POST-PUEBLO USAF ACTIONS
KOREA/JAPAN
JANUARY 1968-JANUARY 1969

25 AUGUST 1969

HQ PACAF
Directorate, Tactical Evaluation
CHECO Division

Prepared by:
COL MAURICE L. GRIFFITH
MR WARREN A. TREST
Project CHECO
HQ PACAF (DOTEC)
# Post-Pueblo USAF Actions Korea/ Japan January 1968-January 1969

## Abstract

Approved for public release, distribution unlimited

## Subject Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. REPORT</th>
<th>b. ABSTRACT</th>
<th>c. THIS PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>unclassified</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Security Classification of:

- a. REPORT: unclassified
- b. ABSTRACT: unclassified
- c. THIS PAGE: unclassified

## Limitation of Abstract

SAR

## Number of Pages

240
The counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare environment of Southeast Asia has resulted in the employment of USAF airpower to meet a multitude of requirements. The varied applications of airpower have involved the full spectrum of USAF aerospace vehicles, support equipment, and manpower. As a result, there has been an accumulation of operational data and experiences that, as a priority, must be collected, documented, and analyzed as to current and future impact upon USAF policies, concepts, and doctrine.

Fortunately, the value of collecting and documenting our SEA experiences was recognized at an early date. In 1962, Hq USAF directed CINCPACAF to establish an activity that would be primarily responsive to Air Staff requirements and direction, and would provide timely and analytical studies of USAF combat operations in SEA.

Project CHECO, an acronym for Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operations, was established to meet this Air Staff requirement. Managed by Hq PACAF, with elements at Hq 7AF and 7AF/13AF, Project CHECO provides a scholarly, "on-going" historical examination, documentation, and reporting on USAF policies, concepts, and doctrine in PACOM. This CHECO report is part of the overall documentation and examination which is being accomplished. Along with the other CHECO publications, this is an authentic source for an assessment of the effectiveness of USAF airpower in PACOM.

MILTON B. ADAMS, Major General, USAF
Chief of Staff
SEE DISTRIBUTION PAGE

1. Attached is a TOP SECRET NOFORN document. It shall be transported, stored, safeguarded, and accounted for in accordance with applicable security directives. Each page is marked according to its contents. The information contained in this document will not be disclosed to foreign nationals or their representatives. Retain or destroy in accordance with AFR 205-1. Do not return.

2. Reproduction of this document in whole or in part is prohibited except with the permission of the office of origin.

3. This letter does not contain classified information and may be declassified if attachment is removed from it.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

WARREN H. PETERSON, Colonel, USAF
Chief, CHECO Division
Directorate, Tactical Evaluation
DCS/Operations

1 Atch
Proj CHECO Rprt (TS/NF/AFEO/LIMDIS), 25 Aug 69
# DISTRIBUTION LIST

## 1. SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
   - **a. SAFAA** .......... 1(1)
   - **b. SAFLL** .......... 1(2)
   - **c. SAFOI** .......... 2(3,4)

## 2. HEADQUARTERS USAF
   - **a. AFBSA** .......... 1(5)
   - **b. AFCCS**
     - (1) AFCCSSA .......... 1(6)
     - (2) AFCVC .......... 1(7)
     - (3) AFCAV .......... 1(8)
     - (4) AFCHO .......... 2(9,10)
   - **c. AFCSA**
     - (1) AFCSAG .......... 1(11)
     - (2) AFCSAMl .......... 1(12)
   - **d. AFGOA** .......... 2(13,14)
   - **e. AFIGO**
     - (1) AFISI .......... 3(15-17)
     - (2) AFISP .......... 1(18)
   - **f. AFMSG** .......... 1(19)
   - **g. AFININ**
     - (1) AFNIE .......... 1(20)
     - (2) AFNINA .......... 1(21)
     - (3) AFININCC .......... 1(22)
     - (4) AFININED .......... 4(23-26)
   - **h. AFAAC** .......... 1(27)
     - (1) AFAMAI .......... 1(28)
   - **i. AFODC** .......... 1(29)
     - (1) AFOAP .......... 1(30)
     - (2) AFOAPS .......... 1(31)
     - (3) AFODCC .......... 1(32)
   - **j. AFPDC**
     - (1) AFDPDSS .......... 1(35)
     - (2) AFPMDG .......... 1(36)
     - (3) AFPMO .......... 1(37)
   - **k. AFRDC**
     - (1) AFRDD .......... 1(38)
     - (2) AFRDQ .......... 1(40)
     - (3) AFRDR .......... 1(41)
     - (4) AFRDF .......... 1(42)
   - **l. AFSDC**
     - (1) AFSLP .......... 1(43)
     - (2) AFSME .......... 1(44)
     - (3) AFSSS .......... 1(47)
     - (6) AFSTP .......... 1(48)
   - **m. AFTAC** .......... 1(49)
   - **n. AFXDC**
     - (1) AFXDO .......... 1(50)
     - (2) AFXDOC .......... 1(51)
     - (3) AFXDOD .......... 1(52)
     - (4) AFXDOL .......... 1(53)
     - (5) AFXOP .......... 1(54)
     - (6) AFXOSL .......... 1(55)
     - (7) AFXOSN .......... 1(56)
     - (8) AFXSOO .......... 1(57)
     - (9) AFXSS .......... 1(58)
     - (10) AFXOSV .......... 1(59)
     - (11) AFXOTR .......... 1(60)
     - (12) AFXOTW .......... 1(61)
     - (13) AFXOTZ .......... 1(62)
     - (14) AFXOXY .......... 1(63)
     - (15) AFXPD .......... 6(64-69)
     - (a) AFXPPGS .......... 3(70-72)
3. MAJOR COMMANDS

a. TAC
(1) HEADQUARTERS
(a) DO. ................ 1(73)
(b) DPL ................ 2(74,75)
(c) DOC. ............... 1(76)
(d) DORQ ............. 1(77)
(e) DIO ............... 1(78)

b. SAC
(1) HEADQUARTERS
(a) DOPL ................ 1(79)
(b) DPLF .......... 1(80)
(c) DM ............. 1(81)
(d) DI ............. 1(82)
(e) OA ......... 1(83)
(f) HI ............. 1(84)

c. MAC
(1) HEADQUARTERS
(a) MAOID ..... 1(85)
(b) MAOCO .... 1(86)
(c) MAFOI .... 1(87)
(d) MACOA ...... 1(88)

d. ADC
(1) HEADQUARTERS
(a) ADDOC ........ 1(89)
(b) ADDOP .... 1(90)
(c) ADLCC .... 1(91)

e. ATC
(1) HEADQUARTERS
(a) ATXDC .. 1(92)

f. AFLC
(1) HEADQUARTERS
(a) MCVSS .. 1(93)
(b) MCOO .. 1(94)

g. AFSC
(1) HEADQUARTERS
(a) SCLAP .... 3(95-97)
(b) SCS-6 .. 1(98)
(c) SGCH .. 2(99,100)
(d) SCTPL .... 1(101)
(e) ASD/ASJT 1(102)
(f) ESD/ESO .. 1(103)
(g) RADC/EMOEL 2(104,105)
(h) ADTC/ADGT .. 1(106)

h. USAFSS
(1) HEADQUARTERS
(a) ODC .... 1(107)
(b) CHO .... 1(108)

i. AAC
(1) HEADQUARTERS
(a) ALDOC-A .... 2(109,110)

j. USAFSO
(1) HEADQUARTERS
(a) COH .... 1(111)

k. PACAF
(1) HEADQUARTERS
(a) DP .... 1(112)
(b) DI .... 1(113)
(c) DPL .... 4(114-117)
(d) CSH .... 1(118)
(e) DOTEC .... 5(119-123)
(f) DE .... 1(124)
(g) DM .... 1(125)
(h) DOTECH .... 1(126)

(2) AIR FORCES
(a) 5AF (DOP) .... 5(127-131)
(b) 7AF (DOAC) .... 2(132,133)
1. USAFE

(1) HEADQUARTERS
   (a) ODC/OA  .......... 1 (134)
   (b) ODC/OTA .......... 1 (135)
   (c) OOT ................ 1 (136)
   (d) XDC ................ 1 (137)

4. SEPARATE OPERATING AGENCIES

   a. ACIC (ACOMC) .......... 2 (138, 139)
   b. ARPC (RPCAS-22) ....... 2 (140, 141)
   c. AFRES (AFRXPL) ....... 2 (142, 143)
   d. USAFA
      (1) CMT ................ 1 (144)
      (2) DFH ................ 1 (145)
   e. AU
      (1) ACSC-SA ............ 1 (146)
      (2) AUL(SE)-69-108 ...... 2 (147, 148)
      (3) ASI (ASD-1) ........ 1 (149)
      (4) ASI (ASHAF-A) ...... 2 (150, 151)
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FOREWORD</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER I - THE THREAT</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Conventional Threat</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Unconventional Threat</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER II - USAF/ROKAF POSTURE</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posture in Perspective</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed Partial Withdrawal</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROKAF Force Modernization</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed MAAG Phasedown</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER III- AIR FORCE ROLE IN COUNTERINFILTRATION</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROKAF Role and Requirements</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF Systems Deployment</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER IV - THE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations and Requirements</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLLEGE EYE Requirement</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Operations in the Sea of Japan</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WESTPACNORTH Interface Program</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER V - THE TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACS Improvement</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAC Aircraft Requirement</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Communications System</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROKAF Role in the TACS</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER VI - RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## UNCLASSIFIED

### Chapter VII - Command and Control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CINCUNC/COMUSKOREA</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Command Arrangements</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the Event of Hostilities</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Pueblo Organizational Refinement</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Footnotes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Appendix I - USAF Readiness Posture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DMZ Incidents/Rear Area Incidents, 1964-1968</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967/1968 Monthly Incident Comparison</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korean Air Force AOB</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korean Air Force Comparative Chart</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea SAM Order of Battle</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Threat in Minutes</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.E. Sector CHICOM AOB</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource Comparison, February 1969</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF/ROKAF Tactical Aircraft in Korea, February 1969</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground Forces Disposition</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROKAF Counterinfiltration Alert</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Forces Korea Alert Posture, February 1969</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missile Forces Alert Posture, February 1969</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Defense Missile Coverage</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Air Control System</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Command Relations - Korea</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Control Chart, February 1969</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Chart, February 1969</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FOREWORD

This report addresses post-Pueblo actions in Korea and Japan during 1968 and early 1969 that impacted on the USAF posture and operations in Northeast Asia. The purpose is to bring these actions and the associated political climate into proper perspective, and to provide a narrative base of reference for on-going planning actions relative to Korea. Narrative presentation is confined to seven operational areas considered to have most import to USAF planners: (1) The Threat, (2) USAF/ROKAF Posture, (3) Air Force Role in Counterinfiltration, (4) The Air Defense System, (5) The Tactical Air Control System, (6) Reconnaissance and Surveillance, and (7) Command and Control.

Throughout the research phase of this project, it was found that the correlation between Southeast Asia experience and prospective combat operations in Korea was a constant consideration -- the propensity for relating the two being inevitable. One salient lesson learned reiterated by developments in Korea was the danger of routinely isolating the Southeast Asia conflict or any singular confrontation with communism from the overall communist threat; conversely, operational concepts and trends that have evolved in Southeast Asia are not necessarily applicable to Korea or other situations. Should hostilities develop in Korea, it is doubtful that they would parallel the SEA conflict. In any event, air operations would still have to be tailored to the environment and tactics employed by the enemy. The point is simply that lessons learned in one situation require fine sifting for their applicability to another.
CHAPTER I

THE THREAT

"...some areas at home maybe discount the continuing aggressiveness of Kim Il Sung's North Korea and its continuing military modernization and preparedness. Excluding Vietnam, we have here in Korea perhaps the most direct, vicious and instable confrontation with a tough, zealous though small communist state that exists in the world." 1/

Gen. Charles H. Bonesteel III, USA

Since 1954, the Republic of Korea (ROK) has existed under an uncertain 2/ military armistice broken intermittently by North Korean armed forays. Although these armed actions were flagrant violations of the 1954 ceasefire agreements, they were, until 1967, considered to be "isolated incidents" which represented no serious threat to the ROK security. This is no longer the situation. An alarming rise in North Korean acts of aggression during 1967, 3/ (Fig. 1) followed by such highly provocative acts as the attempted Blue House raid and seizure of the Pueblo in early 1968, revealed a pattern of North Korean belligerency that posed a very serious threat to the ROK's security. 4/ This threat is greater today than at any time since the Korean Conflict, 5/ and it appears to be expanding at a dangerous pace. 6/

It is historical fact that Kim Il Sung, the North Korean Premier, is dedicated to reunification of the Korean peninsula under communist terms, and he has declared in public addresses and non-public statements at party conclaves a general strategy and timetable by which to effectuate this re-unification with "the next few years." 7/ Indications are that the North Korean
leader has formulated at least four broad objectives in support of this goal:

- To remove U.S. forces from the Republic of Korea -- to reduce American influence, military, and economic assistance, and to gain the military advantage inherent in removal of U.S. forces.

- To increase the strength and readiness of the North Korean Armed Forces. This has been a continuing program since the end of the Korean Conflict.

- To increase the "Revolutionary Power" in the ROK by creating guerrilla networks primarily composed of laborers and farmers, and by continuing to train espionage agents in an attempt to subvert military, governmental, and educational leaders.

- To prolong the Vietnam war by giving advisory support and military assistance to North Vietnam. Additionally, by putting pressure on the Republic of Korea, they are attempting to preclude the dispatch of more ROK troops to Vietnam, and if possible force withdrawal of the ROK forces already there.

Obviously, the current on-going phase of North Korea's aggressive timetable is paced on U.S. and ROK involvement in Southeast Asia, and U.S. efforts to negotiate a settlement of the SEA conflict. Highly provocative acts such as the seizure of the Pueblo and the recent shooting down of the unarmed USN EC-121 were apparently designed to embarrass the United States Government, to test U.S. military and public reaction, and to possibly influence the outcome of peace talks on Vietnam. Other considerations probably included a further complication in US/Japan "security treaty" relations and an attempt to create a rift in US/ROK relations. In April 1968, General Bonesteel, Commander in Chief United Nations Command (CINCUNC)/Commander U.S. Forces
DMZ INCIDENTS

1964: 32
1965: 42
1966: 37
1967: 452
1968: 542

REAR AREA INCIDENTS

1964: UNK
1965: 17
1966: 13
1967: 277
1968: 219

CASUALTIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>ROK Military and Civilian</th>
<th>NK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: DIA/ISIC
10 FEB 1969
1967/1968 DMZ AND REAR AREA INCIDENTS MONTHLY COMPARISON

FIGURE 2
Korea (COMUSK), noted:

"The Blue House raid and the seizure of the Pueblo are evidence of an increased willingness of North Korea to make high risk moves, presumably based on North Korean evaluations of the military power posture and national determination of the United States...

"...Just as the North Koreans increased aggressiveness can be traced, in part, to North Korean evaluations that the U.S. is over-extended power-wise and that the national will and determination has been deteriorating under the pressures of Vietnam, it appears equally true that the ROK Government is likewise concerned about these same factors...

"...The ROK military have been showing increasing interest in learning of realistic U.S. capabilities for the reinforcement of Korea in the event of an emergency. They have a pretty good idea that such capabilities, particularly in ground forces, are severely restricted as against those possible in 1965. The offer by the U.S. to curtail the aerial bombardment of North Vietnam in return for the opening of negotiations has occasioned concern among the ROKs. The fundamental divergence between our governments with respect to ROK retaliation in the event of future North Korean raids has intensified the disquiet...."

Later, in September, General Bonesteel again interpreted that North Korea was willing to take these actions which involved "high risks of war" in the belief that the U.S. power position in Korea "lacked credibility." He noted, however, that these actions "backfired to some extent", by causing quick military augmentations in the form of carrier task forces and tactical air reinforcements to Korea, plus additional military assistance to the ROK and improvements in "our base infrastructure." After January 1968, there was a lull in North Korean provocative acts although their propaganda became increasingly violent and strident. As things cooled off, however, and the US/ROK took no major punitive or retaliatory actions, the North Koreans again
began to increase aggressive activity along the demilitarized zone (DMZ). In June, there were 13 significant firefights, in July 30 firefights, and in August 32 involving, in three months, 83 North Koreans killed in action (KIA) and 25 U.S./ROK KIA. CINCUNC reiterated:

"There have been no valid indications of any change in the zealotry of Kim Il Sung and his North Korean communists to continue vigorously the improvement of North Korea's military capabilities, both conventional and unconventional, or in the intentions reiterated in his speeches to continue aggressively to press for his basic objective for an early reunification of Korea under communist terms by unconventional action backed by the application of conventional military force if and when a propitious time should arise."

In the assessment of North Korea's objectives and capabilities, three levels of threat to the ROK may be distinguished: (1) subversion, sabotage, small-term raids and other harassing actions, (2) limited-objective, conventional attack, and (3) all-out attack. North Korea, in violation of the armistice, has developed a formidable capability for pursuing any one of these courses of action. They can launch a conventional attack against the South as in 1950, or attempt to lay the base for, and then support a guerrilla-type National War-of-Liberation, which they have been working toward for several years.

The Conventional Threat

Since the end of the Korean Conflict, North Korea has continued with substantial Soviet assistance to improve its conventional forces. The North Korean Army is the fourth largest in the Communist World with a 350,000 man
force composed of 25 divisional equivalents. Combat elements, modernizing at a steady pace, consists of five army groups, three of which share sector responsibilities along the DMZ. The 10,000 man North Korean Navy, essentially a coastal patrol and inshore defense force, can conduct limited offensive operations in situations where the high-speed and mobility of its PTG and PT craft, and the surprise advantage of its "W" class submarines, can be effectively utilized. The PTGs and PTs could conduct Styx-missile and torpedo attacks respectively, while the submarines could lay mines or attack ROK Navy vessels with torpedoes.

Of particular note is the threat posed by the North Korean Air Force (NKAF) -- which is numerically superior to the Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF). In the year following the Pueblo Incident, North Korean conventional forces have been substantially modernized, especially their tactical air and air defense capabilities. The NKAF, with a strength of 23,000, continues to show a significant qualitative and quantitative improvement with Soviet supplied high-performance jet fighters, transports and helicopters. They are striving for a versatile fighter force capable of performing all the roles of a tactical force as well as the air defense of North Korea. Their Air Order of Battle (AOB) has been upgraded with the acquisition of more MIG-21s (Fig. 3 and Fig. 4). U.S. Intelligence sources estimate an increase from 20 to approximately 70 between January 1968 and March 1969. The MIG-17 force of approximately 350 and the IL-28 Bomber force of 80 remained relatively stable. The proficiency of the North Korea pilots is believed to have increased greatly. This is due in part to their participation (estimate 100 to 150 pilots) in
North Vietnam operations.

In February, 1968, U.S. reconnaissance discovered a new airfield at Changjin, bringing the total to 16 jet capable airfields in North Korea. Considerable construction was done during 1968 to harden the airfield facilities. Such items as cave storage, revetments, and hardened POL facilities have reduced these airfield's vulnerability to attack. Large amounts of the national budget are being devoted to the military in North Korea. This has included the underground building program which has encompassed everything from complete underground hardened factories to airfield hangar caves.

The North Korean air defense capability also changed. Their radar network, both GCI and early warning, has been upgraded with the acquisition of EW/GCI sites increased by about fifty percent to a January 1969 total of thirty-six. As of March 1969, there were 36 SAM sites and four SA-2 missile support facilities compared to only 13 sites and one support facility evident in January 1968 (Fig. 5). Since March of 1968, the AAA inventory increased by fifty 57MM guns and twenty-five 85/100MM guns. January 1969 totals were approximately 350 37MM, 400 57MM, and 225 85/100MM guns. PACAF Intelligence officials also pointed out:

"All indications point toward increased Soviet aid to North Korea. As a result of this aid, the number of SA-2 sites can be expected to increase, more and better radars will be added to the system, and additional MIG-21s will be made available. It can also be expected that, at some future date, the Soviets will provide the North Koreans with SU-7/FITTERS and perhaps the Brewer
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>JAN 68</th>
<th>JAN 69</th>
<th>CHANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FAGOT (MIG-15)</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRESCO (MIG-17)</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARMER (MIG-19)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FISHBED C/E (MIG-21)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>+24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FISHBED D/F (MIG-21)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>+28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEAGLE (IL-28)</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOUND (MI-4)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLT</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>+26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRANSPORT/UTILITY</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>+4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAINERS</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>678</td>
<td>731</td>
<td>+50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
North Korea's build-up of conventional forces appears to be aimed at creating a sanctuary from which they can conduct unconventional operations, but in addition it provides a considerable capability for conducting surprise conventional operations. While North Korean military forces are not sufficient to offer any chance of success in a full scale conventional war aimed at driving U.S. Forces out of the country without the assistance of either China or the USSR, they do provide the capability to inflict serious damage to the ROK if employed in surprise attack.

The NKAF's tactical force is capable of striking any target on the Korean Peninsula, in varying profiles, and with various ordnance loads ranging from 20MM cannon to the 6,600 lb. bomb load of the IL-28. It is estimated that the North Koreans could destroy approximately forty percent of the ROKAF/USAF forces in South Korea with a pre-emptive airstrike. In a low-level surprise attack by North Korea, minimum warning time could be anticipated. Seoul, the capital of Korea, is a mere three and one-half minutes from the DMZ, while the southernmost bases and ports in the ROK are less than 25 minutes from the DMZ. (Fig. 6.)

Although a pre-emptive airstrike by the NKAF would run the high risk of U.S./ROK retaliation, the U.S. Forces Korea Commander has not discounted this possibility.
"Such an attack might have only a limited objective and be aimed to inflict maximum damage on military targets in the south in a short duration action, hopefully to be stopped by a UN demand for a cease fire in place. Kim would hope to quickly gain his limited objectives and then garner world opinion in favor of a cease fire before the U.S. and the ROK could effectively restore the situation. If successful, such an attack would severely discredit the credibility of U.S. power in the Far East and could lead to the downfall of the Pak government."

The Unconventional Threat

U.S. military officials concerned with the Korean situation are in agreement that the most immediate and ominous threat to the ROK's security lies in North Korea's capabilities to conduct unconventional warfare in the ROK, and North Korea's apparent intention to use these capabilities to conduct a campaign of terrorism, subversion and sabotage. Considerable concern about North Korea's unconventional plans and operations existed prior to the abortive assassination attempt against President Pak Chung Hee by North Korean agents in January 1968; however, this incident reemphasized the seriousness of the unconventional threat. Since the close of the Korean War, North Korea had sponsored a program of clandestine infiltration against the ROK, and the rash of armed incidents involving North Korean infiltrators in 1967 indicated that these activities were being dangerously escalated.

As North Korea's unconventional activities expanded rapidly in 1967, U.S. and ROK military officials became greatly involved with efforts to improve South Korea's capability to counter this threat. In this regard, U.S. military agencies initiated several extensive surveys to determine the extent of the threat and ROK requirements to counter it. One such survey was begun by the USAF Special Air Warfare Center (SAWC), Eglin Air Force Base,
Florida on 27 November 1967 and published on 15 January 1968. Known as Project CORONET CONJUGATE, this survey noted:

"...While conventional invasion from the North has been planned for, especially along the Demilitarized Zone, the infiltration of subversive agents into the interior has produced a situation that is currently untenable...."

"North Korea prefers to accomplish its objectives through subversion, sabotage and guerrilla activities rather than all out warfare. Critical analysis of all available intelligence data plus personal interviews with CIA personnel have produced evidence that first stage guerrilla warfare has already started...."

"An intensive and aggressive effort is being made to subvert the ROK through sea infiltration operations originating on both the west and east coast of North Korea and in a third country, specifically Japan. Included in these subversive operations are acts of espionage, infiltration of ROK political parties, recruitment of high level ROK political and military leaders, formation of underground cells, establishment of enclaves for future guerrilla operations, recruitment of ROK citizens in enclave targeted areas, and propaganda dissemination...."

On 16 December 1967 in a speech, North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung stated:

"The northern half of the Republic is the revolutionary base for accomplishing the cause of national liberation on a nationwide scale '(and I expect my people) to accomplish the revolutionary cause of unification of the country at all costs." At the time of this speech, it had become clearly evident that to further this goal of unification, North Korea was...and would in the future, rely heavily on unconventional warfare tactics.

During 1968, infiltration incidents along the DMZ increased substantially over previous years. North Korea's efforts during the year in the rear
areas of the ROK were highlighted by the landing in early November of at least 120 trained commando/guerrilla-type personnel at Ulchin on the east coast. This infiltration was designed to establish bases from which guerrilla operations could be conducted, with the objectives of weakening confidence in the ROK Government, retarding ROK economic growth, subverting the populace and creating the environment for an "uprising" or "peoples war" when "the time is favorable."

The Ulchin landings represented one of the most provocative anti-ROK operations ever conducted, the other being the abortive Blue House raid -- both demonstrating North Korea's willingness to commit comparatively large unconventional warfare forces against the ROK. The Ulchin operation was unique in that it was the first attempt to establish permanent guerrilla bases through force, and in the size of the force employed. Purpose of the operation was to establish viable guerrilla bases in the mountainous, sparsely populated areas along the east coast of South Korea. Tactics to be employed were first to attempt to subvert segments of the local populace peacefully if possible, but through terrorism if necessary, and to destroy the symbols of ROK authority through assassination and sabotage.

Hq PACAF DDEE commented further on the Ulchin area infiltration:

"This incident probably represents the outcome of the most important decision made by the North Koreans in regard to anti-ROK operations since the Korean War. The reasoning behind the decision to initiate large-scale guerrilla
operations involves many factors. Among these are the apparent growing success of the ROK economy, the growing stability of the ROK Government, lessons of the Vietnam War, the failure of other tactics which probably have generated some internal conflict, and the realization that general war is not possible without Soviet material aid and Chinese Communist manpower, which is unlikely to occur without a Sino-Soviet rapprochement."

Reaction by the ROK to the Ulchin landings was immediate. Initially, they mobilized over 2,000 homeland reserve forces, airlifted a ROK Marine Brigade to the area, and airdropped 550 ROK Special Forces troops; 400 Korean National Police and over 5,000 ROK Army Troops also engaged in immediate operations. Later, this force reached a peak strength of 70,000 men to search out and destroy every North Korean guerrilla. This indicated "over-reaction" by the ROK Government, but it also reaffirmed that the North Korean guerrillas were extremely dangerous and difficult to neutralize. Almost two months following the 120-man North Korean landing, the ROKs accounted for 107 killed and seven captured, with six intruders still at large or exfiltrated. Friendly casualties included 40 ROK KIA and 55 WIA, and 23 civilians killed and four wounded.

The Ulchin landings provided a good example of the North Korean capability to infiltrate guerrillas into the rear areas of South Korea. What is important, however, is that these landings presented only a "glimmer" of the North Korean capabilities. As of February 1969, official sources estimated North Korea's unconventional warfare/guerrilla strength to be 40,000 personnel. Of these, 24,000 were available for immediate use in South Korea. The remaining 16,000 were a partially trained reserve force. PACAF Intelligence officials reported
that the "currently available 24,000 are an extremely well-trained, rugged, dedicated group." Their willingness to conduct difficult, almost suicidal missions was well demonstrated by the attempted Blue House raid.

PACAF Intelligence officials also noted the threat to U.S. bases in South Korea:

"Recent reports indicate the North Korea guerrilla forces have undergone winter training, and have simulated attacks against airfields, missile sites, divisional command posts, and other military installations.

"From the facts, we must conclude that North Korea has the capability to conduct guerrilla raids against USAF installations and intend to do so at some future time. The most likely time for such attacks is after North Korea has succeeded in establishing some form of guerrilla base structure in South Korea. The risk of retaliation from such attacks will then be lessened since they could be attributed to South KOREAN 'patriots'. However, the possibility of isolated attacks cannot be ruled out completely, since the North Koreans may resort to such indiscriminate acts should their prepared plan for the overthrow of the South KOREAN Government fail."

Since the Korean War, over sixty percent of known agent infiltrations have been by sea. While anti-infiltration protection and devices have been greatly improved along the DMZ, the 1,500 miles of coastline and the 3,000 islands of South Korea remain relatively vulnerable. As an example, the primary POL storage areas and port at Inchon, as well as the nuclear weapons and aircraft both at Osan and Kunsan are ideal targets for seaborne unconventional warfare. With the introduction of chemical agents, selected resources
could literally be stolen and all other significant military targets at these key facilities destroyed at will.

There are four sea escort agencies with a total strength of about 1,200 men who are responsible for transporting and protecting guerrillas being infiltrated into rear areas of the ROK by sea. Two of these agencies are based on the west coast of North Korea at Rampo and Halju, and the remaining two are based at Wonsan on the east coast. Between them, they have about 40 agent boats. These boats are equipped with modern navigational equipment such as Japanese made Furuno radars, Lorans and depth finders. Their armament consists of one 82mm recoilless gun, one 40mm anti-tank launcher, two 14.5mm AAA machine-guns, and five 7.62mm machine-guns. They are manned by a crew of 12 and can transport 15-30 armed agents, depending on the duration of the trip. One boat, which was captured (later sunk) off Cheju-do Island in August 1968, made the 830 nautical mile trip from Nampo to Cheju-do Island with a stop for refueling from a small North Korean tanker at a rendezvous 20 miles off Kiangsu Province, China. For landings on the east coast of Korea, there is no need for refueling.

The impressive operating characteristics of the agent boats have enabled them to proceed on their landing missions by going well out to sea and proceeding straight into their landing objective, using one engine with a silencer, and at a slow speed. Their wooden construction and low silhouette make them a difficult target to identify, radar or visually, particularly
during the slow speed approach. Often, the mode of operation of agent ships has been to approach the Korean coast using the masking of legitimate Korean fishing fleets. Some agent ships cruised in unmasked, but all had the common window of rising to high tide on the west coast and use of the cover of darkness. Many times, they are believed to land the agents, and return to North Korea, completely undetected.

Additionally, North Korea has an airlift capability of 20 helicopters (MI-4) and 63 light aircraft. Although the primary mission of the light transport aircraft of the NKAF would be in support of conventional military operations, the AN-2s pose a formidable threat if they choose to use them for support of infiltration operations. There are at least 45 AN-2/COLTS in the North Korean inventory and they have the capability of penetrating radar gaps at low altitude, especially in the rugged, mountainous, sparsely populated areas in the eastern part of the ROK, for the purpose of air dropping agents and supplies. The following table portrays aircraft available to the NKIS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>NO.</th>
<th>CAPACITY</th>
<th>RANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAB (LI-2)</td>
<td>Light Transport</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25 Paratroops</td>
<td>1215 NM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRATE (IL-14)</td>
<td>Light Transport</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21 Paratroops</td>
<td>1600 NM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLT (AN-2)</td>
<td>Light Transport</td>
<td>45+</td>
<td>10 Paratroops</td>
<td>930 NM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COKE (AN-24)</td>
<td>Light Transport</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50 Paratroops</td>
<td>1550 NM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOUND (MI-4)</td>
<td>Helicopter</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12-16 Troops</td>
<td>270 NM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Summary

North Korea has shown by word and deed that it fully intends to reunify the Korean Peninsula under the leadership of Kim Il Sung. Currently, their plan calls for creation of a revolutionary base in South Korea for the eventual downfall of the ROK Government through insurgency. Thus far, there has been a demonstrated lack of success on the part of dispatched North Korean Intelligence Service Agent Teams in recruiting ROK citizens. In fact, the success of agent apprehensions thus far has been largely due to information supplied to ROK Counterespionage/Counter-Guerrilla Forces by local residents in areas of agent activity. However, this lack of success has failed to dim Kim Il Sung's ambitions for a "revolution" in the South.

At the beginning of the year, COMUSKOREA warned that the North Koreans could be expected to intensify their "Porous War" in 1969 with the objective of driving a wedge between the ROK and the United States; discouraging foreign investments; weakening confidence in the ROK government; subverting the populace; and creating the environment for an uprising when the time is favorable." He considered 1969 to be a decisive year in Korea, and that current developments "are of gravest importance to essential United States interests in Asia." If North Korea's present tactics are successful, he can be expected to continue the present modus-operandi with even greater vigor. If unsuccessful, and the timetable of current planning appears in jeopardy, it could lead the North Korean Premier to hasty action in a "now or never" drive to subvert the ROK or even to attempt a reunification of the Peninsula by force.
Any thought that the release of the Pueblo crew represented a turnabout in North Korea's policy of belligerance was clearly rebuked by their recent shooting-down of the unarmed U.S. Navy EC-121. A Hq PACAF paper of 29 January 1969 was almost prophetic in this regard:

"Concurrent with the creation of a revolutionary base is the need to strain ROK/U.S. relations until a rift develops. The best method for straining this relationship is the use of conventional forces to conduct raids in the DMZ, and other acts such as the seizure of the Pueblo. DMZ raids cause friction between the ROK and the U.S. because the ROK usually reacts violently and wants to conduct retaliatory raids, while the U.S. urges restraint for fear of provoking a major incident which might lead to a U.S./Soviet confrontation. The seizure of the Pueblo not only caused this type of friction, but had the additional advantage of highlighting U.S. weakness and lack of resolve to punish the North Koreans for what was termed 'an act of war.'"
### N.E. SECTOR CHICOM AOB

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BAT &amp; BEAGLE</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIG-19 FARMER</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIG-17 FRESCO</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIG-15 FAGOT</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIG-19 FARMER</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIG-17 FRESCO</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRANSPORT/UTILITY</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HELICOPTER</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL AIRCRAFT</strong></td>
<td><strong>793</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER II
USAF/ROKAF POSTURE

"The professional, impressive build-up of the U.S. Air Force in Korea and the quick reaction of our Naval Carrier Task Forces have given Kim Il Sung food for thought. The fact that these forces can depart as quickly as they arrived has not been lost on the ROK's." 1/

Adm. Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, USN

Background

The United States has long participated in a mutual security treaty with the Republic of Korea, which binds both parties to "a common purpose, united resolve, and coordinated action" in withstanding the continuing danger posed by communist forces in Northeast Asia. In keeping with this treaty and in appreciation of the importance to U.S. security interests of the political integrity of South Korea, the U.S. has maintained a strong military presence, which has made it possible for the ROK to maintain internal security, defend against infiltration and deter outright North Korean attack. Moreover, behind this shield, the government and people of South Korea have established a viable state and have erected the beginnings of an economic and social structure which promises to provide a basis for growing prosperity to its citizens. 2/

In this achievement, the U.S. has an important stake.

While some 50,000 U.S. troops have been positioned in Korea since 1954, the U.S. has assisted the ROK in developing a relatively strong military posture, which allowed the commitment of some 49,000 of the ROK's best troops 3/ to combat operations in South Vietnam. In keeping with its Military
Assistance Program (MAP) objectives, development of the armed strength, qualitatively and quantitatively, in the ROK had the ultimate aim of phasing-out the U.S. military presence. At the time of the Pueblo Crisis, the ROK forces posture under MAP was below parity with that of North Korea, while the U.S. Forces posture in Northeast Asia had been trimmed materially. This was especially true of the Air Force.

A prime deterrent to communist aggression in Northeast Asia has been the sizable air force deployed by Fifth Air Force at bases in Japan, Okinawa, and Korea. This strong air posture, coupled with the high probability of decisive U.S. reaction to armed aggression, kept the reins on North Korean belligerence. However, in the two years prior to the Pueblo's seizure, the 5AF posture was adversely affected by the loss of assigned aircraft to meet Southeast Asia (SEA) attrition requirements. The 5AF force status report dated 1 January 1968 reflects the following 5AF tactical aircraft possessed: 37 F-105, 32 F-4Cs, 7 F-100s, and 25 F-102s. Moreover, whether so intended, the Blue House raid and the Pueblo incident were timed to coincide with the Tet Offensive that was developing in Southeast Asia. This and other implications concerning U.S. involvement in SEA raised the probability level for North Korea risking these actions with relative impunity.

In September 1968, COMUSKOREA reflected on this situation:

There were many indications...that Kim Il Sung believed
the U.S. to be so militarily over-extended by Vietnam
that he discounted our capabilities and determination
to rapidly augment our forces in Korea should the
necessity arise. At the same time it was clear that
he believed public opinion and the Doves in the U.S.
made it possible that the U.S. would not react positive-
ly to progressively aggressive actions and would want to
maintain the 'peace' here despite his provocative acts.
I have no question but that he was rudely shocked and
dissillusioned by the rapid Navy and Air reaction to the
Blue House/Pueblo incidents but it is unclear how he
interprets our subsequent restraint, the somewhat pub-
licized debate between the U.S. and ROKs on the question
of retaliation, and our apparent growing willingness to
apologize for the Pueblo. The credibility of our power
position has undoubtedly improved but may in his eyes
still be more marginal than we believe."

Posture in Perspective

Initial U.S. reaction to the Pueblo incident included a sizable augmenta-
tion of tactical air forces rapidly deploying to Korea from Southeast Asia,
Okinawa, Japan, and the United States. This deployment constituted a total
augmentation to Korean bases of 182 tactical aircraft. It included 72 F-4Ds,
18 F-4Cs, 34 F-105s, and 38 F-102s. The JCS also directed that ten KC-135s
and 15 B-52s be deployed to Kadena AB, Okinawa, to be responsive to the Korean
situation. This augmentation was primarily a "show of force" to discourage
further belligerency by North Korea and to reassure the ROK government of
firm U.S. support, and it was emphasized that "no permanency" should be
attached to this reinforced posture. CINCPAC discussed this point in a
message to the JCS on 10 February 1968:

"There are no clear indicators as yet concerning what
course of events may develop relative to the Korean
situation. At the same time, our commitments in SEA
are placing increasing requirements on all services for personnel, equipment, aircraft and logistics support. The likelihood of involvement in peripheral areas where U.S. interests are of concern cannot be discounted. Even with mobilization, a situation could develop elsewhere so quickly that we would not have time for conventional reaction. Planning must ensure that there are options available which will permit the maintenance of security worldwide with forces presently available, including the limited use of tactical nuclear weapons as necessary.

"The sizable forces deployed in connection with the Korean situation has unquestionably strengthened our position to react to contingencies which may arise in that area. Contingency plans have been and continue to be developed. Also required is an examination of what course should be followed with respect to duration of time the forces are to remain deployed in the area. To place the U.S. in a more flexible posture and to avoid the implication that present force levels may be committed to South Korea indefinitely, it may be prudent to change the level of forces in Korea by deploying from time to time Air Forces between forward bases in Korea and Japan, Okinawa."

Along with this force augmentation, the U.S. conducted a wide range of high level studies, some of which were begun earlier, to evaluate both near-term and long-term U.S./ROK force requirements in the Korean theater. One near-term result of these studies was the provision of a 100 million dollar extra MAP package for the ROK. Another was the quick passage of a FY68 MPC providing 87.8 million to begin improvements in the U.S. base infrastructure. These studies addressed the entire spectrum of U.S./ROK force requirements, and study findings impacted on practically every area of the USAF/ROKAF near-term and long-term posture. Many of these areas, e.g. Air Defense, the Tactical Air Control System (TACS), and Counterinfiltration, are discussed in subsequent chapters.
There were many factors, other than the North Korean threat and the disparity between NK/ROK forces, that came to bear on decisions concerning the air posture in South Korea. Not the least of these was the continuing need to re-examine U.S. policy toward Asia as a whole, and South Korea in particular. Communist China and Russia were, of course, major considerations. The ROK government was strongly urging that a position of strength be attained, and that strong action be taken against North Korea. Always in the background was the fact that the responsibility for overseeing the armistice in Korea rested with the United Nations, and the joint forces in South Korea were still deployed under the banner of the United Nations Command. As for the air posture, the U.S. found itself in the ambivalent position of providing a force augmentation that would give confidence to the ROK government and ease their concern and maintain this capability at a level that would deter North Korean aggression, yet hold this force to a level that would not prompt unilateral preemptive or retaliatory attack by the ROK.  

A joint policy paper prepared at the Washington level following Mr. Cyrus R. Vance's Special Presidential mission to Seoul in February 1968 noted that although the ROK could be brought to parity in air strength with North Korea, this was "probably unnecessary and undesirable." Rationale for this conclusion:

"Unnecessary, because much of the North Korean Air Force is obsolete and of dubious effectiveness in supporting an all-out assault on the ROK, and because U.S. air strength would in all relevant contingencies
be able to redress any unexpected reverses. Un-desirable, since numerical parity would be extremely costly to provide and maintain and could simply lead to an accelerated arms race on the peninsula. We should therefore support only a modest expansion of the ROK Air Force from 11 to 13 tactical fighter squadrons and concentrate on modernization of existing units and improvement of base facilities."

This paper recommended that the ROK air capability be held to a minimum in order to limit the extremely high costs of a large air force; to reduce the danger that the Soviets would feel impelled to upgrade the North Korean Air Force and restore the present ratio of air strength at a higher level; and to avoid providing a level of airpower to the ROKs which would facilitate -- and might encourage -- large retaliatory actions or preemptive attack. In addressing the strength of the USAF in South Korea, it noted these forces should be "adjusted to local political and security conditions," but should "in general be phased down in step with increase in ROKAF strength." 12/

It was felt that Chinese participation in a new attack against South Korea appeared unlikely, "so long as the U.S. maintains its present security commitment to the ROK, backed up by both a nuclear deterrent and the ability to deploy forces to Korea if the need arises." 13/ Following the Pueblo seizure, the 5AF posture was required to be responsive to "all levels of conflict from counterinsurgency to a full scale nuclear confrontation." Previously, it had been primarily oriented toward nuclear operations. As both a deterrent and contingency force, the USAF had maintained a rotational "nuclear"
alert force in Korea for several years. Washington officials noted that this capability could be withdrawn "when it appeared feasible to rely on U.S. nuclear forces from outside Korea," and that "remaining U.S. forces would ultimately consist of headquarters staff, military advisors, and personnel in selected logistic units." \(^{15}\)

The 5AF Commander considered it essential that the question be raised of maintaining the nuclear contingency alert in South Korea "where survivability is a problem, and where the alert is prone to a flush, vice a nuclear alert force on Okinawa where it could be executed as a retaliatory force." It was noted that while movement of F-4 units from Korea or Japan to Okinawa in lieu of F-105s for this alert would "affect posture for other contingency plans," these aircraft could, with air refueling, be "utilized for the 13 nuclear contingency targets." He considered this latter course of action to be preferable to maintaining the nuclear contingency alert in South Korea. "If for reasons unknown to us, nuclear alert posture must be retained in South Korea," he advised, "four F-105s on alert at Osan and nine F-4s on alert at Kunsan are considered feasible, though undesirable." \(^{16}\)

Several questions posed in the joint policy paper were indicative of the multiple considerations facing U.S. policy makers and planners: \(^{17}\)

"The heart of our security problem in Korea is what threat military forces (both U.S. and ROK) in and near South Korea should be designed to defend against. Can we rely on remote deterrence (as opposed to..."
deterrence of forces close at hand) to prevent the participation of Chinese Communist forces, (or perhaps of Soviet forces, though this is most unlikely) in any North Korean attack on the ROK?

"If we decide that remote deterrence, both conventional and nuclear, is adequate against the Soviets and the Chinese, several other issues come more sharply into focus. Can, and should, the ROK forces be given the capability to defend successfully against an all-out North Korean attack with only U.S. logistic support? If so, what changes in U.S. deployments in South Korea would be in order? Should present command relations as a consequence be altered?

"Quite apart from the answers to the above questions, we must also deal with several other problems in the security field. What should be the role of nuclear weapons in the defense of the ROK against various conceivable levels of attack? Can the ROK forces be given a more permanent role in dealing with aggression outside Korea after the ROK divisions have returned from Vietnam? And, finally, how can we minimize any danger that the ROK will provoke a resumption of major North-South hostilities?"

Also addressed in this paper were "briefly what our principal objectives in Korea should be" and the "preferred strategy in Korea over the coming decade." The following objectives were listed: (1) Prevent large-scale North-South hostilities, (2) Maintain a stable compromise among the great powers with interests in Korea, (3) Keep Korea out of hostile hands, (4) Increase the ability of the ROK to defend itself, (5) Promote South Korea's steady progress toward self-sustaining economic growth and political stability, (6) and encourage the Japanese to make a greater contribution to the stability in Korea and to the prosperity and security of the ROK.

Preferred strategy was stated:
A continued effort to help the ROK achieve self-sustaining economic growth, while deferring until after the 1971 elections the phase-out of congressional AID assistance.

A significant and continuous decline in U.S. involvement in ROK decision-making.

Maintenance of our present security commitment to the ROK.

Subject to the availability of resources, a vigorous effort, probably concentrated in the period immediately following the Vietnam War, to help the ROK to gain the ability to defend itself successfully against an all-out North Korean attack with U.S. logistic support.

Reduction of U.S. forces in Korea consistent with both the defensive capabilities of the ROK forces and the commitments applicable while ROK troops remain in Vietnam.

Support of peaceful reunification as a desirable goal, but tacit acceptance that progress toward that goal is not likely for many years.

The foregoing discussion is presented to provide some insight into the political complexities surrounding the Korean situation and the U.S. commitment there and elsewhere in Asia. It is also intended to help bring into perspective any ambiguous connotations that might be implied by postural dialogue and decisions in the months following the Pueblo Crisis.

To draw a comparison between the North Korean AOB and that of the USAF/ROKAF forces in Korea without a review of the overall force situation would be over-simplification and greatly misleading. (Fig. 8.) The Chinese Communist AOB is a major contingency consideration, just as the 5AF posture is
the primary factor in all force planning for Northeast Asia (Appendix I). The capability for rapid force generation from outside Northeast Asia weighs heavily on plans and decisions. In the event of a conventional attack, aircraft in the ROK are to be launched under a "Flush" plan, and could probably function only as a "holding" force until airpower outside Korea could be brought to bear. A further complexity exists in that the ROKAF, unless employed unilaterally by the ROK government, is authorized under UN auspices to be launched only in a defensive profile. These, and other factors, not only govern to a great extent the force posture, but are key factors in all force planning for Korean contingencies.

A brief review of the early 1969 Fifth Air Force posture provides a better picture of USAF forces readily available in Northeast Asia for contingency planning. In Japan, USAF aircraft operated from four bases -- Misawa, Yokota, Tachikawa, and Itazuke. At Misawa, the 475th TFW had three fighter squadrons authorized 18 F-4C aircraft each. The 347th TFW at Yokota had three squadrons equipped with F-4Cs, also authorized 18 aircraft each. This wing also had the 556th Reconnaissance Squadron equipped with C-130s and B-57Es. There were no tactical fighters stationed at Tachikawa, which was the hub of logistical operations for 5AF. For several years prior to the Pueblo Incident, Itazuke AB had been retained only as a forward operating location with no tactical forces assigned permanently. As part of the post-Pueblo buildup, the 165th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, equipped with RF-101s, was deployed there. This was a National Guard unit from Louisville, Kentucky and had 18 aircraft authorized. The 19th TEWS, which was assigned to the
## Resource Comparison

**February 1969**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USAF/ROKAF AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>NKAF AIRCRAFT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F-4</td>
<td>MIG-21 C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-105</td>
<td>MIG-19 B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-102/F-106</td>
<td>MIG-21 D/F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-5/F-100</td>
<td>MIG-19 A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-86 F</td>
<td>MIG-15 MIG-17ABCD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-86 D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RF-101</td>
<td>*20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RF-86 F</td>
<td>IL-28 BEAGLE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Aircraft**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USAF/ROKAF</th>
<th>NKAF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>357</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Jet Airfields**

| 6 |

---

*Located at Itazuke A.B., Japan*

### Surface to Air Missile Sites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ROK/USA</th>
<th>NK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HAWK (OPR)</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HERCULES (OPR)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAMS (INACTIVE)</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Radar Sites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GCI RANGE</th>
<th>E.W. RANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 200NM</td>
<td>23 160NM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 130NM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### A/A Artillery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ROK/USA</th>
<th>NK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12.7MM/14.5MM</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37MM/57MM</td>
<td>468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85MM/100MM</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOTAL WEAPONS</th>
<th>176</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

---

**Figure 8**
USAF / ROKAF TACTICAL AIRCRAFT IN KOREA
FEBRUARY 1969

USAF
13 F-102
18 F-106
29 F-4C
50 F-100C
7 F-4C
22 F-4C
12 F-105

ROKAF
42 F-86F
39 F-5A/B
10 RF-86F
26 F-86D
21 F-86F
20 F-86F (Training)
34 F-5A/B
21 F-86F

FIGURE 9
18th TFW in Okinawa was also deployed to Itazuke with four ECM-equipped EB-66s.

Fifth Air Force had two air bases, Kadena and Naha, on Okinawa. The 18th TFW at Kadena had seven F-105 Wild Weasels, a squadron equipped with 18 F-105s, a reconnaissance squadron with RF-4Cs and the TEWS that was deployed to Itazuke AB, Japan. Also based at Kadena were the PORT BOW B-52s and the 498th Tac Missile Gp with 32 Mace missiles. Naha AB was the hub of the air defense of the Ryukyu Islands with one AC&W squadron located there and detachments in the outlying islands. The 82nd FIS, equipped with 31 F-102s, was located at Naha, and had part of its force deployed to Korea.

All USAF bases in Japan and Okinawa were involved with the defense of Korea, and the fact that these bases would eventually be returned to the Japanese Government also bore heavily on the question of the future posture in Korea. The USAF force generation into Korea consisted of 5AF assigned aircraft as well as additional augmentation of deployed units from other USAF commands. One of the largest stateside deployed units was the 4th TFW, equipped with F-4Ds which returned to Seymour Johnson AFB in July 1968. It was partly replaced by the 354th TFW, an Air National Guard (ANG) unit with two squadrons equipped with F-100Cs, which were deployed to Korea despite the fact that, in the event of hostilities, they would be an ineffective weapons system in the sophisticated defense environment of North Korea. Fifth Air Force assumed the remainder of the commitment by rotating its Okinawa and
Japan based forces into and out of Korea. USAF units deploying to Korea were positioned at five bases -- Osan, Kunsan, Suwon, Taegu, and Kwang-Ju. Osan and Kunsan were USAF bases; the others belonged to the ROKAF.

The 314th Air Division, the major unit in Korea, was based at Osan, which was also the location of the 71st FIS with 18 F-106s. The 71st FIS was a rotational unit from the Air Defense Command and arrived from Malstrom AFB in December 1968. Also at Osan, 27 F-4C slots were filled by rotational aircraft of the 347th TFW at Yokota. Six of these were on hard alert for SIOP. The others were prepositioned to support other contingency plans. The ANG wing was positioned at Kunsan, with its F-100s sharing the ramp with eight more SIOP alert F-4Cs from the 475th Wing at Misawa, which were engaged in the same type activities as the F-4s at Osan. Twelve F-105s were rotated to Kwang-Ju AB from Kadena; six of these aircraft were specially configured to seek and destroy SAM sites. At Suwon AB, the 82nd FIS from Naha maintained 13 of its F-102s to bolster the air defense of Korea.

Fifth Air Force units were committed to support several contingency plans:

- Under OPLAN 39, CINCPAC could direct available forces throughout the PACOM area to counter large scale Chinese Communist aggression.
- OPLAN 23 supported the British Forces in a forced withdrawal from Hong Kong.
- OPLANS 41 and 42 were for countering Chinese Communist intervention in operations in Southeast Asia.
The 67 Plan was a program for withdrawal of forces from SEA in a six month period if the conditions of the Manila Communique were met.

The defense of Taiwan and the Penghu Islands was covered by OPLAN 25.

OPLAN 27 covered the support for the Defense of Korea.

Under OPLAN 27, 5AF would employ forces to assist in the defense of Korea. Operations would consist of two phases. The objective of Phase I would be to counter enemy assaults on the ROK while protecting bases and preparing to launch a counteroffensive under Phase II. Action would be required in conjunction with other U.S. and Korean forces, and such United Nations or allied forces, as made available. The plan is based on the following assumptions: (1) That bases in Japan would be available for logistic and combat operations. If the UN resolution is not involved, the use of these bases would be subject to prior consultation with the Government of Japan. (2) It is also assumed that Communist China may intervene militarily, but the Soviets will confine themselves to providing technical and other indirect support. (3) That the ROK will place its armed forces under the operational control of U.S. Command authorities if hostilities are resumed and the UN resolution is not invoked, or, is terminated. 5AF tactical forces that would be in place in Korea after D-Day were five tactical fighter squadrons, one tactical reconnaissance squadron, and thirteen fighter interceptor aircraft. These would be augmented by aircraft from other USAF resources.

In light of increasing North Korean "truculence and belligerency" and the inadequacies of the force posture in Northeast Asia at the time of the
Pueblo Crisis, CINCPACAF and the Commander 5AF considered it essential that a "functional and geographically balanced tactical air posture" be maintained in Northeast Asia for "the foreseeable future." CINCPAC and COMUSKOREA were in agreement with this position. It was emphasized that only a modest effort was projected by Japan toward the modernization/development of an overall defense capability. Conflicting pressures in the political sphere rendered it highly improbable that a national consensus would evolve "in the near term" which would enable the GOJ to adopt and implement a defense policy designed to meet either its own defense requirements or to assume broader obligations in the interest of regional security. "Assuming continuation of present U.S. commitments," there was no decrease foreseen in the need for forward based USAF tactical forces and a rapid buildup capability to serve as a credible deterrent and to provide the means for immediate response and sustained operations if required.

Colonel Marshall E. Baker, 5AF Director of Plans, noted that the future USAF tactical posture in the 5AF area "should be the minimum essential to provide an effective immediate reaction capability while at the same time keeping bases 'warm' and capable of ready expansion." Other characteristics of this force posture were considered to include the following:

- Functionally and geographically balanced forces to allow for modern all-weather air defense and recce as well as strike aircraft strategically located on Japanese, Okinawan and Korean bases.
- Minimum force to meet contingency requirements in order to preclude unnecessary Gold Flow and complacency on the
part of our allies, particularly Japan; incentive for our allies to do more in behalf of their own defense must not be impaired.

- Adequate posture to reassure our allies and to effectively complement JASDF and ROKAF forces.

- Adequate force to demonstrate U.S. resolve and credibility as a deterrent and as an effective means to readily counter enemy hostile acts or aggression.

- Force posture sufficient to help provide greater assurance of continued orientation of the ROKAF and particularly the JASDF toward the U.S.

The 5AF Director of Plans further noted that the requirements for contingency bases in the ROK was "likely to prevail well into, if not throughout the next decade." Base denial and loss of overflight rights in Japan, Okinawa and the Philippines would necessitate additional forces in Korea. Augmentation and support of forces in Korea from more distant bases would be less responsive in initial stages of contingency operations and the effectiveness of sustained operations over longer distances would be greatly decreased. Conveniently located main support bases would no longer be available with resultant magnified logistic problems. During this timeframe, technological developments would be unlikely to obviate or significantly lessen the requirement for Korean bases. Improved communications, advanced EW systems, increased automation in command and control and logistics all would serve to improve the responsiveness and general effectiveness of tactical forces. However, there would be a continuing need for quick reaction tactical forces deployed on forward bases and the facilities in being at overseas locations to accommodate force and logistics buildup. Advanced aircraft such as the F-111 with its longer range would permit effective operations from bases somewhat distant from the scene of action. Nevertheless, its
conventional role would be complementary and would not obviate the require-
ment for the quick response and flexibility characteristics attendant to
shorter range aircraft based at forward locations. This would be especially
significant with regard to the air defense and close air support roles.

Colonel Baker pointed out that although "other technological advance-
ments, i.e., POSIDON and MIRV," would contribute substantially to an improved
SIOP capability, "the nuclear role for tactical air forces will continue to
be an important one for several reasons":

. It provides capability for first strikes on highly
important time sensitive targets.

. It affords our allies with visible evidence of U.S.
resolve and adds credibility to protection accorded
under the U.S. "nuclear umbrella".

. The non-SIOP nuclear capability of tactical forces
provides national authority with increased flexibility
and range of options, including the employment of air
burst, low yield nuclear weapons.

. Nuclear configured aircraft and nuclear trained air-
crews are available for immediate deployment to any
area where circumstances might dictate. For example,
5AF aircraft and aircrews could be readily deployed
to SEA, if required, to counter Chinese entry into the
Vietnam conflict.

. Aircraft on nuclear alert at forward bases serve as
an impressive deterrent; if no guarantee against
hostile acts on the part of the enemy it may well be
decisive in deterring aggression.

. Finally, the enemy is forced to devote additional effort
and resources to both passive and active defense measures.

The Base Infrastructure

USAF force generation into Korea as a result of the Pueblo Crisis brought
new attention to an old deficiency. When deploying to Korea, this force found itself on a base structure which was "adequate, if at all, for a 1959 force." Communications, navigational aids, POL facilities, ammunition storage, and command facilities were not adequate to permit dispersal of the force over all jet-capable South Korean airfields. Passive protection of the force was non-existent. Command and control was inadequate for offensive operations.

The lack of sufficient jet-capable bases in South Korea as well as the inadequate base structure had been of concern to the USAF for many years. One tactical fighter wing commander, Col. Oliver B. Bucher, Jr., reported on readiness of Korea-based units during the early days of the Pueblo Crisis:

"In the early days at Kunsan we were ill-prepared for conventional action. Munitions, racks, pylons, ejector cartridges, air to air missiles, etc., were not available in sufficient quantity to efficiently load the token force available. Had the North Koreans intended capture of the "Pueblo" as the gambit to open hostilities, we would have been hard pressed to long contest the DMZ airspace and incapable of providing effective support to friendly ground forces. It is recognized that ROKAF and USN air forces were also available for employment; however, analysis of the forces involved, the state of training and logistics base available indicate that timely achievement of air superiority would have been a challenging task. It is desirable to carefully review the adequacy of the organizational and logistics base maintained in South Korea. An ability to react in force on very short notice appears essential. The capability requires a supporting state of readiness at the South Korean bases not seen in recent years."

One high-level study group noted that "perhaps the salient lesson to be learned from the tactical air reaction to the Pueblo incident is that
rapidly achieving a viable offensive and defensive air posture to confront a formidable air threat requires that the command, communications, control and logistics infrastructure in an overseas theater must be continuously modernized, updated and exercised."

The base infrastructure in Korea was the subject of exhaustive study following the Pueblo Crisis. Limitations that were found to impact on the effectiveness of the US/ROK structure included the following:

- Shortage of jet-capable airfields for adequate dispersal of aircraft.
- Existing MAP funds did not provide ROK with sufficient resources for both force modernization and infrastructure improvements.
- US and ROK airfields were highly vulnerable to strafing attacks; shelters for US and ROK aircraft were required, as well as air defense weapons for air base defense.
- Although improvements were being made for aircraft control and warning, the system was limited since it was manual; the ROKAF air defense communications network was still considered marginal; and additional facilities were required to fill existing gaps in radar coverage, to include extending low altitude coverage off the west coast.
- Additional measures for base installation security against infiltration and sabotage were required.
- There was an inadequate Air Line of Communications network to support ground forces.
- Additional communications were required for fully effective command and control.
- An urgent requirement existed for two additional Hawk battalions.
- US Nike units in ROK AW units had obsolete equipment.
Most USAF facilities in Korea were those remaining from Korean war days and were in need of extensive repair, upgrading or replacement. The most urgent need was to provide facilities which would permit a rapid buildup of augmentation forces and those which would be more capable of withstanding enemy attack, i.e., repair of runways, improvement of terminal facilities, hardening of defensive positions and vital command and control facilities, dispersal and revetment of parking hardstands. Field Commanders urged that "priority be given to development of an adequate infrastructure support base for both immediate requirements to support current and planned U.S. augmentations and a longer term posture." The scope "should embrace U.S. and ROK forces requirements, including capability to support U.S. troop unit/squadron deployments for sustained periods and, if possible, in advance of need for their full employment." Troop housing and essential administrative facilities rated equally high with operational requirements.

Extra funds were made available to correct many of the deficiencies existing in the base infrastructure, and improvement actions were expedited. Revetted aircraft shelters and adequate living facilities were matters of top priority, as were communications and other equipment improvements. The USAF shelter erection program for Korea called for 170 shelters, located as follows: Osan - 59, Kunsan - 56, Taegu - 21, Kwang-Ju - 21, and Suwon - 13. Fifth Air Force officials explained actions that were completed on this project during 1968:

"...Initially there was no aircraft protection available and dispersal could be accomplished only on the limited number of hardstands and taxiways existing at
the time. In reality, there was no practicable dispersal possible. We simply had too many aircraft for the ramp areas available...ARMCO-type revetting material began arriving in February 1968 and these were erected as quickly as possible on existing stands to protect our tactical aircraft. They are known as type B revetments and are constructed out of 16 foot high corrugated steel double walls and are center filled with earth. While these walls provide considerable aircraft protection from near misses and ground fire, overhead protection is lacking.

"For permanent aircraft dispersal, we are constructing dispersed hardstands on which will be erected aircraft shelters consisting of a steel shell with an 18 inch thick concrete cover...The corrugated steel components arrived early last fall. A number of the shells were completed by late fall."

To alleviate the troop housing problem, modular relocatable troop housing units were funded and ordered. These began arriving by surface vessels during the fall. In the meantime, construction teams were preparing the foundations at the new sites. Air Force officials in Korea believed these units to be the answer to the troop housing situation. By early 1969, 39 of these units had been assembled and were ready for occupancy. Forty-three more were in various stages of construction. These units would eventually house 5,912 officers and airmen at a project cost of 7.7 million dollars.

Although these and a number of other actions were initiated to improve the Korea base infrastructure, CINCPAC emphasized in mid-1968 that "the completion of these on-going actions and additional improvements require priority consideration if we are to react effectively to a major North Korean provocation now or in the foreseeable future." He urged that continued emphasis be placed on improving "our tactical air warfare posture
in, and adjacent to, South Korea." He summarized the requirement:

"The US/ROK Air Forces currently in the ROK constitute a significant deterrent to a North Korean conventional offensive. In the event of hostilities, augmentation of these forces by U.S. air units will become necessary. In a limited objective offensive, the ability of these Air Force units to meet and counter a well-executed surprise air attack on the most northern portion of the ROK is considered marginal. If the North Korean limited ground offensive does not include concurrent air strikes, particularly against ROK airfields, the ROK/US tactical fighter forces could be applied in maximum support to the friendly ground forces. This maximum support would be further dependent upon the counter air program required. Existing deficiencies in the tactical air control system for Korea limit the desired effectiveness for direct air support to ground forces."

CINCPAC also addressed a major logistic support problem which would impact on the Air Forces in the event of North Korean attack. The POL posture in Korea, marginal in peacetime, would likely be seriously degraded as a result of an initial North Korean air attack. The major U.S. military POL terminals at Inchon could be expected to be destroyed, as could the Korea Oil Corporation refinery and terminal at Ulson. All POL tankage in Korea was above ground and vulnerable to air attack and sabotage. The support of air bases was heavily dependent upon the rail transportation system which also was subject to disruption. Resupply of POL within Korea after the initial attack would require the immediate availability of extensive over-the-beach type POL equipment and long-haul POL transportation.

Proposed Partial Withdrawal

While postural deficiencies in Korea made it more palatable for USAF tactical aircraft to be deployed at less vulnerable bases in Northeast Asia,
there were overriding requirements that dictated their continued presence. Aside from ROK political considerations and the continued deterrence of North Korean aggression, the foremost requirement was to provide security for U.S. and ROK ground forces and to blunt any attack by North Korea. The political complexities involved with launching strikes from bases in Japan and Okinawa, and the inevitability of losing rights to these bases, weighed heavily on the requirement for maintaining a strong posture in Korea, and developing a sound infrastructure for possible future deployments.

In April 1968, the Secretary of Defense approved a USAF force level in Korea of 151 aircraft. This force was considered the minimum USAF posture which could, in conjunction with existing ROKAF capabilities, present a reasonable deterrent to the North Koreans -- and, should the deterrent fail, sufficiently blunt an attack to allow the deployment of augmentation forces to redress the situation. The position of CINCPACAF and CINCPAC, supported by other component commanders, was that "deterrence during duration of Pueblo Crisis is best maintained by and depends on continuance of current deployment posture of USAF forces in Korea." JCS stipulated that "unless and until the Pueblo situation is resolved" the existing force levels in Korea would be maintained. They further stipulated that in the event that the Pueblo problem was resolved, a minimum fighter force level of 75 aircraft would be maintained "for the foreseeable future."

CINCPACAF also urged that high priority be given to "deployment of first line, most advanced fighter aircraft." He advised:
"With limited deployment capability in Korea and high probability of upgrade/modernization North Korean AOB essential that tactical weapon systems with greatest versatility and flexibility be given priority for deployment to Korea. All-weather, UN/missile/MB capabilities in F-4 aircraft should be fully exploited to assure reasonable degree of success and survivability in air defense, air superiority, interdiction and close air support operations. Replacement of F-100 units should receive strong consideration upon increased availability of F-4 assets. Consideration should also be given to replacing F-106/W interceptors with fighters possessing both night/all-weather and close-in fighter vs fighter capability...Munitions availability and compatibility, particularly various improved types should be given highest priority to provide flexibility and insure high degree of success. Forces/equipment in support of tactical air must also be equally modern with latest state of the art capabilities. New developments in day/all-weather tactical reconnaissance sensors with compatible processing/exploitation systems, survivable airborne FAC aircraft are areas of significance as demonstrated by lessons learned in SEA."

In early September, however, a joint State Department/Department of Defense proposal indicated that in some areas the negative aspects of maintaining the "existing" force level in Korea might take precedence over the positive aspects. On 3 September, OASD/ISA advised JCS that consideration was being given to withdrawal of approximately one-half the augmentation aircraft and associated personnel in Korea "to CONUS and or/locations within WESTPAC for at least the winter season." The following rationale prompted this consideration:

"The increased permanency which could be imputed to the augmentation force deployment with the passage of time and the acquisition of additional semi-permanent housing for Air Force personnel involved could tend to limit our future freedom of action with respect to this augmentation force. Further
there is concern as to the vulnerability of these aircraft noting that the aircraft shelter program will not be completed until about June 1969 as well as the relatively short distances from North Korean airfields, and less than optimum system of early warning and air defenses in South Korea -- a situation not completely correctable with funds available at this time."

Noting that erection of approximately "one half of DOD category 720 troop housing for Air Force" was deferred, and that a decision on completion of this second half was needed prior to 1 October in order to provide the total troop housing requirements prior to the winter season, OASD/ISA advised that "the intent would be to redeploy the number of Air Force personnel that would have been housed by ... the deferred second half of the troop housing...together with the associated aircraft." It was recommended that this redeployment commence about two weeks following ROK Armed Forces Day -- 1 October 1968.

A Department of State representative and the U.S. Ambassador to Korea discussed the proposed withdrawal during the week of 9 September. It was reported to be the Ambassador to Korea's judgment that the atmosphere in Korea "is now such that the question of location of aircraft to defend Korea against attack can be addressed from the point of view of maximum military efficiency." In this regard, the Ambassador believed that if it should become a military judgment that the defense of Korea could best be fulfilled by dispersing part of the augmented aircraft to bases "in Okinawa and Japan", the ROK government probably could be convinced of the military validity of such a redeployment. The Ambassador noted that the ROK's willingness to
accept such a redeployment "without protest" would be based on an understanding that the redeployed aircraft would remain in Japan and Okinawa and that construction underway to harden and improve the operational capability of airfields on Korea would be carried through as planned. He further noted that moving some of the redeployed aircraft back into Korea on training missions would enhance the ROK's belief in "our determination to fulfill our commitments to them".

Recommendations from JCS and PACOM military commanders on the proposals were requested, as well as "possible rationale for approach to the ROK government." PACOM commanders were in agreement that maintenance of the "current" posture was both feasible and desirable during the 1968-1969 winter season, "admittedly with some inconvenience and discomfort at Korean bases for USAF people." It was also considered an appropriate time to affirm "a clear-cut position from a military standpoint" on the Korean posture. The Fifth Air Force Commander stated:

"It is unrealistic to assume that the North Korean threat will lessen in the foreseeable future. The continued advocacy of the policy to reunify Korea by force, and the repeated acts of belligerency on the part of the North Koreans portend a progressive increase in the threat. Notwithstanding these realities of the situation present planning does not go beyond CY 68. The present deployments are to be considered temporary and policy direction has dictated that this point be emphasized in negotiations/contacts with the ROK government.

"At the same time we have the task, tacitly or otherwise, of reassuring the ROK of the U.S. intent to meet our commitment in respect to the defense of the area. This must be done in the face of the dwindling military assistance program which results in drastically
inadequate investment monies for urgently needed modernization of the ROK armed forces.

"The withdrawal of forces from Korea at this time would not only add further uncertainties to an already unsettled situation but could also seriously degrade the credibility of our deterrent.

"The coordination among the USA/USAF/ROKAF/ROKA elements and exercising of command and control systems and procedures being realized through daily training efforts constitute valuable experience and is resulting in progress toward an integrated combat capability. It would be premature to degrade or significantly lessen this effort at a time when we are attaining a position portending substantially greater progress in the future."

The 5AF Commander recommended that USAF forces in Korea be retained "essentially at present level" at least "until adequate base facilities are developed." In this regard, he strongly recommended that pending construction programs as well as programs for development of the TACS, including support communications and an alternate TACC at Taegu, be supported as matters of the highest priority. He felt that once these facilities were in being, consideration could more reasonably be given to a substantial reduction of in-country deployments. In his view, support personnel would be kept in place and vacated bases would be exercised regularly and thus be kept in readiness for "immediate expansion should the situation dictate."

"This would constitute a more plausible approach which it is believed would be more readily understood and acceptable to the ROK," he noted, "Moreover, it would insure that the investment already made for facilities upgrading would be secured rather than lost by default -- all too frequently the result of stop and start planning."
It was further noted that positive steps had been taken, and were continuing to be taken to decrease force vulnerability and that programmed improvements "should be pursued on a priority basis." In the event that other considerations outweighed the military factors involved and a partial withdrawal of forces became mandatory, it was considered essential that the Korean forces remain within Northeast Asia -- Japan or Okinawa, and that all BOS personnel remain at the various bases in Korea. In addition, it would be recommended that appropriate support personnel, i.e., load teams, flightline mechanics, AGE and certain other specialists, be kept in place. This would permit the use of these facilities on a daily basis to keep them in a state of readiness and would allow for training sorties in sufficient number to exercise the TACS including aircraft allocations to the close air support role.

In the above planning, it was visualized that rotations in and out at the various bases would approximate four to ten per day. This would necessitate the retention of maintenance personnel and other specialists at the forward locations. It was estimated that the number of personnel that could actually be removed from Korea would be in the range of 500-800. This approach would insure that aircraft were readily available for redeployment to Korea if necessary, while having minimum impact on the in-being base infrastructure. Moreover, the daily rotation levels visualized at bases from which aircraft withdrawals would be made would provide visual evidence to the ROK of U.S. intent to meet its commitment.

JCS fully supported the PACOM commander's recommendations, noting that
they had to be "taken in consonance with the world-wide situation and resultant priorities." On 4 October, the Deputy Secretary of Defense authorized the Air Force to proceed with the erection of the second half of the cantonement facilities in South Korea and on 15 October concurred that there should be no partial withdrawal of Air Force augmentation units "at this time." 59/

Thus, the proposal to reduce the force level in Korea was tabled -- only be raised again at the beginning of 1969, at which time DOD directed that the Tactical air posture in Korea be reduced by 50 F-100C aircraft. This reduction was based on the requirement for returning the ANG squadrons to the United States and reserve status, and the rationale "that since the Pueblo situation has largely been resolved, a phasing down of Air Forces deployed to Korea during early 1968 is strategically sound and politically expedient at this time." 60/ During the same period, CINCNORAD proposed that consideration be given to return the F-106 squadron to NORAD. 61/

Once again, reclamas were submitted from the field against force reduc-

"at this time." COMUSKOREA urged against redeployment of the F-106s. This was based on the fact that the 18 F-106s in Korea represented over forty percent of the total modern all-weather air defense aircraft in Fifth Air Force. They were also the most versatile, considering, range, speed, and armament. Thirteen of the 31 F-102 aircraft assigned at Naha AB were "currently" maintained on alert at Suwon. These 13 F-102s would be the only effective all-weather aircraft to maintain air defense alert in Korea if
the 18 F-106s were withdrawn. While the F-4 aircraft are air defense capable and have radar missiles for a true all weather capability, their primary role was in a tactical configuration and they could not be simultaneously on alert for both air defense and attack requirements.

COMUSKOREA also strongly recommended that upon withdrawal of the two F-100 ANG squadrons, replacement F-4 squadrons be provided "until such time as the threat decreases or the ROKAF has increased combat capability." Fifth Air Force had deployed 58 of its 108 F-4C aircraft to Korea, fourteen of which were not available for tactical air missions due to another high priority mission. Twelve F-105s and 50 F-100s completed the tactical air inventory in Korea. Withdrawal of the F-100s would reduce the USAF tactical air posture by nearly fifty percent in Korea and thirty percent in Fifth Air Force. This reduction, coupled with delays in modernization of the ROKAF fighter force, portended a very inadequate air force. COMUSKOREA noted that a "recent cut in the FY 69 MAP program for Korea" had resulted in the cancellation of ten new F-5s that were scheduled for delivery to ROKAF in 1969. The two squadrons of ROKAF F-86-D aircraft had an obsolescent all-weather capability and were of marginal combat effectiveness due to their obsolescence and their relatively slow speeds. Regarding the timeliness of this proposal, COMUSKOREA said:

"Although we recognize that there is a shortage of overall resources so long as hostilities continue in SEA, it must be realized that by dint of this very shortage the same time frame, i.e., in Korea, an extremely crucial period because North Korea is apt to feel it should make all the

45
successes it can before large resources are released by the end of hostilities in Vietnam. The often reiterated hope of Kim to reunify Korea by 1970 is based in part on his belief that the U.S. is over-extended in Vietnam. Hence the period when it would be wise for the U.S. to maintain a clear deterrent in Korea is from now until the resources in Vietnam become available for deployment.

"A reduction in USAF resources at this time is also considered politically unsound. It will undoubtedly appear to the ROKG that the release of the Pueblo crew prompted this decision, or even possibly that an under the table agreement was reached with North Korea to phase down U.S. forces in Korea in return for the release of the Pueblo crew; further, that the phasedown of U.S. aircraft signals the beginning of a gradual disengagement of U.S. military resources from Korea."

Also, actions for overall strengthening of ROK airfields to include hardening, dispersal and updating had not as yet been fully implemented. Until such time as this infrastructure was fully developed to permit rapid acceptance of deployable U.S. assets, it was considered militarily prudent to maintain adequate forces immediately available in Korea to provide proper air defense of the airfields, particularly in the early hours or days following a possible surprise attack. Without such local protection, the fields might be so massively damaged that augmentation forces could not be accepted in Korea from outside resources. It was also highly doubtful that air superiority could be achieved in a timely manner by conventionally armed aircraft operating only from Japanese and Okinawan bases.

One of the most "telling arguments" was that the withdrawal would encourage North Korean unconventional war efforts which would "surely result in ever-increasing U.S. casualties in US/ROK efforts to counter." CINCUSARPAC offered further rationale:
"The critical time in any overt attack by North Korea along or behind the DMZ is in the first hours when they must mass their troops to penetrate our defenses or in the early stages of a landing. It is during these hours that air support of our defenses will be most effective in inflicting losses on the enemy and in reducing our own casualties. Any decrease in immediate availability of aircraft will make the unified commander's decisions on priorities of air missions much more difficult and will be costly in terms of lives and equipment lost on the ground."

Colonel Baker, the 5AF Director of Plans, felt that two other considerations should be addressed. The forthcoming 1970 U.S./Japan security treaty negotiations and the related issue involving the reversion of the Rykyus which were coming under active consideration rendered it untimely to effect any significant reduction in the 5AF tactical air posture. Colonel Baker conjectured:

"Such action could be construed by the GOJ as a lessening USAF force requirement to meet US commitments associated with the defense of the Far East area. Any evidence such as the proposed reduction of our Korean force posture that might lend support to this view on the part of the GOJ could tend to weaken the US position in the forthcoming negotiations."

The other consideration concerned the ROK government:

"The ROKG, already concerned about the possibility of the loss by the US of unrestricted base rights in Okinawa, could see only further cause for alarm in the reduction in our Korean posture at this time. Also significant in this regard is the fact that the development of FY-70 ROKAF MAP Program has been based on a recommended adjustment in the ROKAF force posture calling for the inactivation of two F-86F Sq in CY-69 (one-31 Jul and one-31 Dec). This adjustment is necessary to:
(1) reduce costs; (2) keep the ROKAF within the JSOP force objectives of 8 Tactical Sq and 2 Interceptor Sq; and (3) contribute to the availability of 'trainable' manpower skills for the ROKAF F-4D Program. The main point here is the fact that a reduction in the USAF force posture in Korea would render ROKAF concurrence in the dropping of two F-86F Sq from their force posture considerably less likely."

On 13 February 1969, JCS advised CINCPAC that decisions had been reached regarding the proposed withdrawal of the F-106s and non-replacement of the ANG F-100s. Since the F-106s were providing approximately 60 percent of the modern all-weather air defense aircraft in the ROK, this rotational squadron would be retained in the ROK until the programmed ROKAF F-4 squadron was in place, or until "a reassessment of the threat would indicate a force adjustment is possible." The ROKAF was scheduled to receive 18 F-4s by 31 December 1969.

JCS reemphasized that the force posture in support of South Korea "should be flexible to support contingencies". Base development would be continued as a matter of priority and, simultaneously, any indication that the present force was permanent would be avoided. In this regard, no replacements were being planned when the F-100s returned to the United States. "For these reasons, plus acknowledging that the threat has not diminished," the JCS advised that while the "F-106s will remain in Korea, and the 5-base posture will be maintained, an option will be retained until 15 April 1969 to recommend that the F-100s be replaced." The Secretary of Defense had been advised that the option to replace the two F-100 squadrons with CONUS squadrons could be delayed until about 15 April without undue hardship on replacement
personnel. The subsequent loss of the USN EC-121 to a North Korean MIG on 14 April 1969 would reemphasize the threat as well as the requirement for a strong force posture in Korea.

ROKAF Force Modernization

USAF officials were concerned with several areas of force modernization in the ROKAF during 1968 -- improvements in both conventional and unconventional capabilities. This section addresses primarily the MAP tactical aircraft modernization program, while other areas, e.g. counterinfiltration and the air defense system, are discussed in subsequent chapters. The philosophy of the MAP Program is to bring countries within MAP to a degree of military strength and effectiveness that will allow the timely phasing out of U.S. forces within these countries. In view of the discussion presented in foregoing sections of this report, it is ironic that the requirement for a strong USAF posture in Korea stems from the inadequate force structure of the ROKAF, yet there is hesitancy in some areas about bringing the ROKAF to parity with the NKAF -- rationale being based on the concern for possible unilateral retaliatory or preemptive action by the ROK government against North Korea, the high cost of maintaining a large force, and the possibility of promoting an arms race on the peninsula.

The high cost of maintaining an effective force would appear to be negligible considering the mammoth U.S. investment this force would be protecting, and the greater costs that might accrue as a result of continuing North Korean aggression -- which a strong ROK force would go far toward deterring.
North Korea has continued to develop a very strong conventional and unconven­
tional military posture, despite the "moderation" applied to the 
ROK posture -- thereby nullifying the question of an arms race. In many 
respects, ROKAF isn't in the running. As for ROK preemptive action, 
considering the multiple nature of the threat and the necessity of a "strong 
military shield" to assure continued economic viability and a stable 
government in South Korea, it would appear that measures other than contin­
uous military disparity are more realistically available for "controlling" 
ROK actions. The knowledge that it could not survive in a sustained situa­
tion without U.S. logistic support, and in most contingency situation with­
out sizable U.S. force augmentation, are significant balancing factors. 
Even more balancing are the severe economic impacts that would result from 
"unacceptable" unilateral moves. Conversely, if North Korean aggression con­
tinues with impunity, this is sure to discourage foreign investments which 
are vital to the ROK economy, thereby placing a greater burden on U.S. aid.

There was no doubt that the ROKs wanted to take retaliatory action 
against the North Koreans. One senior U.S. commander in PACOM observed that 
"the average Korean believes war is inevitable and therefore now is the best 
time to strike." He also noted, however, that the top ROK military leaders 
understood the situation and realized the results to Korea of overt war 
without U.S. complete backing. He qualified this with the observation that 
being soldiers, they would obey whatever their government directed. This 
commander also noted actions taken during the Pueblo crisis that did not 
help "our relations with the ROK's and which we could have avoided." He
considered that excluding the ROKs from discussions on the return of the Pueblo was a mistake as it had made them suspicious of U.S. intentions. "We could well have taken them into our confidence without any degradation of our position," he noted. It was also pointed out that while the U.S. has operational control of ROK forces, "we have been prohibited from discussing any of our own plans with them. He felt that had the ROK's been informed of U.S. intended actions, they would have "heartily" cooperated, but failure "to take them into our confidence" harmed relations.

Also, CINCUNC noted in April that a ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND) brochure contained a statement: "It is considered essential that North Korea be sufficiently convinced that none of their aggressive acts could ever be successful, or go unchallenged, or without great cost to themselves. This can be achieved by our responsive, immediate retaliation." He also reported what appeared to be "a basic change in the ROK defense policy." This new policy seemed "aimed at developing by 1970 the highest feasible degree of self-contained ROK military capabilities involving minimal dependence on U.S. military forces for support in the defense of Korea ..., but increasing the requirements for military assistance funds and equipment from the U.S." According to CINCUNC, this "new policy" had been clarifying steadily since the Blue House raid, the Pueblo Incident, and the visit by Mr. Cyrus Vance. He explained:

"President Park's speeches exhorting South Koreans to create through maximum self-help a more independent defense, initiation of the homeland reserve force, and
the urgent military assistance requirements developed by the ROKs in the last few weeks and set forth in the MND's brochure, are all evidence of the ROK's 'new look'. The brochure and program carried by General Im to Washington was a first cut at their requirements. Last week, just prior to the expected departure of President Park and the MND to the then-planned Honolulu Conference, the MND presented CINCUNC with a brochure and find it most interesting in terms of its political and military implications....

"...Just as the North Korean's increased aggressiveness can be traced, in part, to North Korean evaluations that the U.S. is over-extended power-wise and that the national will and determination has been deteriorating under the pressures of Vietnam, it appears equally true that the ROK government is likewise concerned about these same factors. This appears to be a primary motivation behind the ROK's 'new look'.

"The ROK military have been showing increasing interest in learning of realistic U.S. capabilities for the reinforcement of Korea in the event of an emergency. They have a pretty good idea that such capabilities, particularly in ground forces, are severely restricted as against those in 1965. The offer by the U.S. to curtail the aerial bombardment of North Vietnam in return for the opening of negotiations has occasioned concern among the ROKs. The fundamental divergence between our governments with respect to ROK retaliation in the event of future North Korean raids has intensified the dispute...."

Shortly after the Pueblo, a $100 million supplemental appropriation was approved for FY 68 to "provide for some of South Korea's most pressing needs" for military material to strengthen her defenses. This was based on a CINCPAC list of the most urgent material requirements, which were based primarily on North Korean unconventional actions. The regular MAP was not able to supply these shortages. The world-wide program had been decreasing for a number of years, and in FY 68 the MAP had reached the point that providing $100 million by diversion from other countries, such as China, Turkey, Iran and Latin American and African States, for example, would
completely cut programs that had already received cuts averaging up to 50 percent.

MAP officials reported that sharply reduced military assistance appropriations in recent years had made it impossible to provide the desirable degree of modernization for the ROK forces and the specialized equipment to meet the rising unconventional threat, without unduly jeopardizing security interests elsewhere in the world. The compromise solution in the past had been to accept a calculated risk that the pressure from the North would not increase to the danger point "it had now reached." Despite the fact that Korea was the only country where the MAP was not reduced following the 35 percent cut in the FY 68 appropriation, available funds were not sufficient to supply the equipment needed to meet the increased threat.

CINCPAC commented:

"Previous year military assistance programs have increased the combat effectiveness of the South Korean forces substantially, but the hard fact must not be obscured that the Korean forces today are short of much modern equipment and supplies. The capabilities of the ROK Army to maneuver and communicate must be enhanced, particularly with regard to the conduct of counterinfiltration operations. Improvement in combat service support is also required. Modernization of the ROKAF must be expedited as an effective counter to the large, late model MIG force supplied North Korea by the USSR. The restricted speeds of ROKN ships, many of which are over 20 years old, render most of them ineffective in protection of the long ROK coast line against infiltrator penetration by fast agent boats. This threat must be met by improved radar coverage and faster interceptors. In general, specialized counterinsurgency equipment is needed by all services. We cannot and should not wait for hostilities to commence to provide this equipment."
Major items for ROKAF in the $100 million package were F-4D aircraft (18 UE), four 0-1F aircraft, and air base hardening and improvement. The F-4 commitment was the "most dramatic" item in the entire package, and there was a divergence of opinion regarding this commitment. The U.S. Ambassador to Korea commented on alternative proposals which differed substantially from the recommendations submitted by COMUSKOREA -- one of which deleted the F-4 aircraft. He advised Washington that these were not "mere program changes, but bear on major political decisions involving President Park." Differences of view on the composition of this list had already contributed to the dismissal of the ROK Minister of National Defense. The Ambassador commented on the political importance of the F-4s: "One proposed DOD alternative does not provide for an F-4 squadron. If there is one item in the proposed programs that comes close to being a sine qua non, it is the requirement for F-4s. Deletion of these aircraft would simply not be understood by Park or the Korean people, and would invite another flare-up of strain in ROK-US relationships of the kind which Cy Vance's visit here was so helpful in controlling."

The Ambassador and COMUSKOREA had gone to considerable length to give President Park and his military advisors "a sense of participation" in developing a program on the $100 million which would help meet the threat to their security "as they see it." He cautioned: "To ignore Park's feelings ... would be very unwise, particularly when our own military commander in Korea believes that from an overall US policy point of view he finds no reason to fault it." From the political point of view, it was considered essential that "we proceed along the lines President Park has approved and which we submitted."
It was considered that F-4 aircraft for the ROKAF would have "dramatic far-reaching political and military impact." Since the F-4s were specifically requested by President Park, and this was widely heralded in news media, they were "politically" essential. Militarily, ROKAF's position vis-a-vis the North Korean Air Force would be significantly enhanced. CINCPAC commented: "When the cost of the F-4 squadron and the 175mm gun battalion is weighed against the cost of all other requirements of the ROK armed forces, including these units in the list might be questioned from an overall force improvement standpoint. On the other hand, their excellent political and psychological impacts coupled with their military potential make their inclusion in the $100 million package warranted and desirable."

The F-4 commitment resulted in the ROKAF receiving the "lions share" of the total augmentation package. The ROKAF portion is summarized below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
<th>COST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Construction (Not F-4 Associated)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>$ 5.101 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment (Not F-4 Associated)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>$ 0.998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-4D Aircraft</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>35.442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-4 AGE (Not definitized)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-4 Concurrent Spares</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engine, J-79-GE15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2.443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-4 Tech Assistance</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-4 Training</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun Pods, SUU-23A</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0.920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-4 WRM</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$ 56.640 Million</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Meanwhile, it was noted that ROKAF "in recent planning" was attempting to justify a future force posture "considerably in excess of that set forth in JSOP." The ROK force improvement plan proposed the introduction of
six F-4 squadrons without stipulating any reduction in the "present and projected" force posture. This appeared to be part of a ROK concept to develop balanced armed forces, which on their own would be capable of:

(1) Deterring North Korean aggression, (2) Defeating such aggression should it occur, and (3) Attacking North Korea if provoked. This was considerably out of line with USAF planning and desires. It was felt that the ROKAF Chief of Staff understood this, but was following guidance of his Government.

5AF officials noted the military import of the F-4s to the ROK:

"...increased capability offered by the F-4D considered important in view of the sophisticated nature of the threat, including MIG-21s. The capability of present ROKAF aircraft to perform the counterair role is negligible; virtually all of the North Korean AOB is beyond the range of F-86s and F-5s."

The officials also observed that the "calibre and professionalism" of ROKAF aircrews and the "technical aptitudes and potential" of ROKAF maintenance/support personnel projected convincing evidence of the "capacity of the ROKAF to absorb and effectively use" the advanced aircraft. Additionally, receipt of this first line fighter would help the ROKAF enhance its posture vis-a-vis that of the ROK Army. The latter had always been the predominant service and had provided the source of most of the top political leaders, including President Park. Also, the combat experience being gained by the continued deployment of 45,000 to 50,000 ROKA troops in SEA had added the unfavorable balance in prestige.

After the ROK Minister of Defense requested authority to begin F-4
Training and to be advised of aircraft delivery status, CINCPAC, on 8 August 1968, requested CSAF submit a training package to OASD/ISA for approval and authority to start training. The Air Staff response advised that action was in process to establish a training program for eight aircrews and approximately 105 technicians, with a target date of 1 August 1969 for training completion.

The primary mission of the F-4 squadron would be air interdiction with the AIM-9B and AIM-7E missiles; the secondary mission to be air to ground with the AGM-12B missiles. All aircraft would be based at Taegu.

At one point later in the year, OSD/ISA advised pending Congressional action on the Foreign Aid Bill and an expected reduction in MAP funds that implementation of F-4s for ROKAF should be suspended. This was later rescinded, and it became final that the ROKAF would receive one squadron of F-4Ds, the first aircraft to be delivered in August 1969, and the complete package by December 1969.

Other action was taken, however, which would impact heavily on the ROKAF. This was a proposed $21 million reduction in the FY 69 MAP Program. If the proposed reduction materialized, it would result in cancellation of ten ROKAF F-5s in the FY 69 program. COMUSKOREA strongly opposed the FY 69 reduction, and expressed his views in a 23 December message to CINCPAC:

"The most startling revelation, given a fresh look at the threat and at our defense posture here, is that at a time when the NK with USSR help is significantly building up its conventional and unconventional military capabilities and is acting more aggressively than previously, we are reducing our support to the ROK by disproportionate cut of $21 million from the overall congressionally imposed..."
out in the current year MAP. This seems totally inconsistent with the relative immediacy and scope of the threat confronting Asian countries and our position several months ago when we seemed to have recognized that increased support to the ROK was clearly needed and provided a supplemental $100 million package. It should be remembered that even with this added package there remains an unfunded but valid investment MAP requirement of approximately $570 million FY 69 and this MAP short fall will increase to over $620 million in the next five years.

"I was surprised to learn that for the East Asia block of MAP supported countries (Burma, China, Indonesia, Korea, and the Philippines) MAP was cut from $219.3 million -- a reduction of $19.4 million. The cut to Korea MAP was $21 million -- more than the total cut for the whole area. The Republic of China was actually given an augmentation of $5.6 million, although I am unaware of any increase in the immediacy of the threat against them."

COMUSKOREA urged that "timely, substantive and forward looking" actions be taken "on short order" to provide the resources necessary to keep the ROK/U.S. forces in Korea capable of coping successfully with the "greatly increased" unconventional threat and abreast of the modernization of the North Korean conventional forces. This was considered necessary if a "too little-too-late" situation was to be avoided. "We must do this to halt and turn downward the ascending curve of North Korean aggressiveness before it gets out of hand," he warned. Not only was this considered essential to the credibility of the U.S. power posture in N.E. Asia, but the impact could resound throughout Free Asia. COMUSKOREA warned that unless this was done, "we must expect to have to put up far more later, when perhaps it will be uncomfortably late."

Proposed MAAG Phasedown

Another proposal that suggested perhaps all ears were not attuned to the
prevailing winds came from the U.S. Embassy in Seoul in mid-June 1968. The
Ambassador forwarded to Washington an Embassy-formulated recommendation that
"in-country numbers of service military advisory group personnel" be phased
down, "commencing this calendar year." In the Ambassador's view, the
Korean military establishment was no longer in need of "close-in advice and
guidance" provided by "present approximately 1600-man" U.S. Advisory Group.

"As a matter of policy the time has come when U.S. should reduce its in-
volved in details of ROK military affairs, limiting ourselves to major
policy and program considerations," the Ambassador said. He continued: "We
have moved a long way in this direction on the economic front and we should
begin to do so with respect to the military. It seems to me that the longer
we delay in this move the more we are likely to prejudice our ability to
participate in and influence the more important considerations of ROK-U.S.
92/
military relationships."

In recommending that the advisory group be reduced "in this calendar
year," the Ambassador proposed a one-third reduction (approximately 600 per-
sons) in 1968, another third during the first half of 1969, and "final phase-
93/out" in the last half of 1969. He offered the following rationale:

"Support for this view would seem to lie in fact of Korean
military performance in Vietnam which has evoked praise from
our highest military levels. Obviously any country which
can contribute an efficient operational force functioning
well under its own command in a country as far away as Viet-
nam does not require a U.S. Advisory Establishment of the size
of this one. Additionally, in-country Korean units display
efficiency in maintenance of their equipment substantially
on a par with that of U.S. forces and this is evident in ROK
units of various size with or in absence of U.S. advisors."
COMUSKOREA took the view that the abolition of the service MAAGs in Korea at this time, "particularly so drastically and rapidly" as was suggested, would be adverse to the U.S. national interest. He advised: "Considering the unique command channels and responsibilities placed on the U.S. military for the defense of the ROK, the operational control exercised by CINCUNC over the ROK armed forces of about 600,000 men, and the complex concerns of the ROK on the defense of Korea in this critical period, the drastic changes recommended by the Embassy would have a traumatic effect on the ROKG and could well cause a lasting estrangement in their military circles. It would, in my estimation, gravely prejudice my current, but so far important, ability to keep the ROK military relatively cool in the face of increasing and deliberate efforts by the North Koreans to provoke large-scale ROK retaliation." 94/

The Embassy had previously cited concern over the ROK acting unilaterally. COMUSKOREA noted that this was contrary to recommending a phase out of the service advisory effort "since the MAAGs are essential agencies which assist CINCUNC in restraining ROK forces reaction to North Korean provocations." COMUSKOREA in his dual position of CINCUNC was held responsible for ROK adherence to the armistice terms. MAAGs deployed throughout the ROK were in daily contact with the major ROK commanders at all echelons and were a primary means of providing CINCUNC with information on ROK actions and plans. The MAAG organization was tailored to the unique UNC operational control structure in Korea and it was "understood and accepted by the ROK government and armed forces." In addition, COMUSKOREA said: "Korean government officials and people strongly associate the presence of U.S. MAAG forces in Korea with
continued U.S. concern for the defense of Korea."

The assumption that ROK forces were self-sufficient was inaccurate. Acknowledging the "current improved state of the ROKA," there were also recognized areas in which U.S. advice and assistance were still required. One such area was in logistics, both from a planning and an operational standpoint. COMUSKOREA also felt that it was an "exaggeration" to contend that ROK forces displayed efficiency in maintenance of their equipment substantially on a par with that of U.S. forces. To the contrary:

. The removal of advisors and technicians from the 18 ROKA Nike and Hawk missile support sites would quickly degrade the ROK air defense capability.

. ROKA is unable to manage resources properly. This is manifest in the inequitable distribution of TOE items at all echelons and in depots.

. ROKAF has just taken over the Blue Fortune microwave communications net. Continued advice and technical assistance will be required if this system is to be maintained effectively.

. Although the ROKMC is sound in basic tactical operations and training and the ROKN uses individual ships in an outstanding manner, both services need continued planning, scheduling, joint employment, supply management and equipment maintenance.

It was further noted that "the contention that close-in advice and guidance" was no longer needed in view "of the praise and repute" of the performance of ROK forces in Vietnam was not well-founded. This statement failed to recognize the efforts of the U.S. and RVN which enabled the ROKF-V to be an effective operational force. Advisors were provided to ROKF-V down to battalion level, and logistical support was provided by the U.S. logistical
system. Also, the military effort of the ROK forces in Vietnam did not involve all ROK services to a significant degree; therefore, self-sufficiency of all ROK military forces could not be demonstrated in the RVN. ROKAF participation was limited to air-medical evacuation support and FAC/ALO orientation. Such participation in SEA activities allowed no test of their capability to perform the primary mission of air defense and tactical air support. It was further noted that delivery to the ROKAF of an F-4 squadron would severely tax ROKAF technical capabilities.

COMUSKOREA also noted that following the ROK deployment to Vietnam in 1964, U.S. and ROK news media were encouraged to give them favorable publicity. While this had increased national pride and international prestige, it was not a realistic evaluation of the self-sufficiency or capability of ROK elements in Korea. ROK Vietnam forces were furnished new equipment, given U.S. logistical support and heavily depended on the U.S. supply and depot maintenance system. These examples were not intended to discredit the progress which had been made in each of the ROK services, but ROK forces were not near "self-sufficiency", and the introduction of improved technology and modern equipment created a continuing need for advisory effort. The Embassy proposal was not favorably received, nor acted upon.

Summary

Much was done following the Pueblo crisis to improve the tactical air warfare posture of the USAF in N.E. Asia and that of the ROKAF. Force
effectiveness was increased significantly, ROKAF force modernization continued, and strides were made in upgrading the base infrastructure in Korea. Additionally, considerable attention was given to increase joint USAF/ROKAF planning, and combined U.S./ROK exercises continued to enhance force preparedness.

The Air Forces Korea TACC was reorganized based on PACAFM 55-15. The current operations branch of the TACC was manned with ROKAF and USAF personnel on a counterpart basis and coordination between USAF and ROKAF offensive and defensive elements was conducted routinely in all air operations. A ROKAF liaison officer assigned to the current plans branch coordinated all ROKAF training sorties fragged by Air Forces Korea. In the joint training area, USAF and ROKAF aircraft and weapons were exercised in coordination with ROK and U.S. Army ground units. Also, USAF FACs began working on a daily basis with ROK Army units and ROKAF FACs.

To facilitate joint planning, a combined U.S./ROK contingency war planning team was established. Known as the Joint Target Group (JTG), this combined team was composed of ROKAF, USAF and USA personnel and was supervised by the Deputy Chief of Intelligence, 5AF ADVON. Mission of the JTG was identification, selection, and nomination of targets for tactical operations. As its preliminary task, the JTG established a joint target data base, to identify all targets by one unique identifier. Machine-run listings and maps depicting plots of targets were produced for use by service components of both nations. Targeting initially covered the area between the DMZ and 39 degrees north, with expansion to include targets in all North Korea. Also, targets along LOC segments were to be identified. In the event of hostilities, the JTG
would be expanded to provide full-time targeting support to the Commander Air Forces Korea and 5AF ADVON, with the main effort being in support of the TACC.

In September 1968, COMUSKOREA noted the force improvements that had been made, but felt that further improvement, both short-term and long-range, was required. He was concerned that the momentum gained following the Pueblo seizure might be allowed to falter. He said: "I feel most strongly that it would be highly unwise and contrary to our national interest to withdraw any of existing U.S. military power from Korea at this time, to slow down or choke off our moderate proposed plans to augment the credibility of our power position both in terms of manpower, improvement of infrastructure and the lessening of our many current vulnerabilities." It was pointed out that the studies "of the Yager Group clearly bear out the need in the short term to strengthen our posture in order to achieve the stability that will permit an eventual and gradual disengagement of U.S. military forces in Korea." Also, the definitive assessments in the JCS Special Study on tactical air warfare requirements and force effectiveness in the Korean theater strongly supported the requirement for an improved U.S. Air Force capability. He warned:

"Our small but relatively better than last year's successes in coping with the North Korean infiltration threat does not, to my mind, justify any complacency nor does it indicate that Kim Il Sung is growing dove's feathers...."
"I recognize ... increased tensions and requirements for Europe as well as continuing of Vietnam. However, I would caution that last year the credibility of our posture in Korea fell below safe standards, ...and to permit it to do so again in the face of continuing North Korean belligerency and military preparedness program might be far most costly in the end than the provision of moderate requirements now."
CHAPTER III
AIR FORCE ROLE IN COUNTERINFLICTATION

"Of particular importance is the requirement for an Air Force capability designed specifically to assist in countering the growing intrusion and insurgency operations being conducted by North Korea in the ROK." 1/

Gen. John D. Ryan, USAF

While progress was being made in improving the tactical air warfare posture in and adjacent to Korea, there were efforts underway to enhance the Air Force role in ROK counterinfiltration operations. Primary interest was directed at increasing the effectiveness of ROKAF in the overall counterinfiltration role; however, the demonstrated success by North Korean agents to infiltrate the ROK undetected dictated the requirement for a system too sophisticated for immediate integration into ROKAF. Thus, there were continuing efforts during 1968 to develop a system, which would be a unilateral USAF effort initially, that would be effective in detecting infiltrators in the unique Korean environment. 2/

ROKAF Role and Requirements

Several months prior to the Blue House and Pueblo incidents, CINCPAC, CINCPACAF and other component commanders had expressed growing concern over the rise in North Korean infiltration into the ROK. Consequently, CSAF directed that the USAF Special Air Warfare Center (SAWC) conduct a study on ROKAF requirements in the counterinsurgency (COIN) role. This report, known as CORONET CONJUGATE, was initiated in November 1967 and published in January.
Earlier, in a related effort, the United Nations Command in Korea conducted a study to evaluate the total ROK effectiveness in countering the unconventional threat and to determine associated ROK force requirements -- both near-term and long-term. This study, entitled "Counterinfiltration/Counterguerrilla Capability for Korea (CIGCREP) was completed in October 1967, with subsequent revisions made along lines directed by CINCPAC and JCS. Coupled with conventional force requirements prompted by the Pueblo Incident and the Blue House raid, this study provided the basis for the $100 million additional funding for ROK force improvement. Included were a portion of the requirements identified by the CORONET CONJUGATE report and the Commander Air Forces Korea.

It was noted that since the Military Assistance Program (MAP) in Korea was committed to conventional warfare in defense of the country, "little or no money was available for other contingencies." The increased threat of unconventional warfare by North Korea, therefore, introduced the requirement for methodology and equipment that fell considerably outside the range of "present defense programs" for the ROKAF. The SAWC report concluded that the unconventional threat was "a different problem demanding different solutions and if necessary -- separate funds."

Infiltration into the ROK was both by land and by sea. Overland infiltration entered through the demilitarized zone (DMZ). The DMZ established by the
Armistice Agreement of 1953 covered an area two thousand meters on either side of the 151 mile long Military Demarcation Line (MDL). The MDL was the line of contact at the time of cessation of hostilities and presently served as a line of demarcation between the ROK and North Korea. A buffer zone extended 2,000 meters on either side of the MDL, in which military operations were restricted by the terms of the Armistice Agreement; however, the North Koreans had shown little restraint, especially since 1967, and their actions in 1968 became even more aggressive.

The ROK was divided into three zones for counterinfiltration operations and reporting. Zone I was bounded on the north by the MDL and on the south by the Civilian Control Line (CCL). Zone II was bounded on the north by the CCL and on the south by the I US Corps (Gp) and First ROK Army (FROKA) rear boundaries. The Zone III area was further divided, for control of military forces, into four large Military Districts and the Logistics Base Command.

Most major conventional ground combat forces were positioned in Zones I and II because of conventional defense requirements. These forces also conducted counterinfiltration missions. Deployed along the DMZ were nine ROK Army divisions, one U.S. division reinforced with a ROK Army Regimental Combat Team, and one ROK Marine Brigade. (Fig. 10.) Approximately one-third of each division's combat elements is engaged in DMZ security operations. These same units in most instances were also assigned the general outpost mission. The remaining elements of the forward divisions had a primary
mission of readiness for the conventional defensive mission, but they also supported DMZ forces and conducted counterinfiltration operations as required by the situation. The remaining seven divisions of I US Corps (Gp) and FROKA were positioned for their normal conventional role as Corps and Army Reserve; these divisions however, had counterinfiltration missions within their assigned areas and were committed to counterinfiltration operations elsewhere as the situation required. Korean National Police (KNP) and Homeland Defense Reserve Force (HDRF) units were both active in counterinfiltration operations within Zone II; however, responsibility in this zone rested primarily with the ROK military with close coordination being effected between military, KNP and HDRF elements.

In Zone III, the Second ROK Army (SROKA) and the KNP shared the responsibility for counterinfiltration operations. In reality, however, the ROK military was required to handle significant counterinfiltration operations in this zone. The ROK Government controlled and directed, through national channels, counterinfiltration operations in the rear and interior areas of the ROK. Within Zone III, the KNP had deployed 28 of their total 37 Combat Police Companies on or near the coast with the remaining nine being deployed in the interior. These companies were assigned to the provinces and operated under the provincial chief. SROKA had available to it ten reserve divisions, three of these were Ready Reserve Divisions, the other seven were Rear Area Security Divisions. Each of these ten reserve divisions had been augmented with two counterinfiltration battalions. Twelve of the 20 counterinfiltration battalions were located on or near the coast with the prime duty of coastal
security and the other eight battalions were located throughout the interior.

The ROK Government created the Homeland Defense Reserve Force (HDRF) in early 1968. Much of this militia force was located within Zone III. The mission of this HDRF was the defense of the villages and industrial plants whenever these were threatened by armed infiltrators or anti-national groups. The HDRF numbered about 2,000,000 former service personnel organized into companies, platoons and squads.

The system for countering boat infiltration operations consisted of a distant sea barrier of patrolling ROK Navy ships and sometimes U.S. Navy patrol aircraft; a close-in barrier of patrolling ROKAF C-46s and Korean National Police (KNP) Coast Guard vessels; and, a coastline barrier of radar stations and KNP coast watchers. Infiltration by sea presented the greatest problem. There was a demonstrated lack of ability to search, detect, and identify the North Korean fast boats that were being used to land agent teams in the ROK. In 1967 and 1968, highspeed agent boats similar to the Soviet Komar class had proved highly successful in landing agents in the ROK undetected. Expense of neutralizing agents and guerrilla activity once ashore, became critical in time, prohibitive in resources, and often ineffective in preventing North Korean mission accomplishment. An example of this was the November 1968 landing at Ulchin of 120 agents that took weeks to neutralize. This incident was discussed in Chapter I.

An earlier example occurred on 3 June 1967, when 29 agents landed on the central coast of Korea without observation, the discovery of their
stranded ship being the first intelligence of their infiltration. It took 3,500 ROK police and military 27 days to kill 21 and capture four agents. Four others were still unaccounted for and may have engaged in further subversive activities. At least 60 percent of infiltrations was by sea, and a great percentage of these were successful. To counter this, eight sea watch radars had been commissioned by the ROK Navy since 1966, but these were ineffective in detecting enemy vessels. In May 1968, the ROK Navy divided the sea approaches to the ROK into 27 sectors for patrolling; however, their ships and craft were incapable of speeds in excess of 20 knots. Also, the ROK Navy was composed primarily of obsolescent craft equipped with outmoded communications equipment incapable of desired detection rates. COMUSKOREA commented on the Navy limitations in November 1968:

"COMNAVFORKOREA has increased ship surveillance to maximum extent possible but has not been able to prevent North Korea from penetrating sea barrier with agent boats. When contacts are made at night by ROKN ships capability for continuous radar tracking is poor because of speed differential ROKN ships and agent boats."

At the time of the CORONET CONJUGATE report, the ROKAF had not played a very active role in counterinfiltration operations. Aside from other policy considerations, the ROKAF was in some situations limited by strict adherence to the UN armistice agreements. For instance, North Korean aircraft were known to fly over the ROK near the DMZ, even in very slow aircraft.
but ROKAF fighters were not allowed to fly near the DMZ and attack them.  

CORONET CONJUGATE reported that ROKAF fighters had destroyed only one of the thirty "known" boats that infiltrated in 1967. This was done on April 17th, approximately nine and one-half hours after the ROK Navy first sighted and engaged the vessel. From April 17 to November 10, twenty confirmed successful landings occurred. It was concluded that enemy infiltrations "have and will be made with impunity until the ROKAF is capable of dispersal, fast reaction and effective fire power."  

The Commander Air Forces Korea, Brig. Gen. John W. Harrell, noted one example of the larger contribution that ROKAF could make in the neutralization of enemy agents, if allowed to do so. On 19 January 1968, a group of South Korean woodcutters stumbled onto the North Korean Blue House raiding team and reported the encounter to the NKP. From the information derived from the woodcutters, it was clear that a well armed enemy formation was in the ROK. Brig. Gen. Harrell asked if Air Forces Korea could assist in ongoing operations involving neutralization of the raiding team. The army component staff replied that Air Forces Korea assistance was not necessary. General Harrell persisted with a position that ROKAF possessed a capability that should be used in raiding team neutralization operations. Finally, the army staff requested a Tactical Air Control (TACP) be deployed in support of flare operations. As it resulted, the TACP was necessary and the army corps commander stated that ROKAF flare support was a vital contributor to
the ultimate success of the operation.

Primary to the development of an increased role for ROKAF and associated program requirements was the CINCUNC policy that established parameters for ROKAF participation in counterinfiltration/counterguerrilla operations. The SAWC study group noted that the United Nations Commander's policy limited "present ROKAF strike activities" to anti-boat operations, and as the first priority mission, any SAW capability in ROKAF would be directed toward countering boat infiltration. The Air Force would work with the Navy. Policy also held that the ROKAF would not be helicopter single manager. At the time, the study group was also advised that a near-term capability would have to be formed from existing ROKAF resources and that major additive forces were a long term consideration.

In assessing near-term requirements, the study stated an immediate need for a night strike capability against agent boats. It was recommended that the C-46 be used for flare support, the F-5 for strike, and the UH-1 and H-19 helicopters for the airlift of quick reaction forces or possible strike. An effective COIN capability would depend upon four major qualifying elements which did not exist in the ROK at that time:

- An effective concept of operations involving all tasked command and operational elements.
- A fully integrated, real-time, communications net that would link these elements together.
Sufficient supply and maintenance support for mission aircraft.
Adequate aircrew proficiency and support skills.

A concept of operations was defined that was considered to be "effective and well within the ROKAF's capability to employ." Recommendations included specific items of communications equipment that would allow not only the rapid transmittal of surveillance information, but also the fastest possible reaction by strike forces. ROKAF crews required training to conduct strikes against a boat target at night under flares. A Mobile Training Team (MTT) consisting of three F-5 instructor pilots (IP), two C-46 IPs, and three C-46 instructor load-masters was recommended for early deployment. It was additionally recommended that ROKAF helicopters assigned to the 33rd Air Rescue Squadron be given a secondary mission to provide emergency airlift support for quick-reaction forces and base perimeter defense plans, provided that a suitable 2.75-inch rocket delivery system could be adapted to the UH-1D. This aircraft could provide a very effective offshore night strike capability against an agent boat.

In the long-term, it was recommended that ROKAF capabilities be expanded to meet not only increased agent boat infiltration, but also increased insurgency operations within the interior of the country, "especially in the Wilderness Mountains." As no airborne FAC capability existed within the ROKAF, it was recommended that 16 O-1 aircraft or other suitable FAC vehicle be provided. The T-28D or comparable airframe was recommended as a COIN
aircraft for ROKAF. For night attack under flares in narrow mountain valleys, the T-28 offered a more maneuverable and safer weapons platform than a high performance jet. It also could be deployed with a SAW unit to an austere forward operating base (FOB). Also proposed was that twelve SEA-configured helicopters, preferably UH-1s, be procured for use by the ROKAF.  

CORONET CONJUGATE near-term recommendations for ROKAF were included in the revised CINCUNC study with three exceptions: (1) M-60D Machine Guns, (2) F-5/C-46 and communications MTTs, and (3) starlight scopes for boat spotting. Reasons given were that .50 caliber machine guns were available in ROKAF resources as a suitable substitute; a ROKAF/6146th AFAG-developed night ordnance delivery training program was already in progress; and, the lack of funds prohibited acquiring starlight scopes for the time being. C-46 replacement would be provided from another source.  

Regarding long-term requirements, CINCUNC was approached with the idea of a SAW squadron for the ROKAF. He opposed this requirement on the basis that there was "currently counterinfiltration, not counterinsurgency" involved in the ROK. Guerrilla/infiltration activities were not considered of the magnitude to require "airborne firepower for suppression." It was also stated that the SAW capability would be, to some degree, duplicative of capabilities which already existed or were programmed. Helicopters would be competing with longstanding army requirements in Korea. CINCUNC did agree to fund command control communications and 0-1 VR aircraft.
The Air Forces Korea Commander noted that "should the current situation change, a full SAW capability may be required." He also urged that "training to achieve this capability is desired at this time." CINCPACAF strongly supported the position for training toward the full SAW requirement, but this action could not be implemented because MAP/CIGCREP funds were not available.

CINCUNC's opposition to a SAW capability for the ROKAF was contrary to CINCPAC's recommendations to JCS (JSOP 70-77), wherein a ROKAF Air Commando Squadron was proposed. The following was included in the CINCPAC justification of force objectives:

"The Air Commando Squadron is required for Special Air Warfare tasks, to include counterinsurgency psychological operations and unconventional warfare. Of particular importance is the requirement for an Air Force capability designed specifically to assist in countering the growing intrusion and insurgency operations being conducted by North Korea in the ROK."

Another action taken to improve the counterinfiltration capability was the conduct of joint U.S./ROK forces exercises. In this regard, it was felt that operations along the DMZ and in the interior had provided the U.S. and ROK with the experience necessary to establish effective operational procedures and to evaluate force and other needs to counter the threat. A similar depth of experience did not exist with respect to the sea infiltration threat. Accordingly, the Air Forces Korea Commander advised: "It appears desirable to conduct a series of tactical training exercises under the auspices of the UNC which will serve to test the validity of the current and planned counter sea infiltration concept and supporting procedures together with existing and planned forces, communications and material."
The Air Forces Korea Commander was assigned the responsibility for developing the counterinfiltration exercise plans. Plans were developed and related actions included ROKAF C-46 flare ships being placed on alert and participating with the ROK Navy in identifying suspect boats. Each operation of this type constituted an exercise of capability as well as accomplishment of an operational mission. ROKAF fighters were also undergoing training in delivery of rockets at night with illumination supplied by C-46 flare ships.

Briefings on capabilities of the "currently deployed elements" of the Tactical Air Control System (TACS) were given to the Commander, I Corps (Group), and the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, ROKAF. For the counterinfiltration effort, these capabilities were: (1) Accurate illumination of areas in which counterinfiltration ground operations were being conducted during hours of darkness, (2) Accurate control of visual reconnaissance of areas in which infiltrators were suspected to be active, (3) and, Accurate placement of helicopter delivered quick reaction forces in the vicinity of infiltrators/guerrillas.

The Air Forces Korea Commander assured that "highly skilled pilots" were available in the ROKAF for delivery of appropriate weapons against North Korean infiltrators/guerrillas whenever such operations were required and approved by CINCUNC. F-86, F-5 and T-28 aircraft with .50 caliber gun pods were available for these operations to provide flexible and appropriate levels of fire support.
Despite the actions that were taken to improve the ROKAF role in counter-infiltration operations, ROKAF/ROKN forces continued to have little success in detecting and intercepting North Korean agent boats. ROKAF C-46 surveillance missions were considered to be unsuccessful because these aircraft had no electronic search capability, crews had to rely on visual means, and the C-46 had a restricted field of vision. It was also noted that Naval forces had difficulty tracking agent boats, and the reaction time necessary to position C-46 flare ships on station usually resulted in loss of contact.

In another special study concluded in early 1969, CINCUNC reported that the DMZ barrier system "was fairly effective in 1968" in detecting and deterring infiltrators. Much of this effectiveness resulted from the timely delivery of CIGCREP items which increased the ROK's capabilities. The other barrier systems, however, were much less effective. CINCUNC noted:

"The Ulchin landings which were accomplished with complete initial success without being detected by either the sea or coastal barrier systems give ominous proof of North Korean capabilities. An important consideration regarding these landings is that it took two months for an average of 20,000 active ROK forces with the meager helicopter support the Eighth US Army could provide, plus another 20,000 or more Homeland Defense Reserve Force and Korean National Police to kill 107 of the infiltrators and capture 7. Multiple agent boat landings along the extended coast of the ROK would severely tax capabilities of ROK forces and seriously degrade the conventional defense posture. The sea, coastal and interior barriers should be improved to nullify the greatly improved North Korean capabilities. The DMZ barrier system also requires improvement to confront infiltrators with changed tactics and a reoriented and stronger defense posture."
ROKAF COUNTERINFILTRATION ALERT
AS OF FEBRUARY 1969

1 C-46 15 MIN
4 F-86 30 MIN

4 F-5 30 MIN

2 F-86 30 MIN

1 C-46 15 MIN
2 F-5 30 MIN

1 C-46 15 MIN

1 C-46 15 MIN

FIGURE 11
USAF Systems Deployment

USAF systems that were considered for use in the counterinfiltration role in the ROK were directed toward airborne surveillance and target acquisition. The USAF position was that ROKAF should assume the entire air role in counterinfiltration, where possible, with the realization that the situation required probable introduction of surveillance and detection systems too advanced for immediate introduction into ROKAF. In consideration of complexities in operating and maintaining these sophisticated systems, their introduction into the ROK would be a unilateral USAF effort initially, with the idea that, security considerations permitting, ROKAF should "assume this capability for long-range situation."  

Many methods for improving the airborne detection capability in Korea were under study. An ARDF requirement was established prior to the Pueblo Incident, and this requirement was to be met by three CT-29s, scheduled for 1969. It was recommended that this program be expedited, or that one or more EC-47s scheduled for SEA be diverted pending arrival of the CT-29s. Night sensor gunships were also recommended. Hq PACAF strongly supported this action, and recommended the early deployment of a platform to test and develop the concept. PACAF had already requested deployment of an NC-123K BLACK SPOT unit for a similar purpose, and pending "outcome of BLACK SPOT operations, the decision would be made on possible deployment of gunships."  

Some thought was given to the introduction of an air oriented anti-infiltration system, such as the IGLOO WHITE system in SEA, to include
In May 1968, CINCPACAF advised against this: "Considering present situation in Korea and limited effectiveness of IGLOO WHITE operation in SEA, believe deployment of such a system would not produce results commensurate with costs involved."

The newly developed Lockheed QT-2 "Quiet Aircraft" was also under consideration for Korea. Developed by ARPA with assistance by U.S. Army Aviation Material Laboratories, the QT-2 was designed to operate at low noise levels for covert night surveillance. Two of these aircraft had completed operational evaluation in Southeast Asia, and follow-on aircraft would "have improved performance and sensory equipment." The Commander Air Forces Korea reported on 7 May 1968:

"During discussions of QT-2 briefing, General Bonesteel stated the QT-2 should be provided in-country to counter enemy agent boat threat regardless the possessing service. In addition, General Bonesteel stated an immediate requirement for in-country IR read-out capability."

JCS established a tri-service concept for the "Quiet Aircraft." The development program involved three phases of development, with the Army designated as the executive agent for management of the program. Phase I called for redeployment of the two original QT-2s, which had been modified, in June 1968 to South Vietnam for continued operational evaluation by USARV. Phase II would be development of "operational QT-3 aircraft based on evaluation of the QT-2 and incorporating the provisions desired by the services."
The Air Force and Navy were tasked to identify their quantitative requirements, define the desired additional modifications of the QT-2, and transfer necessary purchase funds to the Army as appropriate. Army planned a rapid development contract for ten QT-3 aircraft for operational evaluation in South Vietnam with first delivery in November 1968. The contract would contain options for additional buys to satisfy other service requirements. CINCPAC recommended procurement through service channels, and "close cooperation by the services in developing specifications for the QT-4 based upon operational evaluation in SVN."  

Of 40 quiet aircraft planned for SEA, CINCPACAF had stated a requirement for 18 in 7AF. The unit would be deployed to South Vietnam to perform the VR/SCAR mission. It was recommended in August 1968 that a "follow-on test program" be initiated in Korea to determine operating procedures and techniques for mountainous terrain. In addition to the peacetime counterinfiltration role, it was envisioned that under combat conditions these aircraft could provide support to air base defense and assist in locating enemy rocket and artillery firing sites and night troop movements, as well as improve friendly night artillery effectiveness.

One USAF system which had promise for use in Korea was the NC-123K BLACK SPOT aircraft. BLACK SPOT was conceived as an integrated multisensor test bed operating at slow speeds and low altitudes in a permissive environment. Optimum operating altitudes for target detection and weapon release were 2,500 to 3,500 feet AGL. A BLACK SPOT Task Force, consisting of two
NC-123Ks, was deployed to Osan AB, Korea on 29 July 1968 to evaluate its effectiveness in detecting enemy agent boats attempting sea infiltration or detecting agent locations on land. Night missions were flown in support of Naval forces along the western coast of the ROK. Missions were primarily at sea and over the numerous islands along the western coastline.

As of 30 September, 27 missions had been flown in support of this operation. The BLACK SPOT aircrews demonstrated their ability to search for, detect, track, and to inspect boats utilizing the sensors installed in the aircraft. They were successful in detecting and tracking all size boats. The size, outline, speed, direction of travel, and number of operational engines could be determined by the aircrews.

There were limiting factors, however, which made effective utilization of BLACK SPOT in ROK sea surveillance highly questionable. Frequently, 1,000 or more friendly boats were located in the search areas and airborne identification of agent boats was not possible. Agent boats were designed similar to local fishing boats and the fishing fleets were used for concealment.

The slow speed of the NC-123K limited its alert response time and limited the area that could be searched on one mission. Areas vulnerable to infiltration from the sea included the entire coastal areas of the ROK offshore islands along the west and south coasts. This large area of operations required the aircraft to fly long distances in response to search requests by Naval vessels. Therefore, operations were limited to areas...
along the west and south coasts. On a normal four hour search mission it was not possible to thoroughly check each individual boat in this large area. Consequently, one BLACK SPOT mission could search very little of the actual area and could make virtually no positive identification of any of the boats actually detected.

Shortly after the BLACK SPOT unit departed Korea for operations in Southeast Asia, the successful landing of 120 agents on the east coast in November 1968 increased U.S. and ROK concern about the sea infiltration problem. Despite its limitations in the Korean environment, COMUSKOREA advised that the deployment of BLACK SPOT aircraft from Korea had decreased radar sea search capability as well as the capability to vector ROK aircraft for flare drops. He felt that the capability of the EC-121 COLLEGE EYE aircraft could overcome "to a large extent" this deficiency and also provide control of F-5 flare equipped aircraft which could reduce reaction time to a minimum after initial contact was made. The point was made that COLLEGE EYE aircraft had a greater capability than BLACK SPOT due to positive control of strike aircraft. COLLEGE EYE temporary deployment was requested "to provide coastal surveillance" on the east and west coast of the ROK.

CINCPACAF had already requested approval of employment of seven COLLEGE EYE/RIVET GYM EC-121D/T aircraft to support FRESH STORM/FREEDOM DROP contingency operations. It was emphasized that the EC-121s were required in the primary Air Defense early warning role, and utilization of these aircraft
for sea counterinfiltration was questionable. On 18 November, COMUSKOREA persisted in the utility of EC-121s in the counterinfiltration surveillance role:

"State of the art of sea detection/identification at best is not good. Realize limitations of COLLEGE EYE in sea surveillance role because of lack of identification capability, i.e., IFF/SFF. However, COLLEGE EYE EC-121 has capability to detect surface objects. This detection capability, coupled with ROKN fighters and C-46 aircraft for identification purposes, would improve probability of detection/identification far above our present capability. With proper control and coordination, COLLEGE EYE aircraft can measurably improve our total sea surveillance system."

COMUSKOREA advised that North Korea also had the capability of utilizing light transport aircraft in a low level para-drop role, that could conceivably enter the ROK through sea approaches with a very low probability of detection. Detection of extremely low flying aircraft over the northeast and northwest approaches to the ROK was of "concern in view of North Korean capability to drop agents into the ROK." Although full period coverage was desirable, coverage during the most likely period of agent infiltration (hours of darkness) was considered the minimum requirement. Navy P-3 and ROKAF C-46 aircraft could help fill the gap during daylight hours.

The Army commander's request for "early deployment" of COLLEGE EYE aircraft resulted in Exercise BIG FISHERMAN. On 24 November 1968, EC-121s were in place at Itazuke AB to participate in the exercise. The exercise
was composed of two phases. Phase I covered the period 26 November - 2 December and was designed to determine the capabilities, limitations, and reliability of the COLLEGE EYE system in surface surveillance and detection. It was also designed to determine the procedures, command, control and communications applicable to conduct an integrated coastal/water interdiction program and to determine the specific role that COLLEGE EYE would play in such a system. The Phase II objective was to conduct and determine the feasibility of an integrated interdiction system in Korea. This phase ran from 3 December through 8 December 1968.

A BIG FISHERMAN critique was held on 7 December, the day prior to the last mission, and attended by representatives of 5AF, 5AF ADVON, 314AD, COMNAVFORK, COMUSKOREA, and COLLEGE EYE. A short debriefing was given by each representative and the many problems brought to light were discussed. It was generally agreed that the EC-121D had a "poor capability to detect and track surface vessels, especially in the Korea environment where the vessels they are concerned about are small (25 to 35 feet long), sometimes wooden hulled and usually travel close to shore near islands or through friendly fishing boats." It was further agreed that the only mission for COLLEGE EYE as far as surface traffic was concerned, would be in a command and control role where the EC-121 would receive plots from other detection agencies, i.e. Navy P-3s and ROK Navy radar ships, and control flare aircraft and strike aircraft to the vicinity for identification and/or destruction. It was emphasized, however, that such a mission in conjunction with an air surveillance mission would divide the COLLEGE EYE efforts and thus
provide perhaps less than would be needed in each area due to limited number of personnel and scopes available.

The following report was made regarding the last mission which was conducted on 8 December:

"COLLEGE EYE was assigned a role of command and control on this mission and experienced the greatest success yet on BIG FISHERMAN. Both fake boats were detected and told to COLLEGE EYE. A ROKAF C-46 flare ship was vectored to the area, illuminated the target and fighters were controlled to the target simulating destruction of same. COLLEGE EYE had control of all aircraft during this mission except for short periods when ROK patrol craft took control for visualvectoring to the target area."

Reiterating that COLLEGE EYE possessed limited, if any, reliable surface detection capability as applied to the Korean coastal interdiction problem, the test crew reported the integrated test of all elements available indicated "the feasibility of establishing procedures/program which can be effective in the interdiction, destruction, capture or repulsion of the North Korean surface infiltration vessels." However, the degree of effectiveness that could be expected from such an integrated system was directly dependent upon the addition of "several facilities/equipments not currently available within Korean forces and deployed U.S. forces." Effectiveness would also depend upon the reorientation of "certain ROKN procedures and invocation by the ROK of certain restrictions to friendly fishing fleet activities." The ROK JCS indicated their intention to take action in support of these latter two items.

Additional facilities/equipments required:

. An airborne command and control capability such as COLLEGE EYE considered essential to the integration of the land,
sea and air elements.

- OSAP aircraft (probably other than the P-3 which was optimized for under surface surveillance and detection rather than surface surveillance and detection) were considered essential for the EW detection and tracking of intruder vessels.

- Organic identification devices for ROKN patrol vessels, such as IFF/SIF were required.

- Air/ground and point-to-point communications to ROKN patrol vessels was necessary.

- Point-to-point communications to all land elements (KNP and ROKA coastal defense units) were required.

- A surface plotting/filter center capability at the 314th AD TACC for coordinated TAC action through the Current Operations section of the TACC was considered essential.

Later, when presenting his concept for a sea barrier in Korea, COMUSKOREA requested that Navy P-2 aircraft be made available immediately for sea detection during "the vital 1969 spring and summer seasons while the initial phase radar sites are being constructed and readied for operations." He envisioned the P-2 aircraft "as the vehicle to provide a much needed in-depth capability." Expeditious deployment of at least eight P-2 aircraft and crews to the ROK for a six month test period was requested.

Regarding this request, CINCPAC advised JCS:

"Deployment of U.S. P-2 aircraft to Korea and possible later provision of these aircraft to the ROCAF are not warranted at this time and should await implementation of the remainder of the sea barrier concept before being further considered. While airborne radar can detect surface craft, the key problem is identification of agent boats, which are disguised as fishing boats..."
from among the hundreds of legitimate fishing boats normally found off South Korea's coast. Such identification is beyond the capability of present airborne search radar. In addition, because of the cluttered radar scope which results from operating an aircraft close to a shoreline, the use of the P-2 as a stopgap substitute for radar sites is not considered practicable."

Aside from the sea infiltration problem, the USAF Commander in Korea identified six AC-47 gunships and 24 OV-10s as being "essential for effective defense of USAF facilities and for reconnaissance missions to be flown by the Tactical Air Control Parties (TACP)." The concept for utilization of these aircraft envisioned one AC-47 stationed at each of the six bases where USAF aircraft were deployed. They would also be used to defend AC&W sites and nearby agent "hot spots".

The OV-10s would be used by the 39 USAF ALO/FAC personnel deployed throughout Korea to the ground forces. At the end of 1968, ALO/FACs were supplied with radio equipped jeeps which hindered mobility and limited reaction time. Also, because of the rugged mountainous terrain in Korea, surface detection of infiltrators was extremely limited; airborne surveillance was considered to be the proper tactic to employ. It was proposed that 18 OV-10s be positioned at five Korean airstrips with the remainder being stationed at Osan for maintenance and necessary FAC training.

It was noted that requirements for the AC-47s could be met by other suitable gunships programmed for PACAF. There had been a long standing requirement for FAC aircraft in support of the TACS in Korea. These aircraft would provide a significant collateral capability in the counterinfiltration
role. In the event OV-10s could not be made available, SAF recommended that 0-2s or 0-1s be considered.

Summary

As of the end of 1968 and early 1969, U.S. officials were still striving for the most effective means to counter North Korean infiltration into the ROK. Despite increased actions taken in 1968 to increase the "barrier" capability, a truly effective mean of countering the infiltration effort, especially by sea, had yet to be implemented. This problem was under constant study.

At CINCUNC's request, the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) conducted an analysis of the counterinfiltration system and made recommendations toward improvement. CINCUNC felt that this study, ARPA Study 1115, indicated a good probability of success in thwarting agent boat landings with an integrated system based upon additional radar sites. The system proposed detecting all boats approaching the beach, identifying the inimical ones, and having sufficient forces to bear to neutralize them promptly before agents could penetrate to the interior. The initial phases of the concept contemplated the construction and activation of integrated surveillance radar sites along the 100 most threatened miles of the East Coast and effecting continuous radar coverage that would block the Haeju approaches on the West Coast to discourage agent landings in these vital areas.

Additional coastal radars would be introduced into the system after
tests and evaluation of the initial increment. This would provide capabilities to detect, identify and neutralize suspected craft. The complete system would require additional ships, patrol craft, aerial surveillance means, coastal radar coverage and an increased and more sophisticated communications system for positive cross-tell among ships, aircraft and coastal radar stations and immediate reporting/response to and from command and control agencies.

The concept for employment of this system was generally as follows:

- A barrier of radar equipped patrol vessels would be maintained south of the DMZ extended off the East and West coasts of the ROK. Patrol vessels would conduct visual and radar search for the purpose of detection and identification. Communication links among ships, maritime patrol aircraft, and coastal command centers would be provided.

- Both coasts of the ROK would be protected by layers of patrols for detection, identification and neutralization of agent boats. From seaward in, these layers included maritime patrol aircraft, barrier patrol ships, coastal boats, radar sites, coast watchers, and quick reaction forces. Overall coordination would be provided by coastal command centers.

- Maritime Patrol Aircraft (P2V), which CINCPAC recommended not be deployed, would supplement C-46 aircraft in the conduct of maritime patrols. Concomitantly, these aircraft could act as an on-the-scene airborne command center.

- Barrier patrol ships and boats in constant communication with maritime patrol aircraft, surface ships, radar sites and command centers would patrol assigned sectors off both coasts. Increased communication capabilities together with extended radar coverage was required.

- Mobile quick reaction forces would, by improved communications, attempt to establish blocking positions on beach exits to deny the enemy easy access to the interior.
Real time advisories would give all command centers immediate knowledge of intrusion attempts and thus improve necessary coordination of effort.

As for the rear and interior areas, CINCUNC stated that the existing concept had proved to be "generally sound," but felt that "substantial increases in material resources, as well as additional counterinfiltration units," were required to strengthen the ROK capability. It was planned to increase the counterinfiltration battalions from 20 to 27 and to provide 10 new ranger battalions. The requirement for these increased forces included possible multiple infiltrations by the North Koreans. The especially organized ranger units would be located in the vicinity of the Taebaek and Chiri mountain areas which were of critical concern to the ROK Government. Increased ground and air mobility would also be required, and there was a need to improve the communications capability of existing units and headquarters and to equip new units.

To further protect isolated and vulnerable areas from infiltrators, the ROK government was taking, inter alia, the following self-help measures to be funded out of the won budget: (1) Relocation of about 15,000 isolated houses (1,600 in 1969 all of which were in the East coast area); (2) Construction of about 350 miles of tactical roads in eleven critical areas; and improvement of communications. In the latter case, FM-5 radios would be given to selected warships, patrol boats, aircraft, combat police units, police boxes along the coast and on the islands, and to coastal watch areas to permit more rapid and continuous communications. The total cost of this program was estimated at nine million dollars.
CINCUNC advised that both ROK and US Air Forces had played important roles in countering infiltration attempts:

"This has been accomplished through the conduct of air surveillance and reconnaissance missions and by maintaining on alert quick reaction fighter forces. Transport aircraft have contributed significantly to night flare operations and ROKAF helicopters proved invaluable in the recent East Coast operation. There has been no evidence of a north Korean attempt to infiltrate the ROK by aerial means. This is a high tribute to the deterrent value of the ROK and US Air Force."

To increase the value of this air support, CINCUNC recommended specific additions and improvements. These included communications and command and control facilities to more closely tie Air Force installations into an integrated counterintelligence network, and armed T-33s plus light observation aircraft and helicopters to improve air support of ground operations. In a requirements study accomplished by CINCUNC at the end of 1968, he also requested that the ten ROKAF F-5s, which had been deleted in the FY69 MAP Program, be restored.

CINCUNC also requested funds for critically needed improvements at Kangnung and Pohang airfields, and voiced concern over the shortage of airfields "which hinders the rapid and effective application of airpower" in counterinfiltration operations. The paucity of airfields on the east coast had adversely effected aerial operations in the past; similarly, the shortage of airfields in the Chiri-San area had hindered air operations in the south. CINCUNC noted that improvements had been made at Kangnung in 1968 and that this base was the center of air operations during the November
east coast infiltration incident. C-46s were assigned at Pohang, and all
facilities at this field were in urgent need of repair or replacement. Work
at Sachon, located just east of the Chiri-Sans, was being initiated under
CIGCOREP I; however, budget limitations precluded completion of the minimum
essential requirements. 

Other material requirements for ROKAF that were identified by CINCUNC
included additional O-1s, mobile communications equipment, airfield hardening,
and additional UH-1Hs. Objectives for USAF and ROKAF participation in
counterinfiltration operations were listed as follows:

. Aerial surveillance to detect, identify and track
infiltrators on the sea.
. Intercept and destroy agent boats designated hostile.
. Aerial surveillance to detect infiltrators operating
in the interior.
. Airlift support for counterinfiltration operations.
. Early warning of aircraft attempting to deliver or
resupply agents by air.
. Aerial operations against designated agents in the
interior.
. Protect existing ROKAF and USAF installations against
guerrilla attack.

In summary, CINCUNC advised that improvements during 1968 made with
the assistance of additional funding had helped considerably to keep north
Korea in check, especially along the DMZ. On the other hand, the Ulchin land-
ings in November 1968 were "ample evidence that the ROK is quite vulnerable
to highly trained, ruthless and determined infiltrators, making a concerted
effort. North Korean capabilities to employ thousands of such personnel
to infiltrate by land, sea and/or air, made imperative the provision of
additional funding for improvement of the ROK counterinfiltration capability.
CHAPTER IV

THE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM

"The surveillance capability of the South Korean Air Defense System is incapable of providing sufficient warning time to establish a maximum alert posture since the radar cannot monitor low altitude (enemy and friendly) aircraft operating over North Korea and along the North Korean/Russian/Chinese border."1/ The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Limitations and Requirements

Limitations imposed by the ground electronic environment and communications system in the ROK were not a new problem. They were long recognized by USAF officials who had recommended corrective action; the Pueblo Incident only served to emphasize the "urgency and criticality" of the situation. The Commander Air Forces Korea (AFK) also noted that as a result of the pressures imposed by the USAF buildup, it now appeared that, under MAP, the ground environment and communications system had been turned over to the ROKAF "before the ROKAF was really ready to take it." This prompted the observation that when complicated systems and equipment were released to emerging nations, it "might be advantageous ... to include recapture agreements in case of major deployments or emergencies" into these countries. This would allow the U.S. forces to immediately participate in management, maintenance and supply by a directive rather than on a cooperative basis.2/

The Korean Air Defense Sector (KADS) was part of the WESTPACNORTH Air Defense Region, which was the responsibility of the 5AF Commander. There
were four other sectors in WESTPACNORTH -- three in Japan and one in Okinawa. In addition to three land based systems -- Japan, Okinawa, and Korea, the air defense capabilities of the 7th Fleet were integrated into the region when these forces were transiting the area. In Korea, the command and control system, including the radar facilities, was owned and operated by the ROKAF. The Air Forces Korea Commander exercised operational control of these forces; however, ROKAF exercised some unilateral prerogatives. In Japan, the radar facilities and interceptor aircraft were operated by the Japan Air Self Defense Forces (JASDF). The USAF did not control the JASDF forces in any way, but did function within the JASDF system to satisfy 5AF operational requirements. Only in Okinawa was the air defense system totally under the control of U.S. forces.

Although there were limitations in the Okinawa system, it was considered to be "a viable, well-trained and dependable" segment of WESTPACNORTH. Limitations included "the small allocation of 18 F-102s for air defense and the problem of maintaining the proficiency and training of 40 weapons controllers with the limited number of sorties available." In addition, the system was a pure manual environment which, although flexible, had severe limitations, in that the destruction of one site could destroy a fair percentage of the effectiveness of the entire system. Nevertheless, USAF officials considered that this segment of WESTPACNORTH could be depended upon for the effective air defense of its area of responsibility "within the limitations inherent to our available force and the vulnerability of sites to low level attacks."

The system in Japan consisted of 24 radar sites, three control centers
and the combat operations center at Fuchu Air Station. All the equipment and physical facilities of an automated system were in place; however, JASDF had not transitioned to an automated mode of operation. They were conducting an extensive follow-on test and training program, and anticipated going to an automated operation late in 1969 or early 1970. They planned to retain a capability to operate the manual system for an indefinite time.

Responsibility for the air defense of Japan was jointly shared by the U.S. and JASDF. The great majority of the equipment, weapons and personnel allocated to the air defense function were provided by JASDF. JASDF operated and maintained the radars, and controlled the interceptors and Hawk and Nike missiles. Lt. Col. Lester B. Goldberg, SAF Chief, Air Defense Division, explained the USAF function within the Japan system:

"At the present time we have a small complement of personnel assigned to key facilities within the Japanese system. These people, numbering approximately 100, are assigned to six direction centers, three control centers and the Fuchu COC. We have no USAF interceptors standing air defense alert. Our F-4 aircraft have an air defense capability and can be used for air defense purposes; however, they are committed to an offensive role. When and if they are utilized in a defense role, commitment and operational control would be exercised by General McGehee [SAF Commander], but they would be directed by JASDF weapons controllers."

For the most part, the air defense system in Japan was considered satisfactory, but there were some problems. The biggest problem was that, due to political restraints, there was a reluctance on the part of JASDF to pursue or "even acknowledge a working relationship" with the other sectors
in the region. The lateral tell of air defense information from one sector to another was restricted, and any semblance of region-type operation was due to the efforts of the U.S. personnel involved in the system. Also due to political considerations, JASDF would not aggressively prosecute intruders of their air defense identification zone. They would not intercept an intruder any further than 60 to 80 miles from the Japan coast. Lt. Col. Goldberg explained, "We are now using USAF interceptors based in Korea to intercept those intruders the Japanese won't intercept with their own aircraft." 

It was further noted that the U.S. air defense forces had been acting as catalytic agents in an attempt to improve working relations between ROKAF and JASDF and totally integrate the defense system. The use of Korean based USAF interceptors was part of this program. A concept was being developed wherein ROKAF interceptors would be controlled by the JASDF radar sites and then land at JASDF bases for refueling before returning to their home station in Korea.

The air defense system in Korea was described as "the antithesis of Okinawa since its capabilities are few and its limitations many." Although the ROKAF Aircraft Control and Warning (AC&W) System was purely air defense oriented prior to the Pueblo Incident, its coverage and capabilities were severely limited in relation to the threat. Criticality of this system's limitations became more pronounced with the influx of a USAF air defense fighter force into Korea. Prior to the Pueblo buildup, the USAF did not
possess and maintain any air defense aircraft in Korea. The air defense capability was provided solely by ROKAF F-5 and F-86 aircraft. In addition to the USAF air defense deployment into Korea, the influx of combat strike aircraft in a tactical air configuration impacted on the system.

Due in part to the large influx of combat strike aircraft, the Korean AC&W system became the AC&W element of the Tactical Air Control System (TACS). The Air Defense Command Center (ADCC) at Osan AB assumed the primary function of a Tactical Air Control Center (TACC). The radar sites acquired additional missions such as controlling air weapons on offensive missions, coordinating and controlling air rescue activities, coordinating control activities for close air support and directing air to air refueling. In addition to other tactical air oriented systems, TSQ-81 COMBAT SKY SPOT units were deployed to Korea and integrated into the total system.

Post-Pueblo, the Korean AC&W system was now composed of a Tactical Air Control Center, two Control Reporting Centers (CRC), and six Control Reporting Posts (CRP). The system now functioned dually as the Korean Air Defense System (KADS), which was divided into two subsectors. Mangil San was the CRC for the northern subsector, with three CRPs at Yongmunsan, Kangnung, and Pang Yang Do. The southern subsector CRC was at Palgong San and the CRPs were at Uisong Bong, Irwol San, and Cheju Do. These radar sites comprised the basic eyes and ears of the KADS. The U.S. and ROK Army SAM systems supplemented the AC&W system for air defense. There were two Hercules
battalions, one U.S. and one ROK, and six Hawk battalions, four U.S. and two ROK. Elements of the Army SAM direction system were collocated at each CRC.

One immediate problem that presented itself was the lack of USAF Weapons Controllers in the system. The concept had been that the host nation's Weapons Controllers would direct USAF aircraft, but operational control would always remain with USAF. With the advent of the Pueblo incident, a requirement existed to provide USAF control for specified missions and intercepts and to preclude violations of the DMZ. ROKAF allocated one PPI scope at each site for sole use of USAF controllers and one scope for joint USAF/ROKAF use for training missions. No combat ready weapons controllers existed in Korea, since the original concept called for the use of ROKAF controllers. As an interim measure, 20 weapons controllers and 24 intercept control technicians were provided TDY from Okinawa. Manning was later provided to Korea, and a training school was established at Naha to upgrade Korean assigned weapons controllers to combat ready status.

Lt. Col. Goldberg commented in August 1968 on the overall problems in the Korean system:

"The existing communications system was marginally capable of supporting the defense mission, and is currently incapable of supporting the expanded mission encompassing the total tactical air control system requirements. Communications spare parts are a major problem, and the ROKAF maintenance and supply practices leave much to be desired. The air defense experience level of assigned USAF personnel is extremely low, as recently demonstrated by some questionable air defense tactical decisions during
both exercises and active air defense. Operational control of ROKAF, although vested in COMAFK, has on occasion been abrogated by ROKAF, who have acted on their own initiative. Radar low level coverage is another recognized limiting factor. The capability of this portion of the region to carry out its assigned air defense mission is questionable."

Modernization of the Korea system had made some progress under MAP. The eight radar sites were modernized and re-equipped as a result of three MAP-funded programs -- ROCKTOP, TOP LEVEL and Perimeter Site Modernization. All sites had dual channel FPS-100 search radars, with the exception of Kangnung and Cheju-Do, which had the dual channel GPS-4, and FPS-89 height finders. Additionally, the Korean communication system was improved by the addition of a new micro-wave system called BLUE FORTUNE. This MAP funded system was installed primarily to tie in the new radar sites. Despite this improvement, the communications capability in Korea was determined to be incapable of handling the increased command and control requirements associated with the USAF force build-up. Tactical Mobile Communications Systems were deployed to Korea, but the system was still inadequate from the standpoint of reliable air defense communications. Command/control communications were a major problem associated with the USAF buildup. In May, Hq 5AF advised:

"Concur in the concern over the lack of highly reliable command/control communications in Korea. All concerned undoubtedly recognize that the USAF, prior to the Pueblo Incident, had virtually no interbase communications facilities in Korea. The U.S. Army has had the responsibility for all long lines communications in Korea and the ROKAF has been providing their own air defense communications network. Since the Pueblo Incident, USAF has deployed a large quantity of mobile
tactical communications equipment into Korea to provide for emergency command/control requirements. However, even this effort has been limited due to the requirement that we locate mobile communications assets on existing real estate. Our efforts have been, and will continue to be, directed toward improving the ROKAF and Army communications so that deployed mobile communications assets can be released."

While action was expedited to improve the interim air defense capabilities, the major concern was to provide permanent improvements for systems capability and reliability. For instance, the capability of both search and height finder radars to counter a jamming threat was limited. Consequently, ECCM devices were recommended for installation. These were being programmed wherever security classification of the equipment did not prevent release to foreign governments.

Another problem was that serious deficiencies existed in the radar coverage on the low level approaches from the North. Especially needed was low-level radar coverage of the approach routes to the Seoul area, as the Capitol City and the military installations in the area were prime enemy targets. Other gap filler requirements were determined to be better coverage to prevent DMZ overflights and better monitoring of the air-to-ground range operations.

To meet the need for low-level coverage, the Air Force Advisory Group (AFAG) submitted requirements for gap filler radar and simultaneously directed a test of the only available gap filler type radar in-country, the AN/TPS-1D. In March 1968, ROKAF deployed a TPS-1D to the Han Estuary area and performed a flight-check. This three-week test proved that the
TPS-1D was unsatisfactory for low-level coverage and a gap filler role. Peaked to its specifications, the TPS-1D presented too much ground clutter to be effective.

AFAG also coordinated a test using the Hawk CW and pulse acquisition radars. Both provided minimal low-level coverage, mainly because they were sited for missile firing and short-range target acquisition. Additionally, the use of Hawk CW radars as a gap filler would deprive an entire Hawk battalion of its low-level capability, thereby degrading the Hawk mission.

Another consideration was the ROK Navy STS-53 X-band radars, which were being used primarily to detect boats. Maximum range of these radars was 30 miles and, by ROKN policy, were set on a ten mile range. They normally provided approximately a seven mile surface search detection capability. These were not considered adequate for the gap filler role and if turned to any other use would deprive the ROK Navy of this specific mission capability.

Subsequently, two surveys and one field test using an UPS-1 radar were conducted. As a result of the surveys, optimum site locations were determined and studies were being conducted of availability and supportability of these sites. Also, site locations were determined on the basis of theoretical surveys; only one site was evaluated using an actual radar set. A meeting was held in February 1969 to examine the overall problem of site selection, determination of available gap filler radars, and O&M
requirements with ROKAF. As a result, operations would continue at one site with the UPS-1 with a request for additional sets forward to higher headquarters.

COLLEGE EYE Requirement

In consonance with the Korea build-up, immediate consideration was given to diverting a portion of the EC-121 COLLEGE EYE Task Force from Taiwan to Korea. This consideration was based on support required for "possible" air operations against North Korea. The decision was made against COLLEGE EYE deployment, with the understanding that "should strikes in North Korea begin on a regular basis, we anticipate a request for diversion of two EC-121s to provide coverage." This initial estimate also discounted the requirement for COLLEGE EYE aircraft in an air defense role because a "review of ground based radar coverage reveals satisfactory radar surveillance capability for air defense purposes." Experience showed that the opposite was the case -- that radar surveillance was not "satisfactory," and the COLLEGE EYE support might well be required.

In May, a short test of the COLLEGE EYE/RIVET GYM capability was conducted in Korea, resulting in "extremely successful indications." Based on these results, a justification was submitted for a full 24 hour capability. In the proposed concept of operations for COLLEGE EYE in the Korean environment, 5AF noted that the EC-121 could be positioned at low altitudes and
to provide low level coverage for an anticipated low-low-low profile by North Korean MIGs approaching from the Haeju Peninsula area. A primary consideration was that COLLEGE EYE could provide an augmentation capability in the event that radar coverage was lost in the damage or destruction of Pang Yang Do, which was located in the "shadow" of communist guns.

Indications were that the radar site at Pang Yang Do would be attacked by guns on Walli-Do in conjunction with or just prior to any attack launched by North Korea. Since the guns on Walli-do had been "zeroed-in" on the site since the end of the Korean conflict, it had long been anticipated that the site would be severely damaged or totally destroyed within the first five minutes of any attack. The loss of Pang Yang Do would deprive the Korean Air Defense System of much of its early warning capability to the north and northeast. In addition to the radar replacement capability, the full complement of three weapons controllers on board the EC-121 would provide a replacement control capability for that lost on Pang Yang Do.

Other points made in the conceptual plan for the EC-121s:

- The RIVET GYM capability would provide a bonus source of early warning, in addition to providing warning for offensive forces.
- The EIFF capability would provide a continuous source of warning of intended intercept of offensive forces.
- The EC-121 would provide an interim command and control capability if Osan and the CRC at Mangil-san were damaged/destroyed.
It would be desirable to implement 24 hour COLLEGE EYE employment prior to hostilities, but considering prior commitments and the lack of resources, an 8-10 hour coverage would be acceptable as an interim measure.

The EC-121 would be extremely vulnerable to attack, therefore, once it provided the early warning on an attack, it would turn south, head for an over water area south of Kunsan AB, but continue to feed radar information gained from its backward looking electronic equipment.

CINCPACAF approved additional tests of COLLEGE EYE in Korea. Subsequently, a ten day test was conducted to determine the most ideal areas for the orbit, the coverage desired and that which could be provided, the adequacy of existing communications, command and control tests, the handover and control of interceptors, to include handover of close air support sorties to FAC's and return of control to COLLEGE EYE, and use of the airborne early warning aircraft as a radio relay. Following this test, the SAF Director of Operations advised that "COLLEGE EYE control added a much needed flexibility and increased coverage essential in Korea."

In November 1968, CINCPAC validated the PACAF requirement for seven EC-121D/T aircraft for Korea, based primarily on the contribution that these aircraft would make to the overall air defense system. Specifically, COLLEGE EYE would provide greater low-level radar coverage, increased range of surveillance, and a viable command and control platform. When used in conjunction with the RIVET GYM mod, it would provide a more significant early warning capability by itself than being realized from COMMANDO ROYAL. Additionally, the inherent command and control capabilities could
be utilized to integrate the land, sea and air elements of the Korean
Integrated Coastal Interdiction System. As of the end of the year, JCS had not replied to this requirement.

Naval Operations in the Sea of Japan

With the deployment of the U.S. Navy flotilla into the Sea of Japan during the Korean crisis, the air activity in the JASDF Air Defense Intercept Zone (ADIZ) more than doubled. This increase resulted in a rash of unnecessary scrambles of JASDF interceptor aircraft. On 23 January 1968, 510 tracks were detected, and this figure rose to a high of 1,057 on 12 February. Tracks classified as unknown were at a low of seven on 23 January and rose to a peak of 145 on 7 February. The largest proportion of these unknowns were subsequently identified as USN. Most of the unknowns resulted from no IFF, faulty IFF, incorrect IFF code, or a failure on the part of the USN to adhere to normal air defense cross-tell procedures.

In an effort to alleviate this unacceptable situation, a meeting was held at Osan on 14 February 1968 between 5AF air defense representatives and USN personnel. A new set of procedures was established and the Navy published new operating instructions for their pilots. As a result, there was a drastic reduction in the number of unknowns and unnecessary scrambles of JASDF interceptors.

CINCPACFLT reported on 14 July:
"...difficulties were encountered in establishing communications on the air defense liaison net and therefore the air defense information net was not utilized as intended. Instead, crosstall of air defense information between Navy units and Fifth Air Force, Osan, was passed via the commando escort net normally utilized as an Air Force command and control circuit. Further investigation indicates that there is a requirement to modify present procedures and circuit utilization in order to have the capability to rapidly establish communications between PACAF/PACFLT units and pass timely air defense information, especially in the Korean area in which Navy units are now periodically committed."

A PACAF Air Defense Study noted that communications designated for use to interface the land based and sea based air defense systems were totally inadequate and unreliable. Although noting the reliability of command and control HF Single Side Band circuits which were used as a substitute, the study also listed shortcomings. The land based terminals available were located only at major communications facilities. To establish communications between tactical forces, traffic had to be passed verbally through various centers or excessive patching had to take place throughout the land system. As a result the timeliness of the tactical information was marginal to inadequate in most cases. It was recommended:

"In view of the poor quality of communications available, efforts should be made to provide HF SB communications facilities at the various land-based air defense facilities which are positioned to have duplicate coverage with Naval Forces and/or which will direct fighters against threats in the area of duplicate coverage. This will permit Air Force and Naval tactical units to exchange critical air defense information at a rate compatible with reaction times required. The Japanese
Self Defense System surveillance coverage also overlaps that of Naval units in the Sea of Japan and the Japanese Systems should also be included in the net to ensure crosstalk with Naval units in that area. The Japanese systems should be adequately informed as to action anticipated being taken by U.S./South Korean forces against targets which are detected by the systems in Japan, the Sea of Japan and in South Korea to preclude duplicate action or action against friendly forces by forces in Japan."

Efforts were underway to improve this situation. In this regard, a conference was held at Clark AB, the Philippines on 9-11 December to formulate operational procedures and equipment recommendations to improve the existing Air Force - Navy cross tell net. 5AF, 13AF and 7th Fleet were represented at the conference. During the same month, AFR 23-5 action was taken to provide contingency HF radio assets at net stations in Korea, Japan, Okinawa, Taipei and the Philippines. An interim capability was expected to be achieved in early 1969.

WESTPACNORTH Interface Program

The WESTPACNORTH Interface Program was designed to provide a digital interface to allow the automatic, computerized exchange of air defense data between the JASDF automatic system, the U.S. Navy system, and the USAF 418L system that was programmed for Okinawa. It also contained provisions for interfacing the manual Korea AC&W system. The program was placed in motion in February 1966, when DOD approval was given and funds were made available. USAF was designated as the executive agent and program acquisition and management was turned over to the Electronic Systems Division of Air Force Systems Command (AFSC).
In August 1966, DOD approved the system's concept of operations as submitted by JCS and CINCPAC. The program progressed through the initial design stage, and all formal system documentation was published. One year later, however, the JCS approved a recommendation by the Chief of Naval Operations, that program implementation be suspended pending a cost effectiveness review, and in September 1967, DOD placed a hold status on program fund obligation authority. One portion of the program, involving additions and modifications to the JASDF automated system, jointly funded by USAF and JASDF, proceeded on schedule.

Supporting the USN contention that there was no requirement for a digital interface, the JCS recommended in January 1968 that the program concept be revised to substitute a voice/teletype interface between the JASDF and USN systems. Trouble developed in the 418L program during this period in that MCP funds were deferred, and in April 1968, default action was taken against the 418L contractor for non-performance. This, in effect, eliminated the requirement for the JASDF/Okinawa link of the interface program. A long, involved study of the interface requirement followed.

On the basis of the operational need for the system and a moral obligation on the part of the U.S. Government stemming from contractual agreements with the Japanese Government, a new limited program was approved by JCS in August 1968. This new program called for one, universal transportable buffer in lieu of the four buffer stations of the original program. In
November 1968, DOD approved the new concept and funding.

An initial operational capability was now tentatively scheduled for the first quarter of 1971. USAF was again designated as the executive agent and was tasked to develop an interface design plan. The USN was tasked to develop, design, program, build and test the universal buffer. USAF also was assigned the responsibility of operating and maintaining the buffer after accepting it from the Navy. This was a change from the original program concept which required the Navy to operate and maintain the four buffer stations. The buffer would have a capability to interface any eventual automated system that might be deployed in Korea and Okinawa.

Summary

The WESTPACNORTH Air Defense Region, especially the Korean sector, was under close scrutiny following the USAF force build-up in early 1968. Prior to 1968, the air defense systems in WESTPACNORTH, especially the KADS, provided a capability far less than desirable. Following the force build-up, system deficiencies became even more critical, and their resolution more urgent. Exhaustive study and effort were undertaken by USAF officials not only to improve the existing capability within Korea, Japan and Okinawa, but to provide adequate interface with USN forces who undoubtedly would be operating in the Sea of Japan in the event of a conflict between North Korea and the ROK.

A PACAF Air Defense Study conducted in April 1968 identified the "most
prominent features of the air defense problem in Korea as being:

. Bases for enemy aircraft are very close to the targets being defended by the U.S./ROK system.
. Low-altitude strike penetrations to mask an attack are probable.
. Early warning can be very short, on the order of 5 minutes under a surprise attack.
. The North Koreans have over 500 aircraft and could be augmented by Chinese Communist aircraft.

The study concluded that the ROK did not enjoy the advantages of a defense in depth -- even for the southern region, because of the sea approaches. The defense system itself was vulnerable. There were only a limited number of GCI sites. They were identifiable and attackable. Control centers could be attacked. The location of the ADCC/TACC at Osan AB, for instance, was likely known to North Korean Intelligence and was easily identified from the air. Also, the missile sites could be attacked, at a price, either for general degradation of the defenses or specifically to push through a corridor, as would be possible at Kunsan or Kwangju.

To further illustrate the marginal aspects of the ROK air defense system, the study noted:

"On a low-low-high profile operating from Wonsan and Kwang-ju Air Bases, MIG-17s armed with a gun only can attack air bases as far south as Osan. The low-low-low profiles which may be required to survive the US/ROK missile defense environment are appreciably shortened, but still cover large portions of the peninsula. From the standpoint of potential weight of attack, the northern sector is
clearly in greatest jeopardy, but the southern one can also be reached by appreciable numbers of IL-28s.

"US/ROK defenses are also concentrated most heavily in the area of Seoul/Suwon/Osan complex and northward to the DMZ. The air bases to the south are all covered by one or more missile sites, but the coverage is thin. In terms of broad geographical area considerations, there are obvious gaps in the defense umbrella in the approaches to various important targets. Un-defended low-altitude corridors are available to enemy air for penetrating existing defenses in the Korea Air Defense Sector (KADS)."

A highly critical area was communications deficiencies, which USAF officials were attempting to rectify. The April PACAF study noted that in some cases, USAF aircraft that were on a 5-minute alert status lacked the necessary communications to scramble them. USAF interceptor units, due to the shortage of ramp space for aircraft, could not be collocated with the existing ROKAF interceptor squadron. Consequently, the in-place ROKAF scramble circuits terminated at the Wing Operations Center and were not available for use by the USAF forces.

In May 1968, of the 150 USAF and 170 ROKAF fighters assigned to Korea, 78 were assigned to air defense during daylight hours and 42 at night. The main USAF air defense force consisted of 18 F-106s and 13 F-102s. These aircraft were "excellent against bomber forces attacking under either night/all-weather conditions or in daylight conditions," but possessed "a lesser capability against enemy fighters -- especially those ingressing at low altitudes, due to reliance on fire control systems for optimum armament delivery and lack of a close-in armament delivery capability
against maneuvering targets." The best all-around air defense capability in Korea was considered to be possessed by the F-4s equipped with gun pods, as these aircraft "have both a night/all-weather capability plus a day close-in counter-fighter capability." There were four F-4s committed to air defense at night and 16 during day-light hours. The remainder of the 78 fighters assigned to Korean Air Defense during daylight hours -- F-5s and F-86s -- had a close-in counter-fighter capability.

On 23 May 1968, Hq PACAF officials noted that the number of fighters in Korea that could be assigned to air defense were adequate considering the limited capability of the AC&W system for close control, but that the type of air defense interceptors assigned to Korea was not optimum in the case of the F-106s/F-102s. The following recommendation was made:

"Requirements, due to the threat, are for a fighter equipped with both night/all weather defensive capability plus a day close-in armament counter-fighter capability. Assigned F-106s/F-102s have the former but not the latter. F-4s equipped with gun pods have both and consequently have the best all-around defensive capability in Korea.

"Recommend that present number of air defense fighters be retained in Korea but that the 18 F-102s and 18 F-106s be replaced at the earliest opportunity. Suggested types of replacement aircraft are either the F-4E or F-106 with internal gun installation."

This recommendation was based on the fact that "the present state of the art" in delivering conventional ordnance under night/all weather
**AIR DEFENSE**
*(FRESH STORM)*

**AIRBASE** | **5 MIN** | **15 MIN** | **30 MIN** | **60 MIN**
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
| **DAY NT** | **DAY NT** | **DAY NT** | **DAY NT** |

| OSAN | F-106 4 | F-106 8 | |
| KWANG JU | F-5 4 | F-5 4 | F-86F 6 |
| | F-86F 2 | F-86F 2 | |
| SUWON | F-102 2 | F-102 2 | F-86D 6 |
| | F-5 2 | F-5 4 | F-86D 4 |
| | F-86D 4 | F-86D 2 | |
| KUNSAN | F-86F 2 | F-100 8 | F-86F |
| KIMPO | F-86F 2 | F-86F 4 | F-86F 8 |

**FIGURE 12**
### USA
**HAWK BATTALIONS (4)**
- (16 BTRY)
- (36 MSL PER BTRY)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Normal</th>
<th>0445-0845</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 MIN</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 MIN</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 MIN</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### USA
**NIKE-HERCULES BATTALIONS (1)**
- (6 BTRY)
- (18 MSL PER BTRY)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Normal</th>
<th>0445-0845</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 MIN</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 MIN</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 MIN</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### ROKA
**HAWK BATTALIONS (1)**
- (8 BTRY)
- (36 MSL PER BTRY)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Normal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 MIN</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 MIN</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 MIN</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### ROKA
**NIKE-HERCULES BATTALIONS (1)**
- (4 BTRY)
- (18 MSL PER BTRY)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Normal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 MIN</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 MIN</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 MIN</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 13**
AIR DEFENSE MISSILE COVERAGE

HERCULES — HAWK

SEOL
OSAN
KUNSAN
KWANG-NU
TAEGU

SECRET—NOFORN
attack conditions was such that attacks of this nature did not constitute the main threat. The PACAF Air Defense Study indicated that the most likely attack would be a mass low level daylight attack against airfields, integrated so as to provide minimum warning time. Tactical warning of either five to eight minutes, or 15 to 20 minutes was expected depending on enemy performance and ROK AC&W system reaction.
"An acute shortage of FAC aircraft in SEA prevents the development of an airborne FAC capability for Korea from within current PACAF resources. Should hostilities resume in Korea, USAF close air support would be seriously degraded by the present lack of airborne vehicles for control." 


TACS Improvement

Prior to the Pueblo Incident, the control system in Korea was primarily oriented toward air defense. The Tactical Air Control System (TACS) "took second place and as a result was not as effective as it should have been." Concurrent with the USAF buildup, higher command interest in the TACS was generated and planning, execution and briefings on CAS, Interdiction, Reconnaissance, Airlift, and Rescue operations were exercised daily. Communications system and frag order distribution was improved. Commanders at all levels began placing greater emphasis on the importance of the TACS. Army units were familiarized with air request nets. Indoctrination and aircraft recognition training was accomplished. MDCs/DCs were trained to be better capable of executing CRC/CRP functions. 

As noted by the Air Forces Korea Commander, "the philosophy of force employment had been changing toward a tactical role, but the revision and related elements such as organization, communications, manning, training, etc. was lagging behind." "There existed a dire need of a more rapid..."
change to a Tactical Air Control System," he recalled. The offensive requirements associated with the threat and the force buildup provided the necessary impetus for rapid change. Concerted efforts were immediately focused in changing the concept of operations, operational procedures, organization, and manning requirements to that of a TACS.

During February and March 1968, extensive renovation was completed which collocated the ADCC and the TACC. Internal communications were improved and personnel were selected to man the facility. In April, an intensive effort was devoted to developing a combat ready TACC. Another action taken to enhance the TACS involved placing Tactical Air Control Parties (TACP) with Army units in the field. The Air Forces Korea Commander described the situation prior to the force buildup:

"The few USAF ALO/PAC teams permanently assigned in the Republic of Korea were centrally based at Osan. The bulk of the close air support for the U.S. and ROK Army units is conducted in the northern section of South Korea, therefore the DASC, FAC, or ALO had to deploy during exercises or contingency operations. Due to the road conditions in Korea deployment time was excessive. The time required for a TACP to deploy to the area of operation was 3 to 5 hours and DASC deployment, to be operational, was one day and sometimes two. Due to the frequency of CAS exercises FACs were spending a good portion of their time on the road. Much of this time could have been more effectively used to perform their assigned mission. CAS missions attacked the same targets daily."

To correct this situation, the 2nd and 4th Direct Air Support Flights (DASF) were collocated with the U.S. I Corps and the 1st ROK Army
(FROKA) respectively. Forward Air Controllers (FACs) were permanently assigned to Army units thereby reducing deployment time to a minimum. The end result was that "the entire TACS is 100% more effective because wasted effort is reduced to a minimum, and Army units are more knowledgeable and have more confidence in the tactical air resources available to them." With the TACP permanently assigned in the forward area, air support could be conducted in a realistic environment and in an area which would be familiar to aircrews in the event of hostilities.

The 4th DASF deployed to the FROKA headquarters became the FROKA Direct Air Support Center (DASC). As of May 1968, there were fifteen TACPs deployed to the various Corps and Divisions of the 1st ROK Army. There were 22 officers and 33 airmen assigned to the DASC and TACPs. The DASC was physically located in a large bunker that housed the complete Tactical Operations Center (TOC) in the event of hostilities. A 5AF survey team report, 6-16 May 1968, included the following findings:

- Initially, USAF personnel had to continually request close air support targets. ROK Army personnel now have a much better understanding of the system and the correct procedures for requesting close air support. They take an active part in submitting requests for both preplanned and immediate missions which keeps all elements of the system functioning daily.

- ROKAF details pilots to the FROKA for FAC training. These pilots are assigned to each of the Corps for a two to four week period. Under the close supervision of a USAF ALO/FAC, they learn how to use the equipment and direct close air support missions of both
TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM

- FROKA
- DASC
- AIR BASES
- ALO'S
- TACP'S

- CRC
- 3 CRP'S

- CRC
- 3 CRP'S

- I CORPS
- DASC
- AIR BASES
- ALO'S
- TACP'S

AADCP

FIGURE 15
ROKAF and USAF fighters, and call in the bomb damage assessment and, when required, call the information to the DASC for immediate scrambles.

The DASC had initiated a program with the ROK Army to fly USAF FACs in the back seat of the ROKA O-1s. The FAC carried a PRC-41 radio for communications with the fighters.

The 2nd DASF deployed to the I Corps headquarters at Uijongbu became the I Corps DASC. This DASC controlled 26 TACPs which were deployed with the various I Corps units. The majority of these TACPs were assigned to the U.S. Second Division, which was deployed along the DMZ. Thirty-four officers and 53 airmen were assigned to the DASC and TACPs. The DASC was located in back-to-back Army 292 vans and was positioned adjacent to the TOC. 5AF survey team findings on this DASC included:

- The 292 vans were wired for the TRC-97, HF, and UHF communications. Mobility capability was excellent as the wiring could be disconnected, equipment stored and the vans ready for deployment within 30 minutes.
- The primary area of training was devoted to the education of the Army on the principles of the TACS. This was a continual process because of the rapid turnover of personnel in Korea.

FAC Aircraft Requirement

Control of tactical air support in Korea was seriously impaired by the lack of FAC aircraft for the use of Forward Air Controllers. The TACPs were currently utilizing radio jeeps for control purposes, but adequate control depended upon airborne FACs. In Korea, much of the terrain is not accessible by ground vehicles, and large portions of the country, including
parts of the DMZ front line area, were unobserved for long periods of time.

A lesson was revealed during the Korean conflict that the Korean topography somewhat limited the effectiveness as well as the life expectancy of ground vehicular equipped FACs. A solution at that time was the field development of the airborne FAC utilizing the T-6 aircraft to supplement the ground FACs. This lesson was still valid, but there were no mission aircraft assigned or available to the FACs. The ROKAF was equipped with 12 0-1As and 23 T-28s which had a secondary mission as FAC aircraft in the event of hostilities. These aircraft were old but were used in the ROKAF pilot training and would require modifications to include marking rockets, UHF Radio, and FM Radio installation prior to their effective application in the FAC role.

Hq PACAF submitted a requirement for a squadron of FAC aircraft for Korea. This would permit:

- Forward area surveillance without regard to terrain.
- Realistic exercise of TACS elements in the forward area with associated ground force units.
- Immediate and effective response in the event of hostilities.
- Theater checkout and initial training in the rear area.

The Communications System

To satisfy the immediate increased requirements of the TACS, tactical
communications assets were deployed from the Philippines. Although these assets allowed responsiveness to many additional air requirements, the TACS was still "saturated" and there were "still many minimum essential communications requirements that were not satisfied." The 5AF survey noted that the major limiting factor in the TACS was "the lack of redundancy and reliability in tactical communications." This problem was recognized by all concerned, and plans were developed to improve overall communications reliability and efficiency.

Status of improvements were as follows:

1. The BLUE FORTUNE Phase I expansion was approved, and would provide 56 additional circuits within six months of the contract award date.

2. The Korean Wideband Network was prepared at DCA with assistance from COMUSKOREA, for submission to DOD by the Army for approval of FY 70 funds. If approved, this would provide an additional interim upgrade/expansion of the ROKAF BLUE FORTUNE system by July 1970, and ultimately reliable DCS communications support from the Korean Wideband Network by November 1971.

3. Requirements were submitted for an upgrade and expanded tactical communications system to satisfy minimum essential communications until satisfactory support could be realized from the Korean Wideband Network.

There was also a requirement for improvement in base communications support for the TACC and its supporting elements. By the end of 1968, all major requirements for the TACC were identified, with GEEIA engineering assistance provided in selecting equipment and allied support/construction.
Command and Control would be provided through a voice switch for the TACC; both dedicated and administrative lines would be controlled from positions in the TACC operations area, using call director units. HF/SSB would be provided for both primary and back-up capability for the two DASCs and for cross-tell, plot-tell and forward-tell nets. An air/ground capability would be provided at the CRCs, CRPs and the TACC in support of an airborne AC&W environment. Secure teletype would link all key elements of the TACS on 100 WPM circuits. The hub of this system would be located at the TACC; CRCs, CRPs, TUOCs, DASCs and out-of-country headquarters would be tributaries of this central control facility.

ROKAF Role in the TACS

ROKAF maintained an extremely limited capability to support a tactical air support system. They were operating an Air Ground Operations System (AGOS) School which provided instruction and orientation in tactical air control subjects, with pilot graduates of AGOS participating in field exercises with the ROK Army for two weeks. The remainder of the TACS to include ALOs, DASC, and necessary equipment was totally lacking. The Air Forces Korea Commander noted that the ROKAF pilots were controlling fighter aircraft in the CAS role using "ROK Army Korean conflict vintage jeeps and ARC-30 radio equipment." Also, ROKAF was short of pilots, and if hostilities were to begin, most pilots would be needed in the cockpit leaving few available for FAC duties.

Building an in-depth capability within ROKAF for tactical air support
of ROK Army forces was far more desirable than continuing to provide a USAF capability in this critical area. While USAF support would be provided to U.S. Army forces under combat conditions, support of ground operations in the ROK Army area was primarily a ROKAF mission. The subject of enhancing the role that ROKAF played in the CAS aspect of the TACS had been under coordination for some time. The force build-up, following the Blue House/Pueblo Incidents, highlighted the need for serious and immediate consideration of developing this control capability in ROKAF.

A requirement was identified for the ROKAF to develop a complete system "up to at least the DASC at FROKA." This DASC would be tied into the Direct Air Support Squadron at Osan, and the TACC. In April 1968, ROKAF obtained 162 manpower spaces from ROKA to meet this requirement. The problem now was to develop a plan that would allow ROKAF within available MAP funding and personnel allowance to develop an effective TACS.

In accordance with the Air Forces Korea Commander's guidance, the 6146th AF Advisory Group engaged in joint planning with ROKAF to define equipment and manning requirements for the TACS role. The concept of operations envisioned ROKAF building its TACS capabilities in three phases, which would phaseout the USAF TACPs in FROKA. ROKAF had taken steps to expand their AGOS School and had readied plans for a permanent TACS to be implemented when assured that the system would receive the necessary equipment.
Summary

While a concerted post-Pueblo effort was made to improve the Korea TACS, many factors, such as personnel, equipment, and financial restrictions, inhibited the attainment of a fully operational TACS which was sufficiently sophisticated in its control function and which had reasonable survival expectancy in combat. The ROKAF radars were exposed and subject to destruction through enemy action and had maintenance deficiencies and operational inadequacies. An urgent requirement existed for the immediate establishment of an alternate TACC in the Taegu area to back up the highly vulnerable TACC facility at Osan. Also, the entire communication network, which supported the TACS environment, needed enhanced dependability through alternate routing redundancy. These and other requirements continued to receive command attention during 1969.
CHAPTER VI
RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE

"Basic concept ... embraces areas of reconnaissance surveillance which have traditionally and effectively been accomplished by other services. It is recognized, however, that the largest share of collection capability lies within the Air Force resources. In view of this it would appear reasonable that Air Force management of the total system would provide the most integrated and effective reconnaissance and surveillance operation." 1/

USAF reconnaissance forces conducted missions over Korea and the peripheral areas under two distinctly separate programs -- the PAR (Peace-time Airborne Reconnaissance) program and the tactical reconnaissance program. While PARPRO (PAR Program) reconnaissance forces were dedicated to special missions in support of National Security Agency collection requirements and were JCS controlled and directed, other forces were assigned to support Air Force requirements and those of COMUSKOREA, as approved by higher headquarters. PARPRO surveillance missions were flown from Yokota and Kadena Air Bases and were conducted along the periphery of Russia, China and North Korea. Utilization of PARPRO forces was restricted to JCS-directed operations; however, there were provisions for meeting certain in-theatre requirements by submission of these requirements through command channels for JCS consideration in line with other agency priorities. 2/

Within the tri-service framework, U.S. Navy reconnaissance forces
operated in the Western Pacific in both the JCS-directed program and in a
tactical reconnaissance role. The Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) in Korea also had
three Mohawk OV-1s that were conducting SLAR operations along the DMZ. Also
available in Korea were the ROKAF RF-86s; although these forces were under
the operational control of USAF, their primary tasking was to support ROK
forces requirements.

Following the Pueblo incident, both PARPRO and tactical reconnaissance
forces were partially augmented to meet increased requirements; however, in
a 28 February 1968 letter to CINCPAC, COMUSKOREA indicated that additional
reconnaissance and surveillance resources were required to support his mission.
He concurred in a requirement stated by the Commanding General, EUSA for an
Aviation Company Surveillance (OV-1s). Justification for this unit indicated
that a shortfall in reconnaissance and surveillance support existed within
the tri-service framework of these activities. In July 1968, CINCPAC concurred
subject to "confirmation" by a joint study of Korea reconnaissance and surveil-
ance requirements, and requested that COMUSKOREA initiate a joint NOFORN
study, with PACOM service component commands participating, to examine the
"current and full spectrum" requirements in this area.

CINCPAC advised that the study should examine operational capabilities,
collection requirements and shortfall under two situations: (1) Current
situation to include support from on-going land, sea, air, and other applicable
programs, (2) and, under phased operations in the event of a renewal of
hostilities by North Korea or by combined North Korea and Chinese communist
forces. It was further directed that Southeast Asia experience "as appropriate"
be applied to the analysis, which should address, but not be limited to, the following considerations:

- Full-spectrum collection requirements.
- Forces and systems requirements: land, sea, and air and other sensor platforms and systems; data handling and processing; and control-communication system.
- Survival, responsiveness, basing and vulnerability aspects.

At the time CINCPAC directed this study be accomplished, USAF forces were conducting a variety of photographic and communications reconnaissance missions to satisfy requirements for Korea. With regard to tactical reconnaissance, PACAF, under CINCPAC post-SEA hostilities planning, is programmed for only two RF-4C squadrons to accomplish minimum theatre requirements. These two squadrons will normally be based in the 5AF area; however, it is logical to assume that one squadron could be deployed to 13AF for SEA surveillance operations, leaving NORTHWESTPAC with only one squadron to help fulfill tactical requirements.

This was the 15th TRS at Kadena AB, which was authorized 18 RF-4Cs. Other tactical photo reconnaissance assets included 19 RF-101s which were deployed with an Air National Guard (ANG) unit to WESTPAC following the Pueblo Incident. This squadron was located at Itazuke Air Base and flew training and operational missions in Korea as directed by 5AF; however, these resources were lost in April 1969 when the ANG units were returned to CONUS.

The 314th Air Division at Osan was assigned two camera configured C-47s which conducted reconnaissance under the COMMANDO SMOG program. COMMANDO
SMOG aircraft provided oblique photography north of the DMZ and overhead photography of South Korea in direct response to EUSA requirements. They flew scheduled missions and also responded on an as-necessary basis. By July 1969, the C-47s were programmed to be replaced by three CT-29s, equipped with infrared, ARDF, and improved photographic sensors.  

Fifth Air Force also had operational control of two COMMANDO CLINCH RB-57Fs which were flown by the 56th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron at Yokota. In addition to performing long range oblique photography of the Sino-Soviet periphery, these aircraft also performed oblique photography of areas immediately north of the Korean DMZ and to depths of 60 nautical miles. COMMANDO CLINCH missions in Korea were currently being flown at least twice monthly, normally more often. Three BLACK SHIELD SR-71 photographic missions were flown subsequent to the Pueblo Incident, but other planned missions were canceled by higher headquarters.

Specially configured COMMANDO ROYAL C-130s, assigned to the 556th Reconnaissance Squadron at Yokota AB, performed electronic reconnaissance in both Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. In addition to missions flown from home station, TDY operations were conducted from detachments at Osan AB, Korea; Kadena AB, Okinawa; and Cam Ranh Bay, RVN. Operations from Osan began following the Pueblo incident. The detachment at Cam Ranh Bay flew missions in support of 7AF requirements in Laos, and were assigned against a sophisticated ELINT program called PROJECT EARS. The remainder of the
surveillance missions were flown from Yokota and Kadena and were conducted along the periphery of Russia and China in support of NSA collection requirements. In mid-1968, there were ten aircraft assigned, two of which were in SEA; in 1969, three more aircraft were deployed from CONUS to support SEA operations. Additional support was provided by SAC's BURNING PIPE project; impending activation of the RIVET KITE/SENTINEL STRING CT-29s would provide an ARDF capability.

No visual reconnaissance (VR) was being provided by USAF forces. Although FACs were available, the lack of FAC aircraft precluded their use as an immediate producer of intelligence. However, they did provide a potential source for satisfaction of Army requirements if and when they did become equipped with FAC aircraft.

On 13 August 1968, 5AF advised that "current daily tasking of the 154th TRS involves approximately four sorties flown in support of Army and Air Force requirements in South Korea." Targets included airfields, bridges, road strips, camouflage detection of friendly units (visual and photographic) and deployed Army field units. The 154th TRS flew approximately 12 sorties daily to satisfy training requirements. RF-101s were provided on 15 minute alert during daylight hours in support of immediate Korea requirements. Although the primary mission of the unit was to support tactical operations during a Korean emergency, it was envisioned that the unit would be tasked in support of any PACOM contingency as required.
Regarding other resources, 5AF advised:

"Formal arrangements to satisfy Army requirements exist in the form of EUSA/AFK SOPs. In the past these requirements have been accomplished mainly with COMMANDO SMOG assets. Since Pueblo, increased requirements have been satisfied using tactical reconnaissance assets as well.

"Night reconnaissance requests will be fulfilled using RF-4Cs of the 15th TRS and CT-29 aircraft of the 314th AD.

"ROKAF reconnaissance forces have a limited role in support of South Korean photo requirements due to the far superior products provided from USAF resources."

As requested by the CINCPAC message of 29 July, the Commander U.S. Forces Korea/Commander in Chief United Nations Command directed the UNC/USFK joint staff to conduct the study and assigned J-3 as the office of primary responsibility. J-3 convened the meeting in Korea on 5 September with representatives present from all services. The first order of business was to establish a definitive statement of intelligence requirements under the peacetime situation (present to 1971) and the phased wartime situation as defined in CINCPAC OPLAN 27-69. J-2 was tasked to head a team to develop these collection requirements. It was decided to limit the initial study to identifying all U.S. service requirements for reconnaissance and surveillance, during current and projected peacetime conditions, for all North Korea and specific areas of China and USSR. These requirements were grouped by priorities: (1) indicators of hostile intent, (2) operational intelligence requirements (3) and, basic intelligence requirements. Then, each requirement was identified as to the frequency of collection desired and the source of
collection, i.e. photographic intelligence, signal intelligence.

Due to the Army request for an aviation company of surveillance aircraft based on a "shortfall within the tri-service framework," there were roles and missions overtones to the joint study. As the study progressed, however, one point became more and more clear: collection would largely be met by aerial reconnaissance platforms, requiring the inherent expertise of Air Force managers and operators, and it logically followed that Air Force resources should be utilized to the fullest in meeting these requirements, and the overall mission should fall within the framework of centralized Air Force management.

After the initial step of identifying requirements was completed, one Air Force representative at the joint conference observed that "Army representation at the conference was extremely conspicuous by its absence." Only one Army officer, a lieutenant from J-2 USFK/UNC was a regular attendee, whereas the Air Force provided operators from all levels: USAF, TARC, PACAF, 5AF, and 5AF ADVON in addition to Air Force intelligence officers. This fact was mentioned several times by Air Force representatives and the reason given was that "the Army had no knowledgeable reconnaissance people who could contribute to the study other than in the mapping area." A note was made for the record by USFK that the Army had been specifically invited to provide representation at each session and had failed to do so in most instances.
In November, one representative observed that there were indications USFK would attempt to use the results of the study to justify the establishment of a complete Military Intelligence Battalion, Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance (MIBARS) system in Korea -- rationale being that sufficient resources were not currently available in the ROK to process, exploit, and store all the film which "must be flown." He noted:

"USFK is currently setting up a reconnaissance section in both J-2 and J-3 to identify requirements and to process requests for reconnaissance. USFK personnel feel that General Bonesteel, while in Washington, D.C., is currently pushing very hard for the MIBARS and possibly for the Aviation Company..."

The 5AF Chief, Reconnaissance Division, Lt. Col. Roger L. Cooper made the observation that the joint study was accomplishing a valuable purpose "regardless of the reasons for which it was precipitated." One benefit was that a priority target listing for both North and South Korea had been selected. Such a list was "long overdue." He also said:

"It is generating Army interest in what reconnaissance can do for them. CINCUNC has requested an additional slot for a Recce officer. Increased Army interest will further their understanding of reconnaissance capabilities and serve to better utilize existing resources. It will also familiarize Army personnel with the proper procedure for requesting reconnaissance.

"Mapping of South Korea will be updated. The last update was accomplished in 1954."

The study group divided collection requirements into four specific areas: (1) Targets within the communist controlled areas, (2) Targets
within South Korea, (3) Coverage of the DMZ, and (4) Counterinfiltration coverage. Within the communist controlled areas considered to be in the COMUSKOREA sphere of concern, 3,635 targets were identified. These represented the full spectrum of target categories, i.e. airfields, missiles sites, command and control centers, naval facilities, etc. Collection requirements dictated the utilization of SIGINT, HUMINT, and imagery resources. Both vertical and peripheral collection capabilities were deemed necessary to satisfy these requirements.

As for availability of resources to cover the communist controlled areas, the study concluded that "existing assets currently utilized in national directed collection programs are considered adequate." There were no equipment shortfalls; however, political agreements honored by the U.S. and imposed military restraints prevented overflight of the referenced communist controlled area. It was further explained: "Current nationally directed peripheral collection programs to include those that are responsive to COMUSKOREA satisfy a limited number of these requirements; however, they fall considerably short of desired goals. Execution authority to employ the available assets will undoubtedly remain at a national level; therefore, acquisition of the required intelligence is beyond present or predictable scope of COMUSKOREA." For possible use of the PARPRO resources, it was recommended that COMUSKOREA forward targets identified in the communist controlled areas to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) through CINCPAC for validation and inclusion in the Imagery Requirements Objective List (IROL).
Rationale for requirements within the ROK considered the possibility that all or portions of the country would be overrun in a preemptive attack, resulting in many installations and facilities being subject to friendly recapture efforts or destruction -- to deny enemy utilization. Photographic reconnaissance of selected targets could be accomplished under present circumstances in a completely permissive environment and required target intelligence files could be built under peacetime conditions. Photographs of targets selected would be used for target intelligence purposes, defense analysis, route planning, weaponeering, etc., in event that UNC air, ground, or naval offensive actions were required against these targets.

All major fixed installations, as well as lines of communications and population centers in South Korea were examined for nomination to an in-country requirements list. The Target Data Inventory (TDI) for South Korea was extracted from the Automated Intelligence File (AIF) for use as a basic source document. Approximately 1,350 targets were identified and placed on a COMUSKOREA Reconnaissance Objectives List (CROL) -- South Korea. In addition, approximately 144 special targets were selected, for a total target intelligence requirement of approximately 1,494 targets. This list was to be dynamic in that additions and deletions would be made as continuing intelligence information recommended.

Capabilities to accomplish vertical and oblique photographic coverage of
targets identified in the CROL were required. All tri-service reconnaissance aircraft that could be responsive to CROL requirements were identified as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Availability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>USAF - Fifth Air Force</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 RF-4Cs</td>
<td>Present time through 1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 C-47s</td>
<td>Present time through 1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 CT-29s</td>
<td>June 1969 through 1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2 RB-57s</td>
<td>Present time through 1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>USN - Seventh Fleet</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 RA-3B (VAP-61)</td>
<td>Present time through 1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 RF-86s per CVA</td>
<td>Present time through 1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 RA-5Cs per CVA</td>
<td>Present time through 1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>US ARMY - Eighth Army</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 OV-1s</td>
<td>Present time through 1971</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Availability of Naval aircraft was qualified:

"The RF-8G aircraft are deployed aboard small deck aircraft carriers (CVA) and the RA-5C are deployed aboard large deck CVAs. The type and number of Navy reconnaissance aircraft available at any given time will vary depending upon the deployment schedule for the aircraft carriers. These assets would be available on a non-interference basis with primary mission tasking and consistent with the CVA area of operation. Unless specifically tasked by higher authority, deployments of heavy photographic squadron sixty one (VAP 61) to Korea in support of CROL-KS objectives are not envisioned. It is anticipated that CROL-KS R&S objectives would be programmed for CVA-embarked aircraft only during routine CVA operations off Korea, and VAP 61 aircraft only when deployed to Korea in support of specific cartographic/reconnaissance projects validated by higher authority."

Also, reconnaissance assets external to CINCPAC could be requested to fulfill specific requirements in support of COMUSKOREA. A "recent" example was the February 1969 deployment of a SAC U-2 aircraft to perform Korean
COMUSKOREA identified a requirement for reconnaissance and surveillance of the entire DMZ by visual, electronic, photographic or other means, to detect indications of impending hostile intent or actions. "Maximum early warning of any potential threat to UNC/USFK forces" was needed, and "twice nightly SLAR coverage to a depth of 60 kilometers beyond the DMZ" was considered a "minimum requirement." Additional flights on a quick reaction basis (one hour criteria) would be required when tasked by EUSA. Due to the known size, close proximity and general high readiness posture of the North Korean forces, the success and ability to neutralize any enemy advance will depend on early warning to the ground command in sufficient time to enable the COMUSKOREA forces to react.

The study group concluded that an airborne sensor system capable of collecting high resolution imagery, i.e. tactical size targets - tanks, trucks, jeeps, etc., during day, night all weather conditions was necessary to satisfy this requirement. Further characteristics were identified: "The system must have a capability to data link in real/near real time sensor signals/collections to complement analytic-decision authority at army ground sensor terminals located at separate brigade level and above. A Moving Target Indication (MTI) capability that could be overlayed simultaneously on large scale mapping imagery is required to display the location of moving targets. The system must have a standoff capability to provide the required imagery and MTI to depth of at least 60 kilometers north of the DMZ."
This requirement was being partially satisfied by three OV-1B Mohawk aircraft and two AN/APS-94 SLAR systems. The Army also had two AN/TKQ-1 radar data receiving sets which provided a limited near real time capability using a line of sight data transmission system. These aircraft, flying two sorties nightly out of K-16 airfield near Seoul, collected MTI information along the DMZ to a depth of approximately 60 kilometers. The nightly MTI take was compared with normal activity, derived from a data base assembled with the results of many successive flights along the DMZ, as a method of determining enemy levels of activity. In addition to collection of MTI information, the OV-1B has a capability to collect radar ground mapping imagery. This imagery is of small scale and low resolution. Therefore, it is not possible to detect stationary tactical size targets, i.e., jeeps, trucks, tanks, surface to surface missiles, etc., and as a result the OV-1B was not normally employed for this role.

The COMMANDO CLINCH program, utilizing RB-57 aircraft, was providing photographic coverage in portions of the areas desired. This standoff type system was limited to daylight visual conditions because of optical camera systems.

The study group concluded that the existing systems in Korea did not meet the stated requirements in the following areas: (1) Sensor range and all weather system - COMMANDO CLINCH, (2) Imagery Resolution - OV-1B, and (3) Data-Link Transmission - OV-1B. Thus, these were listed as shortfalls. It was noted that the reliability of data-link transmission had been less
than satisfactory due to mountainous type terrain and the limited altitude
of OV-1B operations.

Further conclusions and recommendations were:

"The present systems are providing photography up to approximately 10-12 miles and MTI information to approximately 60 kilometers beyond the DMZ, but has no capability to detect stationary tactical targets to the desired 60 kilometers. Increasing the OV-1B force would not aid in satisfying the EUSA requirement since the present force is adequate to provide the required frequency of coverage and additional aircraft would not significantly increase responsiveness.

"The only known sensor presently capable of collecting imagery through clouds, haze or precipitation is radar. Recommend that a reconnaissance weapons system utilizing a high resolution side looking airborne radar (SLAR) with MTI installed in a reconnaissance aircraft equipped with a data transmission capability be considered. Aircraft would fly parallel to the DMZ and data link its take to the ground station where it would be correlated, if required, for exploitation and immediate use by the ground commander. It is envisioned that a high flying aircraft is required in order to overcome limitations of radar shadow and provide line-of-sight transmission."

Regarding counterinfiltration requirements, the study group concluded that a shortfall did exist in the SIGINT portion of the collection effort, but this might be eliminated by the SENTINAL STRING program which was scheduled to become operational in-country in July 1969. It was recognized that HUMINT resources would have to be utilized in conjunction with photographic and signal intelligence in order for the counterinfiltration effort to be effective.
In addition to deployment of SENTINAL STRING, the group recommended a continuing review and testing of new SIGINT/PHOTINT systems for possible application to the infiltration problem. Other recommendations included correlation of all SIGINT/PHOTINT derived information with HUMINT and obtaining photography of ten key areas identified as possible agent operating areas.

Summary

Available USAF reconnaissance units were directed to obtain photography in support of the Reconnaissance and Surveillance study. In January 1969, 5AF advised that the 314th AD would be tasked to manage the execution of photographic requests in support of the study, anticipating that COMUSKOREA would assume the major portion of this function when able. 314AD utilized 165TRS and COMMANDO SMOG aircraft primarily to perform the requested photography.

The joint study "greatly increased the demand for tactical reconnaissance in South Korea." Based on possible increased South Korean collection requirements and the scheduled return of the ANG RF-101 squadron from Itazuke AB, Japan, CSAF requested an estimate of Korean tactical reconnaissance requirements subsequent to redeployment of ANG forces. This estimate was forwarded to CSAF in the form of a preliminary report on Part II (Collection Requirements - S. Korea) of the R & S Study. The preliminary report identified a total of 800 targets in South Korea which required oblique, vertical, summer and winter coverage. From this approximation, CSAF estimated that an additional one-half squadron would be required to meet continuing peacetime South Korea requirements.

Initial PACAF planning was to increase the 15TRS to 27 UE aircraft and to
operate six of these aircraft, with associated ground processing equipment, out of an FOB in the Republic of Korea. In January 1969, however, CSAF notified PACAF that there were no plans to augment the 15TRS by 9 RF-4C aircraft. The final report, Volume 1 of the R & S Study, further substantiated the PACAF requirement for an additional one-half squadron by showing a 694 target increase over preliminary estimates. As currently programmed, the reconnaissance capability to support total PACOM requirements will be significantly reduced during the SEA post-hostilities phase with only two RF-4C squadrons in WESTPAC. Therefore, PACAF requested an increase of tactical reconnaissance aircraft in JCS and CINCPAC planning documents to reflect an effective tactical reconnaissance force of four RF-4C squadrons for Korean and WESTPAC operations.

Results of the joint study showed that in-being tri-service resources could effectively satisfy the majority of COMUSKOREA's stated reconnaissance and surveillance requirements. Shortfalls were identified in two areas -- adequate DMZ coverage and counterinfiltration detection capabilities. USAF capabilities programmed for Korea, i.e. the CT-29s, were deemed adequate to overcome this shortfall; however, operational effectiveness in Korea should continue to be closely monitored, and changes in enemy tactics, techniques and improved infiltration capabilities might well indicate the provision of additional USAF capabilities.

Regarding effective DMZ coverage to a depth of 60 kilometers, the study group identified a serious shortfall. The low altitude OV-1s were not satisfactory in that the mountainous terrain precluded in-depth coverage. The recommended solution was a reconnaissance weapons system utilizing a high resolution side looking airborne radar (SLAR) with MTI installed in a reconnaissance aircraft equipped with a data transmission capability. Such a system, if developed, would logically be provided through USAF.
CHAPTER VII
COMMAND AND CONTROL

"...If a Deputy Commander for Air is established in Korea, in addition to the one in Vietnam, it portends that this organizational pattern will become a doctrinal standard. The concept, therefore, must be carefully evaluated." 1/

CINCUNC/COMUSKOREA

Command arrangements for control of military forces in the post-Pueblo Korean situation mirror the political complexities inherent in the 1950-1953 conflict and the on-going armistice. United States and other Free World Forces fought in the Korean conflict under the United Nations (UN) banner, and, in theory, these forces are still deployed under UN auspices to "keep the peace" in Korea. In reality, however, there are Korean contingencies which might dictate decisions and actions without United Nations endorsement. U.S. command arrangements are structured to encompass these contingencies.

Since the Korean conflict, the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC) has been a U.S. Army Four Star General. Should hostilities develop wherein UN resources are used to counter enemy actions, he would have operational control of all forces assigned or allocated to CINCUNC. This includes 2/ the ROK Armed Forces. He wears the collateral hat of Commander, U.S. Forces Korea (COMUSKOREA), wherein the ROK Armed Forces do not unequivocally fall under his operational control. In other words, if operations occurred under U.S./ROK bilateral arrangement, operational control of ROK forces would not
necessarily be vested in the U.S. Commander. They might necessarily be accomplished on a coordinated-coalition basis as in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN).

General Bonesteel, CINCUNC/COMUSKOREA, commented on this ambivalent command situation following the EC-121 incident in April 1969:

"We must weigh the pros and cons of purely U.S. unilateral action, imposed, so to speak, on the ROKs, as against actions undertaken under the United Nations Command umbrella. It is not too well realized outside of Korea that operational control of ROK forces is given directly by the ROK government to the CINCUNC and not to the United States. This is most meaningful to the ROKs and enables them to accept the unique compromise to their sovereignty which operational control to a foreigner implies. To me this means that we must deal and plan closely with the ROKs, the security of whose country is at stake, and thus by example reassure our other allies in eastern Asia."

In his capacity as CINCUNC, General Bonesteel answers direct to JCS; as COMUSKOREA, he heads a sub-unified command under CINCPAC. He also wears a third hat as Commanding General, Eighth U.S. Army -- which serves structurally as the Army Component Commander to U.S. Forces Korea. This, in effect, means that he is the Army Component Commander within his own joint command.

Air Force Command Arrangements

Air Force command arrangements for Korea operations have been of equal complexity. At the time of the Pueblo incident, the Air Force Component Commander in Korea was a USAF Brigadier General. A USAF Lieutenant General position was located on the joint USFK/UNC staff; however, he served in the
AIR FORCE COMMAND RELATIONS - KOREA

CONFIDENTIAL

SOURCE: HQ 314th AIR DIV (DOP)
capacity of Chief of Staff, and not as the Air Force Component Commander. The Component Commander, i.e., Commander, Air Forces Korea, was the second hat of the 314th Air Division Commander -- a Brigadier General position. As 314th Air Division Commander, he was responsible to the Commander, 5AF; as Commander, Air Forces Korea -- to CINCUNC/COMUSKOREA. His other roles included: Commander of the Korean Air Defense Sector exercised under the Commander WESTPACNORTH, i.e., Commander, 5AF; Air Advisor to the Senior Member, Military Armistice Commission; and Chief of the Air Force Advisory Group in Korea.

This command situation developed within the post-conflict Korean milieu, wherein the Commander 314th Air Division/Air Forces Korea had certain responsibilities to both the Commander 5AF and CINCUNC/COMUSKOREA, but had no command responsibility for tactical air forces. Prior to the Pueblo Incident, the Northeast Asia deterrent posture was primarily oriented toward nuclear operations; tactical forces were deployed on a rotational basis and command authority remained with Fifth Air Force. Other than providing support to these tactical units, the 314th Air Division Commander's primary concern with regard to these forces was "flush" authority in the event of enemy air attack.

Following the force buildup, which had no "permanency" attached to it, a modification in the command and control structure was required; this was accomplished in a manner that would place command authority, within Air Force channels, under a senior USAF Commander. The major point here is that the
forces deployed to Korea were not placed under the command of CINCUNC/COMUSKOREA, but would operate in support of CINCUNC/COMUSKOREA, while remaining under the unilateral command of CINCPACAF. In the event these forces were launched against the enemy, they would still be operating in support of CINCUNC/COMUSKOREA objectives, but not under his command.

To satisfy the "peacetime" Korea requirements associated with the force buildup, CINCPAC agreed that CINCPACAF "would propose the establishment of a 5th Air Force ADVON in Korea, who would exercise operational control of all Air Force units deploying." He "speedily" approved the CINCPACAF proposal, and CINCPACAF issued an appropriate directive to all concerned, indicating that operational control rested with the Commander 5AF through 5th AF ADVON.

5AF ADVON was activated on 29 January 1968, with the Commander, 5AF, assuming additional responsibilities as Commander of the ADVON. Initially, a separate staff was established at the ADVON, which was coequal with the one existing at 5AF proper. The ADVON remained in Korea after the Pueblo crisis subsided; however, there were structural modifications which are discussed later in this chapter. Formation of the ADVON effectively retained control of Air Force resources within Air Force command channels. Maj. Gen. Joseph J. Kruzel, Vice Commander 5AF, commented on this in September 1968:

"A single commander acts as CINCUNC, COMUSK and Army Component Commander of CG of the 8th Army.

"The inference I think is clear. It would be difficult to assume that air operations under a component commander of another service would be carried out according to sound air doctrine if the total air effort in Korea were placed in this command channel."

10/

11/

12/

13/
Also, on 29 January, CINCPAC affirmed that he exercised operational command of all forces assigned to PACOM, and the Component Commanders, CINCPACAF, CINCPACFLT, and CINCUSARPAC exercised command and control of assigned forces. He further directed that, as appropriate, CINCPACAF would exercise operational control or coordination of any allied intra-theater airlift resources "as may be made available."

In the Event of Hostilities

CINCPACAF advised that while 5AF ADVON satisfied the "peacetime" command requirements, some confusion might develop if combat operations were initiated under CINCPAC OPLAN-27. At that time, the 27-Plan was an old one, having been drafted in 1962, with only cursory updatings, and it was noted that the plan was in need of "major overhauling in the light of current developments."

The plan clearly recognized the employment of airpower by two means. One involved operational control of two tactical fighter squadrons and a fighter interceptor squadron to COMUSKOREA, through his Air Force Component, Commander Air Forces Korea (COMAFK). A second means of applying airpower, as provided for in the 27-Plan, was through the employment of supporting forces under the operational control of CINCPAC, and exercised through his Component Commanders. CINCPACAF's position: "It is clearly in the best interest of all of us that the major burden of the air war, and certainly the offensive phase involving strikes against North Korea, be controlled by this second means."

CINCPACAF considered a conceivable situation wherein CINCPAC "might
withhold the assignment of any air units to COMUSKOREA, considering offensive operations against North Korean air bases and other vital targets to be the primary objective, as in the case of North Vietnam." There was the probability, however, that some forces would have to be assigned to COMUSKOREA for support of the ground forces, as called for in the 27-Plan. In his directive of 29 January, CINCPAC qualified that, in the event of a renewal of hostilities, planning and execution of air operations, "other than close air support of UN operations if required," will be accomplished through established PACOM Service Component Commanders - CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF. For this eventuality, CINCPACAF stated: "I am preserving a separate role for Commander, 314th Air Division/COMAFKOREA. I would propose that he operate the TACC and provide air support to ground forces, as required, just as we do it in South Vietnam, today."

It was reemphasized that 5AF ADVON was being established on a co-equal basis with COMUSKOREA, and "in no way under his control." His combat activities would be conducted through coordination with the TACC, thus insuring no conflict between "the in-country war and the major operations in the north." This was provided for in the PACAF OPLAN-27, which had been in effect with minor revisions since 1963. The only question CINCPACAF felt could be raised was "whether or not all air units based in Korea must necessarily come under the operational control of COMUSKOREA." This was addressed in the approved PACAF 27-Plan which provided that "depending upon the situation, air operations in support of COMUSKOREA will be prepared to stage through, or recover at Korean bases, as required." Further, it stated that operational control of these forces would be retained by Commander 5AF.
CINCPACAF further clarified for 5AF the command and control arrangements for air operations in Korea, in the event of hostilities:

"I desire to separate clearly, the supporting role which is 5th ADVON's responsibility, from the forces assigned to COMUSKOREA role, which is COMAFKOREA's second hat. Important that we keep these two separate. COMAFKOREA, with associated TAC, will direct air effort of Air Force units, if and when associated to COMUSKOREA. Conduct of offensive air war in North Korea will be accomplished through SAF ADVON. USAF units deploying to Korea under OCPON of 5th ADVON, will be considered as staging units, not committed to COMUSK."

Consideration was also given to the political ramifications that might evolve from the 5AF Commander becoming engaged in combat operations against North Korea. The 5AF Commander wore the dual hat of Commander, U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ), and the involvement of this position with hostilities in Korea could prove politically to be a highly sensitive action. At the time of the Pueblo incident, CINCPACAF considered these ramifications and opinioned:

"If a shooting-war should develop ... I believe we should give some thought to establishing, at the time, a separate numbered Air Force to run the war in Korea. This would also insure that the Air Force supporting commander is not subjugated to Army forces in Korea."

Despite the earlier accord on command and control of air operations in Korea, when the CINCPAC 27-Plan was revised, there was a divergence from the originally agreed position. This position restated was: (1) 314AD as component of COMUSK responsible for air operations in support of U.S. ground forces with forces made available by 5AF and as Commander KADS responsible to 5AF.
for Air Defense; (2) 5AF ADVON as an extension of the Commander 5AF, a supporting commander to COMUSK, responsible for air superiority and interdiction operations against North Korea. Rationale was that the "conduct of war against North Korea will require same effective command and control from unified command level as has proved successful in North Vietnam." This would relieve COMUSKOREA of involvement in a major air campaign in the North "which could dilute his air/ground efforts in defense of South Korea." 23/

In the CINCPAC OPLAN 27-69, however, there was no reference made to 5AF ADVON, and it was specified: (1) Commander 5AF would be designated as Deputy for Air and Air Force Component Commander to COMUSK/CINCUNC in time of hostilities; (2) Commander 314AD continued to serve as Air Force Component Commander in peacetime. 24/ Discussions between CINCPAC and CINCPACAF on 8 May 1968 reaffirmed CINCPAC's desire that control of air operations against North Korea be exercised by CINCPAC through his Air and Naval Component Commanders as was the case in operations against North Vietnam. It was not CINCPAC's intent that the OPLAN be at variance with the previous understanding. Nonetheless, the CINCPAC Plan had already been published and distributed to JCS, and it was suggested that CINCPACAF approach the matter through Air Force channels to JCS in an effort to resolve the issue. 25/

Subsequent efforts toward resolvement of this point, however, focused attention on the roles and missions controversies that would likely arise in the event of hostilities in Korea. Furthermore, Korean operations would feel
the impact of command and control precedents established in Southeast Asia. PACAF, at the request of the Air Staff, made a reassessment of its position regarding the CINCPAC 27-Plan in January 1969. PACAF preference was that the coordination of In-country Air Operations be effected for the subordinate Unified Commander by the Air Component Commander through his Tactical Air Control System (TACS). "In-country" was defined as air support given to the subordinate Unified Commander's operations within the area bounded by the line of contact -- the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA). Maj. Gen. Milton B. Adams, Chief of Staff, PACAF, recognized, however, that "experience in Southeast Asia ... suggests that this essential management of the in-country air operations may not be possible without the establishment of a Deputy for Air position." On this point, General Adams said:

"...as an alternative to the Air Component Commander exercising essential management authority with respect to the In-country air battle, PACAF can concur with the establishment of a Deputy for Air. However, the functions of the Deputy for Air should be carefully drawn to limit his authority to the In-country management problem. The management authority of the Deputy Commander for Air should be clearly inclusive with respect to forces assigned, attached, or supporting the In-country air campaign. Concur with the position of CINCPAC that the Out-country air war (the enemy side of the line of contact or FEBA) be directed by CINCPAC through the appropriate PACOM Service Component Commander (CINCPACAF or CINCPACFLT). Where both forces are jointly involved, recommend that CINCPACAF function as coordinator of the air effort. Responsibility for air defense of land areas should continue in the PACAF chain of command."
It was emphasized that the Deputy for Air and the Air Force Component Commander "should at all times continue to be the same individual;" however, PACAF preference was that the 27-Plan not specify the Commander "to occupy the COMAFK position in time of war". To provide desired flexibility, it was recommended that the wartime designation of CCOMAFK be determined based "on the situation existing at the time." General Adams stated that the plan "should note that COM314AD is designated as CCOMAFK in peacetime, and, upon implementation of the plan, designation of CCOMAFK will be based on the situation existing at the time."  

The question of Single Management of Air resources was the subject of on-going USAF/Marine controversy in the In-country Vietnam Conflict. In the event of hostilities in Korea, the 27-Plan recognized that Marine force would likely be deployed; thus, the Single Manager controversy would undoubtedly flow over into the Korean situation should hostilities develop, and a command situation similar to SEA evolve. In this regard, PACAF cautioned:

"The inference that operational control of U.S. Air Forces must be vested in the Deputy Commander for Air in order for that Deputy to perform the Single Manager function would appear only to lead again to the same arguments raised by the Marines against the Single Manager in SEA. So long as the Deputy Commander for Air is given Single Manager authority regarding allocation and control of target assignments and air strikes In-country, a further designation of operational control is not necessary and could be misleading.

"To clarify channels of control, recommend statement to
the effect that the Deputy Commander for Air will exercise Single Manager function through the already established TACC of the Air Component Commander."

It was further noted that should the Air Force Component Commander/Vice Commander 5AF be designated as the Deputy COMUSKOREA for Air, it would be possible "in peacetime" to bring Deputy for Air procedures/policies to bear on any In-country air operation in Korea. This was extremely important in that, if the Deputy for Air concept was approved, it would be appropriate that this concept be functioning prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

In its concept for employment of U.S. Marine forces during Korean hostilities, the CINCPAC 27-Plan used the term "Uni-Service Force" in reference to the Marines, and stipulated that U.S. Marine Forces employed in amphibious operations would only be under the operational chain of command of CINCPACFLT. The latter stipulation was inserted subsequent to PACAF review of the final draft of the plan. As written, this stipulation would preclude the conduct of amphibious operations by COMUSKOREA, although as in South Vietnam, there could be occasion for such operations integral to the conduct of other COMUSKOREA operations. PACAF recommended that this stipulation be deleted from the plan.

As for the term "Uni-Service Force" as applied to the U.S. Marine forces, PACAF pointed out:

"These words not previously used in CINCPAC OPLAN 27. Our interpretation is that this footnote is designed
to permit U.S. Marine forces to operate independently under COMUSKOREA and outside normal subordinate Unified Command Component Commander organization. Continuation of this footnote potentially would make exercise of the Single Manager for In-Country air operations difficult. Recognize that uni-service force terminology appears in the UNAAF; however, do not believe it was intended to apply to the U.S. Marine force."

Subsequent to review of the CINCPAC 27-Plan at the Washington level, CINCPAC directed that the section detailing command authority and responsibilities for the conduct of In-country tactical air in event of hostilities be deleted from the plan. He also deleted "Commander 5AF" from the Command Box titled COMAFK. CINCPAC requested COMUSKOREA's recommendations on the conduct of air operations, emphasizing that "single managership" had not been intended for the Deputy for Air position. COMUSKOREA echoed CINCPAC's remarks that "single managership" was not intended by the OPLAN which spelled out certain functions/responsibilities of the Deputy COMUSKOREA for Air. He advised, however: "This does not change the requirement of this command for a senior Air Force officer to be Air Deputy/COMAFK. Recommend PACAF designate in its supporting OPLAN 27-69 an appropriate senior Air Force officer who has the requisite resources to fulfill these functions and authorized direct coordination with COMUSKOREA for planning. The revised COMUSKOREA OPLAN 17-69 will be developed with the assumption and will reflect the requirement that an Air Deputy/COMAFK be designated by PACAF."

On 20 May 1969, CINCPAC responded by requesting CINCPACAF designate a
senior USAF General Officer to function as Deputy COMUSKOREA for Air Operations/COMAFK in event of hostilities in Korea and to accomplish the requisite pre-hostilities planning. He further tasked COMUSKOREA to prepare in coordination with CINCPACAF, a concept for employment and control of all In-country tactical air. When queried by PACAF, Hq 5AF replied that designation of a senior USAF General Officer to engage in requisite pre-hostilities planning "is considered to be a timely and highly desirable course of action." It was further deemed that selection of the Commander, 5AF was the "only logical course." This was based on: "The mission jurisdiction and staff capability of this headquarters and the preliminary actions taken and in process to establish closer liaison and a mutuality of planning efforts with COMUSK." When queried by PACAF, Hq 5AF replied that designation of a senior USAF General Officer to engage in requisite pre-hostilities planning "is considered to be a timely and highly desirable course of action." It was further deemed that selection of the Commander, 5AF was the "only logical course." This was based on: "The mission jurisdiction and staff capability of this headquarters and the preliminary actions taken and in process to establish closer liaison and a mutuality of planning efforts with COMUSK." When queried by PACAF, Hq 5AF replied that designation of a senior USAF General Officer to engage in requisite pre-hostilities planning "is considered to be a timely and highly desirable course of action." It was further deemed that selection of the Commander, 5AF was the "only logical course." This was based on: "The mission jurisdiction and staff capability of this headquarters and the preliminary actions taken and in process to establish closer liaison and a mutuality of planning efforts with COMUSK." When queried by PACAF, Hq 5AF replied that designation of a senior USAF General Officer to engage in requisite pre-hostilities planning "is considered to be a timely and highly desirable course of action." It was further deemed that selection of the Commander, 5AF was the "only logical course." This was based on: "The mission jurisdiction and staff capability of this headquarters and the preliminary actions taken and in process to establish closer liaison and a mutuality of planning efforts with COMUSK." When queried by PACAF, Hq 5AF replied that designation of a senior USAF General Officer to engage in requisite pre-hostilities planning "is considered to be a timely and highly desirable course of action." It was further deemed that selection of the Commander, 5AF was the "only logical course." This was based on: "The mission jurisdiction and staff capability of this headquarters and the preliminary actions taken and in process to establish closer liaison and a mutuality of planning efforts with COMUSK." When queried by PACAF, Hq 5AF replied that designation of a senior USAF General Officer to engage in requisite pre-hostilities planning "is considered to be a timely and highly desirable course of action." It was further deemed that selection of the Commander, 5AF was the "only logical course." This was based on: "The mission jurisdiction and staff capability of this headquarters and the preliminary actions taken and in process to establish closer liaison and a mutuality of planning efforts with COMUSK."
Air Force, using the combined manpower resources of the 314AD/5ADVON without any disruption of command/staff capability.

"The Air Deputy arrangement may tend to assume the status of air doctrine. However, it appears to me to meet the essential prerequisites for the effective employment of airpower without placing the Air Force in an untenable position. Finally, there does not appear in this instance to be an alternative that so nearly meets the basic doctrinal considerations."

On 3 June 1969, CINCPACAF designated Lt. Gen. Thomas K. McGehee, Commander 5AF, as Air Deputy COMUSKOREA/COMAFK pro tem, in the event of hostilities. General McGehee was further designated as the CINCPACAF representative to coordinate with COMUSKOREA in preparation of the concept for employment and control of In-country tactical air.

Post-Pueblo Organizational Refinement

While high level concern was directed toward the command and control of tactical air forces in the event of hostilities in Korea, there was also a requirement for refinement and clarification of the "peacetime" command control structure that developed as a result of the force buildup. In this regard, the 5AF Chief of Staff, Col. Marshall R. Graham explained: "The rapid buildup of COMBAT FOX forces in the months following the USS Pueblo crisis, coupled with major changes in tactical units and personnel in and in support of Korea, created problems which dictated the need for clarification of tasks, authority and responsibilities." To accommodate this need, the 5AF Commander, Lt. Gen. McGehee issued a policy and guidance message on 16 August 1968.
CONFIDENTIAL

OPERATIONAL CONTROL
February 1969

5 ADVON

354 TFW
KUNSAN

391 TFS
TAEGU

TAC ELEMENT
(51 FIW) SUWON

TAC ELEMENT
(18 TFW) KWANG JU

TAC ELEMENT
(347 TFW) OSAN

48 FIS
OSAN

TAC ELEMENT
(556 REC SQ) OSAN

154 TRS
ITAZUKE

DET 1, 363 TRW
ITAZUKE

6988 SEC SQ
(ADVON) OSAN

FIGURE 17
UNCLASSIFIED

SUPPORT

314 AD

6314 SPT WG
OSAN

603 DASS
OSAN

6167 AB SQ
KIMPO

150 COS SQ

107 COS SQ
KWANG-JU

152 COS SQ
SUWON

6146 AFAG
SEOUL

354 TFW
KUNSAN

354 COMBT SPT GP

OPERATIONAL CONTROL-ADMIN & LOGISTICS SUPPORT

ADMIN & LOGISTICS SUPPORT

FIGURE 18

UNCLASSIFIED
An earlier directive had established Maj. Gen. Jerry D. Page, Commander, 313th Air Division in Okinawa as Vice Commander, 5AF ADVON. Under the 16 August directive, the Commander 314AD was designated as Assistant Vice Commander of the 5AF ADVON. Fifth Air Force ADVON was assigned responsibility for all operational planning and execution of all operations in Korea except SIOP and specified operations and training of forces specifically allocated to the operational control of COMAFK; the Commander 314AD was assigned responsibility for commanding and controlling all support activities and organizations in Korea and for establishing such lines of command and staff supervision necessary to insure appropriate administrative and logistics support of assigned and attached units.

In a 10 September 1968 letter to Maj. Gen. Ernest C. Hardin, Jr., DCS/Operations, PACAF, Maj. Gen. Kruzel, 5AF Vice Commander, explained:

"...by highlighting the additional hat we gave Brig Gen Bud Holderness as Assistant Vice Commander, 5th ADVON, it was made clear to all Air Force units located in Korea and Itazuke that they were working for Bud Holderness. That is, all forces except the SIOP elements at Osan and Kunsan which are controlled directly by their parent units at Yokota and Misawa and are merely supported by the Division at Osan.

"We are continuing to study this subject with a view to further reducing the complexity of our Korean organizational arrangements. Our next apparent move is to authorize Holderness to combine the 5th ADVON and 314 Air Div operational elements into one integrated operational staff. This would be done to eliminate confusion and gaps or duplication in operational planning and
supervision. However, the separate 5th ADVON and 314 Air Div element of the integrated Ops staff would compare with the in-country TACC element of 7AF Ops in Southeast Asia."

The 5AF Commander advised that "under the present arrangement", there was no alternative but to retain "not only the identity of the Fifth Air Force ADVON, but also to continue to charge it with operational control of COMBAT FOX tactical forces." This precluded making the resources of the Tactical Fighter Wing permanently available to the 314AD Commander in his capacity as COMAFK and to CINCUNC. However, the 5AF ADVON/314AD would be the sole and unilateral authority for command, operations and support responsibilities in Korea. This included the authority for the 314AD Commander as Assistant Vice Commander, Fifth Air Force ADVON, to exercise full command control of the Tactical Fighter Wing.

The specific mission of the 5AF ADVON was to exercise operational control over the following 5AF tactical units with operating locations in Korea and Itazuke:

- 354TFW, Kunsan AB
- 48FIS, Osan AB
- Tactical element of 82FIS, Suwon AB
- Tactical element of 18TFW, Kwang Ju AB
- 391TFW, Taegu AB (and subsequent rote sqdns)
• 36TFS, Osan AB (and subsequent rote sqdns)
• 6988 Security Sq ADVON, Osan AB
• Det 3, 556RS, Osan AB
• 1646ARRS, Osan AB
• 154TRS, Itazuke AB, Japan
• Other units as/if tasked

Hq 5AF exercised normal staff supervision of the Korean and Itazuke based detachments, squadrons and wings, and coordinated all staff activities with the Director of Operations, 5AF ADVON. In general, the 5AF ADVON was responsible for all operational planning and execution of all operations in Korea, except SIOP and that portion of tactical operations under the direct control and supervision of the 314th Air Division; i.e., operations and training of forces assigned to or specifically allocated to the operational control of COMAFK -- ROKAF and specified USAF reconnaissance, air defense and joint Army/AF Tactical Training.

Fifth Air Force ADVON was responsible for the planning, training (including exercises) and execution, within the higher headquarters directed constraints, of all Korean contingency operations for which the deployed tactical forces were tasked. The 314th Air Division was responsible for the planning (both unilateral and joint U.S./ROKAF), training (including exercises) and operational testing as deemed necessary to insure effective execution of appropriate tactical and air defense operations in support of COMUSK and the
Commander 5AF. Direct coordination was accomplished with 5AF ADVON to insure adequate USAF tactical and air defense sorties were made available to 314th COMAFK for joint training and operations.

Under this concept, the 314th Current Operations (TACC) exercised control over all airborne aircraft in the KADS to insure appropriate safety and security practices. In other words, all local flying and operational training missions fragged by 5AF ADVON in support of appropriate higher headquarters conventional and nuclear contingency plans were to follow in accordance with policies and operating procedures and restrictions established by the Commander 314AD and directed through his TACC.

Lt. Gen. McGehee provided further rationale regarding ADVON relationships:

"Inherent in these instructions is the continuation of the identity of the ADVON and allowance for closer integration of the 314 Air Div and ADVON organizational structures. When directed by this headquarters, Maj Gen Page will assume responsibilities in-country as Vice Commander, 5AF ADVON. In case of serious deterioration of situation, Cmdr, Fifth Air Force, will exercise command of the ADVON from on-site location at Osan."

Summary

Of singular importance was the designation of the 5AF Commander as Air Deputy COMUSKOREA/COMAFK pro tem, in the event of hostilities. Although the PACAF stated preference was that "the wartime designation of COMAFK be determined based on the situation existing at the time," COMUSKOREA's
request that a "senior Air Force Commander with requisite resources" be designated as his Deputy, and CINC PAC's subsequent directive to this effect, required immediate action. Positive aspects of this action included 5AF staff authority to engage in requisite pre-hostilities planning with COMUS-KOREA, and the opportunity of developing the concept for employment and control of In-country tactical air prior to the advent of hostilities.

This pre-hostilities designation does not, however, affix single managership of tactical air resources within Air Force command channels. Both CINC PAC and COMUS KOREA took the position that this designation did not imply "single manager" authority. Should U.S. forces become engaged in combat operations in Korea, it can be assumed that air elements other than USAF will be deployed under the 27-Plan. If this occurs, SEA experience has shown that clear lines for centralized command and control of tactical air resources responsive to the In-country Commander should be drawn prior to applying these forces in battle.

U.S. Marine Forces and their organic tactical air assets were deployed to Vietnam in a status whereby they operated for many months more or less independent of other forces. Action by the In-country Commander to effect single manager authority was not taken until the battlefield situation became critical and dictated that all tactical air resources be immediately responsive to his overall requirements. This allowed the independent operation
of the U.S. Marines in a static ground environment to assume the nature of a precedent, whereby the timing of single manager directive became more difficult to apply. SEA experience strongly suggests that the time for establishing single manager authority is in the pre-hostilities development of the concept for employment and control of In-country tactical air. This could be even more important in the Korean environment, wherein the enemy forces are highly prepared for conventional combat at the outset. The situation may offer little or no time for resolving vital questions on command and control.
UNCLASSIFIED

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I

1. (TS/NF/ SPECAT) Msg, UK 54849 CC, COMUSKOREA to CINCPAC, subj: Situation in Korea, 070110Z Sep 68. (Hereafter cited as: COMUSKOREA Msg 070110Z Sep 68.) Doc. 1.

2. (S) Msg, OSD/DMA Wash DC to CINCPAC, subj: FY68 Korean $100 Million Supplemental MAP Program, 16 Feb 68. (Hereafter cited as: OSD/DMA Msg, 16 Feb 68.) Doc. 2.


4. (S/NF) Project CORONET CONJUGATE Special Report by the USAF Special Air Warfare Center, Eglin AFB, Flordia, 15 Jan 68. (Hereafter cited as: CORONET CONJUGATE Report.)

5. (S) Ltr, CINCPAC to JCS, subj: Urgent Requirements of ROK and U.S. Forces in Korea, 31 Jan 69. (Hereafter cited as: CINCPAC Ltr, 31 Jan 69.)

6. (S/NF) Msg, UK 57248, COMUSKOREA to CINCPAC, subj: Additional Information Concerning CIGFIR, 111307Z Feb 69.

7. (S/NF/ SPECAT/ LIMDIS) Msg, UK 51619, COMUSKOREA to CINCPAC, subj: MND Brochure; Problem Areas in ROK Defense (U), 140619Z Apr 68. (Hereafter cited as: COMUSKOREA Msg 140619Z Apr 68.)

8. (S) Hq PACAF, DOMA Operations Assistance Team Report, FY68, 4 Nov 68. (Hereafter cited as: Operations Assistance Team Report.)

9. (S/NF) COMUSKOREA Msg 140619Z Apr 68.

10. (TS) COMUSKOREA Msg 070110Z Sep 68, Doc. 1.

11. (TS) Rprt, U.S. (Yager) Policy Paper toward Korea, (undated), conducted at request of the Undersecretary of State pursuant to the recommendations of Mr. Cyrus R. Vance who headed a Special Presidential Mission to Seoul in Feb 68 that a new assessment be made of our policy toward Korea. Prepared in Dept of State with DOD, JCS, CIA, AID, etc. (Hereafter cited as: Yager Policy Paper.)
13. (S) Msg, COMUSKOREA to CINCPAC, subj: Tactical Air Deployments to Korea, 241130Z Jan 69; USFK Special Report, subj: Counter-infiltration/Guerrilla and Force Improvement Requirements (CIGFIR), 15 Jan 69. (Hereafter cited as: CIGFIR Report.)
14. (S) CINCPAC Ltr, 31 Jan 69.
15. (S) CIGFIR Report.
16. (S/NF) Msg, 5AF (DOP) to CINCPACAF, subj: Tactical Air Deployments to Korea, 7 Mar 69. (Hereafter cited as: 5AF Msg, 7 Mar 69.) Doc. 4.
17. (S) Hq PACAF Ltr, DIEE to DI, subj: Proposed Reduction of USAF Aircraft in South Korea, 29 Jan 69. (Hereafter cited as: PACAF DIEE Ltr, 29 Jan 69.)
18. (S/NF) 5AF Msg, 7 Mar 69. Doc. 4.
19. Ibid.
20. (S) PACAF DIEE Ltr, 29 Jan 69.
21. (S/NF) 5AF Msg, 7 Mar 69. Doc. 4.
22. (S) PACAF DIEE Ltr, 29 Jan 69.
23. (S) CIGFIR Report.
24. (S/NF) Threat Estimate to USAF Installations in South Korea, DIEE, Hq PACAF, 25 Feb 69. (Hereafter cited as: PACAF DIEE Ltr, 25 Feb 69.)
25. (S) Msg, COMUSKOREA to CINCPAC, subj: Tactical Air Deployment to Korea, 241130Z Jun 69.
26. (S) CIGFIR Report.
27. (S) CINCPAC Ltr, 31 Jan 69.
29. (S) CORONET CONJUGATE Report.

162
30. (S/NF) Briefing presented by Maj Weiner, Hq 5AF (DIW) to Amb. U. Alexis Johnson at a Country Team Meeting in Tokyo, 27 Jan 69. (Hereafter cited as: 5AF (DIW) Briefing.)

31. (S) CINCPAC Ltr, 31 Jan 69.

32. (S/NF) 5AF (DIW) Briefing.

33. (S/NF) Paper, subj: North Korean Guerrilla Infiltration Capabilities, by Capt Catherall, DIEE, Hq PACAF, 27 Jan 69. (Hereafter cited as: Catherall Paper.) Doc. 5.

34. (S/NF) Ltr, Hq PACAF (DIEE) to (DIE), subj: Comments on 5AF North Korean Anti-ROK Operations Briefing, 19 Feb 69.

35. (S/NF) 5AF DIW Briefing.


37. Ibid.

38. (S/NF) PACAF DIEE Ltr, 25 Feb 69.

39. Ibid.

40. (S/NF) Proposed ROC, Hq 314th AD (DPP), 12 Aug 68.

41. (S/NF) Catherall Paper, Doc. 5.

42. (S) CIGFIR Report.

43. Ibid.

44. (S/NF) Catherall Paper, Doc. 5.

45. (S) CIGFIR Report.

46. (S/NF) PACAF DIEE Ltr, 29 Jun 69.

47. (S/NF) Operations Assistance Team Report.

48. (S) CIGFIR Report.

49. (S/NF) PACAF DIEE Ltr, 29 Jun 69.
CHAPTER II

1. (TS) Msg, Adm Sharp, CINCPAC to Gen Ryan, CINCPACAF, 262220Z Feb 68.
2. (S) OSD/DMA Msg, 16 Feb 68. Doc. 2.
3. Ibid.
4. (S/NF) CHECO Report, The Pueblo Incident, 15 Apr 68.
5. (TS/NF) COMUSKOREA Msg, 070110Z Sep 68, Doc. 1.
6. Ibid.
7. (S/NF) CHECO Report, The Pueblo Incident, 15 Apr 68.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. (S) Msg, JOPREP JIFFY DO/DE 0773 Sep 68, 5AF CC to CINCPACAF CC, subj: Redesignation of 314ADCC, 170300Z Sep 68. (Hereafter cited as: 5AF CC Msg, 170300Z Sep 68.) Doc. 6.
17. (TS) Yager Policy Paper.
18. (TS) Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.

22. (S/NF) Msg, COMUSKOREA to CINCPAC, UK 51646CJ, subj: Tactical Aircraft Deployments to SEASIA, 160310Z Apr 68.

23. 5AF Command Briefing, 22 Feb 68. Doc. 8.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. (S/NF) Msg, 5AF to CINCPACAF, subj: Visit of Special State Defense Study Group, 090909 Apr 68. (Hereafter cited as: 5AF Msg, 090808 Apr 68.) Doc. 10.


29. (S/NF) 5AF Msg, 090808 Apr 68. Doc. 10.

30. Ibid.

31. (S) Msg, Cmdr 314AD (DPP) to Hq 5AF, subj: Visit of Special State Defense Study Group, 150530Z Apr 68.

32. (S/NF) 5AF Msg, 090808 Apr 68. Doc. 10.


34. (S/NF) Ltr, Cmdr 475th TFW to 5AF (CS), subj: Unit Deployment, 1 Mar 68. Doc. 11.


36. (S/NF) Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, subj: Addendum to Position Papers for Defense Minister's Meeting, 260219Z May 68. (Hereafter cited as: CINCPAC Msg, 260219Z May 68.)

37. (S/NF) Msg, CINCPAC to COMUSKOREA, subj: Status of Planning to Counter NK Aggressive Acts, 040205Z May 68. (Hereafter cited as: CINCPAC Msg, 040205Z May 68.)


40. (S) Ltr, Hq PACAF, DCEPR to DIEE, subj: Hardened Aircraft Shelters, Korea, 15 Feb 69.
41. 5AF Command Briefing, 22 Feb 69. Doc. 8.
42. Ibid.
43. (S/NF) CINCPAC Msg, 260219Z May 68.
44. (S/NF) CINCPAC Msg, 040205Z May 68.
45. (S) Msg, CINCPACAF CINCPACAF C 030636Z May 68.
46. (S/NF) Msg, COMAFKOREA to COMUSKOREA, subj: Tactical Air Deployment to Korea, 232130Z Jan 69.
47. (TS) AFSSO PACAF Msg, 180644Z Sep 68, Doc. 9.
48. (TS) Msg, JOPREP JIFFY 899, 5AF to CINCPACAF, quoting CSAF Visit, 060924Z Nov 68.
49. (S) Msg, CINCPACAF to CINCPAC, subj: Tactical Air Warfare Requirements and Force Effectiveness in the Korean Theatre, 010015Z Jun 68.
50. (S) Msg, SecDef to JCS, #8604 fm OASD/ISA, subj: Possible Partial Removal of Augmentation Aircraft (S), 031547Z Sep 68. (Hereafter cited as: OASD/ISA Msg 031547Z Sep 68.) Doc. 13.
51. Ibid.
52. (TS) Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, subj: Possible Partial Withdrawal of Augmentation Aircraft, 172316Z Sep 68.
53. (S) OASD/ISA Msg 031547Z Sep 68. Doc. 13.
54. (TS) AFSSO PACAF Msg, 180644Z Sep 68. Doc. 9.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. (TS/NF SPECAT) CINCPAC to COMUSKOREA, subj: Situation in Korea, 240223Z Oct 68. Doc. 15.
60. (S) JCS Secret Msg, S/NF, 221934Z Jan 69.
61. (S) JCS to CINCPAC, subj: Tactical Air Deployments to Korea, 132158Z Feb 69.
62. (S) Msg, COMUSKOREA to CINCPAC, subj: Tactical Air Deployments to Korea, 241130Z Jan 69; (S/NF) Msg, COMAFK (DOP) to COMUSKOREA, subj: Tactical Air Deployment to Korea, 230910Z Jan 69.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Note by Gen Adams, PACAF CS, on COMUSK Msg, Situation in Korea.
66. (S) Msg, CINCUSARPAC to CINCPAC, subj: Tactical Air Deployments to Korea, Secret GPOP-PL 3308, 252122Z Jan 69.
67. (S/NF) Msg, 5AF (DOP) to CINCPACAF, subj: Tactical Air Deployments to Korea, 7 Mar 69. Doc. 4.
68. Ibid.
69. (S) Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, subj: Tactical Air Deployments to Korea, 132158Z Feb 69.
70. Ibid.
71. (TS/AFEO) Msg, CINCUSARPAC to CINCPAC, subj: Situation in Korea, 250222Z Feb 68. Doc. 16.
73. (S) Msg, VADM Heinz OSD/DMA, Wash, D. C. to Adm Sharp, CINCPAC, OSD/DMA 01886 Feb 68, 16 Feb 68, subj: $100 Million MAP. Doc. 2.
74. Ibid.
75. (S) Msg, Adm Sharp, CINCPAC to Adm Hein, OSD/DMA, Wash, D.C., $100 Million MAP, 17 Feb 68. Doc. 17.
76. (S/NF) Msg, COM 314AD to Hq 5AF, subj: 100 Million Dollar ROK Package, 20 Feb 68.

77. (S) Msg, Seoul 4606, AMEMBASSY Seoul to SecState, Wash, D.C., subj: ROK $100 Million Augmentation Package, 290939Z Feb 68.

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid.

80. (S) Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, subj: Korean $100 Million MAP Augmentation Package, 240245Z Feb 68.

81. (S) Ltr, Hq 5AF, DOP to Cmdr, subj: MAP F-4D Program for ROKAF, 22 Oct 68.

82. (S/NF) 5AF to CINCPACAF, subj: Free World Force Planning, 180137Z May 68.

83. (S/ SPECAT/LIMDIS/AFO) Msg, Hq 5AF to CINCPACAF, DPL, subj: Military Assistance in Korea, 200611Z Jan 68. (Hereafter cited as: 5AF Msg, 200611Z Jan 68.)

84. Ibid.

85. Hq PACAF (DOMA) ROKAF Status Book, 23 Oct 68.

86. (TS/LIMDIS) CINCPAC Command Center, 0730 Briefing Notes, 3 Dec 68.

87. Interview with Col. C. H. Robson, Jr., Hq PACAF (DOMA), 17 May 69.

88. (S/ AFO) 5AF Msg, 200611Z Jan 68.

89. (S/NF SPECAT) COMUSKOREA to CINCPAC, subj: Korea MAP FY69, 210419Z Dec 68. Doc. 18.

90. Ibid.

91. (S) Msg, Seoul 7913, AMEMBASSY Seoul to SecState, Wash, D.C. subj: BANY-Phase 2--Military Advisory Group, 170310Z Jun 68.

92. Ibid.

93. Ibid.
94. (S/NF) Msg, UK53736, COMUSKOREA to CINCPAC, subj: Service MAAGs, Korea, 222318Z Jun 68. (Hereafter cited as: COMUSKOREA Msg, 222318Z Jun 68.)

95. Ibid.

96. Ibid.

97. (S/NF) Msg, CINCUSARPAC to CINCPAC, subj: Service MAAGs, Korea, 220200Z Jun 68.

98. (S/NF) COMUSKOREA Msg, 222318Z Jun 68.

99. Ibid.

100. (S/NF) Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, subj: Service MAAGs, Korea, 240454Z Jun 68.

101. (S/NF) COMUSKOREA Msg, 222318Z Jun 68.

102. Interview with Col Robson, 17 May 69.

103. (S) Msg, Osan AB to J3 Seoul, Korea, subj: Planning with ROKAF, 060541Z Jun 68.

104. Ibid.

105. Ibid.

106. (TS/NF) COMUSKOREA Msg, 070110Z Sep 68. Doc. 1.

107. Ibid.

CHAPTER III

1. (S) Msg, CINCPACAF to CSAF, subj: CORONET CONJUGATE, 28 Feb 68.

2. (S) Msg, CINCPACAF DPL to CSAF, subj: Counterinfiltration/Counter-guerrilla Capability for Korea, 081615Z May 68. (Hereafter cited as: CINCPACAF Msg, 081615Z May 68. (Hereafter cited as: CINCPACAF Msg, 081615Z May 68.)

3. (S/NF) CORONET CONJUGATE Report.
4. (S/NF) Research of message traffic concerning $100 Million Package for the ROK.

5. CINCPACAF Msg, 081615Z May 68.


7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. CINCPACAF Msg, 081615Z May 68.

12. (S) Msg, 5AF (DOT) to CINCPACAF, subj: Operational Requirement in Korea, 060920Z May 68. Doc. 19.

13. (S/NF) Proposed ROC, hq 314th AD (DPP), 12 Aug 68.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.


18. CORONET CONJUGATE Report.

19. Ibid.


22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.
25. (S) Msg, CINCPACAF (DPL) to CSAF, subj: CORONET CONJUGATE, 28 Feb 68.
26. (S) Msg, 5AF ADVON (DOP) to CINCPACAF, subj: Priority Assistance to ROKAF, 240840Z Feb 68.
28. (S) Msg, 5AF ADVON to CINCPACAF, subj: SAWC MTT for ROKAF (S), 200802Z Feb 68.
29. (S/NF SPECAT AFEO) 5AF to CINCPACAF, subj: Korean $100 Million Package, 070640Z Mar 68. Doc. 21.
30. (S) Msg, 5ADVON to CINCPACAF, subj: SAWC MTT for ROKAF (S), 200802Z Feb 68.
31. Ibid.
33. (S) Msg, CINCPACAF (DPL) to CSAF, subj: CORONET CONJUGATE, 28 Feb 68.
34. (S/NF) Msg, 314AD DPP to 5AF CC, subj: Korean Counterinfiltration Capability, 290510Z Mar 68. Doc. 22.
35. (S) Msg, Hq 5AF to CINCPACAF (DPLY/DPL), subj: Joint ROK Forces Counterinfiltration Exercises, 170550Z Apr 68.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. (S) CIGFIR Report.
40. (S) CIGFIR Report.
41. (S/NF) CORONET CONJUGATE Report.
42. (S) Msg, CINCPACAF DPL to CSAF, subj: Counterinfiltration/Counter-guerrilla Capability for Korea, 081615Z May 68.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>43.</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44.</td>
<td>(S/ SPECAT AFE0) CSAF to CINCPACAF, subj: Counterinfiltration/Counterguerrilla Capability for Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45.</td>
<td>(S) CINCPACAF Msg, 081615Z May 68.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46.</td>
<td>(S/ SPECAT AFE0) Msg, 314AD to Hq 5AF, subj: Improving Surveillance Capabilities in Korea, 072445Z May 68. Doc. 23.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47.</td>
<td>(S) JCS Msg, 9742/231855Z May 68.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49.</td>
<td>(S/NF AFE0) Ltr, Hq 5AF (DOP) to CINCPACAF (DPL), subj: Improving Air Surveillance Capability in Korea, 23 Aug 68. Doc. 25.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50.</td>
<td>(S) Msg, CSAF to CINCPACAF, subj: BLACK SPOT 151424Z May 68.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51.</td>
<td>(S) Msg, AFK/314AD (DOCP) to CINCPACAF/DO, subj: BLACK SPOT, 020830Z Oct 68.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52.</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53.</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54.</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57.</td>
<td>(TS) Msg, COMUSKOREA to CINCPAC, UK 56006 CJ, subj: Reassessment of COLLEGE EYE Temporary Requirements in Korea, 180858Z Nov 68. Doc. 27.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58.</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59.</td>
<td>(S) Monthly History, Hq 5AF (DOTD), 16 Dec 68. Doc. 29.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

172

(This page is UNCLASSIFIED.)
61. (S) Msg, CETF Korat AFB to 552AEWCCON WG, subj: Final Mission Wrap-up on Big Fisherman, 140955Z Dec 68. Doc. 31.

62. (S) Msg, 5AF (DO) to PACAFCC (DO), subj: Final Summary Report, Exercise Big Fisherman, 13 Dec 68. Doc. 32.

63. (S/NF) COMUSKOREA to CINCPAC, UK 57248, subj: Additional Information Concerning CIGFIR, 111307Z Feb 69.

64. (S) Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, subj: Urgent Requirements of ROK/U.S. Forces in Korea, 080226Z Mar 69.

65. (S) Ltr, 314AD (DOC) to 5AF (DO), subj: Aircraft Requirements in Support of CIGCOREP II, 27 Dec 68.

66. (S) Msg, 5AF (DOP) to CINCPACAF (DPL), subj: CIGCOREP II, 060705 Jan 69.

67. Ibid.

68. (S) CIGFIR Report.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid.

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid.
CHAPTER IV

1. (TS) JCS Ltr, SM-474-68, 15 Jul 68, quoted in TS/NF Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, subj: COLLEGE EYE/RIVET GYM Support for Korea, 070453 Nov 68.


4. Ibid.

5. (S/NF) Air Defense Briefing, by Lt Col Lester B. Goldberg, 9 Jan 69. Doc. 34.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.


11. (S) Memo for the Record, Hq 5AF Air Defense Division, 7 Mar 68. Doc. 36.

12. (S) Ltr, subj: Trip Report on Korea AC&WS, by Hq PACAF DOCOA, 18 Jul 68.

13. Ibid.

14. (S) Msg, CINCPACAF to CSAF/AFXOSN, subj: Tactical Air Control System, Korea 300950Z Jan 68.

15. (S) Ltr, subj: Trip Report on Korea AC&WS, Hq PACAF DOCOA, 18 Jul 68.


17. (S/NF) Briefing by Lt Col Lester B. Goldberg, 5AF Air Defense, 6 Aug 68. Doc. 33.
UNCLASSIFIED

18. Ibid.
20. (S) Hq 5AF Briefing, C-E-M Posture-Korea, 19 Dec 68, Doc. 38.
21. Ibid.
22. (S) Ltr, subj: Trip Report on Korea AC&WS, by Hq PACAF, DOCOA, 18 Jul 68.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. (S) 5AF Briefing to CINCPACAF, 7 Mar 69. Doc. 39.
27. (S) Msg, CINCPACAF to CSAF/AFXOSN, subj: Tactical Air Control System, Korea 300950Z Jan 68.
28. Ibid.
29. (S/NF) Briefing by Lt Col Goldberg, 5AF, 6 Aug 68. Doc. 33.
30. Ibid.
31. (S/NF) Ltr, Hq 5AF (DOTD) to (DO), subj: CETF Concept of Operations, 9 Jul 68. Doc. 40.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. (S) Msg, 5AF to ADC, subj: ADC Participation in FRESH STORM CETF, 190115 Sep 68. Doc. 41.
36. (S) Ltr, Hq PACAF to DOPLS, subj: Korean Redeployment Posture, 10 Dec 68.
37. (S) Msg, 5AF (DOP) to CINCPACAF (DPL), subj: CIGCOREP II, 060705Z Jan 69.
38. (S) Ltr, Hq PACAF to DOPLS, subj: Korean Redeployment Posture, 10 Dec 68.
39. (S) Ltr, Hq 5AF DOTD to DOT, subj: Sea of Japan Air Defense Activity, 19 Feb 68. Doc. 42.

40. Ibid.


42. (S/NF) Air Defense Study of Korea, conducted by Hq PACAF with assistance from USARPAC, PACFLT, 5AF, 314AD and 38th Arty Bde, 15 Apr 68. (Hereafter cited as: PACAF Air Defense Study.)

43. Monthly History, Hq 5AF, DOCOD, 14 Jan 69. Doc. 43.

44. (C) Briefing Paper, Hq 5AF DOCOD, subj: WESTPACNORTH Interface System, Jan 69. Doc. 44.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. PACAF Air Defense Study.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.


54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.
UNCLASSIFIED

CHAPTER V


4. (S) Hq 5AF DO Report, subj: Tactical Air Control System Survey, Korea, 3 Jun 68. Doc. 46.


6. Ibid.

7. (S) 5AF, DO Report, subj: Tactical Air Control System Survey, Korea, 3 Jun 68. Doc. 46.

8. Ibid.


10. (C) Paper, subj: Concept for Close Air Support in Korea, by 314th AD, 1 Nov 68.

11. (S) Ltr, Hq PACAF to Hq USAF, subj: TAC Aircraft for Korea, 25 Jun 68. Doc. 45.

12. (S) Briefing, 5AF, Communications-Electronics MET Posture-Korea, 19 Dec 68. Doc. 38.

13. (S) Hq 5AF, DO Report, 3 Jun 68. Doc. 46.


15. Ibid.


177
UNCLASSIFIED

17. (S) Ltr, Cmdr 314AD to Cmdr 5AF, subj: Transfer of MRC-107 Jeeps to ROKAF, 1 Jul 68. Doc. 48.

18. Ibid.

19. (S) Ltr, 314th AD (DO) to DPP, subj: ORKAF Role in TACS, 5 Aug 68. Doc. 49.

20. (C) 314AD Plan, Concept of Operations, 2 Jul 68. Doc. 47.

21. (S) Ltr, 314AD (DO) to DPP, subj: ROKAF Role in TACS, 5 Aug 68. Doc. 49.


CHAPTER VI


2. Interview with Maj. Thomas Nash, Hq PACAF (DORC), 28 May 69.

3. Ibid; (S/NF) 5AF Briefing, Feb 69; (S/NF) Draft COMUSKOREA Reconnaissance and Surveillance Requirements Study, May 69.

4. (S/NF) Ltr, COMUSKOREA CJ to CINCPAC, subj: Justification of Additional Units for EUSA, 26 Feb 68.

5. (S/NF) Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, subj: Justification of Additional Units for EUSA, 291918Z Jul 68.


7. Ibid.

8. (S) Ltr, Hq PACAF (DO) to DPLD, signed by Maj. Gen. Ernest C. Hardin, Jr., subj: Itazuke AB, 30 Nov 68.

178
9. (S/NF) 5AF Briefing, Feb 69.
10. Interview with Maj Nash.
11. (S/NF) 5AF Briefing, Feb 69;  
   (S/NF AFEO)  
   Msg, AFSSO 5AF to AFSSO PACAF/DI, subj: Reconnaissance and  
   Surveillance Study, 23 Aug 68.  
   Doc. 53.
12. Ibid.
13. 5AF Briefing, Feb 69.
14. (S/NF AFEO)  
   Msg, 23 Aug 68.  
   Doc. 53.
15. Ibid.
16. (C/AFEO)  
   Msg, 5AF to CINCPACAF/DORC, SPECAT, subj: Tac Recon Support  
   of Army Requirements, 130241Z Aug 68.
17. Ibid.
18. (S)  
   Msg, AFSSO 5AF to AFSSO PACAF, subj: Reconnaissance and Survey­  
   lance (R&S), 170303Z Sep 68.  
   Doc. 54.
19. (S/NF)  
   Ltr, Hq 5AF DICQ to Hq PACAF (DIRP), subj: USFK Reconnaissance  
   and Surveillance Conference, 11 Nov 68.  
   (Hereafter cited as:  
   5AF DICQ Ltr, 11 Nov 68.)  
   Doc. 55.
20. Ibid.
21. (S/NF)  
   Ltr, Hq 5AF (DOTR) to Hq 5AF (DOT), subj: Trip Report on the  
   Reconnaissance and Surveillance Study, 18 Nov 68.  
   (Hereafter cited as:  
   5AF DOTR Ltr, 18 Nov 68.)  
   Doc. 56.
22. (S/NF)  
   5AF DICQ Ltr, 11 Nov 68.  
   Doc. 55.
23. Ibid.
24. (S/NF)  
   5AF DOTR Ltr, 18 Nov 68.  
   Doc. 56.
25. (S/NF)  
   Draft, COMUSKOREA Reconnaissance and Surveillance Require­  
   ments Study, copy on file Hq PACAF, DORC, undated.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.

179
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
41. (S) Msg, CINCPACAF/DORC to 5AF/DOTR, subj: 15TRSUE, 200022Z Dec 68. Doc. 58.
42. (S) Ltr, Hq PACAF (DO) to DPLD, subj: Itazuke AB, 30 Nov 68; Evidence provided by Hq PACAF, DORC in letter, dated 4 Aug 69.
43. (S/NF) Draft, COMUSKOREA Reconnaissance and Surveillance Requirements Study, on file Hq PACAF DORC.
44. Ibid.

CHAPTER VII

1. (TS/SPECAT AFEO) Msg, CINCPACAF to CSAF (afxpd), subj: Review of CINCPAC OPLAN 27-69 as Amended by Changes 1 and 2, 132252Z Jan 69; Released by Maj. Gen. Milton B. Adams, Chief of Staff, Hq PACAF. (Hereafter cited as: PACAF Chief of Staff Msg, 132252Z Jan 69.)
2. (TS) Msg, CINCPAC to 5AF, subj: Command Relations Relative to Current Situation in Korea (C), 010330Z Feb 68.


6. (S) 314AD/AFK Command Briefing, 28 Feb 69. Doc. 60.


11. (TS/AFEO Specato) Msg, CINCPACAF to CSAF, JOPREP JIFFY Cl99, Exclusive for CSAF from CINCPACAF, 290430Z Jan 68.


14. (TS) Msg, CINCPAC to CINCUSARPAC, subj: Command Relations Relative Current Situation in Korea (C), 202242Z Jan 68.

15. (TS/AFEO Specato) Msg, CINCPACAF to CSAF, JOPREP JIFFY Cl99, Exclusive for CSAF from CINCPACAF, 290430Z Jan 68.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. (TS) Msg, CINCPAC to CINCUSARPAC, subj: Command Relations Relative Current Situation in Korea (C), 292242Z Jan 68.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(TS/ SPECAT AFEO)</th>
<th>(TS/ SPECAT AFEO)</th>
<th>(TS/ SPECAT AFEO)</th>
<th>(TS/ SPECAT AFEO)</th>
<th>(TS/ SPECAT AFEO)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>(TS/ AFEO SPECAT)</td>
<td>(TS/ AFEO SPECAT)</td>
<td>(TS/ AFEO SPECAT)</td>
<td>(TS/ AFEO SPECAT)</td>
<td>(TS/ AFEO SPECAT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>(TS/ AFEO SPECAT)</td>
<td>(TS/ AFEO SPECAT)</td>
<td>(TS/ AFEO SPECAT)</td>
<td>(TS/ AFEO SPECAT)</td>
<td>(TS/ AFEO SPECAT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>(TS/ AFEO SPECAT)</td>
<td>(TS/ AFEO SPECAT)</td>
<td>(TS/ AFEO SPECAT)</td>
<td>(TS/ AFEO SPECAT)</td>
<td>(TS/ AFEO SPECAT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>(TS/ AFEO SPECAT)</td>
<td>(TS/ AFEO SPECAT)</td>
<td>(TS/ AFEO SPECAT)</td>
<td>(TS/ AFEO SPECAT)</td>
<td>(TS/ AFEO SPECAT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33.</td>
<td>(S) Msg, CINCPAC et al, subj: Advance Change 3 to CINCPAC OPLAN 27-69, 202230Z Feb 69.</td>
<td>34.</td>
<td>Memorandum, Hq PACAF (DPLYC), subj: Change 2, CINCPAC OPLAN 27-69, 28 Feb 69.</td>
<td>35.</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
36. (S) Msg, COMUSKOREA to CINCPAC, subj: Advance Chanve 3 to CINCPAC OPLAN 27-69, 070300Z Mar 69.

37. (S) Msg, CINCPAC to CINCPACAF, subj: Command Arrangements for CINCPAC OPLAN 27-69, 200747Z May 69.

38. (TS/LIMDIS/AFE0) Msg, Hq 5AF to CINCPACAF, subj: Command Arrangements for CINCPAC OPLAN 27-69, 270915Z May 69.

39. Ibid.

40. (S) Msg, CINCPACAF to COMUSKOREA, subj: Command Arrangements for CINCPAC OPLAN 27-69, 032044Z Jun 69.

41. (S) Ltr, Hq 5AF (5-OMO) to 5AF Staff, signed by 5AF Chief of Staff, subj: Command Control and Support Relationships of Fifth Air Force Units in Korea, 19 Nov 68. (Hereafter cited as: 5AF Ltr, 19 Nov 68.) Doc. 62.

42. (U) Special Order M-84, Hq 5AF, 17 Jun 68. Doc. 63.

43. (S) 5AF Ltr, 19 Nov 68. Doc. 62.

44. (S/NF) Kruzel Briefing. Doc. 59.

45. (S) Ltr, Cmdr 5AF to Cmdr 314AD, subj: Organization, Management and Control of USAF Resources in Korea, 19 Nov 68. Doc. 64.


47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

183

(This page is UNCLASSIFIED.)
APPENDIX I
USAF READINESS POSTURE*

1 May 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>POSSESSED</th>
<th>READY</th>
<th>ALERT STATUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>475TFW</td>
<td>F-4C</td>
<td>Kunsan AB, Korea</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4 on SIOP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>475TFW</td>
<td>F-4C</td>
<td>Misawa AB, Japan</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>475TFW</td>
<td>F-4C</td>
<td>Taegu AB, Korea</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8-15 Min ) FLUSH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>347TFW</td>
<td>F-4C</td>
<td>Kunsan AB, Korea</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7-13 Min ) FLUSH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>347TFW</td>
<td>F-4C</td>
<td>Yokota AB, Japan</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5 on SIOP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4TFW</td>
<td>F-4D</td>
<td>Kwang-Ju AB, Korea</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12 on 15 Min ) FLUSH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4TFW</td>
<td>F-4D</td>
<td>Kunsan AB, Korea</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>9 on 30 Min ) FLUSH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>318FIS</td>
<td>F-106A</td>
<td>Osan AB, Korea</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24 on 15 Min ) FLUSH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18TFW</td>
<td>F-105D/F</td>
<td>Kadena AB, Okinawa</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19 on 30 Min ) FLUSH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18TFW</td>
<td>F-105D/F</td>
<td>Osan AB, Korea</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4 on SIOP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64FIS</td>
<td>F-102A</td>
<td>Suwon AB, Korea</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4 on 5 Min</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL: 193 166

* Does Not Include Port Bow B-52 in Okinawa.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>POSSESSED</th>
<th>READY</th>
<th>ALERT STATUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>475TFW</td>
<td>F-4C</td>
<td>Kunsan AB, Korea</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5 on SIOP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>475TFW</td>
<td>F-4C</td>
<td>Misawa AB, Japan</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8 on 15 Min) FLUSH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>475TFW</td>
<td>F-4C</td>
<td>Taegu AB, Korea</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6 on 30 Min) FLUSH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>347TFW</td>
<td>F-4C</td>
<td>Osan AB, Korea</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8 on SIOP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>347TFW</td>
<td>F-4C</td>
<td>Yokota AB, Japan</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4TFW</td>
<td>F-4D</td>
<td>Kwang-Ju AB, Korea</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12 on 15 Min) FLUSH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4TFW</td>
<td>F-4D</td>
<td>Kunsan AB, Korea</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4 on 30 Min) FLUSH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>378FIS</td>
<td>F-106A</td>
<td>Osan AB, Korea</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12 on 15 Min) FLUSH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18TFW</td>
<td>F-105D/F</td>
<td>Kadena AB, Okinawa</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9 on 30 Min) FLUSH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18TFW</td>
<td>F-105F</td>
<td>Osan AB, Korea</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4 on 5 Min) FLUSH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82FIS</td>
<td>F-102A</td>
<td>Suwon AB, Korea</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12 on 30 Min) FLUSH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>354TFW</td>
<td>F-100C/F</td>
<td>Kunsan AB, Korea</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Wild Weasel TDY from Nellis AFB</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL: 218 190
### USAF Readiness Posture - Northeast Asia

#### 1 October 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>POSSESSED</th>
<th>READY</th>
<th>ALERT STATUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>475TFW</td>
<td>F-4C</td>
<td>Kunsan AB, Korea</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6 on SIOP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>475TFW</td>
<td>F-4C</td>
<td>Misawa AB, Japan</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>475TFW</td>
<td>F-4C</td>
<td>Taegu AB, Korea</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>347TFW</td>
<td>F-4C</td>
<td>Osan AB, Korea</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8 on SIOP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>347TFW</td>
<td>F-4C</td>
<td>Yokota AB, Japan</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48FIS</td>
<td>F-106A</td>
<td>Osan AB, Korea</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4 on 5 Min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18TFW</td>
<td>F-105D/F</td>
<td>Kadena AB, Okinawa</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10 on 30 Min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18TFW</td>
<td>F-105D/F</td>
<td>Kwang-Ju AB, Korea</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82FIS</td>
<td>F-102A</td>
<td>Suwon AB, Korea</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4 on 5 Min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>354TFW</td>
<td>F-100C/F</td>
<td>Kunsan AB, Korea</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>8 on 15 Min</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL:** 160 131

#### 1 December 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>POSSESSED</th>
<th>READY</th>
<th>ALERT STATUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>475TFW</td>
<td>F-4C</td>
<td>Kunsan AB, Korea</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6 on SIOP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>475TFW</td>
<td>F-4C</td>
<td>Misawa AB, Japan</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>475TFW</td>
<td>F-4C</td>
<td>Taegu AB, Korea</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>347TFW</td>
<td>F-4C</td>
<td>Osan AB, Korea</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8 on SIOP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>347TFW</td>
<td>F-4C</td>
<td>Yokota AB, Japan</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48FIS</td>
<td>F-106A</td>
<td>Osan AB, Korea</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4 on 5 Min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18TFW</td>
<td>F-105D/F</td>
<td>Kadena AB, Okinawa</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8 on 30 Min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18TFW</td>
<td>F-105D/F</td>
<td>Kwang-Ju AB, Korea</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82FIS</td>
<td>F-102A</td>
<td>Suwon AB, Korea</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4 on 5 Min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>354TFW</td>
<td>F-100C/F</td>
<td>Kunsan AB, Korea</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>8 on 15 Min</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL:** 178 145

**SOURCE:** PACAF Command Center
# UNCLASSIFIED

## GLOSSARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAA</td>
<td>Antiaircraft Artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AB</td>
<td>Air Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC&amp;W</td>
<td>Aircraft Control and Warning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Air Defense, Air Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADCC</td>
<td>Air Defense Control Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADIZ</td>
<td>Air Defense Intercept Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADVON</td>
<td>Advanced Echelon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFAG</td>
<td>Air Force Advisory Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFK</td>
<td>Air Forces Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFSC</td>
<td>Air Force Systems Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGE</td>
<td>Aerospace Ground Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGL</td>
<td>Above Ground Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGOS</td>
<td>Air Ground Operations System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIF</td>
<td>Automated Intelligence File</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALO</td>
<td>Air Liaison Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANG</td>
<td>Air National Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOB</td>
<td>Air Order of Battle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARDF</td>
<td>Airborne Radio Direction Finding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARPA</td>
<td>Advanced Research Project Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AW</td>
<td>Automatic Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>Close Air Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCL</td>
<td>Civilian Control Line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Commanding General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCONAD</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINPAC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINPACAF</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINPACFLT</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCUNC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, United Nations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCUSARPAC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMAFK</td>
<td>Commander Air Forces Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUSK</td>
<td>Commander, U.S. Forces Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Continental United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>Control Reporting Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CROL</td>
<td>COMUSKOREA Reconnaissance Objectives List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRP</td>
<td>Control Reporting Post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSAF</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CY</td>
<td>Calendar Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DASC</td>
<td>Direct Air Support Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DASF</td>
<td>Direct Air Support Flight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Direction Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCS</td>
<td>Defense Control System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIA</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIEE</td>
<td>Director of Estimates (Threat Analysis Division)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMZ</td>
<td>Demilitarized Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECCM</td>
<td>Electronic Counter Countermeasures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIFF</td>
<td>Electronic Identification Friend or Foe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELINT</td>
<td>Electronic Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUSA</td>
<td>Eighth U.S. Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EW</td>
<td>Early Warning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAC</td>
<td>Forward Air Controller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEBA</td>
<td>Forward Edge of the Battle Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIS</td>
<td>Fighter Interceptor Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOB</td>
<td>Forward Operating Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROKA</td>
<td>First Republic of Korea Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCI</td>
<td>Ground-Controlled Intercept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEEIA</td>
<td>Ground Electronics Engineering Installation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOJ</td>
<td>Government of Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDRF</td>
<td>Homeland Defense Reserve Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HF</td>
<td>High Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>Human Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFF</td>
<td>Identification Friend or Foe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IROL</td>
<td>Imagery Requirements Objective List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISA</td>
<td>International Security Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JASDF</td>
<td>Japan Air Self Defense Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSOP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Objectives Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTG</td>
<td>Joint Targeting Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KADS</td>
<td>Korean Air Defense System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>Killed in Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNP</td>
<td>Korean National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAAG</td>
<td>Military Assistance Advisory Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAP</td>
<td>Military Assistance Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>Military Construction Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>Master Direction Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDL</td>
<td>Military Demarcation Line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIBARS</td>
<td>Military Intelligence Battalion, Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIRV</td>
<td>Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MM</td>
<td>Millimeter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MND</td>
<td>Ministry of National Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTI</td>
<td>Moving Target Indication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTT</td>
<td>Mobile Training Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NK</td>
<td>North Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NKAFL</td>
<td>North Korean Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NM</td>
<td>Nautical mile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORAD</td>
<td>North American Air Defense Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OASD</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>Operational Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>Operations Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACAF</td>
<td>Pacific Air Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACFLT</td>
<td>Pacific Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>Pacific Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAR</td>
<td>Peacetime Airborne Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARPRO</td>
<td>Peacetime Airborne Reconnaissance Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHOTINT</td>
<td>Photographic Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td>Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>Patrol Torpedo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROKA</td>
<td>Republic of Korea Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROKAF</td>
<td>Republic of Korea Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROKF-V</td>
<td>Republic of Korea Forces, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROKG</td>
<td>Republic of Korea Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROKN</td>
<td>Republic of Korea Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RVN</td>
<td>Republic of Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>Surface to Air Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAW</td>
<td>Special Air Warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAWC</td>
<td>Special Air Warfare Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCAR</td>
<td>Strike Control and Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>Southeast Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>Signal Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIOP</td>
<td>Single Integrated Operations Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLAR</td>
<td>Side Looking Airborne Radar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SROKA</td>
<td>Second Republic of Korea Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACC</td>
<td>Tactical Air Control Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACP</td>
<td>Tactical Air Control Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACS</td>
<td>Tactical Air Control System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TARC</td>
<td>Tactical Air Reconnaissance Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDI</td>
<td>Target Data Inventory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEWS</td>
<td>Tactical Electronic Warfare System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFS</td>
<td>Tactical Fighter Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFW</td>
<td>Tactical Fighter Wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRS</td>
<td>Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUOC</td>
<td>Tactical Unit Operations Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UE</td>
<td>Unit Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USFJ</td>
<td>U.S. Forces Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USFK</td>
<td>U.S. Forces Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN</td>
<td>United States Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VR</td>
<td>Visual Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WESTPAC</td>
<td>Western Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WESTPACNORTH</td>
<td>Western Pacific, North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WRM</td>
<td>War Readiness Materiel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>