Civil Military Operations: Afghanistan

Observations on Civil Military Operations
During the First Year of Operation Enduring Freedom

by William Flavin

23 March 2004
**Report Documentation Page**

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Introduction


Background and Time Frame

The U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute (PKI), located at the U.S. Army War College, has previously conducted studies of Civil Military Operations (CMO) in U.S. military engagements abroad. Based on comments from various levels of command engaged in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, PKI felt that the one-year mark was the proper time to do an assessment of CMO there. Most participants would be completing tours and have the time and perspective to reflect on their experiences. In late FY 03, PKI was reorganized into the U.S. Army Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI). This report is therefore published under the auspices of PKSOI.

The report covers the period from 11 September 2001 until the end of December 2002. Afghanistan remains a dynamic situation; therefore, the details associated with the findings are temporally bound. This report attempts to identify the trends and concerns that still exist, although their dimensions and magnitude may change.

Characteristics of Successful Civil Military Operations

The Department of Defense Dictionary defines Civil Military Operations as:

\[ \text{The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO.} \]

Successful CMO:

- Achieve the national objectives through creating and sustaining appropriate conditions by harmonizing civil and military actions.
- Assist the commander in meeting his legal responsibilities under the laws of Armed Conflict. Many times those tasks require close civil and military coordination.
- Achieve harmony between civilian and military actors to reduce the natural friction between them.
- Enable a successful transition from a military focused to a civil focused operation.
The Challenges in Afghanistan

The military situation in Afghanistan epitomizes full spectrum operations as identified in Joint and U.S. Army doctrine. Army Field Manual FM 3-0, Operations, states:

Army doctrine addresses the range of full spectrum operations across the spectrum of conflict Army commanders at all echelons may combine different types of operations simultaneously and sequentially to accomplish missions in war and military operations other than war (MOOTW). For each mission, the JFC and Army component commander determine the emphasis Army forces place on each type of operation. Offensive and defensive operations normally dominate military operations in war and some small-scale contingencies (SSC). Stability operations and support operations predominate in MOOTW that include certain SSCs and peacetime military engagement (PME)... When conducting full spectrum operations, commanders combine and sequence offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations to accomplish the mission. The JFC and the Army component commander for a particular mission determine the emphasis Army forces place on each type of operation. Throughout the campaign, offensive, defensive, stability, and support missions occur simultaneously. As missions change from promoting peace to deterring war and from resolving conflict to war itself, the combinations of and transitions between these operations require skillful assessment, planning, preparation, and execution. Operations designed to accomplish more than one strategic purpose may be executed simultaneously, sequentially, or both. For example, within a combatant commander’s AOR, one force may be executing large-scale offensive operations while another is conducting stability operations. Within the combat zone, Army forces may conduct stability operations and support operations as well as combat operations.3

The excerpt above well describes the situation in Afghanistan. Military forces are conducting offensive operations against Taliban sanctuaries in the Eastern Mountains while building schools and wells in nearby villages, training the new Afghanistan Army, and supporting Humanitarian Relief Agencies in protecting the populations at risk from the harsh winter. Security levels and development vary greatly throughout the country, and commanders must allocate their resources to best advantage.

There are two separate military organizations with different orientations operating simultaneously. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) is the American-led coalition focused on eliminating the Taliban and Al Qaeda threat. OEF operates throughout the country wherever the threat might be located. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), sanctioned by the United Nations, is based in Kabul and immediate vicinity, and is concerned with the security and stability of Kabul. The different orientations of the two forces affect their relationships with the various civilian organizations. OEF uses U.S. CMO doctrine based on a combination of Desert Storm and Balkan experience, while
ISAF uses NATO Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) doctrine based on Northern Ireland and the Balkans.

Non Governmental Organizations (NGO), International Governmental Organizations (IGO), and the relief community were uprooted and displaced after 9/11 and are adapting to a new reality. Concerned for their safety, most of the non-indigenous NGO and IGO personnel departed Afghanistan leaving behind their national staffs. Under the Taliban, these organizations had developed relationships that created Humanitarian Space to deliver essential services such as health, agriculture, road repair and water. These were provided nearly exclusively by the NGO/IGO community and therefore, their departure had a significant effect. After the military operations stabilized the situation, these NGOs and IGOs returned and are trying to reestablish themselves under a different political reality than existed under the Taliban.4

The Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) and later, the Islamic Temporary Government of Afghanistan (ITGA) were full players. Unlike Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Bosnia, or East Timor, indigenous governance is up and running, and is a key player. Under the Taliban, the relief community had developed relationships with various ministries. Now, the new governing body of Afghanistan wants direct influence over NGO and IGO activities. The international development and relief community is finding this a challenge.5

The operational environment remains unstable. The Taliban have not been eliminated but are in sanctuaries and passing undetected in various communities waiting for an opportunity to push their agenda. Various regional strong men, whose power has increased because of the conflict, are vying with the central government for power. There is no peace settlement but rather a peace process inside of which all parties are maneuvering. There is no countrywide international security force and the new army, police, and border security forces of the Afghan government are not yet trained or deployed.

The operation is being conducted in the context of other worldwide commitments. Afghanistan competes with numerous and varied interests including Iraq, Iran, Colombia, North Korea and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict for U.S. and world attention. These competing interests affect focus, commitment, and available resources.7
Executive Summary

General

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) succeeded in supporting humanitarian assistance operations while simultaneously conducting combat operations. By all accounts, OEF won the hearts and minds of those people it touched, and the support of many others. OEF brought a level of stability to many areas and established close relationships with interagency organizations such as U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). OEF employed a Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF) for the first time, and successfully directed and controlled an operational level Civil Affairs effort with limited resources. There were many challenges to overcome, and OEF continues to address them.

Strategic Direction and Coordination

The focus of U.S. national guidance was on destroying the Al Qaeda terrorist organization, infrastructure, and other terrorist groups; convincing or compelling states and non-state organizations to cease supporting terrorism; and providing military support to humanitarian operations. Its focus was not on conducting stability operations in support of Afghanistan. US national planning guidance focused on combat operations. The Humanitarian Assistance component of the planning guidance was designed to convince the Afghan people and the rest of the Islamic world that this was not a conflict directed against them. It was also designed to win the “hearts and minds” of the Afghan people in support of U.S. combat operations. Nevertheless, the initial guidance was that the U.S. military would not participate in Nation Building. This guidance influenced the force structure and the operational and tactical approach. In June 2002, following the deployment of CJTF 180, the shift toward stability operations began. The pace of Civil Military Operations has accelerated since then, but the legacy of the first year remains.

There appears to have been adequate national level guidance but no interagency plan was written until April 2002. That plan was not disseminated and proved to be inadequate. There were many committees and working groups formed but there was little coordination, direction, or sharing of information. All of the output of these working groups could have been pulled together had there been an interagency plan by late 2001 or early 2002.

Current policy directives do not require the development of a coordinated interagency plan. During the Clinton administration, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56 required the government to conduct interagency pol/mil planning. National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) XX, designed to replace PDD56, remains unapproved. This meant that for operations in Afghanistan, the various agencies involved planning and execution were not required to produce an interagency planning consensus.

An interagency plan was finally requested in April 2002, five months after operations had started. The published product did not meet the minimum requirements envisaged by NSPDXX. It did not prove useful toward establishing lines of authority and responsibility for the various aspects of Afghanistan operations. The lack of a plan resulted in the following gaps:
Safe and secure environment countrywide could not be established. ISAF controlled only Kabul and OEF controlled just the areas near its bases and operations.

Security Sector development has been retarded by the lack of a holistic coordinated approach.

Resources for the initial phases were constrained because of the “light footprint” of OEF and the limited capacity of other agencies.

Governance has not been extended beyond Kabul because of the lack of a safe and secure environment and the lack of a functional security sector. Limited resources and the “light footprint” concept of United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) compounded the lack of governance.

Limited resources and lack of a countrywide secure environment also affected Humanitarian Assistance.

Development and Reconstruction require a degree of central management and synchronization. The lack of a holistic interagency approach to the issue has slowed progress as well as limited resources.

Operational Direction and Coordination

The initial focus was to disrupt, defeat, and destroy terrorists and not to conduct CMO/Stability Operations. By December 2002, CMO/ Stability Operations were key missions. From September 2001 until December 2002, the CMO concept of support had changed three times. The initial concept was wholesale support of non-military organizations from locations outside of Afghanistan. By November 2001, needs forced the concept to shift to retail support. A Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force deployed to Kabul and Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHLC) expanded in the key locations in Afghanistan to expend Overseas Humanitarian Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) funds on quick impact, high visibility projects to “win the hearts and minds” of the Afghan people. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the US Embassy in Kabul worked closely with the CJCMOTF and the CHLCs to insure that the projects supported the legitimacy of the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) and later the Islamic Transitional Government of Afghanistan (ITGA), and met the appropriate contracting criteria. The quick impact missions took priority over the traditional assessment and coordination missions. With the deployment of Combined Joint Task Force 180 (CJTF180), the concept changed to stability operations. At the operational and tactical levels, a full service concept was launched in the form of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). These teams operated in eight major cities along with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and UNAMA regional Offices. They not only provided the quick impact projects, but also provided a focal point to coordinate the reconstruction programs of the NGO, IGO, and the ITGA. The shift has been from just assisting other agencies from a distance to engaging inside Afghanistan in order to support Afghan institutions and to eliminate sources of instability.

There was no holistic coordination mechanism established in Afghanistan to integrate civil and military operations. Under the “light footprint” concept, there would be no overall holistic international oversight of the peace building process as was
attempted in Bosnia and more successfully in Kosovo. Rather, the UN encouraged many countries to engage directly with the Afghan authorities. UNAMA only has two pillars: one for Relief, Recovery and Reconstruction and the other for Political Affairs. So, unlike the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), it does not see itself as the central coordinator. The ISAF coordinates its activities through a CIMIC center with various Afghan ministries and NGOs, and the coalition forces coordinate their activities through the CJCMOTF with the same ministries and NGOs. Initially in the field, the CHLCs coordinated locally with NGOs and IGOs that were in their areas. UNAMA uses the UNOCHA regional coordination centers to interface with NGOs and IGOs, and integrate that with the Afghan ministries’ efforts. Until July 2002, the relationship between UNAMA and the OEF coalition was distant and frosty. Each of the national embassies conducts its own business with the ITGA and UNAMA. The U.S. embassy coordinates with the CJCMOTF and CJTF180 through the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan (OMC-A). However, there is no organization charged with the overall coordination of all of these elements. In December 2002, CJTF 180 launched the Provincial Reconstruction Teams and the Civil Military Coordination Center in Kabul in an attempt to bring together the efforts of all of these agencies. At the beginning of 2003, the ITGA had established consultative groups in an effort to get its hands around the reconstruction efforts. **Operational support was not focused on CMO.**

- **Information Operations** were focused on supporting combat operations, and gaining legitimacy and force protection for OEF. Although ISAF used IO to effect, OEF had a difficult time exploiting the opportunities presented by CMO.

- **Intelligence Operations** were focused on supporting combat operations. Again it was difficult obtaining products that supported CMO. HUMINT was inadequate and opportunities were missed.

- **Information Management** was concerned with OEF combat operations. As of December 2002, CJCMOTF still did not have access to CENTRIXS (the coalition data network). The web-based system of CJTF 180 did not facilitate interagency coordination.

- **Command and Control** relationships between CJCMOTF, its subordinate units, and the rest of OEF were confused and counter productive. There were issues concerning support of Special Forces, the commands in Tampa and Kuwait, the US Embassy, and the OEF subordinate task forces that were still unresolved in December 2002, over a year after CJCMOTF and CHLC had deployed.

**There were useful mechanisms created at USCENTCOM in Tampa and in Islamabad to coordinate CMO.** A combined United Nations and NGO Liaison Team was created at USCENTCOM in Tampa to facilitate the flow of information and provide planning assistance, education, and subject matter expertise. CENTCOM established a Liaison Team in Islamabad that successfully coordinated and deconflicted military and relief actions. By all accounts, these efforts were successful.

**Tactical Direction and Coordination**

Success at the tactical level depended on the successful application of the principles of peace operations/stability operations. The ISAF forces and most of the US CA forces
had served in Bosnia and Kosovo, and applied the principles designed for successful tactical operations. These were the principles of consent, impartiality, transparency, force capability, and appropriate use of force.

**Successful tactical operations revolved around the concept of integrated interagency operations of USAID, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and Security Operations.** ISAF arrived with a concept of “linked up government” along three key lines to be conducted simultaneously: Information Operations, Security Operations, and Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC). The objective of CIMIC operations was to provide force protection for the ISAF force and to promote UNAMA and the ITGA by winning the “hearts and minds” of the people. Integrated teams patrolled day and night in villages around Kabul using their technology, especially night vision, to gain superiority over spoilers. CA teams operating with SOF approached this technique naturally, but the conventional forces took some time to develop this method of tactical CMO. 101st Airborne Division and 82nd Airborne Division both wanted to use CA assets in support of their operations, but the CA forces were concentrated in the CHLCs. Thus, aside from some limited staff elements, these units had no CA forces attached. The 101st initially used its subordinate Canadian battalion to conduct CMO.

**Conventional Units had difficulty accomplishing the CMO mission because they did not have control of their CA war trace units.** The WARTRACE CA units were controlled by the CJCMOTF and not by the task force commanders in whose areas they operated. Task force commanders were not sure how to influence the situation. Eventually, the commanders assumed CMO projects that had been initiated by CA forces.

**U.S. CA profile differed from previous contingencies in that small CA teams conducted self-contained operations in the countryside removed from OEF support.** CA accepted the risk and achieved credible results despite being neither equipped nor trained for such a mission. The teams identified and funded high impact projects to bring stability to villages and win “hearts and minds.” With the advent of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in December 2002, a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) was stood up to coordinate with NGOs, IGOs, USAID, Department of State, UNAMA, and ITGA.

**Doctrine**

**There is no approved interagency doctrine or policy.** This resulted in inadequate interagency planning and management, and ultimately a lack of national level integration and synchronization.

**Joint and Army Doctrine do not adequately address the CMO that were and are being conducted in Afghanistan.** There are no overall principles for CMO in either Joint or Army doctrinal manuals. Civil Affairs doctrine does not address the operations of the CHLCs and the Provisional Reconstruction Teams. Nor does it address the CJCMOTF and its relationships with the CA Commands, Brigades and Battalions. The relationship among the UN, U.S. Embassy, and the U.S. force commander also needs to be examined. The relationship between supporting and supported units needs to be clarified.

**Factors for successful doctrine:**

- Maneuver units should conduct, coordinate and integrate their CMO efforts with assigned CA forces instead of the CJCMOTF conducting regional operations under its own direct control.
Maneuver units should have their WARTRACE CA elements assigned to them.

The US Air Force should include the concept of the Regional Air Movement Control Center (RAMCC) in its doctrine. The RAMCC was a key and essential organization supporting OEF but has not been included in Air Force doctrine.

Relationship with NGO and IGO Communities

The relationship between the U.S. Military and the NGO and IGO communities was more strained and less functional than in previous operations. The relationship between the military and the NGO community went through several phases and existed on several levels.

- All sides struggling to establish relationships and operational parameters characterized the period prior to the start of combat operations. These were not clearly established before the conflict. The lack of an interagency planning process contributed to this deficiency. Also, the security climate restricted information flow and resulted in confusion.

- When the international community began wholesale distribution of aid, the military coordinated with the lead NGO and with the UN to facilitate delivery of supplies. As a result, the synchronization of combat operations with humanitarian relief succeeded. However, the NGO community, as well as the military Civil Affairs community, had some issues with the Humanitarian Air Drops. The working relationships with the NGO in Islamabad were close, but there were sensitivities over the neutrality issue. It was clear that a rift was developing between the war fighting mentality and the CMO mentality. NGO requests for security and air support were turned away because it was not the policy of OEF to provide either countrywide security or to divert military assets from combat operations to assist the NGOs.

- As the international community began the retail distribution of aid, OEF deployed CHLCs into Afghanistan working along side the NGO and UN communities. The relationship among OEF, the UN, and the NGOs was chilly at the operational and managerial levels, but accommodations occurred at the tactical level. Because OEF was considered a belligerent, the UN was especially reluctant to associate with the U.S. military until it determined the attitudes of the Afghans towards the U.S. The NGO community was slow in returning to the Afghanistan countryside. Therefore, the Afghans turned toward the CHLCs, which could provide resources, rather than NGOs. Embarrassment, suspicion, and trepidation marked the formal relationship, and this manifested itself in the issue of CHLC personnel wearing of civilian clothing. Some, but not all, NGOs complained that the CHLCs’ wearing of civilian clothing compromised the NGOs’ neutrality. As a result, the CHLC dress was modified. In spite of this problem, the NGOs continued to coordinate informally with the CHLC. For example, in Herat, the UN established a policy that the U.S. Military could not participate in their daily coordination meetings with the NGOs. But the next day after these meetings, the CHLCs visited the UN and the NGOs separately to coordinate. At the countrywide level, the CJCMOTF, because of its focus on projects, did not reach out to the NGOs and to the Afghan
Ministries as did ISAF. The NGOs had certain expectations of the military based on U.S. doctrine and practice in the Balkans. However, not all were met. For example, the NGOs expected the military to provide countrywide security.

• When the US-led coalition began stability operations, relationships between the UNAMA and OEF improved, and new mechanisms were established to integrate and encourage NGO and OEF cooperation. Based on prior experiences, the NGOs recognized that the CHLCs were not in competition with them but would assist them in getting projects. The CJCMOTF shifted its focus from primarily projects to the full spectrum of CMO to enable Afghan institutions and NGOs. Coordination and cooperation mechanisms were established such as the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) and the Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMOC) in Kabul. A new attitude at UNAMA and an outreach program to the NGO community, combined with an understanding among all sides about the future improved the situation. The ITGA also demonstrated initiative by establishing Consultative Groups to coordinate reconstruction.

Successful relationships.

• USAID, USCENTCOM, and the operators in the field forged closer and more productive relationships. USAID representatives were initially skeptical of the ability of the CHLCs to identify and conduct projects. But because the military was the only entity to operate in theater and USAID access to the country was restricted, the military was the only tool that the U.S. government could use. USAID, initially through the embassy and then through field officers, assisted CHLCs with the selection, funding and oversight of the programs. This close coordination with the operational command should serve as a model in the future.9

• The relationship between CHLCs and Other Governmental Agencies (OGA) was close. Early in the crisis, the CHLCs depended on OGA for assistance and funding. OGA were flexible, helpful, and able to provide quick impact money.

• The military was able to deconflict combat operations with Humanitarian Relief. CENTCOM was able to sanitize sensitive information and pass it to the NGO community in a timely manner.

• CJCMOTF worked closely with the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. CJCMOTF arrived in Kabul with the U.S. Marine security team that opened the embassy and the CJCMOTF commander was a member of the country team. This provided him access to the interagency process and gave him the ability to assist directly in national policy issues. In November 2002, the U.S. Army deployed a Major General to head the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan (OMC-A) in the US Embassy and provided him with a broader mission than the previous OMC. OMC-A will focus on coordinating the security sector issues.

• UNOCHA, United Nations Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC), and INTERACTION established a successful cell at USCENTCOM in Tampa to coordinate and inform the USCENTCOM staff on the conduct of CMO.
• UNJLC concept worked exceedingly well in providing an emergency response to coordinate the relief efforts. The CJCMOTF worked closely with the UNJLC sharing information and assisting each other.

• CHLCs at the tactical level established productive and harmonious working relationships with several NGOs. There were many examples of NGOs and CHLCs sharing and cooperating on projects.

• CJTF 180 has developed plans and command vision that recognizes the need to conduct harmonious operations with NGO and is proceeding to bring those visions to reality. This vision is being realized through the PRTs and the CJCMOTF coordination in Kabul.

Providing Appropriate Forces

Tables of Organization and Equipment do not support the CA employment profile in Afghanistan. The current TO&Es of the Reserve Component Civil Affairs Brigades and Battalions (RC) are based on the concept that these units will be operating in support of a conventional force that will provide force protection and support. Communications systems, weapons, transportation and other equipment are not adequate for independent operations. Civil Affairs units are not organized and equipped for the type of independent operations in an austere and non-permissive environment that they conducted in Afghanistan.

The Army system did not supply appropriate forces and individuals in a timely manner for the CMO operations in Afghanistan. Units and individuals mobilized late with a cascading effect. Units were given shifting mission statements before, during, and after the mobilization process that affected their preparation. Composite Units were formed and deployed mixing derivative UIC with TO&E units. WARTTRACE alignments were ignored. Mobilization sites did not properly prepare CA units for the specific region and missions. CA units had lower priorities than combat units and several key items on their Statement of Requirements (SOR) were not fulfilled.

Education and Training

Limited exposure to CMO in education and training has produced misunderstanding and a lack of appreciation.

• Commanders, staffs, as well as soldiers did not appreciate the complexities of CMO when they initially deployed and were not comfortable in dealing with CA issues. Confidence and understanding grew after on the job training. However, personnel turnover required that the process of education start anew.

• For Bosnia and Kosovo, the U.S. Army realized that extensive preparation was necessary and established Mission Readiness Exercises (MRE) training programs at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Ft. Polk, LA and at Hohenfels, Germany for all units deploying to those theaters of operations. After a year and two rotations into Afghanistan, no similar program had been developed for units deploying to Afghanistan.
Resources

CMO was not properly resourced in the areas of transportation and communications. Difficult geography, lack of road infrastructure, and lengthy distances placed a premium on reliable transportation. The military force was structured and resourced to support combat operations. However, OEF units did not bring sufficient transportation assets to support the civil demand present in a stability operation.

- Availability of air support was a major constraint in obtaining resupply and support to civil military projects.
- Ground transportation support had to be contracted; the results were mixed.
- Communications equipment did not provide the appropriate connectivity among the CA units, the task force, other U.S. agencies and the NGO community.

Limited resources for CMO affected the concept of the operation and the relationship with non-military organizations. Under the “light footprint” concept, U.S. forces deployed with only that material and equipment that were directly related to combat operations. Military engineer assets were insufficient to support either humanitarian or development operations. Because of limited Afghan and NGO capacity, several key humanitarian infrastructure projects such as bridges repair were not accomplished.

The funding process essential to supporting the civil projects proved to be restrictive and bureaucratic.

- Operational Funds: The CA teams were given OPFUNDs for the first time and they were indispensable in supporting isolated operations.
- Project Funds: Overseas Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster and Civil Aid (OHDACA) provided the funding for most of the CMO projects. The OHDACA funds did accomplish the mission of providing a workable financial tool to fund quick impact projects. The approval process, however, became bureaucratic, and the availability of contracting officers and transportation to get contracting officer to key areas was a constraint. OHDACA is a contracting tool and does not supply immediate impact monies. The CHLCs needed a fiscal tool that provided immediate impact monies for low dollar items. No such tool existed.
- Financial Constraints. USAID money and OHDACA money cannot legally mix. The CHLC and implementing partners of USAID had to take care that there was separation of funded projects. This separation constrains the synchronization of an interagency approach to stability operations, and therefore defeats one of the underlying fundamentals.

Transportation of humanitarian supplies. The Denton Amendment allows humanitarian goods to fly space available but there was no space available for OEF. There were other requirements in the War On Terrorism in other theaters that required airlift, not the least of which was Iraq. The forces supporting OEF depended on the U.S. Postal Service.
Planning

The initial military planning for OEF did not consider long-term stability operations. Only limited Civil Affairs advice was provided in the initial planning because of problems with understaffing and mobilization. Without the Civil Affairs perspective, CMO was viewed as a logistics issue of facilitating the delivery of humanitarian supplies. Staffs were not directed to consider long-term stability operations in the initial planning. Initial CENTCOM/ARCENT planning was linear and did not facilitate concurrent combat and peace operations as described in Joint and Army Doctrine. Eight months into the operation with the deployment of CJTF 180, lines of operations finally did adequately address long-term stability operations.

Effects based planning worked. CJTF 180 used effects based planning to develop lines of operations and measurers of effectiveness that addressed long term stability operations. By following these concurrent lines of operations, the commander could allocate resources across the spectrum of operations to best achieve his objectives. Collaborative planning did not occur for stability operations.

OEF planners developed their plans in accordance with the Military Decision Making Process. They then coordinated and deconflicted the plans with the CA, NGO and U.S. government agencies and departments. In stability operations, other agencies and staff sections should participate in the Operational Planning Group deliberation during concept development. This was not done for OEF. Transition planning was inadequate.

Initial transitional planning focused on humanitarian assistance and not on stability operations in Afghanistan. Subsequent planning was hampered by the lack of a strategic level political military plan. Doctrinally, the considerations for developing a transition plan are well conceived but presuppose that a political military plan exists. How does the military conduct transition planning when there is no organization identified by a political military plan that the military is to hand off to? Transition planning was still in flux by the end of this study.

Recommendations

- Develop clear political-military guidance for stability operations. The NSC should issue an NSPD replacing PDD56 and follow its guidance to produce a vision, a plan, and coordinating mechanism for interagency execution of stability operations.
- Establish interagency mechanisms at the operational theater level to coordinate theater wide military and civil efforts.
- Revise Joint and Army doctrine to reflect CMO/CA lessons learned in Afghanistan. The doctrine should address CMO principles, concept of operations, planning guidance, and command and control.
- Organize and equip forces in accordance with revised doctrine. The new tasks performed by CA in Afghanistan must be supported by TO&E. Correct force design to organize and equip CA forces.
- Provide appropriate CMO/CA expertise at senior commands. Develop and resource the TO&Es, and Joint Manning Documents to provide the appropriate expertise. Support the interagency task force concept.
• **Provide commanders financial and resource flexibility to address stability operations.** Laws should be reviewed, agreements made, and commanders educated to obtain and use resources to the fullest extent to accomplish the stability mission.

• **Establish clear lines of communication and coordination between military and NGOs/IGOs.** Establish a CMO advisor for each Combatant Commander. Support the establishment of a FEMA-type interagency task force within the Combatant Command.

• **Ensure intelligence supports CMO and stability operations.** Focus appropriate resources, particularly HUMINT, on supporting these types of operations.

• **Ensure information operations support CMO and stability operations.** IO must be designed to support stability operations. Establish theater integration and coordination mechanisms that link tactical level IO with interagency operational level guidance. Actively integrate civil affairs and intelligence into Information Operations.

• **Ensure planning encompasses full spectrum operations.** Concepts must include conflict termination, post-conflict actions, transition planning, along with relevant measures of effectiveness.

• **Educate and train military and civilian leaders.** Provide education at all PME levels on the principles of CMO. Develop, in concert with civilians, exercises that address CMO and stability operations.
Chapter 1. Background

This chapter outlines the basis and methodology for the study

Basis

The U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute (PKI) located at the U.S. Army War College has conducted studies of civil military operations in previous contingencies ranging from Haiti to Hurricane Mitch to Kosovo. Based on comments from various command levels engaged in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, PKI felt that the one-year mark was the proper time to do an assessment. Most of the participants would have finished or be near the ends of their tours and possess perspective to reflect on what had happened. Additionally, the arrival of the Combined Joint Task Force 180 in June 2002 provided the opportunity to understand its operational thrust. After the draft of this study was completed under the auspices of PKI, that Institute was reestablished as the U.S. Army Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI).

Methodology

The study considered basic documents such as orders, briefings, and reports, along with academic research papers, news media, and conference reports. The key to understanding what lay behind the written word was in the interviews. The objective was to interview all of the key players from the strategic down to the tactical level even though the focus was to be at the strategic and operational level. To frame the interview, PKI developed the following study tasks:

a. Examine the U.S. Interagency process’s ability to provide adequate political-military planning guidance to the Combatant Commander.

b. Examine the civil-military coordination procedures and mechanisms at both the strategic and operational levels.

c. Examine civil-military operations from the coalition, ISAF, NATO/IGO perspective.

d. Determine the adequacy of procedures to plan, coordinate, establish, and execute the CMO/HA mission.

e. Determine if current Joint and Army CA/CMO doctrine is sufficient in depth and clarity.

f. Study the evolution of the CJCMOTF.

g. Identify the lessons learned in standing up the CJCMOTF.

h. Determine the responsiveness of the Reserve Component (RC) mobilization process to support CMO/CJCMOTF operations for OEF.

The above tasks formed the basis for a set of interview questions located at Annex A.

Study Team Composition. PKI sought expertise and participation from the Department of State as well from the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy School at Ft. Bragg, NC. Additionally, PKI coordinated to obtain RAND and OSD representation. The final team was a seven person interagency team comprised of three PKI personnel, one individual
PKI gained approval and support from key agencies before commencing. The study was approved by RADM Robb, J5 of USCENTCOM on 28 Jun 02, by MG Boykin, CG, USAJFKSWC on 27 Jun 02 and by BG Mixon of CJTF180 on 7 Aug 02.

Recording and Footnoting the Results

USJFKSWC allowed PKI access to the 126th Military History Unit’s audio tapes of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs soldiers who served during the first year in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). All interviewees signed release statements, but the USJFKSWC requested that their names not be used. All PKI interviews were conducted under Chatham House rules. None of the comments can be attributed. PKI has developed the following notation system for the footnotes. The note identifies the organization and the date of the interview but not the person. For example, CJCMOTF 01, 4 Nov 02 and NGO 02, 5 Nov 02 identify two separate individuals interviewed on two separate occasions. The key to the notation and the original, attributed interview are maintain by PKI and can be reviewed with authorization by the Director of PKI. The footnote annotations are listed beside each of the sources below to assist the readers.

Sources

The following agencies and organizations were interviewed with footnote identifier:

US Military

U.S. Central Command, (CENTCOM number, date).

U.S. Army Central Command, (ARCENT number, date).

Combined Joint Task Force 180, Afghanistan, (CJTF 180, number, date).

Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force, Afghanistan, (CJCMOTF, number, date).

10th Mountain Division, (10th Mountain Div, number, date).

101st Air Assault Division, (101st, number, date).

360th Civil Affairs Brigade, (CJCMOTF number, date).

354th Civil Affairs Brigade, (CJCMOTF number, date).

352nd Civil Affairs Command, (352nd, CACOM, number, date)

489th Civil Affairs Battalion, (CJCMOTF number, date).

Subordinate CHLC, (CHLC number, date)

122nd Regional Operation Center, (122nd ROC, number, date)

96th Civil Affairs Battalion, (96th CA, number, date)

United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command. (USACAPOC, number, date)

377th Theater Support Command, (377th TSC, number, date)
US Army War College, (USAWC, number, date)
126th Military History Unit. (USJFKSWC Oral History Report number, OEF, date)
U.S. John F Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School Archives. (USJFKSWC, number, date)
U.S. Government
Office of the Secretary of Defense, (OSD, number, date)
Office of the Secretary of State, (DOS, number, date)
U.S. Agency for International Development, (US EMBASSY, number, date)
U.S. Embassy, Kabul, (US EMBASSY, number, date)
Allied Military
3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, (CANADA, number, date).
Joint Doctrine Development Center, United Kingdom, (UK, number, date)
International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, (ISAF, number, date).
UK Department for International Development (DFID), (UK, number, date)
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), (SHAPE, number, date)
United Nations
UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA, number, date)
United UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), (UN, number, date).
World Food Program, (IGO number, date).
UN Joint Logistical Center, (UN, number, date).
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, (UN, number, date).
NGOs (All identified in footnotes as NGO, number, date)
InterAction
CARE
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
Doctors Without Borders/Medecins sans Frontières (MSF)
Mercy Corps
International Organization for Migration (IOM)
Humanitarian Aid Office of the European Commission (Europa-ECHO)
RAND Corporation (RAND)
Chapter 2: Strategic Direction and Coordination

This chapter examines key policies, concepts, strategic direction and coordination

International Direction and Coordination

Between the defeat and departure of the USSR’s occupation force in February 1989 and the attacks of 9/11, the international community did not consider the political future of Afghanistan a priority. In fact, during that 12-year period there were only seven UN Security Counsel Resolutions relevant to Afghanistan, focused mainly on cessation of hostilities and the turn over of Osama bin Laden. The General Assembly passed a number of resolutions during the same time that focused on Human Rights and Emergency Assistance. The U.S. had no political or strategic vision in Afghanistan beyond the defeat of the USSR and therefore disengaged from the process. Although the U.S. chose to sit on the political sidelines, it did engage in a significant humanitarian assistance and in a counter narcotic program in Afghanistan. During this period, the United Nations and various NGOs were engaged in primarily humanitarian support of Afghanistan with the U.S. being the largest donor of humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people. When Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda took up residence in the country the U.S. and the UN engaged the Taliban via Security Council resolutions and sanctions focused on eliminating the Taliban’s support of terrorism. This general lack of political attention became significant in the post 9/11 world, where events rapidly outpaced policy.

While the speed at which events developed did not allow time for an international consensus on Afghanistan’s political future to crystallize, the international community was legitimately concerned about how to engage positively in Afghanistan. It neither wanted to repeat the mistakes of the USSR’s occupation nor to create a condition that portrayed the West as an occupier working through a puppet government inattentive to the desires of the Afghan people and destructive to Islam. Al Qaeda could use this image to increase its support in the Islamic world. Additionally, there was concern that Afghanistan could become a client state dependent on the international relief and development community, as had been the case before 9/11. These concerns shaped subsequent UN Security Council resolutions and the Bonn agreement.

For the first time since it was recommended in the Brahimi Report of 20 October 2000, the UN formed an Integrated Mission Task Force to provide support and policy recommendations to Mr. Brahimi, the designated Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan. This task force helped formulate the policy guidance, the concept for the organization and the mission of UNAMA.

Security Council Resolution 1383 of 6 December 2001 established the guidance for a strategy:

... to help the people of Afghanistan to bring to an end the tragic conflicts in Afghanistan and promote national reconciliation, lasting peace, stability and respect for human rights, as well as to cooperate with the international community to put an end to the use of Afghanistan as a base for terrorism.
The Bonn Agreement, signed the previous day, stated that:

*The interim arrangements are intended as a first step toward the establishment of a broad-based, gender sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government, and are not intended to remain in place beyond the specific period of time...[this interim authority was to] act in accordance with the basic principles and provisions contained in international instruments on human rights and international humanitarian law; cooperate in the fight against terrorism, drugs and organized crime; ensure the participation of women as well as the equitable representation of all ethnic and religious communities.*

The Bonn Agreement was not a peace agreement like the General Framework Agreement for Peace signed in Dayton was for Bosnia. It did not lay down a blue print for civil implementation as did nine of the eleven annexes of the Dayton agreement. Many key issues were either not addressed or left vaguely worded. The key issue of power sharing between local and central governments was not addressed. However, Bonn Agreement did establish a framework and a process. It was an attempt to address the concerns that the Afghans would oppose the imposition of a solution from outside players. An International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was established with assistance from the United Kingdom to support the peace process. ISAF was not sent to enforce a peace agreement but rather to assure the political neutrality and security of Kabul so that the new government could consolidate power. The Bonn framework was open-ended and required planning, coordination, and integration mechanisms to achieve its objectives.

The United Nations concept to provide those mechanisms was through a “light footprint.”

Lakhdar Brahimi, the United Nation’s Secretary General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan stated, “Parachuting a large number of international experts into Afghanistan could overwhelm the nascent transitional administration and interfere with the building of local capacity...The peace and reconstruction process stand a far better chance of success when it is nationally owned rather than led by external actors.” The concept was not to create an Afghan society with an unhealthy dependency on the international community that could quickly outlast its welcome. Mr. Brahimi’s objectives for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan were:

- Deploy and establish a small international profile.
- Work through partnership with the Afghan authorities.
- Integrate and coordinate the efforts of all agencies.

Security Council Resolution 1402 of 28 March 2002 established UNAMA under the direction of UNPD rather than UNDPKO and provided the following guidance on the relationship among the UNAMA, the Afghan Government, and international donors:

*Stresses that the provision of focused recovery and reconstruction assistance can greatly assist in the implementation of the Bonn Agreement and, to this end, urges bilateral and multilateral donors, in particular through the Afghanistan Support Group and the Implementation Group, to coordinate very closely with the Special Representative*
of the Secretary-General, the Afghan Interim Administration and its successors; Stresses also, in the context of paragraph 3 above, that while humanitarian assistance should be provided wherever there is a need, recovery or reconstruction assistance ought to be provided, through the Afghan Interim Administration and its successors, and implemented effectively, where local authorities contribute to the maintenance of a secure environment and demonstrate respect for human rights;\textsuperscript{16}

This resolution marked a change in approach. Previous practice was not to funnel resources through indigenous authorities; now the situation was reversed. Additionally, it stated that developmental assistance should be conditional on supporting the Bonn agreement. That created tension with the NGO community.

UNAMA was not developed from scratch, but rather was built upon the UN’s previous organizations in Afghanistan. Before 9/11, the UN had two separate existing missions: the UN Coordinator’s Office (UNOC), also called United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan, which coordinated the seven regional centers responsible for humanitarian assistance and the UN Special Mission for Afghanistan (UNSM), which had a political agenda. Both organizations had different tasks and end states. UNCO was run out of United Nations Office of Humanitarian Assistance and UNSM was run out of United Nations Department of Political Affairs. UNCO and UNSM did not always have a harmonious relationship, despite UN efforts in 1998 to achieve this through a \textit{Strategic Framework for Afghanistan} that aimed at “a more coherent, effective, and integrated political strategy and assistance programme.” Two groups were created to support this structure, the Afghanistan Support Group (ASG) and the Implementation Group (IG).\textsuperscript{17} This approach failed also; additionally, after the imposition of sanctions in 1999, relations with the governing Taliban also deteriorated.

Given this past experience, UNAMA’s mandate was intended to integrate all UN efforts into a single mission “to ensure that all UN efforts are harnessed to fully support the implementation of the Bonn Agreement.”\textsuperscript{18} The Secretary General declared in an 19 March 2002 report that UNAMA should:

\textit{Aim to bolster Afghan capacity (both official and non-governmental), relying on as limited an international presence and on as many Afghan staff as possible...thereby leaving a light expatriate ‘footprint.’}\textsuperscript{19}

Mr. Brahimi’s objective was to integrate all UN agencies under the SRSG and eliminate their stovepipe direction from their various headquarters in New York, Geneva, and Rome. Also, Brahimi did not want separate agencies of the UN to cut their own deals with different agencies of the Afghan Government, as had been the practice under the Taliban.\textsuperscript{20}

UNAMA was organized into two pillars: Relief, Recovery, and Reconstruction and Political Affairs. The four-pillar structure that had been adopted for United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo was not used. There was no separate pillar for security or rule of law or Humanitarian Rights. In line with the ‘light footprint’ concept, UNAMA limited the size of the staff, especially in the areas of security, elections, humanitarian rights and Disarmament Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR). There would be no overall holistic international oversight of the peace building process as in Kosovo. Instead,
many countries were encouraged to engage directly with the Afghan authorities. The objective was to push the local authorities to accept responsibility for their own country and legitimize those authorities through providing effective international assistance.

For instance, rather than establishing a pillar for rule of law, several nations assisted in developing the constituent pieces. Germany focused on the training of the policemen. Italy assisted the judiciary. The United States, along with Japan, focused on border guards and the United Kingdom worked with counter-drug activities.21

CJTF 180 estimated that the reconstruction effort involved six UN agencies, 33 Afghan Ministries, 250 NGOs, and 65 Nations without any coherent centralized management.22

With the signing of the Bonn agreement, a plan for Afghanistan to guide stabilization and appeal to donors was required; however, none was created. There are multiple visions for the End State in Afghanistan, including those of UNAMA, ISAF, OEF, the World Bank, and US Department of State. Not all of these visions are congruent on all points. There are differences concerning the status of humanitarian assistance and aid conditionality, human rights and gender policy. Some examples follow:

- **Intermediate Transition Assistance Program (ITAP) 2002.** This is a fund-raising document intended by the UN to generate contributions and investments. It was prepared as a functional alternative to the UN consolidated appeals process supporting the Tokyo Ministerial Meeting.

- **U.S. Pol/Mil Plan** prepared by the POLMIL bureau at US Department of State coordinated by the interagency, April 2002. This plan lays out one vision by the U.S. interagency but is not the action document used by the Afghans or by USCENTCOM.

- **Transition Support Strategy for Afghanistan** by World Bank, March 2002. It provides a framework for the donors and is focused on the activities of the World Bank.23

- **National Development Framework** by the Islamic Transitional Government of Afghanistan (ITGA). The ITGA is using this blueprint. It is a living document drafted by the Afghan ministries in coordination with the United Nations and other interested nations to guide investment and serve as the basis for the National Development Budget. This is the most useful document and comes the closest to providing a strategic vision for the new Afghanistan according to the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit.24

Differing views are not necessarily counter productive as long as existing mechanisms can rationalize and integrate them. But the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Units’ study in August 2002 concluded:

> It is clear that the assistance effort is perceived by those involved in it to be characterized by internal argumentation, interagency rivalry, weak cooperation, and strategic disarray.25

Unfortunately, the initial relationship between the US and the international community did not facilitate close working relationships. Initially, the US was considered a combatant in the process and therefore, kept at arms length by the UN and the NGO community. This attitude did not facilitate collaborative planning and coordination. A UN and NGO cell was
establishing at Central Command and allies participated in the coordination process, but coordination at the operational level was a challenge.

Early on, the United Nations Joint Logistical Center (UNJLC) provided the key coordination and integration mechanism to link the strategic to the operational and enable the Humanitarian Relief supply deliveries.

In November 2002, UNDPKO assumed the mission support for UNAMA. UNDPKO provided quiet support from the beginning, but its significant planning and coordination capability was not formally harnessed. This had as much to do with US national agenda not to call Afghanistan a Peace Operation as with the UN concept for engagement. In December 2002, The Afghan Government established Consultative Groups (CGs) to focus on specific benchmarks in the 12 development programs as defined in the National Development Framework presented in October 2002 to the international donors. These groups will include representatives from the Afghan Government, focal point donor, UNAMA, and NGOs. The hope is that these 12 groups, reporting to the Afghanistan Development Forum, will provide rationalization for the development process. CJCMOTF has deployed civil affairs ministerial teams to link up with these ministries and assist.

U.S. National Direction and Coordination.

Four factors shaped U.S. National Direction and Coordination: lack of an adequate interagency plan, the focus on hunting terrorists and not on nation building, security concerns that hindered coordination and information sharing, and resource constraints and concerns.

The suddenness with which the need to deal with Afghanistan arose, hindered the interagency process in developing consensus. Policy was developed concurrently with operational planning and many times operational realities out paced policy guidance. The quick end to the Taliban resistance accelerated the need to “do something.”

The overall direction from U.S. leadership was clear: “to support the creation of an international political environment hostile to terrorism…” An interagency plan to operationalize this azimuth was required.

A Campaign Coalition Working Group chaired by the NSC met within days of 9/11. It interacted with the UN and was instrumental in assisting the UN construct its response to global terrorism. This group, along with a Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) chaired by State and NSC, led the discussion on post-war Afghanistan. The PCC, in coordination with the UN, worked out the concept for the UN transitional administration and the concept for the ISAF. The UK took the lead for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

Many more committees and working groups formed concurrently, and many people tried to help, but there was little coordination, direction, or sharing of information among them. An interagency political military plan could have pulled all of this effort together. The current administration is under no directive to develop such a plan. PDD56, approved under the Clinton administration, required interagency pol/mil planning. NSPD XX, designed to replace PDD56, still awaits approval. This meant that for Afghanistan, no mechanism existed to force an interagency planning consensus.

An interagency plan was finally requested in April 2002, five months after operations had started. The published plan did not meet the minimum requirements envisaged
by NSPDXX, nor was the plan utilized as an implementing and tracking tool after its production. Specific problems included:

- The end states, interim objectives and measures of effectiveness that were described in the plan were neither disseminated nor used.
- The plan did not describe an inter-agency division of labor.
- The plan did not specify lines of authority among U.S. government agencies
- The plan did not fully developed the international context for U.S. engagement
- The plan did not establish a balance between short term needs against long-term objectives—for example funding of proxies to prosecute the war was focused on short term objectives that conflicted with the long term-objectives of building a new Afghan Army and the power of the central government.

Another factor that affected the strategic direction of the operation was the initial decision that the U.S. would not focus on Nation Building or Peace Operations. Although unrealistic, it was an outgrowth of the lack of a political/military planning process. This initial direction stunted the development of a coherent approach to address the reality on the ground in Afghanistan. It affected the operational concept of USCENTCOM, the organization of the forces, engagement with other agencies and allies, the relationship with NGOs and with the Afghan population. Since January 2002, Civil Affairs Teams were supporting projects that could be termed “nation building.” The focus shifted toward stability operations with the deployment of JTF 180 in July 2002, the development of a Civil Military Concept of Operations, and the deployment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in December 2002.

Security concerns also impacted strategic direction. The focus on defeating terrorists led to the imposition of restraints that that eliminated much of the coordination and information sharing with NGOs/ IGOs. Although an LNO cell consisting of UN and NGO representatives was established at USCENTCOM, there was little interface and preparation similar to that accomplished before military operations in Haiti or the Balkans. Humanitarian and military operations were successfully deconflicted through the sharing of information, but collaborative planning for stability operations did not occur. This lack of coordination led to misunderstandings and a great deal of friction and lost opportunities.

Finally, the need to allocate resources for Iraq and other battlefronts against worldwide terrorism shaped strategy in Afghanistan. Additionally, the enormity of the issues in Afghanistan led to a concern that Afghanistan could become a “black hole” that would consume U.S resources and capacity. These concerns, coupled with that of being seen as a conqueror and out lasting the welcome of the Afghan people, as well as providing propaganda and recruiting tool for Al Qaeda, convinced U.S. leadership to adopt a “light footprint” concept. So, the military designed a small force optimized to seek and destroy Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and have minimal contact with the local population.

Gaps

The above described conditions contributed to the following gaps between needs and capabilities:
Safe and Secure Environment

On 29 January 2002 President Bush stated:

_The United States is committed to building a lasting partnership in Afghanistan. We will help the new Afghan government provide the security that is the foundation for peace._

In March 2002, the Security-General’s report to the Security Council described the following situation:

_At present the Force (ISAF) remains limited to Kabul, while the main threats to the Interim Administration emanate from the provinces. There is a continuing danger that existing security structures, both Afghan and international, will not adequately address the security threats that are currently discernible._

A year later in March 2003, the situation was much the same:

_Security remains the most serious challenge facing the peace process in Afghanistan. Security must be improved to allow the re-establishment of the rule of law, ensure the protection of human rights, promote the reconstruction effort and facilitate the success of the complex political processes, including the development of the new constitution and the holding of free and fair elections. Afghans in many parts of the country remain unprotected by legitimate State security structures. Criminal activity by armed groups has of late been particularly evident in the north, east and south, and in many areas, confrontation between local commanders continues to contribute to instability._

Coalition forces comprising OEF are focused on hunting Al Qeda and Taliban remnants, while the ISAF’s “light footprint” limits it to Kabul and its environs. As a result, large swaths of Afghanistan remain unsecured. Local warlords still hold sway in many areas. Their relative power has even increased in some instances because of resources and support that the U.S. gave and is still giving some of them.

There have been debates in the UN and among coalition partners about expanding ISAF or directing OEF to assume a country-wide security mission. ISAF, as of this writing, does not appear to be expanding. OEF has no plans to increase in size or capability. Although OEF has launched the concept of Provincial Reconstruction Teams to try to address some of these issues and extended presence, they were not to extend the “ISAF” effect of establishing a long term safe and secure environment. NATO has now assume the responsibility for ISAF and is considering assuming the responsibility for some of the PRIs.

Of course, a wide range of reconstruction, development, and political/legal initiatives cannot be extended throughout the country without a safe and secure environment. The Afghanistan Army, national police, border guards and other security forces will take several years and a great deal of support and political deal making before they are effective. Until these forces are ready, or the international community takes action, the security gap will remain.
Security Sector

Building viable Afghanistan security sector is an essential step. Nevertheless, no holistic approach exists to develop required institutions and UNAMA’s charter includes no security sector pillar.

- **Afghan National Army (ANA).** Initially the focus was on training tactical units and not on a complete renovation of the defense structure. Over time, however, the U.S. has taken an increasingly comprehensive approach. In October 2002, the Office of Military Cooperation—Afghanistan (OMC-A) at the US Embassy received the mandate to coordinate all security sector issues for the U.S. Government, which is a step toward achieving a holistic U.S. approach toward the security sector. The U.S. has also contracted Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MRPI) to assess the situation and help develop a more comprehensive development program for the ANA and the Ministry of Defense.

- **Rule of Law.** Rule of Law consists of many interrelated parts. These constituent parts must be approached in a comprehensive manner supported by military, political, and economic development to be successful. Getting the drug trade under control and disarming and demobilizing the various local militias will be critical. However, there is no comprehensive approach; indeed, the establishment of five separate Consultative Groups within the Transitional Government for rule of law reinforces fragmentation.  

  a. **Judiciary:** Italy has the lead, with the U.S. in support. The U.S. program is valued at $2 million. Implementation has been delayed by uncertainty over the outcome of Afghanistan’s constitution drafting process.

  b. **Police:** Germany has the lead, and the U.S. will follow. The U.S. is a major contributor, having offered $25 million.

    1. **Police Intelligence:** Germany is the lead.
    2. **Criminal Investigations:** UK is the lead.

  c. **Border Police.** The U.S. is responsible for training but there is no money, no air support, and no overall vision or structure.

  d. **Penal:** No one has the lead. At last report, one Finnish officer was monitoring the situation for the UN. The Afghan police run the prisons in a Soviet Style, so there are many problems.

  e. **Counter Drug and Drug Interdiction:** The UK has the lead and has asked the U.S. for support. A Counter-Narcotics Directorate has been established within the ITGA, but this agency shares the same lack of resources, capacity, and clout outside of Kabul as the rest of the Afghan government.

  f. **Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR).** The program currently is voluntary, coordinated by the ITGA and a small UN office. Although it is well funded by Japan, there may be problems in putting teeth into the program. Reforming the Ministry of Defense is a necessary first step to avoid the perception that DDR is merely a Tajik plot to eliminate military
competitors. The U.S. policy is that OEF forces will not get involved in engagements between Afghan factions or support DDR by use of force.  

Resources

Resource shortfalls have limited international capacity on the ground to accomplish vital tasks directly, as well as limited the ability to assist the ITGA extend its influence. Great distances and a lack of useable road infrastructure in the country make air transport essential. But the U.S. military has provided only enough airlift to support combat operations and not CMO. This lack of air assets has prevented the extension of central government control. For instance, in November 2002, limited air support prevented the government from getting the new currency to all areas of the country in an acceptable time, resulting in currency speculation and devaluation. Additionally, contracting officers are needed to execute contracts supporting development and humanitarian relief. The few contracting officers are limited by the availability of air transport to such a degree that contracts for critical support are often delayed. Lack of military air assets has also driven the international community to contract primarily East European and Russian entrepreneurs at premium prices.

Insufficient engineer capacity on the part of ISAF and OEF, coupled with the lack of local capacity and NGO capacity, has delayed critical infrastructure recovery necessary for humanitarian relief and extension of central governmental influence. The OEF coalition brought just enough engineer support to focus on the primary mission of hunting Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Because the military was not going to do nation building there was no need to provide extra capability. This is a capability that NGOs and IGOs have been conditioned to expect from past operations. This state of affairs limited capacity compelled them to contract for support with external players such as Turkey and Pakistan.

The “light footprint” has led to proxies, such as the Afghan Militia Forces (AMF) employed by the local and provincial warlords, to continue to provide security and services. This program, using generous pay scales, has, at times, increased local power at the expense of the central government, and upset the local economic structure and expectations. Additionally, it has led to complications when the new police and Afghan National Army arrive in the outlying regions.

Governance

A governance gap is the result of the preceding gaps. Control from Kabul will take time to extend to all parts of the country, resulting in a high degree of inefficiency, ineffectiveness, lack of coordination, and delay. This in turn, empowers local strong men who have differing agendas and loyalties.

Fragmentation will likely increase with implementation of the concept of the Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority (AACA). Its role is to encourage national governments to deal separately with various parts of the ITGA, as well as the local governors and warlords. The concept to establish twelve consultative groups for each of the twelve National Development Program defined within the National Development Framework is designed to enable donors to finalize their support to each program area in consultation the Afghan Government stakeholder.
Humanitarian Assistance

The absence of a safe and secure environment and the concomitant hesitancy of NGOs to expand into the countryside, along with infrastructure shortfalls, have slowed the response to people at risk. There is a humanitarian assistance gap to overcome.

OEF support to humanitarian assistance was defined in the context of supporting combat operations, deconflicting those operations with humanitarian assistance but not in providing critical support countrywide. If the relief efforts were in proximity to or could influence OEF operations, then support could be considered. But general relief convoys transiting the county were on their own with no promise of any security support from OEF. While both OEF and ISAF forces have responded to crises, there remains no overarching plan to support humanitarian assistance.

Development/Reconstruction

A development/reconstruction gap exists principally because initially there was no central management mechanism assessing the entire Afghanistan picture. Placing the various Afghan Ministries in charge, assisted by the international community, has led to diffusion. Mr. Brahimi has attempted to guide the UN agencies and the Afghan ministries but there are many other forums, groups, meetings and people dealing with various Afghan Ministries. The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit wrote in August 2002:

*There is no entity meeting or process that incorporates the term “strategic coordination” in its formal title, and partly because the processes of coordination were being re-invented at the time of writing. It is also due in part to the difficulty in identifying what actually constitutes strategy for the international assistance effort for Afghanistan, and who or what is responsible and accountable for it.*

Some of the organizations, operating in stovepipe fashion, attempting to coordinate development/reconstruction are listed below. Though some have done good work, the whole is less than the sum of the parts.

**Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority (AACA).** Formed in April 2002 to coordinate all external assistance to Afghanistan. It participates in two types of meetings: one held by the Afghan authorities, another by the CJCMOTF. It does not address security issues.

**National Security Coordination Meeting.** Forum for coordination of security sector. To date it has only been a clearing house for information, but has the potential to be a policy and coordination body.

**Afghan Reconstruction Steering Group (ARSG).** Provides a forum to vet donors.

**Afghan Support Group (ASG).** Provided some direction to focus monies funneled into the country from 1997 through the end of 2002, when it was discontinued and transferred its responsibilities to the ITGA.

**United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA).** UNAMA and its regional offices are growing into focal points for the NGO community. In December 2002, CJTF 180 began the deployment of Provisional Reconstruction Teams to be located near the UNAMA regional offices in an effort to harmonize the efforts of the military, NGOs/IGOs, and ITGA.
Consultative Groups (CGs) In December 2002, the Afghan Government established Consultative Groups (CGs) to focus on specific benchmarks in the 12 development programs as defined in the National Development Framework presented in October 2002 to the international donors. These groups include representatives from the Afghan Government, focal point donor, UNAMA, and NGOs. The hope is that these 12 groups, reporting to the Afghanistan Development Forum, will provide some harmonization and rationalization for the development process. By December, the CJCMOTF had deployed civil affairs ministerial teams to link up with and assist the ITGA ministries.  

Even though the monetary assistance that Afghanistan now receives exceeds any previous amounts, the needs are daunting. At the Tokyo Conference, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank along with the UN Development Program provided an estimate of the minimum reconstruction requirement. But the pledges of grants and loans totaled only 60 percent of the low-end five-year projection. Some of these pledges were slow to be paid and the humanitarian needs of food, water and medicine seem to act as a “black hole” sucking in an ever-increasing amount of monies that should go toward reconstruction. Although President Bush referred to a “Marshall Plan for Afghanistan,” nothing akin to it has yet been developed for Afghanistan.

More donor money is needed urgently to buttress what is still a tenuous transition to sustainable peace. The average Bosnian or East Timorese receives more than $200 in foreign assistance per year, while the average Afghan has probably been allocated about $85. Yet, the requirements in Afghanistan are greater than those in Bosnia or East Timor. A more realistic assessment suggests that Afghanistan needs some $15 billion over the next five to eight years. This is three times the sum pledged in early 2002 at a major donor conference held in Tokyo.

Afghanistan’s needs were underestimated partly because the assistance program at the Tokyo conference was cobbled together on the basis of very little information or discussion. The Afghan Interim Administration, which had been in office for less than two months, presented a very modest budget proposal for the country’s recovery. Donors were also in something of a wait and see mood. They wanted to be sure that any money would be spent effectively.

Factors for Successful Strategic Direction and Coordination

- Establish clear political guidance.
- Publish a political-military plan.
- Establish coordination mechanisms.
Chapter 3: Operational Direction and Coordination

This chapter considers key operational direction and coordination

Operational Focus

OEF’s initial focus was to disrupt, defeat, and destroy terrorists. Stability operations as such were not considered. The U.S. did not intend to conduct nation building. Nevertheless, the leadership recognized that the result of combat operations would exacerbate the already grave humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan. Therefore, humanitarian relief would be necessary and U.S. support for humanitarian relief would demonstrate to the world that OEF was not directed Islamic people, but indeed intended to aid them.

The initial OEF operational concept was:

On Order, USCENTCOM, as part of a National Counter Terrorist Campaign and ICW Allies and Coalition partners conduct sustained military operations within the AOR to destroy the Al Qaida terrorist organization, infrastructure and other terrorist groups. Convince or compel states and non-state organizations to cease support of terrorism and eliminate terrorist access to WMD. Be prepared to provide military support to humanitarian operations. Once initial objectives are achieved, maintain capability to detect, deter, defeat/destroy the re-emergence of terrorism. Protect citizens, forces and critical infrastructure of the U.S., Allies and friends.43

USCENTCOM envisioned providing support to NGOs/IGOs that were conducting humanitarian assistance throughout all four phases of the operation. The intent was to “mitigate the humanitarian crisis and allow the Coalition to continue its campaign against international terrorism.”44

In this context, military humanitarian assistance had a significant psychological operations dimension. Its goals were behavioral as well as purely humanitarian. Those goals were to:

• Prevent destabilization of the region by preventing the refugee flow into Pakistan.
• Insure that the coalition could continue its campaign against international terrorism without interference from civilians.
• Generate support among the Afghan people for the coalition campaign, i.e. “win their hearts and minds.”
• Prevent a humanitarian disaster that would have negative political consequences for the U.S. and the Coalition in their war against terrorism.

Wholesale Method of Aid Distribution (Sep 01 – Nov 01). The initial approach was that of wholesale distribution. The military would liaise with relevant NGOs/IGOs through the UN Joint Logistics Center (UNJLC), use the existing civilian framework where ever possible, employ the most efficient military air capability available, and then cease military support once NGOs/IGOs reestablished delivery of vital aid using their own resources. The
military would use the existing civilian infrastructure and provide emergency support only as required. Military involvement would cease once the aid community could generate enough capacity to take over the delivery of humanitarian supplies.

In October 2001, OEF planners did not see the need for Civil Military Operations on the ground in Afghanistan. Additionally, the UN desired to minimize its association with the coalition on the ground and were satisfied with wholesale humanitarian assistance. USCENTCOM would support the delivery of humanitarian assistance from locations in Islamabad, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan without ever having to establish a long-term presence in Afghanistan. This concept supported the “light foot print” concept and reservations against nation building.

To coordinate these humanitarian operations, USCENTCOM tasked US Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT) to put together an organization. Based on joint doctrine, ARCENT elected to establish a Combined Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF). A crucial problem was which unit to organize the CJCMOTF around. The CJCMOTF was to support NGOs/IGOs, but there was no Pol/Mil plan, and no idea of what the end state should look like. The lack of guidance was exacerbated by the limited peacetime CMO planning capability in ARCENT. Recommendations to form the core of the CJCMOTF ranged from a Civil Affairs Brigade, an active Engineer Brigade, and even U.S. Army Southern European Task Force (SETAF). Ultimately, because ARCENT viewed the mission as primarily logistical and somewhat analogous to the BRIGHT STAR exercise template of four to five remote logistics bases, ARCENT tasked units that had recently exercised in BRIGHT STAR, the 377th Theater Support Command, (TSC), and the 122nd Rear Operations Center, (ROC) to form the core of the CJCMOTF.

The USCENTCOM, ARCENT, 377th TSC, and 122nd ROC commanders had all developed personal relationships working with each other over the years on USCENTCOM plans and exercises. This was in contrast to the lack of such relationships between civil affairs personnel and the USCENTCOM or ARCENT senior commanders and staffs. The 122nd ROC provided 34 officers and enlisted to man staff sections, while the 377th TSC provided fillers. ARCENT provided the plans section until the 352nd CA Command could provide fourteen captains to form a planning cell. CJCMOTF was initially commanded by the 122nd ROC commander and subsequently, when the need arose for a flag officer, by Deputy Commanding General, 377th TSC. From the outset then, while understanding logistics, the CJCMOTF did not possess great CMO experience or expertise.

CJCMOTF started its life in Atlanta, GA with ARCENT. But as the locus of coordination was in Tampa at USCENTCOM, CJCMOTF established a presence there as well. CJCMOTF started out as a true combined headquarters early on. Department for International Development (DFID) from the UK, and the UK CIMIC team joined the CJCMOTF in Tampa (though when the CJCMOTF deployed to Kabul in December 2001, the chief of the UK CIMIC team joined ISAF. The rest of the British CIMIC team and DFID representative remained with CJMOTF until April 2002). The Australians and New Zealanders were to provide teams but a civilian clothes issue prevented them from joining. On the other hand, CJCMOTF was not joint. The Air Force never provided personnel. While the Marines did mobilize part of their Civil Affair Group (CAG), they did not provide an officer to the CJCMOTF in that capacity. There was a real need for an Air Force
officer to assist in dealing with the significant airlift issues that would be associated with
the CMO effort.

On 11 October 2001, a major from the 96th CA Battalion deployed to Islamabad
along with the USCENTCOM LNO team led by USAF Brigadier General to establish a
coordination center. The major established a CMOC along with four members of the British
CIMIC team headed by deputy commander of UK CIMIC and DFID representative. It was
several weeks later before any other U.S. personnel arrived to assist. The UK assistance
made the mission in Islamabad possible.

The CMOC created Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHLC) to gain acceptance
with the NGO/IGO and UN community, who were concerned about the term military
in CMOC. The CHLCs coordinated with this community, assisted them in providing
humanitarian assistance, assessed the requirements for assistance in Pakistan, and laid
the initial ground work for future relationships with the UN. The key task was deconflicting
humanitarian assistance with combat operations.

The deconfliction mission was a success, but the NGOs/IGOs and UN wanted more
in the way of support, but under the wholesale approach OEF was not going to provide
logistical or security support to the international aid community.

After Kabul fall on 13 November 2001, the aid community started to move to Kabul.
Because the locus of action had shifted into Afghanistan, it became apparent that the CHLC
function could be better served there. In December 2001, the CHLCs moved to Kabul with
the idea of setting up the same type of operation that it had been conducting in Islamabad,
but the approach then changed. Commander CJCMOTF in Kabul directed that the mission
was to identify projects to assist the Afghan people.47

Retail Method of Aid Distribution (Nov 01- Jun 02). The move to the retail
approach was driven by several factors: frustration at USCENTCOM with the progress
of humanitarian assistance, the need for ground truth, SOF requirements for support
to indigenous fighters, and the IO imperative to do something positive for the Afghan
people to convince them and the Islamic world that this was not a conflict against Islam.
Commanders at all levels realized that some type of on-the-ground assistance had to be
provided immediately and could not wait until combat operations ceased. 48

As the CJCMOTF and CHLCs moved into Afghanistan, they realized that the concept
of quick impact projects could accomplish the following objectives:

- Minimize the negative effects of Combat Operations
- Enhance the Credibility of Coalition Forces with the Afghan People
- Enhance the Credibility of the Interim Government.49

There were few engaged NGOs in the unsecured, volatile conflict areas where a civic
action program was needed to win the hearts and minds of the people. The 96th CA
Battalion received the mission and deployed with the following initial objectives:

- Support the families of the warriors that the Special Forces were advising
- Support the local leaders through providing them immediate impact projects.50
The 96th CA, in coordination with the JSOTF, conceived and deployed Humanitarian Assistance Survey Teams consisting of different functional specialists to assess critical infrastructure to include schools, hospitals, water, power and electric. Projects were then recommended to support the Special Forces missions. Initially, the money for these projects came from the Special Forces, OGAs (Other Governmental Agencies,) and some UK Department for Foreign Internal Development (DFID) sources. The initial canal project in Herat for Ismail Khan was supported by these sources. When additional support was required, the request went to USCENTCOM where a reserve CA officer in the CMO cell at CENTCOM, who understood Office of Humanitarian Disaster Assistance Civil Aid (OHDACA) funding, worked the action with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict to make OHDACA funds available.

Debra Alexander of the USAID Office of Transitional Initiatives arrived in theater about the same time that the CJCMOTF and CHLC were starting their programs. Ms. Alexander had worked with the CA teams in Kosovo and Bosnia, and realized their potential in Afghanistan. For security reasons, the Regional Security Officer in the U.S. Embassy would not support USAID representatives operating outside of Kabul, so Ms. Alexander and Elizabeth Kvitasvili of USAID at the embassy coordinated with Commander CJCMOTF, to see if the CHLC could assist and provide security. A sound relationship was developed whereby each organization could assist the other. USAID had DOS money and CJCMOTF had DOD money to spend on projects. USAID had experience to assist the CHLC and the CHLC had access and security in areas that USAID needed to have influence. CHLC could identify projects and conduct assessments, and USAID could use that information to obtain contracting partners. This arrangement proved to be successful.

By January 2002, the CHLC employment concept was in place. Its focus was on immediate impact projects using Office of Humanitarian Disaster Assistance Civil Aid (OHDACA) funds administered by DOD in coordination with USAID to win the hearts and minds of the people in areas near coalition operations. The intent of the OHDACA program was to “enhance force protection and facilitate coalition presence.” Instructions from commander Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) were clear that this was not a purely humanitarian program but an information operation. The focus was not on performing surveys and establishing long-term programs, but on searching for quick impact programs that would provide the most visibility for the limited funds available. It was project-oriented and coordinated with USAID. This played to the strengths of a CJCMOTF under the leadership of a Theater Support Command more comfortable with project selection and execution than with CMO. Initially, CFLCC directed activities only in permissive areas in support of OEF forces.

The CHLC had criteria established by OSD and looked for projects that fit those criteria. However, there was no overall international or U.S. interagency plan to guide either USAID or CJCMOTF in selecting these projects or fitting them into a coherent whole. Each organization, therefore, made selections based upon their best judgment.

The following is a summary of the approval criteria:

- Support the Basic Needs of the Afghan People
- Provide Access to and Increase Afghan Support for Coalition Efforts in Afghanistan
• Provide Support to the Legitimacy of the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA)
• Support the Efforts of the Primary Post-conflict Phase Actors. (AID, DFID)\textsuperscript{56}

Because there were eight CHLCs and the CJCMOTF to share only $2.5 million of initial OHDACA monies, the guidance was to spread the money as widely as possible to achieve the maximum effect. The majority of projects attended to the needs and desires of the local authorities and focused on schools, medical facilities, and water. From August to May 2002 the CHLC in Gardez initiated $350,000 worth of projects. This translated into 19 projects. There were 16 school projects, two clinic and hospital projects and one water project. The overall breakdown of projects completed as of May 2002 was 41 percent schools, 30 percent medical, 20 percent water, and the rest on agriculture, bridges and other.\textsuperscript{57}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ESTIMATED EXPENDITURES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bridge/Road</td>
<td>$15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>$47,120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<tr>
<td>Irrigation</td>
<td>$191,125</td>
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<tr>
<td>Water Well</td>
<td>$316,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital/Med</td>
<td>$785,209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School</td>
<td>$1,048,694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>$2,566,588</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At times, CHLCs would be in the uncomfortable position of trying to keep the support of the local community while they waited on funds or the visit of a contracting officer for up to six weeks. This problem manifested itself on one of the very first projects, the canal project for Ishmael Khan. The project consisted of clearing out 170 kilometers of canals in time for the planting season while employing between 5,000 and 12,000 individuals in a cash and food for work program. Funding delays caused significant concern with the CHLC and tension with locals, as it kept promising the money as the weeks went by. Eventually, funds arrived and the project was a success, not only employed many locals but also reclaiming over 400 hectares of arable land, thus increasing food production, feeding Iranian refugees and engaging USAID’s implementing partners.\textsuperscript{58}

Initially, CHLCs wore civilian clothes, concealable body armor, carried concealed weapons, and lived in houses in the local neighborhoods. ARCENT approved these procedures to reduce the visibility of coalition forces in the Area of Operations.\textsuperscript{59} Later, some of the NGO community would object to CHLC wearing civilian clothes and the policy was changed.\textsuperscript{60}

The NGOs expected to coordinate through a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) and not have CHLCs contracting for projects. Initially, the CMOC function of enabling
and supporting NGOs to provide relief was performed by the CHLC in Islamabad by deconfliction of combat operations with humanitarian relief. However, when civil affairs deployed into Afghanistan, this function lapsed. Although two organizations were formed called CMOC North and CMOC South, they were essentially logistical centers and did not perform any outreach. ISAF, through its only CIMIC Center in Kabul, did perform the functions of a CMOC. CHLCs in their areas coordinated with the NGOs in support of their high impact projects, but did not perform traditional CMOC functions.

Because of the status of the U.S. as a combatant, the NGO community was not entirely comfortable in associating with the U.S. military. The UN only invited the U.S. military to participate in their meetings on a case-by-case basis and would rarely attend meetings called by the military. However, the CHLC in Islamabad did force the issue and would go to the private offices of UN and NGOs, and meet with them discreetly to accomplish the mission.61

Commander CJCMOTF could not arrange a personal meeting with the UNAMA leadership until CJTF 180 arrived and took control in May 2002. Just before he turned over command in May 2002, the CJCMOTF Commander attended a meeting with the Commander CJTF 180 and UNAMA. At that meeting, UNAMA extended an invitation, stating that it was time to start a dialogue62.

In the field, the CHLCs did establish working relationships with the NGOs. There are many accounts of NGO and CHLC sharing projects and coordinating on efforts. The CHLC in Mazar-E-Sharif reported that they worked successfully with about 48 different NGOs. Information was the primary currency that CHLC offered.63

Overall, however, even with its wholesale approach, OEF offered little that NGOs/IGOs wanted.

Stability Operations. (Jun 02-Present). With the deployment of CJTF 180 in May 2002, the focus began to change from combat operations with humanitarian assistance support to stability operations and the enabling of Afghan institutions. CJTF 180 believed that CJCMOTF had a vital role to play here. Additionally, the 350th CA Brigade assumed command of the CJCMOTF and began to look upon the situation as a CMO problem with long-term implications. CJTF 180 developed a plan in which two of the three major lines of operations embraced stability operations. Civil Affairs Ministerial Teams arrived in November 2002 and CJCMOTF engaged with the Afghan Ministries through these teams to focus on reconstruction. Previously, such linkage was ignored.64

CJTF 180 also directed more CHLCs be deployed to hot spots and not just into permissive areas. With the deployment of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in December 2002, CJTF 180 provided the CMO function that had been lacking before and created what the UK calls “linked up government” with DOS, USAID, UNAMA, and ITGA representatives.

The PRTs are intended to help combat the causes of instability by forming and facilitating information-sharing bodies that support the ITGA. This should stimulate and enhance local, regional, and national reconstruction efforts by monitoring and assessing military, political and civil reform efforts and providing data into the Afghan Information Management Service (AIMS) data bank. The PRTs are planned to be located in the eight locations where the UNOCHA coordinators are also located. CJTF 180 has asked other nations to provide the lead for these PRTs. The UK has agreed to run one of them.
concept had the support of President Karzai who took a direct interest in their deployment and support. The Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACABAR) also supports this initiative.

It is not the purpose of the PRTs to extend the ISAF Effect. This is not a “force” to extend a security umbrella over these regions. That will remain an issue and has been identified by ACABAR and the British Agencies Afghan Group (BAAG) as a major concern.

Coupled with the creation of the PRTs was the coming together of a national level coordination body for reconstruction. In December 2002, The Afghan Government established Consultative Groups (CGs) to focus on the attainment of specific benchmarks in the 12 development programs defined in the National Development Framework presented in October 2002 to the international donors. These groups include representatives from the Afghan Government, focal point donor, UNAMA, and NGOs. The intent is that these 12 groups, reporting to the Afghanistan Development Forum will provide some rationalization for the development process. CJCMOTF has deployed civil affairs ministerial teams to link up with these ministries and assist.

In February 2003, President Karzai established a cabinet level committee composed of the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and the NSC Advisor. Ambassador Bill Taylor, the Special Ambassador for Reconstruction, will represent the US Government. This committee should help to provide the national level guidance for reconstruction that is needed.

CJMOTF established an outreach program called the Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMCC) to share information among NGOs/IGOs and the ITGA and participate in reconstruction.

In December 2002, ISAF provided a permanent liaison section to the CJCMOTF. Up until this time they did not feel comfortable with the close relationship because of the combatant status of OEF.

By the end of December 2002, UNAMA and the ITGA demonstrated more initiative by hosting planning workshops on development. In January 2003, UNAMA hosted a series of planning workshops in Bamyan that included key players such as: IOM, UNHCR, UN Habitat, Solidarities, Secretary of the local Governor, Education and Public Works Directors, Aga Khan Development Foundation, and representatives from the PRTs. The UNAMA area coordinator met with the commander of the PRT in Bamyan and agreed to act as moderator between the U.S. coalition and assistance organizations. This is a significant step forward in the relationships. The civil affairs will vet all of their projects through the UNAMA coordinator. According to the USAID regional representative, “The PRT has been invited to attend the UN Heads of Agencies monthly meetings; attend the bi-weekly NGO forum facilitated by UNAMA; and meet weekly with UNAMA.” This again is a significant advance toward harmonization.

These programs were starting as this study ended so it was not possible to evaluate them.

Operational Support

Information Operations. Initially, there was no coherent IO program at the strategic level. This was due in part to the rapidity with which the operation unfolded. USCENTCOM’s initial IO focus was on support to combat operations by gaining legitimacy for the U.S. engagement in Afghanistan.
USCENTCOM’s major IO objectives were:

- Build/maintain regional/international support for U.S. and coalition operations and objectives.
- Compel states and non-state entities to withhold support to terrorist organizations.
- Support humanitarian assistance to eliminate or mitigate the conditions that spawn terrorist organizations.

These were translated into the following PSYOP objectives:

- Influence regional state sponsors to cease harboring terrorists
- Isolate al-Qaeda
- Isolate the Taliban
  - De-legitimize the Taliban’s claim to rule.
  - Counter anti-American propaganda
  - Reinforce the legitimacy of the operation
  - Promote civilian non-interference with the operation
  - Support an independent and viable Afghanistan.

Only the final item on this list concerned peace building in Afghanistan. In contrast, ISAF’s IO did focus on the long-term stability of Afghanistan and, combined with civil-military cooperation, intelligence, and security operations, proved a success. OEF’s IO campaign’s effectiveness varied depending on the abilities of the various units. The Canadians, subordinate to the 101st Airborne at Kandahar, took the very general guidance and built a successful information campaign from the ground up.

Information Operations supporting CJCMOTF were under resourced and not focused. The CJCMOTF had no IO staff element until December 2002. Though ISAF had demonstrated the power of CMO with IO, this was not practiced by OEF.

Civil affairs elements had the majority of the contact time with the locals and therefore were an excellent organization to carry the IO themes and provide feedback needed to adjust the program. However, the lack of vertical information flow inhibited this potential.

Opportunities were consistently missed. Several school and public facilities openings, and medical assistance missions were not exploited. For example, there was a serious whooping cough outbreak in the Badakhshan province and medical relief from World Health Organization and the Afghan Ministry of Health could not get to the site of the outbreak. About ten children a day were dying. Air transport was the only solution, because the medication would expire in 48 hours without refrigeration, and it would take weeks to get over the Hindu Kush by ground transportation. Ultimately, the JSOTF provided air support, but there was not significant interest at CJTF 180 to exploit the IO aspects of saving a province from epidemic. Requests for Combat Camera, PSYOP, and international media were not supported. The operation was a success but an opportunity was lost.

IO also failed to support the PRTs. For a month and half during the fielding of the Gardez PRT there was a media blackout imposed by CJTF 180. This blackout was designed
to allow the deputy CJCMOTF commander to test the PRT concept out of the limelight. In the absence of a positive IO effort, the media issued a spate of articles that were in the main negatively focused and one sided. No rebuttals were offered. When the blackout was lifted, the entire program operated under a cloud. The success of the PRT program depends on the support of U.S. decision makers, NGOs/IGOs and coalition partners, along with the Afghan authorities, UNAMA and ACBAR. Transparency is key to gaining this trust and support.\footnote{71}

In November 2002, a senior officer in CJCMOTF, after six months in theater, described IO as being poor from the beginning. “There were no themes, no messages, no coordination and in my opinion, information operations does not exist. It should be more than just publishing the actions of civil affairs at the national level”.\footnote{72}

**Intelligence Operations.** As with IO, the focus of intelligence operations was on supporting combat operation against al-Qaeda and Taliban. Again, because there was no interagency plan and a directive not to engage in nation building, the intelligence effort was slow in analyzing those items that would be critical for long-term stability.

OEF’s “light footprint” imposed severe limits upon information gathering. Additionally, the uncertain security situation had driven most NGOs/IGO out of much of Afghanistan. The tendency therefore was to rely more heavily on technical intelligence. Technical intelligence, however, has substantial limits in stability operations.

While most U.S. forces were reluctant to get out among the people and exploit information, other coalition forces and ISAF, based on CIMIC concepts and their experiences in the Balkans, put foot patrols among the local villages and had selected individuals live in the villages, much like the CHLCs and the Special Forces. These new sources of information increased the overall security of the forces and allowed them to assess the attitudes of the locals. After Operation Anaconda, the 3rd Brigade of 101st Airborne Division moved among the villagers and assumed a respectful and non-threatening stance toward the locals. This enabled them to gain their respect and trust. The U.S. Army Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) reported “locals in turn started providing intelligence to the soldiers on who was a Taliban and who was not, thus increasing their success in the war on terrorism.”\footnote{73}

Initially, the NGOs/IGOs needed information on combat operations to deconflict deliveries of humanitarian relief. At USCENTCOM headquarters in Tampa this issue was resolved by providing an intelligence team for the coalition and NGO/UN LNO team. They were able to sanitize the intelligence products in a timely manner to facilitate coordination and planning for the delivery of humanitarian relief. This carried over to the CHLC in Islamabad. Nevertheless, a great deal of information remained over classified. For example, maps depicting the location of land mines that were readily available for NGO and IGO in the Balkans were restricted because of the perceived need to protect US forces. Additionally, many Reserve CA officers did not possess Top Secret Clearances and could not get access.

The lack of intelligence sharing affected operations in the field. For example, many documents that coalition forces needed were marked NOFORN and thus kept them out of the hands of allies and partners. In an extreme instance, The Canadians were routinely denied access to intelligence products in Kandahar for which they had been the primary source based on their HUMINT operations in the local villages.\footnote{74}
Information Management.

CJTF 180 established a web based information management system. The success of the system depended on web design, data base management, and accessibility to non-military organizations. The system did not facilitate efficient and effective execution. CALL reported:

*Part of the problem was each higher headquarters had a SIPRNET information page but had not maintained them. Many pages were outdated, even those shown the CAAT. Data on them was over 3 weeks old; some pages were over a month old.*

It was a pull system that did not fit the expectations of non-military organizations. For instance, U.S. embassies were conditioned to reading cables. CJTF 180 provided the embassy in Kabul with a computer terminal and instructions for accessing their web based systems, but the embassy was never really comfortable dealing with such a system.

Much of the CMO coordination was handled via email and the internet. This again was breaking new ground. The 96th CA had their dedicated channel over PSC-5, ran chat room and shared information over SIPR. There were some challenges with the Reserve Components. Initially, the CJCMOTF was on a separate server that routed through Atlanta. Several times service outages on weekends could not be solved until the workers in Atlanta returned on Monday. Also, there was no common drive between CJCMOTF and CJTF 180, so that information sharing suffered.

AIMS

The Afghanistan Information Management Service (AIMS) is a database that portrays the status of humanitarian assistance activities, to include who is doing what and where, funding, maps and geographic information, and reports from other organizations’ websites. ISAF, CIMIC, CJCMOTF, and the Afghan Ministries use this service. The CHLCs and now the PRTs input their projects into this database. The intent is to present an integrated picture to help coordinate activities. There have been challenges managing the databases and keeping the information current. CHLCs reported that the database is an excellent reference point, but that it must be verified by on the ground face-to-face meeting with the local authorities.

CENTRIXS

Coalition Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS) is the USCENTCOM coalition classified data network. CJCMOTF had not been given this system when it set up in Kabul. Lack of this system severely limited the information sharing with coalition partners and kept the CJCMOTF “out of the loop.” Such a system should have been fielded immediately to the CJCMOTF. As of January 2003, it had yet to be fielded to it.

Targeting

CFLCC initially conducted Targeting at Camp Doha, Kuwait, and not in the area of operations at CFLCC Forward, the 10th Mountain Division, in Bagram. CJTF 180, in June
brought the Targeting process forward into the area of operations. It was initially focused on combat. Non-lethal means, except for some IO, were not considered because OEF was not conducting nation building. Under CJTF 180, however, the integration of the full spectrum of lethal and non-lethal means is better understood and applied, but training and experience are still needed to translate the plans to actions.  

**Command, Control, and Coordination**

**Command Relationships.** A number of C3 questions confronted planners:

**To whom should CJCMOTF report, USCENTCOM or CFLCC?** Initial thoughts were that it should report directly to USCENTOM. The rationale was:

- Humanitarian assistance should be separated from the operational commander in order to provide a greater perception of neutrality from third parties.
- CJCMOTF was a strategic asset and therefore should have a direct relationship with the strategic headquarters.
- Coalition member representatives and the representatives of some civilian agencies located themselves in Tampa; therefore, CJCMOTF should be co-located with them.

Commander USCENTCOM decided to place CJCMOTF OPCOM to the CFLCC in Kuwait for the following reasons:

- ARCENT/CFLCC was tasked with conducting the operational aspects of the campaign, and controlling CJCMOTF would allow them to integrate and synchronize supporting elements.
- If humanitarian operations needed to be conducted in Afghanistan, then having the CJCMOTF within theater made better sense.
- Early on there was an information gap between Tampa and what was happening on the ground. CJCMOTF needed to be close to the area of operations to obtain ground truth.

**To whom should the 96th CA Battalion (AC) report?** SOCCENT and JSOTF-N wanted the unit to report to the SOF whom they were directly supporting. Conversely, CJCMOTF wanted the 96th CA Battalion to report to it because it was tasked with coordinating all humanitarian assistance in theater. The 96th CA Battalion is part of the SOF community, and was accustomed to receiving support from that community. The unit was unsure whether CJCMOTF and the CFLCC, both essentially conventional commands, would understand and properly support it. Ultimately, The 96th CA Battalion was directed to report to both headquarters. CAT-B and two CAT-A of C/96th were attached to JSOTF-N in November 2001, and the rest of the committed elements of the 96th CA Battalion were attached to CJCMOTF. The Company commander took the majority of his guidance from CJCMOTF and balanced that against JSOTF-N. This situation remained until the 489th CA Battalion (RC) replaced the 96th CA Battalion.

**What is the proper relationship between the CHLCs and the SOF they support?** The CA units working with SOF reported through the CJCMOTF to the CFLCC at Camp
Doha, Kuwait. The SOF reported through the JSOTF to SOCCENT. The two elements were able to work together successfully, but problems arose when approval was needed for immediate impact projects. Those projects that supported the SOF mission were vetted by CJCMOTF and USAID, and approved by CFLCC out of the chain of command of the SOF. The CHLCs had to work out the issues between the SOF, OGA, USAID, and CJCMOTF to reach a consensus on how they would approach projects. The bottom line was that professionals at all levels made the process work so that appropriate projects were identified and funded, but it was harder than it needed to be.

What is the relationship between units with attached Civil Affairs and the CHLCs working in their Area of Operations? CHLCs were under the operational control of CJCMOTF in Kabul. However, the CAT-A assets that were mobilized were WARTRACE CA elements for the 101st Airborne Division, 10th Mountain Division, and the 82nd Airborne Division. These units assumed that their WARTRACE units would support them, but that was not the case. These divisions deployed without their direct support CA elements. This shortfall was addressed by workarounds in theater with the CMOC’s providing personnel to furnish the maneuver units some support. However, the maneuver commanders still had a difficult time influencing the civil environment in their AOs. The question that arose was should the CHLCs report to the maneuver commander in whose area they were working? There were no liaisons or communication between the maneuver units and CHLCs. When the commands did get attached civil affairs elements, there was still no easy way to determine how the maneuver commander could have input. CJTF 180 was working on this issue when this study ended. The command and control issue, and the relationships between the operational level CA and the direct support to the combat unit CA must be clearly defined and understood before operation starts.

What is the relationship between CJCMOTF and the US Embassy? BG Kratzer was dual-hated as the commander CJCMOTF and the deputy chief of the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan (OMC-A). LTG Milolshek, the CFLCC commander, was the OMC-A chief but remained in Kuwait. Commander CJCMOTF therefore dealt with USAID, UNAMA, ISAF, and the ATA, all the key organizations that would shape the future of Afghanistan. CJCMOTF was the key representative of USCENTCOM in signing the ISAF and the ATA Military Technical Agreement, and in attending the Tokyo donors’ conference. Thus, an organization that was considered only an ancillary supporting mission was in fact in a position of significant political/military influence, even though it was not a headquarters with significant CMO expertise until May 2002.

Coordination at Central Command:

Civil Military Operations Cell:

There was only one CA officer at USCENTCOM when operations began, and he was working in the J5 supporting the Combatant Commander’s security cooperation plan. ARCENT did have three CA officers assigned but there was a lack of integrated and coordinated planning with the supporting 352nd CA Command. An Operational Planning Team from the 352 CA Command existed but was never requested. The CENTCOM After Action Reports from exercises in the previous two years identified deficiencies in CMO planning.
The 352d CA Command was able to deploy a few individuals to USCENTCOM in the first several weeks after September 2001, but the remainder was delayed by significant mobilization challenges. Eventually, a CMO cell of approximately 35 personnel was established in the USCENTCOM J5. The impact was that critical decisions about the future of OEF were made without essential input from CMO experts. All of the projects were considered in the short term of supporting the combat operation without seeing the long-term implications of the stability part of the operation.\textsuperscript{86}

**Humanitarian Assistance Working Group (HAWG).**

The HAWG was established by the CJCMOTF in Tampa to coordinate the humanitarian relief effort into Afghanistan by matching requirements with resource. It responded to requests for assistance and provided information to deconflict relief and combat operations. Doctrinally, it was a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) operating at the USCENTCOM level. It was chaired by CJCMOTF and its membership included representatives from all coalition nations, UNOCHA, UNJLC, INTERACTION, and the USCENTCOM J2 and J5.

Here is an example of how the HAWG typically operated:

USCENTCOM presented a sanitized, unclassified intelligence and situation briefing, INTERACTION reviewed the NGO situation, UNOCHA reviewed the UN Relief situation, and UNJLC reviewed the status of the delivery of relief. CJCMOTF then would review the major projects and seek support from coalition members. Members of the group could then request support from USCENTCOM. At the end of the meeting, CJCMOTF would meet separately with each of the participants to clarify and arrange details. These informal and private meetings seemed to be where most business was conducted.

CJCMOTF would then coordinate any air movement of relief with the J-3 Air, who passed it on to the Air Force. This situation existed for at least four months until a Regional Air Movement Control Center (RAMCC), an organization designed to deconflict civil, military, and humanitarian air movement, was established in February 2002.\textsuperscript{87}

The HAWG continued to match resources with requirements. As the operation shifted into the theater, as more of the staff deployed, and as the operational tempo increased, the demand for information increased. Ground truth was only available in theater but parts of the CJCMOTF remained in Tampa so that functions were being performed in several places. This arrangement did not seem the best use of the available assets and by June 2002, with the deployment of CJTF 180, the CJCMOTF in Tampa was dissolved and its function assumed by the J5.

**Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Meeting:**

This meeting was similar to the doctrinal concept of the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC) was run by the USCENTCOM J-5. J-2, CJCMOTF, and the UN and NGO representatives normally attended; none of the coalition representatives were invited. Its purpose was to bring USCENTCOM and UN and NGO communities together. The agenda mainly dealt with contingencies such as the Winter Weather Crisis and the Water Crisis.
UN and NGO Cell in Tampa.

The decision to place a non-military, non-U.S. government cell in the parking lot of USCENTCOM headquarters in Tampa was controversial and sensitive. The personalities in INTERACTION, the UN and USAID realized that this operation had a large civilian component that would get more important as time went on. Many in the UN and NGO community were concerned that this might compromise their neutrality. Nevertheless, community leaders understood that they had to take that risk to obtain the benefits of close association. The entire effort was kept out of the press and the public eye. INTERACTION petitioned Department of Defense officials who were initially cool to the idea of inserting an NGO representation at USCENTCOM. USAID and UNOCHA met with the Commander USCENTCOM and got the concept approved. The cell was formed in October 2001, and was composed of representatives from UNOCHA, World Food Program, representing the INTERACTION, and at times, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), USAID’s Office of Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA), and the U.S. State Department’s Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration (State/PRM).

The purpose of the cell was to provide NGO/IGO perspective to the command, facilitate the flow of information affecting relief and recovery, advocate greater involvement of coalition forces in the completion of requests for assistance submitted by the NGOs, and provide education and subject matter expertise to the USCENTCOM staff.

Although the interagency group did have access to the command group through the Deputy Commander, it did not have access to the planning process and was not involved in the critical Operations Planning Groups. Their advice was sought only after a concept had already been devised and many times the information was a one-way street. USCENTCOM requested information and the NGOs/IGOs responded. In spite of that, the NGOs/IGOs enjoyed some success:

- They were able to halt the Blind Humanitarian Daily Ration (HDR) air drops in Afghanistan. On 13 December 2001, the unattended (Blind) airdrops using the flutter method were stopped and on 24 December 2001, all Blind airdrops were stopped. This operation was not popular with the civilian relief community.
- They obtained a policy change on the issue of the reserve CA teams wearing civilian clothes and carrying weapons.
- They were able to affect some of the targeting of airfields that needed to be used for follow-on humanitarian relief supplies.
- They were partially successful in focusing the military on the rehabilitation of vital infrastructure to facilitate long-term relief instead of “high profile- low impact” projects designed to win hearts and minds.

The interagency LNO team suffered from poor communications between Tampa and the operational area. The NG/IGO communities have not invested in the same level of communication as the military. USCENTCOM often demanded a level of detail and data about operations that could not be obtained. INTERACTION recommended that in the future, a forward team should be placed in the theater with communication assets so that the LNO teams would be more responsive.
By February 2002, UNAMA had been established along with the UNOCHA regional offices, the CJCMOTF had deployed to Kabul and the RAMCC had been established, and the locus of action began to shift forward. The liaison cell now reported to the J5 instead of the Deputy Commander. By June 2002, the group’s usefulness appeared to be over and it was disbanded. But USAID, realizing the importance of such an organization, has established a linkage with USCENTCOM.89

Part of the cell’s success obviously depended on the personalities of its people. The cell had to interact with both civilians and military, and relate to both. It had to be able to place issues in a format that both the military and NGOs could understand. It had to understand the processes of all players and how to enter the process and find the correct pressure points with out alienating the parties involved. It was fortunate that the UN had a retired Army Colonel who had not only been a regional coordinator in Somalia and East Timor, but also had most recently come from the US Army Peacekeeping Institute where he possessed the appropriate security clearances and understood how all sides worked.90

**Coordination in Afghanistan:**

No overall coordinating mechanism existed for the various peace building efforts in Afghanistan; rather organizations concerned themselves with portions of it.

**UN Joint Logistical Center (UNJLC)**

The UNJLC was one of the most successful organizations to coordinate the relief effort. The concept was developed in 1997 for the World Food Program to handle complex contingencies and integrate the efforts from many different responders. When the crisis phase is over, the UNJLC will dissolve and the UNOCHA or UNHCR will take the lead.

The UNJLC had two operations centers in Islamabad and Rome and six satellite centers in Kabul, Mazari-e-Sharif, Faizabad, Kandahar, Duchanbe, and Herat. The UNJLC coordinated all humanitarian assistance air and land movements, consolidated requests and forwarded them to USCENTCOM to ensure deconfliction and, in some instances, security. A major challenge was poor communications connectivity between the UNJLC and USCENTCOM. Additionally, the requirement that the UNJLC provide 72 hours advance notification was problematic, since the relief community often could not confirm missions more than 24 hours in advance.91 Nevertheless, the UNJLC succeeded in coordinating large amounts of relief aid and getting it to populations at risk.92

**UN Office Chief of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA)**

UNOCHA has seven regional offices in Afghanistan to handle relief and development. These offices provide a forum for NGOs/IGOs to coordinate initiatives. UNOCHA coordinated with CJCMOTF in Islamabad on a case-by-case basis. CJCMOTF has used these UNOCHA to exchange information with NGOs with whom they do not normally communicate.

**UN Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA) Area Coordinators**

UNAMA established area coordinators in an attempt to synchronize reconstruction and governance efforts in the provinces. These area coordinators host and facilitate meetings among the aid community and locals.
ISAF CIMIC Center

ISAF established a CIMIC center to coordinate its programs with the NGOs/IGOs in the area around Kabul. CJCMOTF provides an LNO, initially on a temporary basis and, by March 2003, permanently. CJCMOTF coordinates with ISAF on deconflicting projects. CIMIC staff has attempted to engage USAID to participate, but as of December 2002, it had not elected to do so.\textsuperscript{93}

Afghanistan Assistance Coordination Authority (AACA)

The AACA is a statutory body of the Afghan Interim Administration responsible for coordination of all external assistance in Afghanistan. CJCMOTF was first invited to participate in the AACA meeting in May 2002.\textsuperscript{94}

Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief. (ACBAR)

ACBAR was formed in 1988 and provides a forum for NGOs to obtain information and coordinate. ACBAR has been trying to reestablish itself in Kabul and regain status as a lead agency for NGOs, but this has proven difficult. It does have a Resource and Information Center in Peshawar. In April 2002, the Kabul-based “NGO Forum” was placed under ACBAR’s aegis, which then included approximately 70 NGOs.

CJCMOTF Meetings and Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMCC)

When CJCMOTF established itself in Kabul in December 2001, there was no CMOC function being performed there. CJCMOTF started a weekly meeting that included representatives of the Interim Government, along with some NGOs, ISAF and eventually UNAMA. At first the commander, CJCMOTF, believing the meetings were unsuccessful, canceled them. But the NGOs objected. The commander subsequently discovered that the meeting minutes were being distributed to the greater NGO community, which felt uneasy attending. The command reestablished the meetings because of this wide, if indirect, appeal to the NGOs.\textsuperscript{95}

When the 350\textsuperscript{th} CA Brigade stood up as CJCMOTF in May 2002, it planned to reach out to the NGO and Afghan community. The Civil-Military Coordination Meeting (CMCC) was formed in December 2002 to provide national level interface with the ITGA ministries, UNAMA, ISAF, and NGOs/IGOs on a weekly basis. In March 2003, the meeting was moved outside of the secure compound to provide better access to non-military organizations.\textsuperscript{96}

Consultative Groups (CGs)

In December 2002, the ITGA established CGs to focus on attaining specific benchmarks in the 12 development programs defined in the National Development Framework presented in October 2002 to the international donors. These groups include representatives from the Afghan Government, focal point donors, UNAMA, and NGOs. The intent is that these 12 groups, reporting to the Afghanistan Development Forum, will provide rationalization for the development process. By December 2002, the CJCMOTF had deployed civil affairs ministerial teams to link up with these groups and assist.\textsuperscript{97}

CJCMOTF Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
CJTF 180 established PRTs in December 2002 as a tool to help set the conditions for the move from combat operations (Phase III) to post combat operations and reconstruction (Phase IV). The concept included embedded interagency partners within PRTs. USAID, DOS, and DOJ were some of the suggested interagency partners to work closely with the coalition and Afghanistan Ministry officials. The PRTs mission would be to facilitate information sharing among various agencies, to strengthen and extend ITGA influence, to provide advice and assistance, to provide a safer environment by assisting with the regional development of the Afghan Nation Army and local Afghan law enforcement authorities.98

PRT Cabinet Committee of the ITGA

This committee was is formed after December 2002, and is composed of the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and the NSC Advisor. The State Department’s special ambassador for reconstruction will represent CJTF 180. This committee should help to provide the national level guidance for reconstruction.

Hindrances to Effective Direction and Coordination

Many personnel working CMO in the field felt constrained by what seemed to be an insatiable hunger for information at all levels of command. Soldiers called this “feeding the monkey”; even NGOs felt this pressure. Two contributing factors appear to be:

**Oversupervision at All Levels.** Frequently, each echelon of command from CJCMOTF to CFLCC to USCENTCOM questioned the decisions and judgment of subordinate elements. This was most apparent in the OHDACA approval process. For example, a CHLC in Kabul submitted a proposal to shift work on the waiting room of the Women’s Hospital in Kabul to the kitchen because an NGO had proposed to renovate the waiting room. A change to the scope of work was submitted, reviewed and approved by CJCMOTF, but disapproved by CJTF 180 and returned with questions about the cost. The review team at CJCMOTF was comprised of 12 reservists who were certified, licensed professional civil engineers. CJTF 180 had one U.S. Army engineer captain, a recent graduate of the advanced course. Yet rather than defaulting to the senior expertise that existed at the field level, each level of command felt compelled to comment and concur or non-concur. The project in question was eventually approved without alternation but this required several staff officers and commanders to waste considerable time and effort in a needless bureaucratic shuffle. In another example, the CHLC in Herat found many local NGOs willing to do projects such as schools and wells. The CHLC believed it should therefore focus on long-term projects such as the refurbishment of the canal. CJCMOTF directed instead that they remain focused on schools and wells99.

**Lack of understanding of CMO.** CMO is complicated. It deals with civil populations and issues such as claims, environmental law, fiscal responsibilities, human rights, security assistance, intelligence, the laws of armed conflict and rules of engagement, international agreements, and information operations. It requires close coordination with NGOs/IGOs and foreign governments. The military does not routinely train and prepare its commanders to function in such an environment. The result is that commanders are understandably conservative in their approach in a desire to do the right thing and this can lead to micromanagement.100
Factors for Successful CMO at the Operational Level

• CMO planning and advisory structures should be established at all combatant command headquarters and land component headquarters.
  o Civil Affairs should provide full time planning and advice.
  o Interagency, NGO, and IGO advisors should be present at these headquarters.
  o Commanders should call upon the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion Regionally aligned company and reserve Civil Affairs units WARTRACED to their commands when facing civil military issues.

• Humanitarian Assistance should be considered a CMO and not just a logistical mission.

• Clear command and control must be established over CMO. CMO is a command responsibility. The command relationships with the Civil Affairs Forces needs to be clarified.

• Coordination and integration mechanisms should be established early to synchronize security, relief, and reconstruction efforts.

• Commanders and staff must consider legal and fiscal issues before deployment and become comfortable with them.
Chapter 4: Tactical Direction and Coordination

This chapter describes the tactics, techniques, and procedures used to accomplish CMO at the tactical level

UK CIMIC Concept.

The UK provided ISAF’s initial leadership and incorporated the experience of Northern Ireland and the Balkans in designing an approach to civil military operations. Large portions of the international force had served in Bosnia or Kosovo and were therefore familiar with NATO CIMIC. The UK provided national level direction for CIMIC, specifically to support the return of governance and the reconstruction of the Afghan society so that it could be reintegrated “as a responsible member of the international community.” Additionally ISAF had a mandate from the UN and a Military Technical Agreement with the AIA. This allowed ISAF to develop a tactical approach based on the following principles.

- **Consent.** Each soldier was to ensure that all actions focused on increasing and maintaining the consent of the Afghans supporting the Bonn process. ISAF was a guest and therefore was not to conduct itself as an occupying force.

- **Impartiality.** The soldiers were to treat all Afghans impartially in respect to supporting the Bonn process

- **Transparency.** As in all such operations, the forces had to be open about what they were doing and what was expected from the Afghans.

- **Capability.** The force had to project that it was prepared to handle any threat.

- **Appropriate use of Force.** Because ISAF did not have overwhelming force to face down challenges, it accomplished the mission by supporting the police and authorities in Kabul.

Based on the experience in Kosovo, ISAF developed a Military Technical Agreement with the Afghan Authorities that served as a memorandum of understanding and an element of transparency. The key aspect was the linkage of Information Operations with CIMIC and Security.

- **Information Operations** were the number one priority for all members of ISAF. Initially, there was a complete lack of information among the Afghans, some of whom thought that the USSR had returned. Most knew nothing about the Bonn agreement and UNAMA. ISAF published a newspaper, used loudspeaker broadcasts, and conducted information patrols among the people.

- **CIMIC** was focused on increasing the force protection of ISAF. It was about winning the hearts and minds of the people, and influencing them in a positive manner toward ISAF. CIMIC was seen as a bridge between the Afghans and ISAF. The UN and the NGOs were responsible to support the locals and provided basic care and reconstruction. Military CIMIC was a focused program. CIMIC teams were assigned sectors in Kabul, so that they could become familiar with the problems and issues, and develop relationships with the locals. ISAF ran a CIMIC center to coordinate its activities with the AACA and the over 600 NGO eventually working in Kabul. The center was identified viable projects and linked
them up with security providers. CIMIC developed a useful database that was valued by NGOs.

- **Security** was based on the Northern Ireland experience. Companies were billeted with the local police at their stations. Combined patrols included a competent interpreter. Patrols consisted of a four-man section with other four-man sections satellited around them. Normally, ISAF patrolled by vehicle during the day and by foot at night. Locations depended on specified measures of effectiveness and the relationship with the civil community.\textsuperscript{102}

### U.S. CMO

CJCMOTF and the CHLC conducted CMO in support of SOF and later supported USAID and other agency projects. The conventional units also conducted CMO in support of their local operations.

**CJCMOTF.** The 96\textsuperscript{th} CA Battalion (AC) deployed initially in support of the SOF supporting the Northern Alliance. The teams lived alongside Special Forces A Teams. CHLCs depended on the local militia forces, the Afghan Militia Force (AMF), for protection, access to the locals, and as a source of information. Maintaining good relationships with the local warlord was essential. Initially, all of the contracting and monies went to support locals loyal to the warlords.\textsuperscript{103}

Like the ISAF, US CMO had the greatest impact when civil affairs, information, intelligence, and security operations integrated. This village teaming concept is taught at the civil affairs school and was used in Vietnam and Haiti. When the CHLC first moved into Gardez, locals pelted them with stones. But after the community saw that CHLCs could provide improvements attitudes changed. Even in Kandahar, the Taliban’s former base, there was a change of attitude after the CHLC built a school. A prime example of how CHLC can affect a shift in attitudes was in Deh Rawod. The CHLC moved into a hostile situation there after an incident involving accidental lethal bombing of a wedding party. After constructing a clinic and some wells, the local attitudes improved. “The Afghanis subscribe to the axiom that deeds speak louder than words”.\textsuperscript{104}

**Conventional Forces.** The initial units deploying to Afghanistan, the Marines, the 10\textsuperscript{th} Mountain Division and the 101\textsuperscript{st} Airborne Division, were told that their mission was combat and not to expect to come into contact with the locals. This guidance was incorrect, because in complex contingencies such as Afghanistan, CMO is to be expected. Army units did not deploy with their WARTRACE civil affairs attachments and did not exchanged LNOs with the CJCMOTF, and therefore had no influence over any of the CMO being conducted in their areas of operation. Although the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Brigade of the 101\textsuperscript{st} Airborne Division created a CMO cell of a captain (with no CMO experience) augmented by two civil affairs officers from CJCMOTF, its efforts were limited to focusing on mounted force protection patrolling.\textsuperscript{105}

The 3\textsuperscript{rd} Brigade of the 101\textsuperscript{st} Airborne Division did grant permission for the Princess Patricia’s Light Infantry Battalion from Canada to conduct CIMIC operations. The Canadians were fully versed in the type of CIMIC operation that ISAF was conducting, and had experience from Bosnia and Kosovo. Canadians adopted the U.S. Special Forces profile of soft caps, no flack vests, some beards, and living and working with the locals in Kandahar. Initially, they only conducted reconnaissance patrols and used the Special Forces
contacts with the local warlord to gain introductions to the village leaders. They started by conducting joint patrols with the warlord’s men until the Canadians were accepted in their own right. Their CIMIC officer took up residence in the warlord’s ‘headquarters’ and provided them squad radios to demonstrate trust and insure positive communication to resolve crises.\textsuperscript{106}

The local leaders were concerned for their safety, material well being, as well with what was going to happen to the local political structure. By understanding these concerns, the Canadians tailored their PSYOP and CIMIC approach. However, the Canadians had no money and were unable to deliver any sort of assistance for three months, until $50,000 allocated from operational funds, coupled with private donations the unit generated from its own troops and supporters back in Canada, allowed freedom of action. Eventually, the Canadians successfully linked up with the CHLC and, with CHLC assistance, developed project requests that were approved through the CJCMOTF process for funding. They were able to rebuild eight schools and sink 20 wells before they redeployed. An old villager told one of the Canadians that he remembered that the Russians tried to buy friendship by just handing out goodies. But the unit provided assistance, advice, and some money and material to improve the long-term success of the village.\textsuperscript{107}

The tactical method employed was the triad of CIMIC, PSYOP, and HUMINT. A village team would be comprised of each of these disciplines. The Canadians received support from U.S. PSYOP and MI personnel. The PSYOP team had a black American Muslim as a team member who proved to work very well with the locals. The soldiers would engage the locals in conversation about topics important to that village. The used the passive technique of eliciting information. The PSYOP would hand out leaflets and talk with leaders about the purpose and meaning of OEF. In exchange, the villagers would inform the unit about the Taliban cells and criminals previously unknown. The locals also provided information on the following:

- Location of minefields, UXO and other hazards
- High confidence routes suitable for Coalition operations
- Local customs, sensitivities, politics military structures etc.
- Likely enemy approaches to Kandahar Air Field and preferred enemy methods of attacking and disrupting coalition efforts.\textsuperscript{108}

The Canadians felt that their unit was able “to dominate the ground (in this case, the ‘hearts and minds’) of a patrolling area of roughly 100 square kilometers containing perhaps 10,000 people with one liaison officer and $50,000 supported by a reconnaissance platoon, a finance office, a judge advocate general office, PSYOP and medical support.\textsuperscript{109}

After Operation ANACONDA, the remainder of 3rd Brigade 101st Airborne Division began conducting operations similar to the Canadians. It went so far as to direct 3-187 Infantry to co-locate one of its TOW HMMVW platoons with a local Afghan Force. By the end of the unit rotation, the 101st demonstrated the CMO flexibility that enabled them to make considerable headway with the locals.

Information Operations used the bottom up method. TF MOUNTAIN and TF RAKASAN identified themes, but the integration and synchronization group at the battalion level developed the actual text. These messages were adjusted based on the
results of information gathered by previous patrols in the villages. The integration group worked off a matrix that projected four days in advance. Intelligence, operations, CIMIC, the patrol leaders and the commander vetted the messages. Word of mouth was the key means of transmission. Interpreters would pass on information and make sure that it got back to the warlord. Everyone was aware that whatever was said in the presence of the interpreter would be passed back to influential Afghans.

MEDCAP was a significant part of the mission. The needs were significant in and around Kandahar, because there was no local medical or veterinarian infrastructure. The villages were selected based on population, medical need, tactical importance, and intelligence value. HUMINT personnel would talk with the leaders while the medical teams looked after the people. The MEDCAP would check on other projects such as wells, and hand out leaflets and soccer balls.

Factors for Successful CMO at the Tactical Level

- Understand and apply doctrinal principles.
- Develop a CMO plan before deploying. There was no CJCMOTF Component plan to guide the tactical level of CMO. It was built after deployment.
- Provide ready funds to quick impact projects.
- Develop constructive relationships with NGO and IGO so that their considerable capabilities can be leveraged in support of long-term development. The resources that the military can provide will always be limited. Success depends upon the ability of the military to enable the NGO and IGO communities to assume the lead in assisting and reconstructing the communities. A clear concept on how to do this must be in place before deployment.
- Conduct comprehensive Information Operations at all levels. An IO campaign plan should be developed before deployment that addresses the fundamentals of stability operations. All members of the unit must promote and reinforce the positive aspects of the military presence and support consensus for the political processes. IO must be adjusted based on the HUMINT that is gathered locally.
- Coordinate and synchronize all operations. All of the following disciplines must be integrated: intelligence, civil affairs, information operations, and security.
- Provide fiscal flexibility for commanders. Commanders should be free to use O&M monies, conduct MEDCAP and pay claims when they directly support the mission.
- Resource the CMO effort. CMO was not adequately resourced with money, transportation, communications, or access to humanitarian resources.
Chapter 5: Doctrine

This chapter examines current doctrine in light of the actual operations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom

Interagency

There is no interagency doctrine. There have been previous attempts to establish standards and procedures. Operation Restore Democracy (1994) in Haiti was the genesis in May 1997 of PDD 56, “Managing Complex Contingency Operations.” In 1998, the NSC published the Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex Contingencies to institutionalize the mechanisms directed in PDD 56.

PDD 56 and the handbook were not reissued with the new administration. A draft NSPD XX covering interagency procedures was prepared, but has not been approved. There is no current guidance on how to integrate and synchronize political-military interagency operations.

Multinational

There is no multinational doctrine USCENTCOM/coalition operations. NATO has STANAGS and Allied Joint Publications to guide operations. American British Canadian Australian Forces (ABCA) has QSTAGs, and the Coalition Operations Handbook for Multinational Forces. Because USCENTCOM had no multinational procedural manual or SOP, coalition forces defaulted to that with which they were most familiar.

The Canadian Princes Patricia’s Light Infantry, attached to the 3rd Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division, operated in accordance with NATO CIMIC principles while the remainder of the division’s units operated in accordance with U.S. CMO doctrine. The approach of both organizations to the Afghan situation was quite different. The 101st Airborne Division did not receive its WARTRACE CA units and hesitated, without its expertise, to be engaged. The Canadians, in accordance with CIMIC doctrine, engaged up close with the locals.

U.S. Joint Doctrine

U.S. Joint Doctrine properly describes the operational environment that exists in Afghanistan but does not provide adequate guidance for CMO. JP 3-0, Joint Operations and 3-07, Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW), describe simultaneous theater operations where part of the theater could be in a wartime state, while the other part is in a post-conflict state, and the commander is encouraged to synchronize both efforts toward a common goal. In accordance with Joint Doctrine, Afghanistan is a MOOTW involving the use or threat of force. The coalition forces supported an insurgency to overthrow the Taliban and are now conducting counter-insurgency operations to eliminate resistance while using Foreign Internal Defense techniques to support the ITGA and facilitate humanitarian assistance. The doctrine for MOOTW in JP 3-07 and its subordinate TTP on Foreign Internal Defense, JP 3-07.1, Anti Terrorism, JP 3-07.2, Peace Operations, JP 3-07.3, and Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, JP 3-07.6, adequately cover the planning and execution of an Afghanistan-type of operation through transition planning. The force commander must recognize, however, that he is in a MOOTW. The initial vision, planning
and execution of Operation Enduring Freedom indicated that this was not understood. In June 2002, CJTF 180 issued orders and plans indicating it does understand operations in Afghanistan are MOOTW.

Joint CMO doctrine, JP 3-57, states that CMO is the responsibility of the entire command but the Army has not internalized this concept. JP 3-57 states:

*CMO are an inherent responsibility of command...Joint force commanders (JFCs) integrate civil affairs (CA) (i.e., those specialized units trained to plan and conduct CA activities) with other military forces (e.g., maneuver, health service, military police, engineering, transportation, and other special operations forces) and civilian organizations (both governmental and nongovernmental) to provide the capabilities needed for successful CMO. While CA are the “bedrock” facilitating application of these selected capabilities, this joint publication (JP) reflects the transition from a primarily CA approach to the broader and over-arching concept of CMO... CMO may be performed by designated CA, by other military forces, or by a combination of CA and other forces.*

In OEF, the U.S. Commanders usually defaulted to the Civil Affairs to take care of CMO unlike the ISAF, which made it part of every unit’s responsibility.

**CMO doctrine, as described in JP 3-57, does not establish any principles to guide the commander.** Unlike Joint MOOTW doctrine, Joint CMO doctrine fails to describe and offer suggestions on how a commander can approach the type of operational environment that is found in Afghanistan, where conflict and peace operations coexist. The manual states that most operations will fall between the two extremes of support to war and peacetime operations. Unfortunately, the manual does not address operations that fall between the two extremes and offers the commander little guidance on how to balance the resources between combat and stability operations. Figure 1-3, “Civil Military Missions in Support of Major Regional Conflicts and other Combat Operations,” in JP 3-57 provides examples of civil military support during each phase of an operation. But it only provides examples for the pure combat option and not the most likely operation that falls between the extremes. Further, JP 3-57 does not establish any principles for CMO, though it does list some for Civil Affairs Activities. NATO and the EU have established a set of principles for CIMIC that should be considered as a starting point. These principles are listed in Annex C of this study.

**The Civil Affairs Principles in the joint CMO manual do not describe how CMO is being conducted in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.** The principle of “Economy of Personnel and Resources” does not paint an accurate picture. That principle states, “The activities of Civil Affairs should be limited, where possible, to those involving coordination, liaison, and interface with existing or reestablished civilian authorities.” CHLC functions, with direction from CJCMOTF, were similar to an NGOs taking direct action in the community. Later with the establishment of the PRTs all of the functions of coordination, liaison, interface and direct action on projects were combined. Civil Affairs support to Unconventional Warfare was another emerging concepts. These concepts should be evaluated for inclusion in doctrine.

**The concept of a CJCMOTF was validated by this operation.** This task force provided oversight and control of the civil military effort at the operational level. However,
some issues need to be clarified. Commander relationships and coordination between the CJCMOTF and its operational elements and the CA teams attached to the maneuver elements must be delineated. The issue of supporting and supported needs to be clarified as it relates to the maneuver units. Issues to address include the following. Maneuver units did not have their WARTRACE CA slice with them and CJCMOTF controlled the CA efforts throughout the theater. How do the maneuver units conduct CMO under this situation and how is it coordinated and integrated? When they do have their WARTRACE units, how are their activities coordinated with CJCMOTF’s elements?

The relationship among the UN, ISAF, U.S. Embassy, CJCMOTF and the U.S. combat force commander should be examined in the context of a peace building operation like Afghanistan. CJCMOTF can assume significant responsibilities. Initially, the commander CJCMOTF was also the Deputy OMC for the U.S. Embassy. As the USCENTCOM representative in Kabul, he signed the Technical Agreement drawn up between ISAF and the ATA. He was in a position of great influence, acting for the commander USCENTCOM, but reporting to CFLCC. CFLCC did not appreciate CMO and was not a forward planning organization for CMO. Therefore, CENTCOM established direct liaison with CJCMOTF to facilitate future planning.118

There are some organizational problems with forming the CJCMOTF that must be considered. For example, how does the existing civil affairs structure fit into the concept of the CJCMOTF? In OEF, what was the role of the Civil Affairs Command, Brigades, and Battalions? Parts of all of these organizations formed the command element and staff of CJCMOTF. There were feelings among the commanders that the inclusion of all of these organizations in the process led to redundancy where Battalion and Brigade headquarters were amalgamated doing the same job. The Civil Affairs community should examine how the logistics community transforms from a peacetime administrative structure into a wartime task organized structure. For the concept of CJCMOTF to be an unqualified success, its organization and command relationships need to be streamlined.

The use of military capability in support of CMO was different in practice than in theory as described in JP 3-57. In JP 3-57, logistical and engineer capability are directed to support transporting time sensitive items and relief supplies, and restoring and maintaining relief lines of communications (LOC) “while civilian capacity is catching up.”119 In OEF, the decision was made not to provide any excess capacity to support CMO, even in the face of civilian need and lack of emergency capacity. It was not the responsibility of OEF to support civilian need in theater. All logistical and engineer assets were focused on supporting the combat forces. This had not been the case in previous contingencies such as the Balkans. This “change of concept” confused and upset NGOs that had read the doctrine and participated in these operations.120 Practice and doctrine ought to align.

U.S. Army

Like joint doctrine, U.S. Army doctrine describes the type of operational environment that exists in Afghanistan, but does not provide an adequate set of principles to guide commanders. The Army’s Civil Affairs Manual, FM 41-10, uses the principles of war, which were designed for combat operations, as the basis for Civil Affairs operations that deal in an entirely different dimension. The manual does the same thing for SOF “imperatives” that also do not correlate well with CMO. Army doctrine developers
should consider incorporating UK and NATO CIMIC principles. For example, one highly useful CIMIC principle absent from Army doctrine is Transparency, the development of mutual trust and confidence. Lack of transparency repeatedly increased the friction between OEF forces and NGOs.

Civil Affairs doctrine in FM 41-10 does not describe the type of operations conducted by the U.S. Forces in Afghanistan. Doctrine calls for using CA assets indirectly “supplementing or complementing Host Nation (HN) or Humanitarian Relief (HR) agencies.” However, CA teams (CHLCS) became service providers rather than coordinators. They used DOD, DOD, and OGA monies to provide quick impact projects. The quick impact missions took priority over traditional assessment and coordination missions. ODACHA monies were used for the first time in supporting military operations instead of a natural disaster. This meant that the projects had to involve military forces vice NGOs or contractors. The doctrine needs to clearly describe this new approach.

The doctrine does not describe how the Civil Affairs teams conducted operations at the tactical level. The doctrine does not describe the village team concept of CA, PSYOP, and INTEL that was used, even though this technique is taught at the civil affairs school. The mission of the CHLCs was primarily to win the heart of minds of the people through quick impact projects. This concept is also not covered in the doctrine. The doctrine assumes that the main objective is humanitarian relief.

The doctrine also states that the “Military forces provide a secure environment,” but it was not the mission of OEF to provide such an environment for the relief community. The doctrine must be expanded to cover the situation created in Afghanistan in which OEF was not intended to provide a safe and secure environment for relief efforts, and did not bring any excess capacity to assist in humanitarian assistance. The result was that NGOs did not stretch out in any great numbers into the country.

Terminology in the doctrine is confusing and does not lead to full understanding of C2 and coordination relationships. There was a proliferation of ad hoc arrangements (e.g. CHLCs, CMOC North and South, NCMCC, CM Coord Center, JRT) that are not described in doctrine. CJTF 180 has renamed and readjusted most of these organizations so that they now reflect current doctrine but non-doctrinal terms such as the PRT (provincial reconstruction team) and the CM Coord (Civil Military Coordination Meeting) still exist.

Doctrine does not describe the concept of contingency aid that the CHLCs employed. The objective of CMO in Afghanistan was to “win the hearts and minds” of the Afghans and increase force protection of U.S. forces. This was a PSYOP objective rather than CA because it focused on modifying behavior. CMO doctrine does not discuss PSYOP or force protection objectives.

Doctrine for planning, commanding, and controlling operations contains no guidance on combined and interagency integration. FM 5-0, Planning and Orders and FM 6-0 Mission Command have little to say about synchronizing operations with non-military organizations and coalition partners. Doctrine says nothing about concurrent and collaborative planning with non-military entities. CJTF 180 created the PRTs without collaborative planning, leading to difficulty in getting this concept accepted by the NGOs.
U.S. Air Force

**RAMCC should become part of Air Force Doctrine.** The RAMCC provides a centralized facility to coordinate arrival and departure times to help de-conflict both military and civilian air traffic at designated airfields in a particular area of responsibility.

The RAMCC helps the Airspace Control Authority (ACA), normally the C/JFACC, fulfill its duties. The goal of the RAMCC is to provide a safe and efficient operating environment for all aircraft transiting the airspace control area, including military combat, combat support and humanitarian airlift missions and civil humanitarian and commercial air operations. A RAMCC has been used at least twice to date, first in the Balkans and, more recently, beginning in January 2002, for OEF. In both situations, the air traffic control structure was inadequate to deal with the complex interaction of military and civil aircraft attempting to access the regions. A RAMCC is indispensable when significant military forces operate in an area lacking a robust air traffic control infrastructure. CFACC stated on 27 January 2002, “I couldn’t do my job without you…the RAMCC should be a part of every AOC from the beginning.” The RAMCC stood up late because it was not a part of Air Force or joint doctrine. This concept should be included in that doctrine.  

**New Concepts**

The following are new concepts used in Afghanistan that should be addressed in doctrine.

- **Stand Alone Civil Affairs Teams at the Operational Level.** The CA teams operated as small stand alone elements under the operational control of a CJCMOTF. They conducted operational level tasks in support of the force commander and his nationwide concept and not under the control of the various Army unit commanders in whose areas they operated. They formed interagency and intergovernmental teams including DOS and local government officials that combined CMOC as well as direct action project functions. Doctrine developers need to carefully consider this new in light of CA force structure and attendant support requirements.

- **Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).** The study ended before this concept could be fully evaluated but it needs to be examined. These teams integrated the CHLC function of doing projects with the CMOC function that had been lacking before, and created what the UK calls linked-up government with DOS, USAID, UNAMA, and ITGA representatives.

- **Contingent Assistance.** The UK CIMIC concept differentiates between humanitarian assistance that is to be dispensed without conditions and developmental assistance which should be contingent. The 96th CA Battalion deployed with the purpose of assisting those who supported the US. SOF and influencing those who were not supporting. If the objective is to increase the consent for the Bonn process or any peace process than contingent assistance is used to reward the supporters. The UNSCR that established ISAF states that contingent assistance will be used to support the Bonn process. The doctrine must address this issue by clearing up the distinction in doctrine between these two categories.
• **Force Protection aspects of Civil Military Operations.** Local community engagement through CHLCs and village teams proved effective in obtaining information that directly assisted force protection by providing indications and warnings. This concept should be added to the doctrine.

• **Psychological Aspects of Civil Military Operations.** The CHLCs, CJCMOTF, the 101st Airborne Division, CJTF 180, and the ISAF CIMIC all stated that the purpose of their engagement with the Afghans was to win their hearts and minds, a psychological objective. Afghanistan presents a clear example of the use of CMO primarily to influence behavior. Doctrine should address this purpose of CMO.

• **Role of the Non-Civil Affairs Forces in CMO.** Although doctrine clearly states that any formation can conduct CMO, several of the military forces acted as if CMO was the special preserve of Civil Affairs and defaulted to them. The doctrine should be more specific and provide examples of non-civil affairs units conducting CMO.
Chapter 6: NGO/IGO Issues

This chapter describes the relationship among the military, Non-Governmental Organizations, the International Governmental Organizations

From Operation Provide Comfort, the operation assisting the Kurds in Northern Iraq, through the operations in the Balkans, working relationships among the NGO and IGO community and the U.S. military gradually improved. Seminars were held, NGOs participated in major exercises, and Army units such as the XVIII Airborne Corps pursued their own initiatives with the NGO community. Doctrine was written about dealing with NGO. ASD (SOLIC)’s Office of Stabilization conducted outreach programs. But during OEF, the NGO/IGO relationships with U.S. Military were strained more that any time since Operation Provide Comfort.

General

Relations between the military and NGOs/IGOs mirrored the complexity of the situation in Afghanistan. Relations varied based upon different stages of the operation and different methods of aid distribution, and also varied at different levels as well.

Pre-Conflict Planning and Coordination

A long-term relationship and clear operational parameters among all players was never established before the conflict. The lack of an interagency plan and management process contributed to this failure. Tight security restrictions also resulted in poor information flow and mutual suspicion. NGOs/IGOs knew that a major operation was about to happen with an attendant humanitarian crisis, but could not get any information. Most of the U.S Army’s CA officers are reservists who lacked Top Secret clearances and were therefore also restricted.

UNOCHA and USAID, realizing that coordination was essential, sought approval to establish an LNO with USCENTCOM. USCENTCOM’s concept was to provide wholesale support to NGOs/IGOs and avoid conducting direct humanitarian assistance. The LNO team at Tampa did provide assistance and some coordination but it never participated in any operational planning. USCENTCOM used them as an information source, but offered little in return. The LNO team provided a critical resource to educate the command on the civilian aspects of humanitarian assistance and recommendations to the command group. USCENTCOM and the NGOs considered its existence a success.124

Because of the close hold nature of the operation and the question of neutrality, there was no rehearsal or training building up among the NGO community and the military as there had been for Haiti and the Balkans. The NGO community had to rely on previous exercises, operations and U.S. doctrine for a guide. But U.S. operated differently in Afghanistan.

ISAF and NGO Coordination

The Joint Doctrine Development Center in the UK was conducting a CIMIC conference with key NGOs when the announcement was made that the UK would lead ISAF. The
conference then became the venue where information and experiences were shared and working arrangements developed for ISAF. Here “soft” networks were established that enabled planning and sharing of information. The ISAF planning was modified based on these personal contacts. So unlike the U.S. planning effort that was characterized by exclusion, the UK and NGO relationships gathered strength and understanding through informal networks.\textsuperscript{125}

**Wholesale Support Method**

While the international aid community focused on wholesale support, the military coordinated with NGOs and the UN to facilitate aid delivery. The military had not expected to be on the ground for an extended period with the NGOs in Afghanistan. Overall, deconfliction of combat operations with humanitarian relief was a success story. The working relationships with NGOs in Islamabad were close, but there were sensitivities over the neutrality issue. It was clear that a rift existed between OEF’s operational focus and NGO needs. NGO requests for security and airlift were turned away as not the policy of OEF to provide either countrywide security or to divert military assets from combat operations to assist NGOs.

**Deconflicting Humanitarian Relief**

NGOs/IGOs were primarily concerned with delivering relief and protecting their people. Two organizations were established to ensure this—the UN/NGO cell at USCENTCOM and the CHLC at Islamabad. The UN/NGO cell worked with the USCENTCOM J2 and J5 to pass critical, time sensitive information to the NGOs. The procedure adopted to accomplish this task was to pass information to USCENTCOM’s LNO in Islamabad and share with the NGOs at the HAWG in Tampa. Additionally, UNJLC provided what information it could on the movements of aid and personnel. There was no injury or loss of life reported because of lack of coordination. An accidental air strike on an ICRC warehouse on 25 October 2001 was partly the result of the reluctance of the ICRC to participate with the military in any of these deconfliction meetings and to share information with the military.

The following is one example of a successful operation. The Disaster Assistance Relief Team (DART) of USAID in Islamabad contacted the CHLC to inform them that there was a humanitarian relief convoy between two towns that was currently under aerial attack by OEF CHLC informed the USCENTCOM LNO team and within three minutes AWACS had been notified and ensured that the convoy was not hit by the bombing.\textsuperscript{126}

The NGOs/IGOs also requested the use of military air and desired that the military provide security for their convoys. The CHLC in Islamabad replied that OEF had no assets to assist the NGO community. Eventually the NGOs stopped asking.

**Humanitarian Air Drops**

On 7 October 2001, concurrent with the combat air operations, the U.S. started air dropping Humanitarian Daily Rations (HDRs) into Afghanistan. The HDR was developed in 1993 as a less expensive alternative to the military’s Meal Ready to Eat (MRE). The ration was designed to be more appropriate to the needs of refugees and other vulnerable populations. Designed to be acceptable under the widest range of cultural and religious dietary restriction the HDRs contain no animal products and are readily digestible by
moderately malnourished people. HDRs can be airdropped via the triad system, by which individual packets flutter to the ground.\textsuperscript{127}

DoDs viewed these drops as the only way to get food into areas where NGOs were not present and as a way to demonstrate the U.S. government’s good will to the Afghans, and the rest of the world. However, the international relief community opposed the program. NGOs viewed this as a U.S. psychological military operation rather than as a humanitarian effort. NGOs raised the following specific concerns:

- Drops were directed toward drop areas that the military could support, rather than the most desperate populations.
- Intelligence was not accurate enough to ensure effective targeting of the drops.
- Because of the threat, the rations were dropped from altitudes above 30,000 feet, which created concerns about drop accuracy and damage to the packages. In fact, some packages were damaged and the contents contaminated, allowing Islamic extremists to claim that the U.S. was conducting biological warfare against the Muslim people of Afghanistan.
- HDR were dropped individually at an exorbitant cost that out weighted their benefit. The first UNJLC convoy provided more food that the entire airdrop did from October through December 2001.
- Distribution of the supplies could not be controlled. Reports from the ground indicated that the hungry populations were not getting the rations directly. Instead, the HDR were going to combatants or to enterprising individuals who would sell them to the highest bidder.
- The color and shape of the ration was similar to that of the cluster bomb submunitions. There was fear that civilian could be hurt of killed by a cluster bomb mistaken for food packet.
- Drops brought people into risky areas and endangered them in recovering supplies.
- HDR provided a little amount when compared to the effort. A better solution from the NGO perspective was to establish a safe and secure environment so that the food convoys could get through to secure distribution locations.\textsuperscript{128}

The validity of NGOs’ concerns is unknown; what is certain is that HDR became a key friction point between the U.S. military and the NGOs.

\textbf{Retail Support Method}

As the international community turned to retail distribution of aid, with the NGOs and the CHLCs working inside Afghanistan, the relationship among OEF, the UN, and NGOs was chilly at the operational and managerial levels, but accommodations occurred at the tactical level. CJCMOTF, with its focus on executing projects, did not establish as successful an outreach to NGOs and the Afghan Ministries as did ISAF. The NGOs had certain expectation of the U.S. military based on U.S. doctrine and previous practice that were not met.
NGO Expectations of U.S. Military Capabilities and Support

Based on their experience in the Balkans, NGOs expected the U.S. military to deploy with sufficient capacity engineer, transportation, logistic, and civil affairs specialty assets, which would stabilize the situation while the NGOs built their own capability. NGOs expected to find a CMOC where they could coordinate for this support. But there were neither these capabilities nor a CMOC function.129

Safe and Secure Environment

The NGOs/IGOs expected the U.S. military to establish a general safe and secure environment in which to work. But the U.S. policy guidance was to do no such thing. ISAF was expected to establish such an environment in and around Kabul. The U.S. did not favor an expansion of ISAF and did not intend to expand its own forces into a countrywide peace enforcement mission.

NGO/IGOs felt unsafe returning to the countryside. The NGOs who had been in Afghanistan prior to OEF carried baggage had previously arranged with the Taliban for security and were unsure about their future relationships with the warlords. OEF military assets did not provide security either on an area basis or for specific events such as WFP food shipments. The lack of communication among all parties aggravated the situation. One result was that NGOs were not represented in most of the countryside and that the CHLCs assumed the role that NGOs would have performed.130

“Market Share”

CFLCC desired that CA make an impact to win the hearts and minds of the Afghans and not just coordinate the actions of others like CA did in the Balkans. There, CA established CMOCs to coordinate and enable NGO work over which they had no direction or influence. In Afghanistan, CA contracted projects with ODAHCA monies. It should be noted that NGO complaints that OHDACA monies represented funds somehow diverted from them were invalid. Under the program’s governing rules, OHDACA set-aside money would never have gone to NGO in the first place.131

CA operated in areas that had been the domain of NGOs for over ten years. Nevertheless, CA operations did not steal NGOs’ “market share.” Initially, many NGOs, for a number of reasons, not the least of which was uncertainty about their relationship to the new political reality, did not extend their operations beyond the major population centers. As they did expand outward, in many instances, CA teams shared projects or gave them to NGOs to execute. In only rare circumstances did an NGO and the U.S. Military directly compete over a project.132

Much more common were episodes such as the renovation of the Women’s Hospital in Kabul, OHDACA monies focused on renovating parts of the building, and the NGO provided the medical supplies. In this way, CHLC and NGO were complementary. Afghan benefited.133

Perceptions of Neutrality and the Civilian Clothes Issue

Neutrality and independence are two of the fundamentals that guide most NGO and UN agencies dealing with relief. The relief community seeks to create “humanitarian space” to reach at risk populations. For many years under the Taliban, NGOs and the UN made
deals to create humanitarian space, at times playing off one Taliban faction against another. With OEF, the entire situation changed.

The U.S. was considered a belligerent. Early in the conflict, the UNOCHA in Islamabad maintained liaison with both the U.S., and the Taliban, and only met with them on a case-by-case basis. The conflict’s outcome was uncertain, and the UN felt it had to keep the doors open to create humanitarian space. Additionally, they were concerned for the safety of local staff that was inside Afghanistan. Some of their staff did come under pressure because of the impression that their organization was associating with the U.S. military.134 NGOs shared this concern and it crystallized around the subject of some U.S. military CA personnel wearing civilian dress. The episode provides an interesting case study of misunderstanding and miscommunication.

When the CHLC arrived in Islamabad, the U.S. Ambassador, concerned that the increasing numbers of the U.S. military in Pakistan would place them and the operation at risk, requested that military personnel wear civilian clothe. In Afghanistan, Northern Alliance leaders required U.S. to wear native clothes to reduce the appearance that outsiders were influencing them. When the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion deployed, it assumed the same garb. After the fighting subsided, Ismael Khan, Abdul Dostum, and other local governors continued to request that CHLCs wear civilian clothes for their own protection and for the general stability of the region. Also, these governors wanted it to appear that they were in charge of their area and not beholden to OEF forces or the central authority in Kabul. The UN and some NGOs also initially insisted that OEF soldiers wear civilian clothes to meet with them.135

Other NGOs, however, became upset because the military was wearing civilian clothes while, carrying weapons. They were concerned that the locals would not be able to differentiate between U.S. military and NGOs, and that their security and freedom of action could be compromised. Medecins sans Frontieres expressed this view quite vehemently:

*Time and again the Medecines Sans Frontieries team in Kandahar has observed military personnel from the international coalition force in civilian cloths with or without concealed guns, driving civilian cars... People suspect us of carrying hidden guns. We were repeatedly warned by Afghans not to go to specific places outside town since people might not be able to distinguish us from western soldiers....With the underlying tension between some Afghan military factions and the coalition forces, humanitarian aid workers are placed a significant risk because of this confusion...If armies engaged in fighting are involved in delivering humanitarian assistance, it can be regarded by their opponents as an act of war. If humanitarian action is seen as partisan, aid and aid workers can be targeted. Humanitarian aid promotes a concern for humanity and dignity in times of violence. This relies on a respect for the impartiality of aid agencies, and their independence from the pursuit of military causes.... Coalition forces who wear civilian clothes misrepresent their role. This practice jeopardizes the safety of humanitarian workers and endangers the humanitarian work...*136

On 19 March 2002, USCENTCOM completed a review of the issue and directed all CA personnel in Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif to return to full uniform. Guidance and authority
were provided to ground force commanders to establish uniform policies based upon local threat conditions and force protection requirements.\textsuperscript{137}

Because of the NGO complaints, the issue of military wear of civilian clothing was further reviewed within the DoD. Following DOD-JCS coordination, guidance was forwarded to USCENTCOM in May 2002 that was consistent with CJCMOTF guidance issued 7 April 2002. Because of USCENTCOM/CJCMOTF guidance, the number of CA personnel in civilian clothing had already diminished significantly before DOD-JCS action.

As the CHLCs switched to uniforms, there was an initial period where the local people would not talking to them. But, because the CHLCs had already achieved rapport, the people responded positively after a few days. The CHLCs appeared to be able to continue their mission successfully in uniform.\textsuperscript{138}

**Relationships with Warlords**

CHLCs initially owed their access, security and support for projects to the regional leaders or warlords. It was essentially the only way the teams could survive and function. However, this left them open to the impression that they were the lackeys of the warlords, doing the bidding of individuals who had questionable human rights pasts.\textsuperscript{139} NGOs complained that the CHLCs were only considering short-term objectives by strengthening the hand of the warlords at the expense of the Afghan central government. NGOs such as CARE and IGOs such as ICRC felt that they were supporting the overall Bonn vision of creating a stable country based on legitimate central authority, but that CJCMOTF was only focused on increasing warlord support to OEF combat objectives that could undermine the central authority. CJCMOTF understood this problem but there was no concept or transition plan that laid out how to proceed in strengthening the central government’s control in these regions. Without such a concept or plan, CHLCs continued to support the local authorities during this phase of the operation.\textsuperscript{140}

**Conditionality of Aid**

The relief community was concerned because humanitarian assistance provided by the military, both OEF and ISAF, was conditional. Among NGOs/IGOs the accepted definition of humanitarian assistance is that it is to be unconditional and focused on populations in need and at risk.

Part of the problem lies in the definition of humanitarian assistance. The CHLCs, for the most part, were dealing more in reconstruction than pure humanitarian aid. But because of the restriction placed on nation building, everything the CHLC did was called humanitarian aid. Rebuilding schools, digging water projects, and refurbishing medical facilities fit more into the developmental definition than the humanitarian aid definition.

For instance, the intent of the OHDACA program to “enhance force protection and facilitate coalition presence” created friction with the UN and NGO relief community. The instructions from commander CFLCC were clear that this was not a purely humanitarian program, but a psychological operation aimed at winning the hears and minds of the local population to enhance force protection and to maximize civilian support for military operations.\textsuperscript{141}

On the other hand, CHLCs, in providing conditional developmental aid, were doing no more than what had been done in the past. Conditional aid was the basis for the Office of the
High Representative operations in Bosnia, UNMIK in Kosovo, and is part of the mandate for UNAMA. The Security Council Resolution establishing UNAMA in Afghanistan specifically instructed that reconstruction aid be conditional. The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit called this “aid-induced pacification.” Those who support the peace process are rewarded with developmental assistance; those who do not support it receive none. This was the basis for the CHLC and ISAF projects.

By all reports, the CJCMOTF and ISAF CIMIC did succeed in “winning the hearts and minds” of the peoples that their programs touched. The projects enhanced force protection, built consent for the Bonn process, and supported U.S. and UK national objectives in coordination with USAID and DFID.

**Communication and Coordination Mechanisms**

USCENTCOM had the HAWG in Tampa but did not establish any in theater CMOC to inform and coordinate NGO/IGO actions. CMOC North and CMOC South were command and control headquarters for the CHLCS and did not perform any of the traditional CMOC functions. CMOC North did conduct briefings for UNJLC in Tashkent. CHLCs in the field were focused on projects and not on outreach to NGOs.

Even though the NGOs/IGOs had worked with the CHLC in Islamabad, the UN decided that it would have no formal relationship with the U.S. military since the U.S. was a belligerent. There were workarounds, however. For example, the UN would not allow U.S. participation in its daily coordination meetings with the NGOs. But the day after these meetings, the CHLC visited the UN and each of the NGOs separately to coordinate. The UN in Tashkent was open to coordination based upon a different threat and the fact the US teams did not openly appear as US Military.

Overall, the absence of any institutional means of sharing information and expectations among NGOs, IGOs, and the U.S. military increased misperceptions about intent and capabilities on all sides. By contrast, from the beginning, the ISAF CIMIC Center did provide that information for those NGOs associated with ISAF. The result was that ISAF was able to develop a much more harmonious relationship with NGOs than OEF, even though they were conducting similar civil military operations.

Again, there were several incidents of quiet cooperation. CJCMOTF and UNICEF cooperated on putting together boxes of school supplies to hand out to the local villages. UNICEF provided the expertise to determine what should go in the boxes, CJCMOTF provided the materials; UNICEF boxed the materials out of its warehouses, and CJCMOTF taped them closed. Even though CJCMOTF could not use UNICEF tape because the UNICEF symbol was on the tape, both sides were satisfied.

Generally, NGO—even *Medecins sans Frontieres*—and CHLCs worked with each other at the tactical level in remote locations; however, the relationship was difficult at the operational and higher levels.

**NGO relationships with Afghan Government and internal coordination**

Relationships between NGOs and the Afghan Governmental structures have been strained. For instance, the Afghan Government wanted to exercise control over NGO activities but the NGOs, accustomed to a decade of operating in a vacuum, bypassed the new central government and chafed at the suggestion of control. Often, the Afghan
Government would complain to ISAF and OEF, which further soured the relationship between those military entities and NGOs.

The NGOs have had difficulty coming together in any useful forum. By doctrine, the CJCMOTF looked for the semblance of a Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC), but except for the UNOCHA sectors, there was nothing. With difficulty, the Agency Coordination Body for Afghans Relief has been trying to reestablish itself in Kabul and regain status as a lead agency for NGO. In April 2002, the Kabul based “NGO Forum” was placed under ACBAR’s umbrella.

Stability Operations

As the coalition began stability operations in earnest, the U.S. military and UNAMA and OEF established mechanisms to foster cooperation between OEF forces and NGOs. Some NGOs recognized that the CHLCs were not competitors, but would assist them in getting projects. CJCMOTF shifted to enabling Afghan institutions and NGOs, and created coordination mechanisms such as PRTs and the Civil-Military Coordination Center in Kabul. The ITGA also demonstrated initiative by establishing Consultative Groups to coordinate reconstruction.

Coordination Mechanisms

With the deployment of CJTF 180 and the 360th CA Brigade standing up as CJCMOTF, the situation began to change. Mechanisms such as PRTs and the Civil-Military Coordination Center led to improved relationships with Afghans and NGOs. ACABAR supported the PRT initiative and the ITGA was embedded in the project. PRTs, working in the countryside, coordinated the military support with the ITGA and NGOs, and provide the interface needed to begin the process of transition envisioned in Phase IV of OEF.

With the PRTs, UNAMA, and the ITGA hosted development planning workshops. These included key players such as: IOM, UNHCR, UN Habitat, Solidarities, Aga Khan Development Foundation, and representatives from ITGA ministries and local government. The UNAMA area coordinator met with the PRT commander of the PRT in Bamyan and agreed to act as moderator between the coalition and aid organizations—a significant step forward. According to the USAID regional representative, “The PRT has been invited to attend the UN Heads of Agencies monthly meetings, as well as the bi-weekly NGO forum facilitated by UNAMA, and to meet weekly with UNAMA.” Again, this step is a significant advance toward harmonization.147

On 2-3 November 2002, 500 representatives of the Afghan government, NGOs, UN, and donor counties met in Kabul at the urging of the Afghan Ministry of Planning assisted by ACSF, ACBAR and ANCB. Simply having the conference indicated a notable improvement of the climate between the new Afghan Government and NGOs. The Afghan government stated that it depended on NGO support:

> Especially in expanding capacity, involving representatives of civil society, setting standards, and advising on policy. The Afghan Government expects help from the NGOs, especially in the sectors of women’s and human rights.148
The conference ended with the founding of a working group of Government and NGOs. Additionally, in December 2002, The Afghan Government established Consultative Groups (CGs) to focus on the attainment of specific benchmarks in the 12 development programs as defined in the National Development Framework presented in October 2002 to the international donors.149

Key Successes

- **USAID, USCENTCOM, and operators in the field forged a closer and more productive relationship than at any time in the past.** USAID assisted CHLCs with program selection, funding, and oversight. This close coordination should serve as a model and be repeated in the future.150

- **The relationship between CHLC and OGAs was closer than at any time in the past.** CHLCs depended on OGAs for assistance and funding. OGAs were flexible and able to provide quick impact money.

- **The military was able to deconflict combat operations with Humanitarian Relief.** USCENTCOM was able to sanitizing intelligence and pass it to NGOs in timely fashion.

- **CJCMOTF and the U.S. Embassy in Kabul worked closely from the beginning of the operation.** Commander CJCMOTF was a member of the country team. This access led to synchronization of political, economic, informational, and military activities.

- **UNOCHA, UNJLC, and INTERACTION established a successful cell at USCENTCOM in Tampa.** This contributed to successful CMO.

- **UNJLC concept worked exceedingly well in providing an emergency response to coordinate the relief efforts.** CJCMOTF worked closely with the UNJLC.

- **CHLCs at the tactical level established working relationships with several NGO that proved to be productive and harmonious.**

- **CJTF 180 has a vision that recognizes the need to coordinate with NGOs and is developing plans accordingly**
Chapter 7: Providing Appropriate Forces

This chapter examines the structure, identification, mobilization, equipping, and assignment of forces.

If CA forces are to be employed again as they were in Afghanistan, then changes must be made to basic organizations, equipment, and mobilization procedures and preparation.

Tables of Organization and Equipment Do Not Support the CA Employment Profile in Afghanistan.

The current RC CA brigade and battalion TO&Es are based on an employment concept in which these units operate in support of a conventional force that provides security and support. But in Afghanistan, CA units were required to conduct small unit, independent operations in an austere and non-permissive environment. Because the units were not properly organized and equipped for this, CA commanders task organized their forces to accomplish the mission. For future “come as you are” contingencies, consider giving priority to equipment and personnel to ensure readiness matches contingency requirements.

The RC CA TO&Es are deficient in the following areas:

- **Communications**: The current TO&E authorizes communications capability compatible with conventional units with which the CA element is designed to work, but it does not support stand alone, small team operations in remote locations. CA units need the communications capability to conduct split team (CAT-A, CAT-B) two to three person teams operations, with the same type of redundant communications that the SOF possess. For the majority of the deployment, some of the AC 96th CA Battalion did not have secure data communications capability. There was a difference between COMOC North assets and CMOC South. CMOC North had INMARSAT, Iridium, PSC5, MBITAR, and an international cell phone (primary, alternate, contingency and emergency communications). However, CMOC South did not deploy with all the communications needed. For almost two months the CAT-A and CAT-B teams in Kabul could not even talk to their headquarters located only one mile away. Radios such as the PSC-5, Inmersat, and iridium handheld satellite phone, to communicate with civilian as well as military were not required, but were not authorized across the Civil Affairs active and reserve forces. In Afghanistan, SOF assisted CHLCS with communications so that they could perform their tasks.

- **ADP Support**: The independent nature of the operations requires more laptop computers than the TO&E allows.

- **Transportation**: Adequate transportation for a four-person team to operate independently is not provided for in the current TO&E. As a result, CHLCS had to contract automobiles that were of poor quality and provided inadequate force protection. In several places in Afghanistan, and other areas of the world, HMMWVs are too large to move and require a significant logistical tail. Consideration should be given to authorize CA units to purchase civilian vehicles that meet specifications such as other SOF did in Afghanistan.
• **Weapons.** The teams require the firepower and flexibility that includes the type of weapons that the Special Forces teams are authorized. The standard M16 cannot be maneuvered inside a vehicle. The M4 is a better weapon, but although on the TO&E of CA units, it has not been fielded to them.

• **Night Vision.** The units need to be authorized the current night vision systems.

• **Body Armor.** Current state of art, concealable body armor should be authorized.

• **Proper Military Occupational Specialties.** To operate as small, detached units, the MOS structure should be reviewed to ensure that proper rank structure and skills are resident to meet the operational concept. The CA teams perhaps should look more like small Special Forces teams with medical, engineer, and intelligence specialists.

• **Tentage. More required to support stand alone operations.** If possible, teams will look for existing structures for security and access to key players.

• **CA Support to Conventional Brigades.**

The ODP for 39C (Civil Affairs) does not exist to support a CA officer on conventional maneuver brigade staffs.

The 352\(^{st}\) CA Command’s AAR, (26 July 2002), provides more detail on the above issues to include equipment specific nomenclature.\(^{1.53}\) New equipment that was issued was fielded improperly with no training provided. For instance, both the 450\(^{th}\) CA Battalion and the 360\(^{th}\) CA Brigade received AN/PRC-150 Improved High Frequency Radios before deploying. But they were issued without the proper components that included antennas, power supplies and amplifiers.\(^{1.54}\)

**“Light Footprint” and No “Nation Building” Limitations Affected Deployment**

Because the U.S. explicitly eschewed nation building in Afghanistan and sought to minimize its military “footprint” there, both the size and composition of CA units were restricted. In reality, the situation on the ground required a robust CA capability. Most of the equipment required by the CA units was available at the mobilization site, but was reserved for combat forces despite the fact that units like the 489\(^{th}\) CA Battalion were deploying small, unsupported units into remote and hostile territory, places that combat units were not going. This employment profile was neither understood nor appreciated by those preparing and authorizing the CA units for deployment.\(^{1.55}\)

**Mobilization Did Not Support the Mission.**

**Mobilization was not timely**

The National Guard elements that formed the first CJCMOTF mobilized in a matter of weeks; the RC CA units, however, took months. The 377\(^{th}\) TSC took only two weeks to start arriving at ARCENT. A three member planning team from the 352\(^{a}\) Civil Affairs Command did arrive in two weeks at USCENTCOM, but the rest of the unit’s mobilization took 43 days.\(^{1.56}\) Thus, there was little CA expertise available in the key early phases of the operation.
Part of the explanation for the difference between National Guard and RC CA mobilization time lies in the added procedures for SOF mobilization. Unlike the non-SOF National Guard, the SOF RC requests went first from USCENTCOM to USSOCOM and then to ARSOC at Ft Bragg, back to USCENTCOM and then to USA FORSCOM. The non-SOF National Guard deals directly with FORSCOM. In the case of OEF, the procedures were not well understood and the initial request for CA when first sent to FORSCOM, was rejected and sent back without action for resubmission through the appropriate channels. This initial confusion caused delays.\textsuperscript{157}

There was also a great deal of confusion over mobilization orders and formats when dealing with SOF Army Reserve and National Guard. The Army Regulations were not helpful, and the staff officers were not educated in the procedures. The result was delay and complication. Many soldiers did not receive orders in a timely manner. In fact, some received orders the day they were to report and then waited 60 days at a mobilization site, which created unacceptable problems for families and employers.

Later mobilized units fared no better. 414\textsuperscript{th} CA Battalion took over 60 days to mobilize. This unit went through multiple reorganizations before it left Ft Bragg due to a lack of clear mission guidance. Other units were given shifting mission statements before, during, and after the mobilization process, thus affecting their preparation. The 414\textsuperscript{th} CA Battalion received at least three different missions while in the mobilization station, thus limiting their ability to prepare.\textsuperscript{158}

The Center for Army Lessons Learned summarized as follows:

- The time between the request for forces (RFF) and the approved deployment order was too bureaucratic and time consuming.
- The force cap placed on the theater resulted in a departure from the standard approach to resourcing the theater.\textsuperscript{159}

**Mobilization site did not prepare units for the specific region and mission**

Most of the CA units reported a poor experience at the Fort Bragg Mobilization Unit In-Processing Center (MUIC). Pre-mobilization Training Support Requirements (PTSR) are designed to facilitate preparation. If done properly, PTSR allow the commander and the mobilization site to tailor a training program that takes into account the commander’s estimate of his unit’s strengths and weaknesses. This did not happen. The MUIC used the cookie cutter approach for all the units.

The authors of this study attended an abridged version of the full MUIC training cycle that included mine awareness, counter-terrorism, force protection, ROE, and six hour mandatory video. The team concluded that operations at the MUIC were extremely disjointed, unfocused, and failed to prepare mobilized CA units for the combat environment of Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{160}

The AARs compiled by the 352\textsuperscript{a} CA Command, 489\textsuperscript{th} CA Battalion, 401\textsuperscript{st} CA Battalion, 418\textsuperscript{th} CA Battalion, 377\textsuperscript{th} TSC. As well as interviews of all ranks conducted by the 126\textsuperscript{th} Military History Detachment were nearly universal in their complaints about the mobilization process. The key issues were:
• Training was not tailored to the support the specific mission area of the target country. There were few or no briefings on Afghanistan customs, government, or religion.

• No country specific ROE briefing was presented.

• Training and awareness were not updated by information from the operational area. There was no current intelligence reports from the AOR provided to the CA units in the MUIC. The 96th CA Battalion had just returned from Afghanistan in March 2002, but was not tasked by USASOC or USACAPOC to provide subject matter experts to mentor, train or prepare subsequent deploying CA units. Soldiers returning from the 10th Mountain Division or 101st Airborne Division could have been used as well. Initially there was no mine awareness training for the 352nd CA Command. Unqualified instructors using inaccurate data about actual conditions in Afghanistan presented the mine awareness training to this research team one year later.

• Poor coordination delayed processing and training by weeks. At Ft. Bragg, there were many units engaged (USACAPOC, Dragon Brigade, Training Support Brigade, 78th Division (TR), liaison teams, and the mobilizing unit), none of whom understood the relationship among all of these entities or how to coordinate with them to gain maximum benefit.

• Many soldiers in the CA community needed “over-40” physicals and medical support. The MUIC was not prepared to handle the volume of such individuals and this created delays and lost training opportunities.

• There were no uniform standards on time utilization for the validation process. Units reported that soldiers were idle days at a time and then would spend hour upon hour on work that was focused neither on the mission nor the Area of Operations. Some units provided four day passes to fill in the time.

• Units were held from forward deploying pending the certification of one or two individuals.

• At Ft. Bragg, planned classes on OPFUNDs classes never occurred for still undetermined reasons. Therefore, key individuals deployed without a clear knowledge of accounting procedures, purchasing restrictions, and authorization authority.\textsuperscript{161}

The Army established a system that supports deployment to the Balkans, but has not transferred those lessons to OEF. The 26 November 2002 report of the U.S.A. John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School provides more detail on the problems associated with preparing civil affairs units for deployment into Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{162}

**Composite Units**

Derivative Unit Identity Codes (UICs) were used to integrate parts of units into other units. This created support problems because the parts of units came with no equipment sets. The mixing of derivative UICs and a TO&E unit broke down the integrity of both elements and created confusion and a lack of teamwork. Earlier deploying units took elements
and equipment from latter deploying units to fill their needs. This caused problems in subsequent rotations. The mixing of units and the harvesting of equipment from other units was necessary because the standing CA units were not fully mission capable. They were not fully staffed and needed special skills and equipment that had not been filled.\(^{163}\)

**WARTRACE alignments were ignored**

For OEF, the WARTRACE concept was violated, leaving units without CA support. Neither the 101\(^{st}\) Airborne nor the 10\(^{th}\) Mountain Divisions had support from their habitual CA slices. CHLCs supported operations indirectly, but the task force commanders, did not have a means of directly influencing CA in their own AOs. The Commander of TF 82 (82\(^{nd}\) Airborne Division) listed the lack of his WARTRACE CA slice as one of the major shortcomings of OEF. As with the conventional units, SOF also suffered from the breaking of habitual relationships. The 404\(^{th}\) CA Battalion (Special Operations) has been established in the force structure to support employed Special Forces units in the conduct of unconventional warfare. However, the 404\(^{th}\) was never mobilized, and its mission was assumed, first by the 96\(^{th}\) CA Battalion and later by the 489\(^{th}\) CA Battalion, a unit with a WARTRACE to the 101\(^{st}\) Airborne Division.\(^{164}\)

**Conventional Units Were Not Resourced to Conduct CMO**

Deprived of their CA slices, units needed additional resources to conduct required CMO. Nevertheless, these units had no access to funds to conduct any quick impact projects to support their operations. Any of the materials that they obtained came from OGAs, CJMOTF or JSOTF. They did receive materials through the mail from concerned U.S. citizens but this was sporadic. Without access to the programs of CJCMOTF, these commanders had little flexibility to shape their operational areas.\(^{165}\)

**CA Force Structure Inadequate to Support World Wide Requirements**

The CA force structure is inadequate to provide immediately deployable assets to conduct initial on-the-ground CA/CMO assessments, despite commitments to all of the Combatant Commanders that include Homeland Security and three major theater war contingencies.

Doctrinally, the AC Civil Affairs component provides the initial (M Day) “generalist” capability, while the RC provides the “functional” CA expertise at M+30 to 60 days. However, the situation in Afghanistan demanded early RC expertise. Partial mobilizations had to be done to obtain key capabilities to support the mission. The AC/RC mix must be reassessed.\(^{166}\)

**Force Cap Adversely Affected CMO Capability**

The CJCMOTF objective plan for Afghanistan was a task force of 3,000 individuals that included all of the disciplines and support needed to deal with the instability of the country. However, the force cap that was imposed on the number of military that could be in Afghanistan meant that CJCMOTF never approached this capability.
Chapter 8: Education and Training

This chapter examines the military’s preparation to face civil military challenges such as Afghanistan

The consistent response from the NGO, IGO, CA and SOF communities was that most U.S. commanders, staffs, and soldiers at all levels lacked an understanding of complex stability operations. The chapter addresses this issue by examining at the three pillars of Army education and training: institutional, unit, and self development.

Institutional Training.

In 1999, United States Institute for Peace conducted a conference with senior commanders after their deployment in the Balkans to determine how prepared they were to face a stability operation. Generals William Nash and Eric Shinseki stated that for thirty years, the Army trained them to “read a battlefield” and that they had to learn to read a “peace field.” General William Crouch noted that although the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) helped him prepare for Bosnia, it did not provide any guidance on how to link the civil with the military effort. General Montgomery Meigs stated that he was given no preparation other than what he did personally.167

The Army needs must increase awareness and understanding of CMO and stability operations at all levels of its institutional training.

Unit Training.

For Bosnia and Kosovo, the U.S. Army realized that extensive preparation was necessary and established a training program for all units would accomplish before deploying. Once a unit is identified for participation in a Balkan peace operation, it alters its training focus toward peace operations 90 days before deployment.

Over this three month period, training sensitizes the unit to many of the situations that it might face. It includes using ethnic role players in simulated joint military commission meetings, dealing with the media, harmonizing civil and military operations, working with IGOs, NGOs and civilian contractors, dealing with civil unrest, use of force and ROE. The situations are vignette-driven and the unit takes home these vignettes on CDs and videotapes.

After a year and two rotations of units into Afghanistan, the Army had not developed a similar training program. This was initially understandable given the need to quickly deploy units. However, the situation has changed and the challenges in Afghanistan are as great as in the Balkans. The Army should consider institutionizing a train-up program.

Current mobilization training and preparation of reserve units for Afghanistan was inadequate, especially in the areas of CMO and stability operations.

Self Development.

Respondents stated that their personnel experience in previous engagements in the Balkans, Haiti, Somalia, Panama, or East Timor formed the base of their preparation. CA units that had served in the Balkans were able to adapt to the environment.
Self development cannot fill all the educational gaps. Commanders should consult experts to become knowledgeable about legal and fiscal issues. Dealing with other agencies’ funding arrangements, operational funds, donated humanitarian goods, local contractors, and other countries’ monies, placed commanders and staffs on unfamiliar ground. When CHLCs initially deployed, they were unprepared to write contract proposals, arrange bidder’s conferences, and deal closely with OGAs and regional warlords upon whom they would depend upon for security and access.168

The Army emphasizes self development but does not provide helpful tools in the area of stability operations. The Chief of Staff of the Army has published a professional reading list that does not include one work on stability operations. Instead, all of the books are focused on combat. For instance, the list might profitably include the U.S. Army Center for Military History’s book *The US Army Counter Insurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941*, which provides insights into these types of operations.169

**Lessons Not Learned and Exercise Design**

Lessons learned is the feedback that shapes training and education systems. Before OEF, USCENTCOM conducted a number of exercises that all identified CMO shortfalls such as the need for a CMO cell in the headquarters. These recommendations were not acted upon; for example, no CMO cell was established full time at USCENTCOM.170

Additionally, most exercises stop short of post conflict, peace-building activities. Exercises focus on combat, with CMO as supporting task. In environments such as Afghanistan, CMO has the major weight with combat in support. Exercise design should take this new operational environment into account.

**RC Civil Affairs Education and Training.**

Although many non-CA soldiers may not understand CMO, many times the CA forces do not understand how the rest of the military works. Some CA staff officers have been assessed as weak in understanding and applying the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). This lack of training leads to difficulties integrating within planning groups at tactical and operational headquarters. This was one of several factors driving the decision not to have a CA unit form the initial CJCMOTF.171

The Joint Special Operations University has started a Civil Affairs Campaign Planners workshop. CA should seek more slots in the School of Advanced Military Studies at Ft. Leavenworth and the Basic and Advanced Strategic Arts Programs at the U.S. Army War College.172

**Personnel Turnover**

Rapid personnel turnover hindered operations also. The NGO/IGO representatives at Tampa became frustrated when officers they had educated in were constantly reassigned. The LNO cell at Tampa stated that in a one-week period at the beginning of the OEF, the officers with whom they worked changed three times.173
Chapter 9: Resources

This chapter examines the resources that were made available to support CMO and the limitations on those resources.

The “light footprint” concept, coupled with the self-imposed stricture against “nation building,” as well as other global requirements, affected the resources available to support OEF. Afghanistan of course had limited indigenous capacity. The NGO community had left the country before the conflict, and was limited in generating capability. During the initial emergency phase of OEF, the U.S. military was the only organization that could gain access and provide support for much of the country. However, CMO was under resourced.

Transportation

Difficult terrain, primitive or nonexistent infrastructure, and extreme distances placed a premium on reliable transportation, but the military force was structured and resourced only to support the combat operations. OEF did not include transportation assets required to support the CMO demands present in a stability operation.

Availability of air support was a major constraint. In Herat, the CHLC went without resupply for up to six weeks, because no airlift could be found. Projects that had been approved were often delayed because contract officers could not be transported to required locations. Project Execution Teams (PETs) had difficulty assessing contract compliance because they could not obtain timely transportation.

The purpose of the CMO effort was to demonstrate that the U.S. cared about the population and prompt action on projects was key. In order to overcome some of the problems, CJCMOTF used opportune UN air and borrowed SOF airlift from JSOTF. To get around the constraints imposed by lack of air assets, in April 2002, CJCMOTF deployed the PETs to mass at one location to begin simultaneous projects. Commander CJCMOTF also formally proposed to establish a standard fixed-scheduled “milk run” to each of the CHLC locations with a fixed wing aircraft. This proposal was never acted upon, and CJCMOTF, as January 2003, was still scrounging aircraft support.

Ground Transportation was another shortfall. Some CA units were directed at the mobilization station not to deploy with their organic transportation. This led them to lease (they were not allowed to purchase) automobiles, pick-ups and SUVs to accomplish their in country mission. The cost was between $900 and $3,000 per month per vehicle in November 2002. The Pakistani contractor provided older, unreliable Japanese vehicles that lacked on board equipment such as jacks and spare tires and offered no force protection measurers. Although a maintenance contract did exist, it could not respond to vehicles at remote sites. The CJCMOTF did the best it could under these circumstances.

In these remote situations, a combination of milititay and civilian vehicles is required. The current fleet of military vehicles is too wide to travel on all roads, and fit into narrow streets and compounds. Additionally, there are political constraints on military vehicles. For instance, some borders such as the one with Uzbekistan would not allow military vehicles to transit. Further, meetings with some NGOs/IGOs could not be accomplished in military vehicles. Consideration should be given purchasing a fleet of CMO vehicles with
a maintenance package and proper force protection before deploying. The Special Forces did this by purchasing vehicles and outfitted them to specs at Ft Bragg. 176

**Inadequate security for ground transported logistics support.** CJCMOTF contracted local trucks to supply CHLCs and PRTs. Frequently, between 30 to 50 percent of the supplies on these trucks were pilfered. CJTF 180 did not have the assets to secure these convoys nor did the Afghan authorities. This situation had no solution other than CJCMOTF hiring private contractors to secure its ground lines of communication. 177

**Funds**

The UK and the U.S developed different approaches to funding CMO.

**UK and ISAF:**

The UK, as the lead nation for ISAF, used the Department of International Development (DFID) monies for quick impact projects. The concept came from Bosnia, where DFID did not have the ability to disburse funds over a wide area and asked UK military officers to assume that responsibility, while DFID ran the programs. The UK agreed, with the proviso that DFID allow a certain percentage of projects to be determined by the military as long as they met general DFID guidelines. Thus, the UK military gained a tool to win hearts and minds and used it in Afghanistan, though perhaps not as effectively as in the Balkans as indicated below.

DFID provision of funds to military units has always been a contentious issue amongst some in the humanitarian community. The involvement of UK troops in offensive military actions at the same time as UK troops being in a leading position in ISAF was a further complicating factor. Nonetheless, the DFID strategy remained constant and ISAF projects received funds on satisfactory compliance with DFID criteria established for QIPs. Adherence to these criteria and staffing of project proposals to the standard expected within the timescale required did not prove easy for either DFID Kabul or ISAF and the relationship suffered as a result. 178

DFID initially provided the money for immediate impact projects. Later a considerable donor base developed for ISAF with the UK, Turkey, Germany, Finland, the Netherlands, and the European Union being some of the major contributors. CIMIC’s 2002 budget of 4.422 Million Euros provided a deal of flexibility to coordinate projects.

Additionally, the UK commander can use his Operational Money to fund civil military projects that support his mission. The UK has authorized its operational commanders to spend O&M monies on building a bridge or fixing a school if that supports the accomplishment of the mission.

**US and CJCMOTF:**

There are two aspects to funding: operational funds that support CA teams survival in their environment and those that support quick impact projects.
Operational Funds

CJCMOTF and the CHLCs needed money to operate. They had to contract for security with the local warlords, provide for quarters and rations, and obtain transportation and other sundries in areas remote from the support structures of the main military force. The Special Forces teams were allocated operational funds to meet these needs. CA teams are not normally provided those funds, because their doctrinal mission does not envision such independent employment. In Afghanistan, the CA teams were given operational funds for the first time and they were indispensable. If this is to be a model for future CA missions, then operational funds should be provided, along with the education required to properly manage them. The utility of operational funds must be balanced against contracting for services. Contracts are better for long-term, recurring expenses. The PRTs are using both.\textsuperscript{179}

Project Funds

In Afghanistan, CA teams contracted directly for projects and getting the appropriate funding was essential. Initially, they used funds from U.S. Special Forces, OGAs, and the UK DFID, before an independent U.S. funding source was provided. They needed two types of funds, one for quick impact, and another for longer-term, large projects. They eventually obtained money for the latter contracting projects--Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civil Aid funds--but never got money for the quick impact projects that they had local authority to expend. CA teams should be provided a variety of financial tools and authority to use them.

Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Disaster and Civil Aid (OHDACA)

In December 2001, USCENTCOM requested that funds be authorized to support CMO operations in Afghanistan. In January 2002, DOD authorized OHDACA funds to be used for quick impact projects. The initial OHDACA concept came from the Humanitarian Assistance Survey Teams from Bamiyan and Konduz. These teams identified projects that were submitted to USCENTCOM who arranged the funding concepts.

OHDACA is a program to support Combatant Commanders’ security cooperation strategies to build capabilities and cooperative relationships with allies, friends, and potential partners through an unobtrusive and low cost means. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, ASD (SOLIC), manages the funds in coordination with the DOS and USAID. Although these funds are the result of a deliberate planning process aimed at shaping the international environment, OSD has increased the emphasis on crisis response in recent years. The program has expanded to include the use of contractors under DOD oversight. OHDACA allows greater flexibility than projects under the Humanitarian Civic Action (HCA) program that requires training benefits to the U.S. and host nation forces be paramount. OHDACA can focus on humanitarian benefits without such constraints.\textsuperscript{180}

No category of project was restricted provided it met the general guidelines of the policy. Annex F to this study includes a complete list of the guidelines.\textsuperscript{181}

OHDACA funds were a useful tool that allowed commanders the flexibility to support projects, though the following issues arose:
• The intent of the OHDACA program to “enhance force protection and facilitate coalition presence” created friction with the UN and NGO relief community. The instructions from commander USCENTCOM and CFLCC were clear that this was not to be a purely humanitarian program nor nation building, but rather a psychological operation aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the local population, to help the force protection of OEF, and to maximize civilian support for military operations.\textsuperscript{182}

• CA soldiers felt that the funds should have been available upon deployment. The CJCMOTF should have requested these funds immediately, but did not. Initially, the CHLCs could do little to influence the situation until the funds became available. Although OHDACA was approved in January 2002, the 489\textsuperscript{th} CA Battalion did not see the money until April 2002. \textsuperscript{183}

• OHDACA is a contracting tool and is not designed to provide immediate impact funds. What the teams needed was a funding tool that would provide immediate monies for low dollar projects such as putting up traffic signs. Operational funds are not authorized for such a use. In another example, the commander of CJTF 180 wanted CJCMOTF to put together packages of school supplies for distribution when they visited a village. Under the rules established for OHDACA, this material had to be tracked, which was next to impossible. How do you track crayons? The CJMOTF, however, designed a plan that was acceptable. All items were packaged together in one kit and the chief village elder was required to sign for the kit, thus ensuring the fiction of “accountability,” because U.S. soldiers could not hand kits out directly to the people. To avoid this type of situation, a separate operational fund source without the contractual restrictions of OHDACA is required.\textsuperscript{184}

• Conflicting guidance on the monetary cap per project caused the CA teams to search for other methods of funding. OSD’s intent was that any project over $300,000 should be referred to it for approval. However, the guidance that USCENTCOM provided to CFLCC commander stated that $300,000 was the limit and no projects that exceeded that limit would be accepted. The initial guidance provided to the CHLCs was also confusing. The guidance first stated that no projects over $100,000 would be considered. Then it was changed to $250,000 then to $300,000. By November 2002, the J-9 CJCMOTF understood that all projects in excess of $300,000 would be sent to the HAWG at CENTCOM to be considered vetted. Although this procedure did exist for vetting projects in excess of $300,000, it was rarely used.\textsuperscript{185}

• There were complaints that the bureaucratic system for project approval was not responsive. This research team and CALL identified bureaucratic problems with a program that was designed to be streamlined and flexible.
  o Each headquarters from USCENTCOM to CFLCC to CJMOTF added constraints to the approval and execution process. The legal advisors for CJMOTF did not identify any legal reason for such an extensive review process. The research team has identified other examples of micromanagement
that stemmed from a concern that commanders and staffs believed that their subordinates needed advice and close supervision.  

- When the CHLCs would identify a project, it would be screened by CMOC North or South and then forwarded to CJMOTF, where they would be deconflicted with USAID and other agencies, and subjected to a board review. Next, the project would be submitted to CFLCC in Kuwait, where it was subjected to another board review. CJMOTF and the CHLCs would then have to respond to the concerns of the CLFCC staff in Kuwait. In June 2002, CJTF 180 in Bagram replaced the CFLCC in the process. CLFCC would then send a report to USCENTCOM listing the projects. After approval there followed the process of getting the contract let. This entire process could take up to two months before work began.

- CHLCs felt they needed a 96 hour response on approval and contracting. Initially, the CHLC supporting the JSOTF had to wait six to eight weeks for approval of a small scale project. The immediate impact value was usually lost.

- CFLCC, as the initial approval authority for all HA projects, made the key decisions in Kuwait far away from the area of operations. CFLCC’s focus was not CMO, but to ensure that these projects met all regulatory criteria and to provide an implementation plan with the approved projects to USCENTCOM. Unfortunately, there was no holistic plan for the stabilization of Afghanistan that the CFLCC could work with to place all of these projects into perspective. All they had was a list of criteria and the recommendations from the field.

- At first, most of the CHLCs did not know how to write a contract, arrange a bidder’s conference and follow up on the work. So part of the “bureaucratic burden” stemmed from the lack of preparation and inexperience of the teams. As of November 2002, neither CJCMOTF nor any other entity had established standard cost estimate guidelines. Each CHLC made its estimates differently based upon what it felt was appropriate. This led to a disparity among the various locations. The CHLCs grew into the jobs and became more proficient at the process, but there was room for improvement.

- Eventually CJTF 180 reduced the approval process down to two weeks and then had to wait for the availability of funds. But the second-guessing did not stop. The two weeks was much faster than the average NGO could respond.

- Funding was not immediately available and that affected operations:
  
  - The standard peacetime funding cycle did not facilitate operations. It took three to four months to get the funding into theater. In March 2002, the funds began to flow. But as the end of the fiscal year neared, the funding dried up until just prior to the year’s end when the teams got a pot of money and had to commit it all in a short period of time. This type of funding profile places a burden on the teams in the field trying to cope with a volatile situation.
An example of an information operations opportunity lost because of the nonavailability of funds was the clean up of the Kandahar Hospital following its seizure by Al-Qaeda patients. After Special Operations Forces had retaken the Kandahar Hospital from the Al-Qaeda, the intent was to conduct a quick assessment, get materials and supplies, and go in to clean up and repair the damage in an effort to capitalize on HA capabilities while the media covered it. It would have also shown Afghans that while the U.S. can kill Al Qaeda terrorists; it could also provide compassionate, humanitarian assistance. The lack of an established quick disbursement system held up the funding. It took several months to get a contractor to do the clean up.

- Meeting the basic criteria for project selection, supporting the AIA, and meeting the basic needs of Afghan people were difficult because there was no overall plan and no overall coordination mechanism. As discussed earlier, there was no overall theater plan upon which to base project selection. The initial teams had no guidance on what projects they should consider. Some teams, like the CHLC in Kunduz, tried to second-guess what they thought the U.S. authorities would approve as “popular projects.” They guessed schools correctly and they realized that any public property that had sustained war damage from U.S. actions would get priority. The CHLC in Herat recognized that the NGOs in their area were willing and capable of building schools, and found a high impact infrastructure project. They guessed incorrectly; CJCMOTF directed them toward school projects. With the shift of emphasis in CJCMOTF upon the arrival of 360th CA Brigade toward a holistic CMO, the establishment of the CMOC in Kabul December 2002, and the publishing of the latest Afghan Development Budget and Development Framework, the project selection process improved.

Quick Impact Funds.

Most CA commanders propose that CA teams be authorized a quick impact fund that is similar to operational funds. CA teams would be authorized an amount they could spend to quick start local, low cost projects that do not lend themselves to contracting. Had this existed in Afghanistan, great benefits could have been reaped.

OHDACA, although an excellent program, does not lend itself to solving immediate problems. For example, CJCMOTF supported Muslim pilgrims making the Hajj in March 2002. Transportation problems left thousands of people stranded for several days at the Kabul airport. It was cold and three people died from exposure. CJCMOTF discovered the problem, and convinced a local contractor to purchase 15 stoves and construct warming areas in the buildings at the airport. This rapid action saved lives. However, CJCMOTF had no fund source to authorize the immediate purchase of the stoves. The contractor went acted in hope of reimbursement. Ultimately, CJCMOTF resolved the problem by contracting for stoves in Bagram and reimbursing the contractor with them. Had this failed, the CJCMOTF commander and staff were prepared to pay for the stoves out of their own pockets. Had a quick impact fund been authorized, then such funding would have been readily available.
Interagency Mixing of Money

USAID money and OHDACA money cannot legally mix. The CHLCs and implementing partners of USAID had to ensure there was separation of funded projects. This restriction constrains the harmonization of an interagency approach to stability. As noted earlier, the UK has no such constraints between military and DFID.194.

Combat Commanders use of O&M Funds:

Commanders are constrained in the use of O&M monies in support of full spectrum military operations. Although commanders have always had the authority to define what support of operations means, their approach is generally conservative when it comes to CMO, since their actions are typically subjected to extensive legal review. The Operational Law Handbook provides the following guidance:

Examples of O&M expenses include force protection measures, sustainment costs, and repair (vice construction) of main supply routes. Likewise, expenses that are “necessary and incident” to an assigned military mission (e.g., costs of maintaining public order and emergency health and safety requirements of the populace in Haiti during the NCA-directed mission of establishing a secure and stable environment). Beware of “mission creep,” however. Where the military mission departs from security, combat, or combat-related activity, and begins to intersect other agencies’ authority/appropriations, the expenditure merits close scrutiny by the judge advocate. For example, commanders must have special authorization before engaging in “nation-building” activities or recurring refugee assistance. These activities normally fall within the category of foreign assistance functions administered by the State Department or U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).195

In complex contingencies like Afghanistan, the military operates in an environment where victory is largely defined in non-military terms. During the initial phases of such operations, before NGO/IGO and interagency processes can be established, the military should have the flexibility to expend O&M monies without fearing extensive bureaucratic review. U.S. military commanders should be provided with flexibility akin to that afforded UK commanders.

Payment of Claims for Collateral Damage.

Additionally, the restriction on paying claims for collateral damage tied the hands of U.S. commanders in Afghanistan. Although the non-payment policy may make sense at the macro level, it has significant drawbacks at the micro level. Afghan society believes in compensation for death or destruction of property. The CHLCs were forced on occasion to request assistance from other agencies to provide compensation when the U.S. military would not pay. For instance, during an operation in the village of Kwost, U.S. forces accidentally fired upon the village truck. The village depended on the truck for its well being. It was essential to make amends to turn villagers away from the Taliban and to gain intelligence. The local CHLC turned to an OGA for resources to repair the truck.196
Provisions should be made for the military to pay. Precedent exists. The *Operational Law Handbook* states:

> At the conclusion of combat in Grenada, it quickly became apparent that the U.S. could not refuse to pay for combat-related damage if it wanted to maintain the support of the Grenadian citizens. With the claims statutes providing no means to make such payments, the Department of State entered a Participating Agency Servicing Agreement between the U.S. Agency for Internal Development (USAID) and the U.S. Army Claims Service (USARCS) that allowed for payment of combat claims. This agreement established a nonstatutory, gratuitous payment program outside of the combat activities exclusion using USAID funds. USARCS provided personnel to staff FCCs to process requests, investigate, and recommend payment or denial of claims. This was done in Panama to support the Endara government and help to establish its legitimacy. Our mission was to support the legitimate government, not to act in place of it. The U.S. and Panama agreed to a Letter of Instruction (LOI) that established the procedures to be followed, listed categories of claims deemed not compensable, and set monetary limits for claims under the Foreign Claims Act that were not barred by the combat claims exclusion. These commissions proceeded to adjudicate and recommend payment on the combat-related claims, essentially using the same procedures already established for the payment of claims under the Foreign Claims Act and incorporating the special requirement of the LOI. $1,800,000 of USAID money was made available: $200,000 to support the claims office and personnel and the remainder to pay claims.\(^{197}\)

**Humanitarian Supplies**

Because of the “light footprint” and other priorities, obtaining humanitarian supplies was a challenge. TF Mountain (10th Mountain Division) distributed approximately 500,000 pounds of humanitarian assistance goods, most all of which were provided by CJCMOTF, JSOTF, and OGAs. When the 82nd Airborne Division assumed the mission, SOF provided them with an 8,000 pound stock of humanitarian material for distribution.\(^{198}\) Many civilian groups, some associated with the deployed forces, donated goods to be distributed to the people of Afghanistan. These goods enhanced good will, and provided some essential items to make life easier in the communities. Two programs are set up to get these goods to deployed forces: Funded Transportation under Title 10 U.S.C., Section 2551 and the Denton Transportation Authority (Space Available) under Title 10 U.S.C., section 402.

The Funded Transportation program is supported by OHDACA appropriated funds that are pre-positioned at the beginning of the fiscal year at USTRANSCOM. The NGO or IGO must request transportation through DOS, which certifies that it is in the foreign policy interest of the U.S. and meets a minimum cargo requirement. If approved, the goods are transported by the most economical means available.

The Denton program allows greater flexibility and responsiveness for transporting humanitarian supplies. DOD will provide transportation on military aircraft of privately donated humanitarian cargo on a space-available basis.\(^{199}\)
In OEF there was little space available airlift for humanitarian cargo. Units in theater often relied upon the postal service to transport donated goods. For example, one CHLC got on the Internet and generated support from friends, churches, medical facilities, and local organizations across America. These supportive American citizens used their own funds to mail large quantities of goods to Bagram, where the CHLC picked them up and distributed them to the population. The medical supplies for the rebuilding of the National Medical School in Kabul were obtained in the same manner. The CJCMOTF Surgeon contacted medical colleagues in the U.S. and had them mail books and supplies to Bagram to form the basis for the reconstitution of the medical facility. Other CHLC as well as elements of the 101st Airborne Division, the 82nd Airborne Division, and the Canadian Princess Patricia’s Light Infantry all generated humanitarian goods through the post.
Chapter 10: Planning

This chapter examines the CMO planning process

National Guidance

U.S. national level guidance for Afghanistan was succinct and implied the need to develop a stability plan to address full spectrum operations. That guidance was:

Support the creation of an international political environment hostile to terrorism. 

However, without an interagency plan to interpret this guidance, establish responsibilities and develop end states, each department interpreted the guidance independently.

USCENTCOM’s Operational Plan Was Focused on Combat, not CMO

USCENTCOM developed a plan that focused on defeating Al Qaeda and the Taliban while supporting NGOs/IGOs that provided humanitarian aid. Nevertheless, this plan did not address CMO. The plan consisted of four phases:

- **Phase I**—Set conditions and build forces to provide the National Command Authority credible military options.
- **Phase II**—Conduct initial combat operations and continue to set conditions for follow-on operations.
- **Phase III**—Conduct decisive combat operations in Afghanistan, continue to build coalition, and conduct operations AOR wide.
- **Phase IV**—Establish capacity in coordination with coalition partners to prevent the re-emergence of terrorism and provide support to humanitarian relief efforts.

The concept called for defeating Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and then in Phase IV supporting humanitarian relief and transition to civil control. The small CMO cells at USCENTCOM and ARCENT knew that humanitarian assistance had to be ongoing in each of the phases and worked that concept into the plan’s CMO annex. Humanitarian assistance support to the NGOs/IGO would commence in Phase II and continue throughout until transition in phase IV.

The plan was envisioned as a phased sequential plan, but the phases as defined did not enhance the commander’s ability to address the full spectrum operation that in fact occurred in Afghanistan. Humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, supporting a new Afghanistan government, training a new Afghan defense force, controlling civil disturbances, and fighting the Taliban and Al Qaeda in their sanctuaries all occurred simultaneously.

Initially, Phase IV was not considered a stability operation or military operation other than war (MOOTW). Planning focused on delivering humanitarian aid and not on establishing stability inside Afghanistan. The thought was that first the Taliban would be defeated and then stability operations would start and the U.S., having defeated the Taliban and assisting the NGO and IGO community to establish itself, could depart. In fact, the CFLCC developed a plan for the downsizing of the CJCMOTF and its forces by the spring of 2002 and then shifting its functions to the OMC in the U.S. Embassy.
Planners never have a crystal ball. The initial plan was written in October 2001, before the Taliban were defeated, before the Bonn Agreement was developed, and before ISAF and UNAMA were even conceived. Planning did not envision full spectrum operations that included a stability role for the OEF. This lack of planning was due in part to DOD strictures against peacekeeping and nation building. Security concerns provided another constraint to effective planning. Due to compartmentalization, planning for various aspects of the operation, to include CMO, was done in a vacuum. Sporadic linkage to the interagency, and lack of coordination with coalition partners and NGO/IGO also hindered planning. All of this, plus a lack of understanding by the commands at all levels about CMO, set the stage for disjointed planning.\textsuperscript{203}

**Measures of Effectiveness/Criteria for Success**

USCENTCOM developed initial measurers of effectiveness (MOE), but none of them were CMO-specific. The CMO cell did develop an Endstate for the humanitarian assistance operation that focused on providing wholesale support to NGOs/IGOs.\textsuperscript{204} MOE were renamed “criteria for success” and eventually passed to CJCMOTF:

**Endstate:**

\textit{IO/NGO are capable of providing vital HA to the vulnerable population in AFG within own resources}

**Criteria for Success**

- Mortality rate less than Sep 01 level as measured by UN
- Nutrition level greater than Sep 01 level as measured by UN
- Regional hubs have sufficient stores to feed the vulnerable people in AFG
- Flow rates of vital HA to the vulnerable population are sufficient to ensure survival\textsuperscript{205}

These criteria supported the wholesale part of CMO, but events in Afghanistan quickly made these criteria obsolete. The tactical operation shifted to retail and to stability operations, and the criteria based on the original plan no longer applied. The 96th CA Battalion never felt that it understood how to determine a successful transition to civil organizations. For instance, in areas where NGOs were delivering food at five times the rate of September 2001, CHLCs were nevertheless still operating. The mission had shifted from what was originally envisioned of just providing support to humanitarian assistance to one of stability operations, but the USCENTCOM plan never adjusted to the changed reality. Until the CJTF 180 arrived in June 2002 and issued its plan, the criteria for success remained unchanged.\textsuperscript{206}

**CJTF 180/Effects Based CMO Planning**

The first plan that CJTF 180 drafted contained just three lines on CMO; the only guidance that the plan provided was “conduct CMO.” Eventually, the concept was revised to include a significant section on CMO. Planners determined that the existing criteria for success were inadequate and that effects based operations (EBO) would better address the dynamic
situation in Afghanistan. EBO is a process for obtaining a desired outcome or effect on the enemy or situation through the synergistic, multiplicative, and cumulative application of the full range of military and nonmilitary capabilities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. An officer on loan from the UK to CJTF 180, used effects based targeting concepts and assisted in development of a plan that addressed full spectrum operations. He and his team looked at six areas of CMO: Populace and Resource Control, Humanitarian Assistance, Foreign Nation Support, Emergency Services, Military Civic Action, and Support to Civil Administration, and linked them to EBO concepts. The planners identified the operational objective as ensuring that Afghanistan would be stable enough not to export terrorism. This objective nested with the DOS-led Interagency Plan objective of ensuring “that Afghanistan never again becomes a haven for terrorists.”

Planners identified two centers of gravity: one for Al Qaeda/Taliban and another for stability of Afghanistan institutions. Four lines of operation were determined based upon effects required to leverage the centers of gravity and achieve the operational objective. One focused on removing the causes of instability, the second on assisting Afghanistan institutions, a third on defeating terrorism, and the last on protecting the coalition’s own friendly center of gravity. The lines proceeded concurrently. By following these lines of operations, the commander could allocate resources across the spectrum of operations to best achieve his operational objective. Each line of operations was subdivided into operational tasks, operational supporting tasks, and tactical tasks. For these tasks, the command developed MOE. These were rated red, green, and amber with a trend arrow.

**Transition Planning**

By May 2002, USCENTCOM’s CMO cell began developing revised criteria for success in Phase IV and a transition plan. Doctrinally, the considerations for developing a transition plan are well conceived but presuppose that a political-military plan exists. As noted previously, this was not the case in OEF.

Initial guidance stated that the military would pass off the humanitarian assistance mission to the NGOs when they were capable. The plan did not envision the need to establish stable governance in Afghanistan. Yet, had an unconstrained CMO estimate of the situation been conducted in accordance with the Post Conflict Matrix in the introduction section of JP 3-57, the stability issue could have been framed and the command poised to seize the initiative. The US Army Peacekeeping Institute recommended this approach to ARCENT in September 2001, but it was rejected based on OSD guidance that the military should avoid involvement in nation building in Afghanistan. The staff used the ITAP 2002 as the basis for developing transition criteria, although this plan was essentially a UN vehicle for donors and not a true blueprint for Afghan reconstruction. Transition planning was still in flux by the end of this study.
Chapter 11: Keys to Success in Afghanistan

This chapter presents observations based upon what the study team believes are three keys to success in Afghanistan

General

The study team believes that there are three keys to success in Afghanistan.

Establish a Safe and Secure Environment.

A safe and secure environment is absolutely essential. The security gap must be filled to insure the survival of a national government and the establishment of an atmosphere that will encourage investment and development. Security will create political and economic space for development. The components are:

- **Extend the ISAF “effect” countrywide.**
  - ISAF and OEF should merge as one stabilization force for the country.
  - This new force must extend its influence countrywide.

- **Establish Rule of Law.**
  - UNAMA should establish a holistic, systemic approach that integrates the police, judicial, and penal aspects of the rule of law.
  - The Afghan Constitutional Process must determine what law is to be followed.
  - The police and judicial system should be integrated with the Defense and Border systems.
  - Providing for a rule of law will assist in establishing a viable counter-drug program.

- **Reform the Ministry of Defense**
  - The ANA should be trained to become a more capable force than the local militias.
  - The Ministry of Defense must develop a national security strategy.

- **Establish a functioning DDR program**
  - A program for the reintegration of local militia into their societies is essential.
  - Central control should be established over use of military power.

- **Establish a functioning Human Rights program.**
  - Address justice for criminal acts and war crimes.
  - A Human Rights commission must identify and legally deal with accused war criminals.
Share Power Successfully Between Central Government and Local Power Centers

This issue must be settled if Afghanistan is to survive as a country and preclude the reemergence of the Taliban and the return of Al Qaeda.

- **Establish Afghan governmental political power in the provinces.**
  - Enhance governance to give all people a stake in the central government.
  - Extend the political mandate to the provinces.
  - Capitalize on the Loya Jirga and extend to future elections.

- **Strengthen central government institutions, finance and trade.**
  - Ensure money flows into the government rather than out to the provinces or to other countries.
  - Establish arrangements so that the majority of tax revenues return to the central government.
  - Control illicit sources of money such as drugs and smuggling.

**Extend and Resource Reconstruction Countrywide.**

Physical reconstruction must be tied to extending the political mandate, because one cannot exist without the other. The Afghanistan central government must have a hand in providing “bread and work.” NGO and IGO programs cannot work at cross-purposes by supporting warlords at the expense of the central government.

- **Extend government ministries’ presence into the country**
- **Extend NGO presence into the countryside to previously nonsecure areas in support of government ministries.**
- **Provide adequate resources for countrywide reconstruction**
- **Decrease dependence on UN, NGO, OEF and ISAF through comprehensive and well-integrated transition plans.**
Chapter 12: Recommendations

This chapter provides recommended approaches to address complex Civil Military Operations

Develop Clear Political-Military Guidance for Stability Operations

- Promulgate a directive to ensure interagency planning. Approve NSPD XX to replace PDD 56.
- Establish a standing emergency management organization at the national level. One proposal worth examining suggests the formation of a Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)-type organization to employ the same concepts applied to domestic crises international crises.

Establish Interagency Mechanisms at the Operational Theater Level to Coordinate Theater Wide Military and Civilian Efforts

- Add a civil stability advisor co-equal to the political advisor (POLAD) to the special staff of the Combatant Command. This advisor could come from USAID or an umbrella NGO such as InterAction.
- Establish an NGO/IGO coordination cell at combatant commands to provide input for impending operations. This cell must be supported with communications and access to the planning process.
- Publish and promulgate a political military plan to establish holistic management oversight. Commanders should establish close working relationships with other USG operations in theater. An executive committee of all agency leads should be established to provide a forum to synchronize planning.
  - Regional Action Groups should be established to execute the directions of the executive committee. The PRT concept in Afghanistan is an example of a regional action group.
- Establish reliable communications among all Host Nations and international players. The Department of Defense may have to provide the communications equipment.
- Conduct collaborative transition planning. The other U.S. agencies, Host Nation officials, and UN and NGO representatives should be included at the onset of planning. The objective is to gain consensus and early buy-in to a transition plan.
- Establish a full time, active component, civil affairs planning cell at each Combatant Command and Army component command. This cell would work future operations and OPLANS during peacetime, and coordinate with the regional CACOM and handoff the planning to them when operations are pending.

Revise Joint and Army Doctrine to Reflect CMO/CA lessons learned in Afghanistan

- Revise Joint doctrine to include CMO principles and describe the concept of operations for multidimensional operations involving both combat and stability.
NATO doctrine for CIMIC should be used as a model.

- Revise Army doctrine to reflect the emerging concept of CA operations as practiced in Afghanistan.
- Emphasize the commander’s role in CMO.
- Add the Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team Model to the CA Operational Doctrine.

Organize, Train, and Equip forces in Accordance with Revised Doctrine

- Develop TO&E that supports the new tasks performed by CA in Afghanistan. Correct force design to organize and equip CA forces, to include organic transportation and communications.
- Provide the appropriate priority to CA as afforded to combat units in future complex contingencies that include a stability component.
- Review and Active and Reserve Component mix; more CA forces required in AC.
- Mobilize appropriate RC personnel in a timely manner.
- Support the interagency task force concept.

Provide Appropriate CMO/CA Expertise at Senior Commands

- Establish a peacetime CA planning cell at each Combatant Command.
- Develop habitual planning relationships between Combatant Commands and supporting CACOMs through peacetime exercises.
- Enhance the planning abilities of CA officers through education and training in order to make them valued and credible to supported commands.

Provide Commanders Financial and Resource Flexibility to Address Stability Operations

- Provide fiscal and resource flexibility to all commanders. Provide fiscal tools so that the commander can support stability operations.
- Review existing laws to provide commanders the confidence to take appropriate actions in expending monies or providing resources, to include support in providing humanitarian aid.

Establish Clear Lines of Communication and Coordination Between Military and NGOs/IGOs

- Facilitate collaborative planning while protecting essential information.
- Develop working relationships, during peacetime, that establish informal networks and frames of reference to serve as the basis for coordination during crisis. This can be done through exercises and joint training events.
- Second military officers to NGOs and IGOs.
Ensure Intelligence Supports CMO and Stability Operations

- Provide appropriate intelligence support to stability operations and CMO. Lower echelon units should have their intelligence staffs augmented with personnel well-versed in stability operations. These operations require a breadth and depth of intelligence support that is normally not resident even at the division level.

- Consider using the procedures developed in Bosnia for integration of coalition HUMINT into operations. [AMIB, Factional LNO, JCO, and national NIC]

Ensure Information Support CMO and Stability Operations

- Establish theater integrating and coordinating mechanisms that link tactical level information operations with interagency operational guidance.

- Integrate IO with the CA effort. Integrate IO among all of the interagency as well as with the host nation.
  - Communications may have to be provided to Host Nations to assist in the overall IO effort.

- Tailor IO to address cultural realities. For instance, for Afghans, legitimacy is built on actions rather than words.

Ensure Planning that Encompasses Full Spectrum Operations

- Insure that planners develop concepts that address full spectrum operations including conflict termination, post-conflict actions, and transition planning.

- Develop measurers of success that guide policy makers, interagency and coalition partners, and members of the command that relate to full spectrum operations.

Educate and Train Military and Civilian Leaders

- Make CMO and stability operations a part of the curriculum in all PME.

- Conduct unit-level mission rehearsals that incorporate stability operations

- Conduct regular exercises centered on stability operations involving military, interagency, and NGO/IGO participation.
ANNEX A: CMO STUDY QUESTIONS

Attribution: Will the following be for attribution or non-attribution?

1. General Description
   a. Describe your position and function?
   b. How long have you been working these issues?
   c. How do you fit into the structure?

2. Preparation
   a. Describe your preparation prior to deployment.
   b. Did you attend any orientation seminars on Afghanistan or CMO?

3. Training
   a. How did your organization approach training and preparation for this activity?
   b. What sort of training was provided for people before deployment? In the field? Has this changed as the mission evolved?
   c. How well do you think you were prepared to work in this environment?
   d. Did the prospect of working alongside disparate organizations factor into your training?
   e. Did you train with NGOs, International Organizations, or Interagency personnel?

4. Deployment
   a. Describe the deployment.
   b. Were you mobilized?
   c. Describe the mobilization.

5. Guidance
   a. What is your mission?
   b. What written guidance have you received?
   c. What verbal guidance have you received?
   d. What guidance have you promulgated?
   e. Is the guidance adequate to the situation?
   f. What addition guidance is required?

6. Concept of Operation
   a. To what extent do you believe that humanitarian assistance can assist in the military mission in Afghanistan? In what ways?
   b. In what ways, if any, do you believe the two missions support one another or compete with one another?
c. What do you think are the views on these questions of others in your organization and in other organizations and other countries?

d. How do these issues affect relationships between the military International Organizations, NGOs, and other groups?

7. Coordination

a. With whom do you talk, hourly, daily, monthly?

b. To whom would you turn to “get things done?”

c. Who should you be coordinating with that you are not?

d. Describe the coordinating bodies that can assist you?

e. Do you run a coordinating body? Describe its composition, purpose, and procedures.

f. To and from what organizations do you have liaisons? To and from what other organizations would you want to have liaisons?

g. What mechanisms were established to share information?
   i. Was there an information management strategy?
   ii. Are you familiar with the Afghan Information Management System (AIMS)? Did you use this or know of others that did? Evaluate its effectiveness.
   iii. What worked and what did not and why?


a. Given the politically fragmented nature of Afghanistan, are the civil affairs teams and the humanitarian organizations able to operate effectively across the country?

b. Are certain regional commanders more cooperative with civil affairs and NGOs than others?

c. Describe your relationship with local political authorities.

d. Describe your relationship with local religious authorities.

e. How has this changed over time?

f. What have been key challenges of working with local authorities? Key successes?

g. What would you characterize as some of the important lessons from this experience in this issue area?

h. Describe your relationships with other, international and otherwise, donors and aid providers. How have these changed over time?

i. What have been key challenges of working with other groups? Key successes?

j. What would you characterize as some of the important lessons from this experience in this issue area?
9. **Agendas**
   a. Do you think different organizations approached the issues involved in this mission differently? In what ways? Did they have different goals? What were they? How did this affect interaction?
   b. Do you think individual personalities played an important role in how organizations interacted? Did certain personality types that you can identify, certain sorts of people, seem to be more or less effective in this environment?

10. **Communication**
    a. What communication means do you use?
    b. To whom are you connected?
    c. To whom are you not connected but would like to be? To whom would like to be connected by another, different communication means?

11. **Requirements**
    a. In practice, was there coordination between agencies in assessing what humanitarian needs were and how they would be met?
    b. Did these assessments change as the mission evolved? Were any proven false?
    c. What role was played by various organizations (NGOs, IOs, military, host nation, etc.)?
    d. What different assumptions about humanitarian needs and mechanisms of provision did you and your organization have initially? Were there discrepancies with what other individuals and organizations believed? How were disagreements resolved?
    e. What were the mechanisms by which humanitarian requirements were validated among the groups involved in providing assistance? Were there regular meetings? How frequent? Who attended? How useful were these meetings?
    f. How did each organization’s own bureaucratic procedure affect coordination?
    g. Did issues often have to be cleared through headquarters and capitals? What level of consensus was there among organizations and groups about requirements and needs? Did disagreements follow similar lines each time? Were there patterns of agreement and disagreement? How were disagreements resolved?
    h. What was the role of capitals and headquarters in establishing and assessing and validating requirements? How and how often were they briefed on issues? What sorts of issues required their involvement? How different was this for different organizations? Did the need for some organizations to coordinate with capitals and headquarters present problems?
    i. How did the requirements process change over time?
    j. How do you think the requirements and assessment process can be improved?
12. Capabilities
   a. How were capabilities prioritized and assigned within and among various organizations and groups?
   b. What were the major capabilities that different organizations and groups brought to the table?
   c. How much overlap was there? How much complementary?
   d. Who were the most important players (organizations and individuals) in prioritizing operations?
   e. What mechanisms were used to generate consensus on how capabilities and activities would be allocated?
   f. How did the prioritization process change over time?
   g. How can this process be improved, in your opinion?

13. CMO Projects
   a. Describe the CMO project(s) you have completed.
   b. Describe the current and future projects.
   c. How do you determine what projects to undertake?
   d. Describe the funding an approval process for your projects.
   e. How did the streamlined procedures for using OHDACA funds in Afghanistan impact on mission success?
   f. What would be the impact now if the normal approval process through Washington, D.C. was re-instituted?
   g. Whom do you contract with to accomplish those projects?
   h. What standards do you use?

14. Interagency
   a. Describe you interaction with the U.S. Interagency?
   b. Do you deal with OFDA/ AID?
   c. Do you deal with the US Embassy or Military Mission?
   d. Do you work with any other U.S. interagency entity? What are the long-term, strategic objectives for Afghanistan, as you understand them? What is your source for this understanding?
   e. How does the work of your organization support the attainment of these strategic objectives?
   f. Do you feel that your organization’s goals are in consonance with USG objectives, or working at cross-purposes? In what ways?

15. UNAMA/ ISAF
   a. Describe your relationship with UNAMA/ ISAF.
b. Do you work with the ITAP or the AIA National Development Framework Plan?

c. Describe your relationship with ISAF.

d. Do you coordinate with the ISAF CIMIC? What is their relationship to you?

e. You are involved in the DDR program?

f. Describe your relationship with other UN agencies.
   i. UNHCR
   ii. UNOCHA
   iii. WFP JLC

16. Afghan Transitional Authority

   a. How effective would you say the Afghan Transitional Authority has been?
   b. What, if any, is your role in support of providing a secure environment for the Afghan Transitional Authority? For the international relief effort? What is the impact of this role on your other missions and vice versa?

17. Afghan National Army

   a. Have you had any interaction with the Afghan National Army (ANA)?
   b. What is your impression of the concept of developing the ANA into a regional security force using U.S. SOF training support? Has it been effective? Mixed? Unclear? Please provide examples.

18. Security Situation

   a. How does the difference between the security situation in Kabul (ISAF control of the capital) vice that in the countryside (where the US ENDURING FREEDOM forces patrol) impact on humanitarian activities?
   b. What is your role?
   c. What is UNAMA role in developing defense structure for Afghanistan?
   d. Do you have a role in developing a security structure for Afghanistan? If yes:
      i. What is UNAMA role in developing defense structure for Afghanistan?
      ii. Where does the US Training of the ANA fit?
      iii. What role will the Germans, UK and others play?
   e. What role is played by the ATA?

19. Effects of Military Operations on Civil and NGO

   a. How did military support to humanitarian activities affect the local populace?
   b. How did they affect coalition military operations? The efforts of NGOs? Of IOs? Please provide examples.
   c. How well integrated would you say the military and civilian efforts were? What about the efforts of various states? Please provide examples.
   d. Describe the challenges you have encountered in dealing with the military?
20. **Combat Operations.**
   a. How do combat operations against Al Qaeda impact on your and your colleagues’ relations with the local populace? With the NGO/IO community?
   b. How do they affect CMO activities?
   c. Do you have any dealings with the combat Special Forces elements? How do the Special Forces operations affect yours?

21. **Local Contractors**
   a. What are the political affiliations of the contractors you deal with?
   b. What is the state of the local infrastructure?
   c. Describe you dealings with local business or financiers.

22. **Demining.**
   a. Were or are you involved in the Demining effort?
   b. Explain your involvement and your observations?

23. **Human Rights**
   a. Were you involved in the Human Rights Issues?
   b. Explain your involvement.
   c. What are your observations?

24. **NGO/IO**
   a. Who are the NGO/IOs that you deal with all the time?
   b. Describe your relationship with the NGO/IO community.
   c. Describe the attitudes of the locals to the NGO/IOs and yourselves.
   d. How do the NGO/IOs coordinate their activities?
   e. Are you aware of the issue of U.S. Military wearing civilian cloths conducting civil action programs?
      i. What is the issue if any from your perspective?
      ii. How was it perceived by the IO, NGO or Military?
      iii. Has this been resolved? How?
iv. Evaluate how it was handled.

v. Have similar situations occurred in the past?

25. Language
   a. Are you proficient in any of the local languages?
   b. Did you receive any orientation languages before deployment?
   c. Do you use an interpreter?
      i. What is the political affiliation of the interpreter?
      ii. How was the interpreter selected?
      iii. What do you use as a guide for dealing with interpreters?

26. Information Operations
   a. Describe how you support the information operation?
   b. What themes/talking points are you required to put out concerning the stability mission?
   c. What methods do you use to support the information operation?

27. Media
   a. Describe your relationship with the media.
   b. What effects has media been on your operations?
   c. Have you talked with a media representative?
   d. What guidance were you given about talking with the media?

28. End State/Transition
   a. What do you use as measures of effectiveness (MOE) or criteria for success?
   b. How do you measure success?
   c. What are the major barriers that prevent mission accomplishment?
   d. Does your organization have a transition plan?

29. Lessons and Experience
   a. Based on your past experience/knowledge, how similar or different was Afghanistan from previous CMO/Humanitarian operations?
   b. Do you think certain things worked better in Afghanistan than they did in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, and elsewhere? Did other things work better in other operations?
   c. To your knowledge, was experience specifically drawn from previous operations applied in Afghanistan? Please provide examples. How applicable did this experience prove?
   d. Do you think there are areas where past lessons could have been applied, but were not? Do you think there are unique aspects to this operation that make past experience less relevant? What are some of these?
30. Issues:
   a. What are the major problems as you see them?
   b. Although combat operations and CMO are often in tension, combat operations clearly have priority when they are underway. How often and in what specific instances or issue areas has the tension actually become a problem in Afghanistan? (Possible examples might include airlift, resources, etc.)

31. Opportunities
   a. What missed opportunities did you observe?

32. Recommendations
   a. What are your recommendations to improve the situation?
   b. What are the positive lessons learned?

33. Further Investigation
   a. Who else should we talk with?
   b. What documentation should we consult?
## ANNEX B: CHRONOLOGY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 June 01</td>
<td>DART deploys to Afghanistan in response to Food Crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Sep 01 - 19 Sep 01</td>
<td>NGO and DART start to leave Afghanistan for Islamabad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 01</td>
<td>BRIGHT STAR exercise in Egypt. 377th TSC deployed and start planning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Sep 01</td>
<td>US SOF Deploys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Sep 01</td>
<td>Taliban cuts the UN communication in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Sep 01</td>
<td>96th CA LNO attached to 5th SFG for planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Sep 01</td>
<td>UNJLC Established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 01</td>
<td>CFLCC in Cairo West planned for Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ARCENT team arrives in Tampa to stand up CJCMOTF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Oct 01</td>
<td>President Bush announces $320 mil assistance program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Oct 01</td>
<td>OEF starts with Air Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>First Humanitarian Air Drops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Oct 01</td>
<td>96th CA LNO team attached to 5th SFG deploys to Stronghold Freedom, Karshi-Khanabad, Uzbekistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Oct 01</td>
<td>UNJLC has delays in food delivery that will persist until 9 Dec 01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Oct 01</td>
<td>LNO at CENTCOM established consisting of UNOCHA, UNJLC, UNHCR and later on 24 Oct, InterAction, ICRC declines the invitation. Senate Foreign Relations Committee holds first of Committee meetings on Humanitarian Assistance, Hearing voiced concerns about the utility of Air Drops of HA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Oct 01</td>
<td>Major Dejarnette, 96th Civil Affairs Bn. arrives in Islamabad and forms the CHLC. It consists of one US Major, four UK CIMIC officers and DFID representatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Oct 01</td>
<td>Cat-A32 from 96th CA deployed to Uzbekistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Oct 01</td>
<td>A Team Deploys into Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Oct</td>
<td>ARCENT deploys 2 Man Cell to Tashkent. First meeting of the CA cell of 8 at ARCENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Oct 01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Oct 01</td>
<td>US Air Strike against ICRC warehouse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Nov 01</td>
<td>USMC at Kandahar Air Port</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>First Elements of 122nd ROC arrive to Augment CJCMOTF later followed by 377th TSC and a planning section from 352 CA Command.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Nov 01</td>
<td>CHLC reinforced in Islamabad of 2 US from 96th CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Nov 01</td>
<td>Mazar-e Sharif falls to Dostum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Nov 01</td>
<td>10th Mountain deploys to Uzbekistan K2 Stand up CFLCC( Forward)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Nov 01</td>
<td>Kabul Falls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Nov 01</td>
<td>ARCENT Orders CAT-A of 96th to establish HA Hub at Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan. ADVON of ARCENT arrive at Camp Dohar. USMC and SOF arrive at Bagram. CJCMOTF formed in Kuwait with 80 personnel from 377th, 122nd, and CA planning team of 352nd ?? (exact dates uncertain)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

91
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 Nov 01</td>
<td>US Japanese Reconstruction Talks Afghan Reconstruction Steering Group formed. ARSG.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Nov 01</td>
<td>C company of 96th CA (CAT- B and 3 CAT A’s) arrive at K2. <em>(exact dates uncertain)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Nov 01</td>
<td>CHLC (CAT A32 and CAT B30) 96th CA deploy to Bagram in support of Special Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Nov 01</td>
<td>Camp Rhino Established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Nov 01</td>
<td>CHLC (CAT-A33) 96th CA deployed to Mazar-e-Sharif.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Nov 01</td>
<td>ARCENT Forward CFLCC established at Camp Dohar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Nov 01</td>
<td>Kunduz falls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Dec 01</td>
<td>Tora Bora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Dec 01</td>
<td>Bonn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9 Dec 01</td>
<td>CJCMOTF deploys to Kabul, D company of 96th CAT –B and 5 CAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Dec 01</td>
<td>Kandahar Surrenders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Dec 01</td>
<td>HAST (Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team) of 96th CA deploys to Bamiyan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-9 Dec 01</td>
<td>Friendship Bridge Open and Large Food convoy of WFP flows from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Dec 01</td>
<td>Karzi Arrives in Kabul 10th MTN Div (-) Uzbekistan establish CFLCC (FWD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Dec 01</td>
<td>Humanitarian Air Drops using the flutter method stops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Dec 01</td>
<td>US Embassy in Kabul Opened.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Dec 01</td>
<td>ISAF arrives in Kabul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-21 Dec 01</td>
<td>ARSG meets in Brussels under EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Dec 01</td>
<td>ATA formed in Kabul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Dec 01</td>
<td>End of daily C-17 HA Air drops. Elements of CJCMOTF and ACT A 34 and A 36 deployed to K2 to link up with C company and D company of 96th CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Dec 01</td>
<td>CAT A 36 Deployed to Dushanbe, Tajikistan to establish a CHLC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 02</td>
<td>352 CA finally completed mobilization. 1 Jan, CHLC CAT A 34 set up in Herat, 14 Jan,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Jan 02</td>
<td>3rd BDE 101st Deploys to Kandahar along with Canadian Bn.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Jan 02</td>
<td>CAT A-32 deployed to Konduz to form CHLC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Jan 02</td>
<td>Immediate and Transitional Assistance Programme for the Afghan People 2002 issued by UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-22 Jan 02</td>
<td>Tokyo Conference ASD Collins (Office of Stability), AMB Dobbins, BG Kern (CG, 352nd CACOM), BG Kratzer Commander CJCMOTF went to the Tokyo conference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Jan 02</td>
<td>OSD Message outlining the rules for OHDACACA monies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Jan 02</td>
<td>President Bush press statement “lasting partnership” with Afghanistan to provide security and ensure stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 02</td>
<td>OHDACA funds received.  <em>(exact dates uncertain)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Feb 02</td>
<td>RAMCC Operational in Qatar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Feb 02</td>
<td>10&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Mountain Deploys to Bagram as CFLCC forward</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Feb 02</td>
<td>489 CA BN arrives to begin the replacement of 96&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; CA. and assume their projects. Kandahar CHLC established. <em>(exact dates uncertain)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 02</td>
<td>10&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Mountain assumes command of CTF Mountain and moves from K2 to Bagram. Bamyan CHLC sets up. <em>(exact dates uncertain)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 – 18 March 02</td>
<td>ANACONDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 March 02</td>
<td>World Bank Transitional Support Strategy for Afghanistan issued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 March 02</td>
<td>Earthquake support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 March 02</td>
<td>UNAMA established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 02</td>
<td>96&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; CA redeploy. <em>(exact dates uncertain)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 02</td>
<td>National Development Framework Drafted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 02</td>
<td>Department of State issues “Political Military Plan”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 April 02</td>
<td>COMCFLCC approved to draw down the CJCMOTF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 April 02</td>
<td>CENTCOM develops plan and concept for XVIII Airborne Corps to assume responsibility for Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 April 02</td>
<td>Loya Jirga Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 April 02</td>
<td>President Bush calls for “Marshall Plan” for Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 May 02</td>
<td>First meeting between CJCMOTF and AACA inside the wire. XVIII Corps begins to deploy to Bagram as CJTF 180.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 May 02</td>
<td>US start training Afghan Army. UK had training one BN earlier that was used to support the Loya Jirga.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 May 02</td>
<td>Loya Jirga phase 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 May 02</td>
<td>House of Reps voted a $1.4 mil aid package.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 May 02</td>
<td>Donors Conference in Delhi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 May 02</td>
<td>CJTF 180 Assumes command in Bagram, reverses the draw down of CJCMOTF and increases their presence in non-permissive areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 02</td>
<td>CJTF 180 Established in Afghanistan and CFLCC is no longer in charge. CJTF 180 shifts to stability operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 June 02</td>
<td>Loya Jirga Phase 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 June 02</td>
<td>IATG formed with Karzai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 02</td>
<td>Bombing of Afghan Ceremony Uruzgan province. LNO office UNOCHA, UNJLC, and InterAction at CENTCOM is shut down.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 July 02</td>
<td>US Bn ANA graduated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Oct 02</td>
<td>ALAMO SWEEP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 02</td>
<td>360&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; CA BDE Arrives to assume command CJCMOTF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3 Nov 2002</td>
<td>NGO government conference in Kabul at the request of Afghan Ministry of Planning; ACSF, ACBAR, and ANCB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Dec 02</td>
<td>PRT initial test in Gardez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 03</td>
<td>PRT officially opened.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX C: NATO AND EU CIMIC PRINCIPLES

A. PRINCIPLES GOVERNING MILITARY DIRECTION

2. Mission Primacy. NATO conducts CIMIC activities in support of a military mission. In turn, however, the latter will have been derived from a political strategic objective and should therefore not conflict with the objectives of most of the civilian organisations working in an area of operations. Nonetheless, only the commander can decide how far military resources will be committed to CIMIC tasks. Indeed, additional humanitarian tasks should not be assumed without an assessment of the resources and the prioritisation of military tasks. Nor should any local CIMIC tasks that might compromise the theatre level CIMIC effort or the overall mission be undertaken by subordinate commanders.

3. Command Direction. The direction of CIMIC operations and activities is the responsibility of commanders at all levels. Only through unity of authority and integration of effort at all levels can peace be achieved and transition to normalcy be realised. Commanders should be aware of the impact of military operations on the civil environment and the impact of the civil environment on their operations. They must be able to prioritise and direct CIMIC operations and activities in such a way that military effectiveness is maintained without adding unnecessarily to civil hardship.

4. Economy. Commanders must seek to minimise the use of military assets and maximise the use of civil resources. Care must be taken not to deplete the latter beyond that needed to sustain the civil population. Low level CIMIC activities are often carried out in circumstances where the civil population faces an inadequate infrastructure and widespread shortages of essential goods and services. Military resources are finite and care must be taken to preserve military capability; only the minimum required to achieve the military aim should be used in support of the civilian population or civilian organisations. Commanders must guard against creating long term civilian dependence on military resources by either the local population, government, or IOs/NGOs. Once provided, withdrawal or reduction of resources could be difficult as it may strain civil-military relations, retard the growth of civil authority, and may cause lasting damage to public confidence in the military force.

5. Concentration. Assets available for CIMIC will be limited, therefore they should be concentrated on those tasks that are most likely to lead to mission success. Concentration has the advantage of improving civilian perceptions of the military force and demonstrating its determination to act in the civil interest. Dissipation of assets, on the other hand, will result in minimal impact on the population and the mission, and runs the risk of unnecessarily prolonging the achievement of the desired end state.

6. Humanitarian Obligations. Commanders have a legal responsibility to comply with international legal statutes concerned with armed conflict and the law of war. In addition to fulfilling these legal requirements, commanders should always seek, within the constraints of the mission, to reduce the effect of military operations on, and where possible facilitate maximum support for, non-combatants. This is fundamental to building mission legitimacy. The use of military force, with few exceptions, entails
human suffering which should be relieved whenever possible and wherever it is found. The dignity and human rights of individuals and groups must be respected and protected in compliance with international law and the Rules of Engagement.

**PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP**

7. Cultural Awareness. A sustained sensitivity towards civil customs and ways of life is of fundamental importance to all missions. In a politically sensitive environment a thoughtless violation of a local law or custom can create a highly unfavourable news event and seriously undermine the mission’s chances of success. The military must acquire a sound understanding of local culture, customs and laws. CIMIC plays a vital role in ensuring cultural awareness of the forces through education.

8. Common Goals. Once a relationship has been established, it will usually need to be maintained, and whenever possible strengthened in order to survive disagreement, setback, compromise and even threats from third parties. Therefore common goals shared by NATO forces and civilian organisations must be established and recognised. Both CDOs and CROs take place in rapidly changing environments where decision-making processes must be streamlined and responsive. Each participating organisation must understand the political and resource commitments required. This understanding forms the basis of civil-military co-operation and commitments are made in anticipation of achieving objectives and not timelines.

9. Shared Responsibility. The ethos, structure and working practices of the civil organizations and agencies with which NATO military forces must co-operate is extremely diverse. The analysis of common goals must lead to an agreed sharing of responsibilities in order to establish and maintain a durable and mutually beneficial relationship. CIMIC must establish co-ordination measures with the civilian organizations as soon as possible in order to avoid misunderstandings and define their respective roles and responsibilities.

10. Consent. Because a military organization does not ultimately require consent to function, its crucial importance in CIMIC matters can be overlooked. Every effort must be made to secure the willing consent of civilian organizations with which the allied force deals; coercion may have a similar effect to consent, but it achieves poor results and will not endure. Loss of consent can occur suddenly, for reasons that seem trivial and commanders must be prepared to expend time and energy in its pursuit and retention.

11. Transparency. Successful CIMIC operations and activities require the mutual trust and confidence of all those involved in an operation. CIMIC work should be transparent, demonstrating competence, capability and resolve in order to win the trust and confidence of all elements of the civil environment. The tension between political, military, humanitarian and other components of a civil-military relationship will inevitably lead to confusion and misunderstanding at times. These tensions will be aggravated by political bias, media inaccuracy or distortion and poor communications. Transparency is vital in preventing and defusing such potentially volatile situations because it instills trust, increases confidence and encourages mutual
understanding. CIMIC personnel will be a valuable source of local information and will be advocates of the military cause, but they will rapidly become ineffective if used for intelligence gathering or as a means of communicating inaccurate information. It must be recognised that information obtained by military means cannot always be shared with civilian organisations and authorities. CIMIC staff must work closely with intelligence assets to obtain the most accurate information that may be passed to the civilian organizations in time to be effective. Much of this information, such as refugee movements, given to the civilian organizations may assist the commander greatly by allowing the appropriate civilian agency to react in a timely manner while minimally diverting military resources. Such information allows the civilian agencies to tailor themselves to the developing situation and prevents the military from unnecessarily expending its resources. Specific rules and arrangements to declassify military information should be made in advance.

12. Communication. Effective communication with civil authorities, agencies, organizations and populations is vital to maintaining consent and co-operation. The differences between military and civilian organizations require an investment in time and understanding to overcome. Most civilian organizations with which the military will deal will, to a large extent, pursue their own priorities. Indeed, some may take the view that co-operation with the military and independence are mutually exclusive. The key to minimizing these difficulties is to maintain open and constant communication. Clear and effective measures to establish and maintain these communication channels through CIMIC sources and possibly CIMIC centres should be developed to avoid potential disruptions and misunderstandings. As civilian organisations continue to arrive throughout the operation, they should be encouraged to adapt to the established system.
ANNEX D: UNITED NATIONS S/RES/1383 (2001)

Security Council

01-68109 (E)

*0168109*

Resolution 1383 (2001)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4434th meeting on

6 December 2001

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its previous resolutions on Afghanistan, in particular its resolution 1378 (2001) of 14 November 2001,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Afghanistan,

Stressing the inalienable right of the Afghan people themselves freely to determine their own political future,

Determined to help the people of Afghanistan to bring to an end the tragic conflicts in Afghanistan and promote national reconciliation, lasting peace, stability and respect for human rights, as well as to cooperate with the international community to put an end to the use of Afghanistan as a base for terrorism,

Welcoming the letter of 5 December 2001 from the Secretary-General informing the Council of the signature in Bonn on 5 December 2001 of the Agreement on provisional arrangements in Afghanistan pending the reestablishment of permanent government institutions (S/2001/1154),

Noting that the provisional arrangements are intended as a first step towards the establishment of a broad-based, gender sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government,

1. Endorses the Agreement on provisional arrangements in Afghanistan pending the re-establishment of permanent government institutions as reported in the Secretary-General’s letter of 5 December 2001;

2. Calls on all Afghan groups to implement this Agreement in full, in particular through full cooperation with the Interim Authority which is due to take office on 22 December 2001;

3. Reaffirms its full support to the Special Representative of the Secretary General and endorses the missions entrusted to him in annex 2 of the abovementioned Agreement;

4. Declares its willingness to take further action, on the basis of a report by the Secretary-General, to support the Interim institutions established by the abovementioned Agreement and, in due course, to support the implementation of the Agreement and its annexes;
5. *Calls on* all Afghan groups to support full and unimpeded access by humanitarian organizations to people in need and to ensure the safety and security of humanitarian workers;

6. *Calls on* all bilateral and multilateral donors, in coordination with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, United Nations Agencies and all Afghan groups, to reaffirm, strengthen and implement their commitment to assist with the rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction of Afghanistan, in coordination with the Interim Authority and as long as the Afghan groups fulfill their commitments;

7. *Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.*
Resolution 1401 (2002)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4501st meeting, on 28 March 2002

The Security Council,


Recalling all relevant General Assembly resolutions, in particular resolution 56/220 (2001) of 21 December 2001,

Stressing the inalienable right of the Afghan people themselves freely to determine their own political future,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Afghanistan,

Reiterating its endorsement of the Agreement on provisional arrangements in Afghanistan pending the re-establishment of permanent government institutions, signed in Bonn on 5 December 2001 (S/2001/1154) (the Bonn Agreement), in particular its annex 2 regarding the role of the United Nations during the interim period,

Welcoming the establishment on 22 December 2001 of the Afghan interim authority and looking forward to the evolution of the process set out in the Bonn Agreement,

Stressing the vital importance of combating the cultivation and trafficking of illicit drugs and of eliminating the threat of landmines, as well as of curbing the illicit flow of small arms,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 18 March 2002 (S/2002/278),

Encouraging donor countries that pledged financial aid at the Tokyo Conference on reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan to fulfill their commitments as soon as possible,

Commending the United Nations Special Mission in Afghanistan (UNSMA) for the determination shown in the implementation of its mandate in particularly difficult circumstances,

1. Endorses the establishment, for an initial period of 12 months from the date of adoption of this resolution, of a United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), with the mandate and structure laid out in the report of the Secretary-General of 18 March 2002 (S/2002/278);
2. Reaffirms its strong support for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and endorses his full authority, in accordance with its relevant resolutions, over the planning and conduct of all United Nations activities in Afghanistan;

3. Stresses that the provision of focused recovery and reconstruction assistance can greatly assist in the implementation of the Bonn Agreement and, to this end, urges bilateral and multilateral donors, in particular through the Afghanistan Support Group and the Implementation Group, to coordinate very closely with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, the Afghan Interim Administration and its successors;

4. Stresses also, in the context of paragraph 3 above, that while humanitarian assistance should be provided wherever there is a need, recovery or reconstruction assistance ought to be provided, through the Afghan Interim Administration and its successors, and implemented effectively, where local authorities contribute to the maintenance of a secure environment and demonstrate respect for human rights;

5. Calls upon all Afghan parties to cooperate with UNAMA in the implementation of its mandate and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its staff throughout the country;

6. Requests the International Security Assistance Force, in implementing its mandate in accordance with resolution 1386 (2001), to continue to work in close consultation with the Secretary-General and his Special Representative;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council every four months on the implementation of this resolution;

8. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
ANNEX F: OHDACA CHECKLIST

GENERAL PROJECT GUIDANCE

1. Projects must advance DOD security goals.
2. Improve access and influence to regions and people.
3. Reinforce security and stability.
4. Generate good will for DOD.
5. Economic assistance is NOT humanitarian assistance.
6. “Nation building” and foreign assistance type projects that go beyond mere humanitarian assistance are NOT authorized. Distinguishing between Nation Building and the first four bullets above can sometimes be difficult.
7. Projects should be sustainable w/o continued long term oversight by DoD personnel.
8. Projects that improve the capacity of the HN to address problems are preferred to projects that simply provide services.
9. Projects should address the basic humanitarian needs of local, humanitarian populations.
10. Goods and services may only be received by the host nation. The beneficiaries should be the civilian population.

SPECIFIC PROJECT GUIDANCE

1. Single projects cannot exceed $300,000. Single end-items cannot exceed $100,000.
2. Although permissible, projects that merely purchase a piece of equipment should be limited. I would expect increased scrutiny for purchases of pieces of equipment, especially if high dollar and numerous.
3. Approved project categories under OHDACA:
   a. Public Health Survey and Assessments – Does not include authority to actually conduct medical treatment. Treatment and funding authority must be conducted under 401.
   b. Water supply / Sanitation
   c. Well Drilling
   d. Medical Support & Supplies – There is a preference for using existing stocks of DOD med supplies under the DOD excess property program. Before purchasing medical equipment it should be determined beforehand that it can be properly maintained and operated. Does not provide legal and funding authority to conduct direct medical treatment. Treatment and funding authority for direct treatment are under 401.
e. Construction & Repair of rudimentary surface transportation systems and public facilities – A very broad category that has allowed for us to do many of the school and hospital projects.

f. Repair Electrical Grids – May enhance electrical service, but may NOT provide a level of service greater than pre-war Afghanistan.

g. Humanitarian Demining Mine Awareness Training – Mine awareness is currently the only authorized HD activity.

h. Mine display boards – Could be implemented as part of a mine awareness campaign.

i. Essential repairs/rebuilding for orphanages, schools, relief warehouses

j. Animal husbandry / VETCAP

k. Victim Assistance training for mine victims
GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AACA</td>
<td>Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACBAR</td>
<td>Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief. Founded in 1988 to coordinate aid for Afghanistan from Pakistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACSF</td>
<td>Afghan Civil Society Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIA</td>
<td>Afghan Interim Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIMS</td>
<td>Afghanistan Information Management Service. Computer Data Base</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMF</td>
<td>Afghan Militia Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANCB</td>
<td>Afghan NGOs Coordination Bureau/Body</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARCENT</td>
<td>U.S. Army Forces Central Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARIC</td>
<td>Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR) Resource &amp; Information Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARSG</td>
<td>Afghanistan Reconstruction Steering Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASG</td>
<td>Afghanistan Support Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATA</td>
<td>Afghanistan Transitional Authority/Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAAG</td>
<td>British Agencies Afghanistan Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAG</td>
<td>US Marine Corps Civil Affairs Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>CALL</td>
<td>Center for Army Lessons Learned</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAT</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENTRIXS</td>
<td>Coalition Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System</td>
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<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Consultative Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFLCC</td>
<td>Coalition Forces Land Component Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHLC</td>
<td>Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cell</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation. The concept for NATO, the UK and ISAF</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJCMOTF</td>
<td>Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force</td>
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<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMCC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Coordination Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMOC</td>
<td>Civil Military Operations Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>United Nations Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development. The UK counterpart to USAID.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department for Peacekeeping Operations of the UN</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>SETAF</td>
<td>U.S. Army Southern European Task Force (Airborne)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SF</td>
<td>Special Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOR</td>
<td>Statement of Requirements</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSC</td>
<td>Theater Support Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Department for Peace Keeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNJLC</td>
<td>United Nations Joint Logistics Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOC</td>
<td>Office of the UN Coordinator</td>
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<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPD</td>
<td>United Nations Procurement Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSMA</td>
<td>United Nations Special Mission in Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>USASOC</td>
<td>United States Army Special Operations Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>United States Central Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USIP</td>
<td>United States Institute for Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>USJFKSWC</td>
<td>United States John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center</td>
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• Combined Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force, Afghanistan, (CJCMOTF, number, date).
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• 101st Air Assault Division, (101st, number, date).
• 360th Civil Affairs Brigade, (CJCMOTF number, date).
• 354th Civil Affairs Brigade, (CJCMOTF number, date).
• 352nd Civil Affairs Command, (352nd, CACOM, number, date)
• 489th Civil Affairs Battalion, (CJCMOTF number, date).
• Subordinate CHLC, (CHLC number, date)
• 122nd ROC, (122nd ROC, number, date)
• 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, (96th CA, number, date)
• United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command. (USACAPOC, number, date)
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• Office of the Secretary of State, (DOS, number, date)
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• US Embassy, Kabul, (US EMBASSY, number, date)
• Allied Military
• 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, (CANADA, number, date).
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• ISAF, Afghanistan, (ISAF, number, date).
• UK Department for International Development, DFID, (UK, number, date)
• Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe, SHAPE (SHAPE, number, date)
• United Nations
• UNAMA, Afghanistan, (UNAMA, number, date)
• UN Office of Chief for Humanitarian Assistance, UNOCHA (UN, number, date).
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211 Mr Mark Walsh, Mr William Flavin, COL Mike Dooley conversations with Major Kim Fields ARCENT, COL George Oliver conversations with G5 ARCENT September and October 2001. PKI offered to attach an advisory team to ARCENT to assist in developing a plan for the eventual stability operations. ARCENT decided to turn to the Center of Excellence in PACOM because the mission looked like Humanitarian Assistance with no following on stability operation. Additionally, there were personality issues involved.

212 CENTCOM 02, 30 MAY 02