Maintain Stability Operations Capability During Military Operations

by

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Today, the United States has approximately 148,000 service members deployed or forward stationed in nearly 150 countries to support our nation’s strategic political / military objectives. U.S. response to emerging megatrends of the 21st Century along with budgetary constraints suggests significant changes to this status quo. Consequently, U.S. force structure and training strategies must be nested with Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational (JIIM) partners to achieve unity of effort throughout all phases of military operations to include efforts to shape and prevent likely irregular conflicts ahead. We must eliminate training gaps and exploit efficiencies gained through the last decade of war through utilization of lessons learned, Joint Doctrine, professional leadership development, and training efforts designed to achieve U.S. national goals and objectives. U.S. military forces must retain the capability to prevent, shape, and win our country’s wars, but also must be prepared to execute stability operations through all phases of operations and be capable of transition into a supporting role to other USG agencies or multinational organizations.
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It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us…¹

—Charles Dickens

21st Century Challenges

Borrowing the opening sentence from 19th Century British Author Charles Dickens’, A Tale of Two Cities, seems appropriate as a framework for the United States of America’s (U.S.) frenetic journey into the rest of the 21st Century. America quickly approaches the zenith of an unprecedented period of global leadership, with rising global or regional powers seemingly at least a decade or more from challenging the world’s only super-power in peer-to-peer conflicts. The U.S. military capability to strike known adversaries real-time anywhere in the world across all domains of power (land, air, sea, space and cyber) is without precedent in world history. Yet, if that is the case, can the U.S. embrace a strategy of global hegemony as the most powerful country in the world, and enjoy, as Dickens would say, “the best of times”, and why should the U.S. Joint force be concerned with integrated operations with our JIIM partners? The answer can be found by examining the challenges posed by the complex 21st Century global operating environment, or “worst of times” from a U.S. national security viewpoint. Challenges include catastrophic U.S. budget reductions, rising near-peer competitors, transnational criminal or violent-extremist organizations obtaining advanced weaponry (to include Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles), failing states, non-state actors, ideological/religious groups, along with an urbanized, technologically “tuned-in” world population. These challenges, exacerbated by the present U.S. financial crisis, pose significant risk of degraded U.S. military
support to vital national strategy and America’s ability to promulgate its core national interests, support our friends and allies, influence and shape neutral actors and nations, and deter and constrain our global / regional adversaries and challengers. U.S. military forces must retain the capability to prevent, shape, and win our country’s wars, but we now must be prepared to execute stability operations through all phases of operations and be capable of transition into a supporting role to other USG agencies or multinational organizations.

Extremely relevant today, does U.S. have the correct national security policies and strategies (Ends) now and in the coming decades? Are we tracking the most likely and most dangerous global trends and environments? Do we have the right military strategies (Ends, Ways, and Means) to be effective against these new and complex threats and are they nested into joint, whole of government, and international coalition strategies and policies? Does U.S. doctrine of Unified Action, executed through Decisive Action, correctly balance combined arms maneuver and stability operations training and resourcing to meet 21st Century challenges? Proposed answers to the above questions will be examined through the lens of policies and strategies, lessons learned from a decade of conflict, and leader development and interagency training strategies. Documents such as the Joint Staff’s Decade of War Vol 1 illustrates a Preparation / Execution Gap existing between U.S. execution of major combat operations (excellent = preparations exceeded requirements) vice execution of missions other than war (initially inadequate = requirements exceeded preparations). Important takeaways from this report are reflected in current doctrinal discussions regarding the right mix of Combined Arms Maneuver and Stability Operations training for most-likely
future conflicts and the risk of allowing these gaps to continue. Pending budget constraints will undoubtedly challenge the force’s ability to train in either competency; however, we must retain the capability to conduct stability operations during all levels of joint operations and, in particular, must be able to transition from supported to supporting agency and complement interagency or multinational agencies in Phase IV and V joint operations. Recommendations to minimize future gaps or mitigate future risk will be made through an examination of emerging 21st Century Megatrends, lessons learned over ten years of war, current Unified Action doctrine, leader development guidance, and successful interagency training methodologies.

Emerging 21st Century Trends

Historically, strategy and policy-making during the Cold War (1950s - 1990) focused on the seemingly-sensible Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) and Capability Of Firing First If Necessary (COFFIN) nuclear deterrent strategies targeted primarily toward Cold War adversary, the Soviet Union.\(^3\) In fact, the U.S. knew the type of nuclear weapons available in the Soviet arsenal, specific types of delivery systems, Soviet strategy, training doctrine, and available national resourcing, although at times critical capability gaps were suspected. Significantly, the U.S. also knew (Sun Tzu-like) Soviet redlines and were able to be mitigate or minimize overall risk through policies of détente, strategic arms limitation treaties, weapon inspection programs, and direct communication between the two superpowers’ leadership to divert catastrophic war.\(^4\)

Emerging diverse, volatile, political-social 21st Century global megatrends identified by the National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2030 Alternate Worlds will affect the world for several decades to come. Four complex megatrends include: Individual Empowerment; Diffusion of Power; Demographic Patterns; Food, Water, and
Energy Nexus, which can be effected by six game-changers resulting in four potentially different future world scenarios.5

What are the real dangers, impacts, or risks to the U.S., friends / allies, and even our competitors and adversaries, resulting from the new environments of the 21st Century? Strategist Joseph Nye, who is credited with creating the term “soft-power”, postulated in his recent book that Diffusion of Power, Cyber power, and rising states will quicken the end of American hegemony. Rising states, primarily identified as the BRIC countries, (Brazil, Russia, India and China), but potentially including South Africa, Korea, Vietnam, and others, all have the potential to be regional or global political-military powers. Nye claimed through fast, easily assessable cyberspace and various social media applications, a considerable amount of traditional power wielded by the sovereign state will be transferred to individuals or political groups.6 Present U.S. doctrine of Unified Action acknowledges an end to the U.S. “unipolar” era and provides strategic direction for the U.S. role in a multi-polar future, although there remain many challenges of implementation.

Joint Strategy Guidance and Doctrine

Comprehensive U.S. strategic guidance for the 21st Century (ends), defined priority military tasks (missions or ways) and directed a comprehensive review of how the Defense Department integrates whole-of-government strategies utilizing all instruments (diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence, and Legal (DIME-FIL) of national power.7 The Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army, published the Army Capstone Concept, the 2012 Army Training Strategy (new 2013 Army Training Strategy just published), and the Chief of Staff Marching Orders, all reinforcing a rebalance of the force, Leader Development, and a pivot to the
Asia-Pacific region. One effective strategy across the DIME to deter non-state actors is to build the legitimacy and control of the host nation, which in turn, make it imperative for the US to "continue initiatives designed to build partner capacities and irregular warfare capabilities, as well as interagency and multinational cooperation." Unfortunately, published guidance such as the National Security Strategy 2010 directs the execution of these capacities and cooperation strategies but leaves strategists and budget analysts throughout the force with many questions how to execute that strategy.

A primary imperative for the United States is to retain (and re-modernize) its nuclear capabilities and extended nuclear umbrella which is nested in our strategic policies of deterrence, assurance, reassurance, and partnership and engagement as the primacy of our foreign policy. For several years, key allies whom depend most on the U.S. nuclear shield – North American Treaty Organization (NATO) countries, Japan, Korea, Israel, Australia, etc, have questioned aging, and arguably eroding, U.S. nuclear strategic capabilities. They also question potentially degraded U.S. political will to engage in nuclear conflict not directly involving U.S. territory or citizens; however, due to a focus on other strategies and space limitations this vital national interest will not be discussed in depth.

Again, this discourse will examine U.S. national policies and military strategies and potentially exposes a gap between our written policies and guidance and military strategies (ends, ways, and means) to execute them. For example, Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta’s budgetary guidance in January 2012 reflected impacts to national military strategy, even as sequestration and further reductions threaten the second half of FY13 expenditures. The new guidance reflected a $487 billion in
Department of Defense (DoD) budget reductions over a ten year period, and directed a rebalanced force structure and investments toward the Asia-Pacific and Middle Eastern regions while protecting technology capabilities and advances to counter anti-access strategies of potential US adversaries. Other key guidance included the defeat of a major theater contingency while denying access or imposing unacceptable cost in other regions, and no longer providing forces for large, sustained stability operations but to retain the hard lessons learned in the past decade of war.

Efforts through the military domain (ends, ways & means) to support vital U.S. national interests “demonstrate the will and commit the resources needed to oppose any nation’s actions that jeopardize access to and use of the global commons and cyberspace, or that threaten the security of our allies.” Despite pending defense budget cuts, U.S. forces will conduct a sustainable pace of Asian forward presence operations, including rotational deployments and bilateral and multilateral training exercises to “ensure its ability to operate effectively in anti-access” and area denial (A2/AD) environments.” These activities reinforce deterrence, help build the capacity and competence of U.S., allied, and partner forces for internal and external defense, strengthen alliance cohesion, and increase U.S. influence.

An appropriate starting point to review a few key policies and their effectiveness is the National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization (R&S) which directed Department of State (DOS) and DoD to work together to integrate Reconstruction and Stability (R&S) capabilities. The intent of NSPD-44 was furthered in the FY2008 Guidance for the Employment of Force (GEF) specifically tasking components to: develop plans to
align with wider USG policy and complement and synchronize with parallel inter-agency activities; ensure military activities will support U.S. Government (USG) objectives; integrate military activities with other US federal agencies, coalition military partners, local populations, host nation and other foreign-government partners, and key, private, security actors to integrate with military activities; and importantly to develop criteria to shift responsibilities between DoD supported and supporting roles. Critics claim the effectiveness of NSPD-44 was degraded from a lack of clarity defining authorities and funding as well as the lack of operational level capacity of DOS and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

In 2009, DoD Instruction 3000.05, Stability Operations, “reinforced that stability operations remain a core U.S. military mission and DoD should be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations.”12 This was a far-reaching directive that really has not been executed throughout the DoD as intended. DoD was directed to maintain the capability to sustain stability operations activities throughout all phases of conflict and across the range of military operations, to include combat and non-combat environments, and to support stability operations activities led by other USG departments or agencies. Specific DoD activities included “establishing civil security and civil control, essential services, repair and protect critical infrastructure, and deliver humanitarian assistance until such time as it is feasible to transition lead responsibility to other U.S. Government agencies, foreign governments and security forces, or international governmental organizations.”13 Further tasks included maintain international law; assist other agencies or governments in planning and executing stabilization efforts and to plan accordingly across the Doctrine, Organizations, Training,
Material, Leader Development, and Facilities (DOTMLPF). In reality, this requires a major paradigm shift by Army leaders who seem grateful to return to conventional force on force combined arms training at the expense of meeting this directive.

Another important DoD Directive, the DoDD 3000.07, "Irregular Warfare (IW), was published in 2008 to reinforce the IW concept and “Recognize that IW is as strategically important as traditional warfare.”14 Additionally, as a core U.S. military mission, DoD must conduct IW across the full range of military operations independently or simultaneously with major combat. Five core IW directives include maintain effective IW capabilities, identify and defeat IW threats, train and advise foreign security forces, and support foreign governments through direct or indirect means and create safe secure environments in failed or fragile states.15

Guidance from then-U.S Army Combined Arms Center Commander, LTG William B. Caldwell IV, reinforces the importance of stability operations, deterrence, peacekeeping aligned with Unified Action and Decisive Action strategies. LTG Caldwell postulated “…the greatest threat to our national security comes not in the form of terrorism or ambitious powers, but from fragile states either unable or unwilling to provide for the most basic needs of their people.” He added, “…Military success alone will not be sufficient to prevail in this environment. To confront the challenges before us, we must strengthen the capacity of the other elements of national power, leveraging the full potential of our interagency partners.”16

Such seamless movement from a supported to a supporting role during conflict transformation seems to be problematic for the U.S. military which raises valid concerns regarding future focus on traditional war-fighting training and not maintaining the vital
stability operations skill sets learned under fire in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).

Interagency Partnerships

Perhaps DoD’s most critical interagency partners regarding future integrated training strategies are the DOS and USAID. Recently, several encouraging developments occurred in cooperation and integration between departments and agency due to Secretary-level cooperation. Particularly innovative was then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s introduction of the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR 2010) and the development of the Diplomacy, Defense, and Development (3Ds) strategy. Another key development was the Civilian-Military (CIV-Mil) integrated field training at Muscatatuck Center for Complex Operations (MCCO) to include Security Forces (SECFOR) for Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), National Guard units, and DoD’s Contingency Expeditionary Work (CEW) and Ministry of Defense Afghanistan (MoDA), DoD Educational Advisors (DoDEA), and the DOS Foreign Service Institute (FSI), all representing positive advances in U.S. interagency cooperation.

Utilizing her exposure to military doctrine and methodologies, Secretary Clinton directed the first ever Department of State QDDR, calling for “a sweeping reform agenda for the State Department and USAID, the lead agencies for foreign relations and development respectively.” Key imperatives of the DOS QDDR directed the Chiefs of Missions (COM) be accountable for interagency training and results by turning to other federal agencies before engaging private contractors.

As previously discussed, today’s complex, inter-connected, global operating environment demands DOS and DoD to coordinate and lead U.S. whole of government
efforts and this complex topic has fittingly been addressed by both the executive and legislative branch. Secretary Clinton astutely observed: “the geometry of global power is becoming more distributed and diffuse even as the challenges we face become more complex and cross-cutting,” and acknowledged the need for a more multifaceted and integrated approach to execute “smart power” or to utilize “the full range of tools at our disposal – diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural – picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation.” A decade after major combat operations ended in Iraq, many issues remain regarding processes, procedures, and capabilities during transitional phases across strategic to operational levels for many agencies, as well as multiple agencies’ inability to effectively operate in an irregular warfare environment.

In August 2012 remarks, Andrew J. Shapiro, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, highlighted additional inter-agency coordination which resulted in the January 2012 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between DOS and DoD directing a substantial and high level of personnel exchanges between the departments. The MOU directed approximately 100 DoD personnel to be detailed to State and approximately 95 State Department Foreign Policy Advisors to be assigned to DoD. In addition, 30 State personnel were assigned as faculty advisors at the war colleges. Key successes from this expanded agreement include the first-ever Foreign Policy Advisor to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a 2-star flag officer to serve as a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Political-Military Affairs Bureau, the first since George Schultz was Secretary of State. These are all great steps to ensure successful interagency / intergovernmental strategies and doctrine; however, future results will be
gauged by how we integrate unity of effort, solve funding and title authority issues, and involve other agencies into the planning process with a unified purpose during all operational phases and transitions.

**Lessons Learned**

Historically, many strategic *shocks* apparently caught U.S. analysts unprepared, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, the strains on the Westphalian nation state paradigm, the effects of rapid spread of technologies and globalization, the current struggles of the American Economy, and the rapid rise of Chinese economic and military influence. Critics charge the U.S. missed a one-time opportunity to strategically mold, shape and influence the post-cold war world by misjudging or ignoring many indicators and trends of a rapidly changing world environment. Arguments can be made the U.S. missed key global indicators to include: social media effects on the Color Revolutions in former Soviet Bloc nations; Arab Spring; effects of globalization; social media, and technological improvements and their effects on U.S. national security; and the effects of failed states and the rise of volatile non-state actors and violent extremist organizations.

Compounding apparent strategic misreading of these indicators, the U.S. has been frustrated by several disappointing events important to national interests, all of which challenged U.S. credibility such as failing to: deter and prevent Iranian and North Korean proliferation of nuclear weapon capability and delivery systems; failure to deter on-going Israeli-Palestinian conflict, failing to deter the influence and spread of Al Qaeda affiliates and splinter groups.

Naturally, following these setbacks, questions arose if U.S. analysts were appropriately capturing critical megatrends and changing social dichotomies?
Strategists claim the focus of modern conflict and warfare has transitioned from center of gravity focused on the *government-military* combination of the trinity toward a more *government-population* focus. This refocus on human considerations will challenge commanders to develop integrated Rules of Engagement (ROE) and be prepared to operate in both an irregular warfare environment and decisive action combat operation simultaneously.\(^2^2\)

Additionally, key lessons learned from the Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) division, *Decade of War: Enduring Lessons Learned from the Past Decade of War, Vol 1*, posited current conditions affecting the contemporary environment: a shift from US hegemony toward national pluralism, the erosion of sovereignty and the impact of weak states, the empowerment of small groups or individuals, an increasing need to fight and win in the information domain.\(^2^3\)

Space and scope limitations prevent a detailed examination of the eleven strategic themes and enduring lessons and challenges of the last decade identified by the DOW Vol 1; however, themes listed below in Figure 1 should be integrated into multi-echelon, JIIM training plans.
- **Understanding the environment**: A failure to recognize, acknowledge, and accurately define the operational environment led to a mismatch between forces, capabilities, missions, and goals.

- **Conventional Warfare Paradigm**: Conventional warfare approaches often were ineffective when applied to operations other than major combat, forcing leaders to realign the ways and means of achieving effects.

- **Battle for the Narrative**: The US was slow to recognize the importance of information and the battle for the narrative in achieving objectives at all levels; it was often ineffective in applying and aligning the narrative to goals and desired end states.

- **Transitions**: Failure to adequately plan and resource strategic and operational transitions endangered accomplishment of the overall mission.

- **Adaption**: Department of Defense (DOD) policies, doctrine, training and equipment were often poorly suited to operations other than major combat, forcing widespread and costly adaptation.

- **Special Operations Forces (SOF)**: Multiple, simultaneous, large-scale operations executed in dynamic environments required the integration of general purpose and special operations forces, creating a force-multiplying effect for both.

- **Interagency Coordination**: Interagency coordination was uneven due to inconsistent participation in planning, training, and operations; policy gaps; resources; and differences in organizational culture.

- **Coalition Operations**: Establishing and sustaining coalition unity of effort was a challenge due to competing national interests, cultures, resources, and policies.

- **Host Nation Partnering**: Partnering was a key enabler and force multiplier, and aided in host-nation capacity building. However, it was not always approached effectively nor adequately prioritized and resourced.

- **State Usage of Surrogates and Proxies**: States sponsored and exploited surrogates and proxies to generate asymmetric challenges.

- **Super Empowered Threats**: Individuals and small groups exploited globalized technology and information to expand influence and approach state-like disruptive capacity.

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Figure 1. Eleven strategic themes as identified in the Decade of War Vol I Enduring Lessons Learned From The Past Decade of Operations, Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) Division, 15 June 2012, Joint Staff analysis of 46 lessons learned since 2003.⁴

As discussed earlier, there is an apparent gap between U.S. national security policies and objectives (ends) and the whole-of-government methodologies (ways and means) of how those policies and objectives are supported, and at what identified and accepted risk. Full exploration of all of the gaps would be prohibitive in the space allowed here, so I will try to examine three or four areas where we still need to improve across the range of military operations. For example, Understanding the Environment, Conventional War Paradigm, Adaption themes all are related to preparation for the right war and the execution of it, and whatever steps were needed to adapt and mitigate risk.

Our preparation for war prior to 9/11 consisted of preparing the world’s best, modern, combined-arms-maneuver force in the world with culminating force-on-force
combined arms maneuver training at our national training centers. The same combat power capabilities evidenced in Desert Storm was still very evident in OIF I, which was a maneuver victory of historical proportions. However, we were not prepared for termination of hostilities and post-conflict stability and reconstruction operations in Iraq nor Afghanistan. National command leadership has defined U.S. vital national interests (ends) charging U.S. military forces to execute overarching military strategy (ends, ways, and means) needed to ensure success across joint operations. However, glaringly, there exists strategic, operational, and tactical risks between the national objectives (ends) the capability to conduct decisive action operations in a comprehensive JIIM environment. In other words, due to natural trends for military leaders to focus on combat arms versus SO, we are poised to repeat the hard lessons learned from OIF/OEF which, as evidenced by the 11 themes in figure 1, requires a whole of government / coalition unity of effort through the full range of military operations.

For example, today’s USG interagency coordination and collaboration capability seems to be more functional during Phase O operations (Shape); however, we still need to improve that process. Coordination and planning for all operational phases should occur prior to the execution of any campaign plan or crisis action plan, with the caveat that changing conditions on the ground will require a reassessment of interagency efforts and responses, but we are not executing that methodology effectively at this time. Efforts have been made to leverage liaison officers, Political Advisors, and Political-military officers but we have not sufficiently gained operational knowledge of interagency or multinational partners, required duties and responsibilities
remain largely undefined, nor have we found interagency funding or appropriation shortfalls.

Another valuable lesson learned during the last decade of war (not mentioned in the DOW report) was integrating the National Guard and U.S. Army Reserves into the Operational Force as a result of high OPTEMPO and short dwell times of active duty forces. In fact, recently published Army Total Force Policy, provided guidance for the continued integration of Active, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve components. Army senior leadership commented, “The Army National Guard and Army Reserve today have invaluable experience as an operational reserve and provide expert capability that is indispensable in current and future conflicts.”

Continuing efforts to align National Guard efforts as part of the Total Force, the National Defense Authorization Act of 2010 recognized the National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) and authorized funding according to DoD program guidance. Consequently, in December 2012 DoD provided funding instructions and responsibilities for the SPP with the publication of DoDI 5111.20. DoDI 5111.20 directed the “establishment and conduct of an SPP between the Department of Defense and a foreign partner nation involving a U.S. State’s National Guard shall further U.S. defense strategy objectives. In addition, all SPP activities and events shall be planned, coordinated, and executed to achieve the theater security cooperation program objectives of the geographic Combatant Commander taking into account the objectives of the relevant chief of mission (COM), as well as the national security objectives of the partner nation, and all SPP activities will be integrated into theater security cooperation programs, as appropriate.”
SPP began in 1993 in eight former Soviet Republics and now operates in 65 nations, providing unique capacity-building skills and expertise to combatant commanders and U.S. ambassadors to shape future environments to build partner capacity and prevent future conflict in foreign lands where fog and friction of war can have unexpected negative consequences for the U.S. Many senior leaders in the national capital region are “beginning to recognize the SPP for what it is – a low-cost, high impact, small footprint program that helps us meet our national security objectives in a resource-constrained and evolving strategic environment.” 28 This out of the box methodology to utilize the additional skill sets of National Guard service members will provide an efficient, cost-effective contribution to meet SO objectives of enabling civil control and security and mitigate risk through ways and means that are resource effective.

Leader Development Training

Relevant leader development training remains critical to the force to truly develop and learn from the difficult lessons learned from a decade of war and to promote a culture of continuous learning and adaption. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), General Martin Dempsey, directed leadership development at all levels of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) to develop new adaptable leaders for the Joint Force 2020 capable of adapting and exploiting complex environments.

Preparation for joint operations in a complex environment depends greatly on leader development and they must focus on three strategic objectives for training the Total Force: training units to be versatile and ready to support combatant commanders worldwide; developing military and civilian leaders to meet the challenges of the 21st century; and holding commanders responsible for the development and execution
of progressive, challenging and realistic training guided by the doctrine of mission command.  

Leadership training (alignment, visioning, and change) as posited in the USA War College *Strategic Leadership Primer* requires new paradigms which promote creative, cost-effective and environmentally solutions as well as the leaders maintaining six meta-competencies (Identity, Mental agility, Cross-cultural savvy, Interpersonal maturity, World-class warrior, and Professional astuteness). Accordingly, recent presentations by senior U.S. Army leadership focused on trust, building consensus (internally and externally), and reinforcing the above mentioned leadership meta-competencies.

Reinforcing this model of leader development, The Elements of Globally Integrated Operations, documented in the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO): Joint Force 2020, September 2012 shared the CJCS’s vision for future leaders to demonstrate proficiency through institutional, operational and self-development educational opportunities to successfully execute in a complex environment across the JIIM environment.

To execute senior leadership’s intent for Joint Force 2020, the U.S. military must be a values-based organization and senior leaders, as stewards of the organization, should empower subordinates through *Mission Command* to meet future complex challenges. Army Doctrinal Publications (ADP), ADP1 and ADP3-0, addresses the concept of commanders’ intuitive ability. As Clausewitz described “All great commanders have acted upon instinct, and the fact that their instinct was always sound is partly the measure of their innate greatness and genius.” Clausewitz’s preferred a
commander gifted with intuitive leadership, but due to his military academic background, he believed that leaders can be trained to a certain level of proficiency to make the right decisions during the “fog” of war, which would also include friction and chance.

![Diagram showing the process from data to understanding](image)

**Figure 2. ADRP 6-0 MISSION COMMAND, May 2012.**

**Mission Command**

Success of future full range of military operations (Offensive, Defensive, and Stability Operations) depends on “individual initiative within the commander’s intent, and leaders who can anticipate and adapt quickly to Mission Command.” Mission command philosophy combines with mission command war fighting function (WfF) to create conditions conducive for “every Soldier to be prepared to assume responsibility, maintain unity of effort, take prudent action, and act resourcefully within the commander’s intent.” To ensure Mission Command’s requirement for Commander’s to take prudent risk, decentralize decision-making, and grant subordinates significant freedom of action requires focused leadership education and training.

Recently, GEN (R) Robert H. Scales, responding to a 2012 book on post-World War II Army leadership, reinforced the importance of senior institutional leadership training. He wrote, “The war colleges, the hubs of strategic learning in the U.S. system of military education, need to be more selective and academically rigorous so that they do a better job of producing truly educated generals who are able to offer the strategic leadership the military needs”. Simultaneously to the publication of GEN Scales article, the 49th Commandant of the US Army War College, MG Anthony A. Cucolo III,
embarked on an ambitious assessment and reorganization of the core USAWC curriculum in 2012 to ensure USAWC as a premier, educational and thinking organization to produce the right strategic leaders for Joint Force 2020 and beyond.

Figure 3. Unified Action Executed Through Decisive Action and Guided by Mission Command. MISSION COMMAND ADP 3-0 (Final Approved Draft) 22 Sep 2011

Military Training Strategies and Joint Force 2020

As previously mentioned, the Army Total Force Policy requires Active, Guard, Reserve and Civilian component—as one Total Force—to provide the operating and generating forces, along with institutional capabilities, to support national strategies,
policies, and Joint Force commitments worldwide. Additionally, the Army Campaign Plan guidance, building toward a *regionally aligned, mission-tailored force* that can Prevent, Shape and Win now and in the future, identified imperatives to provide modernized tailored land forces ready to meet combatant commanders requirements across the range of military operations and to develop leaders to meet the challenges of the 21st century. Amid declining defense budgets and considerable reduction in Army force structure its imperative we search for non-traditional solutions such as tasking active duty forces with major combat operations and anti-access area denial missions and tasking the National Guard and U.S. Army Reserves with building partner capacity, stability operations, and peacebuilding operations. Civilian experience in law enforcement, engineering, government, construction, and contracting are more compelling in an era when budget reductions will demand out of the box hard decisions regarding roles, responsibilities, force structure, and funding of the services and their components. Without innovative solutions, current programming and training strategies will be hard-pressed to eliminate “preparation-execution” training gaps or incorporate lessons learned from DOW V.1.

Undoubtedly, an important element in U.S. successful combat operations in recent decades has been a result of tough, realistic combined arms training at world class facilities such as the National Training Center (NTC) – Fort Irwin, CA; the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) – Fort Polk, LA; the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JRMC) in Hohenfels, Germany; and the Joint National Training Center at Muscatatuck Urban Training Center, Butlerville, IN. However, DOW V1 illustrated that
we were remarkably prepared to execute combat operations in OIF, but critically unprepared for post-conflict stabilization and peacebuilding operations.

Following September 11, 2001 terroristic attacks, NTC re-focused on continuous counterinsurgency operations reflected by the rapidly changing battlefields of OIF/OEF. However, U.S. senior leaders, energized by the Israeli – Hezbollah war in 2006, assessed Israeli Defense Forces difficulty in waging combined arms warfare – merging into irregular warfare in an urban environment in south Lebanon. This assessment resulted in a re-focus toward decisive action across the full range of military operations through combined arms maneuver and wide area security, evidenced in the recently completed “hybrid-Rotation 05-12”. In fact, NTC Rotation 05-12 was the “first hybrid NTC rotation since 9/11 to focus on combined arms maneuver in major operations and campaigns preparing for the conflicts of the future.”

Future global operations will validate if the goals/objectives of the hybrid-rotations have captured the right mixture of combined arms maneuver and stability operations.

In late January, soldiers of Task Force Tiger III deployed from JRTC to Afghanistan as Security Force Assistance Teams (SFAT) to advise Afghan security forces as they assume the operational lead with assistance from advisors. “The Security Force Assistance Teams represented by Task Force Tiger are a critical step in continuing our nation’s effort to improve their capabilities and to help them take responsibility for the security of their country,” said Col. Matthew F. McKenna, 162nd Infantry Brigade commander. As operations in Afghanistan transition after 2014, one USG challenge will be to establish nested training programs for all types of foreign assistance advisor teams to include Security Operation Agreement (SCA), Foreign
Internal Defense (FID), SFAT, Agricultural Development Teams (ADTs), Female Engagement Teams (FETs), etc.

Maintaining a synergistic approach and gaining more multinational training partners each year, the JRMC, in Hohenfels, Germany, provides tough and relevant training scenarios, from simulated urban warfare to peacekeeping missions to include combined arms maneuver, urban operations, Counter Insurgency (COIN), Negotiated Engagement Skills (NEST), stability operations and peacekeeping to U.S Army, Joint Service, NATO and allied forces, from the individual to the brigade level.\textsuperscript{41}

A relative new Joint National Training Center, the Muscatatuck Urban Training Center (MUTC), provides a three-dimensional (air, ground, and sub-terrain), complex that is fully capable of modeling foreign and domestic urban scenarios to include cyber and UAS. MUTC, operating under the auspices of the Indiana National Guard, now called the Muscatatuck Center for Complex Operations (MCCO), provides a wide spectrum of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multi-national, and private sector training. MUTC hosted more than 134,000 personnel from military, government, and private agencies in FY11; including Army National Guard, First US Army, Canadian Battle Groups, Air Force Special Teams, UMSC logistic elements, civilian first responders and those participating in integrated field training with U.S. government civilians, as well USNORTHCOM’s VIBRANT RESPONSE, and Joint Staff’s (J7/9) BOLD QUEST exercise.\textsuperscript{42}

Perhaps, most importantly, MCCO’s (MUTC) unique 21st century operating provides a vital model for interagency CIV-Mil training for both DoD and OGAs in an advanced urban operations environment. Hardened facilities with power grids, roads,
schools, prisons, and a hospital can be tailored to replicate both foreign and domestic scenarios and can be used by a wide array of civilian and military organizations. A great team effort by DOD, DOS, ARNG, and IN NG and private sector resulted in a CIV-Mil training model with T10 ARNG observer-controllers training / assisting T32 NG units training on Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills integrating with DOD Contingency Expeditionary Workforce (CEW) and DOS Foreign Service Institute (FSI) in a two week field training exercised that benefited all organizations involved. A realistic re-assessment of U.S. Codes (USC) titles, authorities, and funding streams will be needed to facilitate more interagency / intergovernmental training, as well as allowing JFC more ability to mitigate risks in developing sourcing solutions for regional campaign plans.

Future budget constraints require a tough, realistic prioritization of all DoD training and professional education programs and to resource what is effective and eliminate those that are not. Truly integrated courses such as the Joint Operational Fires and Effects Course (JOFEC), conducted at the Fires Center of Excellence at Fort Sill, OK, must be retained to ensure success in future joint operations. JOFEC trains all services, ABCA countries, and other government agencies on the skills and processes necessary to apply and integrate joint lethal and non-lethal fires and effects. While the JOFEC has a primary military offensive / defensive operational focus, it is a great example of how a comprehensive training program was developed to eliminate a gap to effectively employ lethal and non lethal fires and effects and to prepare students to function effectively in a joint operational environment in support of the Joint Force Commander. Each student gains a base knowledge of joint and service fires capabilities, platforms, operational environment, doctrine, the joint targeting process and
how the joint fires and effects system works. Intergovernmental training, educational, and developmental opportunities, much like JOFEC for Joint forces, must be available to leaders at all levels, civilian and military, to ensure familiarity with JIIM partners and the ability to integrate partner capabilities and limitations.

Recommendations and Conclusion

Not surprisingly, the most important recommendation to improve U.S. whole of government strategies to support U.S. national strategic goals and objectives is to regain fiscal responsibility. According to defense leadership, budget constraints will potentially “hollow out” the force and will certainly make it difficult to achieve truly integrated, multi-echelon partnerships across the JIIM environment, especially since DOD usually bears the lions-share of responsibility because of its size, planning, and operational capabilities versus OGAs. U.S. military forces must provide future regionally aligned mission-tailored forces capable of full range of operations across short term and persistent conflicts. This will require small, tailored forces well-versed to operate within the local culture, language, human terrain environment of their AO and prepared at all levels to complement activities of all interagency/intergovernmental agencies.

Difficult decisions regarding strategies, training, and force development combined with continuous risk mitigation will be necessary to support U.S. vital national interests. For example, future increases in special operations force structure and CYBERCOM personnel must be nested with the rebalance of conventional forces and maturation of Unified Action/Decisive Action planning and doctrine. Also, a thorough re-assessment of future force structure should examine the right mix of active duty and reserve component personnel.
In addition, joint courses such as the JOFEC at the Fires Center of Excellence must be resourced and maintained as a model of success for joint military training, and similar CIV-Mil integrated training should be programmed and resourced. JPME training and education should be nested across the services and inter-agencies to gain synergy and reduce redundancies. Valuable training venues such as Muscatatuck Urban Training Center need to be fully resourced and engaged across the joint force and civilian agencies. The U.S. no longer has the budget capacity to build and maintain duplicate and redundant training facilities to capture what already exists at MUTC.

Stability Operations must be integrated into training at all levels despite current budget constraints and it’s imperative that SO remain a core mission and resourced across the DOTLMPF. Integrated planning and pre-execution training between Combatant Commanders and JFCs staffs and appropriate agencies should be the norm rather than the exception.

To recapitulate, published U.S. policies and strategies appear sound and well nested across the whole of government approach; however, “the devil remains in the details” to execute seamless unity of effort where DoD and other OGAs efforts complement overall USG goals and objectives. The complex 21st Century contemporary environment and U.S. transition to leaner, more-specialized formations leaves our policy makers and strategic planners in very challenging positions “to get it right” because we can’t afford to get it wrong. The world could be in for a contentious 21st Century if the U.S. is unwilling or unable to pay the political and economic cost to maintain global leadership activities across all elements of national power.
In spite of political and financial challenges, U.S. military forces must: excel at Mission Command as a concept and war-fighting function; maintain robust and innovative leadership capabilities across joint, interagency, and multinational arenas; regain combined arms maneuver proficiency through combat training center rotations and multinational training exercises, integrate conventional forces with special operations and Cyber capabilities, and retain stability operations / peacebuilding lessons learned over the last decade. Ultimately, the U.S. military has shown a tremendous ability to adapt to meet mission requirements which it must retain within a leaner, specialized, and regionally aligned, mission-focused force to dominate over the full range of military operations, including comprehensive stability operations.

Endnotes


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