The Next Acquisition Challenge: Transitioning Enduring Capability

by

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Abstract

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“What I fear more than the strategies of my enemies is our own mistakes”

-Pericles (431BC)

After over a decade of war and numerous inward looking studies, the Department of Defense (DoD) has and is continuing to make significant changes to all three key “Big A” processes that are required to deliver new capabilities to the warfighter. They have revised or considered alternative methods to streamline requirement generation and approval within the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), sought to synchronize Planning, Programming, Budget, and Execution (PPBE) funding processes, and adjust the 5000 Series Defense Acquisition paradigms by leveraging the enhanced buying power of the government, new contract negotiation and structure techniques, competitive development opportunities, and integrated testing. One of the critical modifications was the implementation of various rapid acquisition processes exemplified by Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement (JUONS) or Army’s Operational Need Statement (ONS). To date, most of the JUONS/ONS process improvements have been focused on trying to reduce the time required to execute each of the required acquisition steps in order to minimize the total time from requirement identification to actual fielding in theater. However, now that the war in Iraq is over and Afghanistan is nearing conclusion it is critical that the process for identifying, evaluating, determining, and transferring material solutions from the rapid acquisition process into the defense acquisition Program of Record (PoR) system be given serious consideration. If the services fail to adequately emphasize the transition phase of the JUONS/ONS process, the Department of Defense runs the risk of wasting valuable
resources in an austere budget environment by making unsound investments in the
next generation of technologies to maintain our military superiority. The Army's
Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition (CDRT) process has been a significant
development in implementing a framework for meeting this important challenge,
however to date its effectiveness has achieved mixed results because of a potential drift
from its original purpose.

Rapid Acquisition Process

In 2004, when then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s famously remarked
that “you go to war with the Army you have, not the Army you might want or wish to
have” in response to why it was taking so long to provide ungraded armor protection to
the warfighter, it became clear that the services could no longer rely on the current
Defense Acquisition Management System Model. Although, the DoD “Big A” based
acquisition process had successfully produced the key weapons systems of the Air
Land Battle doctrine such as the M-2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, M-1 Abrams Tank, and
M-60 Blackhawk Helicopter, these major weapons systems took on average nine years
to transition from concept to an Initial Operating Capability. That slow deliberate model
could not be applied to an environment in Iraq and Afghanistan where the enemy rapidly
exploited capability shortfalls with new and creative tactics, techniques, and procedures.
Instead, the existing Department of Defense acquisition model would have to be
modified to provide new material systems and non-material capabilities to counter the
ever changing threats posed by an asymmetric enemy.
In effect, the DoD and the Services needed to develop and formalize dual acquisition paths for standard (or deliberate) and rapid requirements. In response to the rapid requirements, the DoD initiated the JUONS process. Each service also maintained its own unique variation of the JUONS process; the Army implemented the ONS process, the Navy uses the Urgent Operational Needs Statement, the Marine Corps follows the Urgent Need Statement (UNS), the Air Force executes its Rapid Response Process, and finally United States Special Operations Command uses the Combat Mission Needs Statement (CMNS). The primary determinate of which process is implemented is based on the intended end user. The JUONS process provides the Combatant Commander with a method to identify critical material and non-material requirements that are inherently joint in nature (e.g. theater-wide spanning multiple services) that fall outside of the existing service acquisition process that "if not addressed immediately, will seriously endanger personnel and/or pose a major threat to ongoing operations."² If the requirement does not meet that benchmark it is delegated down to the lead service process, for example the Army’s ONS. The ONS process is then followed “to document the urgent need for a nonstandard and or unprogrammed capability to correct a deficiency or improve a capability that enhances mission accomplishment”³ of an Army specific nature.

The primary purpose of the JUONS process is to rapidly validate, resource, field the combatant commander’s requirement realizing that it is a time-sensitive need for warfighters in combat related on-going operations.⁴ The key steps in the process are requirement approval, funding, development, and fielding. The process begins when the combatant commander submits his request simultaneously to the Joint Staff J-8 and
the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC). The JUONS is then reviewed by various internal DoD boards to ensure the requirement meets the minimum benchmark of a JUONS and should continue through the process. If it is determined to be urgent and compelling it will then delegated to the Functional Capabilities Board (FCB) JUONS Working Group (WG) for analysis. If the requirement is not determined to be sufficient it is sent back to the Combatant Commander. The FCB JUONS WG validates the requirement, researches potential technical solutions, identifies funding options, and provides a recommendation for the lead service for the acquisition development. The FCB JUONS WG input is then reviewed and approved by the FCB who provide it along with the JUONS priority within the designated portfolio to the Joint Control Board (JCB). The JCB reviews the FCB recommendations and determines priority across the services and functions. Finally, the Budget Office Director Board approves the various review board recommendations, directs funding allocation, and the designated service to initiate the acquisition process. DoD’s goal is to execute these first two steps in 10 days from initial submittal. The ultimate goal of the development and fielding phases is to deliver the capability in as rapid a timeframe as possible, with a goal of between 6 and 18 months depending on the complexity and scope of the requirement. All of the services have similar process, although each has a slightly unique nuances based on the internal acquisition approval hierarchy.

Limitations of Rapid Acquisition

In order to meet that aggressive schedule, the acquisition community divert from the fundamental steps of a traditional acquisition program. They are aided in the fact
that most JUONS do not have the lengthy detailed requirements that are common in traditional acquisition programs source documents such as the Capabilities Requirement Document (CRD). This lack of specificity and compressed timeline leads to principally orienting on capabilities requiring little to no development or Modified Commercial-Off-The-Shelf solutions. In addition, the lack of detailed requirements allows many of the required defense acquisition model developmental testing requirements to be waived. As a result, the overall equipping timeline can be significantly compressed. The JUONS and service processes have rapidly delivered well publicized successful systems such as the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle, Raven Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, and Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar system to the warfighter giving them enhanced capability on the battlefield.

However, for every successful use of this rapid model there are numerous less known failures, to include various man-portable robots, biometrics systems, and Airborne Multi-Sensor Systems. Therefore the divergence from the standard acquisition system should not be considered a panacea. The desire for speed must be off-set by the acceptance of inherent risks. Where these risks become evident is when they are viewed through a functional solution analysis. This analysis is the framework from which the DoD holistically assesses current capabilities and manages the risk caused by an proposed change, a framework, known by the acronym DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities). When the Army deliberately uses an integrated DOTMLPF approach to change, it “enables the Army to improve its capabilities to provide dominant land power to the joint force.” The individual component parts of DOTMLPF should never be looked at in
isolation as each has potential influence on the other. Detailed analysis through these domains in the development of a capability effectively makes the difference between fielding (the goal of a standard acquisition program) and equipping (the goal of the rapid acquisition program) a capability to the force. The acceptance of reduced DOTMLPF analysis in exchange for speed has caused common deficiencies in the capabilities sent to the force as a part of the rapid acquisition process. Common deficiencies include: lack of planning by the gaining command element on how it will integrate the new capability into its formation; immature technology that is not effective in the required operational environment; interoperability issues with other systems; insufficient training concepts/plans; lack of unit manpower to operate or maintain the equipment causing an over reliance on contractors; and incomplete or under resourced lifecycle sustainment plans. Despite the JUONS/ONS process meeting its objective of rapidly equipping the force with a capability; one critical aspect that they do not consider is what to do once the immediate need is fulfilled and the system is in the field. According to legal opinion A4-08-145, a validated ONS suffices for wartime, short-term efforts, whereas the transfer of capabilities to a formal acquisition program supporting long term use requires implementation of the JCIDS process to validate the requirement.  Although this is primarily a JCIDS requirement and PPBE resourcing deficiency, the lack of specified funding in the annual Defense Authorization Bill and Defense Appropriations Bill leaves these systems in an “acquisition process limbo” as they do not have dedicated resources to develop, sustain, or improve their capability. The only avenue for sustaining these systems is through the use of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) Funds, which as a result of tighter Office of Management Budget funding
guidance issued to DoD in 2010 have a significantly stricter definition of their use in support of replacement, repair, modification, and procurement of equipment and are limited to a 12 month time frame to obligate.”

**Genesis of a Transition Process**

To address this significant shortfall of the JUONS/ONS process, in December 2004 the Army’s Vice Chief of Staff, General Richard Cody, directed the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to identify promising rapidly equipped systems for Army-wide fielding (Spiral-to-the-Army). In response to this tasking, the TRADOC Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) Accelerated Capabilities Division (ACD) and Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) G-3/5/7 Capabilities Integration Division develop the CDRT process to annually identify materiel systems fielded to meet emerging requirements, assess their operational performance in the field, and determine if they should transition as long-term capabilities for the Army. Since its initial implementation in 2004, the CDRT process has evolved from an annual review of materiel systems, to a semi-annual process considering both materiel systems and non-materiel capabilities, to now being executed quarterly with overlapping iterations. The CDRT process consists of five key phases: Identify, Assess, Recommend, Validate, and Approve.
The initial phase of the process is the Identify phase. This phase begins with the refinement of a preliminary list of candidates separated into two categories, the Acquisition Program Candidates (material solutions) and Enduring Capabilities (non-material capabilities). The preliminary list of nominations is derived from the previous iteration and is sent via Secure Protocol Internet Routing email to select Joint and Army Acquisition organizations to include the Department of Defense’s Rapid Reaction Technology Office, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, JRAC, and the Army’s Rapid Equipping Force. The purpose of the preliminary list is to add additional nominations and solicit input from the generating Army. In order for a material solution or non-material capability to be added to the nomination list the following criteria must be met:

a. Acquisition Program Candidate (APC) Requirements:
   i. Not a current JCIDS Milestone B or later acquisition program.
ii. System has been in use in theater for at least 120 days.
iii. Completed Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) Capabilities and Limitations Report or Emerging Results Board.
iv. Completed ATEC Forward Operational Assessment (FOA) or comparable evaluation.
v. Potential for increased production without major modifications.
vi. Addresses current and future force capability gaps/requirements.

b. Enduring Capability Candidate (EC) Requirements:

i. In use by deployed or deploying forces or at training base in support of deploying forces for 120 days.
ii. Documented requirement, including associated DOTMLPF implications.
iii. Written endorsement from deployed or recently returned unit.
iv. Assessment from appropriate functional proponent.
v. Proposed implementation strategy.

Once the preliminary list is refined, it is then sent to the CDRT Community of Interest (COI), which consists of the combatant commanders, Army component commanders, Army corps commanders, HQDA principal staff, and the Army Center of Excellence commanders. The memorandum serves four purposes: Establishes the current CDRT iteration timeline, solicits additional nominations from the operational Army, solicits system performance feedback from the operational Army, and identifies members of the CDRT COI primary point of contacts.

The second phase or “Assess” phase of the CDRT process begins when the COI begins its review of the initial candidates list. Members of the COI then categorize and prioritize candidate systems on the final list. Each system is assigned to one of the following four categories:
a) Transition to an “APC” or an “EC.” This is defined as a system or capability that is required throughout the current or future force.

b) Sustain. This is defined as a system or capability for current in theater use only.

c) Terminate. This is defined as stop all further development and support of this system or capability.

d) No Response. This is defined as a system or capability that is unfamiliar to the organization or it falls outside of the organization’s purview.

Phase three is the “Recommend” phase of the process consist of reviewing the input from the field, conduct analysis of each candidate final categorization, and preparing the “Recommended List”. The critical task of this phase is the assessment of each candidate using Total Point Value (TPV) analysis. If a system or capability receives over 50% of the total possible points and is not categorized “Terminate” by any organization it is considered to be fully supported by the field as an APC or EC. If a system receives categorizations as “Terminate” by multiple organizations it is added to the potential Termination list. To be categorized as “Terminate,” it signifies the warfighter feels the system does not fulfill its intended function adequately or it is obsolete and most importantly further development, support, and funding by HQDA is not warranted (individual units may retain and sustain with unit funds if desired). All other material systems or non-material capabilities are classified as “Sustain”. Once each candidate has been through the TPV analysis, TRADOC ARCIC ACD develops the “Recommended List” for those systems that are categorized as APC or EC. TRADOC ARCIC ACD transmits the “Recommended List” to the CDRT COI for review and preparation for the next phase of the process. As part of that preparation, each lead TRADOC Center of Excellence (COE) with a recommended APC or EC will
prepare systems briefings, resource estimates, and initiate funding strategy discussions with the Army G-8. This entire phase is expected to take three to four weeks to complete.

Phase four or the “Validate” phase consists of a series of six key approval briefing. This phase begins when the “Recommendation List Briefing” is conducted and approved by the Chief, Accelerated Capabilities Division. The list is then briefed and approved in sequence by the Director, Requirements Integration Division; Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) Council of Colonels (COC); Director, ARCIC; Army Requirement and Resourcing Board (AR2B) COC; AR2B General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC); and finally the Commanding General, TRADOC. This phase is expected to take up to six weeks to complete.

The fifth and final phase of the process is the “Approval” phase which entails briefing and receiving approval from the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and the Army Requirements Oversight Counsel (AROC). Once Army approval is given, the candidate systems then enter the JCIDS process at the appropriate acquisition milestone. The purpose is to qualify “each materiel system for entry into the JCIDS process at a later stage, either beginning with a CDD or a CPD, instead of the Capabilities Based Analysis (CBA) phase.” Once the AROC approves the CDRT recommendations, HQDA (through TRADOC headquarters) tasks the lead TRADOC COE or other combat developer to produce the required JCIDS documentation. The successful execution of the CDRT process for a system or capability that was initially fielded under a JUONS/ONS would therefore either speed up the normal JCIDS process for a proven system, or identify capabilities of value to current operations but that do not have a
place in the future force, or to terminate Army support for obsolete or non-performing systems.

**Another Approach to the Transition Issue**

Before analyzing if the Army process is effectively making these critical determinations it would be useful to see what the other Services are doing to address this same issue. Although the Army has initiated well over 500 Urgent Needs Statement requests, the Marine Corp has also made substantial use of the rapid acquisition process. Since 2001, the Marine Corp has received over 700 requests for different capabilities to meet urgent requirements in theater.\(^1\) The Marine Corps’ Urgent Universal Needs Statement, like the other services is designed to “respond to urgent warfighting capability needs by providing the best available solutions to mission-critical capability gaps in an acceptable timeframe to the operating force commander.”\(^2\)

As of November 2011, 144 capabilities had been fielded to meet these requests. However, the Marine Corp approaches the issue of determining whether the material solution is solely an interim or an enduring capability that needs to be transitioned in a different manner. The Marine Corps policy outlines specific transition responsibilities to its Subordinate Elements as part of the UNS process. Marine Corps Order 3900.17: The Marine Corps Urgent Needs Process (UNP) and the Urgent Universal Need Statement (Urgent UNS), already includes the key Assess, Recommend, and Validate phases tasks as follows:

a. **Supported Commander of Marine Forces.**
   (1) The command that generated the requirement will provide a report on the operational effectiveness and utility of those capabilities in order to enable
continued improvements to interim solutions and to inform the deliberate processes of the Expeditionary Force Development System (EFDS).

(2) Identify those capabilities provided through the UNP which require continued sustainment until satisfied by a program of record.

b. Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and Integration. Conduct planning for the continued sustainment of capabilities fielded via the UNP, unless further resolved by programs of record.

c. Chairman, Combat Development Integration Board. Ensure that all capability gaps identified in an Urgent UNS are subsequently considered deliberately in the EFDS.

The Marine Corp sees this determination as not being a separate process but as the logical extension of the existing EFDS. Although this is an efficient way to address urgent requirements, it is not transferrable to the Army because its success is predicated on the small size of the Marine Corp as an organization and the centralization of the acquisition process under Marine Corp System Command.

**Does the CDRT Process Work?**

When evaluating any process it is critical to determine what the desired outcome is. In the case of the CDRT Process the desired outcome is three-fold: Establish a process that allows for the rapid evaluation of capabilities that have been fielded to Army forces under Urgent Needs Statements, and determine the suitability of those capabilities for continued or enduring use by the force, and quickly convert them into the traditional acquisition process. In order to examine this three-fold outcome one needs
to determine the efficiency of the process, the effectiveness of its ability to determine suitability, and the time it takes for them to become traditional Programs of Record (PoR). Although efficiency analysis may be useful to the TRADOC ARCIC ACD action officers who manage the process and a Lean Six Sigma event would identify modifications to the periodicity of reviews, COI distribution process, and user feedback percentages it would not have significant implications to the future of the Army. On the other hand, the effectiveness of the process and the speed of transition is what is critical and should be the Army’s focus in the near longer term because the longer unnecessary systems are still supported in the field the more they divert funding from capabilities that the Army will need in the future.

**Effectiveness of the Process**

As of 22 October 2012, the Army had conducted 14 iterations of the CDRT process. During those reviews they examined 657 material or non-material candidate systems for consideration as to their utility to the future Army. The breakout of the classifications is shown in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Systems Disposition</th>
<th>Iteration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Selected for ...</td>
<td>#1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 #9 #10 #11 #12 #13 #14 Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquisition Program Candidate (APC)</td>
<td>7 7 4 5 0 2 2 1 0 2 1 1 0 2 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merge into AP</td>
<td>10 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enduring (non-materiel)</td>
<td>0 0 1 6 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustain</td>
<td>0 70 124 40 27 12 15 14 15 20 21 29 25 18 430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terminate</td>
<td>0 0 48 51 14 3 0 0 0 8 21 10 7 5 167</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1- Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition Process System Disposition\(^{17}\)
Although it is interesting that the number of “Terminated” programs outnumber the successful programs by almost three to one, that should not be surprising based on the inherent risks of trading speed of equipping versus the holistic view of fielding systems under the traditional acquisition model outlined earlier. What is more relevant is that 430 systems or 66% of all systems fielded have been categorized as “Sustain.” This implies that these systems work well for CENTCOM missions, but do not have a broader application to other theaters or the Army as a whole. As a result, these systems will continue to require annual OCO funds to be maintained so that the capability resides in theater. The CENTCOM OCO requirement will becoming increasingly difficult to justify to Congress as our involvement in those conflicts continue to deescalate, as evident in the approximately 6% reduction in OCO funds for acquisitions program from 2010 to 2011. More troubling is the determination by the General Accountability Office (GAO) that “Army officials have stated, that the majority of capabilities considered by the CDRT Community of Interest are placed in the sustain category because the Army has yet to make definitive and difficult decisions about whether it wants to keep them and cannot afford to sustain this equipment without overseas contingency operations appropriations.” If this perspective is accurate it would indicate that the CDRT’s “Validate” phase is not effectively functioning as designed.

So is the GAOs assertion that the Army’s over use of the “Sustain” category as a default causing ill informed resourcing decisions valid? To address this question, it is insightful to review both the process and the ARCIC COC deliberations. Several aspects of the process potentially are impacting on the high number of capabilities
categorized as “Sustain.” First, since ARCIC does not have direct tasking authority over the operational units that are in theater using the equipment, they do not have assurance that they are getting information to and feedback from all of the end users during the Identify and Assess phases. Units can opt in or out of participating in the process. An example of how difficult it can be gain participation without tasking authority, only 12 of 62 CDRT participants responded to US Army Audit Agency questionnaires about the process. Second, a substantial amount of the feedback is derived from the tactical level and not required to be vetted through the Brigade Commander/Staff level before it is sent to ARCIC during the Assess phase. 40% of previous CDRT participants from the operational force, when asked the importance their leadership placed on this task said it was medium or low when compared to other duties. In a process where one “Terminate” vote with little to no justification can override otherwise strong acceptance of a capability and result in a “Sustain” categorization, the unstructured operational unit review process can have unintended strategic impacts. Lastly, during the Validate phase, the only systems that are reviewed by Senior Army leadership are those categorized as APC/EC or Terminate. So any capability that is controversial, incomplete or has conflicting performance information can simply be categorized as sustain and it continues to be funded and no one beyond ARCIC or the ARCIC COC is required to make a decision.

In reviewing the ARCIC COC discussions from integration #12 through #15 there does seem to be some validity for the GAOs assertion. In the case of several capabilities discussed there were references to CDD/CPD that already addressed the proposed capability or when they could not come to a consensus the decision was
made to “sustain” pending more information. For example during iteration #15, the SU-231D 40mm Grenade Launcher Sight was recommended as an APC by both the operational Army and the Maneuver Center of Excellence. However, the rational for not supporting this recommendation (as documented in the comments section of the vote) from a majority of the COC members who voted to categorize the capability as Sustain were related to the systems limited use, reliability, testing, funding strategies, and “sustain capability for further refinement, but never questioned if the requirement for the capability was valid.”

Another example was the Man Portable Line Charge which had been recommended for termination. However, during iteration #15 it was reclassified as “Sustain” because several of the COC wanted to wait for further information from the ATEC FOA. If the FOA had not been complete, this capability should have never been accepted as a nomination, since that is one of the specified criteria for entry into phase I of the CDRT process. Also of interest, all six of the capabilities that were formally presented, during iteration #14, to the COC were actually USSOCOM program of record developed capabilities that were now being considered for transition to the Army. This is a deviation from the guidance in the “Identify” phase of what criteria is used to nominate a candidate capability as an APC/EC. Since these are USSOCOM programs of record they are already a MS B or later acquisition program and would not have the required ATEC Capabilities and Limitation Report.

In addition, GAO voiced concern that no one senior leader in the Army has oversight and responsibility for the entire fielding and disposition process for non-standard equipment. As a result, without a single point of responsibility and no way to track all of the capabilities fielded, there is limited confidence outside of DoD that that
CDRT process will ever identify, assess, and validate all of the capabilities that have been sent to theater. “Moreover, without visibility over the universe of tactical nonstandard equipment, the Army cannot project reset and sustainment costs for this equipment, and ensure that equipment is only being funded to the extent needed to meet continuing needs.”

Speed of Conversion to the Traditional Acquisition System

The final critical outcome of the CDRT process is to take the validated APC and EC systems and quickly integrate them into the traditional acquisition framework. This is important for a number of reasons. First, it requires the TRADOC COE to develop, staff, and gain JROC approval of a detailed CDD/CPD. This document is critical for providing a robust requirement that the acquisition community can then use to provide a holistic fielding of a capability back out to the force. Also once the requirement document is approved the capability can compete for various types of funding (Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation; Procurement; and Operations and Maintenance) under PPBES in the normal budget cycle. Through Iteration #14, twenty-eight APC have been identified as either being recommended for transition straight to an Acquisition Program or entry into JCIDS as a CDD/CPD. The breakout by iteration is depicted in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acquisition Program Candidate Current Status</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acquisition Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPD</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDD</td>
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Table 2- Acquisition Program Candidate Recommendation Status
Of these CDRT validated systems, 36% still do not have an approved requirement document (10 of the 28 identified), including none of the systems that have undergone the process since Iteration #6 (completed in May 2009). Of the remaining eighteen systems the average time from exiting the CDRT process to achieving a validated CDD/CPD is 406 days. Since the responsibility for prioritizing and championing these requirements is left to each of the various Army’s COE’s and their leadership there is no synergies or strategic oversight to ensure each is completed in a streamlined manner. This lag in aggressively executing the JCIDS process is only furthering the impression that the Army is delaying making tough decisions and trade-offs in the next generation of required capabilities for its future force.

**Conclusion**

As the Army initiates efforts to add the REF to its permanent structure and fund its ONS based efforts within its FY15 base budget the demand to execute rapid acquisition efforts will not disappear. As a result, the need for an effective transition process during a period of budgetary austerity will remain. The following steps are necessary to reduce the process shortfalls that currently exist:

a. Identify Phase.

(1) Do not use the CDRT process as a forum for approval of Army Special Operating Forces to Conventional Forces capability transition. It should remain tightly focused on JUONS/ONS based rapid acquisition efforts.
(2) Assign the Army G-8 as responsible agent for maintaining an accurate list of all capabilities fielded under JUONS/ONS to eliminate the ad-hoc nomination process.

b. Assess Phase.

(1) Future CDRT iterations should be implemented via official tasking through the Army G-3 to the Operational Army.

(2) CDRT feedback should be submitted at the Brigade level and approved at the Division level prior to transmittal to TRADOC ARCIC.

c. Recommend Phase.

(1) Redefine the APC/EC category to allow for <10% “Terminate” categorization. This will eliminate an otherwise successful system from being downgraded to “Sustain” by one or two opinions that seem divergent from the rest of the assessments.

d. Validate Phase.

(1) All categories should be discussed in detail at the ARCIC COC and vetted through the TRADOC Commander to Army leadership.

(2) TRADOC should implement off-cycle iterations to review the estimated 430 capabilities currently in the sustain category.

(3) Status of CDD/CPDs for all previously approved APC should be updated by the CDRT COE representatives as part of the AR2B GOSC and Commanding General, TRADOC review.

There will be resistance to implementing these adjustments to the CDRT process from several stakeholders. The Operational Army is likely to complain about additional requirement to issue a formal tasking and the direct Brigade and Division staff
representative involvement. However, this is the best way to ensure the feedback from the force is complete, accurate, valid, and reflects the opinion of the senior operational warfighter. This revised process will also require additional work from TRADOC. It will initially create a backlog of work as they conduct a detailed review and assessment of all the current “Sustain” capabilities and brief them to the TRADOC Commander and Army Senior leadership. Although labor intensive, it will clearly indicate to GAO and others that the claims that the Army is not making the required tough financial decisions are inaccurate. The TRADOC COE’s will not likely embrace the increase visibility given to the CDD/CPDs that are required to be derived by this process. However, increasing the frequency of updates by the COEs action officers to the AR2B GOSC and TRADOC Commander will ensure proper prioritization of these efforts through completion.

It is incumbent on the Army to take a hard look at the existing CDRT process and implement the suggested controls to insure that it continues to identifies the right capabilities, accurately assesses them, and then makes the difficult choices of which capabilities it keeps and which are no longer of benefit to the war fighter or can no longer afford. The success or failure of this process will directly impact the size of the pool of resources available to the force of the future.

Endnotes


2 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Rapid Validation and Resourcing of Joint Urgent Operational Needs in the Year of Execution; CJCS Instruction 3470.01, Washington, D.C, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 15 July 2005, Page GL-1.

4 CJCS Instruction 3470.01, Page A-2.


6 U.S. Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology, Memorandum Subject: Procedures for Transfer of Rapidly Equipped Initiatives/Products/Systems to Program Executive Offices (PEOs) for Life-Cycle Management, 24 October 2008.


8 United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, Accelerated Capabilities Division, Requirements Integration Directorate, Army Capabilities Integration Center, “Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition Briefing”, 1 October 2011, Slide 3.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid. Slide 7

11 TRADOC ARCIC ACD takes each organizations categorization and prioritization input and combines it into the following algorithm to determine what the final Total Point Value for each candidate system or non-material capability:

\[
\text{Total Point Value} = \sum \{(\text{Unit/Org Wt} \times \{(\text{AP votes} \times 10) + (\text{Sustain votes} \times 5) + (\text{Terminate votes} \times (-5)) + (\text{Top third rank} \times 5) + (\text{Middle third rank} \times 3) + (\text{Bottom third rank} \times 1)\})
\]

\text{Unit/Org Weight} = \text{(Division and higher} = 4; \text{Brigade/Task Force} = 3; \text{Bn or Corps/Division Staff} = 2; \text{Company} = 1

12 When a candidate is categorized as an APC or EC it implies: 1. Feedback from the warfighter is that system fills a current operational need, is theater proven, and is applicable to the entire current and future force Army. 2. It can enter the JCIDS process at Milestone B, Milestone C, or can be merged into an existing program. 3. The system will compete in the next PPBE cycle. 4. The Army intends to sustain the system through OCO funding until the system is resourced through the POM.

13 To be categorized as Sustain means the Operational Army believes the system fills a current theater operational need but no broad application to entire Army or useful to future force; the system is recommended for theater use only; the system or capability will be sustain in theater with OCO funding; and HQDA shall provide directed Non-Standard Equipment disposition.
The CDRT process does not circumvent the JCIDS process for materiel systems, but leverages a provision in CJCSI 3170.01 that provides for a military utility assessment to enable entry into the process at a later stage if a system has performed successfully in an operational environment.


Ibid. Page 11.

Iteration #15 was still awaiting final AROC recommendations as of November 2012.

United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, Accelerated Capabilities Division, Requirements Integration Directorate, Army Capabilities Integration Center Memorandum of Record, Subject: Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition (CDRT) Iteration #15 Council of Colonels, 1 August 2012, Page 5.

Ibid. Page 17.

