FIRST TIME GO: CREATING CAPACITY FOR ENDURING STABILITY IN POST-OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS

A Monograph

by

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**Title:** First Time Go: Creating Capacity for Enduring Stability in Post-Operational Environments

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**Abstract:**

Why do Army stability operations fail to produce enduring stability in target countries? The Army has access to innumerable resources for mission accomplishment. Yet, when the US. Army pulls its last combat and peacekeeping or stability troops out of the supported country, historically, the nation too quickly returns to a security dilemma which threatens or destroys the opportunity for enduring stability. This research identifies institutional causes within the U.S. Army that limit its capability to foster stable post-operational environments. Doctrine, training, leadership and education, and policy, provide the framework from which one may detect institutional causes. Findings suggest that historic institutional biases against stability operations have restricted development in doctrine, training, leadership, and education. Similar difficulties at national levels and among senior military leaders have created inconsistent guidance for the execution of stability operations. In recent years, the Army acknowledged lapses in doctrinal development, training opportunities, as well as in the leadership and education of service members. The Doctrine 2015 initiative is a product of this acknowledgement. The new doctrine with Combined Arms Maneuver and Wide Area Security, identifies the concurrent stability environment and how it influences the tactical fight. Enduring stability is the operational goal in stability operations, and can only be achieved through deliberate planning and a whole of government approach.

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

FIRST TIME GO: CREATING CAPACITY FOR ENDURING STABILITY IN POST-OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS, by Major Janine T. Taylor, 63 pages.

Why do Army stability operations fail to produce enduring stability in target countries? The Army has access to innumerable resources for mission accomplishment. Yet, when the US. Army pulls its last combat and peacekeeping or stability troops out of the supported country, historically, the nation too quickly returns to a security dilemma which threatens or destroys the opportunity for enduring stability. This research identifies institutional causes within the U.S. Army that limit its capability to foster stable post-operational environments. Doctrine, training, leadership and education, and policy, provide the framework from which one may detect institutional causes. Findings suggest that historic institutional biases against stability operations have restricted development in doctrine, training, leadership, and education. Similar difficulties at national levels and among senior military leaders have created inconsistent guidance for the execution of stability operations. In recent years, the Army acknowledged lapses in doctrinal development, training opportunities, as well as in the leadership and education of service members. The Doctrine 2015 initiative is a product of this acknowledgement. The new doctrine with Combined Arms Maneuver and Wide Area Security, identifies the concurrent stability environment and how it influences the tactical fight. Enduring stability is the operational goal in stability operations, and can only be achieved through deliberate planning and a whole of government approach.
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INTRODUCTION

The object of war is to attain a better peace…If you concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought for the after-effect…, it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war.

—B.H. Liddell Hart

U.S. Army stability operations routinely do not achieve a post-operational environment capable of sustaining enduring stability. Examples of this include the Vietnam War and missions in Haiti and Somalia.¹ Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001 and 2003, respectively, challenged the post-Cold War doctrine related to stability operations, also known as Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) and Low Intensity Conflict (LIC). The institutional culture of the Army, along with doctrine, must adapt to the post-Cold War world in order to establish a post-operational environment capable of sustaining stability in target countries.

In October 2008, the U.S. Army released Field Manual (FM) 3-07, Stability Operations, to establish how it conducts stability operations across the spectrum of conflict—before, during, and after combat operations.² The Army’s purpose for making this update was to guide soldiers better and to facilitate necessary improvements in the execution of stability operations. However, in order to create lasting change in the way the U.S. Army approaches stability operations and fosters stable post-operational environments, changes must go deeper than doctrine. A model for institutional change suggests that ownership of the concept or vision must exist among the group for changes to become permanent and to evolve into practice.³ Why does the U.S. Army have difficulty fostering enduring stability in post-operational environments? The evidence suggests

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²Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-07, Stability Operations (Washington, D.C: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008), Introduction.

³John P. Kotter, Leading Change (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), 151-155. Kotter said there are eight steps to institutional change. The steps in order are establish a sense of urgency, create a guiding coalition, develop a clear shared vision, communicate the vision, empower people to act on the vision, create short term wins, consolidate and build on the gains, and institutionalize the change.
that the Army’s almost single-minded focus on combat arms training and operations has led it to give little attention to stability operations. This approach, however valuable, has hampered the development of Army stability operations.

Perhaps a new approach is required, one that reconsiders the institutional attitudes toward and foundations for conducting stability operations. New approaches should address the Army’s slighting of stability operations and its institutional tendency to adopt a combat-focused approach that does not build societal foundations in target countries. Without a reevaluation of guiding principles and institutional attitudes, the success of future stability operations remains at risk. A reevaluation should identify ways the Army can better facilitate meeting the mission objectives set forth in doctrine. The objective of stability operations, according to Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-07, Stability Operations, is to “leave society at peace with itself and its regional neighbors, sustainable by the host nation without the support of external actors.”

Institutional causes exist, which contribute to the Army’s ability or inability to achieve its operational and strategic goals as outlined in doctrine and Army policy.

The methodology used in this research is an examination of the elements that provide the foundation for military operations. There are reasons why the Army does not create stable post-operational environments. The Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) process provides eight elements from which one can evaluate capability. They are Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy (DOTMLPF-P). This research uses four of these elements: doctrine, training, leadership and education, and policy. Analyzing the four DOTMLPF-P elements sheds light on likely institutional causes. In Army doctrine, combat arms operations receive more attention than

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4Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-07, Stability (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012), 2-17.

stability operations. Doctrinal emphasis or the lack thereof translates into training exercises, mission essential task lists, and establishes unwritten norms within Army culture of a hierarchy among mission types. Leadership and education are similarly affected by doctrine and subsequently training. The impact of unwritten rules, culture, norms, and attitudes of military leaders becomes apparent in the inquiry of leadership and education. Policy demonstrates the attitudes of national and senior military leaders through written and oral communiques. Furthermore, a review of policy will show how the actions of national and senior military leaders restrict doctrine, training, leadership and education of the Army by the level of emphasis they placed on stability operations over time.

The purpose of this research is to identify some of the institutional causes or biases that restrict stability operations’ planning and execution. Military operations in 2013 and the near future will occur in a resource-constrained environment. It is not politically or economically acceptable to initiate another large troop deployment without just cause and domestic public will. U.S security commitments and growing security concerns around the world further hamper any notion of returning to Afghanistan with major troop concentrations. Consequently, this research identifies institutional causes that lead to unintended shortfalls in operations planning for creating environments capable of long-term stability. This research intends to identify institutional causes within doctrine, training, leadership and education, and policy. Thus, by informing leaders and operational planners of the institutional biases from which they may be working, they can avoid the pitfalls and produce operational plans that address underlying issues hampering effective stability operations training, planning, and execution. Approaching the problem with this mindset may reduce the likelihood of forces returning to a deployed area to resolve a critical, but overlooked aspect of the local environment.

The research’s significance rests on the examination of institutional causes that can limit planning and execution of stability operations that meet the Army’s goal as outlined in ADRP 3-
07. The Army’s goals for stability are to “create conditions so that the local populace regards the situation as legitimate, acceptable, and predictable. Stability first aims to lessen the level of violence. It aims to enable the functioning of governmental, economic, and societal institutions. Lastly, stability encourages the general adherence to local laws, rules, and norms of behavior.”

One may find institutional causes within the Army by looking at doctrine, training, leadership and education, and policy. Doctrine released in 2012, under the Doctrine 2015 initiative, begins to address some of the shortcomings of past stability operations doctrine. For example, ADRP 3-07 clearly lays out a comprehensive approach and emphasizes that stabilization is an iterative process. This is an important acknowledgment if the Army is to progress to a whole of government approach in all military actions.

Military and academic articles, reports, and books form the basis of this research. A main assumption in this research is that Army does not incorporate well the host population’s culture or narrative into stability operations plans. This research contends that target-country populations have useful knowledge and skills, along with their narrative, that can lend to post-operational stability because the population is more accepting of the solution’s legitimacy. Furthermore, active involvement by the local population to develop solutions or a series of initiatives to rebuild their society creates ownership among them. This lends to the subsequent discussion regarding the importance of incorporating the domestic population into operational planning before, during, and after conflict. This research assumes that institutional biases against stability operations have direct and indirect influences upon the readiness of the U.S. Army to conduct those operations and meet the operational goal of enduring stability. A limitation of this research is the sheer volume of information available. For each argument identifying an institutional cause, one might

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6Department of the Army, ADRP 3-07, 1-1.


8Department of the Army, ADRP 3-07, Chapter 1.
find a counter resource to discredit the assertion. Therefore, identification of institutional causes can only create a partial picture as to why the Army continues to sustain a poor record of fostering enduring stability in post-operational environments.

What follows in four parts is a research attempt to address why the U.S. Army has not fostered long-term stability in post-operational environments even after having conducted stability operations for years. First, this research provides a brief review of stability-related literature with definitions of stability, stability operations, and success. This research then analyzes Army doctrine, training, leadership and education, as well as national and Army policies to identify institutional causes that potentially limit the Army’s capability to create stable-permissive post-operational environments. The third section considers these institutional causes and their impact to stability operations and the Army’s ability to conduct them. Finally, there is a discussion of greater prospects and capability in future stability operations based on research conclusions that institutional causes exist and are limiting the Army’s long-term stability success rates in post-operational environments. The goal of this future capability is to achieve alignment with the Army’s 2012 stability operations doctrine emphasizing a whole of government approach.

STABILITY OPERATIONS: FROM STRATEGIC CONCEPT TO TACTICAL MISSION

Literature pertaining to stability and stability operations falls in the general areas of state building, nation building, and peace and conflict studies. Scholars in fields such as history, political science, economics, and anthropology populate these studies. Under nation building or state building theories, the military is sometimes a necessary tool to facilitate spreading democracy across the globe. However, discussions about the military providing stability or stability operations range from what the authors perceive is going right or wrong, to what lessons the military should be learning, or how one might use more cultural perspectives to aid military actions and prepare the environment for civil reconstruction. This section presents the available literature used to understand stability operations and the determinants of success or failure. It also
introduces the importance of having cultural understanding of the target population and knowing its narrative. Knowing the narrative informs the occupier how that society moves and breathes. This information will affect the post-operational environment. Additionally, this section clarifies what a single approach to problem-solving means in this research. Complex problems require creative solutions, not a cookie-cutter or simple solution the Army develops for simple problems.

The U.S. Army as an institution uses doctrine to establish guidelines for the conduct and management of the organization and its mission to defend the American people in war. Changes in its institutional culture or attitude toward stability operations are important to future operational planners. ADRP 3-07, clearly identified that stability operations often happen simultaneous to major combat operations (MCO). Even though the U.S. has been engaged in stability operations for more a decade, history suggests that the Army does not retain lessons from unconventional warfare, LIC, or MOOTW. Because of this deliberate action to forget past lessons, historian Lawrence Yates argued that the Army does not execute stability operations well. Learning and discarding lessons in stability operations occurred repeatedly according to Yates’ review of Army missions over 200 years. Notable in his review are General Winfield Scott’s Mexico City Campaign, the Indian Wars, the Philippine Insurrection, and expeditions in Haiti, Cuba and the Dominican Republic at the turn of the twentieth century. James Dobbins, U.S. Ambassador to the European Union and a political scientist specializing in nation building, agreed and extended the logic to national leadership. Specifically, Dobbins said that despite the

9Department of the Army, ADRP 3-07, 2-2.


11Yates, Stability, 3.

12Yates, Stability, 3-4, 7-9.
growing and obvious need for continued stability operations that “no agency of the U.S.
government has, until recently, invested in capabilities, civil or military, to conduct such
missions.” Historian Brian McAllister Linn highlighted that the experience of the Vietnam War
left national and military leadership so distraught over the idea that conventional victories did not
equate to winning the war, that the Department of Defense did not conduct an internal review of
the conflict. Moreover, the whole of the force reverted its training focus to the more familiar
and conventional Soviet threat in Europe. The Army’s tendency to emphasize conventional over
stability operations appears throughout its history. The Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-
24) stated that the updated manual was necessary after 20 years, because standard “tactics,
techniques, and procedures do not achieve the desired result.” Over time, the Army as an
institution has restricted its own ability to learn and develop the required skills for conducting
stability operations. For change to endure, it must occur internally to the institution.

Dobbins argued that the Army’s propensity for conventional operations has left its
stability operation skills atrophied in comparison to conventional warfighting skills. Without
doctrial and institutional changes, the Army’s results in stability operations will continue to be
inconsistent. Planning is key to operational success. However, Dobbins suggested that the
planning and the execution of state-building activities in post-conflict environments might be
more difficult the more effective the military’s kinetic operational plan was.

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13 James Dobbins, “Learning the Lessons of Iraq,” in Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and

14 Brian McAllister Linn, The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2007), 193.

15 Linn, Echo, 196.

16 Petraeus, Amos, and Nagl, FM3-24, lii.


19 Minxin Pei, Samia Amin, and Seth Garz, “Building Nations: The American Experience,” in
Jarat Chopra stated that this occurs because “operational planners fail to comprehend the degree of social engineering necessary.” A disconnect exists between MCO plans and stability plans. For example, defense analyst Jeffrey Record blamed the failure in the Vietnam War, in part, to U.S. ignorance of the Vietnamese narrative – its history and culture. Had the U.S. invested time to understand the local and national narratives, as Record has suggested, it would have aided in the operational planning that produced the Strategic Hamlet program. The Strategic Hamlet program as a pacification measure and means to reduce Viet-Cong influence among the peasants was a forced relocation program and joint endeavor with South Vietnamese leadership. It moved entire Vietnamese villages into security perimeters.

The Vietnam War and interventions in Haiti and Somalia are examples of conflicts during which the Army failed to create an environment capable of maintaining stability. Minxin Pei, Samia Amin, and Seth Garz, as well as Dobbins, Linn, political economist Paul Collier, Major General H.R. McMaster, Yates, General (Ret.) Anthony Zinni, and others have written as much. Establishing the Army’s temporal success or failure in stability operations is a popular topic among scholars, with failures receiving the most attention. Looking back at Haiti in 1994, Pei, et al., said failure emerged because the mission did not develop or reform the local

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22 Record, *Wrong War*, 126.


administration infrastructure. Therefore, when troops left, the old patterns of Haitian governance quickly reemerged.25 Referring to that same mission, General Zinni said that the military did not resolve the issue that would lead to renewed violence.26 Linn argued doctrine aided the military failure in the Haiti and Somali missions because both environments refuted the viability of Army’s AirLandBattle doctrine.27 McMaster placed the responsibility for failure in the Vietnam War on national leaders and their policies.28 Record blamed national leaders and policies, too. Nevertheless, he also acknowledged the role military leadership played, because of their ridged adherence to conventional methods.29 Linn noted that the Army’s resolution that a conventional fight would win the Vietnam War led it to reject changes toward more non-conventional fighting.30 Noted scholars such as historian Fred Kagan, military theorist Stephen Biddle, sociologist Larry Diamond, and defense policy analyst Andrew Krepinevich, among others have published articles and reports discussing mission failure or means for success in Afghanistan or Iraq. Kagan wrote in 2007 that victory was not only still possible in Iraq but that it was vital to America’s security. To achieve victory, he said the U.S. needed to demonstrate a stronger commitment to Iraq, put more troops on the ground with increased tour lengths to avoid the security disruptions that troop rotations can cause, and increase engagement with Iraq’s neighbors.31 Biddle, Fotini Christia, and J. Alexander Thier said that some range of success was still viable in Afghanistan. However, it would require some sacrifices on the part of the U.S.

26Zinni and Koltz, Peace, 112.
27Linn, Echo, 228.
28McMaster, Dereliction, 323-334.
29Record, Wrong War, 28, 71-71.
30Linn, Echo, 194.
expectations as well as an understanding of Afghanistan and its history. Diamond argued that the any fault in the early years in Iraq was due to restrictions imposed by the President Bush’s administration and the leadership of Ambassador L. Paul Bremmer, III more so than by actions of the military directly. Inadequate numbers of equipment and personnel in theater limited the coalition’s security mission. Importantly, Diamond noted, “the CPA [Coalition Provisional Authority] did not have an adequate grasp of how the reconstruction was proceeding and how Iraqis viewed it.” Meanwhile, Krepinevich remarked that failure during the early period in Iraq suggested a commitment failure on the part of President Bush and his administration. He then suggested means to achieve that success. Such means required a single strategy among coalition partners, acceptance of the insurgency and employment of the necessary skills across the all levels, and addressing the centers of gravity of this complex environment.

The RAND Corporation released a number of studies and reports regarding America’s conduct of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Thomas Szayna, Derek Eaton, and Amy Richardson concluded that the U.S. Army should modify doctrine to correlate with civilian task lists for stability and reconstruction activities. This, they determined, would be key to ensuring a unified effort in the post-operational environment. A logical leap from integrating civilian and military functions in the post-operational environment would change how the Army views the environmental end state in initial operational planning. Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker, and Heather Peterson’s U.S. centric report suggested that in order to improve capacity in stabilization


36 Thomas S. Szayna, Derek Eaton, and Amy Richardson, “Preparing the Army for Stability Operations: Doctrinal and Interagency Issues,” RAND Report (Santa Monica, RAND Corporation, 2007), Summary.
operations, there should be a greater emphasis on what the U.S. agencies can do in the environment rather than what military might bring. Additionally, they repeated the mantra that these type of operations required a long-term commit of time and money. Arturo Muñoz noted that military information support operations (MISO) are moderately effective in Afghanistan but there is room for improvement and further exploitation. He stated, “failure to take into account culture, social, political, and religious factors is a major deficiency in PSYOP [psychological operations] campaigns.” In order to make MISO more effective, he recommended that the PSYOP community record and employ best practices and incorporate the domestic population more.

Identifying success or failure requires a measurement tool. Collier stated that post-conflict elections are a poor marker of success. Kagan, along with retired Army General Jack Keane and historian Kimberly Kagan, commented in 2008 that the level of violence in a given area as a sole determinant of success was insufficient. They argued that rapid force reductions leave transitional areas without the support to continue the work of U.S. military forces in rebuilding their communities and government. The Kagans and General Keane were not the only ones to question using the level of violence as a measurement of success. Blogger Jason Sigger concurred with their position with his challenge to using the centrality of violence as a marker for declaring success. He contended that the Taliban and other insurgent agents would relinquish


40 Collier, Wars, 83.

territory in the face of overwhelming odds against U.S. forces, but quickly reestablish themselves upon troop departure.\textsuperscript{42} Establishing strategic goals too broadly may pose a problem to define success in Afghanistan and Iraq. Ellen Knickmeyer, a \textit{Washington Post} foreign policy journalist focused on the Middle East, noted how over time the U.S. government changed its measurement of success in Afghanistan and Iraq. She pointed out that for a period, the U.S. government used the number of insurgents killed as a metric for success, reminiscent of former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s accounting tool during the Vietnam War.\textsuperscript{43} Further, Major Andrew Knight suggested in his \textit{Military Review} article that the best measure of success is to assess influence the government gains over an area.\textsuperscript{44}

How occupation forces view, manage, and incorporate the target country’s domestic population into post-conflict planning and reconstruction is a recurring theme in literature. ADRP 3-07 stated that cultural norms must be represented in new governance systems.\textsuperscript{45} Kylie Fisk, Adrian Cherney, Matthew Hornsey, and Andrew Smith concluded in their post-conflict societies study found that voice and social identity are key to sustaining a stable post-operational environment.\textsuperscript{46} General Zinni considered domestic or civic development as a means to increase stability and lamented the U.S. military’s inability or unwillingness to develop communities.\textsuperscript{47}


\textsuperscript{44}Major Andrew J. Knight, “Influence as a Measure of Success,” \textit{Military Review} (Jan-Feb 2011): 64.

\textsuperscript{45}Department of the Army, ADRP 3-07, 2-17.

\textsuperscript{46}Kylie Fisk, Adrian Cherney, Matthew Hornsey, and Andrew Smith, “Rebuilding Institutional Legitimacy in Post-Conflict Societies: an Asia-Pacific Case Study, Interphase 1-2,” (Brisbane: University of Queensland, 2011), Appendix A.

\textsuperscript{47}Zinni and Koltz, \textit{Peace}, 149.
Understanding the differences between oneself, as the occupation force, and the occupied population is essential according to Derick Brinkerhoff, Ronald Johnson, Richard Hill, and RTI International. They warned that “unless stability operation strategies, plans, and operations take these host country interpretations into account and incorporate them into S&R [stability and reconstruction] plans, governance restoration and reconstruction targets are unlikely to be achieved.”48 The harnessing of social capital by occupation forces and fledgling governments is necessary when developing or restoring a society. Political scientist Francis Fukuyama said that the government could manipulate cultural norms to a degree.49 Beyond that, there must be an active induction of the population into a new social contract with their nation and government. Social scientists Ashraf Ghani and Clair Lockhart noted that investment in the population is a means for the new government to establish that new social contract.50 A new social contract not only suggests responsibility of the government to the people, but of the people to the government.51 Sociologist John Paul Lederach espoused the value of building on cultural resources and creating responsibility among the domestic population as a means to create stability permissive post-conflict environments.52

In developing stability plans for Afghanistan and Iraq, planners turned to the post-World War II success stories of Germany and Japan.53 They reasoned that stability was enduring in


those environments, so replicating the actions should produce the same results elsewhere.

Historians Donald Wright and Colonel Timothy Reese stated that commanders preparing for Iraq expected the stability phase of operations to look like peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Kosovo.\(^5^4\) This is just one example of the Army’s propensity to develop a single concept or approach and apply it to a wide range of problems. Fukuyama recognized a standard approach for stability operations to be hosting elections, removing centers of power (warlords) and corruption, and establishing means for economic development.\(^5^5\) To that Fukuyama added, of state-building activities in Cuba, the Philippines, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Panama, Nicaragua, South Korea, and South Vietnam, enduring economic stability only resulted in South Korea; the other countries rejected institutions established by foreign powers.\(^5^6\) When speaking of the Vietnam War, General Colin Powell agreed that the U.S. Army does tend to use a single approach, but contends that it is the result of national leaders and their policies.\(^5^7\) Record, Yates, and Flournoy noted the Army’s way of doing things is through conventional power.\(^5^8\) Given the opportunity, the Army will choose to use known means and methods. It turns something that “worked” into a model and tries to apply it in other places – which are different, to address unknown problems. Former Interior Minister of Afghanistan Ali Jalali questioned why the U.S. would bring the Iraqi-style surge of forces to Afghanistan when the environmental conditions

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\(^{56}\) Ibid.

\(^{57}\) Record, *Wrong War*, 11.

\(^{58}\) Record, *Wrong War*, 65. History of military power is use of conventional forces; Yates, *Stability*, 17. Army chooses to fight conventional wars because it best matches its trained skillset; Flournoy, “Nation-Building,” 92. Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were slow to transition to non-conventional methods, staying entrenched in a conventional fight mind-set.
were so different.\textsuperscript{59} He suggested that aggressive surge forces would not serve to connect the population to coalition forces or the nascent government, but further divide them.\textsuperscript{60}

\textbf{The Concept of Stability Operations and Stability}

In order to explore the reasons why the U.S. Army has limited success in establishing stable, post-conflict environments, it is necessary to establish a common understanding of key terminology used throughout this research. Three terms require definition. They are stability, stability operations, and success.

For the purpose of this research, the definition of stability is a security environment that enables the population to operate a normal life – as represented and understood by its society – without fear of repression or reprisal.\textsuperscript{61} Further, this definition outlines how the rule of law governs the actions of citizens and the government; as well as where everyone is accountable to the society writ large. Similarly, Francis Fukuyama defined nation building as “creation of self-sustaining state capacity that can survive once foreign advice and support are withdrawn.”\textsuperscript{62} State building and stability are interconnected; one cannot occur without the other.

Stability operations are a collection of actions undertaken by military forces and governments with the specific intent to create a secure and stable environment and facilitate legitimate governance.\textsuperscript{63} The 2012 Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 1-0, \textit{The Army}, defined stability operations under Wide Area Security as “the tactical tasks that the Army conducts to

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\textsuperscript{60}Jalali, “Winning:” 13-14.
\textsuperscript{62}Fukuyama, \textit{State-Building}, 38.
\textsuperscript{63}Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-07, \textit{Stability} (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012), 11.
\end{flushright}
improve conditions for noncombatants within areas of operations outside of the United States.”64 Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-07, Stability, defined stability tasks as “tasks conducted as part of operations outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.”65 Figure 1 represents the U.S. Army’s underlying logic for stability operations. There are many lines of operation, and most tasks occur simultaneously. Stability operations epitomize the complex problem concept because it inherently encompasses a system of interconnected problems.

64Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 1, The Army (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012), 3-4.

65Department of the Army, ADP 3-07, 1.
Figure 1. Stability Underlying Logic.

Source: Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publications (ADRP) 3-07, Stability (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army 2012), iv.
FM 1-02, *Operations Terms and Graphics*, listed stability operations as “operations that promote and protect U.S. national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crisis.” Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations*, and JP 3-07, *Joint Stability Operations*, defined stability operations as “an umbrella term for various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the U.S. in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and to provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.” Minute differences exist between the Joint Publication and ADP definitions. The definitions themselves presume an understanding of what stability is. Furthermore, they suggest what actions the U.S. military believes it can undertake to accomplish the mission. However, does it really identify stability as a concept, providing a deeper understanding needed to apply the desired comprehensive and whole of government approach as depicted in Figure 1? The degree to which operational planners understand, plan, and execute stability operations lies in their knowledge and experience. A discussion framed in doctrine, training, leadership and education, and policy will identify where shortcomings on this matter exist.

Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3000.05 considers stability operations as “military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions.”

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66Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 1-02, *Operational Terms and Graphics* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2004), 1-175.


supplements DoDD 3000.05 in its discussion of a whole of government approach, including stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction activity.\textsuperscript{69} JP 3-0 acknowledges that stability operations do not operate in a vacuum or by only one entity. Several organizations, like the Department of State, international governmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations share in some tasks and responsibilities.\textsuperscript{70} Indeed, many of these agencies are enablers for the military to accomplish their specific tasks.

One may deduce the essence of what stability is from the goals and objectives of stability operations and the subsequent idea of success or failure to meet those goals. How is success and failure of stability operations determined? There is no shortage of opinions among scholars, the national and military leaders about what success is in stability operations. This research accepts a declaration of success when the U.S. Army fosters the whole of government approach and facilitates a permissive environment for enduring stability after its departure.

A Framework for Assessing Institutional Causes

Opportunities over the past two centuries suggest that the U.S. Army’s knowledge of and skill in stability operations are substantial. Every operation in a foreign land requires Army leaders to employ stability operations and their capabilities within the range of military operations (ROMO) at various touch points in order to affect positively stability in the post-operational environment. Despite this, the Army continues to produce a mixed record of accomplishment in developing environments conducive to post-operational stability.

Specific to the question of Army capability in stability operations, the literature review and definitions aid in identifying institutional causes within the framework of doctrine, training and education, and policy. This framework examinations Army doctrine and any need for


\textsuperscript{70}Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-0, xxi.
institutional change. It then continues along a theme that Army culture and senior military leader attitudes affect the Army’s overall capability in stability operations. Using this framework will also bear light on the importance of understanding why native populations matter. Lastly, the framework assesses national and Army policy and how the Army uses a single approach to many problem sets.

INSTITUTIONAL CAUSES AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

Army stability operations often do not develop a post-operational environment capable of sustaining enduring stability.71 Institutional causes for this are present within Army doctrine, training, leadership and education, and policy. Poor performance in stability operations, according to Yates, is due to the level of importance military leaders historically attach to stability operations.72 Until recently, what are now called stability operations were on the bottom of the operational hierarchy within ROMO.

Stability operations are conducted across the spectrum of conflict and are not unique to conventional warfare. According to the Army’s understanding of what constitutes conventional warfare, the military has only participated in eleven conventional conflicts.73 Large unit operations with integrated tactics and maneuver engaged in the destruction of another nation’s identifiable enemy forces define conventional warfare. All other conflicts, especially in unconventional warfare, require the employment of small unit tactics against an ill-defined or unidentifiable enemy that uses the local populace to achieve its objectives. Additional categories of conflict include LIC, counterinsurgency or unconventional warfare, and MOOTW. These


72Yates, Stability, 1, 3, 7.

73Yates, Stability, 1.
missions often overlap with MCO and may require a hands-on approach with the local population through humanitarian assistance, institution building, reconstruction, and general governance. In post-conflict environments, the military is given or shares responsibility of tasks that typically fell under the Department of State’s purview. Yates suggested that the Army’s long-held premise of state building or stability operations being someone else’s job pervades modern thought. As a result, officers considering themselves to be ‘true’ military leaders traditionally have resisted unconventional warfare, LIC, and MOOTW.

Operational planning reflects strategic goals and objectives. The operational art and level bridge strategic goals and objectives with tactical ones through mission orders. As a linkage between strategic and tactical actions, one cannot underestimate the value and importance of the operational art. This places a burden of responsibility on operational planners to “get it right” and to communicate how well they understand the intent behind strategic goals. It may also challenge operational planners’ knowledge of coordinating with interagency and foreign nationals in a joint environment, and applying a whole of government approach in planning endeavors.

The following sections scrutinizes each of the four framework elements, doctrine, training, leadership and education, and policy. This examination reveals institutional causes within sub-areas. The section for doctrine considers three things. First, it assesses how doctrine is the foundation of military education and operations. Second, it reviews the Army’s historical slow process for making doctrinal changes. Third, it considers the effect of prioritizing conventional over MOOTW or stability operations. The section on training, leadership and education, and policy looks at how the three elements are preparatory tools for training and employment of troops to conduct stability operations. Another sub-area to consider is the attitude of senior national and military leaders and what affect that has on training, leadership and

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74 Yates, Stability, 2.

education. A third inquiry considers the cyclical nature of senior leader influence in informal education. The final section on policy has two sub-areas. The first assesses the impact of national directives for the military and the second looks at Army policy concerning the nature of the Army’s mission.

**Institutional Causes in Doctrine**

There are three means by which doctrine contributes to the U.S. Army’s mixed success in stability missions. The first deals with general doctrinal management. Management of doctrine affects the whole institution because doctrine is the foundation of military education and operations. Doctrine represents the legacy of military knowledge. It provides operational planners and general tacticians formats and tools to guide operations. However, because it is a generic process it does not have an array of answers to address each of the various environments in which the military may operate.

A PowerPoint brief prepared by the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center to promote and inform the Army population about Doctrine 2015 stated that Army doctrine “lays out tactics and procedures” and “describes how the Army executes operations.” A PowerPoint brief prepared by the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center to promote and inform the Army population about Doctrine 2015 stated that Army doctrine “lays out tactics and procedures” and “describes how the Army executes operations.”

Tactics, techniques, and procedures outlined in doctrinal training manuals become tasks in the Unit Mission Essential Task List (METL). METL tasks are those activities which a particular unit is expected to execute in combat. Clearly, if doctrine omits or obfuscates essential tasks related to stability operations then units will not train in those tasks. This produces soldiers and planners who do not have the requisite skill set to best plan and execute stability operations. Therefore, the unintended consequence of doctrinal management lies in its importance to the whole institution. There is a negative correlation of training and education activities to stability operation tasks when doctrine intentionally omits or under develops those tasks.

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The historically-slow process in changing doctrine is a second way doctrine may limit the Army’s capability to develop stabile post-operational environments. The breakneck pace at which Doctrine 2015 moved through the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) for publication, according to Lieutenant General David Perkins, Commanding General, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, challenged its standard doctrinal update process.\(^7\) The 2012 TRADOC Regulation 25-36, referencing Doctrine 2015, stated that the development or revision of doctrine now takes three to twenty-four months.\(^8\) In the past, manual updates or rewrites would take three to five years. Purpose of this long editing period was to ensure that the manual was complete. However, in dynamic fields some doctrinal changes might be out of date before the release of the new manual. In the case of the early planners in the latest war with Iraq, Wright and Reese noted that leaders and operational planners did not have the necessary training or doctrine to engage in the complex environment of Iraq, so they made do with what they had.\(^9\)

Doctrine does not go through development or revision unless there is a perceived need determined primarily by TRADOC with input from the field. Early reactions to the insurgent threat in Iraq made it clear to General David Petraeus that there was a long-overdue need to update the counterinsurgency manual.\(^8\) Institutional attitudes against stability operations did not lead to active assessment of its doctrine or the ability of existing doctrine to meet future needs for these types of operations. Seeing this need in Iraq, General Petraeus, in collaboration with Marine Corps Lieutenant General James Amos and Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl of the Army,

\(^7\)Lieutenant General David Perkins, Briefing to School of Advanced Military Studies, November 28, 2012.


\(^9\)Wright and Reese, *On Point II*, 583.
coordinated the publication of the *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (FM 3-24) in 2007. After the publication release, there was much discussion that the FM was rushed and lacked field review. In order to get this manual to the troops quickly, these officers made the unprecedented move of having it published by a civilian printing house. Some military leaders said the manual was less of an update than a repackaging of the Marine Corps’ *Small Wars Manual* published in 1940. Colonel Gian Gentile, Department of History, U.S. Military Academy, has been one of the strongest voices against the manual. *Joint Forces Quarterly* has been the intellectual battleground between Colonel Gentile and now-retired Lieutenant Colonel Nagl. Transition FM 3-24 is currently undergoing revision.

The third aspect of doctrine, which potentially inhibits the military’s creativity and limits the Army’s capability to establish stable post-operational environments, is the prioritization of conventional over MOOTW or stability operations. Prior to 2003, stability doctrine was broken down into several areas. Operational planners in Haiti, Somalia, and Vietnam would have individual manuals for LIC, MOOTW, small wars, civil support operations, and noncombatant evacuations. When planning for MCO, FM 100-5, *Operations*, was the only manual to which planners turned.

The emphasis on conventional operations led to multiple changes to FM 100-5 from the period of 1982 to 2011. Leaders were thinking about new ways to employ and equip the Army machine for greater combat effectiveness. Beginning in 1978, the TRADOC commander, General William DePuy began pushing for the updates to transition U.S. Army doctrine from the chains of the Vietnam War Active Defense concept. FM 100-5 went through a major revision in 1982 and

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81Petraeus, Amos, and Nagl, *Counterinsurgency*, Introduction.


incorporated the new focus of AirLandBattle. The most important aspect of the 1982 version of FM 100-5 was the shift to include guidance for operational level commanders. This new doctrine greatly effected training, leadership and education. Since General DePuy’s initiative through October 2011, FM 100-5, now ADP 3-0 would have six updates.

Meanwhile, in that same time span, manuals pertaining to stability operations had only three revisions. The Army updated FM 3-07 in 2008, then again in 2012 when it transitioned to ADP 3-07. The 2003 release reflected the transition from the FM 100 series manuals and combined manuals FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, from December 1990; FM 100-23, Peace Operations, of December 1994; FM 90-29, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, dated October 1994; and FM 100-19/FMFM 7-10, Domestic Support Operations, from July 1993. Published in 1961 was another manual on irregular warfare, FM 31-15, Operations against Irregular Forces. No update was released. However, over time, elements of this manual became the irregular warfare section of FM 3-0. The U.S. Army’s institutional attitude that specialized forces or anyone other than the conventional force was


responsible for LIC, MOOTW, and stability operations in general, doctrinal limited development and training opportunities. Emphasis on maintaining current, relevant training manuals is key to building an effective training force. The difference in attention given to MCO over stability operations is an indicator of what the Army views as its most important mission.

Doctrine has its limitations, but it is the first tool a planner uses to develop operational plans. A danger of doctrine is that its checklists become templates that offer seemingly simple solutions. Simple solutions may work for simple problems, but stability operations are not simple. The aggressive and hostile security environment the military faced in Afghanistan and in Iraq had almost no commonality with the MOOTW security environments under which the Army operated in the 1990s. For operational planners, working with pre-Doctrine 2015 manuals to address stability operational planning in 2001 was like trying to conduct land navigation with a broken compass. Entering Iraq, planners referenced outdated manuals on stability operations and tried to make the unknown situation match a known operational process. It also suggests that every unit was doing things differently, given their unique environments. This was, and remains, a poor solution if the intent and purpose of stability operations is to leave the operational environment capable of sustaining stability when external forces depart. Repeatedly lost and learned were stability operation lessons due to the unintended consequences of prioritizing conventional over stability operations, coupled with institutional attitudes against the same.

The prioritization of MCO over stability operations has had repercussions for doctrinal development. Threaded through this discussion is the relative lack of attention given to stability operations in doctrine. This has contributed to the lagging development of doctrine, while emphasizing the importance of conventional warfare.

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80 Wright and Reese, *On Point II*, 59, 64, 65,
Institutional Causes in Training, Leadership and Education

Training, leadership and education have a foundational link to doctrine. As the basis for planning and executing mission tasks, doctrine generates METLs and is the origin of every military school. Leadership and education are the “learning continuum that comprises training, experience, education, and self-improvement.” Military members are products of their education, experiences, and training. As such, there are three sub-areas to explore within training, leadership and education. The first reviews the relationship between the three as preparatory tools for troops and mission conduct. An intrinsic link exists between training, leadership, education, and their role to prepare the military for employment in support of national security interests. The second sub-area is the impact of senior national and military leaders and their attitude towards stability operations. Formal and informal leadership and education opportunities exist at every training event. The third is the cyclical nature of passing on institutional norms and informal education.

Training, leadership and education are preparatory tools for the development and employment of troops. JCIDS’ describes training as any activity that improves an organization’s ability to execute mission requirements at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Doctrine facilitates training, develops leadership, and provides the backdrop for practicing and evaluating lessons learned. All this occurs through formal and informal educational opportunities. The underdevelopment of training on specific skill sets is the result of omitting military tasks from doctrine or deemphasizing mission types in word and deed.

An example of when formal training and education may have limited a future general officer is the story of General Petraeus. Military doctrine during General Petraeus’ formative officer years were reflective of the post-Vietnam War era. The Army’s organizational culture

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90Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCIDS, A-5.
91Ibid.
neglected stability operations training, leadership and educational development.\textsuperscript{92} Brian Linn reviewed the student hours dedicated to MCO and unconventional war at the Army’s Command and General Staff College in 1993 and 1997. He found that in 1993, students spent 116 hours on Corps and Division operations or exercises, 112 hours on large unit commands, and 45 hours for unconventional war. In 1997, Advanced Warfighting combined 162 student hours, within which only one course addressed MOOTW and even then, its focus was joint doctrine and unit training plans.\textsuperscript{93} When General Petraeus went into Mosul, Iraq in 2003, what followed was as much the result of self-learning, personal relationships, and advanced civil education as it was his formal military training. Like many officers, he performed duties not taught in the Infantry Officer Basic Course over the course of his career. Training, leadership, and education for an infantry officer did not include the execution of humanitarian operations; yet, he was required to do so in Haiti.\textsuperscript{94} In Bosnia, he gained counterinsurgency experience when the mission expanded to include capturing al-Qaeda actors and destroying the organization’s financial networks.\textsuperscript{95} This experience, along with his civilian education and contacts with people working in national affairs, gave him a diverse background to address the operational environment. General Petraeus’ unique background perhaps prepared him better than an officer with only traditional military education and training.\textsuperscript{96} While this cannot be quantified, few can question his accomplishment Iraq, and later in Afghanistan. The unintended consequence of not exploiting training and education opportunities for future stability operations led to units needing to figure it out along the way in Iraq in 2003.\textsuperscript{97}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{92}Yates, Stability, 4.
\item \textsuperscript{93}Linn, Echo, 228-229.
\item \textsuperscript{94}Kaplan, Insurgents, 63-64.
\item \textsuperscript{95}Kaplan, Insurgents, 65-66.
\item \textsuperscript{96}Kaplan, Insurgents, 72.
\item \textsuperscript{97}Wright and Reese, On Point II, 568.
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\end{footnotesize}
The second sub-area for consideration within training, leadership, and education is the impact of senior national and military leaders’ attitude toward stability operations. Unit METLs identify key tasks in which units must become proficient. Units test METL competencies as part of their regular training activities. These training events are also opportunities for formal and informal education and leadership development. Here is one means for senior leaders to influence subsequent generations. This is of interest to an inquiry of possible institutional causes, as attitudes of senior leaders can transmit to subordinates, creating a cycle of knowledge that morphs into institutional norms.

Although doctrinal acknowledgement for stability operations has risen recently, past doctrine did not support training and educating the force at large on the complex problem of stability operations. Until now, it took a back seat to conventional operations. Yates noted that this was because conventional operations are the Army’s forte. Training events and formal education center on MCO. An old axiom suggests that military leaders are always planning and training for the last war – or the war they prefer. Military institutions tend to train for the actions they are most capable of executing, which is conventional war. When assessing senior national and military leaders’ attitudes toward MCO or stability operations, consider under what conditions military units, individuals, and leaders receive accolades. Military units receive combat streamers for participation in combat. Military units gained prestige and earned honors in World War I, World War II, the Korean War, and in the Vietnam War. Units do not receive streamers for their administration of a foreign village. Most books on military history focus on the tactical, operational, or strategic levels of war, not the messy part of stability operations that co-

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98Yates, Stability, 3, 14, 27, 28, 37.
exists with conventional military operations. Receiving a governance mission might cause some officers to question future career opportunities because they were not in the fight.

The third area to examine within training, leadership, and education is the impact of senior leader influence through informal education. Institutional norms reflect this informal education and is sometime contrary to published policy. Training for stability operations required tools to understand and knowledge of the domestic populations. When informal influences relegate a mission type below, another, these crucial skills are not developed. Leaders concluded that training for MOOTW or stability operations detracted from conventional training events, so commanders at senior levels continued to dismiss its value. In doing so, these left junior leaders with the impression of what missions were most important to their commanders and promotion boards. This, they carry throughout their careers and in turn, influence the next generation of leaders. Informal education such as this follows a vicious cycle that become institutional norms.

Senior military leadership influence on the next generation of officers is as potent as any formal education. Specific to stability operations, informal leadership and education reveal senior leader opinions and attitudes. General John Shalikashvili’s comment that “real men don’t do MOOTW” was not just a personal opinion, but one generally shared among military leaders in the 1990s. However, at the time, that General Shalikashvili made this statement, doctrine and policy were changing around him. The updated FM 100-5 added a chapter for operations other

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101Kaplan, *Insurgents*, 61, 68.

102Wright and Reese, *On Point II*, 59, 63-64.

than war (OOTW) and FM 100-23 provided guidelines for peace operations. Institutionalizing changes like these requires more than just new doctrine and policy. General David Perkins commented that change in the U.S. Army and acceptance of new doctrine and policy is near impossible without buy-in from senior non-commissioned officers’ and staff officers. Despite these doctrinal updates and increasing engagement in non-conventional operations during the 1990s, the U.S. Army was unprepared for the mission challenges it faced after 11 September 2001.

Institutional affects formal and informal education within the service. Operational planners were unsure how to approach the Iraq environment as the mission changed because the Army neglected stability operations doctrine and embraced the just-in-time training paradigm in training and education of the same. In 2003, political and military leaders alike were questioning if there was a Phase IV stability operations plan in Iraq. Major Ike Wilson was one of those people. There was a plan for Phase IV, dubbed Operation Eclipse II, but the resource for its development was not robust or planned over several years like its namesake. Operation Talisman/Eclipse was General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s plan for the occupation of Germany after hostilities. Planning for Operation Talisman/Eclipse began before the invasion of Europe. In fact, senior commanders began executing portions of the draft plans without the operational “trigger” being pulled because units moved so quickly, commanders found themselves responsible for local population before combat actions completed. While there may not have

104Department of the Army, FM 100-23, Introduction; Department of the Army, Field Publication (FM) 100-5 Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1993), Chapter 13.

105Perkins, SAMS Briefing.

106Kaplan, Insurgents, 77-79.

107Wright and Reese, On Point II, 73-80.

108Wright and Reese, On Point II, 73.

been an initial long-term occupation plan for Afghanistan, adequate stability operations training and doctrine should have been available for planning. U.S. actions to seek out the Taliban as a means to capture al-Qaeda led to regime change. Operations such as this require time and material to transition.

Creating stability in post-conflict environments is challenging. Military actions to restore governance and facilitate physical reconstruction of an area becomes increasingly difficult when that fractured society is also struggling with a new form of government and national structures that differ from its own values and traditions. Stability operations focused on rebuilding infrastructure and governments have trouble addressing the underlying and core civic issues that harbor seeds for future unrest. These issues resurface unless operational planning incorporates culture in the early planning phases. People in societies seek stability through stable power structures. Two tools available to military leaders to help them better understand the human environment are Red Teams and Human Terrain Teams.

Red Teams are comprised of military officers and civilians who have received special training at the University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. According to course designers and instructors, the basis of the course is to create officers who do more than think outside of the box; they are to think as the proverbial “other.” One method toward this end is the pre-mortem exercise established by Gary Klein in The Power of

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112 Smith, Peoplehood, 37.

113 Colonel (Ret.) Greg Fontenot, interviewed by author, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, October 31, 2012; Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Steven Rotkoff, interviewed by author, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, October 15, 2012.
Intuition.\textsuperscript{114} In this exercise, planners look specifically for weaknesses and gaps in the execution of a plan. Beginning with the premise that the plan on the table failed, Red Teamers ask where the warnings and indicators that lead to demise were. Such questions are not popular, but necessary if the commander is to receive the best options to meet tactical, operational, or strategic mission intent. Adding a Red Team perspective during stability operational planning may aid planners in avoiding institutional causes derived from training, leadership and education.

Understanding and incorporating the war-torn state’s culture into mission plans are difficult, but not impossible. The U.S. military seems to recognize this and seeks the right tool for incorporation. In an effort to “win the hearts and minds” in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department of the Army and the Office of the State Department implemented the Human Terrain System (HTS).\textsuperscript{115} This program deploys Human Terrain Teams (HTT) whose mission is to inform commanders and staffs at the Brigade and higher levels on cultural nuances. Use of HTS is controversial, especially among anthropological professionals.\textsuperscript{116} However, HTS has produced tangible mission benefits as highlighted by Lieutenant General Michael Flynn, current Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and Generals Peter Chiarelli and Ray Odierno, former commanding generals of Multi-National Corps - Iraq.\textsuperscript{117} Senior leaders who do not use or understand the tools available to them, may put their units at risk. Operational planners have only so much influence with the commander. Learning to incorporate culture and narrative into planning comes through experience, training, leadership, and educational opportunities. ADRP 3-


07 stated, “sources of instability manifest themselves at the local level.”

One can then conclude that sources of stability reside at the local level, too.

In summary, the unintended effects on stability operation outcomes from institutional causes in training, leadership, and education are the impacts on training, through unit METL tasks, and doctrinal linkages. Units derive their METL from doctrine. Institutional culture proclivities that overlook stability operations tasks in training means units will learn as they go when in a new stability operational environment. The result is increase operational risk.

Additionally, the attitudes and beliefs of senior national and military leaders negatively influence leadership and education in the next generation of officers and planners. The cyclical nature of senior leader influence on subordinates through informal education and leadership perpetuates institutional norms and attitudes. For stability operations, this influence limited the interest of officers to face the complexity of the very human operational environment in order to successfully fostering seeds for enduring stability.

**Institutional Causes in Policy**

Policy is the final area considered for institutional causes that can lead to planning pitfalls that inhibit successful stability operations. Two points of discussion are the impact of national directives on the military and the Army’s mission as identified in policy and doctrine. JCIDS defines policy as issues affecting or limiting the execution of DOTMLPF. For this research, policy refers to strategic guidance, which shapes operational goals. Strategic policy forms the basis of military missions, directs its capability focus, and provides funding. If the strategic policy shifts, objectives within DOTMLPF elements shift, too, in order to continue meeting strategic goals and objectives.

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118Department of the Army, ADRP 3-07, 1-1.

119Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCIDS, A-6.
How national directives and policy concerning the military might restrict stability operational success is the first sub-area under scrutiny. A series of national documents provides guidance to the military in order to prepare for and fight the nation’s wars. Figure 2 depicts key strategic documents that transmit policy to operational planners. Figure 3 illustrates the logic flow of how strategic policy transitions into operational planning. These figures express the complexity of building operational plans that reflect strategic goals and objectives.

**Strategic Planning Process & Documents**

![Strategic Planning Process & Documents](image)

**Figure 2. Strategic Planning Process & Document.**

*Source: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Strategic Planning System, CJCSI 3100.01, Washington, DC, 2008, A-10.*
Specific strategic documents feeding operational planning are the National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the National Military Strategy (NMS). Congress directs a four-year cycle, and some more often, for document updates.\textsuperscript{120} CJCSI 3100.01B outlines this cycle. In cycle year one, strategic documents begin with the President’s NSS along with the Secretary of Defense’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). During other cycle years, documents receive augmentations and updates as required. Cycle years two and four

produce the President’s Unified Command Plan (UCP), the Secretary of Defense’s NDS, the Guidance for Development of the Force (GDF), the Guidance of Employment of the Force (GEF), and the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff’s NMS and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The NMS depends upon the QDR and NSS, which in turn rely on the NDS. Unfortunately, the various departments rarely publish within the cycle directed. For example, the last NSS was published in 2010, the NDS in 2012, while the QDR came out in 2010, and the NMS in 2011. Collectively, these documents feed operational planning. The strategic guidance from these documents becomes the focal point for operational planners. It is their job to decipher this information into ways, ends, and means. They then develop operations plans that facilitate tactical level actions in support of operational and strategic goals.

Timely releases of strategic goals and objectives for stability operations are present more in presidential and military leader speeches than in the formal documents previously listed. Doctrine will eventually reflect the guidance given when national leaders issue general strategic policy for stability operations. Policy directs change within the Army, even if senior military leaders are not ready for it. Planners entering complex environments using out of date doctrine because formal policy and doctrine have not linked up, can put a planner at a disadvantage to affect positively the match current strategic goals with operational ones. In the discussion of stability operations, the 2012 release of ADRP 3-07 clearly states the overarching goals. Specifically it said:

> Ultimately, stability aims to create conditions so that the local populace regards the situation as legitimate, acceptable, and predictable. Stability first aims to lessen the level

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of violence. It aims to enable the functioning of governmental, economic, and societal institutions. Lastly, stability encourages the general adherence to local laws, rules, and norms of behavior. Sources of instability manifest themselves at the local level.123

The whole of government approach is undeniable in this statement. These words identify an understanding of the complexity and interrelated aspects of the operational environment and its population with their norms, values, traditional rules, and beliefs. Reviewing the update history of ADRP 3-07 reveals two updates post 9/11, but only one in the 1990s. FM 3-07, Stability Operations, last released in October 2008 preceded ADRP 3-07. This copy superseded the 2003 version, Stability Operations and Support Operations, which merged many small operations under one umbrella. Which stability operations manual an individual “grew up” with affects ones outlook towards those operations. Officers serving in the 1990s trained with disjointed stability operations doctrine that experienced very few changes.124

While the geopolitical world tried to identify what a post-Cold War environment would look like, the U.S. military continued with Cold War doctrine and tried to make it fit the MOOTW scenarios in Eastern Europe. The conflict among senior military leaders and the Clinton administration about using U.S forces for stability operations in 1995 lead to former Secretary of State Madeline Albright’s famous retort to then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, “what’s the point of having this superb military that you’re always talking about if we can’t use it?”125 This statement leads to a question of how policy and doctrine view the Army’s mission. The unintended consequences of national directives and policy for the military is that publication lags challenge the idea of who is leading whom.

123Department of the Army, ADRP 3-07, 1-1.

124Refer to discussion of stability operations publication updates under doctrinal institutional causes.

Another sub-area for considering institutional causes within policy is how the Army views its mission. In addition, one should review how policy has outlined its expectations for the military. FM 1 stated the purpose of the Army, as one of the oldest American institutions, is to support and defend the U.S. constitution and the American way of life.\textsuperscript{126} The manner in which the Army does this is through war and deterrence as an army-in-being. Accordingly, the preponderance of doctrine focuses on tactical tasks executed in combat.

Doctrine, as a form of Army policy, emphasizes combat skills in its two capstone manuals, FM 1 and FM 3-0, now ADP 1 and ADP 3-0. FM 1 acknowledged the role the Army played over the years in stabilizing other nations after conflict. This annotation occurred in the 2001, 2005, and 2008 versions. Although, the 2005 version of FM 1 included a reference to stability operations, the manual’s emphasis remained on the active prosecution of violence to force the U.S. will upon the enemy.\textsuperscript{127} The Soldier’s Creed, in FM 1’s front matter, highlights how soldiers are “ready to deploy, engage, and destroy, the enemies of the United States of America in close combat.”\textsuperscript{128} Basic soldier skills address combat activities because all military members are soldiers first. This does not suggest that there is no discussion of stability operations, only that they are pushed aside for MCO tasks and missions. In 1994, FM 100-1, the precursor to FM 1, presented OOTW the principles in a single paragraph and dedicated four pages of general discussion on the operations. The apparent lack of discussion and emphasis on stability operations within established doctrinal policy did not prepare operational planners for stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

\textsuperscript{126}Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 1, \textit{The Army} (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2001), 1-1.

\textsuperscript{127}Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 1, \textit{The Army} (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2005), 1-1.

\textsuperscript{128}Department of the Army, ADP 1, The Soldier’s Creed.
The February 2003 version of FM 3-07 centers on how stability operations “promote and protect U.S. national interests.”\textsuperscript{129} The manual suggests that one can do this “by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment.”\textsuperscript{130} Importantly, it identifies the purpose of such actions as “promote and sustain regional and global stability.”\textsuperscript{131} This is a departure from the December 1994 version of FM 100-23 and the December 1990 version of FM 100-20. Stability in FM 100-23 relates to order, as in the “restoration of order and stability.”\textsuperscript{132} This suggests much more of a policing action than societal development. Eliot Cohen remarked that the 1994 version of FM 100-23 was “a valiant attempt to reduce the messiness of…muddy missions” and “a conscientious effort to adapt the army to these uncomfortable missions.”\textsuperscript{133}

What is clear from the evolution of stability operations’ goals in Army doctrine is that it reflects the experiences of the Afghanistan and Iraq operational environments. Soldiers entering Afghanistan in 2001 operated off vague goals to first dislocate al Qaeda and the Taliban, and then shifted to regime change and stability operations.\textsuperscript{134} Initial stability operations goals in Afghanistan were different from those under which soldiers in Iraq operated.\textsuperscript{135} The shift in stability goals at the strategic, operational, and tactical level are more noticeable in Doctrine 2015

\textsuperscript{129}Department of the Army, FM 3-07 (2003), 1-2.

\textsuperscript{130}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{131}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{132}Department of the Army, FM 100-23, iv, 7.


releases, which seemingly move toward alignment with the DoDD 3000.05. The changes in Army policy are just one angle to consider the unintended consequences of policy on stability operations. Another is to look at how national policies view the role and responsibility of the military.

Former Secretary of War Elihu Root said, “the real objective of having an Army is to provide for war.” If national leaders take such a position then policy guiding military actions should reflect this. Indeed, the U.S. Constitution established the Army’s purpose as the defense of the nation. Title 10 of the U.S. Code delineated responsibilities to the Secretaries of the Army and Defense for arming, training, and general maintenance of the force in order to support the purpose identified in the Constitution. Furthermore, DoDD 5100.1 reinforces the Army’s purpose as conducting “sustained combat operations.” History, however, shows that conducting defense and offense are only two aspects of the Army's military capacity.

Meanwhile, policy establishing strategic goals for stability operations could be limiting or vague. This is because they could shift with the changing political or remain stringent to old aging foreign policy positions or theories and preclude military flexibility. For example, national and military leaders have held firm to the idea of conventional war as the means of securing global peace. The 2010 National Security Strategy advised the sustainment of military power sufficient to fight two major wars and one minor conflict. The ability to fight on two fronts is a reflection of World War II battlespace and the U.S. national and global security concerns.

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136Department of Defense, DoDD 3000.05, 2-3; Department of the Army, ADP 3-07, 2-5.
137Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 100-1, The Army (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1994), 2.
The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 was a major attempt to redirect the civil-military relationship and assert control over inter-service or joint operational capability.\textsuperscript{140} It directed the first national security strategy publishing in 1987. The post-Cold War environment kept national security strategies focused on regional conflicts due to the Cold War Communist-Democratic split and the destabilization caused by Soviet Union and Yugoslavia collapsing. Even though the need for stability operations grew in the 1990s, the first national security strategies were not decisive about how it the approach or manage those environments. Prominent discussion of terrorism was not present until 2002. Don Snider, a political scientist with the Strategic Studies Institute, assessed national security strategies from 1987 to 1994 and concluded that the U.S. has had no real grand strategy because of conflicting domestic political interests.\textsuperscript{141} This is concerning when the whole of the military’s efforts are contingent upon that guidance. An inability to sustain timely and strong strategic guidance is a clear institutional cause that leaves the military less prepared to succeed in stability operations and meet national security goals and objectives.

The ties between strategic goals and objectives and those at the operational level should be clear. Ambiguity creates challenges for operational planners. Unclear national security directives to the military leadership can transmit into ineffective doctrine, training, leadership, education, and policy. The just-in-time training paradigm does not work for stability operations because of its complexity and required understanding of the operational environment. Part of the reason for this is that strategic documents guiding military actions continued to emphasize the ability to sustain conventional war on two fronts. Active discussion of stability operations as MOOTW, LIC, and unconventional warfare gained momentum among senior military leaders by 2005, but remained on the outside of what was consider real war. In order to allow the Army the best chance to achieve success in stability operations, one cannot underestimate the unintended

\textsuperscript{140}NDU Library, Goldwater Nichols.

consequences of policy’s institutional causes. In this instance, those consequences are the
reinforcement of institutional proclivities that shun stability operations and thereby increasing
knowledge that can support the development of stability-permissive post-operational
environments.

In summary, the unintended consequences from doctrine, leadership and education, and
policy have in one form or another limited institution development of stability operations, which
lead to enduring stability in post-operational environment. Through all three sections has run a
theme regarding senior military and national leader’s attitudes toward stability operations. The
next section analyzes the unintended effects of the institutional causes.

LINKING CAUSE AND EFFECT TO STABILITY OPERATIONS

Over the past two and a half decades, the U.S. Army has done its share of stability and
peacekeeping operations. In each one, it followed the path of a single constructed solution, based
on Army doctrine, training, leadership and education, and policy to guide planning and
understanding of the environment. It may be too early to determine whether lasting stability will
emerge in Iraq and Afghanistan. Since history indicates that few past stability operations achieve
lasting results, the outlook seems ominous for the current environment. Supporting this
supposition is that in 2013, on the tenth anniversary of the U.S. invasion in Iraq, monthly terrorist
and insurgent activities continue to take as many lives as were lost before the 2007 surge.142

This section analyzes the unintended consequences brought about through doctrine,
training, leadership and education, and policy, which contribute to mixed stability operation
outcomes. An examination of doctrine first established the need for active, living doctrine to
facilitate planning and training activities. It also established a link between doctrinal publications
and the perceived status or importance of one type of military operations over another. Finally, it

142BBC, “Baghdad Hit by Deadly Blasts on Invasion Anniversary.” BBC.co.uk, March 19, 2013,
identified shortcomings in the management of stability operations doctrine to influence positively the operational and tactical levels. Evaluating training, leadership and education demonstrated a direct link to doctrine, unit METL tasks training, and where leadership and education can have lasting negative effects on the next generation of officers. The section on policy demonstrated a propensity for military policy not to align with national guidance at times due to problems with the cyclical publication process. This leads to the Army preparing for the type of warfare it prefers, rather than broadening its doctrine, training, and leadership and education. Two recurring themes came across all three sections. The first is that an intrinsic link exists between the elements. The second concerned the impact that Army culture and its attitude toward stability operations have had on doctrine, training, leadership and education, and policy.

The unintended consequences of doctrine relate to the timeliness and management of doctrinal publications. When military leaders view one type of military mission less significant or important than another, there is a propensity to downplay development of doctrine and training for that lesser mission. This is what has historically occurred to stability operations doctrine. Military leaders place more emphasis on MCO because this is what they see as the Army’s core mission.

Doctrine identifies operational goals for various mission types. Planners incorporate those goals into a commander’s Mission Intent. Past doctrine did not emphasize a whole of government approach in stability operations; however, ADRP 3-07 does. This means that as an institution, the U.S. Army has to reevaluate its propensity to think that stability operations are “someone else’s job.” A Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) report on the role of military in fostering governance through stability operations touches on this discussion. It highlights the need for military leaders and planners to take into account, the different local population perspectives, and expectations in the development and execution of plans. The report warned that “unless stability operations strategies, plans, and operations take these host country
interpretation into account and incorporate them into stability and reconstruction plans, governance restoration and reconstructions targets are unlikely to be achieved.” Strategic goals and objectives determine the ways and means applied to the given security problem. The Department of State, while it may have the mandate for many activities in the post-operational environment, depends upon the Army to set conditions for which the organization’s limited resources can provide the most good. Therefore, operational planners should consider ways to improve stability operations plans that do more than build infrastructure. Growing opportunities in training, leadership, and education should facilitate such an end.

The Army has acknowledged some unintended consequences from training, leadership, and education of stability operations to some extent. Evidence within doctrine are the planning consideration updates for stability operations in ADRP 3-07. Likewise, within training, units rotating into Iraq and Afghanistan after 2007 received more cultural emphasis in training events than did units in the years prior. Training events regularly use role players to challenge tactical troops’ understanding of the operational environment. As troops go through villages they must see that not every local is necessarily the enemy, nor are they friends. In professional education programs, cultural training is becoming part of the curriculum and creates discussion beyond the standard “do and don’t” briefings. However, the emphasis remains at the tactical level. Operational planners need more guidance and direction. That guidance and direction come from leadership as much as from doctrine and past training events. How the commander presents a


stability operation mission to the staff and organization at large, according to General Petraeus, determines a unit’s level of success.\textsuperscript{147}

Leadership plays an important role in future operational planners’ training and educational opportunities. With a broader whole of government approach derived from Doctrine 2015 manuals, training events should challenge the institutional norms, which have stunted depth and understanding of the cultural environment. Application of cultural tools like Red Teams and HTS, as well as building interagency relationships, will give planners more confidence on how to take on the complexity of stability operations. While a planner cannot account for every contingency, they certainly can identify touch points that will cause the environment to spiral out of control. Red Teams can facilitate this type of planning, especially when the Red Teamer is in an assigned staff position.\textsuperscript{148} Operational planners need to realize the importance of understanding of the operational area beyond the surface tribal or political grievances. The QDDR identifies several other drivers of conflict.\textsuperscript{149} Military planners should acknowledge these deeper cleavages when planning their share of the whole of government approach.

While tactical actions provide visible evidence that soldiers are doing something, the real measurement of success may not be readily apparent. Tactical operations in Iraq had many tangible stable periods. A key to continued success is continuity in thought and action to stay on the necessary path to achieve operational and strategic goals.\textsuperscript{150} Unfortunately, this continuity was

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{147}Petraeus, “Observations;” 9-10.
\item \textsuperscript{148}Colonel (Ret.) Kevin Benson, interviewed by author, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 31 October 2012. Divisions and Corps have Red Team MTOE slots. Brigades have positions for Red Team members within the planning team, but these are not MTOE slots, which means it is a second duty for either the intelligence or chemical officer, as they are the ones authorized to attend the training.
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not always present in Iraq. Consider General Petraeus’ success in Mosul in 2003. Many of General Petraeus’ successes in Mosul were lost when the command rotated back to the states. Major Wilson prepared briefings and organized gigabytes of data of how and what the unit did to achieve the current environment, but the new command was not interested – it had its own way. This lack of unity among senior leaders goes back in some degree to the competency and knowledge of their operational planners in this type of environment. This lack of continuity has been evident in Iraq. No less than four units rotated through Fallujah in the year before hostilities exploded in 2004. One might assume that the troop rotations contributed to the insecure environment as each unit came in with a harder position than the last. Other causes existed, too, but the military should acknowledge how they contributed to instability through their conduct and actions. Furthermore, domestic memory of this conduct by U.S. forces increases the difficulty of those same individuals to appear benevolent and not as occupiers or worse in the following days.

Conflicted societies often have common heritages and common narratives, but like siblings of close age, this mere commonality can also be the source of strife and tension. Foreign militaries deployed to restructure the political geography of a target country may deem possible root causes to violence in a given country as irrational and therefore disregard them. The Department of States’ Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) suggests

151Wright and Reese, On Point II, 28, 573.
152Kaplan, Insurgents, 77.
153Ibid.
156Maynard, “Rebuilding,” in Kumar, 204. Maynard suggested that labeling a conflict as ethnic oversimplifies the root causes.
that the real causes of conflict run deep and require time and resource intensive responses. Ignored weak agriculture sectors, food insecurity, starvation, and environmental degradation are significant contributors to chronic instability and conflicts in post-operational environments.\textsuperscript{157} Rebuilding infrastructure alone does little to address these drivers of instability.

Acknowledgment of how U.S. tactical actions can disrupt stability operations is one way planners contribute to whole of government planning in accordance with Doctrine 2015 and strategic policy. Flournoy and Dobbins recommended improvement of parallel planning between military and interagency organizations to improve stability success rates in post-operational environments.\textsuperscript{158} In 2000, social scientist, Robert Putnam published a book titled, \textit{ Bowling Alone}, that argues the merit of society and its social capital.\textsuperscript{159} The purpose of the book was to energize the American population to be one more interested in its own political and cultural development. He argued that Americans are disengaged and this apathy negatively affects society as a whole. While the problem of this research is not about American culture, one could argue that the principles Putnam lays out have relevance across cultures and societies.\textsuperscript{160} Taking Putnam’s argument on social capital to stability operations, political and military analysts Brinkerhoff et al. cautioned that a “weak and divided national society bereft of social capital then contributes to conflict and can lead to violence.”\textsuperscript{161} Reducing the cause for post-operational violence becomes the military’s responsibility through stability operations. Colonel Brian Petit suggested that stability operational success comes through an emphasis in building the community, not

\textsuperscript{157}U.S. Department of State, \textit{QDDR}, 15-16.


\textsuperscript{160}Putnam, \textit{ Bowling Alone}, 184, 288-89, 298-88.

\textsuperscript{161}Brinkerhoff, et al., \textit{Guide}, 37.
reinforcing tribal affiliations or other divisive positions.\textsuperscript{162} Multiple societal ties bind populations in Iraq and Afghanistan, much like the American population to which Putnam refers. A deeper understanding of the local narrative would guide leaders and planners to develop actions appropriate to the diverse areas. Other actions taken by the Army beyond rebuilding infrastructure will go far in the post-operational environment. Brinkerhoff, et al. suggested that Rule of Law activities are a part of a national society reconstruction.\textsuperscript{163} U.S. troop actions must demonstrate rule of law to set an example. Command messaging about prosecution of U.S. troops suspected of committing unauthorized or unlawful acts within a target country should facilitate good will among a divided citizenry. While reporting of the trials of the Marines at Fallujah and the sergeant who massacred eleven people in a village adjacent to his Forward Operating Base have had mixed results, they do not discount the value of transparency in military operations.\textsuperscript{164} These are just a few things for operational planners to consider when entering the complex environment of stability operations.

Ten years in Iraq and twelve years in Afghanistan have led the Army to modify its doctrine. Doctrine 2015 addresses some oversights noted in doctrine during the years in Bosnia and later in Kosovo. Commander tools such as Red Teams and HTS have brought a new perspective to the operational environment, which must be addresses in order to achieve the operational desired end state. Marine publication, \textit{Operational Culture}, discusses stability both in the sense of secure, prosperous economic and political environment, but also in terms of social


\textsuperscript{163}Brinkerhoff, et al., \textit{Guide}, 38.

relationships. Understanding this view of stability and the population’s perspective can significantly influence operational planning and execution. Stability operations present a number of challenges that, without specific focus, lose out to other tasks or missions during training, leadership, and education. Regardless of where fighting will occur, the U.S. military is bound by law to follow national policy.

The analysis of unintended consequences of policy reinforces the subordination of the military to the state. National policy provides the Army with a purpose. Its job is to fight and defend the U.S. from threats to the American way of life. In order to do this, soldiers at all levels must have the necessary tools. Doctrine and policy are those first tools. However, strategic policy is often too broad and may lend to unclear strategic objectives. The publication cycle for guidance finds one entity forecasting its national strategic goals and the military developing plans to meet that presumption. Gaps in national guidance can give the military the opportunity to invest in those training and education programs that meet their interests.

Former Army General and Secretary of State Colin Powell, was adamant in the 1990s that the U.S. not undertake missions abroad without a specific exit strategy and clear operational plan from the onset. A reflection of his experiences from the Vietnam era, this policy became known as the Powell Doctrine. This doctrine remained prominent military policy even after General Powell’s departure as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commanders followed this doctrine as they began operations in Iraq. The policy was tested in Bosnia and Kosovo. Yet, the Powell Doctrine would have its limits. When applied to Iraq, it lacked foresight for stability operations as the environment changed. Iraq was not Bosnia or Kosovo.

165 Barak A. Salmoni and Paula Holmes-Eber, Operational Culture for the Warfighter: Principles and Applications (Quantico: Marine Corps University Press, 2008), 17, 133, 192.
167 Robert Haddick, “This Week at War: The Long Death of the Powell Doctrine,” ForeignPolicy.com, March 5, 2010,
A 2011 self-assessment of the U.S. Army’s capability to conduct stability operations identifies capability shortfalls.\textsuperscript{168} Army institutional causes of its limited success over time to establish stable environments after occupation comes from considering how doctrine, training, leadership and education and policy prepare operational planners for the complex mission. Carl von Clausewitz acknowledged that, “no one starts a war — or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.”\textsuperscript{169} Extending this idea to stability operations, one should not engage in combat or intervene in a dispute without a plan and understanding of how to coalesce the environment afterwards—to consider how to restore the China shop after releasing the bull.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this paper was to identify the institutional causes that preclude the Army from performing stability operations that nurture a stable post-operational environment. These institutional causes include an Army culture that downplays stability operations over conventional fights; doctrine and educational deficiencies appropriate for developing operational planners’ understanding of modern stability environments; and national leaders whose policies allow military leaders to concentrate training and resources for well-defined, not ill-defined missions.

The discussion of doctrine, training, leadership and education, and policy highlighted how military and national leadership attitudes have affected the Army’s treatment of stability operations. These affects are manifested in doctrine, which guides training and military

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education. Operational planners’ understanding of complex environments will suffer under limited or no training in stability operations. Furthermore, it restricts their knowledge of how to incorporate the native culture and social capital into planning. When planning does not incorporate culture, there is little opportunity to build the social capital within a given country in order to foster the development of a more stable post-operational environment. Leadership and policies reinforce institutional norms and perpetuates, at times, out-of-date thinking which further contributes to institutional biases and attitudes toward stability operations. Wright’s and Reese’s account of Operation Iraqi Freedom reinforces what others before have said, that although these types of operations are not new, “joint and Army commands…have over recent decades rather consistently shown a tendency to ignore them in practice.”

The Army is addressing institutional causes related to stability operations. Three notable areas include updating doctrine, continuing role-playing and complex environments in training exercises, and changes to professional education curriculums which emphasize the role and importance of understanding culture and the foreign populations in all missions. First, Doctrine 2015 revamped and updated doctrine across the board. The 2012 version of ADPR 3-07 is a comprehensive publication on stability operations. It embraces whole of government approach. This concept is important because it better enables the Army in creating an enduring stability in target countries. Second, the Army adapted pre-deployment training to replicate some of the complexity of the tactical environment. This experience has an opportunity to grow as the Decisive Action training events at the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center promise to continue using an ill-defined environment within conventional training iterations. However, budget cuts will likely limit rational opportunities. Lastly, there are improvements in profession leadership and education that explain the importance of culture and

170 Wright and Reese, On Point II, 573.
171 Bridgewater, “Decisive Action.”
knowing the human terrain. These programs are expanding down through all levels of officer 
training.172 As junior leaders become planners, they will have a different perspective and 
foundation of stability operations than did their predecessors.

Although the Army has made strides to address institutional causes linked to stability 
operations, one might question if the institution’s culture has also changed. As quickly as the war 
in Iraq came to an end with main troop contingencies returned to the U.S. in December 2011, 
units resumed a traditional or more conventional training focus. Former Secretary of Defense, 
Robert Gates noted that we cannot predict what the next fight will be, so we must find a way to 
balance the force in such a manner that it can flex to respond to conventional and non-
conventional forms of the fight.173 This is a tricky balance, especially when one considers the 
typical peace-dividend budget cuts after large combat operations.

Military leaders brought in or developed other planning and assessment tools to help 
them better visualize and understand the environment. Two of note are Red Teams and the HTS. 
Used together, they may help operational planners build better plans and foster a more durable 
stability. Former Army officer, David Cavaleri states that the key to long-term success in stability 
operations is “a command and staff team armed with a sound initial plan, possessed of a clear 
vision and end-state objectives, enabled by situational understanding, and prepared to adapt that 
plan to accommodate changing capabilities and environmental conditions.”174 The development 
of such plans occurs before or concurrent with combat operation. Entering into combat, one 
cannot necessarily know when troops will transition to stability or Phase IV operations. Lessons 
from commanders in France and Germany in 1944 and Iraq in 2003 also show that the transition

172 Sterilla Smith, “Army Culture:” 3-4.

173 Robert M. Gates, Speech to U.S. Military Academy cadets, West Point, New York, February 

174 Cavaleri, “Stay the Course:” 37.
from Phase III to Phase IV operations is not necessarily sequential, as the pace of combat can move swiftly. Therefore, one must be ready to foster stability before, during, and after conflict.
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