THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT IN PERPETRATING GENOCIDE:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 1994 RWANDA GENOCIDE AND
2003 SUDAN GENOCIDE

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

RONALD RWIVANGA, MAJOR, RWANDA DEFENCE FORCES
B.A., Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda, 1998

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2013-01

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
**REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE**

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

1. **REPORT DATE** (DD-MM-YYYY)  
   14-06-2013

2. **REPORT TYPE**  
   Master’s Thesis

3. **DATES COVERED (From - To)**  
   AUG 2012 – JUNE 2013

4. **TITLE AND SUBTITLE**


5a. **CONTRACT NUMBER**

5b. **GRANT NUMBER**

5c. **PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER**

5d. **PROJECT NUMBER**

5e. **TASK NUMBER**

5f. **WORK UNIT NUMBER**

6. **AUTHOR(S)**

   Ronald Rwivanga, Major

7. **PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)**

   U.S. Army Command and General Staff College  
   ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD  
   Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

8. **PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER**

9. **SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)**

10. **SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)**

11. **SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S)**

12. **DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT**

   Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

13. **SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES**

14. **ABSTRACT**

   Rwanda and Sudan present two of the most recent examples of governments responsible for perpetrating genocide. The extremist ethnic Hutu government planned and executed the 1994 Rwanda genocide against the Tutsi ethnic minority culminating in the death of close to one million people in just one hundred days. Similarly, the predominantly Arab Sudanese government conducted acts of genocide against African communities of the Darfur region in western Sudan between 2003 and 2005 in which hundreds of thousands lost their lives and millions were internally displaced. The two tragic events are a reminder of the historical trend of state-sponsored genocides around the world such as the genocide of Armenians by the Turkish government in 1915, Holocaust of Jews by the Nazi government in the 1930s and 40s, and the Cambodia genocide by the Khmer Rouge government in the 1970s. This thesis compares the 1994 Rwanda genocide with the 2003 Sudan genocide, and examines the role of both governments in perpetrating genocide against their respective opposition support bases. It also explores the failure of international community to stop genocide in both countries and recommends a practical approach to prevent and/or stop genocide in future.

15. **SUBJECT TERMS**

   1994 Rwanda and 2003 Sudan Genocide, Rwanda and Sudan governments, Rwanda Armed Forces and Sudan Defense Forces

16. **SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:**

   a. **REPORT** (U)  
   b. **ABSTRACT** (U)  
   c. **THIS PAGE** (U)

   17. **LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT**

   18. **NUMBER OF PAGES**

   19a. **NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON**

   19b. **PHONE NUMBER** (include area code)

   Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)  
   Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

ii
Name of Candidate: Major Ronald Rwivanga


Approved by:

______________________________, Thesis Committee Chair
Michael E. Weaver, M.A.

______________________________, Member
Sean N. Kalic, Ph.D.

______________________________, Member
Marlyn R. Pierce, MA.

Accepted this 14th day of June 2013 by:

______________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


Rwanda and Sudan present two of the most recent examples of governments responsible for perpetrating genocide. The extremist ethnic Hutu government planned and executed the 1994 Rwanda genocide against the Tutsi ethnic minority culminating in the death of close to one million people in just one hundred days. Similarly, the predominantly Arab Sudanese government conducted acts of genocide against African communities of the Darfur region in western Sudan between 2003 and 2005 in which hundreds of thousands lost their lives and millions were internally displaced. The two tragic events are a reminder of the historical trend of state-sponsored genocides around the world such as the genocide of Armenians by the Turkish government in 1915, Holocaust of Jews by the Nazi government in the 1930s and 40s, and the Cambodia genocide by the Khmer Rouge government in the 1970s. This thesis compares the 1994 Rwanda genocide with the 2003 Sudan genocide, and examines the role of both governments in perpetrating genocide against their respective opposition support bases. It also explores the failure of international community to stop genocide in both countries and recommends a practical approach to prevent and/or stop genocide in future.
I am greatly indebted to my Thesis Committee, chaired by Mr Michael E. Weaver, my two readers, Dr Sean N. Kalic and Mr Marlyn R. Pierce whose constant and constructive guidance made it possible for me to succeed in this endeavor.

I am also grateful to the Directorate of Graduate Degree Programs headed by Dr Baumann, and his excellent team, Dr Lowe, Ms Kruger and the workshop moderator, LTC Andrews for their consistent professional guidance throughout the year.

My appreciation also goes to the CGSC Administration, Faculty, and International Students Division for making my stay at CGSC a memorable and fulfilling academic and social-cultural experience that I will always remember.

I also wish to express my gratitude to the Team 20 Leader, Mr Scott Porter and Staff Group Advisor (20F), Mr Eric McMillin, and faculty instructors, Dr Nicholas Murray, Major Peter Godfrin, Mr John Ukleya, and, LTC Jason Murphy for their effective tutoring and constant mentoring. I enjoyed the unique academic culture of sharing professional experiences of all staff group members (20F). I also greatly appreciate the International students group for the team spirit and comradeship displayed during social and academic events throughout the year.

Special thanks goes to the US government through IMET program for the opportunity offered to me to attend the USCGSC and gain this unique academic experience, the Rwandan Government and Rwanda Defense Forces for selecting me to represent my Army in this reputable institution. To my wife; Macklean Byansinza, whose presence during the course was priceless, to my dear mum; Mrs Mable Rwivanga, for her
dedicated love and encouragement, and to my loving family and friends back home and abroad whose telephone calls energized me to do my best, I salute you all.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYMS</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILLUSTRATIONS</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem Statement</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defining Genocide</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical Background</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Questions</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance of the Study</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumptions</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delimitation</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-examining the 1994 Rwanda and 2003 Sudan Genocides</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatic Instrument</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Relations with Rwanda</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt and South Africa</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN’s Diplomatic Failure</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda Governments’ Diplomatic Success</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What Roles did Britain, China, and Russia, and Arab Countries Play</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in the Sudan Crisis?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Information Factor</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Factor</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan-Chad Proxy War</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Factor</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYMS</td>
<td>EXPLANATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRI</td>
<td>African Crisis Response Initiative (formerly African Crisis Response Force)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMIS</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Darfur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIME</td>
<td>Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAR</td>
<td>French acronym-&quot;Forces Armées Rwandaise&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDLR</td>
<td>French acronym-&quot;Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEM</td>
<td>Justice and Equality Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPA</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Army (Military wing of the Rwandan Patriotic Front)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rwanda Patriotic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLA</td>
<td>Sudan Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLA</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Darfur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHRC</td>
<td>United Nations Human Rights Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 1. Map of Darfur, Western Sudan ................................................................. 19
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Problem Statement

Rwanda and Sudan present two of the most recent examples of governments responsible for perpetrating genocide. The extremist Hutu majority government in Rwanda planned and executed the 1994 Rwanda genocide against the Tutsi ethnic minority culminating in the deaths of close to one million people in just one hundred days (Straus 2006a). Similarly, the predominantly Arab Sudanese government orchestrated a genocide against the African communities in western Sudan between 2003 and 2005 in which approximately four hundred thousand people died and millions were displaced (Lemarchand 2006b). The two genocides are a reminder of the historical trend of state-sponsored genocides such as the Armenian genocide by the Turkish government in 1915, the Jewish Holocaust by the Nazi government in the 1930s and 1940s, and the Cambodian genocide by the Khmer Rouge government in the 1970s.

Since the United Nations adopted the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of genocide in December 1948, it has consistently failed to stop genocide wherever it occurs. There is always a reason for non-intervention, or at best, delayed and ineffective intervention. The story of the 1994 Rwanda, and 2003 Sudan genocides reveals the ability of the state and its government to perpetrate genocide against a section of its populace with impunity and the inability of the international community, particularly the United Nations, to stop this carnage. This thesis explains the reasons behind this failure and the factors that drove the governments of Rwanda (1994) and Sudan (2003) to carry out a genocidal policy against their respective opposition
Defining Genocide

Deciding whether a violent conflict is a genocide, or not, has always been a major issue of debate prior to any international response towards bringing a halt to this atrocity. In Rwanda’s case, international actors including the United States (US) avoided the use of the word ‘genocide’ during the 1994 mass killings due to political reasons (Power 2001). Samantha Power rightly explains these reasons in her essay “the Bystanders to genocide,” in the *Atlantic Monthly*, in September 2001, in which she stressed that the Clinton administration was not ready to engage in another African operation after the Somalia debacle (Power 2001). Evidence from the National Security Archives, a non-profit organization that uses the Freedom of Information Act to secure the release of classified information, suggests that US government had enough information to intervene and save lives but chose not to do so (Ferroggiaro 2004). The national security archive released several documents detailing how the US government received constant information briefs including teleconferences on the genocide in Rwanda but chose not to intervene (Ferroggiaro 2004). The Clinton administration was not willing to take the risk of engaging in another African civil war before the Presidential elections in November of the same year (Power 2001).

During the 1994 genocide, the US State Department could not refer to the mass killings in Rwanda as ‘genocide’ because this would require the US government, which previously intervened to stop genocidal killings in other parts of the world, such as the Balkans (Fisk 2002), to intervene to stop the Rwanda genocide. During a Press briefing
on 10 June 1994, the US State Departments’ spokesperson, Christine Shelly, when asked whether genocide was happening in Rwanda, acknowledged that some ‘acts of genocide’ were taking place in Rwanda. When asked how many acts of genocide it takes to make genocide, she actually had no answer (US Department of State 1994).

Susan Rice, (the current US Ambassador to the UN) and former advisor to the National Security Council on Peace Keeping Operations during the 1994 genocide, is still under scrutiny for failing to frame the crisis correctly by avoiding the word ‘genocide’ in describing events in Rwanda. She regrets to this day that there was nothing done to halt this crime and she became an advocate for the formation of a African reaction force capable of stopping mass atrocities (Power 2001). In Sudan, the scenario was a “slow motion Rwanda” (Reeves 2005, 1). The international debates on whether the Darfur killings constitute genocide went on in a similar fashion, while the Sudanese government carried out a concealed, systematic and deliberate massacre of African communities using its military and Arab militia force, the *Janjaweed*. The Sudanese government was “more calculating, more willing to accomplish their goals through genocide by attrition” (Reeves 2005, 1).

A report by the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the UN Secretary General dated 18 September 2004, concluded that the killings did not constitute genocide (United Nations 2004). However, as if to contradict itself, the report states, “in some instances individuals including government officials may commit acts with genocidal intent; whether this was the case in Darfur, is a determination that only a competent court can determine on a case by case basis” (United Nations 2004, 4).
Article 2 of the 1948 United Nations Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defined genocide as, “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

1. Killing members of the group;
2. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
3. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
4. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
5. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” (United Nations 1948).

There should be no doubt that the indiscriminate killings and displacement of millions of African civilians in the western region of Darfur by the predominantly Arab Sudan government was a deliberate measure by the Arab north to inflict on the Africans in Darfur conditions of life calculated to bring about their “physical destruction in whole or in part” (Reeves 2005).

Analysts and scholars argue that a number of genocidal killings committed since the adoption of the genocide convention do not meet the requirements of the definition and therefore do not qualify for the legal and international action required to halt the crime (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990). As such, they advocate for a wider definition. Most relevant in this endeavor is Helen Fein, a sociologist, professor, founding president of the “International Association of Genocide Scholars” and specialist on genocide and human rights issues. She defines genocide, as a “calculated murder of a segment or the whole of
a group . . . perpetrated by a government, elite, staff or crowd representing the perpetrator in response to a crisis or opportunity perceived to be caused by or impeded by the victim” (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990, 15).

Irving Louis Horowitz defined genocide in a wider perspective to include issues like the quest for cultural purity by a section of the population. Horowitz in his essay, “Genocide and the Reconstruction of Social Theory” noted that totalitarian societies are more prone to becoming genocidal, but a “national culture plays a much more important role in genocide than the ideology of the state” (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990, 14). He stresses that an “ideology may make a specific class, race, or religion ineradicable sins, thus increasing the potential for genocide, but that the decision to eradicate these sins by committing genocide is largely a function of national culture” (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990, 14). Horowitz’s analysis clearly links culture to the act of genocide. This thesis endeavors to prove that the 1994 Rwanda and 2003 Sudan genocides did not conform to such a theory because, in both countries, the ethnic or racial groups involved in the conflict co-existed for centuries. Genocide occurred, clearly as a means (by the government) to maintain a specific group (racial or ethnic but not cultural entity) in power, even if it meant eliminating people of the same religious affiliation that are opposed to the government. It was very common for Catholic Hutus to kill their catholic Tutsi counterparts in catholic churches during 1994 Rwanda genocide (Prunier 1995) and, for Arab Muslims Janjaweed warriors to kill their African Muslim counterparts in Darfur during 2003 Sudan genocide (Reeves 2005).

In Sudan, the Arab Muslim government sought to maintain full control of political and economic power by eliminating the emerging threat of the Sudanese African
communities, including African Muslims with whom they shared the same religious and
cultural values (Reeves 2005). Sudanese Africans became victims of ideological and
developmental genocide as clearly defined by Fein. They placed their African Muslim
victims in the same category as the Christian and Animist Africans of southern Sudan
(Cockett 2010). It was clear that the Arab Sudanese plan to maintain political and
economic power was more significant in driving the genocide than any other cultural or
religious factors.

In Rwanda, the majority Hutu overthrew and expelled the Tutsi minority
“aristocrats” (with whom they shared same language and culture for centuries), to
neighboring countries (Uganda, Tanzania, Congo, Burundi and elsewhere) in 1959.
Several massacres took place to degrade the ability of the Tutsi and moderate Hutu
opposition to threaten the political and economic position of the Hutu extremist
government (Prunier 1995). This thesis illustrates how the 1994 genocide had more to do
with maintaining an extremist government (racial or ethnical) in power and less to do
with preserving the cultural integrity of the ruling group as some theorists would like
people to believe.

It is imperative to review the historical background of the 1994 Rwanda, and 2003
Sudan genocides to include the colonial period, which precipitated regional, tribal, racial
and ethnic divisions, and to review the failure of post-independence regimes to arrest
these divisions. The thesis will explore how the post-colonial governments exploited
these divisions to achieve their respective political agenda, which was the total
destruction of the oppositions support base through genocide. A brief review of the recent
history of both countries explains “how and why” the Rwanda and Sudan governments
used “genocide” as a strategy to eliminate their respective opposition groups, the role of the colonial players in creating divisions in both countries, and the political transition from colonialism to the formation of divided Republics.

Historical Background

Rwanda

Rwanda is a landlocked country located in Central Africa. It borders Uganda to the North, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to the South and West, Tanzania to the East, and Burundi and a part of DRC to the South. The Rwandese society consists of three ethnic groups: Hutu (85 percent), Tutsi (14 percent), and Twa (1 percent) (Straus 2006a). These ethnic groups lived in harmony for centuries with no specific land demarcations for any group. The three ethnic groups lived side by side. The Twa or pygmoids did their hunting in forests, the majority Hutu cultivated land, while the minority Tutsi reared cattle. The Tutsi group caught the eye of nineteenth century anthropologists who took time to theorize about the ethnic differences and commonalities in pseudo-scientific terms (Prunier 1995). Europeans built a hypothetic perception that Tutsis were superior to Hutus. John Hannington Speke, the famous explorer of the Nile wrote in the Journal of the Discovery of the Nile (London 1863), in which he describes the theory of the conquest of inferior races by superior races (Prunier 1995). The theory describes Tutsis as the superior race over the majority Hutu and the historically insignificant pygmies, the Twa (Prunier 1995).

Speke’s scientific theory depicted the Tutsi as “Hamitic” or “Semitic” from a “pre-mordial red race” that came from the East Asia. Some years later, Belgian administrator Count Renaud de Briey speculated that the “Tutsi could well be the last
survivors of the lost continent of Atlantis” (Prunier 1995, 8). This thinking influenced the way the colonialists (Germans and later Belgians) managed this colony. Coincidentally, the Tutsis were the aristocrats and therefore regarded as the rightful leaders of the inferior Negroes (Hutu and Twa). Pierre Ryckmans, a Belgian administrator in Rwanda in 1920s is remembered to have said, “The Batutsi were meant to reign. Their fine presence is in itself enough to give them a great prestige vis-à-vis inferior races . . . it is not surprising that those good Bahutu, less intelligent, more simple, more spontaneous, more trusting, have left themselves be enslaved without ever daring to revolt” (Prunier 1995, 11).

Initially, the Belgians used the Tutsi aristocrats to manage their administrative activities. The Tutsi supervised the Hutu in communal forced or compulsory work known as “Ubuletwa” (Prunier 1995, 13). This situation created deep hatred against the Tutsi by the Hutu. The Hutu saw the Tutsi as representatives of the colonial oppressive government. When the Tutsi began to solicit for independence as early as the 1940s, the Belgians turned to the Hutu populace who were already discontent over maltreatment by their Tutsi overlords and began to empower Hutu peasants to fight against the Tutsi aristocrats. The majority Hutu nationalist groups eventually expelled Tutsis in 1959 and gained independence from Belgium in 1962 (Prunier 1995).

After independence, Hutu extremist governments excluded Tutsis in nearly all spheres of political governance and socio-economic activities from 1959 to 1994 (Prunier 1995). As a result, the Tutsis in the Diaspora linked up with moderate and politically marginalized Hutus to form the Rwandese Patriotic Front and Army (the political and military wings respectively) whose mission was to return home through negotiations or if this failed, through force (Prunier 1995). After a series of failed negotiations, the RPA
invaded the country in 1990 and in response, the extremist government began a series of unregistered and concealed extrajudicial killings of the Tutsi population, considered to be the potential RPF/RPA support base. This went on throughout the four-year war (Straus 2006a).

It is common for scholars to confuse the Tutsi genocide for a single event that occurred between April and July 1994, even when there is sufficient evidence to show that the government carried out extra-judicial killings against the Tutsi ethnic group since 1959 using concealed means, way before the 1994 carnage (Destexhe 1995). For instance, trial massacres began in Rwanda soon after the Rwandan Patriotic Front invaded in 1990. The Hutu extremists slaughtered three hundred Tutsi civilians in Kabirira in October 1990 (Stanton 2009). In January 1991, the army butchered five hundred to one thousand Tutsi in Kinigi, while in March 1992, Hutu militias killed three hundred Tutsi in the Eastern provincial area of Bugesera. No one was ever arrested for these crimes (Stanton 2009). And throughout this period, the diplomatic community knew about the crimes. Cables from the U.S. Embassy in February 1994 described the Interahamwe massacre of seventy Tutsis in Kigali between February 22 and 26. On March 1, 1994, the Belgian ambassador reported that the Radio Television Libre de Mille Colline (RTLMC) was broadcasting inflammatory statements calling for extermination but this was also ignored (Stanton 2009).

This thesis endeavors to explain how the post-independence Rwanda governments deliberately orchestrated a policy of deliberate and selective killings of Tutsis and moderate Hutu opposed to the Tutsi genocide, with the intention of denying the enemy the ability to mobilize, control the populace, and threaten the status quo (Destexhe 1995).
The assassination of President Habyarimana in 1994 simply triggered a more ruthless, open and collective campaign of genocidal killings at a scale never before witnessed. This study disputes the theory(ies) often raised by genocide deniers who view the 1994 genocide as the consequence of a civil war linked to the shooting down of President Habyarimanas’ plane in April 1994. The study provides evidence to the fact that the 1994 Rwanda genocide was planned long before it happened, and that it was executed by the extremist Hutu government to fit into its grand strategy of eliminating the potential opposition support base (Destexhe 1995).

Sudan

Sudan is located in the northeastern part of Africa occupying an area of 2.5 million square kilometers. It borders with Egypt to its north, Uganda, Kenya and Democratic Republic of Congo to south, Libya, Chad, and Central African Republic to its west, and Ethiopia, Eritrea and Red sea to the East. Sudan’s post-independence history since the exit of the British colonial government in 1956 was characterized by armed struggles between the capital city Khartoum run by three riverine Arab tribes (Shaiggiya, Danagla, and Ja’alin) and its western and southern peripheries. The central factor driving the conflict has always been the long-standing desire for the periphery to have a claim on the political and socio-economic privileges of the ruling elite in Khartoum. Sudan was like a “one city state” (Cocket 2010) controlling nearly all the resources from its capital and unwilling to develop other cities partly to deny them the ability and opportunity to threaten its political position (Cockett 2010). Only about three towns of Khartoum benefitted from nearly all the economic projects that the British colonialists left behind (Cockett 2010).
The British colonial government identified an area that was to be the center of Sudan’s political and economic transformation, the ‘Gezira,’ an Arabic word for ‘Island’ (Cockett 2010). The Gezira was located one hundred miles south of Khartoum between the Blue Nile and White Nile. It became the largest irrigated agricultural project on earth (2.2 million acres) and considered “the jewel” of British Colonial development in Africa (Cockett 2010, 21). Gezira alone provided 70 percent of Sudan’s exports and 6 percent of the world’s cotton in 1950s and 1960s. Railways and road networks connected through Port Sudan and overseas markets (Cockett 2010, 21).

The British introduced the Closed District Ordinance Act in 1920 that restricted travel to this part of the country (Cockett 2010). The British selected people from the north and west of the country to work on the project. Surprisingly, this legislation “closed off anyone from the south of the country from working on this vital project” (Cockett 2010, 25). As a result, the north developed at the expense of the south. In comparison, regions in the periphery did not partake in sharing the wealth. Infrastructure sprung up connecting through the Gezira project to the north to include roads, trains, hospitals, and schools (Cockett 2010). The British also separated the Christian and Animist south from the Arab and predominantly Muslim north for administrative purposes, to act as a buffer against the spread of Islam to its colonies further south (Kenya and Uganda). The British successfully divided the nation into two parts as if to prepare for its official splitting forty years later (Reeves 2012). They provided the Muslim north, with unlimited access to economic projects, while denying the Christian south the same. African communities of southern Sudan lived on missionary-care handouts. The British colonialists created the
divisions between the have-nots of its periphery leading to the Sudanese civil wars that characterized the southern and western regions (Deng 1986).

The post-independence governments failed to correct mistakes made by the British colonial administrators of concentrating economic development projects in the center. The oil boom merely exacerbated the regional development imbalances (Totten and Markusen 2006). The Arab tribes such as the Shaygiyya, Danaqla and the Ja’aliyyin enjoyed urbanization at the expense of other tribes in the periphery (Cockett 2010). Nomadic Arab tribes such as the Misseriyya encroached on the African tribal lands in west with impunity. Colonial rule neglected this area for decades. This situation persisted after independence. The Arab north merely focused their political and economic interests in areas that had direct benefit to the center and rarely looked far South, East or West. This attitude persisted for decades. Darfuris continued to contribute taxes to the center (Khartoum) but received nothing in form of infrastructural developments (Deng 1986).

In addition, environmental degradation and the subsequent loss of crops exacerbated the tensions in Darfur leading to hunger and civil strife (Reeves 2005). According to Gerald Prunier, the local tribes in Darfur named the famine “Maja’a al-gutala” (The famine that kills). It was one of the worst famines in Sudan’s history (Prunier 2005). These conditions naturally pitted communities against one another in competition for water and land. In addition to existing economic and political tensions between the west and the north, the ecological devastation, worsened the situation (Prunier 2005, 56). The camel Arab nomads from the northern zone of Darfur often encroached on land and water resources of the Darfur African southerners. Such movements lead to bitter fighting between the two groups during the dry season. The
Arabs forced their herds on the local farmers land with impunity resulting into inter-tribal disputes with the African southern communities such as Zaghwa, Fur and Massalit. This situation, coupled with the historical perception of Darfur marginalization, led to the formation of two political and military resistance movements against the government in Khartoum namely, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The SLA and JEM formulated and articulated political demands to end this oppression (Reeves 2005).

The Government of Sudan responded to political and economic demands of the SLA and JEM by empowering Arabs from northern part of Darfur to counter the threat of Africans from southern Darfur calling them bandits and thereby ignoring their political agenda (Reeves 2012). The government launched a major offensive in July 2003, which escalated the crisis resulting in the death of hundreds of thousands, and displacing millions of people (Totten and Markusen 2006). Just like Darfur, the rest of Khartoum’s periphery revolted, accusing the central government of neglect. The Sudan government responded by employing its armed forces and local armed militia groups to quell the revolts resulting in the death of close to 400,000 people, and displacement of over 2 million people (Totten and Markusen 2006). In April 2003, the militias, the Janjaweed, Arab militias received support from the Sudanese government to attack, loot and burn African villages in Darfur in a massive campaign of ethnic cleansing (Reeves 2005).

There is sufficient evidence to suggest that state sponsored massacres occurred in Sudan well before the 2003 genocide (Reeves 2012). In 1965, Arab Muslims burned “Dinka men and women at a police station in Babanousa and Muglad in the first well-known incidence of state sponsored massacre” (Reeves 2012, 3). In 1972, the Musseriya...
Arabs annexed Dinka Ngok lands leading to forced movements of dinka families southwards. In 1977, the Misseriya Arabs ambushed two trucks carrying eighty four Dinka Ngok passengers, about twenty kilometers outside Muglad (South Kordofan) killing nearly all on board (Reeves 2012, 3-4). In 1980s, the Dinka increasingly resisted attempts by three successive Islamic North governments to completely annex their land and exterminate them; the Jaaferei Nimeiri government of 1985, the Al- Sadiq Siddig government of 1986 to 1989, and the Islamic Liberation Front government of 1989 to 2012 under President Omar Bashir (Reeves 2012, 3-4). The ILF destroyed the North/South peace agreements, declared a Jihad in January 1990, and waged a genocide campaign that is still going on today (Totten and Markusen 2006).

A number of US Key figures such as Ted Dagne and Brian D’Silva also witnessed this carnage first hand. (Reeves 2012). Mr. Ted Dagne, who was a member of a U.S. Congressional Research Service witnessed large numbers of aerial bomb attacks on Nimule in 1993, Brian D’Silva of the U.S. Agency for International Development also witnessed “the bombing of Yei in 1997—damaging both Yei’s cathedral and hospital” (Reeves 2012, 4). Same year approximately 100 aerial attacks caused more than 200 known casualties. The hospital at a place called Kajo Keji was bombed several times in three years. Further still, in June 1999, the Sudanese southerners witnessed the chemical weapon bombings of villages of Lainya and Loka (Yei County) by Sudan government forces (Reeves 2012). From 1999-2001, during Sudan’s oil boom, the government intensified bombings of civilians and cutting off their food supply in order to demoralize them and break their ability to support the SPLA in the south (Reeves 2012).
The conflict in Darfur, and the south of Sudan emanated from the political, economic and regional marginalization, ecological factors, and inter-tribal conflicts over natural resources, especially water and grazing land (Totten, and Markusen 2006). As a result, the southern Sudanese and specifically the Dinka and Nuer African tribes fell victim to government-supported raids from the Arab communities. The Zaghwa, Fur and Massalit, African tribes of south Darfur fell victim to brutal attacks by the joint Sudan military and Janjaweed militia from 2003 to 2005 (Cockett 2010). Despite UN/AU deployments which reduced the threat significantly, the government of Sudan continues to support the Janjaweed’s genocidal schemes. In response to these genocidal actions, the US State department proposed the Atrocities Documentation Team (ADT), comprising of State Department, Bureau of Intelligence Research, American Bar Associations’ Central European and, Eurasia Law Institute to undertake the task of interviewing about 1400 refugees at the border of Chad/Darfur in order to ascertain if incidents reported between 2003 and 2005, constitute genocide. The ADT confirmed that the government committed acts of genocide in Darfur (Totten, and Markusen 2006).

Research Questions

A comparative analysis of the two genocides enables the researcher to track the process of the state sponsored genocide from its origins and its progression to a full-blown event. It also attempts to identify critical lessons for the future. This study endeavors to answer the following key questions:

1. How did the governments of Rwanda and Sudan establish conditions for genocide?
2. Why did the problem evolve to culminate into a full-blown genocide (historical background)?

3. Who were the main actors and what were their motives?

4. What are the similarities and differences between the two genocides?

5. What lessons do the two genocides present for the future?

**Significance of the Study**

The significance of this study is to assess the role of the governments of Rwanda (1994) and Sudan (2003) in planning and executing genocide. By comparing and contrasting the two genocides, the thesis seeks to examine how and why the two governments tried to eliminate the oppositions’ support base. It explains the historical background of the problem in Rwanda and Sudan, and its progression towards a full-blown genocide. Most writers capture the events leading to genocide so vividly in their writings, almost like storytelling, but fall short on the analysis of causal factors and events that triggered the carnage. For instance, Phillip Gurevitch in book about the 1994 Rwanda genocide, *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families: Stories from Rwanda*, presents the ruthlessness and senselessness of the massacres, but falls short of explaining the reasons behind it (Lemarchand 2009). An Africanist writer, Rene Lemarchand, criticized Phillips Gourevitchs’ book quite logically; “What is missing from Gourevitch’s account is the “why” of the killings. It is one thing to describe the horror; another to explain the motivations that occasioned the carnage . . . Gourevitch’s story reduces the butchery to the tale of bad guys and good guys, innocent victims and avatars of hate” (Lemarchand 2009, 88).
In an attempt to fill these analysis gaps, this thesis will focus on the central factor in the two genocides, ‘the role of the government in perpetrating genocide,’ and endeavor to provide answers to some important questions: how and why did the governments of Rwanda and Sudan commit genocide against its citizens? Why were they successful? Why did the international community fail to respond to the Rwanda genocide in 1994 and very slow to respond to Sudan genocide in 2003?

This thesis examines how the two governments (Rwanda and Sudan) used state resources and actors (means) to commit genocide (ways), in order to maintain state power in both countries (ends). Additionally the researcher will assess the governments’ use of the instruments of power: diplomatic, information, military and economic (D.I.M.E) to plan, prepare and execute the genocide with the intention of maintaining state power. Using the DIME concept, the thesis explores the role of external players (D) and the failure of international community (United Nations and its security council) to halt this heinous crime. It also analyzes the impact of information(I) or the lack thereof, and the impact of state run media in rallying the majority ethnic Hutu in Rwanda or the Arabs in Sudan to “defend their country” by eliminating a specific ethnic or racial group (considered rebels). It analyzes the effect of limited access, motivation and willingness of international media to cover this carnage. It further examines the role of the military (M) in recruiting, training, arming and supervising the militia, Interahamwe in Rwanda, and Janjaweed in Sudan, to carry out the mass slaughter of innocent civilians while the international community looked on. This study also investigates the role of state actors and institutions in financing (E) the entire machinery used to commit genocide. Finally,
the researcher examines the response of international community to the 1994 Rwanda genocide and 2003 Sudan genocide with the view of drawing lessons for the future.

Assumptions

This thesis assumes that ethnic and political structures in Rwanda and Sudan are fundamentally different, even though some aspects may be similar. However, the reasons for violence and genocide appear to be the same. The determination to maintain political and economic power motivated both governments to commit genocide against the oppositions’ support base. Another assumption is that Rwanda and Sudan governments were under the threat of a major civil war, in which genocide and violence against the “opposition” was an excuse for the government to get rid of real and perceived rebel sympathizers.

Limitations

The biggest limitation to this work is time and resources to conduct interviews with genocide survivors and key actors in the Rwanda and Sudan genocide. However, this research refers to a variety of writings carried out by competent analysts who had the time to interview the two categories. The thesis extracts evidence from such writings to answer the research questions in order to mitigate this problem.

Delimitation

This study limits itself to the period between 1959 and 1994 for Rwanda and 1956 and 2012 for Sudan. However, the thesis will make a few references to isolated events and players in colonial period which explain the origin of the conflict such as the colonial
legacy of the “divide and rule policy” applied by the colonialists before independence in both countries.

Figure 1. Map of Darfur, Western Sudan

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

This study derives its information from a variety of literature sources ranging from United Nations reports, eyewitness reports, internet sources, interviews with survivors, perpetrators of the genocides, and books written by research analysts, journalists, human rights activists, and academicians. This thesis endeavors to extract answers from available literature as to how and why the governments of Rwanda and Sudan used their institutions, actors, and policies to carry out genocide against sections of its populace.

A number of scholars of genocide have tried to expand on the UN definition of genocide by describing various scenarios of mass killings, which do not meet the requirements of the UN definition of genocide. Writers like Helen Fein, Vahakn Dadrian and Leo Kuper redefined genocide to cover a wider perspective (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990). Helen defines genocide, as a “calculated murder of a segment or the whole of a group . . . perpetrated by a government, elite, staff or crowd representing the perpetrator in response to a crisis or opportunity perceived to be caused by or impeded by the victim” (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990, 15).

Helen Fein’s four-part typology characterized genocide as being either developmental, where the perpetrator destroys any group of people who stand in the way of the economic exploitation of resources, the despotic perpetrator of genocide, who eliminates the potential opposition group in a polarized state, the retributive perpetrator who targets groups opposed to the status quo, and, the ideological perpetrator who targets groups cast as enemies of the state’s hegemony (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990). Fein sums
up the potential flashpoints of a genocide perpetrated by the state, but is careful enough to
refer to the possibility of a group of people, staff, elite or political entity being the
perpetrator and not the state. Helen Fein’s four types of genocide are prevalent in the
1994 Rwanda and 2003 Sudan genocides. However, for the purpose of this thesis, the
researcher will only focus on the role of the two governments in perpetrating genocide.

Leo Kuper, a retired professor in Sociology, analyzes three major motives of
perpetrators of genocide: “genocide designed to settle religious, racial, and ethnic
differences, genocide intended to terrorize a people conquered by a colonizing empire,
and, genocide perpetrated to enforce or fulfill a political ideology” (Chalk and Jonassohn
1990, 17). Kuper emphasizes that genocide is a “product of political domination of a
group of people over another, it is an action intended to terrorize the opposed populace
(instilling fear and inaction) and the result of racial and ethnic differences” (Chalk and
Jonassohn 1990, 17).

Similarly, Vahakan Dadrian, a specialist on Armenian genocide and director of
genocide research at the Zoryan institute in Massachusetts and Toronto (a think tank that
focuses on genocide, Diaspora and Armenia) also emphasizes the intent of the perpetrator
in his definition of genocide. He defines genocide as “the successful attempt by a
dominant group, vested with formal authority and/or with preponderant access to the
overall resources of power, to reduce by coercion or lethal violence the number of
minority group whose ultimate extermination is desirable” (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990,
14).

Dadrian argues that before any genocide occurs there is often a disparity between
the oppressor and the victim. He notes that there are five types of genocide that are likely
to occur: First, cultural genocide, in which assimilation is the perpetrators aim. Second, latent genocide such as the unintended killing of civilians during raids on enemy targets. Third, retributive killings designed to punish a segment of minority that challenges a dominant group. Fourth, utilitarian genocide, which includes mass killings to obtain control of economic resources. Fifth, optimal genocide, in which the aim of perpetrators is to destroy the whole group (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990). Dadrian identifies issues often raised by genocide scholars and investigators, which the United Nations definition does not cover. However, he is criticized for combining deliberate acts of genocide with unintended killings (latent genocide) thereby reducing the strength of his definition and argument (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990).

Robert Melson, a professor emeritus of political science and a member of the Jewish studies program at Purdue University presents the events that led to the Holocaust and the Armenian genocide, in his book, Revolution and Genocide. He argues that it is precisely during war that pariah groups are considered threats, and therefore, objects of genocide (Melson 1996). Melson argues that there are four factors that preceded the Armenian genocide, which are also at work in other genocides. First, the victimized group is a communal minority not considered equal to the majority. Second, that the minority undergoes progress in social, economic, cultural and political spheres. The majority considers such progress as illegitimate to the old order. Third, the minorities are associated with their enemy of the state both geographically and ideologically or if there is relationship between external and internal threats. Fourth, the larger society and the state experience military and political disasters that undermine their security and
worldview. Melson argues that a combination of these factors triggered the Armenian and Jewish genocides (Melson 1996).

Melson’s theories relate to Rwanda and Sudan genocides in that the civil war in both countries was a convenient *casus belli* for the government to commit genocide, in an attempt to destroy the opposition support base. The military and political successes of the opposing forces were a trigger for the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and, Sudan in 2003. However, in both situations, there was no significant social, economic, or cultural progress registered by the victim group capable of triggering competition or jealousy from the perpetrators. Hence, the Jewish and Armenian experience is, in this respect, dissimilar to the experience in Rwanda and Sudan.

**Re-examining the 1994 Rwanda and 2003 Sudan Genocides**

Most notable in juxtaposing Rwanda and Sudan genocides is Scott Straus, a Professor of Political Science and International Studies at University of Wisconsin, and former free-lance journalist, in his article, “Rwanda and Darfur, A Comparative Analysis.” Straus makes a general comparison of genocide in both countries and considers the Darfur genocide a “slow motion” Rwanda (Reeves 2012, 1). He notes that in both countries, the strategy of mass violence occurred as rebels where on the offensive. In Rwanda, Hutu extremists committed genocide as they were losing ground to rebels from 1993-1994. Similarly, in Sudan (especially in Darfur) the Arab hardliners advocated mass violence after the rebels made a series of victories (Straus 2006b).

Straus stresses that both Rwanda and the Sudan indicate the importance of ethnic nationalism in the perpetration of genocide. In Rwanda, an ideology of “majoritarian Hutu nationalism underpinned each post-independence government before the 1994
genocide” (Straus 2006b, 48). In Sudan, “Arab nationalism has been a consistent feature of Khartoum governments since independence” (Straus 2006b, 48). Again, in Sudan, it was clear from the start that the Sudan government directed violence at black African Darfuris, with the aim of “destroying the black portion of the population in substantial part” (Straus 2006b, 48). Straus criticizes the international community for its failure to intervene quickly in Sudan, just as it failed in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide. He describes the “international paralysis” in the wake of clear indicators. He argues that the commonalities and differences between the two genocides provide the theoretical perspectives that explain why and how genocide occurs, while the international response to the two events explains the “practical perspective of effective intervention or lack thereof” (Straus 2006b, 48).

Colin Powell, the Former US secretary of state, admitted in 2004, that what was happening in Darfur was without any doubt genocide. He appeared before a US Senate committee and applied the term genocide to explain the violence in Darfur. Several weeks later, President Bush made the same claim in an address to the United Nations (Straus 2006b).

Similarly, Alan Kuperman, an associate professor in international relations at John Hopkins University campus in Italy, compares the two genocides in his essay, the “Genocide: The case of Rwanda and Sudan”. He notes that there is a relationship between “societies that are not free and genocide” (Kuperman 2007). He stresses the fact that governments of both countries systematically planned the heinous crime. He argues, “States respond to rebellion in a number of ways, often initially with counterinsurgency campaigns. However, one of their options, and one they often choose, is to target
civilians of the ethnic group that supports the rebels (Kuperman 2007). He argues that genocide can be conducted in a spectrum of ways, ranging from forcing the civilians to evacuate their land and flee, to killing them (Kuperman 2007). Kuperman makes a historical analysis of both genocides explaining the source of conflict between the Tutsi and the Hutu in Rwanda, and the Arabs and African communities in Sudan. He takes note of major similarities in the government’s actions especially in using its militia supporters to execute most of the killings (Kuperman 2007).

Alan Kuperman, in another analytical book, *The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention*, criticizes the US and other countries after the 1994 Rwanda genocide arguing that a small force of 5,000 international peacekeepers could have halted some of the killings. He notes that a combination of the limited intelligence available to western policymakers at the beginning of the crisis and the realities of military logistics made it easy for genocide to occur and succeed. He concludes that these factors would have delayed the arrival of additional peacekeepers enough to save only approximately one-quarter of the Rwandan Tutsi killed. He argues that, even if the US government had decided to intervene immediately when it became fully aware of the genocidal aspects of the crisis, three-quarters of the Rwandan Tutsi victims would have been killed anyway (Kuperman 2001).

Eric Reeves, a Professor of Literature at Smith College, Northampton, Massachusetts, and a research analyst on Sudan, draws attention to the world’s failure to learn from the Rwandan carnage in his article, “the Ghosts of Rwanda; the failure of African Union in Darfur.” He compares African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), headed by Lt. Gen. Roméo
Dallaire. He notes, “we are witnessing an equivalently dishonest and cowardly failure . . .

The Ghosts of Rwanda, he argues, are stirring in Darfur” (Reeves 2005, 1). This article effectively documents the failure of the United Nations and its Security Council to undertake the necessary diplomatic and military efforts to end this type of carnage. It also calls for a more vigorous and concerted international response to genocidal situations (Reeves 2005).

Eric Reeves in another book entitled, *Compromising with Evil, An Archival History of Greater Sudan 2007-2012*, outlines a chronological time-line of isolated acts of genocide carried out by Sudan government against the South Sudanese Africans long before the 2003 Darfur Genocide. He notes that, as far back as 1965, Arab Muslims burned a unknown number of Dinka men and women at a police station in Babanousa and Muglad (present day South Kodorfan). In 1972, the Misseriya Arabs annexed Dinka Ngok lands. In 1977, the Misseriya Arab ambushed and killed eighty four Dinka Ngok passengers, about twenty kilometers outside Muglad, South Kordofan (Reeves 2012). The ILF government destroyed the North/South peace agreements, and declared a jihad in January 1990, which gave way to a systematic genocide campaign that continues to this day (Reeves 2012).

Gerald Prunier, a French academic and historian, well known for his interest in conflict studies in the horn of Africa and East Africa, states in his book, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide*, that the world ignored plenty of warnings of genocide by Rwanda’s government. He refers to evidence of the government’s plan to eliminate the Tutsis before the genocide. He recalls how Professor Fillip Reyntjens’ described to the Belgian senate in October 1992, how Hutu Power death squads targeted Tutsi
communities and names some of their leaders, including Colonel Théoneste Bagasora, who later coordinated the 1994 Rwanda genocide (Prunier 1995). He rightly notes that writing about the Rwanda genocide is a way to ensure that the dead do not go unrecorded or distorted by propaganda and media distortions (Prunier 1995). “Denying them the meaning of their death is “like killing them twice, first in flesh, then in spirit” (Prunier 1995, xxi).

René Lemarchand, a professor at University of Florida, known for his writings on genocide in Rwanda, Burundi and Darfur, in his article entitled, “Unsimplifying Darfur,” highlights the crimes committed by the Janjaweed (evil horsemen) ranging from killing and maiming of civilians, to rape, destruction of houses, farmland and theft of cattle (Lemarchand 2006).

Samantha Power, an Irish American academic, writer and, recently appointed Special Assistant to President Barrack Obama, in her book, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide, rightly notes that intelligence warnings are common in any conflict situation, and may be exaggerated to call for attention and, reports are usually intended to influence and inform (Power 2002). However, she argues that, it is the duty of analysts to sift through information that is either “incomplete or incorrect” in order to determine the truth (Power 2002). Samantha argues that in Rwanda, the long history of Hutu-Tutsi conflict may have allowed readers around the world to discount the gravity of Dallaires’ reports from the informant. Powers insists that the diplomatic or political objective of the US Embassy in Kigali at the time would have been to support the implementation of the Arusha peace process but this was not the case. This support would have included maintaining diplomatic contacts with key participants throughout
the crisis, and informing Washington of important developments for quick action (Power 2002).

John G. Heidenrich, a Senior National Security Analyst with vast experience as a consultant in several US departments (State Department, Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency), in his book, *How to Prevent Genocide: A Guide for Policymakers, Scholars and the Concerned Citizen*, goes further than any other source in suggesting ways of preventing and halting genocide. He suggests a more effective UN-peacekeeping capability; more like a standing UN force, an idea initially suggested by US President Ronald Reagan (Heidenrich 2001). Heidenrich also considers the application of all instruments of national power: the diplomatic, informational, military and economic, (DIME) to the problem. However, Heidenrich’s conclusion that the 1994 Rwanda genocide happened so quickly that none of the remedies he proposes would have had any noticeable effect seems to suggest that it was not possible to stop genocide with a UN peacekeeping force (Heidenrich 2001).

Phillip Verwimps’ discussion paper, “A Quantitative Study of the Genocide in Prefecture Kibuye in Rwanda,” was designed to ascertain the “age group, sex, occupation, commune of residence, place and date of death” of approximately 59,050 victims in Kibuye prefecture (Verwimp 2004, 233). Verwimp explains how communities that gathered around communal public places like local stadiums hoping to receive public protection fell victim to a ruthless betrayal at the hand of local officials. He refers to an analysis carried out in one commune (Mubanza) which “showed that the chance of surviving the genocide was higher in areas of the commune where Tutsis did not congregate at a football stadium” (Verwimp 2004, 233). This partly suggests that the
Tutsi victims who camped at football stadiums probably trusted their local authorities to protect them but this did not happen. The local authorities handed them over to the army and the *interahamwe* killing squads for execution (Verwimp 2004).

A review of literature on the Rwanda and Sudan genocides reveals the governments’ use of its four instruments of power: diplomatic, information, military and economic (D.I.M.E) to maintain power and execute its genocidal objectives unabated. Succinctly, the governments’ strong diplomatic relations with external players (D), well-planned information network (I), well-equipped military (M), and, foreign financed economic programs (E) enabled the state to execute one the worst genocides in history, with impunity.

**Diplomatic Instrument**

French Relations with Rwanda

Joan Kakwenzire and Dixon Kamukama both lecturers at Makerere University in Uganda, explain in their book, *The Development and Consolidation of Extremist Forces in Rwanda*, that, as a result of the RPF invasion in October 1990, the Rwandan Armed Forces (Forces Armées Rwandaises or FAR), “expanded almost overnight from 5,000 to 28,000 men” (Kakwenzire and Kamukama 1999, 76). It got considerable assistance in training and arms from the French government. President Mitterrand’s son, Jean-Christophe, headed France’s Special Africa Unit at the Elysée Palace, and was a very close friend of President Habyarimana. He was directly involved in France-Rwanda government military support programs during the RPF war from 1990 to 1994 (Meredith 2011). During this period, “around 600 French paratroopers secretly took control of the
counter-insurgency campaign in support of the Rwanda government” (Kakwenzire and Kamukama 1999, 76).

Linda Melvern in her book, *A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide*, presents a collection of facts implicating the West especially France in the Rwanda genocide. For instance, she notes that the Belgian ambassador in Kigali, Johan Swinner warned his government that the *Akazu*, a secret group of Hutu Power advocates organized around the President’s wife, were planning the extermination of the Tutsi of Rwanda (Melvern 2000). Linda Melvern notes that the French embassy shredded all classified documents “nearly filling a room” before they left in 1994. She notes that a few documents were found in a military archive in Kigali, including a letter from Deogratias Nsabimana, commander-in-chief of armed forces dated 9 December 1992, paying tribute to French forces for “improving their defenses against the rebels in the North” (Melvern 2000, 49). Aid workers saw French soldiers operating artillery positions during the war, and others were seen controlling checkpoints in Kigali asking for identity cards and handing over people with Tutsi identity to the Rwandan Army for execution in 1994 (Melvern 2000, 49). The *interahamwe* militia frequently chanted “Thank you Mitterrand” referring to the French President as “*Miterahamwe*” (Melvern 2000, 49).

**Egypt and South Africa**

The Egyptian government, with the intervention of Foreign Minister Boutros Boutros-Ghali, sold $5.9 million in ammunition, rifles, mortar bombs, rockets, and rocket launchers to Rwanda on 28 October 1990. Between 1990 and April 1994, Rwanda spent an estimated $112 million on arms, making it the “third largest arms purchaser in Africa, after oil-rich Nigeria and Angola” (Melvern 2000, 31-32). Melvern notes that in
December 1991, an Egyptian Colonel Sami Said, told the regime in Kigali to keep the arms deal a secret. He feared that Egypt’s relations with allies would be compromised if they knew about the arms deals. “In order to camouflage the deals, it was proposed that commercial trading should start and Egypt would buy Rwanda tea and coffee” (Melvern 2000, 65-66).

In 1992, President Habyarimanas’ government appointed a military attaché to the Rwanda Embassy in Cairo. The same year, a French state owned bank “Credit Lyonnais” acted as a guarantor to a deal between the Egypt and Rwanda governments worth US$ 6 million of light weapons and small arms. Suffice it to note, that the Rwanda government made payments in installments of US$1million through the account of the Egypt’s Military attaché to London in Credit Lyonnais bank on Regent Street, London (Melvern 2000, 66).


UN’s Diplomatic Failure

Rwanda Governments’ Diplomatic Success

Several sources examine how the United Nations failed to use its instruments of power to halt the Rwanda genocide. Dr. Gregory Stanton in his book, The Rwanda Genocide, Why Early Intervention Failed, notes that during the months prior to the Rwandan genocide, General Roméo Dallaire, the Commander of the U.N. Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), warned the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
(DPKO) that Hutu extremists were planning a campaign to exterminate Tutsis. In a famous cable to New York on January 11, 1994, shared with the US, French and Belgian Embassies, “General Dallaire asked for authority to search for, and seize weapon caches shipped into Rwanda for the Hutu militias, *Interahamwe* (Gregoire 2009, 7).

Iqbal Riza, the Deputy to then Undersecretary General for Peacekeeping, Kofi Annan, in a letter signed by Annan, denied General Dallaire permission to act in the wake of compelling evidence of mass atrocities, arguing that such an act exceeded UNAMIR’s mandate, and instructed him instead to take the information to the Rwandan government, which was the actual planner of the genocide (Des forges 1999). In January 14, 1994, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali himself admitted that he got evidence from General Romeo Dallaire but did not act on it (Des forges 1999).

The UN refused to grant General Dallaire’s informant his request for asylum. He therefore stopped providing inside information on planning process. General Dallaire’s early warning of genocide proved to be true after the UN confirmed that assassinations had taken place between January and March 1994, as reported in several cables to the US State and Defense Departments. “On January 21-22, UNAMIR seized a planeload of Belgian arms (shipped on a French plane) purchased by the Rwandan Armed Forces, kept in joint UNAMIR/Rwandan government custody” (Des forges 1999, 156-171). Belgium explicitly warned the “UN Secretary General of impending genocide on February 25, 1994, but Belgium’s plea for a stronger UN peacekeeping force was rebuffed by members of the UN Security Council, particularly the US and the United Kingdom” (Kuperman 2001, 85). Instead of beefing up the force that was in place, the
UN thinned down the force leaving the Tutsi even more vulnerable to attacks (Power 2007).

What Roles did Britain, China, and Russia, and Arab Countries Play in the Sudan Crisis?

Richard Cockett, in his book, *Sudan: Darfur and the Failure of an African State*, expounds on the role of external players in setting conditions for regional divisions and disputes in Sudan noting that powerful countries like Britain before independence in 1956, as well as oil hungry China and Russia after independence, played a role in the countries demise (Cockett 2010). Cocket notes that the British colonialist developed the Muslim north by setting up economic projects, while denying the Christian south access to the same. African communities of southern Sudan lived on missionary-care handouts. The British colonialists created the divisions between the haves of the north and have-nots of its periphery leading to the Sudanese civil wars that characterized the southern and western regions for decades (Cockett 2010).

Richard Dowden, a British Journalist with a specialty in African studies notes in his book, *Africa Altered States Ordinary Miracles*, that China’s policy of non-interference has led to uninterrupted sale of arms to rogue states like Zimbabwe and Sudan (Dowden 2009). The discovery and exploitation of oil reserves in the South Sudan exacerbated current civil wars. It devastated and destabilized the social, political and religious life of the Sudanese people. Instead of uniting the country, the rush for oil and complicity of international corporations meddling in the Sudanese affairs, further polarized the nation (Dowden 2009). Dowden adds that, when Sudanese government forcibly removed thousands of people from their land at Merowe to allow the Chinese to
build a dam on the Nile in exchange for oil concessions, Beijing’s reaction to this incident was that it was none of their business (Dowden 2009). Chinas’ economic interests in the Khartoum government affected its decisions regarding quest for peace in Darfur. When the United Nations including the United States (as a UN Security Council member) passed a resolution against Sudan, China and Russia abstained because they did not want to jeopardize their economic interests (Allesi 2012).

In July 2004, the United Nations Secretary General signed a common communique with Khartoum’s Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail promising that the Sudanese government would disarm the “Janjaweed,” but they did nothing about it. On September 19, 2004, the United Nations Security Council passed a “Resolution 1564 with Algeria, Pakistan, China and Russia abstaining to create a Commission on Inquiry to determine whether genocide took place and to threaten possible sanctions against the Sudanese government. China bought 50 per cent of Sudan’s oil while Russia sold to Sudan most of its arms; both countries chose to abstain rather than veto the UN Resolution (Zissis 2006).

Gerald Prunier, in another of his books, The Ambiguous Genocide, expounds on the fact that a wave of “Arabism” spread from Libya and Chad to Sudan’s Darfur province in the 1980s (Prunier 2005). The late Libyan President Gaddafi sent 2000 troops to Darfur in 1987 as part of his desire to curve out an Arab sphere of influence in what was called the “Arab gathering” (Al tajammu al arabi) a racist and militant organization (Prunier 2005). The Arab-African conflict in Darfur was therefore, not a new phenomenon at the time of the genocide
The Information Factor

Allan Thompson, a Professor of Journalism at Carleton University of Ottawa, Canada, does a fantastic job of collecting essays on the role of domestic and international media, in his book, *The Media and the Rwandan Genocide*. The first part of his book handles the role of domestic hate media in the 1994 genocide. While the second part focuses on the international media (Thompson 2007). Thompson refers to Alison Des Forges’ call to jam the governments’ Radio Television Milles Collin (RTLM) network and the *Kangura* newspaper for spreading hate speeches and mobilizing people to kill. Daryl Li and Charles Mironko paint a vivid picture of the role of radio through their interviews with prisoners who confessed that the Radio broadcasts played a critical role in driving people to participate in the killings (Thompson 2007). The second part of his book explains the role of the international media or the lack thereof, in the 1994 genocide. Mark Doyle recounts his difficulties of covering the genocide while Steven Livingston reiterates the reluctance of the international media, disinterested editors, and the failure of journalists to get sufficient live video coverage during the genocide (Thompson 2007).

Dr. Gregory Stanton argues in his essay, “The Rwandan Genocide, Why Early Warning Failed”, that the dehumanization of Tutsis had already been a feature of genocidal massacres in 1959, 1962, and 1972. In December 1990, the Hutu Power hate newspaper, *Kangura*, published the “Ten Commandments of the Hutu.” They included the injunction, “The Bahutu should stop having mercy on the Batutsi” (Stanton 2007, 4). The Ten Commandments called for continuation of the Habyarimana government’s policy that the army must be exclusively Hutu, and that officers are prohibited from
marring Tutsi women. Cartoons and articles in *Kangura* referred to Tutsis as
cockroaches and snakes, and regularly expounded the myth that they were from Ethiopia.
Tutsis were “devils” who ate the vital organs of Hutus (Stanton 2007, 4). This type of
propaganda fuelled Rwanda’s illiterate Hutu peasantry to commit mass violence against
their Tutsi victims.

In Sudan, the situation was different; the local and international media was more
responsive. Darfur and South Sudan had sufficient coverage via internet and international
television station like British Broadcasting Cooperation (BBC), Cable News Network
(CNN) and Aljazeera in which film actors from Hollywood like George Clooney and
Don Cheadle were engaged in activities of showing the world the depth of the plight of
the Sudanese Africans (Goffe 2011). The international community was very slow to react
and only reacted due to the publicity by the media and Holywood. This slow international
reaction allowed the Sudan government to continue its plan of killing hundreds of
thousands, and displacing millions of the African communities in Darfur (Goffe 2011).

In Rwanda, during the colonial period, the Belgians initiated the identity card to
help them identify Hutu peasants (workers) from the Tutsi aristocrats (administrators).
The identity card was useful in the management of workers on farms. The Belgians used
Tutsi leaders to supervise Hutu peasant workers on colonial plantations. Decades later,
the identity card became a convenient mechanism of identifying Tutsis for elimination by
the government. Dr. Stanton argues that the identity cards provided the government the
required information(I) through lists to facilitate speedy identification of their victims for
execution. This strategy made it easy for the hunter to identify the hunted. During his first
stay in Rwanda in 1988, Stanton did a study of judicial administration for the Rwandan
Ministry of Justice, and advised the President of the Supreme Court, Joseph Kavaruganda and later, President Habyarimana to issue new Identity Cards without the ethnic designation. He told them about the danger of the identity cards with ethnic groups indicated being used to identify and eliminate the Tutsis’ and they remained passive and non-committal. Further still, the Arusha peace agreement signed in August 1993, proposed the change of identity card but this did not happen. New identity cards (IDs) were printed but never issued (Stanton 2007, 6).

Hutu Power advocates wanted the ethnic designation on the identity cards retained for the obvious reason that it was a requirement for the genocide (Stanton 2007). During the genocide, Interahamwe operating roadblocks presumed anyone who failed to produce an identity card to be a Tutsi. In less than 100 days, the government soldiers and interahamwe rounded up Tutsis and systematically massacred them in areas such as churches, stadiums, playing fields and roadblocks (Stanton 2007).

In South Sudan and Darfur, the identity cards were not necessary for the perpetrators to identify their victims; the skin color distinction between Arabs from the North and African communities in Darfur and South Sudan is certainly obvious. Secondly, they lived in isolated villages that were easy to locate and attack (Reeves 2005). There was no need for the identity card to enable them to locate and eliminate the targeted population. Living apart made it very easy for most African communities to flee before attacks reached them (Reeves 2005). It was also easy for Africans in Darfur to withdraw to secure areas where displaced persons could assemble and receive protection. However, such concentration frequently became soft targets for the government to engage using its Air force and Janjaweed (Reeves 2012). In Rwanda, Tutsi and Hutus
lived side by side, and the genocide happened abruptly and took less than three months. Public assembly areas like churches turned into slaughter centers. Stadiums were convenient places for the killers to kill more people in a short period of time. It was very difficult for Tutsis to escape, husbands betrayed their wives sometimes to save their own lives, and in some cases, to merge with the extremist government in its agenda to eliminate the oppositions support base (Prunier 1995).

Military Factor

Scott Straus in his book, Order of Genocide, explains how the military in Rwanda was involved in the planning, preparing and executing the genocide. The presidential guard was the lead unit of this operation (Straus 2006a). By March 1993, the Ministry of Defense in Kigali started mobilizing civilians to join self-defense units. Colonel Theonestre Bagosora, the director of cabinet in the ministry of defense, and Colonel Rwagafirita were responsible for establishing Para-military units, interahamwe.

Linda Melvern also noted in her book, A People Betrayed, that the President instructed his Army Sector Commanders to organize the public to defend themselves. This instruction initiated the infamous death squads called the “interahamwe” (Melvern 2000). The Rwanda Army’s Military Intelligence (G2) archives had clues to the genesis of the plot to conduct genocide. Reports indicate that as early as1992, Colonel Bagosora, a ministry of Defense official, and Lieutenant ColonelNsengiyunva, the chief military intelligence (G2) prepared a series of secret reports for the army commander and the President stating that the Hutu population was against power sharing. The two officers formed a “Hutu power society” within the army called “Amasasu” which means “bullets.” They warned that the “people are terrified by Tutsi domination” and there was
“talk of mass exodus” if the Tutsi were allowed to share power (Melvern 2000, 63). They further warned that if power sharing occurs, Hutu communities would carry out massacres against the Tutsi. This turned out to be an accurate prediction (Melvern 2000, 63).

The idea of arming civilians started as far back as 1991 when Lieutenant Colonel Serubuga the Presidents’ brother-in-law and head of military intelligence proposed it. He advised that people approved by local authorities received arms in order to support the army in dealing with the enemy “Tutsis” who were hiding within the country. In 1993, the army delivered eight AK-47 rifles in Ngoma district, Butare province to supplement twenty-six already deployed as part of civil defense network, and each “commune had several representatives from the ruling party, the MRND” (Melvern 2000, 64). The United Nations received reports of stockpiles of ammunition in secret locations in Kigali and Gitarama, where “approximately 50,000 pistols and rifles, machetes” were distributed (Melvern 2000, 64-65). By the time the genocide began, the government had distributed about “85 tons of ammunition” (Melvern 2000, 64-65).

Eric Reeves notes, in his 2005 comparative piece in the Sudan Tribune, “the Ghosts of Rwanda; the failure of African Union in Darfur,” that the situation was the same as Rwanda’s in as far as, the governments support to militia groups is concerned. The ILF government financed and armed the local armed militia group, the Janjaweed, to eliminate Africans from southern part of Darfur. The Janjaweed killings went on unabated, even after UN Peace keepers deployed (Reeves 2005).

The Islamic Liberation Front (ILF) completely destroyed the North/South peace agreements and declared a jihad in January 1990, officially waging a genocide campaign.
against the African communities throughout the 1990s until its climax in 2003. In 2003, the government launched successive offensive operations that resulted in the death of hundreds of thousands and displacement of millions of people (Reeves 2005).

Sudan-Chad Proxy War

The Sudan and the Chad governments fought a vicious proxy war along the Chad/Darfur border in 2005. The opposition political movement, Sudan Liberation Army received support from Ndjamena government after the later realized that the Khartoum government facilitated the “Front Uni pour la Changement (FUC)” in the raid on a Chad border town of Adre in 2007 (Tubiana 2011). The Government of Sudan also simultaneously facilitated an Arab militia, the Janjaweed to pursue a genocidal counter-insurgency against African Darfuris and the eastern region of Chad. Human Rights Watch documents the nature of this cross-border genocidal attacks on non-Arab civilians in the article: “They Came Here to Kill Us’:Militia Attacks and Ethnic Targeting of Civilians in Eastern Chad” (Human Right Watch 2007). Given the earlier failure of the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (Abuja, Nigeria), Sudan and Chad went on a small arms race rampage to arm the proxy conflict (Tubiana 2011).

Economic Factor

Linda Melvern’s book, A People Betrayed; The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide, is perhaps the best piece of literature at expounding the role of western players in financing the Rwanda government during the 1990-94 conflict. While it was within their defense responsibilities for the government to invest millions in fighting the Rwandese Patriotic Army and its “Tutsi civilian sympathizers,” its budget was by all
standards unprecedented” (Melvern 2000). Between 1990 and April 1994, Rwanda spent an estimated $112 million on arms, making it the “third largest arms purchaser in Africa, after oil-rich Nigeria and Angola” (Melvern 2000, 67). Most of this money came from Western Countries especially France.

In Sudan, the government also received financial and material support from two controversial players: Russia and China (Cockett 2000, 27-28). The oil boom and China’s insatiable apetite for oil significantly enabled the government to maintain itself despite international sanctions. Cockett argues that this dual-support ensured that the Sudanese governments continued indiscriminate massacres and displacement of African civilians in Darfur and South Sudan. As earlier noted, the economic disparity between Khartoum and the periphery was so wide that it brought the North into perpetual conflict with its periphery. All major economic projects located in North served the Arab Muslims at the expense of all other African communities in the periphery. Cockett also expounds on the fact that the oil refineries and related investment projects were located further North of Khartoum near Port Sudan, while the major oil wells remained clustered in the south yet the local inhabitants; Abyeyi, the Afrikan Dinka, did not benefit from the oil extracted from underneath their land (Cockett 2000, 26-28).

In conclusion, therefore, most literature on Rwanda and Sudan genocides comes to a logical conclusion that the United Nations and its Security Council consistently failed to put pressure on the two governments to end their genocidal programs. The two governments used the four instruments of power: Diplomatic, informational, military and economic to maintain their destructive agenda. They built alliances with permanent members of the UN Security Council such as France, China and Russia with the aim of
gaining the necessary veto against any possible international military interventions and/or sanctions. In 1994, France openly backed the Rwanda government before and during the genocide; they even sent troop for the infamous Operation Turquoise (OT), to defend the genocidal forces against RPA rebel attacks towards the end of the genocide. The OT protected the retreating killers instead of stopping the genocide. Similarly in 2003, Russia and China consistently backed Sudan government in its genocidal campaign against the African communities of southern and western Sudan. It is clear that in both Rwanda and Sudan, the government was triumphant in its genocidal program and the UN failed to execute its mandated role of preventing and stopping genocide and mass atrocities.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction
Chapter 1 focuses on historical background and events leading to the genocide in both countries, and the significance of the study of the two genocides. It explores the political, economic and social conditions created by colonial governments and exploited by post-colonial governments to exacerbate regional and ethnic divisions, and the origin and development of the genocide ideology in both countries. It also highlights the primary and secondary questions of the thesis. Chapter 2 reviews literature that explains the genesis, development and execution of genocide in both countries. This chapter discusses the methods used to collect and analyze information required to answer the primary and secondary questions of the thesis. The researcher conducts a qualitative analysis of secondary sources of literature on the 1994 Rwanda, and 2003 Sudan genocides with the view of ascertaining the role of the government in perpetrating genocide in both countries. The study adopts two main qualitative research methods: the case study and comparative analysis methods.

Qualitative Research Method
By its nature, qualitative research interprets events or situations and makes an inquiry into patterns and reasons that govern behavior ( Marshal and Rossman 1998). It investigates why and how something happened, in addition to what, where, and when it happened (Yin 2003). In this particular thesis, the researcher will interpret findings from secondary sources like Scott Straus who carried out firsthand interviews with key
perpetrators and actual killers in his book, *The Order of Genocide* in order to understand the process and reasons behind the genocide. Straus was able to interview about 210 respondents from fifteen prisons (Straus 2006a). His interviews provide crucial information about the age groups, professions, education levels, and motivations of the genocides. He asked questions about their belief systems before the genocide. He asked them how they were mobilized into the genocide and what happened during the violence, and why they committed violence, often against people they knew (Straus 2006a). Reports like Straus’s provide the researcher with explanations to the causes of the genocide, and saves time and resources of carrying out the same process. The researcher therefore, mitigates the limitation of time and resources by citing a number of reliable sources of literature that cover purposeful engagements with witnesses, convicted perpetrators and survivors of this carnage.

**Case Study Method**

A case study is a qualitative method that provides a detailed examination of an aspect of historical explanation related to other events (Taylor-Powell 2003). It is an intense investigation of single situations, which explain and describe a phenomenon (Yin 2003). It is a systematic way of looking at events, analyzing information and reporting the results (Yin 2003). This research uses the case study method in order to analyze events exhaustively. After analyzing each case study, a comparison of the individual cases is possible in order to identify similarities and differences and come up with solutions to general and specific problems. The case study of Rwanda and Sudan gives the researcher an insight into the causal factors and conditions that facilitated genocide in
both countries. The case study methodology enables the researcher to examine a set of variables within each individual case (Taylor-Powell 2003).

Case study method requires synthesizing a lot of information and material on every individual case study since its variables may not have standard measures and only “show behavior, attitudes, opinions and beliefs” (Ambert 1998, 880). Baxter contends that using a case study methodology creates problems from a strict academic point of view, which points out the inherent element of subjectivity and generalization (Baxter 2008). There is a mistaken belief that data and figures are more valid and reliable than the explanations in research. Yin notes that the major shortcoming of the case study method is “that you may not always be able to generalize from a single case study to many situations” (Yin 1989, 21).

**Comparative Analysis**

This study adopts a comparative analytical approach to provide the researcher with explanations to the process and motivations of the two governments in perpetrating genocide against its people. By comparing similar variables in both countries, the researcher is able to show the common patterns as to how and why the crisis evolved into a full-blown genocide. The researcher identifies the main actors and the nature of the victims in both genocides in order to prove the hypothesis that governments use genocide to achieve political objectives. The comparative analysis provides the researcher with a set of similarities and differences between the two genocides with a view of identifying common causes, effects and lessons for the future.
Organizational Scheme

According to Dr Kerry Walk, a higher education administrator, and writer of the document, “How to Write a Comparative Analysis,” there are two basic ways to organize the body of a paper: the ‘point-by-point’, and the ‘text-by-text’ approaches (Walk 1998). This research uses both methods to compare the two genocides. The ‘text-by-text’ approach exhausts one case study or subject before discussing the other (Walk 1998). For example, the researcher can exhaustively review ‘Country or Genocide X’ before reviewing ‘Country or Genocide Y.’ In Chapter 1, the researcher followed the text-by-text approach to review the historical background to the 1994 Rwanda genocide and, then went on to review the 2003 Sudan genocide. This approach enables the researcher to review events systematically and chronologically in order explain why events happened the way they did.

The thesis also carries out the point-by-point approach, which in this case requires the researcher to explain point ‘A’ in country ‘X’ followed by a comparable point ‘B’ in country ‘Y’ (Walk 1998). The point-by-point approach allows the researcher to compare patterns of events and causal factors to the genocide in both countries. For example, the first point may state that the Rwanda government ordered interahamwe Hutu youth militia forces to kill innocent Tutsi civilians in 1994, while in Sudan; the government supported Arab militia, Janjaweed in executing the genocide in 2003. In this case, by comparing the two related variables, the researcher conveys the message that both governments used armed militia groups to execute the genocide.

Conclusively, this thesis generally applies the qualitative research method to compare and contrast the role of the government in perpetrating genocide in Rwanda and
Sudan. Both the case study and comparative analysis methods enable the researcher to explore the subject matter in depth. The Case study approach is exhaustive as a method of identifying the causal factors and conditions that facilitated the carnage in both countries, while the comparative analysis approach is very vital when comparing two or more case studies in order to identify common patterns and features. The commonalities derived from the case study and comparative analysis methods give policy makers a starting point in preparing workable measures against genocide in future.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

This chapter focuses on analyzing and interpreting evidence produced by the research and describes how this evidence answers the research questions identified in the first chapter. Chapter 1 provides a short historical background of the Rwanda and Sudan genocides, outlines the primary and secondary research questions of the thesis, and explains the significance of this study. Chapter 2 captures literature available on the two genocides, while chapter 3 delves into the methods used to carry out this research. This chapter analyses the two genocides from a comparative perspective to provide answers to the primary and secondary questions raised in the first chapter. It answers questions as to why the governments of Rwanda and Sudan established conditions for genocide; how the conflict evolved to full-blown genocide (historical background), the main actors, and their motives for carrying out the genocide. It examines the similarities and differences between the two genocides in order to draw lessons and recommendations for the future.

Does the Definition of Genocide Matter Anymore?

Wherever genocide occurs, there is always a need for verification as to whether it should be named as such, because, by so doing, the United Nations would be obliged to respond militarily to stop the genocide. It is worth stressing that the 1948 Genocide Convention defined genocide as, “acts committed with intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group” (United Nations 1948). The UN committed itself to act in order to stop the crime of genocide wherever it occurs.
However, it failed to act in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide, (Power 2001) and was very slow to react in 2003 Sudan atrocities (Reeves 2012). Surprisingly, even in Rwanda where the massacres of Tutsis were too obvious to dispute since they were carried out in the open, the United Nations Headquarters and the Clinton administration did not find reason to act in response to this crime and instead ordered troop withdrawal and evacuated US and other European citizens. The unfortunate decision to ignore the genocide and subsequently withdraw, gave the genocidal government confidence to continue the killings (Power 2001).

More surprising, is that even after the Rwanda debacle and the UNs’ record failure to intervene to halt the 1994 Rwanda genocide, the UN commission of inquiry on Darfur made a similar misjudgment ten years after the Rwanda genocide (United Nations 2004), when it concluded that the Sudan government did not commit genocide in Darfur despite clear evidence to the contrary. The Commission argued that there was no evidence to suggest that the Sudan government sought the total destruction of the African communities of Darfur. Needless to say, that any attempt at partial destruction of a group is still by definition, genocide (United Nation 1948). Gerald Prunier rightly argues that if analysts and policy makers are to go by the definition of genocide as defined by the 1948 UN Convention on genocide, then the Darfur killings qualify to be a genocide (Prunier 2005, 155).

The UN Commission report on Darfur argues that Bashir government committed crimes against humanity by killing innocent civilians during a counter insurgency operation, but did not commit genocide (UN Commission of Inquiry Darfur 2004). Such a conclusion seems to suggest that the Sudan massacres did not target a particular race
but rather targeted insurgents and, that the killings were collateral and not deliberate. This argument is both incorrect and counterproductive to the process of halting state sponsored genocide in future, because it tends to encourage the concealment of the genocide in counter insurgency operations (Reeves 2005).

The UN report negates evidence gathered from the scenes of atrocities in Darfur which reveal the deliberate destruction of entire villages, raping of women and indiscriminate killings of innocent civilians by Janjaweed warriors and their government backers which were clearly not counter insurgency operations (Reeves 2012). It is not surprising that the United States government contradicted this report in 2005, when the Atrocities Documentation Team (ADT) visited refugees in Chad, interviewed them and, concluded that genocide occurred in Darfur (US Department of State 2004). General Colin Powell and President G.W Bush soon after, went public about this, stressing that genocide had indeed taken place in the Darfur region of Sudan. Once again, the UN got it wrong. The UN report failed to see the striking similarities between 1994 Rwanda, and 2003 Sudan genocides, which this thesis clearly highlights.

Similarities between the 1994 Rwanda and 2003 Sudan Genocides

The Rwanda Army was involved in a war with an insurgency (RPA) in 1994 in the same way that the Sudan Army carried out a ruthless counter insurgency campaign against JEM and SLA in 2003. Both countries had a peace process going on at the time of their respective genocides, in which the extremists in both governments did not want the process to succeed (Straus 2006b). Both genocides were sparked by a critical event, the shooting down of President Habyarimana’s plane in Rwanda, and the El-Fashal incident
in Sudan, both genocides involved an armed militia force to carry out the carnage; the Interhamwe in Rwanda, and the Janjaweed in Sudan (Lemarchard 2006).

The Rwanda and Sudan governments deliberately perpetrated genocide, by systematically eliminating its ethnically and racially marginalized groups respectively. Both clearly had a deliberate strategy to destroy the oppositions support base. Both governments conducted a utilitarian genocide (killing in order to obtain or maintain total control of economic resources). As far back as 1972, the Musseriya Arabs annexed Dinka Ngok lands. These acts of grabbing land continued in many parts of South Sudan throughout the 1970s, 80s and 90s (Reeves 2012). In Rwanda, the Habyarimana government was not ready to settle millions of Rwandese Tutsi who fled the 1959 revolution, back to Rwanda. The regime spread propaganda that Tutsi were coming back to take their land and peasants actually believed this (Prunier 1995).

Why and How did the two Governments Establish Conditions for Genocide?

A close comparison of the two genocides reveals that they were both politically and economically motivated. Genocide was a calculated tool used by the governments to maintain a specific group (racial or ethnic) in power by eliminating the opposition and rival ethnic group, tribe or race (Straus 2006a). The political and economic motives overruled all other motives. In Sudan, the Arab Muslims sought to maintain full control of political and economic power by eliminating the emerging threat of the Sudanese African communities, including African Muslims with whom they shared the same religious and cultural values (Lemarchard 2006). Sudanese Africans became victims of ideological and developmental genocide as clearly defined by Fein (Chalk and Jonassohn
1990). They placed their African Muslim victims in the same category as the Christian and Animist Africans of western and southern Sudan. It was clear that the ideology of state and the intentions of the Arab North to maintain political and economic power were more significant in driving the genocide than any other cultural or religious factors (Cockett 2010).

In Rwanda, the majority Hutu overthrew and expelled the Tutsi minority ‘aristocracy’ (with whom they shared same language and culture for centuries) to neighboring countries in 1959 (Prunier 1995). Several unrecorded massacres took place between from 1959 to 1972, during Gregoire Kayibanda’s regime and from 1973 to 1994, during President Habyarimana’s regime. Their agenda was simply to degrade the Tutsi populations’ ability to threaten the political and economic position of the Hutu governments (Prunier 1995). Catholic Hutu extremists plotted against their catholic Tutsi counterparts in catholic churches during the 1994 Rwanda genocide, while in Sudan (Darfur), Arab Muslims (Janjaweed warriors) raped and killed their African Muslim counterparts between 2003 and 2005 (Reeves 2005).

Sudan and Rwanda’s colonial and post-colonial history presents evidence to support the “hypothesis that war and genocide are causally related” (Straus 2006b, 48). In both countries, genocide happened during periods of intense civil war. Perpetrators in both countries justified acts of genocide as counter-insurgency operations against rebels. In both countries, the strategy of mass violence occurred as rebels were on the offensive. In Rwanda, Hutu extremists committed genocide as they were losing ground to rebels from 1993-1994. Similarly, in Sudan (especially in Darfur) the Arab hardliners advocated
mass violence after the rebels (JEM and SLA) won a series of victories against Sudanese government forces (Lemarchard 2006).

Professor Jacque Sémelin, an expert on genocide, argues “in war, when security is threatened, leaders advocate the use of violence for self-protection” (Straus 2006b, 12). Sémelin’s comparative analysis of causes of modern genocide is a major accomplishment in the realm of genocide studies. He argues that in the modern state, intellectuals, religious figures, and media outlets may legitimize, promote and coordinate violence of this scale (Straus 2006b, 12).

Both Rwanda and the Sudan indicate the “importance of ethnic nationalism in genocide” (Straus 2006b, 48). In Rwanda, an ideology of majoritarian Hutu nationalism “underpinned each post-independence government before the 1994 genocide” (Straus 2006b, 48). In Sudan, Arab nationalism has been a consistent feature of Khartoum governments since independence. Again, in Sudan, it was clear from the start that the “Sudan government directed violence at African communities of Darfur, with the aim of destroying the black African portion of the population in substantial part” (Straus 2006b, 48). Colin Powell, appeared before the US Senate committee in September 2004, and declared that the Bashir government carried out genocide against the African communities of Darfur. Several weeks later, “President Bush made the same claim in an address to the United Nations” (Straus 2006b, 50).

In Rwanda and Sudan, violence happened during peace negotiations with opposition groups, which proves the argument that governments tend to mislead the international community that they are ready for negotiations with opposition groups while at the same time planning their extermination (Kuperman 2007). For instance, in
Rwanda, just prior to the genocide, the Habyarimana government signed a peace agreement (the Arusha Accords) with the rebels while planning the carnage. Rwanda’s peace deal ironically fired up Hutu extremism probably because they were not sincere in their terms of negotiation. It remains unclear whether the peace talks (Comprehensive Peace Agreement) in Sudan directly triggered further violence (Straus 2006b). However, it is clear is that as Darfur crisis broke, Bashir’s government was in the process of finalizing a peace deal with Southern rebels. Hence, in both countries, the mass violence happened after or during peace negotiations. The evidence from both cases suggests that the “timing of mass violence relates to when the ethnic or racial exclusivity of a ruling coalition is ending” (Straus 2006b, 48).

Both governments looked for a pretext to justify the use of extreme violence. In Rwanda, the shooting down of the plane in April 1994 was a catalyst for the full-blown genocide, but the elimination of ethnic Tutsis was already happening albeit at a much smaller scale to warrant any attention from the international community (Straus 2006b). In Sudan, most analysts argue that the “triggering factor was the surprise attack on El Fasher, in April 2003, by the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA),” (Straus 2006b, 49) a faction that conducted a daring attack on Sudan forces resulting in the destruction of seven military aircraft and the death of about 100 people. Nevertheless, El Fasher was one incidence in a line of concomitant events that followed (Reeves 2012).

In Rwanda, the killings easily qualified for the prescribed definition of genocide, because the massacres were openly carried out for all to see. However, mass killings of innocent civilians had taken place before 1994, which were regarded as counter-insurgency actions by the perpetrators in order to prevent international reactions to the
carnage (Power 2001). There was also sufficient evidence in Sudan to suggest that state sponsored massacres took place long-before the 2003 Darfur genocide as clearly highlighted in the first and second chapters of this thesis (Reeves 2012).

Scott Straus correctly stresses that the story of the Rwanda and Sudan genocide provides substantial evidence to “support the hypothesis that genocide happens in periods of political upheaval and transition” (Straus 2006b, 47). The story proves that, “genocide is a product of a conscious choice made by the government and ruling political party to dominate politics, promote hatred, fear and violent suppression of rival political groups” (Straus 2006b, 47).

In both cases, a civil war presented the governments the opportunity to justify violence against civilians in the name of suppressing the opposition. Both governments attached importance to ethnic or racial nationalism in competition for political and economic power. Both countries used ethnic and racial factors to identify their victims; it was easy for the Sudanese to distinguish the black communities from their Arab counterparts. However, in Rwanda, the government used identity cards to identify its victims because the differences between Tutsi and Hutu are not as clear as the Arab-black differences. Both countries used the military and a group of militia trained by the military to conduct genocide against the unwanted populace (Straus 2006b).

Both genocides also attached importance to economic conditions and the quest for economic resources. Phillip Verwimp, in his article entitled, “Development Ideology, the Peasantry and Genocide: Rwanda represented in President Habyarimana’s speeches” explicitly explains the development of a genocide ideology and how it spread so fast. Verwimp argues that, “War allows a regime to hide preparations for mass murder from
the media, from its own population, and from a political opposition” (Verwimp 2003). In addition, war allows the spreading of a message of ethnic hatred among the population. In a context of war, a regime can blame the rebels for the massacres (Verwimp 2003). Phillip notes that genocide happened at a time when economic conditions were deteriorating in Rwanda. Coffee prices were low and unemployment was high (Verwimp 2003). Similarly, in Sudan, the African communities of Darfur revolted against the Sudan government at a time of severe drought and famine; and instead of solving the huge socio-economic problem; the Khartoum government resorted to use direct and indirect force. They fired up the Janjaweed to rape, kill, plunder, and destroy the scattered African communities of Darfur (Cockett 2010).

Rwanda, just like Darfur, experienced high levels of sexual violence during the genocide estimated between 250,000 and 500,000 (Straus 2006b). Most estimates of rape cases in the Rwanda genocide were made from assessment of pregnancies out of rape, and not through the actual rape incidences which were very hard to compile. Besides, there is a very high figure of Tutsi women who were raped and killed, who will never be known (Straus 2006a). In Darfur, young girls fell prey to Janjaweed rape, which was a commonly used weapon of violence (Reeves 2012).

Differences between the 1994 Rwanda and 2003 Sudan Genocides

It is very clear that the scale, nature, and duration of the two genocides was different. During the 1994 Rwanda genocide, the extremist Hutu government targeted both Tutsi and moderate Hutus who opposed the government (Prunier 1995). The Rwanda government’s decision to eliminate Tutsi and moderate Hutus’ reduced its legitimacy and control over the country. This extremist agenda gradually discredited the
ideals that initially united the Hutu government (Prunier 1995). In South Sudan and Darfur, the situation was quite different; the predominantly Arab government troops and their Janjaweed militia targeted the African communities of South Sudan and Darfur, and did not target moderate and opposition Arabs in their genocidal campaigns. The skin color distinction between Arabs from the North and African communities in Darfur and South Sudan was enough for them to identify their victims. Besides, Africans lived in known locations, which made them easy targets (Deng 1986).

Even more paradoxical is the fact that the 2003 Darfur genocide (not recognized by UN), tends to provide a clearer link to the 1948 Convention definition of genocide, than the 1994 Rwanda genocide, because the Darfur/Sudan genocide clearly targeted the African race in Darfur and did not target Arab political rivals. Conversely, the Rwanda genocide was a combination of ethnic killings of Tutsis’ and moderate Hutu politicians (politicide) including high profile personalities like Madame Agathe Uwilingira, the Hutu Prime minister who was hacked to death along with her family. It was clearly a mixture of genocide and politicide in Rwanda whereas the Darfur killings were mainly racially motivated and therefore more genocidal in nature.

It is also worth noting that the massacre of Tutsi and moderate Hutus alienated the government from some portions of Hutu populace and gave the RPA more political legitimacy (Prunier 1995). In Sudan, the line was clearly drawn. Arab militia groups supported by an Arab government, conducted attacks against innocent African civilians and never attacked any moderate Arab political opponents as was the case in Rwanda. This among other factors lends credibility to the decision to consider the Darfur killings, genocidal in nature.
It must be understood that the United Nations and the international media could not dispute the Rwanda genocide because of the scale, viciousness, and openness of killings (Prunier 1995). There is no doubt that the propaganda of the killers primarily targeted the Tutsi ethnic group, despite the fact that moderate Hutu politicians were also targeted in order to eliminate the potential opposition to Hutu extremism (Straus 2006a). While in Sudan, the Sudanese government clearly targeted the African racial groups (Shaiggiya, Danagla, and Ja’alin) considered the base of the political opposition (Cockett 2010).

In Rwanda, the genocide happened much faster and the rate of survival of the victims was minimal. The killings involved the Hutu public and often took place in public assembly areas like churches and sports stadiums, which turned into slaughter centers. It was not easy to escape the killing squads, Hutu husbands sometimes betrayed their Tutsi wives willingly or sometimes to save their own lives (Omaar 1994). In Sudan, the situation was different. Arabs and Africans lived separately and there was limited or no public engagement in killings within the community. It was clearly an attack by the Arab government troops and militia on African communities such as the Shaiggiya, Danagla, and Ja’alin (Cockett 2010).

**International Response to Genocide**

Eric Reeves rightly argues in his book, *Compromising with Evil*, that the international community did not respond appropriately to the Sudan genocide (Reeves 2012). First, they initially called the Sudan genocide a humanitarian crisis and created United Nations/African Union Force to provide basic security in support of humanitarian assistance (Reeves 2012). He argues that the response was slow and inappropriate and
that the humanitarian crisis was the direct result of Khartoum’s counter-insurgency strategy of genocidal violence and the mass displacement of civilians, intended to weaken the rebels’ civilian support base and not a product of a natural catastrophe; therefore the immediate response did not focus on the real problem (Reeves 2012). Second, the AU Peace and Security Council was not effectively prepared to take on a mission of this scale, complexity, and logistical difficulty (Reeves 2012). He notes further that the Security Council Resolution 1769 (July 2007), authorized a UN/AU “hybrid” force with very light equipment, poor logistics, and the absence of decisive international political and material support (Reeves 2012). Nevertheless, the UN/AU response in Sudan was more coordinated, purposeful and impactful that it significantly reduced the scale of genocide. In Rwanda, UN forces withdrew and left thousands of innocent civilians at the mercy of a ruthless government (Straus 2006a).

There is no doubt that a more robust United Nations peace-Keeping or enforcement force would have saved hundreds of thousands of lives by establishing safe zones to which the public could seek refuge. The United Nations and its security council failed in its international responsibility to act appropriately to halt this heinous crime (Straus 2006a).
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Conclusion

Any adequate account of genocide in Rwanda and Sudan, must acknowledge the manipulation by external forces, domestic pressures, historical legacies and existing ethnic or racial prejudices. Nevertheless, the government must be seen as central in exacerbating tensions and executing genocide to its political advantage. The Rwanda and Sudan genocides took place under the aegis of the state, and the government was the main actor involved (Straus 2006b). It must be viewed from the perspective of colonial legacies and the resulting formation of a divided state, whose autocratic and unpopular governments were facing serious threats to their hold to state power, for which genocide represented a final attempt at survival (Hintjens 1999). Many of the mechanisms through which genocide was prepared, implemented and justified in Rwanda and Sudan, bore striking resemblances to other previous genocides such as the Nazi genocide against the Jews in the 1930s and 40s, and the Khmer Rouge genocide against Cambodians in 1970s.

This research comes to the conclusion that the primary motive of the two governments in perpetrating genocide against a section of its populace was to maintain state power. It is very clear that the ethnic factor was used to eliminate the minority in Rwanda (Hintjens 1999) as much as racism was used to do the same in Sudan (Reeves 2012). The government in Rwanda demonized the RPF rebel group as well as the entire Tutsi ethnic group. This served to create ethnic tensions, which distracted people from the real economic and political issues, and served to lessen any support for the RPF, as well as destroy any basis for the Arusha Accords (Hintjens 1999). The government allied
itself with extremist anti-Tutsi political groups (Lemarchand 1995), propaganda was used as a political tool, and it encouraged the direct involvement of Hutu elite in the genocide against the entire Tutsi ethnic community (Hintjens 1999). The killings that took place in Rwanda between 1990 and 1993 (Uvin 1997) and, South Sudan as far back as 1965 (Reeves 2012) also reveal that the governments already had a genocidal plan in place well before the two genocides happened. The government also trained and equipped militia groups, interahamwe in Rwanda (Hintjens 1999) and the Janjaweed in Darfur (Reeves 2005) to carry out the carnage to a grand scale in order to eliminate the oppositions support base.

The two governments used the four national instruments of power: diplomatic, informational, military and economic to plan, prepare and execute the genocide without fear of international reaction. There was sufficient evidence connecting France to the governments’ genocidal program well before the 1994 genocide (Melvern 2000). The Rwandan government received considerable assistance in money, training, troops and arms from the French government (Des Forges 1999). Britain’s colonial approach of empowering the Arab north while isolating the Christian and animist south from the central economic systems of Sudan created the divisions between the haves of the north and have-nots of the periphery which led to the Sudanese civil wars that went on for decades (Cockett 2010). Russia’s and China’s role in maintaining trade and economic relations with Sudan at a time when sanctions were imposed on the country for its genocidal actions against the African communities of the south, (Cockett 2008) played a critical role in maintaining the economic engine of the Sudan government.
The governments’ effective use of domestic hate media and the failure of international media to create an atmosphere of urgency for international response in the 1994 Rwanda genocide facilitated the genocidal program in Rwanda. The call to jam the governments’ Radio Television Milles Collin (RTLM) network and the Kangura newspaper for spreading hate speeches and mobilizing people to kill was met with deaf ears in UN and US. The lack of international coverage of the 1994 genocide as a result of the reluctance and disinterest of editors, coupled with fear of death by journalists led to insufficient news coverage of the genocide (Thompson 2007). The Hutu Power hate newspaper, Kangura, published the “Ten Commandments of the Hutu” published statements like, “The Bahutu should stop having mercy on the Batutsi” (Stanton 2007, 4). It advocated for an exclusively Hutu army that prohibited marriage to Tutsi women. Cartoons and articles in Kangura referred to Tutsis as cockroaches and snakes, and regularly expounded the myth that they were from Ethiopia. Tutsis were “devils” who ate the vital organs of Hutus (Stanton 2007, 4). This type of propaganda fuelled Rwanda’s illiterate Hutu peasantry to commit mass violence against their Tutsi victims.

In Sudan, the local and international media was more responsive in its coverage of the Darfur crisis via internet and international television station like British Broadcasting Cooperation (BBC), Cable News Network (CNN) and Aljazeera in which film actors from Hollywood like George Clooney and Don Cheadle exposed the depth of the plight of the Sudanese Africans (Goffe 2011). Even then, it must be noted that the international community was still very slow to react and this also allowed the Sudan government to continue killing hundreds of thousands, and displacing millions of the African communities in Darfur (Reeves 2012).
In Rwanda and Sudan, the military was involved in planning, preparing and executing the genocide. In Rwanda’s case, intelligence organs prepared a series of secret reports for the Army commander and the President stating that the Hutu population was against power sharing (Melvern 2000, 63). By the time the genocide began, the government had distributed about “85 tons of ammunition” (Melvern 2000, 64-65). The interahamwe militia were trained and equipped long before the genocide started (Melvern 2000).

In Sudan, Eric Reeves notes that the situation in Sudan was the same as Rwanda’s in as far as the governments’ support to militia groups, is concerned. The ILF government financed and armed the local armed militia groups, the Janjaweed, to eliminate Africans from southern part of Darfur. The Janjaweed killings went on unabated, even after UN Peace keepers deployed (Reeves 2005). The Islamic Liberation Front (ILF) completely destroyed the North/South peace agreements and declared a jihad in January 1990, officially waging a genocide campaign against the African communities throughout the 1990s until its climax in 2003. In 2003, the government launched successive offensive operations that resulted in the death of hundreds of thousands and displacement of millions of people (Reeves 2005).

International Response

The two tragic events are a reminder that there is no effective international response mechanism in place to prevent or stop acts of genocide. The UN peace keeping force is not structured and empowered to react to incidents like this effectively. Further still, UN investigative reports of acts of genocide and the reaction that followed, left a lot to be desired. In Rwanda’s case, despite overwhelming evidence, nothing was done to
stop the genocide, while in Sudan, the UN investigations found that the killings did not constitute genocide, and instead concluded that they were crimes against humanity as if to lessen the urgency for intervention (United Nations 2004).

Suffice it to note that the international response required in most violent situations involving human rights violations and crimes against humanity is evidently different from the kind of response and attention that the crime of genocide receives (Power 2001). In the case of countries or governments accused of crimes against humanity, the most common action taken is the indictment of leaders accused of committing atrocities, or the deployment of peacekeeping forces to ensure that such acts do not happen again. Sadly, history proves that military intervention to halt the crime of genocide is not always guaranteed, or if it arrives, it is too late to do much (Reeves 2012).

This thesis explains how the governments of Rwanda and Sudan were able to use the four instruments of power: diplomatic, information, military and economic, to discourage international intervention during the genocide. Their alliances with permanent members of the UN Security Council such as France (in the case of 1994 Rwanda genocide), China and Russia (in the Sudan genocide) gave the two governments enough time to finish their respective genocidal programs. The UN security council members successfully vetoed against any possible international military interventions and/or sanctions. In addition, France openly backed the Rwanda government during the 1994 genocide by sending troops in the infamous “Operation Turquoise (OT),” to defend the genocidal forces against RPA rebel attacks towards the end of the genocide. The OT protected the retreating killers instead of saving the victims of genocide. Similarly, Russia and China consistently backed Sudan government in its genocidal campaign
against the African communities of southern and western Sudan in 2003 (Alessi 2012). It is evident that the UN could hardly reach a decision to intervene to stop genocide in countries in which some permanent members of the security council have vested interests (Melvern 2006).

**Recommendations**

**Preventive Action**

Most Genocides tend to occur during civil wars. Once a government is engaged in a civil war, it tends to categorize the opposition groups as hostile and is very likely to subject them to unbearable living conditions. When the opposition takes up arms, the government will most certainly respond by striking their support base. The amount of care taken to prevent collateral damage is often limited in such situations. It is very common for entire communities to designate races, tribes, religious or ethnic groups that form the opposition as the enemy, and for their lives to be of no account. This thinking naturally fuels justification for violence against these groups and slowly descends into genocide. It is therefore always vital to reduce the chances of genocide by focusing on addressing the causes of conflict. Once a country has been earmarked as being at high risk of mass atrocities, the international community (UN) must work towards preventing escalation at the national and regional level.

UN must not only deal with genocide but also mass murder and other large-scale human rights violations, such as ethnic cleansing because such incidences are clear indicators of possible genocide. An early-warning mechanism must be established and strengthened with intelligence, surveillance and, reconnaissance assets as well as human intelligence resources. Genocidal government will always try to conceal aspects of mass
murder or genocide, hence, there is need to maintain first hand information from insiders and other sources to provide crucial details of the machinations of a genocidal system.

Environmental problems must be given greater attention, and tensions related to competition over natural resources such as the case with the black African communities of Darfur and South Sudan competing with Arab communities of Sudan. The civil society and young populace must be given a chance to improve their lives through education and purposeful employment, so that they are less likely to be recruited into predatory gangs and militias like the Interahamwe in Rwanda and the Janjaweed in Sudan. The rights of minorities must be protected, since they are genocide’s most frequent target. The roots of violence and genocide: hatred, intolerance, racism, or ethnicity which deny targeted groups their dignity and rights must be dealt with seriousness.

Protection of Civilians

Even when the international community fails to prevent conflict, one of its highest priorities must always be to protect civilians. States and state actors need to be constantly reminded of their responsibility to protect civilians from violence (R2P), under international humanitarian law. Despite the complexity involved in most conflict situations of a genocidal nature, the UN through its Security Council must at the minimum work towards protecting the innocent civilians. It is very common for civilians, including women and children to become the direct targets of violence and rape, as war is waged against a whole society. Wherever civilians are deliberately targeted because they belong to a particular community, we are in the presence of potential or actual genocide. The international community can no longer afford to turn a blind eye to such acts. The United Nations peacekeepers should no longer be restricted to using force only in self-
defence. They must be empowered to do so in defence of their mandate, and that mandate often explicitly includes the protection of local civilians threatened with imminent violence. In all genocidal situations or ‘High Risk’ situations, peace enforcement should be recommended to save lives.

Early Warning Systems

One of the reasons for UN’s failure to respond to genocide in Rwanda stems from the fact that it did not take early warning reports seriously (Powers 2007). Romeo Dallaire’s reports in early 1994 were trashed as inaccurate instead of raising serious red flags for increased action (Powers 2007). If the United Nations is serious about preventing or stopping genocide in future, it must not be held back by legalistic arguments about whether a particular atrocity meets the definition of genocide or not. By the time it is certain that genocide is happening, it will always be too late to act. Signs of possible genocide should be able to trigger immediate response, to ensure timely action to avert it. In Rwanda, the UN had enough information to show that genocide was happening and they chose to withdraw, hence, giving the government a green light to continue killing innocent and helpless Tutsi civilians, sometimes, as UN vehicles and Trucks departed from an area. The Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings (SREK) described many warning signs in Rwanda the year before the genocide happened, and no one paid attention (UN Commission on Rwanda genocide 1994).

The biggest challenge is to bring information together in a focused way, so as to better understand complex situations, and thus be in a position to take appropriate preventive action. At present there are still evident gaps in the United Nations ability, capacity and general consensus to manage and react to genocide signs. This must be
changed. It must be emphasized that accurate information on the prevalence of mass atrocities needs to be directly tied to political will to respond on the part of the five permanent members of the security council to bring an end to the worst crime in human history. Without this consensus, genocide is bound to happen again and again, and the UN will continue to fail again and again, in its fight to prevent and/or stop it.

**Recommendations for Further Study**

The most unanswered question in relation to preventing genocide and mass atrocities around the world remains; how can response operations towards genocide be more effective? Despite having a good working plan for action, the UN always fails in implementation. The military planning handbook on Mass Atrocities Response Operations published by the US Army Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Institute offers very good guidelines on how response can be effectively conducted. However, it remains unclear as to how effective this can be in complex conflict situations such as the 1993 Crisis in Somalia where government structures collapsed and the country was in total anarchy, and/or the 1994 Rwanda genocide in which the Rwanda government was complicit in committing atrocities against minority Tutsi population, or even the most recent civil war in Syria in which both the government and rebels are committing mass atrocities. The whole world watched on television screens as US forces withdrew from Somalia in 1993 after some of their soldiers were dragged dead on the streets of Mogadishu, and also watched how the Belgium withdrew from the UN peace keeping mission in Rwanda after ten Belgian UN peace keepers were killed and mutilated in Kigali. Such kneejerk reactions of withdrawal, by international peace keepers and
enforcers, due to public pressure at home, plays into the hands of mass murderers and genocidal governments and allows mass slaughter to continue unabated.

For any form of response to be effective, the actors have to be fully committed. A study should be made to evaluate the effectiveness of regional response mechanisms in preventing mass atrocities and genocide, for instance, the study should start evaluating whether or not the AU forces in Somalia and Sudan today are effectively handling the crisis in both countries. The UN and AU reports, so far suggest that AU forces from Uganda, Kenya, Burundi deployed in Somalia on one hand, and the joint forces from Rwanda, Nigeria, Ghana, and several other countries deployed in Darfur, on the other, have significantly reduced mass atrocities and acts of terrorism in the entire region, and will continue to do so, with continued material support from international community.

The UN should use the Sudan and Somalia experiences as clear examples of how well resourced continental forces are more likely to commit themselves to stopping mass atrocities in complex conflict situations, than forces from US or Europe whose willingness and readiness to commit ‘boots on the ground’ in such complex conflict situations, is extremely low.
REFERENCE LIST


Gourevitch, Philip. 1998. *We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families*. New York: St. Martin’s Press.


