Stability Operations
Policy and Doctrine Awaiting Implementation

by

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**14. ABSTRACT**

The contemporary global environment is complex and changing. A variety of threats to US national security require military formations proficient in missions across the spectrum of conflict—offense, defense, and stability. Strategy and doctrine direct proficiency in stability yet an offensive and defensive focused culture, maneuver brigade organizational structure, and related processes prevent this. Stability has historically been one of the Army’s most prevalent missions and because it is likely to remain so, strategic and operational improvements must be made. At the strategic level, following the example of Army Transformation, TRADOC strategic leaders must align culture to strategy and doctrine using cultural embedding mechanisms. At the operational level units and training institutions must internally reorganize, adopt doctrinal stability procedures, and emphasize education. Failure to make these changes will result in units with narrow capability, unable to conduct the stability missions our strategy requires.

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Stability Operations
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if a standing army must be tolerated…it should be as useful as possible, and not merely in military ways.¹

—President Thomas Jefferson

Defense spending represents the greatest portion (25% 2012) of the U.S. Federal budget.² Although shrinking, this spending will dominate budget allocations for the foreseeable future. When our civilian leaders demand a return on this taxpayer investment, the military—specifically the Army, must be ready to fight and win the conflicts we are presented rather than the ones we would choose. We are at a familiar moment in time, at the end of a period of prolonged conflict, trying to prepare for future contingencies. Consequentially, national strategy, policy, guidance, and doctrine direct the Army be prepared to perform missions across the spectrum of conflict. Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations (ULO), requires the Army to be able to conduct the core missions of offense, defense, stability, and defense support of civil authorities. Some leaders and trainers believe we are proficient in stability operations and should focus on the lethal end of the spectrum (offense and defense).³ This paper challenges that belief. It argues that to mitigate or defeat threats facing the US, the Army must improve its ability to conduct stability missions. While maintaining the ability to conduct offense and defense will always be critical, an inability to conduct stability will increasingly put US national security at risk. Although this has been acknowledged in national security policy and doctrine, stability remains inadequately addressed in the Army’s generating force. Army culture, organization and processes
have greatly limited its ability to educate and train its brigade combat teams (BCTs) to conduct effective stability missions.

Stability Operations, the Contemporary Environment and Threats to U.S. National Security

In a world which has changed rapidly over the last decade, the Army endeavors to define its current and future operational environment (OE). Most contemporary studies describe a diverse milieu which poses varied security challenges for the US, and its allies. In places like Syria, Congo or the Balkans, US land forces could be deployed as the lead element or in an advise and assist role to accomplish a variety of security tasks. Regardless of the mission, the end result would be to stabilize the area where they are deployed. Consequently, the Army must be prepared to mitigate a variety of threats. Noteworthy, these threats can’t be defeated simply with offensive and defensive missions. The narrow scope of these missions only fosters the defeat of an enemy, not the stability of an area. Thus stability missions will be a critical—if not primary—component of future military operations. Acknowledging the reality of future environments rather than as we wish them to be must be the priority for shaping US military capabilities.

Stability operations are not new. Since the 1840 Mexican War, the Army has conducted these operations approximately every 25 years. Examples include the Philippines, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. It is in Vietnam where the ramification of failing to execute effective stability missions can be seen most clearly. The Army initially focused on offensive and defensive operations and only started to conduct effective stability operations late in the war, after conventional operations proved ineffective. Failing to learn the lessons from Vietnam, the post-Vietnam Army
emphasized offensive and defensive operations focused on traditional threats. The cost, as evidenced in Iraq and Afghanistan, was the inability to effectively stabilize the country.

Our military fought as it had trained and while it successfully defeated conventional military formations, was ineffective against lightly armed insurgents with limited popular support. While some units had success adopting innovative tactics, overall the Army’s approach to operations (tactics, training, operations) remained fundamentally unchanged for much of both campaigns. Even after the Army developed doctrine and altered strategy, stability gains were either late coming or were never achieved. Consequently, both countries remain unstable. As the Army moves into a new period of combat preparations, it is again focused on offense and defense and risks arriving at a future conflict unable to conduct stability missions. While military force is a crucial component of mitigating and/or defeating threats to US national security, the overall goal of any employment of military power is to stabilize an area. Therefore, the Army must be able to effectively conduct offense, defense, and stability missions.

Strategy, Policy, Guidance and Doctrine

Though stability has been an enduring mission for the military, in 2005, amidst two wars, national leaders saw the need to provide specific policy for stability and reconstruction operations. This was the result of friction between government agencies and military reluctance to focus on such missions. To address this, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued Instruction Memorandum (DODI) 3000.5. This unprecedented directive orders stability as a core military mission equivalent to combat operations and directs the military to assume a lead role in coordination and execution. DODI 3000.5
prompted DOTMLPF® adjustments in the Army; however the changes did not provide sufficient stability related skills (civil affairs, information operations, etc.) in the BCT.

More recently, following the issuance of the Obama Administration’s Priorities for 21st Century Defense, DOD and the Army released Guidance Outlining Primary Missions of the U.S. Armed Forces and the Army’s Strategic Planning Guidance. These directives identify ten primary missions for the military, ranging from irregular warfare to disaster relief. Of these ten missions, seven of them require proficiency in stability missions.9

With these directives and the ADP 3-07 (Stability) doctrinal series, never before has so much guidance existed. Yet in Army tactical formations and training institutions it is not being implemented. As an illustration, a sampling of BCT training guidance, Combat Training Center (CTC) mission letters, and a review of Army training institution programs of instruction (POI) show stability comprises of 1% of the total guidance or instruction.10 Some memorandums and courses do not even address stability.

Causal to this underperformance is a military culture (beliefs and environments which shape how we act) of lethality.11 This culture produces commanders and trainers focused on offense and defense who improperly translate guidance. Commanders and trainers (battalion and above), present under the creation of new policy and doctrine grew up in a Cold War Army where conventional operations were a priority in training.12 This contributed to a mindset which guided how we conceived conflict and, more importantly, interpreted guidance. General John R. Galvin stated “When we think about the possibilities of conflict we tend to invent for ourselves a comfortable vision of war… one that fits our plans, assumptions, hopes, and preconceived ideas.”13 As an example,
some commanders and trainers may have interpreted the guidance “U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.” as stability is no longer a priority. This results in leaders who revert back to offensive and defensive competencies. Therefore, they cannot properly train, assess, and enforce stability.

Addressing this problem will require strategic leadership to shape culture and promote understanding of policy and strategy. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) must ensure compliance with policy and strategy through Army training institutions. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) must do the same with the generating force. Addressing culture and ensuring compliance with policy and strategy must be followed by the structural and procedural changes they require.

Consequences

To achieve what current strategy and policy direct, the Army must institute change. For example, the Army Chief of Staff, General Odierno directs, “the Army must develop new capabilities and adapt processes to reflect the broader range of requirements to ensure it is an agile, responsive, tailorable force…” Abiding by this guidance, BCTs must tailor organizational structure, establish relevant processes, and train and educate their personnel, while at the strategic level institutional training organizations complement these changes. Recent adaptations such as company intelligence support teams (COIST) and company level operations centers are examples of the force tailoring that must occur to meet a broad range of requirements outlined in policy and strategy.

In order to tailor a BCT for stability missions, DOTMLPF adjustments under organization, processes (doctrine), and education (training) are required. These were selected because they represent the most significant shortfalls that necessitated
augmentation and adjustments for stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. To illustrate force tailoring, an understanding of stability operations and the importance of understanding the operational environment (OE) is required.

Stability aims to create a condition so the local population regards the situation as legitimate, acceptable, and predictable. Since these missions are population-centric, they emphasize the “art” of war fighting which requires alternative approaches to adapt formations and tactics to achieve effects. Knowledge is primary and soldiers succeed by understanding human behavior models, religion, and foreign culture. Leaders succeed by possessing knowledge of stability concepts and societal behavior theories so they may conduct maneuver suitably. Because these domains are so diverse, a single stove-piped organizational structure, process and method of training will not work. A fundamental prerequisite to creating and tailoring any process or restructuring units is to first understand the OE. Unlike offense and defense where the goal is to defeat, destroy or neutralize the enemy, understanding the OE for stability missions requires a unit to navigate through a complex web of socio-cultural factors to determine where root causes of instability originate.

A study by the Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis Division (JCOA), J7, Joint Staff, concluded “failure to understand the operational environment” was the number one lesson not learned from the last decade of war. This was the result of ineffective intelligence and BCT organization, processes, and training not focused on understanding the OE. Recognizing this, the Army responded by tailoring BCT organizations (augmentation and modularity), and adopting new processes (District Stability Framework). This helped but BCTs still struggled under their existing
organization and processes thus in most cases they were unable to determine root
causes of instability or why an inferior enemy was gaining traction in their areas.
Intelligence drives operations yet the intelligence community struggled to provide
relevant information to commanders. Lieutenant General Michael T. Flynn (then Major
General, ISAF Deputy Commanding General for Intelligence Operations) noted in 2010,
“that we were largely uninformed about populations and ill-prepared to understand them
is a natural consequence of the intelligence community being built upon the edifice of
Cold War politics.”\textsuperscript{16}

Organization

The current table of organization (MTOE) for a BCT does not facilitate stability
operations. In comparison, in offense and defense, some augmentation such as
information support teams (MISO), engineers, and additional fire support may be
required. Yet for stability, aside from the very limited MISO, civil affairs (CA), and
information operations (IO) capabilities internal to the BCT, most of the required skills
are not present. ADP 3-07 (Stability) describes key stability tasks such as restore
essential services, support governance, and support economic and infrastructure
development but no related occupational skills (MOS) exist for these missions.
Furthermore, to determine the societal failures that contribute to instability, proficiency in
social and psychological sciences are required but not resident in BCTs. Successful
BCTs in Iraq and Afghanistan required augmentation in multiple areas. Examples
COIST, provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) to provide expertise in economics,
governance, and infrastructure development, and human terrain teams (HTT) to
understand cultural dynamics. Without this augmentation, our efforts in Iraq and
Afghanistan would have been even less effective. Given our training and doctrine which
encourages us to train as we’d fight and understanding we cannot train with all the required external augmentation, which is being cut in the current downsizing, it is illogical to permanently augment BCTs.

Though broad, permanent BCT organizational changes and additions would be unreasonable to suggest in a time of shrinking DOD budgets, effective changes can be made internally to foster a “tailorable” force. A useful comparison is the depth and breadth found in the fire support structure (FS) inside BCTs. FS personnel and their sections are resident from the BCT to the squad. Even individual soldiers must maintain proficiency in employing fire support, regardless of their MOS. This structure is driven by an essential need for FS and it receives an abundance of institutional and unit training. Effects in stability require the same comprehensive approach. For example, to stabilize an area, the government often needs to be reestablished or supported.

How can this be done? Commanders could look inside their organizations for individuals possessing education or cognitive skills which would allow them to learn government concepts and theories. BCT governance cells, like lethal effects or targeting cells, could accomplish a similar task of analyzing, planning and synchronizing governance efforts across the brigade. Even in platoons and squads, select members would need additional non-MOS skills (surveying, conflict resolution, etc.). A similar approach for other stability tasks (essential services, economy, and development) could also be adopted. During intensive training periods, BCTs should tailor their organization using this approach and create situational training exercises (STX) to test proficiency. CTCs should follow this method to train leaders, units, and staff. For example, an OE
STX centered on the DSF could provide a scenario which would force maneuver units and staffs to tailor their organization and processes to determine causes of instability and develop missions to mitigate them. A BCT demonstrating competence to do this would have a far better chance of success during stability missions. Though organizational changes will greatly assist a unit trying to achieve stability proficiency, it will also require procedures which complement these changes.

**Procedures (Doctrine)**

Procedural inefficiencies can be overcome with two simple changes—improve bottom-up intelligence and use the DSF. Since stability operations are population-centric, they require intelligence collection and analysis from the lowest levels of the formation to identify the local causes of instability. This intelligence, provided to higher headquarters, can provide commanders with a better understanding of the OE fostering more effective stability missions. As an example, the Khowst-Gardez road, a multi-million dollar project in southeastern Afghanistan, designed at division level to promote economic growth, actually created greater instability when the tribes along the road fought over resources, land, and associated road contracts. A bottom-up process would have informed the unit that a road was not going to promote economic growth, only more instability. As a result the unit in the area was consumed by the tribal tensions and fighting and was not able to identify the real SOIs or stabilize the area.

To improve intelligence collection and analysis in Iraq and Afghanistan, COIST were developed. The Army embraced this concept and BCTs began to man and train these teams. However, COISTs were never given permanent manning authorizations or enduring institutional training. Some BCTs continue to field and train these teams but
as Afghanistan transitions, they may disappear. Though COIST manning is an organizational issue, the bottom-up intelligence process depends on their survival.

To address this, the Army must assign the Intelligence Center of Excellence (COE) as the proponent for COIST doctrine and training. COIST training and operations must also have resident expertise at the CTCs. Commanders must identify, man and train COIST teams to exist and train permanently. COIST continuity would foster a foundational capability in each maneuver company to provide the indispensable bottom-driven intelligence needed in BCTs. To be effective, COIST survival must be complemented by a methodology that will deliver effects during stability missions. A useful methodology is the DSF.

The DSF, though doctrinal (ADP 3-07) and mandated by International Security Forces Afghanistan (ISAF), is little known or used across the Army. The Army embedded DSF in doctrine but did not establish a pre-deployment training program for it. Not having used DSF before, commanders were averse to incorporating it into their processes during chaotic Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) pre-deployment periods. Neither has DSF been incorporated in CTC Leader Training Programs (LTP) nor rotations (save JMRC in Europe). A DSF mobile training program was created by ISAF and directed to train units, but many BCTs either ignored this directive or used it to rationalize their pre-conceptions. This situation is the result of the Army culture of lethality which causes commanders to selectively interpret or ignore guidance. Of the few units that embraced DSF, many placed it on the shoulders of small under resourced, non-lethal cells inside their organizations.
The District Stability Framework, created by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in partnership with DOD, was designed specifically for stability operations. Modeled using the targeting and military decision making process (MDMP), DSF advances these processes to help users identify SOIs through a local cultural lens, design operations to address them and monitor their effectiveness. For example, using the doctrinal ASCOPE/PEMSII\textsuperscript{22} population-focused assessment tool, DSF modifies it to provide the local relevance of each aspect of the OE. To illustrate DSF’s value, consider the following example:

Using DSF in the Nawa District of Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 1\textsuperscript{st} Battalion, 5\textsuperscript{th} Marines in 2009 learned that the lack of phone coverage was one of the local population’s principle grievances. Using the DSF Tactical Conflict Survey the unit discovered phone coverage fostered a sense of stability because it allowed people to quickly find out about the security situation in neighboring areas and/or if attacks had injured family members. Based on this information, the battalion and its Afghan National Security Force partners started providing security for the local cell phone towers. This effort led to an increase in the number of tips about enemy activity. Even more significantly, it increased the number of people who believed the area was stable. The Battalion Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Bill McCollough noted “without DSF… we would never have known about this concern, or done anything about it.”\textsuperscript{23}

To fix this shortfall, the Intelligence COE must establish a cadre of DSF trainers, embed this POI into COIST training, and create introductory and advanced DSF education and training modules for basic, career, and intermediate courses. BCTs must train their leaders and staffs and implement this methodology during situational training. CTCs must build observer controller capacity to coach and train units and staffs on the DSF.

Education (Training)

As highlighted, unit and training institution guidance and POIs provide insufficient stability direction which is caused by a culture centered on lethality. Furthermore, because of the differences between offense, defense, and stability, a tailored training
approach is required. BCTs and training institutions can approach this through the following, 1) a balanced approach between offense, defense and stability training and education, 2) doctrinal training management, 3) emphasis on education over training. A balanced approach will allow stability to occupy more of BCT focused training periods so commanders can adjust their organization and exercise their units and staffs. Doctrinal training management will force a task “cross-walk” between doctrine and unit training plans to ensure compliance. Education will equip leaders with a conceptual framework to think their way through complex stability problems.

To achieve balance, BCT commanders must approach stability training at home station the same way they do offense and defense. This means dedicating greater portions of focused training periods to stability and applying the same leader involvement and oversight. Using doctrinal training management, following the principles presented in ADP 7-0 (Training Units and Developing Leaders) and ADP 3-07 (Stability), BCT commanders must develop leader, soldier and unit stability training programs that achieve proficiency. Staff exercises (STAFFEX) and STX training will work the cognitive skills required of leaders and staffs. Building population-centric scenarios to help exercise DSF will add rigor to stability training and increase proficiency.

Along with this training approach, commanders must place a greater emphasis on education. Education will be vital to understanding instability in future operational environments. Since training is currently dominated by offense and defense, education has become secondary.
Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Regulation 350-70 (Army Learning Policy and Systems) defines training as a process geared toward increasing the capability of individuals and units to perform a specified task. Education produces leaders and organizations who know how to think, apply knowledge and solve problems. Stated another way, consider being trained as a pilot to fly a plane or being educated as an aeronautical engineer to know why the plane flies, and then being able to improve its design so that it will fly better. In stability operations, soldiers and leaders will be required to mitigate complex societal problems in constantly changing environments. Therefore, education must take precedence over training.

Education in the social sciences should be included in training, to build internal stability mission capability. Commanders should select individuals inside their organization with the capability to grasp these theories and implement them. This can be done inexpensively identifying personnel inside the organization with these types of experiences or degrees, allowing officers and NCOs to take college classes at community colleges or bringing in professionals to conduct leader training.

Translating policy and strategy through the same lethal lens, Army training centers of excellence (COE) do not treat stability as a core military mission. Aside from some basic instruction on language, culture, and lingering COIN training, there is no stability training in basic, career and NCO professional development courses. Because of this, leaders arrive to units with little or no stability education or training. To remedy this, each COE must establish stability POIs which should include historical cases, vignettes, and exercises to foster learning.
Lastly, CTCs must tailor rotations to better facilitate stability proficiency. Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) rotations, though evolving, have yet to demonstrate an adequate approach to stability. This is evident in rotational training plans and leader training programs (LTP).\textsuperscript{28} Currently, force on force periods move through offense and defense (or reverse) sequentially while stability is presented throughout the rotation. This causes stability to drop in priority as rotational units (RTU) face significant conventional threats from the opposition force (OPFOR). Though it is realistic that a BCT would conduct offense, defense, and stability simultaneously, the complexity of the training scenario prevents proper assessment of stability proficiency. The Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Germany observed, “Although we created a scenario that allowed for significant play for all three missions, the scenario—defending against an invasion and then executing offensive operations to push out the invading force—overwhelmed the RTU.”\textsuperscript{29} To fix this requires an adjustment to the operational environment (OE) which will allow the RTU to focus on stability as a BCT main effort. Following rotations, after action reviews (AARs) must include stability so that units have feedback and recommendations on how they can improve their proficiency.

Along with this adjustment, LTP programs which only dedicate 1\% of their total POI to stability, must achieve balance in offense, defense and stability education and training.\textsuperscript{30} This imbalance is a result of LTP cadre (JRTC and NTC) which are primarily retired officers and NCOs who served either before or retired shortly after 2001. Their frame of reference is 1990s doctrine and operational experiences. This means that the staffs of BCTs and battalions do not get relevant training. To address this, LTPs must
seek expertise from centers like the Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), update their DATE POIs, and/or replace trainers with those who can effectively conduct contemporary staff training.

Changes like the ones outlined here are not a new phenomenon to the Army. Former Army Chiefs of Staff, Erik K. Shinseki and Peter J. Schoomaker recognized the consequences of complex global environments on the Army and implemented change through strategic leadership. Both leaders, having to steer a large organization through change, understood there would be obstacles which could impede success.

Obstacles to Conducting Effective Stability Operations and Strategic Means to Address Them

Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated “the tendency of any big bureaucracy is to revert to business as usual at the first opportunity… for the military, that opportunity is coming with the unwinding of sustained combat.” For the Army, this means regressing to an exclusive concentration on offense and defense. This will result in units which are unable to effectively conduct stability missions. Culture is the primary obstacle. To mitigate this, leaders must understand cultures, attributes, and behaviors as well as means to address them.

Kim Cameron and Robert Quinn offer a competing values framework of cultures to help describe behaviors, and beliefs which shape how organizations act. In this model, they recognize the Army mostly as a Hierarchy but with some attributes of an adhocracy. Hierarchies rely on chain-of-command and well-defined procedures while adhocracies promote independence and flexibility. In Iraq and Afghanistan the Army shifted closer to an adhocracy, necessitated by combat, conducting decentralized operations. However, once back at home stations, units immediately reverted back to a
hierarchy subject to rigid garrison rules and command structures. As Afghanistan transitions, units in traditional offensive and defensive training environments will assume hierarchical characteristics. Conversely, leaders which shape and espouse a culture of adaptability in organization and training will foster an *adhocracy* creating the right environment for stability training and education.

In the standardized, orderly nature of a hierarchy, cultural change will not come easy. The work of Geert Hofstede presents, *Uncertainty Avoidance* as an attribute influencing cultural change. This attribute describes how ambiguous situations are threatening to organizations to which rules and orders are preferred. Leaders in hierarchical organizations who lack stability competence may commit uncertainty avoidance which will cause them to mistranslate or ignore strategy and doctrine.

Along with these cultural attributes and behaviors, Colin Gray offers *Twelve Characteristics of the American Way of War* to help understand the military mindset. Three of these, *technologically dependent, firepower focused* and *profoundly regular* are particularly relevant because they represent a mindset which could be averse to the associated changes required for stability.

America’s technological prowess causes the military to focus on firepower and associated systems such as global positioning navigation, precision weaponry, and surveillance platforms. This technology shapes our processes, training and in some cases our organization. However, much of this technology loses relevance in stability missions where personal contact and acknowledgement of indigenous cultures is crucial. Gray also notes, “American soldiers are generally regular in their view of, approach to, and skill in warfare… they have always been prepared for combat against
a tolerably symmetrical, regular enemy.”\textsuperscript{36} Though there are exceptions, this characteristic is evident in CTC training environments which concentrate on offensive and defensive missions.\textsuperscript{37}

In order to overcome this situation, sociologists like Edgar Schein note that culture can be changed through cultural embedding mechanisms leaders use to promote change in their organizations. These include, \textit{what leaders pay attention to, measure,} and \textit{control}.\textsuperscript{38} Structural applications such as, \textit{organizational design, systems,} and \textit{procedures} also facilitate change.\textsuperscript{39} The experience of Generals Shinseki and Schoomaker provide two examples of successful Army change using these embedding mechanisms.

Witnessing a heavy Army in the Balkans, slow to deploy, move, and adapt and realizing the diversity of the future threat environment, General Shinseki began his embedding process to change the Army announcing “Army Transformation” in 1999.\textsuperscript{40} He faced a conservative Army bureaucracy, resting on its laurels from its successes in Desert Storm.\textsuperscript{41} To overcome this he established the Army Transformation Cell at Fort Lewis, Washington to \textit{measure} and \textit{control} progress. Army Transformation \textit{organizational design} centered on the Stryker brigade concept as a bridge to a future force. He personally carried his “change” message to the Army through his travels and engagements with soldiers and leaders.

General Schoomaker, having to grow the force and provide modular capability to combatant commanders, announced to Congress and the Army, Modular Reorganization.\textsuperscript{42} To make this succeed he formed “Task Force Modularity” under TRADOC to \textit{pay attention to, control} and \textit{measure} this effort.\textsuperscript{43} Having to overcome
similar cultural obstacles, he engaged in a campaign to embed a “joint-expeditionary mindset” with speeches, professional articles, congressional testimony and direct oversight of the effort. The modular brigade was the organizational design born from this effort, possessing increased capabilities.

Common and crucial to both of these successes was what leaders paid attention to. What strategic leaders dedicate their attention to and consider important, so too will subordinate commanders. Coupled with this, measuring and controlling will allow strategic leaders to know if success is being made or changes need to occur.

To address the current problems with stability proficiency, strategic leaders must align culture to policy and strategy as their predecessors did.44

Today’s cultural environment does not differ much from previous ones. To foster change, General Odierno will have to use embedding mechanisms similar to his predecessors to ensure the Army implements his vision and that of our national leaders. TRADOC must be the Army’s strategic proponent for this effort and pay attention to, measure, and control the plan to repair stability proficiency. To accomplish this, the TRADOC Deputy Commanding General should lead an integrated effort by the Combined Arms Center, Army Capabilities and Integration Center, and each of the COEs.

First, in order to pay attention to stability operations, this integrated team should sanction PKSOI to conduct a thorough review and analysis of divisions, BCTs, training institutions, and CTCs to identify where stability shortfalls exist and why. This report, once complete should be presented to the members of the integrated team followed by the creation of an action plan to address shortfalls. Paying attention will require periodic
updates to TRADOC leadership, speaking engagements, white papers, and professional articles on how training institutions and BCTs can tailor and improve their organization, processes, training, and education. This effort must be coupled with leadership visits to training institutions and BCTs during intensive training periods to provide the needed attention. FORSCOM, Department of the Army G3/5/7, and US Army Europe (USAREUR) should be party to the PKSOI study and support this effort using their own strategic leadership and authorities to pay attention, measure, and control division and BCT stability proficiency.\textsuperscript{45}

Second, to control this process, TRADOC should employ PKSOI as its stability cell similar to the Transformation and Modularity Cells which were so essential to the success of earlier transformation efforts. TRADOC should staff PKSOI appropriately using existing personnel such as its Irregular Warfare (IW) cell. This cell could monitor stability training, seek educational assistance from academia, suggest broadening assignments, and provide training to Army trainers and the generating force. TRADOC must mandate changes to CTC rotations to create OEs where stability is a key, measurable training objective. Changes to LTP are required as well, to improve stability staff training. Lastly TRADOC must mandate DSF training in institutions and CTCs and require BCTs to use DSF in their stability training during rotations.

Finally and most important, to measure the effectiveness of these changes improvements and proficiency TRADOC must create or improve reporting procedures that indicate quantity and quality of stability training across the generating force and training institutions. This can be done by follow-on PKSOI and CTC training assessments delivered to the integrated team on a periodic basis. TRADOC,
FORSCOM, G3/5/7 and USAREUR can establish supplementary reporting as needed based on findings.

Conclusion

The problems presented in this paper are well within the capability of the Army to address, even amidst shrinking budgets. Policy, strategy, and doctrine speak clearly of the requirement to maintain stability operations as a core competency. However, if the Army forgets its recent past and shifts its focus to offense and defense it risks arriving on the next battlefield unprepared. The newly formed Decisive Action Training Environment and TRADOC’s strategic adaptability provide a unique opportunity to institute changes forcing units to tailor their organization and processes to achieve stability proficiency. Through self-assessment, a reflection of recent struggles with stability missions and strategic leader involvement the Army can fulfill its obligation to national security policy, strategy, and doctrine and achieve stability proficiency.

Endnotes


3 Conversations and interviews between Task Force Senior Trainers and leaders from BCTs under U.S. Army Europe, field grade officers, E-7s and above at The Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC). Many believe if the Army maintains its basic skills at offense and defense, transitioning to stability will be easy. The author’s personal experience in Afghanistan and having studied the complex nature of stability operations suggests the reverse is true. June 2011 through June 2012.


7 Michele Flournoy, Department of Defense Instruction 3000.5 (Washington, DC; U.S. Department of Defense, September 16, 2009), 2.


10 This statistic comes from a collection and analysis of 15 Division and BCT training guidance memorandums, mission letters for Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) CTC rotations and combat arms training institution (basic, career, NCO courses) POIs. Tasks and guidance relating specifically to offense, defense, and stability proficiency were tallied (tasks like leader development, fitness, and administration were not counted), and averaged across the 15 documents and POIs. A total of 15 stability related tasks were found as opposed to 165 offense and defense tasks. This equated to an average of .090% (percent of each document or POI related to a stability task or guidance), (collected and assessed November through February 2012-2013).


12 Leadership at the Battalion Level and above in 2005 were at the rank of Major or higher on September 11, 2001. Their company grade or junior field grade years were spent in cold a cold war focused training environment.


Ibid.

Result of Author’s experience from 2 years at JMRC in Europe interviewing 22 brigade-level or higher commanders, observing 14 Afghanistan training rotations and assessments from 4 Afghanistan Observer Controller visits to seek current practices in theater.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.


This assertion comes from a search of COE websites and email communication with school staff members (Maneuver, Artillery, and Intelligence). Here I studied the POIs for several courses (basic and career courses, NCOES), [http://www.benning.army.mil/mcoe/](http://www.benning.army.mil/mcoe/) (Accessed January 14, 2013).

JMRC Operations Group After Action Review 14 November 2011, Author’s assessment of rotational training plans from each of the CTCs.
Decisive Action Training Environment at JMRC, CALL Pub no. 12-11, 36.

Review of JRTC and NTC (JMRC is OC run) LTP Programs. A 40 hour training week included only 2 hours of stability instruction equaling 05%. NTC LTP for a DATE rotation had no stability tasks in the LTP POI.


Ibid.


There have been six DATE CTC rotations. Each one focused on offense and defense. Stability scenarios were presented throughout the rotations but were secondary to the units focus on regular hybrid threats.


Ibid.


Department of Command Leadership and Management, United States Army War College, Strategic Leadership Primer (Carlisle, PA: United States Army War College, 2010), 49.

DA G-3/5/7 is the CTC Program Director. FORSCOM provides C2 for NTC and JRTC, and has scheduling authority for MCTP. TRADOC executes C2 for the MCTP, and provides the CTC Program Responsible Official. The CTC Program Responsible Official is tasked with Administration, Validation, and Integration of the program.