
Peter M. Swartz
with Karin Duggan
1. REPORT DATE  
DEC 2011

2. REPORT TYPE

3. DATES COVERED  
00-00-2011 to 00-00-2011

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

5b. GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5e. TASK NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S)

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)  
CNA Analysis & Solutions, 4825 Mark Center Dr, Alexandria, VA, 22311

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:  
a. REPORT  
unclassified  
b. ABSTRACT  
unclassified  
c. THIS PAGE  
unclassified

17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT  
Same as Report (SAR)

18. NUMBER OF PAGES  
52

19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)  
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
CNA is a not-for-profit organization whose professional staff of over 700 provides in-depth analysis and results-oriented solutions to help government leaders choose the best courses of action. Founded in 1942, CNA operates the Institute for Public Research and the Center for Naval Analyses, the federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps.

CNA Strategic Studies (CSS), created in 2000, conducts high-quality research on and analysis of issues of strategic, regional, and policy importance. CSS’ analyses are based on objective, rigorous examination and do not simply echo conventional wisdom. CSS provides analytic support to U.S. Government organizations and the governments of partner countries. CSS also maintains notable foundation-sponsored and self-initiated research programs. CSS includes a Strategic Initiatives Group, an International Affairs Group, and a Center for Stability and Development.

The Strategic Initiatives Group (SIG) looks at issues of U.S. national security, and military strategy, policy and operations, with a particular focus on maritime and naval aspects. SIG employs experts in historical analyses, futures planning, and long-term trend analysis based on scenario planning, to help key decision makers plan for the future. SIG specialties also include issues related to regional and global proliferation, deterrence theory, threat mitigation, and strategic planning for combating threats from weapons of mass destruction.

The Strategic Studies Division is led by Vice President and Director Dr. Eric V. Thompson, who is available at 703-824-2243 and on e-mail at thompsoe@cna.org. The executive assistant to the Vice President and Director is Ms. Rebecca Martin, at 703-824-2604.

The principal author of this study thanks especially Karin Duggan for graphic assistance; Loretta Ebner for administrative assistance; Gregory Kaminski, Laurie Ann Lakatosh, and Rhea Stone for library assistance; and Dana Smith and Anwar Fry for production assistance. A full listing of substantive contributors can be found in Peter M. Swartz and Karin Duggan, *U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts: Introduction and Background: Volume I*, (D0026421.A1, December 2011). A full listing of all volumes in the CNA Navy Strategy series can be found on the inside back cover of this document.

Approved for distribution: December 2011

Dr. W. Eugene Cobble, Jr.
Director, Strategic Initiatives Group

This document represents the best opinion of the author at the time of issue. It does not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department of the Navy.

Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited.
Copies of this document can be obtained through the Defense Technical Information Center at www.dtic.mil or contact CNA Document Control and Distribution Section at 703-824-2123.

Copyright © 2012 CNA
This work was created in the performance of Federal Government Contract Number N00014-11-D-0323. Any copyright in this work is subject to the Government's Unlimited Rights license as defined in DFARS 252.227-7013 and/or DFARS 252.227-7014. The reproduction of this work for commercial purposes is strictly prohibited. Nongovernmental users may copy and distribute this document in any medium, either commercially or noncommercially, provided that this copyright notice is reproduced in all copies. Nongovernmental users may not use technical measures to obstruct or control the reading or further copying of the copies they make or distribute. Nongovernmental users may not accept compensation of any manner in exchange for copies. All other rights reserved.
Contents

- CNO ADM Carlisle Trost (1986-1990) ............ 3
- The Maritime Strategy ................................. 5
  - The Maritime Strategy (SECRET brief)
  - The Maritime Strategy (SECRET pub)
  - The Amphibious Warfare Strategy (SECRET pub)
  - The Maritime Strategy (SECRET pub revision)
  - The Maritime Strategy (UNCLAS booklet)
  - “Looking Beyond the Maritime Strategy” (UNCLAS article)
  - The Maritime Strategy (SECRET pub revision)
  - “Maritime Strategy for the 1990s” (UNCLAS article)
- Companion reference on USN 1980s documents . . 47

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

- Signed by:
  - CNO ADM James D. Watkins
  - CNO ADM Carlisle A.H. Trost

- Amphibious Warfare Strategy signed by:
  - CNO ADM James D. Watkins
  - CMC Gen Paul X. Kelley

- “600-ship Navy” companion piece signed by:
  - SECNAV John F. Lehman, Jr.
ADM James D. Watkins (CNO Jun 1982-Jun 1986)

- May 1984  *The Maritime Strategy* (SECRET pub)
- Jun 1985  *The Amphibious Warfare Strategy* (SECRET pub)
- Nov 1985  *The Maritime Strategy* (SECRET pub rev.)

1st Submariner CNO since ADM Nimitz (1945-7)
Served under President Reagan, SECDEF Weinberger, SECNAV Lehman
Had been CNO ADM Hayward’s VCNO
*The Maritime Strategy*
- Developed by his flag officers & staff, in 1st 2 years in office
- During last 2 years, he embraced and used it, himself
- By end of his term, he considered it his chief legacy
ADM James D. Watkins (CNO Jun 1982-Jun 1986)

- Signature programs:
  - Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
    - Influential advocate at national policy level
  - Navy OPTEMPO & PERSTEMPO rules
- Became Bush administration Secretary of Energy (1989-93)


- Jan 1987 “Looking Beyond the Maritime Strategy” (UNCLAS USNI Proceedings article)
- Feb 1989 *The Maritime Strategy* (SECRET pub revised)
- May 1990 “Maritime Strategy for the 1990s” (UNCLAS USNI Proceedings article)

- Submariner
- Had been Olmsted Scholar (U of Freiburg)
- Provided continuity; served during transitions:
  - Reagan-to-Bush; Weinberger-to-Carlucci-to-Cheney;
    Lehman-to-Webb-to-Ball-to-Garrett
- Signature policy as CNO:
  - Mobilizing & maintaining tough US government resistance to Soviet diplomatic offensive to impose limitations on USN through new naval arms control measures
- Visited Soviet Union (Oct 1989)


- Significant Navy program oversight and analysis experience (OP-96; OP-090)
- Had participated in development of *The Maritime Strategy* as VADM (OP-090)
- As CNO, endorsed staff & fleet initiatives to promulgate & test *The Maritime Strategy*
- Sought at times to “bring the debate indoors”
- Periodically tasked and signed out updated concepts, within original *Maritime Strategy* framework, including “the last word” in 1990
The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

Overview
- Signed by CNOs ADMs Watkins & Trost
- Coordinated with SECNAVs & CMCs
- Primary targets: Numerous, esp. USN officers, Soviets
- Billed as a “strategy”
- Drafted in OPNAV Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603)
- Key idea: The U.S. Navy makes a strategic difference
  - Across the Peace-Crisis-War spectrum
  - In 3-phase global forward offensive campaign vs. Soviet Union, allies & clients, as part of joint, allied global war
- Laid out uncertainties
- Highly influential

What it was (I)
- Billed as a “Strategy”
  - US Naval Institute styled 1st UNCLAS version a “White Paper”
  - “Maritime component of national military strategy”
- CNO ADM Watkins called it a “strategic vision” in his sidebar to his Proceedings article
- Consolidation of existing thinking. Not a vision
- Explanation of use of current forces
- Told a story; provided a narrative
The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

What it was (II)

- Published: Multi-media:
  - 1st 2 years: SECRET briefing (lingua franca of the Pentagon)
  - Included 8 successive CNO-signed official versions
    - SECRET versions: 70 to 87 to 70 to 51 pages
    - Amphibious Warfare Strategy: 47 pages
    - UNCLAS versions: 40 pages; then 4 & 9 pages
    - Central CNO Watkins article: 16 pages
  - Cited but not reprinted verbatim in annual CNO Reports (“posture statements”)
  - A “work in progress” throughout its lifetime

Why it was written (I)

- To achieve consensus within Navy on USN rationale
- To show USN vital relevance to conflict with Soviets, primarily through forward, global, offensive, joint & allied naval operations, especially in Pacific, on European flanks, & against Soviet ocean bastions
- To deter Soviets through communicating to them USN capabilities & intentions
- To show fit between Reagan Administration national security policies & USN recommended strategy, especially to Congress
- To underpin arguments for the Reagan Administration “600-ship Navy” building program, especially CVNs
- To influence development of USN POMs and budgets
The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

Why it was written (II)
- To incorporate new intelligence community view of Soviet naval capabilities & intentions
- To counter SECNAV Lehman arguments that USN officer corps had no strategy
- To educate the OPNAV staff on wider world of joint & USN intelligence, strategic plans & policy
  - Driver for OP-06 AO drafters
- To vet fleet & CNO SSG operational & tactical-based inputs
- To identify & spur internal Navy addressal of “uncertainties”
- Primary targets: Numerous, but esp. USN officer corps

Context (I)
- CNOs ADMs Watkins (1982-86) & Trost (1986-90) (submariners)
- VCNO ADM Small (1981-3)
- USN ASW prowess peaked
- Agreed new US intelligence on Soviet Navy
- New systems & tactics entering fleet, especially AAW, ASW, ASUW, strike
The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

Context (II)
- CWC concept institutionalized in the fleet
- Naval Strike Warfare Center (“Strike U”) established at NAS Fallon (1984)
- USN SEAD capabilities improved
- Soviet submarines becoming progressively quieter
- USN FLEXOPS deployment policy (1982-5)
- USN OPTEMPO & PERSTEMPO goals (from 1986 on)

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

Context (III)
- Navy Long Range Planners Conferences & unofficial “Navy Study Groups”
- OP-00X (Long-Range Planning) created (1980)
  - USN Long-Range Planners Conferences (1985-9)
- Advanced Technology Panel (ATP) re-directed (1981)
- SECNAV Lehman shut down OPNAV campaign analysis & Net Assessment efforts (1981)
  - OP-96 (Systems Analysis) became OP-91 (Program Resource Appraisal)
  - OPNAV Office of Net Assessment abolished
The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

Context (IV)

- NAVWARCOL Center for Naval Warfare Studies (CNWS) (created 1981)
  - Director: Bob Murray
- CNO ADM Hayward created Strategic Studies Group (SSG) under CNWS (1981)
  - Director: Former UNDERSECNAV Bob Murray
  - “To make captains of ships into captains of war”
  - SCI access; well-funded & staffed
  - SSG I SCI games yielded preferred USN CONOPs (1982)
    - Defeat Soviets at sea, combined arms, attrite SSBNs
    - Widely briefed to USN leadership
- NWC Global War Games continued, expanded
  - Focus on superpower war (through 1988)

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

Context (V)

- Context shifted during 1980s
  - Phase I: 1981-1986
  - Phase II: 1986-1988
  - Phase III: 1988-1990
- The Maritime Strategy reflected these shifts
  - 1st, 2nd, 3rd, Amphibious, UNCLAS editions (1982-6)
  - UNCLAS article (1987)
The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

Context (VI): Phase I: Early 1980s (thru Jan 1986)


- Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty (1979)
- Formal USN Freedom of Navigation challenge ops (FONOPS) (from 1979)
- Increased USN visibility in late Carter Admin. defense plans, due to emerging salience of SWA (1979-81)
  - Congress put CVN-71 into FY 80 budget (1979)
  - President Carter did not veto this time
  - Desert One debacle (1980)
  - New RDJTF included significant USN forces
- Polish “Solidarity” Crisis; martial rule (1980-81)
- US voters repudiated Carter administration (Nov 1980)


- New Reagan administration (1981-89)
  - New SECDEF Weinberger
  - New SECNAV Lehman (1981-87)
  - Large defense budget increases; soaring U.S. gov’t deficit spending
  - Anti-Soviet policies, rhetoric
  - President rejected LOS seabed mining terms; would not sign
- CNO ADM Hayward expanded OPNAV OP-095 mandate from ASW to encompass all Navy warfare areas (1980)
  - Moved responsibility for naval warfare program planning from OP-96 to OP-095.
  - OP-96-led Naval Warfare CPAMs became OP-095-led Naval Warfare Appraisals (initially, for POM-83, in 1980)
  - OP-96 retained responsibility for readiness, sustainability, support CPAMs.
The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

Context (VIII): Phase I: Early 1980s (cont)

- UK-Argentine Falklands War (Apr-Jun 1982)
  - RN SSN sank Argentine cruiser
  - Argentine air-launched anti-ship *Exocet* missile sank RN destroyer

- Small-scale real-world ops in Middle East & Caribbean
  - Libya a/c shoot-down (1981); Grenada intervention (1983), Lebanon intervention (1982-3); Med hijacker force-down (1985); US assistance to Central American anti-communist forces

- Terrorist incidents
  - Shiites destroyed USMC, French barracks in Beirut (1983)
  - Covert Libyan mining of Red Sea choke points (1984-5)
  - Hezbollah hijacked TWA flight. USN diver killed (1985)
  - Libyans, PLF hijacked *Achille Lauro* cruise ship (1985)

- PRC hostility to Soviets; fear of Soviet amphibious invasion

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

Context (IX): Phase I: Early-1980s (cont)

- US economy in recession; pulling out of from Nov 1982)
- High U.S. government deficit spending
- Reagan defense budget increases (1981-5); included 600-ship Battle Force goal

- DON annual budgets, USN force levels rising
  - USN in 1981: 490 battle force ships
  - USN by 1987: 568 battle force ships

- Some unfavorable Navy publicity (1985)
  - “$600 toilet seat” acquisition scandal
    - Item in question was actually entire shroud assembly for P-3 a/c
  - Walker family Navy spy ring arrested for spying for Soviets
  - Naval intelligence analyst Jonathan Pollard arrested for spying for Israel
The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

Context (X): Phase I: Early-1980s (cont)
- President Reagan “Evil Empire” speech (Mar 1983)
- Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) (1983)
  - CNO ADM Watkins, RADM Holland, CAPT Brooks, etc.
- US deployed GLCMs & IRBMs to Europe (1983)
  - Triggered so-called Soviet Navy “analogous response” Delta II-class SSBNs deployed off US coasts (1984-7)
- Soviets shot down ROK civilian airliner KAL-007 (1983)
- Soviet “Able Archer” NATO exercise war scare (1983)
- President Reagan re-elected (1984)
- Push for increased US jointness
  - Standup of USCENTCOM (1983), USSPACECOM (1985),
  - USN vainly opposed all

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

Context (XI): Phase II: Mid-1980s (1986-8)
- UNCLAS CNO ADM Trost Maritime Strategy article (1987)
  - US economy growing
  - Gorbachev became GS CPSU (1985)
  - Reagan-Gorbachev Geneva summit meeting (Nov 1985)
  - Reagan-Gorbachev Reykjavik summit meeting (Oct 1986)
    - Failed to agree on arms control & SDI
The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

Context (XII): Phase II: Mid-1980s (1986-8) (cont)

- UNCLAS CNO ADM Trost Maritime Strategy article (1987)
  - INF negotiations led to INF Treaty (1985-7)
    - Eliminated all IRBMs & GLCMs on both sides
    - 1st nuclear agreement w/ intrusive inspections
  - Reagan to Gorbachev: “Tear down this wall” (1987)
  - Increased Soviet push for naval arms control agreements limiting US Navy
    - Gorbachev “Murmansk Speech” pro-Arctic arms control (Oct 1987)
  - PRC no longer feared Soviet invasion (from 1985)

Context (XIII): Phase II: Mid-1980s (1986-8) (cont)

- Continued small-scale real-world ops in Middle East
  - Libya strikes (1986); Persian Gulf “Tanker War” ops (1984-8)
- USN force levels stable; DON budgets peaked (1985) & plateaued (1985-88)
  - USN in 1987: 568 battle force ships (post-Vietnam War peak)
  - USN in 1989: 565 battle force ships
- Push for increased US jointness continued
  - Goldwater-Nichols Act 1986
  - Standup of USSOCCOM & USTRANSCOM (1987)
  - USN vainly opposed all
- Continued terrorist incidents
- Iran-Contra Affair: NSA VADM Poindexter resigned (1986)
- Commander, US Third Fleet shifted flag from ashore HQ to USS Coronado (AGF 11) (1986)
- USN 6-month routine forward deployment length rule imposed (1986)
The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

♦ UNCLAS Maritime Strategy article (1990)
  ♦ George H.W. Bush elected president (Nov 1988)
    ♦ New administration (Jan 1989)
  ♦ Rapid SECNAV turnovers
    ♦ John Lehman (resigned 1987)
    ♦ James Webb (1987-88)
      ♦ Resigned to protest SECDEF Navy force level cuts & de facto abandonment of 600-Ship Navy goal
    ♦ Will Ball (1988-89)
    ♦ Lawrence Garrett (1989-92)

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

♦ Context (XV): Phase III: Late-1980s (1988-90) (cont)
  ♦ Soaring U.S. government deficit spending
  ♦ US Navy force levels, DON annual budgets dropping
    ♦ USN in 1989: 566 battle force ships
    ♦ USN in 1990: 547 battle force ships
  ♦ Continued small-scale real-world ops
    ♦ “Tanker War” (1984-8): Libya a/c shoot-down (1989);
      Panama intervention (1989-90); Liberia embassy protection,
      NEO(1990)
    ♦ Soviet Navy warships bumped USN FONOPS warships in Black Sea (1988)
The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

Context (XVI): Phase III: Late-1980s (1988-90) (cont)

- Continued Soviet push for naval arms control agreements limiting USN
- Continued terrorist attacks
  - Naples USO bombing. USN sailor killed (1988)
  - Libyans bombed PANAM flight over Scotland (1988)
  - Arab terror attack on cruise ship south of Athens (1988)
- Spate of unfavorable USN publicity
  - USS Vincennes (CG-49) shoot-down of Iranian airliner (1988)
  - Former National Security Advisor VADM John Poindexter USN indicted for role in Iran-Contra Affair (1988)
  - USS Iowa (BB-61) turret explosion, investigation (1989)
    - Female midshipman chained to a urinal

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

Context (XVII): Phase III: Late-1980s (cont)

- PLA occupied some Spratly Islands; PLAN defeated Vietnamese Navy in South China Sea battle (1988)
- Soviet retreat from Afghanistan (1988-9)
- Non-Communist government in Poland (1989)
- PLAN deployed 1st SSBN, launched 1st SLBM (1988)
- PRC Tiananmen Square massacre (Jun 1989)
  - US suspended all arms sales and military contacts with China
- US, Soviets agree to avoid future Black Sea FON incidents (Sep 1989)
- CNO ADM Trost visited Soviet Union (Oct 1989)
- Berlin Wall down (Nov 1989)
- Operation Just Cause (Panama) (1989-90)
- Bush-Gorbachev at-sea “Malta Summit” (Dec 1989)
- CFE Treaty signed; Germany reunified (1990)
The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

♦ Cited references (I)

♦ Alliances & treaties
♦ US Reply to NATO Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ)
♦ Title 10 of the U.S. Code
♦ National Security Decision Directives (NSDDs)
  ♦ NSDD-32 U.S. National Security Strategy (Mar 1982)
    ♦ Superseded PD 18 US National Strategy (Aug 1977)

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

♦ Cited references (II)

♦ Defense Guidance (DG)
♦ Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD)
♦ Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)
♦ Unified & specified commander (CINC) plans
♦ CNO-CSAF MOA (1982)
♦ CNO-CCG MOA (MARDEZ) (1984)
♦ CSA-CSAF MOA (1985)
♦ Escort Requirements Study (1982)
♦ Included annotated bibliography (1986)
The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

♦ Context: Other contemporary publications (I)
  ♦ NATO MC 14/3 *Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area* (1968)
  ♦ NATO MC 48/3 *Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area* (1969)
  ♦ Flexible response
  ♦ Robert Komer et al., *Alliance Defense in the 1980s (RAND)* (Nov 1976)
  ♦ NSDM 344 “Navy Shipbuilding Program” (1977)
  ♦ Last Carter Administration budget (1981)
    ♦ Turnaround: Call for strong carrier strike force (for SWA)
  ♦ President Reagan “Evil Empire” speech (Mar 1983)

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

♦ Context: Other contemporary publications (II)
  ♦ Stockholm Agreement (CSBMs) (1986)
    ♦ Included naval CSBMs when linked to ground ops
    ♦ Superseded by Vienna Document (1990)
  ♦ NIE 11-15-84/D *Soviet Naval Strategy and Programs through the 1990s* (Mar 1985)
The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

- Context: Other contemporary publications (III)
    - 6 requirements to be met before US forces committed
    - Major contributions by Military Assistant LTG Colin Powell USA
    - Reaction to disastrous USMC intervention in Lebanon (1983)
  - Forces for Unified Commands memorandum (Feb 1987)
  - JCS Pub 26 Joint Doctrine for Counter Operations (includes JFACC) (1986)
  - CINC & Navy component plans & CONOPS
    - ADM Long PACOM Campaign Plan (1982)
  - CINC CONOPS briefs to CJCS GEN Vessey (1982)
  - Iklé, Holloway et al, Discriminate Deterrence (1988)

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

- Context: Other contemporary publications (IV)
  - Project SIXTY (1970)
  - NWP 1 (1978)
  - Sea Plan 2000 (1978)
  - Other SECNAV Lehman speeches interviews, articles, testimony (1981+)
  - Strategic Studies Group (SSG) reports & briefings (1982-89)
    - Esp. Owens-Cebrowski SSG I game brief (1982)
  - DON, Lessons of the Falklands (1983)
  - “DON Lift 1” & “DON Lift 2” studies (1983, 1990)
The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

Context: Other contemporary publications (V)
- CSFL/C2F/CJTF 120 “Fighting Instructions” (1982-89)
- CINCPACFLT & other fleet “Fighting Instructions”
- CNA studies
  - Soviet Navy policy, strategy & doctrine studies
  - Outer Air Battle study (1981-3)
  - Northern Region Warfare Assessments campaign analyses (1983-6)
  - USN presence & responses to crises studies
  - USN outer air battle studies
  - Offensive Mining Study
- Navy Strategic Planning Experiment (NSPE) “Maritime Balance Study” (1979)

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

Context: Other contemporary publications (VI)
- Omnibus Agreement for Command and Control of Marine TacAir in Sustained Operations Ashore (1986)
The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

♦ Context: Other contemporary publications (VII)
  ♦ Paul Nitze et al, Securing the Seas (1979)
  ♦ OSD/NA Navy Strategic Planning Experiment
    “Maritime Balance study” (1979)
  ♦ Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave (1980)
  ♦ Alva Bowen, Ron O’ Rourke CRS reports

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

♦ Context: Other contemporary publications (VIII)
  ♦ Gen Sir John Hackett
    ♦ The Third World War, August 1985 (1978)
    ♦ The Third World War, The Untold Story (1982)
  ♦ Tom Clancy
    ♦ The Hunt for Red October (1984)
    ♦ Red Storm Rising (1986)
  ♦ Movie “Top Gun” (1986)
  ♦ Cher, USS Missouri (BB-63) music video “If I Could Turn Back time” (1989)
The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

♦ Context: Other contemporary publications (IX)
  ♦ Col John Boyd, briefings on defense reform, maneuver warfare, OODA Loop (1980s)
  ♦ Will become *Masks of War* (1989)

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

♦ Context: Other contemporary publications (X)
  ♦ Morton Halperin et al., *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (1974)
  ♦ ADM (Ret) Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., *On Watch* (1976)
  ♦ CAPT Wayne Hughes, *Fleet Tactics* (1986)
  ♦ RADM Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Problem of Asia and its Effect upon International Politics* (1900)
The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

How it was written (I)

- An organic process. No master POA&M
- Socialization throughout Navy staffs of “Sea Strike”, Sea Plan 2000, ADM Hayward strategy, SSG I briefings, new intelligence assessments, Global War Game insights, new PACOM/PACFLT & LANTCOM/LANTFLT warfighting concepts, etc. (1978-82)
- Initial SECNAV Lehman pronouncements on strategy (1981-2)
  - “Strategy . . . had to be my business”
  - “Strategy is the logical set of allocations and priorities that guide how the Navy Department spends its money and trains its people”
  - “Hail the Return of Strategy” speech (NAWWARCOL 1981)

How it was written (II)

- ENS David Rosenberg USNR Project SIXTY analysis for CDR Harlan Ullman (OP-965) (Jul 1982)
  - Showed utility of such a document
- VCNO ADM Bill Small Aug 1982 tasker: A document to kick off/ inform OPNAV POM-85 force structure decisions
- Based on “Bottom-up” fleet inputs: ADMs Long/ Hayward/ Train PACOM/PACFLT & LANTCOM/LANTFLT war plan concepts of operations
- CNO ADM Watkins initially a customer, not an author
- Personalities (& interactions): Many (West, Hayward, Train, Long, Lehman, Murray, Inman, Haver, Hay, Watkins, Small, Ullman, Moreau, Lyons, Mustin, Larson, Pendley, etc.)
The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

How it was written (III)

- “Hand-picked” OPNAV Strategy & Concepts Branch (OP-603) drafted & briefed successive unsigned SECRET briefings, revisions (Fall 1982 through Fall 1983), to lead POM-85 & -86 development discussions
- Widely vetted. Inputs:
  - Existing CINC & NCC OPLAN & CONPLAN CONOPs
  - Intel community, SSGs 1 & 2, NWC Global War Games
  - Fleet experience & inputs: Operations, exercises, advanced trng
  - CNA: Analyses, tactics, Sovietology
  - Perception management: Bill Manthorpe
  - OPNAV OP-095 (To ensure “fit” with POM development)
- Formal CNO-signed SECRET document finally gelled by May 1984

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

How it was written (IV)

- Debated in unofficial DC-area “Navy Study Group” (1983-5) convened by CDR Jim Stark (Ph.D. Fletcher)
- Various UNCLAS briefs, articles written in 1985
- Naval War College UNCLAS Maritime Strategy seminar with proponents & leading academic critics (Apr 1985)
  - Esp. CAPT Linton Brooks (pro); Dr. John Mearsheimer (con)
- CNO ADM Watkins tasked OP-00K to draft UNCLAS version (published Jan 1986)
- CNO ADM Watkins announced drafting of UNCLAS version at International Seapower Symposium (ISS) in Newport RI (Nov 1985)
- Anti-SSBN ops, rationale not explicit until CNO ADM Watkins decision Dec 1985
The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

♦ How it was written (V)
  ♦ Efforts at higher levels of classification
  ♦ Spin-off strategies drafted
  ♦ Strategy conferences with USA & USAF
  ♦ USN-initiated strategy officer exchange w/ USA, USAF
  ♦ Semi-official history published
  ♦ Annotated bibliography tracked & debated issues
  ♦ Related unofficial outside publications actively encouraged

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

♦ How it was written: Drafters (I)
  ♦ Initial Nov 1982 SECRET brief to kick off POM-85 development
    ♦ Principal drafters: CDR Spence Johnson  
      (Fletcher MA); LCDR Stan Weeks  
      (American U Ph.D.)
    ♦ Inputs from CAPT Bill Manthorpe  
      (Ex-Net Assess; GWU MA)
      CDR Ken McGruther  
      (SSG staff; Brown U MA)
    ♦ Branch Head oversight CAPT Bill Garrett  
      (SAIS Ph.D.)
      CAPT Betsy Wylie  
      (Fletcher Ph.D.)
    ♦ Later enhancements CDR Tom Marfiak  
      (Fletcher MA)
The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

How it was written: Drafters (II)

- May 1984 SECRET Pub
  - Principal drafters: CAPT Roger Barnett (USC Ph.D.)
    CDR Peter Swartz (SAIS, Columbia MAs)
  - Assist from CDR Jim Stark (Fletcher Ph.D.)
    (Sea Plan 2000 team)
  - Inputs from SSGs, fleets, Intel, etc.
  - Intentionally eye-catching bright yellow cover

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

How it was written: Drafters (III)

- Principal drafters:
  - May 1985 SECRET Amphibious Warfare Strategy
    CAPT Larry Seaquist
    Col Phil Harrington (Roots in SSG effort)
  - Nov 1985 SECRET Pub Rev
    CAPT Larry Seaquist
    CDR T. Wood Parker
### The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

#### How it was written: Drafters (IV)

- **Principal drafters:**
  - Jan 1986 UNCLAS Booklet
    - CNO Watkins text:
      - CAPT Linton Brooks
      - CDR Robby Harris
    - CMC Kelley & O’Donnell text:
      - Maj Hugh O’Donnell
    - SECNAV Lehman text:
      - Dr. Harvey Sicherman
      - CAPT Peter Swartz
  - Artwork, photos, captions:
    - CAPT Peter Swartz
    - Fred Rainbow
    (Naval Institute Proceedings Editor-in-Chief)

#### How it was written: Drafters (V)

- **Principal drafters:**
  - Jan 1987 UNCLAS article
  - Feb 1989 SECRET Pub rev.
    - CNO Trost tasker directed rewrite
      - CDR Mitch Brown
      - (OP-603)
  - May 1990 UNCLAS article
    - CNO OP-00K staff
  - All 3 UNCLAS versions professionally edited by US Naval Institute Proceedings staff
  - Classified naval special warfare strategy – nicknamed “SEALSTRAT” – also drafted & signed
  - Unsigned “LOGSTRAT” effort also undertaken
The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

How it was written: USN-USMC coordination (I)
- SSG included USMC members from the start
- HQMC staff officers LtCol Tom Wilkerson USMC & Maj Tony Wood USMC actively participated in drafting early SECRET versions
- Col Phil Harrington USMC wrote *The Amphibious Warfare Strategy* (SECRET) with CAPT Seaquist

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

How it was written: USN-USMC coordination (II)
- CMC Al Gray, PP&O LtGen Carl Mundy inputted, chopped on 1989 SECRET version, signed by CNO ADM Carl Trost
- OP-603 incl/ USMC (& USA & USAF) AOs in mid-late 1980s
- But CMC almost never a co-equal signatory
- USCG inputs sought & used
  - Via USCG AO assigned to OPNAV OP-60 staff
  - COMDT COGARD not directly involved
The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

- How it was written: Semi-official documents (I)
  - VADM Hank Mustin, The Role of the Navy and Marines in the Norwegian Sea,” (Mar-Apr 1986 NWCR article)
  - “600-Ship Navy & The Maritime Strategy” (1986 HASC print)
    - 3-part presentation: Strategy; 600-Ship Navy; Affordability
  - CAPT Linton Brooks, “Naval Power and National Security” (Fall 1986 International Security article)

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

- How it was written: Semi-official documents (II)
  - CAPT Tom Daly, CDR Al Myers, CDR Chris McMurray, “The Maritime Strategy” (1986 UNCLAS CHINFO video)
The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

- How it was written: Semi-official documents (III)
  - John Hattendorf, “The Evolution of the Maritime Strategy” (Summer 1988 *NWCR* article; SECRET study)

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

- Activity at higher levels of classification (I)
  - New intelligence community views of Soviet Navy concepts & intentions
    - DDCI VADM Inman
    - DNIs RADMs Shapiro, Butts, Brooks
    - Rich Haver
      - New NIEs on Soviet Navy; downgraded to SECRET in 1983
  - VCNO efforts (ADM William Small & successors)
  - DNI & DNW (OP-095) efforts (RADM Shapiro & VADM McKee & successors)
The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

- Activity at higher levels of classification (II)
  - Advanced Technology Panel (ATP) (1975-1990)
    - Pre-1981: Assessments of specific threats & programs
    - Post-1981: Discussion of broad policy issues
      - E.g.: SSBN security, anti-SSBN & maritime campaigns, value of EW, perception management & technology transfer
  - Senior flags “Board of Directors” under VCNO ADM Small & successors (from 1981)
  - ATP Rump: Principal sub-panel (from 1981)
  - ATP Soviet strategy study group (from 1982)
  - ATP Working Group (from 1984)
    - CAPT Linton Brooks et al.
  - War gaming support

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

- Activity at higher levels of classification (III)
  - NAVWARCOL Newport war gaming support
  - ONI Det NFOIO-05 (from 1977)
  - CNO Strategic Studies Group (SSG) access (from 1981)
  - War Plans changes
  - CAPT (Ret) Bill Manthorpe as liaison with Navy SECRET & UNCLAS Maritime Strategy efforts, prior to 1985
  - OP-603 direct participation in ATP from 1985 on (CAPT Seaquist (prior access through SSG))
The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

- OPNAV officers actively encouraged related unofficial outside publications

- Sought to build a supportive literature on US naval strategy

---

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

- Outline (UNCLAS 1986 “White paper”)
  - “The Maritime Strategy” (CNO ADM Watkins article)
    - National Military Strategy and the Maritime Role
    - The Era of Violent Peace
    - Soviet Military Strategy
    - The Maritime Strategy: Peacetime Presence
    - The Maritime Strategy: Crisis Response
    - The Maritime Strategy: Warfighting
    - Maritime Strategy and War Termination
    - Executing the Maritime Strategy
    - Summary
The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

Key ideas (I)
- Maritime component of national military strategy
- Consolidate & organize existing USN views
- Peace, crises, war, war termination
  - Not just warfighting. “Violent Peace”
  - Peace-crises-war spectrum borrowed from *Sea Plan 2000*
- Explained how USN would actually be used in war
- Global, forward, joint, combined offensive ops vs. Soviet Union, allies & clients
  - Not just vs. Soviet Navy
  - 3 phases. Horizontal escalation options
- US naval operations “make the strategic difference”

Key ideas (II)
- ADM Turner’s terms used as vocabulary, not as a framework
- Sea control a secondary means. Power projection the primary means
  - But priority to ASW (in 1987)
- Adopted *NWP 1* warfare tasks vocabulary: AAW, ASW, etc.
  - Explicit & deliberate use as organizing concept: 1984-6
  - Fit with OPNAV “warfare appraisal” programming process
  - Fit with fleet CWC warfighting concept
  - Implicit primacy of strike warfare
- Showed global campaign, with geography & sequence
- Told a “story;” provided a “narrative”
Key ideas (III)

- USN officers should think deeply about their service
- Rooted in current force levels, not future plans, programs or visions
- Very joint (coordinated, not integrated); very allied
- Included discussion of “uncertainties”
- Consideration of USN strategy should be integrated into annual OPNAV POM development process

Key ideas (IV)

- Future war with Soviets the central planning case
  - Reflected war planning & fleet exercises
  - USN Pacific posture to attack Soviets, influence China role
    - Pacific region priority increased in 1989
    - Soviet bastions attacked to eliminate planned Soviet SSBN strategic reserves, alter “correlation of forces”
  - IAW new agreed intelligence on Soviets
    - Deep intelligence penetration of Soviets

- Management of Soviet perceptions
  - Signaled that USN knew how they planned to fight, & would deal with it

- Increasing recognition of important non-Soviet threats (1986-90)
The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

Key ideas (V)

- Showed how all the players might play
  - USN LANT-MED-PAC-IO-CARIB forces
  - USN above-the-line & below-the-line forces
  - Sealift and pre-positioning forces
  - USMC & USCG
  - USAF & USA
  - Allied & friendly navies and other armed forces
  - “Neutrals” (like China)
- Showed how new kinds of force packages might play
  - BBSAGs, MARDEZs, MPSRONs

Key ideas (VI)

- Some discussion of “littoral” operations
  - Only in The Amphibious Warfare Strategy (1985)
  - Cited as a US Army responsibility (1984-5)
- FLEXOPS policy optimized & balanced peacetime forward deployment scheduling (1984-5)
- Naval forces prevent major global war through controlling crises & containing limited wars (from 1985)
- Incorporated USMC OTH & pre-positioning concepts
The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

Key ideas (VII)

- “Sealift” as “3rd primary mission of the Navy” (1986)
  - Along with “sea control” and “power projection”
- Sealift given ample coverage in slides & text
- But . . . implications of The Maritime Strategy:
  - Soviets to be held at bay well north of SLOCs
  - Downgraded anticipated Soviet threat to SLOCs
  - Reduced perceived need for replacements for attrited merchant shipping
  - Dovetailed with Reagan Administration policies to avoid subsidizing the US civilian Merchant Marine

Key ideas (VIII)

- 3 principles of naval strategy (1990)
  - Deterrence
  - Forward deployment
  - Alliances
CONTRIBUTIONS TO WAR TERMINATION

**U.S./ALLIES**
- Strategy successful
- Global coalition intact
- Strategic reserve intact
- Industrial base intact
- Viable naval forces in being
  - Must sustain forward global presence

**SOVIETS**
- Strategy Defeated
- Fleet Neutralized

Naval support to NATO operations in central region
Naval operation on maritime flanks

---

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

Was not:
- USN go-it-alone
- Blue-water, open ocean, sea control focused
- Only about war fighting
- Single CVBG operations only
- The product of a carefully orchestrated CHINFO campaign
- Solely the product of SECNAV Lehman
- Merely an ex post facto justification for the 600-ship Navy
- Without significant USMC or USCG input
- Unconnected to national strategy
These later characterizations based on:

- Not actually having read it (or Hattendorf book) or Reagan National Security Strategy
- Perception that any single-service product must be an argument at the expense of the other services and the joint commanders
- Simultaneous strong & public SECNAV & Navy anti-Goldwater-Nichols stance
- Perceived need by later naval strategists to characterize earlier efforts as obsolete
- USMC 1990s agenda to emphasize non-global-war nature of USMC capabilities & operations

What was new? (I)

- Integration of anti-SSBN campaign & all other naval campaigns into a coherent conceptual whole
- Public discussion of anti-SSBN campaign (from 1986 on)
- Mention of forward peacetime submarine intelligence-gathering operations (in 1989)
- Centrality of far forward campaigns vs. Soviets & downgrading of mid-ocean operations, in light of new intelligence community view of Soviet capabilities & intentions
- Mention of naval arms control (if only in passing)
  - As a Soviet agenda
  - Only in 1989-90
- Mention of forward peacetime submarine intelligence-gathering operations (in 1989)
The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

**What was new? (II)**

- Significant discussion of roles of:
  - US Coast Guard (from 1984 on)
  - Sealift (from 1984 on)
  - Allied & friendly land-based TACAIR (from 1984 on)
  - Wartime US coastal defense (from 1984 on)
  - Terrorism as a threat (from 1984 on)
  - Fanatics & insurgents as threats (1987)
  - Drug trafficking as a threat (from 1989 on)
  - Non-state actions as a threat category (from 1989 on)
  - “Non-state actions” mentioned as a threat (1989)

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

**What was new? (III)**

- Comprehensive drawing together of many previous & current campaign strands
- Versions signed by 2 CNOs in a row
- Formal place for strategy presentation & debate in Navy PPBS system (“Maritime Strategy CPAM”)
- Multimedia effort
- Tracking the debate on the strategy, to help ascertain effects
- Recording the history of its development, to help capture lessons learned
The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

- Not addressed
  - Sea-based ballistic missile defense
  - Counterinsurgency, irregular warfare, anti-piracy ops
  - Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
  - Homeland defense besides in US coastal waters
  - Maritime security, interdiction, interception ops
  - US Navy as an “enabling” force for other services
  - US Navy operations in the “littorals”
    - Littorals only seen as areas of USMC & Army interest
- Didn’t anticipate 1991 USSR collapse, Gulf War

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

- Barely addressed
  - Naval arms control (only 1989 & 1990, in passing)
  - Blockade (only 1989 & 1990, in passing)
  - Major regional contingencies
  - US gov’t inter-agency partners
  - “Non-state actions” (1st mentioned in 1989)
  - Convoy operations
    - Discussed in 1st several editions
    - No mention after 1986
    - “Force-in-being” or “fleet-in-being”
The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

- Trends across versions
  - More attention to non-Soviet threats and responses, more focus on USN, more focus on Pacific, more focus on ASW, divergences from 1984-86 format (1987-1990)
  - All versions, through last article (1990), focused on Soviet threat

- Generated fierce open debates on:
  - Utility of naval forces across the spectrum of warfare
  - Optimal SLOC defense operations, doctrine, TTP
  - Horizontal escalation
  - Deterrence vs. provocation
  - Efficacy of attacks on Soviet homeland, strategic forces
  - Nuclear stability
  - Role of USN & USMC Pacific & Indian Ocean forces
  - Resource allocations to USN/USMC vice USAF/USA
  - Internal DON programmatic & budget implications of the strategy
The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

Was it a “strategy’?
What is “strategy” (officially)?
“A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives”
Joint Pub 1-02 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Oct 2008)

What is “naval strategy” (officially):
“The use of naval forces (including naval aviation and Marine forces) to achieve naval objectives determined by national strategy, with the overall objective of controlling the seas and denying to an enemy the use of those sea areas important to enemy operations”
NTRP 1-02 Navy Supplement to the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Aug 2006)

Subsequent analyses & critiques (I)
ADM (Ret) Stansfield Turner (Ret) & CAPT George Thibault, “Preparing for the Unexpected: The Need for a New Military Strategy,” (Foreign Affairs, Fall 1982)
The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

Subsequent analyses & critiques (II)


♦ William W. Kaufmann, Annual broadside booklets vs. the Navy & The Maritime Strategy (Brookings, 1980s)


The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

Subsequent analyses & critiques (III)

A vast literature. This is a sampling


♦ Bud Hay & Bob Gile, Global War Game: The First Five Years (1993)

♦ George Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power (1993)


The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

Subsequent analyses & critiques (IV)


The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

Criticisms (I)

- Un-executable. It couldn’t be done & wouldn’t work
- Dangerously escalatory by threatening Soviet SSBNs
- A major change in national and NATO policy & strategy
- Irrelevant, wasteful and unnecessary
  - “We’re never going to fight the Russians”
  - “If we do fight them, sea campaigns won’t make any difference”
- Took needed resources away from the NATO Central Region air and ground battles
- Not the Navy’s business to develop its own strategy
- Same old stuff: not visionary or innovative
  - Excessively “Mahanian” focus on the offensive
- Not best way to achieve SLOC protection
Criticisms (II)
- Too specific & detailed
- Too general; not enough detail
- Too sensitive; gave too much away to the Soviets on how USN would act
- Promulgating the strategy needlessly called negative attention to the Navy and invited criticism
- Developed subsequent to the Navy force level goal it allegedly justified
- USN focus should be on emerging real-world demand signal for naval forces for SWA and the IO, not the NATO-Warsaw Pact War planning case
- At the end, unwilling to recognize quickly enough that the Soviet Union was no longer a superpower or a threat
- Should have been a co-developed & co-signed bi-service Navy-Marine Corps document

Influence: Significant
- Within the Navy & USMC
- W. House, OSD, Joint Staff
- US Army & US Air Force
- Soviets
- Allied navies & militaries
- Allied parliaments
- US, foreign academia
- Capitol Hill
- US defense industry
- Programs & acquisition
- Fleet exercises
- Global War Games
- CNO SSG
- JSPS pubs, esp JSCP
- Joint, CINC, NCC staffs
- OPLANs & CONPLANs
- USN tactical innovations
- USN morale
- Naval education, esp NPS
- DOTMLPF re: forward ops
The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

**Influence overseas**
- By design
  - *The Maritime Strategy* as centerpiece for bilateral naval discussions & war games w/ foreign navies
  - CSEP OPNAVINST drafter was OPNAV OP-603 *Maritime Strategy* AO (CDR Mitch Brown)

**Continuing influence overseas**
- E.g.: referenced in:

---

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

**Why so influential? (I)**
- Truly achieved internal USN consensus as rationale for USN
- Well-aligned with national defense policies
- Well-aligned with USN & USMC strategic cultures
- Filled a need for clarity and consolidation of thinking
- Major involvement, ownership & support by SECNAV, Navy Flags, SSG, OP-06
- USN confidence & eagerness to debate
- Created by consensus-building approach
- Argued for build-up of naval forces of all types
- Presented to Congress as tied to 600-ship Navy & USN affordability programs
The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

Why so influential? (II)
- Embedded firmly within Navy internal PPBS processes (CPAMs)
  - Smooth segue from Planning (OP-06-led Maritime Strategy CPAM) to Program Planning (OP-095-led Warfare Appraisals and Summary Warfare Appraisals)
- Good fit with how fleet thought about warfighting (CWC)
- Good fit with Navy doctrine (NWP 1 warfare areas)
- Reflected in changing fleet ops & exercise program
- Official history, annotated bibliography conveyed breadth, depth, legitimacy, openness to criticism
- Constructively exposed alignment issues among CINCs, NCCs, fleets, SUBFORs
- Multi-media approach to dissemination

Why so influential? (III)
- Conscious efforts to ensure buy-in & continuity
  - Sense of ownership & pride across the officer corps
  - Endorsed & signed by 2 CNOs in a row (Watkins, Trost)
  - Calculated efforts to invoke Hayward roots
  - Praise by succeeding CNO (Kelso), despite obsolescence
  - Sense of continuity in OP-603 & SSG
  - Praise for efforts of predecessors by successive action officers
- “Success had many fathers”
  - Desire—usually justified—by respected leaders, staff offices, operators to take credit
The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

- Influence on subsequent capstone documents
  - Became an oft-cited (if less oft-read) “gold standard” against which subsequent (& previous) documents were judged
  - Cited in *The Way Ahead, NDP 1, Sea Power 21*
  - Alleged to be the only USN “strategy” until *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* (2007), by the latter’s authors
    - Latter’s authors deliberately sought to bask in *The Maritime Strategy*’s alleged reflected glory
  - Format never repeated, however

1980s: Text & content of each document

CNA studies on U.S. Navy strategies and their context


