THE INVASION OF
THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES

(16th Army)

PREPARED BY
HEADQUARTERS, USAFFE
AND EIGHTH U.S. ARMY (REAR)

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OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
**The Invasion Of The Netherlands East Indies**

**Abstract**

JFSC - WW II Declassified Records.
This monograph is one of a series prepared under instructions from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to the Japanese Government (SCAPIN No. 126, 12 Oct 1945). The series covers not only the operations of the Japanese armed forces during World War II but also their operations in China and Manchuria which preceded the world conflict. The original studies were written by former officers of the Japanese Army and Navy under the supervision of the Historical Records Section of the First (Army) and Second (Navy) Demobilization Bureaus of the Japanese Government. The manuscripts were translated by the Military Intelligence Service Group, G2, Headquarters, Far East Command. Extensive editing was accomplished by the Foreign Histories Division of the Office of the Military History Officer, Headquarters, United States Army Japan.

The writers were handicapped in the preparation of the basic manuscript by the non-availability of many operational records which are normally employed as source material in this type of study. Many official orders, plans and unit journals were lost during operations or were destroyed at the cessation of hostilities. A particular handicap has been the lack of strength reports.

Monograph No. 66 deals with the Java Operation beginning with a brief account of the operations just prior to the invasion and the favorable disposition of the Japanese forces. It then tells of the short successful campaign and the capitulation of the Allied forces.
The basic document used was written by Col. Akimitsu Oda, a former staff officer of the 16th Army, from memory and from his own personal record of the operations. Later, it was read and confirmed by Maj. Gen. Takashima and Lt. Col. Yamashita, both former staff officers of the 16th Army. Subsequent research by the Foreign Histories Division revealed a number of inaccuracies and omissions. For instance, no details of the landings or vital statistics in regard to strengths were given. These have since been obtained by the Foreign Histories Division from Col. Hatsuki of the Military History Section of the Japanese Self-Defense Force, who is making a special study of the Java area, and from Lt. Col. Yamashita, now a civilian living in Tokyo. The monograph has been completely rewritten to effect the necessary corrections and insert essential information.

The History Section, Army War College, Japanese Self-Defense Force, has proved most helpful by placing its documents and personnel at the disposal of the Foreign Histories Division.

The editor has received valuable assistance in research and in the preparation of maps and charts from Tadao Shudo, formerly a lieutenant colonel on the staff of the Army General Staff, 4th Air Army and Air Army General Staff.

All maps submitted with this monograph were drawn by the Foreign Histories Division and the spelling of place names in the text and on the maps is that used by AMS 5301.

Tokyo, Japan
10 April 1958
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CHAPTER 1
Preparations for the Invasion of Java

On 6 November 1941, Imperial General Headquarters issued orders mobilizing the Southern Army General Headquarters in preparation for operations in the southern area should the United States and Japan fail to reach agreement in their current negotiations in Washington.1

On the same day, Southern Army's order of battle was issued to include the 16th Army, composed of the 2d Division and the Sakaguchi Detachment (56th Mixed Infantry Brigade). In early January, after the capture of Hong Kong and Manila, the 38th and 48th Divisions were transferred to the command of the 16th Army and the Army was ordered to prepare to invade Java. An outline of the order of battle of the 16th Army was as follows:

16th Army Headquarters - Lt. Gen. Hitoshi Imamura, Commander
2d Division - Lt. Gen. Masao Maruyama, Commander
38th Division - Lt. Gen. Tadayoshi Sano, Commander
48th Division - Lt. Gen. Yuitsu Tsuchihashi, Commander
Sakaguchi Detachment (nucleus 3 Infantry Battalions, and 1 Field Artillery Battalion)
2d and 5th Antitank Gun Battalions
2d and 4th Tank Regiments

1. Japanese Monograph No. 147, Political Strategy Prior to Outbreak of War, Part III.
18th Field AAA Headquarters
16th AA Artillery Regiment
44th, 45th and 48th AA Artillery Battalions
3d Independent Engineer Regiment
138th and 168th Railway Transport Headquarters
40th and 45th Anchorage Headquarters
16th Army Signal Unit
5th Telegraph Regiment
48th Lines of Communication Headquarters
28th Motor Transport Regiment
39th Motor Transport Battalion

Just prior to the invasion the 16th Army published its plan of operations as follows:

The Sakaguchi Detachment will invade Davao in the southern Philippines and strategic points in eastern Borneo. It will occupy all airfields and confiscate all petroleum products.

The 38th Division will organize the Ito Detachment. This Detachment will invade and occupy Amboina.

The main body of the 38th Division will invade southern Sumatra. It will occupy Palembang and other oil fields. In addition, it will occupy the airfields in southern Sumatra in preparation for the invasion of Java.

The Army's main force (2d Division, Shoji Detachment and units under the direct command of the 16th Army) will move from Takao to Camranh Bay. The 48th Division will move from Lingayen to Jolo Island.
Immediately all troops are in position for the attack on Java the 16th Army's main force and the 48th Division, coordinating their movements, will sail toward and invade Java from the east and west.

Operations Prior to Invasion of Java

On 19 November 1941, the Sakaguchi Detachment (composed of the 124th Infantry Regiment and one field artillery battalion and commanded by Maj. Gen. Shizuo Sakaguchi, commander of the 56th Mixed Infantry Brigade) left Moji, Japan. On the 28th, it was joined at Palau by the Miura Detachment of the 14th Army, which then came under the tactical command of General Sakaguchi. On 17 December, the two detachments left Palau and, on the 20th, captured Davao on Mindanao. At this time, the Miura Detachment was returned to the command of the 14th Army and the Sakaguchi Detachment advanced to Jolo Island, which it occupied on the 25th. On 11 January 1942, after overcoming slight resistance, the Sakaguchi Detachment captured Tarakan Island and, on the 24th, occupied Balikpapan, Samarinda and Tenggarong. The Detachment then split in two with the main body marching overland while the smaller unit proceeded by sea. On 10 February, coordinating their movements, they attacked and captured Bandjermasin and secured the airfield.

16TH ARMY OPERATIONS PRIOR TO INVASION OF JAVA
19 NOV 1941 - 1 MAR 1942

MAP NO. 1

1. JAPANESE ARMY
   - KANE. D. KANEMURA DET
   - KAN. D. KANEKI DET
   - SH. D. SHOJI DET
   - SA. D. SAKAGUCHI DET
   - TA. D. TANAKA DET
   - TO. D. TOHO (ITO) DET
   - KU. D. KUME DET

2. KILOMETERS

3. CHINA
   - CANTON
   - HAINAN

4. INDO-CHINA
   - FRENCH INDO-CHINA
   - THAILAND

5. PHILIPPINES
   - LUSON
   - MINDANAO

6. JAVA
   - BATAVIA
   - BALI

7. BORNEO
   - SAMARINDA

8. AUSTRALIA
   - MALAYA
   - SUMATRA

9. TIMOR

10. KOREA

11. KYUSHU

12. SHANGHAI

13. FORMOSA

14. PALAU

15. MALAYSIA

16. GUINEA NEW
On 4 January 1942, the 38th Division, which had previously been engaged in the Hong Kong Operation, was placed under the command of the 16th Army and its Ito Detachment (composed of the 228th Infantry Regiment and 1 mountain artillery battalion, commanded by Maj. Gen. Takeo Ito, commander of the 38th Infantry Group) was ordered to seize Amboina. On 12 January, the Detachment left Hong Kong and sailed toward Davao, arriving there on the 18th. On the 28th, it left Davao and, on the 31st, invaded Amboina. By 7 February, the entire island was occupied. On 17 February, the main force of the Toho Detachment (Ito Detachment renamed) left Amboina while the remaining units left on the 18th. On the 20th, the main force landed at Koepang and the other units at Dili. During this movement the Detachment was protected by the 2d Destroyer Squadron.

In the meantime, during the latter part of January, the 38th Division (minus the Ito and Shoji Detachments) assembled at Camranh Bay, French Indo-China. On 15 February, covered by the 3d Destroyer Squadron, it landed on Bangka Island and occupied Muntok airfield. It then crossed to the coast of Sumatra and, travelling up the Musi River, on the 16th, in cooperation with the 1st Airborne Unit, it attacked and occupied Palembang. The capture of Palembang was regarded as an important victory as the oil refineries were taken in perfect condition.

The Advance Unit (known as the Tanaka Detachment, composed of
one infantry battalion of the 229th Infantry Regiment and the 38th Engineer Regiment and commanded by Col. Ryozaburo Tanaka, commander of the 229th Infantry Regiment) occupied Tandjoengkarang on 20 February. It then repaired and equipped the airfield in preparation for use in the invasion of Java. In addition, an oil drilling unit began drilling for oil.

The Kanki Detachment (3d Battalion of the 230th Infantry Regiment and one mountain artillery battalion, commanded by Col. Bukichi Kanki, commander of the 38th Mountain Artillery Regiment) occupied Bendoele on 24 February. The Orita Battalion (1st Battalion of the 229th Infantry Regiment commanded by Maj. Masaru Orita) which had been transferred from Bangka, attacked Djanbi, and, after overcoming some enemy resistance, occupied the town on 4 March.

Invasion of Bali

Situation Prior to the Invasion

The only enemy force on Bali was one battalion of native troops (approximately 600 men) commanded by the Army District commander with his headquarters at Soerabaja. One infantry company with armoured cars guarded the Denpasar airfield while the main force of the battalion was stationed at Singaradja. It was believed that four fortress guns guarded the Lombok Straits.

As the Sakaguchi Detachment at Bandjermasim was unable to obtain assistance from the Navy to transport its troops for the attack on Bali, the Kanemura Detachment (composed of the 3d Battalion, minus
one company, of the 1st Formosa Infantry Regiment, one mountain artillery platoon, elements of the radio and field hospital units, one engineer platoon and part of the Anchorage Headquarters) of the 48th Division was ordered to leave Lingayen Gulf and assemble at Makassar in the southern Celebes, where it was to prepare to attack Bali.

**Terrain on Bali**

As the northern and eastern coasts of the island were protected against landings by high jagged cliffs; the western coast by a strait too narrow for ships to pass through, and the southern coast by coral reefs, the Detachment planned to land on a small sandy beach on the eastern shore near Denpasar. The maximum speed of the currents in the Bali and Lombok Straits was approximately 5 knots. The Detachment would have to land near a belt of coconut groves and paddies. However, the roads, which on maps had looked mere trails, on closer inspection proved to be fairly good vehicular roads. The houses in the area were enclosed by high walls.

**Invasion**

While in Manila, the Kanemura Detachment had received orders from the 48th Division commander to land to the east of Denpasar and to occupy the airfield located approximately 10 km southwest of Denpasar.

An outline of the orders was:

- On 5 February the Detachment will leave Lingayen Gulf and, on the 8th, it will assemble at Jolo.
At Jolo the Detachment will load the materials necessary for the Navy Air Unit on ships. Agreement will be reached with the Navy Air Unit in order to coordinate actions in regard to the invasion of Bali. The Detachment will leave Jolo on 13 February and arrive at Makassar on the 15th. On the night of 18-19 February, the Detachment will land on the east coast of Bali in the vicinity of Denpasar.

A transport ship will leave port on the night of 19 February and, upon arrival in the Makassar Strait, men and materiel of the 28th Independent Engineer Regiment will be transferred to the main convoy and, at that time, will return to the command of the 28th Engineer Regiment.

The Kanemura Detachment arrived at Makassar aboard the Sasago Maru and the Sagami Maru on 14 February but, due to the presence of the enemy fleet in the Java Sea, its departure from this area was postponed until the 18th. During this time, the Army and Navy commanders held conferences in order to coordinate the landing operations while the troops underwent a course in amphibious landings.

The Detachment, escorted by the 6th Destroyer Division (four destroyers) made a surprise landing on the east coast of Bali near Denpasar at dawn on 19 February. Heavy rain had begun to fall at 0400. Taking advantage of the heavy rain and darkness, the Detachment overran the enemy's barracks and, after quelling slight enemy resistance, by the following afternoon had completely occupied the airfield. During this time, the Sasago Maru and the Sagami Maru were attacked by enemy planes and submarines. The boilers of the Sagami Maru were damaged by bombs and the Sasago Maru incurred slight damage but landing operations were continued without interruption.
Singaradja was occupied on 27 February.

**Disposition of 16th Army's Main Force for Invasion of Java**

While these small operations were taking place, the 16th Army's operational preparations for the invasion of Java were making excellent progress. The 48th Division had been placed under the command of the 16th Army on 14 January and, in early February, assembled at Jolo. Simultaneously, the 2d Division and units under the direct command of the Army assembled at Camranh Bay. One battalion of the Sakaguchi Detachment (known as the Kume Detachment) was placed under the direct command of the Army and ordered to garrison Bandjermasin while the main body of the Sakaguchi Detachment prepared for the invasion of Java.

**Enemy Pre-Invasion Situation**

The mixed and insubstantial Allied forces that remained in and about Java prior to the Japanese invasion were under the command of Dutch officers. Japanese intelligence estimated enemy strength in the Dutch East Indies to be in the vicinity of 85,000 men, with a large proportion of this force being natives who were considered very poor fighters.3

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3. For details of estimated strength see Japanese Monograph No. 24, History of the Southern Army, 1941-1945, Table 4.

Lionel Wigmore in *Australia in the War of 1939 - 1945*, Series One, Army, Volume IV, "The Japanese Thrust," Chapter 22, states that Allied strength in and around Java at that time was three British cruisers, two Australian, two Dutch and one American; five British destroyers, four American and two Dutch; and some Dutch submarines and smaller craft. The defending aircraft included some 18
Operational Preparations for the Invasion

On 16 January 1942, Lt. Gen. Imamura left his command post at Saigon and returned to Takao, arriving there on the 18th. Based on orders received from the Southern Army he began to speed up preparations for the invasion of Java but, due to shipping shortages, found it necessary to make many adjustments in his plans. On the 20th, he received orders from the Southern Army to attack Java. These orders read:

The Southern Army, in cooperation with the Navy, will invade Java immediately.

The 16th Army will invade Java in the following manner:

Taking advantage of our air attack the main force of the 16th Army will land on western Java. Simultaneously, a unit will land on the east coast. During this operation attacks may be expected from enemy aircraft and ships.

Batavia, Soerabaja and Bandoeng will be occupied as quickly as possible.

An air base will be established on Java as quickly as possible.

During this operation the commanders of the General Shipping Transport Headquarters and the 3d Air Group will cooperate with the 16th Army.

On 21 January, General Imamura arrived at Manila to inspect the 48th Division and to discuss the invasion of Java with the commander.

3. (Cont'd)

British fighters and 20 twin-engined aircraft fit for operations; a few American fighters; and ten Dutch squadrons, all much depleted. The Dutch Army totalled some 25,000 troops but, as the Australians had observed early in February, they seemed unlikely to be capable of very effective resistance. The only effective mobile striking units were two Australian battalions (2/3 Machine Gun and 2/2 Pioneers) under the command of Brigadier Blackburn, a squadron of British tanks of the 3d Hussars and a battalion of the 131st American Field Artillery Regiment.
of the 3d Fleet. Heavy rains had delayed the establishment of Navy air bases in Borneo and the Celebes. Therefore, on the 23d, General Isamura and the Fleet commander, with the concurrence of the Southern Army, decided to postpone the invasion operation for two weeks.

On 24 January, the 16th Army commander issued the following order to the 48th Division:

Prior to leaving the Philippines, the 48th Division commander will issue orders for preparations for the Java Operation to those units which will be attached to the Division upon leaving the Philippines and units arriving in the Philippines to be attached to the Division.

The Division will embark at Lingayen between 1 and 7 February and depart for Jolo on the 8th.

A unit of the 48th Division, composed of one infantry battalion and one mountain artillery platoon, will occupy Bali airfield. In cooperation with the Navy Airfield Construction Unit, it will repair and equip the airfield as quickly as possible. This operation will commence two days before "L" day. ("L" Day signifies the day the 48th Division will land on Java.)

"L" Day is tentatively 23 February. A definite date will be announced later. Should "L" Day be delayed, the 48th Division will leave Lingayen on schedule and will await orders at Jolo.

At dawn on "L" Day, the Division will land to the north and south of Kragan. Part of the Division will occupy the ford of the Solo River and will capture the oil refineries at Tjepoe. At the same time, the main force of the Army will land on western Java.

The Division will occupy Soerabaja. One strong unit of the Division will raid Tjilatjap and cut the enemy's retreat route to the sea. After the initial invasion, a landing base will be established at Soerabaja.

After occupying Soerabaja, the 48th Division, in cooperation with the 16th Army's main force, will occupy eastern Java.
Airfields will be captured as quickly as possible and every effort will be made to prevent the enemy destroying the oilfields and installations.

While on Formosa the 16th Army commander held conferences with the commanders of the 3d Air Group, 3d Fleet and 11th Air Fleet on the coordination of landings when the following landing schedule and operational outline for each unit was agreed upon:

The 16th Army's main force, in cooperation with the Navy, will land on western Java at dawn on "H" Day. ("H" Day signifies the landing day of the Army's main force.) At the same time, other units will land on the east coast.

Reconnaissance at landing points: Army planes will reconnoiter the landing point of the Army's main force; Navy planes will reconnoiter the landing point of the 48th Division.

Air strength to be used: Army - 180 planes; Navy - 240 planes.

Convoy escort: One day before "H" Day Navy planes will escort the convoy of the Army's main force. After "H" Day Army planes will escort the convoy.

Navy planes will escort the convoy of the 48th Division throughout the entire operation.

Although, due to shortage of shipping and the necessity to alter schedules, the Army's main force did not assemble as early as at first planned, by the end of January most units had assembled on Formosa. On 25 January, the 16th Army commander ordered the assembly point advanced from Formosa to Camranh Bay and, on the 30th, issued the following order to attack Java:
The first convoy (nucleus: 2d Division, minus one field artillery battalion and the Shoji Detachment) will, in cooperation with the 5th Destroyer Squadron, leave Camranh Bay six days before "H" Day. At dawn on "H" Day ("H" Day will be announced at a later date) it will land on the west coast of Java and attack Batavia and Bandoeng successively. At the same time, the 48th Division will land on the east coast of Java and occupy Soerabaja.

The 3d Air Group and air units under the command of the 1st Southern Expeditionary Fleet will cooperate with the Army's main force in this operation.

The main body of the 1st Southern Expeditionary Fleet will act as escort for the Army's main force.

The 2d Division will occupy Batavia as soon as possible after the operation opens.

At dawn on "H" Day the 2d Division will land at Merak and Banten and advance toward the Tjioedjoeng River. Part of the 2d Division will advance to Buitenzorg to cut the enemy's line of retreat and source of reinforcements and to gain a base for a projected attack on Bandoeng. The main body of the Division will advance along the Serang-Tangerang-Batavia highway and capture Batavia and the area to the south.

The 2d Division will assist the air units as much as possible in transporting fuel and ammunition and repairing airfields.

The Shoji Detachment will land at Patrol at dawn on "H" Day. It will occupy Kalidjati airfield, and will cut the line of retreat and route of reinforcements to the enemy in the Bandoeng-Batavia area at the crossing point of the Tjiroem River.

Depending on the situation, part of the Shoji Detachment may participate in the invasion of Batavia.
The Shoji Detachment will assist as much as possible in repairing airfields and will supply and guard the Air Maintenance Unit.

By this time, the Sakaguchi Detachment had already occupied Balikpapan and the Toho Detachment had landed on Amboina.

Operational Preparations of the Army's Main Force (2nd Division and Shoji Detachment)

The 2d Division, under the command of Lt. Gen. Masao Maruyama, was mobilized in mid-November 1941 at Sendai, Japan, and in early December, was transferred to Narashino and Shimoshizu in Chiba Prefecture. On 3 January 1942, a unit, comprising 448 men, 1,700 horses and some materiel, was formed to remain in Japan as a replacement unit for the Division, while between 15 and 23 January its main strength left Ujina for Takao, arriving there between 21 and 26 January. A further unit, (197 men and 178 horses of the 16th Infantry Regiment and the 3d Battalion of the 2d Field Artillery Regiment) was ordered to follow in the second convoy to Takao.

On 27 January, an agreement was reached between Lt. Gen. Maruyama and Admiral Kenzaburo Hara, commander of the 5th Destroyer Squadron, in regard to the landing schedule and operation plans for Java, as follows:

Landing Schedule:

At 0200 on "H" Day, the main strength of the 2d Division will land on Banten Bay. The remaining units will land to the north and south of Merak and advance to the right bank of the Tjiodjoeng River without waiting for the landing operations to be completed.
Operation Plan:

The 2d Division will land on the northwest coast of western Java and attack Batavia. After occupying Batavia the main body of the 2d Division will invade Bandoeng. Operations from this point will depend largely on circumstances but the principal mission will remain the occupying of the western part of Java as quickly as possible.

In accordance with this landing schedule and plan, on 31 January, the Division commander issued orders to combat load the transports at Takao, Formosa.

The Shoji Detachment, under the command of the 38th Division, on 5 January 1942, began its operational preparations at Kowloon. The Detachment, commanded by Col. Toshinari Shoji, was composed of the 230th Infantry Regiment (minus the 3d Battalion), one mountain artillery battalion (minus one battery), one engineer company (minus two platoons) one antitank gun battalion (minus two batteries) one light tank company, one AAA battery, two independent engineer companies (minus three platoons) one platoon of a bridge material company, one motor transport company, part of the 40th Anchorage Headquarters and part of the Airfield Battalion.

On 19 January, this Detachment was placed under the direct command of the 16th Army. It left Hong Kong on the 29th and assembled at Takao on the 31st.

The Detachment moved to Camranh Bay in early February, when, assuming that there would be no enemy resistance at its landing
point, its troops were organized for the occupation of Kalidjati Airfield rather than for combat during its landing operations.

The aerial support that could be expected from the Army air base in Sumatra or the Navy air base in Borneo was considered inadequate for operations in central Java, due to the distance the planes would be required to fly. Consequently, the occupation of the Kalidjati airfield by the Shoji Detachment was considered vitally necessary to the quick and smooth execution of the Java Operation.

Col. Shoji had left Hong Kong ahead of his Detachment and arrived at Takao on the 25th. On the 27th, having conferred with the 2d Division commander and the Navy, he published his plan for landing operations during the Java Operation as follows:

At zero hour on "H" Day, the Detachment will proceed to the appointed place of anchorage near Brotan-wetan 10 km east of Patrol. Debarkation will commence at 0130. Immediately after debarking, the Detachment will occupy and finally secure the Kalijati airfield with its main force while part of the Detachment will command the crossing point of the Tjitaroem River. This will result in the isolation of enemy positions in the Bandeng and Batavia areas as well as the severing of their route of retreat and the interception of their reinforcements.

Units were assigned as follows:

Wakamatsu Unit Maj. Mitsunori Wakamatsu (2d Battalion commander)

2d Battalion (minus 8th Company)
Main heavy weapons of the Infantry Regiment

Main strength of the 1st Antitank Gun Battalion (minus two companies)

One light tank company

One engineer platoon

Egashira Unit Maj. Masaru Egashira (1st Battalion commander) commander

1st Battalion (minus 4th Company)

Some heavy weapons of the Infantry Regiment

One engineer platoon

Guard Unit Lt. Col. Ono (1st Antitank Gun Battalion commander) commander

4th Company, 1st Battalion

Motor Transport Unit

Reserve Unit

8th Company, 2d Battalion

Missions of Main Units:

The Wakamatsu Unit will advance as quickly as possible after the landing and occupy and secure the Kalijati airfield.

The Egashira Unit will follow the Wakamatsu Unit. It will secure the crossing points of the Tjitaroeu River, isolate the enemy positions in the Bandoeng and Batavia areas, sever the enemy route of retreat, and intercept the enemy's reinforcements.

Scheduled Time of Landing:

After entering the appointed anchorage at zero hour on "H" Day, the first unit will debark at 0130.
Reassignment and Operational Preparations of the 48th Division

The 48th Division with two antitank gun companies, two tank companies, one medium artillery battery, four AAA batteries, one independent engineer regiment, one railway company, one wire communications company, three radio platoons, one river crossing material company, one bridge material company, a lines of communication unit and the 45th Anchorage Headquarters attached, under the direct command of the 14th Army, participated in the invasion of the Philippines, and, on 2 January, in the capture of Manila. The Division then attacked Bataan. On 8 January, the 65th Brigade relieved the 48th Division and the Division returned to Manila. It was then placed under the command of the 16th Army and was motorized in preparation for the Java Operation. The plan for the Division's participation in the Java Operation was as follows:

The 48th Division will land on the east coast of Java and advance to Tjapoe, Soerabaja and Malang when, in cooperation with the Army's main force, it will capture all strategic points and areas rich in natural resources.

On 4 January, agreement was reached between the Division commander and the commander of the 4th Destroyer Squadron in regard to the transportation of the troops. On the 26th, the Division moved from Manila to the Lingayen Gulf area. Both at Manila and after arrival at Lingayen Gulf, units were attached to the Division. The troops embarked between 30 January and 7 February. Prior to this, by order
of the 16th Army, the Kanemura Detachment had been organized for the occupation of the airfield at Bali. The Detachment left Lingayen on 5 February and reached Jolo on the 8th.

Operational Preparations at Advanced Assembly Areas

As soon as operational preparations were completed on Formosa, the 16th Army commander advanced the units in the first convoy to Camranh Bay and Jolo Island.

On 4 February, the commander arrived at Camranh Bay by air and left for Saigon the same day. There he conferred with the commanders of the Southern Army, the Escort Fleet and the 3d Air Group in preparation for the Java Operation.

Because of the Sakaguchi Detachment's success in the Bandjermaspin Operation, it was decided that the Detachment would participate in the attack on eastern Java. Accordingly, on 10 February, the 16th Army commander published the following order:

At dawn on "H" Day, the 48th Division will land in the vicinity of Kragan.

The Sakaguchi Detachment will land in the vicinity of Kragan and will advance to the area west of a line connecting Mt. Lasem (approximately 20 km east of Rembang) and Mt. Lawoe (approximately 40 km east of Soerakarta) to Tjilat-jap in order to cut the enemy's line of retreat.

The Sakaguchi Detachment Headquarters with approximately one infantry battalion will depart from Balikpapan under naval escort and land at dawn on "H" Day in the vicinity of Kragan. The unit will be joined by the convoy of the 48th Division off the coast of Balikpapan.
Transport ships, escorted by the Navy, will arrive at Bandjermasin at the earliest possible date. There they will pick up a unit of approximately one and one-half infantry battalions and transport them to Kragan.

After successfully occupying Kragan, all units will advance to Tjilatjap and occupy the surrounding area.

The commander of the 48th Division will revise the agreement with the 4th Destroyer Squadron so as to include transportation of the Sakaguchi Detachment. The Division commander will hereafter command the Sakaguchi Detachment during convoy and landing operations.

The Division commander may order Maj. Gen. Sakaguchi to discuss sailing movements from Balikpapan to the landing point and the operational movement of his unit at Bandjermasin with the escort commander.

Because of insufficient air cover the Navy requested that the date of invasion be delayed. The Army acceded to this request but, on 10 February, the Southern Army commander announced the date of invasion as 26 February. Accordingly, the 16th Army commander issued orders to the 48th Division and the Army's main force to prepare to invade on that day.

On 17 February, the 16th Army commander returned to Camranh Bay from Saigon and, on the same day, boarded the Ryujo Maru.

In the meantime, in accordance with 16th Army orders, the Army's main force (composed of the 2d Division, Shoji Detachment and units under the direct command of the Army) under the command of the 2d Division commander, had left Tako between 1 and 6 February and,
escorted by the 5th Destroyer Squadron, had arrived at Camranh Bay between 6 and 10 February. Upon arrival there this force underwent further training in amphibious operations and repaired and replenished its equipment and supplies.

On 8 February, the 48th Division left Lingayen Gulf escorted by the 4th Destroyer Squadron. It arrived at Jolo Island on the 12th. There the Division conducted Army-Navy coordinated training maneuvers. At this time, the Division commander assumed operational command of the Sakaguchi Detachment.

After the Sakaguchi Detachment occupied Bandjermasin on 10 February, it received orders from the 16th Army to participate in the invasion of Java. Its plan for the operation was:

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The Detachment, together with the 48th Division, will land to the east of Krugan and will then assemble in the vicinity of Bloro. It will advance as quickly as possible toward Tjilatjap by way of Soerakarta, Magelang and the southern foothills of Mt. Slamet. It will occupy Tjilatjap and cut the enemy's retreat from Batavia and Bandoeng. In cooperation with the 2d and 48th Divisions, the Detachment will then invade the central area of Java.

If the situation permits, the Detachment will participate in the attack on Bandoeng.
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Movement Toward Java

Under instructions from the 16th Army commander, part of the Sakaguchi Detachment remained to protect Bandjermasin. Its main force was loaded on a transport ship to await the southward approach
of the 48th Division convoy while a unit was ordered to board the
Samago Maru which was returning from Bali and proceed to Kragan
following the main force.

The first convoy (56 ships) with the Army's main force aboard,
which had been at anchor at Cam ranh Bay since 10 February, left its
ANCHORAGE at 1000 on 18 February escorted by the 5th Destroyer Squad­
rone. Although interference by enemy submarines was expected, none
was encountered. Between 19 and 21 February the weather remained
fair and no enemy ships were sighted. At noon on 22 February a re­
quest was received from the 3d Fleet asking for a postponement of
the attack on Java for two days as three large cruisers, five medium
 cruisers and eight destroyers of the British Fleet were in the Java
Sea. This request was approved by the Army and the first convoy,
which had been heading south, reversed its course to north at Lat.
N. 1° 24', Long. E. 107° 55' at 1500 and sailed on this course for
approximately 24 hours. On the 23d it turned and headed south once
more.

On 24 February, in the area to the southwest of the extremity
of Borneo, the Navy sighted and attacked enemy submarines. From
the afternoon of the 26th, the 7th Cruiser Division (composed of
the Chokai and four other heavy cruisers) was assigned to aid the
5th Destroyer Squadron in protecting the convoy. On the same day,
the 3d Air Group was ordered to provide air cover for the convoy.
On the 27th, one enemy plane attacked the convoy but inflicted no casualties. On the same day at 1100, the Navy requested a further postponement of one day in the landing date as enemy ships (one heavy cruiser, two light cruisers and four destroyers) had been sighted at Bantam Gulf and in the Sunda Straits. The invasion date was then set at 1 March.

At 0500 on 27 February, the ships carrying the Shoji Detachment left the main convoy and, escorted by the 5th Destroyer Squadron (whose flagship was the Natori), headed for Patrol.

On the evening of 28 February, the convoy carrying the Army's main force arrived in the vicinity of Bantam Peninsula where, about 2225 hours, the escort ships on the south side of the convoy engaged enemy gun boats in battle for approximately one hour. After successfully beating off this attack, all ships readied their paravanes. At 2320, the ships carrying units scheduled to land at Merak left the convoy and, ten minutes later, the ships carrying the unit scheduled to land at Bantam Bay advanced to their anchorage. By 0020 on 1 March, all convoy ships had reached their designated positions.

On 19 February, the 48th Division, escorted by the 4th Destroyer Squadron and the 23d Air Fleet, left Jolo and sailed toward the east coast of Java. Soon after leaving Jolo enemy submarines were sighted but they did not attack. On the 21st, the convoy arrived in Makassar Strait. On the 22d, having been notified of the postponement of the landing date to the 28th, the convoy reversed its course and headed
for Balikpapan where it anchored temporarily. Meanwhile, the Sakaguchi Detachment joined the 48th Division convoy and came under the command of the 48th Division commander.

On the 25th, the 48th Division again left Balikpapan and headed south. Just prior to entering the Java Sea, the convoy was attacked by enemy planes but these were beaten off and the convoy continued to its pre-determined landing point. On the 27th, the enemy fleet was sighted and attacked by the 4th Destroyer Squadron and other units of the 3d Fleet. Heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy. The Java Sea battle delayed the invasion of Java by a further twenty-four hours. The convoy, which had turned back at the beginning of the action, resumed its southerly course when the battle was over and, at 0015 on 1 March, anchored off Kragan.

Preparations of the 3d Air Group

On 20 January 1942, the 3d Air Group received orders from the Southern Army which read:

In order to defeat the enemy in west Java, the 3d Air Group will advance as large a force as possible to the airfield on southern Sumatra, as soon as the airfield is repaired and equipped.

It will cooperate with the main force of the 16th Army during the landings on Java.

\(^4\) Details of the Java Sea battle are given in Japanese Monograph No. 101, Netherlands East Indies Naval Invasion Operations, Jan - Mar 42.
The 3d Air Group, therefore, having occupied Palembang in mid-February, advanced part of its group to the airfield at Palembang and from there attacked the enemy Air Force on Java eight times between 19 and 25 February. It was reported at the time that approximately 210 enemy planes were destroyed and that the major part of the enemy's air power had been wiped out. The Group then established a front-line airfield at Tanjoenkarang on southern Sumatra and advanced its command post to Palembang.

Thus by late February, Army, Navy and Air Force operational preparations for the invasion of Java were completed.

5. The figure given in this monograph is considered far too high. Japanese Monograph No. 31, Southern Air Operations Record, states that the number of planes shot down by the 3d Air Group during this period was 37 and the number damaged on the ground was 50. The estimate given of usable enemy planes on Java as of 26 February 1942 was 20. These figures approximate the estimate given by General Wavell in the British History of the Second World War, The War against Japan, Volume I, page 428.
CHAPTER 2
Invasion of Java

Outline of Operational Progress of the 16th Army (Map 2)

Having successfully overcome the enemy's naval and air attacks, simultaneously at dawn on 1 March the main force of the 16th Army landed near Cape Awoeran and Merak; the Shoji Detachment landed in the vicinity of Eretan-wetan, and the 48th Division and the Sakaguchi Detachment landed in the vicinity of Kragan. By evening, the main force had advanced to the Tjioedojoeng River; the Shoji Detachment to Kalidjati airfield; the Sakaguchi Detachment to the vicinity of Bloro, and the 48th Division to approximately 50 km inland from its landing point. All enemy resistance had been wiped out and all road blocks overcome in these sectors.

At 2130 on 5 March, the Sato Detachment of the 2d Division occupied Batavia. Early in the morning of the 6th, the Division's Nasu Detachment occupied Buitenzorg.

On 2 and 3 March, the Shoji Detachment was attacked by enemy mechanized units but, assisted by the 3d Air Brigade of the 3d Air Group, defeated them. Overcoming enemy counterattacks on the 5th, the Detachment moved southward on Bandoeng and that evening penetrated the southern sector of the defense line at Tjiater.1

1. Army Headquarters was disturbed when it received reports that the Shoji Detachment alone had attacked enemy prepared positions south of Tjiater as it had estimated that the enemy would
OUTLINE OF OPERATIONAL PROGRESS OF 16TH ARMY
1 - 9 MARCH 1942

MAP NO. 2
The Sakaguchi Detachment successively occupied Soerakarta, Jogjakarta, Magelang and Poerwokerto. On the 8th, it occupied Tjilatjap. This completely cut the enemy's route of retreat.

On the evening of the 2d, the Raiding Unit of the 48th Division occupied Tjepoe. A bridge was thrown over the Solo River in the vicinity of Tjepoe and, on the 4th, the main force of the Division advanced to the right bank of the Brantas River via Kediri. By 6 March it had penetrated to Modjokerto.

Because of the rapid and successful advance of the 2d Division and the Shoji Detachment, the Army sent the Nasu Detachment of the 2d Division directly toward Bandoeng to pursue the enemy and transferred the main force of the Division to Kalidjati to support the Shoji Detachment.

On the night of 7 March, the commander of the Netherlands East Indies forces dispatched a surrender party to the Shoji Detachment and, in response to a radiogram, the 16th Army commander immediately advanced to Kalidjati. On the afternoon of the 8th, he met the Governor-General and the Army commander (Lt. Gen. H. ter Poorten) who agreed to the surrender of all the troops in the Netherlands East Indies.

1. (Cont'd)

stop the Japanese main strength some distance from Bandoeng and there take the offensive against the Shoji Detachment.

The Shoji Detachment had been assigned the mission of occupying Kalidjati airfield and the crossing points of Tjitaroem River and to prepare, in cooperation with the 2d Division, to attack Bandoeng fortress.
The same evening the 48th Division completely occupied Soerabaaja. At 1200 on the 9th, after all operations had ceased, the Nasu Detachment advanced to the vicinity of Tjimahi, the Shoji Detachment to the vicinity of Lembang and the Sakaguchi Detachment to the vicinity of Bandjar.

Approximately 11,000 men of the British-American forces who had escaped to southeastern Java, as well as other enemy units on the island, surrendered in accordance with the terms accepted by the Netherland East Indies commander.

The invasion of Java was completed.

Summary of Operational Progress of Each Unit

2d Division (Map 3)

The Nasu and Fukushima Detachments proceeded to their anchorages off Merak as scheduled and, about 0200 on 1 March, successfully landed in their respective areas. There was approximately one company of Dutch soldiers in the vicinity of Merak but these troops were quickly overcome and the landings progressed smoothly.

2. The Nasu Detachment was commanded by Maj. Gen. Yumio Nasu, commander of the 2d Infantry Group, and was composed of the 16th Infantry Regiment (minus 1st En), the 2d Reconnaissance Regiment, 1st Battalion (minus 1st Co) of the 2d Field Artillery Regiment, the 1st Company of the 2d Engineer Regiment and two motor transport companies. The Fukushima Detachment was commanded by Col. Kyusaku Fukushima, commander of the 4th Infantry Regiment and was composed of the 4th Infantry Regiment (minus 3d En) 2d Battalion of the 2d Field Artillery Regiment, the 5th Antitank Battalion and the 2d Company of the 2d Engineer Regiment.
About 2330 on 28 February, the Sato Detachment arrived off Bantam Bay and proceeded to its designated anchorage.\(^3\) About 0001 on 1 March, the Detachment commenced landing in successive waves. A brief attack by the cruisers Perth and Houston and the few remaining Allied planes caused some confusion but the first wave completed landing without any opposition from the shores between 0015 and 0045. Very few casualties were sustained by the first line units but some ships of the convoy were damaged.

The 2d Division's operational plan after landing was:

The Nasu Detachment will occupy the crossing points of the Tjioedjoeng River as quickly as possible with the 2d Reconnaissance Regiment.

The Detachment will then capture Buitenzorg in order to cut the enemy's retreat route from Batavia to Bandoeng.

The Sato and Fukushima Detachments (the main strength of the Division) will advance along the Serang-Balaradja-Tangerang-Batavia road and the southern area toward the southwest of Batavia where it will prepare to invade Batavia.

After occupying Batavia, the Division will prepare to attack Bandoeng Fortress and, in cooperation with the Shoji Detachment, will capture Bandoeng.

\(^3\) The Sato Detachment was commanded by Col. Hanshichi Sato, commander of the 29th Infantry Regiment and was composed of the 29th Infantry Regiment, the 2d Tank Regiment, 1st Company of the 2d Artillery Regiment and the 2d Engineer Regiment (minus two companies).
As soon as the 2d Reconnaissance Regiment of the Nasu Detachment landed, it immediately advanced to the banks of the Tjoedjoeng River. Approximately 200 Dutch troops offered some resistance but were unable to check the Regiment’s advance and, by 0700 on 1 March, it had penetrated to Serang.

The Regiment continued to advance up the banks of the Tjoedjoeng but about 1400 was stopped near Kopo as the bridge had been destroyed. It arrived at the Rangkasbitoeng Bridge seconds after the enemy had destroyed it but reached the Pamarajan Bridge in time to engage and annihilate the enemy on the east side of the bridge as they were attempting to destroy it.

The main strength of the Nasu Detachment arrived in the vicinity of Serang on the afternoon of 1 March. At 2100 it left Serang and, crossing the Pamarajan Bridge, advanced as far as Rangkasbitoeng.

The advance of the Fukushima and Sato Detachments was greatly hindered by the enemy’s destruction of bridges and roads and it was not until the night of 1 March that the leading elements of these detachments had reached the banks of the Tjoedjoeng River. The main strength of the Fukushima Detachment succeeded in advancing to Serdang but the Sato Detachment found all roads to the south of the landing point thoroughly blockaded and was able to advance only to Bodjanegara.
Under these conditions, the Division commander ordered part of these detachments to occupy the crossing points of the Tjidoerian River and ordered the main strength of the detachments to concentrate along the Tjoedjoeng River.

On 2 March, part of the Nasu Detachment pursued the enemy toward Buitenzorg while its main strength concentrated in the vicinity of Rangkasbitoeng. It then advanced toward Buitenzorg and, by night, had arrived in the vicinity of Djasinga. The Detachment commander accomplished this by using two motor transport companies to transport the troops in a shuttle system.

Also on the night of 2 March, the Nasu Detachment, after removing antitank obstacles which had been placed along the road, dispersed part of the enemy force to the east of Boenar and, by the following evening, its leading elements had advanced to the vicinity of Leuwiliang. There they found the Leuwiliang Bridge already destroyed and approximately two companies of Australian soldiers manning pillboxes on the east side of the bridge. To the rear of Leuwiliang, on a line several kilometers long running north and south from Tjibatok, there were prepared positions consisting of pillboxes guarded by approximately 1500 Australian troops. In addition, in the area surrounding Buitenzorg, the enemy was still constructing positions.

The Nasu Detachment planned an enveloping night attack on enemy positions at Tjibatok. It, therefore, dispatched the main
strength of the 16th Infantry Regiment from the south side of Leuwiliang and sent the 2d Reconnaissance Regiment down the Tjikaniki River by boat. Time had been lost, however, and all attempts to cross the river on the south side of Leuwiliang were frustrated. Finally, after a full day's preparation, on 4 March a night attack was launched and the Detachment succeeded in crossing the river some miles south of Leuwiliang. The Australians resisted stubbornly but were forced to withdraw to a position to the west of Buitenzorg. There the Japanese forces found that the three bridges along the main highway had been destroyed and they were compelled to advance along a side road by way of Tjampea, then ford the Tjisadane River to reach the right bank.

At 0001 hours on 2 March, the Fukushima Detachment left Serdang and, that afternoon, reached Pamarajan. Part of the Detachment continued to advance and, the following afternoon, reached Madja. There they found that the bridge had been destroyed and that there were practically no paths on the right bank of the Tjidoerian River.

On the night of 2 March, part of the Sato Detachment crossed the Tjidoerian River near Kopo and, on the 3d, occupied the Parigi Bridge. That night they advanced as far as Balaradja only to find that the bridge there had already been destroyed.

At 2000 on 2 March, the Division commander left Serang for Petir reaching there the following morning. Upon arrival he was informed
that while the tactical situation in the Nasu Detachment area was progressing on the whole according to schedule, the Fukushima and Sato Detachments had been greatly delayed by the widespread destruction of bridges. On the 3d, therefore, he ordered the diversion of the Fukushima Detachment and one infantry battalion of the Sato Detachment to the Buitenzorg road. At the same time, he disposed his reserves (3d Battalion of the 4th Infantry Regiment) east of Pamaramjan to cover this movement. On 4 March, learning that the enemy near Batavia was withdrawing toward Buitenzorg, the Division commander decided to use his main strength to capture Buitenzorg immediately. He attached the Fukushima Detachment and the infantry battalion of the Sato Detachment to the Nasu Detachment and ordered the main force of the Sato Detachment to proceed immediately to south of Batavia. On the same day, he advanced his command post to Rangkasbitoeng. At 1600 on the 5th, part of the Nasu Detachment cleared the enemy from the right bank of the Tjisadane River north of Tjampea, while another element of the Detachment advanced to Bantarkaming, approximately eight kilometers northwest of Buitenzorg. At this time, the enemy in the Batavia area was still withdrawing toward Buitenzorg. On the night of the 5th, the Nasu Detachment, together with about one battalion of the Fukushima Detachment and one battalion of the Sato Detachment, having no time to reconnoiter Buitenzorg nor to secure accurate information concerning the enemy situation, launched attacks
in waves against Buitenzorg and, about 0500 on the 6th, penetrated the city's defenses. However, it was found that between 2,000 and 3,000 Australian troops believed to have been defending the town had already withdrawn toward Bandoeng. By 0600 on 6 March, Buitenzorg was occupied.

The Nasu Detachment immediately dispatched an infantry company to pursue the enemy toward Poentjak Pass, between Mt. Prangrango and Kentjana.

The main strength of the Sato Detachment, having diverted approximately one infantry battalion to the Nasu Detachment area, continued to advance along the road to Batavia. Despite the fact that all the bridges on the rivers had been destroyed, they quickly reached the outskirts of the town. At dusk on 5 March, the enemy in the vicinity of Batavia surrendered to the Sato Detachment and, by 2130 that night, the city had been occupied.

At the time Batavia and Buitenzorg were occupied, the lines of communication units of the Nasu Detachment had not caught up with the Detachment and the main strength of the Fukushima Detachment, changing its course from Madja, needed two more days to concentrate at Buitenzorg. In addition, all transport troops of the Sato Detachment were west of Serang.

**Occupation of Bandoeng**

The Army ordered the 2d Division to change its course and to march to the north of Bandoeng and take the town by storm. The
Division commander, therefore, decided to dispatch the Nasu Detachment to secure a foothold in the Tjiandoer area and, at the same time, to dispatch the main strength of the Division immediately to the vicinity of Soebang. The two forces began to converge on Bandoeng from the west and north when, unexpectedly at dawn on 8 March, they were notified of the enemy's proposal to surrender. The Division commander immediately ordered each detachment to advance without delay toward Bandoeng with maximum strength. At this time the units from the Fukushima and Sato Detachments, which had been attached to the Nasu Detachment, were returned to their parent organizations.

In the meantime, while part of the Nasu Detachment was pursuing the enemy toward Poentjak Pass, the main strength of the Detachment was pursuing the enemy by rail. On the night of 6 March, it met and engaged the retreating enemy near Tjibadak. Since the bridges near Tjibadak were already destroyed, the main force of the Detachment was compelled to abandon its pursuit by rail and, changing its course, proceeded toward the Poentjak Pass. On 8 March, part of the Nasu Detachment advanced to the vicinity of Tjimahi.

On 9 March, the Division commander was informed that the Shoji Detachment had been placed under his command and, at the same time, he was ordered to occupy Bandoeng. He, therefore, ordered the commanders of the Nasu and Shoji Detachments to each dispatch one infantry battalion to Bandoeng to occupy and firmly secure the town.
At the same time, he ordered the main strength of the Nasu Detachment concentrated in the vicinity of Tjimah; the main strength of the Shoji Detachment in the regions north of Bandoeng to the vicinity of Lembang, and the Sato Detachment to assemble in the area east of Bandoeng. The Detachments completed their concentration on 14 March.

**Shoji Detachment (Map 4)**

Having assembled his forces at Camranh Bay, the Shoji Detachment commander issued orders in regard to landing operations. Assuming that there would be no enemy troops in or around his planned landing point, he organized his troops for the occupation of Kalidjati airfield rather than for a combat landing operation.

Due to the distance from the Army base in Sumatra, it was recognized that aerial support from that base would be inadequate during the Central Java Operation. Consequently, it was of the utmost importance that Kalidjati airfield should be occupied as expeditiously as possible.

On 18 February, the Shoji Detachment left Camranh Bay with the convoy of the 16th Army's main strength. On the 27th, as soon as they entered the Java Sea, the Detachment separated from the main convoy and proceeded alone toward the waters off Eretan-wetan where it was planned to land.

Allied bombers from Kalidjati attacked the smaller convoy at night when it was about 50 miles from the coast but the scale of
OPERATIONAL PROGRESS
OF SHOJI DET
1-9 MAR 1942

- JAPANESE ARMY
- ALLIED ARMY
S.D. --- SHOJI DET
WU --- WAKAMATSU UNIT
E.U. --- EGASHIRA UNIT

5 10 15 20
KILOMETERS
attack was too light to do any serious damage. About 0130 on 1 March, the convoy reached its anchorage near Eretan-wetan, and, about 0330, landed its first troops. There was no opposition on the beaches but in the air 12 Hurricanes, pressing low-level attacks, caused heavy casualties among the troops in the landing craft and impeded the landing.

At 0610, the Osawa Advance Party (7th Company of the 2d Battalion) left the landing point by motor transport and rapidly advanced toward the Kalidjati airfield. At 1030, it engaged about 100 enemy soldiers, who had been sent to destroy the bridge at Pamaneokan, approximately one km west of Soebang.

At 0800, the Wakamatsu Unit left the landing point by motor transport with only the strength that had completed landing at that time, and, at 1045, overtook the Osawa Advance Party, which was then engaging the enemy. The Wakamatsu Unit assumed command of the Osawa Party and together they routed and pursued the enemy toward the Kalidjati airfield. By 1230, practically the entire defense party was wiped out and the airfield was completely occupied. The Unit then engaged in mopping-up operations and setting up defensive measures in the surrounding area. As the airfield was in good condition, the Wakamatsu Unit attempted to notify headquarters that it could be used immediately but, due to communication difficulties, was unable to do so. It then attempted to notify the 3d Air Group direct but again was unsuccessful.
The Egashira Unit was assigned the mission of securing the bridge across the Tjitaroom River, severing the enemy's route of retreat in the Batavia area and, if circumstances permitted, of attacking Batavia. At 0540 on 1 March, this unit left its debarkation point with its first-landed troops. Their advance westward along the road to Batavia was considerably delayed by low-flying attacks by the remaining British fighter squadron from Tjililitan, but by nightfall they had succeeded in concentrating their strength at Pamanockan.

At 0500 on 2 March, the Shoji Detachment Headquarters and some reserves reached Soebang and occupied the town. At 1100 that morning, about 250 Dutch troops counterattacked, supported by 20 tanks from Bandoeng. The tanks reached the center of the town but the infantry was unable to support them and the whole force had to withdraw after a 90-minute engagement. That afternoon, the 3d Air Brigade advanced to Kalidjati airfield. At dawn on the 3d, enemy planes bombed the field and inflicted some damage. About 0930 the same day, five enemy tanks attacked the field but were quickly destroyed by the Wakamatsu Unit.

After checking enemy destruction of bridges and overcoming enemy opposition, at 1200 on 3 March, the Egashira Unit finally reached the bridge near Djiatisari only to find it had already been destroyed. The Detachment commander, therefore, ordered the Unit to change its course and advance by way of Kalidjati and Poerwakarta. At 2000 the Unit reached Pamanockan.
About 1400 on the 3d, about 120 enemy tanks and trucks attempted to break through the defenses around Kalijdjati by way of Poerwakarta but planes from the 3d Air Brigade attacked and routed them. Earlier, about 1130, an enemy infantry unit with ten tanks and approximately 60 trucks had been sighted moving northward toward Djalantjagak (approximately 27 km north of Bandoeng). Toward evening they appeared before the Shoji Detachment's positions but were attacked by planes from the 3d Air Brigade and repulsed.

On the night of 3 March, the Ono (Landing-Point Protection) Unit made a night attack on Kandanghaoer and routed an enemy force of approximately 200 soldiers, 4 tanks and 8 guns. By 2400, this unit had completely occupied the town.

In view of enemy activity in its vicinity, the Shoji Detachment decided to destroy immediately the enemy forces at Poerwakarta and Tjikampek, smash the enemy offensive and sever the road between Batavia and Bandoeng as quickly as possible. It ordered the Wakamatsu Unit to occupy Poerwakarta and the Egashira Unit to secure the Gedoenggde Bridge, northwest of Krawang.

The Wakamatsu Unit left the Kalijdjati airfield in motor vehicles, and at 0040 on the 4th, about 16 km west of the airfield met and engaged an enemy force of about 100 troops supported by tanks, armored cars and antitank guns. Within thirty minutes they had overcome this force and, after having repulsed two more enemy attacks on the way, finally reached and occupied Poerwakarta at 0700. Having been informed that the Egashira Unit had advanced to Tjikampek at 1230, about
1400 the Wakamatsu Unit left Poerwakarta and returned to Kalidjati airfield.

About 1400 on the 4th, the Egashira Unit penetrated Tjikampek by way of Soebang and Kalidjati. Finding Tjikampek already deserted by the enemy, the Unit continued its advance to Gedoenggde. About 1830, it penetrated Krawang and routed the enemy force stationed there. At 1910, however, upon arriving at the Gedoenggde Bridge they found it already destroyed by the enemy.

On 5 March, the Shoji Detachment commander's estimate of the situation was:

It is evident that the enemy's positive actions from 2 to 4 March were nothing more than coastal defense operations as their offensives were at all times weak and uncoordinated. It is apparent that they had made no definite plan to conduct defensive actions from their already constructed positions.

Enemy movements after the Shoji Detachment had repulsed their first offensive indicate that they plan to withdraw their strength and concentrate it in the Bandoeng area where they will carry out offensive actions from already established positions.

The Detachment commander, therefore, decided to destroy the enemy positions north of Bandoeng before they could be firmly consolidated and ordered his Detachment to proceed to Bandoeng.4

4. Army Headquarters was surprised to receive a report of this decision as it was felt that the Shoji Detachment commander had exceeded his authority. The Army commander reasoned that should the enemy launch an offensive with its main strength at Bandoeng, the entire Japanese Army on the island would be threatened. However, the enemy apparently estimated the Japanese strength in this sector to be between one and two divisions and, in consequence, did not attack.
The Wakamatsu Unit (three infantry companies supported by the main strength of the mountain artillery battalion) left Soebang at 1100 on 5 March with the mission of penetrating enemy positions south of Tjiater and advanced immediately to the plains of Bandoeng. At 1730, it attacked an enemy force of about one company and, by nightfall, had seized the second line of positions. During this time, the 3d Air Brigade used almost its entire force to support the Detachment.

At dawn on the 6th, the Wakamatsu Unit continued its attack and, at the same time, defeated the reinforcements attempting to relieve the enemy. Then, passing to the left of the enemy positions, the Unit advanced toward the mountain at the enemy's rear and took the positions by storm. Although the Unit did not completely overcome the enemy until nightfall, this victory gave it complete control of the mountain pass.

The Egashira Unit, having reached Soebang by motor vehicles, concentrated its strength there. Again, during the 6th, the 3d Air Brigade devoted its entire strength to supporting the Shoji Detachment.

Having decided to continue its penetration of the region to the north of Bandoeng, the Shoji Detachment ordered the Wakamatsu Unit to attack and pursue the enemy stationed to the west of the main highway while the Egashira Unit was to attack and pursue the
enemy forces stationed along the main highway. By 2000 on the 7th, these units, one following the other, had advanced to Lembang in the northern suburbs of Bandoeng. The Wakamatsu Unit then advanced to the plateau south of Lembang.

At 2230 on 7 March, a messenger bearing a flag of truce, arrived at the Detachment Headquarters and delivered a proposal for a truce from Maj. Gen. Pessmann, the commander of Bandoeng district. In reply, the Detachment commander agreed to meet the General at the Isola Hotel in Lembang at 1000 on 8 March. He then assembled his Detachment and prepared to march into Bandoeng.

Sakaguchi Detachment (Map 5)

The Sakaguchi Detachment, having captured various strategic positions in east Borneo, left Banjermasin and, at dawn on 1 March, after repulsing persistent enemy air attacks, entered its appointed anchorage with the 48th Division's convoy of transports.

At 0700, the Kaneuji Unit (approximately one infantry battalion) landed on the southeast side of Kragan (left of the 48th Division) and immediately proceeded to Bloro by motor vehicle. The Yamamoto and Matsumoto units (each approximately one infantry battalion) landed at 0230 on 2 March and followed the Kaneuji Unit toward Bloro by motor vehicle.5

5. Kaneuji Unit was commanded by Maj. Kaneuji, commander of the 2d Battalion, 124th Infantry Regiment; the Yamamoto Unit by Col. Yamamoto, commander of the 124th Infantry Regiment, and the Matsumoto Unit by Lt. Col. Matsumoto, commander of the 3d Battalion, 124th Infantry Regiment.
Situation Prior to the Occupation of Magelang

At 2000 on 1 March, the Kaneuji Unit advanced as far as Bloro and, the following night, the main strength of the Sakaguchi Detachment concentrated there.

At 1500 on the 2d, the Kaneuji Unit left Bloro and, receiving an intelligence report that there still remained some 600 enemy troops in Semarang, advanced as far as Godong and dispersed a small enemy force that was stationed there. The Kaneuji Unit then protected the Detachment's right rear.

At 0030 on 4 March, the Matsumoto Unit left Bloro. At dawn on the 5th, proceeding by way of Poerwodadi, it penetrated enemy positions north of and quickly occupied Soerakarta.

On the morning of the 4th, the Kaneuji Unit left Godong and proceeded toward Bojolali. The enemy had destroyed all the bridges, blockaded the roads, and burned all materials along the way. Overcoming all obstacles, the Kaneuji Unit routed about 100 enemy troops in the section north of Bojolali and, by the evening of the 5th, had advanced to Jogjakarta. Approximately 700 enemy troops stationed in Jogjakarta surrendered to the commander of the Kaneuji Unit and were immediately disarmed.

The Matsumoto Unit advanced through Jogjakarta and, on the evening of the 6th, attacked Magelang. At 1850, the enemy garrison surrendered and, by 1935, the Matsumoto Unit had completely occupied the town.
Since there still remained a number of enemy troops in Salatiga, Ambarawa, Semarang, and the surrounding district an enemy lieutenant colonel, captured at Magelang, was ordered to advise these troops to quickly surrender and disarm themselves.

**Situation in the Vicinity of Tjilatjap**

At 0600 on 6 March, the Yamamoto Unit, with the Kaneuji Unit under its command, left Jogjakarta and, moving along the beaches, advanced toward Tjilatjap. About 1230 that day, the Kaneuji Unit engaged and defeated an enemy force of approximately 100 troops just southwest of Poerworedjo. About thirty minutes later, it annihilated a further 100 troops just west of Keboesen, and by evening it had advanced to the vicinity of Macs-lor.

Although all bridges across the Serajoe River had been destroyed, the Kaneuji Unit quickly prepared ponton rafts and, at 2000 on the 7th, commenced crossing the river. By 1240 the following day, it penetrated Tjilatjap. At 1500 on the 8th, the Yamamoto Unit entered the town only to find that the approximately 2,000 enemy troops had already withdrawn toward Wagon.

At dawn on 7 March, the Katsumoto Unit left Magelang and, by noon the following day, after subduing a small enemy force at Bandjarnegara, reached Poerbalingga.

At first, the Sakaguchi Detachment Headquarters, advancing along the same course as the Kaneuji Unit, established its command
post at Jogjakarta. Later, following the same course as the Matsuno­
moto Unit through Magelang, it reached Poerwokerto at 2300 on the
8th.

While the Tjilatjap occupation forces (Kaneuji and Yamamoto
Units) were preparing to attack Wangon, a messenger bearing a flag
of truce arrived at 1300 on 9 March and delivered a proposal of
surrender to the commander of the Yamamoto Unit from Maj. Gen. Cox,
commander of the Central Army District at Wangon. Col. Yamamoto re­
quested General Cox to present himself at the Sakaguchi Detachment
Headquarters which was then at Poerwokerto.

At 1110 on 10 March, General Sakaguchi met General Cox at the
Regent's residence (regional governor) at Poerwokerto and accepted
his surrender.

48th Division (Map 6)

General Tsuchihashi, the 48th Division commander, estimated
that the enemy would concentrate a force to the northwest of Soera­
baja. He, therefore, planned to advance part of the Division to
Soerabaja from the northwest as a diversion and, at the same time,
have the Division's main strength detour and attack from the south,
thus not only attacking toward the weakest point but also cutting
the enemy's route of retreat. On landing, the strength of the Di­
vision was divided into the following units:

49
Right Flank (Imai) Unit

Commander: Col. Hifumi Imai, commander of the Formosa 1st Infantry Regiment

Formosa 1st Infantry Regiment (minus 1st Battalion)
One mountain artillery battalion
One engineer company

Left Flank (Abe) Unit

Commander: Maj. Gen. Koichi Abe, commander of the 48th Infantry Group

48th Infantry Group Headquarters
47th Infantry Regiment
One mountain artillery battalion
One engineer company

Tjepoe Raiding (Tanaka) Unit

Commander: Col. Tohru Tanaka, commander of the Formosa 2d Infantry Regiment

Formosa 2d Infantry Regiment
One mountain artillery battalion
One engineer company

Bodjonegoro Raiding (Kitamura) Unit

Commander: Lt. Col. Kuro Kitamura, commander of the 48th Reconnaissance Regiment

48th Reconnaissance Regiment

As General Tsuchihashi believed that the reason Bataan had been so difficult to take was that sufficient heavy artillery had not been
committed in the early stages of the operation, he ordered the Imai Unit to land to the west of Kragan and establish a beachhead. Part of the unit was then to occupy Rambang Harbor where the heavy artillery and other materiel to be used against Soerabaja Fortress was to be unloaded. The Abe Unit was ordered to land on the beach to the east of Kragan and establish a beachhead in order to cover the landings of the Tanaka and Kitamura Units. The Tanaka Unit was to land and advance to Tjepoe as quickly as possible and there occupy the oil fields. In addition, it was to secure the crossing points of Solo River near Tjepoe. The Kitamura Unit was ordered to land at the same time as the Tanaka Unit. It was to advance and occupy Bodjonegoro as well as the crossing points of the Solo River near that town. It was then to advance to Soerabaja by way of Babad and Lamongan.

The main strength of the Division (Imai, Abe and Tanaka Units) was to detour to the south of the Brantas River and to prepare to attack Soerabaja Fortress from the south.

At 01:00 on 1 March, having been subjected to almost continuous air attacks since 27 February, the convoy carrying the 48th Division dropped anchor off Kragan. It was a bright moonlight night, the sea was calm and the anchorage free of mines. There was no opposition on the beaches but enemy aircraft made repeated attacks on the transports, damaging two of them and causing some casualties.
At 0345, the Right Flank Unit succeeded in landing and, by 0400, the Left Flank Unit also had landed. Both forces then advanced inland. The 3d Mechanized Company of a Dutch cavalry regiment was encountered near the beaches but was quickly routed.

Enemy planes continued bombing and strafing attacks until after daybreak, inflicting heavy casualties on the advancing troops. Six of the 12 enemy fighter planes were shot down. (Later, an intelligence report stated that only one enemy plane returned to its base.) In addition, during the landing operations, the Navy sank ten enemy submarines.

Between 1000 and 1200 on 1 March, the front-line units advanced to a line running from Sedan to Boeloe and firmly established themselves there. In the meantime, the Tjepoe and Bodjonegoro Units continued to advance toward their objectives. By evening, the Division had established a beachhead 50 km deep and had unloaded munitions in anticipation of future operations.

The Imai Unit, after first advancing to the vicinity of Sedan, that night captured Rembang. The Tjepoe Raiding Unit broke through the blockaded region between Bloro and Tjepoe and, at 1800 on the 2d, occupied Tjepoe, only to find the bridge had already been destroyed. At 0600 on the 3d, the Bodjonegoro Unit crossed the Solo River in small craft (the bridge had been demolished) and by 0850 had occupied Bodjonegoro.
At 2030 on 4 March, having thrown a bridge across the Solo River near Tjepoe, the Division's main strength advanced toward the east bank of the Brantas River. It continued its advance during that day and the following night. On the 5th, it crushed enemy opposition at Ngawi, Tjaroeban, Ngandjoek, Kertosono, Kediri and Djombang. On the 6th, it occupied Modjoagoeng. Before retreating, the enemy had attempted to demolish the bridge at Keltosono, but it had only sunk one or two feet below the surface. The Division, therefore, was able to advance across this bridge, and, by noon on the 6th, the Imai Unit had reached Modjokerto.

Intelligence reports stated that, realizing that the Japanese forces were detouring to the south, on the 5th, the enemy commander had ordered his troops located near Babad to advance to Modjokerto and to endeavor to stockpile sufficient ammunition for one division for several days in the town. About 1600 on the 6th, however, information was received that enemy forces were retreating toward Soerabaja. In addition, there was no large concentration of troops in the Malang area. The 48th Division commander, therefore, ordered his units to contact and destroy the enemy in the region south of Soerabaja. At first he had ordered the Kitamura Unit, which was advancing from Babad to Soerabaja by way of Lamongan, to bypass Lamongan to the south and march toward Modjokerto. However, with the favorable development of the situation, he issued a new
order to the Kitamura Unit instructing it to advance directly to
the western suburbs of Soerabaja.

On the evening of 6 March the Abe Unit took Porong by storm
before the Allies were able to destroy the bridges near the town.
It then assembled its force in the area south of Wonokromo Canal.

At Modjokerto the Division captured detailed maps showing en-
emy installations at Soerabaja. In addition, intelligence reports
received from the front lines about noon on the 7th stated that
the enemy was flooding the region south of Soerabaja by damming
the river with sunken small boats and other obstacles. Japanese
troops advanced and quickly removed these obstacles and, by mid-
night on the 7th, the water gradually began to recede.

At 0600 on 8 March, the Division commander ordered his units
to prepare to attack and occupy Soerabaja the following evening.
At the same time, knowing that the enemy front lines were thinly
held, he stated that if conditions were favorable, the attack could
be made on the evening of the 8th.

At 1100 on 8 March, the 49th Division Headquarters at Porong
received a report from reconnaissance planes that the enemy had
hoisted a white flag near the bridge south of Soerabaja. At 1130,
the Division Headquarters was informed that an enemy messenger,
bearing a flag of truce, had arrived at the Front Line Unit Head-
quartes. At 1500, the Division commander summoned the Governor of
East Java Province and other enemy officials to the Divisional Command Post at Sidoardjo and interviewed them. As it was not clear, however, who commanded the enemy troops in Soerabaja, the Division commander discontinued the interview and ordered his division to advance and occupy the city. By 1800, this had been accomplished.

On the evening of the 9th, Maj. Gen. G. A. Ilgen, commander of the Dutch forces in East Java, presented himself at the Divisional Command Post at Sidoardjo and accepted the terms of surrender based upon 16th Army orders. The disarming of the enemy forces was completed by the evening of 12 March.

Movement of the 16th Army Command Post (Map 2)

On 16 February, Lt. Gen. Imamura and his staff left Camranh Bay aboard the Ryujo Maru, accompanied in convoy by the 2d Division and the Shoji Detachment. At dawn on 1 March, having been fiercely attacked on the way by enemy air and naval units, the Ryujo Maru safely entered Bantam Bay. While the convoy lay at anchor, enemy torpedo and air attacks sank not only the Ryujo Maru but also the Sakura Maru and later the Horai Maru and the Tatsumo Maru. Casualties among the headquarters staff were light and, at dawn on 1 March, the Army commander established his command post at Ragas, about 3 km north of Bodjonegoro. The following afternoon, the commander moved his post from Ragas to Serang, where it remained until 7 March. At 1000 on the 7th, the commander and his staff left Serang by motor vehicle and the same evening reached Batavia, by way
of Pamaram and Balaradja. At dawn the following day, a report was received that the enemy stationed around Bandoeng had surrendered. At 1000 on the 8th, the Army commander and his headquarters staff left Batavia and about 1600 reached Kalijdjati airfield via Krawang.

At 0900 on the 8th, General ter Poorten made a broadcast to the effect that organized resistance by the Royal Netherlands East Indian Army in Java would cease. Soon after his arrival, Lt. Gen. Imamura received the Governor General of the Netherlands East Indies (Junker Dr. van Stakenborgh Stachouwer) and General ter Poorten with his staff, together with Maj. Gen. Pesemann, the garrison commander of the Bandoeng area, at Kalijdjati airfield, when they agreed to the capitulation of all the troops in the Netherlands East Indies. The following day at 1500, in compliance with General Immura’s demand, General ter Poorten made a second broadcast ordering all Allied forces on the island to lay down their arms. Later in the afternoon the Allied commanders again met the 16th Army commander. At this meeting they reported that the terms of the surrender were being carried out.

At 1400 on 10 March, General Immura, accompanied by his staff, moved to Bandoeng.

On the 12th, all Allied commanders were summoned to Bandoeng where they signed a formal instrument of surrender.
Immediately after the conquest of Java, the Sakaguchi Detachment was dispatched to Burma to rejoin its parent organization, the 56th Division. Meanwhile, Sumatra had become the field of operations for the 25th Army and the main force of the 38th Division, which was in Sumatra, was placed under the command of the 25th Army. The Shoji Detachment was also dispatched to Sumatra to join its parent unit. Other Army units not required to garrison Java were either sent back to Japan for demobilization or transferred to areas where operations were in progress. The Toho Detachment, according to the Army-Navy Agreement, remained on Timor Island, and the Kanemura Detachment, which had been responsible for the security of Bali, was recalled to Java.

As Lombok, Flores and Sumbawa Islands in the Sunda Group had not yet been taken, in May units from the 48th Division attacked and occupied them without meeting a great deal of resistance from the enemy. These units later returned to Java.

The 16th Army was made responsible for the garrisoning of Java, while the islands of the Sunda Group became the responsibility of the Navy and the Toho Detachment was ordered to cooperate with the Navy in the defense of Timor.

The 16th Army ordered the 48th Division to defend east Java and the 2d Division to defend west Java. In July, when the Toho Detachment was returned to Sumatra, the 48th Division was ordered to dispatch one infantry regiment, under the command of the 48th Infantry
Group commander, to Timor. This regiment then came under the direct 
command of the 16th Army commander.

Thus the occupation of Java and the disposition of forces to de-
fend the island was completed.
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