an operational pause to enable the CHS system to catch up with the other battlefield operating systems. The most disturbing finding was:

The fact that the HSS [health service support] assets available to the future force UA [unit of action] battalion in this scenario (that is, all brigade assets, a CHS at division, and all the aerial medical evacuation assets allocated to the division) were probably more than what would reasonably be expected suggests that the HSS systems portrayed in these three workshops, even in optimized and undegraded states, were inadequate.

The most recent transformation efforts of the Army Medical Department include plans for a more robust command and control structure for brigade-level medical CHS, but, by and large, the fundamental elements do not appear to have changed from 20 years ago. If we truly desire brigade-centric organizations, the medical support structure must be enhanced. The technologies envisioned by the Army Medical Department will undoubtedly improve operational capabilities and save lives, but their effectiveness will be limited if they are incorporated into an outmoded organizational design. The organizational structure for combat health support must be engineered to meet the known and expected challenges of planned contingencies, yet flexible enough to respond to less predictable scenarios. The design that is currently welded into the Army’s transformation plans has been adequate for the past two decades but does not seem sufficient to meet the demands of the near future.

Transform and Perform
For purposes of describing a general concept of CHS transformation, the model proposed here uses the Army’s maneuver brigade as its organizational structure; however, it likely is equally applicable to the Marine expeditionary brigade. The three main recommendations below are especially relevant to the Army’s vision in the creation of brigade units of action. Ultimately, these brigades will replace the division as the primary Army warfighting unit, and the CHS system that supports them must be reengineered to support this doctrinal shift. All the battlefield operating systems in these
brigades must have command and control capabilities to operate independently, unit architecture that allows them to deploy flexibly, and subordinate units that can project rapidly and sustain significant combat power. Moreover, this redesign must support the ability to perform in a more joint fashion. There is perhaps no function on the battlefield with more potential for exploiting joint capabilities than the CHS system.

**Expand level II medical support.**

Brigadier General Edward Usher, USMC, the Commanding General of the 1st Force Service Support Group, I Marine Expeditionary Force, in Operation Iraqi Freedom, has praised the performance of the forward resuscitative surgical squads that accompanied their level II medical units in direct support of Marines engaged in combat: “I didn’t want to take them to war, but now I wouldn’t go to war without them.” Every combat unit that directly witnesses a fully equipped and prepared medical support force at work can immediately appreciate its overwhelming value.

I propose an organizational design that would include a medical battalion as organic to the maneuver brigades. Medical platoons need to expand to company-sized elements. These medical companies would provide sufficient personnel to:

- outfit the rifle companies with a full complement of combat medics
- increase evacuation assets to support multiple casualty collection points
- adequately staff a battalion aid station to execute split-team operations
- provide medics for widely dispersed operational areas with regular support to scouts, mortars, and antitank units (which are not currently authorized organic medical support)
- transition the company’s mission to area support for humanitarian civic assistance actions following combat operations.

Each of these medical companies would continue to maintain a direct support relationship to the maneuver battalions as the medical platoons do now, but they would ultimately come under the command and control of a medical battalion commander on the maneuver brigade commander’s staff. Assets under the immediate control of the medical battalion commander would include a forward surgical capability and other ancillary services, such as preventive medicine, dental support, laboratory, and radiology. A generic organizational design proposal is provided in figure 2.

This direct command relationship would provide the maneuver brigade commander with a comprehensive treatment and surgical capability allowing him to function independently from the forward support battalion. He owns the assets. Additionally, the medical battalion commander would have a vantage that allows him to view and direct all available medical assets consistent with the brigade maneuver plan in order to weigh the main effort of the operation and to reposition them in real time as conditions change on the battlefield. Above all, a medical battalion must provide the maneuver brigade commander with a comprehensive treatment and resuscitative surgical capability allowing him to function in real time as casualties come under his command.

There is perhaps no function on the battlefield with more potential for exploiting joint capability than the CHS system. A more subtle but no less important advantage in this transformational design is the mentoring and professional development that a medical battalion commander provides to junior medical operations officers in the maneuver brigades. Today’s medical company commander must be able to: predict areas of casualty density, evaluate routes of evacuation and plan casualty collection points for use during the fight, deconflict airspace management for aeromedical evacuation routes with the brigade aviation liaison officer, determine how to tailor limited resources while still supporting the main effort, evaluate and coordinate the necessity for additional corps assets, plan and operate communications networks, precoordinate all fixed and rotary-wing aeromedical evacuation support, synchronize the efforts of every

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**Figure 2**

Proposed Organizational Design for Combat Health Support in the Brigade Units of Action

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PREPARED BY:

**LEGEND**

- Command & Control
- Operational Alignment
- TMT Treatment (Advanced Trauma Life Support)
- EVAC Evacuation
- CM Combat Medics
- BH Behavioral Health
- OPT Optometry Services
- DENT Dental Services
- SURG Surgery
medical platoon and section in the brigade area of operations, and other activities—all before the first shot is fired. It is a daunting responsibility for a young captain who likely has received little mentorship from a seasoned medical service corps officer during his career. Clearly, the operational constraint of the golden hour separates combat health support from every other logistic function.

Establish the joint theater hospital. This emphasis on the golden hour and level I and II units does not suggest a diminished role for level III hospitals. It does, however, point to a fundamentally different and more dynamic role than present doctrine allows. Five levels of care have been historically arranged, both tactically and operationally, to support a large, static, and linear theater of war and to displace casualties according to the severity of their conditions. The primary objective of the present CHS system is to maximize the return-to-duty rate to maintain as many warfighters in the combat zone as possible. Doctrine has since changed for combined arms operations, and technologies along with it, but the CHS system remains largely enconced in the more dated paradigm.

The shortcomings in level III hospitals have become increasingly apparent as combat operations and tactics advance. After-action reviews from Afghanistan and Iraq, from both medical leadership and the line, continue to lament the lack of modularity and scalability of hospitals. The current design of Army combat support hospitals and Navy fleet hospitals is a Cold War relic: massive unit assemblages that are incapable of rapid force projection, immobile once they arrive in theater, incapable of echeloned movement to maintain continuity of support for maneuver units, and designed so rigidly that it is virtually impossible to tailor them to changing conditions on a high-tempo battlefield. A conceptual design for a joint theater hospital was outlined by the Joint Staff in 1997, the product of an enormous tri-Service effort under the rubric of Joint Vision 2010/2020. While the operational concepts of that effort have had some influence on subsequent operations, the force structure of level III medical facilities has not experienced commensurate change.

The Force Health Protection component of Joint Vision 2010 advocated a single joint theater hospital design that could be adopted by all Services. This new level III facility would be capable of providing essential care in theater, as opposed to the more comprehensive care that could be gotten from existing combat support hospitals and fleet hospitals. The concept offers countless advantages over the current design. By focusing on essential care of casualties, a joint theater hospital could dramatically reduce weight and cubic volume of its equipment and supplies to facilitate more rapid deployment in support of contingency operations. Furthermore, a joint theater hospital must assume a modular design that enables the unit to deploy in echelons. This provides two advantages. First, a small level III

Sailors evacuate wounded Iraqi soldier during Operation Steel Curtain
capability could be quickly inserted with rapid deployment combat forces to provide surgery, patient hold, and a more definitive care capability consistent with requirements for the combat force buildup. Second, once a hospital is fully deployed in theater, it can move in sections (or echelons) to support the advance or other offensive operations of combat forces. This creates a tactical advantage that is impossible under existing designs. It also offers greater flexibility to commanders for quickly tailoring medical units for a broad range of contingencies—whether humanitarian assistance actions, stability operations, or more intense combat operations.

The joint theater hospital, by necessity, would be more dependent on responsive aeromedical evacuation assets that provide more sophisticated clinical capability for en route care. Recent experiences in Operation Iraqi Freedom, however, indicate that the Air Force may be prepared for this challenge. New changes in aeromedical evacuation doctrine, equipment, and organization are well synchronized with the demands of this transformed combat health system.

A single joint design also enhances interoperability between the Services. Combatant commanders and staff, as well as strategic movement planners, would now recognize a lone menu of options for hospital support, irrespective of Service color, to support the different phases of a given operation. Medical logistic support, biomedical maintenance repair, and general support maintenance are more easily facilitated when the whole CHS system is operating under a common set of requirements. The greatest benefit is the potential to leverage the entire inventory of medical personnel across the MHS to staff these hospitals. Service-specific requirements are less pronounced beyond the division rear boundary. The unit of productivity is essentially the same—treating the wounds and saving the lives of individual Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines. Once units across all Services are equally equipped, trained, and functioning as joint hospitals, any Service could support the casualty flows from brigade medical units.

Streamline five levels of care to three. By expanding the resources of level II units, creating a more dynamic level III capability, emphasizing en route patient care to sustain stabilized patients, and using definitive fixed facilities outside of the combat zone, we can now pare the five-level system to three levels. Level I would represent brigade (division) level medical support, with no distinction between the battalion aid station and medical

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company capability since the full complement of advanced trauma and surgical care is organic to the medical battalion and can be employed wherever the battlefield dictates. Level II would represent the stabilizing care capability provided by the joint theater hospital. Level III would provide definitive care and is represented by any fixed facility positioned beyond the combat zone.

**Tenets for Critical Thinking**

Transformation of any system must begin with a vision. General Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has stated, “I will tell you categorically that if we change none of our toys and simply change the way we think about how to apply them, we will have transformation on a very, very fast pace.”\(^{10}\) It would be easier to continue on our current path and accept incremental change to the current design, particularly given our successes in Operation Iraqi Freedom. True CHS transformation will invite controversy. An article in *Army Magazine* stated, “Army leaders must create an environment where critical thinking is the norm and reasoned debate replaces unspoken dissent.”\(^{11}\)

Can those who represent the MHS find a means to channel its collective energy, experience, and intellect to create a dynamic medical system that will more effectively serve the next generation of warfighters? Ideally, this discussion will provide a point of departure for further discourse, but perhaps most will agree on at least the following tenets:

- The design of the combat health support system must be capable of enjoining an operational tempo commensurate with that of the combat forces we support.
- We must commit ourselves to becoming a fully interoperable joint medical force—a seamless system that leverages Service core competencies for the entire theater and maximizes economies of scale for competencies that are not Service-specific.
- Medical assets must be planned and positioned as far forward as the tactical situation allows.
- Essential care must be provided in theater; effective en route care that sustains casualties can be furnished by all medical evacuation teams (ground and air), both intra-theater and inter-theater; and definitive care can be given by fixed facilities positioned outside the combat zone.
- We must beat the clock. We have only recently explored the advantages of forcing the full impact of American medicine into that first 60 minutes following trauma on the battlefield. It isn’t simply a golden hour; every minute is golden.

Every attempt to press the limits of these tenets will result in a more responsive and joint CHS system that meets the challenges of the golden hour standard. The true benefit will be the lives saved.  

**NOTES**

8. Ibid., 29.
10. Rumsfeld.
In the late 19th century, Hans Delbrück described war in terms of annihilation and exhaustion. A century later, after the advent of airplanes, access to space, computers, nuclear weapons, computers, and the information revolution, strategists introduced a new paradigm, effects-based operations. This concept suggests a new national objective: control of an enemy. Control is a contemporary, efficient, and humane goal. It stands in stark contrast to the traditional and perhaps dogmatic military objectives of annihilating an enemy’s army or engaging in costly wars of attrition.

Given the current constrained fiscal environment and limited goals as features of the most likely future conflict scenarios, this article provides a simple conceptual lens through which to plan or analyze coercive operations. Keeping the objective of control in mind, it asserts that the military instrument, and particularly joint aerospace power, is a vital tool for coercing enemy decision-makers. Then it proposes a simple model that leaders and strategists might consider when planning coercive campaigns. This treatment is not a debate over decisiveness or Service roles and missions.

If one accepts Carl von Clausewitz’s idea that war is politics, then political realities must bound the use of force. So, assuming that the United States will be forced into conflicts in coming years, the most likely disputes will be characterized by limited means and ends. Today, the air component—joint and coalition aerospace power—often provides lower-cost and lower-risk coercive action.

Difficult strategic situations require decisionmakers to use limited means to change an adversary’s behavior. It is not hyperbole to state that the use of limited military force is deep-seated in contemporary American culture. Embedded reporters in Iraq and the administration’s measured response after the 9/11 terrorist attacks provide compelling evidence.

The United States did not rush headlong into battle. Military and civilian leaders alike attempted to limit direct and unintended negative impact on innocents while destroying regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq. The targets were the enemy government’s pillars of power, not the populace. Wholesale destruction of civil infrastructure and wanton killing of innocent civilians were avoided through careful planning, adaptive training, and precise execution. U.S.-led coalitions thus toppled two hostile rogue regimes in 2 years; then, in a uniquely American way of leading war, vast amounts of humanitarian support were provided to the people while military operations were engaged against terrorists, enemy combatants, and rogue regime leaders, often simultaneously.

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This emphasis on exhaustive analysis, careful planning, and limited force is a result of tradition, American values, alliances, cooperative security responsibilities, globalization, politics, and the complexity of the current strategic environment. Fortunately, technology enables more discriminating combat power for those willing to invest in it. Regardless of technical marvels and superpower status, however, today’s enemies seek nothing short of the destruction of the Western way of life—a critical planning factor when comparing will and popular support and considering useful potential strategies against enemies.

Although the stakes are high, Americans prefer limited means to achieve carefully selected objectives. However, a limited war for the United States may be a total war for an adversary. Since contemporary enemies, terrorists, and the states that support them are not constrained by concern for human life and civil rights, strikes against any American interest or ally are possible. Extremists and rogue state supporters encourage attacks against innocents in an age of rapid communication, travel, and proliferation of advanced weapons technology. A fanatical disregard for the safety of their followers or compatriots and a desire to kill innocents make today’s terrorists and rogue leaders dangerous and difficult to thwart.

Leaders attempted to limit direct and unintended negative impact on innocents while destroying regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq

Other factors is ultimately trumped by the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction and the real potential for rapid escalation of a regional conflict. Depending on the situation and specific national interests threatened, a tailored application of limited force can contribute to efforts to coerce an adversary while actually reducing the potential for escalation. In sum, a limited conflict can be a high-stakes contest because of the realities of modern global politics, economics, and power—hence the need to orchestrate the instruments of national power.

Instruments of Power Bound

Many senior U.S. Government and military leaders recognize that coercion will be achieved more effectively by coordinating a variety of instruments of national power. Each case is different, but contemporary international confrontations, at least on the Western side, are unfailingly bounded by political restraints, both domestic and coalition. Military strategies must therefore consider a variety of political factors to avoid international condemnation or long-term diplomatic and economic repercussions while recognizing the necessity to protect U.S. vital interests. The bounds of current political acceptability and American ethics are necessary elements of any responsible discussion of the limited employment of U.S. power.

Political boundaries limiting military options are not new. Hans Delbrück, a student of Clausewitz, noted this idea a
the key to an effective operational strategy is understanding the mechanisms that effect desired behavior

Working in a coalition environment, when moving from the political, diplomatic, economic, and informational realms to the military instrument, low-risk and low-cost options are particularly important to maintain cohesion and avoid rapid, divisive escalation to large-scale war. This is why aerospace power force projection options, such as precision strike and bombardment (but not excluding supply and humanitarian assistance), are so attractive to leaders as relatively low-risk, low-cost military actions—they are akin to dipping a toe into a shark tank. The key to an effective operational strategy, then, is understanding the mechanisms that effect desired behavior, tempered with the knowledge that war is not surgery and 500-pound bombs are not scalpels.

Two Mechanisms

Reducing coercion through force to its essence, the military instrument brings about change in an adversary or its leaders’ behavior—control in the new parlance—through two fundamental mechanisms: fear and loss. Since the first acknowledged offensive force arrives by air (even if that airpower is transported by sea), and airpower itself is particularly useful for destroying objects to produce desired effects, it is likely that use of joint or coalition aerospace power would produce a materiel loss for an enemy. This loss could include eliminating individuals in leadership command positions, as well as destroying fielded or garrisoned military forces and, in some cases, civil or military infrastructure.

Aerospace power is emphasized in this treatment because the range, speed, surprise, and power of weapons used in that medium enable them to attack directly and affect an adversary’s pillars of power with incredible accuracy and at relatively low military and political risk. For example, what is commonly considered the opening shot of Operation Iraqi Freedom was an airstrike in Baghdad against a leadership target. It was at least partly successful even though the battle damage estimate was inconclusive. This same airstrike, however, also served to cause confusion and fear in the minds of the leaders, reducing their grip on power—a difficult effect to measure but one that was nevertheless observable. The reduction in Iraqi command, control, and communications capabilities certainly contributed to the rapid dissolution of the military.

Military force, aerospace power in particular, is well suited to cause the adversary to react with fear. Initially, it is fear of an attack, whether a preemptive strike or a response to provocation. Then the fear changes to a dread of further actions. Both mechanisms are inexorably linked. As Clausewitz said, “The effects of physical and psychological factors form an organic whole . . . in formulating any rule concerning physical factors, the theorist must bear in mind the part that moral [morale] factors may play in it.”

The modern U.S. interpretation of the fear mechanism does not imply terrorizing the populace or collapsing a country’s civil infrastructure. Fear in this context functions in the minds of the enemy leadership, and it influences their decisionmaking process and behavior. Those who resist using the fear mechanism fail to understand modern American employment. They rely on the tired canard, “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter,” a vacuous retort arguing for moral relativism. Terrorizing civilians is unacceptable in the contemporary American psyche and in the coalition against terror, while creating fear and uncertainty in...
the minds of enemy leaders is acceptable. The fear mechanism, then, necessarily focuses on influencing adversary leaders, not crushing or exploiting an already oppressed and presumably powerless civilian populace.

The enabler of this stratagem is technology, a distinct asymmetric American advantage. Technology permits joint and coalition aerospace power to provide pin-point accuracy only dreamed of in the 1930s, when the Army Air Corps hotly debated strategic bombardment and industrial web theory. America and its allies have since modernized their practices to exploit new capabilities and, as a result, saturation bombing and fire bombing of cities are not required or desired to achieve necessary effects. As a result, U.S. policy can emphasize avoiding civilian and unnecessary military casualties on both sides. This desire to minimize death and widespread destruction may result in increased risk to American military personnel and limit the ability to achieve desired objectives. Thus, the mechanism of fear is not terrorism; there is no intent to attack innocents (unlike the aims of such groups as al Qaeda) but instead a deliberate attempt to reduce national disruption through influencing adversary leaders.

The Mechanism of Loss. The most basic and obvious coercive mechanism, loss is the attrition or depletion of a commodity or item that is valuable to the enemy. This deprivation is typically quantifiable, and measures of merit or effectiveness are often straightforward. Some call a strategy emphasizing this mechanism denial.7 Others speak in terms of counterforce or countervalue targeting, depending on the goal.8 Simple attrition may also be part of a strategy emphasizing punishment, or military destruction intended to send a message of resolve, or even actions to encourage civilian disaffection, revolution, or a coup. Loss is not viable as a stand-alone strategy under the modern U.S. construct that promotes life and liberty; it simply describes a mechanism that creates desired effects and changes in adversary behavior that lead to achieving specific objectives under a more comprehensive national strategy.9

Regardless of the moniker and the specific targets chosen, the desired effect of a strategy emphasizing loss is reducing, depleting, or wearing down something the enemy leadership values.10 Furthermore, adversaries’ susceptibility to coercion through attrition using aerospace power depends on their desire to retain their troops, materiel, wealth, or defensive position. In a democracy, it also depends on the will of the people and civilian leaders.

For example, since Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia in 1995, some state and nonstate adversaries have used human shields (innocents or prisoners held as hostages to deter U.S. military action). This strategy specifically targets a perceived American weakness: valuing human life. In these cases, aerial bombardment may be physically possible but not politically or ethically viable, so another instrument may be more useful. Also, nonlethal or indirect options may be available to cause politically acceptable attrition, though international law prohibits some modern nonlethal technologies.

Loss may also directly affect an adversary’s military or economic capability, removing an enemy leader’s options by reducing his military power, wealth, or influence. However, it is critical to determine if the enemy is vulnerable to the politically acceptable and legally supported use of aerospace power. Therefore, intelligence and diplomatic efforts are essential to make an ultimatum or conditions clear to the adversary while permitting a response tailored to compel the outcome with minimal cost, effort, and loss of life.

The need to minimize civilian casualties, collateral damage, and negative political consequences may inhibit the ability to coerce or use airborne weapons.11 Bombing is of limited use if civilians are at risk or the targets are located where unacceptable collateral damage would be unavoidable. In cases where the loss of life would be minimal, or the interest is particularly vital, air attacks can prove effective.

In scenarios short of an unlimited war for national survival, the mechanism of loss has a practical need to focus primarily on destroying enemy forces and military targets. Infrastructure and leadership targets may be acceptable to attack if the political climate allows. Yet enemies who possess fanatical ideologies or who, in their calculus, have no acceptable options may not be susceptible to coercion by loss. They may fight to the death. To avoid this endgame, Sun Tzu recommended leaving a bridge behind an enemy. Ultimately, however, attrition produces strategic effects by force and results in
Delbrück’s exhaustion of an enemy’s ability to fight effectively. The cost, however, may be too high for modern Western sensibilities in most likely conflicts.

The Mechanism of Fear (Morale or Will). Realists anticipate that enemies use a cost-benefit analysis. Adversaries believe they can benefit from war or they would not fight. A calculus may appear obscure to a Western observer but seem perfectly logical to a fanatical adversary, based on culture, extremist values, brainwashing, indoctrination, or a unique situation. Intelligence tempered with sensitivity to cultural differences is imperative during an analysis of intentions and motivations. Though fear is difficult to quantify, a qualitative analysis (incorporating bounded rationality, game theory, or prospect theory) can produce insights into the decisionmaking process. The mechanism that deters aggression is fear—of material loss, death, or loss of power. This mechanism can also help restrain escalation if deterrence proves ineffective.

Destruction of different or fewer targets may be required to affect the fear mechanism rather than to affect the loss mechanism through direct attrition. Moreover, it is more economical than exhausting an enemy’s military before one’s own forces or political will are spent. For example, destroying a country’s principal port and all the ships in it is attrition. But if that country values the port greatly, attacking selected port targets while threatening its long-term viability through diplomacy, psychological operations, and demonstrated military capability could be more efficient in the long term than destroying the entire facility and then rebuilding it.

Unlike assassination, a politically acceptable option may be attacking enemy command and control nodes.

For the adversary, this decision leverages the fear of future loss.

Conversely, attacking fielded forces might be simple attrition. But destroying a leader’s elite personal guard is a selective, deliberate elimination of a valued military unit that reduces the adversary’s power beyond a statistical casualty count. Psychological and information operations can build a synergy in these situations. This targeting strategy may effectively leverage the mechanism of fear in regard to the leaders’ or the remaining fielded forces. It is therefore a more indirect coercive mechanism than loss.

To use the mechanism of fear, the strategist must understand what adversary leaders value and fear. Strategists gain this information through intelligence, analysis, and non-ethnocentric role-playing (wargaming or red-teaming). By deducing an adversary’s vulnerabilities, both physical and psychological, a strategist might exploit the enemy leaders’ fears to coerce them. Furthermore, if what they value is vulnerable to a politically acceptable attack by air forces, then relatively low-risk coercion by aerospace power may be possible.

Strategy and Targets

The loss and fear mechanisms are not discrete; they overlap and synergistically contribute to a coercive strategy. A commander manipulates these mechanisms, under the auspices of a strategy designed to achieve specific effects, by targeting enemy (and axis—entities supporting the enemy) assets and capabilities intended to create an environment favorable for coercion. Informed and careful selection of targets for kinetic and nonkinetic attack will be more likely to lead to the achievement of desired effects at acceptable costs than wanton destruction or annihilation of convenient, or all, enemy forces.

When considering how to achieve desired effects, it is important to recognize that attacking/influencing certain targets can produce unintended consequences, and some targets or methods of attack are physically possible but fall beyond the realm of current political mores. Indeed, the essence of effects-based operations is to determine desired effects and select the best ways to produce them under the given national policy and strategy. Considering where the planned conflict sits in relation to other actions is a useful exercise for leaders, planners, and strategists to bound the possible with the approvable or likely.

Relationship of Fear and Loss Mechanisms

Threatening or attempting to kill an enemy leader affects the fear mechanism directly (figure, point A). It is not the killing itself but the fear of death that may produce a coercive effect. If an enemy leader is killed, the replacement knows his potential fate if he remains recalcitrant. If the leader is not killed, fear still increases the security demands of the adversary leaders and complicates or disrupts their decisionmaking process.

Such a direct approach, however, typically is not politically possible under the current policy and U.S. force employment...
Attacking a militarily significant target that threatens a leader’s life directly carries an implied message. Yet it might also eliminate the leader himself and hasten a new strategic situation. For example, unlike assassination, a politically acceptable option may be attacking enemy command and control nodes, such as command bunkers in presidential palaces or a terrorist camp headquarters (figure, point B). The effect of disruption is manifest, and a lucky strike may end the conflict. But a systemic collapse requires early consideration and preparation, as do branches caused by unintended consequences, such as reported or actual civilian collateral damage.

A nuclear strike against fielded forces intended to destroy an adversary’s military capability and resistance is an extreme example of exploiting the loss mechanism (figure, point C). A brute force strategy this drastic is currently not a politically feasible or desirable use of American power in any but the most profound circumstances.

Conventional weapons, delivered in large quantities with tremendous accuracy, can cause significant material attrition as well as psychological effects against the adversary leadership and fielded forces alike. Extensive battlefield preparation with heavy bombers is politically acceptable and can be devastating physically and against enemy morale, as evidenced by Operations Desert Storm in 1991 and Enduring Freedom in 2001 and 2002 (figure, point D).

If planned well, a strategy balancing the two mechanisms can generate the commander’s desired effects. Both the fear and loss mechanisms are affected when a strategy calls for attacks against targets in this overlapping region, though the strategy remains bounded by shifting political restraints (figure, point E). Retaliatory aerial attacks during the 1996 Desert Strike operation against Iraq serve as an example where loss through bombing was intended, as was the fear of future loss of a valuable resource. In this case, surface-to-air missiles were the valued commodity. Moreover, a fear of further strikes (and the resultant potential for future attrition) was intended to inhibit aggression. The 1998 Desert Fox operation degraded Iraq’s capability to threaten its neighbors while simultaneously sending a message of resolve. Neither of these actions was a stunning success, but the extended air campaign over Serbia in 1999, Operation Allied Force, ended more conclusively. In this operation, coalition aerospace power reduced enemy military capability through attrition, forced dispersion, and eroded the will of adversary leaders enough to force capitulation before invasion became necessary.

In late 2001, Operation Enduring Freedom demonstrated the employment possibilities of a new variety of aerospace and special operations forces (SOF) partnering. This included heavy payload B-1 and B-52 bombers delivering huge amounts of ordnance against Taliban fielded forces. Smaller payload joint surface attack and fighter aircraft, often with the assistance of SOF ground troops, selectively reduced capabilities, particularly in populated or urban areas (figure, point F). This was attrition through ground-assisted aerial bombard-
aerospace power, other escalating military options, and other instruments of national power must be coordinated to remain digestible to domestic and international audiences

navigation, and distribution of humanitarian aid. These noncombat functions demonstrated that bombardment was coordinated to an unprecedented extent not only with SOF but also with other instruments of national power.

Operation Iraqi Freedom blurred the traditional phasing of a conventional, limited war: an extended air campaign, offers for diplomatic recourse, refusal, a land campaign, then a period of stability under arms. Mere hours before the ground assault from the south, a precision weapon airstrike attacked a command and control target in Baghdad. Whether intended as a decapitation or attrition strike against principal enemy decisionmakers by the coalition, it sent a message exercising their fear component. Although aerial bombardment did not kill the Iraqi dictator—the central command and control hub—he was rapidly rendered ineffective. That disruption was apparent days later when Baghdad fell. Striking fleeting targets with precision weapons was a demonstrated capability. Once the Iraqi Freedom ground thrust began from the south, commanders were largely successful in integrating land, sea, and air components on an unprecedented scale (figure, point H). Other simultaneous countrywide operations were synchronized with the southern push, including joint air attacks supported by joint special forces in western Iraq and an extraordinary airdrop of infantry forces in northern Iraq.

Strategists may choose to attack certain targets primarily to create fear and others to destroy materiel, devices, or troops to reduce an adversary’s military capability. Targets produce loss and fear in different proportions, depending on the circumstance and the adversary’s value system. The selection of any strategic target, however, remains bounded by political constraints and the desired endstate. Moreover, some adversaries will be more susceptible to one coercive mechanism than another. The specific targets identified to affect that mechanism depend on the adversary’s governing system, leadership, and other contextual factors. The strategic art resides in determining how to effect change through manipulating all the instruments of national power and the enemy’s vulnerabilities to them.

**Tailored Strategy Basics**

When planning or evaluating a coercive strategy as a whole, it is important to remember the enemy’s perspective, avoid mirror-imaging, and wargame the plan, considering moves from friendly, enemy, and interested third-party perspectives. Fundamentally, a successful coercive strategy must follow a careful analysis to determine if what the adversary possesses is vulnerable to attack before deciding the means or medium. Identified effects, and then targets (or target sets), must be established that would exploit the coercive effects in the given situation.

Once the adversary’s values become evident, strategists should target or threaten selected, politically permissible items to maximize the effects of limited allied resources. However, for the best long-term solution, military force must be part of a coherent strategy, usually in concert with diplomatic actions, a strong economy, and a well-coordinated information campaign. The threat of friendly casualties and international law may limit the strategy and reduce acceptable target sets. In cases where threats or threatening attacks will not work, where “sending a message” is judged to be ineffective, attacks emphasizing attrition may produce coercive effects, but at more cost in political capital and national fortune.

The willingness of the United States to accept casualties varies with the interests and principles involved. Targeting thus varies with the situation, acceptable risk, and sustainable expense. For example, some believed that the Kosovo air campaign, Allied Force, would last just 3 days—though airpower planners were dubious. As days turned into weeks, reality forced reassessment, and the strategy necessarily shifted. The use of regular North Atlantic Treaty Organization ground forces, previously taken off the table, had to be reconsidered, though it was ultimately not necessary. Iraqi Freedom, on the other hand, shows that the United States can still accept casualties for an extended period when the populace deems the objective valuable.

Pervasive media and an around-the-clock news cycle, international law, and the values of American citizens—casualty-sensitive if not casualty-adverse—influence both the desired outcome and the mechanism decisionmakers choose to exploit. Therefore, the outcome and intermediate objectives must all be obtainable and legitimate. The mechanisms must be tailored to affect the adversary in ways that are least costly and most beneficial to the coalition. The effects must directly relate to the targets chosen and should always relate to the strategy employed and the desired endstate. The synergistic effects of aerospace power, other escalating military options, and integration with other instruments of national power must be skillfully coordinated to remain palatable to domestic and international audiences.

When contemplating force in a coercive strategy and considering options led by the air component, leaders and commanders must ask if aerospace power is the right tool. Analysis may indicate that the application of a tailored aerospace power strategy, when coordinated with other instruments, can result in the change of the adversary’s behavior. However, an analysis may also conclude that aerospace power, particularly aerial bombardment, is the wrong tool to effect a change; therefore, alternative strategies are needed. The endstate, mechanisms, and both domestic and international political considerations are important topics to evaluate in order to avoid using the wrong means to achieve coercive ends. Even if aerospace power is not the most effective tool for a given situation, its limited footprint and risk make it tempting. And as technology improves, and when America’s joint air component has a large uninhabited aerial vehicle element, leaders will be even more attracted to the perceived lower risk and cost option.
Value of the Fear-and-Loss Model

The value of considering fear and loss is that the model gives strategists and decisionmakers an uncomplicated lens through which to evaluate a variety of stratagems. A strategy leveraging the mechanisms of loss and fear promotes selectively targeting what an adversary values to achieve limited political ends. Loss and fear do not replace effects-based operations. Rather, the simple mechanisms of this model help frame what effects are likely and useful in the given strategic environment.

Integrating aerospace power in a comprehensive and synergistic coercion strategy involving other nations and instruments of national power is tempting, which is why leaders have relied on the air component to lead most post–Cold War conflicts. A final caution, however, is that predictability is a real risk. Until the ground assault in Operation Iraqi Freedom, conventional wisdom—including international conventional wisdom, to the degree that such a thing exists—assumed aerial bombardment was the most likely first U.S. reaction to provocation. Therefore, responding with joint aerospace power must involve close integration of other instruments of national power to increase useful synergy and reduce predictability.

Indeed, the art (the “genius” in Clausewitzian terms) required to succeed with a coercive strategy lies in the leaders’ ability to assess how, when, and where to exert pressure to achieve desired ends. JFQ

NOTES


4 Craig, 342.

5 Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow, From Lexington to Desert Storm (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), 13–14. Drew and Snow note that the United States needs objectives that are simple, morally or politically lofty, and vital to national interests.


U.S. targeting strategy is based on counterforce and countervalue. Under a counterforce strategy military assets of a hostile state, both conventional and nuclear, are held at risk. A key component in the way we practiced nuclear deterrence during the Cold War, this strategy requires many weapons. A countervalue strategy holds populations, major industry, and leadership of a hostile state at risk. It requires fewer weapons than counterforce.


10 See Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 70–71, for more on brute force, coercion, and compellence.


12 Schelling, 3, calls this process “latent violence.” Not simply the brute force destruction of a country, but the threat of damage, or of more damage to come.

13 I am not advocating assassination. Attacking command and control targets, including leadership targets, may be permissible depending upon the circumstances in a conflict.

14 Heavy bomber, B–1, B–2, or B–52, bombing attacks used dozens of 500- or 2,000-pound bombs dropped in a line over several hundred yards. This example is in contrast to the many precision bomb attacks made by smaller fighter-bombers, which typically carry a load of 2 to 12 bombs.

Joint Logistics in the Future

Leaders win through logistics. Vision, sure. Strategy, yes. But when you go to war, you need to have both toilet paper and bullets at the right place at the right time. In other words, you must win through superior logistics.

—Tom Peters, “Rule # 3: Leadership Is Confusing as Hell,” Fast Company (March 2001)

By C. V. CHRISTIANSON

The logistic capacity of the U.S. military is unmatched, and the Nation’s ability to project military power provides the joint warfighter unprecedented capabilities. However, a constantly changing operating environment and budgetary constraints demand that we optimize joint logistics to enhance capabilities. We are at a point where we have the opportunity to advance efforts to design and implement systems, processes, and organizational changes that will improve the support of tomorrow’s joint warfighter.

The necessity of joint logistics is almost unanimously accepted throughout the Department of Defense (DOD) logistic community, and most agree that the effective delivery of logistic support is essential to the joint warfighting commander, the ultimate customer. Achieving harmony between and among Service- and agency-funded systems, processes, and programs, however, is challenging. Harmony is only possible with a common understanding of the purpose of joint logistics. This agreement comes from determining what joint logistics is and why we need it.

Joint logistics is the deliberate or improvised sharing of resources by reducing or eliminating constraints and restraints and developing ways to facilitate this process. This is needed because the Services seldom have enough resources, especially during initial expeditionary activity. Sharing resources can optimize the apportionment of assets to provide maximum capability to the supported commander. The overall purpose of joint logistics is thus to achieve logistic

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synergy—getting more out of what we collectively have than we could by ourselves.

**The Joint Logistic Environment**

The war on terror and other threats frame the joint logistic environment. Gone are the days when we had the time and resources to position large stores of assets in response to a stable, predictable threat. Future operations are likely to be distributed and conducted rapidly and simultaneously across multiple joint operational areas within a single theater, or across boundaries of geographic combatant commands. In that environment, force projection operations give the Nation the ability to close the gap between early entry and follow-on combat operations and simultaneous stabilization and reconstruction operations. The requirement to harmonize force projection operations in a complex operating environment offers the greatest challenge to the joint logistician. This article describes the three imperatives that frame that challenge. While these imperatives are not goals in themselves, they define the outcomes of a confederation of systems, processes, and organizations that are agile, effectively adapting to a constantly changing environment to meet the emerging needs of the supported joint force commander (JFC). These outcomes are delivered within an operating environment that spans tactical, operational, and strategic spaces.

**gone are the days when we had the time and resources to position large stores of assets in response to a predictable threat**

The effect of joint logistics is freedom of action for the JFC. The success of this effort must be measured in the tactical space, where readiness is the principal deliverable. Sustained joint logistic readiness enables freedom of action and results from the synchronization and coordination of all logistic capabilities. The readiness achieved within the tactical space results from the cumulative efforts of Services, agencies, and other players across the entire operating environment. There is a high price in the tactical space for inefficiencies within the operational or strategic spaces.

Operational space is where joint logistics must deliver and where the ability to integrate logistic capabilities provides the greatest opportunities. Moreover, operational space is where the joint logistician must bridge Service, coalition, agency, and other organizational elements and capabilities, linking national and tactical systems, processes, and organizations to enable the freedom of action the JFC must have. The essence of joint logistics is in the operational space, where the work of joint logistics should concentrate.

The U.S. ability to project and sustain military power (its campaign quality) comes from the strategic space. This national system enables sustained operations over time and leverages our most potent force multiplier, the vast capacity of the industrial base. At this level, modern, clearly defined, well-understood, and outcome-focused processes drive efficiencies across Service, agency, and commercial capabilities. The power of robust and efficient global processes, combined with agile global force positioning, gives the Nation the foundation for success. This system is fundamental to global flexibility in the face of constantly changing threats.

**Strategic Framework**

The strategic framework for joint logistics can be built around the roles and accountabilities of the global players within the joint logistic domain and its community of interest. This collaborative network of relationships should be based on the preeminence of the Services because they are responsible to raise, train, equip, and sustain forces for the joint force commander. Since the Services lie at the heart of the joint logistic network, the joint community of interest (processes, systems, programs, organizations) should measure value with the Service components of the joint commands. Every logistic program, system, and initiative should be viewed within the framework of these critical strategic relationships, which describe key strategic interdependencies.

The JFC, through his Service components, acts as the commander of joint logistics in his area of responsibility and as the principal focus of the national organizations described below. These organizations comprise the backbone of joint logistics and provide and sustain logistically ready forces to the supported JFC. These organizations may be seen as global providers, responsible for the end-to-end synchronization and coordination of processes that deliver outcomes to the supported commander. They constantly strive to improve their capabilities in concert with each other, integrating deployment/redeployment, supply, distribution, and readiness processes to ensure that the supported commander receives both forces and logistic sustainment on time and where needed.
The Services—which can be viewed as defense readiness process owners—form the foundation of this joint framework and are the supported organizations for logistic readiness. In this role, they are responsible for the life-cycle readiness of their systems and are focused on the product they are chartered to deliver: logistic readiness at best value.

The Services and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) share responsibilities as joint supply process owners. In that shared role, they are supporting organizations to the components of the joint force for logistic readiness. The Services and DLA are responsible for strategic supply support and, supported by the distribution process owner (DPO), are focused on their product: perfect order fulfillment.

U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) serves as the joint deployment process owner and is the primary conventional force provider and global force manager. In this role, USJFCOM globally manages forces to ensure that the supported commander is provided with the forces needed to achieve national objectives. The command coordinates and makes recommendations for the global conventional force and, supported by the DPO, is focused on its product: perfect capability fulfillment.

U.S. Transportation Command serves as the Defense DPO and is the supporting organization to DLA and the Services for sustainment and to USJFCOM for the movement of force capability packages. The command coordinates and synchronizes the defense distribution system and is focused on its product: time-definite delivery.

Imperatives for Success

The supported joint force commander expects joint logistics to give him freedom of action—to enable execution of his mission according to his timetable. The value of joint logistics can be measured by how well three joint logistic imperatives are achieved: unity of effort, domain-wide visibility, and rapid and precise response.

Unity of effort is the coordinated application of all logistic capabilities focused on the JFC’s intent and is the most critical of all joint logistic outcomes. Achieving unity of effort requires the seamless integration of U.S. joint, multinational, interagency, and nongovernmental logistic capabilities and is built around three enablers:

- Effective organizational capabilities and authorities provide the means to execute joint logistics.
- Shared priorities across the logistic domain drive unity by focusing capabilities against the joint warfighter’s most important requirements. Key tasks are the integration of priorities across joint, combined, and interagency domains and the continuous sorting of them in space and time.
- Common critical processes drive synergy across the joint force. Understanding how a joint logistic process works, how members of the joint force access it, and how the JFC measures success frames this enabler.

Domain-wide visibility is the ability to see the requirements, resources, and capabilities across the joint logistic domain. Three fundamental enablers frame the ability to achieve this imperative:

- Connectivity is access to a network 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, to synchronize and coordinate efforts of supporting DOD agencies, interagency participants, multinational partners, host nations, contractors, and commercial sector participants.
- Standard enterprise data architecture is the foundation for effective and rapid data transfer and the fundamental building block to enabling a common logistic picture and high logistic situational understanding. This
enabler fosters warfighter confidence by facilitating visibility across the entire global supply chain.

- **Global focus** over the processes that deliver support to the joint warfighter is paramount to effective joint logistics. Logistic support to the joint force is global business, and any view of joint logistics that operates below this level will suboptimize processes and deliver less than acceptable readiness.

**Rapid and precise response**, the third imperative, is the ability of the supply chain to meet the constantly changing needs of the joint force. Lack of key supplies, regardless of the reason, undermines readiness and increases mission risk. The following performance measures indicate how well the supply chain is responding to the needs of the joint force:

- **Speed** is the core of responsiveness and its most critical aspect to the warfighter. Ideally, all logistics should be immediately available all the time, but that is not possible given cost and resource constraints. The focus should be on what is *quick enough*, recognizing that not all supplies are equally vital. Items that truly drive readiness deserve special treatment.

- **Reliability** is the ability of the supply chain to provide the warfighter predictability of supply or time-definite delivery. When items are not immediately available, the joint logistic system must provide immediate and reliable estimates of delivery to enable the warfighter to make decisions regarding mission options.

- **Visibility** is closely aligned with speed and reliability and is the supply chain feature that provides rapid and easy access to order visibility information. Fundamentally, this tells the warfighter where a shipment is and when it will arrive.

- **Efficiency** is directly related to the supply chain’s footprint. In the tactical and operational spaces, where every human resource is limited and every moment spent chasing information in the supply chain drains these resources, the footprint can be viewed in terms of the personnel resources needed to compensate for the inefficiencies of the current supply chain. In the strategic space, efficiency can be viewed as measure of the cost per outcome.

Joint logistics exists to give the JFC the freedom of action to meet mission objectives. It delivers this effect by integrating all logistic capabilities within the operational space, bridging the national strategic sustainment base with the complex operational environment in a way that guarantees freedom of action to the supported JFC. Through rigorous self-assessment, discussion, analysis, and collaboration, significant progress can be made toward this objective.

Programs and initiatives that truly support joint logistics must move forward. Planners cannot wait until every issue is resolved to make decisions. Viewing initiatives through the lens of the imperatives above should offer a reasonable starting point for assessing an initiative’s value. The challenge of integrating Service- and agency-funded programs and systems not designed to support joint operations holistically cannot be underestimated. However, the importance of this effort must be all-prevailing.

Current logistic systems reflect inefficiencies, redundancies, and process gaps that are driving unacceptable risks across the joint force. We have a responsibility to the American people and the next generation of Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines to do better. **JFQ**
For a country that continues to enjoy an unrivaled global position, it is both remarkable and disturbing that the United States has no truly effective strategic planning process for national security. Fifteen years after the Cold War, the United States still lacks a comprehensive interagency process that takes into account both the character of the international security environment and its own ability to deal with future challenges and opportunities. Today, the United States is engaged in conflicts that will, whether by success or failure, completely transform both the broader Middle East and the U.S. role in the world; yet there is no integrated planning process from which to derive the strategic guidance necessary to protect national interests and achieve U.S. objectives.

While the George W. Bush administration’s 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America did articulate a set of national goals and objectives, it was not the product of serious strategic planning. More than 4 years after September 11, 2001, there is no established interagency process for assessing the full spectrum of threats and opportunities endemic to the new security environment and identifying priorities for policy development, execution, and resource allocation. The articulation of a national vision that describes America’s purpose in the post–September 11 world is useful—indeed, it is vital—but describing a destination is no substitute for developing a comprehensive roadmap for how the country will achieve its stated goals. Various institutions in the national security apparatus have attempted strategic planning, but these efforts have been stovepiped within individual agencies and have varied in both approach and quality.

There is still no systematic effort at strategic planning for national security that is inclusive, deliberative, and integrative. David Abshire was correct in concluding that the demands of strategic transforma-
that would ensure that agency budgets reflect both the fiscal guidance and the national security priorities of the President. This essay looks to the Project Solarium of the Eisenhower era for inspiration, design principles, and best practices, while also taking into account lessons to be learned from the experience of other administrations since then. Our aim is to offer a set of actionable recommendations to the President and National Security Adviser that would enhance their ability to integrate all the disparate elements of national power to enable the United States to meet today’s challenges and be better prepared for those of tomorrow.

The Problem

Presidents, National Security Advisers, and Cabinet Secretaries face a vexing challenge from the moment they take office until the moment they leave: how to keep the urgent from crowding out the important. In the national security arena, “the tyranny of the inbox” often becomes “the tyranny of managing today’s crises.” For reasons both practical and political, the day’s headlines, meetings with counterparts, actions on Capitol Hill, and crises at home and abroad often set the day-to-day agenda for senior leaders. This focus on today, however, often precludes strategic thinking about tomorrow.

The Government currently lacks both the incentives and the capacity to support strategic thinking and long-range planning in the national security arena. While the National Security Council (NSC) staff may develop planning documents for their respective issues, they do not have the ability to conduct integrated, long-range planning for the President. While some capacity for strategic planning exists in the Department of Defense (DOD), no other department devotes substantial resources to planning for the long term. Although the Department of State’s Policy Planning Office develops a big-picture approach in specific policy areas, such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization enlargement or relations with China, it focuses (with some exceptions) on issues already on the policy agenda rather than those looming over the horizon. Nor does it

address the types of capabilities the United States should develop to deal with future challenges.

Moreover, there is no established interagency process for regularly bringing together senior national security officials to identify long-range threats and opportunities and consider their implications for U.S. policy and capabilities. While the Intelligence Community provides valuable products to policymakers on a regular basis, it has not been tasked to support a more interactive process in which future trends, possible developments, and wild cards can be discussed and debated to inform national security decisions. Such an interactive process, in which policymakers would hear not only the Intelligence Community’s consensus views but also the diversity of views on more controversial topics, would be invaluable to senior leaders faced with making tough choices for an uncertain future.

Finally, existing processes for ensuring that national security policy priorities are reflected in how agencies allocate resources are weak. Today’s budgeting processes are largely unchanged from the Cold War era. Agencies generally prepare their own budgets in stovepipes. These budgets are keyed to top-line fiscal guidance from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and to individual agency priorities, but not always to common strategic priorities as articulated in the National Security Strategy or other Presi-

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dential statements. Furthermore, no consistent process exists for developing budgets across agencies against these policy priorities. Without articulated priorities against which agency budgets can be examined on an inter-agency basis, the Federal Government has little means of assuring that the hard choices on funding national security missions are being considered within the context of a particular mission and against the full range of the President’s top goals and objectives.

OMB is viewed as a dependable, often unbiased White House player with expertise about how programs work and how to pay for them. But it is principally concerned with the fiscal dimension of the overall budget. This primary task of fiscal control means the
office lacks the tools to develop, evaluate, and endorse robust and resource-intensive policy options. While it is excellent at finding resources to support Presidential priorities, the OMB process alone does not necessarily result in a realignment of resources to reflect policy priorities, either within any budget function or across functions.

This is a critical problem in an era in which nearly all national security priorities—from combating terrorism, to preventing and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to homeland security—require integrated action on the part of multiple independent agencies.

In sum, the absence of an institutionalized process for long-range planning puts Washington at a strategic disadvantage. If the current administration faces: how to plan for an uncertain future when the stakes are high and there is little consensus on how to deal with a growing strategic threat.

On entering office, President Eisenhower grew concerned that national security strategy, as articulated in National Security Council Memorandum 68, committed the country to policies that were not sustainable in the long term.4 In the late afternoon of May 8, 1953, in the White House solarium, he engaged in an extraordinary debate with his foreign policy advisers on the Soviet threat and what an American national security strategy should look like. John Foster Dulles suggested that the President’s focus on “talk about ‘liberty’ doesn’t stop people from becoming communist.” Eisenhower replied, “It’s men’s minds and hearts that must be won.”5 The breadth and intensity of the debate convinced Eisenhower to propose an exercise that would analytically capture the range of options available to the United States while preserving the differences and disagreements between them. “Project Solarium,” as it became known, is a rare example of useful strategic planning at the highest levels of the executive branch.

Eisenhower understood from his experience as a military officer that long-term planning, while necessary, is difficult to sustain when daily operations and crises eclipse a commander’s efforts to keep his eyes on the horizon. Eisenhower clarified the importance of strategic planning early in his administration, telling the NSC principals that they had little time to think through “the best decisions regarding the national security. Someone must therefore do much of this thinking for you.” Thus, when Project Solarium was proposed, Eisenhower immediately suggested that the administration assemble “teams of bright young fellows” who would “take an alternative and tackle it with a real belief in it just the way a good advocate tackles a law case.” Eisenhower wanted each team to present its findings before the NSC principals, with “maps, charts, all the basic supporting figures and estimates, just what each alternative would mean in terms of goal, risk, cost in money and men and world relations.”

United States wants to defeat global terrorism, keep weapons of mass destruction out of the wrong hands, and deal with other threats to its vital interests, it needs a proactive national security policy that is sustainable over the long term. Achieving this requires building more capacity for long-range planning at the highest levels of government and creating incentives for harried decisionmakers to participate.

**Project Solarium**

An example of a truly inclusive and integrated process of long-term strategic planning in the executive branch does exist, although one must look back more than 50 years to find it. President Dwight D. Eisenhower faced a situation in 1953 similar to what the current administration faces: how to plan for an uncertain future when the stakes are high and there is little consensus on how to deal with a growing strategic threat.

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Eisenhower grew concerned that national security strategy committed the country to policies that were not sustainable in the long term. After working on their positions at the National War College throughout June, the groups convened at the White House on July 16 for a special meeting of the National Security Council. Beyond the principal members of the council, the meeting included the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Secretaries, and the NSC Planning Board. During the all-day gathering, each group presented its views and was questioned by opposing groups and the gathered officials. The conversation coalesced around each group’s more controversial recommendations. While some participants argued that the conclusions of each group were fundamentally incompatible, Eisenhower dissented and ordered the three groups to meet to “agree on certain features of the three presentations as the best features and to bring about a combination of such features into a unified policy.” While the formulation of what would become NSC 162/2 took several more months, critical elements of the presentations ended up constituting several core strategies.

Project Solarium owed its success to unique features. Unlike most attempts at high-level strategic planning in the executive branch, the project was the direct result of Presidential leadership. Eisenhower understood the value of being challenged by his advisers on even his most basic assumptions regarding the nature of the developing Cold War with the Soviet Union. He understood the benefits of disagreement and sought to institutionalize such a debate in an inclusive and integrative fashion. Throughout Project Solarium and the subsequent drafting of NSC 162/2, all the institutions with a stake in the outcome were an integral part of the process. Moreover, the differences in opinion between both the Solarium groups and the various secretaries and NSC principals were not watered down to build consensus. Eisenhower understood that his job was to choose between irreconcilable positions. “I have been forced to make decisions, many of them of a critical character, for a good many years, and I know of only one way in which you can be sure you have done your best to make a wise decision,” Eisenhower recollected in a 1967 interview. “That is to get all of the...
[responsible policymakers] with their different points of view in front of you, and listen to them debate." The value Eisenhower placed on preserving alternative analysis and contrarian viewpoints was surely crucial in the formulation of national strategy during his administration. Ultimately, however, he provided the leadership that only a President can exercise.

The Eisenhower administration offers perhaps the best example of long-term strategic planning in the history of the American Presidency. David Rothkopf considers Project Solarium "not just the work of a good executive or a master bureaucrat or even a canny politician; it was a magisterial illustration of an effective President in action." The success of Project Solarium is directly attributable to the ability of President Eisenhower to preserve and nurture long-term strategic planning as a basic prerequisite of an effective and responsible foreign policy.

Unlearning Lessons

The decline of strategic planning after Eisenhower was largely due to three trends that have transcended the unique features of every modern administration. First, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs evolved into a powerful political player who, in turn, has helped push the NSC staff to a dominant position in the foreign policy process. Second, informal methods of Presidential decisionmaking, while always important in the final calculus of choice, have tended to eclipse the more structured and formal mechanisms that were once equally valued and prominent in the process. Finally, as administrations focus on crisis management and daily operations, outside entities such as Congress, other government agencies, and think tanks have attempted to address the strategic planning deficit, with varying results. These trends run deep within the currents of national security foreign policy mechanisms. In her influential Flawed by Design, Amy Zegart concludes that "Under [McGeorge] Bundy, the NSC staff became a truly Presidential foreign policy staff for the first time. . . . Rather than serve as the executive branch’s professional bureaucrats, they served as Kennedy’s personal advisers." The job of managing the President’s daily activities was surely complicated by the dismantling of the Operations Coordinating Board, a move, in Bundy’s words, "to eliminate an instrument that does not match the style of operation and coordination of the current administration." In this more nebulous and informal structure of decisionmaking, Kennedy established a situation room in the White House after the Bay of Pigs failure, which was to serve as a "nerve center" that would give him access to a near–real-time flow of information. Thus, in contrast to the stated desires of Kennedy and Bundy to push coordination out to the various lead departments that would carry out Presidential policy, the elimination of much of the inherited NSC system, combined with the creation of the situation room, quickly led Bundy . . .

Congress, Government agencies, and think tanks have attempted to address the strategic planning deficit, with varying results
and his staff to be overwhelmed by the daily operational needs of a very active President. In dismantling the extensive NSC structure, the administration actually became more reliant on the smaller organization that remained.

The process the Kennedy administration set in motion dramatically altered the relationship between and among the President’s senior foreign policy advisers. The National Security Adviser became, if formal meetings of the National Security Council to the periphery of decisionmaking has been created by the rise of informal mechanisms as the primary arena of Presidential consultation. From Lyndon Johnson’s famous “Tuesday luncheons,” to Richard Nixon’s backroom dealings, to Jimmy Carter’s “Friday breakfasts,” and to Ronald Reagan’s tiny “National Security Planning Group,” all Presidents have regularly used informal mechanisms. These procedures individual agencies to pick up the slack. The problem with strategic planning outside the White House, however, is that it tends to be either confined to the purview of individual agencies or vulnerable to the partisan environment in Washington. There are, nevertheless, lessons to be learned from these efforts. Effective planning requires an interagency process that is inclusive, integrative, and comprehensive and that facilitates the unity of effort necessary for success.

It is unrealistic to suppose that a perfect organizational structure can be created that would ensure both prescient and consistent strategic planning while catering to the unique preferences of different administrations. It is, however, reasonable to consider what basic structure would best ensure a healthy balance between long-term planning versus daily operations and crisis management. The evolution of the National Security Adviser and the NSC staff from the Eisenhower era to the current administration is characterized by increasing emphasis on daily requirements and crisis management. The inability of senior decisionmakers to think strategically, to recognize and adapt to new challenges, and to ensure that resource allocation and policy execution reflect their priorities has contributed mightily to the types of failures we have seen in the post–Cold War period. In the words of the 9/11 Commission, “It is therefore crucial to the types of failures we have seen in the post–Cold War period. In the words of the 9/11 Commission, “It is therefore crucial to find a way of routinizing, even bureaucratizing, the exercise of imagination.” The prevention of strategic failure in the 21st century depends on the ability of senior national security decisionmakers to drive continuous and extensive efforts at long-term strategic planning.

**Charting a Way Forward**

In light of this history, and given today’s complex and critical national security challenges, we recommend that the President and the National Security Adviser take a number of steps to establish a truly strategic planning process. Although no approach can guarantee a successful national security policy, we believe that the mechanisms below would substantially enhance any President’s
ability to integrate all elements of national power to meet present and future challenges. The QNSR should produce two primary products: the National Security Planning Guidance described below and the unclassified National Security Strategy already mandated by Congress. As such, it should logically precede, and provide the conceptual basis for, agency reviews, such as the DOD Quadrennial Defense Review.

**Establish an Interagency Threat Assessment Process to Support the QNSR.** In the opening phase of the QNSR, the Director of National Intelligence should be tasked to support a series of roundtable discussions for national security principals on the threats, challenges, and opportunities posed by the future security environment. This process could build on existing products (for example, the National Intelligence Council’s Global 20XX series) with the aim of identifying future trends, uncertainties, and wild cards as the basis for senior leader discussions going into the QNSR. Perhaps the most important design feature of this threat assessment process would be the focus on highlighting areas not only of strong community consensus but also of strong differences of opinion and debate. To enable such frank debate, the President and the National Security Adviser must create a Solarium-like environment in which alternative points of view are encouraged, senior officials are not allowed to “shoot the messenger,” and discussion is driven toward decisions and tradeoffs that must be made in the QNSR rather than a lowest common denominator consensus.

**Establish Semiannual “Over the Horizon” Reviews.** In these meetings, the Director of National Intelligence would present the deputies (representing NSC, OMB, and all other agencies involved in national security) with an over-the-horizon look at possible developments in the international security environment in 1 year, 5 years, and 10 years or more. This material would be developed in concert with the broader Intelligence Community and would highlight not only points of consensus but also areas of uncertainty and debate that should inform national decisionmaking. This review would increase the visibility of longer-term trends, plausible developments, and wild cards to
stimulate more proactive consideration of ways the United States could shape the international environment and prevent or mitigate crises.

Establish an Annual Table-top Exercise Program for Senior National Security Officials. This exercise program would serve several functions. First, it would allow senior national security officials to manage a crisis or complex operation virtually, without real-world costs and risks. Second, each exercise would enable officials to identify courses of action that might prevent or deter a crisis as well as responses to explore and develop further. Identified courses of action could be more fully developed and explored in the wake of the exercise, possibly for presentation at the next session. Finally, these simulations would enable participants to identify critical gaps in U.S. capabilities and task development of action plans to address them. Progress in implementing these plans could be reviewed in subsequent exercises or as part of the biannual National Security Planning Guidance process.

Create a Classified National Security Planning Guidance. The President’s National Security Planning Guidance would articulate the White House’s national security objectives and the strategy and capabilities required to achieve them. It would provide authoritative planning guidance under the President’s signature, directing the National Security Adviser and Cabinet Secretaries to develop particular courses of action and undertake specific activities in support of the strategy. This document would provide the conceptual basis for the unclassified National Security Strategy, the development of interagency concepts of operation for specific mission areas, and the conduct of interagency mission area reviews as described below. It would also be the starting point for all of the national security departments to develop their own implementing strategies, such as the DOD defense strategy. This guidance would be issued in the first year of a new administration and updated biannually.

Create an NSC Senior Director and Office for Strategic Planning. In support of the above recommendations, the National Security Adviser should establish a small but empowered staff devoted to strategic planning and insulated from day-to-day demands and crisis management. The proposed Senior Director for Strategic Planning would be responsible for coordinating the Quadrennial National Security Review, drafting and staffing the President’s National Security Planning Guidance and the National Security Strategy, working with the Director of National Intelligence to prepare the semiannual over-the-horizon reviews, and overseeing the annual national security exercise program.

Conduct NSC/OMB Mission Area Reviews. For high-priority mission areas, such as combating terrorism or homeland security, mission area reviews should be conducted to systematically identify gaps, duplication, or misalignment of effort among agencies. Because of the challenges inherent in the budget process, this strengthened review procedure—with NSC focusing on the President’s policy guidance and OMB on fiscal guidance—should be confined to specific mission areas drawn from the most critical Presidential priorities and requiring coordinated implementation across multiple Federal agencies.

For specific high-priority mission areas, budgets would be presented to Congress not only in the traditional form, but also as a crosscut. Such a presentation would help the executive branch to defend its submissions based on the rationale with which they were developed.

The United States is at a crucial point, facing new and challenging threats as well as unprecedented opportunities in the national security domain. Yet at this critical juncture, the Government lacks an interagency process to ensure that national security decision-making at the highest levels is informed by the long view—a considered assessment of the future security environment and how the Nation can best protect and advance its strategic interests, objectives, and priorities over the long term. Nor does it have adequate mechanisms in place to ensure that national security resources are actually allocated and spent according to the President’s policy priorities. The concrete steps recommended herein draw on the best practices and lessons learned from previous administrations. Collectively, they offer a new way forward for national security policymaking—a truly strategic planning process that could make the United States more effective in bringing the full range of its instruments of power to bear in meeting the challenges of the 21st century. 

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NOTES

2. This article is drawn from a longer paper commissioned by the Princeton Project on National Security, available at <www.wws.princeton.edu/ppns/papers.html>.
3. This section is drawn from work originally done by Michele A. Flournoy, Anne Winkowski, and Christine Wormuth at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and first presented in Clark A. Murdock and Michele A. Flournoy, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase 2 Report (Washington, DC: CSIS, July 2005).
5. Ibid., 125.
7. Bowie and Immerman, 125.
9. Eisenhower, quoted in Greenstein and Immerman, 344.
15. Murdock and Flournoy, 26–42.
16. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) recommends the creation of a National Security Planning Guidance (NSPG), aimed at directing the development of both military and nonmilitary plans and institutional capabilities. The QDR advocates an NSPG that would set priorities and clarify national security roles and responsibilities to reduce capability gaps and eliminate redundancies.
Opinions are sharply divided about whether George Armstrong Custer was a brilliant tactician or a compulsive risk-taker. Was the massacre at the Little Bighorn the result of his misfortune or his audacity? This article does not aim to settle the argument between admirers and critics. Rather, it uses a new explanatory model of cognition in combat to explore what Custer’s case suggests about decisionmaking in today’s era of networked warfare.

How does this flamboyant 19th-century cavalry officer relate to information-age military decisionmaking? After all, Custer’s “bandwidth”—binoculars and scouts—was negligible by today’s standards. Yet there are good reasons to consider his experience. First, 19th-century cavalry action was a precursor of the fast-breaking distributed warfare that characterizes the network era. Cavalry-type missions (reconnaissance, deep strike, disruption) and qualities (speed, flexibility) are relevant in current warfare. The cavalry had to respond to the unfamiliar, unclear, and unanticipated. More than those who directed set-piece infantry maneuvers and artillery bombardments, cavalry commanders had to make prompt decisions under fluid and ambiguous conditions, often

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without guidance from higher authority, much like tactical-level officers in networked warfare. More generally, how fallible humans can make sense of information, draw on experience, analyze options, and make decisions in the face of danger, urgency, and uncertainty are questions as old as military history. There is no more arresting case of ill-fated decisionmaking by an individual under pressure than Custer’s Last Stand. The battle offers insights into how and how not to combine experience-based intuition and information-based reasoning, both crucial in today’s world of uncertainty and abundant information. Custer’s thinking worked well during much of his career. Most of the 20-plus battles he fought in the Civil War were victories, and only one was a clear defeat, suggesting superb decisionmaking and perhaps high self-regard. Yet his cognition failed utterly at the Little Bighorn. The contrast offers fuel for analysis if we can deduce why and how he made his decisions.

We begin by offering a model for effective decisionmaking in combat when time is short, danger is great, and conditions are unfamiliar and dynamic. We call this battle-wisdom. If Custer was battle-wise in earlier battles, why not in his final one? By observing him in that light, we can learn about good and bad decisionmaking in combat as well as about the man who made the Last Stand.

Battle-Wisdom

We should take a particularly keen interest in military decisionmaking at this juncture for two reasons: information networking is enabling better decisionmaking, and geopolitical turmoil is making better decisionmaking imperative. Today, such enemies as al Qaeda are exploiting information to complicate and confuse our strategic and operational reasoning. Cognitive superiority has never been so crucial; indeed, it is the new plane of military competition. But what is it?

When conditions are complex and unstable, time is short, and information is abundant, the key to making good decisions is to blend reliable intuition with timely reasoning. Intuition is demanded by urgency. Research in many fields (military, emergency room care, firefighting, neonatal intensive care) shows that the greater the time pressure, the more decisionmakers rely on intuition. For our purposes, intuition is the mental model, or map, a person brings to a situation, mainly based on experience and only lightly affected by fresh information. Intuitive decisionmakers do not weigh the risks and rewards of alternative courses of action but proceed down the paths they have been conditioned to believe are right for given circumstances. The reliability of intuition depends heavily on whether the circumstances at hand are broadly familiar. In strange circumstances, therefore, intuition can be wrong.
Conversely, reasoning (informed, methodical, logical analysis) is vital when complexity and change (unfamiliarity) reduce the utility of experience, on which intuition depends. Reasoning uses new information to check and correct intuition and to consider the merits and costs of multiple options. However, reasoning can be time-consuming, so people neglect it when time is precious, as it is in combat. It follows that the decompression of time and chance to exploit information is crucial for introducing reasoning and for cognitive effectiveness, less by replacing intuition with reasoning than by integrating the two.

Those good at integrating intuition with reasoning should make good military decisionmakers. They tend to be self-aware—to know or be able to judge dispassionately how much they can count on their intuition. Before making irretrievable decisions, they will consider whether their prefabricated mental models are applicable to the situation at hand.

The way decisions are made during operations is crucial. In what we call rapidly adaptive decisionmaking, self-aware intuition is used initially but provisionally when both time and information are scarce, thus gaining time to gather information and introduce reasoning to enhance cognition. Such an approach can be taught, practiced, and refined.

Four particular battle-wise abilities that are especially important in the age of networked warfare were also applicable in 19th-century cavalry action: anticipation, decision speed, opportunism, and learning in action. Each aims at gaining and exploiting an operational time-information advantage, by which we mean the product of, or synergy between, time and information. Anticipation can make time an ally from the outset of hostilities. Decision speed helps control the course and tempo of action. Opportunism seizes fleeting conditions that offer nonlinear gains; when opposing forces are both vulnerable, the one that strikes just when the other is especially vulnerable can prevail. Learning in action means getting smarter and adjusting rapidly and continuously despite complexity and confusion—all the more advantageous if the enemy is relying on a script that events have superseded. Taken together, time-information superiority offered by these abilities means that information can be used to defeat urgency, the enemy of sound military decisionmaking. Custer needed all four at the Little Bighorn.

**Massacre at the Little Bighorn**

The massacre of Custer and much of his 7th Cavalry Regiment in June 1876 is one of the most perplexing battles in American history. Why were he and his 210 troops annihilated? While theories abound, two stand out: Custer was either a foolhardy glory-seeker or a victim of circumstances beyond his control. Both have merit, yet neither by itself provides a satisfying explanation. While Custer may have been seeking glory, he was no fool. He was a top-notch cavalry commander, and his tactics that day were consistent with the Army doctrine of his time. While events mainly broke against Custer, that did not make annihilation inevitable. The situation was fathered by Custer’s own decisions, and he could have saved his command simply by changing course until near the end.

If Custer’s tactical decisions resulted in calamity, why did he make them despite several opportunities to make better decisions and escape disaster? While the truth lies buried with Custer, we offer our own hypothesis. Early in the battle, he formed a mental model, based on his experience and assessment of the situation, of how the 7th Cavalry should engage the Indians. This mental model, embodied in a hammer-and-anvil battle plan that was a proven standard for cavalry operations, led him to expect victory. When the plan began breaking down in the face of surprises and adversity, Custer failed to use new information, time, and reasoning to reevaluate his premises and analyze his options. Though facing unfamiliar circumstances, he did not question his intuition, which had served him so well to that point.

The idea that Custer was a compulsive risk-taker and poor tactician is belied by his success in the Civil War. From 1863 to 1865, he led his brigade and division in 23 cavalry engagements, many of them major battles. He won most of them decisively; and while he suffered a few reversals, he never lost in a calamitous way. Widely regarded as having a natural flair for combat, he showed professional skill at sizing up complex situations and seeming to “know” how to act. Like most seasoned cavalry commanders, he believed that offensive action was key to victory, and he practiced the art of rapid mobility. He earned a reputation for being able to read terrain quickly, discern the enemy, craft an effective plan, and lead troops to success. He also showed skill at changing tactics in fluid situations and at extracting his forces from peril. One of his brigade commanders summed up his talent: “Custer was a fighting man through and through. There was in him an indescribable something—call it caution, call it sagacity, call it the real military instinct, it may have been genius—by whatever name entitled, it nearly always impelled him to do the right thing.”

**Setting the Stage**

Custer’s troubles at the Little Bighorn were not due to lack of experience at fighting Indians on the Great Plains. After the Civil War, he was made a lieutenant colonel, given command of a single regiment, and sent to Kansas. He mostly experienced lengthy patrols and small clashes, but in 1868, he led a big cavalry assault against an Indian village at Washita, Oklahoma. Attacking at dawn from multiple directions, he surprised and quickly overran the village, killing or capturing a large number of Indians.

In 1873, Custer led the 7th Cavalry to a new home at Bismarck, North Dakota.

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with at least 1,500 who were battle-ready. On June 17, a large Indian force attacked General Crook, sending him into retreat. Unaware of Crook’s battle, Terry (with Custer) and Gibbons met on June 21 in southern Montana. Suspecting an Indian village was somewhere to the south, they decided that Custer would lead his 600 troops and 35 Indian scouts southward along the Rosebud River, which flows a few miles west of the Little Bighorn River. He was to march rapidly as far as 125 miles, then turn around and move northward along the Little Bighorn. Meanwhile, a column led by Terry and Gibbon would march south along the river with 500 troops, reaching the Little Bighorn valley on June 26. Terry hoped that even if a pincer attack by both columns was unrealistic, at least one of the columns, most likely Custer’s, would find the Indians and win a major battle.4

After marching along the Rosebud about 60 miles, Custer discovered Indian trails leading west, suggesting a village on the Little Bighorn. He promptly turned that way. Early on June 25, he arrived at a high point overlooking the valley. His scouts detected a large Indian village about 15 miles north. Terry and Gibbon were a full day away.5

Decisions

Custer’s first big decision was to attack on June 25 rather than the next day. Critics claim that he rushed to grab all the glory before Terry and Gibbon arrived. Perhaps; but he also had other considerations in mind. Early on June 25, he became aware that his presence had been detected by Indian hunting parties. Fearful that the Indians would flee the village and escape altogether, he decided to act immediately. His decision had logic, but it also had drawbacks. Had he not been detected, a dawn attack on June 25 could have caught the Indians asleep, for he not been detected, a dawn attack on June 25 had logic, but it also had drawbacks. Had he decided to act immediately. His decision would flee the village and escape altogether, hunting parties. Fearful that the Indians his presence had been detected by Indian Early on June 25, he became aware that Crook’s battle, Terry and Gibbons met on June 21 in southern Montana. Suspecting an Indian village was somewhere to the south, they decided that Custer would lead his 600 troops and 35 Indian scouts southward along the Rosebud River, which flows a few miles west of the Little Bighorn River. He was to march rapidly as far as 125 miles, then turn around and move northward along the Little Bighorn. Meanwhile, a column led by Terry and Gibbon would march south along the river with 500 troops, reaching the Little Bighorn valley on June 26. Terry hoped that even if a pincer attack by both columns was unrealistic, at least one of the columns, most likely Custer’s, would find the Indians and win a major battle.4

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Custer’s scouts reported that the village contained at least 1,500 warriors, but he still felt that the 7th Cavalry could win if it attacked boldly. About 13 miles from the village, at noon, he decided to divide the 7th Cavalry into 3 battalions. He kept a battalion of 5 companies with 210 troops under his personal command and assigned a battalion of 3 companies to Major Marcus Reno. These two columns were to advance toward the village on opposite sides of a creek. In addition, he sent a battalion of three companies under Captain Frederick Benteen 3 miles westward to reconnoiter terrain there.

Custer’s decision to divide his force has been criticized because none of the columns would have enough troops to defeat a large Indian force. But again, he had reasons. Custer envisioned a hammer-and-anvil attack in which rapid operations of all three columns would be coordinated, thus striking the Indians from both sides of the village and compelling them to surrender. Custer did not imagine that both Reno and Benteen would perform poorly, leaving him exposed to the full wrath of the Indians.

When Custer was within 3 miles of the village at 3:00 p.m., he ordered Reno to attack it from the south. As Reno set out with his troops mounted, Custer proceeded with his 5 companies on a 6-mile march along a steep ridgeline that paralleled the village on its eastern side, across from the narrow Little Bighorn. He intended to advance along the ridge, concealed by its rugged terrain, so he could swoop down on the village from the north, thus bringing down the hammer on the enemy held by Reno’s anvil. He also sent urgent orders to Benteen to join the main body.

Much depended on Reno diverting the Indians from Custer and on Benteen arriving promptly. Neither occurred. When Reno met resistance, he dismounted his troops, advanced in skirmish formation, and at 3:30 retreated into a nearby grove. Twenty minutes later, Reno and his embattled troops fled the trees in a mad dash across the Little Bighorn and up “Reno Hill” to establish a defensive position. Meanwhile, Benteen’s force marched slowly, and when it arrived at 4:20, it joined Reno, not Custer, who by then was 6 miles away.

As Custer made his way along the ridge-line, he became aware of Reno’s mounting troubles. Twice Custer paused to get reports, which told him of Reno’s dismounting in the face of stiff resistance and then retreating into the woods. Instead of returning to join Reno, Custer hastened northward in hope of encircling the village as soon as possible. He also sent another urgent appeal to Benteen to “come quick.” Custer lost sight of Reno by the time of the latter’s retreat across the river, which extinguished all hope of a successful hammer-and-anvil attack. The Indians were then free to mass against Custer, whose presence became known when he launched a diversionary attack on the village called Medicine Tail Coulee. Custer continued the remaining 3 miles to the far end of the ridge, where his Last Stand took place.

What happened on Last Stand Hill is controversial. Evidently, Custer was not overrun immediately. Reno and Benteen heard heavy firing to the north from 4:25 to 5:10 p.m., but they were too preoccupied guarding against further attack to ride to Custer’s aid. The next day, 350 survivors on the Indian were free to mass against Custer, whose presence became known when he launched a diversionary attack on the village.
grass to draw close and deluge the cavalry troops with arrows and repeating rifles. The massacre probably began when the right wing suddenly collapsed, sending frightened troops toward Custer’s left wing. Few made it. Custer was left on Last Stand Hill with only two companies to fend off hundreds of Indians sensing victory. It was over quickly.

Custer’s decisions to attack the Indian village on June 25 and to divide his command into three dispersed battalions have been criticized by historians. But these choices did not doom him, and there was reasoning behind them. Nor did the failures of Reno and Benteen seal his fate. Rather, it was his decision to continue his rapid march along the ridgeline toward Last Stand Hill after learning of Reno’s troubles and the Indians’ strength. Even on Last Stand Hill, Custer had a chance to break contact when he realized that Benteen was not going to show. Yet he stayed there in a vulnerable attack posture.

Despite collapsing odds, Custer stuck with his plan. Had he instead broken contact and reconstituted his forces, with modest losses, the 7th Cavalry could have remained capable of pursuing the Indians if they fled. The failure to take this option despite mounting risks of disaster, while hard to explain, may provide lessons of enduring significance concerning cognition in battle.

**Findings**

We have noted several mistakes by Custer, including, as it turned out, his choice of a plan that splintered his force and his haste in executing it. But the most significant error for our purposes, as well as for Custer, was the one that produced the actual massacre. Custer’s plan depended on Reno’s anvil. Yet even if he did not know Reno was in full retreat, he knew the anvil had not held. This same information should also have alerted Custer that he was facing a larger and fiercer Indian force than he had expected or previously fought. Nevertheless, he proceeded with his original attack plan in apparent confidence that he could pull it off.

As an alternative hypothesis, perhaps Custer judged that the hammer must strike even faster with the anvil cracking. If so, his objective in hurrying to the far end of the village to attack would have changed from exploiting Reno’s anticipated success to relieving his actual failure. By this interpretation, Custer did rely on reasoning once new information had shattered his model, as opposed to proceeding chiefly on intuition and self-confidence. But the reasoning led him back to his original plan, not despite
he relied excessively on his mental model, including prompt attack and the experience from which it was formed. The best evidence that he did not augment his intuition with reasoning is that rational analysis, had Custer taken time for it, would almost surely have revealed that striking as planned was not his best option. Even after reaching Last Stand Hill, he could have escaped had he not positioned to attack. Custer’s experience and intuition failed him because what he faced at the Little Bighorn was unfamiliar—precisely the point at which cold, hard reasoning, triggered by self-awareness and new information, must take precedence.

Gaining Time-Information Advantage. Custer did not use information to gain time or time to gain information. Moreover, he seems to have placed more stress on moving swiftly than on getting good information. Instead of easing the urgency that precluded reasoned thinking, he intensified it. Of course, because he was satisfied that proceeding as planned was the correct choice, he did not see himself in need of either more information or time. Consequently, he found himself critically short of both when what he needed was more of both.

Adapting Rapidly. Custer failed a core test of battle-wise ability, learning in action. Of all his failures, this is the hardest to understand, given his reputation for “knowing” the right thing to do in combat. Custer was neither rigid nor doctrinaire; in fact, his record suggests a creative and supple mind. He had options at the Little Bighorn that were better than the course he took, not just with hindsight but with the information he had. Custer went with his plan not because he was incapable of adapting but because his intuition told him he did not need to adapt. To learn why, we must imagine how his mind worked.

It seems that Custer was both a brilliant tactician and a willing risk-taker rather than one or the other. It was this mix that brought him and his troops to their end. Military history reveals that the combination of brilliance and determination can be advantageous when the right tactics are devised. But what if the tactics are wrong, as they can be for even the smartest commander? It is at this point that risks can multiply and intuition must be married with reasoning. Otherwise, the self-confidence and impatience that often accompany brilliance can be fatal.

It does not appear that Custer suffered from self-doubt. After all, he went from last in his class at West Point to general in 2 years, which both reveals and may have contributed to a surplus of confidence in his methods and intuition. He had known mainly victory, rarely defeat, and never disaster. As his career shows, Custer was not inflexible by nature, for he had deftly escaped numerous predicaments. At the Little Bighorn, he might have been less sure of complete victory than of being able to cheat defeat if his gamble failed.

Intuition travels a different cognitive route than analysis. Whereas the latter involves identifying all interesting options before comparing them and choosing one, the former runs rapidly through familiar approaches one by one, starting with the rational analysis, had Custer taken time for it, would almost surely have revealed that striking as planned was not his best option.
been out of character—for if he had, he could hardly have affirmed his intuition. Custer’s poor self-awareness accounts for his inability to learn in action. At the very moment when intuition from experience was misleading him, Custer employed it with gusto.

The Indian leaders, notably Crazy Horse and Gall, were the ones who gained a time-information edge at the Little Bighorn, despite having been attacked. They, too, had options once Reno’s attack failed. After the Indians drove Reno onto his hill, they could have continued attacking him in force. However, at about the same time they had Reno on the run, Custer tipped them off to his presence by his feint down Medicine Tail Coulee. In minutes, they must have decided to let Reno go, not to buy Custer’s feint, and to concentrate their strength where they anticipated Custer would make his real attack. Along with Custer’s failures, this reveals the leverage of rapid adaptation. The Indian leaders managed to strike Custer at a moment of his maximum vulnerability, created by his failure to use time and information to think of a better course of action.

In sum, the explanation for the Last Stand was not simply Custer’s reliance on intuition, which had served him well repeatedly. The massacre required a specific set of circumstances, Custer’s poor self-awareness, and capable Indian leaders. For that moment, he was the wrong man.

Notwithstanding the specificity of the conditions at the Little Bighorn, the battle is instructive today, and not just for senior commanders. One of the consequences of the network revolution and corresponding distribution of authority is that many more persons up and down the ranks will be making combat decisions than in the days of centralized command and control. The lesson of Custer can be applied as readily to the major in charge of a small, mechanized column as to the major general in charge of a joint expeditionary force.

The goal, simply stated, is to have battle-wise decisionmakers who are capable of rapidly adaptive decisionmaking. The military needs leaders at every level who can combine reliable intuition with quick reasoning to gain and exploit time-information in battle. As we enter the age of networked warfare, when cognitive excellence can provide the decisive edge, this need has become strategically important. But the case of Custer suggests that it will not be an easy goal to achieve.

George Armstrong Custer showed that military decisionmakers may seem battle-wise in many circumstances but not in others, where failing to blend intuition with reasoning may be disastrous. This suggests a need to track and test performance under real or simulated combat pressure. Moreover, as with Custer, decisionmakers may be unaware of the limits of their intuition. This underscores the importance of inculcating explicit and objective self-awareness. Finally, there is a need to develop adaptive decision-making methods and habits to allow reasoning despite urgency.

Meeting these challenges demands use of all the tools that affect whether and how battle-wise leaders end up making decisions in combat. These tools lie mainly in military personnel systems and policies. People with battle-wise potential must be sought in recruitment, screened, sorted, and favored for line responsibility starting early in their careers. Strong intuition should continue to be favored—but so must analytical skills, which unfamiliar conditions may demand. Self-awareness, which is crucial to integrating intuition and reasoning, must be stressed in development and advancement, as should key battle-wise abilities. Training and education should emphasize analysis under pressure, using intuition judiciously, and adaptive decisionmaking.

His impressive record and abilities notwithstanding, Custer had a fatal flaw in his inability to ask, “Might I be wrong?” In the military personnel system of today, even though there may be some place for officers with such absolute confidence in their intuition that they leave no room for reasoning and thus little room for error, an officer incapable of questioning his intuition should not hold an important command in an important conflict.

The U.S. military will always have its Custers: self-assured, driven, and impatient. Yet it is on other qualities, those that deliver consistent battle-wisdom regardless of circumstances, that the Nation increasingly and vitally depends. JFQ

NOTES


3 For details, see Gregory J.W. Urwin, Custer Victorious: The Civil War Battles of General George Armstrong Custer (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983).

4 For details, see Wayne Michael Sarf, The Little Bighorn Campaign, March–September 1876 (Conshohocken, PA: Combined Books, 1993). General Terry’s written orders to Custer make clear that Custer could deviate from the original plan to march to the Lower Rosebud if he had “sufficient reason.” Not knowing exactly where the Indians were located, but expecting them to be along the Lower Little Bighorn, Terry evidently hoped that Custer’s 7th Cavalry, rather than his own smaller, less mobile force, would fight the battle.

5 For details, see John S. Gray, Custer’s Last Campaign: Mitch Boyer and the Little Bighorn Reconstructed (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1991).

6 For analysis, see Richard Allan Fox, Jr., Archaeology, History, and Custer’s Last Battle (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993).


**Book Reviews**

The diversity of articles in this issue’s Forum suggests, the topic of integrated operations encompasses a wide swathe of operational and tactical meanings. In his guidance to the Joint Staff, General Peter Pace refers to the need for collaboration “within our own staff, the Department of Defense, the interagency, and ultimately with our Coalition partners. . . . Our collaborative effort with the Office of the Secretary of Defense is critical to enhancing effectiveness in the interagency and can enable the interagency to function more like an integrated task force.” The authors of the following two readings have adopted this concept as the touchstone for their works, which tackle the issue of what integrated operations are—and what they could or need to be—in the broadest possible sense.

**Securing America’s Future: National Strategy in the Information Age**

*by Daniel M. Gerstein*

Westport, CT, Praeger, 2005

288 pp $44.95


Daniel M. Gerstein, a U.S. Army officer and recent military fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, contends that national security strategy, which historically has depended heavily on the external use of hard (political, military, and intelligence) power, does not take into account the effects of the world’s transition into the information age or the accompanying globalization. To be effective in this new age, U.S. security strategy must embrace the elements of soft power (economic, cultural, social, and informational tools), an approach that will demand an expanded interagency role. According to Gerstein, organizations and agencies wielding soft power—for example, the Departments of Justice, Commerce, Education, and Health and Human Services—should be engaged in every phase of a spectrum of operations traditionally dominated by hard-power elements. In the author’s words, “this is about the commitment of national power rather than the commitment of force.”

Likewise, the documentary foundation on which national security is based—the U.S. National Security Strategy, the National Strategy for Homeland Security, and the recommendations of the Commission on National Security/21st Century and the 9/11 Commission—is inadequate in this regard. To remedy this deficiency, Gerstein recommends the creation of a new National Security Act that will survey national goals and objectives in the information age environment and lay out the ways and means to achieve them.

**“Solving the Interagency Puzzle”**

*by Major Sunil B. Desai, USMC*

*Policy Review* 129 (February/March 2005)

available at <www.policyreview.org/feb05/desai.html>

Arguing that the stakes are too high to allow poor coordination among the government organizations wielding the instruments of national power, Desai champions a shift to a broader interagency culture akin to the joint military culture created by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. Citing four impediments to this shift—the lack of a coordinated doctrine of operations, the absence of a central, independent authority for training personnel in such a doctrine, the disparity of regional structures used to organize domestic and foreign policies, and the failure of individual organizations to cultivate an interagency ethos—Desai shows how the Armed Forces, which overcame similar obstacles on the road to jointness, can be used as a model for success. He concludes that his proposals, if enacted, would “enable actual integrated operations, and not just improved coordination and cooperation” among the entities that comprise America’s instruments of national power.

**The Military Use of Space: A Diagnostic Assessment**

*by Barry D. Watts*

Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2001

130 pp. $20.00

ASIN: B0006E8UWA

**Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age**

*by Everett C. Dolman*

Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002

208 pp $24.50


**Mastering the Ultimate High Ground: Next Steps in the Military Uses of Space**

*by Benjamin S. Lambeth*

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003

193 pp. $24.00

ISBN: 0–8330–3330–1

**International Regimes for the Final Frontier**

*by M.J. Peterson*

Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2005

340 pp. $85.00

ISBN: 0–7914–6501–2

**Review essay by PETER L. HAYS**

Even in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the war on terror, and America’s changed perception of national security, interrelationships between outer space and global security remain salient and highly charged issues. Few security challenges elicit greater strategic expectations or raise more hackles...
than the prospect of significant weapon deployments in space or questions about a separate space force. Despite improvements in integrating space capabilities into operations and some work in implementing recommendations in the January 2001 Rumsfeld Space Commission Report, the United States still lacks a clear vision for foundational national security space issues and has recently backslid in key organization and acquisition efforts. For example, the October 2002 absorption of U.S. Space Command by U.S. Strategic Command resulted in a significant loss of focus and emphasis on military space; the July 2005 separation of the Department of Defense (DOD) Executive Agent for Space from the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office portends the same deleterious outcomes for black-white space integration; and, worse, almost every current major space acquisition program faces large cost overruns and lengthy schedule delays. The United States needs to reconsider carefully the full range of issues raised by the works considered here and then reengage more effectively to develop and implement its vision for national security space.

The Military Use of Space is technologically well informed and carefully derives an essential foundation for understanding how space activities are likely to affect national security. Barry Watts is a retired Air Force F-4 pilot and an experienced defense analyst and author on military topics. He endorses current U.S. priorities for military space, a centrist approach unlikely to arouse much enthusiasm but open to attacks by those who believe the Nation should be doing a lot more or a lot less. He urges the United States to continue upgrading its ability to provide actionable, real-time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance data directly to warfighters but doubts that force application will become a more important space mission than force enhancement before 2025. Watts also concludes that the United States will continue to derive far more military capability from space than will any other state, but these benefits will create substantial risks and vulnerabilities for transformation and power projection; America probably has yet to realize more than a fraction of space’s potential for force enhancement; and growth in commercial and dual-use space technologies worldwide probably will complicate efforts to sustain the asymmetric U.S. space advantage.

These findings indicate that the path toward space weapons is already a slippery slope, and they highlight the chasm between assigned responsibilities for space control and capabilities to execute this mission. Despite the growing importance and vulnerability of space systems, Watts concludes that the United States does not currently face a strong strategic imperative to weaponize space. Although the strategic logic of spacepower favors weaponization in the long run, and the United States has the largest role of any state in this decision, the critical link in the logic chain leading toward this outcome is “the assumption that near-earth space will be an economic and military center of gravity for the United States in the foreseeable future. Yet it is precisely this assumption that seems open to question—at least between now and 2025” (p. 111).

Everett Dolman, a professor at the Air Force’s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, has studied space issues since 1982 as a space systems and foreign-area analyst for the U.S. Government. Astropolitik, his intellectual tour de force, discusses grand strategy and world politics at the highest level by explaining how the physical attributes of outer space and the characteristics of space systems ought to shape the application of spacepower. Dolman’s book is intellectually grounded in the best traditions of geopolitics, adds genuinely new and vital contributions to the dialogue about space and national security, and develops a compelling vision for how America could use space to promote free-market capitalism and provide global security as a public good. The first book that can legitimately claim to present a comprehensive theory of spacepower, Astropolitik is easily the most important book on this topic since Walter A. McDougall’s The Heavens and the Earth in 1985.

Dolman begins by applying geopolitics to space, deriving the astropolitical dicta that guide his analysis. He posits “future lines of commerce and military lines of communications in space will be the Hohmann transfer orbits between stable spaceports” (p. 73). Since Hohmann transfer orbits begin in low-Earth orbit (LEO)—and all spaceflight must traverse LEO—Dolman identifies this orbit as the first and most important astropolitical strategic narrow. He also describes the astropolitical importance of the geostationary belt, the Lagrange libration points, and the Van Allen radiation belts, and explains the advantages and limitations of particular launch sites and satellite fields of view. Dolman captures this analysis in his primary astropolitical dictum: “Who controls low-Earth orbit controls near-Earth space. Who controls near-Earth space dominates Terra. Who dominates Terra determines the destiny of humankind” (front dust jacket).

The remainder of the book explains the evolution of the legal and political regime for space that is dominated by the Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967, analyzes how this regime relates to astropolitics, and maps a new path forward. Dolman also presents sophisticated social science arguments on issues such as collective action, the Coase theorem, and the tragedy of the commons, relating them to how a legal and political regime for space ought to operate. Not surprisingly, he finds that both the theory and practice behind the current OST-dominated space regime are inimical to his astropolitical dicta and have already stunted U.S. development and use of space. Dolman urges that the United States immediately withdraw “from the current space regime and announce it is establishing a principle of free-market sovereignty in space,” use “its current and near-term capabilities...to seize military control” of LEO, and establish “a national space coordination authority” to “define, separate, and coordinate the efforts of commercial, civilian, and military space projects” (p. 157). Throughout, however, he emphasizes that America’s priorities in space must remain balanced and that the goal of astropolitics is not the militarization of space. Rather, the militarization of space is a means to an end, part of a longer-term strategy. The goal is to reverse the current international malaise in regard to space exploration, and to do so in a way that is efficient and that harnesses the positive motivations of individuals and states striving to improve their conditions. It is a neoclassical, market-driven approach intended to maximize efficiency and wealth (p. 183).

Benjamin Lambeth’s Mastering the Ultimate High Ground returns us to Earth with an insightful analysis of the bureaucratic and organizational dynamics that have shaped recent military space efforts. A senior strategic analyst at RAND, Lambeth has emerged as a dean of modern airpower thought with...
his analyses on the transformation of American airpower and its use over Kosovo. His previous work provides an ideal background to transcend semantic arguments, review Air Force perceptions about air and space, and analyze the Service’s role in the origins of the Space Commission and implementing its recommendations.

The Air Force’s efforts to come to grips with space have been molded by its struggles to become a separate Service, the position of the other Services, domestic and global politics, technology developments, and the conceptual issue of whether air and space should be viewed as separate mediums. As Lambeth recounts, during its early years as a separate Service the Air Force centered on the aero-space concept—the idea that air and space are best seen as one seamless domain that the Air Force should be primarily responsible for projecting force from and controlling. He explains that the opportunity costs to the Air Force of using the aerospace concept include stifling development of spacepower theory due to inappropriately substituting air characteristics and attributes to describe space and making inappropriate trade-offs when allocating resources between competing air and space systems.

These issues, as well as the perception that the Air Force was an inadequate steward of space, prompted creation of the Space Commission, a move the Air Force rightly perceived as a threat to its current and future space responsibilities. The commission report critiqued Air Force performance in areas such as developing a space cadre and normalizing space operations. However, the commissioners recommended holding off any significant changes in organizational structure such as creation of a space corps or separate Service. They also strengthened the Air Force position by recommending that it be made DOD executive agent for all military space activity and that the Commander of Air Force Space Command be made a four-star position independent of the Commander of U.S. Space Command.

Lambeth builds on these organizational considerations to emphasize that increasing U.S. commercial and military dependence on space systems also increases the likelihood that these critical nodes will be attacked. This means the United States must develop more robust space control capabilities, defined as ensuring its freedom of action in space while denying the same to adversaries. Lambeth advocates better space situational awareness capabilities as the most important foundation for space control and favors flexible negation options but, in conclusion, does not believe the United States or Air Force would be well served in the near term by deploying weapons in space.

*International Regimes for the Final Frontier* by M.J. Peterson provides insights into a final and perhaps increasingly important way to bound and order thinking about the interrelationships between space and national security. Peterson is a professor of political science at the University of Massachusetts and former editor of *Polity*. His work examines the formation of international agreements on space activity between 1958 and 1988 and is the longest and most formal of the works under consideration. Peterson evaluates whether rational choice theory or social practices best explains regime formation by focusing on bargaining processes and using space as a case study rather than emphasizing the space regimes themselves. This approach differs considerably from the other works and is unsuitable for those unwilling to wade through Peterson’s political theory foundation. Those who do, however, will be rewarded with a well-developed and supported conceptual framework about space regimes that also provides a way to study regime formation in other areas of international politics.

Regimes are the sets of rules, norms, and expectations that guide the behavior of actors in certain issue areas. In political theory, rational choice analyses see actors’ pursuit of goals as the primary determinant of their behavior, whereas social practices approaches emphasize the role actors perceive themselves playing in shaping their behavior. Peterson finds that both are important, but social practices provide better insights into the development of regimes for space. He also explains that analogy was a more powerful tool than metaphor and shows, for example, how development of the space regime as *res communis* rather than *res nullius* was informed by development of the Antarctic regime. Peterson applies his framework to the development of all major regimes that help define the characteristics of space and regulate its use: locational classification, registration of space objects, rescue of space crews, liability for damage on Earth, military activity in space, exploring and using the Moon, and use of geostationary orbit.

Along the way, he details the development of the treaties and agreements that formalized these regimes, including the 1967 OST, the 1968 Rescue and Return Agreement, the 1972 Liability Convention, the 1975 Registration Convention, the 1979 Moon Treaty, and the 1988 International Telecommunications Union allotment plan for orbit and spectrum resources.

Completion of the last space regime in 1988 and increasing commercial and military space activity facilitate application of Peterson’s analytical approach to more recent events. Two trends may be contributing to pressures to modify existing space regimes or create new ones: growth in the number and diversity of major space actors, with commercial players potentially becoming more significant than all but the most important spacefaring states, and the changing locus of space security issues away from the superpowers and toward fora such as the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. Neither trend seems likely to buttress current U.S. space policy. A growing number of diverse and commercially driven space actors are not likely to play the same role as states did during the Cold War; similarly, the U.S. position that the OST regime is all that is needed to regulate space activity may become increasingly untenable at the CD and elsewhere. JFQ

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