Arms Control and Missile Defense: Explaining Success and Failure in U.S.-Russian Cooperation

by

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Russia can no longer be considered a world superpower, but it remains a great power in terms of strategic global security. Russia’s importance is based on its nuclear arsenal and permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. This research analyzed arms control and ballistic missile defense (BMD) in order to explain the success and failure of cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation. Utilizing international relations theory, realist and constructivist frameworks were applied to two separate case studies: U.S.-Soviet cooperation on the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty and U.S.-Russian failure to cooperate on BMD.

Each case was started with material factors that opened the opportunity for the Soviet and Russian Federation elite to be responsive to new ideas. The elite then turned to the state’s intellectual entrepreneurs to find new ideas. In the case of the Soviet era, the elite chose to cooperate due to the influence of the international organizations they were associated with. In the present day, the elite, many of whom have a background in the Soviet and Russian Federation secret service, have chosen to defect from cooperation due to the socialization received during their time as KGB or FSB officers.
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ABSTRACT

Russia can no longer be considered a world superpower, but it remains a great power in terms of strategic global security. Russia’s importance is based on its nuclear arsenal and permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. This research analyzed arms control and ballistic missile defense (BMD) in order to explain the success and failure of cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation. Utilizing international relations theory, realist and constructivist frameworks were applied to two separate case studies: U.S.-Soviet cooperation on the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty and U.S.-Russian failure to cooperate on BMD.

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<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>Anti-Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>ASD</td>
<td>Air-Space Defense</td>
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<td>BMD</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile Defense</td>
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<td>BMEWS</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile Early Warning System</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<td>CTR</td>
<td>Cooperative Threat Reduction</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSB</td>
<td>Federal'naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Russian Federal Security Service)</td>
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<td>GLCM</td>
<td>Ground-Launched Cruise Missile</td>
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<td>GLONASS</td>
<td>Global’naya Navigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema, or Global Navigation Satellite System</td>
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<td>GMD</td>
<td>Ground-based Midcourse Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>Intercontinental Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>IMEMO</td>
<td>Institute of the World Economy and International Relations</td>
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<td>INF</td>
<td>Intermediate Nuclear Forces</td>
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<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<td>ISKAN</td>
<td>United States of America and Canada Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>KGB</td>
<td>Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnost (Soviet Secret Service)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIRV</td>
<td>Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle</td>
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<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NMD</td>
<td>National Missile Defense</td>
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<td>NPT</td>
<td>Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
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<td>NRC</td>
<td>NATO-Russia Council</td>
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<td>Russian Radio-Technical Nodes</td>
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<td>PAA</td>
<td>Phased Adaptive Approach</td>
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<td>PTBT</td>
<td>Partial Test Ban Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>Research and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>SALT</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty</td>
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<td>SLBM</td>
<td>Sea Launched Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>SM</td>
<td>Standard Missile</td>
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<td>SORT</td>
<td>Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty</td>
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<td>SPRN</td>
<td>Russian Missile Early Warning Radar</td>
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<td>START</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>TBMD</td>
<td>Theater Ballistic Missile Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>THAAD</td>
<td>Terminal High Altitude Area Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION

Famed international relations scholar Robert Jervis wrote that on the international stage the gain in security of one state often inadvertently threatens the security of another state, and that “although actors may know that they seek a common goal, they may not be able to reach it.”¹ For the United States and the Russian Federation cooperation has been sporadic at best, and non-existent at its worst. I will analyze the relationship of the United States and the Russian Federation by looking at where cooperation has occurred, most notably on arms control, and where the two states have failed to reach an agreement on ballistic missile defense. In both cases material deficiencies provide the starting point that led the ruling elite to turn to the states intellectual entrepreneurs, many of whom were in positions of power, in order to solve the state’s material deficiencies. Soviet elites chose to cooperate with the United States because of the international organizations they were involved with provided the elite with ideas to implement economic reform that lead to cooperation with the west on arms control. President Vladimir Putin and the current cadre of intellectual entrepreneurs chose to follow a different path. I argue that the failure to cooperate, while based on material deficiencies, is due to current Russian intellectual entrepreneurs association with organizations whose purpose in the past was the strategic and political safety of the ruling party. In 2006 the number of people with a background in the security services (KGB, FSB, or armed forces) had reached 77 percent of Russia’s top 1,016 governmental positions.² The background of these new ruling elite has shaped how they respond to material and external threats to the Russian state.

This chapter will first outline why the topic is important in today’s international environment. Second I will look at some of the problems and hypotheses associated with the topic. Third, a short literature review to provide an overarching review of topics I will further develop in the subsequent chapters. Finally, I provide an overview of the methods and sources I used as well as a breakdown of the topic of discussion for each chapter.

A. IMPORTANCE

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia can no longer be considered a world superpower. However, Russia is still a great power nation when it comes to strategic global security. Russia’s importance is based on its nuclear arsenal and permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. Russia’s cooperation with the United States continues to provide support for arms reductions and nuclear non-proliferation on the global stage. However, the bilateral and multilateral treaties on the reduction of nuclear arms and nuclear non-proliferation are being threatened, from the Russian standpoint, by U.S. plans for a European Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system.

In 2002, when President Bush withdrew the United States from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty Russia warned “that the loss of the treaty would undermine the nuclear strategic stability on which the delicate balance of terror had rested during the Cold War,” claimed that a world without the ABM treaty would jeopardize the other standing arms control agreements – Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and II), Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF), and even the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).3

In the post-Soviet era, when it comes to global and regional security the benefits of cooperation outweigh the benefits of non-cooperation. By looking at the historic precedence of cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation and arms reduction treaties between Washington and Moscow it allows for an examination of the conditions and policies that created cooperation. Just as important is looking at the conditions and policies of Moscow and Washington where cooperation has failed. The analysis here provides a way to look at the relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation in order to better understand how to achieve more cooperation in the future. The ultimate purpose is to show how material factors and ideas work together to explain the success and failure of cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation.

B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES

Relations between the United States and the Russian Federation since the collapse of the Soviet Union have been tenuous at best. While there have been periods of cooperation, arms control and anti-terrorism/counterinsurgency, the majority of the time, the two countries have looked at each other through the lens of the cold war and ideological differences. Despite the cold war being over for more than twenty years, the mutual distrust between the two nations is still part of their working relationship.

There are two major problems when analyzing and explaining the patterns of the strategic relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation. First, the future of cooperation on arms reductions and nuclear non-proliferation, are being threatened by the areas of non-cooperation, European missile defense. Russia repeatedly claimed that any change to the ABM treaty would result in the end of cooperation in arms control and potentially Russian involvement in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); however, in 2010 President Obama and then President Medvedev signed into law the new START treaty. Are U.S. and Russian differences on ABM a true point of contention that would reverse the years of cooperation on arms control? How would this reversal in cooperation effect Russian security overall? What does the Russian Federation hope to gain in the long run by reversing its global stance on arms reduction and nuclear non-proliferation? What kind of message would their withdrawal from START, INF or even the NPT have on nations like North Korea and Iran, who are advancing their nuclear and missile programs?

Second, international relations (IR) theory continues to provide hypotheses and predictions when it comes to how states interact with one another. For example, International relations theory provides reasoning as to why a nation wishes to ally itself with other nations, and why a nation would feel threatened by purely defensive weapons. Cooperation theorists believe that cooperation is possible in an anarchic world. They believe that world politics is not a zero-sum game and that nations have an incentive to realize the benefits that come from long term mutual cooperation through the knowledge
that the “two players” will meet again. The relationship between the United States and Russia can be characterized as a long term relationship, with the “shadow of the future” indefinite as long as Russia maintains its nuclear arsenal and permanent seat on the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Can IR theory provide answers to why Washington and Moscow cooperate in some areas and do not cooperation in others? What were the conditions that created cooperation and what are the conditions that created non-cooperation? Can IR theory provide a mechanism on which Russia and the United States can learn from their cooperative relationship on nuclear non-proliferation and arms control and apply it to their non-cooperative relationship on missile defense? Is Russia’s isolation from cooperative relationships with the West on ballistic missile defense due to internal or external factors (state or systemic level of analysis)?

This research shows that cooperation between the United States and Russia is possible on missile defense, but unlikely under the current material deficiencies and make-up of the Russian ruling elite. However, we first have to understand why the United States and Russia have cooperated in nuclear non-proliferation and arms control yet failed to cooperate on missile defense. Russia has cooperated in the areas of nuclear non-proliferation and arms control because it believes that it will create a nuclear parity with the United States by reducing the number of nuclear weapons on both sides therefore maintaining the balance of power; also, arguably, the Non-Proliferation Treaty guarantees no other state will acquire nuclear weapons to threaten that balance of power. The missile defense system in Europe is perceived by the Kremlin as directed at them despite the repeated claims by Washington that “missile defense in Europe poses no threat to [Russia’s] strategic deterrent.” This concerns Russia because if missile defense is capable of altering the strategic balance of power, its strategic deterrence will no longer be credible.

In order for cooperation to occur in the area of missile defense the United States and Russia have to understand that the delicate balance of power can be altered due to


decisions to increase defensive capabilities just as much as decisions to increase offensive capabilities. Also, that mutual defection from cooperative agreements has the potential to affect other agreements thus reducing the security of all parties involved.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

Cooperation and non-cooperation has been the theme of relations between the United States and Russia, more so since the election of Vladimir Putin to the presidency of Russia in 2000. The brief review of the literature below will provide a foundation on which to determine the conditions for cooperation between the United States and Russia on nuclear non-proliferation and arms control, and what conditions have prevented cooperation between the two governments on European missile defense. First, a brief history of the cooperation between Washington and Moscow, then a look at the issues of non-cooperation and the positions that each side are taking, finally an analytical look at these areas of cooperation and non-cooperation. Utilizing international relations (IR) theory, I hope to establish the conditions that created cooperation in the areas of non-proliferation and arms control. I will then attempt to apply those conditions to the area of missile defense to see if cooperation will emerge from the mutual defection of both Russia and the United States.

The election of Vladimir Putin to the presidency of the Russian Federation in 2000 ushered in a new era of relations between Russia and the United States. Putin and United States President George W. Bush both inherited a historical sense of cooperation dating back to before the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The first steps toward a deeper cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union began in 1963 with the Partial Test Ban Treaty, which was soon followed with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968. The first arms reduction treaties began in 1972 with the series of Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT I and II). The Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty of 1987 would eliminate intermediate nuclear weapons on the European continent. The next series of treaties, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I and
II) in 1991 and 1993 would continue to reduce the number of nuclear weapons between the old Cold War adversaries.6

The collapse of the Soviet Union created a need for a different kind of cooperation. The Nunn-Lugar Act, or the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, was initiated as a measure to secure nuclear material and facilities during the era of political, economic and social crisis among the former Soviet states.7 Anton Khlopkov et al. argue that through projects like CTR, the Russian Federation and the United States have “increased mutual confidence, established regular contacts between Russian and U.S. government experts and nuclear scientists, and enriched overall nuclear security technologies and procedures, all of which has ultimately led to the sustainable progress in nuclear security.”8 These programs have also provided an important means of maintaining the cooperation between Russia and the United States through a bilateral arrangement creating an environment for future work on a range of nuclear non-proliferation problems.9 Jim Nichol echos this sentiment in his Congressional Research Service report from February 2011. He states that the CTR’s use in Russia is an example that can be used as a model for future “nonproliferation and anti-terrorism assistance to nations around the world.”10

Despite all the optimism from the aforementioned group of authors, failure to cooperate in the area of European missile defense has the potential to undo much of the work that was established with the first steps towards nuclear threat reductions in the 1960’s. According to Celeste Wallander, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty is the


9 Ibid., 8.

backbone of strategic stability and is the foundation on which the array of arms reduction and nuclear non-proliferation treaties has been built. In 2000 the view of former Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov, was that if the ABM Treaty was dissolved then the “interconnected system [would] collapse, nullifying 30 years of efforts by the world community.”11 In 2012 Russian President Vladimir Putin noted that U.S. plans for a European missile defense system still “affects the strategic nuclear deterrence forces that only Russia possesses in that theater, and upsets the military-political balance established over decades.”12 He further suggests that cooperation is possible and that if cooperation could be achieved it would “[open] the floodgates for building a qualitatively new model of cooperation, similar to an alliance”; but, if cooperation failed then Russia would respond with its declared countermeasures should the American deployment of missile defense reach a scale that would demand a Russian response.13

The stated reason for the United States National Missile Defense (NMD) system is that the “United States is threatened by the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology by certain ‘states of concern’.”14 In the view of the Russians this is an unrealistic fear. According to Wallander, the disagreement to the United States withdrawal from the ABM is complicated and requires an understanding of Russia’s national security issues, status of its military, foreign policy doctrine, capabilities of Russian conventional and nuclear forces, and the role that nuclear weapons play in Russia’s defense posture.15 Research will show that the Soviet Union was capable of meeting the new lower nuclear numbers because, despite the decline soviet material


13 Ibid.; For Russian proposed response to American deployment of BMD systems see Stephen Pfifer’s article “Missile Defense in Europe: Cooperation or Contention” found on the Brookings Institute’s website: http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2012/05/08-missile-defense-pifer. Highlights include deployment of S-400 and S-500 interceptors; developing the capability to attack NATO control systems for missile defense; and deploying modern weapons in locations where they could “take out any part of the U.S. missile defense system in Europe. One step in this process will be to deploy Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad.”


15 Ibid..
decline the conventional capability of the USSR was still a capable deterrent. Nuclear arms talks maintained parity with the United States and as such made sense for Gorbachev and his cadre of policy-makers.

Today, Russia’s continued material decline is now affecting its conventional armed forces, which has led Russian analysts to conclude that “Russia’s conventional forces are insufficient to defeat external aggression and internal conflicts.” As a result of the decline in their conventional forces’ capabilities to defend the homeland, Russia has lowered the threshold for the use of nuclear forces in an armed conflict. Wallander argues that the consensus is that the Russian Federation will rely on its nuclear arsenal for its defense, escalation control, and deterrence policies. For Russia, the possible threat that the American Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) poses to Russia’s ICBM deterrent is of great concern because it could “make it impossible for Russia to retaliate against a US nuclear (or massive conventional) attack.”

The proposed Russian response if the ABM Treaty is renegotiated with a limited U.S. NMD system would require a recalculation of the Russian retaliatory capability. If the U.S. develops a NMD system then the Russians have stated that they would begin arming the Topol-M missile with a multiple warhead system (In 2007 Russia began tests of a MIRVed version of the Topol-M mobile missile, which was designated RS-24 with deployment beginning in 2010.) By creating a multiple warhead capable rocket, the Russians believe they will be able to counter the defensive capability of the U.S./NATO ABM system. Also of concern is that as the United States deploys an NMD system what will the Chinese response be? Russia assumes that with a U.S. NMD system deployed the Chinese will respond with an increase in deployment of missiles to counter the new American defense capability. Russia will then respond with an increase in their number

16 Ibid., 340.
of deployed warheads in order to maintain a credible deterrent. This places the New START and previous START, SORT, and SALT reductions in jeopardy.20

International Relations theories offer a way to analyze and debate the possible outcomes of interactions between two states. The relationship between the United States and Russia allows for a real-time look at how some of the major theories play out in a real-world scenario. No paradigm or theory can fully explain the complex relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation. The realist Stephen Walt described this need to keep an open mind and to engage different theories when he wrote:

Our understanding would be impoverished were our thinking confined to only one of them. The “compleat [sic] diplomat” of the future should remain cognizant of realism’s emphasis on the inescapable role of power, keep liberalism’s awareness of domestic forces in mind, and occasionally reflect on constructivism’s vision of change.21

Realism and the power of material factors and interests defined in terms of power along with Russian concerns with the balance of power provide the overarching rational for the Russian response. However, the social construct of a nation’s policymakers determines how a given state reacts to the material issues they are facing. As will be shown later the social construct of the Russian elite that now inhabit the Kremlin is based on KGB and FSB ideology and has a profound effect on Russian policy-makers decision making.

Russia’s realist dilemma stems from its material deficiencies as compared to the United States. In the first decade following the collapse of the Soviet Union the quality and quantity of the Russian conventional forces “crashed and burned.”22 President Vladimir Putin pointed out the deficiencies of his military by conceding the fact that the Russian military-industrial complex had missed in the last 30 years several modernization cycles. Also, he expressed concern that the United States had surpassed the Russian

20 Ibid.
21 Stephen Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy, no. 110 (Spring, 1998), 44.
Federation in the development and deployment of precision guided munitions. Realists believe that in an anarchic world the “only currency that matters is power – the material capability to ward off pressure or coercion while being able to influence others.”

In the eyes of the Russians the balance of power is shifting away from them and towards the United States as evidenced by Russian disapproval of Washington’s European missile defense plan. The missile defense system in Europe is perceived by the Kremlin as directed at them despite the repeated claims by Washington that “missile defense in Europe poses no threat to [Russia’s] strategic deterrent.” This concerns Russia because if missile defense is capable of altering the strategic balance of power, their strategic deterrence will no longer be credible. Neorealist Kenneth Waltz described this dilemma of one state feeling insecure because of the security of another state when he wrote:

If each state, being stable, strove for security and had no designs on its neighbors, all states would nevertheless remain insecure; for the means of security for one state are, in their very existence, the means by which other states are threatened.

Robert Jervis argues that if one state becomes invulnerable by becoming more powerful than most other states – as is the case with the United States – and the “price for DD [defect-defect] is low, it leaves [hegemonic states] with few hostages for its good behavior. Others who are more vulnerable will grow apprehensive, which will lead them to acquire more arms and will reduce the chances of cooperation.”

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23 Pavel Felgenhauer, “Putin Declares His Defense Agenda for the Next Decade,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 9, no. 38 (February, 2012), http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews%5Bany_of_the_words%5D=James%20Brandon%20pkk&tx_ttnews%5Bpointer%5D=4&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39051&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=381&cHash=0cb514fdeb4b2b3b0a661dfe1b7a881#.UiuGdMbOxkE.


Understanding this idea one can see that Russia’s responses to perceived threats have caused the Kremlin to suspend its involvements in international treaties – such as the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty – in order to increase its material power. Russia continues to believe that conventional military reform, conventional rearmament as well as developing and deploying a new generation of nuclear weapons will regain the perceived loss of a balance between itself and the United States. Because of the anarchic nature of the global structure, nations are unable to fully trust each other and are forced to be guided solely by their own self-interest in order to survive.28

Realism provides the starting point for looking at the relationship between Washington and Moscow. It is not, however, the complete view. By looking at what Thomas Risse-Kappen describes as the “interaction of international and domestic influences on state behavior and take the role of ideas – knowledge, values, and strategic concepts,” a more complete view of Russian behavior is uncovered. For Risse-Kappen “ideas intervene between material power-related factors on the one hand and state interests and preferences on the other.”29 Constructivism argues that state identity is important to understanding how a state will react to set situation. According to Ted Hopf identity is one of the key fundamentals in understanding international politics and the nature and definition of those actors: “Constructivism . . . assumes that the selves, or identities, of states are a variable; they likely depend on historical, cultural, political, and social context.”30 In the cases that will be discussed below, I take these ideas and apply them to how the Soviet Union was able to cooperate with the United States at the end of the Cold War by signing the Intermediate Nuclear Forces in Europe Treaty, and how the interests of the new cadre of personalities that are occupying the Kremlin have responded toward Washington’s plan for a limited missile defense shield for Europe.


For my purposes I look at the process by which the ideas were generated in the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation and how new ideas shaped the final foreign policy outcome that led to cooperation on arms control and failure to cooperate on missile defense. I focus on the hypothesis of Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth that a “crisis creates a window of opportunity by discrediting old policies and the ideas associated with them. Idea entrepreneurs then fill the gap by showing how novel ideas resolve strategic dilemmas.”31 These intellectual entrepreneurs may be intellectuals in the various bureaucracies who feed new ideas to their superiors or they are the top leaders themselves. Brooks and Wohlforth further contend that the learning process – for individual leaders or elites – draw less on lessons from specific events but on “elite socialization to new norms or other cultural, social, or intellectual changes in international society.”32 Both ideas provide the explanatory power behind the decisions by Mikhail Gorbachev and his group of intellectual entrepreneurs who were influenced toward a cooperative stance based on their socialization through their association with international organizations who called for cooperative arms reductions. Putin’s regime and his cadre of former KGB and military members, on the other hand, perceive their world based on the socialization they received as members of the Soviet era KGB and post-Soviet collapse FSB, which has influenced them to take an uncooperative approach to the planned deployment of U.S. missile defense systems to Europe.

The Figure 1 diagram offers a visual representation for what has been expressed above and how I propose to view the two case studies.

32 Ibid., 10.
Figure 1. Theoretic Flow from Material Deficiencies to New Foreign Policy
D. METHODS AND SOURCES

Utilizing International Relations Theories from a historical and present day context, an in-depth look at the areas of cooperation between the United States and Russia will be evaluated. Using the same analytical methodology, the areas of non-cooperation will be discussed in order to find where possible common ground is on these strategic issues that affect global security.

E. THESIS OVERVIEW

The thesis will be broken down into four chapters. This first chapter has been an overview of my research question and why it is important to the study of international relations. The second chapter will focus on U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear/arms control cooperation, explaining both why cooperation occurred and how it can be used as a foundation for cooperation in more difficult. The third chapter will focus on the non-cooperation in European missile defense plans. The fourth chapter will contain my concluding arguments and areas for future study.
II. AMERICAN AND RUSSIAN STRATEGIC COOPERATION

Nuclear non-proliferation, arms control, and nuclear arms reduction have been the foundation on which strategic cooperation has been built between the United States, the Soviet Union, and the post-Soviet Russian Federation. President Obama has argued that continued U.S.-Russian cooperation on arms control can help move the U.S. and international agenda for nuclear non-proliferation forward. It has also been argued that American and Russian cooperation on arms control could strengthen U.S.-Russian cooperation on an array of other issues that currently plague their relationship. The cooperative foundation built during the Cold War that has extended beyond the collapse of the Soviet Union provides insight into how cooperation is built between opposing super-powers and can provide the factors needed to create cooperation in areas of contention between the United States and the Russian Federation.

This chapter will show why cooperation occurred between the United States and the Soviet Union in the late 1980’s by showing that material deficiencies led the Gorbachev regime to turn to its intellectual entrepreneurs in order to find solutions to the Soviet material decline. Soviet intellectual entrepreneurs then turned to international organizations that provided inputs that supported arms reductions in order to aide in achieving economic reforms. It can be argued that because the deterrent capabilities of the Soviet armed forces at the time was sufficient to provide a suitable deterrent that the Kremlin elite were able to cooperate with the United States on the elimination of Intermediate Nuclear Forces from the European continent. After all, Gorbachev did make unilateral cuts in the conventional forces shortly after the signing of the INF Treaty to further reduce the costs that the Soviet armed forces were absorbing.

I break this chapter into two sections, the first section provides a historical perspective by looking at a brief history of U.S.-Russian arms control talks and treaties dating back to the 1960’s.


In the second section the focus will shift to the modern arms limitation treaties between the United States, the Soviet Union, and Russian Federation. Utilizing the research conducted by Stephen Brooks, William Wohlforth, and Thomas Risse-Kappen and by taking a realist and constructivist view to connect material deficiencies to intellectual entrepreneurs to cooperative outcome I use the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) as a case study to determine what factors led to successful nuclear talks between the Americans and the Russians at the end of the Cold War.

A. HISTORICAL STRATEGIC COOPERATION ON ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION.

The United States and Russia have a deep history of strategic cooperation that provides a foundation for U.S.-Russian relations. The first steps toward cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union began in 1963 with the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT). The PTBT prohibited the testing of nuclear weapons except in underground facilities. The PTBT was designed to ease the tension created by the Cuban Missile Crisis and to slow the arms race.35

The PTBT was soon followed by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty in 1968. The NPT’s objective is to “prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament.”36 The NPT represents a binding commitment to the overall goal of disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States and “declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race.”37

The strategic cooperation formed during the 1960’s led to a policy of détente during the 1970’s leading to the first arms reduction talks between the United States and Russia. In 1972 the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) was concluded and


37 Ibid..
resulted in two treaties: first, the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms was to limit the offensive nuclear weapons of both countries, more specifically limiting strategic ballistic missile launchers to their existing number; the second was the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that would limit the number of deployed national missile defense systems - ABM systems and the Treaty will be discussed at length later.\textsuperscript{38}

With détente still holding, Washington and the Kremlin began further talks from 1977 to 1979, which resulted in SALT II:

“1,320 equal aggregate limit on MIRV systems; a ban on construction of new land-based ICBM launchers limits on deployment of new types of strategic offensive arms; and important elements of the Interim Agreement (e.g., relating to verification) would be incorporated in the new agreement; finally 2,400 equal aggregate limit on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers).”\textsuperscript{39}

Due to the Soviet invasion of the Afghanistan, President Jimmy Carter withdrew the treaty from congressional ratification in 1979. Despite this cooling in relations both the Soviet Union and the United States abided by the treaty until 1986 when President Ronald Reagan withdrew from SALT II due to perceived violations of the treaty by the USSR. In the end the treaty was never ratified by either country but its limitations were maintained well into the 1980’s when the next round of talks began under new Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev and his policies of Perestroika and Glasnost.\textsuperscript{40}

The Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty of 1987 required the United States and the Soviet Union to “verifiably eliminate all ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers.”\textsuperscript{41} The INF established an


\textsuperscript{40} Country Profile: Russia, Nuclear Threat Initiative, http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/russia/nuclear/.

unprecedented, intrusive inspection regime, to include on-site inspections, laying the groundwork for the verification process of the subsequent Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties.

The next series of treaties, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and II) would continue to reduce the number of nuclear weapons between the old Cold War adversaries. START I provides a framework for detailed verification of arms reduction that had not been previously seen. Signed in 1991, START I limited both nations to “1600 delivery vehicles that could carry no more than 6000 ‘accountable’ warheads.”

START II would further limit the number to a range of 3000 to 3500 warheads. START II was signed and ratified by the Russian Duma in 2000 but was never entered into force due to concerns over the withdrawal of the United States from the ABM treaty in 2002.

Both the INF and START treaties will be discussed at length in section two of this chapter.

The collapse of the Soviet Union created a need for a different kind of cooperation. The Nunn-Lugar Act, or the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, was initiated as a measure to secure nuclear material and facilities during the era of political, economic and social crisis among the former Soviet states. Anton Khlopkov et al. argue that through projects like CTR the Russian Federation and the United States have “increased mutual confidence, established regular contacts between Russian and U.S. government experts and nuclear scientists, and enriched overall nuclear security technologies and procedures, all of which has ultimately led to the sustainable progress in nuclear security.” These programs have also provided an important means of maintaining the cooperation between Russia and the United States. Through bilateral


43 Ibid.


arrangements an environment for future work on a range of nuclear non-proliferation problems has been created. Jim Nichol echoed this sentiment in his Congressional Research Service report from February 2011. He states that the CTR’s use in Russia is an example that can be used as a model for future “nonproliferation and anti-terrorism assistance to nations around the world.”

B. MODERN NUCLEAR ARMS TREATIES AND THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

1. Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty

Formal Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union began in November of 1981 and concluded in 1987. By the end of negotiations on the table was the elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapon delivery systems. The signing of the INF Treaty would give a boost to other nuclear arms control negotiations that would lead to the signing and implementation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I). The INF Treaty also set precedence for negotiating stringent inspection regimes that are still relevant and part of today’s arms reduction treaty negotiations (New START). In this section first I provide a brief history of the INF Treaty, followed by my theoretical analysis of the cooperative relationship that developed between the United States and the Soviet Union by utilizing realist and constructivist theories of international relations.

a. Brief History of the INF

By the Mid 1970’s the Soviets had begun a program of replacing its aging “medium range” nuclear delivery systems – the old SS-4 and SS-5 missile systems were to be replaced with the more advanced and capable SS-20 missile system. The SS-20 missile system had a range of 5,000 kilometers and could carry three warheads instead of the single warhead of the SS-4 and SS-5 systems. The SS-20 also had a solid fuel motor system that sped up pre-launch preparation times. More importantly was that the entire

46 Ibid., 8.

SS-20 system was fully mobile and concealable until erected for launch. With its longer range, mobility, and three warheads capable of striking European capitals, the deployment of Soviet SS-20 missile systems increased the tension between Europe and its Soviet neighbors. In order to calm its NATO allies the United States devised a “dual-track” approach to its negotiations with the Soviet Union over INF missile threats. The “dual-track” approach combined bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on arms control with the deployment of new US INF missile systems to Europe. The “arms control” track focused on “achieving a balance at the lowest possible levels” while the “deployment track” set in motion the deployment of nuclear armed Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) systems to the European continent. If negotiations on the “arms control” track failed then the United States would replace the 108 Pershing IA missile systems in West Germany with 108 of the Pershing II missile systems. In addition to the Pershing II systems 116 GLCM’s would be deployed to the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy.

b. 1981-1983 Negotiations

When initial INF negotiations opened in 1981 five guiding principles governed the US position: (1) negotiations would be bilateral; (2) any limitation on US INF must be accompanied by Soviet INF limitations; (3) objective of negotiations would be to limit US and Soviet INF missile systems; (4) any limitations would be one of equality in both numbers and in rights; (5) any agreed to limitation must be verifiable. Just before negotiations were to open Reagan announced that the new stance of the Americans would be a “zero-zero” position. In other words, the United States would not deploy any Pershing or GLCM systems if the Soviet Union agreed to destroy its inventory of SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 INF missile systems. The initial proposal was


summarily rejected by the Soviets, who counter-proposed that both parties should have equal numbers of medium range systems in Europe.\textsuperscript{50}

Negotiations remained non-conclusive over much of 1982, and in early 1983 with the consent of NATO, US negotiators established an outline for an agreement that was other the Reagan’s initial “zero-zero” that included equal limits and rights, no inclusion of third party systems, and limits to apply globally. While the sides exchanged several proposals, it remained clear that the two parties remained too far apart to make any real headway. Adding to the stagnation was the looming deployment of US INF systems to Europe in late 1983. Throughout the negotiations the Soviets had maintained that should the United States deploy its new INF systems to Europe the Soviets would withdrawal from negotiations. True to their word the Soviets walked out of the negotiations in November of 1983 with the first deployment of Pershing II missile systems to West Germany.\textsuperscript{51}

c. 1985-1987 Negotiations

By 1985 the Soviet Union had a new premier in the form of newly elected General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, and in the United States President Ronald Reagan was in the first year of his second term. This period in Soviet-US cooperative history, 1985-1991, is marked by a transition in the relationship between the Cold War adversaries. Gorbachev under the constraints of a failing economic system began to change the thinking of the Soviet Union in terms of guaranteeing security by seeking an improved international security environment:

“Security cannot be built endlessly on fear of retaliation, in other words, on the doctrines of ‘containment’ or ‘deterrence.’ . . . In the context of the relations between the USSR and the USA, security can only be mutual . . . The highest wisdom is not in caring exclusively for oneself, especially to the detriment of the other side. It is vital that all should feel equally secure . . . In the military sphere we intend to act in such a ways to give nobody grounds for fear, even imagined ones, about their security.”\textsuperscript{52}


\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 10.

\textsuperscript{52} Risse-Kappen, “Ideas do not Float Freely,” 200-201.
For the United States and President Reagan the goal was to break from the previous negotiation schemes of Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter – which focused on delivery vehicles – and focus on limiting “the actual weapons, the warheads, ‘which are what kill people.’”

Once negotiations restarted in early 1985 the Soviet planned goal was to link progress in the areas of INF to progress in other areas like START, BMD and other space issues. However, by October of ’85 Gorbachev began to voice that the Soviet Union might be able to accept the INF as a separate agreement that was delinked from the other negotiations. Included in delinking BMD and START was the removal of British and French nuclear systems from “the ledger.”

It would not be until the Reagan-Gorbachev summit of October 1986 in Reykjavik that real progress towards the total elimination of INF systems began to take shape. Up to this point the Soviets had maintained that an equal limit between the United States and Soviet Union should be maintained, but at ever decreasing numbers. By late 1986 the Soviets proposed that “the United States and Soviet Union eliminate all of their INF missile systems in Europe.” While this did not include the Asian based systems it was a drastic move toward the initial Reagan proposed treaty of “zero-zero.” By 1987 the deal was all but concluded with both sides agreeing to the zero-zero proposal of the United States all that was left to negotiate was how the intrusive inspection regime would be framed. Negotiators would continue to work on the inspection guidelines up until the eleventh hour before President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev were to sign the final INF treaty on 8 December, 1987.

C. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

Soviet policy transition in the 1980’s has been a hotly debated topic since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Several theories have risen from the ashes of the

53 Schenck and Youmans, “From Start to Finish,”425.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid., 11-12
Soviet Union with each of the major ideologies weighing in on what the causal factors might have been for such a drastic changing in Soviet foreign policy. Two examples include: the realist idea, as put forth by Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, that it was material factors that lead to the Soviet policy changes; and a liberal/constructivist view as presented by Thomas Risse-Kappen, that it was the social interactions of the Soviet elite and the institutions they attended that brought about the change in thinking along with domestic structures that ultimately led to the turnaround in Soviet elite foreign policy thinking. Utilizing the research conducted by Brooks/Wohlforth and Risse-Kappen and by taking a realist/constructivist view I propose that it was a mix of the two, that it was the material factors that led the Soviet elite to turn to the states intellectual entrepreneurs and the international institutions they were a part of to find the solutions they needed to make a change in the Soviet foreign policy stance towards the west:
Figure 2. Theoretical Flow from Material Factors to a New Soviet Foreign Policy
First a look at the material factors that led the Soviet elite to determine that the policy of retrenchment as put forward and enacted by Gorbachev. Second, I will look at the role that international institutions and the social interactions of the Soviet elites within those institutions played in creating the ideas that ultimately shaped the Soviet Union’s foreign policy. Finally, I will analyze some counterarguments and by defending against them prove that in the end the material factors and social interactions in the international institutional arena were the causal mechanism that resulted in the foreign policy change of the Soviet Union.

a. The Material Decline of the Soviet Union

The perception and in fact reality of a material deficiency between the Soviet Union and the United States is the underlying factor that caused the Soviet Union to reconsider its status. As Brooks and Wohlforth show, the Soviet Union was in a systemic decline that could not be attributed to the normal cycle and the ability to maintain the status quo could no longer be sustained. According to both Soviet and CIA estimates the Soviet decline economically began as far back as the 1960’s. By the 1970’s the decline in Soviet economic capabilities took and even greater toll on the economy as rates of return on investment declined, the number of patents that were approved to Soviet scientist also declined, even in the face of increased expenditures for R&D by the state, and the Soviet Union became the “first industrialized country to register peacetime declines in life expectancy and infant mortality.”

By the 1980’s the Soviet’s had reached the point of no return in terms of economic capability and that the gap in both economic terms and technological terms could never be overcome.

From a fiscal perspective the Soviet Union dedicated massive amounts of resources to their military apparatus and maintaining the status quo. Estimates show that the Soviet Union dedicated 40 percent of its budget, or 15-20 percent of GDP towards defense. These numbers were almost 4 times higher than that of the United States during the same time period, early 1980’s. What is also staggering is that because of their

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58 Ibid., 19.
“imperial overstretch,” the amount they were spending was increasing as costs in maintaining its empire doubled between 1972 and 1982. Part of that overstretch can be seen with the imposing of martial law in Poland in 1981, as a result huge subsidized loans were granted to the states of Poland, Bulgaria, and East Germany.\textsuperscript{59}

Faced with these economic and technological problems and using the realist framework there are three options that a state can take when faced with imminent decline within the bi-polar system: go to war in order to reverse the decline, do nothing and continue to maintain the status quo, or appease the dominant power and foster a policy of retrenchment in order to revitalize domestic production and reverse your decline. In response to the first two options, going to war with the United States and its western allies would not have been an option because of nuclear deterrence. Maintaining the status quo was impossible because of the rapid decline of the Soviet economy coupled with the increased spending on defense. The fact that the status quo could not be maintained was emphasized by Gorbachev when he stated in a Politburo session that “our goal is to prevent the next round of the arms race. If we do not accomplish it, the threat to us will only grow. We will be pulled into another round of the arms race that is beyond our capabilities . . . because we are already at the limit of our capabilities.”\textsuperscript{60} This statement by Gorbachev along with the material factors, and as we will see during the intellectual entrepreneur and idea formation process, appeasement was the Soviet Union’s best option.\textsuperscript{61}

\textit{b. Intellectual Entrepreneurs, Social Interactions and International Institutions}

As was previously shown the economic and fiscal problems that were facing the Soviet Union were of a systemic rather than a cyclical nature. As a result pressures on the Soviet foreign policy stance began to mount. As a result, new ideas of foreign policy needed to be formed in order to combat the perceived and real gap

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., 22-23.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 29.
between the Soviet Union and its rival the United States. With the reality of the gap beginning to set in, Gorbachev turned to the more radical intellectual entrepreneurs to find new ideas as he embarked on a public campaign to change the old way of thinking policy practices and what the Soviet Union’s international role would be in the future. The question then is where were these new intellectual entrepreneurs gaining their insight? How were they able to pass their new ideas onto the Soviet elite?

By looking at the research done by Risse-Kappen we can begin to put answers to the previous two questions. We will look first at some of the Soviet intellectual entrepreneurs that had close ties to both Gorbachev and the Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and how they utilized two key Soviet organizations that were involved in transnational institutes for change: the United States of America and Canada Institute (ISKAN) run by Georgii Arbatov and his deputy Andrei Kokoshins; also, we will look at the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) and its efforts to create a change in Soviet foreign policy.62

ISKAN would become a crucial link between the international community and Gorbachev’s inner circle. As director of ISKAN Georgii Arbatov was involved in the Palme commission or the Independent Commission for Disarmament and Security, but he also held a key position in the Gorbachev cabinet giving him a unique opportunity to directly influence Gorbachev’s thinking on foreign policy and Soviet security issues.63 What the Palme commission offered would be instrumental in shaping east west relations by introducing the concept of common security.64 With the advent of the atomic and hydrogen bombs the idea that a full scale war could be won by either side had lived out its time and that in the new world order a common security for all needed to be established in both the east and the west. The commission provided the framework for how to “define the principles of a cooperative East-West security regime and spelled them out with regard to arms control, confidence-building measures and economic

63 Ibid., 202.
64 Ibid., 198.
cooperation.”  According to Arbatov the Palme commission was very significant in changing the political thinking within the Soviet Union.

To a lesser extent the impact that the IMEMO had on changing Soviet thinking was through aides to Gorbachev and not through direct access such as with ISKAN. As the new head of the Department of Disarmament and International security, Alexei Arbatov a radical “New Thinker” and son of ISKAN director Arbatov, helped to foster new ideas and thinking. The IMEMO was able to forward its ideas for change, especially in changing the idea that America’s capitalism was an enemy, through two key advisors in the Gorbachev inner circle, Aleksandr Yakovlev and Tevgeniy Primakov. The IMEMO proposal also worked to show that through interdependence the goals of both the Soviet Union and the United States could be met.

IMEMO and ISKAN provided the mechanism for transferring new ideas to the Soviet intellectual entrepreneurs. These intellectual entrepreneurs then in turn aided General Secretary Gorbachev in creating the ideas of glasnost and the new approach of a non-confrontational stance towards the west. According to Donaldson and Nogee, the ‘new thinking’ in Soviet “foreign policy proceeded from the premise of the ‘interdependence of states and peoples. In an interdependent world, Gorbachev reasoned, national security could not be based on the use or threat of nuclear power. Rather, security for the superpowers must be mutual, and must be ensured by political means.”

The new Soviet policy of an interdependent world along with Gorbachev and Reagan’s desires to limit nuclear weapons, if not eliminate them entirely, directly led to the agreement on Intermediate Nuclear Forces in February 1987. The agreement was to eliminate a dangerous threat to the security of Europe, the entire class of intermediate nuclear forces.

65 Ibid., 199.
66 Ibid., 202.
67 Ibid..
68 Ibid., 194.
INF, having been in negotiation since late 1981, allowed Gorbachev to make the greatest strides toward creating a non-confrontational stance towards the west. Gorbachev was able to use what Matthew Evangelista calls the strong normative commitment to nuclear disarmament within the soviet elite to his advantage in ultimately achieving the treaty. However, there is the possibility that it was the proposed deployment of the Pershing II and GLCMs to Europe that led the elite to support the INF, a purely realist perspective. According to Bohlen et al, the Soviet elite determined that the sacrifice of their INF was more palatable than the full deployment of US Pershing II and GLCM’s. The potential fear was that the new Pershing II’s would be capable of reaching Moscow and “thus could threaten a quick, decapitating nuclear strike.”

Another argument can be made that the large standing army of the Soviet Union in the late 1980’s allowed for Gorbachev to push for the reduction in INF; however in 1988 Gorbachev announced unilateral troop reductions and shortly after accepted the Western proposal to establish a conventional parity in Central Europe during the Conventional Forces in Europe negotiations. Ultimately, due to material factors, the reorientation of Soviet policy was influenced by the transnational interactions that international institutions provided. By having access to the inner circle, either directly or indirectly, the result that the institutchiks achieved was a major policy shift towards the west by providing a rationalized argument for the need to make a dramatic change.

D. CONCLUSIONS

Nuclear arms reductions and arms control are the cooperative foundation on which relations between the United States and the Russian Federation is built. Starting in the 1960’s and culminating in the signing of the INF treaty in 1987, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the post-Soviet Russian Federation have continued to build their relationship on this foundation concluding such arms control treaties as START I and II, SORT, and new START. These treaties have significantly reduced the number of nuclear weapons that the two largest holders of these destructive weapons currently hold. Under

new START the number of deployable strategic nuclear warheads was reduced to 1,550 and strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to 700, with the goal of seven years from inception to reach the new levels. The reductions are 75 percent lower than the original START treaty and nearly 30 percent lower than those negotiated in SORT.73

This has all been achieved thanks to the INF treaty. While there were many treaties that sought to limit the arms race and control the spread of the nuclear weapons, i.e. NPT and PTBT. However, it was not until the INF that real strides could be made in the true reduction of nuclear weapons. For the Soviet Union the road to the INF negotiations began in the 1960’s as the Soviet economy began its steady decline towards total collapse. It is the material factors of a declining economy that led the Soviet elite to turn toward transnational institutions such as the Palme commission, ISKAN, and IMEMO in order to find new ideas for correcting the material deficiencies of the Soviet Union. What resulted was the Soviet ‘new thinking’ that allowed Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to achieve his goals of reforming the Soviet foreign policy from an atagonistic approach toward the West to one of interdependence.74

In the world of nuclear superpowers, Gorbachev argued for mutual, political advancements in the relationship between the East and West in order to achieve and maintain international security. For INF this meant the concession to the West’s call for the ‘zero-zero’ by the Soviets. Reagan’s ‘zero-zero’ called for the complete removal of the entire class of intermediate nuclear forces from the Soviet and American inventories. Some have argued that the response by the Soviets was based on realist factors as the United States was beginning its deployment of the new Pershing II nuclear tipped missiles into Europe as part of its two pronged approach to INF negotiations. The Soviets believed that the concession on INF to ‘zero-zero’ was a better option than the possibility of continued Pershing II deployments to NATO. It also achieved Gorbachev’s ‘new thinking’ goal of nuclear arms reductions.

73 Schenck and Youmans, “From Start to Finish,” 432.
74 Donaldson and Nogee, The Foreign Policy of Russia, 95.
To conclude, the INF was the stepping stone that established intrusive inspection regimes and began the push by both the Soviet and post-Soviet Russian Federation to conclude drastic nuclear arms reduction treaties with the United States. The road to these historic treaties begins with the material problems of the Soviet Union. As the elite looked for solutions, they turned to transnational organizations and institutions in order to seek new ideas for reform. The elite intellectual entrepreneurs then influenced the primary foreign policy maker, Gorbachev, or where foreign policy makers themselves, Shevardenadze, to make dramatic foreign policy changes that led to Soviet ‘new thinking’ culminating in a conciliatory stance in achieving INF.
III. THE UNITED STATES, RUSSIA, AND THE BMD DEBATE

A. INTRODUCTION

The attacks on the World Trade Center towers by Islamic terrorists in September 2001 altered fundamentally the status of global international relations. The new threat brought on by the attacks led to new areas of cooperation between the United States and its former adversary, the Russian Federation. However, when President George W. Bush unilaterally announced the withdrawal of the United States from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense (ABM) Treaty in December of 2001 the trust fostered following the September 2001 attacks disappeared, and created an acrimonious environment between Washington and Moscow. Furthermore, the withdrawal from the ABM treaty in 2002 has placed the cooperative relationship between the United States and Russia with regards to European security in jeopardy.

In the previous chapter I showed how material deficiencies forced the Soviet intellectual entrepreneurs to turn to international organizations in order to construct new ideas for Soviet foreign policy that led to cooperation and the ultimate signing of the INF treaty. In this chapter I utilize the same method in order to look at how the material factors have led the new cadre of elite controlling the Kremlin to turn to their intellectual entrepreneurs to create new ideas to cope with the material decline of the Russian armed forces. The difference between the two chapters is that the influence on the intellectual entrepreneurs of the Soviet era is vastly different than the influences on the ruling elite of today’s Russian Federation. I argue that the ruling elite and intellectual entrepreneurs inhabiting the Kremlin today are influenced by their socialization in and association with the security services of the former Soviet Union and post-Cold War Russian Federation. That socialization has led them to perceive any move by the United States as a direct threat on the security of Russia. For the United States as, arguably, the global hegemon in terms of material capability and wealth the incentive to cooperate is low since it can use its material power to exploit others to achieve its security goals.
In the first of three sections, I conduct a brief look at the current BMD capabilities of the Russian Federation and the United States. The second section provides a brief outline of the ABM treaty followed by a discussion of the Russian perspective on the United States unilateral withdrawal from the treaty and decision to deploy the ballistic missile defense system to Europe. In the final section of this chapter I show how material deficiencies have led the Siloviki, who rely on their socialization in the KGB and FSB, to determine how the Russian Federation will react to the United States PAA to missile defense of the European continent. In this penultimate section of the chapter I focus on who the Siloviki are, what they want, and how their views affect U.S.-Russian relations.

B. CURRENT BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES

1. Current Russian Ballistic Missile Defense Capabilities

The unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the ABM Treaty caused a stir in the political and military circles of Russia. The Kremlin was forced to reconsider the issue of establishing an air-space defense (ASD) system within Russia. In 2006 Russian President Vladimir Putin approved “The Concept of Air-Space Defense of the Russian Federation to 2016 and the Following Period.” According to General of the Army and president of the Academy of Military Sciences Makhmut Gareev the reasons for the creation of a national ASD system is due to the nature of modern warfare:

Given the current nature of warfare, its center of gravity and main efforts are shifting to air-space. The leading countries of the world put the main emphasis on achieving superiority in air and space by conducting large-scale air-space operation with massive strikes against strategic and vitally important targets all over the country at the very beginning of a war. In these circumstances, instead of recreating a separate branch of the Armed Forces, it is necessary to approach the mission of air-space defense by consolidating the efforts of all services of the Armed Forces and centralize their management under the leadership of the Supreme Commander and the General Staff of the Armed Forces.76


76 Ibid., 148
According to Vikor Esin the ASD Force consists of: the Plesetsk State Testing Cosmodrome in Mirny, Arkhangelsk Oblast; The Titov Main Test and Space Systems Control Center in Krasnoznamensk, Moscow Oblast; The Main Center for Missile Attack Warning in Solnechnorosrsk, Moscow Oblast; The Main Space Surveillance Control Center in Noginsk-9, Moscow Oblast; The 9th Missile Defense Division in Sofrino-1, Moscow Oblast; three air-space defense brigades; Scientific Experimental Station no. 45 at the Kura Test Range, Kamchatka Krai; The Office for the introduction of new systems and facilities in Krasnogorsk, Moscow Oblast; Logistic, security and supply units; The Alexander Mozhaisk Military Space Academy in St. Petersburg with branches in Pushkin, Kubinka, and Cherepovets; finally, the Military Space Cadet Corps in St. Petersburg.\textsuperscript{77} The Russian military scientists view the role of the above forces as “set of country-wide and military activities, operations, and actions by combat troops . . . to provide timely warning of an imminent air-space attack by an adversary, counter such an attack and defend vital sites, military force concentrations, and the population.”\textsuperscript{78} To accomplish its role, the ASD force now controls Russia’s Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (SPRN), the space monitoring system, the A-135 strategic area BMD, and surface-to-air systems.\textsuperscript{79}

Russia’s early warning radar system, the SPRN, is analogous to the U.S. Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) consisting of two echelons: a space echelon and a ground based echelon. The space echelon is used to detect ballistic missile launches, while the ground-based echelon receives initial launch data from the space echelon to begin continuous tracking of the outbound missile in order to determine estimated impact site. SPRN ground-based radar systems, or radio-technical nodes (ORTU), are located in several locations within the Russian Federation. Three other ORTU nodes that were deployed in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Belarus, and two nodes that were located in Ukraine have since been discontinued from service. Each node

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., 150-151.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., 151.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid.,
utilizes one of four types of radar – Dnepr-M, Daryal, Volga, or Voronezh-M – able to detect exoatmospheric targets at ranges of 4,000 to 6,000 km.\textsuperscript{80}

As stated the A-135 strategic area BMD system was only limitedly deployed – within a 150 km radius of Moscow. The system is equipped with a command and control center, two sectoral Dunay-3 type radars, multi-function Don-2n radar for preliminary target designation for missile tracking and intercept, and the 53T6 \textit{Gazelle} short-range interceptor missile.\textsuperscript{81} The \textit{Gazelle} interceptors are deployed at five sites: Lytkarino (16), Sofrino (12), Korolev (12) Skhodnya (16), and Vnukovo (12).\textsuperscript{82}

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., 152-153.

\textsuperscript{81} The A-135 BMD system was also equipped with 32 long-range 51T6 (Gorgon) interceptors which since have been removed from the system, most likely to accommodate new long range interceptors currently under development.

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<tr>
<th>Station</th>
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<th>Range</th>
<th>Altitudes</th>
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Table 1. Current Russian Early Warning Radar Sites and Capabilities

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2. **Current United States Ballistic Missile Defense Capabilities**

Upon taking office in 2008, President Barack Obama directed a comprehensive review of the U.S. missile defense plan. The ten month study resulted in a new approach to missile defense in Europe, the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA). The PAA provided new threat assessments as well as a plan to exploit new technologies and capabilities. The original PAA would be implemented over four phases, starting with implementation of Phase 1 in 2011 and ending with Phase 4 implementation in 2020.

Current United States BMD capabilities provide a very limited form of protection from ICBM threats. The current system to protect the continental United States relies on Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD). In 2010 it was projected that by the end of the FY a total of 30 Ground-based Interceptors (GBI) would be deployed, 26 interceptors at Fort Greely in Alaska and 4 at Vandenberg in California. This number was updated in a statement by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel on March 15, 2013 to a total of 44 GBI’s, adding an additional 14 interceptors to the Fort Greely site.

Regional capabilities have also progressed with the development of increased capabilities of the shore based PATRIOT (PAC-3) batteries and the new Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries. Sea based systems have also developed with advancements in the Aegis combat suite and development of the advanced capability SM-3 Block IA-IIB missile systems. Each system can be fully integrated and receive launch data from sea and space assets.


Phase one detailed the deployment of current missile technologies with a proven track record. The systems included the Sea-based Aegis Weapons system and its SM-3 Block IA missile, and sensors such as the AN/TPY-2 Army-Navy Transportable Radar Surveillance system. Phase two is to be implemented by 2015 following further development and testing of a more capable SM-3 interceptor for both land and sea based systems and improved sensor systems, allowing for an expansion of defended areas against short- and medium-range missile threats. Phase three further builds on current technology advancements to deploy the SM-3 Block IIA to counter short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missile threats by 2018. Phase four was scheduled to be implemented by 2020, and would have deployed the SM-3 Block IIB missile system that would have been capable of intercepting medium- and intermediate-range missiles with the potential for future engagement of ICBM threats to the United States, but has since been canceled by the United States.89

C. THE 1972 ABM TREATY AND THE RUSSIAN RESPONSE

In 2002, when President Bush withdrew the United States from the ABM Treaty Russia warned “that the loss of the treaty would undermine the nuclear strategic stability on which the delicate balance of terror had rested during the Cold War,” claiming that a world without the ABM treaty would jeopardize the other standing arms control agreements – START I and II, INF, and even the NPT.90 According to Celeste Wallander, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty is the backbone of strategic stability and is the foundation on which the array of arms reduction and nuclear non-proliferation treaties has been built. In the view of Moscow and its former Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov, if the ABM is thrown aside then the “interconnected system will collapse, nullifying 30 years of efforts by the world community.”91 What exactly is the ABM Treaty and why was it perceived as so important by the Russian Federation? Is it the

foundation for the “interconnected system” of arms reduction and nuclear non-proliferation treaties as Igor Ivanov claims? What factors are persistent in the BMD debate that is causing the United States and Russia to not cooperate?

1. **1972 ABM Treaty**

In 1972 the United States and the USSR signed into force the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. Signed on May 26, 1972 in Moscow by General Secretary of the Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev and Ratified by the President of the United States Richard Nixon on September 23, 1972 the treaty entered into force on October 3, 1972. Article XIV of the treaty called for review five years after implementation and then at five year intervals thereafter. The ABM treaty allowed for each party to have two ABM defense positions “so restricted and so located that they cannot provide a nationwide ABM defense or become the basis for developing one.”

The locations of the two defended sites had to be at least 1,300 kilometers apart with no more than 100 interceptor missiles and 100 launchers. The parties agreed that one of the two sites could defend its capital while the other could be placed to defend an ICBM launch site. In addition to the limitation on the number of launch sites, interceptors and launchers, the treaty stipulated that each party would limit any qualitative improvement to their ABM systems. This included a ban on the development, testing, or deployment of sea-based, air-based, or space-based ABM systems.

2. **The Russian Perspective**

The stated reason for the United States National Missile Defense (NMD) system is that the “United States is threatened by the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology by certain ‘states of concern’.” In the view of the Russians this is an unrealistic fear. According to Russian analysts the threat from North Korea is ten

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93 Ibid.

years away and the threat from Iran is twenty to twenty-five years away - keep in mind that this article was written in 2000 and as recently as early 2013 N. Korea successfully detonated a nuclear device and continues to advance its missile capabilities working on the Taepadong-2 missile with a range of 5000 to 6000 km.  

Russia believes that the creation and deployment of strategic missile defense systems in former Warsaw Pact states undermines global stability. Also, ABM defensive systems could be a future counter to the Russian ICBM portion of their nuclear deterrence triad. According to Wallander, the disagreement to the United States withdrawal from the ABM is complicated and requires an understanding of Russia’s national security issues, status of its military, foreign policy doctrine, capabilities of Russian conventional and nuclear forces, and the role that nuclear weapons play in Russia’s defense posture. To support her assessment, Wallander provides examples of how Russia perceives threats to its national security. They include the enlargement of NATO, which in the eyes of the Russian Federation has increased the alliances conventional capability while Russia’s conventional forces have been on a steady decline since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russian analysts have concluded that “Russia’s conventional forces are insufficient to defeat external aggression and internal conflicts.”

As a result of the decline in their conventional forces’ capabilities to defend the homeland, Russia has lowered the threshold for the use of nuclear forces in an armed conflict.

Wallander further argues that with a limited U.S. NMD system deployed in Europe and in the United States then the calculations for the Russian retaliatory capability must be changed. If the U.S. develops a robust NMD system then the Russians have stated that they would consider arming the Topol-M missile with a multiple

95 Ibid..  
98 Ibid., 340.
warhead system. By creating a multiple warhead capable rocket, the Russians believe they will be able to counter the defensive capability of the U.S./NATO ABM system. Also of concern is that if the United States deploys an NMD system what will the Chinese response be? Russia assumes that with a U.S. NMD system deployed the Chinese will respond with an increase in deployment of missiles to counter the new American defense capability. Russia will then respond with an increase in their number of deployed warheads in order to maintain a credible deterrence. 

Dmitri Trenin sums the Russian stance up well stating that the Russian elite “focus on states’ military capabilities, rather than their political affiliations. Essentially this means that any country with a substantial military potential – whether an advanced Western democracy, an emerging Asian power, or a restive Middle Eastern regime – can become a threat to Russia.”

The Kremlin has put forward two counter-proposals of its own to support a Europe wide missile defense system. The first was proposed on June 7, 2007, during the G-8 meeting in Germany, when President Vladimir Putin offered to partner with the United States on missile defense. The Putin proposal suggested that the Soviet-era radar facility in Azerbaijan was an ideal location to track and target hostile missile launched from the Middle East. Putin also suggested a week later that the Bush proposed location of interceptors in Poland was not ideal and that “GMD interceptors be ‘placed in the south, in U.S. NATO allies such as Turkey, or even Iraq . . . or on sea platforms.’” In July 2007, Putin also suggested that missile defense be coordinated through the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). By using the NRC it would allow for the cooperation on missile

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99 Topol-M (SS-27) and RS-24 missile systems have been developed at the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology. Topol-M exists in two versions -- silo-based and road-mobile. Deployment of the silo-based version began in 1997. The road-mobile version has completed flight tests in December 2004. The first mobile missiles began service in December 2006. The missile has three solid-propellant stages and was initially developed as a single-warhead missile. In 2007 Russia began tests of a MIRVed version of the Topol-M mobile missile, which was designated RS-24. Deployment of this missile began in 2010.

100 Wallander, “Russia’s New Security Policy,” 341;


defense to be expanded to other European counties and away from the Czech Republic and Poland – a point of contention for the Russians. Cooperation through the NRC would allow for the use of a radar facility in southern Russia for early warning and tracking.  

In November 2010 Russian President Dmitri Medvedev proposed a sector-based missile defense system. In cooperation with the United States and NATO the sector-based system would establish a system where every country would be responsible for a particular sector. Russian Ambassador to NATO Dmitry Rogozin described the system “as ‘two knights standing back to back,’ each fighting off dangers that appeared in his own geographical sphere of responsibility.” Jeffery Mankoff further described the system as a highly integrated system, to include “highly sensitive command and control functions and fire control.” Due to the sectorial nature of the system, NATO and Russian sectors would need to overlap, requiring that Russia be responsible for the defense of NATO territories and vice-a-versa.

D. FACTORS OF NON-COOPERATION AND THE THEORETICAL INROADS

In the previous chapter I discussed the factors of cooperation that led to the eventual signing of the INF treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union. Utilizing the factors that led to cooperation on INF – realist material decline and constructivist intellectual entrepreneurship – I propose that these theories can be utilized in analyzing the current relationship between the United States and Russia. Many of the material factors have been discussed in the previous section of this chapter will be further analyzed here. The second part of the section will focus on the current cadre of intellectual entrepreneurs that have the ear of President Putin and how their cold war

103 Ibid.
104 Tsypkin, “Russia, America and Missile Defense,” 56.

43
thinking and their secret service and military backgrounds have perpetuated an anti-west attitude that is reflected in Russia’s non-cooperation on missile defense.

1. **Material factors**

   “Let us be realists – in the near future Russia hardly will succeed in catching up with and overtaking the leading powers in terms of technological level of development. Our economy is ten times less than the American economy and Russia’s scientific potential essentially was demolished after the USSR’s disintegration. Today the lag behind leading Western counties in a number of critical basic technologies is dozens of years.”

108

As Dimitry Rogozin, Russia’s Vice Prime Minister and Military-Industrial commission Chairman, indicates in the quote above, the material status of the Russian Federation is still lagging behind the rest of the industrialized powers. To add further insult to injury Russia’s conventional forces have been on a steady decline since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russian analysts have concluded that “Russia’s conventional forces are insufficient to defeat external aggression and internal conflicts.”

109 As a result of the decline in their conventional forces’ capabilities the Russian Federation has lowered the threshold for the use of nuclear forces in an armed conflict; therefore, Russia will rely on its nuclear arsenal for its defense, escalation control, and deterrence policies.  

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What are the current shortfalls of the Russian military, and what steps is the Ministry of Defense (MOD) taking to return the military to its past glory? The answer lies in two events in recent history that help to explain the current conventional capabilities of the Russian Federation: The Russo-Georgian War and the large-scale military exercise that were conducted in the Russian Far East military district in February 2013.

108 Dmitry Rogozin, “Five War Scenarios: Dmitriy Rogozin: Russia Must Be Independent and Strong, Or it will not Exist at all,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, July 3, 2013, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1398256519/13F23AAC145142F6D87/1


In 2008 the Russian army invaded Georgia, one of the former Soviet republics, it touched off a series of events that showed that despite the lofty prestige that was once afforded to the largest standing army in the world, that prestige has since been lost. According to Roger McDermott a “[a] recognizable pattern emerged which focused on aged vehicles, hardware, and weaponry; ineffective command and control organizations and systems; lack of interservice coordination; failures of intelligence support and the GLONASS (Global’naya Navigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema, or Global Navigation Satellite System).”111 Based on his review of events in Georgia, Vladimir Shamanov, Chief of the Main Combat Training and Service Directorate, determined that three key factors led to the dismal showing of the Russian military in Georgia: poor coordination between air support and ground troops, poor communications systems, including command and control functions, and a lack of high-resolution surveillance systems.112

Further highlighting Russian conventional forces inadequacies were the findings of Nikolay Makarov, Chief of the General Staff. In December of 2008 General Makarov addressed a meeting at the Russian Academy of Military Sciences in Moscow emphasizing the immense operational and planning problems as well as the low levels of combat readiness during the Georgian campaign. Rodger McDermott suggests that “[I]n short, Makarov suggested that Russian forces were incapable of fighting a modern war and had to be radically reformed.”113 To add insult to injury “Eighty-three percent of Army units were numerically incomplete, and only 17 percent were combat ready. Of the 150 regiments in the Air Force only five are permanently combat ready, while in the Navy ‘half the warships stand idle at anchor.’”114

Since his return to the Presidency in 2012, President Putin has been skeptical of the advances by the MOD since the reform initiatives were implemented in late 2008 early 2009. In a move to test the capabilities of the Russian military a massive unplanned

112 Ibid., 68
113 Ibid., 67-68.
114 Ibid., 68.
exercise was ordered in the East Military District in February of 2013. What resulted from the exercise further highlights the conventional woes of the Russian Federation. After more than 4 years of reform and rearmament the Russian military is still experiencing much of the same problems that it faced in 2008. During the exercise Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu complained that command and control communications were inadequate complaining that he was unable to receive information from aircraft and early warning systems. It was assessed that command, control, and communications were only operating at 18 percent efficiency.\textsuperscript{115} Furthermore, only 17 percent of the military equipment was new in the East Military District.\textsuperscript{116}

Russia continues to cling to vestiges of its super power past to ensure a continuing role in the new world order. According to Dmitri Trenin, Russian policy makers respect the laws of \textit{Realpolitik}, believing that “all nations seek to expand their influence, and in order to do so they rely on their power.”\textsuperscript{117} The lack of major improvements to the capability and arming of the Russian military has President Putin asking questions of Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, who is also the head of the state-run Military Industrial Commission. Current MOD statistics show that approximately 90 percent of items acquired from the defense industry are returned by military representatives during the test stage of development. Furthermore, in 2012 “more than 20 percent of weapons and military equipment products were classified as ‘under-supplied.’ . . . [also] in the first six months of 2013, no more than between 15 percent to 20 percent of equipment scheduled for servicing was actually serviced.”\textsuperscript{118}

The Russo-Georgian War of 2008 and the Far East Military District exercises conducted earlier this year highlight the fact that the Russian military has fallen on hard


\textsuperscript{116} Roger McDermott, “Putin Blasts Rogozin Over Rearmament Failures,” \textit{Eurasia Daily Monitor} 10, no. 145 (August 2013), http://www.jamestown.org/regions/russia/single/?tx_ttnews%5Bpointer%5D=2&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=41232&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=48&cHash=f0c1eb595d3ce7afe1a1f18c08608bd2#.UhBW0JLVAfU.

\textsuperscript{117} Trenin, “Russia’s Threat Perception and Strategic Posture,” 35.

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid.
times and is a source of concern for the Kremlin. The new members of NATO are backed and receiving political and military aid from the largest and most advanced economic power in the world, the United States, while the Russian military is dependent on a mismanaged, over optimistic, and corrupt military-industrial complex that is more concerned with expressing Cold War style rhetoric than in providing the Russian military with reliable, advanced, high-technology weapon systems. However, despite Putin’s desire to increase funding of the military to regain some of the lost prestige, the current economic slowdown affecting the Russian economy has placed that funding in jeopardy. These material factors make the Russians hostile to any United States plans to install BMD systems in eastern or central Europe.119

Furthermore, the Russian preoccupation and refusal to establish a cooperative environment with the United States on missile defense can be found in Russian culture and their preoccupation with strategic depth. Russian strategic depth saved the Russian Empire from Napoleon’s invasion in 1812, and the new Soviet Union from invasion by the Germans in 1941. Today Russians believe that the current planned American missile defense system threatens Russia’s retaliatory response potential therefore limiting its strategic depth. The fall back option that existed for the Soviet Union in the 1960’s and 70’s – “overwhelm any proposed US missile defense by deploying more and more nuclear delivery vehicles” – Russia believes this is no longer feasible due to the continued decline of the Russian military-industrial complex.120 The United States has repeatedly referred the Russians to the U.S. National Missile Defense Act of 1999 which states that the goal of the US BMD system is to defend the United States against a limited ballistic missile attack. Furthermore, US officials have provided the Russian Ministry of Defense with the technical data that shows that neither the current proposed European


BMD shield, nor the SM-3 block IIB is a threat to Russian ICBM’s. The technical expertise of one of Russia’s own, Yury Solomonov, argues that there is no direct threat to the Russian strategic deterrence now or in the future from US BMD. According to Solomonov, who is the chief designer of Russia’s newest ballistic missile, “In most cases, and I’m saying this absolutely officially and competently, [American BMD] is an absolutely far-fetched threat to our strategic potential.”

2. The Siloviki and the New Russian Intellectual Entrepreneurs

During the Gorbachev era, the Soviet Union embodied a conciliatory attitude toward the west. In the face of mounting material deficiencies, it was Gorbachev’s stance, and that of his close advisors, that the Soviet Union needed to retrench its efforts by focusing on domestic issues. In order to achieve this end, Gorbachev made drastic changes in both domestic policy but also in foreign and national security policy. He opted for a less antagonistic stance towards the west, in order to relieve the material pressures of the arms race. As I showed in the previous chapter, much of the policy changes can be attributed to the input Gorbachev was receiving from his closest advisors. In this section I argue that the same process is occurring in President Putin’s regime. Putin may not be the uncommitted thinker of Gorbachev, as Janice Gross Stein argues, who turned to Soviet intellectual entrepreneurs and international institutions to solve the material deficiencies of the Soviet Union, as Thomas Risse-Kappen, Stephen Brooks, and William Wohlforth argue. However, according to Yelena Tregubova – a reporter from the Kremlin press pool – called Putin an apparatchik who could work the system. She described him as a person of “a quite average Soviet education, of an average intellect . . .


122 Ibid., 17-18.

But he is very, very adaptable. [A person who is] simply a brilliant ‘reflector,’ that, like a mirror he copied the person he was with, to compel them that he was just like them.”

Igor Malashenko recalls that “after three and a half hours of talking, I knew about Putin as little as I did before. He was a shallow personality.” Yet Putin turned out to be a firm believer in an oft quoted bromide of the Soviet era, Joseph Stalin’s declaration that “the Cadres decide everything.”

Since Putin came to power in 2000 he and his cadre of former security service personnel – the Siloviki – have come to dominate the Russian political landscape. Who are the Siloviki? What are their political beliefs and wants? How have they impacted Russian foreign policy when it comes to Russian non-cooperation on missile defense? The broad answer to these questions is that Putin and his Siloviki seek to maintain Russian sovereignty, to maintain the image of being America’s equal in terms of being a nuclear superpower, to maintain a place in determining the future security of Europe, and to regain primary influence over its “near abroad.”

a. Putin and the Siloviki: Who They Are

First, a definition of the term Siloviki: Siloviki is derived from the term silovye ministerstva – literal translation is “the ministries of force.” In Russia today the term Siloviki is interpreted as: “a group of current and former intelligence officer from Putin’s hometown of St. Petersburg who wield immense power within the Kremlin and control key sectors of the Russian Economy.” The Russian political landscape is littered with members of the Siloviki, in 2003 one in four of the Russian elite had a military or security background. By 2006 the number of people with a security

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125 Ibid., 51.

126 Ibid., 253.


The *Siloviki* brotherhood is by no means a clan of equals. According to Ian Bremmer and Samuel Charap the *Siloviki* is arranged in a hierarchical system; it is best described as a series of concentric circle that emanates from the core and moves out to secondary and tertiary sub-groups. These groups are roughly based on seniority, policy influence, and relative control over the nation’s resources and institutions. Those in the inner circle have the greatest influence over the president and each other through constant contact with one another. The core group includes: Igor Sechin, deputy head of the presidential administration; Viktor Ivanov, advisor to the president; and Nikolai Patrushev, director of the Federal Security Service (FSB). The secondary circle includes Rosneft chief Sergey Bogdanchkov and Putin’s drug czar, Viktor Ivanov. The tertiary circle is a fluid network of junior members who run smaller government agencies or are deputies of former core members.

**b. What the Siloviki Want**

In recent years the world view of the Russian elite has been focused on the reality of their post-Cold War status and the nostalgia for the lost Soviet era. Putin himself exemplified this thinking when he claimed that the Russian Federation was a victim of “the greatest geopolitical disaster of the twentieth century. In both foreign and domestic policies the Kremlin and the *Siloviki* have pushed to reduce the influence of the United States along the Russian periphery, especially when it comes to former Soviet States.

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130 Kryshtanovskaya and White, “Putin’s Militocracy,” 70-71.
While the *Siloviki* do not have a unified political philosophy they do share a set of core values. First, they believe in the continued consolidation of political and economic power within a centralized state apparatus that is protected by a robust security and defense program. For the *Siloviki* law, order, and stability are of a much higher priority than that of developing a robust civil society or democratically viable system. Second, the *Siloviki* are economic nationalists, seeking the restoration of Russia’s international greatness. To achieve this end they believe in a strong state that should play a prominent role in the economic life of the state by nationalizing strategic sectors of the economy. This includes the natural resources of the state. In a throwback to Soviet days, the *Siloviki* hold to the idea that the natural resources of the nation belong to the people and that in the name of the people “the state should control every aspect of their exploitation.” Furthermore, domestic production should be protected from the forces of globalization. 134

Next, the *Siloviki* continue to push for the restoration of Russian greatness and prestige on the international stage. Despite the end of the Cold War, Russia still views the United States and NATO as an external threat that actively attempts to undermine Russian sovereignty. For the Russian elite this is unacceptable and that the Russian Federation should garner the same respect that the former Soviet Union once commanded by continuing to maintain a strong army with state-of-the-art weapons systems. Included in this sentiment is the insistence of some *Siloviki* that the former states of the Soviet Union be reintegrated into the Russian Federation. 135

c. **The Siloviki and US-Russia Relations**

With the rise of the *Siloviki* to the elite positions in the Russian government, Putin has created a Soviet era political system with its own institutionalized hierarchy of power. At the top is a select group of senior members, similar in style and power to that of the Soviet Politburo. 136 The fact that the majority of the *Siloviki* come

135 Ibid., 89.
136 Kryshtanovskaya and White, “Putin’s Militocracy,” 297.
from the security services binds them together based on a common set of training that separates them from the common civilian.\textsuperscript{137} During the Soviet era those that joined the secret service were in positions of privilege. This is no different than what is occurring today in Russian politics; the Siloviki see themselves as an elite group.\textsuperscript{138} “Their training instills in them a feeling of being superior to the rest of populace, of being the rightful ‘bosses’ of everyone else.”\textsuperscript{139} Having these ideas as a basis for analyzing the current relationship between the United States and Russia is key, because it provides a foundation on which to understand the actions of this group of former KGB and military members in Putin’s regime towards BMD.

The Siloviki’s background in protecting the state and their Cold War mentality has carried over into their role as the dominant political force in Russia. This group of former security members continues to see the United States as an adversary and through mirror imaging believe that the United States sees Russia as the enemy of old. The Siloviki scrutinize each pronouncement by the United States on intelligence and national security matters for any anti-Russian bias. This is also true when it comes to the deployment of United States missile defense systems in former Soviet satellite states against Russian wishes.\textsuperscript{140} For the Russian elite the American BMD deployment plans “serve as a reminder of Moscow’s weakness (as well as lack of technological capabilities to match American missile defences [sic]) in its own neighborhood.”\textsuperscript{141} The BMD deployment as such is thus deemed to be part of a “global plan” by the Americans to “achieve strategic superiority over Russia.”\textsuperscript{142} This attitude of hostility towards America when it comes to BMD in the Russian near abroad is a direct result of the Siloviki’s institutional background and training. It can be argued that the Siloviki’s background in

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{137} Illarionov, “The Siloviki in Charge,” 69.
  \item \textsuperscript{139} Illarionov, “The Siloviki in Charge,” 70.
  \item \textsuperscript{140} Tsypkin, “Russian Politics, Policy-Making and American Missile Defense,” 793.
  \item \textsuperscript{141} Ibid., 795.
  \item \textsuperscript{142} Trenin, “Russia’s Threat Perception and Strategic Posture,” 40.
\end{itemize}
the security services has formed a permanent basis for their ideological orientation. Adding to this track of analysis is the fact that Putin himself is a product of that same training. \(^{143}\)

The rise in power of the *Siloviki* and how they have come to influence Putin can thus be justified by understanding the process by which Putin came to power. Putin was thrust onto the Russian political scene at the very end of 1999 when President Yeltsin resigned making Vladimir Putin the acting president. The sudden thrust into the presidency left Putin no choice but to rely on his cadre of trusted individuals who he had worked with in the past. The post-Cold War era was representative of the political system in which the political regime was highly personalized as no institutionalized means of recruitment were available to Putin. Also, his short term as Prime Minister left him no choice but to turn to individuals with security backgrounds, since they were the individuals he trusted and knew the most.\(^{144}\)

### E. CONCLUSIONS

According to Russian scholar Dmitri Trenin, the Russian strategic policy-makers have no specific ideology, but they do respect what they call the laws of *Realpolitik*. They believe that “all nations seek to expand their influence, and in order to do so they rely on their power, both hard and soft.”\(^{145}\) Furthermore, the relationship that the Russian Federation maintains with NATO and EU rests on the principle of equality between the one time adversaries. This chapter analyzed the relationship between the United States and the Russian federation on the issue of Ballistic Missile Defense. A relationship that Russia feels is moving towards the subordination of Russian interests to those of the West, and in particularly the interests of the United States.\(^{146}\) First it looked at the current BMD capabilities of the Russian Federation and the United States. Second, I gave brief background of the ABM treaty as well as the Russian perspective on U.S. withdrawal.

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\(^{144}\) Ibid., 911.

\(^{145}\) Trenin, “Russia’s Threat Perception and Strategic Posture,” 35.

\(^{146}\) Ibid., 37.
from the treaty in 2002. Finally, I looked at both the material and political factors that have created an environment of non-cooperation between these two former adversaries.

The ABM Treaty was signed on May 26, 1972 and entered into force on October 3, 1972; however, according to the Bush administration the threats to the United States emanating from North Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran required U.S. withdrawal from the treaties restrictions. The stated reason for the withdrawal from the ABM treaty was that the governments in Pyongyang and Tehran were unpredictable, dangerous, and could not be contained by “traditional forms of military deterrence, diplomacy, or arms control.”

As a result Condoleezza Rice, then Secretary of State, told reporters in December 2007, that she did not see anything in a 2007 National Intelligence Estimate that would alter the course of planned deployment of U.S. missile defense systems to Europe. Originally proposed to roll out in four phases over the next decade, culminating in the deployment of advanced SM-3 missiles capable of intercepting a potential ICBM threat emanating from either North Korea or Iran, the fourth and final phase was cut in early 2013. It was this potential to intercept ICBMs that had the Russian elite concerned and pushing for either a joint BMD system or for legal guarantees that U.S. BMD systems would not target Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrence.

Russian elite have a different view of the threats emanating from the Korean peninsula and the Middle East. According to Russian analysts the threat from North Korea is ten years away and the threat from Iran is twenty to twenty-five years away. What concerns the Russian Federation is the potential that the proposed U.S. European missile defense system could affect the nuclear deterrence of Russia. Included with this concern is the deteriorating state of Russia’s conventional forces. Dimitry Rogozin, Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister, Military-Industrial commission Chairman, and member of the Siloviki, contends that, the material status of the Russian Federation is still lagging behind the rest of the industrialized powers. Russia’s material deficiencies have steadily

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declined since the end of the Cold War, as was evidenced in the 2008 invasion of Georgia, as well as the 2013 unannounced exercise conducted in Eastern Russia. Russian analysts have come to the conclusion that the capabilities of the conventional Russian military are insufficient to defeat any external as well as any internal aggression. It could be further argued that the performance of the Russian military during these two recent military events has led many in the Kremlin to reassess the conventional capability of Russian Forces and move toward implementing reform measures to correct the deficiencies. 150 This has led the Kremlin to reassess its nuclear deterrent capability. As a result, according to the 2010 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, the Russian’s have increased their reliance on nuclear weapons by lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear forces in an armed conflict; therefore, Russia will rely on its nuclear arsenal for its defense, escalation control, and deterrence policies. 151

Material deficiencies have led Russian President Vladimir Putin, the “brilliant reflector,” to turn to his cadre of Siloviki to find solutions to the material deficiencies of the Russian military. 152 The Siloviki, as has been argued above, have gained control over the foreign policy apparatus of the Russian Federation. Their background in the security services makes the security of the state their number one priority. According to Russian analysts like the late Dmitry Furman the Russia-West struggle for influence in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is a struggle of two diametrically opposed systems. The Russian system is a system that has a “compelling need for a foreign policy enemy that seeks not only to weaken Russia but to block its return to great power status, particularly in the CIS.” 153 For the Russian elite the American BMD deployment plans “serve as a reminder of Moscow’s weakness (as well as lack of technological capabilities

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152 Baker and Glasser, Kremlin Rising, 49.

to match American missile defences [sic]) in its own neighborhood.”154 The BMD deployment as such is thus deemed to be part of a “global plan” by the Americans to “achieve strategic superiority over Russia.”155

My concluding argument, based on the evidence that has been presented in this chapter, is that both sides are reluctant to proactively discuss and come to an agreement on missile defense based on realist and constructivist principles. For the United States, the threat emanating from North Korea and Iran pose a direct threat to U.S. national interests – protection of European allies and the homeland. The Russians perceive this threat as unlikely in the near to long term. What they do perceive is an attempt to minimize the strategic deterrence of the Russian Federation through the deployment of United States BMD systems to the European continent. More importantly the Russian elite, the Siloviki, see it as a direct threat to the national prestige and security of the Russian Federation. The Siloviki’s background in the security services of the Soviet Union and Russian Federation has instilled an inherent desire to maintain the security of the state above all other concerns. Current Russian conventional forces capabilities make it more important than ever for Russia to rely on its nuclear deterrent capability for the security of the state. The withdrawal of the United States from the ABM treaty and Obama’s PAA is perceived as a direct threat to that nuclear deterrent.

154 Ibid., 795.
155 Trenin, “Russia’s Threat Perception and Strategic Posture,” 40.
IV. CONCLUSION

I finish where I started with Robert Jervis. Jervis in his article “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” wrote that a state’s decision-makers will act based on the security vulnerabilities they feel.\(^{156}\) I analyzed two separate case studies to show how two different regimes faced with the same dilemma, the material decline of the state, produced two different outcomes. In both cases I showed how the material decline of the state led intellectual entrepreneurs – based on their background, socialization, or association with different international organizations – to come up with different ideas on how to preserve the security of the state.

In the first case study, Gorbachev and the Soviet Union chose to cooperate on INF and sacrifice its intermediate nuclear capability in order to achieve “the earliest and most direct impact on East-West relations” in order to reform the Soviet system.\(^{157}\) The case study of the INF treaty shows that material factors, as realist scholars contend, provided the impetus for the Soviet change in its foreign policy stance. In the INF case study I argued that material factors provided the foundation on which the intellectual entrepreneurs looked to outside sources to solve the Soviet systemic decline. These intellectual entrepreneurs then provided their policy-making superiors their conclusions based on the information that was garnered from social interactions with outside institutions. In some cases, scholars argue that the policy-makers themselves were the intellectual entrepreneurs.\(^{158}\) I argued that organizations such as IMEMO and ISKAN provided the mechanism for transferring new ideas to Soviet intellectual entrepreneurs. These intellectual entrepreneurs then in turn aided General Secretary Gorbachev in creating the ideas of *glasnost* and the new approach of a non-confrontational stance towards the west. The new Soviet policy of an interdependent world along with Gorbachev and Reagan’s desires to limit nuclear weapons, if not eliminate them entirely,


directly led to the agreement on Intermediate Nuclear Forces in February 1987. The agreement was to eliminate a dangerous threat to the security of Europe, the entire class of intermediate nuclear forces.\footnote{Donaldson and Nogee, \textit{The Foreign Policy of Russia}, 95-96; Risse-Kappen, \textit{Ideas do not Float Freely}," 194.}

In the second case study the material crisis of the Russian Federation led intellectual entrepreneurs to take a different path than that of its predecessors. The Gorbachev era looked to open the gates to cooperation that led to a plethora of nuclear arms reduction regimes that have remained relevant till today. However, a new cadre of intellectual entrepreneurs have now taken over the Kremlin who according to Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White number fewer ‘intellectuals’ with higher degrees, are from a more provincial background, and claim to have a military or security background.\footnote{Kryshtanovskaya and White, \textit{Putin’s Militocracy},” 292.} In her 2006 study Kryshtanovskaya found that 77 percent of the 1,016 top Russian government positions were filled by people with a security background.\footnote{Illarionov, \textit{The Siloviki in Charge},” 70.} While they adapted to the new systems that evolved from the collapse of the Soviet Union, their ideas and “metamorphosis of . . . views was typical of former officers during the reform years: an ambivalent consciousness shaped to accommodate both the newly established market and older ideas of state power and social justice.”\footnote{Kryshtanovskaya and White, \textit{Putin’s Militocracy,” 303.} These new adapted ideas are exemplified by author Stephen Blank: “Russia must be an independent sovereign actor, unbounded by any other political association and exercising unfettered power in its own domain,” and the concept of \textit{Derzhavnost}, i.e. the idea that Russia is a unique, autocratic, and great power, a great power that must be acknowledged by other states that is granted a superior status, especially vis-a-vis the neighboring CIS.\footnote{Blank, \textit{The Sacred Monster,” 88.} Within in the material decline of the Russian Federation case study I used two additional case studies to emphasize the material decline of the Russian armed forces, the 2008 invasion of Georgia and the short notice Eastern Military District exercise of early 2013. The Georgian invasion showed that aged vehicles, hardware, and weaponry;
ineffective command and control organizations and systems; and a lack of high-resolution surveillance systems led to what Nikolay Makarov, Chief of the General Staff called immense operational and planning problems as well as low levels of combat readiness. Rodger McDermott suggests that “[I]n short, Makarov suggested that Russian forces were incapable of fighting a modern war and had to be radically reformed.”164 Adding insult to injury 83 percent of Russian Army units were not fully manned, with only 17 percent ready for combat and the Russian Air Force had only five of its 150 regiments combat ready.165

The 2013 exercise was designed to test not only the Russian armed forces but the reforms that had been instituted 4 years earlier. The results were not very promising. During the exercise Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu complained that command and control communications were inadequate complaining that he was unable to receive information from aircraft and early warning systems. It was assessed that command, control, and communications were only operating at 18 percent efficiency.166 Furthermore, only 17 percent of the military equipment was new in the East Military District.167 These two cases continue to show that the Russian Federation still is in the process of rebuilding its armed forces after years of neglect and corrupt leadership and is the overarching reason for the Russian elite to turn to intellectual entrepreneurs to find solutions for the material decline.

Today’s Russian Federation intellectual entrepreneurs are exemplified by President Putin and his cadre of former KGB, FSB, and other security service officers, whose identity is characterized by a determination that “all nations seek to expand their influence, and in order to so they rely on their power.”168 Furthermore, the Russian elite believe in fostering an image of nuclear superpower equality between themselves and the United States. Russia continues to seek a place in developing an all-inclusive European

165 Ibid., 68.
166 Liovkin, “Unannounced Inspections are not Just for Show.”
167 McDermott, “Putin Blasts Rogozin Over Rearmament Failures.”
security regime but sees the continued involvement of former satellites and Soviet Republics in European institutions as a threat to these aspirations and a direct assault on its national prestige.\textsuperscript{169} As a result of these ideals that were ingrained in the Siloviki it has created a system that has a “compelling need for a foreign policy enemy that seeks not only to weaken Russia but to block its return to great power status, particularly in the CIS.”\textsuperscript{170} For the Siloviki that enemy is the enemy that they trained to fight during the Cold War, the United States; therefore, any foreign policy move by the United States will be seen as a policy that is directed at Russia.\textsuperscript{171}

What I have shown here is that the Russian Federation at the systemic level is no longer the superpower of the Soviet Days. Gorbachev recognized this and turned to his cadre of intellectual entrepreneurs, who were connected to international organization, to find solutions to these material deficiencies. Putin has been faced with much the same sort of material decline since his rise to power in late 1999 and early 2000. Where Gorbachev’s intellectual entrepreneurs were connected with international organizations, Putin’s cadre of intellectual entrepreneurs are cut from the same cloth as he is; his cadre is comprised of former KGB, FSB, and other security service individuals whose political socialization was created during the Soviet era when the United States and the West were still viewed as the existential enemy. This has led Putin and his cadre of like-minded policy-makers to reconstruct the Soviet dogma of “enemies . . . surround Russia from all directions, threatening invasions and sabotage.”\textsuperscript{172} By holding to this philosophy the Russian Federation is unwilling to bend and reach a compromise on American TBMD plans for Europe. The United States is also not willing to compromise, as they continue to view the threat from North Korea and Iran as credible.

Current events in the Middle East have sidelined the TBMD debate between the Moscow and Washington, as the United States contemplates either a diplomatic solution

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{170} Blank, “The Sacred Monster,” 58.
\item \textsuperscript{171} Tsyypkin, “Russia, America and Missile Defense,” 59.
\item \textsuperscript{172} Felgenhauer, “Putin Declares His Defense Agenda for the Next Decade.”
\end{itemize}
or a military strike on Syria. However, it could be argued that should the United States become involved militarily in Syria it may create an environment in Iran where military hard-liners dominate the current open minded stance of the new Iranian government. According to Geneive Abdo it will “empower Iran's hardliners at a rare time when the US could engage more moderate leaders on a host of issues from Syria to Iran's problematic nuclear programme. And it might marginalize Rouhani and the technocrats in his new cabinet, who are aptly being called part of a "modern right" faction, for the foreseeable future.” 173 This in turn could give Iran further incentive to continue its alleged research and development of nuclear weapons grade material a development that might further destabilize Middle East security. 174

The BMD debate is by no means the only area that the formulation of factors that has been argued above can be applied to. The current source of conflict between the United States and the Russian Federation on the enlargement of NATO is another area that can be looked at to continue further research in the area of U.S.-Russian relations. Many of the same arguments could be made in terms of material deficiencies of the Russian armed forces as well as the KGB socialization of the Siloviki in terms of the threat of an enlarging NATO.

The Siloviki, as has been argued above, have gained control over the foreign policy apparatus of the Russian Federation. Their background in the security services makes the security of the state their number one priority. According to Russian analysts like the late Dmitry Furman the Russia-West struggle for influence in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is a struggle of two diametrically opposed systems. The Russian system is a system that has a “compelling need for a foreign policy enemy that seeks not only to weaken Russia but to block its return to great power status, particularly in the CIS.” 175 The deployment of a TBMD system to Europe is viewed by the Siloviki


as that foreign policy enemy and the impediment to its return to their perceived right to be a great power state. What the Siloviki fail to see is that their policy of realpolitik toward the United States has helped to foster the continuation of an environment of non-cooperation.176

Taking into account all that has been discussed above, the future of cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation is possible, albeit at a level that is arguable less strategic in nature than the BMD debate. Current events have shown that despite the security risk that the Russian Federation has expressed when it comes to the deployment of American ballistic missile defense systems to Europe, the United States and Russia are able to cooperate in areas like arms control. In September 2013, the United States and the Russian Federation were able to complete bilateral negotiations on establishing an international coalition that would gain control and destroy Syria’s chemical weapons.177 When it comes to the BMD debate, my analysis shows that until the Russian Federation can make strides toward real conventional forces reform it will continue to rely on its nuclear capability to ensure its security. Also, as long as the Siloviki remain in control of Russia’s foreign policy-making, it will remain an imperative for them to protect the state at all costs, regardless of what it does to their standing with the outside world. Also, as long as the United States remains the world hegemon and has the ability to increase its security with little to no regard for others, then the BMD debate will remain a source of contention between the United States and the Russian Federation.

As Robert Jervis pointed out, “as long as DD is low, it leaves others with few hostages for its good behavior. Others who are more vulnerable will grow apprehensive, which will lead them to acquire more arms and will reduce the chances of cooperation.”178 As I have shown this is the scenario being played out now with regards to Russian conventional and nuclear weapons, they have responded to U.S. BMD

176 Ibid.


deployments by arming the Topol-M missile with a multiple warhead system – in 2007 Russia began tests of a MIRVed version of the Topol-M mobile missile, which was designated RS-24 with deployment beginning in 2010. In 2011, then President Medvedev listed a range of measures that the Russian Federation would take in response to American BMD deployments: Russia would commence “deployment of S-400 and S-500 interceptors; [develop] the capability to attack NATO control systems for missile defense; and [deploy] modern weapons in locations where they could ‘take out any part of the U.S. missile defense system in Europe. One step in this process will be to deploy Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad.’”

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