Behind the Periscope: Leadership in China’s Navy

Jeffrey Becker, David Liebenberg, Peter Mackenzie

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Maryanne Kivlehan-Wise, Director of the China Strategic Issues Group, is available at 703-824-2386 and by email at kivleham@cna.org.

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Maryanne Kivlehan-Wise
Director
China Strategic Issues Group
CNA China Studies

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Behind the Periscope: Leadership in China’s Navy

Jeffrey Becker, David Liebenberg, Peter Mackenzie
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Executive summary

Purpose and approach

This study examines current leaders in China’s naval service, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy). It identifies and analyzes the most critical navy leadership positions throughout the Chinese military, examines emerging trends, and provides recommendations for the U.S. Navy.

This study seeks to address the following sets of questions:

- Who makes up the current cohort of Chinese navy leaders, and what positions do they hold in the Chinese military?
- What can be learned about the backgrounds of these individuals?
- What do we know about the common career experiences of this cohort? What have been the basic metrics for success, and how have they changed over time?
- What are the implications for the U.S. Navy?

When selecting individuals to include in this study, we sought to identify uniformed Chinese navy officers who currently hold:

- Positions we judged to have the capacity to significantly influence current Chinese navy activities or operations, or
- Positions we judged to have the capacity to significantly influence the future direction of China’s navy.

Key findings: China’s current navy leaders

PLA Navy leaders hold positions throughout the Chinese military. We identified uniformed naval officers serving in leadership positions within:

- The four general departments of China’s Central Military Commission
- PLA Navy Headquarters
- China’s North, East, and South Sea Fleets
- Military Region Headquarters in the Jinan, Nanjing, and Guangzhou military regions.
As a group, these leaders have a broad range of functional specializations. They belong to one of four career tracks. Each possesses a different set of skills and responsibilities:

- **Command officers:** responsible for operations, training, and staff work. This is the largest group within the current leadership cohort.

- **Political officers:** responsible for overseeing the work of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) within the navy. They are critical to the promotions process and personnel management.

- **Logistics officers:** responsible for finances, health systems, transportation assets, and resource reserves. They are increasingly important as blue-water missions require navy assets to travel farther from shore.

- **Equipment officers:** responsible for support services, technical support, maintenance, and repair. They face new challenges as the navy upgrades its weapons and equipment.

**PLA Navy leaders have demographic and professional characteristics that differ from those of their USN counterparts.** As a cohort, these leaders:

- Are all male.
- Are older than USN counterparts.
- Have less formal education.
- Have less operational experience.
- Have no combat experience.
- Are less likely to have spent their entire careers in the navy. (We identified five current navy leaders who began their careers in other services. The most recent transfer occurred in 2012.)
- Have been evaluated and promoted based on political as well as professional competence throughout their careers.
PLA Navy leaders should not be viewed as a monolith; wide variation is the norm.

Within the lifespan of most of the officers in this cohort, both China and the Chinese navy have undergone historic transformations. As a result, even small age differences among current navy leaders have resulted in radical differences in three areas: (1) training experiences, (2) opportunities for deployment at sea, and (3) views on the navy as an institution.

Within the current cohort of Chinese navy leaders, we have identified three distinct generations.

- **Generation 1:** This includes current PLA Navy Commander Wu Shengli and many of the navy’s highest-ranking officers. Officers in this group joined the PLA in the late 1960s, had limited access to formal military education early in their careers, and joined a coastal navy focused on defending China from the Soviet Union.

- **Generation 2:** This includes navy leaders within China’s fleets, many of whom are expected to rise to replace generation 1 in the near future. Officers in this group joined the PLA in the early to mid 1970s, and began their careers in a navy with few ambitions beyond China’s immediate littoral region. Since then, many have gained experience commanding blue-water operations in areas not imagined when they joined the service.

- **Generation 3:** This includes navy leaders serving as deputy chiefs of staff within the fleets, or lower-level departments in Navy Headquarters. Officers in this group joined the military in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and were the first of the current navy leaders to have a professional military system in place as they began their careers. They also joined a navy that was becoming increasingly engaged internationally.

**Key findings: Trends in China’s navy leadership**

We have identified the following observable trends.

A potential large-scale personnel transition involving the highest-ranking navy leaders is due to take place within the next few years.

- If current regulations are implemented as written, seven of the 13 most influential PLA Navy officers must be promoted or retire between 2013 and 2014. This creates opportunities for new personnel to move into key leadership positions.

- These newly promoted officers will likely be more experienced with the navy’s new roles and missions, and have greater formal education and training, than their predecessors.
Officers transitioning to top-level navy positions will take command of a transformed navy facing new challenges.

- **Joint operations:** The navy will continue to implement reforms begun in the late 1990s to improve its ability to coordinate with the other services, and between its three fleets.

- **Blue-water operations:** Operating farther from China’s shores will require the navy to upgrade its logistics capabilities.

- **Fighting under “informatized” conditions:** As the navy’s roles and missions become more complex, improving its capacity to utilize information technology to improve command and control becomes critical.

- **International engagements:** China’s expanding interests are increasingly bringing its navy into contact with foreign military personnel, increasing the need for a more diplomatically skilled and internationally savvy officer corps.

New promotion indicators, including higher education, and experience at sea, are emerging. Our analysis suggests that emerging navy leaders possess one or more of the following characteristics:

- They are promoted rapidly through the lower tiers of leadership.

- They hold membership in central-level Party organizations.

- They obtain blue-water operational experience, and have performed well.

- They have strong academic credentials, possibly including graduate degrees.

- They have had experience engaging with foreign military personnel, or have received training at foreign academies.

Participation in Party organizations continues to be important as an indicator of career advancement.

- The CCP remains deeply embedded within the navy leadership structure. Officers selected for promotion to leadership positions in the near term, and navy officers with whom the U.S. Navy will engage, will continue to be selected and vetted by the Party.
Recommendations for the U.S. Navy

U.S. Navy officers should expect to encounter wide variations in the impressions they draw from their interactions with PLA Navy leaders.

- Most senior leaders in China’s navy have backgrounds that may differ from those of their U.S. Navy counterparts.
- By comparison, fleet level officers, including commanders of recent Gulf of Aden missions, are developing skillsets more similar to U.S. Navy officers.

Analysis of Chinese navy leadership should be a long-term, sustained, and cooperative effort. Such an effort should use the following methods:

- **Promote sustained cooperation across multiple organizations.** Establishing long-term, cooperative efforts between think tanks and other organizations conducting PLA Navy leadership analysis would improve the data, methods, and analytical approaches available.

- **Fully leverage U.S. engagement opportunities.** Future analysis could also be improved by systematically leveraging U.S. Navy officers’ engagements with their PLA Navy counterparts, thus expanding the amount of data available.
Chapter 1: Introduction

Background: the motivation for this study

This study examines PLA Navy leadership, a group on the verge of a significant personnel transition. It identifies the most critical navy leadership positions within the PLA’s four General Departments, PLA Navy Headquarters, China’s military regions, and the three fleets.

The PLA Navy is transitioning from a technologically limited coastal defense force to a navy capable of carrying out complex missions far from Chinese territory. PLA Navy leadership is transitioning as well. New officers are being promoted to important positions, and Chinese navy officers are becoming more highly educated, experienced at sea, and technically savvy.

As China’s maritime interests expand, officers in China’s navy are being tasked with a growing array of new and more complex missions. These include protecting China’s globalizing economic interests, maintaining access to sea lines of communication, defending maritime claims in China’s traditional territorial waters and near seas, protecting Chinese citizens abroad, and taking part in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.

A number of recent events have brought China’s navy into the international spotlight, helping announce China to the world as an emerging maritime power:

- In 2007, China launched Peace Ark, a hospital ship designed to advance the navy’s capabilities to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) worldwide.¹
- In 2008, China began sending formations to the Gulf of Aden to participate in international anti-piracy efforts. By early 2013, the PLA Navy had sent 14 formations.²
- In 2009, the PLA Navy hosted an international fleet review in Qingdao to mark its 60th anniversary, inviting naval leaders from 14 countries.³
- In 2011, the PLA Navy participated in far-seas non-combatant evacuation operations for the first time, assisting in the evacuation of 35,000 Chinese nationals from Libya.⁴

¹ Peter W. Mackenzie, Red Crosses, Blue Water (Alexandria, VA: CNA, September 2011); Cui Yan, “Uncovering the Secrets of the ‘Peace Ark’ Hospital Ship” (heping fangchuan hao yiyuanchuan jiemi; 和平方船 ’号医院船揭秘), China Ship Survey 10 (2010).
In 2012, China launched its first aircraft carrier, Liaoning. In November of that year, a fighter jet successfully landed on its deck.⁵

In 2013, the PLA Navy conducted its largest-ever single deployment to any joint foreign exercise, to participate in “Maritime Joint Exercise 2013” with the Russian navy.⁶

How China’s navy handles these new challenges depends largely on the quality of its leaders — both in “joint” positions (naval officers serving in the four PLA General Departments and China’s military regions) and naval officers staffed at Navy Headquarters and the three fleets.⁷

The navy is now seeking to recruit and foster “new-type” leaders who are well educated, technologically adept, diplomatically skilled, and able to endure various pressures and demands.

**Purpose of the study**

This study seeks to address the following sets of questions:

- What positions make up PLA Navy leadership, and where are they located in the Chinese military structure?
- Who staffs these positions? What do we know about their backgrounds, and how can we summarize the nature of the PLA Navy leadership overall?
- What do we know about common career experiences of this cohort? What have been the basic metrics for success, and how have they changed over time?
- What are the implications of the answers to these questions for the U.S. Navy?

**Approach to the study**

To answer these questions, we took three steps:

- Identified PLA Navy leadership positions
- Collected data and developed personnel biographies
- Conducted analysis on both the entire cohort and smaller groups of leaders with the goal of addressing the questions above.

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⁷ While official PLA publications increasingly use the term “joint” (lianhe 联合) in various contexts, this term is not widely applied to personnel positions. The 2012 PLA Military Dictionary, for example, provides no formal definition of what constitutes a “joint position” within the PLA. In this study, we define a joint PLA Navy leadership position as a billet outside the PLA Navy that is staffed by a uniformed naval officer. This term is not usually applied to these positions by the PLA.
Identifying leadership positions in the Chinese navy

There is no universally accepted list of PLA Navy leaders, and PLA Navy leadership positions are located throughout the Chinese military hierarchy. Therefore, our first analytical task was to identify these positions and the officers serving in them. Our research approach for doing so is described in detail in chapter 2.

Collecting data and developing biographic profiles

After identifying PLA Navy leadership positions, we collected biographical data on the officers serving in these positions, and created individual profiles for each officer. In collecting the data for use in these profiles, we relied on the sources listed below.8

News media:

- **Authoritative Central PRC news media**: National-level media thought to receive guidance directly from the CCP Central Propaganda Department. These include CCP and government-owned media outlets such as Xinhua, CCTV, and People’s Daily.

- **Hong Kong news media**: Hong Kong media often report on civilian and military leadership issues in the PRC. While these articles cannot be considered authoritative, they provided a useful starting point for gathering information on PLA Navy officers.

- **PLA news media**: These include official PLA media such as the PLA Daily, and the People’s Navy, the official newspaper of the Chinese navy.

Books and reference material:

- **Chinese academic journals**: Many naval leaders publish articles in Chinese academic and technical journals. These sources provide information on the current state of knowledge within the Chinese navy leadership, and often provide biographical or career information on the author.

- **Chinese local government websites**: Local-level government websites often contain information on Chinese naval leaders from the region, and frequently include articles about “Hometown Heroes” after they receive promotions, move to new billets, or return home to visit or speak at local institutions.

- **Chinese military publications**: These include written material produced by China’s military, such as publications from Haichao Press, the official publishing house of the PLA Navy, as well as the PLA Navy Encyclopedia and the Handbook for Officers and Enlisted of the Chinese PLA Navy.

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8 The complete list of sources used in this study is provided in the works cited at the end of this document.
- **National Chengchi University’s Center for China Studies**: Taiwan’s NCCU maintains a database of PRC military leaders. We used this database as a first step to identify basic biographic information, and later sought to confirm its accuracy by cross checking it with information obtained through more authoritative sources.

- **Other U.S. government databases and leadership guides**: This study draws on a wide range of U.S. government material on Chinese navy leadership.

- **Western academic source material**: This study also draws on existing studies of the Chinese navy, including U.S. academic studies, and previous CNA studies.

**Interviews:**

- **Discussions with PLA officers and Western academic experts**: This study also uses discussions between CNA analysts and Chinese military officers. We also spoke with U.S. experts both inside and outside government.

The full biographic profiles, which form the basis for our analysis, are in appendix A of this report.

**Analysis of biographic profiles**

The next step was to conduct analysis with the goal of answering the questions listed above. One challenge we encountered was the uneven nature of biographical data on PLA Navy leadership personnel. While there is a wealth of information on higher-level Chinese navy officers, careers of mid-level and junior-level navy leaders were less extensively covered.

To mitigate this problem, we grouped PLA Navy officers according to their positions and responsibilities, and conducted most of our analysis on these smaller groups of officers. This approach allowed us to be more nuanced in our analysis. For example, while PLA enlistment dates were not publicly available for all 91 officers in the study, they were available for all PLA Navy deputy commanders and deputy political commissars. By examining those officers as a separate group, we could identify trends in the data and draw conclusions that were not apparent when examining the entire collection of officers together.

**Organization of the study**

The remainder of this study is divided into five chapters:

- **Chapter 2: An overview of China’s navy leadership.** Chapter 2 analyzes the entire PLA Navy leadership cohort. It examines their commonalities and differences, places them in the historical context of events which shaped their early careers, and examines the recent events that have shaped their tenure during China’s naval modernization.

- **Chapter 3: PLA Navy leadership at the center.** Chapter 3 identifies and analyzes leading navy leadership in the four PLA General Departments and Navy Headquarters.
• **Chapter 4: Navy leadership in China’s military regions and fleets.** Chapter 4 examines navy leadership in China’s three fleets (the North Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet, and South Sea Fleet), as well as the three military regions (MRs) to which those fleets are institutionally connected.

• **Chapter 5: Factors affecting PLA Navy officers’ careers.** Chapter 5 examines multiple factors in order to assess their impact on the future career advancement of the PLA Navy officers currently serving in junior-level leadership positions.

• **Chapter 6: Emerging trends in PLA Navy leadership and implications for the U.S. Navy.** Chapter 6 discusses the emerging trends in Chinese navy leadership, and their implications for the U.S. Navy. It also identifies possible topics for further research and ways to improve and advance future PLA Navy leadership analysis.
Chapter 2: The current PLA Navy leadership

Introduction: who are China’s navy leaders?

China analysts have not reached a consensus over which positions in the Chinese military should be considered “PLA Navy leadership.” Though some national-level billets—such as the PLA Navy commander and the PLA Navy political commissar—are clearly positions of naval authority, other officers at PLA Navy Headquarters and within the fleets likely also play important leadership roles.

In addition, uniformed naval officers serving in positions outside the direct PLA Navy structure may also impact naval activities and operations. Historically, it has been difficult to even identify such officers; before the 1990s, for example, PLA Navy officers working in central military units outside the navy were not allowed to wear navy uniforms.9

Defining PLA Navy leadership

Our first analytical task, therefore, was to identify uniformed naval officers in leadership positions throughout the PLA. This included national-level command organizations, PLA Navy Headquarters, China’s three fleets, and China’s military regions.

To identify these positions, we conducted a wide-ranging assessment of the roles and responsibilities of PLA military positions. For each position, we applied the following general criteria to determine whether it should be included in the study:

- Does the position have the capacity to significantly influence current PLA Navy activities or operations?
- Does the position have the potential to significantly influence the future direction of the PLA Navy?

Through this analysis, we identified what we assess to be the most critical PLA Navy leadership positions within four types of PLA institutions.

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The four PLA General Departments:¹⁰

- Naval officers serving as deputy chiefs of the General Staff
- Naval officers serving as assistants to the director of a general department
- Naval officers serving as directors or deputy directors of PLA first-level departments.

Navy HQ:

- The PLA Navy commander and political commissar
- PLA Navy deputy commanders and deputy political commissars
- PLA Navy chief of staff and deputy chiefs of staff
- The directors, political commissars, and deputy directors of the navy’s Political, Logistics, and Equipment departments
- Directors of lower-level departments within the navy’s Political, Logistics, and Equipment departments.

PLA military regions:¹¹

- Naval officers serving as MR deputy chiefs of staff
- Naval officers serving as deputy directors of MR logistics departments
- Naval officers serving as directors of MR navy departments.

The three fleets:

- Fleet commanders and fleet political commissars
- Fleet deputy commanders
- Fleet chiefs of staff and fleet deputy chiefs of staff
- The directors of the fleet Political, Logistics, and Equipment departments.

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¹⁰ The four PLA General Departments are the General Staff Department, the General Political Department, the General Logistics Department, and the General Equipment Department. PLA Navy leadership positions within these departments are examined in detail in chapter 3.

¹¹ China’s three fleets are the North Sea Fleet (NSF), which is subordinate to the Jinan MR; the East Sea Fleet (ESF) which is subordinate to the Nanjing MR; and the South Sea Fleet, which is subordinate to the Guangzhou MR. These positions and their roles and responsibilities are analyzed in detail in chapter 4.
Figure 1 locates these PLA Navy leadership positions within the organizational context of the PLA. Organizations shaded in blue denote the presence of a PLA Navy leadership position.

Blue and white stripes indicate organizations in which “positions to watch” are present. These positions are not currently staffed by a naval officer, but, given the roles and responsibilities involved, they have the potential to significantly impact naval activities and operations. We examine these organizations, and how they impact the PLA Navy, in chapter 3.

Figure 1. PLA Navy leadership positions throughout the PLA

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Commonalities within the PLA Navy leadership

Although they possess a wide variety of backgrounds and experiences, the PLA Navy leaders examined here share the following commonalities:

- **Shared demographic characteristics**: They are all men, are active duty naval officers, are between the ages of 48 and 68, and were born and grew up along China’s coast. Three are sons of former high-ranking PLA officers.

- **Shared career lifecycle**: Most entered the navy officer corps one of three ways: (1) after studying at PLA military academies, (2) from enlisted service, or (3) by transferring from other services. Many have served in similar billets at similar stages of their careers, and are subject to the same PLA-wide retirement regulations that are being enforced with increasing regularity.

- **Shared criteria affecting their career success**: All have been evaluated in their careers by a set of core criteria. While these criteria have remained relatively stable over the years, the weight given to each has varied significantly at different times.

Shared demographic characteristics of China’s navy leadership

PLA Navy leaders share the following demographic characteristics:

- **They are all men**: None of the PLA Navy leadership positions identified in this study are staffed by women.

- **They are all uniformed naval officers**: Although some of the officers in this study are staffed in joint positions outside Navy Headquarters or the three fleets, they remain PLA Navy officers. This has not always been the case in the Chinese military.

- **They are older than their U.S. Navy counterparts**: We identified birth dates for 50 of the 91 PLA Navy leaders in this study. Their average age is approximately 59 (see table 1). The largest number of PLA Navy leaders were born in the early to mid 1950s.\(^\text{13}\)

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\(^\text{13}\) Navy leaders for whom birth dates were unavailable were mostly from lower-level leadership positions. It should be noted that these statistics most likely reflect a selection bias, since the officers for whom birthdates were not available were mostly at lower grades and presumably younger than the average. A rough estimate of the birthdates of the missing officers in this study based on their current grade and rank suggests that the average age for the PLA Navy leaders in this study is roughly between 56 and 59.
Officers in this study ranged between the ages of 48 and 68. The youngest officer we identified within this group is Senior Captain Li Hanjun, who is the director of the PLA Navy Military Training Department. The oldest, PLA Navy Commander Wu Shengli.

Table 1 compares the ages of PLA Navy admirals, vice admirals, and rear admirals identified in the study with the average ages of U.S. Navy officers of similar rank. Table 1 lists only those PLA Navy rear admirals belonging to the navy leadership cohort, rather than all rear admirals. This likely skews the average age higher for that group.

The data suggest that the top-level PLA Navy leaders are decidedly older than their U.S. Navy counterparts. For example, while the average age for the three Chinese admirals in this study was 64, as of March 2013, the average age for the 10 U.S. Navy admirals (O-10) was 57. ADM Wu Shengli, the Commander of the Chinese navy, His closest U.S. Navy counterpart, CNO Admiral Jonathan Greenert, is eight years younger.

Table 1. Average ages of PLA Navy and U.S. Navy leaders

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<th>PLA Navy officers</th>
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<td>Rank</td>
<td>Average age of PLA Navy leaders</td>
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<td>Admiral</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice Admiral</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rear Admiral</td>
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China’s navy leaders largely grew up in coastal provinces. We identified hometowns for 49 of the 91 officers within our leadership dataset. At least one-third (18 of 49) of these officers come from the coastal provinces of Shandong (10) or Jiangsu (8), which are situated between Beijing and Shanghai. All 49 of these officers are from the eastern part of the country.

Among China’s top navy leadership, we found only two officers who shared a hometown. Commander ADM Wu Shengli and Deputy Chief of the General Staff ADM Sun Jianguo are both from Wuqiao County in Hebei Province.

15 Data on age of U.S. naval officers were obtained using CNA’s end of March extract of U.S. Navy OPINS (Officer Personnel Information System) to determine the mean age of regular navy (active component) admirals by rank.
16 Admiral Wu Shengli’s surname Wu (吴) is the same as the first character in the name of his home county, Wuqiao County (wujiaoxian; 吴桥县), which translates as “the county of Wu’s bridge.”
Additionally, the assistant to the director of the PLA General Political Department, VADM Cen Xu, and the Navy Logistics Department director, RADM Xu Weibing, are both from Rudong County in Jiangsu Province.

**Princelings in the Chinese navy:** Three of the PLA Navy’s highest-ranking officers are the sons of former high-ranking PLA military officers, and so are often referred to as “princelings” (*taizi*).

- Navy Commander ADM Wu Shengli is the son of Wu Xian, who was a Red Army political commissar during the Anti-Japanese and Chinese Civil War.  
17

- VADM Ding Yiping is the son of PLA Lieutenant General Ding Qiusheng. General Ding Qiusheng is a former political commissar and veteran of the “Long March,” a series of strategic retreats undertaken by the Communist Red Army in 1934-35.  
18 The Long March is an important foundational event in CCP mythos, and Long March veterans are highly venerated in the Party.

- VADM Liu Zhuoming is the son of Admiral Liu Huaqing. Also a Long March veteran, ADM Liu Huaqing is a former CMC vice chairmain, a former navy commander, and a key figure in PLA Navy modernization efforts.  
19

**Shared aspects of PLA Navy leaders’ careers**

The current cohort of PLA Navy leaders also have some basic similarities associated with the initial, intermediate, and end stages of their careers:

- Most enter the officer corps after studying in military academies, from the enlisted force, or by transferring from other services.

- They serve in one of four career tracks (command, political, logistics, or equipment).

- They follow a similar career trajectory, serving in similar billets in similar stages of their careers. This is particularly the case for officers in the same career track.

- They now have greater access to professional military education (PME) — the training provided to PLA officers to ensure they have the necessary skills at various stages in their careers.

The sections below examine these commonalities in detail.

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Accession to the PLA Navy officer corps

The current PLA Navy leadership is drawn from three main sources:

- PLA Navy military academies
- The enlisted force
- Other PLA services.

**PLA Navy military academies:** Most of China’s military officers come from one of the navy’s military academies. The PLA Navy has at least five academic institutions that provide cadets with their primary education. Some receive a bachelor’s degree and some receive a three-year senior technical degree. We have identified five PLA Navy academies that provide this type of education:

- Dalian Naval Vessel Academy
- Naval Aviation Academy
- Naval Aviation Engineering Academy
- Naval Engineering University
- Naval Submarine Academy.

Evidence regarding education experience is limited. However, some of the navy leadership cohort began their careers after receiving education at a PLA Navy academic institution. Three officers, for example, received their initial cadet training at the Dalian Naval Vessel Academy:

- PLA Navy Military Training Department Director SCAPT Li Hanjun
- North Sea Fleet Deputy Commander VADM Ding Yi
- PLA Navy Equipment Department Director RADM Hao Yanbing.

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20 Chen Liangyu, Sun Wei, and Lu Li, *Education and Management of Cadets at Military Schools* (junxiao xueyuan jiaoyu yu guanli; 军校学院教育与管理) (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2003), p. 20. In 1998, the PRC established a National Defense Student Program (guofangsheng), which funds students in exchange for military service. However, this program is too recent for China’s current PLA Navy leadership to have participated.


22 The Naval Logistics Academy also trained cadets to be navy logistics officers in the past. However, in 2004, it was incorporated into the Naval Logistics Academy. See “Naval Engineering University Overview” (haijun gongcheng daxue gaikuang; 海军工程大学概况), *PLA Daily*, 18 September 2007, [www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/2007ztindexc/2007-09/18/content_955430.htm](http://www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/2007ztindexc/2007-09/18/content_955430.htm).
In addition, the current PLA Navy deputy commander, VADM Su Shiliang, graduated from the Naval Submarine Academy in 1968 with a specialization in torpedo design.

The enlisted force: Enlisted personnel may be promoted into the officer corps, although this is a less common method. We identified only two current navy leaders who were promoted from the enlisted force. Both promotions took place over 40 years ago. RADM Zhou Xinlian, a deputy director in the Jinan Military Region Joint Logistics Department, enlisted in 1969 at the age of 19. The current PLA Navy political commissar, ADM Liu Xiaojiang, entered the PLA ground forces in 1970 as an enlisted soldier in the Railroad Corps.

Transfers from other PLA services: In the U.S. military, officers rarely transfer between services. In the PLA, we identified five navy leaders who began their careers in either the PLA ground forces or the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), and transferred to navy billets at a later date. Within this group, command track officers tended to make the transition to the navy sooner than political officers on average.

Table 2 lists the leaders we identified who began their careers in different services.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officer</th>
<th>Current position</th>
<th>Joined PLA</th>
<th>Original service</th>
<th>Transfer to navy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADM Liu Xiaojiang</td>
<td>Navy political commissar</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Ground forces</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VADM Zhang Yongyi</td>
<td>Navy deputy commander</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Air force</td>
<td>Late 1960s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Gen. Wang Sentai</td>
<td>Navy deputy political commissar</td>
<td>Late 1960s (estimated)</td>
<td>Ground forces</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VADM Wang Dengping</td>
<td>South Sea Fleet political commissar</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Ground forces</td>
<td>Late 1990s/early 2000s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Li Xiaoyan</td>
<td>South Sea Fleet deputy chief of staff</td>
<td>Late 1970s (estimated)</td>
<td>Air force</td>
<td>1987</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


24 Hukou County Communist Youth League, “Pride of Pohu: General Biography of Rear Admiral Zhou Xinlian” (*pohu jiaozi: zhou xinlian jiangjun zhuanlue; 鄱湖骄子：周新廉将军传略*), www.blog.jxcn.cn/u/xunhui1570/223950.html. PLA Navy leadership staffed within China’s military regions are discussed in detail in chapter 4.


26 VADM Zhang Yongyi joined the PLA Air Force in 1966. His first known position is as a naval aviation squadron commander. Because he was in this position in a lower-level unit, he probably transferred to naval aviation from the PLA Air Force relatively early in his career.

27 Lt. General Wang Sentai Most PLA officers of his generation enlisted in their late teens; this suggests that he joined the PLA in the late 1960s.
PLA Navy officer career paths and training opportunities

Many of the current PLA Navy leaders have served in similar billets at similar periods in their careers as they have moved through the Chinese navy promotion system. This section examines similarities in the following characteristics of PLA Navy leaders’ career paths and training opportunities:

- Initial career assignments
- Mid-career training opportunities
- Service experience
- Current opportunities for senior-career education and training
- Retirement regulations to which these officers are currently subject.

The PLA grade system

The PLA uses a 15-point grade system, which is the primary determinant of where an officer stands within the PLA hierarchy.

Grades for the most common navy positions in this study are listed below. A more extensive description of the grades and ranks system is in appendix B.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Position Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grade 3</td>
<td>Navy commander, Navy political commissar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 4</td>
<td>Navy deputy commander, Navy deputy political commissar, Navy chief of staff, Director, Navy Political Department, Fleet commanders, Fleet political commissars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 5</td>
<td>Navy deputy chiefs of staff, Director, Navy Logistics Department, Political commissar, Navy Logistics Department, Director, Navy Equipment Department, Political commissar, Navy Equipment Department, Fleet chief of staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 6</td>
<td>Fleet deputy chief of staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 7</td>
<td>Director, Navy Second-level Departments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

28 RADM Li Xiaoyan Most PLA officers of his generation enlisted in their late teens, which suggests that he joined the PLA in the late 1970s.
Early career — choosing a path: At the initial stages of their careers, most PLA Navy officers are assigned to one of four basic career tracks. 29

- **Military (command) officers (junshi junguan; 军事军官):** responsible for operations, training, and administrative management. Most officers in this study are command officers, and serve as commanders, deputy commanders, chiefs of staff, deputy chiefs of staff, and staff officers at Navy Headquarters and within the fleets.

- **Political officers (zhengzhi junguan; 政治军官):** responsible for establishing and overseeing Party organizations, educating Party members, and handling military public affairs. 31 Political officers in this study include political commissars and directors, deputy directors, and staff officers in PLA Navy political departments.

- **Logistics officers (houqin junguan; 后勤军官):** responsible for unit finances, health systems, transportation assets, and petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL) reserves. Logistics officers in this study serve as directors, deputy directors, and staff officers in logistics departments at Navy Headquarters, in the fleets, and within joint logistics departments (lianqinbu 联勤部) in China’s military regions.

- **Equipment officers (zhuangbei junguan; 装备军官):** responsible for equipment management and support services, including technical support, maintenance, and repair. Within the PLA Navy leadership, equipment officers serve as directors, deputy directors, and staff officers in equipment departments at Navy Headquarters and within the fleets.

As they progress in their career, they are further divided into junior, mid-level, and senior-level officers based on the following criteria: 32

- **Junior (chuji; 初级) officers:** Officers holding a battalion leader grade position (grade 11) or below

- **Mid-level (zhongji; 中级) officers:** Officers holding a regiment, brigade, or division leader grade position (grade 10 - 7)

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29 PLA Navy officers may also be assigned to the specialized technical officers’ career track (zhuanye jishu junguan; 专业技术军官). No officers examined in this study are members of that career track.


• **Senior (gaoji; 高级) officers:** Officers in positions equal to or above a deputy corps leader grade position (grade 6).

Very little is known about the initial assignments of current PLA Navy leaders when they were junior-level officers. Some served as platoon leaders, as squad leaders in naval aviation units, or in staff positions.

For example, PLA Navy Political Commissar ADM Liu Xiaojiang served as a platoon leader. PLA Navy Deputy Commander VADM Zhang Yongyi was a squad leader for a naval aviation squadron early in his career. RADM Zhou Xinliang, the deputy director of the Joint Logistics Department for the Jinan Military Region, served in the Propaganda Office (ke; 科) of the Political Department of the PLA Navy Logistics Department’s branch located in Handan city, Shandong Province. 33

**Opportunities for mid-career training:** After serving in these initial billets, but before being promoted into mid-level officer positions, PLA Navy officers receive additional training at a naval academic institution. The exact institution and duration of the training depends upon the officer’s career track: 34

- Surface warfare officers attend a 10-month tactics command course at the Dalian Naval Vessel Academy.
- Submarine officers attend a 10-month tactics command course at the Naval Submarine Academy.
- Naval aviation officers attend a five-month course at the Naval Aviation Academy.
- Political officers first spend five months studying unit-level political work at the Dalian Naval Vessel Academy, after which they spend an additional two months studying combined arms tactics at the Naval Command Academy in Nanjing.
- Logistics officers first spend five months studying at the Naval Logistics Academy, after which they spend an additional two months studying combined arms tactics at the Naval Command Academy in Nanjing.
- Equipment officers first spend five months studying at the Naval Equipment Academy, after which they spend an additional two months studying combined arms tactics at the Naval Command Academy in Nanjing.
- PLA Navy officers in both the marines and coastal defense forces attend a 10-month course at the Naval Marine Academy.

33 “Pride of Pohu: General Biography of Rear Admiral Zhou Xinlian.”
**Similarities in service experiences:** After rising to mid-level positions, PLA Navy leaders’ careers begin to display the following characteristics.

*Command officers*

As mid-level officers, command track officers typically obtain experience on surface vessels or submarines. For example, of the 15 command officers for whom mid-career information is available, 8 were vessel commanders or deputy commanders. These include officers who served as deputy commanders of destroyers, commanders of frigates, submarine captains, and deputy commanders of naval aviation divisions.

Before reaching senior command positions, command officers typically serve in command positions on naval bases, in naval flotillas (*zhidui*), or within second-level departments at Navy Headquarters. Of the 51 command officers examined here, 13 served as deputy commanders or chiefs of staff on a naval base, before being promoted to a senior-level command position. Another 14 officers commanded a submarine or surface vessel flotilla, or naval aviation unit.

Twelve other officers served at Navy Headquarters at this stage in their careers. However, as shown in table 3, only those who served in the Military Affairs, Military Training, or Operations Departments were promoted on to higher-level command positions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officer</th>
<th>Position at Navy HQ</th>
<th>Current position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RADM Yang Junfei</td>
<td>Director, Training Department, Navy HQ</td>
<td>NSF deputy commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Shen Hao</td>
<td>Director, Operations Department, Navy HQ</td>
<td>ESF deputy chief of staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Xu Jiwen</td>
<td>Director, Military Affairs Department, Navy HQ</td>
<td>Nanjing MR deputy chief of staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Sun Dezhong</td>
<td>Director, Military Affairs Department, Navy HQ</td>
<td>NSF deputy commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Li Shihong</td>
<td>Director, Military Affairs Department, Navy HQ</td>
<td>SSF deputy chief of staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Dong Jun</td>
<td>Director, Military Affairs Department, Navy HQ</td>
<td>NSF deputy chief of staff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A *zhidui* is an organization of vessels at the division leader grade (grade 7) within the PLA Navy. Different Chinese military sources translate the term either as “flotilla,” “detachment,” or “division.” This paper uses the term “division” or “flotilla.” Where the term *zhidui* is used in the Chinese source, *zhidui* will be in parentheses to alert the reader to this issue. For more information on the term *zhidui*, see *China’s Navy 2007* (Washington, DC: Office of Naval Intelligence, March 2007), p. 4. See also Zhang Xusan, ed., *PLA Navy Encyclopedia* (Beijing: Haichao Press, 1997), p. 179.
Upon entering senior-level officer positions, many of the command officers examined here typically served as fleet deputy chiefs of staff. We identified 18 officers within this group who served as deputy chiefs of staff at fleet headquarters.

An additional 9 officers served as commandants or deputy commandants of military academic institutions, including the Naval Command Academy in Nanjing, the Dalian Naval Vessel Academy, and the Naval Marine Academy in Guangzhou. Nine others continued to serve on PLA naval bases, moving up the ranks to be promoted to base commander.

Table 4 shows common experiences for command track officers.

Table 4. Common career experience for PLA Navy command officers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officer level</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Junior-level</td>
<td>Experience serving in platoon, company, and battalion level units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-level</td>
<td>Vessel commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deputy commander or chief of staff of a vessel flotilla (zhidui)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deputy commander or chief of staff of a naval base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Director of lower-level department at PLA Navy Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior-level</td>
<td>Deputy chief of staff at fleet headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commander of a naval base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deputy commandant, commandant at a naval academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fleet deputy commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PLA Navy deputy chief of staff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Political officers

As mid-level officers, many of the political officers examined here have served on naval bases or naval garrisons as political commissars, deputy political commissars, or deputy political department directors. For example, of the 18 political officers examined here, 8 have served in one or more of these positions.

Upon reaching a senior-level officer position, many political officers served as naval base political commissars or in naval military academies in their first senior-level billet. Six of the 18 political officers examined here served as naval base political commissars. Four others served in a naval academic institution.

Later in their careers, many political officers typically move to fleet headquarters to serve as fleet political department directors. Others move to PLA Navy Headquarters to serve as political commissars of the navy Logistics or Equipment Departments, or as deputy directors of the navy’s Political Department.
Table 5 shows common career experiences for political officers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officer level</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Junior level</td>
<td>• Experience serving in platoon-, company-, and battalion-level units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid level</td>
<td>• Political commissar of a brigade or lower-level unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Political commissar of a naval garrison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Political department director of a naval support base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Second-level department director at PLA Navy HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior level</td>
<td>• Political commissar of a naval support base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Political commissar of a PLA Navy academic or research institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Deputy political commissar at PLA Navy Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Fleet political department director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Fleet deputy political commissar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• PLA Navy political department deputy director</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Logistics officers**

One typical career path for mid-level logistics officers is to serve in one of the second-level departments within the PLA Navy Logistics Department or fleet logistics departments.\(^{36}\) Half of the logistics officers examined here (6 of 12) served in the Logistics Department at Navy Headquarters or fleet logistics departments.

For logistics officers, serving as the director of a lower-level department within the PLA Navy Logistics Department may be a stepping stone to further promotions. For example, three of the five deputy directors currently serving at PLA Navy Headquarters, or at a joint logistics department within one of China’s military regions, were promoted from their position as department directors in the PLA Navy Logistics Department.

Table 6 shows the common career experience for logistics officers.

\(^{36}\) Departments within one of the four first-level departments (the Headquarters, Political, Logistics, and Equipment departments) are referred to as second-level departments. See chapter 3 for a list of important second-level departments within the PLA Navy. See appendix D for profiles of these second-level departments.
Table 6. Common career experience for PLA Navy logistics officers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officer level</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Junior level</td>
<td>• Experience serving in platoon-, company-, and battalion-level units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid level</td>
<td>• Director, support base logistics department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Director, lower-level department within the fleet logistics department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Director, lower-level logistics department at PLA Navy Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior level</td>
<td>• Deputy director, PLA Navy Logistics Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Deputy chief of staff, MR joint logistics department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Director, fleet logistics department</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Equipment officers

PLA Navy leaders in the equipment career track typically served on naval support bases, or at PLA Navy Headquarters as mid-career officers. Five of the 10 equipment officers examined in this study served in these two positions as mid-level officers.

Some officers currently serving in senior-level equipment officer billets have significant experience outside the equipment career track. Three of the 10 equipment officers examined here, for example, served as commanders of a naval support base as senior officers, rather than in an equipment career track position. Two current fleet equipment department directors, RADMs Liu Gengchun and Jiang Zhonghua, served as commanders of the Qingdao and Yulin support bases, and only later served as equipment department directors for the North and South Sea fleets, respectively. The current PLA Navy Equipment Department deputy director, RADM Wu Fangchun, was also promoted after having served as commander of the Yulin Support Base.

Table 7 shows common career experiences for equipment officers.

Table 7. Common career experience for PLA Navy equipment officers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officer level</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Junior level</td>
<td>• Experience serving in platoon-, company-, and battalion-level units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid level</td>
<td>• Director of an equipment department, or deputy chief of staff on a naval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>support base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Director of a lower-level department in the fleet headquarters department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Director of a lower-level department in the PLA Navy Equipment Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior level</td>
<td>• Deputy director, PLA Navy Equipment Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Commander, naval support base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Director, fleet equipment department</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PLA Navy officers who have experience as personal secretaries and assistants: Two officers examined in this study have experience serving as personal secretaries (*mishu*; *秘书*), for high-ranking officers. Personal secretaries play an important role in the Chinese political, economic, and military systems. 37 They often act as “gatekeepers,” informal advisors, and policy coordinators, and may even represent their superior officer when that officer is unavailable.

- In the early 1980s, the current navy political commissar, ADM Liu Xiaojiang, served as a personal secretary to the powerful former commander of the navy and CMC vice-chair Liu Huaqing. 38
- South Sea Fleet Political Commissar, VADM Wang Dengping, served as personal secretary to Major General Zhou Keyu, a Communist Party Central Committee member. 39

In addition, two officers are currently serving as assistants to high-ranking officers (*zhuren zhuli*; *主任助理*).

- VADM Cen Xu is currently serving as assistant to the director of the PLA General Political Department, General Zhang Yang. 40
- RADM Han Xiaohu is currently an assistant to the PLA Navy chief of staff, VADM Du Jingchen. 41

Career training for rising senior-level PLA Navy officers

Before being promoted to senior-level positions, naval officers receive additional professional training. While professional military education in mid-level billets tends to be highly specialized, with officers receiving training at specific academies depending upon their career tracks, training at this level tends to converge: officers at the same level of the PLA Navy hierarchy attend the same courses regardless of career track. For example:


• After reaching a position roughly equivalent to an O-5 or O-6 in the U.S. Navy, PLA Navy officers attend a course on naval combined arms command at the Naval Command Academy.⁴² For command officers, the course is 10 months. For political, logistics, and equipment officers, the course lasts five months.⁴³

• PLA Navy officers promoted to a position roughly equivalent to an O-7 in the U.S. Navy return to the Naval Command Academy to take a five-month course on naval campaigns.⁴⁴ This is true of all officers within the four main career tracks.

• At higher levels within the PLA military hierarchy, naval officers attend a 10-month course at National Defense University on joint campaign command.⁴⁵

Retirement regulations

In 2000, the National People’s Congress amended the Regulations of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army on the Military Services of Officers in Active Service, which forms the basis for the PLA’s current system for formal retirement ages.⁴⁶

While enforcement is at times uneven, the PLA Navy leaders examined here are subject to PLA-wide retirement regulations. However, these regulations have been more strictly enforced among the top-level leadership, and relaxed at lower levels of navy leadership.

This general trend of retirement regulations being more strictly upheld at higher-level positions appears to exist for officers in other branches of the PLA as well. For example, we examined 107 PLA commanders and deputy commanders serving since 2005 in all four PLA service branches (the ground forces, navy, air force, and 2nd artillery). Within this group, we found only seven officers remaining in active service past their respective retirement ages.⁴⁷

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⁴² PLA Navy officers at this stage in their career have reached the level of a regiment leader grade (grade 9) position within the Chinese military hierarchy. See Du, Handbook for Officers and Enlisted of the Chinese PLA Navy, pp. 144-153.

⁴³ According to the Handbook for Officers and Enlisted of the Chinese PLA Navy, surface warfare officers, submarine officers, naval aviators, marines, coastal defense forces, and electronics and communications officers each enroll in the 10-month course, while political, logistics, and equipment officers attend a five-month course.

⁴⁴ Officers at this stage in their career have attained roughly a division deputy leader grade (grade 8) position within the Chinese military hierarchy. See Du, Handbook for Officers and Enlisted of the Chinese PLA Navy, pp. 144-153.

⁴⁵ Ibid.


⁴⁷ An additional 11 officers reached their retirement age in 2013. Information on whether these officers have retired is not yet available.
In contrast, at least 12 navy leaders serving as deputy commanders in the fleets, or as deputy chiefs of staff at Navy Headquarters, in the fleets, or in the military regions, were already past the age limit as of 2013.

The law which governs retirement ages does provide opportunities for a “small number” of mid-level officers to delay their retirement, “provided this is necessitated by work and approved by the authorities.” The maximum extension for officers in these positions is three to five years. As shown in table 8, however, we found at least five navy leaders, all serving as deputy directors at Navy Headquarters, fleet deputy commanders, or deputy chiefs of staff, who have exceeded even those maximum retirement age extensions.

Table 8. Chinese navy leadership exceeding retirement extension ages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officer</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Normal retirement age</th>
<th>Extended retirement age</th>
<th>Years over retirement age (extended retirement age)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RADM Geng Guangsheng</td>
<td>Deputy director, PLA Navy Equipment Department</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>9 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Han Linzhi</td>
<td>Deputy chief of staff, Guangzhou Military Region</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>6 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Xiao Xinnian</td>
<td>Deputy chief of staff, PLA Navy</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>6 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Wang Zhiguo</td>
<td>ESF deputy commander</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>7 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Zhang Huachen</td>
<td>ESF deputy commander</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>7 (2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PLA Navy Commander ADM Wu Shengli, who is 68, holds a grade 2 position within the Chinese military hierarchy, and is not subject to these retirement regulations.

Criteria affecting PLA Navy officers’ career success

A final commonality among PLA Navy leaders is that, throughout their career, they have been evaluated based on the following criteria:

48 These positions are roughly equivalent to O-6 to O-9 positions in the U.S. Navy.

• Political competency
• Professional competency
• Professional experiences
• Education and training.

While each of these criteria has influenced the career progression of the officers in this study, the relative importance of each has changed over time. For example:

• Although political competency remains necessary for career success, it is not the sole or primary measure of success that it was during much of the 1960s and early 1970s.

• In 2004, CMC Chairman Hu Jintao outlined a new set of missions for China’s armed forces, which expanded traditional Chinese definitions of security and provided the PLA Navy with new roles and missions. As the navy seeks to carry out these missions, professional competency for PLA Navy officers is seen as increasingly important.

• New roles and missions have also given navy officers opportunities to gain professional experience in ways previously unavailable. For example, over the past few years, the navy has increased its presence in the East and South China Sea. Since 2008, the navy has also conducted escort missions in the Gulf of Aden, increasing China’s presence in the India Ocean region as well. These missions have given navy officers greater opportunities to be deployed at sea.

• When many of the current navy leadership joined the PLA, training opportunities were limited. For example, we identified only six leaders who received military training abroad, all of them in Russia. Today, younger officers are training abroad in ways unavailable to most of the navy leaders. For example, SCAPT Zhang Zheng, the captain of China’s first aircraft carrier and a potential candidate to emerge as a future PLA Navy

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53 Two officers, ESF Commander VADM Su Zhiqian and Guangzhou MR Deputy Chief of Staff RADM Han Linzhi, were trained at the Russian General Staff Military Academy. Three officers, ESF Chief of Staff RADM Yan Yuejin, ESF Deputy Commander RADM Gu Xiangbing, and SSF Deputy Chief of Staff RADM Li Xiaoyan, were trained at the Russian Naval Academy. Senior Captain Li Hanjun, the director of the PLA Navy Military Training Department, attended an unidentified Russian academy.
Differences within the current PLA Navy leadership

Three generations of PLA Navy leadership

Members of the PLA Navy leadership can be divided into three distinct generations. Each generation has a distinct set of characteristics and experiences formulated in the early stages of their professional military careers.  

Key events in the careers of PLA Navy leaders

**Cultural Revolution (1966-1976):** This violent social and political movement was characterized by factional infighting among various political groups. China’s higher education system was largely shut down at this time.

**Sino-U.S. Rapprochement (1972):** President Nixon’s visit to China signaled a shift in China’s relationship with the United States from potential combatant to possible counterweight against the Soviet threat.

**China’s Vietnam War (1979):** China’s invasion of its neighbor to the south, marked by poor performance and high casualties, demonstrated the decline in PLA capabilities.

**Reform and Modernization (1978):** Deng Xiaoping’s return to power marked the beginning of China’s economic reforms, and China’s opening to foreign investment.

**Reestablishing Professional Military Education (PME) (1985):** Shut down during the Cultural Revolution, the PME system began to be revived in the mid to late 1970s. However, it was not fully reestablished until the mid 1980s.

**Establishment of formal retirement ages for PLA officers (2000):** In the mid 1980s, the PLA began instituting formal retirement ages for all active-duty military personnel. The most recent revisions of these regulations were made in the 2000 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Officers in Active Service.

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54 “Zhang Zheng: Captain of China’s First Aircraft Carrier ‘Liaoning’” (zhongguo shousou hangkongmujian ‘Liaoning jian’ jianchang; 中国首艘航空母舰 辽宁舰舰长), China Youth Daily, 10 May 2013, news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-05/10/c_124690301.htm. This trend in PLA officers training abroad is examined in detail in chapter 5.

55 Analysts commonly focus on the ages of 17-25 as particularly formative. This is relevant for navy leaders, since most officers for whom data are available joined the PLA at the ages of 17 or 18—and thus their formative years coincide with the first 8-10 years of their professional military career. On generational analysis within China, see Cheng Li, “China’s Fifth Generation: Is Diversity a Source of Strength or Weakness?” Asia Policy, no. 6 (July 2008), pp. 53-93, and Michael Yahuda, “Political Generations in China,” China Quarterly, no. 80 (December 1979).
Of course, other countries also have multiple generations of leadership serving at the same time. In China, however, generational differences are exacerbated by the extreme changes that have occurred over the past few decades, both in the country and in the PLA Navy. This section examines some of those changes and their impacts on China’s current navy leadership. Table 9 summarizes these events.

Table 9. Events that shaped current PLA Navy leaders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Joined PLA</th>
<th>Key events during officers’ early careers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Generation 1</td>
<td>The World: Growing tensions in Sino-Soviet relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid to late 1960s</td>
<td>China: Nation-wide political factionalism and social violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PLA: Professional Military Education (PME) system shut down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PLA Navy: Focus on coastal defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation 2</td>
<td>The World: Chinese involvement in Southeast Asia; Sino-Vietnam War; U.S.-China relations established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early to mid 1970s</td>
<td>China: Social violence begins to decline; political factionalism continues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PLA: Rudimentary PME system reestablished</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PLA Navy: Early stages of PLA Navy reforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation 3</td>
<td>The World: Relaxation of international tensions; end of the Cold War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late 1970s to early 1980s</td>
<td>China: Start of market based reforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PLA: PME system fully established; focus on military modernization and professionalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PLA Navy: Changes in navy orientation from coastal defense to near seas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Generation 1

We identified 14 navy leaders who joined the PLA in the 1960s. This generation contains the most high-ranking officers of any of the three generations. For example, two of the three top-ranking uniformed naval officers, PLA Navy Commander ADM Wu Shengli and Deputy Chief of the General Staff ADM Sun Jianguo, are members of generation 1. ADM Wu joined the PLA in 1964 at the age of 19, and ADM Sun Jianguo joined the PLA in 1968, at the age of 21.

As navy commander, ADM Wu holds an influential and powerful position. However, he does not make decisions alone. Instead, he participates in collective leadership. The body that leads
China’s navy is known as the Navy Party Standing Committee.\(^{56}\) Seven of the 13 members of this decision-making body belong to generation 1.

In addition to ADM Wu Shengli and ADM Sun Jianguo, generation 1 includes the following:

- Four of the five current PLA Navy deputy commanders (VADM Su Shiliang, VADM Zhang Yongyi, VADM Xu Hongmeng, and VADM Ding Yiping)\(^{57}\)
- Navy Equipment Department Deputy Director RADM Geng Guangsheng
- PLA Navy Deputy Chief of Staff RADM Xiao Xinnian.

As a group, officers’ early military careers shared the following characteristics:

- Their primary task was preparing to defend China against a Soviet invasion or attack.
- They experienced the domestic political and social violence of the Cultural Revolution, which shifted the PLA’s priorities away from technical proficiency and towards political ideology.
- The turmoil of the Cultural Revolution limited these officers’ ability to obtain PME until later in their careers.
- As a service, the PLA Navy at this time was focused on coastal defense — specifically, on countering possible Soviet attacks in the northeast that would be part of a larger land invasion.

**Threat of war:** One factor that likely affected everyone who joined the PLA in the 1960s was the threat of total war with the Soviet Union. Throughout the 1950s, the Soviet Union provided China with modern military equipment, technical assistance, and financial support. With the death of Stalin in March 1953 and the growing radicalization of Chinese politics, Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated throughout the 1960s. This deterioration culminated in open fighting on Damansky Island in the Ussuri River in March 1969.\(^{58}\)

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\(^{56}\) Chapter 3 discusses the Navy Party Standing Committee.

\(^{57}\) Some Chinese Military enthusiast websites report that VADM Liu Yi joined the PLA in 1969, at the age of 14. While this is extremely young, it may be that he was attempting to escape the dangers of the Cultural Revolution by joining the military. See Jun Zheng, “Backgrounds of Deputy Military Region Leaders” (*fudaqu lingdao jianli*; 副大区领导简历), 3 November 2012, [www.360doc.com/content/12/1103/06/0_245418893.shtml](http://www.360doc.com/content/12/1103/06/0_245418893.shtml).

Some officers who joined the PLA in 1968 or 1969 — such as ADM Sun Jianguo, or Deputy Chief of Staff RADM Xiao Xinnian — were serving their first full year in the PLA when China and the Soviet Union entered into armed combat.  

**Cultural Revolution:** Excluding PLA Navy Commander ADM Wu Shengli, who joined the PLA in 1964, all officers within this group began their military careers during the Cultural Revolution. During this time, the PLA was largely de-professionalized. It focused on ideological issues, intensely studying Mao Zedong thought and supporting various political factions, rather than training and military issues.

PLA personnel who spent the early years of their careers at this time were also part of a military more directly involved in maintaining social order than their modern-day counterparts. With the breakdown of Chinese society, PLA troops were called upon to secure important centers of state power and maintain law and order. PLA troops were also tasked by Mao and Mao’s supporters to defend certain political factions and attack others. In many locations the PLA was the only institution providing law and order.

**Lack of access to PME:** By the mid 1960s, the Cultural Revolution had largely shut down China’s professional military education (PME) system. As a result, many PLA Navy leaders in generation 1 were forced to wait until after the system was reestablished in the late 1970s to receive PME. Only three officers in this group were identified as having received PME before or during the Cultural Revolution. Given the social upheaval occurring during the Cultural Revolution, the quality of any PME received in the late 1960s should be viewed with suspicion.

- PLA Navy Commander ADM Wu Shengli received his undergraduate education at the PLA Surveying and Mapping College in Xi’an, Shaanxi Province, in 1964-1968.
- Deputy Commander VADM Su Shiliang reportedly attended Qingdao Naval Academy in 1968.

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59 In addition, current SSF Deputy Chief of Staff Li Xiaoyan is from Changchun city in the northern province of Jilin, which borders Russia. He was eight years old at the time of the crisis. He went on to study at the Kuznetsov Naval Academy in Saint Petersburg, and wrote his thesis in Russian.


62 Center for China Studies, “Profile of Wu Shengli.”

63 “Vice Admiral Su Shiliang, PLAN Chief of Staff,” *Chien Shao*, 1 March 2009.

Others in this age group had to wait until after the Cultural Revolution to obtain professional military education. Deputy Chief of the PLA General Staff Sun Jianguo, for example, waited until 1978 (when he was 26 years old) to attend the Naval Submarine Academy.

**China’s navy as a coastal defense force:** When officers in this group were entering the service in the late 1960s, China’s navy was a coastal force. It consisted largely of small missile craft and a few combat vessels and submarines, and was focused on defending against attacks from the United States and Nationalist forces located on Taiwan. 65

Following Soviet naval theory, China’s navy focused on the “Young School” of naval strategy, which emphasized coastal defense. 66 Influenced by the PLA’s history of guerilla warfare, navy doctrine in that period also focused on conducting “people’s war at sea,” which entailed harassing a larger enemy force with attacks by lighter, faster vessels. Writing during this time period for example described how important it was to “make the best use of the sorghum fields at sea — the reefs, islets, cold, fog, and waves — and bring into full play the tactics and strategy of people’s war.” 67

**Generation 2**

We identified 25 navy officers who joined the PLA in the early 1970s. Many officers identified in this generation are operational-level officers, tasked with carrying out the orders of the navy commander and the Navy Party Standing Committee. They include:

- Navy Political Commissar ADM Liu Xiaojiang
- Navy Deputy Political Commissar VADM Wang Zhaohai
- Fleet commanders VADM Tian Zhong (North Sea Fleet), VADM Su Zhiqian (East Sea Fleet), and VADM Jiang Weilie (South Sea Fleet)
- North Sea Fleet political commissar and chief of staff (RADM Bai Wenqi and RADM Yuan Yubai)
- East Sea Fleet political commissar and chief of staff (RADM Ding Haichun and RADM Yan Yuejin)
- Deputy commanders RADM Yang Junfei (North Sea Fleet) and RADM Qiu Yanpeng (East Sea Fleet).

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Officers in generation 2 began their careers in a coastal navy, but then went on to gain experience commanding many of the navy’s highest-profile blue-water operations. Thus, they are in sharp contrast to PLA Navy leaders in generation 1, many of whom are serving in top-level leadership positions but have had limited opportunities to command blue-water operations.

Most officers in generation 2 currently occupy operational positions within the fleets. However, as generation 1 officers staffed in higher-ranking positions begin to retire, some of the officers in generation 2 may be promoted into these positions, thereby gaining opportunities to influence the future direction of the navy.

As a group, these officers share the following characteristics:

- In their early careers, they experienced a shifting foreign policy environment, most noticeably in the form of improved relations between China and the United States.
- Their early careers coincided with China’s last wartime experience, with Vietnam.
- They all experienced the turmoil of the early Cultural Revolution as children or adolescents, outside the protective confines of the PLA.
- They had more access to PME earlier in their professional careers than officers in generation 1.

**International shifts:** For the first decade of these officers’ careers, China was experiencing a pronounced shift in foreign policy, particularly with regard to U.S. – China relations. With the decline in Sino-Soviet relations and Nixon’s visit to China in 1972, the United States shifted from an enemy to a potential counterweight against the Soviet threat.

None of the navy officers examined had a high enough rank at that time to have played a role in the rapprochement process. While their personal views are unknown, all of them had been subjected to years of state propaganda portraying the United States as a threat. This change in Chinese foreign policy may therefore have been a significant psychological shift for them, as well as for the PLA as an institution.

**War with Vietnam:** In early 1974, during these officers’ early careers, PLA Navy vessels successfully engaged Vietnamese warships, taking control of islands in the Paracel island chain in the South China Sea. Given the short and confined nature of the conflict, it is unlikely that many of the officers examined here participated. The mission’s successful outcome, however, was likely a welcome achievement for the entire PLA, and later served as a positive contrast to its failures in Vietnam.

After aligning with the Soviets, Vietnam invaded Chinese-allied Cambodia in December 1978. In response, the PLA invaded Vietnam in February 1979, capturing three northern Vietnamese
cities. By most assessments, the PLA’s performance in the war was abysmal. It suffered tremendous casualties, and displayed serious limitations in capabilities. We found no evidence that any current navy leaders were involved in combat operations, yet the PLA’s poor performance may have had a demoralizing effect on those who had recently joined the organization.

**Experiencing the Cultural Revolution as civilians:** Officers in generation 2 likely experienced the worst excesses of the Cultural Revolution as young civilians, since many of the most violent events took place in 1967 and 1968, before they joined the PLA. Officers in this generation therefore could have been part of the “sent down youth” movement, which forced roughly 12 million urban youths out of the cities to live and work with Chinese peasants and workers in the countryside between 1968 and 1975.69

**Re-establishment of the PME system:** By 1976, the PLA had begun to re-establish its PME system, focusing on rotational training and unit readiness.70 Officers in this group therefore had access to some form of PME earlier in their careers than officers in generation 1. It is important to note, however, that the PME system at these early stages remained extremely rudimentary. With the threat of conflict with the Soviet Union still a concern, the PLA sought to provide abbreviated training to as many officers as possible, as rapidly as possible. As a consequence, even PLA writing described the system at this time as one of “chaos.”71

**Early stages of China’s naval reforms:** In these officers’ early careers, China’s navy remained focused on coastal defense; however, it had begun developing into a more modern, professional navy. These reforms were motivated partially by China’s changing economic policy, including initiatives to increase economic growth through foreign trade and to safeguard and exploit offshore maritime resources.

Many of the naval reforms of the early 1980s took place under ADM Liu Huaqing, who served as commander of the PLA Navy from 1980 to 1983. During this time, he oversaw improvements to China’s naval bases, and helped establish a system of research and development facilities focused on basic research. Liu also oversaw the development of a process for collecting

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71 Ibid.
information about Western naval strategy and tactics, organizational theory, weapons, weapons
design, and ship building.  

Generation 3

We have identified 10 members of this dataset who joined the PLA Navy in the late 1970s and
early 1980s. Many in this generation are on the lower rungs of PLA Navy leadership. They
include a number of deputy chiefs of staff within the fleets, as well as directors of important
second-level departments at Navy Headquarters. They also include the following:

- East Sea Fleet Deputy Chief of Staff RADM Zhou Xuming
- South Sea Fleet Deputy Chief of Staff RADM Li Xiaoyan
- PLA Navy Headquarters Training Department Director Senior Captain Li Hanjun.

As a group, officers in generation 3 are the most highly educated and technically skilled of the
current PLA Navy leadership. They are the first of these three generations to have begun their
military career with a PME system in place. In addition, because they joined the military during a
time of significant Chinese economic expansion and wealth creation, they were likely the first of
the three generations of current navy leaders for whom joining the military was not their best
professional career choice.

Most officers in generation 3 are engaged in current navy activities at an operational level — for
example, supporting the commander and chief of staff within the fleets. However, as officers in
generation 2 are promoted, officers in generation 3 will move into higher-level operational
positions. Given their young age, they have significant potential to influence the future direction
of the PLA Navy.

As a group, these officers shared the following characteristics in their early military careers:

- They experienced a more peaceful international environment, which allowed the PLA to
  focus on professionalization and modernization.
- They interacted with a society engaged in dramatic economic and social reforms.
- They joined a navy increasingly engaged with the outside world, and focused on
  reforming itself into a service capable of operating farther from China’s shores.

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72 Liu Huaqing, *Memoir of Liu Huaqing* (liu huaqing huiyilu; 刘华清回忆录) (Beijing: PLA Press, 2004); Alfred
D. Wilhelm, Jr., *China and Security in the Asian Pacific Region Through 2010* (Alexandria, VA: The CNA

73 One notable exception to this is the current director of the Navy Logistics Department, RADM Xu Weibing.
RADM Xu joined the PLA in 1978, and is a member of generation 3. However, as the head of Navy Logistics, he
has a seat on the 13-member Navy Party Standing Committee; he is its youngest member.
Improving international environment: By the late 1980s, China’s relations with the United States and Soviet Union had improved considerably. In 1985, Deng Xiaoping provided a strategic reassessment of the current international climate as one of relative peace, in which China could expect at least two decades of international stability. This reassessment allowed the country to focus on economic development, and allowed the PLA to rethink how it approached training, modernization, and national defense. As a result of these changes, officers in generation 3 are the first to have never experienced a PLA planning for imminent war.

Stable but changing China: Officers in generation 3 joined the PLA in a time of relative political stability. Yet they had to come to terms with significant national, social, and economic transformation. Beginning with Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms in 1978, many aspects of the state-run command economy were rapidly dismantled, replaced by an increasingly market oriented economic structure.

PLA Navy leaders joining in the late 1970s and early 1980s were among the first group of new PLA recruits to have had no military experience prior to the start of China’s economic reforms. Thus, they may have had a very different experience from that of previous generations in terms of the PLA’s interactions with China’s civilian economy and society.

Additionally, on June 4, 1989, PLA troops used deadly force to clear Tiananmen Square and other parts of Beijing. For the PLA as an organization, receiving the order to use force against Chinese citizens was a demoralizing experience, and PLA officers at this time likely suffered a significant decline in reputation in the eyes of Chinese society.

More expansive Navy missions: Officers in generation 3 witnessed the emergence of a new strategic concept in naval operations. Beginning in the mid 1980s, this new strategic concept refocused the navy’s efforts on developing a capability to operate farther offshore in China’s near seas, rather than simply as a coastal defense force. More than any preceding group of officers, those in generation 3 were therefore influenced by this emerging shift in the navy’s roles and missions in the early stages of their careers.

Summary

Officers in the current PLA Navy leadership cohort share a number of characteristics. Demographically, they are all men born in the eastern third of the country between 1945 and 1965, and are active duty navy officers. Professionally, they largely entered the navy officer corps through similar channels, and have a core set of shared experiences, specifically in regards to the positions they have held in the intermediate stages of their careers. They are also subject to the same PLA-wide retirement regulations, and have been evaluated throughout their careers based on a core set of criteria (although the relative importance of each criterion has shifted over time).

Once these fundamental similarities have been identified, however, important differences begin to emerge. Specifically, this chapter identified three different generations of PLA Navy leadership serving today. Officers from the navy’s first generation of leaders joined a coastal navy focused on threats from the Soviet Union, and now are serving alongside officers from the second generation who joined the PLA in the early 1970s, and are gaining direct experience with the navy’s new roles. Officers in the navy’s third generation of leaders joined the PLA during the early stages of China’s economic reforms, and joined an increasingly confident navy that has grown more engaged with the international community. In the next two chapters, we continue to analyze smaller groups of the navy leadership. We examine navy leadership within four types of PLA institutions, and the officers serving in those positions.
Chapter 3: PLA Navy leadership at the center

This chapter examines China’s national-level navy leadership positions in the following institutions:

- **The PLA’s four general departments**: These four organizations (the General Staff Department, General Political Department, General Logistics Department, and General Equipment Department) are directly under the command of China’s Central Military Commission (CMC), its highest-level military body. 78

- **PLA Navy Headquarters**: The highest level organization within China’s navy.

**Navy leadership within the PLA General Departments**

Through the four General Departments, the CMC exercises its administrative control and political leadership over the PLA. This includes China’s military regions and the services. 79 Therefore, much of the work of the four General Departments directly affects the navy.

The four General Departments are mirrored within the PLA Navy. For example, the PLA Navy has a headquarters department (associated with the General Staff Department), as well as a political, logistics, and equipment department.

In addition, each of the four General Departments has a number of sub-departments called “second-level departments” (*erjibu*; 二级部). Many of these departments also have counterparts at PLA Navy Headquarters. For example, the Military Affairs Department is a second-level department within the General Staff Department. There is, however, also a Military Affairs Department within the PLA Navy Headquarters Department. 80

The following members of the current PLA Navy leadership cohort are staffed in the four general departments:

- Deputy chief of the General Staff, ADM Sun Jianguo
- Director of the Operations Bureau, SCAPT Ma Luping
- Assistant to the director of the General Political Department, VADM Cen Xun
- Deputy director of the Science and Technology Committee, VADM Liu Zhuoming.


We also highlight an additional eight positions to watch within the PLA General Departments. We have not identified any naval officers currently staffed in these eight positions. However, given their responsibilities, which are described below, they have the potential either to directly influence current navy activities and operations, or to influence the future direction of China’s navy. We have therefore noted these as eight positions to watch, should they be staffed by naval officers in the future.

Table 10 presents a summary of the four positions staffed by PLA Navy leaders, as well as the eight institutions to watch. We examine each of these positions in detail below.
### Table 10. PLA Navy leadership within the four PLA General Departments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Position or institution</th>
<th>Naval officers</th>
<th>Impact on the PLA Navy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| General Staff Department       | Naval officers serving as deputy chief of staff               | ADM Sun Jianguo      | • Only navy officer serving as deputy chief of the General Staff  
• Supports PLA chief of staff in coordinating work of the four General Departments                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
|                                | Director, Naval Operations Bureau                            | SCAPEt Ma Luping     | • Likely plays a role in navy-specific operational planning                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
|                                | Informatization Department                                  | Unknown              | • Likely coordinates with navy Informatization Department on navy command and control issues                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
|                                | Military Training Department                                | Unknown              | • Likely coordinates with Navy Military Training Department  
• Training important component of navy modernization goals                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| General Political Department   | Naval officers serving as assistant to the director          | VADM Cen Xu          | • One of two known GPD assistants  
• Previous naval officers serving in this position later promoted                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
|                                | General Office, Foreign Affairs Bureau                       | Unknown              | • Oversees contact with foreign militaries; possibly handles arrangements for PLA officers traveling abroad                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
|                                | Propaganda Bureau                                            | Unknown              | • May coordinate with navy Propaganda Department to oversee navy publications                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| General Logistics Department   | Finance Department                                          | Unknown              | • Likely coordinates with navy Finance Department regarding the navy’s budget requests                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
|                                | Vessel Transportation Bureau                                | Unknown              | • Responsible for oceanic transport  
• May coordinate with navy Military Transportation and Communications Department                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
|                                | Quartermaster, Materials, and POL Department                 | Unknown              | • Likely works with navy Logistics Department to ensure delivery of supplies and materials                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| General Equipment Department   | Science and Technology Committee                            | VADM Liu Zhuoming    | • Oversees nation’s weapons and equipment development                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
|                                | Navy Equipment Bureau                                        | Unknown              | • Participates in technical appraisal process for domestically produced naval equipment                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
General Staff Department

The General Staff Department (GSD) acts as the headquarters for the PLA ground forces. It is responsible for planning, organizing, and directing military operations, leading the PLA’s modernization program, and providing guidance to units throughout China’s military.81

This section examines positions within the GSD that have roles and missions directly affecting the navy. Figure 5 lists these offices and their locations within the GSD.

Figure 2. Offices within the General Staff Department positioned to significantly influence the PLA Navy82

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81 David Finkelstein, “General Staff Department,” p. 127.
PLA General Staff Department Deputy Chief of Staff

GSD deputy chiefs of staff support the GSD chief of staff in ensuring that the orders of the Central Military Commission are carried out. They also coordinate the work of the four general departments.  

Deputy chief of the general staff is a high-ranking position within the PLA military hierarchy, equal to a Chinese military region commander. Since 2004, two different naval officers have served as a deputy chief of staff in the GSD. ADM Wu Shengli served in this position from 2004 until he became PLA Navy commander in 2006. ADM Sun Jianguo has served as deputy chief of the general staff since 2009.  

The fact that a naval officer has served in this position since 2004, combined with PLA’s continued promotion of “jointness” across the services, suggests that a billet for deputy chief of the general staff is now reserved for a naval officer. Whether or not another naval officer takes ADM Sun’s position on this body when he retires, or if he is promoted or transferred, will shed additional light on this question.  

Both ADM Wu and ADM Sun are command track officers. ADM Wu has spent his career on surface ships, and ADM Sun is a career submariner. Like many command track officers, they both have experience as captains. ADM Wu has served as the captain of a navy frigate and a destroyer, and ADM Sun has served as the captain of both conventional and nuclear submarines.  

General Staff Department, Operations Department, Bureau of Naval Operations (haijun zuozhanju; 海军作战局)

The GSD’s Operations Department, also referred to as the First Department (yibu; 一部), is responsible for developing PLA war planning, and tracking Chinese and foreign military activities. The Bureau of Naval Operations is housed within this department. While little public information is available detailing the specific responsibilities of this bureau, the bureau’s name and its location within the GSD Operations Department suggest that it may play a role in navy-specific operational planning.

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85 See chapter 2 for an examination of the career experiences of PLA Navy command track officers.
86 Ni Eryan, “New Round of Adjustment of PLA Senior Generals” (jiefangjun xinyilun gaoji jiangling tiaozheng; 解放军新一论高级将领调整), Wen Wei Po, 6 February 2009.
87 Finkelstein, “General Staff Department,” p. 144.
Since 2008, the director of this bureau has been Senior Captain Ma Luping. On 23 December 2008, he participated in a Defense Ministry briefing to answer questions on the navy’s new escort operations in the Gulf of Aden. 88

Given its name and previous activities related to the navy’s Gulf of Aden operations, it is likely that the position of director of the GSD Bureau of Naval Operations is reserved for a uniformed navy officer. This cannot be confirmed, however, until other naval officers in this position have been identified.

General Staff Department, Informatization Department (xinxihuabu 信息化部)

Established in the summer of 2011, the GSD Informatization Department was formed as part of the restructuring of the GSD Communications Department (tongxinbu; 通信部). 89 The original Communications Department was responsible for the PLA’s Command and Control System, and the creation of the Informatization Department reflects the PLA’s growing focus on fighting wars under “informatized conditions” – the PLA’s phrase used to describe the application of information technology to command and control. 90

Naval officers have served in this department in the past. For example, the current navy deputy chief of staff, RADM Zhang Jianchang, served in the GSD Informatization Department as a deputy director until he became a navy deputy chief of staff in late 2012. 91 However, we were unable to identify any naval officers currently serving in leadership positions in the GSD Informatization Department.

Given the limited data available, it is unclear whether a deputy director position on the Informatization Department is specifically reserved for a naval officer. However, it is clear that issues of command and control are important to the navy, as it continues to pursue more complex and sophisticated missions, including blue-water operations, joint operations, and combined military exercise with foreign navies. This growing importance of informatization to the navy’s


89 Zhang Yanzhong, “Ratified by Chairman Hu and the Central Military Commission, the Communications Department of the PLA General Staff Department Has Been Reorganized into the Informatization Department of the PLA General Staff Department” (zongcanmoubu tongxinbu gaibianwei zongcanmoubu xinxihuabu; 总参谋部通信部改编为总参谋部信息化部), PLA Daily, 1 July 2011.


activities suggests that naval officers may be staffed in the Informatization Department again in
the future.

General Staff Department, Military Training Department (xunlianbu; 军训部)

In 2011, the GSD Military Training and Service Arms Department (junxun he bingzhongbu; 军训和兵种部) was reformed and reorganized into the Military Training Department.  This new department has been described by unnamed department officials as being responsible for the “strategic management of military training within the entire armed forces,” including all the services. Training, particularly training in blue water, has become an important component of the navy’s overall modernization goals. China’s most recent defense white paper, for example, notes that the PLA Navy is “intensifying blue-water training” and “improving the training mode of task force formation in blue-water.” Limited public information is available, however, regarding specifically how the GSD Training Department oversees navy training plans and activities, or whether there is a component of this department whose portfolio covers naval training issues specifically.

General Political Department

The General Political Department manages the relationship between the CCP and the PLA, and ensures that the CCP remains in control of the armed forces.

One way the CCP retains this control is through political work, which includes conducting political training and indoctrination, overseeing personnel issues, managing civil-military relations, and overseeing and controlling the military’s foreign engagements. Political work therefore remains a critical component of the Party’s relationship with the PLA.

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92 Liu Fengan and Wu Xu, “General Staff Training and Service Arms Department Reorganized into General Staff Training Department” (zongcan junxun he bingzhongbu gaibian wei zongcan junxunbu; 总参军训和兵种部改编为总参军训部), PLA Daily, 22 December 2011, www.military.people.com.cn/GB/172467/16678424.html.


Figure 3 depicts the offices (and their locations within the GPD) that are positioned to significantly influence either current or future navy activities.

Figure 3. Offices within the General Political Department positioned to significantly influence the PLA Navy

Naval officer(s) serving as assistant to the director of the General Political Department

VADM Cen Xu is currently serving as assistant to the director of the General Political Department. He was transferred from his previous position as PLA Navy deputy political commissar in early 2013.  

Other navy officers have served in this position, although it does not appear to be a permanent billet reserved for navy officers. From 2005-2007 for example, VADM (ret.) Tong Shiping served as assistant to the GPD director before being promoted to deputy director of the GPD. However, we could find no other examples of PLA Navy officers serving in this position, either before 2005, or between the time of VADM (ret.) Tong’s promotion and 2013, when VADM Cen assumed the position.

95 Chart based on Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military, pp. 135-143.
96 Publicly available sources indicate that the directors of the PLA General Staff, Political, Logistics, and Equipment departments each have an unknown number of “assistants to the director” positions (zhuren zhuli: 主任助理). We have identified two current assistants to the PLA chief of the General Staff (the director of the General Staff Department), and two assistants to the director of the PLA General Political Department. The directors of both the General Logistics Department and the General Equipment Department have previously had assistants, although it is unclear who if anyone is currently serving in these positions.
97 “Navy Deputy Political Commissar VADM Cen Xu Has Become GPD Assistant to the Director.”
98 Other naval officers have served as assistants to the directors of other general departments, and have also gone on to be promoted to higher-level positions. For example, ADM Sun Jianguo served as an assistant to the chief of the General Staff in 2006, and was promoted to deputy director of the General Staff Department.
Both VADM Cen Xu and VADM (ret.) Tong are political career track officers, and both have served as fleet political commissars. VADM (ret.) Tong for example served as the political commissar of the South Sea Fleet from 2000 to 2003, while VADM Xu served as political commissar of the East Sea Fleet from 2008 to 2012.

General Political Department, General Office, Foreign Affairs Bureau (bangongting de waishiju; 办公厅的外事局)

The Foreign Affairs Bureau within the General Political Department oversees contact between the PLA and foreign military personnel. PLA organizations that have contact with foreign military often have a foreign affairs bureau which oversees these interactions. The Foreign Affairs Bureau within the General Political Department therefore likely coordinates the foreign affairs activities of these lower-level foreign affairs offices. As China’s navy continues to increase the number and scope of its foreign engagements, this organization may play a role in those activities in conjunction with the Foreign Affairs Office at PLA Navy Headquarters.

General Political Department, Propaganda Department (xuanchuanbu; 宣传部)

The GPD Propaganda Department oversees the implementation of ideological education within the PLA, including educating PLA personnel on the Party line, Party guidelines, and Party policies.

This department also oversees the PLA publishing system, including navy publications. For example, the GPD Propaganda Department provides guidance to the various PLA-affiliated publishing houses, which would likely include the navy’s Haichao Press. The GPD Propaganda Department also trains the directors and editors of PLA newspapers and periodicals, such as People’s Navy, the navy’s official newspaper.

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99 Career experiences of PLA Navy political career track officers are examined in detail in chapter 2.

100 Center for China Studies, “Profile of Tong Shiping,” National Taiwan Chengchi University, http://ics.nccu.edu.tw/chinaleaders/profile.php?id=5896.


102 Finkelstein, “General Staff Department,” p. 238.

103 Lieberthal, Governing China, pp. 186-189.


Institutions to watch within the General Logistics Department

The General Logistics Department (GLD) is the lead organization for PLA logistics, and is responsible for organizing, overseeing and managing logistics work throughout China’s armed forces.\(^{106}\)

Key leadership positions within the GLD remain dominated by ground force officers. We did not identify any PLA Navy officers serving in key GLD leadership positions.

Given the role that the GLD plays in overseeing logistics support throughout the PLA, however, we identified three institutions within the GLD that have the capacity to affect either current navy activities and operations, or the future direction of the navy. Given the increasingly important role of logistics in the navy’s new roles and missions, these positions should be watched, should navy officers staff them in the future. Figure 4 depicts those institutions and their locations within the GLD. Each of these institutions is examined below.

**Figure 4. Offices within the General Logistics Department positioned to significantly influence the PLA Navy**\(^{107}\)

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Finance Department (caiwubu; 财务部)

The GLD’s Finance Department is the PLA’s main organ responsible for the Chinese military’s medium-term and long-term financial budgets and expenditure plans. In this role, the GLD’s Finance Department likely coordinates with the PLA Navy’s Finance Department in budget requests.

Military Transportation and Communications, Vessel Transportation Bureau (junshi jiaotong yunshubu de jianchuanju; 军事交通运输部的舰船局)

The Vessel Transportation Bureau in the Military Transportation and Communications Department of the GLD is responsible for oceanic transport. We have found little information about the specific activities of this bureau. However, given its responsibilities in maritime transportation, it likely provides guidance and coordinates its activities with the Military Transportation and Communications Department within PLA Navy Headquarters.

Quartermaster, Materials, and POL Department (junxu wuzi youliaobu; 军需物资油料部)

The GLD Quartermaster, Materials, and POL Department is the head of the PLA’s system for provisioning and POL support for the entire PLA. In this capacity, the department likely works with the corresponding PLA Navy Logistics Department to ensure that the navy receives the necessary supplies and materials required for its ships and sailors. As the navy continues to conduct a growing number of blue-water operations, public statements by PLA Navy officers suggest that ensuring proper provisioning on these missions has become increasingly important.

This department also likely works with the PLA Navy’s corresponding department to ensure that it receives POL support from Chinese oil refineries, which deliver to navy POL depots.

General Equipment Department

The General Equipment Department (GED), also referred to as the General Armament Department, oversees the nation’s weapons and equipment maintenance and development. It operates many of the PLA testing and training bases and satellite launch centers. Figure 5 depicts

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109 Ibid., vol. 7, p. 64.
110 Ibid., vol. 4, pp. 30-36.
111 Yao Jiang, Lu Wenjie, and Lu Wenqiang, “Lifting Warships Rush into the Sea” (tuoju zhanjian chuang dahai; 托举战舰闯大海), People’s Navy, 3 July 2012.
the offices (and their locations within the GED) that are positioned to significantly influence either current naval activities and operations or the future direction of China’s navy.

Figure 5. Offices within the General Equipment Department positioned to significantly influence the PLA Navy

Naval officer(s) serving as deputy directors, Science and Technology Committee (kexue jishu weiyuanhui; 科学技术委员会)

Previous research by U.S.-based analysts suggests the GED’s Science and Technology Committee provides policy support to the PLA on issues of military modernization, defense procurement, and export control. The committee may also coordinate activities among the CMC, lower-level military units, and the defense industry.

The Science and Technology Committee is one of the highest ranking organizations within the GED. It is the only institution within the GED known to be directed by a full general (General Li

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113 Harlen Jencks, “The General Armaments Department,” in Mulvenon and Yang, eds., The People’s Liberation Army as Organization, p. 304.

114 Keith Crane et al., Modernizing China’s Military: Opportunities and Constraints (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 2005), p. 163.

Andong), who serves concurrently as a GED deputy director. Other institutions within the GED are commonly led by major generals or senior colonels. 116

Given the portfolio of the GED Science and Technology Commission, and its prominent position in the General Equipment Department, it is likely that this commission helps coordinate the navy’s research and development process, and therefore has the potential to impact the future direction of the navy’s weapons and equipment development. However, institutions at PLA Navy Headquarters also play a key role within the Chinese naval research and development process, and these institutions are profiled below.

The importance of the GED Science and Technology Committee to the navy is also suggested by the presence of VADM Liu Zhuoming, who, as of 2011, was the lone uniformed naval officer on the commission. 117 Liu is the son of former PLA Navy Commander ADM Liu Huaqing, a strong advocate of China’s carrier program. 118

The navy does not appear to have a permanent deputy director billet on the GED Science and Technology Commission, as VADM Liu is the only naval officer we were able to identify who has served as a deputy director. 119 The only other naval officer known to have served on this body is RADM (ret.) Zheng Ming, who served as an advisor to the commission in the early 2000s. 120 RADM (ret.) Zheng was a contemporary of ADM Liu Huaqing, and former director of the PLA Navy Equipment Department while ADM Liu Huaqing was navy commander. 121

Navy Equipment Bureau within the Services and Branches Equipment Department (junbingzhong zhuangbeibu de haijun zhuangbeiju; 军兵种装备部的海军装备局)

The Navy Equipment Bureau is located within the Services and Branches Equipment Department of the PLA General Equipment Department. Official Chinese sources suggest that one of its functions is to participate in the technical appraisal process for domestically produced naval equipment, and to provide follow-up recommendations on naval production programs, as part of a multi-organizational committee.

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117 Chin Chien-li, “The CPC’s Key Figure in Conflict With Taiwan” (zhonggong duitai zuozhan zhongxing renwu; 中国对台作战中坚人物), Chien Shao, 1 March 2007.

118 Ibid.

119 In addition to serving as PLA Navy commander and vice-chair of the CMC, Liu Zhuoming’s father, Liu Huaqing, served as vice minister of the Commission for Science, Technology, and Industry for the National Defense (COSTIND), an organization that has played a role in military research and development, as well as military weapons and equipment procurement decisions. See Keith Crane et al., Modernizing China’s Military, pp. 160-167; China’s Navy 2007, p. 13.

120 Liu Huaqing, Memoir of Liu Huaqing.

121 Ibid.
This bureau, for example, has participated in the technical appraisal process for a ship gas
turbine engine developed for the navy. It did so in cooperation with the Equipment Department
at Navy Headquarters, and relevant defense group companies. 122

**Leadership positions at PLA Navy Headquarters**

The highest decision-making organs within the Chinese navy are at PLA Navy Headquarters,
located in Beijing. These organs are chiefly responsible for the navy’s operational command,
training, communications, and military affairs. 123

**The importance of the Communist Party to PLA Navy leadership**

Within Navy Headquarters, the most important decision-making institution is the Navy’s Party
Standing Committee. All major decisions at Navy Headquarters go through this Standing
Committee, which discusses them and determines how they should be implemented. 124

Normally, the navy political commissar serves as the Standing Committee secretary, the leading
position within this institution, while the navy commander serves as the deputy secretary.
Members are the commander and political commissar, their deputies, and the directors of the
four navy first-level departments (the navy chief of staff, and the navy Political, Logistics and
Equipment departments).

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Members of the PLA Navy Standing Committee are listed in table 11.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Generation</th>
<th>Birth year and province</th>
<th>Area of expertise</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADM Liu Xiaojiang (navy party secretary)</td>
<td>Navy political commissar</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1949, Jiangxi</td>
<td>Party affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADM Wu Shengli (navy deputy Secretary)</td>
<td>Navy commander</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1945, Hebei</td>
<td>Surface vessels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VADM Zhang Yongyi</td>
<td>Navy deputy commander</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1950, Liaoning</td>
<td>Naval aviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VADM Ding Yiping</td>
<td>Navy deputy commander</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1951, Hunan</td>
<td>Surface vessels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VADM Su Shiliang</td>
<td>Navy deputy commander</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1950, Shandong</td>
<td>Surface vessels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VADM Liu Yi</td>
<td>Navy deputy commander</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;125&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1955, Shandong</td>
<td>Submarines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VADM Xu Hongmeng</td>
<td>Navy deputy commander</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;126&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1952, Liaoning</td>
<td>Submarines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VADM Wang Zhaohai</td>
<td>Navy deputy political commissar</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1950, Jiangsu</td>
<td>Propaganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT GEN Wang Sentai</td>
<td>Navy deputy political commissar</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;127&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1951, Zhejiang</td>
<td>Propaganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VADM Du Jingchen</td>
<td>Navy chief of staff</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1952, Shandong</td>
<td>Surface vessels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VADM Ma Faxiang</td>
<td>Director, navy Political Department</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Weapons development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Xu Weibing</td>
<td>Director, navy Logistics Department</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1961, Jiangsu</td>
<td>Naval aviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Hu Yuhao</td>
<td>Director, navy Equipment Department</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Engineering</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>125</sup> Some Chinese military enthusiast websites assert that VADM Liu Yi joined the PLA in 1969, at the age of 14. See Jun Zheng, “Backgrounds of Deputy Military Region Leaders” (fudaqu lingdao jianli; 副大区领导简历), 3 November 2012, www.360doc.com/content/12/1103/06/0_245418893.shtml.

<sup>126</sup> The date VADM Xu Hongmeng joined the PLA is unknown. However, he To be a member of generation 2, he would have had to join the PLA after the age of 18.

<sup>127</sup> The date Lt. Gen Wang Sentai joined the PLA is unknown. However, he To be a member of generation 2, he would have had to join the PLA after the age of 18.
Shared characteristics of the Navy Party Standing Committee

Members of the PLA Navy Standing Committee have the following characteristics:

**Most are officers who spent the early years of their career in a navy dramatically different from the one they lead today:** Six members of the Navy Standing Committee are members of generation 1, having joined the PLA in the mid to late 1960s. These officers began their careers in an ideologically oriented PLA and a PLA navy focused on coastal defense. Four others joined the PLA in the early 1970s. Only Navy Logistics Director RADM Xu Weibing, who joined the PLA in 1978 and is the youngest member of the Navy Standing Committee, is a member of Generation 3.

**Although dominated by older generations of officers, all have had a wide array of experiences:** This wide variation is illustrated in the vastly different experiences of officers who are currently serving on the committee at the same time. For example, the oldest member of the Committee, ADM Wu Shengli, was 21 years old during in 1966, when he was attending the Surveying and Mapping College of the People’s Liberation Army. At this time, the youngest member of the Standing Committee, RADM Xu Weibing, was five years old. When RADM Xu had reached his early 20s, he was studying advanced flight technology as a young naval aviator in the early years of China’s economic reforms.

**Most are command officers, rather than political, logistics, or equipment officers:** As described in chapter two, PLA officers are divided into four basic career tracks; military (command), political, logistics, and equipment. Seven of the 13 Standing Committee members are command track officers, and have served on surface vessels, on submarines, or as naval aviation pilots. Four of the 13 members are political officers, one is a logistics officer, and one is an equipment officer.

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128 Center for China Studies, “Profile of Wu Shengli.”


130 As the director of the Equipment Department, RADM Xu Weibing is an officer in the equipment career track, despite his previous naval aviation experience.
Table 12 below lists the number of Navy Standing Committee members by officer type.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Career track positions on the Navy Standing Committee</th>
<th>No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Navy Standing Committee could experience significant personnel transition in the near term: According to current PLA retirement regulations, most Navy Standing Committee members (9 of 13) are expected to retire at the age of 63. PLA Navy Logistics and Equipment Department Directors, RADM Xu Weibing and RADM Hu Yuhao, hold Grade 5 positions, and are expected to retire at age 55. Navy Political Commissar ADM Liu Xiaojiang’s formal retirement age is 65. If these retirement regulations are followed, seven officers currently serving on the Navy Standing Committee must be promoted by 2014 to remain on active duty. However, there are more officers seeking promotion than positions available, creating space for new membership.

PLA military academies may serve as stepping stones for navy leaders, as over half of all Navy Standing Committee members have held positions in military academies: Seven of the 13 Navy Standing Committee members have served in PLA and PLA Navy military academies. For example, four have served as commandants of PLA Navy academies, including the Dalian Naval Vessel Academy (ADM Wu Shengli), the Naval Flight Academy (VADM Zhang Yongyi), the Naval Marine Academy in Guangzhou (VADM Ding Yiping), and the Naval Command Academy in Nanjing (VADM Su Shiliang). Deputy Political Commissars VADM Wang

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131 *Law of the People’s Republic of China on Officers in Active Service*. These retirement ages are based upon officers’ grades. Nine of the 13 navy Party Standing Committee members hold a grade 4 position, which is roughly equivalent to an O-8 or O-9 position within the U.S. Navy. See appendix B for a list of all PLA grades and ranks.

132 According to PLA regulations, VADMs Zhang Yongyi, Su Shiliang, and Wang Zhaohai will reach their retirement age in 2013. ADM Liu Xiaojiang, VADMs Ding Yiping and Xu Hongmeng, and Lt. Gen. Wang Sentai will reach their retirement age in 2014.

Zhaohai and VADM Wang Sentai both held leading positions at the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences.\(^{134}\)

This section examines key positions in Navy Headquarters and the officers in those positions.

**PLA Navy commander**

The PLA Navy commander is the highest-ranking officer within China’s navy, and is the navy’s representative on the Central Military Commission (CMC), a grade 2 position roughly equivalent to an O-10 position within the U.S. Navy.\(^{135}\) As navy commander and a member of the PLA CMC, he has the following responsibilities:

- Direct the operational tasking of the navy in accordance with national security objectives as established by the Party and the CMC.\(^{136}\)
- Oversee the development of navy strategy, operations and tactics.\(^{137}\)
- Provide guidance on China’s overall military strategy as one of 11 CMC members.

**PLA Navy political commissar**

The PLA Navy political commissar is responsible for overseeing all political work within the navy, including the daily work of the Navy Party Committee and the navy’s Discipline Inspection Commission. The latter is the Party organ within the navy that is tasked with maintaining Party discipline, and guarding against corruption among the navy’s Party members.\(^{138}\)

**Command relationship between the navy commander and political commissar**

The navy commander and political commissar have historically served as co-equals. Both are grade 3 positions, equivalent to a military region commander in the PLA or roughly equivalent to an O-9 position within the U.S. Navy. Since 2006, when the navy commander was given a seat on the CMC, PLA Navy Commander ADM Wu Shengli has served as a CMC member, a grade 2


\(^{135}\) See appendix B for a complete description of PLA grades and ranks.


\(^{137}\) For example, according to the PLAN Encyclopedia, the director of the Naval Military Studies Research Institute (haijun junshi xueshu yanjiusuo; 海军军事学术研究所), an important research center for the study of navy operational war-fighting concepts and tactics, reports directly to the PLA Navy commander.

position within the PLA military hierarchy. There is no evidence, however, that the grade status of the navy political commissar has been elevated as well.

ADM Liu remains the chair of the Navy Party Standing committee, which provides him with significant influence on navy decision-making, and may serve to balance this difference in grade between him and ADM Wu, thus keeping the traditional relationship of co-equal commanders.\(^{139}\)

**Navy deputy commanders and deputy political commissars**

Directly below the commander and political commissar in the Chinese naval hierarchy are the navy’s deputy commanders and deputy political commissars. The PLA Navy currently has five deputy commanders and two deputy political commissars. They are listed in table 13.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Birthplace</th>
<th>Birthdate</th>
<th>Year of appointment to current position</th>
<th>Fleet experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VADM Zhang Yongyi</td>
<td>PLA Navy deputy commander</td>
<td>Liaoning</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>NSF, SSF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VADM Ding Yiping</td>
<td>PLA Navy deputy commander</td>
<td>Hunan</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>NSF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VADM Xu Hongmeng</td>
<td>PLA Navy deputy commander</td>
<td>Liaoning</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>ESF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VADM Su Shiliang</td>
<td>PLA Navy deputy commander</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>NSF, SSF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VADM Liu Yi</td>
<td>PLA Navy deputy commander</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>NSF, ESF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VADM Wang Zhaohai</td>
<td>PLA Navy deputy political commissar</td>
<td>Jiangsu</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>NSF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As members of the Navy Party Standing Committee, each has a voice in the major leadership decisions that go through this Party institution.

In addition, each deputy commander has a broad portfolio of responsibilities.\(^{140}\) While the exact delineation of each portfolio is not publically known, an examination of deputy commanders’

past career experiences, professional specialties, and published writings does suggest that they have certain responsibilities as part of their portfolios.

For example, Deputy Commander VADM Zhang Yongyi has responsibility for the flight test and training program for China’s aircraft carrier, Liaoning.\(^{141}\) He was also chief editor of the 2006 *Science of Navy Training*, a volume produced in a major research project during the 10th Five Year Plan (2001-2005).\(^{142}\) The volume was produced under the guidance of the navy’s Training Department and the Training and Service Arms Department of the General Staff Department.\(^{143}\) The fact that VADM Zhang was the lead editor on this important training volume may suggest that training issues are also part of his portfolio. PLA Navy Deputy Commander VADM Ding Yiping was also involved in the creation of *Science of Naval Training*, described above, as a deputy editor.\(^{144}\)

Shared characteristics of navy deputy commanders and deputy political commissars

Many of the officers currently serving in these positions have similar attributes, which may influence the manner in which they conduct their work:

**Most navy deputy commanders and deputy political commissars are members of generation 1, having joined the PLA in the mid to late 1960s.** Only the youngest navy deputy commander, VADM Liu Yi, and navy Deputy Political Commissar Wang Zhaohai, joined the PLA in the 1970s. The remaining five officers all joined the PLA in the 1960s.

**Five of the seven current navy deputy commanders and deputy political commissars served in the North Sea Fleet:** Most fleet deputy commanders and deputy political commissars have a shared experience of serving in the North Sea Fleet. Both VADM Ding and VADM Su have served as North Sea Fleet commander. VADM Zhang Yongyi served as the head of North Sea Fleet naval aviation, and VADM Liu Yi was formerly commander of the Laoshan Submarine Base in Qingdao. Deputy Political Commissar VADM Wang Zhaohai began his career as an administrative clerk in the NSF.

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\(^{140}\) *China’s Navy 2007*, p. 15.


\(^{144}\) Zhang (ed.), *Science of Navy Training*.

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The positions of navy deputy commander and deputy political commissar may experience significant personnel turnover in the next few years: Six of the seven deputy commanders and deputy political commissars will reach their official retirement age in 2013 or 2014, meaning that they must be promoted in order to remain on active duty.

Two navy deputy commanders, VADM Zhang Yongyi and VADM Su Shiliang, as well as navy Deputy Political Commissar VADM Wang Zhaohai, are scheduled to retire in 2013. Two other deputy commanders, VADM Ding Yiping and VADM Xu Hongmeng, as well as navy Deputy Political Commissar Lt. Gen. Wang Sentai, are scheduled to either be promoted or retire in 2014.

With limited naval experience, Deputy Political Commissar Lt. Gen. Wang Sentai is an outlier within this cohort: In contrast to the rest of his colleagues, who all have served in the navy for at least a decade, Lt. Gen. Wang Sentai was transferred to his current position at the end of 2012. He has no known naval experience, having previously served in the General Political Department, the Academy of Military Sciences, and the PLA’s film and television company. This recent personnel transition suggests non-naval officers can still be assigned to high-ranking naval positions, even in an era when the PLA Navy continues to professionalize its officer corps.

Department leaders at Navy Headquarters

PLA Navy Headquarters is divided into four departments, which mirror the structure of the four General Departments described in the first section of this chapter.

They are listed in protocol order below:

- The Headquarters Department
- The Political Department
- The Logistics Department
- The Equipment Department.

The navy’s four departments handle everything from personnel management, training, and operations, to barracks and food supplies. They also give guidance to subordinate units in support bases, flotillas (zhidui), and vessels.

The directors of the Navy Headquarters Department and Navy Political Department are grade 4 positions, the same grade as a deputy commander of a military region. The directors of the PLA Navy Logistics Department and PLA Navy Equipment Department are grade 5 positions, the same grade as a PLA Navy deputy chief of staff. The directors of all four first-level

145 Gao (ed.), *Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy*, p. 85.
departments are members of the PLA Navy Standing Committee. The directors and political commissars of the four first-level departments are shown in table 14.

Table 14. Leadership of the PLA Navy’s four first-level departments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Year of appointment</th>
<th>Fleet experience</th>
<th>Area of expertise</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VADM Du Jingchen</td>
<td>Navy chief of staff</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>NSF, SSF</td>
<td>Surface vessels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VADM Ma Faxiang</td>
<td>Director, PLA Navy Political Department</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>NSF</td>
<td>Weapons development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Xu Weibing</td>
<td>Director, PLA Navy Logistics Department</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>NSF, ESF</td>
<td>Naval aviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Kang Fei</td>
<td>Political commissar, PLA Navy Logistics Department</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Hu Yuhao</td>
<td>Director, PLA Navy Equipment Department</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Wang Jianxin</td>
<td>Political commissar, PLA Navy Equipment Department</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>NSF</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To better understand the roles of the leadership in the four first-level departments, we will examine each department, including the following:

- **Function.** What is each department officially responsible for and how does it contribute to the navy?

- **Second-level departments.** What are the important second-level departments, and how might they affect current or future navy operations?

- **Leadership.** What do we know about the background and professional history of the personnel serving in key leadership positions in each department?

The Headquarters Department

The Headquarters Department is the central military command organization at PLA Navy Headquarters in Beijing. It is the navy’s highest command organization, and is responsible for operational preparation and force readiness, military training, administrative management of the navy, and organizing the navy’s military scientific research.148

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These duties encompass specific responsibilities, such as:\footnote{This list is derived from Chen, Command Headquarters Work, pp. 63-64.}

- Receiving and passing operational instructions from the General Staff Department to lower-level navy units
- Gathering, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence information to naval units
- Organizing and testing the navy’s routine combat and operations readiness
- Organizing military training routines
- Improving the navy’s legal system
- Establishing mobilization and national defense plans, including operations documents
- Coordinating the research efforts of the PLA Navy’s research institutions
- Organizing the PLA Navy’s foreign trips in accordance with the PLA’s program for foreign exchanges and the foreign affairs requirements of the navy.

The current navy chief of staff is VADM Du Jingchen. VADM Du is supported by seven deputy chiefs of staff, listed in table 15.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Birth year and province</th>
<th>Year appointed</th>
<th>Retirement age and year reached</th>
<th>Fleet experience</th>
<th>Blue-water experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RADM Leng Zhenqing</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>55 (Unknown)</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2010 Zhenghe expedition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Duan Zhaoxian</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>44 (Unknown)</td>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>Executive director, joint China-Russian naval exercise 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Song Xue</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>55 (Unknown)</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Zhang Jianchang</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>55 (Unknown)</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Important characteristics of current navy deputy chiefs of staff

Many navy deputy chiefs of staff have blue-water operational experience: Unlike members of the navy Standing Committee, four of seven navy deputy chiefs of staff have blue-water operational experience. For example, VADM Liao Shining was commander of an expedition which circumnavigated the globe on the training ship Zhenghe. RADM Leng Zhenqing commanded an expedition on the Zhenghe in 2010, visiting countries in the South Pacific.

Some navy deputy chiefs of staff have served in important positions at GSD: Both VADM Liao Shining and RADM Zhang Jianchang have served within the General Staff Department. VADM Liao has served as the director of the campaign training bureau, an important third-level organ within the General Staff Department’s Operations Department, which is involved in the creation of PLA-wide operational training requirements. RADM Zhang became navy deputy chief of staff after serving as the deputy director of the GSD’s Informatization Department.

Key lower-level departments and bureaus within Navy Headquarters

Many of the departments within the Navy Headquarters Department mirror those found in the General Staff Department (GSD). For example, like the GSD, Navy Headquarters maintains second-level operations, intelligence, and informatization departments.

All the institutions at Navy Headquarters play a role in the navy’s overall operations. The available information on the roles and responsibilities of some of the departments and bureaus, however, suggests that they have the potential to significantly impact current PLA Navy activities and operations or the future direction of China’s navy.

Table 16 summarizes the roles of these 10 offices and their impact on the navy. A biographical profile of the naval officers identified as directors of these departments is in appendix A. Each of these organizations is described in detail in appendix D.

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150 The Chinese term “blue-water” is yuanhai (远海), which has also been translated as “distant seas” or “open oceans.” This term is used to describe missions requiring long-distance movement of PLA Navy vessels from Chinese bases. See for example, Lu Xue, “Views on Improving the Armed Forces’ Ability to Execute the Historic Missions,” Military Science (Junshi Kexue; 军事科学), no. 5 (2007), p. 107.


152 Ma Haoliang, “High-Ranking Officer Adjustments in the Navy with a Focus on Having a Technologically Strong Military” (haijun jiangling tiaozheng tuoxian keji qiangjun; 海军将领调整 凸显科技强军), Ta Kung Pao, 9 February 2011; “PLA Exercise Makes Pincer Attack on Taiwan; Two Major Fleets Sent; ‘Chance Encounter’ with Kitty Hawk” (jiefangjun yanxi jiaji Taiwan liang da jiandui chudong ‘qiaoyu’ ‘xiaoyinghao; 解放军演习夹击台湾两大舰队出动‘巧遇’小鹰号), Ming Pao, 24 November 2007.

153 “Zhang Jianchang Promoted to Deputy Director of the PLA Informatization Department.”

### Table 16. Roles of key departments within PLA Navy Headquarters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Director</th>
<th>Impact on the navy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aviation Department</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Naval aviation increasingly important branch of the PLA Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Department</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Likely responsible for gathering and analyzing intelligence, and disseminating that intelligence to naval units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Affairs Office</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Likely coordinates with GPD Foreign Affairs Office to oversee foreign military engagements according to PLA’s guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informatization Department</td>
<td>SCAPT Wei Rongliang</td>
<td>Oversees development of communications systems in the navy; likely plays a role in the navy’s command and control system; part of PLA-wide informatization system headed by GSD Informatization Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Affairs Department</td>
<td>SCAPT Wang Bin</td>
<td>Responsible for implementing administrative and management procedures within the navy; likely part of PLA-wide military affairs system headed by GSD Military Affairs Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Training Department</td>
<td>SCAPT Li Hanjun</td>
<td>Responsible for navy’s overall training programs; likely coordinates with the PLA’s military-wide training system headed by GSD Military Training Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navigation Support Department</td>
<td>SCAPT Liu Zhihao</td>
<td>Provides navigation support to PLA Navy vessels; coordinates with civilian maritime agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Safety Bureau</td>
<td>Pang Jinli</td>
<td>Active in civilian nuclear safety issues; likely also responsible for nuclear safety within the navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations Department</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Responsible for navy combat readiness, combat training, and joint operations; likely part of PLA’s military-wide operations system headed by GSD Operations Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines Bureau</td>
<td>SCAPT Ge Gengzhong</td>
<td>Active in development and modernization of navy’s submarine forces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Political Department

Just as the PLA General Political Department is responsible for political work throughout the PLA, the Navy Political Department is responsible for all political work within the Navy. Its responsibilities include:

- Instilling patriotic spirit and a respect for “socialism with Chinese characteristics”
- Conducting political preparations for military battles
- Setting up unit-level Party committees
- Managing personnel, including evaluations and promotions in accordance with relevant PLA regulations

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• Strengthening political institutions and improving the quality of PLA Navy political officers.

The director of the navy Political Department is VADM Ma Faxiang. We have identified four deputy directors who support VADM Ma. They are listed in table 17.

Table 17. PLA Navy Political Department deputy directors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year of appointment to deputy director</th>
<th>Formal retirement age</th>
<th>Political specialty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RADM Qu Chengjun</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>Cadre work¹⁵⁶</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Li Bin</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Gao Changqing</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Zheng Hengbin</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>Propaganda</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Important characteristics of navy political department directors and deputy directors

While all have years of experience as political officers, the director and his deputy directors have worked in significantly different environments.

• PLA Navy Political Department Director VADM Ma Faxiang served as political commissar of the Huludao Base in Liaoning, a missile test, research and development, and training base in the North Sea Fleet.¹⁵⁷
• PLA Navy Political Department Deputy Director RADM Qu Chengjun has served both as a deputy director in the General Political Department’s Cadre Department, and as deputy political commissar of PLA naval aviation.
• PLA Navy Political Department Deputy Director RADM Zheng has served as political commissar to the Xisha (Paracel) Naval Garrison.¹⁵⁸

Key second-level departments within the PLA Navy Political Department

Publically available information regarding the following organizations in the PLA Navy Political Department suggests that they have the potential either to substantially impact current activities and operations or to influence the future direction of the navy. Table 18 summarizes the roles of these offices and their impact on the navy.

¹⁵⁶ Cadre work encompasses all tasks that fall under office personnel management in the PLA.
Table 18. Roles of key departments within the PLA Navy Political Department

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Director</th>
<th>Impact on the navy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Propaganda Department</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Responsible for the navy’s publishing system and dissemination of political materials to military personnel; likely part of PLA-wide propaganda system headed by GPD Propaganda Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discipline Inspection Department</td>
<td>RADM Zhu Qian</td>
<td>Maintains Party discipline in the ranks of PLA Navy Party members; authority to investigate and punish violations of Party discipline with approval of Party Committee and higher level discipline inspection organs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Logistics Department

The PLA Navy Logistics Department manages logistics support throughout China’s navy. It is responsible for maintaining and overseeing the living conditions of navy personnel, constructing ports and base facilities, and supplying and providing technical support for munitions and certain equipment, including specialized navy munitions such as missiles, torpedoes, and mines.\(^{159}\)

Evidence suggests that the directors of the navy logistics and equipment departments are one grade below the director of the navy political department and the navy chief of staff.\(^{160}\) Whereas the navy chief of staff and political department director are grade 4 positions, equal in status to navy deputy commanders and deputy political commissars, the directors of the navy logistics and equipment departments are grade 5 positions (although they still occupy a position on the navy’s Party Standing Committee).\(^{161}\)

The director of the PLA Navy Logistics Department is RADM Xu Weibing. RADM Kang Fei serves as that department’s political commissar.

We have identified three deputy directors who support RADM Xu. They are listed in table 19.

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\(^{159}\) *China’s Navy 2007*, p. 9.

\(^{160}\) Blasko, *Chinese Army Today*, p. 65.

\(^{161}\) Ibid., p. 65.
Table 19. PLA Navy Logistics Department deputy directors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year of appointment</th>
<th>Formal retirement age</th>
<th>Fleet experience</th>
<th>Specialty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RADM Ren Zhongji</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>NSF</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Li Yunqing</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Barracks management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Su Jingxiang</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Finance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Important characteristics of PLA Navy Logistics Department officers

The director and political commissar of the PLA Navy Logistics Department are significantly younger than their counterparts in other navy departments. RADM Xu Weibing is the only generation 3 officer to head one of the navy’s four first-level departments. The political commissar of the department, RADM Kang Fei, and is estimated to be a member of generation 3 as well.162

Both officers have recently served in leading positions in naval academic institutions. In 2008, RADM Kang was serving as the political commissar of the Dalian Naval Vessel Academy, where he published an article in *Political Work Study Journal* on the academy’s future and plans for development.163 At the same time, RADM Xu was serving as deputy commandant of the Naval Engineering University, the navy’s largest educational institution for specialized technical personnel.164

Many of the logistics officers profiled here have written or spoken publically on their technical areas of expertise. Publically available coverage of these officers focuses on their areas of expertise rather than their personal characteristics.

Key second-level departments within the PLA Navy Logistics Department

Publically available information regarding the following second-level departments within the Logistics Department suggests that they have the potential to substantially impact current activities and operations, or influence the future of the navy.

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162 RADM Kang Fei and is estimated to be a member of generation 3 as well. To be a member of generation 2, he would have had to join the PLA before the age of 17.

163 Kang Fei, “Carrying Forward Tradition; Scientific Development; Striving to Create a Brilliant Tomorrow for the PLAN Dalian Vessel Academy,” *Political Work Study Journal (Zhenggong Xueke)*, no. 11 (2009).

164 This university was formed out of the 1999 merger of the Naval Engineering Academy in Wuhan and the Naval Electronic Engineering Academy in Nanjing. See *An Overview of Military Academies and Schools (zhongguo junshi yuanxiao tonglan; 中国军事院校通览)* (Beijing: Academy of Military Science Press, 2002).
Table 20 summarizes the roles of these offices (listed in alphabetical order) and their impact on the navy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Director</th>
<th>Impact on the navy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engineering Design and Research Bureau</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Provides engineering, design, and surveying support to the navy’s coastal facilities, as well as important civilian projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance Department</td>
<td>Chen Yihao</td>
<td>Oversees the PLA Navy’s financial system; inefficiencies and delays in financial support have been known to delay past navy operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Communications and Transportation</td>
<td>Ye Xiaotao</td>
<td>Oversees navy military transportation via rail, public roads, waterways, and air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Supplies Maintenance and Fuel</td>
<td>Senior Captain Wang Jinliang</td>
<td>Responsible for purchase and distribution of bedding, clothes, food, agricultural goods, and petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) equipment for the navy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Equipment Department

The PLA Navy Equipment Department is responsible for the navy’s weapons systems. Its responsibilities include developing, designing, constructing, inspecting, testing, and evaluating navy weapons systems, delivering them to the units, and supporting them throughout their lifecycle.165

The Equipment Department is also responsible for subordinate factories, warehouses, repair facilities, and purchasing stations.166

The current director of the Navy Equipment Department is RADM Hu Yuhao. RADM Wang Jianxin serves as political commissar.

We have identified three deputy directors who support RADM Hu. They are listed in table 21.

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166 *China’s Navy 2007*, p. 9.
Table 21. PLA Navy Equipment Department deputy directors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Birth year and province</th>
<th>Year of appointment</th>
<th>Formal retirement age</th>
<th>Fleet experience</th>
<th>Specialty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RADM Geng Guangsheng</td>
<td>1949, Jiangsu</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Vessel development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Meng Tao</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Wu Fangchun</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>SSF</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Important characteristics of navy equipment department officers

Current officers in the PLA Navy Equipment Department have a wide range of different experiences. Some, such as RADM Wang Jianxin and RADM Wu Fangchun, have experience serving on PLA Navy support bases. RADM Wu also has command experience, having served as the commander of the Guangzhou support base for two years. 167

Others have been promoted from within the PLA Navy Equipment Department. Current PLA Navy Equipment Department Director RADM Hu Yuhao, for example, previously served as a chief engineer in the department. RADM Yin Mingyan previously served as director of the Navy Equipment Department’s Aircraft Department before becoming a deputy director. 168

Some of the officers in this department are well past the retirement age for their position. RADM Geng Guangsheng, for example, reached his retirement age for his position nine years ago in 2004, yet remains on active duty. 169

Key second-level departments within the PLA Navy Equipment Department

Publically available information regarding the following departments in the Navy Equipment Department suggests that they have the potential to substantially impact current activities and operations, or influence the future of direction of the navy.


Table 22 summarizes the roles of these offices and their impact on the navy.

### Table 22. Roles of key departments within the PLA Navy Equipment Department

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Director</th>
<th>Impact on the navy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Department</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Active in testing and procurement of aviation equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviation Procurement</td>
<td>Xiao Chaofu</td>
<td>Active in naval aviation procurement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science and Technology Committee</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Supports the navy on military modernization, defense procurement, and export control issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Military Representative Bureaus</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Responsible for quality control issues related to equipment manufacturing in factories, research institutes, and academies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary**

Many of the navy’s top leadership positions are staffed by some of its oldest and most experienced officers. Many joined the PLA in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and are now in key positions of authority, overseeing a navy that is vastly different from the service in which they came of age. However, the presence of some notably younger officers on key decision-making bodies, such as the Navy Party Standing Committee, means that high-level decisions within the navy are made collectively by officers with widely different career experiences.

As many senior-level officers approach retirement in the next few years, there will likely be opportunities for officers in regional positions to be promoted. These include positions within China’s three fleets, as well as the military regions to which these fleets are attached. These regional leadership positions are the focus of the next chapter.
Chapter 4: Navy leadership in China’s military regions and the fleets

Below the central military organizations examined in chapter 3 are China’s military regions (MRs) and three fleets. Navy leadership positions are within three MRs, which border the maritime areas in which the fleets traditionally operate:

- The Jinan MR, which borders the North Sea Fleet (NSF)
- The Nanjing MR, which borders the East Sea Fleet (ESF)
- The Guangzhou MR, which borders the South Sea Fleet (SSF).

This chapter first identifies the navy positions found within these three MRs, examines the personnel currently in those positions, and analyzes the types of officers staffed in those positions. It then examines the overall situation for each of China’s three fleets, including:

- **Operational history**: What military actions or notable operations have these fleets taken since their founding?
- **Geography**: Where is each fleet located? Where do these fleets traditionally operate?
- **Strategic importance**: What strategic factors affect each fleet’s standing in the PLA’s strategic calculus?

Finally, it examines navy leadership at the fleet level. It identifies fleet-level officers serving in the following positions:

- Fleet commanders and political commissars
- Fleet deputy commanders
- Fleet chiefs of staff
- Fleet political, logistics, and equipment department directors
- Fleet deputy chiefs of staff.
Navy leadership positions at the military region (MR) level

The PRC is divided into seven military regions (da junqu; 大军区). Military regions are made up of military districts (sheng junqu; 省军区), the PLA’s administrative organization within a single province, as well as army, air force, and naval units located within the military region.\(^\text{170}\)

As a service, the PLA Navy has the same status as one of the seven military regions. Each of the three fleets is therefore one step below this in the PLA chain of command, meaning that fleet commanders and fleet political commissars are subordinate to MR commanders within the PLA’s personnel structure.

This is illustrated by the fact that fleet commanders serve concurrently as deputy commanders of the military region to which their fleet is attached.

The navy’s three fleets are located in the jurisdiction of the following three coastal MRs: \(^\text{171}\)

- **The North Sea Fleet Headquarters is in the Jinan MR**, which borders the southern half of the Bohai Sea, and is made up of the Shandong and Henan Military Districts.

- **The East Sea Fleet Headquarters is in the Nanjing MR**, which is made up of the Shanghai Garrison, and the Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, and Jiangxi Military Districts.

- **The South Sea Fleet Headquarters is in the jurisdiction of the Guangzhou MR**, which is made up of the Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, and Hubei Military Districts.

In addition to the roles of the fleet commanders and fleet political commissars, we identified the following navy leadership positions staffed in the Jinan, Nanjing, and Guangzhou MRs:

- Naval officers serving as the head of MR naval departments
- Naval officers serving as deputy chiefs of staff at MR headquarters
- Naval officers serving as deputy directors of MR joint logistics departments.

This section examines each of these positions.


\(^{171}\) Descriptions of the Jinan, Nanjing, and Guangzhou Military Regions are based on Blasko, *Chinese Army Today*, pp. 94-100.
Naval officer(s) serving as directors of MR naval departments

Local Chinese government news reports suggest that this department’s responsibilities include collaborating and coordinating with other PLA organizations that have operations responsibilities at the fleet and base level, such as naval operations divisions (chu; 处) on nearby naval support bases. The Navy Department also works with local civilian agencies, including local municipal maritime bureaus, as well as national-level civilian government agencies. For example, representatives of the Guangzhou MR Navy Department have participated in meetings related to maritime and port inspection activities with central government organizations, including the General Administration of Customs (haiguanzongshu; 海关总署), as well as staff from the Ministry of Public Security.

The Guangzhou MR has had a navy officer staffed as head of the Navy Department since at least 2003, suggesting that this is a billet reserved for naval officers. The current commandant of the Dalian Naval Vessel Academy, Jiang Guoping, served in this position between 2002 and 2003, before becoming the commander of the Shantou Naval Garrison in the South Sea Fleet. The current director of the Guangzhou MR Navy Department, RADM Zhai Zhenliang, has served in this position since 2003.

We were unable to identify any recent references to naval departments within the Nanjing or Jinan military regions. Given the location of a fleet within each of these military regions, however, it is possible that the Nanjing and Jinan MRs also have a navy department tasked with similar responsibilities.

Little information is publically available regarding RADM Zhai’s professional career. However, his predecessor, Jiang Guoping, has been promoted multiple times since his tenure in this position. As the current commandant of Dalian Naval Vessel Academy, he is in a position previously held by multiple top-level navy leaders, including current North Sea Fleet Deputy Commander RADM Yang Junfei, and current PLA Navy Commander ADM Wu Shengli.

While more data are needed to determine the extent to which the position of Guangzhou MR Navy Department director is a stepping stone to higher positions, Jiang’s promotions since serving in this positions may indicate that this is a position to watch.

173 Ibid.
175 “Dongguan Humen Port Events 2002.”
Naval officer(s) serving as deputy chiefs of staff at MR headquarters

MR deputy chiefs of staff likely support the chief of staff in maintaining force readiness, overseeing plans for military training, and managing the administrative work of the MR. Uniformed naval officers serving in these positions may be responsible for some of these missions as they pertain to naval and maritime issues specifically.

Evidence suggests both the Guangzhou and Nanjing MRs have a deputy chief of staff position reserved for a naval officer, as both MRs have had at least one naval officer in this position since at least 2001. Each MR currently has a naval officer serving as a deputy chief of staff.

In the Guangzhou Military Region:

- RADM Yu Mingchu served as a deputy chief of staff from roughly 2001 to 2009.
- RADM Han Linzhi has served as a deputy chief of staff from 2007 until the present.

In the Nanjing Military Region:

- VADM Su Shiliang held the position from roughly 2002 to 2006 before being promoted to North Sea Fleet commander, and eventually, PLA Navy deputy commander.
- RADM Xu Jiwen has been in this position since 2006.

All the officers who have served in this position have strong naval academic teaching or research credentials, and held the following positions before being promoted to MR deputy chief of staff:

- RADM Yu Mingchu was formerly the commandant of the Guangzhou Vessel Academy (currently the Naval Marine Academy).
- VADM Su Shiliang was formerly the commandant of the Naval Command Academy.
- RADM Xu was formerly the deputy commandant of the Dalian Naval Vessel Academy.

Although RADM Han has not held a naval military academic position, he has published multiple papers on naval tactics, and studied abroad at the Russian General Staff Academy in 1999.  

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177 Chen, Headquarters Work, pp. 50-51.
Naval officers serving as deputy directors in MR joint logistics departments

In 1998, the PLA began the process of developing a joint logistics system for the PLA military regions. In April 2007, the CMC ordered the establishment of a joint logistics support system (lianhe baozhang tixi; 联合保障体系) that would fully support the army, navy, and air force units of the Jinan MR.

The Jinan MR appears to have at least one deputy director billet in its joint logistics department reserved specifically for a uniformed naval officer. It has had a naval officer in this position since 2004, following the MR’s designation as an experimental MR for joint logistics. RADM Zhou Xinlian has served in this position since 2004, and RADM Xiang Longhua has served in this position since 2009.

Both RADM Zhou and RADM Xiang have spent most of their careers on the logistics career track. Since entering the PLA, RADM Zhou has served in multiple logistics positions, both in the GLD and at PLA Navy Headquarters. RADM Xiang was formerly the director of the North Sea Fleet’s Logistics Department’s Quartermaster Division, and director of the Qingdao Support Base’s Logistics Department.

We were unable to identify naval officers serving as deputy directors in the joint logistics departments of other MRs, although unofficial Chinese sources state that RADM Xiang formerly served as a deputy director in the Joint Logistics Department of the Nanjing MR.

The navy’s three fleets

Most of the PLA Navy’s regional leadership is assigned to China’s three fleets. Members of China’s younger generations of navy leaders (generations 2 and 3) are concentrated in key fleet leadership positions.

Fleet commanders and deputy commanders, for example, mostly joined the PLA in the early 1970s, just as China was entering a more stable domestic and international environment. Some of the younger officers began their military careers in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as China was starting to enact large-scale economic reforms.

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181 It is unclear whether RADM Zhou is still serving in this position as an active-duty naval officer or whether he retired in early 2013. A detailed profile of him is in appendix A.
182 Detailed biographies for both officers are in appendix A.
North Sea Fleet

Geography

The North Sea Fleet (NSF) has historically operated in the Yellow Sea, which borders three Chinese provinces—Liaoning, Hebei, and Shandong—as well as the municipality of Tianjin. It is headquartered in Qingdao, Shandong Province (see map 1).

Map 1. Primary bases of the North Sea Fleet

The North Sea Fleet’s primary bases include:

- Two main support bases, at Qingdao, Shandong Province, and Lushun, Liaoning Province. These bases are responsible for area defense, as well as for providing operational, technical, logistical, and engineering support to the fleet.185

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184 Cole, Great Wall at Sea, p. 71.
A specialized research and development, training, and missile test base at Huludao, Liaoning Province.

The Jinggezhuang Naval Base, in Shandong Province, which is an important NSF base for nuclear-powered submarines.

Subordinate garrisons in Dalian, Liaoning Province, and Weihai, Shandong Province. These garrisons are subordinate to naval bases and oversee certain naval units such as frigates and naval unit squadrons.186

Operational history

The NSF headquarters was officially established in Qingdao in May 1960, although the PLA Navy has been operating from Qingdao since the 1950s.187

In April 2003, the Bohai Sea was the site of the “Ming 361 Incident,” one of the worst peacetime military disasters in PRC history, which resulted in the death of all 70 crew members of a Ming-class (No. 361) submarine.

More recently, the North Sea Fleet has participated in maritime exercises with the Russian Navy:

- **Peace Mission 2005:** “Peace Mission” is an annual Sino-Russia bilateral exercise. In 2005, the exercise had a maritime component, which was held in Qingdao, Shandong Province.188

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186 *China’s Navy 2007*, p. 7.
187 *PLA Navy Encyclopedia*, p. 49.
• **Maritime Cooperation 2012:** An annual bilateral exercise between the PLA Navy and Russia's Pacific Fleet.\(^{189}\)

• **Maritime Cooperation 2013:** The PLA Navy’s largest-ever single deployment to any joint foreign exercise.\(^{190}\)

Strategic importance

The North Sea Fleet’s traditional area of operations in the Yellow Sea has several strategically important characteristics, discussed below.

**It guards the approach to the capital.** Though North China has not been attacked from the sea since the founding of the PRC in 1949, China’s pre-Communist history contains numerous instances in which foreign powers crossed the Bohai Gulf to assault or invade Beijing. These include the Second Opium War in the mid 19th century, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, and Japan’s invasion of North China in the 1930s. Historical memory of these invasions, in addition to the meager strategic depth offered by the small and narrow Yellow Sea, is behind the desire for China’s northern coast to be well protected. This has also made Beijing particularly wary of any foreign naval activity taking place in this portion of its near seas, including recent U.S.-South Korean combined naval exercises.\(^{191}\)

**It is a major training ground for navy officers.** The Dalian Naval Vessel Academy and the Submarine Academy in Qingdao are both on the coast of the Yellow Sea. The North Sea Fleet is home to the training vessels *Shi Chang* and *Zheng He*, which are associated with the Dalian Naval Vessel Academy. According to a 2005 article in *Modern Navy*, most of the navy’s current command and technical officers took their first sea voyage on one of these ships.\(^ {192}\)


It is important to China’s maritime trade and transport. This area contains four of China’s top 10 commercial ports by cargo volume: Tianjin, Qingdao, Qinhuangdao, and Dalian. North China also contains much of the PRC’s heavy industry, including the so-called “rust belt” of state-owned factories that produce a large share of the region’s GDP. The North Sea Fleet is responsible for the main outlet to the sea by which North China exports its industrial products. This area is a major avenue of commerce with China’s Northeast Asian neighbors, particularly Japan and the Republic of Korea.

It holds valuable offshore resources. The North Sea Fleet is responsible for an area that contains rich fishing grounds as well as considerable oil and natural gas deposits; these include most of China’s proven offshore oil reserves in the Bohai Bay basin. Economic development plans promulgated by Beijing in the last decade have emphasized the need to develop marine resources and to explore for offshore energy sources in the Yellow Sea and the Bohai Gulf.

East Sea Fleet

Geography

The East Sea Fleet (ESF) traditionally operates within the East China Sea, which borders the provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Fujian, as well as the municipality of Shanghai. It is headquartered in Ningbo, Zhejiang Province (see map 2).

193 American Association of Port Authorities, http://aapa.files.cms-plus.com/Statistics/WORLD%20PORT%20RANKINGS%202010.pdf. These ports have a combined annual cargo volume of over 1.2 billion tons.


197 Cole, Great Wall at Sea, p. 71.
The East Sea Fleet’s primary bases include:

- Support bases in Zhoushan, Fuzhou, and Shanghai.
- Subordinate garrisons in Shanghai, Zhoushan, and Xiamen.

Operational history

The ESF traces its roots back to the East China People’s Navy, which was established in May 1949 under the Shanghai-based East China Military District Command (huadong junqu haijun;
华东军区海军。198 In April 1950, the naval forces under this command were integrated into the PLA Navy. The East Sea Fleet was officially established in October 1955. Its headquarters were first in Taizhou, Jiangsu Province, and then transferred to Ningbo, Zhejiang Province, where they are currently located. 199

In the early years of the PRC, the East Sea Fleet’s primary goals were to capture maritime territories and prevent re-invasion by the Nationalists under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and eventually to support PLA ground forces in retaking Taiwan. Given its proximity to Taiwan, the East Sea Fleet experienced the most conflict during this period. 200 In the mid 1950s, the ESF took part in various naval battles and amphibious landing campaigns that resulted in China’s capture of offshore islands from Nationalist forces. 201 In 1965, ESF ships engaged in two naval battles with the Taiwan navy, sinking three ships. 202

In 1995-1996, the ESF took part in naval exercises near the coast of Taiwan that contributed to the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. 203 As captain of the Luda-class (Type 051) destroyer Zunyi, current SSF Commander VADM Jiang Weilie participated in these exercises.

Strategic importance

The East Sea Fleet’s traditional area of operations in the East China Sea has the following strategically important characteristics:

It contains multiple disputed territories, including Taiwan and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The PRC claims Taiwan as part of its territory, even though it has been under separate administration since the government and military of the Republic of China fled mainland China in 1949. Following the Taiwanese presidential elections in 1996, the PRC conducted missile tests in the vicinity of Taiwan and the navy conducted exercises in the Taiwan Strait. 204

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198 Cole, Great Wall at Sea, p. 7.
201 Li, “PLA Attacks and Amphibious Operations During the Taiwan Strait Crises,” pp. 143-167.
203 Ibid., p. 242.
The East China Sea also contains the islands known in China as the Diaoyu Islands and in Japan as the Senkaku Islands. In September 2012, after several years of increasing assertiveness by Chinese maritime surveillance ships, research vessels, and civilian shipping boats near the disputed islands, the Japanese government announced that it would purchase the islands from a Japanese family that held title to them, thus nationalizing the islands. Since that time, the PLA Navy has increased its naval patrols around the islands and surrounding areas.

The East China Sea also includes Socotra Rock, a submerged reef in the northwestern part of the East China Sea, known in China as Suyan Rock and in South Korea as Leodo Rock. This land formation is claimed by both the PRC and South Korea.

It is important to China’s national economy, maritime trade, and transport. China’s coast along the East China Sea contains a number of key national commercial and financial centers. These include Shanghai—China’s largest city, its busiest commercial port, and its financial capital. This coastal region along the East China Sea is also home to the cities of Ningbo and Xiamen, two of China’s 10 largest ports by cargo volume.

Additionally, the Yangtze River Delta lies along China’s east coast, adjacent to the East China Sea. The Yangtze River Delta is one of China’s most densely populated regions, and is the terminus for shipping from cities along the Yangtze, Asia’s longest river. Because the Yangtze River Delta relies on the East China Sea as its connection to the rest of the world, any threat to maritime traffic to and from this region would have dire consequences for the Chinese economy.

The region contains valuable offshore resources. The East China Sea contains substantial oil and natural gas deposits, which are underexplored due to the current maritime boundary disputes described above. The U.S. Department of Energy estimates that the East China Sea may have reserves of as much as 100 million barrels of oil and 2 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.

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208 American Association of Port Authorities, http://aapa.files.cms-plus.com/statistics/WORLD%20PORT%20RANKINGS%202010.pdf. These ports have a combined annual cargo volume of over 1 billion tons.

South Sea Fleet

Geography

The South Sea Fleet has traditionally operated within the South China Sea, which borders the Chinese provinces of Guangdong and Guangxi, as well as the Guangzhou Military Region. The South China Sea is by far the largest and deepest of China’s three near seas.

The South Sea Fleet is headquartered in Zhanjiang, Guangdong Province (see map 3).

Map 3. Primary bases of the South Sea Fleet

The South Sea Fleet’s primary bases include:

- Support bases located in the city of Guangzhou, Zhanjiang, and Yulin
- Subordinate garrisons located in Shantou, Beihai, and Yulin
- A fleet training base in Dongguan
- A ship training center in Zhanjiang.
Operational history

The SSF is a successor to the naval forces under the Guangdong Military Region Defense Command (Guangdong jun chu jiangfang silingbu; 广东军区江防司令部), established in December 1949. The SSF was officially established in October 1955.210

During the early years of the PRC, the South Sea Fleet’s area of responsibility held little potential for maritime conflict, as offshore resources were largely unexplored and the SSF lacked sufficient range to patrol far offshore. Since the 1970s, however, sovereignty issues involving islands and other land features in the South China Sea have become an increasing strategic concern for China—one that has placed the PRC in contention with several of its maritime neighbors.

In 1974, SSF ships were deployed in a successful naval action to reclaim control of the Paracel Islands (known in China as the Xisha Islands) from South Vietnam.211 In 1979, PLA Navy ships intercepted several Vietnamese Navy surveillance ships that had been sent to the Spratly Islands (known in China as the Nansha Islands), further reinforcing China’s claim over these islands.212

Another naval skirmish between China and Vietnam broke out in 1988, involving Chigua Reef in the Spratly (or Nansha) Islands. In this brief conflict, SSF frigates sank two Vietnamese Navy ships and damaged a third. This is the most recent instance of the PLA Navy engaging in an actual naval battle.213

Since 2000, the SSF has also been involved in several incidents with the U.S. Navy. In 2001, a mid-air collision between a U.S. Navy EP-3 intelligence-gathering aircraft and a J-8II fighter jet piloted by an SSF naval aviator led to tense bilateral negotiations over the release of the American plane and its crew members.214 In 2009, the USNS ocean surveillance ship Impeccable was approached in a harassing manner several times by SSF ships and planes, which led to a U.S.-China dispute over military activities in China’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ).215

210 PLA Navy Encyclopedia, p. 1370.
212 Ibid.
213 Ibid., p. 263.
In 2013, ships from the South Sea Fleet took part in “Maritime Cooperation-2013,” an annual bilateral exercise between the PLA Navy and Russia’s Pacific Fleet.  

Strategic importance

The South Sea Fleet’s traditional area of operations in the South China Sea is strategically important for three reasons:

**It is critical to China’s maritime trade and transport.** Chinese maritime trade with Europe, Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East goes through the South China Sea. Additionally, Chinese sources indicate that roughly 80 percent of the nation’s energy imports pass through the Strait of Malacca before entering the South China Sea on their way to other parts of the country.

**It provides valuable offshore resources.** The South China Sea is one of the richest fishing grounds in Asia and a major source of food and livelihood for southern China. In addition, it contains large deposits of natural gas, providing most of China’s current domestic offshore gas production. The region also contains petroleum deposits, though estimates vary widely on the extent of these resources.

**It contains many disputed territories.** China’s expansive territorial claims in the resource-rich South China Sea have brought it into dispute with a number of its neighbors over maritime territory, islands, and other land features. These include:

- Disagreements over maritime territory between China and Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines
- Disputes over the control of the Spratly Islands between China and Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines
- Disputes over the Paracel Islands between China and Vietnam.

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220 U.S. Energy Information Administration, *South China Sea.*
Fleet leadership

Fleet commanders and fleet political commissars

The commanders and political commissars of the navy’s three fleets form the highest echelon of leadership at the campaign level. Table 23 gives information on these personnel.

Fleet commanders are the chief points of contact between navy organizations at the headquarters and fleet levels. As concurrent military region deputy commanders, they are also the main link between the navy and the ground-force-controlled military regions.

Fleet political commissars serve as secretaries of fleet-level Party committees, which are the top decision-making bodies within each of the fleets. Their leadership is essential to all areas of political work within the fleets, including promotions, managing fleet personnel, and overseeing public affairs activities, as well as maintaining Party discipline and adherence to Party rules and regulations among fleet Party members.

Table 23. Basic information on fleet commanders and political commissars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Fleet</th>
<th>Province, date of birth</th>
<th>Appointed</th>
<th>Area of expertise</th>
<th>Retirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VADM Tian Zhong</td>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>NSF</td>
<td>Hubei, 1956</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Minesweepers</td>
<td>2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VADM Su Zhiqian</td>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>Fujian, 1955</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VADM Jiang Weilie</td>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>SSF</td>
<td>Jiangsu, 1955</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Bai Wenqi</td>
<td>Political commissar</td>
<td>NSF</td>
<td>Liaoning, 1956, 2012</td>
<td>Naval aviation</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Ding Haichun</td>
<td>Political commissar</td>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>Hunan, 1955, 2012</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As discussed below, the current fleet commanders and fleet political commissars share a number of characteristics.

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221 According to Chinese military doctrine, campaigns are operations fought by juntuan (军团) level forces. China’s fleets are the juntuan-level forces within the navy. See Zhan Yuliang, ed., The Science of Campaigns (zhanyixue; 战役学), (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2006).

222 Information in this table is derived from the profile of each officer in appendix A.
All six fleet commanders and political commissars belong to generation 2. All but one of these six individuals were born in 1955 or 1956, the exception being South Sea Fleet Political Commissar VADM Wang Dengping, who All of these officers joined the PLA in the mid 1970s. Younger than their counterparts in generation 1, these officers are a bridge connecting the older generation of PLA Navy leaders, who came of age in a coastal navy, with the younger (generation 3) officers, who came of age as the PLA Navy was beginning to take on more expansive missions.

All three fleet commanders have expertise in surface vessels, and two have served in destroyer units. Although submarine units and naval aviation are increasingly important components of the PLA Navy’s overall force structure, it is important to note that the top-level leadership within the fleets remains dominated by officers who have spent their careers on surface ships.

For example, East Sea Fleet Commander VADM Su Zhiqian spent part of his early career in various positions within destroyer divisions (zhidui) before eventually commanding the South Sea Fleet’s 2nd Destroyer Division. South Sea Fleet Commander VADM Jiang Weilie spent part of the 1990s as captain of the Luda-class destroyer Zunyi, which took part in live-fire exercises during the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996. North Sea Fleet Commander VADM Tian Zhong obtained most of his vessel experience in minesweeper units.

All three political commissars have experience as political officers in fleet-level operational units. North Sea Fleet Political Commissar RADM Bai Wenqi has served in multiple political positions in naval aviation departments in the North and South Sea fleets. South Sea Fleet Political Commissar VADM Wang Dengping served as political commissar of the North Sea Fleet’s Qingdao Support Base. East Sea Fleet Political Commissar RADM Ding Haichun served for two years as political commissar for the North Sea Fleet’s Lushun Support Base.

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225 For details on these positions, see the profile of RADM Bai Wenqi provided in Appendix A.
All six have held positions in two different fleets. All but one of the six fleet leaders (RADM Ding Haichun) have spent time in the South Sea Fleet. All have served in two fleets, but none have served in all three fleets:

- The North Sea Fleet commander and political commissar served in the South Sea Fleet.
- The South Sea Fleet commander and political commissar served in the East Sea Fleet.
- East Sea Fleet commander VADM Su Zhiqian served in the South Sea Fleet.
- East Sea Fleet Political Commissar RADM Ding Haichun served in the North Sea Fleet.

This stands in contrast to deputy fleet commanders and deputy political commissars at PLA Navy Headquarters, five of seven of whom have experience serving in the North Sea Fleet.

Historically, the North Sea Fleet has received more resources and attention from national-level decision makers in the PLA hierarchy, which may partially explain why many deputy fleet commanders and deputy political commissars at Navy Headquarters, many of whom are members of generation 1, served in the North Sea Fleet. The fact that fleet commanders and political commissars in the fleets have served most of their careers in other fleets may reflect the growing importance of the South and East Sea fleets vis-à-vis the North Sea Fleet during these officers’ careers.

All fleet commanders have taken part in delegations to foreign countries, with at least two known to have visited the United States. North Sea Fleet Commander VADM Tian Zhong has led delegations to Russia, North Korea, and South Korea. East Sea Fleet Commander VADM Su Zhiqian has led delegations to Russia, England, Spain, and France, and took part in a high-level PLA delegation to the United States. South Sea Fleet Commander VADM Jiang Weilie took part in a high-level PLA delegation to the United States.

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In contrast, we found evidence of only one political commissar visiting foreign countries in an official capacity. This is South Sea Fleet Political Commissar VADM Wang Dengping, who has traveled on official delegations to India, New Zealand, Chile, Sri Lanka, and North Korea.²³²

**No current commander has led a Gulf of Aden mission, but at least two have other types of blue-water operational experience.** Currently, only one navy officer who has commanded a Gulf of Aden mission has risen to the level of a fleet commander—VADM Du Jingchen, who commanded the first Gulf of Aden task force before becoming East Sea Fleet commander and then navy chief of staff.

However, at least two fleet commanders have gained blue-water experience through other operations. In 2007, current East Sea Fleet Commander VADM Su Zhiqian commanded the Chinese contingent of “China-France Friendship 2007,” a combined search-and-rescue exercise near the southern French port of Toulon.²³³

In early 2013, North Sea Fleet Commander VADM Tian Zhong commanded what the *People’s Navy* and other official Chinese media referred to as “distant seas training” in the Western Pacific, taking his fleet’s ships through the Miyako Strait south of Okinawa, and the Bashi Channel between the Philippines and Taiwan.²³⁴ We found no evidence that South Sea Fleet VADM Jiang Weilie has experience with blue-water operations.

**Two of three fleet commanders have served as full or alternate members of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee.** In addition to professional accomplishments, rising to the ranks of a fleet commander in the Chinese navy also requires an officer to rise within the ranks of the CCP, and all three fleet commanders have national-level political credentials.

For example, North Sea Fleet Commander VADM Tian Zhong is the youngest of only four navy officers to have been elected as a full member to the 19th Communist Party Central Committee,

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an important national-level Party organization. South Sea Fleet Commander VADM Jiang Weilie was elected as an alternate to the 18th Central Committee. East Sea Fleet Commander VADM Su Zhiqian is a member of the 18th National Party Congress. In contrast, we found no evidence of any of the three fleet political commissars holding positions in national-level CCP organizations.

The ESF and SSF political commissars have both worked with current fleet commanders while serving in other positions. East Sea Fleet Political Commissar RADM Ding Haichun was political commissar of the Lushun Naval Base while VADM Tian Zhong was the base commander. Later, RADM Ding worked with VADM Jiang Weilie in the same capacity when he became the Lushun Base commander.

In addition, South Sea Fleet Political Commissar VADM Wang Dengping has served as North Sea Fleet political commissar during VADM Tian Zhong’s command.

Without more specific data about the nature of these professional relationships, it is impossible to know how they affect current inter-fleet relations. However, the basic fact that these officers are familiar with each other’s work styles, personality traits, and decision-making behavior, may facilitate interaction between the fleets in which they currently serve.

Fleet deputy commanders

Fleet deputy commanders support the fleet commanders in implementing their initiatives throughout the fleets. Though their specific duties are not clearly defined in publically available information, it is likely that they are each chiefly responsible for a specific portfolio within fleet operations. Table 24 gives basic information on the fleet deputy commanders.


236 “List of Alternate Members of 18th CPC Central Committee,” Xinhua, 14 November 2012, CPP, CPP20121114968271.

Table 24. Basic information on fleet deputy commanders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Fleet</th>
<th>Province and date of birth</th>
<th>Appointed</th>
<th>Operational background</th>
<th>Reaches retirement age in</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RADM Yang Junfei</td>
<td>NSF</td>
<td>Unknown, 1955</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Sun Dezhong</td>
<td>NSF</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Ding Yi</td>
<td>NSF</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Naval aviation</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Du Xiping</td>
<td>NSF</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Wang Zhiguo</td>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>Unknown, 1951</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Zhang Huachen</td>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>Unknown, 1951</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Qiu Yanpeng</td>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>Unknown, 1956</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Gu Xiangbing</td>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Yao Zhihao</td>
<td>SSF</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Wang Changjiang</td>
<td>SSF</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Naval aviation</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Zhang Zhaoyin</td>
<td>SSF</td>
<td>Shandong, 1955</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Ground forces, staff officer</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Du Yongguo</td>
<td>SSF</td>
<td>Tianjin, 1958</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A few comparisons may be made between deputy commanders at the fleet level:

Many of the fleet deputy commanders are past the formal retirement age for their position. According to current PLA retirement regulations, fleet deputy commanders are expected to either

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238 Information in this table is derived from the profile of each officer in appendix A.
retire or be promoted by the time they are 55 years old. Currently, 5 of the 12 deputy commanders are already past the retirement age for their position.

This finding appears to support our assertion in chapter 2 that PLA retirement regulations have been more strictly enforced at grade 4 level billets and above and less strictly enforced at the grade 5 level billets and below.

**It is not uncommon for fleet deputy commanders to serve in multiple fleets.** For example, the following five deputy commanders have served in multiple fleets:

- RADM Sun Dezhong has served in the NSF and the SSF.
- RADM Ding Yi has served in the NSF and the ESF.
- RADM Du Xiping has served in the NSF and the ESF.
- RADM Gu Xiangbing has served in the NSF and the ESF.
- RADM Wang Changjiang has served in the ESF and the SSF.

**At least 6 of 12 deputy commanders are known to have taken part in foreign engagement activities, including foreign delegations, port visits, and combined military exercises.**

- In 2008, North Sea Fleet Deputy Commander RADM Yang Junfei commanded an expedition by the training vessel Zheng He, visiting Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam.\(^{240}\)
- In 2010, North Sea Fleet Deputy Commander RADM Du Xiping commanded a formation during the combined military exercise with Russia.\(^{241}\) He also accompanied Fan Changlong, a current vice-chair of the CMC and former Jinan Military Region commander on a delegation to the United States.\(^{242}\)
- In 2009, East Sea Fleet Deputy Commander RADM Wang Zhiguo carried out joint ship escort operations with the Russian Navy during his command of the 3rd Gulf of Aden escort mission.\(^{243}\)

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\(^{239}\) *Law of the People’s Republic of China on Officers in Active Service.* Fleet deputy commanders hold a corps leader grade (grade 5) position. See appendix B for a list of all PLA grades and ranks.


In 2011, East Sea Fleet Deputy Commander RADM Zhang Huachen commanded a formation on visits to Tanzania, South Africa, and the Seychelles.\textsuperscript{244}

In 2007, East Sea Fleet Deputy Commander RADM Qiu Yanpeng commanded a destroyer division in a Pakistan-hosted combined military exercise with eight other nations (including the United States), called “Aman-07.”\textsuperscript{245} He also commanded a destroyer formation on a visit to Indonesia, engaged in the PLA Navy’s first port visits to Abu Dhabi, and commanded the \textit{Peace Ark} hospital ship in “Harmonious-Mission 2011,” an expedition that visited Cuba, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Costa Rica.\textsuperscript{246}

In 2009, South Sea Fleet Deputy Commander RADM Yao Zhilou participated in a PLA delegation to Brunei and Japan.\textsuperscript{247} He also conducted a port visit to India, and accompanied former defense minister General Liang Guanglie on a delegation that traveled to Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines.\textsuperscript{248}

\textbf{Five deputy commanders have commanded Gulf of Aden missions.}

- RADM Yao Zhilou commanded the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Gulf of Aden task force.
- RADM Wang Zhiguo commanded the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Gulf of Aden task force.
- RADM Qiu Yanpeng commanded the 4\textsuperscript{th} Gulf of Aden task force.
- RADM Zhang Huachen commanded the 7\textsuperscript{th} Gulf of Aden task force.
- RADM Yang Junfei commanded of the 11\textsuperscript{th} Gulf of Aden task force.

RADM Yao, Wang, and Zhang commanded these missions while in their current positions, while RADM Qiu and Yang were fleet deputy chiefs of staff at the time.


\textsuperscript{247} “Ge Zhenfeng Visits Japan and Brunei,” Xinhua, 17 February 2009.

Of the 12 current deputy fleet commanders, 6 have served as fleet deputy chiefs of staff, suggesting that fleet deputy chief of staff may be a stepping stone to fleet deputy commander. Current fleet deputy commanders who have made this transition include North Sea Fleet Deputy Commander RADM Yang Junfei; East Sea Fleet Deputy Commanders RADM Sun Dezhong, RADM Wang Zhiguo, RADM Qiu Yanpeng, and RADM Gu Xiangbing; and South Sea Fleet Deputy Commander RADM Yao Zhilou.

Many deputy fleet commanders are active in public affairs, having published professional articles or provided commentary in official publications. For example, at least seven deputy commanders either have published articles or have been quoted in official press on a wide variety of topics, including training reforms, China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime interests, and informatization.

- North Sea Fleet Deputy Commander RADM Yang Junfei has been quoted by PLA Daily on training issues. 249
- North Sea Fleet Deputy Commander RADM Du Xiping has been quoted in People’s Daily on nuclear safety issues and by CCTV on distant-seas operations and China’s expanding maritime interests. 250
- East Sea Fleet Deputy Commander RADM Wang Zhiguo has been quoted in the PLA Daily on the Gulf of Aden escort missions, and he wrote a 2011 article on informatization for PLA Daily. 251
- East Sea Fleet Deputy Commander RADM Zhang Huachen is frequently quoted and interviewed by Chinese and foreign media on issues of China’s maritime interests and strategy. 252
- East Sea Fleet Deputy Commander RADM Qiu Yanpeng has made statements to the press regarding the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute and China’s maritime rights. 253


• East Sea Fleet Deputy Commander RADM Gu Xiangbing has published dozens of articles, including one in *Modern Navy* on German submarines.\(^{254}\) He has also been interviewed by *CCTV* on informatization.\(^{255}\)

• RADM Zhang Zhaoyin has published two articles in *PLA Daily*. These articles discuss the importance of maintaining the PLA’s focus on preparing for combat operations and “winning local wars under informatized conditions,” rather than preparing for non-military operations, and strengthening the PLA’s “information-system-based system of systems operations capability.”\(^{256}\)

**Three deputy commanders have experience at Navy Headquarters in Beijing.** North Sea Fleet Deputy Commanders RADM Yang Junfei and RADM Sun Dezhong both served as directors of the Navy Headquarters’ Training Department. South Sea Fleet Deputy Commander RADM Wang Changjiang served as deputy director of the Navy Equipment Department and as a navy deputy chief of staff.

**As a career ground force officer, South Sea Fleet Deputy Commander RADM Zhang Zhaoyin is an outlier.** Unlike the other naval deputy commanders who have spent many years in the navy, RADM Zhang has spent most of his military career in the ground forces and General Equipment Department.\(^{257}\)

**Given their activities described above, four fleet deputy commanders appear particularly noteworthy.** All have participated in high-profile foreign delegations, commanded blue-water Gulf of Aden operations, and published or provided public comments on naval activities in the Chinese media:

• RADM Wang Zhiguo
• RADM Qiu Yanpeng
• RADM Zhang Huachen
• RADM Yang Junfei.

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\(^{257}\) Ibid.
Fleet chiefs of staff

Fleet chiefs of staff lead their fleet’s headquarters department, one of the four first-level departments at the fleet level (in addition to the political, equipment, and logistics departments). As the heads of the fleet headquarters department, fleet chiefs of staff are responsible for guaranteeing that the orders and policies of fleet commanders are implemented. Table 25 describes the current fleet chiefs of staff.

**Table 25. Basic information on fleet chiefs of staff**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Fleet</th>
<th>Province and date of birth</th>
<th>Appointed</th>
<th>Operational background</th>
<th>Reaches retirement age in</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RADM Wei Gang</td>
<td>NSF</td>
<td>1960, Shandong</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Yan Yuejin</td>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>Unknown, Jiangsu</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Wei Xueyi</td>
<td>SSF</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As a group, the fleet chiefs of staff share the following characteristics:

Two of the three have been in their positions for at least three years. East Sea Fleet Chief of Staff RADM Yan Yuejin was appointed to the position in 2009. South Sea Fleet Chief of Staff RADM Wei Xueyi has served in this position since 2010. In 2013, North Sea Fleet Chief of Staff RADM Yuan Yubai was replaced by RADM Wei Gang.

Two have backgrounds in destroyers or submarines, and one has experience commanding both destroyers and submarines. East Sea Fleet Chief of Staff RADM Yan Yuejin spent most of the 2000s serving in a destroyer division (zhidui) – first as a chief of staff, then as a deputy commander, and finally as a commander. South Sea Fleet Chief of Staff RADM Wei Xueyi is

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258 Information in this table is derived from the profile of each officer in appendix A.

259 RADM Wei Gang replaced RADM Yuan Yubai as North Sea Fleet chief of staff in 2013. While unconfirmed, Chinese military enthusiast websites report that RADM Yuan Yubai has been transferred to the position of North Sea Fleet deputy commander. See “3 Chinese Navy Warships Visit the U.S., Will Exercise with the U.S. Military in Hawaii” (zhongguo haijun 3 suo junjian fangmei jiangzai xiaweiyi yu meijun yanxi; 中国海军 3 艘军舰访美 将在夏威夷与美军演习), China National Radio, 20 August 2013, http://war.163.com/13/0820/09/96NBE3CV00014OMD.html.

former commander of the SSF’s 32nd Submarine Division (zhidui). North Sea Fleet Chief of Staff RADM Wei Gang has experience in destroyers, having previously served as chief of staff, and later commander, or the North Sea Fleet’s 1st Destroyer Division (zhidui).

All three fleet chiefs of staff have taken part in exchanges with foreign militaries, including delegations and combined military exercises. RADM Wei Gang served as the formation commander of the task force that visited Australia, New Zealand, and the United States in the summer of 2013. RADM Yan Yuejin was the deputy commander of a navy formation visiting India. RADM Wei Xueyi has led navy formations to Indonesia and Saudi Arabia.

One has commanded a Gulf of Aden mission.

- RADM Wei Xueyi commanded the 6th Gulf of Aden escort mission.
- Former NSF Chief of Staff RADM Yuan Yubai commanded the 14th Gulf of Aden mission.

Fleet political department directors

Political departments are first-level departments within the three fleet headquarters. Similar to the PLA Navy Political Department at Navy Headquarters, these departments are responsible for establishing unit-level Party committees, managing personnel matters, strengthening political institutions, training political officers in the fleet, and overseeing fleet discipline inspection committees. Table 26 gives information on the three fleet political department directors.

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261 “Wei xueyi” (wei xueyi; 魏学义), Xilu.com; http://club.xilu.com/xinguancha/msgview-950389-118176.html.
262 “3 Chinese Navy Warships Visit the U.S., Will Exercise with the U.S. Military in Hawaii.”
265 “Chinese Naval Vessels Visit Saudi Arabia for First Time.”
267 Cole, Great Wall at Sea, pp. 62-63.
Table 26. Basic information on fleet political department directors\textsuperscript{268}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Fleet</th>
<th>Province and date of birth</th>
<th>Appointed</th>
<th>Area of expertise</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RADM Yin Dunping</td>
<td>NSF</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Propaganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Yang Shiguang</td>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Wang Huayong</td>
<td>SSF</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following comparisons can be made between these three individuals:

**All three fleet political department directors have served as political commissars of support bases.** RADM Yin Dunping served as political commissar of the Guangzhou Support Base in the South Sea Fleet; RADM Yang Shiguang served as political commissar of the Fujian Support Base in the East Sea Fleet; and RADM Wang Huayong served as the political commissar of the Yulin Support Base in the South Sea Fleet. This suggests that political commissar experience at the base level may be an important step towards serving in leadership positions at fleet headquarters.

**Fleet equipment and logistics department directors**

Following a CMC decision in 1998, these departments were eliminated at the fleet level, creating a direct line from these two first-level departments at Navy Headquarters to the various support bases throughout the fleets. In late 2011, however, official Chinese media reported that these two departments had been re-established at the fleet level. The re-establishment of two first-level departments within the fleets, and the formal reintroduction of senior-level naval officer billets responsible for fleet logistics and equipment issues is a major reform, and may be part of a larger restructuring of PLA Navy logistics and equipment units.\textsuperscript{269}

Given their relatively recent reintroduction into the fleet structure, little information is publically available regarding the specific roles and responsibilities of the reestablished fleet logistics and equipment departments. They likely have responsibilities similar to those of the Logistics and Equipment departments at Navy Headquarters. For example, the fleet logistics department likely has responsibilities for living conditions of fleet personnel, constructing ports and base facilities, and supplying and providing technical support for munitions and certain equipment – much like

\textsuperscript{268} Information in this table is derived from the profile of each officer in appendix A.

the PLA Navy Logistics Department at Navy Headquarters. The equipment department is likely responsible for helping support the navy’s weapons systems.

Following the PLA-wide grade system for military officers, the directors of fleet logistics and equipment departments are likely one step below the director of the fleet political department and fleet chief of staff within the PLA military hierarchy.\textsuperscript{270} The navy chief of staff and political department director are grade 5 positions, equal in status to fleet deputy commanders and fleet deputy political commissars. The fleet logistics and equipment department directors are grade 6 positions, equal in status to the fleet deputy chiefs of staff and deputy directors of the fleet political department.\textsuperscript{271} Table 27 gives information on the fleet logistics and equipment department directors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Department and fleet</th>
<th>Province and date of birth</th>
<th>Appointed</th>
<th>Operational background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SCAPT Pu Ruinan</td>
<td>Logistics, NSF</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Naval aviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Liu Gengchun</td>
<td>Equipment, NSF</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Zhang Jingle</td>
<td>Equipment, ESF</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Liu Hongshen</td>
<td>Logistics, ESF</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Fast attack craft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Guan Jianguo</td>
<td>Logistics, SSF</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Jiang Zhonghua</td>
<td>Equipment, SSF</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Fast attack craft</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All six individuals have held positions outside the logistics or equipment career tracks, suggesting that their careers are not completely stove-piped.

- RADMs Liu Hongshen, Guan Jianguo, and Jiang Zhonghua have all served as support base commanders.
- RADMs Guan Jianguo and Zhang Jingle have both served as fleet deputy chiefs of staff.
- RADMs Liu Hongshen and Jiang Zhonghua have both commanded divisions (zhidui) of fast attack craft.
- RADM Liu Gengchun has served as deputy chief of staff of a support base.


\textsuperscript{271} Ibid., p. 65.

\textsuperscript{272} Information in this table is derived from the profile of each officer in appendix A.
SCAPT Pu Ruinan has served as deputy commander of North Sea Fleet naval aviation.

All are fairly new to their positions. Since logistics and equipment departments at the fleet level were re-established in late 2011, all of the logistics and equipment department directors at the fleet level are relatively new to their positions.

Fleet deputy chiefs of staff

Fleet deputy chiefs of staff support the work of the fleet chief of staff. In recent years, they have often been assigned to lead key operational and training activities, including many of the recent Gulf of Aden missions. At present, this position appears to be important to developing a future generation of navy leaders with blue-water operational experience. We have identified eight deputy chiefs of staff, listed in table 28.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Fleet</th>
<th>Province and date of birth</th>
<th>Appointed</th>
<th>Operational background</th>
<th>Reaches retirement age in</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RADM Sui Hongdi</td>
<td>NSF</td>
<td>unknown, Shandong</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Naval aviation</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Dong Jun</td>
<td>NSF</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Zhou Xuming</td>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>1962, unknown</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Shen Hao</td>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>Likely mid-1950s</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Li Shihong</td>
<td>SSF</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Li Xiaoyan</td>
<td>SSF</td>
<td>1961, Jilin</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Zhang Wendan</td>
<td>SSF</td>
<td>1958, Anhui</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Fast attack craft</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Four of the eight have commanded Gulf of Aden missions. Three have also been involved in foreign port visits or combined military exercises with foreign countries.

- South Sea Fleet Deputy Chief of Staff RADM Zhang Wendan commanded the 5th Gulf of Aden mission, which participated in combined military exercises with the Republic of Korea Navy and conducted port visits in Egypt, Italy, Greece, Burma, and Singapore. 274

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274 Information in this table is derived from the profile of each officer in appendix A.
South Sea Fleet Deputy Chief of Staff RADM Li Shihong commanded the 10th Gulf of Aden mission.275

East Sea Fleet Deputy Chief of Staff RADM Zhou Xuming commanded the 12th Gulf of Aden mission, which included a visit to Australia.276

South Sea Fleet Deputy Chief of Staff RADM Li Xiaoyan commanded the 13th Gulf of Aden mission. He has taken part in port visits to countries in Southeast Asia and Africa, and commanded a multi-national naval exercise in the Malacca Strait.277

Four are former division commanders. They have commanded destroyer, submarine, or naval aviation divisions, or divisions of fast attack craft. This may indicate that division commander is a preparatory position for fleet deputy chiefs of staff.

- RADM Hao Yanbing once commanded the NSF’s 1st Destroyer Division (zhidui).278
- RADM Sui Hongdi once commanded the NSF’s 2nd Naval Aviation Division.279
- RADM Zhou Xuming once commanded an ESF submarine division (zhidui).280
- RADM Zhang Wendan once commanded a fast attack craft division (zhidui) based in the SSF.281

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280 Qian Xiaohu and Fang Lihua, “ECSF Holds Military-Police-Civilian Joint Anti-Terrorism and Rescue Exercise.”
Summary

Navy leaders in the fleets have had decidedly different experiences from their colleagues who serve at top-level positions at Navy Headquarters. For example, while opportunities to gain experience at sea were limited for the top-level leadership, officers in China’s fleets are increasingly being provided these opportunities. Many leading officers in the fleets, for example, have recently gained blue-water operational experience. Others have gained foreign exposure in ways unavailable to previous fleet-level officers, such as participating in combined military exercises, port visits, and foreign military delegations.

As described in chapter two, PLA Navy officers have been evaluated by a core set of criteria, throughout their careers. While these criteria have remained relatively stable, the weight provided to each has changed over time. In the next chapter, we expand upon this analysis by examining specific factors which influence the potential for navy officers’ career advancement.

281 “Senior Captain Zhang Wendan Promoted to South Sea Fleet Deputy Chief of Staff” (zhang wendan daxiao tiren nanahai jiandui fucanmozhang; 张文旦大校提任南海舰队副参谋长), Xilu.com, http://club.xilu.com/xinguancha/msgview-950389-95761.html.
Chapter 5. Factors influencing PLA Navy officers’ careers

This chapter examines factors affecting junior-level PLA Navy officers’ career advancement. It focuses primarily on the following factors:

- Pace of career progression
- Participation in Party organizations
- Experience at sea
- Training, education, and technical expertise
- Experience abroad.

We identified these factors through an analysis of the navy’s emerging challenges and responsibilities in the context of official promotion regulations, navy leadership statements, official PLA Navy publications, and data on recent promotions made publically available through official statements.

Pace of career progression

For all ranks above ensign and lieutenant junior grade, the *Law of the People’s Republic of China on Officers in Active Service* (*Active Service Law*) stipulates a minimum time in rank of four years before promotion. This same law stipulates a minimum time in each grade of three years before advancement, as well as the maximum age that an officer can reach when serving in each grade before either being promoted or retiring.²⁸²

However, the *Active Service Law* also provides exceptions to these provisions. “Exceptionally outstanding” officers may be promoted by skipping a grade.²⁸³ In addition, officers from division leader grade to the corps (jun) leader grade (grades 7 to 5) may serve up to five years past their mandatory retirement age.²⁸⁴

Because PLA regulations provide a standard time before promotion, they can be used as a baseline with which to compare PLA Navy officers’ career progression. If an officer is progressing more quickly than the standard promotion timeline as established by current PLA regulations, and more quickly than his peers, it may indicate that the officer is poised for even further career advancement.

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²⁸³ Article 20, *Law of the People’s Republic of China on Officers in Active Service*.

²⁸⁴ Article 14, 18, and 20, *Law of the People’s Republic of China on Officers in Active Service*. 

107
Most of the navy officers examined in this chapter have been promoted in a timeframe consistent with the PLA regulations cited above. However, some officers have been promoted both faster than their peers, and without serving the minimum required time in grade, similar to officers who are “deep selected” in the U.S. Navy.

One officer who has advanced more quickly than PLA regulations commonly stipulate and more quickly than his peers is South Sea Fleet Commander VADM Jiang Weilie. In 2008, VADM Jiang was serving as the commander of the North Sea Fleet’s Lushun Support Base. By the end of 2008 he had been promoted to chief of staff of the East Sea Fleet. Later, he was transferred to the PLA Equipment Department, where he served as director in 2010. After serving for roughly a year in this position, he was promoted again, to South Sea Fleet commander in early 2011.

Similarly, North Sea Fleet Commander VADM Tian Zhong has been promoted rapidly. He was promoted from North Sea Fleet chief of staff in 2007 to North Sea Fleet commander in 2008, less than a year later.

**Participation in central-level Party organizations**

Since authority in China ultimately rests within the Chinese Communist Party, PLA Navy career advancement is tied to political as well as professional achievements.

While it is expected that leading navy officers will hold positions in their units’ Party committees, some exceptional officers may also be selected to hold positions in CCP organizations at the national level as well. PLA officers make up only a small portion of the total membership of central-level Party organizations. Of the 2,270 delegates to the 18th National Party Congress in 2012, roughly 10 percent (251 delegates) were from the PLA.

Given the importance of political as well as professional achievements to a Chinese naval officer’s career prospects, combined with the relatively small number of naval officers selected for membership in central-level CCP organizations, membership in them therefore may be a useful metric for gauging an officer’s performance in the political domain. This may be

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288 “PLA PAP Select 300 Individuals as 18 Party Congress Representatives.”
especially true for navy officers selected to these organizations at a relatively young age or while in a relatively junior-level position. 289

PLA Navy officers are currently members of the following central-level CCP organizations:

- National Party Congress (NPC)
- Party Central Committee (CC)
- Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI).

**National Party Congress:** The NPC is the Party’s largest central-level body, and has 2,270 delegates. 290 The full NPC meets every five years, and acts as a vehicle for announcing and initiating important Party policy. 291

The 18th National Party Congress, held in November 2012, had 251 delegates from the PLA. As shown in table 29, thirteen of the leading navy officers examined in this study were delegates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PLA Navy officer</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Grade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADM Wu Shengli</td>
<td>Navy commander</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADM Liu Xiaojian</td>
<td>Navy political commissar</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VADM Cen Xu</td>
<td>PLA GPD assistant to the director</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADM Sun Jianguo</td>
<td>PLA deputy chief of the general staff</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Gen. Wang Sentai</td>
<td>Navy deputy political commissar</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VADM Du Jingchen</td>
<td>Navy chief of staff</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VADM Ma Faxiang</td>
<td>Navy Political Department director</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Xu Weibing</td>
<td>Navy Logistics Department director</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Hu Yuhao</td>
<td>Navy Equipment Department director</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VADM Su Zhiqian</td>
<td>ESF commander</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VADM Jiang Weilie</td>
<td>SSF commander</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VADM Wang Dengping</td>
<td>SSF political commissar</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VADM Tian Zhong</td>
<td>NSF commander</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given the size of the NPC, membership is not necessarily an indication of imminent promotion. However, membership at a relatively junior level may be a positive sign for an officer’s career. For example, Wang Hongmin, the current commander of the destroyer Fuzhou, which is a

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290 “Backgrounder: Makeup of delegates to 18th CPC National Congress,” Xinhua, 6 November 2012, news.xinhuanet.com/English/special/18cpcnc/2012-11/06/e_131955026.htm.

regiment leader grade (grade 9) position, was elected to the NPC for the first time in 2012 at the age of 44. That is eight years younger than the average age of 52.

**Party Central Committee:** Directly above the NPC in the Party hierarchy is the Communist Party Central Committee. The Central Committee is a smaller body, consisting of 205 members and 171 alternate members. Unlike NPC delegates, Central Committee members all hold important positions in the Party, government, or military, and have greater access to information on Party affairs.

Less than 20 percent of all Central Committee members are from the PLA (39 of 205 members). As shown in table 30, only four officers examined in this study are members of the 18th Party Central Committee:

- Navy Commander ADM Wu Shengli
- Navy Political Commissar ADM Liu Xiaojiang
- PLA Deputy Chief of the General Staff ADM Sun Jianguo
- NSF Commander VADM Tian Zhong.

Of these four officers, North Sea Fleet Commander VADM Tian Zhong stands out. At 57, VADM Tian is the youngest PLA Navy delegate to the Central Committee; he is four years younger than the next-youngest navy Central Committee member, ADM Sun Jianguo.

VADM Tian also holds a position of relatively low standing compared to many other PLA delegates on the Central Committee. For example, all CMC members have a position in the Party Central Committee, as do the majority of MR commanders, and MR political commissars. As a fleet commander, however, VADM Tian’s position within the Chinese military hierarchy is lower than all of these officers.

VADM Tian is also the only navy officer on the Central Committee who does not hold the rank of full admiral. As a fleet commander, he holds a position equal in rank and grade to a PLA Navy deputy commander. In contrast, the other navy representatives to the Central Committee

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292 “PLA PAP Select 300 Individuals as 18 Party Congress Representatives.”
293 “Backgrounder: Makeup of Delegates to 18th CPC National Congress.”
296 “List of members of the 18th CPC Central Committee, Xinhua, 14 November 2012, news.xinhua.com/english/special/18cpnpe/2012-11/14/c_131974817.htm.
297 At the time of this writing, the only two MR commanders or MR political commissars who are not on the Central Committee are Li Shiming, the commander of the Chengdu MR, and Li Changcai, the Lanzhou MR political commissar.
are either members of the CMC (ADM Wu Shengli) or are equal in grade to an MR commander in the PLA’s organizational structure (ADM Sun Jianguo and ADM Liu Xiaojiang).

The fact that VADM Tian has been selected to be a Central Committee member at a relatively young age, and while occupying a relatively junior level position compared to other navy representatives on that body, may be an indicator of his future career potential.

Current South Sea Fleet Commander VADM Jiang Weilie was named a Central Committee alternate (see table 30). There are 171 alternates to the Central Committee, and alternates are listed in official Chinese media in the order of the number of votes they received. VADM Jiang received the 56th highest number of votes out of the total 171 alternates — a relatively large number of votes, which may indicate strong political support.

Table 30. Leading PLA Navy officers in the 18th Party Congress Central Committee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central Committee members</th>
<th>Officer</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADM Wu Shengli</td>
<td>Navy commander</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADM Liu Xiaojiang</td>
<td>Navy political commissar</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADM Sun Jianguo</td>
<td>PLA deputy chief of staff</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VADM Tian Zhong</td>
<td>NSF commander</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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Central Commission for Discipline Inspection: An organization within the CCP Central Committee, the CCDI oversees the Party’s internal systems responsible for educating Party members, evaluating Party personnel to ensure that they abide by Party regulations, and investigating violations of Party discipline. The CCDI currently has 130 members.

Like membership in the Central Committee, membership in the CCDI may be a positive signal that an officer’s career is on the upswing. Only two officers in this study are CCDI members: Lt. Gen. Wang Sentai and VADM Cen Xu. Both are career political track officers, although their careers have had little in common. For example, VADM Cen Xu has significant experience in the fleets, having previously served as fleet deputy political commissar, and, later, political commissar — whereas Lt. Gen. Wang Sentai has limited naval experience, as he only transferred to the navy in late 2012.


Experience at sea

The emergence of new roles and responsibilities, combined with more frequent activities and operations at sea, suggests that navy officers may be increasingly evaluated by their experience at sea. This experience includes blue-water operations, such as:

- Antipiracy activities in the Gulf of Aden
- Training missions in the Western Pacific
- Training and humanitarian missions far from China’s borders.

This also includes traditional, combat-oriented missions closer to China’s borders, such as:

- Combat readiness training exercises in the North, South, and East China seas
- Joint exercises with other PLA units and Chinese maritime organizations.

Growing importance of experience at sea for navy leadership

Many officers we examined within the fleets have substantial experience at sea. For example, 5 of the 12 current fleet deputy commanders, and 4 of the 8 fleet deputy chiefs of staff, have led a Gulf of Aden task force.300 The growth of PLA Navy activities at sea suggests that operational experience may be a valuable attribute for navy officers seeking advancement.

According to one senior PLA Navy officer, China’s anti-piracy operations have accelerated the development of the country’s blue-water capabilities, allowing training activities to continue for weeks whereas previously they were day-long events.301 This same officer also noted that blue-water operational experience is increasingly being emphasized when evaluating officers for promotion, and that those who have been in “major operations” are more likely to be promoted.302

For many of the older PLA Navy officers who joined the PLA in the late 1960s (generation 1), opportunities for blue-water training were simply not available early in their careers. However, as China’s navy has evolved into an expeditionary force capable of operating further afield, evidence suggests that the importance of gaining operational experience at sea has grown significantly.

300 These include NSF Deputy Commander RADM Yang Junfei; ESF Deputy Commanders RADM Zhang Huachen, RADM Qiu Yangpeng, and RADM Wang Zhiguo; and SSF Deputy Commander RADM Yao Zhiluo. Fleet deputy chiefs of staff include ESF Deputy Chief of Staff RADM Zhou Xuming; and SSF Deputy Chiefs of Staff RADM Li Xiaoyan, RADM Li Shihong, and RADM Zhang Wendan.

301 Interviews, 2013.

302 Interviews, 2013.
For example, in 2010, then East Sea Fleet commander Du Jingchen emphasized the importance of operational training at sea. Du commanded China’s first anti-piracy task force to the Gulf of Aden in 2008.\(^{303}\) In a 2010 editorial in the *People’s Daily*, Du stated:

> Regarding training on the high seas as a normal state is the inevitable choice for the Navy to move toward the deep-blue water. As an old saying goes, “A horse that covers a thousand li a day is not trained in a courtyard.” Only on the high seas will it be possible to hammer out a true “blue-water navy… it is imperative for us to normalize training on the high seas before we can build a powerful people's navy that can effectively perform the historical military mission in the new century and the new stage.”\(^{304}\)

Other members of the navy’s top leadership have spoken publically about the role of training at sea as well. Speaking to the *PLA Daily*, East Sea Fleet Deputy Commander RADM Qiu Yuanpeng stated:

> With the constant improvement of China’s naval equipment and support capability, the waters for maritime training also keep expanding. Open-sea training has become an effective means and inevitable choice to enhance the combat capability of the PLA Navy.\(^{305}\)

### Experience at sea a necessary but not sufficient requirement for promotion?

While experience at sea may be increasingly important for navy officers, multiple sources suggest that, by itself, it is no guarantee of promotion. To paraphrase a senior PLA Navy officer:

> Taking part in the escort operations is something we increasingly emphasize in promotion. *But escort participation by itself does not guarantee promotion* (emphasis added). It is not the case that if you take part in the escort operations, you will be promoted, and if you do not take part, you will not be promoted. If you take part in the escort, and you show a good performance, then you may be promoted (paraphrase).\(^{306}\)

Instead of leading directly to promotion, evidence suggests that experience at sea has become a prerequisite. For example, Fu Yaoquan, political commissar of a destroyer flotilla (*zhidui*) in the

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\(^{304}\) Du Jingchen, “The Distant Oceans as a Training Ground” (*ba yuanhai dayang dangzuo ‘lianbingchang’迎海大洋当作练兵场*), *People’s Daily*, 14 May, 2010, p. 20. A *li* is a Chinese measurement of distance, equal to roughly 0.5 km.

\(^{305}\) Sun Yanxin and Ju Zhenhua, “Chinese Navy Normalizes Open-Sea Training.”

\(^{306}\) Interview, 2013.
East Sea Fleet, noted that “owning experience and ability in high-sea operations has become a prerequisite for selecting and appointing captains of new-type warships.” This suggests that having such experience is necessary to be considered for promotion, but does not automatically guarantee that an officer will be promoted.

Nor does commanding a Gulf of Aden task force appear to lead directly to promotion. VADM Du Jingchen was promoted less than a year after commanding China’s first escort mission in the Gulf of Aden, but since then only one officer, RADM Qiu Yanpeng, has been promoted after serving as a Gulf of Aden task force commander. Other officers have been promoted immediately before serving in this capacity, but none have been promoted after doing so.

In contrast to the basic requirement of experience at sea, officers with multiple types of experience at sea, including commanding combat training operations in China’s near seas, Chinese contingents in Combined Military Exercises (CMEs) with foreign militaries, or far-seas operations, such as a Gulf of Aden task force, may be well positioned for future advancement.

We have identified several navy officers currently at the fleet level who have experience leading multiple types of operations at sea:

- East Sea Fleet Deputy Commander RADM Qiu Yanpeng has experience commanding operations in the East China Sea, and commanded the 4th Gulf of Aden task force.
- North Sea Fleet Commander VADM Tian Zhong led training operations in the Western Pacific, and he led the Chinese contingent of a combined military exercise with the Russian navy. VADM Tian was also the first naval officer to lead joint training operations in the Jinan MR involving the PLA Navy, Air Force and Army. This marks a break from previous joint exercises, which were led by a ground forces officer.

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308 RADM Qiu Yanpeng was promoted to deputy chief of staff of the East Sea Fleet in 2009, shortly before commanding the 4th Gulf of Aden task force. He was later promoted again to East Sea Fleet deputy commander in late 2012.

309 For example, in 2011, RADM Han Xiaohu was promoted to deputy chief of staff of the East Sea Fleet. That spring, he was appointed commander of the 8th Gulf of Aden task force.

310 Liang Qingsong, “Our Naval Ship Formation Patrols in Waters Near the Diaoyu Islands” (wo haijun jianting bianduai zai diaoyu fujin haiyu xunhang; 我海军舰艇编队在钓鱼附近海域巡航), People’s Navy, 12 December 2012.

311 The leadership of such future joint exercises in the Jinan Military Region will rotate between the services. See Wang Lingshuo, “Sino-Russian Joint Exercise Enters the Stage of Summing-up and Exchange” (zhonge lianyan jinxing zongjiejiaoliu; 中俄联演进行总结交流), PLA Daily, 28 April 2012.

312 Zhang Tianman, Fu Kaiqiang, and Mi Jinguo, “Why is Flavor of the ‘Sea’ so Strong During this Battle?”
South Sea Fleet Chief of Staff VADM Wei Xueyi led the 6th Gulf of Aden escort mission. During this time he was involved in carrying out the navy’s first open-sea replenishment operation for a 10,000-ton (Fuqing-class) ship.\(^{313}\)

**Training and education**

China’s leadership has assessed that the development of a modern military will require a more educated officer corps with greater formal education and more technical expertise. In 2001, for example, the PLA laid out the following personnel goals which they hoped to achieve by the middle of the decade:

- Eighty-five percent of PLA officers should have a college-level or higher education.
- Forty percent of officers should have experience at civilian colleges or universities.
- Officers at the regiment level and above should have both undergraduate education and specialized training.\(^{314}\)

In addition, the PLA has also sought to identify ways to improve the educational levels of its officer core through partnering with civilian educational institutions. For example, in 1998, the PRC established a National Defense Student Program (guofangsheng; 国防生), which funds students in exchange for a period of military service. According to eol.com, an education website established by Qinghua University, 117 universities were affiliated with the program by 2011.\(^{315}\)

**Growing importance of advanced academic credentials for navy officers**

Over the past decade, evidence suggests that the PLA has made progress towards improving the educational quality of its personnel. For example, in 2012, the PLA Daily reported that approximately 82 percent of all “grassroots officers,” those below the battalion level, had obtained a bachelor’s degree.\(^{316}\)

While few, if any, navy leaders in generation 1 had a college education when they joined the PLA in the late 1960s, having a bachelor’s degree is now a prerequisite, rather than an advantage, for PLA officers. However, officers with advanced degrees remain less common. By

\(^{313}\) Li Yanlin, “PRC’s 10,000-Ton Class Ships Carry Out First Open-Sea Replenishment While Underway” (wo wandunji jianting shouci shishi yuanhai hangxing bugei; 我万吨级舰艇首次实施远海航行补给), People’s Navy, 13 July 2010.


2012, only about 7 percent of “grassroots” officers had master’s degrees or doctorates. Only 20 percent of all PLA cadres had postgraduate degrees.

This appears to be the case for PLA Navy officers as well. During a 2011 work meeting, the director of the Navy Political Department’s Cadre Department, Xia Ping, told reporters that as of 2011, the navy only had about 100 vessel captains with master’s degrees or doctorates. It was seeking to cultivate at least 2,000 Ph.D. candidates, and have at least 20 percent of its cadres obtain graduate study, by the end of the 12th Five Year Plan, in 2015.

Given the navy’s goal of rapidly adding to the number of personnel with advanced degrees, a PLA Navy officer holding an advanced degree may be well positioned for further career advancement.

This assumption is supported by navy publications such as Modern Navy and People’s Navy, which frequently profile vessel and submarine commanders, highlighting officers’ academic qualities, research skills, and advanced degrees. For example, Liu Zhe, the commander of the Jiangwei-class frigate Sanming, was noted for having a doctoral degree in military strategy from the Academy of Military Science, China’s most prestigious military education institution. He was also named an “outstanding cadre graduated from civilian colleges in the PLA.”

Zhao Lang, who in 2010 was identified as captain of the Luda-class destroyer Zhuhai, was profiled in 2008 by People’s Navy, and noted as a graduate degree holder.

Gaining an advanced degree from a prestigious civilian university may be another way for navy officers to distinguish themselves. Since the late 1990s, the navy has offered commissions to civilian university graduates, and has developed collaborative relationships with top Chinese academic institutes to recruit personnel and conduct research. The Navy Equipment Research Institute for example has established post-doctorate workstations to recruit civilians with

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317 Ibid. In the PLA, the term “grassroots officers” usually refers to officers at the battalion, company, or platoon level.


advanced degrees to participate in naval research. Since 2007, the Naval Aviation Engineering School has had a cooperative agreement with Tsinghua University to conduct national defense scientific research and “explore new roads for training national defense personnel.”

Some things to look for in a PLA Navy officer’s background:

**Career progression:** Has the officer been promoted in less than the normal three-year timeframe?

**Party organizational participation:** Is the officer a delegate to the NPC, Party Central Committee, or Central Discipline Inspection Commission? Has he been given successively more important Party positions (e.g., from NPC delegate to Central Committee alternate to full CC member?)

**Operational experience:** Has the officer commanded or participated in blue-water operations (e.g., Gulf of Aden missions, training missions in the Western Pacific, combined military exercises with foreign navies, or joint training exercises with other PLA services)?

**Studying abroad**

Allowing PLA officers to gain experience abroad has also been part of the PLA’s strategy of cultivating qualified officers.

According to a 2011 *China Military Science* article summarizing then CCP General Secretary and Chairman of the CMC Hu Jintao’s thinking on the development of future officers, Chairman Hu believed the PLA should be increasing the number of officers going abroad:

Comrade Hu Jintao pointed out that we should gradually increase the number of [people for] overseas studies, and actively participate in international military exchange activities, so that the joint operations command personnel under

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cultivation can broaden their field of vision, enrich their experience, and gain knowledge.325

While comprehensive statistics on the number of PLA military officers studying abroad remain unavailable, anecdotal evidence suggests that their numbers are increasing.

In 2004, for example, *People’s Navy* reported that the cadre department of the PLA Navy Political Department issued new guidelines designed to promote scientific and technical expertise within the navy. One aspect of these guidelines was that time spent studying abroad would count towards an individual’s time in a specialized technical position.326 Because time in rank and time in grade are requirements for promotion, such a policy change both signaled the navy’s intent to encourage officers to go abroad, and made it easier for officers to do so without adversely affecting their career advancement.

In addition, throughout the mid 2000s, PLA Navy publications began publishing reports of various units sending exceptional officers abroad to study. In August 2004 for example, *People’s Navy* reported that a destroyer flotilla (*zhidui*) had made new investments to “cultivate, use, improve, and retain highly educated personnel, including letting officers study abroad and return with new skills and knowledge.”327 The same year, an unnamed South Sea Fleet submarine flotilla (*zhidui*) noted that it sends two to three command personnel abroad for training annually.328

Other evidence suggests that studying abroad has had a positive impact on the career advancement of military officers throughout the PLA. For example, a 2010 *PLA Daily* report, citing statistics from the cadre department of the PLA General Political Department, said that of the military officers who had studied abroad and returned to China, more than 50 had “walked onto a leading position above the army corps level,” which would include PLA Navy deputy chiefs of staff, fleet chiefs of staff, and fleet commanders.329

Because we could not identify the total number of PLA officers sent abroad to study during this time period, it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions about the statistics cited above. It does,

328 *People’s Navy*, 7 December 2004.
however, suggest an increased focus on providing opportunities for PLA Navy officers to obtain training abroad.

Profiles of PLA Navy officers appearing in official navy publications often draw attention to officers’ foreign study experiences. For example, a *People’s Navy* profile of Senior Captain Hu Wubo, chief of staff of a submarine flotilla (*zhidui*) in the East Sea Fleet, noted his previous study at a military command academy of a foreign country (most likely Russia). According to the report, studying abroad enabled Hu to master a foreign language and to become “very familiar with submarine tactical and technical issues.” This experience qualified him to lead a submarine crew abroad to study technical submarine equipment issues in 2004.

Another profile on North Sea Fleet Naval Aviation officer Zhao Shumin noted that he went to Europe in the 1980s to study “ship-board aircraft weapons and equipment technology and antisubmarine tactics.” According to the profile, these “expanded international perspectives…enabled Zhao Shumin to have quickly become an excellent first generation aviation antisubmarine commander,” and an “authority in the field of antisubmarine tactic theories.”

**Officers positioned for advancement**

Based on the analysis in this chapter, we identify four PLA Navy officers who may be poised for future career advancement.

**VADM Tian Zhong, North Sea Fleet commander**

*Pace of career progression:*

- VADM Tian has risen to his current position at a relatively rapid pace and at a younger age than his peers. In 2007, he was promoted to North Sea Fleet commander after having served less than a year as North Sea Fleet chief of staff.
- At 57, he is the youngest fleet commander by one year.

*Membership in central-level Party organizations:*

- VADM Tian is the youngest and lowest ranking of the four navy officers who sit on the Party Central Committee, which is an important central-level CCP organization.

330 A more recent profile of Hu states that he studied at the Kuznetsov Naval Military Academy from October 1999 to August 2001, suggesting that his foreign language expertise is in Russian. Liu Wenping, Li Yibao and Cao Jieyu, “Devote Every Effort for Winning – Story of Hu Wubo, Chief of Staff of an Unidentified Submarine Flotilla of the East Sea Fleet” *People’s Navy*, 14 October 2009. The *People’s Daily* report fails to directly identify the submarine flotilla in question, referring to it only as an “unidentified submarine flotilla” (*mou qianting zhidui*; 某潜艇支队).

331 Liu, Li, and Cao, “Devote Every Effort for Winning.”

**Experience at sea:**

- In 2012, VADM Tian commanded the Chinese contingent of a combined naval exercise with Russia. He has also led joint training operations in the Yellow Sea with other branches of the PLA, and naval training operations and patrols in the Western Pacific.333

**RADM Li Xiaoyan, South Sea Fleet deputy chief of staff**

**Pace of career progression:**

- At 52, RADM Li is two years younger than the known average age for navy officers currently serving in similar positions.

**Advanced education and training abroad:**

- RADM Li has two bachelor’s degrees.334
- In 1996 he went to Russia’s N.G. Kuznetsov Naval Academy to study advanced naval theory and equipment.
- He graduated in 1999 with a master’s degree. His thesis, written entirely in Russian, was titled “Vessel Formation for Naval Attack Operations.”335

**Experience at sea:**

- In 2012, RADM Li commanded the 13th Gulf of Aden mission.
- In 2007, he commanded the Chinese contingent of a combined military exercise in the Malacca Strait. This exercise included ships from the United States, Canada, Japan, Pakistan, Korea, and Singapore.336
- In 2000, he commanded the Luhai-class destroyer *Shenzhen* on a 65-day goodwill mission to Southeast Asia and Africa. This mission was the first time a PLA Navy vessel crossed three oceans in one trip. It was also the first time a PLA Navy ship crossed the Indian Ocean, passed the Cape of Good Hope, and visited Africa.

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333 Wang Lingshuo, “Sino-Russian Joint Exercise Enters the Stage of Summing-up and Exchange;” Zhang Tiannan, Fu Kaiqiang and Mi Jinguo, “Why is Flavor of the ‘Sea’ so Strong During this Battle?”


335 Li Chenghua, Chen Wanjun, and Li Xiangdong, “Proud, Valiant Fighters of the Ocean (Parts 1 and 2).”

336 “Chinese Frigate Arrives in Singapore for Multilateral Exercise.”
VADM Jiang Weilie, South Sea Fleet commander

_Pace of career progression:_

- VADM Jiang has been promoted rapidly in the past few years from commander of the Lushun Support Base in 2008, to commander of the South Sea Fleet by late 2010.

_Membership in central-level Party organizations:_

- VADM Jiang was elected as an alternate to the 18th Party Congress Central Committee, which is an important organization in the Communist Party hierarchy.

In addition, although the following two officers hold lower-level positions within the PLA Navy and are not part of this leadership cohort, they may be well positioned for career advancement in the near term.

**Senior Captain Zhang Zheng, commander of the aircraft carrier Liaoning**

_Advanced education and training abroad:_

- SCAPT Zhang is a 1990 graduate of Shanghai Jiaotong University, one of China’s premier civilian academic institutions.
- From 1992 to 1995, he studied at the Dalian Naval Vessel Academy, and graduated with a master’s degree.
- From 2001 to 2003, he studied at the British Defense Language Institute and the British Joint Services Command and Staff Academy. He is fluent in English.

**CDR Wang Hongmin, commander of the destroyer Fuzhou**

_Membership in central-level Party organizations:_

- CDR Wang appears to have developed good Party credentials at a relatively young age. In 2012, Wang was made a delegate to the 18th National Party Congress for the first time. During the Congress, Wang was named by Chinese authoritative media as a model representative of a PLA delegate.

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339 “PLA PAP Select 300 Individuals as 18 Party Congress Representatives.”

• He joined the Party in 1993, and was named an outstanding member of the Party within the army in 2011. \(^{341}\)

*Experience at sea:*

• In 2011, CDR Wang participated in the navy component of the mission to evacuate Chinese citizens from Libya. \(^{342}\)

• Also in 2011, he participated in the 7\(^{th}\) Gulf of Aden task force as the captain of the frigate *Xuzhou*.

**Summary**

As the PLA Navy continues to professionalize its officer corps, evidence suggests that the five factors examined in this chapter have the potential to influence an officers’ career advancement.

Rapid career progression and participation in central-level Party organizations have long been important to PLA Navy officers’ careers. However, the growing importance of experience at sea, formal training and education, and experience abroad, stand in stark contrast to the early career experience of China’s current navy leadership – particularly generation 1 officers who joined the PLA in the 1960s. For these officers, access to formal education was limited, opportunities to study abroad were restricted, and the navy lacked the capacity to operate for long periods of time in the high seas. For these reasons, it is unlikely that formal education and deployment at sea played as important a role in the career progression of the current PLA Navy leadership as they do for younger officers today.


\(^{342}\) Ibid.
Chapter 6. Trends in PLA leadership and the implications of our findings for the U. S. Navy

The final chapter of this study identifies some emerging trends in China’s navy leadership, and examines the implications that our findings have for the U.S. Navy.

**Observable trends in China’s navy leadership**

We have identified the following as observable trends occurring within the PLA Navy leadership:

- A potential large-scale transition within the highest-level of navy leadership.
- Upcoming PLA Navy leaders will have more operational experience than their predecessors.
- A new leadership will take command of a dramatically transformed PLA Navy.
- China’s youngest generation of navy leaders are obtaining higher levels of education and more technical savvy.
- New promotion indicators, including higher education and experience at sea, are emerging.
- Participation in Party organizations continues to be important as an indicator of career advancement.

**A large-scale transition may take place within the highest-level PLA Navy leadership.**

One of the most important trends to emerge from this study is that the PLA Navy is likely to experience a significant transition of its most senior leaders in the near term. Since ADM Wu Shengli assumed command of China’s navy in 2006, the top level of the navy’s operational leadership has remained relatively stable. Four of the 13 Navy Party Standing Committee members have served on that decision-making body for at least five years. For example, Navy Political Commissar ADM Liu Xiaojiang has served in his position since 2008 and Deputy Commanders VADM Zhang Yongyi and VADM Ding Yiping have both served for seven years.

However, over half of the Navy Party Standing Committee membership will reach their retirement ages by 2015, suggesting that China’s navy is on the cusp of a leadership transition at the highest levels. Moreover, given that many Committee members are reaching their retirement age at roughly the same time, a leadership transition may occur suddenly. This could create multiple openings on the PLA Navy Standing Committee for officers currently serving in lower-level leadership positions at PLA Navy Headquarters, or within the fleets, to fill.
Upcoming PLA Navy leaders will have more operational experience than their predecessors.

The eventual retirement of core members of the Navy Standing Committee will leave multiple vacancies to be filled by younger members of the PLA Navy leadership. Most candidates likely to fill these top-level positions are members of generation 2. These officers joined the PLA in the early 1970s, before it began to modernize. Now, however, many have direct experience with its new roles and missions: commanding training missions in the Western Pacific, and escort operations in the Gulf of Aden. Thus, the new cohort of top leaders would be significantly more experienced in the PLA Navy’s new roles and mission than their predecessors.

Like their predecessors, the next generation of navy leaders will be shaped by their memories of the Cultural Revolution.

One characteristic that the next generation of navy leaders will share with their older counterparts is a living memory of the Cultural Revolution, which was one of the most dangerous and unstable periods in recent PRC history. The youngest navy leaders we encountered in this study were born in the early 1960s, meaning that virtually every individual within the senior leadership of the navy has memories of the decade of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). This was a period in which intense political movements brought the Chinese economy and educational system to a virtual standstill, and social and political structures to the brink of collapse.

It is likely that every current PLA Navy leader was affected by his experiences during the Cultural Revolution. The extent of these effects on specific individuals is not known; however, all of these leaders remember a time when China was weak, unstable, and under threat of a major war. They have also seen China emerge from that period to become a world economic and military power with a high degree of internal stability.

China’s navy leadership will take command of a dramatically transformed PLA Navy, albeit one that continues to exist within a PLA that remains ground force centric.

Years of focused, well-funded modernization efforts have transformed the PLA Navy from a technically backward coastal defense force into an emerging expeditionary navy capable of conducting blue-water operations. These changes, however, bring with them a new set of problems that the next generation of leaders must address. New blue-water missions, for example, will require the PLA Navy to continue to upgrade its logistics capabilities to support those missions. In addition, the navy, like the rest of the PLA, will continue to improve its ability to conduct “joint operations” with the other services.

The navy’s new generation of leaders must address these challenges, but they will do so within a military structure that remains largely ground force centric. PLA ground force officers will continue to dominate top positions throughout the PLA military hierarchy.
Therefore, the PLA Navy’s new cohort of leaders will take over a navy that is dramatically
different both from the one their predecessors took command of, and from the one they
themselves first experienced in the early years of their military career.

As the PLA Navy's next generation takes command, they will be leading officers who are
more educated and technically savvy than any in recent PLA history.

Below the next generation of leadership is the navy’s youngest generation of current leaders –
generation 3. Staffed in Navy Headquarters and within the fleets, many in this group are better
educated and more technically savvy than their counterparts in generation 1 or generation 2.

Officers currently at the top levels of PLA Navy leadership are mostly from the first generation,
which entered military service when most military academies were shuttered. Likewise, officers
in China’s second generation of leadership joined the PLA before the PME system had been
completely re-established.

By contrast, officers from the youngest generation of PLA Navy leaders entered the military
after the PME system had been fully re-established and improved. Their careers have unfolded
during a time when the PLA has placed increasing emphasis on advanced technology and on the
application of information technology to command and control, or “informatization.” Most navy
officers hold at least a bachelor’s degree, and more and more officers are receiving graduate-
level education.

Given the PLA’s increasing focus on education and technical expertise, younger officers with
advanced training and education may be well positioned for further promotion. This could be
particularly the case for officers in the logistics and equipment career tracks, whose jobs require
high levels of technical expertise. The PLA Navy has already shown a willingness to promote
younger logistics officers into high-level positions. As an example, PLA Navy Logistics
Department Director RADM Xu Weibing, at 52 years old, is the youngest member of the Navy
Standing Committee. At age 64, Equipment Department Deputy Director RADM Geng
Guangsheng is one of the older members of the navy leadership cohort. As he and other
equipment and logistics officers retire, this may provide opportunities for generation 3 officers
within these career tracks to advance.

Certain factors make individual navy officers strong candidates for career advancement.

Though many of the standards and regulations guiding promotion and career advancement within
the PLA are publicly available, the continued importance of personal connections, family
relationships, and corruption make it impossible for outside observers to gain a complete picture
of all the factors that influence the promotion process. Nevertheless, the career trajectories of
officers at the top of the PLA Navy hierarchy often exhibit one or more of the following
characteristics:
• They are promoted rapidly through the lower tiers of leadership, often faster than the normal three-year timeframe in each grade, or the four-year timeframe for rank. In rare cases, promising officers may have even skipped a grade during the course of their career.

• They hold membership in central-level Party organizations.

• They obtain important blue-water operational experience through commanding operations such as Gulf of Aden missions, Western Pacific operations, or combined military exercises with other countries, and have performed these tasks well.

• They have strong academic credentials, including graduate degrees.

• They have received training at foreign academies, or have had experience engaging with foreign military personnel.

One constant across generations of PLA Navy officers is their political reliability and loyalty to the Communist Party.

The Communist Party remains deeply embedded within the navy leadership structure. No major decision can be made within PLA Navy units without the Party Committee’s approval. The Party has an especially strong role in personnel issues, including promotion decisions. The Chinese officers with whom the U.S. Navy interacts have been carefully selected and vetted by Party institutions. Their statements in official settings will reflect what the Party views as the primary objectives for the military-to-military exchange.

Implications for the U.S. Navy

The analysis above suggests a number of implications for USN officers as they strive to understand and interact with their Chinese naval counterparts:

Because of the differences within the PLA Navy leadership cohort, U.S. naval officers should consider modifying their expectations, engagement style, and approach, depending upon the naval officer(s) with whom they are likely to interact.

Because the Chinese navy leadership is not a unified group, U.S. naval officers engaging with their Chinese navy counterparts will be interacting with different types of officers, who may possess different qualities depending upon when they joined the Chinese military.

Younger generations of currently serving PLA Navy leaders are becoming increasingly professional, developing skills and backgrounds that are similar to those of their U.S. Navy counterparts.

At the highest level of U.S.–China naval engagement, U.S. officers are currently interacting with PLA Navy leaders who are capable and self-confident. As a group, however, these officers have
the least amount of formal and technical training, and the least amount of direct experience with the PLA Navy’s newest roles and missions.

Below the top level of PLA Navy leadership, generation 2 officers serving in Navy Headquarters and the fleets are gaining direct experience with the navy’s new missions, and are spending more time deployed at sea. These officers may therefore have more areas of commonality with their U.S. Navy counterparts than their more senior colleagues in generation 1.

China’s youngest generation of navy leaders are the most highly educated, technically savvy, and professional of any of the three generations of PLA Navy leaders. Given their advanced education, professional military education, and experience at sea, generation 3 officers may share the most commonalities with their U.S. Navy counterparts, and may have a greater capacity for engagement at the operational level than more senior level officers.

**PLA Navy leaders serving in joint positions across the PLA provide the U.S. Navy with additional opportunities to expand their understanding of the officers shaping the PLA Navy, as well as the drivers of China’s naval activities.**

Chinese naval officers are serving in important PLA Navy leadership positions, not only at Navy Headquarters and within the fleets, but in other positions throughout the PLA. Chinese naval officers, for example, serve as deputy chiefs of the PLA general staff, as deputy directors on the Science and Technology Committee in the General Equipment Department, and in important logistics and general staff positions in China’s military regions.

Understanding and engaging navy officers serving in these joint positions will provide additional insights into the drivers shaping China’s naval modernization.

**Effective PLA Navy leadership analysis must be a long-term and sustained program.**

While identifying key leadership positions is the first step in PLA Navy leadership analysis, remaining up to date and informed of the changes occurring within those positions is the only way to provide timely and effective analysis. The dynamic and changing nature of the PLA Navy personnel landscape requires a sustained level of effort to keep pace with those changes.

**An ongoing program of PLA Navy leadership analysis should consist of the following:**

- **Utilize all means of analysis available.** By identifying possible candidates for the “next generation” of navy leaders before they come of age, U.S. naval officers can be well prepared for future leadership transitions. They can do this through linking leadership analysis with operational analysis, which focuses on the PLA Navy’s most operationally advanced platforms, where many of China’s future navy leaders are currently serving.

Also needed is a greater focus on the PLA Navy’s strategic and operational policymakers serving in military academies and research institutes. These individuals have yet
to be systematically examined, despite their capacity to influence future directions in PLA Navy doctrine, personnel, and technical research.

- **Share information and cooperate across multiple organization.** Sustained cooperation between CNA and other organizations studying the PLA Navy, such as the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the China Maritime Studies Institute at the Naval War College, would increase the data and analytical methods available to identify and examine the next generation of China’s navy leadership.

- **Fully leverage the U.S. Navy’s engagements with the PLA Navy.** Future analysis could also be improved by systematically leveraging the U.S. Navy’s growing engagement opportunities with the PLA Navy. Systematic coordination and preparation of U.S. participants in these engagements would expand the amount of PLA Navy leadership data available, while more in-depth leadership analysis would likely improve the quality of those engagements.
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PLA Navy Headquarters, Beijing

ADM Wu Shengli (吴胜利)

Position: Commander, PLA Navy; Deputy Secretary, PLA Navy Party Standing Committee

Grade: Central Military Commission Member (Grade 2)

ADM Wu Shengli in Wuqiao County, Hebei Province, about 200 miles south of Beijing. He is the son of Wu Xian, who was a Red Army political commissar during the War of Anti-Japanese Resistance and the Chinese Civil War. The elder Wu later held important political positions during the Mao years, including mayor of the city of Hangzhou and vice governor of Zhejiang Province. Due to his parentage, ADM Wu can be considered a “princeling” (taizi; 太子) in Chinese political parlance.343

ADM Wu earned a degree in oceanography from the Surveying and Mapping College of the People’s Liberation Army in 1966, just before the Cultural Revolution swept China and largely shut down the country’s higher education system. He did not attend naval officer training courses until 1972, when he began the captain’s course at the Dalian Naval Vessel Academy. 344

In the 1970s and 1980s, ADM Wu gained experience as the captain of navy frigates and destroyers. From 1984 to 1992, he served as the deputy chief of staff of the Shanghai Naval Base, a major support base for the East Sea Fleet, strategically located at the mouth of the Yangtze River and close to China’s largest coastal city. Jiang Zemin, future president of China, was serving as Shanghai Party secretary during this time, leading some PLA-watchers to speculate that ADM Wu may have cultivated ties with Jiang.345

In 1992, ADM Wu became chief of staff of the Fujian Support Base in the East Sea Fleet. In 1994, at age 49, he was appointed commandant of the Dalian Naval Vessel Academy, his alma mater and the PLA Navy’s highest educational institution for surface vessel officers. He was also promoted to rear admiral. ADM Wu rejoined the East Sea Fleet as a deputy commander in 1998.

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343 Center for China Studies, “Profile of Wu Shengli,” National Taiwan Chengchi University, http://ics.nccu.edu.tw/chinaleaders/profile.php?id=2787. In China, “princelings” are viewed as a distinct political class of people, who enter public service, business, or the military with career advantages based on their families’ prestige.


345 Ibid.
In 2002, he was appointed commander of the South Sea Fleet. He was promoted to vice admiral one year later. In 2004, he moved to Beijing after being promoted to deputy chief of the General Staff, a Grade 3 (MR Leader grade) position that made him the second-highest-ranking operational officer in the PLA Navy.\textsuperscript{346}

ADM Wu was named PLA Navy commander in 2006, when a terminal illness forced his predecessor, ADM Zhang Dingfa, to step down. He has presided over the PLA Navy during a time of expanding Chinese maritime interests, increasing regional tensions, and diversifying missions for the navy. The service has grown from a narrowly focused coastal defense force to an emerging expeditionary force. His tenure has been marked by a litany of achievements and historic firsts. These include the PLA Navy’s first deployment of a counter-piracy task force to the Gulf of Aden in 2008, the successful preparation and execution of the 60\textsuperscript{th} Anniversary Fleet Review in 2009, the first evacuation of foreign nationals from a distant country during the 2011 Libya crisis, and the commissioning of China’s first aircraft carrier in 2012.

In the run up to the 18\textsuperscript{th} Communist Party Congress in November 2012, some PLA-watchers expected that ADM Wu would be named vice chairman of the Central Military Commission or defense minister.\textsuperscript{347} However, after the Party Congress, he remained PLA Navy commander. He remains a member of the 18\textsuperscript{th} CPC Central Committee.

\textsuperscript{346} Center for China Studies, “Profile of Wu Shengli.”

ADM Liu Xiaojiang (刘晓江)

Position: Political Commissar, PLA Navy; Secretary, PLA Navy
Party Standing Committee

Grade: Military Region Leader (Grade 3)

According to the *Southern Daily*, a daily newspaper affiliated with the Guangdong provincial Party committee, Liu Xiaojiang 刘晓江 in Ji’an, a city in the southern inland province of Jiangxi. He is married to Man Mei, the daughter of former PRC general secretary Hu Yaobang, a political moderate whose death in 1989 was a major contributing event to the Tiananmen Square demonstrations. In Man Mei’s 2005 memoir about her father, she recounts how Liu joined Man’s three brothers in carrying wreathes for the December 1990 ceremony at which Hu’s ashes were interred. 348

In 1968, at the height of the Cultural Revolution, Liu was forced to work on a rural commune in Xixiang County, Shaanxi Province, as an “educated youth.” He remained there for two years before joining the military. 349

Liu entered the PLA ground forces in 1970 as a soldier in the railroad corps, and was eventually made a platoon leader. At some point in the 1970s he became a political officer, and served as director of the Propaganda Department for a ground forces division. 350

Most likely due to the upheaval of the early Cultural Revolution, which brought higher education in China to a standstill, Liu did not begin his undergraduate education until age 23, two years after joining the PLA. From April 1972 to January 1975, Liu studied at the Chinese Department of Heilongjiang University. 351

From 1978 to 1980, Liu served in the PLA General Staff Department (GSD) as secretary of the Headquarters Office of the GSD Communications Department. 352

From 1980 to 1983, Liu served as personal secretary to the powerful former PLA Navy commander and CMC vice-chair Liu Huaqin. 353

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350 Ibid.

351 Ibid.

352 Ibid.

353 Ibid.
In 1984, Liu Xiaojiang was assigned to the PLA General Political Department (GPD), serving as deputy director of the Planning and Assignments Division (jihua tiaopeichu; 计划调配处) within the GPD’s Cadre Department, a department responsible for a wide range of personnel matters. From December 1992 to August 1998, he served as deputy director of this division, and was later promoted to director of the GPD’s Cultural Department.

In 1998, at age 49, Liu took his first navy billet, becoming deputy director of the PLA Navy’s Political Department, a Grade 5 (Corps (Jun) Leader) position. Soon afterwards, Liu was appointed head of a special investigative task force for the navy following the Xiamen-Yuanhua smuggling case, a major corruption scandal that implicated hundreds of Party personnel, including GPD Intelligence Chief General Ji Shengde.\footnote{Liu Xiaojing, “Move Forward During the Improvement of the Party’s Working Style and the Building of a Clean Government” (zai dangfenglianzheng jianshezhong qianxing; 在党风廉政建设中前行), \textit{PLA Daily}, 16 March 2009. For more on this scandal and its implications for the PLA, see James Mulvenon, “To Get Rich Is Unprofessional: Chinese Military Corruption in the Jiang Era,” \textit{China Leadership Monitor}, 5 June 2003.} Two years later, he was appointed to the Navy Discipline Inspection Committee, the main body responsible for handling illegal activity or violations of Party discipline within the navy. Liu was also made a member of the Party-wide 16\textsuperscript{th} Central Discipline Inspection Committee. In 2009, Liu published a lengthy article in \textit{PLA Daily}, recounting his work on the Yuanhua affair and discussing steps the PLA should take to address the challenge of corruption.\footnote{Liu Xiaojing, “Move Forward.”}

Liu became political commissar of the PLA Navy after his predecessor, Hu Yanlin, retired in 2008.\footnote{“Liu Xiaojiang,” \textit{China Intelligence}.} Liu was elected as a full member to the 17\textsuperscript{th} CPC Central Committee in 2007 and the 18\textsuperscript{th} CPC Central Committee in 2012.\footnote{“Member List of the 17th Central Committee” (zhongguo gongchandang shi jie zhongyang weiyuan huiyi weiyuan mingdan; 中国共产党第十七届中央委员会委员名单), Xinhua, 21 October 2007, \url{http://news.xinhuanet.com/mise/2007-10/21/content_6917382.htm}; “Member List of the 18th Central Committee” (zhongguo gongchandang shi jie zhongyang weiyuan huiyi weiyuan mingdan; 中国共产党第十八届中央委员会委员名单), Xinhua, 14 November 2012, \url{http://news.xinhuanet.com/18cpcnc/2012-11/14/e_113690703.htm}.}

Liu will reach the mandatory retirement age for his grade in 2014.
PLA Navy deputy commanders

VADM Ding Yiping (丁一平)

Position: Deputy Commander, PLA Navy

Grade: Military Region Deputy Leader (Grade 4)

VADM Ding Yiping 钟一平 in Xiang County, Hunan Province, an inland province in central China. Ding is reportedly the son of PLA Lieutenant General Ding Qiusheng, a Long March veteran and former political commissar of the People's Liberation Army General School for Advanced Infantry (now the Nanjing Army Command Academy). Therefore, ADM Ding (like ADM Wu Shengli) can be considered a “princeling.”

Ding joined the navy in 1968 and the Communist Party in 1970. He worked his way up through various surface vessels, including destroyers and frigates, before commanding his first ship, the destroyer Changsha in the late 1970s.

In 1979, Ding became deputy chief of the training office for the headquarters of a naval garrison. In 1983, he became chief of staff of a minesweeper squadron (dadui). In October 1984, he was promoted to deputy commander of a frigate squadron. In 1985, he was promoted to deputy commander of a frigate division (zhidui). In 1987, he was appointed deputy commander of a naval garrison, and in 1989, he was made commander of a destroyer division (zhidui). Four years later, in 1993, he served briefly as chief of staff of a naval base.

In 1980, Ding completed a year-long course in vessel command at the Naval Command Academy in Nanjing. In September 1985, Ding returned to the Naval Command Academy to begin a two-year combined arms command program, which ended in July 1987. In 1996, he completed a three-month course in national defense research at the National Defense University. In 2001, he completed a three-year postgraduate program for provincial and ministerial-level cadres at the Central Party School in Beijing.

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360 Center for China Studies, “Profile of Ding Yiping.”
362 Ibid.
363 Ibid.
In 1993, Ding was appointed commandant of the Guangzhou Naval Vessel Academy (now the Navy Marine Academy). In January 1995, Ding became chief of staff of the North Sea Fleet. In December 1997, he became a deputy commander of the North Sea Fleet. Three years later, he was promoted to commander of the North Sea Fleet. He was made a vice admiral in 2002.

At that time, Ding was considered a rising star within the PLA Navy leadership. However, in 2003, during his command, the North Sea Fleet’s Number 361 Ming-class nuclear submarine malfunctioned, killing all its crew members. The “361 Incident” reverberated throughout the top navy leadership, and it marked a significant setback for Ding’s career. Following the incident, Ding was removed from his command (as was the North Sea Fleet political commissar) and transferred to Beijing to serve as a deputy chief of staff, a position one grade lower than that of a fleet commander (a grade 5 versus grade 4 position). This was termed as an “administrative demotion” in the Hong Kong press (including the PRC government-funded Ta Kung Pao), though official mainland outlets only reported that Ding had been dealt with severely.

After three years in this posting, he returned to a grade 4 position in August 2006, when he was promoted to PLA Navy deputy commander. From December 2006 until 2009, Ding served as both a deputy commander and as PLA Navy chief of staff. In 2009 he relinquished his post as chief of staff, but remained a deputy commander. Ding was an alternate member of the CCP Central Committee for both the 16th and 17th Party Congresses.

Ding is one of the more prolific writers in the PLA Navy leadership. In 2000, he published a book on world naval history. He also served as deputy editor of the 2006 Science of Naval Training. Ding has also published several articles, including a 2007 article on the importance of civil-military relations in the journal Culture in Barracks.

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364 Center for China Studies, “Profile of Ding Yiping.”
365 “Ding Yiping,” Hunan Popular Science.
369 “Ding Yiping,” Hunan Popular Science.
370 Ding Yiping, World Naval History (shijie haijun shi; 世界海军史) (Beijing: Hai Chao Press, 2000).
372 Ding Yiping, “For the Military To Advance, It Relies on the People,” Culture in Barracks, no. 11 (2007).
VADM Liu Yi (刘毅)

Position: Deputy Commander, PLA Navy

Grade: Military Region Deputy Leader (Grade 4)

VADM Liu Yi was born in Shandong Province 373 He is a career submariner. Unofficial Chinese websites note that VADM Liu Yi joined the PLA in 1969, at the age of 14. 374

From early 2001 to 2007, Liu served as commander of the 1st Submarine Base in the Laoshan District of Qingdao Municipality. In mid 2007, Liu became a PLA Navy deputy chief of staff. 375 A few months later, Liu published an article about the Indian Navy in Modern Navy. 376 In 2009, he commanded a goodwill mission to the Republic of Korea and Japan, during which non-Chinese cadets took part in full-course navigation training on a Chinese ship for the first time. 377

In 2010 and 2011, Liu was rapidly promoted through several key positions, serving consecutively as a deputy commander of the East Sea Fleet, commander of the East Sea Fleet, and a deputy commander of the PLA Navy. 378 He is currently the navy’s youngest deputy commander, and the only active duty deputy commander who will not reach retirement age before the 19th Party Congress in 2017.

In light of his relatively young age and the pace at which he has been promoted since 2010, VADM Liu is worth following as a potential future PLA Navy commander. However, Liu was not elected to the 17th or 18th Central Committees of the Communist Party, suggesting that he lacks the Party credentials possessed by some of the other candidates.

374 Jun Zheng, Backgrounds of Deputy Military Region Leaders (fudaqu lingdao jianli; 副大区领导简历), 3 November 2012, www.360doc.com/content/12/1103/06/0_245418893.shtml.
VADM Su Shiliang (苏士亮)

Position: Deputy Commander, PLA Navy

Grade: Military Region Deputy Leader (Grade 4)

Su Shiliang was born in Qingzhou, Shandong Province, about 150 miles west of Qingdao, where the North Sea Fleet is headquartered. Su’s background is in destroyers, and he previously commanded a destroyer division (zhidui). 379

Limited information is available regarding VADM Su’s educational background. According to a 2009 profile of VADM Su published in the independent Hong Kong-based magazine Frontline (Chien Shao), he graduated from Qingdao Naval Academy in 1968 with a specialization in torpedo design. 380 He also attended the Dalian Naval Vessel Academy, Naval Command Academy, and National Defense University (NDU). 381

In 1995 VADM Su became chief of staff of the Qingdao Support Base. Three years later, he was promoted to deputy chief of staff of the North Sea Fleet. In 2000, Su was appointed commandant of the Naval Command Academy in Nanjing. In 2002, he was appointed to the Nanjing Military Region (MR) Headquarters as a deputy chief of staff, thus gaining cross-service experience. 382

After his service in the Nanjing MR, Su enjoyed a rapid series of promotions and transfers. In April 2006, he took command of the North Sea Fleet. In late 2007 he was appointed to the South Sea Fleet, becoming the only current PLA Navy leader to have commanded two different fleets. In 2007, he was elected as an alternate to the 17th Central Committee. 383

According to the Frontline article referenced above, as South Sea Fleet commander, VADM Su, upon orders from Navy Headquarters, dispatched a Marine brigade to respond to the Sichuan earthquake in 2008. 384

By early 2009, Su had replaced VADM Ding Yiping as chief of staff of the navy. 385 In this position, he accompanied Minister of Defense Liang Guanglie on a delegation to the United

380 This “institute” is likely the Naval Submarine Academy.
381 Chin Ch’ien Li, “Vice Admiral Su Shih Liang, Chief of Staff of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN): Excellent Vice Admiral among Fifth Generation of Admiral-Level Officers,” Chien Shao, 1 March 2009.
382 Center for China Studies, “Profile of Su Shiliang.”
383 Ibid.
384 Chin Ch’ien Li, “Vice Admiral Su Shih Liang.”
States.\textsuperscript{386} He was appointed a PLA Navy deputy commander in late 2010.\textsuperscript{387} Unless his birthdate has been misreported, Su will reach retirement age in 2013.

VADM Xu Hongmeng (徐洪猛)

Position: Deputy Commander, PLA Navy

Grade: Military Region Deputy Leader (Grade 4)

VADM Xu Hongmeng 在 Suizhong County, Liaoning Province.\textsuperscript{388} Xu is one of two current deputy commanders with a background as a submariner, the other being VADM Liu Yi.

Xu was educated at the Naval Command Academy, majoring in military strategy.\textsuperscript{389} He previously served as commander of the 42\textsuperscript{nd} Submarine Division (zhidui). From 1999 to 2002, he served as a deputy chief of staff of the East Sea Fleet. In 2002 he became deputy commander of the East Sea Fleet’s Zhoushan Support Base, and was later promoted to base commander.\textsuperscript{390}

In 2005, Xu moved to Beijing to serve as a deputy chief of staff of the PLA Navy. In less than a year he was promoted to commander of the East Sea Fleet.\textsuperscript{391} While in this position, Xu published an article in Modern Navy asserting the usefulness of a conventional submarine force.\textsuperscript{392} In 2007, he was promoted to vice admiral.\textsuperscript{393}

\textsuperscript{385} “Vice Admiral Su Shiliang Transferred to Chief of Staff of the Navy” (zhongjiang su shiliang tiaoren haijun canmouzhang; 中将苏士亮调入海军参谋长), Sina.com, 22 January 2009, http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_416498da0100ceoy.html.

\textsuperscript{386} Jiang Xinxiang, “Five Army, Navy, Air Force High-ranking Officers Accompany Liang Guanglie on the Foreign Visit” (hailukong [wuhujiang] sui liangguanglie chufang; 海陆空「五虎将」随梁光烈出访), Wen Wei Po, 7 May 2012.

\textsuperscript{387} Center for China Studies, “Profile of Su Shiliang.”


\textsuperscript{389} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{390} Center for China Studies, “Profile of Xu Hongmeng,” National Taiwan Chengchi University, http://ics.nccu.edu.tw/chinaleaders/profile.php?id=5933.

\textsuperscript{391} China’s National People’s Congress, “Delegate Information.”


\textsuperscript{393} China’s National People’s Congress, “Delegate Information.”

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In 2009, Xu became a deputy commander of the PLA Navy. In this position, he has accompanied former CMC vice-chair Guo Boxiong on two separate occasions: once to Kazakhstan in 2009, and once to Vietnam in 2011. Xu will reach retirement age in 2014.

**VADM Zhang Yongyi (张永义)**

Position: Deputy Commander, PLA Navy

Grade: Military Region Deputy Leader (Grade 4)

Zhang Yongyi in Haicheng County, Liaoning Province, about 150 miles north of the port city of Dalian. According to Taiwan academic sources, he attended an unidentified air force flight academy. He also holds a graduate degree in politics and law from Capital Normal University, making him one of only a few top PLA Navy leaders to have received a graduate degree from a civilian university.

Zhang entered the air force in 1966. He later transferred into naval aviation, and served as an instructor at the Naval Flight Academy. Afterwards, he moved up through the ranks of PLA naval aviation, serving successively as commander of a battalion (zhongdui), commander of a regiment (dadui), and chief of staff. He was then promoted to commandant of the Naval Flight Academy in Huludao, Liaoning Province, before serving as head of naval aviation for the North Sea Fleet and later the South Sea Fleet. By 1998, Zhang had become a deputy commander of PLA naval aviation. In 2003, he became a PLA Navy deputy chief of staff.

Zhang was a delegate to the 10th National People’s Congress in 2003. In late 2004, he was promoted to PLA Navy deputy commander. VADM Zhang is the longest-serving current navy deputy commander.

Judging by his publications, since becoming deputy commander, Zhang’s portfolio may include responsibilities related to mobilization and training. Early on in his assignment as a deputy commander...
commander, Zhang wrote an article on mobilization in the journal *National Defense*. In 2006 he edited *Science of Navy Training*, one of a series of authoritative publications published by the Academy of Military Science, focusing on issues related to training across the PLA services. Fellow deputy commander Ding Yiping served as Zhang’s deputy editor on this volume.

Zhang is also responsible for the flight test and training program for China’s aircraft carrier, *Liaoning*. In 2012, Zhang led a delegation to the United States and met with many top U.S. naval officers, including Vice CNO ADM Ferguson.

Unless his birthdate has been misreported, VADM Zhang will reach mandatory retirement age in 2013.

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PLA Navy deputy political commissars

Lt. Gen. Wang Sentai (王森泰)

Position: Deputy Political Commissar, PLA Navy
Grade: Military Region Deputy Leader (Grade 4)

Wang Sentai was born in Wuxing, Zhejiang Province. He holds a graduate degree in international politics.405

According to Hong Kong media, Wang served as the political commissar for Bayi Studios, the PLA’s film and television production company.406 In 2007, Wang was promoted to director of the Subordinate Organizations Work Department (zhishu jiguan gongzuobu; 直属机关工作部) under the GPD, the department responsible for cultural goods produced directly for the GPD.407 Soon afterwards, Wang was selected to be a delegate to the 11th NPC.408 During the third meeting of the NPC, Wang gave a speech on ideological work for senior and mid-level cadres.409

In early 2010, Wang became deputy political commissar of the Academy of Military Sciences.410 Shortly afterwards, he published articles in two national newspapers. On July 18th he published an article in PLA Daily discussing the importance of political values to military innovation and research.411 Four days later, he published an article in People’s Daily on how best to popularize Marxism.412

406 “Major Adjustment of PLA Senior Political Generals” (jiefangjun gaoji zhenggong jiading datiaozheng; 解放军高级政工将领), Ta Kung Pao, 26 January 2010.
407 Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military, p. 136.
408 Wang Sentai, “People’s Daily.
411 Wang Sentai, “Thoughts on Forming Correct Value for Military Scientific Research” (duanzheng junshi keyan jiazhiguan de sikao; 端正军事科研价值观的思考), PLA Daily, 18 July 2010.
412 Wang Sentai, “Adhere to and Develop Marxism When Promoting its Popularization” (zai tuidong dazhonghua zhong jianchi he fazhan makesi zhuyi; 在推动大众化中坚持和发展马克思主义), People’s Daily, 22 July 2010.

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In 2012, Lt. Gen. Wang was elected as a member to the 18th Party Congress’s Central Discipline Inspection Committee. A few months after this appointment, Lt. Gen. Wang became a PLA Navy deputy political commissar.\(^{413}\)

**VADM Wang Zhaohai (王兆海)**

Position: Deputy Political Commissar, PLA Navy

Grade: Military Region Deputy Leader (Grade 4)

VADM Wang Zhaohai in Jianhu County in East China’s Jiangsu Province, about 200 miles north of Shanghai. He is a graduate of Sichuan University’s Chinese Department.\(^{414}\)

Wang joined the PLA Navy at age 20, taking a clerical position with the North Sea Fleet Logistics Department. He later joined a navy engineering battalion, and, after joining the Party in 1972, he became the battalion’s Party secretary. Later, he was appointed secretary of the Propaganda Office of the North Sea Fleet Logistics Department’s Political Department. In 1977, Wang began a 15-year-long rise through the ranks of *People’s Navy*, the official newspaper of the PLA Navy, of which he eventually became assistant editor-in-chief.\(^{415}\)

After leaving *People’s Navy* in 1992, Wang became secretary-general (*mishuchang* 秘书长) of the PLA Navy Political Department, and director of the Political Department’s Cultural Department. In 2000, he was appointed deputy director of the PLA General Political Department’s Propaganda Department, where he was in charge of cultural work.\(^{416}\) In 2004, he became director of the Political Department of the Academy of Military Sciences (AMS), and in 2008, he became a deputy commandant at AMS.

In 2009, Wang became director of the PLA Navy Political Department. He was promoted to deputy political commissar two years later.\(^{417}\)

Wang has written for military publications such as *Army-Party Life* and *People’s Liberation Daily*. He has also published essays in high-level Party periodicals such as *Study Times* and

\(^{413}\) Chen Baocheng, “Reshuffling of High-Ranking Military Officers at Sub-Military Region Level After 18th National Congress of Communist Party of China Is Basically in Place” (*shibadahou fu dajunqu ji jiangling tiaozheng jiben dawei*; 十八大后副大军区级将领调整基本到位), *Caixin*, 29 January 2013.


\(^{415}\) Ibid.


\(^{417}\) Center for China Studies, “Profile of Wang Zhaohai.”
Seeking Truth. His essays often discuss the importance of political work. He is an honorary member of the China Federation of Literary and Art Circles, a Party-affiliated association of writers and artists.

Wang will reach mandatory retirement age in 2013.

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419 Wang Zhaohai, “Political Work Also Has Equipment.”
PLA Navy Headquarters Department

VADM Du Jingchen (杜景臣)

Position: Chief of Staff, PLA Navy

Grade: Military Region Deputy Leader (Grade 4)

VADM Du Jingchen in Tancheng County, Shandong Province.420

Du’s early naval career was spent primarily on surface vessels. He was the youngest PLA Navy captain to ever command a destroyer, as well as the youngest officer to command a destroyer division (zhidui).421

Throughout his early career, Du traveled extensively. By the time he was a division commander, Xinhua notes, he had already “traveled some 350,000 nautical miles, visited six countries, and successively joined in 10 major state scientific research experiments and large-scale military exercises.” Du took part in the PLA Navy’s first overseas delegation in 1985.422

In 2002, VADM Du became a deputy chief of staff of the Lushun Support Base. In late 2004, he became an assistant to PLA Navy chief of staff Sun Jianguo, who is now a deputy chief of the PLA general staff. In 2008, Du was promoted to chief of staff of the South Sea Fleet.423

That same year, Du was appointed commander of the very first Gulf of Aden task force. After returning home, he was promoted to commander of the East Sea Fleet, and less than a year later he was made PLA Navy chief of staff.424

Du will reach retirement age in 2015.


422 Ibid.

423 “(Navy Vessels Escort) This Escorting Fully Shows Our Responsible Great Country's Image” (junjian huhang zheci huhang chongfen zhanshelie wo fuiren daguo xinxiang); (军舰护航 这次护航,充分展示了我负责任大国形象), Xinhua, 27 April 2009. The source does not specify which country was the destination of this delegation.

424 “PLA Navy Chief of Staff Rear Admiral Du Jingchen Promoted to Vice Admiral; Du Jingchen resumé of the former East Sea Fleet Commander” (haijun canmouzhang dujingchen shaojiang jinsheng zhongjiang juxian dujingchen jianli yuanren haijun donghai jianlui silingyuan; 海军参谋长杜景臣少将晋升中将军衔 杜景臣简历 原任海军东海舰队司令员), Sina.com, 3 August 2011, http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4fcd03e90102drbe.html.

425 Ibid.
RADM Duan Zhaoxian (段昭显)

Position: Deputy Chief of Staff, PLA Navy Headquarters Department

Grade: Corps (Jun) Leader (Grade 5)

Military enthusiast websites state that RADM Duan Zhaoxian in Duannian Village, Tutang Township, in the county of Duchang in Jianxi Province. The same websites provides information on his early background military career, and education. In 1972, during the Cultural Revolution, he worked on an agricultural commune, and joined the military in November of that year. After receiving three months of training in Fujian he was assigned to work under the commander of the Fujian Base. In 1975 he served as a sailor on a navy frigate, and in 1978 he served in the operations division of the Fujian Naval Base.

From 1979 to 1981, RADM Duan studied at the Naval Staff College, receiving a secondary technical diploma (zhongzhuan wenping; 中专文凭), roughly equivalent to a high school degree in the Chinese education system. From 1982 to 1985, he took a self taught correspondence course from the Beijing Language and Culture University.

From 1984 to 1986, he served on the operations staff at East Sea Fleet Headquarters. In 1986, he became the deputy director of the operations division of a naval base in Fujian Province, and was promoted to director in 1990. From 1992 to 1993 he received training at National Defense University, after which he became the deputy chief of staff of the naval garrison located at Xiamen, Fujian Province. In 1996, he became director of the East Sea Fleet’s military training division. From 1996 to 1999, he participated in an undergraduate, distance learning course on military command and management from the Naval Command Academy at Nanjing.

In 2000, RADM Duan served as the commander of a fast attack craft division (zhidui) based in Fujian in the East Sea Fleet. In March 2004, he was promoted to chief of staff of the Fujian Support Base. In April 2011 he was promoted to navy deputy chief of staff.

In 2012, Duan directed a combined military exercise with Russia called “Maritime Cooperation-2012.” According to Hong Kong paper Wen Wei Po, the exercise had an unusually prominent operational component, and featured joint antisubmarine warfare as well as joint air defense.

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426 Unless otherwise noted, this profile relies on “[Reserved] Background of Rear Admiral Duan Zhaoxian (PLA Navy Deputy Chief of Staff)” ([zhuanzai] duan zhaoxian xiaojian jianli (haijun canmouzhang; [转载段昭显少将简历（海军副参谋长）], Sina.com, 20 February 2012, http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_721f597b0101292x.html.
exercises. Duan worked with VADM Ding Yiping and North Sea Fleet Commander VADM Tian Zhong in organizing and carrying out this exercise. Afterwards, Duan said in a Hong Kong TV interview: “[The exercise] delivered a message to our people that our navy and our people need and love peace. If anyone bullies us, we will not be frightened by going to war and will surely win.”

**RADM Leng Zhenqing** (冷振庆)

Position: Deputy Chief of Staff, PLA Navy Headquarters Department

Grade: Corps (Jun) Leader (Grade 5)

Little information is available about RADM Leng Zhenqing’s career prior to November 2005, when he became a deputy director of the PLA Navy Equipment Department. He remained in that position for nearly five years before becoming a navy deputy chief of staff in March 2010. Before that, Chinese military enthusiast websites state that he previously worked as the department director for the Navy Equipment Department’s Comprehensive Planning Department.

Like VADM Liao Shining, Leng commanded a far-seas expedition on the training ship Zheng He during his tenure as deputy chief of staff. In July 2010 he commanded a formation that toured the South Pacific to promote the navy’s “harmonious ocean” concept in five countries: Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Tonga, New Zealand, and Australia.

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428 Interview with Duan Zhaoxian on Hong Kong Phoenix TV Info News Channel program, “Chinese News Live,” 27 April 2012.

429 “Leng Zhenqing Promoted to PLA Navy Deputy Chief of Staff” (leng zhenqing xiaojiang ren haijun fucanjingmouzhang; 冷振庆人海军副参谋长), bbs.tiexue.net, 30 March 2010, [bbs.tiexue.net/post_4166267_1.html](http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_4166267_1.html).

430 Ibid.

VADM Liao Shining (廖世宁)

Position: Deputy Chief of Staff, PLA Navy Headquarters Department

Grade: Corps (Jun) Leader (Grade 5)

A Chinese military enthusiast website states that Liao is based in Zhanjiang, Guangdong Province, home of the navy’s South Sea Fleet. According to Hong Kong paper Ta Kung Pao, Liao previously served as a deputy commandant of the Naval Engineering University. According to another Hong Kong paper, Ming Pao, Liao also has experience as director of the Campaign Training Bureau of the General Staff Department’s Operations Department.

In early 2006, Liao became a deputy chief of staff of the East Sea Fleet. He was made a PLA Navy deputy chief of staff in July 2009. In 2010, he led a navy delegation to Hawaii to take part in talks on maritime security issues.

In 2012, for the second time in its 63-year history, the navy circumnavigated the globe via the training ship Zheng He. VADM Liao served as commander of this expedition. The ship visited 14 countries and participated in anti-piracy training in the Gulf of Aden.

If the unofficial source cited above is correct, VADM Liao will reach retirement age for his grade in 2013.

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433 Ma Haoliang, “High-Ranking Officer Adjustments in the Navy with a Focus on Having a Technologically Strong Military” (haijun jiangling tiaozheng tuxian keji qiangjun; 海军将领调整 凸显科技强军), Ta Kung Pao, 9 February 2011; “PLA Exercise Makes Pincer Attack on Taiwan; Two Major Fleets Sent; ‘Chance Encounter’ with Kitty Hawk” (jiefangjun yanxi jiaji Taiwan liang da jiandui chudong ‘qiaoyu’ xiaoyinghao; 解放军演习夹击台湾两大舰队出动‘巧遇’小鹰号), Ming Pao, 24 November 2007.

434 “Liao Shining Resumé” (liaoshining jianli; 廖世宁简历), Biographies of Famous People (mingren jianli; 名人简历), www.gerenjianli.com/Mingren/02/1c7s21085gri1bb.html.


RADM Song Xue (宋学)

Position: Deputy Chief of Staff, PLA Navy
Grade: Corps (Jun) Leader (Grade 5)

Like fellow navy deputy chief of staff RADM Leng Zhenqing, RADM Song Xue came to Navy Headquarters via the Navy Equipment Department. In fact, the two worked together as deputy directors in 2009. Before that, RADM Song had been in charge of the Comprehensive Plans Department within the Navy Equipment Department.\textsuperscript{437} He became a navy deputy chief of staff in late 2012.\textsuperscript{438}

One reason why RADM Song may be worth watching is his involvement with the training program for the Liaoning aircraft carrier. He serves as deputy commander of the Liaoning’s test flight program, working under current navy deputy commander VADM Zhang Yongyi.\textsuperscript{439}

RADM Wang Weiming (王维明)

Position: Deputy Chief of Staff, PLA Navy Headquarters Department
Grade: Corps (Jun) Leader (Grade 5)

RADM Wang Weiming in Zhaoyuan, Shandong Province.\textsuperscript{440}

RADM Wang is a career naval aviator. He worked his way up through the 5\textsuperscript{th} Naval Aviation Division in the North Sea Fleet, and eventually served as its commander. In 2003, he transferred to the South Sea Fleet to become naval aviation chief of staff. Three years later, he was promoted to the position of fleet deputy commander and commander of the fleet’s naval aviation. In 2011, he became a navy deputy chief of staff.\textsuperscript{441}

\textsuperscript{437} “Senior Captain Song Xue Promoted to Equipment Department Deputy Director” (song xue daxiao shengren haijun zhuangbeibu fubuzhang; 宋学大小升任海军装备部副部长), Sina.com, 9 March 2009, http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_416498da0100cu3e.html.


\textsuperscript{439} “Aircraft Pays Tribute to Hero,” Xinhua, 28 November 2012.


\textsuperscript{441} Ibid.
RADM Xiao Xinnian (肖新年)

Position: Deputy Chief of Staff, PLA Navy Headquarters Department

Grade: Corps (Jun) Leader (Grade 5)

RADM Xiao Xinnian in Hanchuan, in central China’s Hubei Province. He joined the PLA in 1969. 442

He is a submariner by experience, and a graduate of the Naval Submarine Academy and National Defense University. 443 In his early career he worked his way up from submarine division (zhidui) commander, to chief of staff of a North Sea Fleet support base. He became chief of staff of the North Sea Fleet in 2002. 444 Also in 2002, he was named as a delegate to the 16th Communist Party Congress. 445

Only a few months after RADM Xiao became North Sea Fleet chief of staff, the Ming 361 incident occurred, in which a submarine malfunction caused the death of its crew. Like his superior at the time, VADM Ding Yiping, RADM Xiao was also demoted—in his case, from fleet chief of staff to fleet deputy chief of staff.

Since then, however, RADM Xiao’s career appears to have recovered. In 2007, he commanded the first-ever PRC naval delegation to Japan, which was described in the Chinese and Japanese media as a historic and important step in bilateral relations. 446 Shortly after returning to the South Sea Fleet, he was promoted to fleet deputy commander, which was the same grade as the North Sea Fleet chief of staff billet he held four years previously. 447 In 2008, RADM Xiao was transferred to Navy Headquarters to serve as a deputy chief of staff.

442 Liu Yue-shan, “Xiao Xinnian Promoted to Office of Deputy Chief of Staff of Navy” (xiao xinnian shengren haijun fu canmouzhang; 肖新年升任海军副参谋长), Wen Wei Po, 24 September 2008.

443 Ibid.


In August 2009, he attended a Sino-U.S. security meeting on maritime safety hosted in Beijing. In September, he attended the third Sino-Vietnam defense and security consultations. He also gave a detailed press briefing to foreign media following the first Gulf of Aden mission.

At 60 years old, RADM Xiao is five years past the retirement age for his position (55).

**RADM Zhang Jianchang (张建昌)**

Position: Deputy Chief of Staff, PLA Navy Headquarters Department

Grade: Corps (Jun) Leader (Grade 5)

In late 2010, RADM Zhang became a deputy director of the Informatization Department of the General Staff Department. He was appointed PLA Navy deputy chief of staff in late 2012. In 2003, he wrote an article in the *PLA Daily* promoting expansion of informatization throughout the PLA.

**SCAPT Wang Bin (王滨)**

Position: Director, PLA Navy Headquarters Department, Military Affairs Department

Grade: Division Leader (Grade 7)

SCAPT Wang Bin is director of the Navy Headquarters Department’s Military Affairs Department. He was deputy commander of the 9th Gulf of Aden escort mission, where he worked with formation commander and current director of the South Sea Fleet Logistics Department, RADM Guan Jianguo. In 2011 he was quoted in *People’s Daily* and *People’s

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Navy on non-commissioned officer (NCO) regulatory reform and NCO contributions to the navy.

**SCAPT Li Hanjun (李汉军)**

Position: Director, PLA Navy Headquarters Department, Military Training Department

Grade: Division Leader (Grade 7)

He entered the Dalian Naval Vessel Academy in 1983 at the age of 18. As a second-year student, he participated in the 1984 troop review. He entered the Dalian Naval Vessel Academy in 1983 at the age of 18. As a second-year student, he participated in the 1984 troop review. In an interview with Xinhua in 2009, a reporter states that SCAPT Li was once captain of a new-type guided missile frigate. A 2002 *PLA Daily* report also names him as an outstanding young captain in an article about talented military officers who had good grasps on new technology in the East Sea Fleet. SCAPT Li was serving in the East Sea Fleet at this time, serving as deputy chief of staff of the 6th Destroyer Division (zhidui) based in Zhoushan, Zhejiang Province, from 2000 to 2002. According to the Xinhua interview cited above, SCAPT Li studied abroad in Russia in 2002, where he attended classes with U.S. and British officers. SCAPT Li was promoted to chief of staff of the 6th Destroyer Division in early 2002 (which at that time was commanded by current

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454 "NCOs from the Navy’s North Sea Fleet Molded into ‘Swords of the Officers’”; “Provide System Guarantee for Advancing Scientific Development of Noncommissioned Officers Contingents Construction — Questions and Answers With Navy Headquarters Department Military Affairs Department Director Wang Bin on Study and Implementation of New "Noncommissioned Officers Management Regulations" (wei tuidong shiguan duiwu jianshe kexue fazhan tigong zhidui guanzhu — haijun xueyuan shiguan guanzhu dao jizhe wen; 为推动士官队伍建设科学发展提供制度保证—海司军务部王滨部长就学习贯彻新‘使馆管理规定’答记者问), *People’s Navy*, 29 July 2011, p. 3.


457 Ibid.


460 “Navy Cadet Formation Leader Li Hanjun: Cultivating Captains is Not Easy.”
deputy commander of the East Sea Fleet, RADM Qiu Yanpeng). In 2006 SCAPT Li was appointed deputy commander of the 6th Destroyer Division. In 2009, he was reported as serving as the director of the Navy Headquarters Military Training Department. However, a 2009 Xinhua article lists Li as deputy commandant of the Dalian Naval Vessel Academy, his alma mater. It is possible that he was misidentified in one of these sources, or that he served in these multiple positions concurrently.

SCAPT Li led the Naval Cadet formation for the 60th anniversary troop review, which took place in 2009. The formation was made up of undergraduate students from the Dalian Naval Vessel Academy.

**SCAPT Liu Zhihao (刘志浩)**

Position: Director, PLA Navy Headquarters Department, Navigation Support Department

Grade: Division Leader (Grade 7)

Liu Zhihao is director of the Navy Headquarters Department’s Navigation Support Department. He served as a radar squadron leader on a new-type fast attack craft, and co-authored a thesis titled “The Operational Use of a Certain Missile Speed Vessel.” The thesis was used in teaching materials in unnamed naval institutes, with Liu being hired as an unofficial instructor. Liu is also a permanent member of the Chinese Meteorological Society.

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462 “Navy Cadet Formation Leader Li Hanjun: Cultivating Captains is Not Easy.”

463 Ibid.


465 Xu Gangyao, “Shadowless Sword Shocks the Ocean—The Navy’s First New-Type Missile Speed Vessel Group” (wuying lijian zhenhaijiang jihaijun diyizhi xinxing daodan kuaiting dadui; 无影利剑震海疆记海军第一支新型导弹快艇大队), Xinhua, 9 April 2009.

SCAPT Ge Genzhong (葛根忠)

Position: Director, PLA Navy Headquarters Department, Submarine Department

Grade: Division Leader (Grade 7)

SCAPT Ge Genzhong graduated from the Naval Submarine Academy. He also attended Russia’s General Staff Academy of the Armed Forces. He has served as the captain of over eight submarines, and has repeatedly participated in submarine blue-water training, new-type weapons and equipment experiments, and important military assignments. He also represented the Chinese navy while giving academic reports in many different countries. 467 According to an article published on the Shenzhou Municipal website in Zhejiang, he became director of the Submarine Department in late 2006. 468

SCAPT Wei Rongliang (魏荣亮)

Director, PLA Navy Headquarters Department, Informatization Department

Grade: Division Leader (Grade 7)

Little is known publicly about Wei’s career. He is the current director of the Navy Informatization Department. He has been the director of this department, and its predecessor, the Navy Communications Department, since 2010. 469 In 2007 he served as the director of the communications division at the South Sea Fleet headquarters. During that time Wei co-authored an article on the importance of command security during naval operations when employing open communications networks used by multiple actors. 470


468 “100 Years of Shaoxing Opera in the Community, Experts and Fans Present Their Skills” (bainian yueju jin shequ ximi mingjia tong xiany; 百年越剧进社区戏迷名家同献艺), Shenzhou Municipal website, 27 November 2006, http://www.szycjy.gov.cn/data/body/200611/200611270447464396.htm.

469 The GSD Communications Department was reorganized and renamed the Informatization Department in 2011, and the Communications Department likely underwent a similar reorganization at roughly the same time.

Pang Jinli (逄金礼)

Position: (Probable) Director of PLA Navy Headquarters Department, Nuclear Safety Bureau
Grade: (Probable) - Division Deputy Leader (Grade 8)

Little information is publically available regarding the early years of Pang’s career. In 2006, he served as the director of the Equipment Department at a submarine base located in the East Sea Fleet.\(^{471}\) In 2010, Pang gave an interview in the Chinese journal *Modern Navy* to discuss the collision of two nuclear submarines, one French and one British, in the Atlantic.\(^{472}\)

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\(^{472}\) Bai Tanlin, “Authoritative Exposition on UK-France Nuclear Submarine Collision by Chinese Navy’s Submarine Department Director And Nuclear Safety Bureau Director” (*quanwei jieshi yingfa qianting haidi dapengzhuang; 权威解释英法潜艇海底大碰撞*), *Modern Navy (dangdai haijun)*, 3 (March), 2009, pp. 8-10.
PLA Navy Political Department

VADM Ma Faxiang (马发祥)

Position: Director, Political Department, PLA Navy

Grade: Military Region Deputy Leader (Grade 4)

From 2002 to 2008, VADM Ma served as secretary-general of the PLA Navy Political Department. In 2005, he was promoted to rear admiral. From 2008 to 2011, he served as political commissar of the Huludao Base in Liaoning, a missile test, research and development, and training base. In 2011, Ma became director of the navy’s Political Department. 473

In 2003, VADM Ma wrote a long article in the PLA Daily on building a “scientific spirit” among cadres in the military. In the article, Ma stressed the importance of uniting scientific thought and political thought. He also mentioned the need to safeguard national interests from internal threats such as Falun Gong. 474 In 2009, he embarked on a delegation to South Africa, led by PLA Navy Political Commissar ADM Liu Xiaojiang. 475

Ma served as a delegate to both the 17th and 18th Party Congresses. 476


474 Ma Faxiang, “Promote Scientific Spirit While Leading the Work” (zailingdaogongzuo hongyang kexue jingshen; 在领导工作中弘扬科学精神), PLA Daily, 6 November 2003.


RADM Gao Changqing (高长清)

Position: Deputy Director, PLA Navy Political Department

Grade: Corps (Jun) Leader (Grade 5)

RADM Gao Changqing became a deputy director of the Navy Political Department in 2010. In 2002, he served as director of the Political Department for the Yulin Support Base in the South Sea Fleet. In August 2003 he was promoted to political commissar of the Zhoushan Support Base. While there, he worked with VADM Xu Hongmeng, who was then the commander of the Zhoushan Base and is now a PLA Navy deputy commander. In April 2006, Gao was promoted to director of the South Sea Fleet Political Department, where he remained until he was assigned to a deputy director position in the Navy Political Department in 2010.

In a 2012 speech he gave at Tsinghua University, RADM Gao stressed the importance of naval power. He said, “If sea power is weak, the country declines. If sea power is strong, the country is rejuvenated. Constructing a harmonious ocean environment as well as constructing a powerful coastal defense force has become the common hope of the Chinese people.”

RADM Li Bin (李斌)

Position: Deputy Director, PLA Navy Political Department

Grade: Corps (Jun) Leader (Grade 5)

According to Chinese military enthusiast websites, RADM Li 厉兵 . Before joining the PLA Navy Political Department in 2009, RADM Li served as deputy secretary-general of the General Political Department from August 2008 to late 2009.

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**RADM Qu Chengjun (渠承军)**

Position: Deputy Director, PLA Navy Political Department  
Grade: Corps (Jun) Leader (Grade 5)

RADM Qu served in the General Political Department’s Cadre Department as a deputy director in the early 2000s. He also served as deputy political commissar of PLA naval aviation from late 2003 to 2005. In March 2005, RADM Qu was promoted to deputy director of the Navy Political Department.  

**RADM Zheng Hengbin (郑亨斌)**

Position: Deputy Director, PLA Navy Political Department  
Grade: Corps (Jun) Leader (Grade 5)

RADM Zheng was born in Fuzhou, Fujian Province. He entered the PLA in 1972. Before becoming a political officer, he served as a ship captain. After switching to the political track, Zheng directed the propaganda branch in the South Sea Fleet Political Department. In 1997, while serving in this office, Zheng embarked on a 98-day, 24,000-nautical-mile journey to the Americas, serving as a political officer. The journey broke PLA Navy records for distance traveled, time spent at sea, and numbers of ports and countries visited. He later wrote a long *PLA Daily* article recounting the trip.

By September 2002, Zheng was serving as political commissar to the Xisha Naval Garrison. While serving in this office, Zheng remarked to *PLA Daily*, “The soldiers of the new generation on Zhongjian Island are trained on the high sea and tempered on the sand beaches. They withstand tremendous hardship and stand firmly with a lofty goal of dedicating themselves to the

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motherland."  

From March 2007 to 2009, Zheng served as political commissar of the Guangzhou Support Base. In July 2009, Zheng moved to the Naval Engineering University, where he served as director of the Political Department before being promoted to political commissar in the summer of 2010. While there, Zheng wrote an article in PLA Daily emphasizing the importance of studying Marxist theory for military ideological work. In 2012 he joined the PLA Navy Political Department as a deputy director.

**RADM Zhu Qian (朱谦)**

Position: Director, PLA Navy Political Department, Discipline Inspection Commission

Grade: (probable) - Division Leader (Grade 7)

RADM Zhu was promoted from senior captain to rear admiral on 29 December 2010, while serving as the Political Department director of an unidentified naval test base. Before 2010, RADM Zhu had served as the base’s director of Discipline Inspection.

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PLA Navy Logistics Department

RADM Xu Weibing (徐卫兵)

Position: Director of the PLA Navy Logistics Department

Grade: Corps (Jun) Leader (Grade 5)

Xu Weibing 刘卫兵 in Rudong County, in East China’s Jiangsu Province. He joined the PLA in 1978 as a naval aviation pilot. He moved up through the ranks of PLA naval aviation, serving as a pilot, regiment commander, and division chief of staff. He gained expertise in training when he served as a deputy commander of the Shanhaiguan Naval Aviation Training Base in the North Sea Fleet. A 2008 profile of Xu posted on his hometown government’s website indicates that during his time as a naval aviator he was a diligent student of flight technology, was deeply involved in developing naval aviation training plans and syllabi, and pioneered new methods for ensuring the safety of flight training.488

By 2008, Xu had become deputy commandant of the Naval Engineering University, the navy’s largest educational institution for specialized technical personnel.489 From July 2009 to 2011, he commanded the Shanghai Naval Base, a major support base for the East Sea Fleet strategically located at the mouth of the Yangtze River and close to China’s largest coastal city. In late 2011, he was promoted to director of the PLA Navy Logistics Department.490 RADM Xu was selected as a delegate to the 18th Party Congress.491

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489 This university was formed out of the 1999 merger of the Naval Engineering Academy in Wuhan and the Naval Electronic Engineering Academy in Nanjing.


RADM Kang Fei (康非)

Position: Political Commissar, PLA Navy Logistics Department

Grade: Corps (Jun) Leader (Grade 5)

RADM Kang Fei served as director of the Political Department of the East Sea Fleet’s 3rd Destroyer Division (zhidui) from the summer of 2003 to late 2004. Afterwards, he was promoted to political commissar of the division. While serving in this capacity, he worked with the division’s commander, Han Xiaohu, who was recently a deputy chief of staff of the East Sea Fleet, and is currently an assistant to the PLA Navy chief of staff, VADM Du Jingchen.492

In late 2008, RADM Kang became political commissar of the Dalian Naval Vessel Academy, where he published an article in Political Work Study Journal on the academy’s future and plans for development. 493

In 2012, RADM Kang was promoted to political commissar of the PLA Navy Logistics Department, taking the place of Ding Haichun, the current East Sea Fleet political commissar.494

RADM Kang was a delegate to the 17th Party Congress in 2008.495

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493 Kang Fei, “Carrying Forward Tradition; Scientific Development; Striving to Create a Brilliant Tomorrow for the PLAN Dalian Vessel Academy” (hongyang chuantong kexue fazhan nuli kaichuang haijun dalian jianting xueyuan huihuang canlan de mingtan; 弘扬传统; 科学发展; 努力开创海军大连舰艇学院辉煌灿烂的明天), Political Work Study Journal (zhenggong xueke), no. 11 (2009).


495 “PLA, PAPF Units Elect Deputies to 17th CPC National Congress” (jiefangjun he wujing budui xianju gongsheng chuxi zhongguo gongchandang quanguo daibiao dahui daibiao; 解放军和武警部队选举产生出席中国共产党第十七次全国代表大会代表), PLA Daily, 3 July 2007.
**RADM Li Yunqing (李云请)**

Position: Deputy Director, PLA Navy Logistics Department

Grade: Corps (Jun) Deputy Leader (Grade 6)

Little is known publically about RADM Li’s career. He became a deputy director in 2008. In 2012, he gave an interview to PLA Daily discussing the challenges of modernizing food and drink logistics in the barracks.

**RADM Ren Zhongji (任忠吉)**

Position: Deputy Director, PLA Navy Logistics Department

Grade: Corps (Jun) Deputy Leader (Grade 6)

Chinese military enthusiast websites note that RADM was born in Liaoning Province, near Dalian. Ren has been a deputy director in the Navy Logistics Department since May 2006. Before that he served as director of the Logistics Department for the Lushun Support Base in the North Sea Fleet from 2000 to 2006. In 2009, Ren accompanied current PLA Navy political commissar ADM Liu Xiaojiang, and current director of the PLA Navy Political Department director VADM Ma Faxiang, on a delegation to South Africa.

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497 “Exclusive Interview with Logistics Department Deputy Director Li Yunqing,” PLA Daily, 4 July 2012, http://navy.81.cn/content/2012-07/04/content_4935462.htm.


RADM Su Jingxiang (苏景祥)

Position: Deputy Director, PLA Navy Logistics Department

Grade: Corps (Jun) Deputy Leader (Grade 6)

Little information is available on RADM Su’s career. He has been a deputy director in the navy’s Logistics Department since 2010. Before that, he spent nearly three years working in the Logistics Department’s Finance Department.501

SCAPT Wang Jinliang (王进良)

Position: Director, PLA Navy Logistics Department, Military Supplies, Material, and Petroleum Department

Grade: Division Leader (Grade 7)

As the director of the navy’s Logistics Department’s Military Supplies, Material and Petroleum Department since 2007, Wang has publically written about PLA Navy logistics issues. In late 2010, for example, he wrote a paper examining the PLA Navy’s logistics support capabilities for military operations other than war. The paper was one of 60 selected to receive first prize during the annual Modern National Disaster Emergency Response System with Chinese Characteristics Theoretical Construction Discussion Forum, a joint seminar conducted by the National Disaster Reduction Center in the Ministry of Civil Affairs, and the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences (AMS). The selection panel was made up of experts from the General Staff Department, General Equipment Department, and AMS. 502


SCAPT Chen Yihao (陈义浩)

Position: Director, PLA Navy Logistics Department, Finance Department

Grade: Division Leader (Grade 7)

SCAPT Chen Yihao has served as the director of the PLA Navy Finance Department since late 2009. Since 2011, he has publically discussed strengthening the navy’s military asset management system, with the goal of restructuring the navy’s asset management system by the end of the 12th Five Year Plan in 2015. These reforms include modernizing and computerizing the navy’s asset management system, providing better support to navy escort missions and joint military exercises, and increasing the number of audits to at least one per year for all naval assets, including inventories, equipment, and land assets at all levels.

Ye Xiaotao (叶小陶)

Position: Director, PLA Navy Logistics Department, Military Communications and Transportation Department

Grade: Division Leader (Grade 7)

Director Ye has led the Navy Logistics Military Communications and Transportation Department since 2010. In 2012, he served as the deputy commander on the 13th Gulf of Aden escort mission. During the mission, he gave an interview to China News Service, in which he discussed the importance of materials supply and at-sea resupply to the success of the PLA Navy’s Gulf of Aden escort missions.

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504 Du Long and Liu Wenping, “Earnestly Raising the Efficacy of the Navy's Asset Management” (qieshi tigao haijun zichan guanli xiaoyi; 切实提高海军资产管理效益), People's Navy, 30 December 2011.

505 Ye Xiaotao, “Conratulatory Message” (heci; 贺词), Automobile Application, (qiche yunyong; 汽车运用), issue 10 (2010).

PLA Navy Equipment Department

RA DM Hu Yuhao (胡毓浩)

Position: Director, PLA Navy Equipment Department

Grade: Corps (Jun) Leader (Grade 5)

Little information is available about RADM Hu Yuhao. He was formerly a chief engineer with the PLA Navy Equipment Department, and was promoted to department director in 2011, after the death of former director Lin Yongqing. Hu was selected as a delegate to the 18th Party Congress.507

RA DM Wang Jianxin (汪建新)

Position: Political Commissar, PLA Navy Equipment Department

Grade: Corps (Jun) Leader (Grade 5)

RA DM Wang Jianxin 娄游县 in Jining County, Shandong Province.508 He served as director of the Political Department of the North Sea Fleet’s Huludao base from May 2007 to 2010. In June 2010, Wang was promoted to director of the North Sea Fleet’s Political Department.509 In 2012, he was promoted to political commissar of the Navy Equipment Department.510

RA DM Wang is a delegate to the National People’s Congress.511

**RADM Geng Guangsheng (耿广生)**

Position: Deputy Director, PLA Navy Equipment Department

Grade: Corps (*Jun*) Deputy Leader (Grade 6)

According to the website of a university in Jiangsu, RADM Geng in Dafeng, Jiangsu Province, and entered the PLA in 1969.

Geng received his undergraduate degree from Shanghai’s prestigious Jiaotong University, where he specialized in shipbuilding and submarine mechanics. He served as a military representative on a shipyard dock. With a portfolio focusing on vessel development, Geng has been a deputy director in the Navy Equipment Department since 2000.512

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**RADM Meng Tao (孟涛)**

Position: Deputy Director, PLA Navy Equipment Department

Grade: Corps (*Jun*) Deputy Leader (Grade 6)

RADM Meng became a deputy director in 2009. There is little public information available on him prior to this: overseas Chinese media claim that he once served as chief of an anti-radar unit at Navy Headquarters, but the details of that position are unclear.513 In 2004, he co-wrote an article for Qingdao Submarine Academy’s publishing house, entitled “Experimental Study on Frequency Spectrum Characteristics of Underwater Shockwave Weakened by Bubble Curtain.” It is unclear whether Meng had some involvement in teaching or researching at the academy before he joined the Equipment Department.514

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514 Zhu Anju, Zhang Keyu, Zhan Famin, and Meng Tao, “Experimental Study on Frequency Spectrum Characteristics of Underwater Shockwave Weakened by Bubble Curtain,” *Blasting (Qingdao)* 21, no. 4 (December 2004).
RADM Wu Fangchun (吴仿春)

Position: Deputy Director, PLA Navy Equipment Department

Grade: Corps (Jun) Deputy Leader (Grade 6)

RADM Wu was deputy director of the Yulin Support Base’s Equipment Department from early 2003 to 2004. Afterwards, he was promoted to director, and served until 2008. In 2008, he was promoted to commander of the Guangzhou Support Base. He spent two years in this position before being promoted to deputy director of the Navy Equipment Department.515

RADM Yin Mingyan (殷铭燕)

Position: (Probable) Deputy Director, PLA Navy Equipment Department

Grade: Corps (Jun) Deputy Leader (Grade 6)

RADM Yin Mingyan previously served as director of the Navy Equipment Department’s Aircraft Department. 516 By 2006, he had been appointed director of the Navy Equipment Department’s Aviation Procurement Department. 517 According to military enthusiast website Oumil, he now serves as a deputy director of the Navy Equipment Department. He was promoted to rear admiral in 2005. 518

515 “Wu Fangchun Promoted to PLA Navy Equipment Department Deputy Director,” Military Academy (blog) (讲武堂), 1 September 2010, blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_50ea02ea0100kyyj.html.
Xiao Chaofu (肖超福)

Position: Director, PLA Navy Equipment Department, Aviation Procurement Department

Grade: Division Leader (Grade 7)

Xiao is a graduate of the Shenyang Institute of Aeronautical Engineering (Shenyang hangkong hangtian daxue 沈阳航空航天大学) in Liaoning Province. According to the university, he graduated in 1985. 519

By 2009, Xiao was serving as deputy director of the Navy Equipment Department’s Aviation Procurement Department. 520 By late 2011, he had been promoted to director. 521


ADM Sun Jianguo (孙建国)

Position: Deputy Chief, PLA General Staff Department

Grade: Military Region Leader (Grade 3)

ADM Sun Jianguo was born in Wuqiao County, Hebei Province, in 1949. This county, about 200 miles south of Beijing, is also the birthplace of PLA Navy Commander ADM Wu Shengli. ADM Sun joined the navy in 1968, at the height of the Cultural Revolution, and studied navigation at the Naval Submarine Academy. After graduating, he began his naval career as a navigation master on conventional submarines. At age 26, he returned to the Submarine Academy as a member of the deputy captains’ class. In the 1970s and 1980s, he commanded both conventional and nuclear submarines. According to Hong Kong newspaper *Wen Wei Po*, ADM Sun achieved some fame within the PLA Navy in 1985 for breaking a previously U.S.-held world record for the longest continuous submarine tour. In 1996, he was promoted to deputy commander of a naval warship base.

From 2000 to 2004, ADM Sun served as a PLA Navy deputy chief of staff. In 2004, he was promoted to PLA Navy chief of staff. In 2006, he became an assistant to the PLA chief of the General Staff, who, at the time, was General Liang Guanglie. After Liang left to head the Ministry of Defense in 2007, ADM Sun remained as an assistant to the new chief of General Staff, General Chen Bingde. In 2009, Sun was made a deputy chief of the PLA General Staff. He also serves as secretary-general of the State Commission for National Defense Mobilization.

Sun is one of the PLA Navy’s four full members of the 18th Central Committee. He was also an alternate to the 17th Central Committee. He is widely traveled, having led several

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524 Center for China Studies, “Profile of Sun Jianguo.”

525 Ibid.


527 “Member List of the 18th Central Committee” ([zhongguo gongchandang shiba jie zhongyang weiyuan huiyi weiyuan mingdan; 中国共产党第十八届中央委员会委员名单](http://news.xinhuanet.com/18cpcnc/2012-11/14/c_113690703.htm); Xinhua, 14 November 2012.

528 Center for China Studies, “Profile of Sun Jianguo.”
delegations to Chile, Colombia, Botswana, Congo-Brazzaville, Mauritania, Gabon, and Senegal.  

Some China observers believed that ADM Sun was likely to take ADM Wu’s place as the next PLA Navy commander during the 18th Party Congress in November 2012.  

However, the fact that Wu remains in place in 2013 and has not announced plans to retire makes it unclear whether ADM Sun will be the next commander.

ADM Sun will reach retirement age for his grade in 2017.

**SCAPT Ma Luping (马鲁平)**

Position: Director, General Staff Department, Operations Bureau

Grade: Corps (*Jun*) Leader (Grade 5 - probable)

SCAPT Ma Luping has served as director of the General Staff Department’s Navy Operations Bureau since late 2008. He has been quoted in official media several times on the topic of Gulf of Aden operations.

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VADM Cen Xu (岑旭)

Position: PLA General Political Department, Assistant to the Director

VADM Cen Xu was born in Rudong County in East China’s Jiangsu Province. Little information is available on Cen’s career prior to July 2000, when he became political commissar of the Navy Equipment Proving Research Center (NRC) (haijun zhuangbei luzheng yanjiu zhongxin; 海军装备论证研究中心), the navy’s main institution for developing and testing weapons, ships, and other technical systems. In 2003 this institution’s name was changed to the Navy Equipment Research Institute (haijun zhuangbei yanjiu zhongxin; 海军装备研究院). 532

In late 2004, Cen was promoted to deputy political commissar of the South Sea Fleet, and concurrently political commissar of South Sea Fleet naval aviation. In 2008, Cen was promoted to political commissar of the East Sea Fleet. He was also made a concurrent deputy political commissar of the Nanjing Military Region. While in this position, he worked alongside current VADM Xu Hongmeng and VADM Du Jingchen, and current East Sea Fleet Commander VADM Su Zhiqian. 533

By 2012, Cen had been promoted to deputy political commissar of the PLA Navy. He served in that position for less than a year before being appointed assistant to the director of the PLA General Political Department in January 2013. 534

The Hong Kong newspaper Ta Kung Pao has called Cen “a leader in naval scientific research and armaments.” 535 VADM Cen was recently appointed to the 18th Chinese Communist Party Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), the CCP’s main organization responsible for monitoring the performance of Party members, and policing them for breaches in Party regulations and discipline.


533 National Chengchi University, “Profile of Cen Xu,” Database of Chinese Communist Political Elites, cped.nccu.edu.tw/node/1144342.


VADM Liu Zhuoming (刘卓明)

Position: Deputy Director, General Armament Department’s Science and Technology Commission

Grade: Corps (Jun) Leader (Grade 5)

VADM Liu Zhuoming is the son of Admiral Liu Huaqing, former CMC vice-chairman, navy commander, and an influential figure in PLA Navy history. VADM Liu was born in Dawu, Hubei Province. He received an undergraduate degree in engineering at the Changsha School of Engineering, where he majored in computers. In 2000, Liu Zhuoming was promoted to rear admiral. In 2001, he was appointed director of the Navy Equipment Proving Research Center (NRC) (haijun zhuangbei luzheng yanjiu zhongxin; 海军装备论证研究中心), the navy’s main institution for developing and testing weapons, ships, and other technical systems. In 2003, this institution’s name was changed to the Navy Equipment Research Institute (haijun zhuangbei yanjiu zhongxin; 海军装备研究院). From 2005 to 2010, he served as commandant of the Naval Command Academy in Nanjing. In February 2010, he served as general director of a joint exercise in applying information technology to command and control. Later in 2010, VADM Liu was promoted to deputy director of the General Armament Department’s Science and Technology Commission. VADM Liu is also a delegate to the 2012 National People’s Congress.

539 “Liu Zhuoming Promoted to Deputy Director of the Science and Technology Commission in the General Armament Department,” Oumil, 31 August 2011, Note that China.com lists him as serving as the commandant of the Naval Equipment Academy. The NRC changed its name to the Naval Equipment Academy in 2003.
North Sea Fleet Headquarters, Qingdao

VADM Tian Zhong (田中)

Position: Commander, North Sea Fleet
Grade: Military Region Deputy Leader (Grade 4)

North Sea Fleet Commander VADM Tian Zhong was born in Central China’s Hubei Province in 1960. 

VADM Tian’s vessel experience is in minesweepers and destroyers. He also served as the deputy director and, later, director of the Shajiao Training Base in the South Sea Fleet. 541 From November 2001 to 2004, Tian served as chief of staff of the Yulin Support Base on Hainan Island in the South China Sea. In 2004, he was promoted to commander of the Lushun Support Base in the North Sea Fleet. 542 According to Taiwan’s Chengchi University, he was promoted to chief of staff of the North Sea Fleet in 2007. 543 After serving for less than a year, Tian was promoted to commander of the fleet at the relatively young age of 51. He serves concurrently as deputy commander of the Jinan Military Region. 544

VADM Tian is the youngest of the three fleet commanders, but is also the longest serving. He is one of only four PLA Navy officers to have been elected as a full member to the 18th Central Committee. 545 The other three—Navy Commander ADM Wu Shengli, Navy Political Commissar ADM Liu Xiaojiang, and PLA Deputy Chief of General Staff ADM Sun Jianguo—are all above VADM Tian in the PLA Navy leadership hierarchy.

VADM Tian has served as the director of a training base, and has also written in PLA Daily on the importance of joint training. 546 Additionally, he was the commander of a 2012 combined

542 Ibid.
543 Ibid.
545 “Member List of the 18th Central Committee” (zhongguo gongchandang shiba jie zhongyang weiyuan huiyi weiyuan mingdan; 中国共产党第十八届中央委员会委员名单), Xinhua, 14 November 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/18pcenc/2012-11/14/c_113690703.htm.
military exercise with Russia, which was cited by the *PLA Daily* for its realistic operational character.\(^{547}\)

VADM Tian has experience dealing with foreign dignitaries and military leaders in China’s peripheral states. In 2008, he led a five-day delegation to South Korea.\(^{548}\) In the summer of 2011, he led a delegation to Russia and North Korea. According to Japanese media, this delegation marked China’s first port call to North Korea in over 15 years.\(^{549}\)

VADM Tian will reach retirement age for his current grade in 2019.

**RADM Bai Wenqi (白文奇)**

Position: Political Commissar, North Sea Fleet

Grade: Military Region Deputy Leader (Grade 4)

According to the Hong Kong paper *Ta Kung Pao*, North Sea Fleet Political Commissar RADM Bai Wenqi \(^{550}\) Bai has years of experience in the political tracks of both North Sea Fleet and South Sea Fleet naval aviation units. From early 2004 to 2005, he served as the deputy political commissar of North Sea Fleet naval aviation, based in Qingdao, Shandong Province. From 2005 to 2008, he was the director of the South Sea Fleet’s Naval Aviation Political Department based in Haikou on Hainan Island. By late 2008, he returned to the North Sea Fleet to serve as political commissar of NSF Naval Aviation, and concurrently as a North Sea Fleet deputy political commissar.\(^{551}\)

Bai was promoted to North Sea Fleet political commissar in 2012, after former North Sea Fleet political commissar Wang Dengping was transferred to the South Sea Fleet. Soon afterwards, he was promoted to rear admiral.\(^{552}\)

Bai will reach retirement age for his grade in 2019.

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\(^{549}\) “Chinese Flotilla Makes Port Call in N. Korea, 1st Time in 15 Yrs,” Kyodo World Service, 4 August 2011.

\(^{550}\) “High Level Officer Adjustments Before the 18th Party Congress Transmit Important Information” (*shibada qian gaoji jiangling tiaozheng chuantou zhongda xinxi*; 十八大前高级将领调整传递重大信息), *Ta Kung Pao*, 11 September 2012, [http://www.takungpao.com.hk/mainland/content/2012-09/11/content_1083562_2.htm](http://www.takungpao.com.hk/mainland/content/2012-09/11/content_1083562_2.htm).


\(^{552}\) “Bai Wenqi is Promoted to Political Commissar of the North Sea Fleet,” *Wen Wei Po*, 10 July 2012.
NSF Deputy Commanders

RADM Yang Junfei (杨骏飞)

Position: Deputy Commander, North Sea Fleet
Grade: Corps (Jun) Leader (Grade 5)

According to the website of a manufacturing company in Shandong Province, Deputy Commander RADM Yang Junfei. Little open-source information is available about his career before 2003.

From 2003 to 2008, RADM Yang directed the Military Training Department at Navy Headquarters. In 2008, Yang was appointed commandant of the Dalian Naval Vessel Academy, a military institution that primarily educates command track officers, including vessel technical command officers, political command officers, and maritime mapping and engineering technical officers. In this position, he commanded an expedition by the training vessel Zheng He that visited Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam.

In 2011, Yang became a deputy chief of staff for the North Sea Fleet. During his tenure in this position, he was appointed commander of the 11th Gulf of Aden escort formation. This was the first time that a North Sea Fleet officer had been asked to lead a Gulf of Aden mission. After returning from the expedition, Yang was promoted to deputy commander in 2012.

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RADM Yang has been quoted publicly discussing the importance of training in the PLA. In 2011, he was quoted in PLA Daily as saying, “Whether innovations are made in the field of military training or not is closely related with the strength of an army and the result of a war.”

RADM Sun Dezhong (孙德忠)

Position: Deputy Commander, North Sea Fleet
Grade: Corps (Jun) Leader (Grade 5)

North Sea Fleet Deputy Commander RADM Sun Dezhong was fellow deputy commander RADM Yang Junfei’s predecessor as director of the Military Training Department at Navy Headquarters. He served there from 2001 to 2003. Afterwards, he became a deputy commander at the Yulin Support Base on Hainan Island in the South Sea Fleet. In late 2007, Sun was promoted to North Sea Fleet deputy chief of staff. In late 2010, he became a deputy commander. While serving as deputy commander, Sun received a visiting Pakistani delegation.

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**RADM Ding Yi (丁毅)**

Position: Deputy Commander, North Sea Fleet

Grade: Corps (*Jun*) Leader (Grade 5)

North Sea Fleet Deputy Commander RADM Ding Yi was born in Jiangsu Province. He began his career in the air force in the 1970s, and later attended the Dalian Naval Vessel Academy. He is a career naval aviator. In the late 1990s, Ding commanded a “flying leopard” (*feibao*) stealth bomber unit in the East Sea Fleet. In 1998, the unit broke a PLA record for converting to a new type of aircraft in the shortest amount of time. According to an article in *PLA Daily*, the process normally took three to four years, but Ding’s unit accomplished it within seven months.

By 2010, he had been transferred to the North Sea Fleet after having been promoted to deputy commander and concurrent commander of naval aviation. In this capacity, he likely worked with RADM Bai Wenqi, who then was Naval Aviation political commissar and now is political commissar of the North Sea Fleet.

In 2012, RADM Ding participated in a joint maritime exercise with the Russian navy, led by VADM Liu Yi.

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562 Senior PLA Officers, interview, 2013.


564 “Ding Yi Promoted to North Sea Fleet Commander and Head of North sea Fleet Naval Aviation” (*dingyi ren beihai jiandui fusilingyuan jian beihang silingyuan*; 丁毅任北海舰队副司令员兼北航司令员), Military Academy (blog) (讲武堂), 5 July 2010, [blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_50ea02ea0100jqlb4.html](http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_50ea02ea0100jqlb4.html).
RADM Du Xiping (杜希平)

Position: Deputy Commander, North Sea Fleet

Grade: Corps (Jun) Leader (Grade 5)

RADM Du Xiping previously served as commander of a nuclear submarine.⁵⁶⁵ Du later served as deputy commander of the East Sea Fleet from late 2005 to 2009. In 2009, he made a lateral move and became deputy commander of the North Sea Fleet.⁵⁶⁶

Following the Fukushima disaster of 2011, Du gave a special lecture on nuclear safety at the Central Party School in Beijing. An article in Study Times noted that the speech received a great reaction and said that Du had conducted in-depth research on nuclear submarines and nuclear energy.⁵⁶⁷

Du has also been quoted in the press on sensitive issues related to expanding maritime interests. In 2010, Du remarked to CCTV, “In order to effectively safeguard our country's maritime rights and interests, it is imperative for our naval forces to cruise in the oceans, so as to develop and maintain the combat power of our fleets in distant seas.” That same year, Du commanded a formation during the combined military exercise with Russia, “Maritime Cooperation-2010.”⁵⁶⁸

RADM Du attended classes for provincial and ministerial-level officials at the Central Party School.⁵⁶⁹ In 2011, Du accompanied Fan Changlong, current vice-chair of the CMC and former commander of the Jinan Military Region, on a delegation to the United States.⁵⁷⁰

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⁵⁶⁵ Tao Chun, “Nuclear Power Plants, Nuclear Submarines, Nuclear Safety” (hedian zhan, he qianting, he anquan; 核电站核潜艇 核安全), Study Times, 30 May 2011.

⁵⁶⁶ Du Xiping transferred to North Sea Fleet Deputy Commander” (du xiping tiaoren beihai jiandui fusilingyuan; 杜希平调入北海舰队副司令员), Xilu.com, 18 July 2009, club.xilu.com/xinguangcha/msgview-950389-95920.html.

⁵⁶⁷ Tao Chun, “Nuclear Power Plants, Nuclear Submarines, Nuclear Safety.”


⁵⁶⁹ Tao Chun, “Nuclear Power Plants, Nuclear Submarines, Nuclear Safety.”

**RADM Yuan Yubai (袁誉柏)**

Position: Deputy Commander (unconfirmed)

Former Chief of Staff, North Sea Fleet

Grade: Corps (*Jun*) Leader (Grade 5)

North Sea Fleet Chief of Staff RADM Yuan Yubai 原誉柏 in Nanping Township, Gongan County, in Central China’s Hubei Province. At the end of the Cultural Revolution, RADM Yuan spent two years as a full-time member of his county’s “Basic Line Education Work Team” before joining the navy in 1976.571 “Work teams” were ad hoc organizations invested with authority during the Cultural Revolution. The fact that Yuan Yubai participated for two years as a full-time member of a local work team suggests that he was involved in Cultural Revolution activities in his home county, although the nature of those activities is unknown.572

Yuan is a submariner by experience. In 1976, he entered active service in a submarine unit after 10 months of training at the Naval Submarine Academy. After the academy was restored to full operations in 1978, RADM Yuan returned for a three-year undergraduate course of study. After graduating in 1981, he returned to his former unit as a torpedo commander and later served as a torpedo service specialist. RADM Yuan also holds a master’s degree. In 1990, he served as a submarine captain.573

In 2004, RADM Yuan was appointed chief of staff of the 1st Submarine Base in the North Sea Fleet based in Qingdao. In this position, he likely worked with then-base commander and current Navy deputy commander VADM Liu Yi, eventually replacing him as base commander in late 2007. In 2011, he was promoted to chief of staff of the North Sea Fleet.574 He became a rear admiral in 2008.575

In 2011, RADM Yuan co-commanded a successful multi-service joint exercise in the Yellow Sea, after which he reported to *Jiefangjun Bao*, “We have truly achieved the goal of ‘asking the Party for the main battle to play the leading role in training and letting everybody receive


573 “Yuan Yubai,” Gongan County website.


575 “Yuan Yubai,” Gongan County website.
benefits together.” In early 2013, Yuan was appointed commander of the 14th Gulf of Aden escort missions. This marked the second time that the North Sea Fleet led a Gulf of Aden escort and the third time that a fleet chief of staff was appointed as commander.

Unless his age has been misreported, RADM Yuan is already two years past his mandatory retirement age of 55.

**NSF Headquarters Department**

**RADM Wei Gang (魏钢)**

Position: Chief of Staff, North Sea Fleet

Grade: Corps (Jun) Leader (Grade 5)

RADM Wei in Shandong Province, on the Bohai Sea directly across from the city of Dalian. He likely joined the PLA in the late 1970s.

RADM Wei became the North Sea Fleet Chief of Staff sometime after February 2013. Before that, he served as the commander of the Dalian Support Base in the North Sea Fleet from 2010 until his promotion to fleet commander in 2013.

RADM Wei Gang served as the formation commander of the task force that visited Australia, New Zealand, and the United States in the summer of 2013. While on the delegation to the United States in 2013, RADM Wei gave a speech, and stated that the Chinese visit was the result of a consensus reached this year by the heads of state of the United States and China on building China-U.S. new great power relations.

Before being promoted to Dalian Support Base commander, RADM Wei spent a number of years as a mid-level and later senior-level officer within the North Sea Fleet’s 1st Destroyer

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576 Zhang, Fu and Mi, “Why Is Flavor of the ‘Sea’ So Strong During This Battle?”


Division （zhidui），based in Qingdao. In late 2002 at the rank of SCAPT, he served as the chief of staff of the division. From 2006 until 2008, he likely served as commander of the first destroyer division. Military enthusiast websites suggest he was promoted to North Sea Fleet chief of staff in July of 2013. He was promoted from Senior Captain to Rear Admiral in 2011.

**RADM Dong Jun (董军)**

Position: Deputy Chief of Staff, North Sea Fleet

Grade: Corps (Jun) Deputy Leader (Grade 6)

Little information is available regarding RADM Dong’s early career. Between 2007 and 2009, RADM Dong served as the director of the Military Training Department at Navy Headquarters. According to Hong Kong media, by June 2012 he was promoted to NSF chief of staff. He was promoted from senior captain to rear admiral in July 2012.

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581 “Wei Gang Promoted to North Sea Fleet Chief of Staff” *Sina.com*, 1 August 2013, blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_8c0e29aa01019f15.html.

582 Ibid.

583 These dates conflict with that of the currently known Director of the Military training Department, Li Hanjun, who was identified in that position in 2009. See Li Hanjun’s profile in this appendix. See also, “Chinese Navy Training Department Director Explains ‘Peace 09’ Multinational Maritime Exercise,” *zhongguo haijun junxunbu buchang xiangshi heping-09; duoguo haishang lianhe junyan; 中国海军军训部 部长详释‘和平 09’ 多国海上联合军演*), *Modern Navy (dangdai haijun)*, 1 April 2009, pp. 12-13.


585 Li Zheng and Reporter Liang Qingsong, “PLA Navy Holds Solemn Senior Officer Rank Promotion Ceremony” (*haijun jiangzhong juxing jiangguanjun jiepu sheng yishi; 海军隆重举行将官军衔晋升仪式*), *People’s Navy*, 30 July 2012.
RADM Hao Yanbing (郝延兵)

Position: Deputy Chief of Staff, North Sea Fleet

Grade: Corps (Jun) Deputy Leader (Grade 6)

According to the military enthusiast website Oumil, RADM Hao Yanbing in Kaifeng, Henan Province. The Hong Kong periodical Chien Shao notes that Hao’s father was a retired military official.

Postings on the Chinese military enthusiast website Xilu claim that he entered the military in 1969 and joined the Party in 1972. According to this website, he held a series of positions in the 1st Destroyer Division (zhidui), based in the North Sea Fleet, including soldier, observation and communication chief, communications staff member, communications services chief, deputy captain, captain of Yinchuan, captain of Dalian, division deputy chief of staff, chief of staff, and division commander. This website also claims that he entered the Dalian Naval Vessel Academy in 1972, attended a three-year Captain’s Class program at the Navy Service Arms Command Academy in 1983, and studied at NDU in 1993.

Hao served as commander of the 1st Destroyer Division from 2000 to 2006. He was appointed commandant of his alma mater, the Navy Service Arms Command Academy (now the Naval Marine Academy), in early 2006. In late 2009, he was appointed deputy chief of staff of the North Sea Fleet.

In 2010, Hao served as deputy commander of a training formation comprising over 1,000 officers and soldiers that sailed to the area east of the Malacca Strait and patrolled the Nansha and Xisha islands. The commander of this formation was North Sea Fleet Deputy Commander RADM Du Xiping.

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587 “Search for 'Princelings of the CPC— Name list of Thousands of Children of High Ranking Officials (Serialized, Part III)’ (zhongguo taizidang dasousuo zhonggong gaoganzi di qianren mingdan lianzaisan; 中国太子党大搜索中共高干子弟千人名单连载三), Chien Shao, 07-31 May 2007.


RADM Sui Hongdi (隋洪地)

Position: Deputy Chief of Staff, North Sea Fleet

Grade: Corps (Jun) Deputy Leader (Grade 6)

According to the Chinese military enthusiast website Oumil, RADM Sui Hongdi was born in Haiyang County, Shandong Province. RADM Sui was serving as deputy commander of a reconnaissance aviation unit in the navy. A Xinhua article in 2002 recounts how he met with former PRC chairman Jiang Zemin. The article describes Sui as having a “baby face” but being a successful naval aviator.

From late 2002 to 2006, Sui served as deputy commander of the 2nd Naval Air Division, based in Dalian, Liaoning. In 2006, Sui was promoted to commander of the division, where he served until late 2010. According to the Hong Kong-based human rights organization, the Information Center for Human Rights & Democracy, Sui previously served as commander of a surveillance regiment stationed in Shandong Province. The report also mentions that he was involved in provocations with U.S. air formations.

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NSF Political Department

RADM Yin Dunping (殷敦平)

Position: Director, North Sea Fleet Political Department
Grade: Corps (Jun) Leader (Grade 5)

In late 2007, he became deputy director of the South Sea Fleet Political Department. In late 2009, he was appointed political commissar of the Guangzhou Support Base in the South Sea Fleet. In March 2013, Yin was promoted to director of the North Sea Fleet Political Department.

RADM Yin was deputy commander of the 1st Gulf of Aden mission, where he worked with expedition commander and current chief of staff VADM Du Jingchen. During the expedition, Yin convened a political working group which created a musical piece called “Song of the Gulf of Aden Escort.” Singing the anthem became part of the officers’ and sailors’ daily work duties.

Yin was one of the general producers of “Flagship” (旗舰), a 2008 34-part TV series that “reveals the new generation Navy style” and originally aired on CCTV 1. The series depicts how a group of young cadets become vessel captains. According to People’s Daily, it shows the power of China’s coastal defense forces and is the first series to use underwater cameras to follow divers while they conduct repairs on submarines.

RADM Yin is a member of the 11th Shandong Provincial Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). In January 2013, he gave a speech at the first provincial CPPCC meeting.
in which he discussed the importance of raising people’s maritime awareness, conceptions of coastal defense, and martial spirit. He is quoted in the article saying, “Because of long-term peace, many people, especially young people, have adopted ‘forget war,’ ‘hate war’ or ‘scared of war’ ideologies. When confronting a powerful enemy, forgetting war will result in danger, hating war will result in defeat, and fearing war will result in death. We must get in touch with the blood and tears of our historical humiliation and accelerate the sharpening of the Chinese people’s maritime sword.”

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NSF Logistics Department

SCAPT Pu Ruinan (濮瑞南)

Position: Director, North Sea Fleet Logistics Department

Grade: Corps (Jun) Deputy Leader (Grade 6)

SCAPT Pu Ruinan is the director of the North Sea Fleet Logistics Department. According to a working brief (gongzuo jianbao) available on the Qingdao Government Affairs website, as of June 2010, Pu held the rank of senior captain. In March 2013, he published an article in PLA Daily analyzing the speeches of former PRC leaders.

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NSF Equipment Department

**RADM Liu Gengchun** (刘庚群)

Position: Director, North Sea Fleet Equipment Department

Grade: Corps (*Jun*) Deputy Leader (Grade 6)

RADM Liu Gengchun is the director of the North Sea Fleet Equipment Department. In 2004, Liu was appointed deputy chief of staff of the Lushun Support Base. By late 2008, he had been promoted to commander of the Qingdao Support Base.

In early 2013, Liu was appointed deputy commander of a blue-water training formation made up of three North Sea Fleet vessels: *Qingdao*, *Yantai*, and *Yancheng*. Official Chinese media published several articles discussing the training formation’s focus on improving and training for equipment support. A Xinhua article, for example, noted that the main purpose of the training mission was to test the comprehensive ability of equipment support. Before leaving for the formation, the North Sea Fleet Equipment Department considered all possible equipment malfunctions, and tested and inspected each major piece of equipment. Liu is quoted saying, “We hope that no equipment malfunctions will develop, however if there is a malfunction we will not be worried.”

A different Xinhua article detailed how the formation’s equipment team monitored equipment using vibration surveillance, infrared survey, optical spectrum analysis, and POL tests to prevent malfunction. According to the article, the three ships “displayed good equipment performance in a condition of full-load, high-intensity, and continuous operation, and realized the record of having no major equipment trouble.”

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604 “Former Qingdao Support Base Commander Liu Gengchun Promoted to North Sea Fleet Equipment Department Deputy Director” (yuanqingdao baozhang jidi silingyuan liu gengchun shengren beihai jiandui zhuganbeibu buzhang; 原青岛保障基地司令员刘庚群升任北海舰队装备部部长), [Xulu.com](http://club.xilu.com/xinguangcha/msgview-950389-133986.html), 27 January 2012.

605 Mi Jinguo, “Three Homemade Warships Had Remarkable Performance in Distant Sea Training and Readiness Patrol” (3 suo guochan zhanjian zai yuanhai xunlian he zhanbei xunluo zhong baoxian chuse; 3艘国产战舰在远海训练和战备巡逻中表现出色), Xinhua, 13 February 2013.


607 Ibid.
During the formation, Liu was quoted as saying:

In addition to the self-repair support and the accompanying support provided by the technical personnel, the formation also had the backup of the joint diagnosis system for “long distance service and technical support for the ship equipment.” In the forms of video guidance, telephone consultation, and network communications, timely diagnosis across the vast ocean could be arranged for the ship equipment with the all-weather and all-time support provided by the experts at the home base in the whole process of the task navigation through the digitalized test means, automatic operation form, and the visualized remote diagnosis.  

In an article published on the state-run news portal China.com, Liu discussed the formation’s use of logistical support, describing how it used a process described as “area support” (quyu baozhang 区域保障), where the formation relied on support provided by the South Sea Fleet, rather than bringing along a comprehensive supply ship. According to the article, it was using this practice for the first time.  

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608 Mi Jinguo, “Three Homemade Warships Had Remarkable Performance in Distant Sea Training and Readiness Patrol.”

East Sea Fleet Headquarters, Ningbo

VADM Su Zhiqian (苏支前)

Position: Commander, East Sea Fleet

Grade: Military Region Deputy Leader (Grade 4)

According to military enthusiast website *Oumil*, East Sea Fleet Commander VADM Su Zhiqian was born in Xue’an, a city in coastal Fujian Province directly across from Taiwan.610 Su is a graduate of the Naval Command Academy in Nanjing. He has also studied at the National Defense University, and studied abroad at the Military Academy of the General Staff of Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Su entered the navy in 1970. He served as a staff officer in the operations and training office in the headquarters of a destroyer zhidui (支队), and then served as chief of staff, deputy commander, and commander of the South Sea Fleet’s 2nd Destroyer Division.611

In 2002, he was promoted to South Sea Fleet Headquarters, where he was first a deputy chief of staff and then chief of staff, and in July 2007 was promoted to deputy commander.612 After becoming deputy commander, Su commanded a major naval delegation that visited Russia, England, Spain, and France. According to the Hong Kong paper *Wen Wei Po*, during the mission, Su led combined military exercises focusing on search and rescue.613

In 2009, Su became South Sea Fleet commander. In late 2010, after having spent nearly his entire career in the south, Su was appointed East Sea Fleet commander and concurrently deputy commander of the Nanjing Military Region.614 He is one of only two current navy leaders to have commanded two different fleets (the other is Su Shiliang, who commanded the North Sea Fleet and the South Sea Fleet and is now a navy deputy commander).

Since becoming East Sea Fleet commander, VADM Su has led an observation delegation to a Sino-Thai combined military exercise, accompanied former chief of the General Staff Chen


612 Ibid.

613 Ni Eryan, “New Round of Adjustment of PLA Senior Generals.”

Bingde on a delegation to the United States, hosted Admiral Mullen as he toured the East Sea Fleet, and commanded a combined military exercise with South Korea. In 2012, he held talks with an Indian delegation, which was described by an Indian newspaper, The Hindu, as the highest level of mil-to-mil exchange in years.

**RADM Ding Haichun (丁海春)**

Position: Political Commissar, East Sea Fleet

Grade: Military Region Deputy Leader (Grade 4)

Ding Haichun in Yiyang City, in Central China’s Hunan Province. Little information is available on Ding’s career before 2006.

In late 2006, Ding became the director of Naval Command Academy’s Political Department. In late 2007 he was appointed political commissar of the North Sea Fleet’s Lushun Support Base. In late 2009, he became political commissar of the PLA Navy Logistics Department. After roughly two years in this position, Ding moved to the East Sea Fleet as that fleet’s political commissar.

In 2007, Ding wrote an article in Political Work Study Journal about a navy conference focusing on cadre development, possibly indicating expertise in personnel management.

In the summer of 2013, it was reported that RADM Ding was replaced as East Sea Fleet political commissar by RADM Wang Huayong, who also serves concurrently as Nanjing MR deputy political commissar.

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618 Center for China Studies, “Profile of Ding Haichun.”

619 Ding Haichun, “Knowing People; Educating People; Using People” (zhiren; jiaoren; yongren; 识人; 育人; 用人), Political Work Study Journal, no. 8 (2007).
ESF Deputy Commanders

RADM Wang Zhiguo (王志国)

Position: Deputy Commander, East Sea Fleet

Grade: Corps (Jun) Leader (Grade 5)

According to the Chinese military enthusiast website Oumil, RADM Wang in Sui County, Henan Province.621

In early 2002, he was promoted to deputy chief of staff of the East Sea Fleet. He was promoted to fleet chief of staff in late 2006. In this capacity, he likely worked with then East Sea Fleet commander and current navy deputy commander VADM Xu Hongmeng. In 2009, he was appointed fleet deputy commander.622

In 2009, while serving as deputy commander, RADM Wang was appointed to command the 3rd Gulf of Aden Naval Task Force. While deployed, he told PLA Daily that Gulf of Aden missions are essential for “guaranteeing the unblocked condition of our maritime transportation line, protecting national security and the safety of our people's lives and property, raising our capability of coping with multiple threats at sea and performing diversified military tasks in distant seas.”623 During this mission, RADM Wang carried out joint ship escort operations with the Russian Navy, and an exchange of ship visits with U.S. Navy RADM Scott Sanders.624 RADM Wang wrote an article on “informatization,” published in PLA Daily in 2011.625

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RADM Zhang Huachen (张华臣)

Position: Deputy Commander, East Sea Fleet

Grade: Corps (Jun) Leader (Grade 5)

According to the Chinese military enthusiast website Oumil, RADM Zhang in Zhucheng County, Shandong Province. He served as chief of staff of the Fujian Support Base from 2001 to 2003. In 2003 he was promoted to base commander, serving in that position until 2009. After that he was promoted to deputy commander of the East Sea Fleet. In the winter of 2010, RADM Zhang was appointed commander of the 7th Gulf of Aden escort mission. During this deployment, he led PLA Navy ships on visits to Tanzania, South Africa, and the Seychelles.

As a delegate to the 11th National People’s Congress (NPC), RADM Zhang was vocal about China’s need to assert sovereignty over its maritime territory. In a PLA Daily article covering the NPC meeting, he was quoted as stating: “Aside from the 9.6 million square kilometers of territory, China also boasts more than 3 million square kilometers of territorial waters. For that reason, China is in need of dependable national defense power and military capabilities to safeguard its economic development activities on its own territorial waters.”

RADM Zhang has been quoted and interviewed multiple times by Chinese and foreign media on issues of China’s maritime interests and strategy. In June 2010, Asia-Pacific Defense Magazine, a Taiwanese publication, quoted him as saying that “the Chinese navy is also developing from a coastal defense-type unit to a distant sea defense-type unit.” Late that year, Hong Kong’s Asia

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627 “Resumé of Rear Admiral Zhang Huachen” (zhang huachen xiaojiang jianli; 张华臣小将简历), Feihong-11 (blog), 1 September 2011, blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_7ea215d10100wiz4.html.

628 Ibid.


Times quoted him as saying, “With the expansion of the country's economic interests, the Navy wants to protect the country's transportation routes and the safety of our major sea lanes.”

RADM Qiu Yanpeng (邱延鹏)

Position: Deputy Commander, East Sea Fleet
Grade: Corps (Jun) Leader (Grade 5)

A China-based military enthusiast website states that RADM Qiu was born in 1956. He entered the navy in 1973 and eventually became a destroyer captain. In a 2012 interview, RADM Qiu noted that the PLA Navy in which he served as a young captain had much more limited opportunities at sea than today: “When I served as a ship captain, it was impossible to go out on the open ocean due to the small tonnage of the vessels and the outdated equipment. We could only hover around the ‘home gate’ during the drilling of our soldiers.”

RADM Qiu commanded the 6th Destroyer Division (zhidui) in the East Sea Fleet from late 2001 to 2009. During his command, the division completed a live force confrontation exercise using informatized equipment for the first time.

In 2007, RADM Qiu commanded the Chinese contingent of a Pakistan-hosted combined military exercise with eight other nations (including the United States), called “Aman-07.” It marked the first time China participated in a multilateral combined naval exercise, the first time a division traveled abroad without a supply ship, and the first time the navy used live ammunition overseas. People’s Daily specifically highlighted RADM Qiu’s ability to command the exercise using

636 “PLA High Ranking Officer Qiu Yanpeng.”
637 Wu Dengfeng, Fang Lihua, and Jia Yanhua, “Deeds of the Ace Division at Sea – an Unnamed Destroyer Flotilla of the East Sea Fleet of the PLA Navy” (haishang wangpaishi jihaijun donghai jiandui mou quzhujian zhidui; 海王牌师记海军东海舰队某驱逐舰支队), Xinhua 29 July 2010.
English. Soon afterwards, RADM Qiu commanded a destroyer formation on a visit to Indonesia, the first time a Chinese naval ship had visited the country in over a decade.

In 2009, RADM Qiu was promoted to deputy chief of staff of the East Sea Fleet. A few months after being promoted, he was appointed commander of the 4th Gulf of Aden Task Force. Under his command, PLA Navy ships traveled to the Persian Gulf for the first time, conducting a port visit in Abu Dhabi. Before returning to China, ships in this task force also visited the Philippines, conducting a port visit in Manila. During his deployment, RADM Qiu gave an extensive interview to the Shanghai-based magazine, *Oriental Outlook*, about the task force.

In 2011, RADM Qiu was again sent abroad, this time to command the *Peace Ark* hospital ship in “Harmonious-Mission 2011.” The mission lasted 105 days, covered 24,600 nautical miles, and provided medical care to patients in Cuba, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Costa Rica.

RADM Qiu was promoted to deputy commander of the East Sea Fleet in late 2012. Soon afterwards he was assigned to command a patrol task force operating in waters near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. RADM Qiu has also made several statements to the press regarding the Diaoyu dispute and China’s maritime rights. In 2007, he was quoted in *Jiefangjun Bao* as saying, “The Diaoyu Islands and its affiliated islands have been part of China's inherent territory since ancient times. It is totally proper and legitimate for the Chinese navy to cruise the nearby waters where it has the jurisdiction. It is beyond reproach.”

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640 “PLA High Ranking Officer Qiu Yanpeng.”


RADM Gu Xiangbing (顾祥兵)

Position: Deputy Commander, East Sea Fleet

Grade: Corps (Jun) Leader (Grade 5)

RADM Gu Xiangbing is a career submariner. He holds an undergraduate degree in submarine technology command and has also studied conventional submarine tactical command. In 2002, he took courses at a naval academy in Russia.\textsuperscript{648}

In 2005, RADM Gu was likely assigned commander of the 12\textsuperscript{th} Submarine Division (zhidui) in the North Sea Fleet based in Lushun, Liaoning Province. Afterwards, RADM Gu served as deputy chief of staff of the North Sea Fleet.\textsuperscript{649} In late 2009, he was appointed commandant of the Submarine Academy.\textsuperscript{650} By 2012, he had become deputy commander of the East Sea Fleet.\textsuperscript{651}

According to a U.S. Department of Defense report, RADM Gu has published dozens of articles, including one in Modern Navy on German submarines.\textsuperscript{652}

In 2011, RADM Gu gave an interview on CCTV, where he discussed the topic of applying information technology to command and control, saying, “It is of profound and far-reaching strategic significance and of important military benefit to building a digitized maritime battlefield and winning limited maritime wars under informatized conditions.”\textsuperscript{653}


\textsuperscript{649}Ibid.


\textsuperscript{653}“Military Report” (junshi baodao; 军事报道), CCTV-7, 23 June 2011.
ESF Headquarters Department

RADM Yan Yuejin (严跃进)

Position: Chief of Staff, East Sea Fleet

Grade: Corps (Jun) Leader (Grade 5)

RADM Yan Yuejin was born in Tongzhou, in coastal Jiangsu Province, and entered the PLA in 1973.⁶⁵⁴

According to the Hong Kong independent magazine *Frontline*, RADM Yan has studied abroad at the Russian Naval Academy.⁶⁵⁵

RADM Yan appears to have a shared professional history with current East Sea Fleet commander VADM Su Zhiqian. From late 1999 to 2001, RADM Yan was chief of staff of the South Sea Fleet’s 2nd Destroyer Division (zhidui), while Su Zhiqian was commander. In 2001, RADM Yan was appointed division deputy commander. In 2002, he was promoted to division commander. In 2011 RADM Yan became East Sea Fleet chief of staff.⁶⁵⁶

In 2005, RADM Yan took part in high-level meetings with Indian military leaders as the deputy commander of a PLA Navy formation visiting India.⁶⁵⁷

RADM Yan has been quoted in the press on the application of information technology to command and control, often stressing the need for quick action and decisive command. In 2006, he told *PLA Daily*, “In future informatized warfare…winning or losing will often be decided within a split second; therefore, every operational link is of the greatest importance.”⁶⁵⁸ Two years later, he remarked, “Informatized warfare brings mathematical operations and computers

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⁶⁵⁵ “HK Magazine: Critical Biography of Vice Admiral Su Shiliang, PLAN Chief of Staff,” Chien Shao, 1 March 2009.

⁶⁵⁶ “Yan Yuejin Promoted to East Sea Fleet Chief of Staff” (yan yuejin ren donghai jiandui canmouzhang; 严跃进任东海舰队参谋长), Oumil, 12 December, 2011, oumil.com/article/zhenggong/1805.html.


into the realm of the military…command and operational decision making must be fast and accurate.”

RADM Shen Hao (沈浩)

Position: Deputy Chief of Staff, East Sea Fleet

Grade: Corps (Jun) Deputy Leader (Grade 6)

RADM Shen Hao joined the PLA in 1974. From 2007 to 2010, he served as director of the Operations Department at Navy Headquarters. In 2010, he was appointed commander of the East Sea Fleet’s Fujian Support Base. One year later, he became commander of the Shanghai Support Base. He was appointed deputy chief of staff of the East Sea Fleet in 2012.

In 2012, RADM Shen commanded a joint exercise called “East China Sea Coordination-2012” with the Ministry of Agriculture’s East China Sea Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (FLEC) and the State Oceanic Administration’s East China Sea Branch. RADM Shen explained to Chinese media the fourfold purpose of the exercise: to improve “the ability of fleet units and the state's maritime law enforcement forces to coordinate with each other”; to test the ability of fleet units to “deal with sudden situations at sea and support the state's maritime law enforcement forces in protecting rights”; to “raise the level of military and civilian maritime coordination and cooperation”; and to “enable our various maritime forces to link up better into a tight-knit, coordinated system.” He stated that the exercise displayed “the capabilities and determinations of our country for protecting the nation's territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests.”


660 Wang Jingguo et al., “Reporting From Chinese Warships’ East China Sea Exercises” (zhiji zhongguo zhanjian donghai yanxi; 直击中国战舰东海演习), Guoji Xuanqu Daobao, 26 October 2012.

661 “Rear Admiral Shen Hao Promoted to East Sea Fleet Deputy Chief of Staff” (shenhao xiaojiang tiaoren donghai jiandui fucanmouzhang; 沈浩小将调入东海舰队副参谋长), Oumil, 19 October, 2012, www.oumil.com/article/zhenggong/9541.html.


RADM Zhou Xuming (周煦明)

Position: Deputy Chief of Staff, East Sea Fleet
Grade: Corps (Jun) Deputy Leader (Grade 6)

According to the China-based military enthusiast website Oumil, RADM Zhou

From 2005 to 2010, RADM Zhou commanded a submarine division (zhidui). In 2010, he was promoted to deputy chief of staff of the East Sea Fleet. RADM Zhou was commander of the 12th Gulf of Aden escort mission and commanded a joint training exercise in 2010 as well. During the Gulf of Aden mission, he led his task force on a visit to Australia.

Based on the birthdate given above, RADM Zhou will reach retirement age for his grade in 2017.

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666 “Senior Captain Zhou Xuming Promoted to Deputy Chief of Staff of the East Sea Fleet” (zhou xuming daxiao ren donghai jiandui fu canmouzhan; 周煦明大校升任东海舰队副参谋长), 10 February 2010, Xilu.com, 10 February 2010, club142.xilu.com/xinguancha/msgview-950389-105380.html?PHPSESSID=ac963207fceeecd2fadadd486bfa4c843.


ESF Political Department

RADM Yang Shiguang (杨世光)

Position: Director, East Sea Fleet Political Department

Grade: Corps (Jun) Leader (Grade 5)

In late 2004, RADM Yang Shiguang was appointed political commissar of an unidentified engineering command unit. In 2008, he became the director of the Fujian Support Base Political Department. In 2009, he was promoted to political commissar of the Naval Aviation Engineering Academy. In March 2012, RADM Yang was once again promoted, to director of the East Sea Fleet Political Department.

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ESF Logistics Department

RADM Liu Hongshen (刘洪深)

Position: Director, East Sea Fleet Logistics Department

Grade: Corps (Jun) Deputy Leader (Grade 6)

In late 2006, RADM Liu was serving as commander of a detachment of fast attack craft, described by an official article as a “heroic unit” called the “Seahawks” (haiying 海鹰). According to the article, as commander, he worked to improve soldiers’ quality of life. By late 2011, RADM Liu was promoted to commander of the Fujian Support Base. Afterwards, he was promoted to director of the East Sea Fleet Logistics Department.

In an article in PLA Daily describing the reestablishment of fleet-level logistics departments, Liu is quoted as saying, “Organization of a logistics organ is not a simple combination of personnel. In order to do a good job in logistics support work, it is definitely necessary to 'change the brain' first. In this case, we will be able to put ourselves in the right place.”

According to military enthusiast website Oumil, RADM Liu Hongshen is the new chief of staff of the East Sea Fleet, although at the time of this writing, this has not been confirmed through official sources.

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673 Feng Zhiyuan, “Cleverly Borrow East Wind To Sail by Cleaving through Waves” (qiaojie dongfenpo langxing; 巧借东风破浪行), PLA Daily, 27 October 2012.

ESF Equipment Department

RADM Zhang Jingle (张京乐)

Position: Director, East Sea Fleet Equipment Department

Grade: Corps (Jun) Deputy Leader (Grade 6)

RADM Zhang Jingle is director of the East Sea Fleet Equipment Department.675 According to Southern Metropolitan Daily, a paper affiliated with the Guangzhou Provincial Party Committee, as well as the website for the Fisheries Bureau of the Huangbo Maritime District in Shandong Province, RADM Zhang briefly served as deputy chief of staff of the East Sea Fleet in 2011, before becoming director of the East Sea Fleet Equipment Department.676


South Sea Fleet Headquarters, Zhanjiang

VADM Jiang Weilie (蒋伟烈)

Position: Commander, South Sea Fleet (2010-Present)

Grade: Military Region Deputy Leader (Grade 4)

VADM Jiang Weilie in East China’s Jiangsu Province. 677

In the 1990s, VADM Jiang served as captain of the Luda destroyer Zunyi, which took part in live-fire exercises during the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996. 678 He later served as deputy commander of the Shanghai Naval Support Base before being appointed deputy commandant of the Naval Command Academy in 2004. In 2005, he was promoted to deputy commander of the East Sea Fleet’s Zhoushan Support Base. In 2007, he was promoted to commander of the North Sea Fleet’s Lushun Support Base. Within a year he was promoted yet again, to chief of staff of the East Sea Fleet. 679 While in this position, he accompanied former vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) General Xu Caihou on a delegation to the United States, which included meetings with former U.S. defense secretary Robert Gates. 680

In February 2010 he began a 10-month assignment as director of the Navy Equipment Department. According to the Hong Kong newspaper Ta Kung Pao, while serving as director of the Equipment Department, Jiang reformed the navy’s weapons acquisition system, a goal allegedly promulgated by the CMC. 681 In December of that year, he became commander of the South Sea Fleet and concurrently deputy commander of the Guangzhou Military Region. Within three years (2007-2010), VADM Jiang had risen from a grade 7 to a grade 4, a rapid career progression. 682

678 Su Tan and Long Xia, “The Two Valiant Generals Who Guard South China Sea” (zuozhen nanhai de liang huijiang; 坐镇南海的两虎将), Global People, 26 July 2012.
681 Ma Haoliang, “High-Ranking Officer Adjustments in the Navy with a Focus on Having a Technologically Strong Military” (haijun jiangling tiaozheng tuxian keji qiang jun, 海军将领调整 凸显科技强军), Ta Kung Pao, 9 February 2011.
682 Center for China Studies, “Profile of Jiang Weilie.”
A 2012 article in *Global People*, a PRC tabloid published by *People’s Daily*, contains commentary on VADM Jiang and his political commissar, VADM Wang Dengping. It quotes Chinese military academics as saying that the appointment of VADM Jiang and VADM Wang to lead the South Sea Fleet was an indication of China's “firm resolve to safeguard its maritime rights and territorial integrity,” and “can be viewed as a signal of more active Chinese responses to South China Sea issues.”

The authors also describe VADM Jiang as “a man of action who knows military and war affairs.” The article quotes a scholar from the Academy of Military Sciences as saying that both VADM Jiang and VADM Wang had expertise in the application of information technology (IT) to command and control, and that both possessed a “more hardline military position.”

In 2012, VADM Jiang was elected as an alternate to the 18th Communist Party Central Committee. Central Committee alternates are listed by the order of votes they received, and his position was 57th out of 171. VADM Jiang will reach retirement age for his grade in 2018.

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683 Su Tan and Long Xia, “The Two Valiant Generals Who Guard South China Sea.”

VADM Wang Dengping (王登平)

Position: Political Commissar, South Sea Fleet (2012-Present)

Grade: Military Region Deputy Leader (Grade 4)

South Sea Fleet Political Commissar VADM Wang Dengping in Feixi County in East China’s Anhui Province.685 He holds a master’s degree in political science from the CCP’s Central Party School in Beijing.686

VADM Wang joined the PLA in 1970, in the middle of the Cultural Revolution, and served as a platoon leader before becoming a political officer. He spent part of his career in Beijing in the General Political Department’s Propaganda Department, first as deputy director of an unidentified bureau, and then as director. Afterwards, he joined the navy as deputy political commissar of the North Sea Fleet’s Qingdao Support Base.687

In 2002, VADM Wang embarked on a navy expedition that circumnavigated the globe. He worked closely with the commander of this expedition, current PLA Navy deputy commander VADM Ding Yiping. VADM Wang later wrote an article describing the experience, entitled “The Chinese People's Navy's First Around-The-World Voyage.”688

In 2003, VADM Wang was promoted to political commissar of the North Sea Fleet’s Qingdao Support Base. From 2006 to 2009, Wang served as political commissar of the Navy Equipment Department.689 In 2009, VADM Wang became political commissar of the North Sea Fleet. In 2012, he was assigned to the South Sea Fleet.690 With this move, he became the only currently serving political officer in the navy to have served as commissar of two different fleets. As a vice admiral, he is also the highest ranking of the three current fleet commissars. VADM Wang is also a deputy to the National People’s Congress.691


688 Ibid.


691 Su Tan and Long Xia, “The Two Valiant Generals Who Guard South China Sea.”
A 2012 article in *Global People*, a tabloid published by *People’s Daily*, quotes Chinese military academics as saying that the appointment of VADM Jiang and VADM Wang to lead the South Sea Fleet indicated China’s “firm resolve to safeguard its maritime rights and territorial integrity,” and “can be viewed as a signal of more active Chinese responses to South China Sea issues.”

The article also quotes an Academy of Military Sciences scholar as saying that both VADM Jiang and VADM Wang had expertise in the application of information technology to command and control, and that both possessed a “more hardline military position.” 692 Around the same time, the Hong Kong newspaper *South China Morning Post* described VADM Wang as “famously hawkish.” 693

In 2009, VADM Wang told *China News*, “We do care about the South Sea issue. We cannot let the territory shrink in our hands. We cannot lose the 3-million-square-kilometer territorial waters while protecting them.” 694 That same year, he told Hong Kong media, “From a military perspective, [China’s] sovereignty over its maritime territories cannot be taken away – not even a single inch of it. We must defend it. We cannot lose it.” 695 He was also quoted on several instances after the incident with the U.S. Navy ship *Impeccable* (2009), asserting China’s right to regulate military activities in its exclusive economic zone. 696

VADM Wang accompanied former General Political Department director General Li Jinai on two separate delegations: one to New Zealand and Chile in 2010, and one to North Korea in 2011. 697 Additionally, he participated in a delegation to Sri Lanka and India in 2012, which was led by former minister of defense General Liang Guangjie. 698

692 Ibid.


695 “Newscast,” Hong Kong Cable TV News Two, 9 March 2009.

696 See for example Er Shan, “High-Ranking People's Liberation Army Officer Responds To Matter of United States Navy Ship's Activities in China's South Sea Exclusive Economic Zone” (*jiefangjun jiangling huiying meijunjian zai nanhai zhongguo zhuanshu jingjiqu huodong zhishi*; 解放军将领回应美军舰在南海中国专属经济区活动之事), *Zhongguo Tongxun She*, 10 March 2009.


698 Shi Ren, “First Visit to India by PRC Defense Minister for 8 Years, to Eliminate Military Suspicions and Boost Mutual Trust” (*zhongguo fangchang ba nian shou fang yin xiaomi junshi yilu cu huxin*; 中防长八年首访印 消弭军事疑虑促互信), *Zhongguo Tongxun She*, 5 September 2012.
SSF Deputy Commanders

RADM Yao Zhilou (么志楼)

Position: Deputy Commander, South Sea Fleet (2009-Present)

Grade: Corps (Jun) Leader (Grade 5)

From 2002 to 2004, RADM Yao Zhilou commanded the South Sea Fleet’s Zhanjiang Support Base.699 Afterwards, he was promoted to deputy chief of staff for the South Sea Fleet.

In 2009, RADM Yao was promoted to deputy commander of the South Sea Fleet.700 In this position, he took part in a PLA delegation to Brunei and Japan, led by former deputy chief of the General Staff General Ge Zhenfeng.701 Soon afterwards, he was appointed commander of the 2nd Gulf of Aden expedition.702 On its way back to China, this mission made a port visit in Cochin, India.703

In May 2011, RADM Yao accompanied former defense minister General Liang Guanglie on a delegation that traveled to Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines.704

In 2002, he was named a delegate to the 16th Communist Party Congress.705

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700 “South Sea Fleet New Commander Su Zhiqian.”
**RADM Wang Changjiang (王长江)**

Position: Deputy Commander, South Sea Fleet (2012-Present)

Grade: Corps (Jun) Leader (Grade 5)

RADM Wang Changjiang has spent much of his career in naval aviation. From 2001 to 2005, he served as deputy commander of the East Sea Fleet’s 4th Naval Aviation Division. In 2005, he became commander of the division.

RADM Wang was assigned to the PLA Navy Equipment Department in 2006, and served as a deputy director for three years. In 2009, he became deputy commander of the East Sea Fleet’s naval aviation unit. The next year, RADM Wang returned to Beijing to serve as a PLA Navy deputy chief of staff.

In 2012, RADM Wang was appointed deputy commander of the South Sea Fleet and, concurrently, commander of South Sea Fleet naval aviation. 706

**RADM Zhang Zhaoyin (张兆垠)**

Position: Deputy Commander, South Sea Fleet (2011-Present)

Grade: Corps (Jun) Leader (Grade 5)

According to unofficial Chinese sources, RADM Zhang was born in Tengzhou, Shandong Province. 707

RADM Zhang has spent most of his military career in the ground forces and the PLA General Equipment Department. He joined the PLA in 1972, working in a tank repair battalion in the Jinan Military Region. He then served as squad leader; staff officer; secretary to a commanding officer; political instructor at the Armored Force Engineering Academy; and staff officer, and, later, deputy chief of staff, in the Arms Department under the PLA General Staff Department. 708

In October 1998, he was appointed deputy director of the Financial Planning Bureau, a third-level bureau under the General Equipment Department’s (GED’s) General-Use Equipment

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Support Department. He was later promoted to Comprehensive Bureau director under the same General-Use Equipment Support Department.\textsuperscript{709}

In 2006, RADM Zhang was appointed deputy director of the GED General-Use Equipment Support Department. He received a rank promotion to major general in July 2007.

RADM Zhang has published two articles in \textit{PLA Daily}. These articles discuss the importance of maintaining the PLA’s focuses on preparing for combat operations and “winning local wars under informatized conditions,” rather than preparing for non-military operations, and on strengthening the PLA’s “information-system-based system of systems operations capability.”\textsuperscript{710}

\textbf{RADM Du Yongguo (杜永国)}

Position: Deputy Commander, South Sea Fleet (2010-Present)

Grade: Corps (Jun) Leader (Grade 5)

The Chinese military enthusiast website \textit{Oumil} notes that RADM Du\textsuperscript{711} was born in Tianjin. In 2009, he was serving as the commander of an unidentified submarine base.\textsuperscript{712} On 27 July 2009 he was promoted from senior captain to RADM, and was also one of 249 PLA delegates to the 17th Party Congress in 2007.\textsuperscript{713} By the summer of 2010, RADM Du had been appointed to deputy commander of the South Sea Fleet.\textsuperscript{714}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{711}“People’s Liberation Army List of Major Generals (by Alphabetical Order)” (zhongguo renmin jiefangjun shaqiang minglu (an xingshi pailie); 中国人民解放军少将名录（按姓氏排列）), \textit{Oumil}, 8 May 2012, www.oumil.com/article/zhenggong/5667_6.html.
\item \textsuperscript{713}“PLA, PAF Units Elect Deputies to 17th CPC National Congress” (jiefangjun he wujing budui xuanju chansheng chuxi zhongguo gongchandang dishiqi ci quanguo daibiao dahui daibiao; 解放军和武警部队选举出席中国共产党第十七次全国代表大会代表), \textit{PLA Daily}, 3 July 2007.
\end{itemize}
SSF Headquarters Department

**RADM Wei Xueyi (魏学义)**

Position: Chief of Staff, South Sea Fleet (2010-Present)

Grade: Corps (*Jun*) Leader (Grade 5)

RADM Wei Xueyi is a submariner. From 2001 to 2008, he commanded the South Sea Fleet’s 32nd Submarine Division (*zhidui*).\(^{715}\) In 2006, Wei’s division participated in a lengthy exercise which, according to the PLA’s “Military Report” program on CCTV, broke several navy records.\(^{716}\)

In 2008, RADM Wei was promoted to commandant of the Submarine Academy in Qingdao. Two years later, he became chief of staff of the South Sea Fleet.\(^{717}\) In late 2010, Wei led a three-ship formation on a visit to Indonesia.\(^{718}\)

In November 2011, Wei was appointed commander of the 6th Gulf of Aden escort mission. During this expedition, the PLA Navy traveled to Saudi Arabia for the first time.\(^{719}\)

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\(^{717}\) “Rear Admiral Wei Xueyi Promoted to South Sea Fleet Chief of Staff” (*wei xueyi xiaojiang shengren nanhai jiandui canmouzhang*, 魏学义小将升任南海舰队参谋长), *Xilu.com*, 4 March 2010, [club.xilu.com/xinguangcha/msgview-950389-106142.html](http://club.xilu.com/xinguangcha/msgview-950389-106142.html).


\(^{719}\) “Chinese Naval Vessels Visit Saudi Arabia for First Time.”
RADM Li Shihong (李士红)
Position: Deputy Chief of Staff, South Sea Fleet (2011-Present)
Grade: Corps (Jun) Deputy Leader (Grade 6)

RADM Li Shihong spent five years as the director of the Military Affairs Department at Navy Headquarters, before being promoted to South Sea Fleet deputy chief of staff in 2011. In this latter position, he commanded the 10th Gulf of Aden mission. After the escort mission, the task force docked in Hong Kong to celebrate the 15th anniversary of the transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong from the United Kingdom to China.

While in Hong Kong, RADM Li was quoted as saying to Hong Kong media that it is “beyond a doubt” that Huangyan Island is China’s territory, and that “as long as the Party central leadership and the Central Military Commission make the decision (regarding Huangyan Island), the Navy will certainly fulfill the missions.”

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RA DM Li Xiaoyan (李晓岩)

Position: Deputy Chief of Staff, South Sea Fleet (2012-Present)

Grade: Corps (Jun) Deputy Leader (Grade 6)

According to PRC-owned Hong Kong magazine Tzu Ching, South Sea Fleet Deputy Chief of Staff RADM Li Xiaoyan in Changchun, a city in Northeast China’s Jilin Province. He holds two bachelor’s degrees, the first of which he received from the Air Force No. 8 Flight Academy in 1979. While serving in the PLA Air Force, Li was invited to participate in a special training program designed to cultivate a new class of “high-caliber” navy captains. The program, which took place at the Guangzhou Naval Vessel Academy, reportedly taught aviators how to command surface combatants. Li graduated from the program with his second bachelor’s degree, in 1987.

At the age of 30, Li served on his first destroyer, Nanchang, as a deputy captain. In 1995, he was promoted to captain of the frigate Jiangmen. One year later, he was sent to Russia's N.G. Kuznetsov Naval Academy to study advanced naval theory and equipment. He graduated in 1999 with a master’s degree. His thesis, which Xinhua claims was written entirely in Russian, was entitled “Vessel Formation for Naval Attack Operations.”

After returning to China, Li became captain of the destroyer Shenzhen. In 2000, he took Shenzhen on a lengthy deployment to Southeast Asia and Africa. The 65-day mission reportedly broke many PLA records: it was the first time the PLA Navy crossed three oceans in one trip; the first time a Chinese ship crossed the Indian Ocean; the first time a PLA Navy ship passed the Cape of Good Hope; and the first time PLA Navy ships visited Africa. A Xinhua article describing the expedition remarked, “Li Xiaoyan presented to the world a bright and brave image of a Chinese vessel captain navigating a new-type warship, crossing the ocean, and going to the world.”

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723 Yu Wen, “China's Aircraft Carrier Commander Will Come From Among ‘Captain Pilots’” (wo hangmu zhikui yian ji laizi “feixingyuan chuanzhang”); 我航母指挥官将来自“飞行员船长”), Tzu Ching, 1 August 2011.
724 In 2011, the academy changed its name to the Naval Marine Academy.
726 Ibid.
727 Li Chenghua, Chen Wanjun, and Li Xiangdong, “Proud, Valiant Fighters of the Ocean – Profiles of Outstanding Vessel Captains With Doctor's and Master's Degrees on a Certain Destroyer Flotilla of the Navy (Parts 1 and 2),” Xinhua, 2 April 2001.
728 Ibid.
RADM Li remained captain of *Shenzhen* until 2004, when he was promoted to chief of staff of the South Sea Fleet’s 9th Destroyer Division (*zhidui*). In 2007, he became deputy commander of the division. That same year, he commanded the Chinese side of a combined military exercise in the Malacca Strait. The exercise included ships from the United States, Canada, Japan, Pakistan, Korea, and Singapore.\(^{729}\)

In 2012, there was speculation in the Hong Kong and Chinese press that Li would be selected to command China’s first aircraft carrier.\(^{730}\) Instead, he was promoted to deputy chief of staff of the South Sea Fleet, and was later appointed commander of the 13th Gulf of Aden mission.\(^{731}\)

RADM Li will reach retirement age for his grade in 2016.

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\(^{731}\) Li, Chen, and Li, “Proud, Valiant Fighters of the Ocean.”
RADM Zhang Wendan (张文旦)

Position: Deputy Chief of Staff, South Sea Fleet (2009-Present)

Grade: Corps (Jun) Deputy Leader (Grade 6)

South Sea Fleet Deputy chief of staff RADM Zhang Wendan in Fuyang County, in East China’s Anhui Province.732

Zhang previously served as director of a ship’s training center.733 From 2004 to 2009, he commanded the 26th Fast Attack Craft Division (zhidui) in the South Sea Fleet.734

In 2009, he was promoted to South Sea Fleet deputy chief of staff. In this position, also in 2009, he commanded the navy’s first joint military-civilian search-and-rescue exercise with the Guangdong Provincial Government.735

In the spring of 2010, RADM Zhang was appointed commander of the 5th Gulf of Aden task force.736 While in the Gulf of Aden, the task force conducted a combined exercise with the Republic of Korea Navy.737 The task force also conducted port visits in Egypt, Italy, Greece, Burma, and Singapore.738


SSF Political Department

RADM Wang Huayong (王华勇)

Position: Director, South Sea Fleet Political Department

Grade: Corps (Jun) Leader (Grade 5)

RADM Wang Huayong was born in Honghu County in Hubei Province. By April 2001, he was serving as political commissar of a marine brigade. In a China News article, the brigade is referred to as “Sky Eagle, Sea Dragon and Land Tiger.” In late 2007, he was appointed political commissar of the Yulin Support Base in the South Sea Fleet. In 2009, he was promoted to director of the South Sea Fleet Political Department.

In summer 2013, it was reported that RADM Wang had replaced RADM Ding Haichun as East Sea Fleet political commissar, and was also serving concurrently as Nanjing MR deputy political commissar.

RADM Wang is a representative of the 12th National People’s Congress. In an article for China.com, he was quoted saying that the March 2013 reorganization of various maritime law enforcement agencies into a new State Oceanic Administration would raise the efficiency of law enforcement.

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740 “Chinese Officers and Soldiers Express Readiness to Speed Up the Armed Forces’ Modernization,” Zhongguo Xinwen She, 16 April 2001.

741 Wang Huayong: Newly Appointed Political Commissar of the East Sea Fleet” (wang huayong: donghai jiandui xinren zhengzhi weiyuan; 王华勇：东海舰队新任政治委员), xhgggg blog, 3 September 2013, blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4d5df9740102e3rc.html.

742 “Nanjing Deputy Political Commissar, East Sea Fleet Political Commissar Wang Huayong Attends Inspection in Jiaocheng District.”

SSF Logistics Department

RADM Guan Jianguo (管建国)

Position: Director, South Sea Fleet Logistics Department

Grade: Corps (Jun) Deputy Leader (Grade 6)

In 2005, RADM Guan Jianguo became chief of staff of the South Sea Fleet’s Guangzhou Support Base. In 2006, he was promoted to commander of the Zhanjiang Support Base, also in the South Sea Fleet. He remained there for four years before making a lateral move to become a deputy chief of staff of the South Sea Fleet in 2010.\(^{744}\) By 2013, RADM Zhang had been promoted to director of the South Sea Fleet Logistics Department.\(^{745}\)

In 2011, RADM Guan was appointed commander of the 9th Gulf of Aden escort mission. This mission included port visits to Singapore, Kuwait, and Oman.\(^{746}\)

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\(^{745}\) “Zhanjiang Holds a Spring Festival Meeting for the Military/Government” (woshi juxing chunjie junzheng zuotanhui; 我市举行春节军政座谈会), Zhanjiang Municipal Government website, 8 February 2013, [http://www.zhanjiang.gov.cn/_Layouts/ApplicationPages/Modules/LeaderPage/NewsDetail.aspx?PageId=2&Type=f3080333-a346-485b-b1f1-55317558110c&Id=b9de1f7f3c12-48ac-8fe0-a708b5a4b089](http://www.zhanjiang.gov.cn/_Layouts/ApplicationPages/Modules/LeaderPage/NewsDetail.aspx?PageId=2&Type=f3080333-a346-485b-b1f1-55317558110c&Id=b9de1f7f3c12-48ac-8fe0-a708b5a4b089).

SSF Equipment Department

RADM Jiang Zhonghua (姜中华)

Position: Director, South Sea Fleet Equipment Department

Grade: Corps (Jun) Deputy Leader (Grade 6)

According to the official website for Humen Port in Dongguan City, Guangdong, by the end of 2002, RADM Jiang Zhonghua was serving as director of the Operations Branch in the South Sea Fleet’s Headquarters Department. In 2003, he was appointed commander of the 11th Fast Attack Craft Division (zhidui) in based in Haikou, Hainan Province. In late 2010 he became commander of the Yulin Support Base. In April 2011, while commander of the Yulin Support Base, RADM Jiang commanded a joint military-civilian exercise that focused on search-and-rescue and anti-terrorism operations. By 2013, he had been appointed director of the South Sea Fleet Equipment Department.

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747 “Famous Soldiers of the ‘90s’ Generation: (ming ‘90 hou’ shibing de shidai dandang; 名 ‘90 后’士兵的时代 当 ), Legal Daily, 26 December 2010, http://epaper.legaldaily.com.cn/fzrb/content/20101226/Article104002GN.htm; “Guan Jianguo, Jiang Zhonghua Promoted to South Sea Fleet Logistics Department Director, Equipment Department Director” (guan jianguo jiang zhonghua ren nanhai jiandui houqinbu buzhang, zhuangbeibu buzhang; 管建国 姜中华任 南海舰队后勤部部长, 装 备 部 部 长 ), Military Academy (blog) ( 讲 武 堂 ), 20 January 2012, blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_50ea02ea0100zymt.html.

748 “PLA Navy, Civilian Units Hold Joint Maritime Exercise in South China Sea,” CCTV, 23 April 2011.

749 “Zhanjiang Holds a Spring Festival Meeting for the Military/Government.”
Jinnan Military Region

RADM Zhou Xinlian (周新廉)

Position: Deputy Director of the Joint Logistics Department, Jinan Military Region (possibly retired).

Grade: Corps (Jun) Deputy Leader (Grade 6)

RADM Zhou Xinlian was appointed deputy director of the Jinan Military Region Joint Logistics Department in 2004. He was promoted to rear admiral in 2005.

Shandong Jiangjun (山东将军), an unofficial military enthusiast website, claims a number of retired and currently serving military personnel as advisors and editing committee members. According to its website, RADM Zhou is an advisor to the site. The website states that RADM Zhou no longer serves as deputy director of the Jinan Joint Logistics Department.

A blog maintained by the Hukou County Communist Youth League provides a detailed description of RADM Zhou’s military career. According to this source, he in Hukou County, Jiangxi Province, in Lisi Township, located in Tongshan Village. He was recruited into the military in December 1969 while studying at the Hukou Branch of the Communist Labor University of Jiangxi (Jiangxi gongchanzhuyi laodong daxue; 劳动大学湖), a CCP-affiliated institution that taught basic agricultural science to farmers throughout the Cultural Revolution. After graduating in 1969, he enlisted in the PLA Navy’s unit number 1222. In

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753 Hukou County Communist Youth League, “Pride of Pohu: General Biography of Rear Admiral Zhou Xinlian.”


755 Hukou County Communist Youth League, “Pride of Pohu: General Biography of Rear Admiral Zhou Xinlian.”

221
In 1971 he was transferred to the Propaganda Division of the Political Department of the PLA Navy Logistics Department’s Handan Branch. He joined the CCP the same year.\(^{756}\)

From 1972 to 1975, RADM Zhou studied in the philosophy department of Peking University. In August 1975, he was assigned to be a political officer working on public affairs in the PLA Navy Logistics Department’s Political Department. In 1981, he became the secretary (mishu) for the PLA Logistics Department’s General Office. He was promoted to deputy director of the General Office in October 1984, and made director in October 1985.\(^{757}\)

In April 1991, RADM Zhou was promoted to deputy division director of the Logistics Department’s Research Office. Four years later, in April 1995, he was promoted to deputy chief of staff of the PLA Navy Logistics Department.

In June 1997, RADM Zhou was promoted again, to director of the Military Materials Department in the PLA Navy Logistics Department. While serving in this position, he took the National Defense University Logistics Command Class, studied logistics in Russia, and received training in Italy, Spain, and other countries in Western Europe.

In June 2004, RADM Zhou was promoted to deputy director of the Joint Logistics Department for the Jinan Military Region. He was promoted to rear admiral in 2005.\(^{758}\)

\(^{756}\) Ibid.

\(^{757}\) Ibid.

**RADM Xiang Longhua (相龙华)**

Position: Deputy Director of the Joint Logistics Department, Jinan Military Region

Grade: Corps (Jun) Deputy Leader (Grade 6)

RADM Xiang was appointed deputy director of the Jinan Military Region Joint Logistics Department in 2009.759 According to military enthusiast website *Oumil*, he was born in Linyi, Shandong Province, and was promoted to rear admiral in 2010.760

*Baidu Baike*, a website similar to Wikipedia, states that RADM Xiang was formerly the director of the North Sea Fleet’s Logistics Departments’ Quartermaster Division, director of the Qingdao Support Base’s Logistics Department, deputy chief of staff of the Nanjing Military Region Joint Logistics Department, and political commissar of the 72681 unit.761

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Nanjing Military Region

RADM Xu Jiwen (许纪文)

Position: Deputy Chief of Staff, Nanjing Military Region
Grade: Corps (Jun) Leader (Grade 5)

RADM Xu Jiwen was born in Wuxi, Jiangsu Province, in 1951. He joined the PLA in February 1968. He has an undergraduate education and graduated from the Central Party School, where he specialized in politics and law. According to Hong Kong’s Chien Shao, a monthly periodical that is often critical of the Chinese Communist Party, RADM Xu also attended the Naval Vessel Academy (it is unclear from the text whether it was the Dalian Naval Vessel Academy or the Guangzhou Vessel Academy), the Naval Command Academy, and National Defense University.

From 1995 to 1997, RADM Xu served as director of the Military Affairs Department at PLA Navy Headquarters. In late 2001, he was appointed commander of the Shanghai Support Base in the East Sea Fleet. According to military enthusiast website Oumil, he was promoted to rear admiral in 2002. Multiple unofficial sources assert that RADM Xu was appointed deputy commandant of the Dalian Naval Vessel Academy after serving in the Shanghai Support Base.

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763 “The CPC’s Key Figure in Conflict With Taiwan: A Critical Biography of Lt Gen Zhang Qinsheng, the New Deputy Chief of General Staff -- Prefect of Hu Jintao’s Class of Military Generals” (zhonggong dui tai zuozhan zhongjian renwu: xinren fuzongcanmouzhang zhang qinsheng zhongjiantaizhan – hu jintao de “jiangjunban” banzhang; 中共对台作战中坚人物：新任副总参谋长章沁生中将评传——胡锦涛的将军办班张), Chien Shao, 7-31 March 2007.


By 2005, RADM Xu had been promoted to deputy director of the Operations Department (1st Department) of the General Staff Department. In May 2005, he accompanied the chief of the General Staff, General Liang Guanglie, on a 12-person delegation to India, Bangladesh, Turkey, and Germany. 

In 2008, he served as director of the Nanjing MR Recruitment Office (征兵办). RADM Xu also served as a delegate to the 10th National People’s Congress. While he was a delegate, he was quoted in PLA Daily several times on the importance of cultivating high-level personnel. On March 10th, the paper reported that Xu “proposed the planned organization of senior officers of combat units, and outstanding young cadres in particular, to study overseas, take short courses, observe, participate in or watch and learn from exercises, so that they are tempered better in multiple duty positions and multiple environments.”

A week later, RADM Xu remarked, “Ultimately, competition within the realm of military affairs is, in fact, competition for personnel. High quality personnel are the most basic source of power, and the most important and decisive factor in military power. We must respond to the developmental tide of the times, and nurture high quality and new models of military personnel.”


767 “CMC Member Liang Guanglie, Others Visit India, Bangladesh, Turkey, Germany,” Xinhua, 19 May 2005.


Guangzhou Military Region

**RADM Zhai Zhenliang (翟贞良)**

Position: Director of the Guangzhou MR Headquarters Department’s Navy Department  
Grade: Division Leader (Grade 7)

RADM Zhai Zhenliang became director of the Guangzhou Military Region’s Headquarters Department’s Naval Department by 2002. According to the *Liaoning Daily*, a media outlet affiliated with the Liaoning Provincial Party, RADM Zhai was raised as an orphan in a provincial orphan academy in Shenyang City.

**RADM Han Linzhi (韩林枝)**

Position: Deputy Chief of Staff, Guangzhou Military Region  
Grade: Corps (*Jun*) Leader (Grade 5)

RADM Han Linzhi 来自一个位于东台附近村庄的农民家庭。他于1969年在文化大革命期间加入中国人民解放军。他在1986年入读海军指挥学院，1996年在国家国防大学进修，1999年在俄罗斯总参谋部学院留学。他的专业学术研究重点是海军战术，他写过许多关于这个主题的论文。

汉是潜艇指挥官。他的早期职业生涯中，他在潜艇队（zhidui）中担任无线电员和潜艇副指挥官、艇长、指挥官，最后成为潜艇队指挥官。2001年，他是海南岛的余林支援基地副司令。

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774 Ibid.

775 Ibid.

By 2004, he was promoted to deputy commander of the South Sea Fleet. Soon afterwards, he led a large naval delegation to India, Pakistan, and Thailand.

In 2007, Han was promoted to deputy chief of staff for the Guangzhou Military Region.

Unless RADM Han’s birthdate has been misreported, he has remained in his billet well past the mandatory retirement age of 55, which he reached in 2007.

779 Zhou Jiansheng, “Han Linzhi: His Chest Conceals a Thousand Green Waves.”
Appendix B: PLA grades and ranks

Since the founding of the Red Army in 1927, the PLA has used a grade system for its military officers. It consists of 15 grades, and applies to all units, organizations, and officers throughout the PLA. This system is key to understanding career progression in the PLA, as grade is the primary determinant (more so than rank) of where an officer stands within the PLA hierarchy.

Grades range from chairman of the Central Military Commission at the top, to platoon leader at the bottom. Each grade has a corresponding name and number, although the PLA uses the name rather than the number when referring to organizations or individuals.

In the U.S. military system, an officer’s grade (e.g., O-6) is associated with one rank. In the PLA, an officer’s grade can be associated with two ranks. For example, a PLA officer with the grade of MR leader can hold the rank of either admiral or vice admiral. These are referred to as primary and secondary ranks.
## Table 31. PLA ranks and grades

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Grade name</th>
<th>USN Equivalent rank</th>
<th>Grades of PLA Navy leadership positions</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>CMC Chairman</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>ADM (O-10)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vice Chairmen</td>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>CMC Member</td>
<td>ADM (O-10)</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>MR Leader</td>
<td>ADM (O-10)</td>
<td>VADM (O-9)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Navy Commander *</td>
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<td>• Navy Political Commissar</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>MR Deputy Leader</td>
<td>VADM (O-9)</td>
<td>RADM (O-8)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Navy Deputy Commander</td>
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<td>• Navy Deputy Political Commissar</td>
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<td>• Navy Chief of Staff</td>
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<td>• Fleet Political Commissars</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Corps (Jun) Leader</td>
<td>RADM (O-8)</td>
<td>VADM (O-9)</td>
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Certain ranks are associated with as many as four different grades. A rear admiral, for example, could hold the grade of military region deputy leader, corps (jun) leader, corps (jun) deputy leader, or division leader. This illustrates the importance of understanding an officer’s grade rather than his rank to determine his position within the PLA hierarchy. Table 32 shows the multiple ranks that are related to each grade.

**Table 32. PLA rank and grade relationships**

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The PLA has implemented mandatory retirement ages for officers at every grade up to and including the MR Leader grade. Retirement ages for CMC members, including the Chair and Vice Chairman, are unconfirmed, but thought to be between the ages of 68 and 70. Table 33 lists the grade names and numbers, and their corresponding retirement ages.

Table 33. PLA grades and corresponding retirement ages

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## Appendix C: PLA Navy leaders’ recent foreign interactions 2005 - 2012

Table 34. PLA Navy leaders’ recent participation in foreign military delegations

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<th>Xu Hongmeng</th>
<th>Ma Faxiang</th>
<th>Tian Zhong</th>
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233
### PLA Navy leaders participating in foreign military delegations (continued)

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Table 35. PLA Navy leaders’ recent participation in foreign port visits

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PLA Navy leaders participating in recent foreign port visits (continued)

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Appendix D: Profile of key second-level departments at PLA Navy Headquarters

PLA Navy Headquarters

PLA Navy Aviation Department (hangkong bingbu; 航空兵部): The PLA Navy first established a Naval Aviation Department at Navy Headquarters on 6 September 1952, the date the navy celebrates as the founding of naval aviation.780 By 2006, the Naval Aviation Department had been abolished.781 However, as late as December 2008, official sources indicate the continued existence of an “Aviation Department” as a second-level department at PLA Navy Headquarters (haijun silingbu hangkongbinbu; 海军司令部航空兵部).782 It is unknown whether this change is the result of a simple name change, or part of a larger bureaucratic restructuring.

Given the PLA Navy’s increasing emphasis on naval aviation, particularly in light of the commissioning of China’s first aircraft carrier and the current efforts to develop a carrier air wing, the Aviation Department may have the potential to impact the development of this branch of the navy.

PLA Navy Foreign Affairs Office (waishi bangongshi or “waishiban”; 外事办公室)

According to the PLA Encyclopedia of Headquarters Work, one responsibility of the Navy Headquarters Department is to organize foreign exchanges according to the PLA’s program for foreign exchange.783 This is likely the responsibility of the Navy Headquarters Foreign Affairs office. However, could find no reference to the current director of this department within the publically available literature.

PLA Navy Informatization Department (xinxihuabu; 信息化部): Like the GSD Informatization Department, the PLA Navy Informatization Department was also established in

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780 Gao Xiaoxing (ed.), The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy, p. 95.
783 Chen, Headquarters Work, pp. 63-64.
2011 as part of a reorganization of the navy’s Communication Department. The last identified director of the Navy Informatization Department is Wei Rongliang. In 2007, while serving as director of the Communications Division at the South Sea Fleet Headquarters, Wei co-authored an article on the importance of command security during naval operations when employing open communications networks used by multiple actors.

Information on this department suggests it likely oversees the development of the navy’s command and control systems. In 2011, *Xinhua* reported on a joint development project which lasted over a year between the Navy Informatization Department and the Chinese telecommunications company *China Mobile*. The goal of this project was to provide cell phone coverage to the Nansha island naval garrison.

**PLA Navy Military Affairs (junwubu; 军务部):** The PLA Navy Military Affairs Department is likely responsible for implementing administrative and management procedures within the navy, much as the GSD Military Affairs Department is responsible for conducting those similar responsibilities throughout the PLA. For example, when the PLA issued revised regulations related to the NCO officer corps in mid 2011, Military Affairs Department Director Wang Bin gave a long interview in *People’s Navy* to discuss the regulations and their impact on the navy. When new PLA-wide regulations appear, spokesmen from the GSD Military Affairs Department are often interviewed to explain their importance, thus the Navy Military Affairs Department appears to play a similar role within the Chinese navy.

The current director of the PLA Navy Military Affairs Department is Wang Bin. Wang’s predecessor, Li Shihong, spent five years in that position before being promoted to South Sea Fleet deputy chief of staff in 2011.

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785 Wei, Liang, Li, and Yu, “Research on Command Security in Information Trunking.”


787 Finkelstein, “General Staff Department,” p. 171.


789 Finkelstein, “General Staff Department,” p. 171.

790 Lu Yuping, “South Sea Fleet Holds Party to Celebrate 90th Anniversary of the Party.”
**PLA Navy Military Training Department (junxunbu; 军训部):** Public reporting on the activities of this department suggests that it is responsible for the creation of the navy’s overall training programs. The current head of the PLA Navy Military Training Department is Senior Captain Li Hanjun.⁷⁹¹ In an interview given to *People’s Navy* in 2011, Senior Captain Li outlined the navy’s projected training plans and activities over the next three to four years, focusing on the “six-ones project.” This project would unify the navy’s training and evaluation outlines, training laws and regulations, instructions, materials, training question banks, and online training systems. Senior Captain Li also discussed the schedule by which the PLA Navy hoped to implement these changes between 2011 and 2013.⁷⁹²

**PLA Navy Navigation Support Department (hangbaobu; 航保部):** This department provides navigation support to PLA Navy vessels preparing for long distance voyages, such as the navy’s Gulf of Aden task forces. In 2012, the department publically highlighted some of its achievements, including standardizing equipment measurement and calibration, and improvements in observation and surveying equipment and technologies. In 2012, *People’s Navy* noted that the department had established processes for observing, forecasting and surveying sea ice, suggesting an interest in future activities in the artic or other cold water regions where the PLA Navy does not frequently operate at present.⁷⁹³

The department also appears to play a role in the navy’s efforts at civil-military integration. It has signed joint cooperative agreements with the State Oceanic Agency (SOA), the parent organization for the PRC’s China Maritime Surveillance (CMS), as well as the Ministry of Land Resources, the ministerial-level government organ which houses the SOA.⁷⁹⁴


⁷⁹² Ibid.

⁷⁹³ Luo Chuanlue, Zhou Chaoye, and correspondent Zhou Zhenguo, “Foster Harmonized Development To Provide Sustained Support to Long-Distance Navigation Carried Out by Naval Vessels —An Eye-Witness Account of the Efforts Made by the Navigation Support Department Under the PLA Navy General Headquarters Department To Explore the Mode of Military-Civilian Harmonized Development” (*ronghe fazhan wei zhan chuan yuanhang te xu geili—hai si hang bao bu lianhe guojia she hai bumen tansuo junmin ronghe shi fa zhan moshi jishi; 融合发展为战船远航特续给力——还司航保部联合国家涉海部门探索军民融合式发展模式纪实*), *People’s Daily*, 14 March 2012.

⁷⁹⁴ Ibid.
Navigation Support Department officials have also met directly with foreign naval personnel in the past. In 2011 for example, Department Director Li Pengcheng met with British Rear Admiral Nick Lambert. 795

In March 2012, People’s Navy noted Liu Zhihao as the incumbent director of the Navigation Support Department. 796 Little is current known about Liu. In February 2013 at the annual joint forum between the navy and the SOA, Liu gave a speech which summarized the status of the cooperative efforts between the PLA Navy and the SOA in 2012. 797

**PLA Navy Nuclear Safety Bureau: (haijun keanquanju; 海军核安全局):** The Nuclear Safety Bureau’s designation as a “bureau (ju; 局) rather than a “department” (bumen; 部门) suggests it is one rank below the other departments within Navy Headquarters. It is unclear however under which department the Nuclear Safety Bureau may be housed.

Little public data are available regarding the bureau’s role in PLA Navy activities. Public reporting however does suggest that it plays a role in civilian nuclear safety issues. For example, high-level Naval Nuclear Safety Bureau Engineer Ma Xiaolin is listed as a member of a leading small group on nuclear safety issues under the Ministry of Environmental Protection. 798 Ma and others have also published on issues of nuclear safety within Chinese academic journals. 799

In 2009, Pang Jinli was identified as the director of the Nuclear Safety Bureau. In 2010, Pang gave an interview in the Chinese journal *Modern Navy* to discuss the collision of a French and a

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796 Luo Chuanlue, Zhou Chaoye, and correspondent Zhou Zhenguo, “Foster Harmonized Development.”


798 Ministry of Personnel, State Environmental Protection Administration, 2003 *Notice on the Promulgation of the Measures for Examination and Implementation of Qualifications for Nuclear Safety Engineers*, 1 September 2003, http://www.mep.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/gwy/200910/t20091030_180680.htm. Note that the Ministry of Personnel has since merged with the Ministry of Labor and Social Security to form the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, while the State Environmental Protection Administration has since been raised to the level of a ministry.

British nuclear submarine in the Atlantic. In 2006, Pang served as an Equipment Department director in a submarine base located in the East Sea Fleet.

**PLA Navy Operations Department (zuozhanbu; 作战部):** Evidence suggests that the Navy Operations Department is involved in multiple Chinese naval modernization efforts. For example, in a December 2007 interview with *People’s Navy*, then Navy Operations Department Director Shen Hao outlined some of the department’s major recent efforts. These included developing new theories of operations, and improving the PLA Navy’s combat readiness response, particularly as it relates to rapid response and responding to sudden incidents at sea. The director also discussed the importance of improving the PLA Navy’s ability to engage in non-combat military operations other than war (MOOTW), improving combat training, and promoting the ability of the PLA Navy to coordinate operations across services and between different naval branches.

The current director of the Operations Department is not known. The previous director, RADM Shen Hao, is currently serving as a deputy chief of staff of the East Sea Fleet.

**PLA Navy Submarine Bureau (qiantingbu; 潜艇局):** The Submarine Bureau’s designation as a “bureau (ju; 局) rather than a “department” (bumen; 部门) suggests it is one rank below the other departments within Navy Headquarters. Evidence suggests this department is involved in the development and modernization efforts of the navy’s submarine forces. For example, a 2009 report on recent developments of PLA Navy submarine forces authored by the department described improvements in submarine weapons systems, stealth technology, combat training, and command and control. It is unclear, however, what role the Submarine Bureau has played in these advancements.

As of 2009, the director of the Submarine Bureau was Ge Genzhong.

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800 Bai Tanlin, “Authoritative Exposition on UK-France Nuclear Submarine Collision by Chinese Navy’s Submarine Department Director And Nuclear Safety Bureau Director” (quanwei jieshi yingfa qianting haidi dapengzhuang; 权威解释英法潜艇海底大碰撞), *Modern Navy (dangdai haijun)*, 3 (March), 2009, pp. 8-10.


803 Submarine Department of Navy Headquarters, “Great Wall of Steel Underneath Immense Ocean — Overview of Navy’s Accomplishments in Building Its Submarine Forces” (wangqing bibo xia de gangtie changcheng – haijun qianting budui jianshe chengjiu xunli; 万顷碧波下的钢铁长城——海军潜艇部队建设成就巡礼), *People’s Navy*, 1 April 2009.

PLA Navy Political Department

PLA Navy Propaganda Department (*xuanchuanbu;* 宣传部): The PLA Navy Propaganda Department is responsible for overseeing and implementing ideological education for navy personnel, and is likely part of the PLA-wide system for managing propaganda work, led by the GPD Propaganda Department. This department is also responsible for the navy’s publishing system, which includes official navy publications such as *People’s Navy*, and the dissemination of political materials to military personnel and to the general public.805

The last known director of the Propaganda Department was Senior Captain Wang Linhai, who served as department director from 2007 to 2013, and was recently appointed deputy political commissar of the Naval Command Academy in Nanjing. 806

PLA Navy Discipline Inspection Department (*jilu jianchabu;* 纪律检查部): Party discipline inspection organs exist through the CCP structure, and the Navy Discipline Inspection Department is responsible for overseeing Party discipline inspection work within the PLA Navy.

The work of the Navy’s Discipline Inspection Department likely includes guiding the work of lower-level navy discipline inspection units to educate Party members, evaluating their behavior and performance, safeguarding against corruption, and investigating instances of Party discipline and handing out punishments when necessary.807 The level of punishment may vary from simple warning (*jinggao;* 警告) to expulsion from the Party, depending upon the violation (*kaichu dangji;* 开除党纪). The department may also recommend that a case be turned over to the military judicial system for further investigation.808

The Navy Discipline Inspection Department, however, does not have unlimited authority to investigate and punish naval officers. Recommendations for punishment must first be approved both by the Navy Party Committee, and by the Party committee and Discipline Inspection organ

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one level higher within the Party hierarchy. Therefore, decisions to punish high-level navy officers by the Navy Discipline Inspection Department must first be approved by the Navy Party Standing Committee, as well as the CMC Commission for Discipline Inspection. 809

These limitations on the Navy Discipline Inspection Department’s authority are also noted by the fact that the current director of the department, RADM Zhu Qian, is not a member of the Navy Party Standing Committee.

809 Ibid.
PLA Navy Logistics Department

PLA Navy Engineering Design and Research Bureau: (gongcheng sheji yanjiuju; 工程设计研究局): This department provides engineering, design, and surveying support to the navy’s coastal facilities. Engineering Design and Research Bureaus operating below the level of Navy Headquarters have been lauded in the Chinese media for their work on coastal defense projects, and have also received State and Military Science and Technology Progress Awards for their work. 810

Navy Research and Design Bureaus have worked on high profile civilian projects including the design and construction of the Qingdao sailing venue for the 2008 Olympics, as well as naval facilities in Hong Kong.811

Limited publically available information regarding Navy Design and Research Bureaus suggests that their activities are closely guarded. One People’s Navy article on an unidentified Design and Research Bureau, for example, boasted that it has not had a security breach in over 57 years. The article discusses the security measures taken by the bureau, including maintaining 24-hour surveillance over all personnel, vehicles, and facilities in the compound, and allocating over 5 million RMB (USD 34,000) developing a bureau-wide computer management system.812 The current director of the PLA Navy Design and Research Bureau is unknown.

PLA Navy Finance Department (caiwubu; 财务部): This department oversees the PLA Navy’s financial systems. This includes making decisions regarding financial support for bases and academies, personnel expenditures and allowances, and controlling finances and regulating expenditures related to ship visits abroad.813

810 “Deepening Activities on Fostering Advanced Units and Individuals and on Vying with Each Other for Excellence,” CCTV Military Report (junshi baodao), 12 December 2010.


813 “Yet Another Significant Measure to Warm Hearts of Troops—Questions and Answers With Navy Logistics Department's Financial Department Director Chen Yihao on Adjustment and Increase in Sailing, Aviation Positions Allowance,” People’s Navy, 5 November 2010, p. 3.
Finance department activities have a direct effect on navy operations. For example, over the past few years, the PLA Navy Finance Department has sought to decrease the time it takes to provide financial support to navy units, as long wait times in the provision of financial support had delayed ship’s sailing times, thus interfering in the conduct of operations.814

The last known director of the Finance Department is Chen Yihao, who was listed as the director of the department in December 2011.815

**PLA Navy Military Supplies, Maintenance and Fuel (junxu wuzi youliabu; 军需物资油料部):** This department is responsible for the purchase and distribution of bedding, clothes, food, agricultural goods, and petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) equipment for the navy. As part of the larger PLA-wide provisioning system, it likely coordinates with the department of the same name located within the General Logistics Department. As of December 2011, the director of this department was Senior Captain Wang Jinliang.816

The Military Supplies, Maintenance, and Fuel Department appears to be directly involved in improving the logistics support capabilities within the navy. In a 2008 interview with People’s Navy, Senior Captain Wang noted the department’s goals of developing greater capacities to support longer and more complex missions at sea. He also mentioned the importance of keeping navy living standards competitive with those found in Chinese civilian life in order to attract high quality personnel.817 In a 2011 interview with the CCTV television program **Military Report (junshi; baodao),** Wang discussed some of the navy’s recent successes in improving logistics support, such as new techniques for preserving food on submarines to support long-distance voyages.818

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815 Du Long and Liu Wenping, “Earnestly Raising the Efficacy of the Navy's Asset Management -- Interview With Chen Yihao, Director of Financial Affairs at the Navy Logistics Department, on Implementing the ‘Opinions on Further Strengthening the Military's Asset Management’” (qieshi tigao haijun zichan guanli xiaoyi – jiu guanche luoshi “guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang jundui zichan guanli de yijian” fang hai hou caiwu bu chenyihao buzhang; 切实提高海军资产管理效益——就贯彻落实《关于进一步加强军队资产管理的意见》访海后财务部陈义浩部长), People’s Navy, 30 December 2011.


817 Shao Zhongzhi and Yu Zhangcai, “Promote Connections between Support and Battlefields Amidst Scientific Development” (zai kexue fazhan zhong tuijin baozhang yu zhanchang duijie; 在科学发展中推进保障与战场对接), People’s Navy, 5 December 2007, p. 1.

PLA Navy Military Communications and Transportation Department (junshi jiaotong yunshubu; 军事交通运输部):

This department is part of the PLA’s overall transportation and communications system, led by the Transportation and Communications Department within the GLD. It oversees PLA Navy military transportation via rail, public roads, waterways, and air. It is also responsible for the maintenance and management of military-use roads and railways, and is in charge of vehicle and vessel usage and management. In addition, this department carries out scientific research and training regarding military transportation.819

The director of the department is Ye Xiaotao. Director Ye has discussed the role of communications and transportation support to the overall success of China’s navy with the Chinese media.820 In 2012, he served as the deputy commander on the 13th Gulf of Aden escort mission, and was interviewed during the mission by China News Service discussing the importance of materials supply and at-sea resupply to the success of the PLA Navy’s Gulf of Aden escort missions.821

820 Ye Xiaotao, “Congratulatory Message” (hecí; 贺词), Automobile Application, (qiche yunyong; 汽车运用), Issue 10 (2010).
PLA Navy Equipment Department

PLA Navy Aircraft Department (haijun zhuangbeibu feijibu; 海军装备部 飞机部): The limited information available regarding this department suggests it may play a role in the testing and procurement of navy aviation equipment, as the former head of this department, Yin Mingyan was reported as one of the delegates to review a test of ejection seat technology for navy aircraft.822 The current head of this department is unknown.

PLA Navy Aviation Procurement Department (hangdingbu; 航订部): In addition to involvement in the PLA Navy aviation procurement process, this department has responded to fleet requests for modifications to existing aviation weapon systems as a result of new missions. For example, the Aviation Procurement Department was described in a People’s Navy article as rapidly responding to demands from one of the navy’s Gulf of Aden task forces for modifications of the ship’s helicopters, in order to more effectively respond to threats from pirates.823 The current director of the department is Xiao Chaofu.824

PLA Navy Science and Technology (S&T) Committee (kexue jishu weiyuanhui; 科学技术委员会): This organ is likely part of the PLA-wide system of S&T Committees, led by the S&T Committee within the PLA General Equipment Department. The Navy’s S&T Committee’s position within the PLA Navy Equipment Department suggests it plays a role in the navy similar to the role of the GED S&T Committee, supporting the navy on military modernization, defense procurement and export control issues. The current director of the S&T Committee is unknown.

PLA Navy Military Representative Bureaus and Offices (junshi daibiaoju; 军事代表局): Like each of the four PLA service branches, the navy Equipment Department manages a network of military representative bureaus, which are responsible for quality control issues related to equipment manufacturing in factories, research institutes, and academies.825

Navy military representative bureaus are located in areas where navy military weapons and equipment are produced, and the PLA Navy has military representative bureaus and officers in

823 Yao Jiang, Lu Wenjie, and Lu Wenqiang, “Equipment Support is Effective in Navy's Open-Ocean Shipping Protection Effort” (tuo ju zhanjian chuang dayang – zhuangbei baozhang wei haijun yuanyang huhang xingdong ti youli zhiyong; 托举战舰闯大洋——装备保障为海军远洋护航行动提有力支撑), People’s Navy, 3 July 2012.
Chongqing, Guangzhou, Shenyang, Shanghai, Tianjin, Wuhan, and Xi’an. The current
director of the navy’s network of Military Representative Bureaus, however, is unknown.

826 See for example “Navy Equipment Department Chongqing Military Representatives Bureau Officers
Courageously Provide Earthquake Relief” (chongqing haijun chongqing daibiaoju guanbing fenyong kangzhen
jiuzai; 海军装备重庆军代表局官兵奋勇抗震救灾 ), Chinamil.com, 26 May 2008,
http://www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/2008a/2008-05/27/content_1283688.htm; Xu Wei, “The Innovative Thinking to
Crack Security Problems of the Navy Equipment Department Tianjin Military Representative Bureau”
(haijun zhuangbeibu Tianjin jundui daibiaoju chuangxin siwei baozhang nanti; 海军装备部天津军代表局创新思维

827 The last known director of this network of PLA Navy military representative bureaus was Bi Yuhui, who served
in the position in 2001.
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## Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADM</td>
<td>Admiral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>Central Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCDI</td>
<td>Central Commission for Discipline Inspection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMC</td>
<td>Central Military Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEZ</td>
<td>Exclusive economic zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>East Sea Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GED</td>
<td>General Equipment Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLD</td>
<td>General Logistics Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPD</td>
<td>General Political Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR</td>
<td>Military region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>National Party Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSF</td>
<td>North Sea Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM</td>
<td>Rear Admiral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA</td>
<td>People’s Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td>Petroleum, oil and lubricants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PME</td>
<td>Professional Military Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLAN</td>
<td>People’s Liberation Army Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ret.</td>
<td>Retired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCAFT</td>
<td>Senior Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSF</td>
<td>South Sea Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VADM</td>
<td>Vice Admiral</td>
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