Understanding the Evolving U.S. Role in Pacific Rim Security

A Scenario-Based Analysis

John Y. Schrader, James A. Winnefeld
# Understanding the Evolving U.S. Role in Pacific Rim Security

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Understanding the Evolving U.S. Role in Pacific Rim Security

A Scenario-Based Analysis

John Y. Schrader, James A. Winnefeld

Prepared for the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command

RAND

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PREFACE

The research documented in this report was undertaken for the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC). Its objectives were to

• Define a range of alternative peacetime and contingency operational strategies for the U.S. Pacific Command.
• Suggest criteria for assessing the fit of different force structures under alternative scenarios and operational strategies.
• Define alternative sets of forces that might meet the criteria.

A related study (Winnefeld et al., 1992) for the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) extends the postures and scenarios developed in this research to identify regional responses to changes in U.S. policy for East Asia and the Pacific. The dynamic nature of political changes and economic development in the Asian Pacific region has made it necessary to review the basis for U.S. policy for a wide range of scenarios. Rather than try to identify the “best” force posture for the U.S., the study identified force and basing constraints that the U.S. may face by the turn of the century. It examined the ability of the U.S. to provide

• A military presence to reduce the likelihood of conflict.
• Effective military forces that respond quickly enough in the event of combat and provide a U.S. military capability that in conjunction with local forces is sufficient for defeating aggression.

This is the second study addressing U.S. strategic alternatives in the Pacific conducted for CINCPAC by the staff of the RAND Strategy Assessment Center (RSAC) under the direction of Dr. Charles Kelley. The RSAC is part of RAND’s National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center supported by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff. Comments and suggestions should be directed to Dr. Kelley or the authors.
SUMMARY

This report summarizes an analytical approach to developing a set of policy changes (or policy variants) that will help to achieve U.S. national security objectives in the Asian Pacific region as the force structure is reduced and political developments limit U.S. access to traditional bases. The concept introduced is to identify a spectrum of potential conflicts that might occur in the period from 2000 to 2005 and a range of force postures that include locations of major force elements. An operational strategy for achieving national objectives is created after examining how U.S. forces are likely to be used and the relationship of U.S. forces to those of regional partners and allies. Where deficiencies in meeting regional objectives are noted, policy variants aimed at mitigating adverse consequences are examined.

The procedures in the analysis are intended both to identify important policy issues now and to provide a framework for subsequent analysis at the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) and elsewhere using different assumptions and a more detailed examination of selected scenarios. Policy analysis of this type is intended to stimulate thinking and to systematically deal with the difficult question of which programs and forces to emphasize as the U.S. enters a period of declining defense resources and changing threats. Combat simulations are useful in identifying important uncertainties and the likely course of conflict, but there is no precise answer to the question, How much is enough? Judgment and risk balancing are required to achieve U.S. political, economic, and military objectives in the Commander in Chief, USPACOM's (CINCPAC's) area of responsibility and throughout the world.

It is impossible to predict precisely how political and economic processes will evolve in the Pacific over the next twenty years. It is also impossible to predict exactly how the U.S. force posture will evolve, although significant downsizing is certain. Some trends are almost sure to continue—reduced resources for the military force structure and operations, a U.S. reluctance to play the role of “global policeman,” a growing independence among U.S. security partners—and they will require the U.S. to decide which interests are the most important and to identify those characteristics of regional security policy that best contribute to achieving U.S. objectives. Based on our review of the role of U.S. forces in a range of contingencies, we suggest an operational strategy to guide CINCPAC in preparing to support U.S. interests in the changing world.

U.S. force reductions will almost certainly result in a reduced physical presence. The extent of their impact on perceived U.S. commitment (an integral part of the U.S. presence) can, however, be mitigated by offsetting actions. These can include a compensatory increase in allied capabilities, clearer definition of the threat, arms control to reduce the need for larger forces, and economic and political ties that reduce the likelihood that forces will be needed. The U.S. can also restructure its forces to better support their rapid reintroduction where they have been drawn down. Prepositioned materials and training with local forces are potentially high-payoff alternatives to the expense of maintaining a permanent physical presence.

We found it useful to divide force requirements into three categories: (1) in-place forces, (2) rapid reinforcement forces, and (3) mobilization forces. The requirement for in-place ground
and air forces only occurs where the threat of aggression is high, and even this requirement could be reduced or eliminated if local force capabilities were adequate or the threat was sufficiently reduced. Most scenarios require only U.S. rapid reinforcement forces. Consequently, military effectiveness can be enhanced and response time reduced if U.S. forces are configured in recognition of their mostly likely role (i.e., rapid reinforcement). Mobilization forces can be important when scenario timelines are long enough to permit such forces to be activated, trained, and deployed.

Although combat simulations are useful in identifying important factors and the types of outcomes that are consistent with assumed performance parameters, many scenarios only require a brief tallying of the forces that can be brought to bear to determine the eventual victors. In other scenarios, such as a second war in Korea or a naval war at sea between the U.S. and Russia, factors such as surprise, electronic countermeasure (ECM) performance, commitment of ground forces, and national will can result in a range of possible outcomes, so one should not be overly reliant on the results of a single war game or set of model runs. Instead, gaming and simulation should be used to build more understanding of the ways that "best estimates" may be wrong.

CONCLUSIONS
We identified a number of issues in our analysis. Brought together, they form a broad set of conclusions:

1. The size of the total active force structure is less important than maintaining a forward presence that is adequate for deterring potential opponents and for providing the stabilizing influence needed to reassure allies.
2. Many possible future contingencies will involve U.S. forces only to evacuate U.S. nationals and keep sea lines of communication open.
3. U.S. reinforcement planning needs to be oriented to Korea and the Persian Gulf.
4. Because the U.S. will have an insufficient number of carrier battle groups (CVBGs) to maintain historical levels of peacetime presence, it must be innovative in considering substitute forces, including forces of other services, to provide a presence.
5. A major role of U.S. forces is to make regional arms races unnecessary.
6. Specific scenarios are not as important for force sizing as classes of scenarios and uncertainties about future events.
7. A more systematic look at policy changes (variants) is required as forces come down in size.
8. Prepositioning and dual basing can pay big dividends both in presence and war-fighting effectiveness.

We used these conclusions to guide our definition of the operational strategy CINCPAC should follow and to arrive at a set of policy recommendations.
OPERATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CINCPAC

The purpose of our analysis was to better define operational strategies in the Pacific. A strategic framework was provided in a DoD Report to Congress (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1990), but it is CINCPAC's responsibility to translate the framework's broad themes into operational plans. We believe that USPACOM's operational (military) strategy is to

- Maintain a **sufficient military presence** throughout the region to reduce the risk of war and to promote active U.S. participation in regional development.
- Provide forces configured to complement coalition defense capabilities in the event of regional conflict.

This strategy is not a precise standard that will result in a hard "requirement" for X tactical fighter wings (TFWs) or Y CVBGs. It is instead a specification of two fundamental pillars for evaluating alternative postures and identifying policy actions intended to mitigate posture deficiencies.

Implementation of this strategy will require further refinement of the list of planning scenarios, the basis for judgments about the risk of war, and the ways in which U.S. involvement in regional military and economic planning contribute to risk reduction. It will also require further development of the concept of complementary coalition defense and will almost certainly mean less U.S. control because the U.S. will be contributing less. In addition, it will require the U.S. to occasionally say, No, we see no need for U.S. involvement in that problem.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

In conjunction with parallel research for the Secretary of Defense (Winnefeld et al., 1992), we constructed an initial list of thirty-three policy variants that might offset the effects of force reductions or lost base access. We then pruned that list to nine recommended variants that are forward looking, challenge the current conventional wisdom, and/or accept the prospect of future force reductions. Analysis of these nine policy variants within the context of the postulated scenarios led to the following seven consolidated policy recommendations.

**Recommendation 1: Modify U.S. grand strategy.** The U.S. should modify its national security strategy to place greater emphasis on U.S. political and economic roles in regional security. In the past, the U.S. relied on a "go it alone" approach because it was dealing with an immediate need to prevent Soviet expansion and global nuclear war. Recent changes require that reassessments be made. Threats exist, and they are numerous, but they are not as urgent as before, and the U.S. does not need to deal with them by itself. The economic development of South Korea has done more to allow a reduction in the long-term U.S. presence than military policy has. The expanding South Korean economic base will permit South Korea to have guns and butter. It will also erode any basis for North Korean hopes of ideological victory. Similarly, a growing interdependent regional economy in Southeast Asia in which Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore all participate will do more for reducing the likelihood of a single government deciding to strike out in frustration than will the full-time presence of a TFW or CVBG.
**Recommendation 2: Overhaul the CVBG deployment policy and patterns.** The shrinking base of carriers requires special attention as a national problem. In crisis, carriers from both the Atlantic and the Pacific have deployed to the Indian Ocean. The CVBG (in conjunction with amphibious task groups with embarked Marines) provides a unique capability for supporting military operations in regions where no usable base infrastructure exists. The U.S. has maintained at least one deployed carrier in each of the Mediterranean Sea, Indian Ocean, and western Pacific for most of the past twenty years, but it will not be able to do so in the future without major changes in personnel policies. CINCPAC will need to coordinate planning with the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command (CINCLANT) and the Joint Staff to determine how much of a CVBG presence can be supported for any future reductions below the base force levels. When worldwide requirements are resolved, CINCPAC can propose offsets for his area of responsibility.\(^1\)

Many options need to be considered. Pinning down a CVBG to support a specific contingency may severely limit the opportunities for presence in important subregions and restrict options for combined training. New concepts using forces from other services or augmented amphibious forces must be demonstrated to be feasible and politically acceptable to regional states before they are chosen as substitutes for CVBGs.

**Recommendation 3: Consider overseas home-porting of an additional CVBG.** Since there are limits to how far the U.S. can stretch a decreasing pool of CVBGs, it may be necessary to consider additional forward basing of some naval units as a trade-off for lower overall force levels. Doing so would limit the U.S.'s ability to surge in crisis but might reduce the likelihood of problems due to an otherwise decreased overseas presence. Forward basing may involve new concepts of multinational force operations.

**Recommendation 4: Use more prepositioning.** The Persian Gulf War has reinforced the value of facilities that can receive reinforcing military units and the value of prepositioned equipment for Marine forces. Airlifted forces can come from almost anywhere in the world if they do not have to bring all of their equipment with them. The U.S. appears to be moving toward arrangements for storage of tanks and other heavy equipment on the Arabian Peninsula. The air bases in Saudi Arabia provided an indispensable starting point for the buildup of coalition forces. The U.S. needs to examine Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia for similar facilities to which U.S. forces could rapidly deploy in support of new coalitions.

A corollary to this recommendation is to support existing prepositioned equipment and a rudimentary base infrastructure as the almost certain force reductions occur. It would probably be better to have two or three additional potential airlift hubs in South Korea or Japan than to retain a brigade that could not be effectively reinforced. These decisions require military judgment and analysis beyond the scope of this work, but they are illustrative of the new perspective required.

**Recommendation 5: Reexamine the nuclear weapons policies.** Although recent decisions to retire some tactical nuclear weapons have removed part of the basis for antinuclear protests, nuclear weapons proliferation will become an increasingly important issue. We

\(^1\)At the time of our research, late 1990 through early 1991, Secretary of Defense guidance on global CVBG presence had recently been provided for service planning based on a review by the Joint Staff. Details were not available for our analysis.
propose an initiative involving changes in U.S. theater nuclear force targeting, weapons basing, readiness and load-outs, disclosure policy, and perhaps attitudes toward regional "nuclearphobia" and nuclear-free zones. The recent decisions have probably bought the U.S. some breathing room, but the U.S. still needs a national policy based on CINC inputs to know where it is headed.

**Recommendation 6:** Recognize that it is sometimes not of vital interest to the U.S. to become seriously engaged in a contingency that could prove to be major. Our research pointed out that the U.S. must make distinctions between concerns and vital interests and let other countries know it will not jump into every world problem. The U.S. is certainly interested, but it will not maintain forces or plans for every eventuality.

**Recommendation 7:** Examine ready and rapidly deployable forces as a substitute for forward-deployed forces. We emphasize the importance of presence for reducing the likelihood of conflict. However, care must be taken to avoid maintaining an ineffective presence. Budget reductions may mean that only CONUS-based rapid-deployment forces can be maintained. If so, the U.S. must develop concepts for using these forces to build as much of a presence as possible through innovative combined exercises and surge deployments. Rapidly deployable forces will be critically dependent on there being a network of facilities that can be rapidly expanded.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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While these contributors share credit for our analysis, they bear no responsibility for its shortcomings.
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### ACRONYMS, INITIALISMS, AND SYMBOLS

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<tr>
<td>AFB</td>
<td>Air Force base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APOD</td>
<td>aerial port of debarkation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW</td>
<td>antisubmarine warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3</td>
<td>command, control, and communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBM</td>
<td>confidence-building measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>commander in chief</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCLANT</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCPAC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNO</td>
<td>Chief of Naval Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CVBF</td>
<td>carrier battle force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CVBG</td>
<td>carrier battle group</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECM</td>
<td>electronic countermeasure</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMF</td>
<td>Fleet Marine Force</td>
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<td>FMS</td>
<td>foreign military sales</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>fiscal year</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>gross national product</td>
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<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMET</td>
<td>International Military Education and Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>LHA</td>
<td>amphibious assault ship (Tarawa class)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LHD</td>
<td>amphibious assault ship (WASP class)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LID</td>
<td>light infantry division</td>
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<td>MEB</td>
<td>Marine Expeditionary Brigade</td>
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<td>Marine Expeditionary Force</td>
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<td>maritime prepositioning ship</td>
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<td>NAS</td>
<td>Naval air station</td>
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<td>NEO</td>
<td>noncombatant evacuation order</td>
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<td>NPA</td>
<td>New People's Army</td>
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<td>Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>operational control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFM</td>
<td>missile patrol boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA</td>
<td>People's Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POD</td>
<td>port of debarkation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POMCUS</td>
<td>prepositioned overseas material configured in unit sets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People's Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSAS</td>
<td>RAND Strategy Assessment System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAC</td>
<td>Strategic Air Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLCM</td>
<td>sea-launched cruise missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLOC</td>
<td>sea line of communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSN</td>
<td>nuclear-powered attack submarine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF</td>
<td>tactical fighter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFS</td>
<td>tactical fighter squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFW</td>
<td>tactical fighter wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>U.S. Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USLANTCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Atlantic Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USPACOM</td>
<td>U.S. Pacific Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>overstrength</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>understrength</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. INTRODUCTION

The objective of our research was to develop and analyze alternative future U.S. force postures in the context of a spectrum of combat scenarios that might arise in the Asian Pacific region in the period from 2000 to 2005.\(^1\) An earlier RAND study for the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC) (Pollack and Winnefeld, 1990) investigated "security arrangements," focusing on East Asia and the western Pacific. Our research built on the broad range of policy alternatives introduced in the earlier study.

Five alternative force postures were constructed to represent possible results of near-term (over the next five years) budget and strategy choices or circumstances that might face the U.S.\(^2\) In addition, thirteen hypothetical scenarios were developed to illustrate the range of contingencies that might be considered when thinking about the adequacy of future force posture alternatives. Analysis of force posture-scenario pairs provides insight into the real and perceived differences resulting from future force posture choices. Moreover, these pairs provide a basis for developing policy, strategy, and force variants to the basic postures—variants shaped to compensate for posture weaknesses brought on by force reductions or lost base access.

BACKGROUND

The U.S. has pursued a forward strategy in the Pacific since the end of World War II. U.S. forces have been based in Korea, Japan, and the Philippines for nearly half a century. The primary rationale for U.S. presence was containment of the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and their client states. Recent events in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have caused a real reduction in the perceived threat from Soviet expansion. The PRC's internal problems and its retreat from the confrontational stance that characterized its international policies until the mid-1970s have combined to diminish the near-term threat the PRC once posed to U.S. security interests. Nevertheless, force structure changes in the eastern portion of the former Soviet Union and in the PRC have not kept pace with the changes occurring through treaty and unilateral actions in Europe. As a result, the long-term potential for conflict remains, and the former Soviet Union is likely to retain its status as the military power with the greatest ability to threaten U.S. security interests in East Asia. Clearly, the rationale for continued U.S. forward military presence in the Asian Pacific region is changing. Familiar and well-understood threats are decreasing, only to be replaced by basic uncertainties about the form, urgency, and locus of future challenges to U.S. security.

U.S. interests go beyond security narrowly defined by military postures. Economic and political development of the states in the Asian Pacific region is the result of a stable and non-threatening relationship among regional states. CINCPAC and his forces play an important role in advancing these interests by helping to underwrite the conditions necessary for na-

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1 A force posture includes both forces and assumptions about their basing and operations.
2 The research was conducted from late 1990 to early 1991, so the subject five years are 1992 through 1996.
tional democratic political institutions to mature and for economic activity to prosper. The U.S. dilemma lies in maintaining the necessary force capabilities in a time of shrinking defense budgets, possible base loss, and an erosion of economic competitiveness. The option of "brute forcing" the problem with resources is no longer available; the U.S. must employ its limited resources wisely. If the U.S. cannot influence regional security with dominant, large forces, it must posture its smaller forces intelligently. One element of "smart" posturing is ensuring that the U.S. provides those capabilities most necessary and suitable for a broad range of contingencies in an uncertain future.

In the past, it was possible to maintain a forward U.S. military presence in the Pacific to counter a real Soviet threat and thereby also have in place a military support structure that could provide immediate help to any security partners threatened by nonsuperpower neighbors. Routine U.S. presence in the waters around Japan and Taiwan has almost certainly reduced the incentive for a major rebuilding of the Japanese fleet. U.S. aircraft in the Philippines have been used to support an elected government faced with insurrection. U.S. forces in Korea and their support structure in Japan have increased the risks faced by Pyongyang as it considered actions against the Seoul government. U.S. forces probably have also helped to restrain border incidents that might have led to war between the two Korean governments. In the future, as the perceived risk of war sponsored by the former Soviet Union decreases, a U.S. presence to support regional partners will have to be based more on the relevance of the U.S. force posture in preventing military conflict. U.S. security commitments can reduce incentives for expanded local military capabilities. However, the residual U.S. operations in the region must support the development of a combined capability in which the U.S. fights alongside regional security partners.

It is impossible to predict precisely how political and economic processes will evolve in the Pacific over the next twenty years. It is also impossible to predict exactly how the U.S. force posture will evolve. Some trends are almost certain to continue—reduced resources for the military force structure and operations, a U.S. reluctance to play the role of "global policeman," and a growing independence among U.S. security partners. These trends will require the U.S. to decide which interests are the most important and to identify those characteristics of regional security policy that best contribute to achieving U.S. goals.

REPORT ORGANIZATION

Section 2 of this report describes the planning environment with relation to major countries in the Asian Pacific region. It presents a spectrum of scenarios ranging from civil wars to major regional wars, identifying U.S. interests and the nature of each type of conflict. A common framework is used to facilitate comparison across scenarios.

Section 3 describes five alternative force postures that may arise because of decisions in the U.S. on defense-resource allocations or decisions by individual states in the Asian Pacific region. The posture descriptions include variations in overall force levels and changes in the distribution of forces to bases or operating areas.

Section 4 discusses the impact of the alternative force postures on the achievement of U.S. policy objectives. The requirements for U.S. forces are presented, and the effectiveness of available forces is assessed. Posture performance is evaluated in terms of the adequacy of...
the provided presence for reducing the risk of war and the effectiveness of the available forces should war occur.

Section 5 extracts findings from the analysis to suggest an operational strategy for CINCPAC's use as a guide in supporting U.S. interests in a changing world and to arrive at seven policy recommendations. This final section is followed by an appendix containing detailed descriptions of the five alternative force postures used in the analysis and a sixth alternative that emerged during the research and was used in a related study (Winnefeld et al., 1992).
2. PACIFIC RIM COMBAT SCENARIOS

It is difficult to determine the utility of alternative military force postures without considering how those forces might be used. However, the future is so uncertain that a range of possible employment scenarios must be taken into account. U.S. forces have been used in the past to

- Show resolve simply by deploying ships off a coast or deploying aircraft to bases in adjacent countries.
- Augment national forces under attack by insurgent groups.
- Fight alongside national forces under attack by invaders.
- Deter aggression by “extending a nuclear umbrella” over allies threatened by conventional forces that could not be defeated by national forces even with U.S. augmentation.

In some cases, the physical presence of effective U.S. forces, either continuous or periodic, is sufficient to achieve the objectives of the U.S. and the affected security partners. In other cases, the threat exceeds the ability of forces that can be brought to bear, and any potential U.S. action is probably inadequate. Our analysis considered a spectrum of hypothetical scenarios in order to examine the factors that could lead to crisis or war and to examine U.S. objectives and the ability of U.S. forces to achieve those objectives.

ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT KEY RELATIONSHIPS

A natural way to proceed in developing scenarios for future conflicts is to identify current regional problems and observable trends, project modernization of the military forces of potential combatants based on their economic potential, and study the nature of campaigns that could be conducted in the 2000-2005 period. We used this method to some extent when examining possible scenarios, but the future environment is based on an interlinked structure of relationships among major powers, groups of lesser powers, and even religious beliefs that transcend political boundaries. Changes in any of these relationships change the likelihood of conflict and the response that might be required from U.S. forces. A set of illustrative scenarios must consider changes in these key relationships in describing likely participants and likely supporters of U.S. forces. For example, in a scenario in which the PRC attacks Taiwan, U.S. response options will be strongly influenced by the availability of basing and base access in Japan and the Philippines, as well as by the frequency of U.S. carrier battle group (CVBG) operations near Taiwan.

U.S.-Japan

U.S.-Japan relations are the primary bilateral relationship determining the flexibility with which the U.S. responds to crises in the Pacific region. In general, our posture options assume that basing decisions are driven by changes in the U.S. force structure, rather than by a U.S. policy decision to retrench or even Japan's denial of U.S. access. One of the
“nightmare” scenarios considered involves major Japanese rearmament as a result of U.S. withdrawal from the region or internal dynamics in Japanese politics. Obviously, in such a scenario, U.S. forces would not be operating in Japan and the U.S. would be denied the benefits of Japanese bases to support U.S. forces in unrelated scenarios. If the U.S.-Japan association changes enough that the U.S. and Japan no longer cooperate on regional security matters, U.S. responses will change from those presented in most of the scenarios.

U.S.-PRC

The future of U.S.-PRC relations is much less clear. Our analysis assumes that the PRC will be cooperative on regional security issues but will be primarily looking inward as it tries to solve myriad internal problems caused by the imbalance between its huge population and still underdeveloped economy. Some scenarios investigate situations in which these internal problems cause the PRC to take aggressive actions in the region. However, because we assume that the PRC will focus on internal problems, the U.S.-PRC association is not as dominant a factor as U.S.-Japan relations. Therefore, U.S. security objectives can be met with or without PRC support.2

U.S.-Former Soviet Union

The former Soviet Union will remain the region’s single locus of power with the greatest military potential. Many people will argue that the remoteness of former Soviet Asia and the economic disadvantage of the former Soviet Union relative to the East Asian economic powerhouses will limit the role of the former Soviet Union in regional security matters. Nevertheless, the risk remains that a future authoritarian government in Moscow, finding limited support and opportunities in Eastern Europe, may look to Asia to reestablish its superpower status either alone or by forming new alliances. None of our scenarios assumes U.S. access to former Soviet bases, and some scenarios address a significantly more hostile relationship. In general, the former Soviet Union is not seen as a major factor in dealing with regional crises away from its immediate borders.

The role of the former Soviet Union as an arms supplier is important. As opportunities arise for regional nations to move to more aggressive postures vis-à-vis their neighbors and the U.S., the success of hostile states will be strongly influenced by their ability to manufacture or acquire modern weapons. The state of the U.S.-Russia relationship will determine how much cooperation is possible in limiting high-technology arms proliferation. How regional actors might obtain their weapons was not part of our analysis, but certainly access to modern weapons will be much easier for regional nations if the U.S. and former Soviet Union are adversaries.

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1 See Kreisberg (1991) for an optimistic assessment of the PRC’s likely future role.
2 The PRC’s support for more militant regional states, particularly through the transfer of military equipment and military technology, certainly influences the risk of conflict for many of the scenarios considered in this analysis. We emphasized the range of possible scenarios and in general did not address the issue of where aggressor states would obtain their weapons.
3 We use former Soviet Union or Russia for whatever successor state emerges with Pacific territory.
U.S.-Arab World

No single country is likely to control the majority of Arab states, but the common Arab cultural values may form a bond that results in a de facto coalition in some contingencies. Islamic fundamentalism could become a unifying theme for insurgencies extending from the Middle East across South and Southeast Asia, where revolutionary ideas backed with oil money could arm insurgents with sophisticated weapons. The U.S. will become more concerned with how its security actions and postures are perceived in the Arab world. The worst case would be the emergence of a regional hegemony in control of Persian Gulf oil and with visions of a new empire. Except in one specific scenario, we assume a continuation of unfocused pockets of Islamic zeal.

U.S. Role in the World

The U.S. has served as the leader of the free world for the latter half of the twentieth century, but economic and political developments may limit its ability to take timely action to sustain a leadership role in the Asian Pacific. The scenarios investigated assume that the U.S. will continue to take the lead in addressing regional security problems in the Pacific. However, they also assume that the U.S. will continue to pursue collective security with regional partners. Requirements for U.S. forces and the adequacy of available resources will have to be reevaluated if isolationism replaces internationalism as a basis for U.S. policy.

The DoD Report to Congress on the Asian Pacific Rim strategic framework (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs [OASD/ISA], 1990) defines the U.S. regional and global perspective:

Our regional interests in Asia will remain similar to those we have pursued in the past: protecting the United States from attack; supporting our global deterrence policy; preserving our political and economic access; maintaining the balance of power to prevent the rise of any regional hegemony; strengthening the Western orientation of the Asian nations; fostering the growth of democracy and human rights; deterring nuclear proliferation; and ensuring freedom of navigation. The principal elements of our Asian strategy—forward deployed forces, overseas bases, and bilateral security arrangements—will remain valid and essential to maintaining regional stability, deterring aggression, and preserving U.S. interests.

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF SCENARIOS

To understand the implications of force posture choices, alternatives must be tested in the context of how those forces might be used to accomplish military objectives. Routine forward military presence shapes the future Asian Pacific security environment by reassuring U.S. security partners, deterring those states that might potentially destabilize the region, and protecting a broad range of U.S. interests. Such actions are expected to be sufficient to sustain a benign environment that fosters economic growth. Underlying the deterrent role of U.S. forces is their capability for military operations in crisis or war.

The scenarios listed in Table 2.1 were developed to expand current perspectives of Pacific policy analysis. They are not intended to single out particular countries or subregions as sources of problems or instabilities. Rather, they redirect thinking from the Cold War ap-
Table 2.1

Pacific Scenarios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>U.S. Interest</th>
<th>Importance of U.S. Peacetime Presence</th>
<th>Likelihood in Near/Long Term</th>
<th>Leverage Provided by U.S. Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Civil War</td>
<td>Questionable</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low/mod</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Civil War</td>
<td>Questionable</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low/low</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan-Islamic Turmoil</td>
<td>Clear</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low/low</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spratly Islands War</td>
<td>Questionable</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low/mod</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian Straits Denial</td>
<td>Clear</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low/mod</td>
<td>Important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Recovery of Northern Territories</td>
<td>Questionable</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low/low</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC Invasion of Southeast Asia</td>
<td>Clear</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low/mod</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India-Pakistan War</td>
<td>Questionable</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Mod/mod</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC-Taiwan War</td>
<td>Clear</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Mod/low</td>
<td>Important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invasion of Saudi Oil Fields</td>
<td>Clear</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Mod/low</td>
<td>Important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renewal of Korean War</td>
<td>Clear</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Mod/low</td>
<td>Important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia-U.S. War at Sea</td>
<td>Clear</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low/low</td>
<td>Important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Pacific Empire</td>
<td>Clear</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low/low</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

proach in which requirements analysis focused on the Soviet threat in the context of a global war and Soviet expansion goals. Regional conflict scenarios formerly could be dealt with as “lesser included cases” and did not require crisp and detailed rationales. “The essence of a national security strategy is to prepare for a wide range of plausible contingencies [emphasis added], not simply the immediate crises of today” (Ikle and Nakanishi, 1990). Judgments of the likelihood of a scenario occurring are highly subjective. Improbable situations are included because they reinforce the need for actions and force postures that keep the probability acceptably low. Michael Nacht touched on this issue at the 1991 National Defense University/CINCPAC Pacific Symposium (February 28, 1991, Honolulu) when he observed that Operation Desert Storm had taught the U.S. that “we have to be prepared to fight in unlikely places” and “we have to be very careful in saying what areas (and situations) we are not interested in.”

Table 2.1 presents judgments about U.S. involvement in each scenario that are developed in later sections. It includes initial judgments on the U.S. view of the importance of a peacetime presence and the leverage provided by U.S. forces. We constructed a broad range of potential scenarios to illustrate the types of future crises U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) planners must consider. We looked at the U.S. role in more detail for each case, judging no scenario as highly likely by itself but assuming that some future conflict is inevitable.

A scenario-based analysis evolves from initial identification through an iterative process in which increasing levels of detail are added to “flesh out” the situation to be studied. As a first step, a thumbnail description identifies the location, the strategy of the attacker and what he wants to achieve, the concept for defense, and a high-level summary of forces applicable to the scenario. Scenarios are frequently postulated, but a campaign plan with a concept of operations for employing forces is often omitted. When used, a campaign plan forces an analyst to be specific in response to questions about the mission, the specific location, and the timing of military operations. In some cases, military contingency plans exist. They may
or may not be the preferred way to respond to a contingency some years in the future. Our analysis did not use actual military plans, but the procedures could be used in later analyses by personnel with access to applicable plans.

For each scenario, we used a thumbnail summary chart to identify the potential role of U.S. forces. These overviews identify current forces in the countries of interest and how those forces might evolve by the 2000-2005 period. Some scenarios are based on a major force expansion; in those cases, the nature of the expansion is presented. U.S. forces available to support U.S. presence and war-fighting objectives vary across the postures being examined. This section of the report ignores posture differences (in terms of military capabilities) and presents the general size of U.S. force requirements regardless of force availability. The distinctions between individual postures are examined in more detail in Section 3.

SCENARIO SELECTION CRITERIA

We considered thirteen scenarios ranging across the Asian Pacific region. They are not intended to be exhaustive, but they do span the range of objectives for forces assigned to CINC PAC. For a scenario to be considered, it had to meet at least one of four objectives—i.e., it had to provide an example of how U.S. forces

- Contribute to deterrence.
- Provide assurance to regional states.
- Respond to contingencies.
- Contribute to containment.

U.S. forces contribute to deterrence when there is a clearly identifiable threat and the U.S. commits to supporting a regional partner if it is attacked. The U.S. has formal obligations as the United Nations (UN) executive agent in Korea, and the U.S. commitment of in-place and reinforcing forces is a significant risk for North Korean prospects of successful attack. In Taiwan, the U.S. commitment is less formal, but continued close relations between the U.S. and Taiwan, coupled with U.S. military presence in Northeast Asia, contribute to reducing the likelihood of PRC military actions against Taiwan.

U.S. forces provide assurance to regional states where threats are less immediate. Our PRC Invasion of Southeast Asia scenario postulates moves by a much larger state against a smaller neighbor. U.S. bilateral security agreements and participation in regional security structures work to keep small states from being coerced and remove the perception of isolation. If Korea was peacefully reunified, U.S. regional involvement could provide assurances to both Japan and Korea that they need not be overly concerned about each other's actions. Without U.S. commitment to regional security, misunderstanding and tensions could build and might lead to military confrontation.

Some scenarios, such as civil war in the Philippines, illustrate the need to respond to contingencies. U.S. forces cannot be precisely sized to support regional contingencies, but any forces that are present can support U.S. policy goals. If the cause for the civil war was terrorist activity against a popular local government, U.S. forces could respond with limited mili-
tary strikes or by providing training and intelligence. If U.S. interests were less clear, the U.S. would categorize the war as one that should be observed and for which U.S. forces should be used for the fourth objective: containment.

In cases in which the U.S. is not directly involved in a conflict (and may even have a hard time deciding which side to support) but does have an interest in seeing that the conflict does not escalate outside the boundaries of the affected states or to the use of weapons of mass destruction, U.S. forces may contribute to containment. Horizontal escalation of smaller wars may force U.S. military forces to operate close to the theater of conflict to protect sea and air lines of communication.\(^4\) For vertical escalation control, a more difficult policy issue arises. That is, the U.S. may have the military capability to prevent nuclear weapon use, but U.S. actions would be perceived as taking sides and could result in a major expansion of the war. Our India-Pakistan War scenario is illustrative of conflicts in which the U.S. objective is containment of a subregional war to the immediate area of the engaged forces.

The catalog of scenarios presented in Table 2.1 is a useful overview tool for identifying the role of U.S. forces in the region. It identifies whether U.S. interests are involved, how much U.S. presence can contribute to reducing the likelihood of a scenario arising, the overall likelihood of conflict, and the leverage provided by U.S. forces if combat should occur. Only in cases for which the U.S. interests are clear and U.S. forces contribute to risk reduction or war termination should the U.S. be concerned about offsetting identified deficiencies. The U.S. is not trying to build a force to become the region’s policeman, but it does want a clearer understanding for itself and its security partners of the role it plans to pursue.

**SCENARIO DESCRIPTIONS**

We now address each of the thirteen scenarios, starting with the lower intensity, somewhat localized cases and progressing through larger wars and situations with major repercussions.

**Philippine Civil War**

The Philippine Civil War scenario represents the low end of the conflict spectrum—i.e., U.S. forces may become involved, but the circumstances surrounding the initiation of hostilities and other political factors will determine the role of U.S. military forces. Figure 2.1 summarizes this scenario.

**Setting.** A Philippine civil war would present U.S. Pacific strategists with difficult choices.\(^5\) The issues leading to war may be entirely internal and the direct result of policy decisions opposed by the U.S. Philippine government policies may also lead to severe restrictions on U.S. peacetime presence. Nevertheless, the long-term U.S. involvement in the Philippines may make U.S. assistance desirable. If the war is the result of insurgency by Marxist-Leninist or Moslem armies in remote areas, the U.S. should be able to provide logistical support and air strike sorties to support government forces at any level of combat. U.S. ground

\(^4\)We make the distinction between *horizontal escalation*, which expands the geographic scope of the war, and *vertical escalation*, which refers to increasing the level of intensity.

\(^5\)We are considering something more widespread and intense than the continuing NPA insurgency.
Crisis/Conflict Initiator: New People's Army (NPA) or Bangsa Moro Army (Moslem)

Rebel/Insurgent Forces:
NPA 16K armed troops
Moro Army 15K armed troops
4K other Islamic insurgents

Likely Defender: Armed Forces of the Philippines

Relevant Government Forces:
68K light infantry troops
10K Marines
45 combat aircraft
70 armed helicopters
50 patrol craft
18 amphibious ships

Rebel/Insurgent Objectives: Demonstrate the inability of constitutional government to provide security for citizens and prospects for improvements in quality of life. Use anti-American nationalism as tool against legitimate government.

Rebel/Insurgent Campaign Plan: Gain control of remote islands, harass government forces throughout archipelago, and expand rebel armies.

Philippine Government Campaign Plan: Provide stable environment for economic growth by quickly defeating rebel attacks and systematically eliminating rebel sanctuaries.

Mission of U.S. Forces: Support constitutional government by providing training and equipment. If required, augment government forces with air power and intelligence support. Credibility of government may be enhanced by good relations with the U.S.

RISKS TO REGIONAL STABILITY:
Broadening Conflict: Low.
Superpower Opposition: Low.

PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION: Low; U.S. combat involvement likely to be minimal.

U.S. POLICY CONCERNS: Chaos in Philippines, if government is perceived as ineffective, could lead to involvement by other regional actors (Indonesia, Vietnam, PRC, Japan).

Fig. 2.1—Summary of Philippine Civil War Scenario
11

forces would be neither required nor provided and would probably be counterproductive, in-
voking memories of the Vietnam War both in the Philippines and in the U.S. This scenario
assumes an insurgency in which the U.S. is supportive of the actions of the Philippine gov-
ernment.

Rebel/Insurgent Forces. Insurgents in the Philippines could field 10,000 to 20,000 troops
that are essentially light infantry units. However, these forces are potentially capable of
taking control of one or more islands. Initial successes against such forces will require am-
phibious or airborne operations by government forces.

U.S./Coalition Defense Forces. Philippine Army units are currently composed of light in-
fantry troops with a small force of Marines (~10,000 men). The Philippine Navy includes a
small number of very old amphibious ships. The Philippine Air Force has 45 combat aircraft
capable of providing limited support for offensive operations within the Philippine
archipelago. Due to the extreme economic difficulties facing the Philippines, there is little
prospect for significant improvement in military capabilities.

U.S. projection forces assigned to CINCPAC could be rapidly deployed to support Philippine
forces if such actions were determined to be in the national interest. Marine air ground task
force elements and amphibious shipping would be particularly useful in moving and support-
ing Philippine ground force units.

U.S. Objective. If the U.S. is committed, there would be no expectation of a significant or
long-term involvement. The most likely operations would be noncombatant evacuation order
(NEO) operations or logistics and air support for Philippine military operations.

Campaign Analysis. Philippine government credibility and strength will be the most im-
portant factors in the event of a civil war. If the government is perceived as effective and re-
sponsive by the majority of the Philippine people, a counterinsurgency campaign can succeed,
and U.S. military support, if provided, can be effective and constructive. On the other hand,
if the war is the result of a collapse of government authority and further economic decline,
even a massive commitment of U.S. forces will not be sufficient to sustain the government.
U.S. actions in the Philippines may undermine achievement of U.S. goals elsewhere in the
Asian Pacific region.

No specific campaigns were analyzed for this scenario. It is included to represent one point
along a range of contingencies for which questions about the role of U.S. military forces may
arise.

Chinese Civil War

The Chinese Civil War scenario represents a possible East Asia contingency in which the
U.S. would not contemplate using military force. Figure 2.2 summarizes this scenario.

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7 This scenario assumes little U.S. involvement. An alternative would be a case in which insurgents pursued an
effective terrorism campaign against U.S. citizens and supporters throughout the islands. U.S. noncombatant
security operations could become extensive and draw military forces into combined operations with Philippine units.
Crisis/Conflict Initiator: Dissident noncommunist Chinese

Rebel/Insurgent Forces: Light infantry units populated with PLA deserters
Some organized PLA units whose leaders have joined the insurgency

Likely Defender: PRC

Relevant Government Forces: People's Liberation Army (PLA)
2 million men
8000 tanks
5000 combat aircraft

Rebel/Insurgent Objectives: Replace communist leadership with an economically focused liberal government.

Rebel/Insurgent Campaign Plan: Develop a noncommunist second revolution arising from both rural and urban regions.

Government Campaign Plan: Suppress insurgency and isolate dissidents from any outside support.

Mission of U.S. Forces: Provide minimal support with continued attempts at all levels to foster responsible Chinese international behavior.

RISKS TO REGIONAL STABILITY:
Broadening Conflict: Low; however, PRC could try to build internal support by "inventing" an external threat.

U.S. or Former Soviet Union Involvement: Unlikely unless neighboring countries are attacked.

PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION: PRC likely to be able to defeat specific threats, but evolutionary changes will be substantial.

U.S. POLICY CONCERNS: Spillover effects on regional stability. Isolation of China causes problems to smolder but not die out. Chinese participation in regional economic development will promote a more peaceful transition.

Fig. 2.2—Summary of Chinese Civil War Scenario
Setting. The leadership succession in Beijing could result in a breakdown of central control and the emergence of provincial military forces. Those regions closely linked with the economies of Hong Kong and Taiwan may pursue a course of liberalization; interior regions may emphasize more authoritarian measures. Tensions between factions could lead to civil war. The U.S. and the rest of the world would be concerned, but outsiders would be able to do little militarily if the war remained within Chinese borders. The U.S. military posture in Asia will probably have little influence on the likelihood of internal rifts, but U.S. Asian policy can limit the effect that an internal war in China would have on other regional states.

Rebel/Insurgent Forces. A civil war in China could find large elements of the PLA joining with insurgent forces. Many troops would be expected to follow their leaders, ignoring Beijing's attempts to control their actions. The PLA might become fragmented into regional armies in which factions form alliances opposed to the central government.

U.S./Coalition Forces. Outside forces are unlikely to be appropriate in the event of a Chinese civil war. At most, there may be a requirement to conduct NEO operations in affected coastal cities.

U.S. Objective. The U.S. goal is to foster a China that is responsible in its international relations and more democratic in its domestic institutions.

Campaign Analysis. No analysis of the dynamics of a civil war was performed in support of this study.

Pan-Islamic Turmoil

The growth of Islamic fundamentalism from its Arab roots to involve Moslem populations in the Southeast Asian subregion would present a difficult situation for the nations most deeply involved in the economic prosperity of the Asian Pacific Rim. Economic disparities and a sense of being exploited for natural resources could provide fertile ground for seeds of revolution. Although the U.S. would not be directly involved, except if U.S. citizens were targets, U.S. economic and political linkages would cause some form of U.S. response. This is not to say that the U.S. would, or should, take the lead in restraining insurgent movements. Figure 2.3 summarizes the Pan-Islamic Turmoil scenario.

Setting. There is no single point of vulnerability, but Indonesia, Malaysia, and the southern Philippines are prime candidates. Insurgent movements could receive financial support, training, and high-technology weapons from Iraq, Pakistan, Syria, or Iran (depending on which one emerges as the major political power). It is also possible that Moslem fundamentalists could come to power in one of the regional states, providing a closer base of support for insurgents.

In this scenario, insurgent forces and their support structure are hard to identify as military targets. U.S. military forces are used in support of threatened local governments. However, U.S. forces are unlikely to be involved in ground combat. They may play an important advisory role in training local forces. U.S. logistics support to move local forces to remote areas and to resupply isolated enclaves can be anticipated. In-place U.S. forces are not required to defend against insurgents, but peacetime joint training activities can build a foundation for later increased U.S. support. Special forces and some of their unique equipment will be useful in both training and direct support of counterinsurgency operations.
**Rebel/Insurgent Objectives:** Establish political institutions not dependent on great power support. Demonstrate the inability of U.S. to provide effective support for affected governments. Remove U.S. as a major regional actor.

**Rebel/Insurgent Campaign Plan:** Focus on countries with links to U.S. (Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore). Conduct terrorist campaign under banner of local "liberation" front army. Establish operating bases in remote regions where autonomy can be declared. Attack government and U.S. military personnel and equipment, avoiding civilian involvement to demonstrate limited objectives.

**Government Campaign Plan:** Isolate rebels and identify their outside support. Deny resupply in conjunction with U.S. forces.

**Mission of U.S. Forces:** Provide military and economic support in conjunction with Japan to minimize economic disruptions and strengthen local governments.

### Crisis/Conflict Initiator:
Broad-based insurgency in Indonesia, Philippines, and India

### Likely Defender:
Unstructured coalition of involved states, U.S., and Japan

### Rebel/Insurgent Forces:
Guerrilla forces with some high-tech light infantry weapons, including heat-seeking surface-to-air missiles

### Relevant Government Forces:
Indigenous local Army units with naval and air support from the U.S.

### Risks to Regional Stability:
- **Broadening Conflict:** High, as sympathetic factions develop in other countries or provinces of affected countries.
- **PRC or Former Soviet Union Involvement:** Moderate, since both have Moslem majority enclaves that could be future targets.

### Prospects for Successful Resolution:
Poor, if a substantial foothold is ever established. There are few historical examples of successful counterinsurgency campaigns.

### U.S. Policy Concerns:
Economic disparities provide fertile base in third world countries. Existing authoritarian regimes can place U.S. in an unsustainable position. Arab-Moslem animosity towards U.S. in Middle East could incite problems in Pacific region. Pakistan's policy is becoming increasingly anti-U.S.

Fig. 2.3—Summary of Pan-Islamic Turmoil Scenario
Rebel/Insurgent Forces. Insurgents may be affiliated with long-standing opposition movements, such as the New People's Army (NPA) in the Philippines, or they may be recently organized smaller groups with a new focus. In either case, operations would be guerilla warfare with the prospect of high-technology precision-guided munitions and very effective communications being introduced.

U.S./Coalition Defense Forces. Defensive activities would be conducted by the armed forces of the affected states. U.S. participation would initially be limited to training local forces to conduct antiguerilla campaigns and providing military equipment and economic assistance. A Vietnam-like commitment of U.S. military forces in Southeast Asia should not be part of any serious contingency planning.

U.S. Objective. The U.S. goal is to provide individualized training to military personnel in Southeast Asia through bilateral agreements before the emergence of serious insurgency threats.

Campaign Analysis. No detailed analysis of counterinsurgency operations was conducted.

Spratly Islands War

This scenario represents the case in which U.S. forces are not allied with any of the major participants. U.S. forces could contribute to risk reduction by peacetime presence, and they might serve as a restraining influence should combat occur. Figure 2.4 summarizes this scenario.

Setting. Contemporary Chinese maps published in the PRC show the South China Sea to be "sacred territory" in which exploitation of undersea resources conflicts with territorial claims of Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam (Duncanson, 1985, p. 23). Occupation of a small island or two would be a simple matter for any of several regional states, but such an action would be opposed by others and could lead to a more general conflict involving naval and air forces. A regional coalition of affected states could count on UN support, but Security Council action could be blocked by the PRC. Routine U.S. presence in the region combined with successful bilateral relationships with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states would make PRC or Vietnamese military movements difficult to sustain.

Economic issues, including access to as-yet unexploited raw materials, may cause nations to act on their own behalf without considering how their actions will be perceived by other regional states with potential claims on the same resources. Regional associations such as ASEAN or the Asia-Pacific Economic Corporation, which provide a forum for discussion of issues and an opportunity to interact with regional partners, can reduce the risk of unintended conflict. In likely problem areas, such as issues in which ownership rights are unclear, ad hoc organizations sponsored by major powers concerned about the potential for escalation can be effective in giving visibility to the concerns of all parties. It will be much more difficult to solve problems of resource development once a war has occurred.

PRC Forces. The overall size of PRC military forces is largely irrelevant to the early stages of a war in the Spratlys, because the islands are very small and the lines of communication parallel the Vietnamese coast. The largest of the Spratlys could not support more than a
PRC Strategic Objectives: Establish effective economic control of oil fields in vicinity of Spratly (or Paracel) Islands.

PRC Campaign Plan: Rapidly deploy military forces to occupy some islands and establish effective control of maritime zone.

U.S./Coalition Campaign Plan: Prevent domination by any single nation. (More of a concern to regional states than to the U.S.)

Mission of U.S. Forces: Use U.S. maritime and air presence in region to provide support for smaller nations and increase difficulty of surprise occupation tactics.

Potential Initiator: PRC

Relevant PRC Forces:
- 10 infantry divisions in Guangzhou military region
- 6K naval infantry
- 92 submarines
- 56 destroyers/frigates
- 58 amphibious ships

Likely Defenders: Ad hoc coalition of Vietnam, Taiwan, and the Philippines

Relevant Defending Forces:
- Vietnam:
  - 27K naval infantry
  - 400 combat aircraft
  - 7 frigates
  - 7 amphibious ships
- Taiwan:
  - 30 Marines
  - 500 combat aircraft
  - 67 destroyers/frigates
  - 27 amphibious ships

RISKS TO REGIONAL STABILITY:

Broadening Conflict: Moderate; could provide pretext for direct PRC action against Taiwan.

Superpower Opposition: High; both U.S. and former Soviet Union could be drawn in.

PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION: Low; stalemate likely. Rapid occupation and subsequent reinforcement would leave expeditionary forces vulnerable; blockade actions would further polarize parties.

U.S. POLICY CONCERNS: Successful PRC military action could lead to further intervention in Southeast Asia.

Fig. 2.4—Summary of Spratly Islands War Scenario
battalion or two of naval infantry. The current PRC naval forces cannot provide adequate self-defense from air attack, but PRC submarines should be able to operate with impunity against surface naval forces and merchant shipping of any of the neighboring Southeast Asian states. The distance from the Chinese mainland to Spratly Island (over 700 nmi) precludes sustained air operations, and only a small air force could be deployed to the islands themselves. Future modernization of PRC naval forces is not assumed to include a large amphibious force or aircraft carriers.

Vietnam has the second-ranking subregional military force after the PRC. Vietnam's army includes naval infantry forces that could occupy one or more of the Spratlys, but the Vietnamese force is not configured for amphibious assault against defended islands. Vietnamese aircraft could conduct air strikes against targets in the Spratlys and could harass PRC surface forces. Today's capabilities are assumed to be suited for combat in the year 2000.

U.S./Coalition Defense Forces. ASEAN is not a military alliance, so coalition defense activities after PRC or Vietnamese actions to limit access to the Spratlys would consist of an ad hoc association among some of the ASEAN states and the U.S. Malaysia and Singapore may grant base access to U.S. air forces for surveillance and long-range strike operations. However, CVBGs operating in the South China Sea are the most effective force for sea control.

U.S. Objective. The U.S. goal is to prevent domination of economic development in the Spratlys by a single subregional power. Any military actions would only take place in association with some affected subregional states and with international agreement. There are no compelling reasons for initial U.S. involvement.

Campaign Analysis. War gaming of Spratly Islands war scenarios at the Naval War College highlighted the difficulties of sustaining outposts on these tiny islands in the face of even limited opposition. A case examined in 1991 included PRC mainland attacks on Vietnam after Vietnam had opposed PRC occupation of Spratly Island. Since the terrain in northern Vietnam is very favorable to defensive operations, the PRC attacks quickly stalled. The campaign at sea also was self-limiting.

U.S. naval forces could easily maintain sea and air control of the Spratlys. However, those actions could be counterproductive to long-term stability in the subregion. U.S. interests would not be served by stepping in too early in regional problems.

Indonesian Straits Denial

This scenario is representative of a class of potential situations in which subregions with significant economic importance may be dominated by a relatively minor military power. But, it is a much more specific scenario than those discussed so far. The combination of geography and economic lines of communication may result in unacceptable costs if freedom of commerce is restricted. These situations would almost certainly affect many nations, and U.S. forces would not be expected to act alone to resolve the issue. Figure 2.5 summarizes the Indonesian Straits Denial scenario.
**Potential Initiator:** Indonesia or separatist insurgents in Sumatra

**Relevant Indonesian Forces:**
- 200K light infantry
- 5–10 missile patrol boats with Exocet missiles
- 75 low-tech attack aircraft

**Indonesian Strategic Objectives:** Establish basis for subregional control. Extract political and economic concessions from major powers for uninterrupted use of waterways.

**Indonesian Campaign Plan:** Close Malacca and Sunda straits by mining and harassing attacks by cruise missiles from patrol boats and shore-based launchers.

**U.S./Coalition Defense Campaign Plan:** Use a three-phased incremental approach: protect shipping in straits by direct military action; blockade selected ports in Indonesia; destroy Indonesian military forces outside immediate vicinity of straits.

**Mission of U.S. Forces:** Foster regional stability and economic growth while retaining U.S. access to resources and markets. Deter aggression from within and outside the region.

**Likely Defenders:**
- Regional coalition of Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, U.S., and UK (perhaps Japan and PRC)

**Relevant Defending Forces:**
- **Singapore and Malaysia:**
  - 15 missile craft
  - Limited minesweeping
  - 100 low-tech attack aircraft
- **U.S.:**
  - CVBGs in E. Indian Ocean and South China Sea
  - TFW rebased to Malay Peninsula
  - MEB for coastal assault
  - Helicopter minesweeping support

**RISKS TO REGIONAL STABILITY:**
- Broadening Conflict: Low.
- Superpower Opposition: Low.

**PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION:**
- High; UN coalition response on Desert Shield model.

**U.S. POLICY CONCERNS:** High probability of successful deterrence with responsible regional presence.

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Fig. 2.5—Summary of Indonesian Straits Denial Scenario
Setting. In this instance, Indonesia is assumed to pursue a divergent course from its ASEAN partners. By 1998, the domestic economic situation is poor, and the gap between Indonesia's economy and the booming economies of Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong leads to a widespread perception by Indonesians that their country is being exploited. The constant flow of oil and other materials through the Malacca and Sunda straits is an irritating reminder of the second-class status of Indonesia. After initial discussions with Malaysia about their mutual rights to compensation for use of their waterways by foreign corporations that make large profits by transporting products through Indonesian waters, Indonesia decides to close its straits until adequate compensation agreements can be worked out. Islamic fundamentalism, extreme nationalism, or even the secession of Sumatra could also lead to the same situation.

To implement its strategy of obtaining economic resources to develop local industries, Indonesia decides that user states should compensate Indonesia for transiting the straits. The Indonesian Navy lays mines in the Singapore Strait and deploys fast missile-armed patrol boats in the coastal regions of the Malacca Straits. Ground-based antiship missiles are also deployed in Sumatra to harass shipping in the Malacca Straits. A similar situation could arise following separatist activity in Sumatra; in that case, defending coalition forces would also include Indonesian government forces.

Indonesian Forces. The current Indonesian Army consists of 200,000 men, including several brigades of infantry and airborne troops that could be deployed to the northern coast of Sumatra to defend shore-based fire positions. The Indonesian Navy has four missile craft, each carrying four Exocet surface-to-surface missiles. The Indonesian Air Force consists of 73 combat aircraft, with two squadrons of A-4 attack aircraft capable of antiship attack in adjacent straits.

The example assumes that there is no significant restructuring of ground forces by the turn of the century, but that the Navy adds missile patrol boats (PFMs) for a force of ten PFMs by 2000. Ground forces are modernized with several batteries of shore-based Exocet-class antiship missiles to function as extended-range coast artillery. By 1990, the Indonesian Air Force will be modernized to include sophisticated antiship missiles.

U.S./Coalition Defense Forces. A coalition of forces from Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, Japan, and the U.S. is assumed to be available to clear and protect the Malacca Straits. The navies of Malaysia and Singapore currently include 15 missile craft and a few minesweepers. Their air forces include about 50 F-5 fighters and about 100 A-4 attack aircraft.

By 2000, Japanese forces are expected to be capable of providing surveillance support and management of shipping. Two U.S. CVBGs, one in the eastern Indian Ocean and one in the South China Sea, would be required to provide sea control and helicopter minesweeping support. Bases in Malaysia and Singapore would be capable of supporting a U.S. tactical fighter wing (TFW). An embarked Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) could spearhead assaults on coastal positions used to harass shipping.

U.S. Objective. The U.S. objective is to provide the majority of air and naval combat forces needed to maintain unrestricted commerce in the Indonesian straits. In-place forces are not required. U.S. forces need not be continuously present in the region to achieve combat objectives if a sufficient rapid deployment capability is retained.
Campaign Analysis. If the U.S. peacetime presence is inadequate and deterrence fails, a regional coalition of Malaysia, Singapore, and the U.S. (with participation by Japan, Australia, and the United Kingdom) can deploy adequate military forces to bases on the Malay Peninsula and to the waters outside the contested straits. The preponderance of affected-nation forces should lead to the eventual defeat of Indonesian air and naval forces, but the campaign could take months. Jungle-based guerilla forces conducting harassing attacks on shipping might survive for years. The opposing coalition could respond in one of three ways:

1. Attempt to continue to use the straits by convoysing forces and providing air cover for transiting ships.

2. Temporarily give up on the straits and impose a blockade on Indonesia.

3. Destroy Indonesian military forces and restore unrestricted use of the straits.

The first response is unlikely to work for reasons of geography. Small mobile forces with guided antiship munitions could easily hide in the jungles and marshes adjacent to the straits and randomly attack transiting and minesweeping forces. Opposing forces would need to pursue patrol craft into marshy coastal areas, where their operating systems, designed for the open-ocean operating environment, would be degraded. Aircraft searching for small naval targets would be vulnerable to hand-held surface-to-air missiles and antiaircraft fire. The real purpose of using the straits is the movement of oil and other strategic materials by merchant shipping. Just the threat of attack and the presence of mines would result in complete avoidance of the straits because of probable high shipping losses and prohibitive insurance premiums. The U.S. could achieve temporary local superiority and transit military units through the straits, but control would revert to local forces as soon as the transit was complete.

The second option, an effective blockade on major ports, could be sustained, but the value of the straits to commerce would be lost for the duration of the standoff. The Indonesian economy is much less dependent on trade than are the economies of the more advanced countries in the region; even an effective blockade on selected ports may not have a major impact. Local food supplies would be sufficient for many months, during which time political pressure would build for a negotiated solution. Since closure of the straits simply increases the cost of commerce, there would be strong pressure to pay Indonesia something, and the result would be a reward for their initial aggression.

The third response option—a direct attack on Indonesian military forces—should be effective in achieving the immediate objective of increasing the cost to Indonesia for closing the straits. However, long-term stability in the region would be undermined by the perception of the U.S. as an imperialistic power that imposes its will on third world states. The Indonesian Air Force would be defeated after a few coordinated strikes, but mines would still have to be removed and harassing ground forces in the jungle would be almost impossible to eliminate.
Japanese Recovery of Northern Territories

This scenario represents a case in which a strong ally undertakes military operations that the U.S. does not support. If escalation occurs, the U.S. could become a reluctant participant. Figure 2.6 summarizes this scenario.

Setting. The Soviet occupation of the Northern Territories since the end of World War II has been a constant barrier to improved Japanese-Soviet relations. Economic issues such as fishing rights in the adjacent waters are secondary to the occupation of former Japanese territory by Russian forces. If Russia and Japan are unable to settle this issue peacefully in the 1990s, conflict may occur as the Japanese military capability improves and the combat potential of the former Soviet Union continues to decline. At some point in the future, the Japanese may feel that they could forcibly retake the islands without provoking a major Russian response. A miscalculation of this nature involving a major U.S. ally and the second largest military power would entail overwhelming risks of unintended escalation or the damaging alternative of the U.S. backing away from support for Japan. In either case, the risks exceed any possible gain.

Contending Forces. Unlike the scenario that assumes major increases in Japanese spending to achieve the status of a regional military superpower, this case assumes only a limited extension of Japan's current capabilities. The Japanese Self-Defense Force currently consists of 150,000 army troops and 800 medium tanks. Naval forces include sufficient amphibious lift to move troops to the lower Kuriles. The current modern air forces, with 130 F-15s, could control airspace in the northern territories. Japanese military capabilities are likely to improve by the turn of the century.

The Russian forces in the northeastern Pacific will be facing major restructuring but are still likely to remain formidable. Their strengths are better matched to long campaigns against U.S. forces. Defending isolated islands so close to Japan would be a major problem for them.

U.S./Coalition Defense Forces. The U.S. would not be a participant in this campaign if it was started by the Japanese.

U.S. Objective. The U.S. goal is continued strong bilateral relations with Japan, including integrated defense planning to avoid situations in which isolation could lead to unilateral military action.

Campaign Analysis. Although former Soviet military forces in the Far East include many mechanized ground forces, they are not very suitable for the defense of small islands such as Iturup. Russian garrison forces can expect initial reinforcements, but Russia is in a position similar to that of the PRC in the Spratly Islands War scenario. Air superiority is impossible to sustain hundreds of miles from mainland air bases. Japanese aircraft can strike at times and places of their choosing and should be able to quickly isolate and destroy Russian garrison forces. Major uncertainties arise, however, if Russian forces attack support bases in Japan. Russian conventional missile attacks on Japanese bases could lead to an unintended
**Crisis/Conflict Initiator:** Japan  
**Likely Defender:** Russia

**Japanese Strategic Objectives:** Quickly recover islands of lower Kuriles occupied since World War II.

**Japanese Campaign Plan:** Conduct air strikes followed by amphibious and airborne landings. Strive for acceptance of a fait accompli.

**Russian Campaign Plan:** Conduct air strikes on invading forces and allied surface ships in vicinity of Kuriles.

**Mission of U.S. Forces:** Monitor military activity through routine northwestern Pacific naval operations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Relevant Japanese Forces:</strong></th>
<th><strong>Relevant Russian Forces:</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>150K Army</td>
<td>Former Soviet Far East military district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>800 light tanks</td>
<td>3 tank divisions</td>
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<tr>
<td>14 submarines</td>
<td>18 motorized rifle divisions</td>
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<tr>
<td>60 destroyers/frigates</td>
<td>500 combat aircraft</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 amphibious ships</td>
<td>Former Soviet Pacific Fleet</td>
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<tr>
<td>400 combat aircraft</td>
<td>81 tactical submarines</td>
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<tr>
<td>(including 130 F-15s)</td>
<td>2 carriers</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>70 cruisers/destroyers/frigates</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Irkutsk Air Army</td>
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<td></td>
<td>200 bombers</td>
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**RISKS TO REGIONAL STABILITY:**

Broadening Conflict: High; Russians may attack support targets on Hokkaido.

Superpower Opposition: PRC unlikely to become involved because of marginal ability to influence outcome.

**PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION:** Uncertain; Russian resistance may be token, but attacks on targets in Japan or mainland Russia would change perceived stakes. Depends on degree of disarray in former Soviet Union.

**U.S. POLICY CONCERNS:** Any conflict involving the former Soviet Union carries serious risk of unintended escalation. Diplomatic alternatives, even if protracted, reduce risks.

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Fig. 2.6—Summary of Japanese Recovery of Northern Territories Scenario
widening of the conflict and much higher costs than Japanese planners would initially have anticipated. Escalation after the Japanese began the war would present the U.S. with difficult policy decisions. A 1956 Suez scenario is not unlikely.

**PRC Invasion of Southeast Asia**

This scenario represents the case in which U.S. forces are unlikely to be involved but U.S. relations with countries in the region would influence a potential aggressor's calculation of the risks and opportunities of military action. If the U.S. decided to support Vietnam, the assistance would almost certainly be limited to supplying equipment and pursuing diplomacy to end a war. Figure 2.7 summarizes the scenario.

**Setting.** Although the Asian communist states are quite different from the former regimes in Eastern Europe, change will eventually be faced in Vietnam, as well as in the PRC. If the pace of democratization was more rapid in Vietnam than in the PRC, the government in Beijing could be threatened by ideas more than by military capability and could choose to establish a more tolerable leader in Hanoi by force. Border incidents could be manufactured, and the PRC could bring massive forces to bear. The course of such a war, once started, is difficult to predict. The U.S. experience in Vietnam is certainly pertinent if the North Vietnamese are motivated and fighting PRC domination. But the PRC will not be as self-restrained as was the U.S. in taking direct action against Hanoi. Resources are likely to be a problem for Vietnam and highlight the potential for a widening of the conflict. If Vietnamese reforms parallel those of the former Soviet Union, a situation could evolve in which both the U.S. and the former Soviet Union are providing aid to Vietnam. The risk of direct combat between nuclear powers would be dangerously high.

**Contending Forces.** The PRC forces include the current two million men of the PLA. Economic limitations and the reduction of the Soviet threat on northern borders will probably lead to downsizing of the PLA. Nevertheless, it will still be the dominant land force in Asia.

Vietnam currently maintains a formidable Army well suited for defensive operations. The Vietnam experience in Cambodia reinforces the difficulty of conducting counterinsurgency operations in another country—the PRC's problem in this scenario. Although Vietnam is also likely to be constrained in military modernization, we assume that the basic structure of the Vietnamese armed forces will not change significantly by the end of the century.

**U.S./Coalition Defense Forces.** If the PRC initiated military actions against Vietnam, the U.S. would not readily join in any military activity. Depending on the circumstances of the start of the war, the U.S. might provide equipment or economic support to Vietnam. Escalation by the PRC and a clear identification of Vietnam as a victim state could lead to a much larger role for USPACOM forces. The narrow width of Vietnam would facilitate air support operations from U.S. CVBGs in the Tonkin Gulf with little risk from PRC air forces. If other subregional states (Thailand, Myanmar) are also victims, a broader coalition would be possible.

**U.S. Objective.** The U.S. goal is to provide economic and moral support for smaller regional states while encouraging self-sufficiency. No defensive military alliance with mainland Asian states is anticipated.
Crisis/Conflict Initiator: PRC

Relevant PRC Forces:
- 2M Army
- 9000 tanks
- 5000 combat aircraft

Likely Defender: Vietnam

Relevant Vietnamese Forces:
- 900K Army
- 1600 tanks
- 250 combat aircraft

PRC Strategic Objectives: Establish border buffer states to remove bases for Chinese insurgent groups.

PRC Campaign Plan: Defeat Vietnamese Army in attrition war. Replace government with puppet regime.

Defender Campaign Plan: Engage PRC forces in protracted war while building support for U.S. or former Soviet Union intervention with ground or air forces.

Mission of U.S. Forces: Use maritime and air presence in region to provide support for smaller nations and increase risk to aggressors.

RISKS TO REGIONAL STABILITY:

Broadening Conflict: High; mismatch in capabilities likely to draw in other military forces.

Superpower Opposition: Likely that both U.S. and former Soviet Union will provide support to Vietnam.

PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION: Poor.

U.S. POLICY CONCERNS: Successful PRC military action could lead to further intervention in Southeast Asia. PRC losses could further weaken government and lead to civil war.

Fig. 2.7—Summary of PRC Invasion of Southeast Asia Scenario
Campaign Analysis. The PRC ground operations into Vietnam that were tried in the past led to stalemate. Future military developments are unlikely to change the factors that favor defenses unless political developments erode support for the existing government. No detailed analysis of ground wars among Asian states was conducted. The case is included to complete the spectrum of possible types of conflict that could arise in the Asian Pacific region.

India-Pakistan War

This scenario is presented to portray a situation in which world opinion focuses on a war in the Asian Pacific region that has unprecedented potential for loss of life and consequences outside the immediate area of combat but for which there is no clear role for U.S. forces. Figure 2.8 summarizes the scenario.

Setting. India and Pakistan have a long history of ethnic and religion-based violence that could again lead to war as it did in 1965 and 1971. India's demonstrated nuclear capability and Pakistan's potential for development raise the specter of unprecedented numbers of civilian casualties if strategic targets are attacked. There are many possible causes of war. India may want to reduce the capability of the Pakistani Army so that it cannot support separatists in Kashmir. Pakistan might start a war to prevent the unchecked growth of Indian military dominance in the subcontinent. For a number of reasons that may not be rational to Western analysts, the potential for war remains.

This example assumes that India initiates a war. Indian objectives are a quick defeat of Pakistani armored and mechanized forces to eliminate the risk of an invasion of India. There are no specific territorial objectives and no long-term plans to occupy Pakistani land. The Indian motivation for choosing preemptive attack is supported by the idea that war with Pakistan is inevitable and that it is thus better to choose the time and place—outside Indian territory. Key elements from a U.S. perspective are disruption of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in the Indian Ocean, the precedent of nuclear weapon use, and the risk to U.S. citizens.

Contending Forces. India's current Army is massive, composed of over a million men, but it is configured for local security operations more than for modern maneuver warfare. The principal forces of interest for operations into Pakistan are two to three armored divisions and several high-readiness infantry divisions that are deployed near the Pakistani frontier in peacetime. The Indian Air Force contains a range of primarily Soviet aircraft that could provide support for offensive ground operations in border regions. Indian military expansion and modernization by 2000 are unlikely to change these basic characteristics.

Pakistan, like India, has primarily an infantry force, but the armored component is relatively more significant (four armored divisions and 1700 main battle tanks compared with India's three armored divisions and 3000 main battle tanks). Pakistan's weapons, particularly aircraft, are of U.S. design. Pakistan's mobile ground forces are the focus of India's concerns, and their destruction would remove any real threat to India.

U.S./Coalition Defense Forces. This is a situation in which U.S. forces are not expected to participate in a coalition with either side in the conflict. However, the U.S. can provide intel-
Crisis/Conflict Initiator: India

Relevant Indian Forces:
- 1.1M Army (3 armored divisions, remainder light infantry; 30 infantry divisions in reserves)
- 2 armored/mechanized divisions and 5 infantry divisions on Pakistani front
- 3000 main battle tanks
- 800 combat aircraft (Soviet)
- 2 aircraft carriers
- 25 destroyers/frigates
- 17 submarines (1 nuclear)
- 10 amphibious ships

Likely Defender: Pakistan

Relevant Pakistani Forces:
- 480K Army (4 armored divisions, remainder light infantry)
- 1700 main battle tanks
- 450 combat aircraft
- 17 destroyers/frigates
- 6 submarines

Indian Objectives: Destroy Pakistan Army as a military threat. Eliminate Pakistani support for Moslem and Sikh insurgencies.

Indian Campaign Plan: Cut Pakistani north-south lines of communication. Engage and destroy Pakistani armor, essentially removing Pakistani power projection capability.

Pakistani Campaign Plan: Oppose Indian advances at the border. Establish attrition campaign favoring defenders.

Mission of U.S. Forces: Focus residual U.S. presence on support structure for maritime transits and Persian Gulf deployments.

RISKS TO REGIONAL STABILITY:
- Broadening Conflict: High; both nations likely to consider nuclear attacks if initial plans prove ineffective.
- Superpower Opposition: Low risk of commitment of ground forces due to remoteness of area of likely operations. Uncertainty about major power actions to prevent nuclear weapon use.

PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION: Low; previous wars were inconclusive and economic problems will continue to grow.

U.S. POLICY CONCERNS: Disruption of Indian Ocean SLOCs, precedent of nuclear weapon use in regional conflicts, and risks to U.S. citizens.

Fig. 2.8—Summary of India-Pakistan War Scenario
ligence information and logistical support if it decides to take sides. Additionally, military force may be required to protect innocent shipping transiting the Indian Ocean or to protect U.S. nationals. International peacekeeping forces may also be required.

**U.S. Objective.** Once a conflict begins, the U.S. will want to limit the scope of the war and provide the strongest possible actions to prevent nuclear weapon use. If the nuclear threshold is crossed, actions to limit further escalation and to encourage war termination will be necessary.

**Campaign Analysis.** Because India and Pakistan have a history of war, it is easy to construct updated replays of previous campaigns. There are two new factors that affect our confidence in predicting the course of future conflict. Previous battles were essentially Army operations on flat terrain—an ideal environment for modern integrated air operations if either side can achieve air superiority and can emulate the coalition campaign of Operation Desert Storm. It is not likely that either India or Pakistan will achieve that capability by 2000. The other uncertainty is the role of nuclear weapons. Massed armor operations are the optimal type of target for tactical nuclear weapons. However, the use of such weapons requires sophisticated command, control, communications, and intelligence that neither side may possess. An easier approach is to target cities, since emerging nuclear states can more effectively employ unsophisticated weapons there, and the result is certain to be catastrophic.

A future India-Pakistan war could end with an early defeat of Indian expeditionary forces because long lines of communication are particularly vulnerable to air attack. In such a case, there is little likelihood of escalation unless major Indian units are surrounded and at risk of annihilation. A more probable outcome would be some kind of a stalemate in Pakistani territory similar to what happened in some of the battles in the Iran-Iraq War. As losses mount and prospects for successful resolution fade, both sides will feel pressured to use nuclear weapons.

**PRC-Taiwan War**

This scenario represents the case in which a combination of U.S. presence and strong bilateral relations could convince a potential opponent of the futility of undertaking offensive actions. Figure 2.9 provides the summary.

**Setting.** The PRC, with its reconstituted conservative leadership grasping for legitimacy, may consider manufacturing a border threat that will draw attention away from internal problems. Leadership problems here, as also postulated for North Korea, could lead to desperate acts, including a movement to forcibly gain control of Taiwan. The rationale could either be to divert attention from internal economic problems or to destroy the threat presented by a more activist Taiwan regime backing more extreme internal changes on the mainland. The long history of close ties between the U.S. and Taiwan make it unlikely that the U.S. would ignore military actions against Taiwan. The need to bridge the Taiwan Strait in the face of probable enemy air superiority also militates against a successful PRC recovery of Taiwan.
**Conflict Initiator:** PRC

**Relevant PRC Forces:**
- PLA 2.3M Army (active plus 1.2M reserves)
- 7500 main battle tanks
- 5000 combat aircraft
- 88 submarines (1 nuclear)
- 56 destroyers/frigates
- 900 patrol craft
- 58 amphibious ships
- 400 landing craft

**Likely Defender:** Taiwan supported by U.S.

**Relevant Taiwanese Forces:**
- 270K Army (active plus 1.5M reserves)
- 30K Marines
- 300 main battle tanks
- 500 combat aircraft
- 4 diesel submarines
- 36 destroyers/frigates
- 67 patrol craft
- 27 amphibious ships

**PRC Strategic Objectives:** Distract own people from domestic troubles (complete revolution's "unfinished business"). Integrate Taiwan economy into PRC. Remove political threat to regime and political alternative for overseas Chinese. Demonstrate PRC's willingness to take military action to protect national interests.

**PRC Campaign Plan:** Preemptively attack Taiwan air bases. Then conduct massive strait crossing, placing 10 divisions ashore to engage and destroy Taiwan military forces.

**U.S./Coalition Campaign Plan:** Maintain air superiority and destroy landing forces before beachheads can be established.

**Mission of U.S. Forces:** Convince PRC of close U.S. ties with Taiwan and the risks of attempts at forced integration. Provide rapid response air support to interdict invading forces.

**RISKS TO REGIONAL STABILITY:**

- Broadening Conflict: Low; however, nuclear weapons are a concern.
- Superpower Opposition: U.S. will support Taiwan with forces in region.

**PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION:** High, if U.S. forces are available before significant PLA forces can be landed.

**U.S. POLICY CONCERNS:** Reduced U.S. regional presence could undermine deterrence.

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Fig. 2.9—Summary of PRC-Taiwan War Scenario
Although the PRC has ample military forces, they cannot be brought to bear without air and sea control. Harassing attacks would always be possible, but control of Taiwan would require occupation, including the landing of several divisions of heavy ground forces. The Taiwan Air Force alone could probably cause serious problems for an attacking force, but it might be worn down by the massive size of PRC air forces. On the other hand, a combination of U.S. carrier and land-based air forces joined with Taiwan's force could maintain local air superiority and destroy most of the PRC shipping before it could land forces on Taiwan.

**PRC Forces.** Although the PLA currently consists of more than two million men, the appropriate threat for an invasion of Taiwan is considerably smaller. Selected units of airborne and first-line mechanized forces could be marshalled on the mainland opposite Taiwan; the total committed force could easily exceed the size of the entire Taiwan defensive ground forces. The PRC Navy could assemble several hundred transport craft, including over 50 amphibious ships. The PRC Air Force has adequate transport aircraft to move necessary ground forces, but tanks and support equipment would need to be transported by ship. Future changes to PRC forces between the present and 2000 are not assumed to include any major changes in the PRC's ability to project power outside its boundaries.

**U.S./Coalition Defense Forces.** Taiwan currently has modern forces, including many U.S. weapons. The standing army of a quarter of a million men provides a solid base for mobilization of Taiwan's considerable reserves. Defensive operations have been planned for many years. Taiwan's small navy could provide effective coastal defense when employed with U.S. blue-water forces. Reductions in the U.S. force posture in East Asia are likely to increase the perceived need for self-defense forces in Taiwan. Taiwan's robust economy should sustain modernization of its air forces and improvement of its air defenses.

U.S. forces, to complement Taiwanese capabilities, would include CVBGs for surveillance and sea control and U.S. tactical aircraft to augment local forces. Intelligence sharing in periods of tension before war could lead to early U.S. actions to position forces to support defensive operations. U.S. ground forces would not be required.

**U.S. Objective.** The U.S. goal is to provide a surge capability with rapidly deployable naval and air forces that are able to operate jointly with Taiwanese forces. No in-place forces are required, but CVBG operations in the western Pacific will be necessary if surprise is a possibility.

**Campaign Analysis.** A successful invasion and occupation of Taiwan would require surprise and a massive sealift and airlift of forces from the mainland. After gaining a toehold, PRC forces would need to build to several hundred thousand troops to defeat the defending ground forces. Resupply activities would need to be carried out after operations began on the ground. The presence of U.S. forces, particularly CVBGs, would complicate PRC attempts to manage the threat to their SLOCs through interdiction strikes on airfields. PRC missiles would be a major threat to large air bases in Taiwan. A PRC decision to attack would almost certainly be based on the PRC's assumption that it could defeat U.S. forces or present a fait accompli before the U.S. could respond.

This example presents a situation in which relatively small potential gains would carry a clear risk of very high losses in prestige. If the strategic objective was to gain control of Taiwan's dynamic economy, a campaign that destroyed that economy would be counterproductive. If a quick victory could be achieved with limited damage to civilian facilities, an at-
tack would be desirable from a limited economic perspective. However, it would undercut trade relations and the perception of the PRC as a “good world citizen.” The existence of an effective coalition for defense would make quick success unlikely. Because of the proximity of Taiwan to mainland China and the historical and cultural ties between the two peoples, it is doubtful that other regional states would participate in defensive operations. This is a case in which U.S. commitment to the defense of Taiwan is crucial. If Beijing believed that the U.S. would not respond immediately, it could justify a decision to attack.

PRC nuclear weapons could threaten the existence of Taiwan as an economic power, but their use would destroy the economy that the PRC saw as the reason for war. Tactical nuclear weapons from medium-range missiles could destroy military airfields but might ensure U.S. intervention and the potential for expanded nuclear weapon use. Accurate Tomahawk cruise missiles provide a strong deterrent for limited PRC use of nuclear weapons because of their ability to destroy selectively important military targets. However, the relationship between the U.S. and Taiwan is more traditional than formal, and the use of nuclear weapons by the U.S., even after an attack on Taiwan, would be a difficult if not inconceivable decision.

**Invasion of Saudi Oil Fields**

This scenario is representative of contingencies in which USPACOM forces are involved but CINCPAC may not have the primary responsibility for planning. Such scenarios further complicate force and policy planning, but they cannot be ignored. Figure 2.10 summarizes this case.

**Setting.** In the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm, there is little need to explain the risk of war in the Middle East. The postwar military situation will be uncertain, but future events in Iraq, Iran, or the Arabian Peninsula could again threaten Persian Gulf oil fields. Western dependence on Middle Eastern oil is not likely to diminish. Gulf states in coalition with Saudi Arabia do not have an adequate population base to sustain large standing armies of the size maintained by Iraq and Iran. Embargoes on weapons and technology are hard to maintain against countries with hard currency and important natural resources. By the year 2000, Saudi Arabia could face an opponent with accurate long-range missiles incorporating stealth technology. Preemptive strikes against military bases with chemical weapons could prevent reinforcement and deny the air supremacy achieved in 1991.

**Iraqi Forces.** Iraq is assumed to reconstitute its army to include a million men with a large armored component. The lessons of Desert Storm motivate Iraqi acquisition of ballistic and cruise missiles from the PRC and North Korea. The missiles would be used to deny early reinforcement through Saudi ports and to harass operations at air hubs in Saudi Arabia. Antiship cruise missiles on fast patrol boats are assumed to be the principal focus of Iraqi naval force modernization.

**U.S./Coalition Defense Forces.** Successful defense in the year 2000, along the lines of Desert Shield, requires a long-term coalition of concerned states. U.S. forces will require prepositioned equipment if rapid reinforcement is to be achieved. Additionally, there must be routine training with coalition partners to avoid a perception that an aggressor could achieve strategic objectives before U.S. forces could be effectively brought to bear.
**Conflict Initiator:** Iraq

**Relevant Iraqi Forces:**
- 1M Army (active plus 500K reserves)
- 2000 tanks
- 300 Air Force combat aircraft
- 14 Navy missile craft

**Iraqi Objectives:** Rapidly destroy U.S. forces on land to reestablish narrowly defined “Arab” control of region.

**Iraqi Campaign Plan:** Conduct preemptive missile strikes on airfields with U.S. forces using chemical weapons. Conduct a combined air and armor attack on U.S. and other non-Arab military forces. Conduct holding action with heavy propaganda component against opposing Arab forces wherever possible.

**U.S./Coalition Campaign Plan:** Stop incursion using air strikes on moving forces and support structure. Launch early air/ground counteroffensive, including amphibious assault into Iraqi flank.

**Mission of U.S. Forces:** Provide military capability (more than a tripwire force) to significantly hinder Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia. Conduct effective cooperative training with Saudi and other allied forces to deter any attacker.

**Likely Defenders:** UN peacekeeping force (primarily U.S. and Saudi with UK, French, and token Arab components)

**RISKS TO REGIONAL STABILITY:**
- Broadening Conflict: High; attack will trigger U.S. mobilization.
- PRC or Former Soviet Union Involvement: Unlikely.

**PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION:** Good; Iraqi attack can be stopped because of long, vulnerable lines of communication, but counteroffensive will be costly and the impact on oil production will be significant.

**U.S. POLICY CONCERNS:** Lack of credible in-place forces will permit coercion and extortion of relatively weak oil-producing states. Long-term U.S. presence will be a focus for Moslem fundamentalist movement, limiting the utility of Saudi-based forces for operation in other subregions.

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Fig. 2.10—Summary of Invasion of Saudi Oil Fields Scenario
**U.S. Objective.** This case requires in-place U.S. forces on the Arabian Peninsula to prevent the immediate loss of territory or entire countries. U.S. forces committed through bilateral agreements provide an effective initial defense capability and a basis for rapid reinforcement.

**Campaign Analysis.** This scenario is representative of a future requirement to support a defense of Middle Eastern oil fields. The principal forces do not need to be American, and the aggressor need not be Iraq. Iran could coopt a weakened Iraq and cause a replay of the 1990 invasion with a pause at the Saudi border. Such a move could be preceded by a closure of the Strait of Hormuz, with the resultant loss of access to Saudi ports for resupply or continuing exports of oil during the war. Variations to this scenario include the overthrow of the Saudi royal family and a grab for the oil fields during a Saudi civil war. In cases involving internal problems, a coalition defense of the oil fields might not be possible, and the U.S. would have to decide whether to take sides in a civil war. Our study emphasized the external threat scenario to evaluate the effects of a requirement for in-place forces and the policy variants the U.S. can consider with regard to substituting for U.S. forces forward deployed on the opposite side of the world.

**Renewal of Korean War**

This scenario is representative of a large-scale war in which U.S. forces would support an ally but would not provide the majority of the ground forces. Figure 2.11 summarizes the elements of this scenario.

**Setting.** The changing political environment and the increasing economic gap between North Korea and South Korea could result in a desperate attempt to reunify Korea under North Korean leadership. There have been improvements in the military forces of both sides over the past ten years, but the results of political, economic, and military changes make it difficult to assess the net effects of those improvements. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (1980, 1990) shows a 66 percent increase in North Korean Army manpower over the ten-year period from 1980 to 1990, with a comparable increase in artillery (from 4000 guns to 6000 guns). South Korean manpower and artillery increased by about 25 percent in the same period. North Korea continues to spend about 20 percent of its gross national product (GNP) on defense. South Korea spends only 5 percent of its GNP on defense, but its GNP is much larger. Neither side's military forces are so dominant that it can ignore the other, and operational issues are likely to determine the outcome of any new war. Numbers favor the North; technology favors the South. There are large reserve forces in the South, but a fast-moving offensive could defeat the South before reserves could be brought to bear. Whether North Korea can sustain its disproportionately large commitment to military spending is an important question. However, history shows surprising acquiescence by the North Korean population to the demands of the Kim regime.

In this instance, North Korea is assumed to plan for a surprise attack on the South, trading off more effective mobilization for denial of strategic warning. Massive artillery barrages are used to break holes in prepared defenses, allowing mobile armored and mechanized forces to sweep rapidly past Seoul to the east and to the west. Air forces in South Korea would be

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8See Shlapak and Davis (1991) for a description of future requirements for forces in the Persian Gulf.
Conflict Initiator: North Korea

Relevant North Korean Forces:
- 930K Army (active plus 26 reserve infantry divisions)
- 3200 main battle tanks
- 650 combat aircraft
- 23 diesel submarines
- 29 missile craft

Likely Defender: Primarily South Korea and U.S.

Relevant U.S./Coalition Forces:
South Korea:
- 550K Army (active plus 23 reserve infantry divisions)
- 1600 main battle tanks
- 450 combat aircraft
- 3 diesel submarines
- 11 missile craft

U.S.:
- 32K Army (plus 23K Marines on Okinawa)
- 84 combat aircraft (plus 120 combat aircraft in Japan)


North Korean Campaign Plan: Weaken prepared defenses with long-range artillery. Take advantage of tunnels using special forces. Advance rapidly east and west of Seoul, with mobile armored and mechanized forces isolating but not directly attacking forces in the capital.

U.S./Coalition Campaign Plan: Utilize active forces in prepared defenses to prevent any breakthroughs; rapidly mobilize reserves to gain numerical superiority; utilize U.S. air power to maintain air superiority and U.S. ground reinforcement to mount a counteroffensive.

Mission of U.S. Forces: Provide stability in North/South Korean relationship through a visible U.S. presence. An attack into South Korea would immediately involve U.S. ground and air forces. Concerns about precipitous South Korean actions are alleviated by U.S. involvement in military planning and operations.

RISKS TO REGIONAL STABILITY:
- Broadening Conflict: Moderate.
- PRC or Former Soviet Union Involvement: Initially low, but PRC role and commitment to Pyongyang are unclear.

PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFUL SOUTH KOREAN DEFENSE: Debatable if surprise achieved by North Korea.

U.S. POLICY CONCERNS: Growing economic disparities between North and South Korea may lead to desperate actions by North Korea, particularly a new regime seeking legitimacy there. A nuclear North Korea by 2000 to 2010 could further destabilize situation.

Fig. 2.11—Summary of Renewal of Korean War Scenario
hampered by special operations force (SOF) attacks on airfields and command, control, and communications (C3) elements. Naval operations would be limited, but North Korean diesel submarines could present serious problems for U.S. amphibious and reinforcement operations.

**North Korean Forces.** The million-man North Korean Army currently includes 25 infantry and motorized infantry divisions, 15 separate armor brigades, and a special-purpose corps with airborne, river-crossing, and amphibious capabilities. Armored forces include 1500 Soviet T-62 main battle tanks and 4000 armored personnel carriers. The North Korean Air Force includes some modern Soviet aircraft but is primarily composed of variants of older Soviet designs. The 1991 North Korean Navy is a token force with very old Soviet-style diesel submarines and missile craft. The extensive ground force weapons industry may provide the ability to buy or build modern diesel submarines that could provide effective close-in defense against surface ships.

By the year 2000, North Korea could produce modern vehicles for mechanized forces (tanks, armored personnel carriers, and self-propelled artillery). North Korean Air Force modernization is anticipated to include locally produced modern air-to-ground combat support aircraft and strike aircraft capable of launching antiship missiles.

**U.S./Coalition Defense Forces.** Although UN sponsorship of the U.S. presence in Korea is assumed to continue, the principal players in Korean defense are South Korea and the U.S. The tendency toward increased South Korean management, with U.S. forces providing air and naval support to the coalition, is expected to continue. ⁹

The 1991 South Korean armed forces consist of 750,000 total active military personnel and 4,500,000 reserves in a wide variety of states of readiness. South Korean mechanized and infantry divisions are configured to support defensive operations. The South Korean Air Force includes 48 F-16s but is composed primarily of older F-4 and F-5 aircraft. In addition to the U.S. aircraft stationed in South Korea, modern U.S. aircraft from Japan and other U.S. facilities both in the Pacific and in the continental U.S. (CONUS) can be expected as rapid reinforcement.

Future improvements favor the South Korean forces as South Korea's strong economy permits continued force modernization with high-technology ground and air weapons. Access to U.S. technology through joint ventures and licensing agreements should result in a significant upgrading of the South Korean air forces.

The U.S. currently maintains air and ground forces in South Korea and plans to commit major elements of USPACOM and CONUS forces to the defense of South Korea. The planned improvements in U.S. forces over the next ten years will be reflected in the forces committed to South Korean defense. No major improvements in the responsiveness of forces stationed outside of Northeast Asia were assumed in this analysis.

**U.S. Objective.** U.S. out-of-area forces are expected to reinforce U.S. in-place forces as rapidly as force levels and force postures permit. In this assumed short-warning case, response in the first few days primarily consists of air forces and naval units present in the western Pacific. Because of the long history of U.S. involvement in the defense of South

⁹See Wolf et al. (1991) for a detailed description of the South Korea–U.S. security relationship.
Korea, a loss there would be a major embarrassment to the U.S. and the UN. Even with a general acceptance of South Korea's assuming more responsibility for defense planning, South Korea will remain an area of special significance.

**Campaign Analysis.** The effectiveness of North Korean surprise is the dominant factor in a future Korean war. Given enough time, the U.S. commitment of ground, air, and naval forces in conjunction with South Korean reserves and industrial capacity will provide a devastating defensive capability that can defeat a North Korean ground force operating without effective air support. Intervention by the PRC or the former Soviet Union in support of North Korea could increase the risks of sustaining an effective conventional defense. Our simulations of a Korean campaign in which tactical surprise could be achieved resulted in situations in which prepared defenses could be breached. If these defenses are breached, North Korean forces can penetrate south of Seoul. Whether a defense can be sustained politically after isolation of the capital is problematic. Nevertheless, such a defense was undertaken successfully in 1950. The same computer models produced drastically different results when South Korea (and the U.S.) responded promptly to a warning of North Korean mobilization. The fortifications near the demilitarized zone (DMZ) are formidable. Heavy initial losses in storming prepared defenses could break the morale and cohesion of North Korean forces.

U.S. ground forces, when present at the start of a war, provide primarily symbolic capability. In the most optimistic case, they are outnumbered 20 to 1 by South Korean soldiers and are deployed east of the principal lines of advance. U.S. air forces (Air Force and Navy), on the other hand, should be able to respond quickly enough to be a major factor in the early stages of a North Korean attack. Ground reinforcements in the first few days of the defensive campaign are much more important than forces that require several weeks to close. U.S. forces that can arrive quickly using prepositioned stocks would be more effective than larger, stronger forces that arrive after initial defenses are breached. However, the vulnerability of bases, particularly air hubs for reinforcing forces, is a continuing concern and adds uncertainty to outcomes when SOF units or chemical weapons are used.

The purpose of this study was in part to show the importance of considering a range of scenarios when looking at alternative force postures. We have already pointed out the many uncertainties associated with combat in Korea. Our analysis could point out only some of the possibilities. A more detailed analysis based on operational plans is certainly required to develop confidence in the adequacy of any proposed future defense posture.

**Russia-U.S. War at Sea**

This scenario—a major direct interaction between U.S. and Russian forces—represents the most militarily sophisticated threat that must be considered in USPACOM planning. The circumstances leading to such an interaction may differ from those postulated here, but the implications of this scenario, however it arises, must be considered. Figure 2.12 summarizes the scenario.

**Setting.** Most of the scenarios addressed so far have not been significantly influenced by the former Soviet Union. Therefore, Soviet actions have not been a factor in determining the ad-
**Conflict Initiator:** Former Soviet Union

**Relevant Russian Forces:**
- Former Soviet Pacific Fleet
  - 45 SSNs/SSGNs
  - 2 carriers (50 Yak-38)
  - 70 cruisers/destroyers/frigates
- Pacific Fleet Air Force
  - 250 combat aircraft with
  - 36 Backfire (AS-4) and
  - 35 Badger (AS-5/6)
- Up to 300 additional antiship missile bombers available from Naval Aviation and Strategic Aviation units outside the region

**likely Defender:** U.S. Pacific Fleet, USAF forces in Japan

**Relevant Defender Forces:**
- 3–4 CVBGs
- 8–10 TFSs

**Russian Strategic Objectives:** Remove U.S. forces from northeastern Pacific waters and bases in Japan. Provoke war at limits of U.S. Pacific reach. Prevent Japanese support through political initiatives and nuclear war threats. Remove U.S. forward-based forces and eliminate forward deployments.

**Russian Campaign Plan:** Initiate submarine attacks on surface forces operating near the Sea of Okhotsk. Expand to attacks on all U.S. forces west of Hawaii.

**U.S./Coalition Campaign Plan:** Maintain sea control by defeating Russian forces in open ocean and through selective attacks on shore-based forces.

**Mission of U.S. Forces:** Provide naval and air forces suitable for northeastern Pacific operations capable of defeating any Russian military operations in maritime areas.

**RISKS TO REGIONAL STABILITY:**

Broadening Conflict: Moderate; U.S. would attack mainland military support targets, but both U.S. and Russia are likely to be deterred from any nuclear weapon use.

PRC Involvement: Unlikely.

**PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION:** Good, but costs will be high due to destructive potential of sophisticated antiship missiles.

**U.S. POLICY CONCERNS:** Economic collapse of former Soviet Union could lead to military adventurism to refocus domestic priorities. If a war started, miscalculations resulting in horizontal and vertical (nuclear) escalation could be catastrophic.

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Fig. 2.12—Summary of Russia-U.S. War at Sea Scenario
equacy of U.S. forces in the Pacific. Economic problems in the former Soviet republics and the restructuring of Eastern Europe lead many to believe that Russia will be only a marginal player in Pacific regional security. Such optimism overlooks the significant military capabilities of former Soviet forces and the fact that the superpower status of the former Soviet Union resulted from its military strength. There are several possible ways that U.S. forces could engage in a war with the former Soviet Union. Even with the breakup of the Warsaw Pact and the splitting off of former republics, some NATO forces could end up at war with Russian forces in Europe after a period of ethnic fighting and ineffective local government. A European war could possibly spill over into a naval war in the Pacific.

The scenario we considered results from the spreading of hostilities between Japan and Russia over the Northern Territories. U.S. support for Japan would lead to an increased U.S. naval presence in the northwestern Pacific and present the former Soviet Pacific forces with a chance to deal a crippling blow to the U.S. The purpose of the war would be to assert Russian control over the waters adjacent to Northeast Asia and to drive out U.S. military forces and break down U.S. ties to Japan. With the U.S. removed, South Korea and Japan would need to deal with Russian demands for greater economic integration in the region. This case is a surrogate for any future conflict between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union.

**Russian Forces.** The former Soviet Union’s Pacific Fleet is currently undergoing a significant transition as older ships and submarines are retired. However, modern units, particularly nuclear submarines built in the 1980s, provide the greatest threat to U.S. naval operations in the western Pacific. These submarines are likely to remain in service through the turn of the century. The emerging Russian power projection capability is likely to be severely constrained by economic and political changes. As a result, no out-of-area CVBG capability is assumed for the year 2000.

Former Soviet Union air forces in the Pacific are expected to undergo a similar process—older aircraft being retired and modern strike aircraft capable of missile attacks on naval forces being retained.

**U.S./Coalition Defense Forces.** Although Japan is assumed to continue its contribution to defense of the sea lanes in Northeast Asia, the Japanese Self-Defense Force is not expected to be able to defeat the former Soviet Union’s Pacific Fleet without joint operations with U.S. naval and air forces. Removing the submarine threat in the western Pacific will require several CVBGs, initially for open-ocean antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and eventually for strikes against submarine bases. Controlling the airspace to limit long-range air strikes and to interdict mainland bases will require U.S. Air Force operations from Japanese bases, as well as multiple carrier battle force (CVBF) operations.

**U.S. Objective.** U.S. naval and air forces in the Pacific must retain numerical and technological superiority over former Soviet Union naval forces for the foreseeable future.

**Campaign Analysis.** If the former Soviet Union embarked on a military campaign in the region, only the PRC would have sufficient ground forces to stop the aggression. Only the
U.S. could defeat the former Soviet Union Navy. This case postulates coordinated attacks on U.S. naval forces operating near the Sea of Okhotsk.

This kind of a situation, however remote, constitutes the most technologically advanced threat to U.S. forces, which is the reason that it must be included in any review of potential scenarios. The sophistication of both former Soviet Union nuclear attack submarines and special-purpose nonnuclear submarines presents unique requirements. If U.S. forces are denied access to bases in Japan and cannot count on Japanese ASW support, the campaign could be very long, costly, and unsuccessful. Unlike the defense of Taiwan, in which case little ground has to be given up before the war is lost, sea room abounds in this case. The natural strategy is to fall back to defensible positions where carriers can operate away from submarine and land-based air threats and then gradually gain sea control. The length of the campaign would be a function of the level of U.S. forces available and the access and assistance provided by Japan. The eventual outcome of an extended war at sea is not in question, because U.S. naval forces are technologically superior to those of the former Soviet Union. U.S. losses would occur and would be dramatic, however, and their size could cause a weakening of resolve at home. Moreover, Russian attacks on Japan could cause a loss of U.S. access. Russia’s willingness to limit its objectives to removal of U.S. naval forces from Northeast Asia could ensure a long campaign. The Russians could strike out, using land-based air forces against naval forces approaching Russian territory. Penetrating the natural barrier formed by the Kuriles would not be easy.

Japanese Pacific Empire

This scenario represents a major change in the geopolitical environment. It could only occur over a period of years, during which the U.S. would have an opportunity to adjust military programs. Unfortunately, however, the U.S. has not always chosen to respond adequately to developing military threats. Figure 2.13 summarizes this scenario.

Setting. No nightmare in the Asian Pacific region is more vivid for Southeast Asian states and the U.S. than a resurgent Japanese military that attempts to couple political domination with economic power. The limited scope of Japan’s military capability is the result of Japan’s experience in World War II and the strong antimilitary sentiments of the Japanese public based on lessons drawn from that experience. The limited scope is also linked to a conscious Japanese strategic decision to emphasize economic and technological growth and minimize military expenditures. As a result, the U.S. has assumed the major burden for defending its own interests and those of Japan in the Pacific. No technological or fiscal constraints limit the potential for development of a modern Japanese Navy with submarines and aircraft carriers, a Japanese Air Force capable of projecting power throughout the Asian Pacific Rim, and contingency ground forces capable of deploying in support of Japanese interests.

More frightening than the risk of Japanese actions against regional states if Japan pursued a strategy of political domination is the potential for development of Japanese nuclear weapons. These weapons have been an anathema in Japan, but so has military influence on politics. Once major changes occur, the outcomes are uncertain. Japan can produce any weapons it wants. Nuclear weapons in Japan’s arsenal would be primarily symbolic, but the symbolism would not be lost on any of the states that Japan would want to influence.
**Crisis/Conflict Initiator:** Japan

**Japanese Strategic Objectives:** Displace weak governments in important regions with new regimes controlled in Japan.

**Japanese Campaign Plan:** Take advantage of economically depressed countries by supporting authoritarian alternatives closely linked to Japan.

**U.S./Coalition Campaign Plan:** Oppose overt military actions and maintain unrestricted access to SLOCs.

**Mission of U.S. Forces:** Continue U.S. presence in western Pacific and pursue active bilateral security arrangements that remove any incentive for Japanese military expansion.

**Likely Defenders:** U.S., PRC, former Soviet Union

**RISKS TO REGIONAL STABILITY:**

- **Broadening Conflict:** High; replay of 1930s possible if militarism is seen as an economic necessity.

- **Superpower Opposition:** Scenario could develop only in the absence of superpowers in the region. PRC would strongly oppose but is likely to be an impotent land power irrelevant to Japanese expansion into Southern Asia.

**PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION:** Poor, since scenario would arise only in a severe power vacuum.

**U.S. POLICY CONCERNS:** Multilateral action for regional crises must continue to be effective. The alternative is for Japan to begin to consider a significantly greater military role in the region.

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**Fig. 2.13—Summary of Japanese Pacific Empire Scenario**
Future Japanese Forces. For this case, current Japanese capabilities are only important as a starting point for the assumed major defense buildup. With a commitment of 5 to 6 percent of GNP, Japan could invest over a trillion dollars in defense by the turn of the century. Such a commitment could produce three to five aircraft carriers and their escorts, a small force of modern diesel submarines, and a sizable air force containing long-range strike aircraft.

U.S./Coalition Defense Forces. If Japan asserts military control over states in East Asia, either by blockade or invasion, the U.S. will require projection forces with highly effective air defenses and sophisticated ASW capabilities.

U.S. Objective. The U.S. objective is to maintain a sufficient presence in East Asia and sufficiently close ties with Japan to prevent any foundation for reemergence of military dominance in Japanese policy development.

Campaign Analysis. Japanese forces currently have such a limited capability that the U.S. will be able to counter Japanese advances with the support of local governments as the twenty-first century is entered. However, the existence of a major Japanese military capability could result in coercion of regional states regardless of the U.S. ability to assist in regional defense. Similarly, the U.S. could defeat Japanese naval forces operating in open ocean areas even after a major Japanese force expansion and severe U.S. retrenchment. Nevertheless, losses in sea battles between high-technology navies could be sizable. There is no specific crisis or contingency proposed for this example. Instead, it is included to illustrate a worst-case possibility if the U.S. significantly reduces its presence in East Asia and a transformed regional environment results.
3. FORCE POSTURE ALTERNATIVES

In this section, we define five alternative postures for U.S. forces in the Pacific and the USPACOM contribution to forces in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf. These postures are neither predictions nor objectives. Rather, they reflect five possible alternative states of the world, defined in U.S. military force terms, that span the range of potential security environments. To supplement these postures, we also define policy, strategy, and force variants that might offer ways to partially compensate for any weaknesses in the postures.

These postures and variants provide a basis for

• Assessing regional reactions to force posture changes.
• Identifying policy, strategy, and force changes that might move those reactions in a direction more favorable to the U.S.
• Assessing the effectiveness (and risks) associated with a given posture in a range of future contingencies.

This section deals only with defining the postures and variants. Section 4 evaluates the performance of the postures in the context of the previously defined scenarios.

POSTURE DESCRIPTIONS

Our five postures are based on decrements and other variations to the fiscal year (FY) 1991 defense budget (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1990). A larger force structure would pose fewer adverse regional reactions and lower the risks involved in responding to future contingencies, but few observers have projected a larger force structure over the next ten years. Since the focus of our analysis was reduced military resources and how to deal with their effects, we thus limited our array of postures to an extension of the FY 1991 budget baseline and decrements to it.¹ Three of the five postures are variations of a 15 percent reduction of USPACOM forces with alternative basing of the reduced forces. One extreme case, a 35 percent reduction of USPACOM forces, is also presented.

Posture A: FY 1991 Budget Extended

This posture is a projection of the October 1990 USPACOM forces into the out-years, allowing for the personnel reductions announced by U.S. Secretary of Defense Cheney in spring 1990 (Phase I of the DoD strategic framework) (OASD/ISA, 1990). Deployment and rotation patterns remain unchanged. U.S. forces are present in strength in South Korea to support the UN and combined-forces commands. Air Force, Navy, and Marine units are stationed in Japan, where a significant infrastructure exists for reinforcement in South Korea or for support of other contingency operations in Northeast Asia.

¹The five postures are more fully described in the Appendix, along with a sixth posture that was used with these five in a companion study for OASD/ISA (Winnefeld et al., 1992).
No long-term presence in Southwest Asia is assumed, but routine CVBG deployments in the Indian Ocean result in substantial naval presence in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. A rotating squadron of F-16s and a detachment of ASW aircraft provide additional presence in Southeast Asia. U.S. forces have been removed from the Philippines, but base access in the Subic complex is available through the year 2000. CONUS-based tactical fighter squadrons (TFSs) are not included. Figure 3.1 shows the disposition of Navy and Marine forces in the USPACOM region. Figure 3.2 shows the assumed distribution and level of land-based air and ground units for the baseline posture.  

Posture B: FY 1991 Budget Decremented by 15 Percent, Forward Basing

This posture represents a 15 percent force reduction over Posture A. This force is slightly larger than the FY 1992–1997 Defense Program “base force.” Its deployment and rotation patterns approximate current practice. Note that the percentage reduction is in forces, not in

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2 Table A.1 in the Appendix provides a detailed breakdown of U.S. forces outside CONUS. The table is organized by geographic areas and shows the variation of force levels in the period from 2000 to 2005 across the five basic postures. Table A.2 summarizes the same forces by subregional arcs, highlighting the total forces available and how they change across the basic postures.

3 Admiral David Jeremiah (1991) described the base force concept in his testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services.
dollars or personnel. In keeping with the DoD strategic framework for the Asian Pacific Rim, some deployed naval and air forces were retained, with offsetting decreases in deployed ground forces. Changes from Posture A include a reduced presence of CVBGs in the Indian Ocean, removal of a MEB from Okinawa, removal of a TFS from Korea, and removal of a maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) squadron and an infantry brigade equivalent from Hawaii. The rotational Air Force unit in Southeast Asia is increased to a full squadron. Figure 3.3 shows Navy and Marine forces in Posture B; Air Force and Army forces are shown in Figure 3.4.

Posture C: FY 1991 Budget Decremented by 15 Percent, Mid-Pacific Basing

This reduced base-access force resembles Posture B in size but is based and deployed to reflect significant reductions in U.S. access to foreign bases. It could be characterized as a force that relies almost entirely on bases in U.S. sovereign or commonwealth territory. The residual Marine forces that were on Okinawa in Posture B have been moved to Saipan. The

---

4 This force has been called (erroneously) the mid-Pacific strategy force based on the presumption that such a strategy is receiving serious DoD consideration. This force and its bases represent a possible future situation, not an important strategic option.
Posture B:
15% Total Force Reduction, Forward Basing

Fig. 3.3—Posture B Navy and Marine Deployments

Posture B:
15% Total Force Reduction, Forward Basing

Fig. 3.4—Posture B Air Force and Army Deployments
western Pacific CVBG's home-port is now in Guam. Air Forces in Japan have been reduced to a single rotational squadron. All U.S. forces based in South Korea have been removed, and a single rotational Air Force squadron provides a token presence. The U.S. is still committed to reinforcement activities, but its day-to-day presence in South Korea and Japan is negligible. As a result of the reposturing, the Army division in Hawaii is again at full strength. Figure 3.5 shows Navy and Marine forces in Posture C; Air Force and Army forces are shown in Figure 3.6.

Posture D: FY 1991 Budget Decremented by 15 Percent, Arabian Peninsula Presence

This Pacific swing force is the Posture B force except that it reflects a long-term deployment of U.S. forces to the Persian Gulf, with many of the forces supplied by CINCPAC, as is the case today. The USPACOM forces supporting the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) in this long-term commitment are smaller than the USPACOM forces deployed to USCENTCOM in support of Operation Desert Storm, but they are larger than the commitments undertaken in 1990 prior to Operation Desert Shield. Because the U.S. tries to maintain as much of a forward presence as possible, Air Force and Marine air units are deployed from Hawaii and Japan, but two understrength TFWs (four squadrons) remain in Japan.
The South Korean presence is unchanged from Posture B. Carrier deployments are a problem: the posture requires a full-time CVBG presence in the Indian Ocean, but the force reductions do not provide a large enough rotation base for continuous peacetime deployments.\(^5\) Figure 3.7 shows Navy and Marine forces in Posture D; Air Force and Army forces are shown in Figure 3.8.

**Posture E: FY 1991 Budget Decremented by 35 Percent, Retrenchment**

This *low-budget force* is a 35 percent reduction over the Posture A force. It reflects some of the more extreme force reduction recommendations heard in the Congress and represents the situation that might be faced by CINCPAC if the overall defense budget is eventually reduced to one-half of the FY 1991 level. While foreign base access is available to support usual force deployments and rotation patterns, the size of the reduction has required some alterations and implied reductions in security commitments. As with Postures B, C, and D, deployed air and naval forces have been reduced less than the ground component. Posture B

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\(^5\) The deficit probably would be remedied by using U.S. Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM) carriers to supplement USPACOM deployments.
Contingency Force
Saudi Arabia
(USPACOM Committed):
50% CVBG
Marines
2 MEBs

Western Pacific
CVBG

Conus Forces:
4.5 CVBGs
Marines
2 MEBs

Contingency Force
Korea:
Air Force
2 TFSs
Army
2 Brigades

Japan:
Air Force
4 TFSs

Posture D:
15% Total Force Reduction,
Arabian Peninsula Presence

Fig. 3.7—Posture D Navy and Marine Deployments

Posture D:
15% Total Force Reduction,
Arabian Peninsula Presence

Fig. 3.8—Posture D Air Force and Army Deployments
is the most applicable case for comparison, since the policy objectives of the two postures are similar. In contrast with Posture B, Posture E draws down forces in South Korea and Alaska but retains both air and ground units on the Korean peninsula. Carrier operations are even more difficult to sustain. A full-time presence can be maintained in the western Pacific with one CVBG home-ported in Japan, but Indian Ocean operations are only occasional. Figure 3.9 shows Navy and Marine forces in Posture E; Air Force and Army forces are shown in Figure 3.10.

FORCE POSTURE VARIANTS

The five basic postures reflect different states of the world from a U.S. force composition and deployment perspective. The policy, strategy, and force variants described here for the postures are options intended to enhance force effectiveness if the environment described by a posture becomes a reality. They are not all-purpose recommendations.

All of the variants do not apply to all postures. Moreover, some variants differ significantly from current policies, strategies, force compositions, and deployment patterns. Our intent is to provide a range of options based on the assumption that future conditions might make the now unpopular or implausible more attractive. Because the number of variants is quite
large, we specify at the end of this section a set of pruning criteria to derive a smaller set for more in-depth assessment.

The thirty-three variants are briefly described next, grouped within ten classes.

**Posture Variant Descriptions**

**Political Initiatives**

1. Make major power security guarantees to both Koreas. The U.S., the former Soviet Union, and the PRC (or perhaps the permanent members of the UN Security Council) would state that while supporting eventual Korean unification, they would consider any cross-border military actions on the Korean peninsula to be detrimental to guarantor power security interests and would move jointly to restore the previous situation.

2. Set up a tripartite security arrangement for Northeast Asia. The U.S., Japan, and South Korea would set up a triangular security relationship to add to the two bilateral treaties that

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*A condensed set of similar initiatives is portrayed in the OASD/ISA study (Winnefeld et al., 1992).*
shape their current relationships. Security consultation and planning would take on a trilat­
eral form.

3. Encourage a security consultation arrangement for Southeast Asia that includes the U.S. as an observer or member. The U.S. would encourage expansion of current bilateral political and military consultations with the ASEAN states to include a framework for multilateral consultation on regional security matters.

Arms Control

4. Hold an East Asian variant of the conference on security and cooperation in Europe. A regional or subregional (e.g., Southeast Asia) conference on the 1975 Helsinki model would be held. Some refer to this proposal as “CSCA.”

5. Move toward a nuclear-free Korea. South Korea and North Korea would undertake to remove nuclear weapons from their respective territories and accept intrusive inspections from the UN-sponsored International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and either each other or the guarantor powers (U.S., Russia, and the PRC).

6. Set up bilateral confidence-building measures (CBMs) between North/South Korea, U.S./Russia, or Japan/Russia. These CBMs might include hot lines between command centers, variants of the U.S.-Soviet Dangerous Military Activities Agreement, and advance declarations of exercises.

Burden Shifting

7. Shift the principal sea lane and air defense tasks to security partners. This shift would be based on agreements addressing specific regional defense tasks.

8. Establish a cost-sharing formula that covers all theater forces. This formula would expand current formulas that apply only to U.S. forces based in certain countries overseas. Cost sharing would still be covered by bilateral agreements, but each force would recognize the role of all forces committed to theater security.

Basing

9. Distribute basing in Southeast Asia. This scheme is based on distributing base functional capabilities among the several nations in Southeast Asia rather than concentrating them in a few bases in one nation, as has been the case in the Philippines.

10. Build up bases in Guam and the Marianas. This variant is intended to compensate for the loss of other bases in the region. However, it could be combined with other basing variants.

11. Rely solely on U.S. sovereign bases. This variant might be an outcome of or stimulus to variant 10.

12. Base more forces overseas. This variant might be driven by a desire to retain the current levels of forward presence as theater forces decrease in size.
Nuclear Weapons Policy

13. Establish an open-declaration nuclear policy. This policy would cancel the current "neither confirm nor deny" policy. It would probably be the result of a changed policy for deploying nuclear weapons in peacetime.

14. Establish a new policy for the deployment and employment of theater nuclear weapons. This policy might be based on greater reliance on strategic nuclear forces and/or different theater nuclear weapon targeting and deployment patterns.

Command and Control

15. Reorganize the CINCPAC command structure to reflect new strategic relationships and contingency scenarios. This variant would reflect the new base force concept (Jeremiah, 1991), changes to the Unified Command Plan, and greater use of joint task forces to replace the current subunified command structure.

16. Increase the frequency and coverage of combined exercises. The current exercise structure would be expanded to include new partners and to establish new security relationships.

17. Increase the use of U.S. and allied liaison officers to strengthen military-to-military contacts in the region.

Force Deployment and Rotation Policy

18. Replace the 2nd Infantry Division with prepositioned overseas material configured in unit sets (POMCUS) or Army prepositioned ships. This could be partial or complete replacement.

19. Replace Marine forces on Okinawa with Guam maritime prepositioning ships (MPSs). This could be partial or complete replacement.

20. Dual base more Air Force forces to substitute for forward-deployed Air Force forces in the region. This variant would probably be based on Air Force composite wings to facilitate deployment of self-contained Air Force packages.

21. Use more or less CVBG basing overseas. This variant would include expansion or termination of the current policy of basing one CVBG in the western Pacific.

22. Rotate Air Force TFSs throughout Southeast Asia. This is an expansion of the recently instituted practice of deploying part of an Air Force TFS to Singapore.

23. Rotate a Strategic Air Command (SAC) squadron to the region periodically. This variant would compensate for the removal of a SAC squadron from Guam. Deployments would coincide with combined exercises.

24. Substitute intermittent massive force deployments for smaller steady-state deployments. This variant would emphasize demonstrating capabilities at the expense of contingency response and day-to-day presence.
**Force Configuration**

25. Substitute an amphibious assault ship (LHA/LHD) as the core ship in selected deploying CVBGs. The LHA/LHD, probably with a composite air group embarked, would occasionally replace a carrier as the core ship of a deploying CVBG. The variant is based on an assumed shortage of carriers for routine peacetime deployments.

26. Substitute sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) platforms for some TFWs and CVBGs. Under this variant, a squadron of SLCM platforms with perhaps as many as 200 SLCMs embarked would substitute for a deployed CVBG or TFW.

27. Substitute deployed composite air/ground packages of Air Force and Army forces for CVBG and/or Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) deployments. This variant uses Air Force and Army forces to substitute for insufficient CVBG and Marine assets.

28. Demonstrate increased lift with high-visibility operations, possibly as part of variant 27.

**Other Military Capabilities**

29. Greatly expand International Military Education and Training (IMET). This variant is based on a major increase in IMET funding and programs with the explicit objective of compensating for reductions in force deployments by increasing the allied role and the included aim of gaining influence on the performance of that role.

30. Expand intelligence sharing. This variant is premised on trying to gain influence by fostering allied dependence on superior U.S. sensors and methods, thereby maintaining or expanding other security relationships.

31. Increase foreign military sales (FMS) and force rationalization. Focused FMS might foster the establishment of a basing and logistics infrastructure that is compatible with U.S. needs if force deployments become necessary.

**National Nonmilitary Capabilities**

32. Modify U.S. grand strategy to emphasize U.S. political and economic roles in regional security. This strategy would replace the historic U.S. strategies that are based on an amalgam of the Truman and Nixon doctrines and thus predicated on a large U.S. military role. It would be based on the judgment that the military threats to regional security have moved from the near to mid/long terms.

33. Use economic aid in place of military aid. Economic aid would be used to assist new governments whose interests appear to converge with those of the U.S.

**Pruning the Variants**

The variants range from reaffirmation of current elements of U.S. policy, strategy, and force posture to major changes to those elements that are controversial, to say the least. Our pur-
pose was not to be deliberately controversial, but to recognize that future events will be determined by elements outside U.S. control as much as or more than by elements the U.S. can manipulate. Our variants are not objectives in themselves; rather, they are options to help the U.S. shape and adjust to future events. However, their number was too great for the time and resources available to this research project and to government officials that might consider them.

Our response to the large number of variants was to specify a set of criteria for pruning the list to a manageable size. These criteria require that a variant selected for closer examination

- Differ significantly from current policy, strategy, and force postures, because U.S. government personnel already understand these elements of the U.S. national security posture.
- Be responsive to contingent fundamental political and military changes in the region or the credible prospect of such changes, because U.S. government personnel (like the rest of us) have more trouble understanding future possibilities than current certainties.
- Be consistent with the fact or likelihood of major U.S. force reductions in the Pacific, because the interactions between the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government make it difficult for DoD to deal credibly with the effects of major force reductions.

When applied to the thirty-three variants outlined above, these three criteria suggest a smaller set that is forward looking, challenges the current conventional wisdom, and accepts (albeit reluctantly) the prospect of future force reductions. Variants not selected remain useful for future analysis should circumstances warrant an expanded consideration of offsetting actions. Table 3.1 maps the criteria to selected posture variants.

Not all variants logically relate to all postures. To help focus the analyses that follow, we suggest in Table 3.2 a map from core variants to postures. The basis for the map is the assumption that if any given posture came to pass (or was seriously considered by DoD), the variant being mapped would receive consideration.

Table 3.1

Application of Selection Criteria to Variants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Varianta</th>
<th>Depart Current Policy</th>
<th>Respond to Change</th>
<th>Consistent with Reductions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear-free Korea (5)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expand U.S. base structure (10)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear weapons policy (13,14)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More POMCUS, MPSs (18,19)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVBG basing (21)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defensive systems (7)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPAC C3 (15)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMET, etc. (29)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand strategy (32)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aNNumbers in parentheses are those used in the earlier listing of the posture variants.
Table 3.2
Relevance of Variants to Postures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Varianta</th>
<th>Postures</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear-free Korea (5)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expand U.S. base structure (10)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear weapons policy (13,14)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More POMCUS, MPSs (18,19)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVBG basing (21)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defensive systems (7)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPAC C3 (15)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMET, etc. (29)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand strategy (32)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aNumbers in parentheses are those used in the earlier listing of the posture variants.
4. IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE U.S. POSTURES

The thirteen scenarios and five force postures described in the two previous sections provide a basis for evaluating the effects of changes in future U.S. postures in the Asian Pacific region. The scenarios were constructed to represent the spectrum of contingencies that CINCPAC planners will need to consider. Each scenario describes the type of forces that might be required and identifies the role of U.S. forces, primarily as an adjunct to local forces. Our objective in defining the force postures was to provide a set of force packages whose adequacy could be judged by their ability to meet U.S. military objectives in the postulated scenarios. This section presents an initial assessment of the postures by

- Extracting requirements from the scenarios.
- Identifying the capabilities of each posture.
- Assessing the fit of the scenarios and postures.
- Examining posture variants to improve posture performance.

The intent of our analysis was to provide insight valuable for planning for future contingencies and for reducing the risks involved in policy decisions made today in the face of extreme budgetary pressures. In some cases, our judgments were informed by war gaming; in others, we drew on our experience in military planning and operations. The analysis as a whole should serve as a vehicle for more detailed analysis of factors shown to be important. The peacetime presence provided by U.S. forces in the Asian Pacific region is expensive, but we believe it contributes to peace and economic development in two ways: by providing visible evidence of U.S. interest and by maintaining properly trained forces, in adequate numbers, to back up explicit and implicit U.S. commitments to friends in the region.

EXTRACTING REQUIREMENTS

Section 2 presents thirteen scenarios ranging from internal insurgencies to major regional war. In some, no commitment of U.S. combat forces is required, but the likelihood of the postulated situation arising is influenced by the level of the U.S. presence. In others, in-place U.S. forces may be required to deter war and to provide a war-fighting capability if deterrence fails. These requirements are interrelated, but it is possible to identify the more important elements for each scenario. Table 4.1 lists the subregions where U.S. presence is required and the type of U.S. forces required by each scenario. It suggests some of the force requirements associated with a vigorous and prompt response in specific contingencies. While the crisis situation portrayed in each scenario may have developed over an extended period, the need for U.S. forces and the decision to deploy them has occurred suddenly. The initial response is carried out by U.S. in-place forces and U.S. forces that could close to the contingency area in approximately one week. In all appropriate cases, prompt allied response and support are assumed.
### Table 4.1

**Forces Required to Support U.S. Objectives**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>U.S. Presence to Reduce Risk of Situation Arising</th>
<th>U.S. In-Place Forces</th>
<th>U.S. Rapid Reinforcement Forces (by C+7)</th>
<th>U.S. Follow-On and Mobilization Forces (by C+30)</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Civil War</td>
<td>MPA</td>
<td>Airlift, 1 CVBG, 1 MEU</td>
<td>Sea control forces, 1 MEB</td>
<td></td>
<td>Assumes role limited to defense, evacuation, support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Civil War</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 CVBG, airlift</td>
<td>1 CVBG, 1 MEU, Naval escort forces</td>
<td></td>
<td>Noncombatant evacuation, shipping escort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan-Islamic Turmoil</td>
<td>Southeast Asia</td>
<td>1 CVBG, SOF, MEU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In-theater retaliation would require larger forces by C+30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spratly Islands War</td>
<td>Southeast Asia</td>
<td>MPA</td>
<td>CVBG, MPA</td>
<td>Naval escort forces</td>
<td>Assumes U.S. maritime escort role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian Straits Denial</td>
<td>Southeast Asia</td>
<td>1 TFS or 1 CVBG, MPA</td>
<td>1 CVBG, MPA, 1 MEB, 2 TFW(C)</td>
<td>Minesweeping, 1 MEB, 1 CVBG</td>
<td>More forces required if land operations eventuate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Recovery of N. Territories</td>
<td>Northeast Asia</td>
<td>1 TFW(C)s, 2 CVBGs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Deployment to support containment of war to Kuriles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC Invasion of Southeast Asia</td>
<td>Southeast Asia</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 CVBG, 1 TFW(C)</td>
<td>1 CVBG</td>
<td>Assumes U.S. maritime escort role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India-Pakistan War</td>
<td>1 CVBG or 1 TFW(C) in Persian Gulf</td>
<td>MPA, airlift</td>
<td>Naval escort forces</td>
<td></td>
<td>Assumes U.S. maritime escort role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC-Taiwan War</td>
<td>Southeast Asia</td>
<td>1 TFW(C) or 1 CVBG</td>
<td>2 TFW(C)s, 1 CVBG</td>
<td>1 CVBG, 1 TFW(C)</td>
<td>Assumes precautionary deployment of total, CINCPAC to provide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invasion of Saudi Oil Fields</td>
<td>Southwest Asia</td>
<td>1 TFW(C) or 1 CVBG</td>
<td>2 TFWs, 2 CVBGs, 1 inf div(L), 1 MEB</td>
<td>4 TFWs, 2 CVBGs, 2 armd divs, 2 mech divs, 1 MEF</td>
<td>1 CVBG, 1 MEF, 1 TFW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renewal of Korean War</td>
<td>Northeast Asia</td>
<td>1 mech div, 2 TFWs</td>
<td>1 MEF, 1 mech div, 1 inf div(L), 3 TFWs, 2 CVBGs</td>
<td>1 MEF, 1 inf div(L), 1 mech div, 3 TFWs</td>
<td>Assumes sufficient POD/APOD in South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia-U.S. War at Sea</td>
<td>Northeast Asia</td>
<td>2 TFWs or 1 CVBG</td>
<td>3 TFWs, 2 CVBGs, 1 inf div(L), 1 MEF</td>
<td>3 TFWs, 2 CVBGs</td>
<td>Assumes sufficient POD/APOD in South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Pacific Empire</td>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>2 TFWs or 1 CVBG</td>
<td>3 TFWs, 2 CVBGs, 1 inf div(L), 1 MEF</td>
<td>3 TFWs, 2 CVBGs</td>
<td>Amphibious and ground forces only required to regain territory occupied by Russian forces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTES:**
1. Blank cells indicate that no U.S. forces are required;
2. The (L) and (C) denote light and composite, respectively.
IDENTIFYING CAPABILITIES

Peacetime Presence to Reduce Likelihood of Conflict

The peacetime presence of U.S. military forces should serve to reduce the probability that a potential scenario will occur. Many of the situations developed for this analysis require a catalyst to cause military conflict. An increasingly isolated North Korea wanting to forcibly reunify the peninsula could use South Korean alerting actions in response to the death of Kim Il Sung as an excuse for an attack. In other cases, pressures from outside the region, such as Arab nationalism originating in the Middle East or the collapse of the Soviet Union, could lead to insurgencies or new governments with a militant approach to international relations. When a stimulus occurs, political leaders formally or informally weigh the chances of success for military operations to gain an important objective. A U.S. forward presence may not have a significant direct effect on internal political actions, but the presence of capable U.S. forces in the region would certainly enter any aggressor state's calculations of risks and prospects for actions beyond its borders.

A review of the differences in U.S. presence across the five force postures under consideration is in order here. In Posture A, U.S. forces are forward deployed in strength throughout the region. Major ground and air forces are based in Korea and Japan. Naval forces are homeported in Japan and routinely operate in Northeast and Southeast Asian waters. This posture is similar to the one that was in place in the western Pacific before August 1990.

In Posture B, U.S. forces are reduced but retain as much forward presence as possible. There are no continuing CVBG operations in Southeast Asia, ground and air forces in Korea and Japan are reduced, and the lack of a major naval presence in Southeast Asia is offset by a rotational U.S. Air Force squadron cycling through airfields in Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia. There is a continuous presence of one CVBG somewhere in the western Pacific and another CVBG in the Indian Ocean for six months of the year.

Posture C has the same force levels as Posture B, but most U.S. forces have been withdrawn to U.S. sovereign bases in Hawaii, CONUS, and some western Pacific territories, primarily Guam and Saipan. Some reduced air forces remain stationed in Korea and Japan. The Okinawa MEB has been relocated to austere facilities in Saipan. A CVBG is based in Guam and operates in the western Pacific. A CVBG is in the Indian Ocean 50 percent of the time.

Posture D contains the same force levels as Posture B, but long-term commitment of USPACOM forces to the Arabian Peninsula results in a reduction of the naval presence in Southeast Asia and a reduced ability to respond quickly with Marines and tactical air forces. The reduced number of carriers available for deployments results in only 50 percent coverage of the Indian Ocean, even in the case that emphasizes a presence in Southwest Asia. (The concept cannot be fully supported by the available forces.)

Posture E incorporates major force reductions but, where feasible, retains forward-deployed forces. Some ground and air forces remain in South Korea and Japan, but the ability to support the defense of South Korea is even more dependent on mobilization and reinforcement. Naval and Marine forces in Japan are reduced. A CVBG remains homeported in Japan, but the smaller number of carriers permits only routine training operations.

---

1 This withdrawal may be the result of U.S. choice or of host country denial or curtailment of U.S. base access.
in the western Pacific and no regular presence in the Indian Ocean. Because of the lower overall force levels, there are no compensating rotational deployments of air forces to Southeast Asia.

Some scenarios do not require any U.S. forces for war-fighting support even though the U.S. presence can play a role in reducing the likelihood of combat. This observation leads to the observation that both presence before conflict and combat potential once war starts need to be considered in assessing the consequences of alternative force postures. Table 4.2 summarizes the capabilities provided by each of the postures.

CVBG presence at sea is more quantifiable and subject to variation. In Postures B, C, and D, the twelve-carrier force can only support a CVBG in the Indian Ocean for half of the year, so a value of 0.5 is assigned in the table. The positioning of residual forces after reductions take place offsets the negative effects and may even lead to a perception of increased presence. Regionwide presence is provided in Posture D, in which a U.S. presence in the Arabian Peninsula is accomplished by a slight redistribution of forward-based assets.

### Ability to Respond Quickly

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait showed that a low-level presence and diplomatic involvement are not substitutes for forces that can respond in time to make a difference. It can be argued that the allied response was sufficient to deter Saddam Hussein from continuing into Saudi Arabia, but it was of little help to the Kuwaitis. Similar concerns have justified the continued presence of U.S. forces in South Korea and naval transits and deployments near Taiwan.

### Table 4.2

**USPACOM Capabilities Provided by Postures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Posture</th>
<th>Presence</th>
<th>In-Place U.S. Forces</th>
<th>Rapidly Deployable U.S. Forces</th>
<th>Mobilized U.S. Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NE Asia</td>
<td>SE Asiaa</td>
<td>SW Asia</td>
<td>Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posture A: FY 1991 budget extended</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posture B: 15% reduction, forward basing</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posture C: 15% reduction, mid-Pacific basing</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>Xb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posture D: 15% reduction, Arabian Peninsula presence</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>0.5c</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posture E: 35% reduction, retrenchment</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a* Indian Ocean CVBG operations and western Pacific CVBG training provide routine naval presence in Southeast Asia.

*b* A MEB and a TFW are available on U.S. territory in the Marianas.

*c* Full-time presence of a CVBG in the Indian Ocean is achieved using USLANTCOM resources for 50% of the coverage.
As the U.S. considers alternative basing structures in the Pacific to accommodate force reductions, it may not be able to respond to crises as promptly as in the past. Table 4.3 lists several representative crisis response packages that the U.S. might use to support a regional security partner.²

The five alternative force postures provide distinctly different capabilities for responding to crises. Both the number of forces available for building packages and the force locations vary across the cases. Table 4.4 summarizes the availability of crisis response forces, illustrating the building-block approach to meeting regional security needs. In all but Postures D and E, a MEB is available in the western Pacific, but the availability of more than a single CVBG to form a CVBF package depends greatly on the posture. Peacetime rules for deployment tempo and the long transits associated with support of operations in the Indian Ocean require the deployment of augmenting carrier forces from the eastern Pacific.

There is no simple way to represent the crisis response potential of each of the force postures. However, our analysis focused on understanding U.S. capabilities for supporting regional policy in the Pacific region. Some insight can be gained by determining the time U.S. forces would need to arrive at a representative location in the western Pacific. Detailed strategic mobility models, such as those incorporated in the RAND Strategy Assessment System (RSAS), can be used to calculate closure times for forces and their equipment.³ For most of the crisis response packages, there are two components, each of which can deploy at a different pace (we used the closure time of the slowest element in the package to determine arrival

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Package</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CVBG</td>
<td>Self-contained strike and local defense force. Limited in size and range of attacks, has little capability against insurgent ground forces, but can stand off from mined waters or shore-based high-technology munitions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVBG and MEB</td>
<td>As above, plus a modest opposed entry or bare base capability suitable for establishing a base to facilitate entry of follow-on forces or to reinforce a threatened ally. Sustaining support required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Infantry Division (LID) and TFW</td>
<td>A major contingency capability against light opposing forces. Preexisting bases and support structure as well as sustainment required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVBF and MEF</td>
<td>Major amphibious assault capability for forced entry or entry into areas with insufficient port facilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Corps and multiple TFWs Specialized capabilities</td>
<td>MEU to support embassy security operations; SOFs for hostage release or specialized support of local forces; airlift support for resupply of local forces or evacuation of casualties.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

² Each package would be modified to deal with a given scenario. Those shown are intended to cover a range of requirements. The reader is spared the great amount of detail underpinning these summary descriptions.

³ A description of RSAS sealift and airlift models will be included in future documentation of the RSAS 5.0 combat models. A RAND analysis of Persian Gulf operations showed that RSAS closure times are consistent with U.S. deployment times for Operation Desert Shield.
Table 4.4
Availability of USPACOM Crisis Response Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Posture</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVBG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Pacific</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Pacific</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Ocean</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan (Okinawa)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saipan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persian Gulf</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFW</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persian Gulf</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LID</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan (Okinawa)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persian Gulf</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The 2nd Infantry Division in South Korea is uniquely organized to participate in the defense of South Korea and is not available for other contingencies. Furthermore, it is not a light division.*

Table 4.5 shows the time (in days) for each response force package to close to a representative location. The indicated times could be improved by prepositioning equipment or by staging forces in the region as crises develop. The packages assume that the LIDs assigned to CINCPAC are appropriate for contingency responses. If heavy forces are required, equipment must be moved by ship, delaying closure by two to three weeks.

**War-Fighting Capability of Available Forces**

Each crisis response package is assumed to contain the combat support and combat service support needed to effectively employ its forces when they are committed to fight. Since we do not anticipate any scenarios in which the U.S. will be fighting alone in the Asian Pacific region, the effectiveness of the U.S. forces must be assessed with the forces of affected regional partners. We now address the fit between the available, committed U.S. forces and the requirements of the particular scenarios.
Table 4.5
Crisis Response Capability for Western Pacific Contingency
(in days)\(^a\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response Force Package</th>
<th>Posture</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CVBG(^b)</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVBG + MEB(^c)</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LID + TFW(^d)</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8e</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVBF + MEF(^f)</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps (LID) + 2 TFW(^g)</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Days for closure of personnel and equipment from peacetime bases and nominal ocean operating areas. No prior mobilization (M=C) of sealift or airlift. All lift assigned to USPACOM as it becomes available.

\(^b\) The closest CVBG home-port operating area is selected as a starting point for a 16-knot transit.

\(^c\) Maximum time for CVBG and MPSs to close and off-load equipment. Marines are airlifted. MPSs available in Guam for all except Posture D, in which case equipment must be back-loaded from the Arabian Peninsula.

\(^d\) Assumes no prepositioning of equipment as POMCUS or as an Army equivalent of MPSs. LIDs can be airlifted with equipment.

\(^e\) Closure time is shorter because Posture A deploys the 25th LID as a unit. In Postures B and D, the 25th retains only two brigades and the third brigade deploys from Alaska. In the latter case, parallel deployment is slightly faster, but it would be preferable to maintain unit integrity if possible.

\(^f\) Time for closure of two CVBGs and two MEBs using MPSs in Guam and Diego Garcia.

\(^g\) All equipment can be airlifted.

ASSESSING FIT

The adequacy of U.S. postures to support policy objectives must be assessed from two perspectives:

- The adequacy of the presence provided to reduce the risk of a scenario occurring.
- The effectiveness of U.S. forces committed to support regional partners.

Presence and effectiveness together provide deterrence. It is almost impossible to measure deterrence directly, so we looked at these two components across a range of situations to gain a better understanding of the differences among the postures.

Assessment Components

**Presence.** Table 4.6 contains our judgments about the adequacy of the given force postures to deter the destabilizing actions inherent in the postulated scenarios. These judgments are based on a complex blend of

- An appreciation of the responses of regional actors to changes in U.S. force deployments over time.\(^4\)

\(^4\) See Winnefeld et al. (1992, Section 4 of R-4089/2).
Table 4.6
Adequacy of U.S. Presence in Selected Scenarios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Posture</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Civil War</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Inadequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Civil War</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan-Islamic Turmoil</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Inadequate</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spratly Islands War</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Inadequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian Straits Denial</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Inadequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Recovery of N. Territories</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Inadequate</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC Invasion of SE Asia</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Inadequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India-Pakistan War</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Inadequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC-Taiwan War</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Inadequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invasion of Saudi Oil Fields</td>
<td>Inadequate</td>
<td>Inadequate</td>
<td>Inadequate</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Inadequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renewal of Korean War</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Inadequate</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia-U.S. War at Sea</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Pacific Empire</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Inadequate</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- An analysis of the war-fighting potential of U.S. and coalition forces (including deployed and deployable) against putative opponents in each scenario, as discussed later in this section.

- An assessment of the role of nonmilitary factors in crisis resolution and their fit with the military instruments of power.

These factors are interrelated in that they all have an effect on regional stability. Our judgments are just that, but our framework for analysis—forcing the focus on specific forces and a specific contingency—offers a means to identify important "cells" in Table 4.6 and to foster dialog on the subject of posture adequacy.

When we apply this method to the first scenario-posture pair in which U.S. forces are likely to be engaged, Indonesian Straits Denial and Posture A, it can first be seen that Posture A has been adequate historically to deter Indonesian actions that would have adversely affected U.S. interests. We know that Indonesia is sensitive to the presence or absence of U.S. regional forces (Wanadi, 1990). As those forces decline in size and frequency of visit, Indonesia must make different calculations in its relations with ASEAN and the major regional powers. There is an increased possibility of a destabilizing result. An Indonesia not under the U.S. umbrella must seek new security partners and (under a more aggressive national leadership) might contribute to regional instability (e.g., West Irian, Timor, territorial differences with the Philippines and Malaysia). For Posture E, in which the U.S. maintains no forces in Southeast Asia and only occasionally transits to the Indian Ocean, our judgment is that presence is inadequate.

Continuing with the examination of differences within a scenario, the most locally confined case is a civil war in the Philippines. U.S. presence is adequate in the base case and with a long-term deployment in the Arabian Peninsula (Posture D), because base access in the Philippines is still available. With routine base access and other military presence in the western Pacific, Philippine leaders could be confident of prompt U.S. assistance if it were requested. The thinning out of U.S. forces in Posture C reduces the adequacy to marginal, and
the effective withdrawal from Southeast Asia in Posture E reduces U.S. presence to an inadequate level.

A Chinese civil war is certainly possible as communist governments fall around the world. However, we judge U.S. presence in East Asia as not applicable to the internal processes of reform. The effectiveness of U.S. forces for conducting NEO operations is addressed separately.

The Pan-Islamic Turmoil scenario is similar to the Indonesian Straits scenario in that U.S. presence in Southeast Asia should provide assurances to regional states and influence outside powers contemplating destabilizing actions. This situation is also influenced by the U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf as a general restraining mechanism on hostile Islamic states.

An India-Pakistan war, if started, would involve ground and air forces in mainland Asia border regions. As long as the U.S. maintains some presence in Southwest Asia, the protection of U.S. interests (citizens, property, and SLOCs) should be adequate. U.S. actions would have little influence in reducing the risk of war.

The criterion for adequate presence in support of Taiwan is the presence of a CVBG in the western Pacific. Deployable TFSs in the region are a marginal substitute. Their potential effectiveness would improve if rotational deployments included combined training with Taiwanese forces. However, the perception of U.S. retrenchment associated the major reductions of Posture E results in inadequate presence. The Spratly Islands War and PRC Invasion of Southeast Asia scenarios raise the same issues as the PRC-Taiwan War scenario. Routine air and naval force operations in Southeast Asia produce the required visible commitment to regional defense and stability. This commitment would stiffen resistance in Southeast Asia to PRC aggression in the region and increase the perceived risks in an attack.

If a result of the Persian Gulf War is a continuing need to station U.S. forces in the region, a restructuring of the current forces described in Posture D would be needed to provide even a marginally sufficient presence.5

The U.S. presence in Korea is adequate so long as there are ground and air forces capable of operating effectively in support of South Korean forces. Posture C for South Korea is inadequate because there are no stationed ground forces, and Posture E is marginal because the one brigade remaining will be viewed as a substantially lower level of commitment than was previously provided.

The Russian-U.S. War at Sea scenario is influenced by the quantity and quality of maritime forces routinely operating in the western Pacific, with particular emphasis on U.S. activity in the northwestern Pacific and U.S. access to Japanese bases. Postures A, B, and D provide adequate presence, but the assessment progresses from marginal to inadequate as the U.S. withdraws.

In summary, the U.S. presence in the region is adequate until reductions in overall force structure are so severe that the remaining forces are no longer credible. Posture C provides the perception of withdrawal because of the location of the remaining USPACOM forces.

5See Shlapak and Davis (1991) for a discussion of minimum residual force levels after the Persian Gulf crisis.
That perception exists even though the following analysis of force effectiveness shows that the U.S. is retaining an adequate capability for responding to many situations. Posture E, with the fewest forces, limits presence most severely because the U.S. can no longer implement its goals of forward basing and deployments.

**Effectiveness.** Table 4.7 provides an overview of how well available U.S. forces can support the campaigns (or special situations) described in Section 2. All postures provide adequate U.S. forces for six of the postulated scenarios (Philippine Civil War, Spratly Islands War, Indonesian Straits Denial, PRC-Taiwan War, Russia-U.S. War at Sea, and Japanese Pacific Empire). Since alliances and coalitions for defense are postulated in all cases, U.S. forces are only required to complement the capabilities of coalition partners.

Obviously, the time to achieve success will vary and the costs will be quite different depending on whether U.S. forces are immediately available or must arrive from units in the U.S. or even from mobilized forces. These variables suggest another way to look at the postures and their fit with the scenarios. We previously showed the inherent capability of individual postures to respond with a specific force. Now we develop force requirements more broadly by presenting a taxonomy of the leverage provided by U.S. forces.

The scenarios can be divided into groups that place common requirements on USPACOM forces even though the location of conflict may vary within groups. Table 4.8 identifies the primary leverage provided by U.S. forces in related scenarios. In some cases, such as an India-Pakistan war, the U.S. needs to consider that a war could occur and, even though in this specific case there is great concern about the use of nuclear weapons, U.S. forces and their deployment patterns will have little influence. There are five groupings of principal interest:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Civil War</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Civil War</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan-Islamic Turmoil</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spratly Islands War</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian Straits Denial</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Recovery of N. Territories</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC Invasion of SE Asia</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India-Pakistan War</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC-Taiwan War</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invasion of Saudi Oil Fields</td>
<td>Inadequate</td>
<td>Inadequate</td>
<td>Inadequate</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Inadequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renewal of Korean War</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Inadequate</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia-U.S. War at Sea</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Pacific Empire</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6Here, adequate means that the available U.S. forces in the indicated postures can support the postulated coalition defense.
1. Scenarios in which U.S. presence is important to maintain an environment wherein regional actors see little advantage from aggression. In these cases, U.S. forces, if available quickly enough, can ensure an adequate defense.

2. Scenarios in which U.S. presence is important for regional stability but requirements for U.S. forces are not significant.

3. Scenarios in which presence is provided by required in-place forces that are ready to immediately support defensive operations.

4. Scenarios that place special requirements on U.S. forces.

5. Scenarios in which U.S. forces have little influence.

**Leverage by Presence and Rapid Reinforcement.** The Indonesian Straits Denial scenario is representative of the most important class of contingencies to be considered—i.e., scenarios in which a U.S. presence significantly reduces the risk of conflict and U.S. forces make a substantial difference if combat occurs. A U.S. presence through bilateral programs with all the countries involved can generate working relationships that can make the scenario appear ridiculous in hindsight. On the other hand, a U.S. abdication of regional responsibilities can lead to growing isolation of some regional states and may provide fertile ground for political changes that lead to war. These cases are also influenced by the perceived ability of U.S. forces to participate in defensive operations. The PRC-Taiwan War scenario presents a situation in which early intervention with U.S. air forces (whether sea based or land based) would raise the cost of trying to mount an assault to unacceptable levels. If U.S. reinforcements were not available in the first few days, defensive operations would be much more difficult.

**Leverage Through Building Self-Assurance.** The second class of scenarios is important because it represents cases in which active U.S. participation in regional security operations and the routine presence of U.S. forces provide a visible reminder that U.S. interests in regional stability are engaged and that escalation might involve a larger U.S. role. Either Vietnam or the PRC could establish control of any of the Spratlys or Paracels, but control would be difficult to maintain in any circumstances, and would be even more so if the U.S. became engaged. A U.S. interest in a Philippine civil war sufficient to warrant participation of U.S. forces would probably be limited to three cases:

### Table 4.8
**Leverage Provided by U.S. Forces**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Role of U.S. Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian Straits Denial</td>
<td>Presence and rapid reinforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC-Taiwan War</td>
<td>Demonstrate U.S. engagement in regional security issues;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spratly Islands War</td>
<td>contribute to keeping conflict localized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Civil War</td>
<td>Defensive partner; in-place forces immediately available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renewal of Korean War</td>
<td>to prevent invasion and offensive momentum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invasion of Saudi Oil Fields</td>
<td>Unique U.S. capabilities; high-technology offensive and defensive forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian-U.S. War at Sea</td>
<td>Little if any</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India-Pakistan War</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Leverage by Presence and Rapid Reinforcement. The Indonesian Straits Denial scenario is representative of the most important class of contingencies to be considered—i.e., scenarios in which a U.S. presence significantly reduces the risk of conflict and U.S. forces make a substantial difference if combat occurs. A U.S. presence through bilateral programs with all the countries involved can generate working relationships that can make the scenario appear ridiculous in hindsight. On the other hand, a U.S. abdication of regional responsibilities can lead to growing isolation of some regional states and may provide fertile ground for political changes that lead to war. These cases are also influenced by the perceived ability of U.S. forces to participate in defensive operations. The PRC-Taiwan War scenario presents a situation in which early intervention with U.S. air forces (whether sea based or land based) would raise the cost of trying to mount an assault to unacceptable levels. If U.S. reinforcements were not available in the first few days, defensive operations would be much more difficult.

Leverage Through Building Self-Assurance. The second class of scenarios is important because it represents cases in which active U.S. participation in regional security operations and the routine presence of U.S. forces provide a visible reminder that U.S. interests in regional stability are engaged and that escalation might involve a larger U.S. role. Either Vietnam or the PRC could establish control of any of the Spratlys or Paracels, but control would be difficult to maintain in any circumstances, and would be even more so if the U.S. became engaged. A U.S. interest in a Philippine civil war sufficient to warrant participation of U.S. forces would probably be limited to three cases:
1. Protection of U.S. citizens and property.
2. Intervention at the request of the duly elected government in some cases (e.g., humanitarian, former Soviet Union or PRC involvement).
3. Peacekeeping duties.

**Leverage as a Defensive Partner.** The third class of scenarios represents the more traditional view of presence, since U.S. forces are physically present as combat units ready to fight alongside coalition partners. In these cases, the threat can be more clearly identified, and simulation models or war games can provide insight on likely courses of combat. These instances are particularly sensitive to changes in the level of U.S. forces committed to in-place defensive operations. In both the Renewal of Korean War and the Invasion of Saudi Oil Fields scenarios, mobilization and further augmentation by follow-on forces are assumed, but the intensity and cost of the campaign will be strongly influenced by the readiness and effectiveness of forces in place when the war starts.

**Leverage from Unique U.S. Capabilities.** The fourth class of scenarios is illustrated by consideration of a Russia-U.S. war at sea. The scope of the hypothetical war could extend over large ocean areas. The technical quality of the forces being opposed requires capabilities that can only be provided by the U.S. In this case, the scope of the combat (can it be contained in a subregion?), the level of intensity, and the magnitude of U.S. and allied losses are directly related to the readiness and effectiveness of U.S. forces. Continued U.S. access to Japanese bases and continued joint defense operations complicate Russian campaign planning. Even if the Russians attempted to focus on attacking targets at sea, they would have to expect their homeland support elements to be targeted by land-based air forces in the region and naval task groups.

**Little If Any Leverage.** In some cases, U.S. forces contribute little or nothing to reducing the likelihood of a scenario developing. Hence, we do not see much of a role for the U.S. should combat occur in these instances. Both an India-Pakistan war and a Chinese civil war are examples of cases in which the U.S. does not "have a dog in every fight."

**Posture Performance**

**Posture A.** Posture A was created by extending the FY 1991 force levels out to the year 2000. This benchmark force is unlikely to be maintained, because the trend in real defense spending is downward. There is little disagreement about the need for at least some reductions. Nevertheless, these forces provide a starting point for measuring policy alternatives. The basing of the Posture A forces is consistent with the DoD strategic framework for the Asian Pacific Rim (OASD/ISA, 1990), emphasizing the importance of a forward U.S. presence in Asia. An overview of the performance of Posture A is shown in Table 4.9. We discuss here the performance of each of the postures in providing presence and effectiveness, separating effectiveness into two elements: the ability to respond quickly and war-fighting potential.

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7This Report to Congress was updated but not substantively changed in November 1990.
Table 4.9
Overall Assessment of Posture A
(FY 1991 Budget Extended)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deficiencies</th>
<th>Strengths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>Gradual loss of Philippine basing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness (responsiveness)</td>
<td>Continuity with most important regional partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness (war-fighting potential)</td>
<td>Adequate for most stressing contingencies (e.g., former Soviet Union, North Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical dependence on response to warning of attack on South Korea; delays in reinforcing Persian Gulf</td>
<td>Balanced contingency capability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Presence.** The forces allocated to CINCPAC include in-place forces for the defense of South Korea, significant Air Force and Marine forces in Japan, and routine CVBG operations resulting in the full-time presence of a CVBG in both the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. The posture assumes that the phase-out of combat forces in the Philippines has been accomplished. U.S. presence in Southeast Asia is limited to support of transiting forces in the Philippines and Singapore and a low level of rotational deployments of Navy and Air Force aircraft to Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines. This presence is somewhat less than the norm sustained during peacetime in the past ten to twenty years, but it contains no abrupt changes that can be interpreted as a lessening of U.S. interest in regional security. In fact, a case can be made that the former Soviet Union's need to focus on internal problems, its withdrawal of forces from Vietnam, and its reduction of military support for both Vietnam and North Korea render the relative U.S. military capabilities available to support regional partners greater than before.

The only presence deficiency for Posture A in the selected cases arises in the Middle East. If Iraq rebuilds its military forces (or if Iran poses a similar threat), the 1990 invasion of Kuwait could be repeated, and a subsequent capture of northern Saudi oil fields might be attempted if residual U.S. forces are not in the region.8

**Effectiveness.** Posture A helps to define the limits of the U.S. war-fighting capability in the region. In-place U.S. ground forces are maintained in South Korea, but they are primarily symbolic. Ground reinforcements will require sealift for most of their equipment, and full support requires mobilization. Air forces can be deployed more quickly. Prepositioned Marine equipment on MPSs can also close to meet with airlifted personnel in a few days. Even for this posture, which involves the largest commitment of U.S. forces to South Korea, the defense of South Korea is still uncertain because of the difficulty in predicting the initiating circumstances. If the warning of a North Korean attack is adequate and acted upon promptly, a successful defense is almost assured. However, if North Korea can achieve surprise and move quickly through the forward defenses, the battle could be lost quickly.

The defense of the Saudi oil fields is a problem for different reasons. This posture assumes no in-place U.S. forces. Warning and the readiness of the U.S. to mobilize and deploy forces

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8At the time of this research, negotiations were going on among Arab states regarding a long-term commitment by Arab forces to in-place defenses in Kuwait and northern Saudi Arabia. Even if an all-Arab force can be sustained and is desirable, the perception of a lack of U.S. commitment could lead to a greater risk of war.
halfway around the world define how far an invader may be able to go before being stopped. Nevertheless, it is almost impossible to stop any initial penetration if U.S. forces are not in place when the attack starts.

The nature of the threats in Southeast Asia are such that available U.S. forces are more than adequate to support security partners. U.S. Marine and tactical air forces in Japan can be quickly deployed and committed to the defense of coalition partners, and CVBGs can arrive within a few days of the onset of a crisis.

The extreme situations present a problem for all postures. PRC ground forces acting on the mainland against nations with common boarders cannot be effectively resisted by U.S. supporting forces. Special capabilities such as intelligence, military assistance, and communications can increase the effectiveness of local forces, but the U.S. would find little support at home for defensive operations on mainland Asia where U.S. vital interests are not threatened. A future militarized Japan could be dealt with only by a coalition of nations with sufficient naval forces to keep aggressive actions within acceptable bounds. These cases are better dealt with by further reducing their already low probabilities through diplomatic and economic actions, just as nonmilitary efforts should be used to reduce the likelihood of all the postulated conflicts.

Since we have already said there is little chance that existing force levels can be sustained, too much should not be made of the adequacy of Posture A for supporting U.S. objectives. There are problems and opportunities in U.S. relations with most nations around the western rim of the Pacific, but the lack of a sufficient military presence or the inadequacy of U.S. combat capabilities is not high on the list of important issues for this posture. A force as robust and well positioned as the one the U.S. has in this post–Cold War era is certainly adequate to maintain the historically strong military foundation for U.S. economic and diplomatic policy initiatives. This adequacy will diminish as fiscal restraints and policy choices result in shortfalls in both presence and effectiveness.

The strength of Posture A also derives from the predicted continuation of good relations with regional partners—primarily Japan, but also South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand. A souring of the U.S.-Japan relationship would make the support of military operations in Northeast Asia much more difficult and would force a reevaluation of the U.S. ability to sustain full-time carrier presence in the Indian Ocean. Relations with the PRC, the former Soviet Union, and Vietnam are less important for this posture, since it includes an adequate military capability for responding to individual crises.

**Posture B.** Posture B forces the U.S. to deal with some of the fiscal realities of the emerging world, but it assumes that the U.S. is able to successfully manage political battles, domestic and foreign, so that a strong forward posture in East Asia and the Pacific can be sustained. Changes from Posture A include reductions in all forward-deployed forces, although major ground and air forces remain in Korea and Japan. Since the overall carrier inventory shrinks, a continuous presence can no longer be maintained in the Indian Ocean. A CVBG is still home-ported in Japan, and a continuous carrier presence is maintained in the western Pacific. The performance of Posture B is summarized in Table 4.10.


Table 4.10
Overall Assessment of Posture B
(15 Percent Reduction, Forward Basing)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deficiencies</th>
<th>Strengths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>CVBG in Indian Ocean only 50% of time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness (responsiveness)</td>
<td>No prepositioned stocks on Arabian Peninsula and possibly long delays in CVBG response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness (war-fighting potential)</td>
<td>Critical dependence on response to warning of attack on South Korea and Saudi oil fields</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Presence. The force allocated to CINCPAC in Posture B provides essentially the same presence in Northeast Asia as Posture A, and that presence was judged to be adequate. The Marine forces in Okinawa are reduced by 50 percent, but MPS equipment is maintained and the MEB remaining in Hawaii or a CONUS MEB could be rapidly moved forward. Air Forces in Japan and Korea share in the worldwide reductions, but the residual capability is large and composed of first-line forces.

The possibly significant presence change for Posture B occurs in the Indian Ocean, where the U.S. has maintained an average of one carrier for the past ten years. Normal peacetime operational constraints on deployment length and home-port time for ship crews result in the ability to maintain only 2.5 deployed carriers (Mediterranean 1.0, Western Pacific 1.0, and Indian Ocean 0.5) from a total force of 12 carriers with one CVBG home-ported in Japan. The gaps created when no carrier is available in the Indian Ocean could be offset by some of the posture variants described earlier (e.g., using LHA/LHD-centered task groups, deployments of composite air force TFWs, home-porting in Australia). 9

For the scenarios considered, only the India-Pakistan War is likely to be influenced by the reduced naval presence. One of the possible reasons for India to start a war with Pakistan is a desire to remove the Pakistani Army as a threat to India's frontiers so that defense resources can be committed elsewhere. The decision to go to war would be based primarily on Indian perspectives on Pakistan, but the absence of a regular U.S. naval presence could reinforce the view that India could act with impunity in its subregion.

Because this posture does not include a long-term presence on the ground on the Arabian Peninsula, it is judged inadequate for future Saudi oil field invasion scenarios in which rapid initial gains may deny bases for air operations and ports for reinforcement. Prepositioned equipment and rotational deployments of Air Force squadrons could offset the presence deficiencies of Posture B, but war-fighting deficiencies would remain until an in-place forward force capability is established.

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9Offsetting actions are discussed below, after our review of the performance of all the postures.
Effectiveness. The war-fighting potential of the forces deployed in Posture B for the selected situations is essentially equivalent to that of Posture A.\textsuperscript{10} Deficiencies exist for the Renewal of Korean War and the Invasion of Saudi Oil Fields scenarios because of uncertainty about warning time. If tactical surprise is achieved, coalition defenses may fail. However, with time for mobilization and deployment, sufficient U.S. forces can be deployed to provide a robust defense. In general, this posture provides adequate military capability for most scenarios and reduces some of the adverse impact of force reductions by maintaining a maximum forward presence.

Posture C. Posture C adds to the 15 percent force reduction a relocation of forces from East Asia to U.S.-controlled territory as far forward as geography and facilities permit. The Japan home-ported CVBG is now based in Guam. Army forces in Korea are withdrawn, and the division in Hawaii is returned to full strength. A single TFS remains as a token rotational presence in Korea and Japan. Indian Ocean carrier deployments remain at 50 percent coverage since there is still a forward-based carrier in the Pacific. A new element is the deployment of a full MEB (with air) and a TFW to Guam and Saipan.

The reason for the pullback to U.S. bases could be either a political backlash in the U.S. that causes congressionally mandated changes in the U.S. Pacific posture or a breakdown of relations initiated by regional security partners. Remedies for posture deficiencies may vary depending on the reason for withdrawal. Reestablishing a U.S. presence and a forward war-fighting capability will be much more difficult than dealing with sensitivities as they arise and before they result in forced withdrawals of U.S. forces. The performance of Posture C is summarized in Table 4.11.

Presence. The U.S. presence is lowest in Posture C because of the clear migration of forces from Northeast Asia to island enclaves in the tropical Pacific. It is no better than marginal for all of the scenarios considered. The most significant change from the previously discussed postures, which emphasize forward presence, occurs for the Renewal of Korean War scenario. The North Korean assessment of the risks of attacking South Korea would change as U.S. forces withdrew from Northeast Asia. The war-fighting potential of the South Koreans would not change, but their own assessment of their prospects would be negatively affected and the risk of war would almost certainly increase.

Whatever small influence the U.S. has on restraining the growth of a rearmed, aggressive Japan or aggressive actions by the PRC would be reduced as the implications of closed facilities and redeployed forces become clear to all regional actors. The impact of the most necessary realignment actions may be offset by policy actions and diplomacy, but some strong actions will be required if the U.S. wants to remain a factor in Northeast Asian security matters.

The situation in Southeast Asia is not as bleak for Posture C because of the proximity of the new bases to the Philippines and the Indonesian straits. The continued Indian Ocean pres-

\textsuperscript{10}Reductions from Posture A to Posture B include removal of some TFSs from Japan and Korea, removal of a MEB from Okinawa, and reduced carrier presence in the Indian Ocean. Since a MEB still remains in Okinawa, the principal impact is felt in scenarios that require large (MEF) Marine and air forces.
Table 4.11
Overall Assessment of Posture C
(15 Percent Reduction, Mid-Pacific Basing)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Deficiencies</th>
<th>Strengths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>Withdrawal from Northeast Asia; CVBG in Indian Ocean only 50% of time</td>
<td>Marianas rebasing retains some visible commitment to Pacific security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness (responsiveness)</td>
<td>Reinforcement of South Korea delayed; possible long delays in CVBG response</td>
<td>Improved flexibility to meet Southeast Asian contingencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness (war-fighting potential)</td>
<td>Serious deficiencies in supporting South Korean defense</td>
<td>Can swing to either Northeast or Southeast Asia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ence of a CVBG (although only for 50 percent of the year) will maintain substantial activity along the SLOC from CONUS to the Persian Gulf.

The regional perception of a Northeast Asian withdrawal as the first step of even greater trenchment will need to be addressed by diplomatic actions. It would be hard to argue that the U.S. has not fundamentally changed its role as an Asian Pacific power when force reductions are accompanied by withdrawal from forward bases. The result would almost certainly be a major realignment and rearrangement of regional security relationships. Domestic political concerns about where remaining defense funds are spent may require saving bases at home at the expense of forward bases. CINCPAC and others must make as strong a case as possible for maintaining an adequate regional capability.

Effectiveness. The war-fighting potential of Posture C is essentially the same as that for Posture B except in the case of two scenarios: Renewal of Korean War and Russia-U.S. War at Sea. We previously developed force requirements associated with scenario objectives (Table 4.1). Two scenarios, Renewal of Korean War and Invasion of Saudi Oil Fields, require in-place forces. Only Posture D provides adequate in-place forces for a Southwest Asia war, and Posture C lacks adequate in-place forces for both Korea and Southwest Asia. If the U.S. is unable to maintain forces where they are required, it will have to put even more effort into reducing the risk of war in other ways. Effective arms control and/or reunification in Korea might be satisfactory military offsets to U.S. withdrawal from regional bases, but the resulting potential problems may make these choices poor ones.

Posture D. Posture D introduces the complication of trying to maintain an in-place force in the Persian Gulf region while implementing 15 percent regional force reductions.\(^1\) Although it is desirable to maintain a CVBG in the Indian Ocean, only a 50 percent presence can be achieved unless Atlantic Fleet carriers supplement Pacific Fleet resources and the Mediterranean presence is gapped. In this posture, USPACOM commits substantial air and Marine units to the contingency force in Southwest Asia. The price of this support is the absence of all Marine air and ground forces in the USPACOM area of responsibility (AOR) west of CONUS. Remaining tactical air forces (previously Air Force and Marine Corps but now only the former) in South Korea and Japan are reduced to half of the levels of Posture A.

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\(^1\)Long-term requirements for in-place forces could be satisfied by Arab forces with sufficient training and modern weapons. Prepositioned stocks and a base infrastructure could permit the U.S. to rely on rapid reinforcement forces. If the threat is sufficiently low or Arab defenders are deemed adequate, the rationale for this posture would be weakened.
Presence. The purpose of Posture D is to maximize the U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf within the constraint of reduced force levels. The result is balanced presence for the scenarios considered. The retention of major ground and air forces in South Korea and Japan should offset the deployment of Marine forces to Southwest Asia. Presence in the Persian Gulf is enhanced with in-place forces that clearly demonstrate U.S. resolve. However, new problems may be generated by having a U.S. presence in a Moslem region when war is not imminent. Retaining the forward presence in East Asia presents the U.S. with a known set of issues that it has had to deal with for years. In the Middle East, cultural differences and the remoteness from other U.S. facilities will make it difficult and expensive to keep more than a token force on the ground.

The center of gravity of naval operations in the Pacific will certainly shift toward the SLOCs supporting the Persian Gulf deployments. This shift should not adversely affect the perception of U.S. commitment to the region as a whole if there is a clear threat in the Middle East. Without a commensurate reduction in the hostile status of North Korea, a refocusing on the Middle East would signal a major shift in U.S. priorities. The posture retains a CVBG homeported in Japan, and there will be adequate capabilities for naval presence in all of Northeast Asia. The performance of Posture D is summarized in Table 4.12.

Effectiveness. Posture D improves on the war-fighting performance of Posture B because of the in-place forces in the Persian Gulf. Naval capability is less than desired because of gaps in the presence of a CVBG, but the Marine and Air Force units on the ground provide a sufficient capability for immediately responding to attack. If Iran or Iraq attacks, in-place forces can quickly be augmented by CVBGs deploying from the western Pacific and the Mediterranean, and a ground support structure will be ready to receive airlifted reinforcements.

Posture E. Posture E portrays an environment with a 35 percent cut in forces. Where it is possible (South Korea and Japan), in-place forces are thinned out to retain a basis for rapid reintroduction of units in a crisis. In other cases, the magnitude of the changes requires a different concept of operations. Only five carriers are available to USPACOM, and it is no

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.12</th>
<th>Overall Assessment of Posture D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 Percent Reduction, Arabian Peninsula Presence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deficiencies</strong></td>
<td><strong>Strengths</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>Drawdown of air forces in Northeast Asia; CVBG in Indian Ocean only 50% of time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness (responsiveness)</td>
<td>Possible long delays in CVBG response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness (war-fighting potential)</td>
<td>Even greater reliance on response to warning time in supporting South Korean defense</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
longer possible to maintain even a 50 percent presence in the Indian Ocean.\textsuperscript{12} Units removed from Northeast Asia cannot be rebased to U.S. Trust Territories; instead they are removed from the force structure.\textsuperscript{13} In this case, the U.S. will have to rely even more heavily on deployments of forces from CONUS to reinforce forward-based forces. Airlift and sealift capabilities need to be spared from disproportionate reductions as the combat force structure is reduced. The performance of Posture E is summarized in Table 4.13.

**Presence.** The presence that can be sustained by Posture E is consistently inadequate. Most of the scenarios considered rely on U.S. actions to develop defensive coalitions to present potential aggressors with limited prospects for success. When force levels fall as low as those defined for Posture E, the U.S. is likely to be perceived as maintaining only a facade of a posture. U.S. ground forces in Korea and Alaska are divisions in name only, because they now consist of only a single active brigade. A single CVBG operating in the arc from Alaska to Australia is a major change from previous U.S. activity. These major reductions, if necessary, will require even closer relationships with regional partners to ameliorate the detrimental effects of this restructuring.

**Effectiveness.** The war-fighting potential of Posture E is adequate for many of the scenarios. There is no observable change relative to Posture B. Forces in South Korea are reduced, but the defense of South Korea is more dependent on the performance of South Korean forces and access to Japan for reinforcement than it is on the size of U.S. ground forces. None of the postures except Posture D provides in-place forces for the initial defense of Saudi oil fields, so the reductions in Posture E have no effect on that case.

Obviously, there is a point at which reductions in the overall U.S. force structure will significantly reduce U.S. war-fighting capabilities. The Pacific Rim scenarios we examined do not

| Table 4.13 |
| Overall Assessment of Posture E  |
| (35 Percent Reduction, Retrenchment)  |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deficiencies</th>
<th>Strengths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>Risk of residual forces being perceived as hollow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness (responsiveness)</td>
<td>Possible long delays in CVBG response and Korean reinforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness (war-fighting potential)</td>
<td>Relies even more on coalition partners; reinforcement may be too late</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{12}CNO staff planning estimates show that, using current planning factors, on average 8.7 carriers are required to support one carrier in the Indian Ocean. If a Japan-based carrier deploys to the Indian Ocean, the requirement for a continuous carrier presence decreases from 8.7 to 7.6. Lower force levels will make a continuous carrier presence in forward areas unachievable unless the definition of how far CVBGs can operate from deployment areas is significantly changed.

\textsuperscript{13}Related analyses of Pacific regional security postures consider a variant of this posture in which a Southwest Asia presence is an additional objective. It will be hard to maintain any presence in Northeast Asia if this additional constraint is imposed on the forces of Posture E.
present threats that cannot be managed with the forces available, if adequate coalitions of regional partners can be developed and if sufficient time is available to deploy forces to forward areas. The cases that require in-place forces present a special requirement. Reduced forces limit options for sustaining in-place deployments even if the posture is politically desirable. A rotation base is required, and Posture E's inability to support CVBG deployments to the Indian Ocean reflects the consequences of a reduced rotation base.

The conclusion that effectiveness can be maintained at lower force levels may be surprising, but it reflects a fundamental characteristic of military operations. There is no simple success/fail criterion for war. The number and type of forces committed will vary with national resolve and the perceived importance of the objective. Early massive commitment of forces in Saudi Arabia after the occupation of Kuwait made possible the rapid success in Operation Desert Storm. Gradual commitment of even larger forces in Vietnam did not achieve similar results. Presence, to show resolve, and mobile forces that are well-trained can help to balance real reductions in the underlying force posture. How low can the U.S. safely go? The answer depends on how the U.S. postures the residual forces and what importance it places on military support of U.S. objectives in the Asian Pacific.

VARIANTS TO IMPROVE FIT

Posture variants involving policy and strategy changes were defined in Section 2. The initial list of thirty-three was pruned to ten that incorporated major changes in current policy or were particularly important to the changing world. We discuss in turn each posture and the potential of policy variants in offsetting deficiencies. We then conclude with a matrix of scenarios and postures that highlights the most relevant policy variants.

Specific Deficiency Offsets

Posture A. Since we previously identified Posture A as out of line with budget trends, it requires only passing consideration. Posture variants apply in three areas. For Korea, there is uncertainty about the effect of the growth of North Korea’s capabilities and the North Korean potential for developing nuclear weapons. Both a nuclear-free Korea and bilateral confidence-building measures between North and South Korea are important. Options to provide a structured removal of nuclear weapons and the potential for their manufacture would reduce the incentives for North Korean development of such weapons. Additionally, North Korean fears of South Korean acquisition of nuclear weapons would be allayed. Another benefit of any new cooperative regime between the two Koreas would be a general reduction of tension and the resultant lowering of the risk of war.

Posture A is also deficient for scenarios in which subversion or coercion of smaller regional states is a problem. U.S. programs of cooperation that provide continuing contact between Americans and regional partners can provide a partial substitute for the lack of traditional military presence. Local acquisition of U.S. equipment, either by purchase or grant, provides a basis for supporting U.S. rapid deployment forces and demonstrates the U.S. link for potentially hostile outsiders.

Posture A has no in-place forces in Southwest Asia. This lack of routine presence can best be offset by prepositioned equipment for U.S. forces that would deploy in crisis. However, if the
U.S. commitment is intended to deny any loss of territory to an aggressor, POMCUS forces would not be sufficient without ground forces supplied by another entity (the Gulf Cooperation Council or a larger Arab coalition).

**Posture B.** Posture B, like Posture A, provides a balanced forward presence, but the deficiencies of Posture A are exacerbated by force reductions that reduce the war-fighting capability and result in a noticeable loss of carrier presence in the Indian Ocean. The beginning of the drawdown of air forces in Korea and Japan requires consideration of expanded prepositioning of equipment, facilities, and munitions for forces that would need to redeploy in a crisis. The reduction in the naval presence in the Indian Ocean necessitates consideration of additional forward basing of a CVBG in the Indian Ocean.

Forward basing would offset the problem created by long transit times from CONUS to the Persian Gulf. Australia would appear to be the prime candidate for cultural reasons, and western Australia would provide a more central location for a force contributing presence in both Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. Related analyses of environmental, legal, and work-force problems associated with enlarging U.S. facilities in the Marianas show that rebasing to U.S. Trust Territories is not a panacea and that other options must be looked for. On the other hand, as forces continue to be reduced, the U.S. must consider the ratio of forward-deployed forces to CONUS-based forces. There is a limit to how much forward basing can be supported by a decreasing U.S. mainland pool of military resources, since forward basing relies on periodic rotations of personnel and equipment.

**Posture C.** Posture C expands the variants previously considered to address the problems caused by the relocation of U.S. forces from South Korea and Japan to the Marianas and Hawaii. First, political and environmental concerns of the affected islands would have to be settled. We can say that options exist if the U.S. loses access to bases in Japan, but they may be so costly or take so long that the U.S. would effectively lose influence in the Asian Pacific Rim in the interim. As the U.S. clearly moves to a world in which it considers committing its forces only when the forces of concerned regional states are also committed, it must also give more consideration to nonmilitary factors in developing security strategies.

The reduced U.S. presence in Northeast Asia associated with Posture C could increase pressures in Japan to build a larger military to meet Japan's overall security needs. Since Japan's pursuit of this course could begin a spiral toward rearmament and possible renewed militarism, some offsetting actions to reduce Japanese security concerns could substitute for absent U.S. forces. An arms control agreement with the former Soviet Union that resulted in a reduced threat to Japan would discourage such a spiral.

The effective withdrawal of the U.S. from the region results in a different type of concern about the case in which Japan attempts to recover its Northern Territories by force. Continued U.S. involvement in Northeast Asia security planning is necessary to reduce the possibility of covert planning for retaking the islands. Once military actions began, the U.S. would be in a difficult position with few good choices.

**Posture D.** Posture D has fewer problems requiring policy adjustments than the other reduced-force cases. Force reductions are partially offset by an increased ability to respond to an initial attack on the Saudi oil fields. Reduced carrier presence in the Indian Ocean is offset by air forces on the Arabian Peninsula. The partial drawdown of forces in Japan and South Korea still needs to be offset by additional prepositioning and development of a basing
infrastructure, but that is true for all postures. It must be noted, however, that Posture D gains some of its strength from the deployment of forces outside CINCPAC's AOR. A long-term presence in Southwest Asia is a national commitment, and USPACOM is only one of the contributors. For this research, we tried to limit our focus to USPACOM concerns, but we could not ignore important contingencies in which USPACOM and other U.S. forces might be involved.

**Posture E.** Posture E needs the most help to make up for reduced forces. Although we constructed Posture E to have as much forward presence as possible, the trade-off is a thinning out of forces in South Korea and Japan. In terms of U.S. presence, Posture E is not as bad as Posture C, but the single brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division remaining in South Korea cannot contribute much military capability to an initial defense effort. Deploying larger (MEF, LID) forces in Posture E requires more time, longer transits, and more CONUS-based elements.

All the posture variants required for Posture C are also important for Posture E. In particular, the reduced presence in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean needs compensation. Because of the reduced resource environment that drives Posture E, it will be difficult to expand any U.S. programs. Low-cost options involving training of individuals and combined military training with transiting or rotational forces may be the most that can be done. More forward basing would help the smaller residual force of carriers provide more of a presence, but forward basing is probably infeasible for this posture.

Structural arms control in Korea and the former Soviet Union, even if it includes some less desirable naval arms control as part of a package, may be the necessary policy consequence of reductions of this magnitude. Internal pressures in the former Soviet Union may make the Russians more willing to codify necessary reductions as the U.S. reacts to similar fiscal imperatives. This is not as likely a motivation for arms control in Korea. North Korea has significant resource limitations, but it is not clear that the North Koreans would be strongly motivated to reduce forces if the U.S. is perceived as being forced to draw down.

Table 4.14 identifies the applicability of the ten principal variants to the set of scenarios. For scenarios in which a posture is marginal or inadequate in terms of either presence or warfighting capability, the most relevant posture variants are identified.

**General Applicability of Posture Variants**

We have just described specific applications of the most important posture variants for each scenario. It is also necessary to consider policy variants that have more general applicability as the U.S. moves into the world that will exist in the year 2000. Budgetary pressures may be the most dominant factor shaping the size of the U.S. forces available to CINCPAC in the future. However, the location of forces and the perception of their effectiveness and responsiveness are also related to how the U.S. manages bilateral relationships and how well the U.S. understands political factors in the Pacific Rim region. Two posture variants, grand strategy and nuclear weapons policy, deal primarily with these latter factors.

The world has changed and will continue to change. The U.S. and its Pacific partners were focused on a global Marxist-Leninist expansionary doctrine that led to wars in Korea and
### Table 4.14

Applicability of Posture Variants to Postures and Scenarios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Posture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A</strong></td>
<td><strong>B</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Civil War</td>
<td>Expanding IMET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Civil War</td>
<td>Expanding IMET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan-Islamic Turmoil</td>
<td>Expanding IMET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spratly Islands War</td>
<td>Expanding U.S. base structure; expanded IMET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian Straits Denial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Recovery of Northern Territories</td>
<td>Expanding IMET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC Invasion of SE Asia</td>
<td>Expanding IMET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India-Pakistan War</td>
<td>Expanding IMET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC-Taiwan War</td>
<td>Expanding IMET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invasion of Saudi Oil Fields</td>
<td>Expanding IMET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renewal of Korean War</td>
<td>Expanding IMET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia-U.S. War at Sea</td>
<td>Expanding IMET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Pacific Empire</td>
<td>Expanding IMET</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** Blanks indicate that a posture is adequate in terms of presence and war-fighting effectiveness for the specific scenario.
Vietnam. The nature of that threat has changed dramatically, if the threat still exists at all. As a result, the U.S. and its security partners may simply require fewer military forces, in which case reductions do not represent a backing away from commitments. Instead, they represent an adjustment to the emerging new realities. The threat has changed, and the U.S. must be ready to support a range of different threats together with its regional partners. These new realities need to be explained to regional partners, potential enemies, and the U.S. body politic. Defining U.S. interests and a proportional engagement commensurate with the threat constitutes a new grand strategy, since it provides assurance that the U.S. commitment to regional security is as strong as ever. Military requirements themselves have changed, so the U.S. patterns of military operations have also changed.\textsuperscript{14}

Nuclear weapons policy must be specifically addressed. Two factors have formed the basis of U.S. perceived requirements for theater\textsuperscript{15} nuclear weapons: the former Soviet Union's ability to attack naval forces with nuclear weapons on land-based aircraft and the potential failure of conventional defenses in South Korea. Navy arguments for retaining theater nuclear weapons have focused on countering Soviet attempts to limit nuclear war to the sea, where the Soviets could attack U.S. carriers from sanctuaries on land. Whether the U.S. is more likely to respond to nuclear attacks on naval forces if naval forces have nuclear weapons cannot be determined analytically. However, the U.S. does have more flexibility in choosing an appropriate response if naval weapons are available.\textsuperscript{16}

Nuclear escalation on the battlefield to prevent defeat has been an argument in NATO defense planning for central Europe for forty years. Defense planning for the situation in Korea—i.e., the possibility of North Korean success in a conventional war because of numerical force imbalances—presents many similarities. The proximity of important civilian areas to retreating front lines requires planning for a forward defense. Nuclear weapons need to be used early, before large areas of friendly territory have been overrun. However, the difficulty in making a decision, in conjunction with allies, to use nuclear weapons argues against relying on early use.\textsuperscript{17}

Nuclear options for theater forces require the presence of nuclear weapons in the theater. However, U.S. policy for many years has been to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons at a specific facility or on a specific ship. This policy has resulted in

\textsuperscript{14} Even though a logical basis for this new strategy can be argued successfully, the U.S. must be aware that any such logic will be perceived by some as simply a rationalization for actions the U.S. is forced to take for reasons unrelated to national security. If anything, this argues for early convergence on a strategy that can form the basis for deciding which forces to reduce and which programs to emphasize as the overall budget and size of the U.S. forces decrease.

\textsuperscript{15} The distinction here refers to weapons used by forces assigned to meet CINCPAC's war-fighting requirements. SSBNs (fleet ballistic missile submarines) have been assigned to CINCPAC, but their missiles are "strategic" weapons. Obviously, this distinction is somewhat artificial, since target characteristics define whether "strategic" or "theater" weapons are more appropriate.

\textsuperscript{16} U.S. policy was revised by President Bush in his announcement on short-range nuclear force reductions on September 27, 1991. The subsequent decision to remove nuclear weapons from Korea diminishes the importance of this point. Nevertheless, air-delivered weapons could be redeployed on short notice. Until the U.S. makes a commitment to "no first use," allies will assume nuclear weapons are still an option.

\textsuperscript{17} Recent actions to denuclearize South Korea facilitate policy steps to restrain North Korea's nuclear weapons development. However, after initial U.S. announcements of planned withdrawals, South Korean Defense Minister Yi Chong-ku said on October 21, 1991, "As long as nuclear threat exists in our surroundings, we need the U.S. umbrella, whatever the form" (Foreign Broadcast Information Service—East Asia, 1991). The situation remains very dynamic, but a comprehensive review of the role of U.S. nuclear weapons is still warranted.
problems in Japan and New Zealand. Although the U.S. has been able to live with the limitations of this policy in the past, it will need to be more flexible in the future. The emerging strategy—defense in combination with regional partners—will require a basing structure that allows the U.S. to routinely deploy forces and even preposition equipment and weapons outside U.S.-controlled facilities. The U.S. may be required to provide stronger assurances than in the past to gain the necessary access.\textsuperscript{18} A clearer identification of the rationale for retaining nuclear weapons capabilities for theater forces and the costs—political, economic, and military—of retaining a nuclear component in regional contingency planning was beyond the scope of our analysis, but it will be required as part of any new grand strategy.

The importance of C3 cannot be overlooked. Successes in Operation Desert Storm stand in stark contrast to problems experienced in Vietnam. Forces alone will not compensate for effective joint and combined training \textit{in the Pacific region} to identify and solve interoperability and coordination problems. Training motivated by the need to improve C3 will contribute to the U.S. presence and the perception that U.S. forces, if committed, will be used effectively.

\textsuperscript{18}“Nuclearphobia” has been associated with both nuclear weapons and nuclear-powered ships. The decision to remove nuclear weapons from deployed ships will greatly reduce, but not eliminate, base access problems.
5. FINDINGS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

ISSUES ARISING IN POSTURE DEVELOPMENT

The postures considered in this analysis were constructed to reflect the basic elements of the future planning environment: reduced budgets and restrictions on U.S. access to overseas facilities. We did not try to predict the point at which the current rounds of force reductions will end; nor did we predict that the basing problems in the Philippines will be repeated in Korea or Japan. Instead, we tried to bound the possible future force posture outcomes by considering 15 percent and 35 percent reductions in the forces available to CINCPAC and alternative basing configurations. A DoD Report to Congress (OASD/ISA, 1990) provided a strategic framework for the Asian Pacific Rim that emphasized a forward presence and mobile forces in the first phases of reductions. We looked at the extension of that guidance into the 2000–2005 period and found that although a forward presence is important in reducing the risk of future war, there are technical limitations that must be addressed before committing too strongly to a peacetime forward presence. These technical limitations include the number of carriers required in the inventory to support forward deployments and the footprint of land-based forces that might substitute for Navy and Marine forces. An Air Force composite wing may provide the combat effectiveness of a CVBG, but the level of support required in countries such as Malaysia and Singapore for a six-month deployment to a forward area may not be acceptable to the host countries.

CVBG Options

CVBGs have provided an important component of the U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific. It is almost second nature for contingency planners to start by sending carriers to areas of crisis. This crisis response requirement will exist even with major force reductions. A peacetime presence is different from a crisis response (though the former plays an important role in facilitating the latter). Carriers operating in the region are a visible sign of U.S. commitment. Sailors on liberty and ships open for general visiting are synonymous with a U.S. presence in the Asian Pacific region. As force levels fall to six or even five deployable carriers assigned to CINCPAC, it will not be possible to maintain the continuous presence of a CVBG in both the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific. Even for the case in which we assumed it was U.S. policy to maintain a carrier in the Indian Ocean as part of in-place forces to protect the oil fields (Posture D), it was only possible to plan on 50 percent coverage without violating peacetime operational planning constraints. The transit time from the U.S. to the Arabian Sea during routine peacetime operations approaches forty-five days. As a result, almost 50 percent of a six-month deployment is spent in transit. Longer deployments that have occurred in the past have had a severe impact on morale and retention.

There are a number of ways to respond to this problem:

- Accept gaps in CVBG presence. Even when a CVBG is in the region, it cannot be in two places at the same time. Routine but less frequent appearances in locations throughout the region may be satisfactory.
• Use non-CVBG forces to provide a presence with an equivalent military capability. Amphibious task groups that include air-capable ships and embarked Marines can respond effectively to many incipient crises. Air Force composite wings with fighters, attack aircraft, and support aircraft could be deployed in periods when carriers are in transit or not available. Air Force units could include in-transit training stops in countries without ports and in different regions of countries traditionally visited by naval forces.

• Base a CVBG in Australia. The carrier home-ported in Japan provides a presence in the western Pacific even when it is in port. It also deploys to the Indian Ocean with a substantially shorter transit time than do carriers based in the U.S. If the continuous presence of a CVBG in the Indian Ocean is a requirement, additional forward basing may be the only solution. There is obviously a limit to the number of carriers that can be forward deployed as the total force size is reduced, and there are substantial costs associated with overseas basing.

Base Access Restrictions

We developed one 15 percent reduction of forces that assumed a loss of forward base access (Posture C). We did not specify why access was limited, but there are ample grounds for speculation, including a change of government in Japan, economic warfare between trading rivals, or simply congressional pressures to base smaller forces on U.S. territory. Whatever the reason, the alternative of choice is to fall back to U.S.-controlled facilities as far forward in the region as possible. Some might argue that if U.S. access is limited, the need for a forward strategy should be reassessed, but U.S. interests in the Asian Pacific go well beyond any single bilateral relationship.

We assumed in our research that the U.S. could, if it chose to, relocate Marines from Okinawa to Saipan, home-port a CVBG in Guam, and maintain a TFW in Guam. The U.S. presence in the Marianas was greater in the past, and the port and airfields there allow for such increases. Operationally, there may even be some advantages to this use of the Marianas, due to their proximity to Southeast Asia and the lines of communication to the Indian Ocean. However, the U.S. would face environmental, economic, and political problems. The cost of building new facilities or expanding existing facilities may be prohibitive even if permitted by the local governments. Economic development, particularly in Guam, is proceeding based on tourism. An increased military presence may not be popular. How such tensions would be resolved was beyond the scope of our analysis; we assumed they could be.

Hollow Forces

A common theme to strategy alternatives for the Pacific is the need for a forward presence, but that need can be carried to an illogical extreme. As forces are reduced, the U.S. could keep the name and a token representative of all the forces that existed before the force posture was adjusted downward. It could then assert that it is maintaining a "presence." The U.S. has already done this by keeping divisions with round-out brigades of reserve personnel or combat units with support personnel in the reserves. For scenarios in which the U.S. plans to commit forces after mobilization, it is appropriate to maintain units that can be fleshed out. On the other hand, if the U.S. accepts commitments for in-place forces or even rapidly deployable forces, the committed forces must be maintained at an effective level of
strength. In constructing our alternative force postures, we maintained units at effective levels and removed them from forward areas as necessary, rather than restructuring them for cosmetic reasons.

ISSUES RELATING TO U.S. PRESENCE IN THE PACIFIC

Perceived U.S. commitment is an integral component of the U.S. presence. If U.S. forces are physically present all the time but U.S. resolve is unclear, the perception of U.S. disinterest undercuts the reason for deploying forces. If a carrier visits Indonesia only once a year but the U.S. actively participates in other regional security activities, the perception of U.S. presence is strong. What the U.S. says may be as important as what it does. If the U.S. emphasizes reductions from traditional operating patterns and does not explain that the residual presence is consistent with a strong U.S. commitment and an effective military capability for responding as necessary, the U.S. further undercuts its residual posture.

Force reductions will almost certainly result in a reduced physical presence—forces simply cannot be in two places at the same time. The extent of their impact on perceived U.S. commitment can, however, be mitigated by offsetting actions, such as a clearer definition of the threat, arms control to reduce the need for larger forces, and economic and political ties that reduce the likelihood that forces will be needed. The U.S. can also restructure the remaining forces to better support the rapid reintroduction of forces where it has chosen to draw down. Prepositioned materials and training with local forces are potentially high-payoff alternatives to the expense of maintaining a permanent physical presence.

ISSUES OF U.S. FORCE CAPABILITY

Scenario-based analysis requires consideration of objectives for both sides in a potential conflict. Often, an aggressor's exact objective is not known, so it may be necessary to consider a range of objectives. With objectives identified, alternative campaign plans can be developed to determine the types of forces necessary to sustain an adequate defense. Finally, the analysis must consider the capabilities and commitment of all the forces likely to be available to form a defensive coalition. If there are no local forces to share the burden of combat, there may be no need for U.S. forces at all. On the other hand, if local forces are heavily committed but also outnumbered, several types of U.S. forces (ground, air, naval) may need to be used.

We found it useful to look at force requirements as three separate categories: (1) in-place forces, (2) rapid reinforcement forces, and (3) mobilization forces. Table 4.1, presented previously, provides an overview of the force requirements for the thirteen scenarios. In-place ground and air forces are required only where the threat of invasion is high. Even these requirements could be reduced or eliminated if local force capabilities were adequate or the threat was sufficiently reduced. Most scenarios require only U.S. rapid reinforcement forces. Military effectiveness can be enhanced and response time reduced if U.S. forces are configured in recognition of their most likely role (i.e., rapid reinforcement). Mobilization forces can be important when scenario timelines are long enough to permit such forces to be activated, trained, and deployed.

Although combat simulations are useful in identifying important factors and the types of outcomes that are consistent with assumed performance parameters, many scenarios only re-
quire a brief tallying of the forces that can be brought to bear to determine the eventual victors. In other scenarios, such as a second war in Korea or a naval war at sea between the U.S. and Russia, factors such as surprise, performance of ECM, commitment of ground forces, and national will can result in a range of possible outcomes, so one should not be overly reliant on the results of a single war game or set of model runs. Instead, gaming and simulation should be used to build an understanding of the ways that “best estimates” may be wrong.

CONCLUSIONS

We identified a number of issues in each phase of our analysis. Brought together, these issues form a broad set of conclusions:

Conclusion 1: The size of the total active force structure is less important than maintaining a forward presence that is adequate for deterring potential opponents and for providing the stabilizing influence needed to reassure allies. This point is valid only if the U.S. is postured to conduct coalition warfare, effectively use its own forces in combined arms operations, and reinforce rapidly with forces outside the contingency area. Thus, Posture B and Posture D look like the best compromises, but Posture E may be adequate if the threat is greatly reduced and the U.S. maintains an adequate presence through forward-deployed forces.

Conclusion 2: Many possible future contingencies will involve U.S. forces only to evacuate U.S. nationals and to keep SLOCs open.

Conclusion 3: U.S. reinforcement planning needs to be oriented to Korea and the Persian Gulf. Elsewhere, the U.S. just needs a presence and a base structure for supporting rapid response and reinforcement. Bases do not need to be controlled by the U.S., but access must be assured.

Conclusion 4: Because the U.S. will have an insufficient number of CVBGs to maintain historical levels of peacetime presence, it must be innovative in considering substitute forces, including forces of other services, to provide a presence.

Conclusion 5: A major role of U.S. forces is to make regional arms races unnecessary. This role is not glamorous, and the U.S. will get little credit for it. However, heading off arms races heads off instability, conflict, and jeopardy to U.S. interests and ultimately reduces force requirements to less than they would be otherwise.

Conclusion 6: Specific scenarios are not as important for force sizing as classes of scenarios and uncertainties about future events. Focusing on specific scenarios is useful only for identifying problems that might be encountered and types of forces and basing that might be useful. Specific scenarios should inform, not shape, force structure and basing decisions.

Conclusion 7: A more systematic look at policy changes (variants) is required as forces come down in size. The previously unthinkable may become more attractive as earlier options are denied. This idea applies to arms control, the role of nuclear forces, and reliance on security partners to perform roles once thought to be solely appropriate for the U.S.
Conclusion 8: Prepositioning and dual basing can pay big dividends both in presence and war-fighting effectiveness. The U.S. currently does not make much use of these options in the Pacific AOR. It should.

We used these eight conclusions to guide our definition of the operational strategy CINCPAC should follow and to arrive at a set of policy recommendations, as described next.

OPERATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CINCPAC

The purpose of our analysis was to better define operational strategies for the Pacific. A strategic framework was provided in a DoD Report to Congress (OASD/ISA, 1990), but it is CINCPAC’s responsibility to translate its broad themes into operational plans. We believe that CINCPAC’s operational (military) strategy is to

• Maintain a sufficient military presence throughout the region to reduce the risk of war and to promote active U.S. participation in regional development.
• Provide forces configured to complement coalition defense capabilities in the event of regional conflict.

This strategy is not a precise standard that will result in a hard “requirement” for X TFWs or Y CVBGs. It is instead a specification of two fundamental pillars for evaluating alternative postures and identifying policy actions intended to mitigate posture deficiencies. There will be circumstances, such as the evacuation of U.S. nationals, in which U.S. forces will have to act alone rather than waiting for a coalition to form. Consequently, some all-U.S. capability to respond must be retained. Nevertheless, we believe the focus for regional response planning should be combined operations with affected states.

Implementation of this strategy will require further refinement of the list of planning scenarios, the basis for judgments about the risk of war, and the ways in which U.S. involvement in regional military and economic planning contribute to risk reduction. It will also require further development of the concept of complementary coalition defense and will almost certainly mean less U.S. control because the U.S. will be contributing less. It also will require the U.S. to occasionally say, No, we do not see a need for U.S. involvement in that problem.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

In conjunction with parallel research for the Secretary of Defense (Winnefeld et al., 1992), we constructed an initial list of thirty-three policy variants that might offset the effects of force reductions or lost base access. Section 2 shows the results of our then pruning that list to nine variants that are forward looking, challenge the current conventional wisdom, and/or accept the prospect of future force reductions. The following is a review and reordering of the list in light of our analysis and our proposed operational strategy.

Recommendation 1: Modify U.S. grand strategy. The U.S. should modify the national security strategy to place greater emphasis on U.S. political and economic roles in regional security. In the past, the U.S. relied on a “go it alone” approach because it was dealing with an immediate need to prevent Soviet expansion and global nuclear war. Recent changes re-
quire that reassessments be made. Threats exist, and they are numerous, but they are not as urgent as before, and the U.S. does not need to deal with them by itself. The economic development of South Korea has done more to allow a reduction in the long-term U.S. presence than military policy has. The expanding South Korean economic base will permit South Korea to have guns and butter. It will also erode any basis for North Korean hopes of ideological victory. Similarly, a growing interdependent regional economy in Southeast Asia in which Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore all participate will do more for reducing the likelihood of a single government deciding to strike out in frustration (as postulated in the Indonesian Straits Denial scenario) than will the full-time presence of a TFW or CVBG.

Recommendation 2: Overhaul the CVBG deployment policy and patterns. The shrinking base of carriers requires special attention as a national problem. In crisis, carriers from both the Atlantic and the Pacific have deployed to the Indian Ocean. The CVBG (in conjunction with amphibious task groups with embarked Marines) provides a unique capability for supporting military operations in regions where no usable base infrastructure exists. The U.S. has maintained at least one deployed carrier in each of the Mediterranean Sea, Indian Ocean, and western Pacific for most of the past twenty years, but it will not be able to do so in the future without major changes in personnel policies. CINCPAC will need to coordinate planning with CINCLANT and the Joint Staff to determine how much of a CVBG presence can be supported for any future reductions below the base force (Posture B) levels. When worldwide requirements are resolved, CINCPAC can propose offsets for his AOR.

Many options need to be considered. Pinning down a CVBG to support a specific contingency may severely limit the opportunities for presence in important subregions and restrict options for combined training. New concepts using forces from other services or augmented amphibious forces must be demonstrated to be feasible and politically acceptable to regional states before they are chosen as substitutes for CVBGs.

Recommendation 3: Consider overseas home-porting of an additional CVBG. Since there are limits to how far the U.S. can stretch a decreasing pool of CVBGs, it may be necessary to consider additional forward basing of some naval units as a trade-off for lower overall force levels. Doing so would limit the U.S.'s ability to surge in crisis but might reduce the likelihood of problems due to an otherwise decreased overseas presence. Forward basing may require new concepts of multinational force operations.

Recommendation 4: Use more prepositioning. The Persian Gulf War reinforced the value of facilities that can receive reinforcing military units and the value of prepositioned equipment for Marine forces on ships. Airlifted forces can come from almost anywhere in the world if they do not have to bring all of their equipment with them. The U.S. appears to be moving toward arrangements for storage of tanks and other heavy equipment on the Arabian Peninsula. The air bases in Saudi Arabia provided an indispensable starting point for the buildup of coalition forces. The U.S. needs to examine Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia for similar facilities to which U.S. forces could rapidly deploy in support of new coalitions.

A corollary to this recommendation is to support existing prepositioned equipment and a rudimentary base infrastructure as the almost certain force reductions occur. It would probably be better to have two or three additional potential airlift hubs in South Korea or Japan than to retain a brigade that could not be effectively reinforced. These decisions require mili-
tary judgment and analysis beyond the scope of this work, but they are illustrative of the new perspective required.

**Recommendation 5: Reexamine the nuclear weapons policies.** Although recent decisions to retire some tactical nuclear weapons have removed part of the basis for antinuclear protests, nuclear weapons proliferation will become an increasingly important issue. We propose an initiative involving changes in U.S. theater nuclear force targeting, weapons basing, readiness and load-outs, disclosure policy, and perhaps attitudes toward regional "nuclearphobia" and nuclear-free zones. The recent decisions have probably bought the U.S. some breathing room, but the U.S. still needs a national policy based on CINC inputs to know where it is headed.

**Recommendation 6: Recognize that it is sometimes not of vital interest to the U.S. to become seriously engaged in a contingency that could prove to be major.** Our review of the India-Pakistan War and Chinese Civil War scenarios pointed out that the U.S. must make distinctions between concerns and vital interests and let others know it will not jump into every world problem. The U.S. is certainly interested, but it will not maintain forces or plans for every eventuality.

**Recommendation 7: Examine ready and rapidly deployable forces as a substitute for forward-deployed forces.** This research emphasizes the importance of presence for reducing the likelihood of conflict. However, care must be taken to avoid maintaining an ineffective presence. Budget reductions may mean that only CONUS-based rapid-deployment forces can be maintained. If so, the U.S. must develop concepts for using these forces to build as much of a presence as possible through innovative combined exercises and surge deployments. Rapidly deployable forces will be critically dependent on there being a network of facilities that can rapidly be expanded.
Appendix

POSTURE DEFINITIONS AND SUMMARIES

The five force postures used in this analysis represent a feasible distribution of force cuts and one way to distribute force reductions in the Pacific theater. The basic premise for Postures B, C, and D was to develop the implications of 25 percent DoD-wide manpower reductions. The analysis assumed that the change in the threat to Europe coupled with the implementation of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty would result in proportionally larger reductions to forces outside the USPACOM AOR. Additionally, it was assumed that there would be some thinning out within units, so a 15 percent reduction in major units would be representative of forces likely to be available at the end of the reductions proposed in the FY 1991 budget. Posture E represents a continuing reduction to a manpower level perhaps 50 percent below projections of the FY 1991 budget. The assumed impact of this reduction on USPACOM forces is a change of 35 percent.

Table A.1 presents the five postures and an additional one, Posture F, by geographic location. Only major combat groupings are shown. A more detailed analysis could add proportional reductions to combat support and combat service support. Groups of naval combatants outside CVBGs are not shown. Table A.2 shows the same six postures aggregated in clusters representing regional groupings (e.g., total forces west of Hawaii). The tables make liberal use of footnotes to provide additional details.

Posture F, like Posture E, assumes that the impact of 50 percent DoD manpower reductions is manifested as a 35 percent reduction in forces assigned to USPACOM. Posture F combines the forces available in Posture E with the requirement for a continued Arabian Peninsula presence. The effectiveness of Posture F forces was not analyzed in the current study, but the posture was used in a related study (Winnefeld et al., 1992) to assess regional responses to changes in U.S. Asian Pacific postures. Posture F is included here for completeness.
### Table A.1
Distribution of USPACOM Forces Outside CONUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forces by Region¹</th>
<th>Postures</th>
<th>A FY 1991 Budget Extended²</th>
<th>B -15%, Forward Basing³</th>
<th>C -15%, Mid-Pacific Basing⁴</th>
<th>D -15%, Arabian Peninsula Presence⁵</th>
<th>E -35%, Arabian Peninsula Presence⁷</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Reg./brig. equiv. (Army/USMC)</td>
<td>3/1²</td>
<td>2/1¹</td>
<td>3/1³</td>
<td>2/1⁴</td>
<td>2/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. MPA</td>
<td>2810⁶</td>
<td>2112</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1415</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>1. Land-based TFSs/aircraft</td>
<td>2/541⁶</td>
<td>2/54</td>
<td>2/54</td>
<td>1/30²</td>
<td>1/24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Reg./brig. equiv. (Army/USMC)</td>
<td>2/0¹⁷</td>
<td>2/0</td>
<td>2/0</td>
<td>1/0²</td>
<td>1/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. MPA</td>
<td>716⁶</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1. Land-based TFSs/aircraft</td>
<td>9/194²²</td>
<td>7/150²⁵</td>
<td>1/24²⁷</td>
<td>4/96²⁹</td>
<td>7/150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Reg./brig. equiv. (Army/USMC)</td>
<td>0/2²³</td>
<td>0/1²⁶</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—³⁰</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. MPA</td>
<td>724⁶</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4¹⁹</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Reg./brig. equiv. (Army/USMC)</td>
<td>2/0³²</td>
<td>2/0</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2/0</td>
<td>1/0³⁵</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. MPA</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1. Land-based TFSs/aircraft</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Reg./brig. equiv. (Army/USMC)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
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<td>—</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. MPA</td>
<td>4³⁶</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At Sea (West Pac and Indian Ocean)</td>
<td>1. CVBGs/sea-based TF aircraft</td>
<td>2/120³⁷</td>
<td>1.5/90⁴⁰</td>
<td>1.5/90⁴³</td>
<td>1.5/90⁴⁴</td>
<td>1/60⁴⁵</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. SSNs</td>
<td>7³⁸</td>
<td>5³¹</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. MEUs</td>
<td>1.5³⁹</td>
<td>1³²</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elsewhere</td>
<td>1. Land-based TFSs/aircraft</td>
<td>0/4-12⁴⁷</td>
<td>1/2⁴⁹</td>
<td>6/12⁶⁵⁰</td>
<td>8/15⁶⁵³</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Reg./brig. equiv. (Army/USMC)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0/1³⁵¹</td>
<td>1/2³⁵⁴</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. MPA</td>
<td>3³⁴⁸</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7³⁵²</td>
<td>10³⁵⁴</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1 Naval forces, except for MPA, are either "at sea" or "in CONUS." A CVBG based in Yokosuka or at sea in the Indian Ocean is considered to be at sea. A CVBG operating off the west coast of the U.S. is considered to be in CONUS.

2 Force A is the 1991 baseline force reflected in the DoD FYDP projected to 1995. It does not reflect the congressionally mandated overall force reductions for FY 91 and the out-years. The decision to remove tactical fighter aircraft from Clark AFB in 1991 is reflected for all Philippine basing options.

3 Force B is an estimated 1992 force that reflects continued force reductions resulting in a 15% DoD force level reduction. The estimated USPACOM share of that reduction is reflected in the forces shown. This force bears a close resemblance (in total numbers) to the Naval War College 1990 Global War Games forces and to those in the revised U.S. force plan (see New York Times, "Pentagon Drafts New Battle Plan," August 2, 1990) announced by President Bush on August 3, 1990. The distribution shown here is based on the New York Times article and the authors' estimates.

4 Force C is identical in size to Force B but has been relocated to bases in U.S. sovereign territory, except for the small rotational deployments indicated. This is the force that would be used to execute the "mid-Pacific" strategy.

5 Posture D is identical in size to Posture B. It assumes a successful conclusion to the Persian Gulf War. Large residual forces (below Desert Storm levels) from USPACOM and other CINC forces are required to deter further aggression in the Persian Gulf.

6 Posture E reflects a major reduction in U.S. force structure—perhaps as much as 50% of the FY 91 forces, although a 35% reduction is shown. This force posture assumes some limited foreign base access.

7 Posture F was constructed to try to meet the objectives of Posture D (strong Arabian Peninsula presence) with the further force reductions (35%) of Posture E.

8 One TFS (24 F-15s) at Hickham AFB and three Marine fighter attack squadrons at Kaneohe (24 F/A-18s, 20 AV-8s and 10 A-6s). These Marine air units with those in Okinawa compose the 3rd Marine Air Wing.

9 An Army infantry division (light) and a MEB, both with supporting elements.

10 Four MPA squadrons at NAS Barbers Point between overseas deployments.

11 Two Army brigades from an infantry division (light) and the ground component of a MEB, all with supporting elements. The round-out brigade for the Army division would be obtained from the Guard/Reserve.

12 Three MPA squadrons at NAS Barbers Point in training between overseas deployments.

13 An Army infantry division (light) and a Marine ground part of a MEB.

14 The 1st MEB has moved to the Persian Gulf.

15 One MPA squadron has moved to Masira, Oman.

16 Two TFSs (+) with F-15s at Anchorage, Fairbanks, and satellite fields.

17 Two brigades of an Army infantry division (light) with supporting elements at Fairbanks and Greeley.

18 One MPA squadron at Adak.

19 A deployment of 4 MPAs to Adak from CONUS.

20 One TFS has deployed to the Persian Gulf. Note: It probably would not be this particular TFS, but as a result of a cascading set of related changes, Alaska would be down one TFS and the Persian Gulf would be up one.

21 While the division headquarters remains in Alaska, it contains only one brigade/regiment with one round-out regiment in the National Guard. The remaining brigade is in CONUS serving as a rotation base for forces deployed to the Persian Gulf.

22 One USAF TFW at Misawa (48 F-16s) and one at Kadena (72 F-15s); four Marine fighter attack squadrons (24 F-18s, 40 AV-8s, and 10 A-6s) at Iwakuni and Okinawa.

23 A MEF (-) with air support in Okinawa.
24 Deployed from NAS Barbers Point.

25 Two reduced-strength TFWs, one at Misawa (48 F-16s) and one at Kadena (48 F-15s). Three Marine fighter attack squadrons (24 F-18s, 20 AV-8s, 10 A-6s) at Kadena (Iwakuni returned to Japanese).

26 One MEB with supporting air units on Okinawa.

27 All permanently based U.S. forces have been removed from Japan. One rotational USAF TFS remains in Japan and operates with the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force.

28 One U.S. MPA squadron is split between Alaska and Japan. A four-plane detachment is at Misawa.

29 All Marine air units would be deployed to the Persian Gulf. Two understrength TFWs remain (48 F-15s and 48 F-16s).

30 The Okinawa MEB would be deployed to the Persian Gulf.

31 One TFW (72 F-16s) at Kunsan.

32 The 2nd Infantry Division is uniquely configured for its role in Korea. It includes two brigades and a special force configured for Panmunjom security.

33 All permanently based U.S. forces have been removed from Korea. One rotational USAF TFS remains in Korea and operates with South Korean forces.

34 A reduced-strength TFW (48 F-16s) would remain in Korea.

35 A U.S. Army brigade plus supporting elements would remain in Korea along with some prepositioned equipment for an additional brigade.

36 Most of MPA squadron at Cubi; the remainder on temporary deployment in the region.

37 Two CVBGs plus escorts and underway replenishment ships. One of these groups is home-ported at various bases in the western Pacific (Yokosuka, Sasebo, Guam); the other rotates from the west coast of the U.S. Each air wing is assumed to be a “Theodore Roosevelt” air wing: 20 F-14s, 20 F-18s, and 20 A-6s plus supporting aircraft. There is one CVBG in the Indian Ocean 50% of the time, and there is one in Southeast Asian waters 50% of the time.

38 These SSNs (nuclear-powered attack submarines) are on rotational deployment from bases in CONUS and Hawaii. At least one is normally with each CVBG.

39 One MEU is on deployment from the 1st MEF based in CONUS; the other is from the 3rd MEF based in Japan. Each has its own amphibious shipping.

40 Transit times coupled with peacetime constraints on deployment time and time away from home-port result in the ability to sustain a carrier in the Indian Ocean for only 50% of a normal year from a total U.S. force of 12 aircraft carriers/nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVs/CVNss).

41 Five SSNs would be deployed forward in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean from bases in Hawaii and CONUS.

42 One MEU would be deployed to the western Pacific from the MEF in CONUS.

43 The CVBG formerly home-ported in Japan and other western Pacific states is now home-ported in Guam. Ship repair is done in Japanese or Singapore yards.

44 Transit times coupled with peacetime constraints on deployment time and time away from home-port result in the ability to sustain a carrier in the Indian Ocean for only 50% of a normal year from a total U.S. force of 12 CVs/CVNss.

45 One to two CVBGs would be deployed forward in USPACOM full time. One carrier is home-ported in Japan. When it is in its home-port, a CONUS-based carrier is deployed to cover gaps. Each CVBG would have a “Theodore Roosevelt” air wing of 60 fighter or attack aircraft.

46 Although the posture emphasizes a Southwest Asia presence, the five carriers assigned to USPACOM can provide only a 50% presence in the Indian Ocean and a 50% presence in the western Pacific.
A rotating detachment of F-16s (4 to 12 aircraft) at Singapore or a Thai airfield.

A rotating detachment of three MPAs at Singapore, U Tapao.

A rotating squadron at various airfields in Southeast Asia. The squadron would probably be F-16s to take advantage of widespread compatible support throughout the region.

A USAF TFW (72 F-15s) is based at Anderson AFB. A Marine air group composed of three fighter attack squadrons (24 F/A-18s, 20 AV-8s, 10 A-6s) is based at NAS Agana.

A Marine infantry regiment including supporting elements has been relocated from Okinawa to Saipan.

A rotational MPA squadron operates out of NAS Agana and occasionally sends a detachment to the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.

Two USAF TFSs and 5 Fleet Marine Force (FMF) squadrons normally assigned to CINCPAC are under USCENTCOM operational control (OPCON) in the Persian Gulf. Additionally, aircraft normally assigned to I MEF under CINCPAC OPCON and USAF TFSs in CONUS are assigned to USCENTCOM.

FMF Pacific supports the MEF remaining in the Persian Gulf; two MEBs remain in CONUS.

One MPA squadron is at Masirah, Oman, and a three-aircraft detachment operates from Bahrain.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forces¹</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forces ¹</td>
<td>FY 1991 Budget Extended²</td>
<td>-15%, Forward Basing³</td>
<td>-15%, Mid-Pacific Basing⁴</td>
<td>-15%, Arabian Peninsula Presence⁵</td>
<td>-35%, Arabian Peninsula Presence⁶</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Forces West of Hawaii/Alaska⁸</td>
<td>12/266</td>
<td>10/222</td>
<td>8/174</td>
<td>14/300</td>
<td>9/198</td>
<td>13/276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Land-based TFSs/aircraft</td>
<td>2/2</td>
<td>2/1</td>
<td>0/1</td>
<td>3/2</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>2/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Reg./brig. equiv. (Army/USMC)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. MPA</td>
<td>2/120</td>
<td>1.5/90</td>
<td>1.5/90</td>
<td>1.5/90</td>
<td>1/60</td>
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<td>4. CVBGs/sea-based TF aircraft</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. SSNs</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Forces Outside CONUS (Lower 48)⁹</td>
<td>18/3/8</td>
<td>15/3/30</td>
<td>13/2/82</td>
<td>15/3/30</td>
<td>14/3/00</td>
<td>14/3/00</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Land-based TFSs/aircraft</td>
<td>7/3</td>
<td>6/2</td>
<td>5/2</td>
<td>6/2</td>
<td>4/2</td>
<td>4/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Reg./brig. equiv. (Army/USMC)</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. MPA</td>
<td>2/120</td>
<td>1.5/90</td>
<td>1.5/90</td>
<td>1.5/90</td>
<td>1/60</td>
<td>1/60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. CVBGs/sea-based TF aircraft</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>5. SSNs</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Forces Available to USPACOM in CONUS¹⁰</td>
<td>14/2/96</td>
<td>11/2/32</td>
<td>13/2/80</td>
<td>11/2/32</td>
<td>7/1/50</td>
<td>7/1/50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Land-based TFSs/aircraft</td>
<td>6/3</td>
<td>6/2</td>
<td>7/2</td>
<td>6/2</td>
<td>5/2</td>
<td>5/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Reg./brig. equiv. (Army/USMC)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. CVBG/sea-based TF aircraft</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. SSNs</td>
<td>32/6394</td>
<td>26/562</td>
<td>26/562</td>
<td>26/562</td>
<td>21/450</td>
<td>21/450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. MEUs afloat</td>
<td>13/6</td>
<td>12/4</td>
<td>12/4</td>
<td>12/4</td>
<td>9/4</td>
<td>9/4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grand Total All USPACOM and Earmarked Forces¹¹</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Reg./brig. equiv. (Army/USMC)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
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<td>3. MPA</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Naval forces, except for MPA, are either "at sea" or "in CONUS." A CVBG based in Yokosuka or at sea in the Indian Ocean is considered to be at sea. A CVBG operating off the west coast of the U.S. is considered to be in CONUS.

Force A is the 1991 baseline force reflected in the DoD FYDP projected to 1995. It does not reflect the congressionally mandated overall force reductions for FY 91 and the out-years. The decision to remove tactical fighter aircraft from Clark AFB in 1991 is reflected for all Philippine basing options.

Force B is an estimated 1992 force that reflects continued force reductions resulting in a 15% DoD force level reduction. The estimated USPACOM share of that reduction is reflected in the forces shown. This force bears a close resemblance (in total numbers) to the Naval War College 1990 Global War Games forces and to those in the revised U.S. force plan (see New York Times, "PentagonDrafts New Battle Plan," August 2, 1990) announced by President Bush on August 3, 1990. The distribution shown here is based on the New York Times article and the authors' estimates.

Force C is identical in size to Force B but has been relocated to bases in U.S. sovereign territory, except for the small rotational deployments indicated. This is the force that would be used to execute the "mid-Pacific" strategy.

Posture D is identical in size to Posture B. It assumes a successful conclusion to the Persian Gulf War. Large residual forces (below Desert Storm levels) from USPACOM and other CINC forces are required to deter further aggression in the Persian Gulf.

Posture E reflects a major reduction in U.S. force structure—perhaps as much as 50% of the FY 91 forces, although a 35% reduction is shown. This force posture assumes some limited foreign base access.

Posture F was constructed to try to meet the objectives of Posture D (strong Arabian Peninsula presence) with the further force reductions (35%) of Posture E.

These totals are for those forces in the western Pacific and Indian Ocean.

These totals are for all forces deployed outside the lower 48 states.

These totals are representative of the totals for U.S. forces under USPACOM OPCON in CONUS or earmarked for USPACOM for planning for a future contingency.

These grand totals include all CINCPAC assigned and earmarked forces.
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