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CREATING A BETTER END GAME STRATEGY: FULLY EXPLOITING THE CAPABILITIES OF MULTIPLE DISCIPLINES

by

Troy A. Sowers

September 2013

Thesis Advisor: Patrick Miller
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CREATING A BETTER END GAME STRATEGY: FULLY EXPLOITING THE CAPABILITIES OF MULTIPLE DISCIPLINES

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Supervisory Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation
B.A., Wright State University, 1994

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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September 2013

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<td>Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula</td>
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<td>AQEA</td>
<td>Al Qaeda in East Africa</td>
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<td>ATF</td>
<td>Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
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<td>USIC</td>
<td>United States Intelligence Community</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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Success is rarely the result of the actions of just one individual. The completion of this thesis is no exception. I would like to thank the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Naval Postgraduate School for initially giving me the opportunity to pursue a master’s degree. I owe a debt of gratitude to my classmates, professors, and staff at the Center for Homeland Defense and Security who challenged me to broaden my perspective beyond personal experiences. I want to specifically thank Pat Miller and Dave Brannan who demonstrated more patience in this project than I deserved and more than I would have shown if the roles were reversed. Finally, thank you to my wife and two daughters for giving me just the right amount of encouragement and persuasion to complete this thesis.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. PROBLEM STATEMENT

The United States’ strategy to combat terrorism has been a popular topic of debate since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. A wide variety of experts, researchers, politicians, reporters, and pundits have offered their opinions on the United States Intelligence Community (USIC) and its ability to counter the threat. James Simon Jr. compared the USIC to Frankenstein with the following description, “an impressive achievement in its parts, but flawed as a whole” (2005, p. 149). The underlying question is whether or not “Frankenstein” can be repaired or should it be dismantled and rebuilt. Two of the main discussion topics have included the failure of the intelligence community to prevent the attacks on 9/11 and the reorganization of the intelligence community. Regardless of these discussions and the subsequent changes, the United States still lacks an entity that preserves all end-game options by using the collaborative capacity of agencies within the United States Intelligence Community.

Nearly all agencies participate in sending and receiving joint duty assignees and in promoting information sharing, yet there continues to be calls for enhanced cooperation. For example, one proposal is a National Interagency Task Force (NIATF), comprised of experts from the various disciplines, to operationally deploy overseas in trouble zones. Between deployments, the NIATF could assist the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) in other counterterrorism missions. The NIATF could also assist in non-terrorism missions. The importance of operating together is to build joint experiences which would enhance the group’s cohesiveness and success in future missions as the partners learn the strengths and weaknesses of each organization (Martin, 2006, p. 9).

The United States military is using a model called the joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) to enhance its ability to coordinate actions internal
and external to the military. The JIACG staff ensures positive information flow up to the commander for situational awareness and also out to other organizations (Jones, 2007, p. 3). Another example is the State Department’s deployment of foreign emergency support teams during times of overseas crises. These teams include the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), State Department, Department of Defense (DoD), and other agencies (Miller, Stone, & Mitchell, 2002, p. 229). The current strategy has delivered many successes since 9/11, but strategies should never be static.

This research investigates options to more effectively combat the terrorism threat around the world. In 2007, the United States Intelligence Community initiated the “500 Day Plan for Integration and Collaboration.” This plan was to address multiple organizational challenges. Collaboration and the factors that hinder true collaboration, such as agency goals being considered more important performance measures than community goals, were addressed (Office of Director of National Intelligence, 2008). The United States has organizations, such as the National Counterterrorism Center, to enhance information sharing and coordination, but this research argues that this is not adequate for targeting specific terrorists. The mechanisms in place were designed for strategic cooperation and action. This thesis explores the need for enhanced collaboration to tactically target individuals.

The author recognizes the significant contributions made by the military in combating terrorism. Because of the nature of the threat, the United States must approach the war on terror cohesively using both military actions and intelligence operations (Torres, 2007, p. 1). This thesis purposefully excludes the portion of the DoD responsible for offensive engagements as this is beyond the scope of this research. However, the DoD’s contribution in the intelligence realm, and to some extent its kinetic capabilities, serves an important role in countering terrorism. The successful nighttime raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound that resulted in his death is a prime example of the importance of the DoD’s capabilities. Except for the target, this raid was not unusual. President Obama’s
administration has dramatically increased the use of special operations forces in covert raids. For example, in 2011, approximately 2,200 raids were conducted, and the Pentagon has estimated 90 percent of these raids “end without a shot fired” (Masters, 2013).

The dominant strategy followed by the United States has been offensive engagement through the military and the CIA. The DoD has deployed soldiers from all branches of the military to many different countries. During this war the military has killed or captured thousands of enemy combatants. The CIA has also captured or taken custody of terrorists throughout the world. Of those captured, many were transported to Guantánamo Bay or other detention facilities around the world. Even though many of these terrorists were specifically targeted by the CIA and DoD, there was little forethought to their ultimate outcome as the capture was the end state rather than the means to an end. Permanent neutralization of the threat through prosecution, targeted killing, or rehabilitation to non-violent means of expression is the goal.

The Guantanamo Bay Naval Base has detained 779 individuals since its inception. Approximately 530 detainees were released or transferred to the custody of another country prior to 2009 (Department of Justice, 2010). The Guantanamo Review Task Force, created by Executive Order 13492 in January 2009, reviewed the cases of 240 detainees still being held in the Guantanamo facility. Of the remaining detainees, 36 were referred for prosecution. Forty-eight were approved for further detention as they still posed a risk to national security, yet the evidence was not sufficient for a prosecution (Department of Justice, 2010). The small number of detainees referred for prosecution highlights the difficulty of obtaining and developing usable evidence for a prosecution. Releasing the detainees creates future risks as approximately 28 percent of released detainees were either confirmed or suspected of reengagement as with the enemy (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2012). Yet, the detention of terrorists in Guantánamo Bay has become fodder for recruitment of terrorists (Brahimi, 2013; Carroll, 2013). President Obama described
Guantanamo Bay as “a recruitment tool for extremists,” and further stated “it hurts us in terms of our international standing” (Obama, 2013).

The United States government has struggled politically and legally with the fate of captured enemy combatants. President Barack Obama ordered the closure of the Guantánamo Bay detention facility in January 2009 (White House, 2009). Additionally, he ordered all CIA prisons to be closed throughout the world (Shane, 2009). While closing CIA prisons was a fairly simple order, closing Guantanamo Bay has been anything but simple. After ascending into office, President Obama was confronted with legislation from a Democratic—led Congress that effectively prevented many of his options to close Guantanamo Bay (Northam, 2013). For example, one option is to prosecute the detainees in a military tribunal, a federal judicial court, or a specially developed terrorism court modeled after the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act court.

Each option has its own limitations. The military commissions differ from federal prosecutions in several ways. One specific way is the defense right to counsel. Under the proposed rules for the commissions, all defense counsel must be U.S. citizens. Federal procedure allows a defendant to seek counsel from their own nation. This rule allows the government to also approve or not to approve the defendant’s counsel (Glazier, 2003, p. 2019).

Other alternatives include releasing the detainees into the custody of their countries of birth or continuing their detention in military holding facilities within the United States. Because terrorist groups continue to conduct operations and training throughout the world, simply releasing detainees is dangerous. As of December 29, 2011, 599 detainees had been transferred out of the Guantánamo Bay facility (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2012). Of those, 15.9 percent were confirmed to have reengaged in terrorism activity, and another 12 percent were suspected of reengagement (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2012). Whenever possible, the end-game strategy must be considered prior to action in order to limit scenarios in which a person is captured without a proposed end.
The current strategy has forced the United States into a defensive position regarding detainees. Congress and the presidential administration continue to explore solutions to those individuals currently detained in Guantanamo Bay. While some may ultimately be released, there are many of them who are deemed to be too dangerous for release. Yet, the United States has little to no evidence that could be presented in an Article III court for trial because these individuals were captured and detained outside the scope of a law enforcement action. Only in the future will the efficacy of military tribunals be able to be judged. At this time, because of the many factors yet to be decided, it is unknown whether they will be judged as competent and fair with due process given to the prisoners or will they be considered “kangaroo courts” (Glazier, 2003, p. 2011). By using a broad definition of terrorism and the terrorist threat, the United States aggressively pursued a strategy that fueled anti-American feelings from the world. It is possible this may have resulted in more terrorist threats than it stopped (Davis, 2006, p. 139).

In the face of international criticism and the current difficulties of processing detainees, the national counterterrorism strategy is being revised. The differing views around the world about America continue to fuel debate about the methods used by the United States to combat terrorism (Stivachtis, 2006, p. 153). The United States finds itself at a crossroads as there is no absolute or singular strategy which will be successful against every terrorist group or operator. Terrorism is not a new phenomenon, even within the United States. President Theodore Roosevelt called for a “crusade to exterminate terrorism everywhere” after President William McKinley was assassinated by anarchists (Rapoport, 2004, pp. 46–47). The United States became a focal point for the eradication of terrorists in retribution for the attacks on 9/11, and it will take the strengths of multiple agencies to combat the problem.

The United States has pursued and will continue to pursue specific and identified terrorists. The participating members of the USIC have primary areas of expertise, such as law enforcement, military or intelligence. The agencies may be
conversant in other disciplines, but their knowledge and experience is typically limited. This thesis argues that national security would be enhanced through a true collaboration of these areas of expertise.

Because “internal barriers to organizational change are powerful and deeply entrenched” (Zegart, 2007, p. 45), change should be carefully considered. If change is required, it must be accepted by those whom it impacts. President Woodrow Wilson once stated, “If you want to make enemies, try to change something” (Wilson, 2013). People are resistant to change. In general, people see themselves as good performers. In addition, they rate their work higher than what others would rate them (Kelman, 2005, p. 24). This gap makes change more difficult because people do not perceive as much need for change because they believe they are performing well (Kelman, 2005, p. 24). Whether or not change is necessary is not decided solely by successes and failures, but also by looking for gaps in the national security structure.

B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

- Do the current agencies and task forces within the United States Intelligence Community have the collaborative capacity to neutralize specifically identified terrorists through any available method?
- How should a unit be structured to effectively combine the capabilities of the military, the intelligence community, and law enforcement, in order to preserve all end-game options?

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

Many writers have articulated the value of attacking terrorism through all available means because agencies with a singular focus will be limited by their own capabilities. The FBI had a history of focusing on criminal leads versus intelligence leads. Arrests and prosecution statistics were the criteria to judge an individual agent and an office. Unfortunately, this often led to ignoring or conducting insufficient analysis of intelligence (Miller, Stone, & Mitchell, 2002, p. 329). Successful military campaigns will be unable to stop all terrorism because
terrorist groups would rather fight on the battlefield than in a court of law (Davis, 2006, pp. 140–141).

When a military inserts ground troops to fight terrorism, there can be negative consequences. Specifically, the terrorists do not have to travel to fight the enemy, and their recruitment propaganda is validated as they cast the military as an invading force (Benjamin, 2008, p. 9). The military can be an effective response to terrorism, but the analysis by Seth Jones and Martin Libicki concluded only seven percent of terrorists group ended because of military action (2008, p. 19).

The two main models to combat terrorism are the law enforcement model and the war model. The war model concentrates on significant offensive and aggressive actions while the law enforcement model requires minimal use of force and seeks to use criminal laws to combat terrorism. Neither of these models if used to the exclusion of the other will eliminate terrorism. The answer can more appropriately be found in an infusion of both principles (Clutterbuck, 2004, pp. 142–143). Jones and Libicki identified “policing, military force, splintering, politics, [and] victory” as the major catalyst for how terrorist groups end, and the end is usually the result of more than one factor (2008, p. 10). Lindsay Clutterbuck (2004) opines that because strong democracies have legitimate and tested laws, the criminal justice system should be the focus. However, targeting terrorism as a criminal violation does not preclude use of the military for counter terrorism operations. Military force should not be an alternative to law enforcement. Instead, it should be part of an integrated plan to counter terrorism (Clutterbuck, 2004, pp. 140–150). This multi-pronged approach has immediate merit because it provides options to decision makers. Before the attacks of 9/11, most countries viewed terrorism as a law-enforcement problem, yet the American reaction was a military response. The separation between these organizations may be “inappropriate to combat security threats” (Davis, 2006, pp. 139–140).
The opinions on which method is the most productive are varied. The 9/11 Commission opined the successes in the 1990s from the first World Trade Center bombing and other plots that were successfully thwarted through law enforcement means gave the United States the false belief the threat could be handled through law enforcement. Also, the successful prosecution negated any reasons to look at terrorism through any other lens (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004, p. 72). Because of the international limitations of police agencies, the law enforcement approach cannot be the sole approach. The lack of cohesiveness and international law is exploited by terrorists (Maogoto, 2005, pp. 52–53). If all measures are considered as potential courses of action, then the strengths and limitations of each must be reviewed.

1. Law Enforcement Model

The observations and opinions typically concentrate on only one discipline—diplomacy, intelligence, military, or law enforcement—to the exclusion of the other disciplines and how they interact. The law plays an important part in the life of a Muslim, and it is held with high honor. Religious scholars often consider themselves jurists who also have a specialty in theology (Akhavi, 2008, p. 37). Within Islam, sharia is the foundation for a Muslim’s life. The sharia, as Islamic law, comes from the Quran and the Sunna (Johnson & Vriens, 2013). Imams are more than just religious leaders. They have a responsibility to assist in the governance and social affairs of the Muslim community (Responsibilities of an Imam, n.d.). A predominant topic has been the influence of the law. The legal framework of terrorism and counterterrorism, especially in terms of detainees and interrogations, encompasses a significant amount of research and opinions.

The Honorable John C. Coughenour, Federal Judge, Western District of Washington, testified before a Senate hearing that Article III courts were more “than just another tool,” but they stood as an anchor for American values. Judge Coughenour spoke with the experience of presiding over the case against the
Millennium Bomber, Ahmed Ressam (Committee on the Judiciary: United States Senate, 2008, pp. 4–5). In the same hearing in which Judge Coughenour expressed his views on the adequacy of the Article III courts, another panelist, Professor Amos Guiora, former commander of the Israel Defense Force’s School of Military Law, opined that Article III courts would be incapable of handling the volume and complexity, specifically the use of classified information, of cases. He recommended the creation of an “American Domestic Terror Court” (Committee on the Judiciary: United States Senate, 2008, pp. 8–9). Both panelists believed the Guantanamo Bay detention facility should be closed. Even within President Bush’s administration, there was significant disagreement about the legal points of the war on terror (Golden & Schmitt, 2005).

The United States criminal justice system has adapted since 9/11. Through the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) enhancements, additional authority, and investigative powers have been granted to the FBI. The Department of Justice has used anti-terrorism statutes as well as traditional criminal statutes to prosecute known or suspected terrorists (Department of Justice, 2008). Historically, terrorism has been a crime. However, since President Bush termed it a “war,” violence by the combatants became legitimate violence under the rules of war (Aukerman, 2008, pp. 148–149). The violence of Al Qaeda could still be considered illegitimate because they target civilians, which is not acting within the rules of war (Aukerman, 2008, pp. 148–149). Within the United States, courts have the power of judicial review. But because of the many nuances, national security concerns are not straightforward and often make it difficult for courts to decide definitively across the spectrum of possible issues and combinations (Bay, 2008, p. 67). Furthermore, the law enforcement option can also be difficult because countries cannot agree upon a definition of terrorism.

Ultimately, any legal action must begin with an enforceable law. The lack of a standard definition of terrorism, and the resulting complications, is a consistent theme in many writings. The lack of a definition limits the ability of
states to have an effective discourse over appropriate measures to counter terrorism. Some countries see acts of violence as a national liberation movement while others view that violence as terrorism. Natural political and cultural biases play into these differences (Maogoto, 2005, pp. 51, 60–61). The observer of terrorist acts makes a judgment based upon his biases. If similar powers are in a fight against each other, it is called a war or battle. When a weaker country or group is attacked and they use asymmetrical techniques, it is called terrorism (Hanafi, 2006, p. 10). Even with an agreed-upon definition, it still may leave for interpretation areas such as inter-ethnic or communal conflict (Davis, 2006, pp. 112–113). The derivation of any definition of terrorism will be biased by political and societal understandings. However, the strength of a legal definition is the authority granted to the law. Even if the definition is not perfect, a working definition allows states to compare actions to the law (Barnidge, 2008, p. 16). Even without a standard definition of terrorism, there are other ways to utilize the law.

The law enforcement approach would allow countries to charge terrorists as criminals in violation of state laws such as murder and kidnapping. These offenses infer upon the terrorists a criminal label, and they do not require any political or social justification for the motive. Since terrorism is ambiguous, a question arises whether terrorists should be viewed as acting within the rules of war or within the rules of criminal law. Unfortunately, legal means will not fully stop the threat of terrorism; therefore, states naturally look to other methods (Maogoto, 2005, pp. 51–52). The law enforcement approach is restricted if the laws enacted by countries throughout the world are not adequate and if countries are unwilling to enforce their laws.

Afghanistan was a safe haven for Al Qaeda prior to 9/11, and this severely limited the United States’ options. While most countries viewed terrorism as a law-enforcement problem before the attacks of 9/11, the American doctrine was a military response as the attacks were considered a national security problem (Davis, 2006, p. 139). The United States created some confusion because during
the early part of the war on terror it indicated a desire to criminally prosecute Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders. Declaring war and claiming the enemy combatants would be tried as criminals caused a legal dilemma. The Geneva Convention requires prisoners of war to be tried similarly to military members of the detaining country (Roberts, 2004, p. 209).

Adding further uncertainty, the Bush administration appeared arbitrary in its application of the rules of war. Some enemy combatants were classified as prisoners of war and some as criminal defendants. The administration was selective in its application of criminal law, and this appeared to be based upon the amount of evidence available for a prosecution (Aukerman, 2008, p. 145). This exacerbated the debate whether or not terrorism should be countered solely through law enforcement. If terrorism was only a crime, this would be the logical conclusion. However, the difference between crimes committed for criminal purposes and crimes for terrorism purposes has become blurred (Clutterbuck, 2004, pp. 146–147). Specifically, fundraising and sending money overseas is a difficult area to investigate.

Many organizations, such as Hamas, have created branches for different purposes. Many people distinguish between Hamas’ military, political, and social fronts. As a result, Hamas is able to overtly carry on its political and social work while covertly conducting its military operations (Levitt, 2006, p. 3). Determining whether or not a person has intentionally sent money to support terrorism is legally challenging. Another difficulty in the counterterrorism mission is identifying those persons planning an act of terrorism before they succeed. Because the perpetrators may be individuals who have never committed a crime prior to their current conspiracy, the law enforcement approach may be an unsuccessful means (Pillar, 2004, p. 115). As a result, the United States government should not limit itself to just law enforcement powers.
2. The Role of Intelligence

The intelligence apparatus should be part of the counterterrorism strategy while recognizing it also has inherent limitations. The National Security Act of 1947 was written to spread intelligence powers across multiple organizations. Specifically, the CIA was given no arrest powers. The framers of this act did not want the CIA to have power over both foreign and domestic intelligence activity (Bay, 2008, p. 73). Although the original intent of the creation of the CIA was to give significant power to the director, it was watered down by multiple other agencies fighting to protect their turf. For instance, the FBI wanted to maintain control of activities within the U.S. homeland, and the Department of Defense did not want to cede any control of its intelligence operations. There was also concern about the CIA spying on American citizens (Zegart, 2007, pp. 64–65). The various reforms since 9/11 have altered the intelligence community and the roles of each agency. The CIA has seen its role diminished (Lowenthal, 2006, p. 40).

The National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) recommended the FBI rely on other intelligence community partners to provide covert overseas intelligence collection, and other agencies should rely on the FBI for domestic collection. Without coordinating and assigning collection roles, the intelligence was creating redundancies (National Academy of Public Administration, 2005, p. xv). Yet, this proposal was not universal as there are differing opinions. Domestic intelligence may be better served by the CIA, which does not have arrest powers. There is a distinction between active intelligence collection for national goals and intelligence collection ancillary to a law enforcement investigation. Law enforcement is a traditional mission of the FBI (Sims, 2005c, p. 56). Hitz opined the CIA should be given broader powers to operate in the United States. This is a better alternative than to be limited by the judiciary branch because the courts will focus more on civil liberties than on counterterrorism (Hitz, 2008, p. 369).

The National Security Act of 1947 kept the CIA apart from military control. It also restricted the CIA’s ability to operate domestically and prohibited any
police powers (Lowenthal, 2006, p. 20). President Truman did not want an American Gestapo; therefore, the CIA was not given law enforcement powers (Hitz, 2008, p. 367). During the search for Ramzi Yousef, the FBI and CIA began coordinating their investigations. The CIA realized the FBI had a unique tool because the FBI had arrest powers. However, the relationship was not strong as they continue to distrust each other. Each agency felt the other agency was withholding information (Miller, Stone, & Mitchell, 2002, p. 125).

Since 9/11, the CIA has exercised its authority of extra-judicial rendition but not without controversy. On April 17, 2007, the House of Representatives’ Committee on Foreign Affairs held a public hearing to discuss renditions. Within the hearing, the elected members and invited participants discussed the consequences of renditions on foreign relations with other countries, the European Parliament report, which condemned the European countries complicit in the CIA activities, and UN Conventions and treaties (Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2007). Even if the practice was accepted in the public’s eye, there would eventually need to be a day of judgment for the target. However, the National Security Act restricts the options available to the CIA once a terrorist is identified. Captured terrorists must be brought before a judicial proceeding at some point as there will come a time when they no longer have any intelligence value (Lowenthal, 2006, p. 266). The nature of their work generally precludes CIA officers from testifying in an open court. Thus, a law enforcement entity is needed.

The argument between intelligence and law enforcement may have become an unnecessary distraction. Intelligence sharing and collaboration of law enforcement agencies is the most effective way to combat terrorism (Krishna-Hensel, 2006, p. 7). Terrorist groups do not need to be approached in a uniform manner as their motives should be distinguished to determine the best countermeasure (Davis, 2006, p. 138). While these statements may be true, the USIC has historically struggled with full cooperation. In January 2001, the Hart Rudman commission concluded the United States was vulnerable to terrorist
attack because of its organizational problems (Zegart, 2007, p. 5). The convergence of overseas and domestic operations is drawing the CIA into the traditional jurisdiction of the FBI. Historically, the CIA has worked with law enforcement counterparts in the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) serving missions in criminal matters such as counter narcotics (Hitz, 2008, p. 368). A rendition, even as part of an intelligence operation, requires law enforcement (Lowenthal, 2006, p. 234). When the United States Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947, it wanted all national security assets to work together toward common national objectives (Martin, 2006, p. 1).

3. Diplomacy

A third discipline that is needed is diplomacy. One theory for the rise of terrorism is the “unequal development” of peoples and countries throughout the world. The weaker countries or groups feel pressure to respond. Terrorism becomes a tool with which to attack the bigger countries (Krishna-Hensel, 2006, p. 7). The European Union security strategy, ratified in December 2003, stated, “Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free...period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history.” The strategy identified terrorism as a threat and noted the method to confront this threat differed among countries (Davis, 2006, p. 111). Intelligence policy cannot stand alone. It is influenced not only by politics but also by laws and oversight. Yet, even within this context, there is often a necessity to violate the laws of another country for the security of the United States (Sims, 2005b, p. 17).

Diplomacy must be part of the efforts to combat terrorism because international terrorism is also a political act. The legal ramifications on the international community, which must develop a foundation to confront transnational problems, require the efforts of the Department of State. Diplomacy will help craft national and international terrorism statutes (Sheehan, 2004, pp. 102–103).
There has been previous cooperation between states on actions, which could be determined as terroristic. In September 1963, an international convention imposed an obligation on states to act if a hijacking has occurred or if one is going to occur (Barnidge, 2008, pp. 116–117). “A universally accepted definition of terrorism” is necessary to provide a means for international cooperation in the legal realm (Aviles, 2006, p. 40). While there was already international agreement on general crimes, this set a precedent for future terrorism cooperation by instituting a foundation of common understanding. Legal actions against terrorists are supported by international and national laws. The guidelines and/or laws that have come out of the United Nations focus on those activities generally accepted as criminal and terrorist. These agreed-upon areas take away the murkiness from the lack of a definition of terrorism and will have a long-term effect in the fight against terrorism (Sheehan, 2004, p. 104). The interconnectedness of people, businesses, and countries, has effectively created a smaller world. Because this has happened in such a rapid fashion, the current structures are ineffective to confront these problems (Krishna-Hensel, 2006, p. 1). The United States needs an organization which can react quickly to the changing environment.

4. Lessons from the Business World

Comparing a business model to a government organization can be a difficult exercise because of their fundamental differences. The vast majority of companies are seeking to make a profit. The government provides a service to the public either directly, such as the Social Security Administration, or indirectly, such as the FBI. However, one commonality is the need to manage resources. For companies, efficient management of resources typically equals greater profits. For government, savings can provide for more services, or, in a more cynical fashion, greater leverage against political opponents and competing federal agencies. Since this thesis is not focused on politics, the effectiveness and efficiencies will be examined.
Organizational efficiency has been the subject of research for many years. This research has produced new innovations with catchy names like Total Quality Management and Management By Objective. Some new trends become the norm while others fade away into obscurity. Studies in the business world are also highlighting the importance of achieving higher level understandings through alliances. Forming strategic alliances helps agencies gain knowledge through collaboration with others. This is commonly practiced by corporations in the business world (Larsson, Bengtsson, Henrikson, & Sparks, 1998, pp. 285–286). Generally, those practices that affect businesses will influence government operations.

The research in the field of organizational theory has been conducted over a wide range including government agencies, for profit businesses, and non-profit organizations. Because the current business environment has become more complex, the relationship between cooperation and competition has become more important. In order to be more competitive, companies are collaborating more with each other (Chen, 2008, p. 292). Clearly, if the business world has seen a need for cooperation, then government should look at its operations for potential adjustments. In the subsequent sections, these lessons and ideas are applied to the counterterrorism structure within the United States government for examination and review.

5. Partnerships

The simplest form of cooperation is often observed within a partnership. These arrangements are present throughout life in social, business, school, and government settings. They can be both formal and informal. Formal relationships usually involve legal responsibility and agreed-upon terms by both parties, while informal arrangements are less strict and easily breakable by either party. The Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (2013) lists one of the definitions as “a relationship resembling a legal partnership and usually involving close cooperation between parties having specified and joint rights and
responsibilities.” This definition will be utilized in this discussion as it contains aspects of the formal and informal.

Partnerships are born out of a belief by two parties that a positive outcome will be achieved through their cooperation. Without this belief, there would be no incentive. However, the partnership itself is only beneficial if it is competently established. There is a direct correlation between the number of connections between two agencies and the benefits received. Specifically, these benefits manifest themselves in sharing of information, economies of scale, and the use of complementary skills. Within research companies, economies of scale are generated by the ability of the partner firms to tackle much larger projects than what they could do separately (Ahuja, 2000, p. 429). Pooling of resources, both knowledge and funds, allows companies the opportunity to address larger problems than acting alone. Gautam Ahuja’s research (2000), conducted in the chemical industry, was focused on the effect of direct ties, indirect ties, and structural holes, which are defined as “gaps in information flow.” He identified and ultimately supported four hypotheses, which are identified as:

- A positive impact of direct ties on firm innovation output;
- A positive relationship between indirect ties and firm innovation output;
- A higher number of direct ties reduces the impact of indirect ties; and
- Structural holes reduce innovation output (Ahuja, 2000, p. 443).

Through his research, Ahuja (2000) determined there was no single answer concerning the number of direct ties versus indirect ties, which would be optimal. The right structure depended on the mission and the organizations. For the purposes of this paper, it is important to note the final proven hypothesis that “structural holes reduce innovation output” (Ahuja, 2000). This is extremely relevant as information sharing was and continues to be a main point of criticism and review within the USIC.
In a similar study to Ahuja’s, the number of connections and realized benefits were compared (McCubbins, Paturi, & Weller, 2009). True coordination can occur between two agencies regardless of their management structure if there is a common benefit to both (McCubbins et al., 2009, p. 900). The study by Matthew McCubbins et al. highlighted the importance of connections when two groups were trying to complete an asymmetric coordination game. Participants were able to quickly solve a variety of problems when there was a common benefit. However, when there was not a common benefit, the ability to coordinate was heavily dependent upon the number of connections between agencies. They concluded that “an increase in the connectivity of the network leads to faster solutions” when there were asymmetric incentives (McCubbins et al., 2009, p. 916). When there was an unequal benefit, the network structure played a more important role in the capability of the groups to solve their problem. In these scenarios, the number of connections between networks becomes extremely important. Therefore, they concluded that organizational designers could affect the success of the partnership based on how they created the networks (McCubbins et al., 2009, pp. 913–916).

Additionally, a report by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) addressed a prevailing culture wherein people had an internal focus to their own agency instead of the intelligence community as a whole. This was evident through the promotion process as most individuals looked to stay within their own organization. As a result, the ODNI highlighted the need for more joint duty programs (Office of Director of National Intelligence, 2008). However, organizations must not blindly enter into new, binding agreements. Before forming a partnership, the affected entities must consider a wide range of factors. These factors include the working environment, the selection and appropriate ratio of partners, and the value each partner will bring for the collective good. One of the key factors to consider is whether or not the partnership will create value. Only after potential value is estimated can an organization compare its costs of partnership to the value gained (Caudle, 2006, p. 4).
There is a distinction between a partnership and collaboration. Sharon Caudle opines that collaborative efforts are temporary agreements to solve specific problems (2006, p. 5). Caudle promotes the idea of a “high performance partnership” promulgated by the National Academy of Public Administration. The partnership is created only after each agency has assessed the strengths and weaknesses of both itself and other agencies. The goal for each agency is to determine if it will receive more value by joining the partnership than by staying alone. It is important to articulate a mission statement because it will become the foundation of future efforts within the partnership. The mission statement also serves as a notice to each partner to contribute their time, resources, and knowledge to accomplish the goal set before them (2006, pp. 4–6).

Partnerships can be simple yet effective structures if designed and staffed appropriately. If a partnership fails, regardless of the reason, there could be a long term, negative effect between the participating organizations as they have to rebuild their trust and cooperation and determine the value of developing a new partnership. For example, a home construction company, Shea Homes chose to change the relationship with its subcontractors to more of a partnership; through this, they gained increased cooperation, lowered their construction times, and reduced delays (Covey, 2006). Shea Homes and their partners increased their profits (Covey, 2006).

In another example in sports and marketing, Michael Jordan and Nike are in an elite class. In 1983, before Nike signed Jordan, their revenues were just $867 million (Rovell, 2013). In 2012, the Jordan brand of shoes captured 58 percent of the basketball shoe market and had $2.5 billion in revenue (Rovell, 2013). In the law enforcement realm, the National Academy of Public Administration recognized the power of joint operations and commended the FBI for its extensive network of joint task forces, such as the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) (National Academy of Public Administration, 2005, p. 21).
6. Teams

Teams are not the same as working groups. Teams are “a small number of people with complementary skills who are committed to a common purpose” (Katzenbach & Smith, 1993, p. 112). Teams can be internal to a single organization and drawn from one or more departments. Moreover, they can also be external and comprised of people from multiple organizations. Because the present-day world is becoming more interconnected, it is important for organizations to establish teamwork and collaboration as priorities. A well-crafted team has the ability to adapt to changing situations. The synergistic effects of a team cause it to outperform the work of individuals (Noble, 2004, p. 2).

The value added is typically the flexibility the team provides. Flexibility and adaptability have become key components in any successful strategy for businesses competing in the present-day dynamic and complex economic environment. To increase their effectiveness and efficiency, companies are moving toward team-based designs. Team design must be tailored to the tasks. If the incorrect resources and personnel are placed on the team, the business will not achieve high levels of desired performance (Jundt, Ilgen, Hollenbeck, Humphrey, Johnson, & Meyer n.d., p. 3).

The creation of teams is not a guarantee of success or true collaboration. A case study of self-managed teams at Xerox Corporation included an examination of 43 teams (Wageman, 1997, p. 32). Some teams were a team in name only as the members continued to accomplish their work just as they had prior to being assigned to a team. Moreover, they were not inclined to work collaboratively to improve performance or develop solutions. This independence was partially credited to hiring practices as Xerox looked for people who could work independently. When the Xerox Corporation changed its business model to a team process, the results were mixed (Wageman, 1997, p. 32). This level of individual independence is a significant factor for consideration regarding the formation of interagency teams within the USIC. Interagency assignments are not typically fully staffed because agencies do not have enough resources to staff
these positions, and many view these assignments as non-career enhancing (Martin, 2006, p. 7). The formation of a successful team must be supported by executive management in the affected organizations to the extent they are willing to commit resources and their personnel view the experience as positive.

The Xerox Corporation study further revealed that team design was more important than the influence of the coach or leader (Wageman, 1997). The signs for self-management were more prevalent in the well-designed teams. While coaching had an influence on self-management, it was to a lesser degree. Furthermore, the effect of positive coaching was greater, once again, on well-designed teams. The poorly designed teams effectively rejected coaching to the point that leaders could not influence the team. As further proof of the importance of the design of a team, ineffective coaches had a detrimental effect on poorly designed teams, but the well-designed teams were able to overcome coaching errors. The researcher identified seven critical success factors which could be observed in successful teams (Wageman, 1997, pp. 34–38).

1. The team must have a sense of purpose and understanding of what they should do. The leader should ensure the group understands the goal, but then he/she must let the group determine how to accomplish the goal.

2. There must be a goal which requires a team versus an individual approach. When people are needlessly put into a team, they will continue to operate as before. While this does not mean the team will be ineffective, it will also not result in gaining any competitive advantages through collaboration and synergy. Uncertainty causes the team to become confused about when to perform work collectively and when to perform individually. Members will tend to work separately when in doubt.

3. Rewards should be given for team excellence and should be fairly distributed amongst the team members. The study indicated that groups which had a 50/50 mix of individual and group rewards were some of the lowest performers.

4. Teams must have the basic resources. Resources should not be held until deemed necessary. Instead, leaders should be with their teams, decide what resources are necessary, and then supply them appropriately.
5. Teams must be given authority to make decisions. The team itself, upon knowing the goal, should be free to develop its work strategies and means to the goal. The leader has the authority to help establish boundaries, and these limits should be explicitly stated.

6. The team’s performance goals should align with the ultimate objectives of the organization.

7. The team’s culture should encourage strategic thinking. The author discusses the fact that all teams will naturally establish a set of norms defined as “the informal rules that guide team members’ behavior.” Leaders must help form these norms to ensure they align with the organization’s objectives.

The team design, which is paramount to the team’s success, requires an understanding of the mission and work environment. Organizations must spend an adequate amount of time in the design process. Self-managing work teams are not a universal solution or concept for all organizations (Spreitzer, Cohen, & Ledford, 1999, p. 359). Developing teams without a clear purpose could be detrimental to the mission as resources would be wasted and the subordinate team may work contrary to the broader organizational goals.

The concept of teams is not new to the government. Within the FBI, task forces are very prevalent and meet the definition of a team. The FBI leads Safe Streets Task Forces to combat gang violence, Safe Trails Task Forces for crimes on Indian reservations, and Crimes against Children Task Forces to target child molesters and predators. These task forces bring together local, state, and federal resources to target specific crime problems which affect entire communities of people.

7. Government

Critiquing government agencies has become a norm in American society. The government, its agencies, and its politicians face criticisms across the political spectrum, from ObamaCare (Mangan, 2013) to foreign policy (In Our Opinion, 2013) to immigration reform (Wade, 2013). After the Iran Contra affair, the Tower Commission was established to investigate the activities of the CIA.
and the executive branch. The commission reported many findings to Congress regarding the failures and deficient policies and procedures (Goodman, 1987, p. 121). The many studies after 9/11 highlighted the failures of the USIC. Members of the USIC have been responding to these criticisms ever since. In 2003, the U.S. Army wrote a plan called, Strategic Plan for Army Knowledge Management. The plan highlighted the importance of shifting from traditional methods of operating to developing collaborative teams. The plan consisted of 13 principles, which the Army used to build a foundation for knowledge management. These principles can also be applied to the intelligence community (Stimeare, 2005, pp. 7–8). Professionals within the USIC may agree operations and intelligence sharing could be smoother, yet the form of that change is hotly debated.

Defense Secretary Rumsfeld understood the difficulties of creating the National Counterterrorism Center when he stated agencies would be forced to “give up some of their turf and authority in exchange for a stronger, faster, more efficient government wide joint effort” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States [9/11 Commission], 2004, p. 406). Personnel from the National Counterterrorism Center and the CIA argued over roles and responsibilities. Furthermore, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld stymied the efforts of the Director of National Intelligence for the exchange of personnel between agencies (Zegart, 2007, p. 184). Clearly, sacrifices would have to be made, but the leader of each organization felt a duty to his/her home agency. To effect the necessary change, a strong argument must be presented that supports how the mission and contributing agencies would be positively enhanced and that government has the capability of working together.

Russ Linden, University of Virginia, IBM Center for The Business of Government, completed a study of three federal agencies striving to unify their operations: the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Department of Transportation, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Within his research, Linden observed the traits and practices which brought about
“oneness.” In his study of the collaboration of government agencies, Linden tried to answer these four questions (Linden, 2005, p. 11):

1. What does it mean for a large federal organization to become “one”?
2. What are some of the key hurdles in the quest for “oneness,” and how can those hurdles be anticipated and managed?
3. Which strategies appear to work well? What are some critical success factors?
4. Is the effort worth it? On balance, given the opportunity costs of engaging in this change initiative, given the vested interests in maintaining the status quo, do the benefits exceed the costs?

Even though each case study was specific to a singular organization, the lessons learned can be applied to the USIC. Through his research, Linden identified several strategies for collaboration (2005, pp. 8–9).

- Use both passion and systems to launch and sustain “one” initiatives.
- Passion and systems are necessary but not sufficient; it is also necessary to apply a strong dose of accountability.
- Use the initiative as a means to a larger end--if there is agreement on that end.
- Do not keep the division at 30,000 feet; bring it down to earth.
- Actively engage middle managers, where the biggest challenges and opportunities exist.
- Create a constituency for the initiative.
- Provide quality training--after the initiative is operating and the leaders have demonstrated their commitment.

The USIC thrives on information gathering to counter enemy intentions, to guide policy, and to advise decision makers. Because organizations learn differently, procedures and processes must be altered, and the perspective of each organization must be toward collective learning. A measurement of success would be identifying knowledge obtained that would have been impossible without the alliance (Larsson et al., 1998, p. 287). As observed in Ahuja’s research, innovation increases when true collaboration is active and present.
The USIC is comprised of agencies and people who want to protect the national security of the United States. Unfortunately, desire does not always equal success. There are times when collaborative teams will fail. David Noble identifies the following three reasons for failure: “inadequate resources, lack of knowledge of what to do, or unwillingness to do the work” (2004, p. 3). The lack of resources is a common theme in government agencies. In today’s economy, this factor may not change in the short-term. Therefore, the USIC must find ways to improve without an increase in resources. Creating more effective teams may be a mechanism to enhance the USIC counterterrorism capabilities. While many factors lead to success or the lack of success in a joint environment, stronger and more effective coordination should generally lead to better results (Barron, 2000, p. 432). Because of increased competition and a changing business environment, businesses are recognizing the need to develop new strategies. While there are many reasons to try these processes, a common factor in all of them is the attempt to integrate more members of the team. Companies view this as a way to obtain greater innovation and commitment from their employees (Gollan & Davis, 1999, pp. 70–71). Partnerships, teams, and intra-agency units are normal within the government and business environment. However, the presence of a team is not always indicative of collaboration, mission sharing, and effectiveness.

D. METHODOLOGY

This thesis utilizes a qualitative analysis approach to explore the current structure within the United States Intelligence Community. Through an analysis of commentary and suggestions, the best approach to confront terrorism and government organizations, or reorganization, is still a debated topic. This debate, namely the lack of a “one-size fits all” answer to terrorism is paramount to the problem. After reviewing the arguments for different approaches to counter the terrorist threat, the researcher analyzed organizational concepts. This thesis identifies key points and studies from the business world which demonstrate important concepts for success in teams, partnerships, and government.
The concept of collaboration, what it is, how it is created, and why it can be a benefit, was then carefully scrutinized by the researcher. In addition, this research includes studies conducted by the government, private foundations, and academia, common practices for success will be identified. The researcher then developed a theme for the framework of an ideal multi-disciplinary unit.

While this research is not designed to be a solution to all the questions and arguments being presented, the current structure will be examined in light of these points. Specifically, the ability of the United States to effectively target individuals and groups, regardless of their geographic location or criminal activity, and to mitigate their threat of terrorism is examined.

The current agencies and units, which are focused on the counterterrorism mission, were analyzed through this lens of collaboration. An alternative proposal, incorporating the many standards of successful, collaborative units, will be suggested and then analyzed by the researcher using the same criteria applied to the existing entities. Finally, based upon this research, the researcher offers judgment will be made for the best way to move forward.
II. DEFINING TRUE COLLABORATION

Information sharing and the absence of it have been debated since 9/11. During the 9/11 Commission hearings, a significant amount of time and energy was spent trying to determine what agencies knew, what agencies disseminated, and what agencies received. However, this was not just a phenomenon of 9/11. Multiple studies of the intelligence community conducted prior to 2001 articulated a combined 340 recommendations for intelligence reform. Ninety-four of the recommendations dealt specifically with improving “coordination across U.S. intelligence agencies and between these agencies and the rest of the U.S. government” (Zegart, 2007, p. 35). Interagency coordination has been practiced and discussed for many years, yet there is little authoritative guidance on how to be effective (Martin, 2006, p. 13). Information sharing and cooperation failures amongst intelligence agencies have frequently been cited as factors that led to 9/11. There has yet to be a systematic study in why these failures persist (Scott & Jackson, 2008, p. 33). This research does not seek to conclusively answer the question why coordination seems difficult. Identifying the attributes of a highly collaborative organization and comparing those attributes to current and proposed agencies is the focus.

The reasons for closer interaction are well documented. The Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) stated, “The evolving complexity of our adversaries challenges existing paradigms” (2007). The traditional methods of conducting counterterrorism must be altered (Homeland Security Advisory Council, 2007, p. 5). While the HSAC was focusing on the walls between federal, state, and local responders, their observation could be applied just as equally to interagency cooperation at the federal level. The Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Commission determined the intelligence community did not lack the talent or tools, but it lacked the cohesive structure to use them effectively (2005). Specifically, it identified that there was insufficient coordination to conduct “critical intelligence functions-ranging from target development to strategic analysis”
(Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2005). Coincidentally, the successes they did uncover were the result of interaction between agencies. Therefore, they concluded the USIC should become “better integrated and more innovative” (Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2005, pp. 309–312). These calls for closer coordination are not going unnoticed as many people believe interagency collaboration is instrumental for agencies to become more effective and efficient. Many agencies are entering strategic alliances to reduce costs; however, others have chosen to remain independent (Thomas, Hocevar, & Jansen, 2006, p. 1). Within the USIC community, there are highly functioning teams, dysfunctional teams, and teams that are best described as non-existent. The goal is to identify those areas in which a team would create new successes.

The maximum amount of collective learning is achieved as people work in a joint environment. This allows the easy transfer of knowledge in both general and specific contexts. Of course, this environment also heightens the risk of one partner becoming selfish and more of a receiver of information than a giver of it. One barrier to collaboration, and therefore collective learning, is trust. Each partner must believe the other is not seeking to exploit the relationship for their own selfish good (Larsson et al., 1998, pp. 292–296). Within the USIC, this can become an issue as each agency fights for more resources and more protection of its role in the counterterrorism mission. This issue of trust will have to be addressed in any collaborative framework.

A. COLLABORATION VERSUS COOPERATION

To accomplish successful agency interaction, it is important to articulate what collaboration is and is not, what the barriers are, what it would look like in an organization, and how it would affect performance. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) defines collaboration as, “any joint activity that is intended to produce more public value than could be produced when
organizations act alone” (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2005, p. 4). Within the post 9/11 dialogue, words such as collaboration, coordination and cooperation have been frequently spoken. These words, and the ideas associated with them, are not the same. Coordination is the least intrusive style, and it primarily is acted upon to prevent agencies from targeting the same subjects, criminal activities, and missions. In a cooperative environment, agencies concentrate on their own missions, but information flows more freely and is more readily available to assist other agencies. Organizationally, collaboration moves well beyond coordination and cooperation. By its definition, collaboration requires agencies to commit resources to a combined and agreed upon mission (Leavell, 2007, pp. 43–45). It is not an impossible goal to attain. Collaboration between people is a normal, interactive process, and it has become both a necessity and a resource in today’s work environments (Barron, 2000, p. 403). A company can stress both its productivity and its people through common vision and positive interaction. Through cooperation, both the needs of the individual and the organization can be met. The reinforcement of these elements becomes precursors for successful collaboration (Tjosvold & Tsao, 1989, p. 194). The pursuit of a collaborative USIC must be a primary goal.

Despite the potential advantages, fostering a collaborative environment is not an easy task. In a report to the United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the GAO stated the following:

 Agencies face a range of barriers when they attempt to collaborate with other agencies. One such barrier stems from missions that are not mutually reinforcing or that may even conflict, making reaching a consensus on strategies and priorities difficult. Another significant barrier to interagency collaboration is agencies’ concerns about protecting jurisdiction over missions and control over resources. Finally, interagency collaboration is often hindered by incompatible procedures, processes, data, and computer systems. Instead, federal agencies carry out programs in a fragmented, uncoordinated way, resulting in a patchwork of programs that can waste scarce funds, confuse and frustrate program customers, and limits the overall effectiveness of the federal effort. (2005, p. 2)
Adding to these barriers are the adversarial attitudes prevalent between agencies. There has been continual rivalry between various members of the USIC, including the FBI, CIA, and the DoD. Collections and operations naturally cross over jurisdictional lines as terrorists operate on both foreign and domestic soil. There has also been a historic rivalry between the CIA and DoD because the Director of Central Intelligence used to oversee the intelligence community, yet the Defense Secretary controlled 80 percent of the spending budget. The DoD still maintains that it must be in control of any intelligence operations affecting military actions (Lowenthal, 2006, pp. 45–46).

Not only do agencies protect their turf, but individuals also seek to hold their positions. The power or authority maintained by people within an organization is an inhibitor to change as those people do not want to give up their positions. This power does not necessarily mean hierarchical authority. Instead, it could also be a skill possessed by people. The routine operations of an organization create resistance to change. As employees become familiar with their jobs, they perform many of their functions with little to no conscious thought. Therefore, the employees miss clues about the need to change (Kelman, 2005, pp. 25–26). Even with the ever-changing environment of counterterrorism work, the mission can become tedious and routine. Intelligence is collected, intelligence is analyzed, and intelligence is disseminated. The number of people doing the field work is limited whereas most resources are expended in the other functions of the intelligence cycle. Motivating individuals and agencies to seek improvement in processes is difficult.

B. TEAMWORK

A sense of team must be established. A truly collaborative environment would celebrate successes and address failures together. The purpose would not be to bring two separate groups to add the sum of their parts, but to create a structure with a synergistic value wherein the sum is greater than the parts. In a bureaucratic environment in which organizations are fighting for funding and
resources, collaboration is sometimes difficult to sustain. Furthermore, the hope would be that creativity is fostered to counter new enemy tactics (Leavell, 2007, pp. 44–45). This speaks directly to one of the criticisms highlighted by the 9/11 Commission. The report from the 9/11 Commission wrote a statement that has been repeated many times. It stated, “the 9/11 attacks revealed four kinds of failures: in imagination, policy, capabilities, and management... it is therefore crucial to find a way of routinizing, even bureaucratizing, the exercise of imagination (9/11 Commission, 2004, pp. 339–344). To realize this goal, the USIC must harness the natural advantages of teams.

This concept of teamwork and success has even been demonstrated in elementary age children. In a study conducted with two groups of sixth grade students, there were several interesting findings about their ability to coordinate their work and find a solution (Barron, 2000, pp. 430–431). Group 1, which solved the problem, created a dynamic in which each member contributed to the solution while the other members listened to them. Although both groups sometimes lost shared focus on the problem, group 1 collectively came back to focus their attention on the problem. As group 1 solved parts of the problem, each member would concentrate their attention on that part of the solution plus consider how it played into the overall success of the problem. Group 2 did not share this level of coordination. The workbook, which contained the problem, became the focus of a battle for possession rather than solution. Overall, group 1 displayed characteristics of shared goals and the alignment of tasks to meet the goals. Group members both confirmed answers of other members and also expanded their thought processes by hearing other ideas. Group 2 tended to be uncoordinated, and their interactions were very disjointed. Partly as a result of the lack of unity, group 2 did not successfully solve the problem (Barron, 2000, pp. 430–431). The amount of coordination and collaboration between the members within each group had a marked contrast when compared to each other. Group 1 showed a level of collaboration which allowed the group as a
whole to keep members on track even when they started to lose focus. True collaboration had a direct effect on success.

There are many factors that affect how a group interacts. Typically, individuals in a diverse group will seek individuals with whom they share commonalities. These interactive patterns will begin to develop at the onset of the group (London & Sessa, 2007, p. 355). Group interaction is a fluid and constantly changing phenomena as tasks are accomplished, roles are set, and communication is established (London & Sessa, 2007, p. 356). During a study of work teams in service organizations, the importance of team characteristics was noted. The authors concluded, “the best teams had clear norms, were able to coordinate their efforts, and developed innovative methods aimed at improving their work methods” (Spreitzer et al., 1999, p. 355). This characterization could have been used to describe group 1 in the previous chapter and its success.

Team members and agencies must commit to a free exchange of information. One observation noted in the studies is that there can be a competitive disadvantage depending upon the transparency and receptivity of the companies seeking to form a strategic alliance. If either of the companies is not transparent with their information, the “collective learning” is decreased (Larsson et al., 1998, p. 286). Partnerships are enhanced through the constant interaction and shared experiences of employees. The interaction also encourages the agencies to open up their databases of information to the other partners (Caudle, 2006, p. 9). High transparency and receptivity are the key to maximize collective learning. Unfortunately, the competitive nature of companies creates barriers to their openness of information sharing which ultimately lessens the impact of the alliance (Larsson et al., 1998, p. 300). The USIC does not have the luxury of failure. Another attack on the scale of 9/11 will have deep and permanent repercussions on the USIC.

Dean Tjosvold and Yuan Tsao (1989) conducted a study of four multinational companies to identify factors to increase productivity. They tried to determine if positive group values such as shared vision and common rewards
would create a more cooperative environment (Tjosvold & Tsao, 1989). The alternate hypothesis was negative group values would create competition. Within competition, there is a win or lose mentality among employees. As common sense would suggest, there was a relationship between productivity, coordination, cooperation and the perceived effectiveness of the employees. While it did not state emphatically that cooperation improves productivity, the study and others since then suggest there are links between the two elements (Tjosvold & Tsao, 1989, pp. 192–194). More recent studies suggest collaboration produces the best results. Common tasks shared by interdependent organizations are best accomplished through collaboration. In these instances, the organizations are able to learn how to effectively partner with one another. Unfortunately, collaboration does not always work even when it seems to be the most effective solution (Thomas et al., 2006, p. 2). It is important to understand why agencies do not collaborate when research indicates positive outcomes are realized.

A constant roadblock on the path to change is people’s general resistance to change. This resistance increases in direct relation to the time in position of an employee. The other difficulty in government bureaucracies is the longevity of employment. Unlike private companies, employees of the government tend to stay longer and move less (Kelman, 2005, p. 29). The basic practices, observable in most bureaucracies, create resistance to change. The specialization of services has the adverse effect of not allowing people to see possibilities for creative change. If a decision is not in the scope of an employee’s position, they will generally seek counsel from a supervisor higher in the chain of command. This limits the ability of the employees to grow because they never make decisions outside of their job description (Kelman, 2005, p. 27). Even if the individuals come together in a cohesive environment, the team may not be a success.
C. FACTORS FOR SUCCESSFUL COLLABORATION

It is difficult to predict the success or failure of a group based upon the categorization of functional and dysfunctional processes. A dysfunctional group could have positive outcomes as the members learn and produce positive change. A functional group may strive for team harmony and reject ideas or concepts that conflict with this harmony (London & Sessa, 2007, p. 355). Perceptions are instrumental in detecting the potency of a team. If team members felt they had the ability and resources to accomplish the mission, they would put forth the effort to succeed (Kennedy, Loughry, Klammer, & Beyerlein, 2009, p. 75). It is important for each person in a collaborative process to both understand the overall task and how their capabilities can contribute to a resolution (Weber & Khademian, 2008, p. 440). This idea of ownership has a resounding effect on personnel. It allows them to fashion the team which fits their operating image. Team members are more satisfied when they are given information about their performance and when they have a perception of their ability to make decisions (Spreitzer et al., 1999, p. 357). However, a leader is necessary to ensure the team continues to focus outward on the mission and not inward on the group’s survival.

Leadership is another factor which contributes to the success of a team. Leaders have the ability to influence people to welcome and incorporate change in the workplace (Kelman, 2005, p. 62). Leaders who possess an in-depth knowledge of their agencies are able to lead the response by understanding the work processes and capabilities across multiple functioning lines. Through this, they can develop collaboration (Weber & Khademian, 2008, p. 456). Managers have more control over organizational characteristics than individual characteristics of a team member; therefore, they must seek to understand how the organization affects the success of a group (Kennedy, Loughry, Klammer, & Beyerlein, 2009, p. 75). Good leadership is a concept that unfortunately does not have a readily accepted description. Most people define good leadership by the
qualities they observed in a leader they liked or about whom they had positive feelings.¹

In a study of collaboration, Edward Weber and Anne Khademian reviewed and investigated the actions of managers in three different cases to determine how they sought out or used the collaborative process. Weber and Khademian used the term “collaborative capacity builder,” and they noted the successful individuals recognized the need to be a facilitator crossing many organizational boundaries (2008, p. 434). Furthermore, they concluded the collaborative capacity builders adopted six similar practices, as identified:

1. Understand the task in basic terms and communicate it clearly;
2. Balance innovation with accountability;
3. Engage public, private, and political landscapes as part of capacity building;
4. Cross boundaries frequently and with ease;
5. Utilize established relationships based on experience and trust, and work to create new trust-based relationships as essential dimensions of capacity; and
6. Employ substantive policy knowledge; know the task and environment from the inside out-experience counts. (Weber & Khademian, 2008, p. 434)

The traits articulated in the above research are very similar to the findings of a 2005 GAO study. The GAO identified several practices which would help agencies collaborate with each other, as follows:

- Define and articulate a common outcome. Agencies must have a defining reason to collaborate together. They could be forced to collaborate through congressional action or voluntarily choose to do so because of the benefit they may both receive from collaboration. At the onset, the agencies must have their employees cross agency lines to develop their common focus and mission. This process will take time and commitment.

¹ This is my personal observation based upon four years in the military, two years with a Big 6 public accounting firm, and over 16 years in the FBI. Employees rate their leaders based upon characteristics to which they are attracted and oftentimes in spite of whether the leader was effectively accomplishing the mission. In a similar vein, a personal friend who is a minister told me that people rarely remember the sermons, but they remember if the sermons were effectively and charismatically delivered.
• Establish mutually reinforcing or joint strategies.

• Identify and address needs and leverage resources. Because agencies have different strengths and weaknesses, the value of collaborative effort is combining these strengths for the common good.

• Agree on roles and responsibilities, including leadership. The unified team has developed plans and procedures for leadership and taskings. These efforts will help the team overcome operational barriers.

• Establish compatible policies, procedures, and other means to operate across agency boundaries. Not only are there technical and administrative matters which must be made compatible, but also agencies have different cultures which must be mashed together. One way to accomplish this is through frequent communication.

• Develop mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on the results. The agencies must develop a set of metrics to allow them to measure the success of their collaborative efforts. Through these metrics, managers will have criteria to help them gauge where improvements are needed.

• Reinforce agency accountability for collaborative efforts. Collaboration must become a part of agencies' strategic plans. This will help ensure that during the planning process, agencies are looking toward how collaboration will help them accomplish their mission as well as the overall mission of a government.

• Reinforce individual accountability for collaborative efforts. In order to assure senior executives place the appropriate amount of emphasis on interagency collaboration, the Office of Personnel Management has required this element in performance plans. Agencies must and should hold their executives accountable to this standard. (2005, p. 23)

There are many common factors in these two lists. Some of the underlying themes include relationship building, trust, and crossing organizational lines. Focusing on these as deliverables in the team framework should increase the chances for success.

The relationship between collaboration and success has been studied in many venues. While there is no exact formula to calculate success or failure in collaboration, several factors affect it. These include "competition/territoriality and
lack of familiarity, inadequate communication, and distrust” (Thomas et al., 2006, pp. 9). These factors blend together and often exacerbate each other. To counter these negative influences, organizations seeking effective partnerships must create opportunities to increase their collaborative capacity (Thomas et al., 2006, pp. 9–10). If the team has a natural mindset to succeed, members will tend to solve their own problems. Therefore, organizational leadership must strive to enhance the team’s view of itself. Leaders must be careful not to confuse what they believe is necessary for success with what the team believes is necessary. However, managers should look for ways to help persuade the team to move within the organization’s strategy (Kennedy et al., 2009, p. 89). Joint activities can occur through long-established teams or leadership meetings. However, these joint activities do not ensure that collaboration has occurred unless there is meaningful progress (GAO, 2005, pp. 6–7). Specifying the metrics of success is a first step in the evaluation of a collaborative effort.

Success should be defined within the context of the mission. The power, and ultimate goal, of strategic alliances in the learning process is through the generation of new ideas and understanding as organizations share their information. Each agency gains from the creative breakthroughs of the other partners without the necessity to spend time and resources learning available knowledge. The common mindset of organizations must be adjusted in a strategic alliance. Typically, firms look at collaboration and competition as polar opposites. If a firm seeks to be collaborative, they will lose a competitive advantage. However, what is missing from this viewpoint is a measure of new knowledge that could be gained in a collaborative environment (Larsson et al., 1998, pp. 289–290). USIC agencies must rid themselves of the competitive culture. Ultimately, the mission is the same for all of the USIC, which is to protect the national security of the United States.
D. **ONE MISSION**

A profound statement was contained within the WMD Commission report (2005), and it speaks to the point of this concept of one mission. The WMD Commission wrote the following:

We begin with an important reservation about terminology. The term information “sharing” suggests that the federal government entity that collects the information “owns” it and can decide whether or not to “share” it with others. This concept is deeply embedded in the Intelligence Community’s culture. We reject it. Information collected by the Intelligence Community—or for that matter, any government agency—belongs to the U.S. government. Officials are fiduciaries who hold the information in trust for the nation. They do not have authority to withhold or distribute it except as such authority is delegated by the President or provided by law. As we have noted elsewhere, we think that the Director of National Intelligence could take an important, symbolic first step toward changing the Intelligence Community’s culture by jettisoning the term “information sharing” itself - perhaps in favor of the term “information integration” or “information access.” (Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2005, p. 430)

Collaboration among USIC agencies will not be a simple task. Government agencies still battle employees who do not share information for their own personal gain. Furthermore, many government employees do not understand their agency’s mission and how their work enhances omission. Linden described government agencies as, “a collection of tribes. Each has its own language, rites, rituals, symbols, [and] traditions” (2005, p. 10). Solid, experienced leadership is crucial because the management of strategic alliances creates new challenges. To prevent the exploitation of any partner, agreements regarding joint supervision and conflict resolution are important. Any selfish incentive for partners to disengage from the alliance after receiving its benefit must not be tolerated (Larsson et al., 1998, p. 287). The goal is challenging but not impossible. There are examples of both failure and success already operating within the USIC.
III. MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO

The USIC was destined to be altered after the events on 9/11. The real debate was not whether the USIC would change but the extent of the change. In some respects, the attack was this generation’s version of Pearl Harbor. The ramifications would be felt for years to come after the airplanes slammed into the Pentagon, Pennsylvania field and World Trade Center Towers. During the ensuing review, there was a significant amount of political wrangling, reputation saving, and turf protection. The resulting actions had both vocal proponents and opponents.

In his testimony before the 9/11 Commission, former CIA Director George Tenet described the successes of the CIA prior to 9/11. In the late 1990s, the directors of the FBI and CIA held “gang of eight meetings” to increase the coordination between agencies. They also decided to exchange senior officials. Yet, this exchange did not receive acceptance by the designated senior officials (Zegart, 2007, p. 78). Furthermore, Mark Lowenthal opined that no study has concluded that pertinent information known prior to 9/11 that could have disrupted the plot was not shared (2006, p. 238). Both Lowenthal and former Director Tenet were former CIA employees, and these responses have a sense of protectionism. To understand where the USIC should be in the future, it is necessary to look at the current structure as a result of the changes since 9/11. This structure will be compared to the best practices of teams, partnerships, coordination, and collaboration as described in the previous sections.

A. CIA’S COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER

At the time of the 9/11 attacks, two main organizational structures were in place to target terrorists. These were led by the FBI and the CIA. The FBI was the lead agency directing and supporting JTTF’s around the country. The CIA housed the Counterterrorism Center (CIA/CTC). The CIA/CTC was originally framed to be a center where intelligence organizations, including the FBI, could
join resources to combat terrorism (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 75). In his testimony before the 9/11 Commission, former CIA Director George Tenet described the successes of the CIA prior to 9/11. One of the successes he mentioned was a focus on exchanging CIA and FBI senior officials to improve interagency cooperation (Zegart, 2007, p. 19). This cooperation extended beyond just the transfer of headquarters managers.

One of the early units in the CIA/CTC started in the 1990s. In 1996, the United States government officially decided Osama Bin Laden was a threat to national security. President Clinton decided the government would pursue Bin Laden through judicial means. However, this did not mean the CIA was excluded as the CIA established Alex Station which was staffed by the CIA, the FBI, and other government agencies. In fact, in 1995, New York FBI Division JTTF agents met with members of the CIA/CTC to discuss Osama bin Laden. They realized the CIA had amassed a significant amount of information about him (Miller, Stone, & Mitchell, 2002, pp. 148–150). This unit enjoyed early successes in gaining knowledge about Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda (Zegart, 2007, p. 77). Given the commentary and conclusions by the 9/11 Commission, the CIA/CTC did not meet the expected standard. When the CIA created the CIA/CTC, it was designed to overcome bureaucratic hurdles. Unfortunately, the CIA/CTC succumbed to the usual battles over jurisdiction and operations (Miller et al., 2002, p. 129).

Through the inclusion of joint duty detailees from across the USIC, the CIA/CTC creates numerous direct ties between organizations. These direct ties can create a benefit to both agencies as strategies and tactics are developed and implemented. The direct ties also reduce structural holes, defined as “gaps in information flow” (Ahuja, 2000, p. 443), which increases the probability that the decision-makers and operators have access to the most current intelligence. The CIA/CTC has been given the authority, the resources, and the accountability for orchestrating the CIA’s contribution to the counterterrorism mission. These characteristics are similar to the observations in successful teams (Wageman,
The framework also meets the GAO definition of collaboration, specifically “any joint activity that is intended to produce more public value than could be produced when organizations act alone” (2005, p. 4). The joint duty personnel are given access to CIA databases, personnel, and mission essentials which fosters a true team environment.

The CIA/CTC is still a functioning center that has enjoyed many successes since 9/11, but it does not meet all the standards for a highly collaborative center. The CIA/CTC is a CIA run center. There are many different agencies, including the FBI and DoD, which send personnel to the CIA/CTC for joint duty assignments. While the joint duty personnel have the ability to more easily reach out to their own agencies, the role is highly diminished. The personnel maintain their chain of command back to their home agencies. The primary responsibility is for coordination and de-confliction. As documented earlier, the goal of coordination is to prevent duplication of effort or conflicts (Leavell, 2007, p. 43). Also, there is limited number of joint duty personnel assigned to the CIA/CTC in comparison to the number of CIA personnel assigned. As a result, group consensus is often swayed by numbers. Also, the detailees are not always given the authority by their home agencies to make decisions without consulting with their home agencies. When this occurs, their role is reduced to that of a messenger. A successful team has the authority to make decisions within the team (Wageman, 1997, pp. 34–38). While this coordination definitely adds value to the USIC mission, there is no synergistic benefit. The CIA/CTC is an effective organization, but it does not meet the perfect standard of highly collaborative organization with access to all threat mitigation options.

B. FBI'S JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE

Combating traditional crimes was the impetus behind the first FBI task forces. At a time when the FBI was still being accused of not cooperating with local law enforcement departments, the New York Division of the FBI changed
the norm. The task force concept began with a joint task force between the FBI and the New York Police Department (NYPD) to investigate bank robberies. After observing the success of this task force, the first JTTF was created (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, 2005). A Deputy Inspector with the NYPD stated the following, “the key to the success of the JTTF concept remains the melding of personnel from the various law enforcement agencies into a single, focused unit” (Martin, 1999, p. 24). This mission focus is a common factor of successful teams (Wageman, 1997, pp. 34–38). The teamwork approach brought forth the strengths of each organization to the benefit of the JTTF as a whole. Combining the street skills of the NYPD officers and the vast investigative experience and reach of the FBI created a highly functioning team (Martin, 1999, p. 24). Interestingly, this statement was made before the attacks on 9/11 as the New York Division JTTF had been successful in a number of incidents and investigations. By 9/11, the FBI was operating 35 JTTFs around the country in major metropolitan cities (Mueller, 2011).

The JTTFs continue to receive praise for their concept of operations and successes. The Department of Justice Office of Inspector General (OIG) completed a review of the various departmental terrorism task forces and councils and determined the task forces were effective and contributed to the counterterrorism mission (2005). The OIG also concluded the task forces were not duplicative, and they highlighted the inclusion of federal, state, and local partner agencies (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, 2005). Additionally, the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) (2005) recognized the power of joint operations and commended the FBI for its extensive network of joint task forces. The panel believed joint operations were becoming the norm and would be critical to future national security investigations. The NAPA further recommended these joint task forces be extended to other law enforcement areas (National Academy of Public Administration, 2005, p. 21).

The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) recognized it was only through joint task forces that collaboration occurred (Office of Director of National
Intelligence, 2008). The assignment of officers from other agencies and investigative successes are indicators to the successfulness of the JTTF model (Goodman, 2008). Most recently, the JTTF in New York City was responsible for the investigation and arrest of Quazi Mohammad Rezwanul Ahsan Nafis, who pled guilty to attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction (U.S. Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of New York, 2013). In 2012, Adel Daoud was arrested by the JTTF in Chicago, Illinois, as he attempted to detonate a car bomb which was filled with inert explosives purchased from an undercover officer (U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Illinois, 2012).

One of the many strengths of the JTTFs is the flexibility offered to neutralize threats. By including state, local, and other federal law enforcement agencies, the JTTFs have the ability to pursue suspected terrorists through local criminal violations, federal violations, immigration proceedings and other means. This has been used many times since 9/11, yet it is predominantly for suspected terrorists located within the United States. The structure of a JTTF naturally creates a significant number of direct ties. Nationally, the FBI operates 103 JTTFs in its field offices, with over 4200 non-FBI participants representing more than 600 state and local departments along with over 50 federal agencies (FBI: Protecting America from terrorist attack). These 4200 law enforcement personnel offer connections back to their own agencies for resources, intelligence, and experiences. Furthermore, the JTTFs become a single point of accountability for the counterterrorism mission on the local area. FBI headquarters relies on the local field office to work jointly with other departments to investigate possible threats and tips coming from local, national or international sources.

The authority and accountability to coordinate and share the intelligence and investigative mission placed upon the local field office is another factor typically associated with successful teams (Wageman, 1997, pp. 34–38). Within the JTTFs, all officers are required to attend the training to ensure every participant has the same baseline knowledge of targets and techniques. Equality
and sufficiency of training is a key component for a collaborative team (Linden, 2005, pp. 8–9).

The National Academy of Public Administration recognized the strength of the FBI JTTF’s and the ever evolving environment in which they operate. Unfortunately, the panel also discovered a bureaucratic process which may impact the efficiency and effectiveness of these task forces. Because the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) grants money to state and local agencies, there could be future coordination problems and duplication of efforts if these departments choose to operate outside of the JTTF (National Academy of Public Administration, 2005, p. 45). The JTTFs provide a strong presence for activities within the United States, but they have a limited reach overseas. For example, the FBI relies upon its contacts with the CIA and DoD in addition to its own network of Legal Attaché offices and foreign liaison partners. The level of involvement of intelligence partners on the JTTFs varies. As a result, some FBI field offices have dynamic relationships which are highly functioning. Other offices have more of a liaison contact than a partnership.

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Table 1. Listing of JTTF Participating Agencies
The National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJITF) was created in 2002 to ensure the effective and efficient administration of the investigative JTTF’s throughout the FBI. Its mission included the coordination of threats and leads between the field and headquarters. Similar to the field JTTFs, the NJITF is comprised of the FBI and many different agencies. The OIG indicated that “during crisis situations, the NJITF’s members support the FBI’s Strategic Intelligence Operations Center and provide information that addresses the crisis or terrorist act” (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, 2005). Yet, the NJITF is primarily administrative in nature. It supports the field JTTFs request for funding and resources. While the participants aid in coordinating actions across agencies, they do not conduct investigations or source operations.

C. NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER

The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) is a creation of the post 9/11 debates and Congressional Acts. The 9/11 Commission believed America had the individual components necessary, but it lacked the organizational structure to unify these components. This disorganization was partially the catalyst behind the formation of the NCTC (Torres, 2007, p. 2). The 9/11 Commission recommended the creation of the NCTC. In its recommendation, it wrote, “breaking the older mold of national government organization, this NCTC should be a center for joint operational planning and joint intelligence.” The NCTC would outline the responsibilities of the agencies; however, each agency would determine how they would fulfill their responsibilities (9/11 Commission, 2004, pp. 403–404).

On August 7, 2004, President George W. Bush signed Executive Order 13354 officially establishing the NCTC. There were five specific functions outlined in the order (Executive Order No. 13354, 2004).

1. Serve as the primary organization in the United States Government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States Government pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism, excepting purely domestic counterterrorism information.;
2. Conduct strategic operational planning for counterterrorism activities, integrating all instruments of national power, including diplomatic, financial, military, intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement activities within and among agencies;

3. Assign operational responsibilities to lead agencies for counterterrorism activities that are consistent with applicable law and that support strategic plans to counter terrorism;

4. Serve as the central and shared knowledge bank on known and suspected terrorists and international terror groups; and

5. Ensure that agencies, as appropriate, have access to and receive all-source intelligence support needed to execute their counterterrorism plans or perform independent, alternative analysis.

The NCTC has broad powers for receiving and analyzing information, but it is limited operationally. Function 3 specifically states, “The Center shall not direct the execution of operations” (Executive Order No. 13354, 2004). The NCTC has the authority and capability to review and analyze intelligence collected from every agency. Through this, it is able to develop a global picture of the terrorist threat. However, it cannot direct the operational activities of an individual agency (Jones, 2007, p. 12). It developed the national implementation plan for the war on terror. However, the chains of command and organizational lanes were not clearly defined for cohesive and unified action (Torres, 2007, p. 3). The future will be the only indicator of whether the NCTC will be successful as currently designed.

Director Redd described himself as the “mission manager” for the DNI. With this designation comes responsibility to ensure the intelligence community has a clear and coherent counterterrorism vision. The NCTC engages itself to ensure that emerging threats are assessed in terms of collection and mitigation. Specifically, the Interagency Task Force (IATF), led by the NCTC, focuses on these new threats. The IATF is comprised of the Departments of Defense, State, Homeland Security, and Justice. The IATF’s proposals are reviewed, approved, and altered by White House and senior staff officials (Confronting the Terrorist Threat, 2007). Finally, the principal deputies who serve as the leadership framework at the NCTC must be change agents. They must strive to develop a
focused and integrated strategy. However, after two years, the NCTC was still developing procedures for interagency cooperation (Reinwald, 2007, p. 11). Given the rapidly evolving face and character of terrorism, specifically Al Qaeda, this pace of change is unacceptable and works to the detriment of the security of the United States.

Since its creation, the NCTC has tried to become mission focused. Former Director Redd testified that through the authority of the DNI, the NCTC was working to ensure agencies were not conducting duplicative work. Instead, they were assigning lead agencies to cover specific threats and to also ensure there was “competitive analysis” to enhance and temper analytical assessments. The NCTC recognized no singular agency could cover all topics (Confronting the Terrorist Threat, 2007). However, without functional authority over other USIC agencies, the NCTC cannot enforce its plans and must make requests not orders. Yet, two years after the creation of the NCTC, it still lacked appropriate resources and authority to accomplish the mission for which it was responsible. Additionally, it had not succeeded in its effectiveness and efficiency (Reinwald, 2007, p. 1). This failure may not be a result of poor function but a flaw in the design.

The NCTC possesses many of the characteristics observed in highly collaborative organizations. For some observers, the NCTC is considered a success story. Personnel from multiple agencies work together and draft analytical reports and assessments (Zegart, 2007, p. 186). Thomas et al. defined collaborative capacity as “the ability of organizations to enter into, develop, and sustain inter-organizational systems in pursuit of collective outcomes” (2006, p. 2). The NCTC continues to draw personnel from throughout the intelligence community into a continuing mission to oversee and drive all source analysis and strategies. FBI employees detailed to the NCTC work under the NCTC chain of command. During their assignment, they respond to NCTC, and not FBI, requirements. One of the strengths of the NCTC is the ability of the personnel to read and analyze all intelligence collected and maintained by the USIC. The
framework of the NCTC creates a significant number of direct ties as the various employees work together and reach back to their home agencies.

The NCTC should not become a bureaucratic organization with strict lines of information flow and reporting. Communication should flow openly and rapidly in all directions. To accomplish this, trust must be developed between agencies (Stimeare, 2005, p. 5). Its organizational structure immediately was fraught with bureaucracy. The Director of the NCTC has two different reporting chains of command. The NCTC Director reports to both the president and the DNI (Lowenthal, 2006, p. 41). Additionally, the NCTC is comprised of personnel serving in joint duty and detaillee assignments. As mentioned previously, these assignments are not always supported by management or sought after by employees. Many times, loyalty remains with the home organization. While it would be idealistic to state a person’s loyalty should be to the national security mission, it is not realistic. An essential element of the success of the NCTC is the acceptance of its value by agency heads. Leadership is the most important factor to attain interagency cooperation. While agencies have a measure of independence and their management positions are technically equals across the government spectrum, there must be a person in command, someone who is held accountable for and holds others accountable for joint action (Jones, 2007, p. 12).

Regardless of motivation or persuasion, the NCTC is staffed and functioning. The mission of the NCTC is not operational in the traditional meaning of the word as it does not directly conduct intelligence collection, human source operations, or investigations. By design, as indicated in functions 1 and 2, the NCTC could be described as an analytical entity formulating the strategic portions of the counterterrorism mission. The NCTC focuses on high-level efforts and relies on other agencies to target identified threats and terrorists. For example, the NCTC created Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Teams (JCAT), which are the successors to the Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group, to enhance intelligence sharing and to ensure terrorism
intelligence requirements were disseminated to all federal, state, and local agencies, who was in position to meet the requirements (National Counterterrorism Center, n.d.). People assigned to the JCAT do not directly collect the intelligence, but they assist in strengthening the intelligence collection process. While the NCTC serves a valuable mission for the United States, it is not the correct entity to oversee or operate against specific terrorists.

D. DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Within the United States, the national security strategy is formulated at the presidential level. The goals and objectives cascade to the Cabinet level departments and their agencies to execute procedures to fulfill these objectives. Currently, there remains little to no oversight for implementation. Each agency designs its strategies based upon the portions of the national security strategy for which it is responsible. Unfortunately, since there is no oversight, the individual plans for national objectives with two or more responsible agencies are not coordinated (Martin, 2006, p. 4). The DNI is technically the office to provide this oversight. The USIC framework was altered with the creation of the DNI. This office has power over both foreign and domestic agencies and the business of intelligence collection (Bay, 2008, p. 74). The position of the DNI was created in 2004 under the authority of the National Intelligence Security Reform Act. The word “foreign” was purposefully left out of the title to demonstrate the DNI’s power over domestic activities, such as the FBI’s intelligence collection, as well (Lowenthal, 2006, p. 30). The presumption was the DNI would help the many agencies of the USIC to integrate.

The topic of integration and coordination was a key discussion point in Congress. In his opening statement before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Ambassador John D. Negroponte (2005), candidate for the DNI, outlined several concerns regarding the intelligence community. One of his concerns was many different agencies had improved and enhanced their collection and capabilities; however, he did not see a coordinated effort which
should have been accomplished through the NCTC (Negroponte, 2005, p. 6). This type of effort was missing prior to 9/11 as noted in several reports, and many reforms were designed to remedy this shortfall. The first recommendation of the WMD Commission stated, “We recommend that the DNI bring a mission focus to the management of Community resources for high-priority intelligence issues by creating a group of ‘Mission Managers’ on the DNI staff, responsible for all aspects of the intelligence process relating to those issues” (Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2005, p. 317). These mission managers could serve the coordinating role sought by Ambassador Negroponte.

Ambassador Negroponte further stated the United States needed:

...a single intelligence community that operates seamlessly, that moves quickly, and that spends more time thinking about the future than the past. We need the right mix of human and technical resources, providing us with a new generation of capable intelligence officers, analysts, and specialists, and innovative technologies. (Negroponte, 2005, p. 12)

The DNI must be a strong authority over the national human collection of United States or they must delegate this authority. Without it, the USIC risks conducting operations targeting similar individuals and groups which would potentially cause the operations to be compromised (MacGaffin, 2005, p. 90). To accomplish this, the DNI must be given the necessary statutory and budgetary authority. Negroponte (2005) believed the DNI should be a value added departmental layer and help people excel by giving them the right opportunities and resources. He wanted to “ensure that our intelligence community is forward-leaning, but objective, prudent, but not risk-adverse, and yet always faithful to our values and our history as a Nation” (Negroponte, 2005, p. 11).

The FBI received significant criticism during the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. This is partially due to the fact that the FBI was not sharing information even within its own organization. Although the FBI offered excuses such as lack of resources and the intelligence “wall,” it could not escape completely from its
culpability. Many people do not believe intelligence and investigative operations can coexist within one agency. Therefore, a separate domestic intelligence institution should be created (Leavell, 2007, p. 33).

In November 2001, Ibn Shaikh Al Libby was captured in Afghanistan. While the FBI was interrogating him, a dispute arose whether or not he was withholding information. While the CIA wanted to turn him over to the Egyptians, the FBI wanted to maintain the ability to use his statements in court. Ultimately, the president decided to turn him over to the Egyptians after the CIA director and the FBI director argued over his fate (Miller et al., 2002, p. 320). It is these specific types of issues the DNI was formulated to assist. One of the proclaimed problems leading to the attacks on 9/11 was the inability of the CIA, FBI, and the rest of the USIC to work together cohesively (Zegart, 2007, p. 4). However, the DNI must have a strong presence because each agency is trying to fulfill their specific portion of the mission as they have defined it.

On September 10, 2007, Vice Admiral (ret.) John Scott Redd, then Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, met with the United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. As part of his opening statement, Director Redd highlighted the need to improve intelligence collection, coordination with state and local officials, coordination amongst agencies, and budgeting and planning (2007). Information sharing and coordination were the same obstacles discussed in the 9/11 hearings years earlier.

In his thesis, Ron Leavell hypothesized, “Our counterterrorism effectiveness will increase by adoption of a fully collaborative multi-level, multi-discipline effort” (2007, p. 4). The underlying question is whether or not agencies merely speak of collaboration or do they actually practice collaboration. To achieve true collaboration, organizations will have to adhere to principles such as “joint governance, joint decision-making, and resource sharing” (Leavell, 2007, p. 4). Over time, as organizations work together, their effectiveness should increase as they develop relationships and build trust with each other (Leavell, 2007, p. 4).
Historically, the agencies within the USIC have been unwilling to set aside their own interests to serve national interests (MacGaffin, 2005, p. 95). Through past experience, military doctrine emphasizes that participants engaging in joint operations must share a common understanding of relevant information including the environment, resources, and personnel. Of course, this task is entirely difficult yet extremely important for the NCTC given its wide range of operations, both in geography and scope (Stimeare, 2005, p. 13). The framework outlined above does not fully satisfy all the needs of the USIC.

E. SUMMARY

Strategic analysis of intelligence helps establish missions and policies. The DNI and NCTC are designed to attack these national level issues. The CIA/CTC and JTTFs focus on threat streams, specific terrorist groups, and individuals. What is missing is a collaborative unit compromised of personnel from the FBI, CIA, and the DoD to target individuals using all the available tools across the USIC spectrum. After the attacks of 9/11, everybody was quick to point blame at individuals. Yet within a bureaucracy, one individual does not always have the power to effect change. It is oftentimes an organizational and hierarchical problem (Zegart, 2007, pp. 6–8).

The preceding sections were written to clarify the roles, responsibilities, and history of some of the different organizations operating in the CT mission. Each of the entities described above serve an important purpose in the counterterrorism mission. This research and analysis of them as highly functioning teams should not diminish or be read as a negative critique of their work. Whether they are described as highly functioning or missing the mark, their mission does not meet what is being proposed as an alternative, specifically a unit that crosses agency and discipline boundaries. The 9/11 Commission report and other studies have highlighted the United States government is deficient in its ability to lead and coordinate operations which cross agency boundaries (Jones, 2007, pp. 2–3).
The next section will provide a recommendation for a new group which pulls together all resources in a balanced unit that has the ability to effectively and efficiently use all mitigation and neutralization tactics.
IV. PROPOSAL

The national security of the United States is a complex mission requiring the resources of multiple organizations. This inherent complexity is magnified by bureaucratic and patriarchal hurdles imposed by fusing together multiple agencies. When considering the addition of a new entity, it is entirely appropriate, if not a necessity, to evaluate the cost versus the benefit. After reviewing and studying the meeting of Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi in Kuala Lumpur and their subsequent travels, the 9/11 Commission concluded the United States government needed to develop a plan for joint operations (2004). They recognized the diverse plans and strategies of the USIC agencies. Furthermore, they knew the leadership challenges in the past would carry forward to the future (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 357). In response to the 9/11 Commission recommendations, the USIC has painfully worked through the creation and development of the DNI and DHS. These were monumental changes affecting the entire community. These changes were also met with stiff resistance and substantial obstacles in implementation. Small adjustments could have the ability to bring great success while causing only minor amounts of stress or change fatigue.

The USIC has a current intelligence structure which encourages information sharing and cooperation. This was not the root problem within the USIC. Prior to 9/11, the agencies within the USIC did cooperate, but legitimate joint action was missing. The 9/11 Commission (2004) differentiated between cooperation and joint action by writing that cooperation was identifying a problem and seeking help to resolve it. On the other hand, joint action brings together the perspectives of all agencies to frame the problem, the potential solutions, and the roles and responsibilities of each agency (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 400). This continued cooperation, and in many respects increased cooperation, is a positive development. After the failures of 9/11, there was widespread agreement amongst both the politicians and the public that the USIC needed to be
restructured in some manner. A significant amount of time, resources, and money have been expended to increase information sharing and collaboration. Domestically, joint terrorism task forces have increased, and fusion centers throughout the United States have been created (Leavell, 2007, p. 25). The majority of studies have identified the value and necessity of increasing the number of joint duty assignments between agencies (Zegart, 2007, p. 38). Yet, the goal should be an increase in collaboration and joint operations not just information sharing.

In this section, the High Value Interrogation Group (HIG) will be reviewed and analyzed using the same criteria previously identified. The HIG example will also help formulate the strategy for the development of an interagency targeting center for identified terrorists. In the chapter entitled, “What to Do? A Global Strategy,” the 9/11 Commission wrote the following: “the United States should consider what to do - the shape and objectives of a strategy. Americans should also consider how to do it -organizing their government in a different way” (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 361). The 9/11 Commission was looking at a macro level at the lack of cohesion in strategy. These same words and idea could be used to review the USIC’s operations at a micro level. Fundamentally, every terrorist group is comprised of individual terrorists. While there are strategies to defeat the group itself, there will always be a need to address the individuals, particularly the leaders, technical experts such as bomb makers, and other influential members. This micro level execution would be served by a national targeting center. As previously noted, the end of a terrorist group is usually the result of more than one factor (Jones & Libicki, 2008, p. 10).

Creating a framework for change is difficult especially when it requires adherence by more than one agency. Intelligence failures would be easy to fix if the root cause was leadership (Zegart, 2007, p. 10). A national strategy is only as effective as its execution, and execution remains a major challenge. It hinges on the capability of all participating organizations to integrate shared operations and objectives while maintaining their independence. As it strives for inclusion in the
planning process, the DoD wrote an annex to its plan which outlined the duties of other agencies which affected the DoD. However, this was just a plan on a piece of paper because the DoD does not have the authority to command other agencies to fulfill their duties (Martin, 2006, p. 6). According to Sims and Gerber, “True intelligence transformation fuses wit, creative business practices, and selected technologies for the purpose of achieving strategic advantage (2005a, p. x). The author is also keenly aware that not all change is good. In the midst of change, a “bias for action” sometimes occurs as positive feedback encourages additional change. As the leadership exerts their influence, the cycle of action and positive feedback continues (Kelman, 2005, pp. 203–204). The national targeting center would include input of authority, responsibility, and strategy by the participating agencies.

A. CURRENT HIGH VALUE INTERROGATION GROUP

One of the success stories for the USIC is the formulation of the High Value Interrogation Group. Its creation was not necessarily a result of the recognition that the agencies needed to work more closely together. Instead, a major catalyst was the many interrogation scandals which impacted the USIC, the United States, and U.S. relationships with some foreign partners. Senator Patrick Leahy praised the Presidential Administration’s decision to have the FBI lead the HIG because the FBI has a “long history of proven success in interrogation without resorting to extreme methods that violate our laws and our values” (2009). Regardless of the reasons behind the formation, it can be used as model for successful collaboration. On the FBI website, the HIG is described:

The High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group (HIG) is an interagency body, housed within the NSB [National Security Branch], and staffed with members from various IC [Intelligence Community] agencies. Its mission is to gather and apply the nation’s best resources to collect intelligence from key terror suspects in order to prevent terrorist attacks against the United States and its allies. (Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.)
The HIG is an assimilation of experts from the USIC, the law enforcement community, and the Department of Defense. These experts include intelligence analysts, officers, FBI Special Agents, interrogators, and translators. The HIG consists of multiple teams capable of deploying on short notice to interrogate captured terrorism subjects. While intelligence collection would be the focus, the HIG would possibly be able to preserve the ability to glean evidence for a criminal prosecution (Department of Justice, 2009). In the past, many of the interrogations were conducted by the agency which maintained primary jurisdiction for the area of capture. For instance, arrests and/or detentions on United States soil were controlled by the FBI or another law enforcement agency. If the capture occurred overseas, either the CIA or DoD would be the lead agency depending upon whether it was a country with whom the United States was at war, such as Afghanistan or Iraq, or other sovereign countries like Pakistan. Frequently, the agency with jurisdiction followed its own set of rules and guidelines with little thought to how that method would affect future control of the terrorist. The goal was simply the collection of intelligence. Unfortunately, this methodology has contributed in part to the many detainees in Guantanamo Bay who cannot be prosecuted because of a lack of evidence.

The case against Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Christmas-day bomber, was one of the first chances to demonstrate the HIG’s value. Abdulmutallab tried to detonate a bomb hidden in his underwear while traveling on a Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day (White, 2012). Dennis Blair, then Director of National Intelligence, faulted the decision to immediately interview Abdulmutallab using Miranda warnings, which are warnings provided to criminal suspects (Hsu & Agiesta, 2010). DNI Blair stated, “That unit was created exactly for this purpose—to make a decision on whether a certain person who’s detained should be treated as a case for federal prosecution or for some of the other means” (Hsu & Agiesta, 2010). In his opinion, the HIG should have been used in this case (CNN Wire Staff, 2010), and he stressed that, in the future, the HIG would be utilized in both overseas and domestic cases (Hsu & Agiesta,
He slightly backed down from his remarks in future interviews, but he truly wanted the HIG involved in all discussions regarding intelligence versus evidence collection during interrogations of captured suspects (Hsu & Agiesta, 2010). In addition, FBI Director Mueller defended the FBI’s actions amidst the chaos. He further commented that “there was no time” for other alternatives (Lake, 2010).

The HIG is a model of collaboration in its structure. While it is administrated by the FBI (Ghosh, 2009), the HIG was designed to bring together experienced interrogators and experts from the USIC (Department of Justice, 2009). The primary mission of the team is to gather intelligence from detained persons regarding additional bomb plots or conspirators. Yet, the team will also try to preserve evidence for prosecution, if feasible (Dozier, 2011; Department of Justice, 2009). Through interagency coordination, the teams would be able to deploy on their interrogation assignments with the necessary subject matter expertise and experience (Department of Justice, 2009).

Bringing together experts from different fields and agencies, the HIG has also been tasked with researching and developing the most effective interrogation strategies (Dozier, 2011). Since the participants are part of the same group, they have the knowledge of what skills each brings to the mission and the personal relationship to ask for assistance and guidance. Requests do not have to be processed through other headquarters personnel.

The HIG hits many of the markers of partnerships, teams, and collaboration, as articulated in the previous sections. Reviewing Ahuja’s research (2000), the HIG has developed direct and indirect ties, which increases its chance to conduct successful and productive interrogations. As a team, its purpose has been stated, and each entity has agreed to the joint endeavor. Also, because of the importance of the mission, teamwork is absolutely essential. The HIG was designed to be the center for strategic planning of interrogations and the focal point for determining the strategy of each interrogation (Department of Justice, 2009).
One limitation of the HIG is clearly evident. The formation of the HIG was focused on preparing for an interrogation. The subject set for the HIG were those terrorists whom the USIC believes will be captured or detained. The missing component is a unified effort to target known terrorists for detention, capture, or kill operations. The HIG should be praised for its proactive stance in preparing for future, anticipated interviews. However, the USIC needs a unit which brings together the USIC agencies in a proactive, equal team to target terrorists using every unique resource available to the participating agencies.

B. PROPOSED NATIONAL TARGETING CENTER

The 9/11 Commission noted many singular items of failure such as lack of information sharing, poor analysis, and ineffective operations. Interestingly, they viewed the failures as symptoms of a greater problem, which was the United States lacked the structure to manage missions which cross national borders. There was no singular person or unit which was able to pull together all available intelligence on a given threat (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 353). The key is to develop a unit with an unlimited flow of information and ideas. This type of system was not evident prior to 9/11. The organizational framework of intelligence made it difficult to share information between agencies (Zegart, 2007, p. 112). Yet, flexibility and adaptability must become key characteristics.

Terrorism will not be eradicated through one discipline. The types of actions committed by terrorists and their associated groups differ. The actions by the United States government prior to 9/11 highlighted the inability of the United States to confront an asymmetric threat. The traditional method was to counter individuals through law enforcement means and nations through diplomacy and war. However, Al Qaeda did not fit either typology as it was neither an individual nor a country (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 348). Learning about a specific terrorist plot is nearly impossible. It is more important for intelligence to learn about the groups, individuals, cells, etc. The systematic disabling of terrorist organizations terrorist by terrorists, cell by cell, is an effective means to operate. If a cell is
disrupted, any plots that cell may have been planning are disrupted. Many terrorists commit other crimes when they are plotting their attack. These can be exploited through legal means (Pillar, 2004, pp. 117–118). The diffuse work of the enemy requires a broad and evolving strategy.

A national strategy hinges on the capability of all participating organizations to integrate shared operations and objectives while maintaining their independence (Martin, 2006, p. 6). After reviewing and studying the meeting of Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi in Kuala Lumpur and their subsequent travels, the 9/11 Commission (2004) concluded the United States government needed to develop a plan for joint operations. The commission members recognized the diverse plans and strategies of the USIC agencies. Furthermore, they knew the leadership challenges in the past would carry forward to the future (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 357). Defining a model joint operation can be difficult. Torres (2007) defines unity of effort as, “a process in which different organizational powers and authorities come together for unified action in order to produce a synergistic effect against a given objective, without any one individual or organization being in complete charge of the ways and means.” More simply, he defines it as, “an atmosphere of cooperation to achieve objectives” (Torres, 2007, pp. 3–4).

The proposed National Targeting Center (NTC) would alleviate many of the concerns against specific and identified terrorists. The issues of terrorism fall into both the intelligence and law-enforcement realm. The FBI, which was historically a law enforcement agency, has been building its intelligence capabilities since 2003 (Lowenthal, 2006, p. 234). The CIA also found itself operating in unchartered territory. As a result of the attacks on 9/11, the new war on terrorism changed the CIA’s operating landscape. They were providing authority to render suspects to other countries for detainment and interrogation (Lowenthal, 2006, p. 27). The structure would be designed to assimilate experts into a cohesive unit.
The NTC would be comprised of all USIC agencies, but each agency would not provide an equal amount of resources. As demonstrated in Figure 1, the FBI, CIA, and DoD would be the bulk of the resources. These three agencies/departments have both the jurisdiction and resources for offensive engagement though kinetic strikes, intelligence collection, or judicial action. However, other USIC agencies (see Figure 1), such as the National Security Agency, provide invaluable resources for intelligence collection.

The proposed NTC would be led by a director from the FBI, CIA, or DoD. The remaining two agencies would serve in deputy director position. These positions would be filled on a rotating basis in two year terms. For example, if the director was from the military, then the CIA and FBI would both appoint an individual to serve as a deputy director. The purpose of the rotation would be to prevent any organization from behaving as the NTC is their unit or losing interest because it is not involved in the strategic planning. Leadership is the most important factor to attain interagency cooperation. While agencies have a measure of independence and their management positions are technically equals
across the government spectrum, there must be a person in command, someone
who is held accountable for and holds others accountable for joint action (Jones,
2007, p. 12). It should be noted the titles do not matter as much as the leadership
role each agency would fill. The NTC is not being proposed as a deconfliction
and assignment entity but rather an operationally focused unit working to
neutralize terrorists and groups. According to Torres, “Unity of command alone
will not result in success; the importance of appropriate authorities and power to
achieve national objectives cannot be over emphasized” (2007, p. 3). While the
leaders are important, the mission must be accomplished by the investigators,
officers, and analysts.

The NTC should be organized according to threats. For example, a
strategy to counter Hizballah would be different than the strategy to counter Al
Qaeda. Hizballah has the support of Iran and Syria, and many Arabs in the
Middle East look favorable upon it for its resistance against Israel. It is also a
political party in Lebanon (Byman, 2003). The NTC will have multiple teams
addressing individual threats and groups. Each team should have members from
each of the three core agencies. For example, the team targeting Al Qaida in
East Africa (AQEA) would consist of members from the military, the CIA, and the
FBI. As major subjects are identified by any USIC agency, the NTC would
determine who it would target. This decision would be accepted by the agencies
to prevent duplication of effort. Then, the team would develop a plan to mitigate
the risk posed by the subject. By including the law enforcement, intelligence, and
military disciplines, the team would be able to formulate the best strategy. Each
team member would remain part of the execution regardless of the strategy
chosen. For instance, if the team decided a military capture or kill operation was
the most effective way to neutralize the threat, the FBI and CIA personnel would
continue to assist in the pursuit of the subject.

The NTC would not be a tri-lateral unit. There are many productive and
active agencies within the USIC doing extraordinary work as part of the
counterterrorism mission. Personnel from other agencies would form a support
element. This element would provide expertise and assistance to the functional teams. As visually portrayed in Figure 2, the support element would contribute to each of the individual threat teams. If needed, members could be fully assigned to a threat team on a temporary basis if there is a specific need. Otherwise, they provide intelligence and handle requests for information from the teams.

![Figure 2. National Targeting Center Team Structure](image)

The NTC would be designed to operate in a collaborative team environment. Bringing together a motivated team of subject matter experts should increase the USIC’s ability to succeed in the mission. The inclusion of the major agencies should reduce the “structural holes” which cause diminishing abilities. The NTC would create a significant number of direct ties between agencies to increase the collaborative capacity of the unit (Ahuja, 2000, p. 443). Improvements in national security must include communication and the flow of information. In order to be able to collaborate on joint activities, agencies must not be hampered by their own culture, legal issues, or regulations (Jones, 2007, p. 11). The NTC would foster this new environment with new norms. The NTC
leadership would also need to foster a collaborative spirit in the teams. If team members lose interest in a target because of the strategic approach being used, the value of the collaboration will be greatly reduced. The leaders must reward the entire team for successes and ensure all members understand individual success is secondary to team success. Also, the teams must be empowered to employ resources as needed. The team members should not have to return to their respective agencies for authority to conduct actions (Wageman, 1997, pp. 34–38).

The authority must rest within the NTC. If structured properly and with right personnel, the NTC will become a highly collaborative entity. Collaborative capacity is defined as “the ability of organizations to enter into, develop, and sustain inter-organizational systems in pursuit of collective outcomes (Thomas et al., 2006, p. 2). The mission of the NTC would be a shared mission, and it would have the power to execute its mission. There is a relationship between organizational support, team processes, and potency. By giving teams the items they need to work efficiently, the teams’ processes become more efficient and effective. Therefore, their potency increases (Kennedy et al., 2009, p. 89). Through strong interagency leadership and a commitment to success, the NTC could be a powerful contributor to the counterterrorism mission.
V. RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended the United States Intelligence Community create a new center similar to the National Targeting Center described above. The mission would be to neutralize identified terrorists through any available means. In 2007, the DHS Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC), Future of Terrorism Task Force, authored a report with several key findings: Globalization has benefited governments and businesses, but it has also benefited terrorist groups by increasing their operational reach.

Terrorists will alter their future tactics and plans based upon U.S. strategy. The Internet will used by terrorists to spread propaganda, recruit and radicalize people, and educate possible actors with operational information (Homeland Security Advisory Council, 2007, pp. 3–5). Continuing the status quo of joint duty assignments and information sharing is a stagnant course of action and lacks imagination. The enemy is adapting; therefore, the United States must be willing to alter its strategy. During the case study of the Department of Veterans Affairs’ attempt to develop better collaboration, one of the articulated problems dealt with the organizational structure, specifically “separate information systems, separate goals, separate reporting chains and accountability, and separate power bases within Congress and the White House” (Linden, 2005, p. 20). The National Targeting Center would not solve all of these problems, but it could eliminate some and reduce the impact of others. The center would operate on the same system and the chain of command would be internal.

Organizational change is not a simple task. According to Zegart, “Internal barriers to organizational change are powerful and deeply entrenched” (2007, p. 45). Accordingly, the creation of a new unit will be difficult. It will require strong people to champion its strengths as it develops (Caudle, 2006, p. 7). Yet, each agency has demonstrated the ability to adapt and change. The CIA has proven itself capable of change (May, 2005, p. 10). During the late 1990s, the FBI sought to extend its capabilities. They increased the number of Legal Attaché
offices overseas to improve relationships with law enforcement partners (Zegart, 2007, p. 130). The Department of Defense has struggled with true interagency collaboration over the last 20 years. However, the DoD’s experiences also provide a glimmer of hope as the DoD has created a more cohesive department (Reinwald, 2007, p. 13).

There must also be a consideration for too much change. While executing an agenda for change, sometimes the extent of the change is broader than originally anticipated (Kelman, 2005, p. 179). The events on 9/11 drastically altered the mission of many components of the United States government. For the FBI and CIA, counterterrorism became the top priority. The military started aggressive and offensive actions to capture or kill terrorist leaders and their followers. The many other USIC agencies began to restructure their personnel and resources to meet the demands of the USIC. Many people were quick to cast blame on the agencies. While not all the criticism was justified, it would hard to dismiss the opinions without careful scrutiny. For example one such criticism, which was oft repeated, was regarding cooperation. One of the problems that led to the attacks on 9/11 was the inability of the CIA, FBI and intelligence community to work together cohesively (Zegart, 2007, p. 4). As a result, the USIC has placed a greater focus on joint duty programs and information sharing. As part of its 500 day plan, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence highlighted its requirement that intelligence community professionals must complete a joint duty assignment before they are eligible for promotion to a senior executive service position (Office of Director of National Intelligence, 2008).

The purpose of this thesis was not to undermine or discount the work of the USIC agencies and, more importantly, its people since 9/11. Instead, the author commends the USIC for the many plots that it has stopped and the threats that have been mitigated. In approximately the first 10 years after 9/11, United States law enforcement authorities charged 192 people with terrorism related charges (Jenkins, 2012). Since 9/11, there have been 60 terrorist plots in the
United States, and four have been successful (Zuckerman, Bucci, & Carafano, 2013). In a study of terrorism plots from 1999–2009, researchers discovered 22 percent of the cases were initiated by information developed by a state or local department, 30 percent from a federal agency, 29 percent from a public tip, and 19 percent from intelligence (Strom et al., 2011, p. 14). These numbers highlight the need to collaborate in the counterterrorism mission.

As a whole, the USIC has drastically changed to meet the challenges the United States faces from the terrorism threat. According to Amy Zegart (2007), here are three aspects of adaptation: “change, the magnitude of change, and improved fit.” These three elements are the measuring stick for whether adaptation has occurred (2007, pp. 16–17). The intelligence community has changed and changed significantly. The proposed National Targeting Center would meet the third aspect of adaptation as it would create a truly, collaborative unit. This will create the best end game strategy.
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