The Trailwatcher

A COLLECTION OF COLONEL MIKE MALONE’S WRITINGS

JIM SHELTON
**Report Documentation Page**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. REPORT DATE</th>
<th>2. REPORT TYPE</th>
<th>3. DATES COVERED</th>
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<td>The Trailwatcher: a Collection of Colonel Mike Malone’s Writings</td>
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<th>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<th>13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</th>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>14. ABSTRACT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<th>15. SUBJECT TERMS</th>
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</thead>
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<th>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>c. THIS PAGE</td>
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</tr>
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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
FOREWORD

A few years back I called Major General Tom Lynch, then Commanding General of the Armor School and a friend, to inquire about my next job. My objective was to get a staff assignment, somewhere I could write and think in behalf of the Army. After all, I had had three continuous years of armor company command, the Infantry career course, a fine graduate education, and most recently the Air Command and Staff College to put on my vita. I felt a good staff assignment would benefit the Army and tap my talent. General Lynch, without pausing, said, "Go to work for Mike Malone . . . he thinks, and besides you might begin to learn something about soldiering." While the assignment did not materialize, I have since come to know and admire Mike. My admiration is best summarized by this comment of one of Mike’s friends when he said, "His unique effectiveness as an instructor in the Ranger School, the Army War College, the Task Force Delta Forum, the Pre-Command Course, and at a variety of service schools constitutes in itself an enormous contribution. Mike motivates, entertains, and teaches. Further, he generates self-criticism and institutional assessment. His writing and speaking have been catalysts in terms of the professional development of the Officer Corps since the early 1970's. He has been, contrary to his announcements that he has not, the Army's conscience—or at least a major spokesman for the Army's conscience."

Why publish this book of readings? There are three reasons. First, and I think Mike would agree, foremost, is to provide the Army with a reference that represents a potential foundation of thought for the Army's future generations. While you may or may not sympathize with the line of reasoning (Mike doesn't care which), as you read the collection of writings you will be thinking, forming your opinions about why a topic is or is not assessed correctly. You will call on your experience and education; both count. Because of this encounter you will have moved one step closer to becoming a professional soldier. That is what all of those generals have said about Mike in Appendix A . . . he is a professional soldier. When one professional speaks to another, hopefully both learn and mature in their ability to reason. In this vein, future generations of professionals will have, as a result of this book, an opportunity to talk with a professional. Maybe, just maybe, these soldiers will build on what Mike says. Some may even implement a few of his admittedly avant-garde ideas. Others will, of course, dismiss these articles as too simple and therefore not worthy of consideration. In both cases, the Army will be better off. The benefit in the first case is obvious . . . ideas that were ahead of their time will be recognized and used. In the second case, the reader will have had to determine why these ideas seem too simple and in the process have possibly designed a better idea, something our force-multiplier-oriented Army of the future will need.

The second major reason for putting this book into circulation is to honor the author. In the annals of our profession, it is rare that an individual steps off the road to the top to sit by the trail and observe while the rest of us struggle toward what we think is higher ground. While the admiration for Mike that is shared by senior officers is probably necessary for Mike, it is not sufficient. This man is a teacher. He wants to teach all ranks whatever he can about the Army. Also, to see something
one has written go into publication is a reward. This book represents a much deserved reward for Mike.

Finally, the Army has, over the years, sought out the "corporate solution" to its problem. Threaded throughout Mike's writing is a disdain for this approach. As he so often mentions, the Army as the largest of these organizations and, without a conventional profit motive, should be a leader, not a follower. Mike considers ironic the fact that we are so quick to adopt the civilian sector solution, one that does not even address the same outcome--readiness for combat. Hopefully this book illuminates his arguments.

Before giving you the enjoyment that comes from reading this collection of Mike's work, please let me explain why the book is organized the way it is. As you can see from the table of contents, there are six sections which seem independent. Such is not the case. They are interdependent. These topics are the result of Mike's work with an "Idea Generator-Integrator-Communicator" called Task Force Delta. An offspring of Mike's effort in early 1978, Task Force Delta was conceived as a non-bureaucratic informal group of soldiers, all of whom wanted to do something to help our Army. More specifically, these soldiers have gone after the question, "While understanding that you and I must work through people, how can our Army establish and maintain control of changing, interdependent systems to maximize force readiness?"

In order to answer this question Colonel Malone just "thought up" these six categories to help focus Delta Force member efforts.

--The Process of Influencing People
--The Process of Control
--The Dynamics of Change
--The Nature of Interdependence
--The Science
--The Dynamics of Force Readiness

The first two, influencing people and control, tend to focus at the individual level. The next two, change and interdependence, deal with relationships between people or organizations. Finally, the last two focus on the whole, how people or organizations relate to accomplish an objective.

The Delta concept is still alive, having somehow survived inside the Army's system--possibly a testimony to our need for such an organization. Anyway, as I began organizing Mike's work, these six topic areas somehow seemed to represent the best format.

That's about all I have to say except that, if you have decided not to go further in reading this book, then do me a favor--read Mike's article entitled "Soldier."

An Admiring of the Trailwatcher

ii
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreward</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABOUT SOLDIERS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldier</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABOUT COMMUNICATION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Bit of Information</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The American Soldier: 30 years of Scientific Research</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Come See Us ... We Got Some Good Things Goin' On&quot;</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications in the Head-Shed</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WOTA</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RX for Information Overload</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X=H</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABOUT POLICY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An IG Inspection Need Not Mean Ignominy</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Register of Military Consultants</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We're Here to Help You</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of Pot Metal and Gold</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knucklebones and Chicken Livers</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our Tactical Doctrine</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) Refinement</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Context for Cohesion</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABOUT TRAINING</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training--The Only Way</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trained to Kill</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Aids that Snap, Snarl and Roar</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABOUT PEOPLE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer Accessions and &quot;The Natural State&quot;</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portrait of a Mob</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Squad</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What Makes People Tick?</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of a Desert Breeze, and the Edge of Dawn, and a Little Dude Named John</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## ABOUT OUR ORGANIZATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Book Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Junction Box</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Trailwatcher</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journey Into the Twilight Zone</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## ABOUT LEADERSHIP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Book Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Essence of Army Leadership</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership at General Officer Level</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common-Sense, Company Level Leadership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The Company&quot;</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The Chain of Command&quot;</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Soldier Values and Soldier Discipline&quot;</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Able and Willing&quot;</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Teamwork&quot;</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Building a Team&quot;</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Leadership Malfunction #1--The Balance&quot;</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Leadership Malfunction--The Difference&quot;</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## ABOUT UNIQUENESS OF OUR ARMY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Book Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thighbones and Bedrock</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You Can't Run an Army Like a Corporation</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## ABOUT FOOD FOR THOUGHT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Book Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Challenge From the Trailwatcher</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State of the Army</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## WHAT OTHERS SAY ABOUT MIKE MALONE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General E. C. Meyer</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Donn A. Starry</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant General Julius W. Becton, Jr.</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant General W. F. Ulmer, Jr.</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General G. S. Meloy</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## THE AUTHOR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Book Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bio Sketch, Dandrige M. Malone</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SOLDIER

by COL Dandridge M. Malone

A guy pinned me right to the wall the other day. I was giving a talk to some basic and advanced course officers out at Ft. Ben. I'd just finished raising all sorts of hell about the pernicious nature of the "civilian equivalency" theme, and about the uniqueness of the soldier. The question period began. This young 2d lieutenant stood up, and, sort of slow and careful like, he said, "Sir, would you please give us your definition of a 'soldier'?"

Well, at first, I thought he was a smart ass, but then I looked more carefully at his eyes, and I saw that he was sincere, and concerned, and serious . . . and it was really me who was the smart ass for thinking that he was. At any rate, I tried to wing it and define "soldier" then and there. I didn't do worth a damn. I know. I watched his eyes.

Some days later, back at the War College, there came a letter from the lieutenant--his name is Tom--and he said, "Sir, when I asked you what is a soldier, I didn't mean to stump you or embarrass you. The thought and response you gave to the question was good, and yet you still weren't able to put your finger on what is a soldier. This is the way I feel, but I'm just starting out (like you were once) and I need to learn what a 'soldier' is."

Well, young Tom, many people, many times have tried to define "soldier." General C. T. Lanham did a real job with a short, beautiful poem called "Soldier" in Infantry Journal, way back in 1936. You got to read that. Another guy, named Herbert, I think, did a sorry job with a long, sick book called Soldier, just a few years ago. Some people define a soldier as a "summer chimney." And here lately, various Congresspersons have been defining a soldier as simply a "civilian equivalent."

I suppose only a fool would try to sit down and actually write out a definition of "soldier," so, I'm going to have at it--in one, sometimes-dated, often-jaundiced, sentimental sentence. Here we go. A soldier is . . .

. . . a boy, now a man, telling his ma, and his father, and his brothers and sisters, and his girl, and his friends that he's "going in" . . . a line of silent young men sitting on benches in the recruiting station . . . promises of a boundless future, of stripes and bars, of education, and retirement, and medical care, and PXs and commissaries . . . many forms, of many shapes and several colors, signed (right by the recruiter's "x") with little comprehension and a world of faith . . . the long ride on the Greyhound, and the loud, boastful, hollow, pitiful tales of touchdowns scored, and money made, and women conquered . . . a long and sleepless night in a strange hotel, in a strange town, with six men to a room, and a government-paid breakfast, and more diesely Greyhound . . .

. . . the initial silence and uneasy jokes when the MP waves the bus through the gate of the first Army post . . . loud sergeants with clipboards and lists of names ("You people git over there!") . . . young
men with "special" problems, trying to get an audience with authority .
the first, shattering look in the mirror after the barbers, smirking, have
done their deed . . . the fast flight of the "Flying $20" . . . uniforms
that will "shrink," or "you'll grow into" . . . the consolidated mess and a
new buddy on detail, scraping trays . . . the first, clumsy attempts to
spit-shine a boot . . . the impossibility of carrying a duffel bag with the
shoulder strap . . . the break-up of newly-established, desperately-needed
friendships . . . the first ride in a covered "duke-and-a-half," with dust
rolling in over the tailgate . . .

. . . the company area, and "The Man," the first awkward and ragged
formation, the countless and incomprehensible rules, and the fear, and the
insignificance . . . long rooms with posts down the center, and lined-up
rows of lockers, and lined-up double-decked steel bunks with bare webs of
wire springs, and lined-up, side-by-side commodes . . . the schemes,
arguments, threats and bargains about the relative merits of upper and
lower bunks . . . the cold, impersonability of supply corporals . . . the
haughtiness of cooks behind serving tables in the mess hall . . . chronic,
epidemic, unabated, and unmanly constipation . . . sad, lonely aching,
hot and wet-eyed homesickness, and the probing flashlight of the CQ,
searching for the white towels on the bed feet of the KP detail . . . the
quick flicker of time between Lights Out and Reveille . . . the pre-dawn
formation, dimly lit by 40-watt firelights, and dark shapes of men numbly
silent except for shuffling feet, and snifflies, and coughs, and the hard,
flat unquestionable barks of the First Sergeant ("Not so fast there,
Rodriguez!") clip-board at chest and pencil making checks . . .

. . . thighs sore from "High Jumper" . . . heels and tendons aching
from new boots, shoulder black and blue from the KD range . . . lickin' and
stickin', and Maggie's Drawers and cold, sour, smelly target paste, and
constant threats, and break-time push-ups, and the strange, new
sound--snap!--of rifle rounds passing close by overhead . . . exploring the
first intriguing mysteries of C-rations . . . lips burnt on a hot canteen
cup, sweetened with sugar dipped from a torn paper sack with a great,
sticky spoon . . . the search for brass in the grass, and the droning voice
in the tower, and the sergeants' shiny boots, and shiny helmets, and
cleaning rods . . . and raking sand, and painting rocks, and signs:
"FIGHTING FIRST," "SECOND TO NONE," "DIRTY THIRD," "FEARLESS FOURTH." . .

. . . the wonder, magic, and confusion of Army weapons and equipment
("Good morning, men. GOOD MORNING, SERGEANT! Today we will cover the
nomenclature and functioning of the M1A1.") . . . huge mock-ups, and great
charts, and scratchy movies of frostbite horrors and things venereal, and
sergeants' names of podiums, and officers standing in the rear by Herman
Nelson . . . the downright haunting beauty of Jody, sung by unseen troopers
moving somewhere out in the dawn . . . ("Jody's got your gal and gone")
. . . the joy, and strength and oneness of boots pounding the pavement at a
steady 180 per . . . a young recruit with all his teeth pulled, and the
tears in his eyes not from the pain . . . sleeping on the springs with the
mattress rolled, late on a Friday night . . . empty boots standing side by
side, laces tied . . . unneeded razors and toothbrushes and bars of soap,
all alike, lined up with a string . . . stencilled names put on clothing,
backwards, with too much ink . . . the clink and rattle of dog tags as a
thin youngster tosses in his sleep . . . the thunk of a major's polished
"tanker" boot striking the tailbone of a terrified trainee, crying and
crawling under barbed wire and bullets ... the clenched fist and gritted teeth and animal urge to smash a fist into the face of authority ... cold, grey, November wind whipping coal smoke around the mess hall ... cold, grey fingers cleaning cold, grey, grease from the mess hall sump late at night ... a box of stale and tasteless cornflakes stolen from the mess hall, smuggled under a field jacket, and devoured, symbolically, by buddies after Taps. ...

... the PX and milkshakes, and cokes, and Snicker bars ... thin stationery with black and gold Army eagles, and air mail envelopes ... long lines of young troopers by the pay phones outside ... the sissies at the Service Club ... proficiency tests, and M-1 pencils, and parades, and the silliness and impotence of pistol belts and .45's hung under too-fat officer bellies ... pictures for the family with uniform, and American flag, and a too-big hat ... the company photo with cadre in the front row, CO in the center, and the guidon ... the yearbook, the duffelbag, the AWOL bag, the spit-shined shoes, and the first leave form--signed. ...

... the strength of a mother's hug ... the wide-eyed and unashamed admiration of little brothers and sisters ... the dog, excited, peeing on the rug ... Dad, a fellow man ... home-cooking, too much, and force-fed ... a contrived meaning for "S.O.S." ... outrageous lies, and war stories of mean sergeants, and physical agony, and special buddies ... the smooth escape of an errant four-letter adjective ... the strange feel of driving a car again ... excitement and anticipation at the sweetheart's front door ... the warmth, the wonder, the fragrance, and the dizzy feeling of the first kiss. ...

... pride in the uniform, and visits to the recruiter, and favorite teachers, and coaches, and buddies, and old hangouts, and the main street ... the careful nonchalance in response to friends ("How you've changed!") ... the inexorable, too-fast passage of squares on the kitchen calendar ... the last supper, the manilla envelope with records, and orders, and last name first ... that goddamn unmanageable, awkward, sonofabitchin' duffelbag ... the late-night and last possible Greyhound ... the darkness, the sadness, the loneliness ... and the Big Dog movin' thru a rainy night. ...

... sergeants with clipboards ... classrooms and more equipment, and more charts, and officer instructors ("Remember, the life you save may be your own!") and more tests ... a pay-day night on the Neon Strip, and country music, and tough women with hard eyes, and sateen skirts, and tiny, tattooed butterflies ... a fight with civilians in a parking lot ("Man, I ran away from home when I found out my mother was a civilian!") ... stompin', and kicking and slashing with antennas torn off cars, and not being able to hit a guy hard enough ... a broken nose, a black eye, a cracked tooth, scraped knuckles, and a morning hangover, and a headache, and braggin' and lying, and the melancholy of Sunday night horse-cuts and beans. ...

... bulletin boards with three sections, and little lettered label signs, done by the company "artist," found by the First Sergeant ... papers posted in perfect alignment, and lined-up lists of names, and "by orders of," and fancy, affected, unreadable signatures ... and the
strange mathematics of detail rosters... morning agonies at the urinal, and disbelief, and a pre-reveille formation in raincoats only, and arms inspections and "non-specific urethritis"... the company commander, and the First Sergeant, and the section NCO... and the curious, ambivalent mixture of personal shame and manly pride... loud talk, feigned unconcern, and penicillin...

... a Post theater graduation ceremony, with flags and "chairs, steel, folding, OD" on the stage... a colonel reading a "speech"... the pumping adrenalin and thundering heart of standing in line to shake hands with a general... the agony of trying to remember: shake with the right above (or below?); take with the left (or right?) below (or above?)... the smile and glittering stars coming closer... a little diploma... an MOS, another stripe, another set of orders, and the unfathomable, omnipotent mysteries of ECUSA, and TDN, and WPOA and RPTNLT-NET, and 2172020 57-1021 P8100000-2190 S36004 (812783.12001)... 

... and again, the damnable duffel bag... and home, and sweetheart, and time passing, and goodbyes and a new Army post... the loss of identity and significance and personal worth at the replacement depot... the insecurity, the boredom, the telephone bargaining for "good deals" by NCOs and officers... the new unit, and the company sign with a smaller sign beneath ("NO AWOLS IN 43 DAYS") and a brass tip brassoed guidon... and outside the Orderly Room, the full length mirror with a sign on the glass ("SOLDIER, CHECK YOURSELF!") which gives the soldier personal significance and a gift of trust and confidence... and inside the Orderly Room, another sign which takes it all away ("A UNIT DOES WELL ONLY THOSE THINGS THE BOSS CHECKS!").

... reveilles, and classes, and details... guard mounts, and guard posts, and guard paddles, and trying to surprise the O.D. on his 0300 inspection tour... "bitch sessions" with the C.O., who calls them something else... IG inspections, and pre-IGs, and pre-pre IGs... officers and NCOs with endless checklists... paint, paint, paint... and clean, new paperwork... and the trading value of acetate, green tape, and sheets of plywood... long, weary hours of cleaning and shining, and extra equipment hidden in ventilator shafts... a last-minute, high-speed, tip-toe trip to a stringed-off latrine reeking with pine oil, and a quick swipe with a handkerchief at a wet dab of overlooked scouring powder... the disappointing, anti-climactic, one simple-assed question ("Where you from, son?") and cursory glance of the inspector... the critique in the dayroom, and numbers, and decimals, and adjectives, and rationalizations... and the wet handkerchief mixing company in the pocket with the broomstraw, the piece of lint, the burnt match, and the tiny paper balls of field-striped cigarettes...

... convoys rolling out past Motor Pool gates, past NCOs with clipboards, past officer jeeps with long antennae... steady speeds, and equal distances, and lieutenants with strip maps and compasses and march tables, and hesitancy, and "route conferences" with their NCOs... dispersed vehicles and camouflage nets, and eyes and lips burning from grease sticks, green/brown, M1A2... the smell of the inside of a tent on a hot afternoon... the whoosh and thump of immersion heaters lit off wrong by scared KPs... Lister bags and iodine water and tactical feeding ("Spread-out, goddamit!")... mermite cans with containers empty except
for the yellow-green juice of now-departed peas and spinach ... the rattle of mess kits sliced in boiling water ... NCOs checking for grease and the "hot clean" rinse. . . .

... man-holes in the ground ("... two by two by you") ... and grenade sumps, and firing steps of sand, and the strange, secret smell of deep earth ... and little, wiggly, inch-long things with a thousand legs and pinchers ... the artful camouflage of yesterday wilted by the hot sun of today ... the difference between a straddle trench and a slit trench ... long marches at night, and red flashlights, and the unrelievably bite of shoulder straps, and feet up on packs at breaks ... and foot powder, and NCOs checking, and dark platoon leaders whispering encouragement ... the mystery, authority and unseen strength of a jeep approaching quietly with cat-eyes ... tense, last-minute checks, and green star clusters, and leaders shouting and cursing in the fog and half-light of dawn ... the acrid, gagging smoke of smoke grenades, the crack of M-80s ... and the whistle and boom of artillery simulators ... strange "enemy" with crests on their helmets and green uniforms with no buttons on the shirtsleeves, running from the hill ... and "victory," and critiques, and camouflage, and range cards and marches, and rain, and wet holes. . . .

... more of the same, and the passage of time, and more schools, and more promotions ... and the sweetheart now a wife, and kids, and a puppy, and furniture from "Sears and Rawbutt," on time ... more orders, more posts, and long moves across the land in middle-aged, middle-priced Fords and Chevys with loaded roof racks, wrapped in torn plastic, whipped by the wind ... economy motels, and hamburgers, and sticky, face-down, grape-red jelly bread, and wet, smelly diapers and awful fusses, and smacked kids, and threats of divorce neither meant nor believed ... rents too high, and quarters too small, and sofa legs broken, and treasures lost, and movers anxious to leave and full of assurances ("Just sign right here"). . . .

... orders to a combat zone, a move to "home," and a leave filled with sadness, and seriousness, and love ... goodbyes at the airport, the sweetheart-wife trying to smile ... the dad, now gray, with eyes cast down, and breaking voice, and a little tremble in his chin ... the Delta bird, winging west in the late afternoon ... the sadness, the loneliness, the thoughts of little children ... and a certain thing they once said, and a certain way they once looked ... final processing at the POE, and shot records, and dog tags, and equipment checks, and the awful agony of the last stateside phone call, collect, to the kids and the sweetheart-wife ("I love you, darlin'"). . . .

... the mighty surge of the Starlifter, nose-up and tail-down from California and west toward the sun ... a familiar face in a nearby seat, and the old, often-played games of "where in the hell did we serve together?" and "did you ever know 'ole whatsisname?" ... box lunches with boiled eggs and apples and Milky Ways, the steady drone of the big jet engines ... watch hands changed forward (or backward?) ... callous, calloused stewardesses ... and the gift shop and snack bar and men's room at Midway. . . .

... a bright green land with great V-shaped fish nets in the river mouths, the blazing white of salt pans, and the curving contours of tiny rice paddies stepping down the sides of the hills ... shell craters, and
bomb craters, and tracks of tracked vehicles, and grasshuts, and villages, and dirt roads, and ears popping, and paved roads, and jeeps, and a helicopter, and an airfield, and the skronk! of wheels down on the Pleiku strip...

... the heat and the dazzle and the newness of an alien land as the door opens... the long line of home-bound troops waiting to fill the still-warm and still-littered seats of the still-whining Starlifter... a waiting truck, and another replacement center, and more of those phone calls ("... but General So-and-so told me I would be assigned to..."), and cold, impersonal briefings, and insignificance... a long, long letter home, telling of the newness of this land, and of the loneliness, and of the love of a husband and father... a morning formation, a list of names, a check on a roster, and a dusty bus down a dusty road to an infantry division's base...

... orientations ("Don't ever pat one on the head!")... and classes, and confusion, and bewilderment, and war stories ("... and the damned NVA cut off the lieutenant's head!")... and anticipation, and clothing and equipment issued and stored, and moves by truck, jeep, and helicopter to the forward bases of the combat units... the battalion fire base, and the battalion commander, and company commanders tanned, tough and thin... apple-cheeked lieutenants with little blond moustaches, and grizzly NCOs, and scruffy troopers laughing, joking, competent... barbed wire, and sand bags, and artillery pieces, and radio antennae, and holes, and trenches, and bunkers... and great, gaunt, mahogany trees torn and blasted and chain-sawed... rucksacks, and rifles, and steel helmets and troopers reading pocket books, poorly printed... the awe, and bewilderment, and confusion, and frustrating inability to rapidly assimilate and adapt...

... the chopper with no doors and no seats, on the battalion pad... door gunners and black machine guns... frightening speed across the roof of the jungle canopy, with tree tops blurring by... tight, canted circles, and the whoop! whoop! of rotor blades as the bird eases down an open shaft in the jungle... troops on the ground, looking up, serious, busy, with longer hair, and beard stubble, and fatigue trousers split open at the rear, and no drawers... a company commander with old-man eyes, and maturity, and authority, and strength... a radio operator with the quick, alert look of a "college kid."

... Claymore mines, and machetes chopping brush, and troopers digging, and fresh holes in the ground, covered over with saplings and sandbags... C-ration beans, with C ration cheese and "Loosiana" hot sauce, warmed with heat tabs... a coffee cup made from a partially opened can, lid bent back for a handle... nighttime, and animal sounds, and whispers, and distant artillery, and the cold of the Central Highlands pouring down unseen into the bunkers... fitful sleep, and soft-grey light, and dawn, and sore muscles, and cleared throats, and broken wind, with wry commentary ("Salute! Awake! Arise! And behold the birthing of a bright new day, you scruffy rat-bastards!")... and cigarettes, and malaria pills, and hot black coffee, and yawning, and scratching, and bitching... short briefings, and Claymores packed, and sandbags emptied, and weapons checked, and a dirty column of dirty men moving out through the jungle along a mountain ridge, bent over under heavy rucksacks, eyes
peering forward under the rim of steel helmets, green towel around the neck to wipe the sweat and ease the bite of shoulder straps. . . . fingernails black and split, sleeves rolled up, and old, nasty, dirty bandages put on by "Doc," and patches of swollen, red-brown jungle rot . . . and around the trooper's neck, things hanging and swinging: dog tags and rosaries, beads and can openers, crosses and bandoliers . . . and on his head, the steel, with its camouflage cover the billboard whereon he proclaims his individuality, with names and words of wisdom and wit, and fear, and hope, and love . . . JESUS . . . JANET . . . MOM AND POP . . . FTA . . . HO CHI MIN IS A ROTTEN BASTARD . . . SHORTIMER . . . COLOR ME GONE . . . GOD MUST LOVE ENLISTED MEN 'CAUSE HE MADE SO MANY OF 'EM . . .

... the column moving forward along the ridge . . . near the rear, a shortimer, afraid to be up where contacts are made, afraid to be back where folks get left, and lost . . . near the center, the CO and his shadow and bunkermate, the radio operator, both mindful of the stories of snipers in trees, and COs shot square between the eyes, falling, staring, without a word . . . and up front and out alone, all by himself, the pointman, moving down the ridge with raw courage, and the sure knowledge that sooner or later some pointman would be in the sights of an NVA weapon . . . and the young, lanky, flat-nosed, white-eyed black whose skill and courage as point was legendary ("Man, 'day calls 'dat cat 'de 'Cat'!") , and who time and again volunteered to walk in other men's boots . . .

... and late afternoon with a final halt, and bunkers dug, and trip flares out, and trees blown down to let choppers in . . . the distant throb of a gas-turbined Huey, the vulnerable belly now overhead, and the whop! whop! whop! whap! whap! whap! whap! of careful descent as the bird settles and squats among the holes and splintered stumps . . . dirt, and paper, and maps, and leaves, and ponchos, and green t-shirts whirling everywhere, and the angry, nervous voice of the pilot ("6, this is Ghostrider . . . will you clean that goddamn crap off the pad?"). . . a trooper with all his gear jumping from the skids and running to the edge of the pad, bent low with one hand on his steel . . . boxes of banded C's with half-moons on the side, and demolitions, and chain saws, and rope, and a case of beer, and a box of grenades, and great, big, orange bags of . . . mail! . . . and letters, and longing, and a little boy in an Easter suit . . .

... and another night, and another day, and many more just the same--curious blends of monotony and tension and physical exertion and a special sort of discipline marked not by shined shoes and short hair and salutes, but by proficiency and dependability and automatic habits of combat never learned in school . . .

... the moving column, and the noonday break, the cold C's lunch, and the CO with his boots off and his feet in the sun . . . the powerful, pungent, scrungy, skanky smell of feet and socks too long together . . . and rucks up once again on bent, young backs, and jungle boots and jungle fatigues down a jungle trail . . . and way up front, the sounds of contact . . . at first, tentative, like firecrackers on the 4th . . . and then the staccato bursts, and the thumps of grenades, and the building crescendo . . . excited voices on the radio ("John, get the hell up here!") . . . men dropping to their knees, rolling out of rucksacks, and moving forward behind NCOs . . . a helicopter overhead, suddenly on the scene, whoppin
and circling . . . the gradual fade of the fire to the front, and troops squatted down, looking around, alert and afraid and big-eyed and ready . . . the CO on the radio ("Ranger, this is 826 . . . 3 NVA in a bunker . . . killed 2 . . . we got one KIA . . . request Dust-off to take him out.").

. . . dead little men in khaki clothes, and entrenching tools with whittled handles, and short black hair, and too-big helmets and too-long belts . . . troopers searching for pistols, and papers, and insignia, and souvenirs . . . splashes of fresh red blood on the ground, and on the bushes, leading down the hill . . . a Dust-off bird hovering up above the jungle canopy, with its winch cable hanging down to the ground . . . the lifeless body of the young black pointman, lifting and turning slowly up into the bird, web straps under arms, head hanging down, feet together . . .

. . . a spooky night, and deeper holes, and more flares, and more alertness, and the deafening, splitting crack of protective artillery registering nearby . . . and briefings, and patrols, and excited reports of fresh tracks, and new commo wire, and recently-emptied enemy holes, and seven NVA seen running down a trail . . . another company comin' in, and more trip flares, and Claymores and concertina, and artillery pieces slung under big, fat, bug-eyed Hookbirds, and helicopters, and colonels, and conferences on stumps and ammo boxes . . . and all night long, the rumbling thunder of the great Arclights out across the valley, ripping life and limbs and sap from trees and men . . .

. . . a huge, jolting explosion close by, then more, then the firecracker sounds and flashes everywhere in the pre-dawn dark . . . all around, the snap! snap! snapsnap! and the whirl and whack of frag . . . men running, and yelling, and some already groaning, and flares popping up above . . . the blue fireballs of NVA tracers, moving slowly at first, then zipping by . . . small dark figures coming forward, in ones and twos, up the hill, outside the wire . . . and into the wire, and through the wire, and into the bunkers . . . and fire, and explosions, and the trembling earth, and dust, and great geysers of dirt, and boards, and boxes, and bodies, flying through the air . . .

. . . and on the radios, the fear and the fire and the fury ("Ranger! Ranger! My eyes . . . I'm hit . . . I can't see! . . . please . . . somebody help . . . I can't see") . . . ("This is 6 . . . little sonofabitches are up on the artillery bunkers . . . beehive the bastards!") . . . ("Grenadier, we got an awful flight going . . . I need all available air strikes . . . right now . . . get me nape and CBU") . . . ("816, get that damn company moving and get up here . . . we got 'em in our bunkers!") . . . ("Jesus Crist! They're coming up behind us! . . . they're goin' to cut us off!") . . . ("John, the CO's hit bad . . . send a medic and ammo . . . over by my bunker") . . . ("Where in the hell is that rocket fire coming from") . . . ("Ranger . . . we got to pull back from our bunkers . . . I've still got some wounded there, but the little bastards are all over us . . . I can't hold on here") . . . ("816, goddammit, where are you?") . . . ("Ranger . . . whop! whop! whop! . . . this is Big Daddy . . . whop! whop! whop! . . . what is your present situation?") . . . ("3, I know we've got wounded in there—now put the goddamn Redleg right on the goddamn bunkerline! VT . . . Now, goddammit!") . . . ("This is Tonto . . . I can't
see your firebase ... it's all fire and smoke and dust ... Jesus!

... ("826! 826!") ... ("Hummingbird, can you ran that air right across the end of the gun-target line? ... that's where the little bastards are.") ... ("This is Grenadier ... we've got two companies airborne and proceeding to your location ... where can we put them in?") ... ("26 Alpha, we got to have ammo! ASAP!") ... ("Pete, see if you can move those wounded up behind the CP") ... ("Jesus Crist! They got a flame thrower!") ... ("316, I moved the Hedleg ... now work your way down the bunker line ... lot of 'em in there ... be careful!") ... ("6! 6! They're right in the next bunker! ... they killed Jackson!") ... ("3, Alpha's hit in the belly, but he's still sitting there running air strikes.") ... ("Ghostrider, goddamn you got guts ... if you can't see the pad, can you see our flag? ... drop the ammo right on it!") ... ("Well, kill the little bastard if he's in there!") ... ("Ranger, they're pullin' back!") ...

... and on and on through the grim hours, with the noise, and the snaps, and the whirs, and the whacks, and the yelling, and the thunder, and the fire, and the smoke, and the dust, and the troopers darting and crawling, and throwing; the shooting, and cussing, and dying, and bleeding ... and the big Phantombirds screaming down behind the hill to lay their nape ... and the artillery pounding steady ... and the fingers of a dead trooper slowly growing stiff as his hoping, hoping buddy holds his hand ...

... and dawn at last, and exhaustion, and relief, and "victory" ... and the grotesque, everywhere clusters of ragged dead enemy outside and inside the wire ... and big Tiny crushed under fallen timbers in a bunker ... and 'ole Smitty, who honestly enlisted to fight a second time for his country, lying there trembling, with one eye gone and his hand reaching out ... and the handsome recon platoon leader, "Steve the Stud," blown to hell by a rocket ... him and his Doc, too, when the final reserve of medics and radio operators and headquarters guys had gone, without question, to help Company D ... and the strange smell of belly wounds, and all the bloody bandages ... and all the dead troopers silent and still under ponchos, lined up--for the last time--on a ragged line of litterers by the pad ...

... and shot-up companies dragging their weary, wore-out asses aboard the birds ... and the rear area, the rest and refit ... and more of the same ... jungle and rain, and mines, and ambushed convoys, and the red dust and tall bamboo of Pleiku, and Dak Pek, and Dak To ... assault helicopters on short final, the artillery shifted, the firecracker sounds down below on a hot LZ, the gunships making their staccato runs, and scared, grim troopers, weapons ready, beads dangling, sitting in the open doors of another chopper flying right alongside ...

... and still more, day after day with time growing short, and odds running out, and buddies dead or med-evacked ... and night patrols, and fire bases, and combat assaults, and the always-dreaded shout ("Incoming!") ... and captured NVA with Time magazine articles ... and the splendid victory of Tet, with hundreds of NVA lying scattered in heaps and windrows outside Kontum, where the deadly gunships had caught them coming, uncharacteristically, across open rice paddies in broad daylight ("... they was all doped up and goin' to a party ... musta been ... crazy
little bastards..."

... and the victory strangely, puzzlingly, lost, somehow, somewhere, up in the air waves of the ten thousand miles between Kontum and home...

... and "the Day," suddenly here, and the quick goodbyes, and shucked equipment, and that 'ole steel helmet, and the beat-up, never-failing submachine gun... the relief, the peace, the sense of completion... the fire base, the base camp, the strange feel of pavement... and the hot, hot shower with gallons and gallons and gallons of water... and great, long, deep hours of untroubled, buck-naked, spread-eagled, flat-backed, mouth-agogged sleep...

... a dusty, mildewed, khaki uniform, unworn for a year and still starched, drawers, white ones, and a too-big belt... a handful of treasures from the PX, a black-faced Seiko, a footlocker, that damned dufflebag, and a set of orders...

... Nha Trang, and the Starlifter once more, and blue water down below, and great thunderheads up above, and a hundred quiet sleeping men, and Midway, and Stateside, and cars, and neon lights... the worry about not enough seats on the eastbound plane, the ticket, the lift-off, the shunting aside of attempted conversations, the building anticipation and excitement, the ache in the loins, the pictures and thoughts running thru a dozing mind, trained to stay half-awake...

... Kansas City, and St. Louis, and Atlanta ("Man, if you die and go to hell, you gotta change in Atlanta")... and the skronk, and the bags, and the cab, and the street, and the house...

... shrieking, flying, socks-down children, and screen doors banging, and khaki knees in the grass, and somehow, four little, precious people held close and tight and fiercely and long... and a tired head, with a little grey, pressed into soft tummies, and filled with nothing but boundless joy... and big brown eyes, with tears... and once again, as years ago, the warmth, the wonder, the softness, the fragrance, the dizzy feeling of the first kiss...

... unintelligible, excited, simultaneously-jabbered stories of school, and scouts, and drum majorettes, and the neighbor's dog... the treasures from the distant PX... a supper of who knows who cares what, and more talk, and bedtime, and kids asleep, and an endless night of soft talk, and moonlight, and touches, and sweet tears of thankfulness, and the pent-up love of a thousand thoughts and dreams...

... a clear blue morning, and a bright yellow school bus, and an apple green housecoat, and hot black coffee... elbows up on the kitchen table, and the first, tentative plans for the next duty station and the next move... and... and if all these wondrous things, which thousands of us share in whole or part, can--by some mindless "logic" of a soulless computer programmed by a witless pissant ignorant of affect--be called "just another job," then I'm a sorry, suck-egg mule.

Tom, my friend, that's the best I can do...
A BIT OF INFORMATION

D. M. Malone

The average person can process about 20 bits of information input each second. This translates to 1200 bits per minute. If we assume that the average person read 300 words per minute, this tells us that an average word contains 4 bits. That puts 1000 bits on the average 250-word page.

Now ring in the villian of this piece. The AG estimates that the Xerox machines in HQ TRADOC, through their collective effort, churn out about 30,000 poopsheet clones (pages) every damned day. Assuming a 5-day week, and 4 1/2 weeks in a month, those 'ole Xeroxes give us more than a half a million pages each month—an extra 675,000 pages . . . times 1000 bits on each page, equals 675 million additional bits of information per month. Divided by an average information input processing rate of 1200 bits per minute, this equals almost 10,000 additional hours of information input processing (steady, no-break reading) each month by the staff. We make the assumption, of course, that all those cloned pages are read. And that assumption assumes that if the pages weren't read, we wouldn't be foolish enough to spend the money required for: the Xerox machines, their maintenance, the Xerox paper, and the secretaries who program and overwatch the cloning process.

I don't think I've ever seen a stick with only one end . . . or ever got anything really worthwhile without paying a considerable price. So . . . I want to know about the flip-side of the Xerox machine.

There are, as all staff officers know, many advantages to the Xerox machine. Its output speeds up staff processing for certain, and each clone transmits an identical array of information bits. But . . . I am not certain that "speeded up staff processing" is all that desirable, nor that "identical arrays" are always interpreted identically, nor that we have any sort of knowledge or skill, much less criteria, about when and how to bring the Xerox into action to do what. I cannot recall having a Xerox in our 4th Infantry Division Headquarters during the Battle of Dak To.

From the perspective of the staffer as an individual, I am sure the Xerox is damned near indispensable, much like individual farmers used to consider DDT. From the perspective of HQ TRADOC as a system, however, those damnable Xerox cloning machines make a major contribution . . . to information input overload in the decisionmaking echelons of HQ TRADOC as a system. Is the pay-off in staff efficiency worth more than the cost in information input overload?

I wonder if our AG folks could find some true information science specialist (Xerox advertises themselves as "information specialists," but their goal is selling more Xeroxes) and see if we can't look at the flip-side of the Xerox, determine some alternatives (computers?) and procedures (skills, criteria?), and get those damned Xerox machines under control.
For the last two decades or so, our 'ole Army has been listening and learning more and more about the human side of military enterprise. It's been a slow, droned process, partly because of the behavioral science language, partly because of the methodology (probability, correlation, the "normal curve"), partly because our decisionmakers as people are already "expert" in people, but mostly because our Army's behavioral scientists do not have their research facts together. This paper pertains to those facts. But, before we get to those facts, we need a bit of background.

One of the big lessons that comes rattling out of the realm of military history is the role of will in war. "New weapons are worthless in the hands of soldiers who have neither the will nor the intelligence to use them," said DuPloq. The role of will in war, peace, or whatever is crucial. Science is probing this relatively new frontier now, and maybe that's why our 'ole Army is starting to listen and learn, careful-like, sniffing the wind. And it's beginning to respond. In the last 5 years, a "human resource" directorate has evolved on the DA staff. First, it was headed by a colonel, then a brigadier, and now by a major general. And that evolution gave rise to staff prototypes, down through the chain of command.

This growth might be just one of the "Peter Principles" in operation, but it might also be our Army beginning to assimilate and apply new knowledge in its never-ending search for combat power potential. Perhaps somewhere in the primal reaches of our Army's memory, left over from the days ten thousand years ago when armies first began, there's a simple and fundamental formula: SKILL + WILL = KILL.

Right this moment, the TRADOC doctrine community is developing a doctrine about the human side of military enterprise... about such things as values, and attitudes, and communication, and cohesion, and commitment. The impact of this effort will have far-reaching implications, both out across our Army and out across time—mainly because this is a doctrinal effort rather than a study, or a special project, or a "people program."

Today's growth of interest in the human side of things will eventually translate into significant increases in combat power and force readiness. But this growth is badly in need of facts... research facts... facts about our Army's soldiers. We probably already have most of the facts we need. But they're scattered, piecemealed, hidden in file cabinets and bookshelves.

Out of WWII came the massive 5-volume study, The American Soldier. (All DCSPER folks, and GI's, and SI's raise your hand if you know what's in there.) Add to that the GSS publication, Assessment of Men; and to that, add all the research done in the intervening years by the Army Research Institute, by the Surgeon General, by the Office of Research at USMA, by ADMINCEN, and by a thousand individual master's theses and doctoral
dissertations. We got the facts. What we need is a meaningful way to aggregate, collate, integrate and promulgate.

Suppose we ask the sources above to pull from their files all of their behavioral science research studies (in which, incidentally, our Army invested). Then, from each study, extract only the "findings." No "methodology," hypotheses, implication, discussions, etc. . . . just the findings . . . the facts. Then code each finding high (H), medium (M), or low (L) to represent confidence in its validity and reliability. Then throw out the L's. Then rewrite the H's and M's in Army words.

Suppose we next get together not researchers, but US Army staff officers, experienced in working the human resources dimension over the past 8-10 years. And we ask them to develop a useful and meaningful taxonomy with which to organize the findings. Then we code such findings with "key words" from the taxonomy. Then we put findings, validity codes, and key words into the computer and let it massage, and shuffle, and cross-reference. And with that, the taxonomy and the findings become not old musty poopsheets, but aggregated and easily accessible organizational memory, and our Army has a place to store what facts it has learned about the people who are the Army.

Suppose we next, with a good shot of information design technology and the computer's help, put the findings and the taxonomy together into a single reference book for staff officers and the commanders. Call it, The American Soldier: 30 Years of Scientific Research. Maybe we can do better than just a book. Make it an FM, somewhat along the lines of FM 101-10: Staff Officer's Field Manual: Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data. Facts about soldiers must be at least as important, as significant, as much needed in staff work and decisionmaking, as facts about trucks and shower units. And make it "loose-leaf," so that it can grow as our Army learns.

All this sounds like a lot of work . . . and, besides, what would such a reference source look like? Years ago at Purdue, I used to watch Ph.D candidates prepping for oral exams. There was one book they memorized, because that one book summarized the significant facts from the whole complex field of research in social psychology. The book was put together by two college professors (and probably a squad or two of graduate students). The book is Berelson and Steiner's, Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings. It can give use a start on style. An extract is attached at Inclosure 1. Two professors and a gaggle of graduate students . . .

In summary, FM 101: The American Soldier is something our Army is beginning to need . . . something that can help bring human factors and soldier facts into our decisionmaking process . . . something that can go a long way toward achieving what I'm sure is a goal held in common by Army decisionmakers and Army scientists—namely, the application of scientific research in helping our Army develop it's combat power potential.
A1. THE MORE PEOPLE ASSOCIATE WITH ONE ANOTHER UNDER CONDITIONS OF EQUALITY, THE MORE THEY COME TO SHARE VALUES AND NORMS AND THE MORE THEY COME TO LIKE ONE ANOTHER.

A1.1. There is a tendency for people to gravitate into groups or subgroups with the effect of maximizing their shared values.

A1.1.a. When caught in cross-pressures between the norms of different groups of which he is simultaneously a member, the individual will suffer some emotional strain and will move to reduce or eliminate it by resolving the conflict in the direction of the strongest felt of his group ties.

A2. THE LARGER THE PROPORTION OF NEW MEMBERS JOINING AN ESTABLISHED GROUP WITHIN A GIVEN PERIOD OF TIME (SHORT OF ACTUALLY TAKING IT OVER), THE GREATER WILL BE THE RESISTANCE OF THE GROUP TO THEIR ASSIMILATION.

A2.1. New personal relations tend to conform to established relations. Thus if A and B are friendly and B is cool to C, then A will tend to develop a cool relationship toward C too.

A2.2. New members of a small group are likely to feel inferior to established members.

A2.3. The less change there is in a group's membership, the higher the group's morale will be.

A2.4. The more eager an individual is to become a member of a small group, the more he will conform to its norms of behavior.


A3.1. The less contact between members of different groups, the less will there be a mutually recognized, proper behavior for their relations. If such contact sharply increases, there will tend to be increased tension until the proper behavior is defined and established.

A4. SMALL GROUPS OF A FREE-FORMING CHARACTER TEND TO BE PARTICULARLY NUMEROUS AND INFLUENTIAL IN THOSE MODERN, ADVANCED SOCIETIES THAT ARE OPEN AND LIBERAL IN THEIR SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION.

B1. THE SMALL GROUP STRONGLY INFLUENCES THE BEHAVIOR OF ITS MEMBERS BY SETTING AND/OR ENFORCING STANDARDS (NORMS) FOR PROPER BEHAVIOR BY ITS MEMBERS--INCLUDING STANDARDS FOR A VARIETY OF SITUATIONS NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE ACTIVITIES OF THE GROUP ITSELF.

B1.1. The more stable and cohesive the group is, and the more attached the members are to it, the more influential it is in setting standards for their behavior.
Bl.1a. The deviant members of the group are more likely to change their behavior to meet the standards of the modal members of the group than the other way around.

Bl.2. The less certain the group is about the right standards the less control it can exercise over its members.

Bl.3. The less definite the standards external to the group itself (scientific evidence, objective reality, the norms of the larger community, religious revelation, the moral code, etc.), the more control the group itself can exercise—and, if its own standards are clear, the more it will exercise.

Bl.3a. When neither an objective nor a group basis of judgment exists, and when divine revelation is not accepted, judgments tend to be unstable; as a consequence there is an increase in interaction within the group in order to reduce the ambiguity.

Bl.3b. As a special case: a single individual tends not to hold out against the weight of an otherwise unanimous group judgment, even on matters in which the group is clearly in error.

Bl.4. If the small group's activities are imposed from outside, the norms set by the group are likely to be limited in character; if they are determined from within, they are more likely to take on the character of ideal goals, to be constantly enlarged and striven for.

Bl.5. Members of a group typically perceive the group's opinion to be closer to their own opinions than it actually is.

Bl.5a. The more frequent the interaction among the members of a group, the more correctly they can judge the opinion of the group, i.e., the more predictable the group's behavior becomes to them and hence the more reliable as a guide to proper behavior.

Bl.6. People in a group tend to agree with the opinions of people they like (i.e., they judge the opinion by judging the advocate); and they tend to think that the people they like agree with them and that those they dislike do not.

B2. THE GROUP STRONGLY INFLUENCES THE BEHAVIOR OF ITS MEMBERS BY PROVIDING THEM WITH SUPPORT, REINFORCEMENT, SECURITY, ENCOURAGEMENT, PROTECTION, RATIONALE, RATIONALIZATION, ETC., FOR THEIR "PROPER" BEHAVIOR: AND BY PUNISHING THEM FOR DEVIATIONS THROUGH THE USE OF RIDICULE, DISLIKE, SHAME, THREAT OF EXPULSION, ETC.
"COME SEE US . . . WE GOT SOME GOOD THINGS GOIN' ON"

D. M. Malone

As we talk with, write to, visit, or run into Division Commanders, we hear that phrase up there all the time. It's not just a nice invite. There's some sort of quiet urgency underlying those words, and it's not a self-serving urgency. Although they themselves have probably never thought of it this way, what they're saying is that our 'ole Army is learning things about how to solve its problems; but what's learned doesn't get circulated around the system, or even put into organizational memory for later use. This is the very essence of evolution, and each time we fail to remember and use the solutions that help us solve problems, what we're doing is failing to respond to the imperatives of . . . "survival of the fittest."

MG Meloy has worked out a "zero-based" reports control concept that cuts upward-flowing reports by a third. LTG Forrest and MG Menetrey, between the two, developed a way to upgrade the quality of company commanders through assessment technology. MG Gorman, in Europe, formulated and applied a "30-60-90" (no changes in company training schedules less than 30 days, Bn:60 days, Bde:90 days) policy that enabled subordinate units to just about double the value that the troopers got out of training.

Now those are just three things . . . three ways of solving problems faced by our Army . . . problems common across all divisions. But, we ain't passed these notions around, nor stuck 'em in memory, and, except within the divisions those fine men command, or commanded, these lessons learned don't contribute to our Army hardly at all in its effort to meet that evolutionary imperative.

We need to do something about that. And we can. Easy. Like so. . . .

Find a good combat arms colonel at USAWC and put him on the road, responding to what it says in the title of this paper. He goes and sees these commanders. Tells 'em he ain't interested in problems, but rather in what the Division has going on that's really working fine. Training, tactics, maintenance, personnel, whatever. Asks Div Cmdr to list 10 of these "good things." Then asks him to pick the best of the good ten. Then he gets 'ole Div Cmdr to explain in detail just how these three best good things work. Having done that, then the colonel checks. Goes to where these good things impact and checks 'em out to see if they really work as good as the Div Cmdr thinks, and why this is so.

Colonel whips on back to USAWC and writes up these concepts. Two pages per concept, to include graphics. The damned essence (not the details) of the concept, and what purpose it serves, and who knows most about it. In a month, he could do 4 Divisions . . . a dozen concepts, 25 pages, 1 publication, entitled "Running a Division," mailed out to each Division Commander, every month or so, as part of a program of "Continuing Education" for Division Commanders, run by the War College, as a logical follow-on to a more formal "Div Cmdr Course," also run by the USAWC. Let's get started.
"... Hey GOMO! Sure glad you decided not to call yourself the Office of General Officer Development, 'way back there in '75. Listen, let me tell you about a notion for building more "US" among our Div Cmdrs..."
I'd like to offer a few ideas regarding better communications at our Army's "head-shed" level. What I don't have is a clear picture of the quantity and content of communications up there. So, what I have to say is based on assumptions about that particular communications environment.

Looking at the Army's "head-shed" communications as a whole, I see some powerful strengths . . . and some powerful weaknesses. There are two main strengths. First, virtually any message that moves around in that environment has an enormous "back-up file" behind it. Somewhere, just about all details have been considered and many perspectives brought to bear. A paragraph moves around in the head-shed traffic, but somewhere there's damn near a book or an inch of files from which that paragraph was extracted. This is both good and bad, but mostly good. (Question: If the ability to "boil down" information is so critical, then why the hell do our service schools, Leavenworth and USAWC in particular, do things ass-backwards? We have our students start with a paragraph, then pump it full of air until it becomes a thesis, or a study, or a book. We should train to condense, to abstract, to synthesize. To go for the essence.)

The second strength of the head-shed net is that the data base is so well-organized. Because of the way our Army organizes functions, we can locate in damn quick order, expertise (or at least responsibility) for almost any "military topic or task. (I might note parenthetically that I think we're clearly losing this ability as the total body of knowledge which the Army must use increases exponentially in both amount and complexity. I know how to help solve this problem, but so far haven't been able to get the DA staff to listen.)

So much for two strengths obvious in a general assessment. That same assessment shows (shows me, at least) about three weaknesses. (A weakness, incidentally, in DA terms, is also known as a "shortfall" or an "underachievement"!)

First, our head-shed net is too tight, too controlled, too secretive. Sure, we've got to guard against spies, and against overreaction by over-zealous staff officers, and against the press, the public and the Congress taking things out of context and blowing them out of proportion, but . . . at head-shed level, we hold too much too close too much. The obvious result is lack of understanding at other than head-shed levels. The less obvious, but more serious, result is that "mystique" (resulting from too much holding close), while it gives power to the mystifier, creates at least some uncertainty, fear, and suspicion in the mystified. Much of the problem of perceived misintegrity or malintegrity, or whatever, of our senior officers comes directly from this mystique.

Second, our head-shed net is probably too formal. Some format and forms are essential for rapid processing or for synthesis. But, I suspect that if you analyzed the total staff effort that goes into the messages moving in the head-shed net, you'd find 30 percent, or more, of the effort expended went to format, spelling, grammar, typing and general appearance.
A lot of this format work comes at the expense of content, of research, of problem-solving thought, of coordination, and, most importantly, of having out implications and unforseen 2nd and 3rd order effects.

And a third principal weakness, it seems to me, is that our head-shed net is too depersonalized. "Just give me the objective facts . . . feelings, sentiment, and emotions don't have any place in the military." We all hear this, spoken or unspoken, all the time. But it ain't true! On the pragmatic side, consider the value to the military of MacArthur's "Duty, Honor, Country" speech. If that ain't damn near all feeling, sentiment, and emotion, I'll be a suck egg mule. And on the research side, good research, by a man named Mehrabian, shows that in a spoken message (such as you get in a head-shed level staff meeting), the words themselves carry only 7 percent of the total meaning. Inflections in the voice carry about 38 percent, and gestures and expressions, an amazing 55 percent! And, inflections, gestures, and expressions are the personalized component of message traffic. But, the argument goes, we need things written down so we can staff 'em. (Question: Is the ability to staff messages, using our current staff concepts and procedures, really worth the cost of giving up about 90 percent of the meaning? And do we really need things written down and xeroxeroxeroxeroxeroxeroxeroxeroxeroxeroxoko . . . or, is what we really need some means of recording things so that they will be accessible to other people across time? There are ways to do this without the typewriters and xeroxers. Like video-discs and computer storage.)

If I were the new Chief (and I'm relaxed, because almost everyone fails to become Chief of Staff), I would ring in my comme officer, jerk his lanyard, and aim him at video. Video captures that missing 90 percent of meaning. It records things. It is accessible by others, over time. We have video now and have for some years, but we just piddle with it. We still look at it as a toy. Is there anyone in the head-shed office who knows the procedures and recent developments in "teleconferencing" with video? Is Leavenworth trying to develop entirely new staff procedures built around the power and potential of video?

Look at your phone there on your desk. On the carriage or base, just erase that dial and all those little plastic buttons (none of which our dads know when they planned, staffed and fought WWI). Now put the keyboard of a pocket calculator on the right side. And on the left side, put six 1-inch video screens like you see on some of the Sonys. And right in the center, put a small, wide-angle video camera lens-like "spy-holes" in the door of the General's office. That's the damned "communicator" that your youngsters and mine are going to be using when they pull their Pentagon tour somewhere out there in the future! But it ain't going to be easy to get there.

I once laid this scheme, this plea, on our Army's senior comme officer. He thought a bit, then he said, "You know, that's a good idea, and we're working on it, but the problem lies in the security classification of the content. Costs too damned much to make video traffic secure, and the really important traffic on the Army Staff is almost all classified stuff."

I let him get away with that, but then, a couple of hours later, I thought about the DCSPER, and the classification of most of the DCSPER
traffic, and our Army's people problems, and the proportion of the Army budget devoted to personnel costs, and ... as much as I liked the man I felt certain he was full of ... wind.

So, for better communications throughout the Army as a whole, I'd jerk the commo folks' lanyard and get cracking on the communication medium that today's youngsters and tomorrow's decisionmakers know best. I'm convinced that cross-breeding a video recorder/player with a computer is the way we must go if we are to handle the exponentially-increasing body of knowledge that the Army must have in order to function in the future.

Well (and if I were Chief), by just jerking a high-level lanyard, I'd know I'd get the experts moving--research, technology, budgeting, and service school indoctrination, education, and training. But that wouldn't be enough. I'd do something else, something of my own, right in my head-shed net. I want to show my staff and subordinate leaders that I mean what I say. I don't want to let my alligator mouth overload my humming-bird butt (i.e., "lose credibility"). I want to give a signal.

So, I'd eliminate the written CSA Weekly Summary. I would probably take the present summary, condense it more, add more graphic/pictorial content, call it something else, find an officer with a background in journalism and with a reputation as a "synthesizer" or boiler-downer to be responsible for it, and continue to mail it out to the same offices that get it now ... but ... for the CSA Summary, I'd go to video tape. Personalized. In my office. Shirtsleeves (the Israeli appear before the whole damned world in shirtsleeves, yet somehow manage to pull off good wars and good air-landed raids). Maybe with one other man--my deputy or the DAS. No prepared script. No nyctalopian eyes on the teleprompter. I'd tell 'em what was hot, where we were going, what our priorities were. And I'd do this about every 2-3 weeks. And I'd send it by mail, knowing that pretty soon, 'ole commo officer or his successor would be able to do it electronically.

"Holy Smokes!!!! You can't talk about classified stuff!" The hell I can't. I do it all the time. Talk about it without specifically stating the secret details. But I'd try to avoid classified topics. I got another place for those.

"Gadzooks!!!! Every general will have to get a video player!" Right, they're all going to have to anyhow, sooner or later, and this is a good time to start. If you can't find the money, find an Arab and sell him a tank or a helicopter ... or, make a trade for some of those damned Xerox machines.

"Keereest!!! We've never done it that way before!" Right, and I ain't never been Chief of Staff before, either.

And, I'd probably do some other things about my head-shed net--

1. In the Air Force, bosses used to prepare regular Efficiency Reports on Colonels and send them in. Then, they would write handwritten, secret letters on the same officer's performance and mail these in ("in a plain, unmarked manila envelope") to selection/promotion boards. The secretive letters implied that the standard reports were weasles--sneaky,
maybe, or untruthful, or at least lacking somehow in validity and credibility. I don't think they did much for, and, in fact, they were probably destructive to, trust, straight-forwardness, and openness. So ... I'd take a close look at the whole business of "back channels." I know there's pros, and there're cons, but I'd want to see if the value in enhancing communications was worth the price I had to pay in trust and confidence. I'd want to see if their originally intended purpose had been overcome by the events of contemporary, satellite- relayed telephone systems.

2. For the written traffic that moved around in my head-shed net, I'd probably encourage use of the style and format used by the information design technologists (they call 'em "visualizers") who are at last putting life and zing into the styling of our field manuals. The use of marginal graphics (the stuff of vugraphs and 35mm slides) integrated right in with the text is a powerful written communication vehicle. Go look at one of our new style manuals. Compare it with those of the 1960's. You'll see.

3. And, finally, I think I might work a little with upward communications. Every now and then, maybe 10-12 times a year, when I was pondering a problem, especially one which would impact Army-wide on the officer corps, I'd like to question a group of about 200 high quality, experienced officers who were damned good "opinion sensers," who had time to give thought to my questions, and who were not bound to the "party-line" or perspective of any particular agency or boss. I'd ask the Army War College to develop a quick turn-around survey research procedure whereby I could get the aggregate opinion of the War College students on a series of questions bearing on the problem I was pondering. I'd want the surveys to contain no more than 15-20 questions, and I'd want the data and analysis back in 2 days. And I'd know they could do it, because the War College developed the procedure several years ago to work on a question once posed by the Vice. I would guard this source and procedure, however. Nobody but me and my head-shed folks would use it (in this quick reaction mode, at least), and then only 10-12 times a year. (This quick turn-around survey works. Ask the guy who was USAWC Deputy Commandant at the time. Young BG name of Meyer. He got the question from the Vice about 0800. Survey research folks got it at 0815, and the Vice got the 2-page answer (with both descriptive and analytical statistics) by 1600. The computer and the telefax helped.)

Be advised that this paper is biased—strongly in favor of more openness, more straight-forwardness, more "leveling" at head-shed level. These factors, in my view, lead to more trust. And this, in turn, leads to more powerful, more positive perceptions and expectations of integrity. And I think you will agree that one of the most powerful forces in determining what a person is, is what others expect him to be.
Our Army is, at the present time, adjusting and adapting to a major change in its environment. A social change. Feminism. Latent for years, but rising to true significance only within the last decade. First came the bra-less ones, with parades, and placards, and little support. Then advocates, and spokesmen, and a political base, and ... into the male domains. Trucking companies, and high steel construction work, and police departments. And on to a small but major objective--West Point--and out across our Army. They're here, and our Army is learning, and adjusting, and adapting, and compensating, and balancing, and assimilating ... change.

And we're doing damned well. Bitchin' about new procedures as soldiers always do. Wishing things wuz like they wuz (which they never wuz), as soldiers always do. But ... getting on with the job, as soldiers, always, do.

There was a primetime television program not long ago ... "Women at West Point". The fat sergeant was missing. No scheming colonels, hell bent on a star. No buffoon generals. Not even a badly mistreated and generally screwed-over private. The program was more than an accurate video story. It was, to me at least, a compliment from the American public. Not just to West Point, but to our whole Army and its admirable effort to assimilate change.

We ain't done yet. Not by a long shot. But the effort continues. We will be slowed and perhaps defocused a bit by the superficial inanities of the Great Wordsmithing and Phrasemongering Drill (which will do well with words, I suppose, but will be hard-pressed to de-sex, or un-sex, or bi-sex the thousands of pictures of men that fill our training manuals). But that drill is of little significance. The big effort, that of our Army assimilating a major change in the social environment, is well underway and we will, by God, get it done right, in time. What our Army gets done with "Women In The Army", "WITA", as we imaginatively call it, may well be the model for the rest of our nation. We've done that before.

It's not "WITA" I'm worried about. It's "WOTA"! Women Outside The Army. Another, and perhaps the main, outgrowth of the feminism change is the independence of women. They want "do their own thing." And the thing they want to do transcends driving a truck, or riveting steel, or riding in a police cruiser. They want to wear white collars as well as blue. Check the Department of Labor statistics on employment of women. You'll see uplifting curves everywhere. Couple this with the powerful drive to be significant, to "do their own thing"; and add to that a rapidly-rising educational level; and, what these gals want is not just jobs; they want ... careers! And, careers, for the most part, outside of our Army.

Case in point. There was this Major assigned to an Army post out in about mid-America. Eight or ten years of service, and a lot of future potential. Up until that time, his wife had been just about whatever it
was The Army Wife, (a highly touted Military Services Publishing Company "Soldiers Manual" sort of thing) said she was supposed to be. But the children were becoming at least semi-autonomous, and she was well-educated and attractive, so she went and got a job with the local TV station. Not as a secretary or receptionist, but as interlocutor/referee/moderator on an early-morning children's program. She did well.

One afternoon, the evening newsbroadcaster got sick or disgruntled (apparently, one should be gruntled in order to do a TV newscast), and the Army guy's wife was thrown into the breach... and on primetime. Bless her heart... she did well. So well, in fact, that with damn near no time in grade, she was offered the evening newscaster's job in a big city nearby. She took it. Primetime and a million folks in the viewing radius. She had to commute daily back to the major and the children, but, she was not doubling the family income and, as long as she could read and remained gruntled, she had a... career!

Things went great for about 6 months. On the airways, at the Army post, and at home. Then the Major's career management guys at MILPERCEN did their number. Assigned him to the West Coast, but adroitly cross-pressured him by telling him this news just about the time he came out on the LTC list. The Major (F) predictably, became disgruntled and began trying to work out options with MILPERCEN.

Now, about that same time, the wife, without the benefit of a career manager, but damn good in her job, got an offer to really get her ticket punched—primetime TV newscaster, with about a Major General's salary, on a major network, in one of the biggest cities in our nation... on the East Coast.

The issue isn't ended yet. I don't know how it should end... and neither does the Army. And that's what "WOTA" is about. Go down the track of time a few years out in the future, launch a lady astronaut or two, pass ERA, run the trend lines out from the Bureau of Labor statistics, and our Army will have a thousand cases like the one just discussed. Wives of Army people, not "Army Wives", with their own careers and every right to pursue them. How are we going to assign our people then? When that time comes, it'll be too late to "hip-shoot" or "case-by-case" the problem. We'll need policy, and you don't get that without first solving problems, and we'll be far better off if we start working the WOTA problem now.

And, still, I've not broached the main point of this paper. The WITA bit tells of our Army adapting to major change in its environment. The WOTA part says that major change usually has hidden and unobtrusive components that can catch our Army unprepared. Feminism is only one of a hundred major changes rumbling around in our environment. Right this very moment. A hundred more are just around the corner. We can, and should, start pushing futures study right now (I can't find but a few hours in any of our school curricula), but that's not enough. We need also, even more, to find some new way of perceiving... some new way of thinking, widely shared, that will give us a better chance of seeing all those unobtrusive second and third order effects that catch our Army unaware, that make us routinely reactive, that take from us the precious and all-too-scarce treasure of having a hand in controlling our own destiny.
Staffing. That's the obvious answer for uncovering those 2d and 3d order effects. That's right. The obvious answer. Who figured out "staffing", and when? Staffing worked fine when animals moved mankind, when information moved at the same speed, and when our world's body of knowledge could be comprehended by one man. Staffing was the obvious solution for those days, and came from those days. The question is: What is the disobvious solution for these days... and tomorrow's?
RX FOR INFORMATION OVERLOAD

COL Dandridge M. Malone

It still happens! It started 2,000 years ago. The man comes out into the center of an arena. Great columns surround him on all sides. Up in the bleachers circling the arena, the spectators mutter and whisper in restless anticipation. Up on the dais, the headman gives the signal. Then, from in and around the columns, beasts of every conceivable kind converge on the brave man in the center. And the spectators roar with excitement!

The columns are columns of numbers, arrayed on great charts. Many are addressed to measurable trivia—like the monthly number of soldiers exceeding the Department of the Army weight limits. The spectators are the staff officers who nurture the numbers and who devise the management "programs" from which the numbers are spawned in all their endless variety and multitude. Headman is a big six, so shot full of PARR (program analysis and resource review) and the PPBS (planning, programming and budgeting system) that he can sense only dimly the deep, long-term nonquantifiable issues and trends that run through his outfit. And the guy out there in the center, he is a troop leader, trying to focus on training and combat readiness.

We do not wear togas any more, but, often, on a monthly or a quarterly basis, we do get the spectators up in the stands and then turn the numbers loose on the troop commanders. The monthly or quarterly circus is bad enough. What is worse is all the time and hours of effort that go into the preparation of the upward-flowing reports that feed the charts.

Few of the hundreds of reports are essential. They are the "demands" whereby the staffs of higher headquarters can provide the "supply" of support required. No problem with that—but "Number of Men Who Failed to Make Dental Appointments?"; "Weight Loss Report for Fat Soldiers?"; "Numbers of Men Buying Savings Bonds?" There must be a better way. There is. Here is how.

Big six must simply, flat-out, eliminate every single required report. For one glorious period of time, about every six months, zero-base the things. Then fall out the staffs and managers and put them in the arena, each to justify every single report for which he is "proponent." The long-overdue inquisition goes like this:

• What is the purpose of this report; why is it prepared to begin with?

• Who prepares it; why that person?

• Who has to/can sign it; why that person?

• Who finally gets it; why that person?

• What does he do with it after he gets it; why does he do that?
• Who has to either endorse it and/or approve it and/or authenticate it as it goes up the tape from the originator to the final recipient?

• Why do those guys who endorse/approve/authenticate it have to do that; what does this accomplish?

• How is it prepared?

• Does it have to be typed; if so why?

• Could it be handwritten instead; if not, why not?

• Could it be telephoned instead; if not, why not?

• How often is the report required; why that frequently; what happens if it is less frequent?

• Does it duplicate information that is or could be provided by an existing computer program, or one easily designed?

• Is it a practical tool for positive command or staff action to identify problems; help the subordinate unit/commander fix a problem? Or is it used primarily to compile questionable statistics? Or is it primarily to force subordinate units/commanders into (reporting) compliance because we do not trust them? Or "don't have time" to check?

Answers to all these questions are bounced against a "Zero-Based Reports Review Philosophy" which big six and his axe man have worked out beforehand. This is the bias they bring to bear when the proponent attempts to justify each report:

• When there is any doubt, blow it out. Eliminate it.

• If it does not leave big six's headquarters, or end up in an official file, do not type it. Handwrite it. Mandatory.

• No "I certify" allowed. Anywhere. Period.

• Wherever possible, change signature requirements from "commander only" to "responsible individual."

• If it is routine, forget memorandums for record. Use the telephone. And, except for emergencies, do not call lower level units before 0900 or after 1600.

• If it is a worthwhile, recurring report or request for administrative action, change the format to "Fill in the blanks with pencil."

• Cut out all intermediate rest stops unless those headquarters have an absolute and legitimate need to get in the act—no rubber stamping.

• On any upward-moving report for which no positive action is taken after three submissions, blow it out and give the axe man a call.
• Wherever possible, automate. For example, send a computer print-out down to the appropriate unit and have it **pencil edit** rather than prepare a separate report.

• No new reports without personal approval of big six and axe man. Be ready to sacrifice an old report in exchange.

• Prepare to do this "Zero-Based Reports Review" for one full day, every six months. Attaboys for reductions. Fangs for increases.

There are a large number of reasons why this "Zero-Based Reporting Review" cannot be done. There are also a small number of reasons why it can. The small number of reasons is two. The two numbers are 5 and 8. This report is the "Percentage of Upward-Flowing Required Reports, Requests, Memorandums and Letters Which Were Eliminated or Simplified When a Division Commander Zero-Based Reviewed the 540 Such Documents He Found Moving Around in His Division" report. **58 percent!** Get 'em, axe man!
X = H

COL D. M. Malone

X = H. Let me tell you why this is so, and why that simple 2-letter formula is of such profound importance to our Army. First, you need to know about X.

PART I

"X"

In the early part of this decade, as our senior Army planners looked up ahead to the future and compared potential US and USSR force readiness, they found our Army in trouble. They looked to the great technological power of our nation for help, then laid the groundwork for a vast array of new and extremely complex weapons for the coming decade. It was with this technology that we hoped to achieve the lead in force readiness potential. The development and resourcing of the weapons began.

As we entered the last quarter of this decade, it became obvious that our plan was failing. The Russians, with a greater slice of the CNP and a weapons acquisition process free of political glue, were matching or exceeding our technological offensive, step by step. This was made even easier by the export of our nation's advanced technology to the Russians in virtually all fields, particularly the technology of computer design and information science. Adding further to the shattering of our planners' hopes were unforeseeable long-term effects of the shift to the volunteer Army back when the decade began. We were (and are) hard-pressed to find sufficient "volunteers" to man our Army. And those available to our Army, in competition with the corporate world for a shrinking manpower pool, were not the sort who could be rapidly trained to fight, survive, and win on the technological battlefield for which we had planned.

And that was, and is, pretty grim. Without all the words, it looks like this:

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FORCE

READINESS

TIME

What we hoped

US

USSR

What happened

POTENTIAL

What we hopeful

US

USSR

What happened
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31
But the situation depicted relates to potential force readiness. Before we start wringing our hands, we must also consider the matter of actual force readiness, and the difference between actual and potential. For them, and for us.

In considering the actual force readiness of both sides, the smooth curves disappear. Problems arise. Things don't work. People screw up. Human and organizational dynamics begin to take their toll. We build a TRIDENT submarine that draws 40 feet of water, 2 miles up a river that's 38 feet deep. The Russians do something equally bright.

There is, then, for both sides, a plot of actual force readiness. Ragged plots they are, made so by the shortcomings of men and their organizations in the pursuit of goals and objectives. In both cases, the plots of actual force readiness are significantly less than those of potential. If one can assume that both the US and the USSR have problems and shortcomings, plots of actual and potential force readiness look like this:

There is, then, for both sides, a shortfall between what is and what could be. If we can't drive our potential curve up (the dotted line), maybe we can figure some way to drive our actual curve up...to reduce the difference between our actual and potential, and to do this better than our adversary. Let "X" be the factor, or set of factors, or "solution set", by which this might be done. Now, the diagram looks like this:
A year or so ago, one of those senior Army planners reasoned along these same lines. He got 2-3 good men together and said, "I want you to try to solve for X." Then he continued:

"...X has something to do with how to run an organization. The ragged line of actual force readiness is a product. It is the output of a system or organization--in this case, our Army. X, then, must lie somewhere in the domain of organizational performance...how an organization performs. And how an organization performs depends on how it is run--how its resources, and activities, and processes are coordinated, and integrated, and controlled.

"...X is neither management, nor leadership, nor organizational development. It is each of those, and all of those, and more. Our ideas in these areas are disparate. Men in war cannot be managed to their deaths, the machines of war cannot be led, and organizational development is an unclear goal in the absence of clear criteria. We need to find a 'conceptual binder,' something that will achieve synergy, something that will bring all those powerful but disparate notions together into a doctrine that will drive up the curve of actual force readiness.

"...Consider our Army as a system, and, to tie down that usually mis-used term, work from a theoretical base of General Systems Theory. That will link you to scientific research in many fields. And, more important, that's the only way you can view our Army as a whole, and if you can't do that, you'll get all hung up on a few particular levels or functional areas. That must not be. Force readiness is the product of our Army as a whole."

That guidance matched neither the content nor format of the "Commander's Guidance" bloc taught at Leavenworth. But what it did do was drive more than a year of intense research and hard thought by the two or three concerned officers who got the task initially and by the 50 or 60 bright people they enlisted to help them think. The 50 - 60 people, known as "Task Force Delta", came from all over our Army with expertise in areas such as these:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Air-Land Ops</th>
<th>Antitank Doctrine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armor Equipment</td>
<td>Briefing</td>
<td>Communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Processing</td>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>Civil Affairs/PSYOPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mil History</td>
<td>BOP</td>
<td>Division Ops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comptrollership</td>
<td>Civic Ethics</td>
<td>Executive Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Document Retrieval</td>
<td>Education Tech</td>
<td>Human Resource Devel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Futures Theory</td>
<td>Gestalt Theory</td>
<td>Industrial Psychol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Info Science</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>Labor Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Labor Relations</td>
<td>Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult Development</td>
<td>Mil Sociology</td>
<td>Nat'l Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Age Values</td>
<td>OPFOR</td>
<td>OE/OD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Ethics</td>
<td>Psychology</td>
<td>Research Design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve Comp</td>
<td>NCO Business</td>
<td>Systems Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Doctrine</td>
<td>Theology</td>
<td>Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WITA</td>
<td>Word Processing</td>
<td>WAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORSA</td>
<td></td>
<td>ETC, ETC, ETC.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This whole outfit was "fed" with documents and research from 9 DOD and national info retrieval services, which were probed with search terms such as these:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leadership</th>
<th>Org'n Control</th>
<th>Space Technology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USSM Policies</td>
<td>Combat Power</td>
<td>Forecasting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis Mgt</td>
<td>Motivation</td>
<td>Job satisfaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision Making</td>
<td>Modelling</td>
<td>Combat Readiness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Planning</td>
<td>Feedback Dynamics</td>
<td>Feedback Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting Spirit</td>
<td>Morale</td>
<td>Personnel Turbulence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synergy</td>
<td>Systems Theory</td>
<td>Leader Performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>Attrition</td>
<td>Computer Conferencing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man/Machine Interface National Service</td>
<td>ETC, ETC, ETC.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
They read, thought, talked, wrote, conferenced, debated, computered, argued, and fought. And all of that was triggered off and coordinated by the challenge they were given as the "statement of the problem".

UNDERSTANDING THAT WE MUST WORK THROUGH PEOPLE, HOW CAN OUR ARMY ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN CONTROL OF CHANGING, INTERDEPENDENT SYSTEMS TO MAXIMIZE FORCE READINESS?

The end result of all that work by all those people was - single letter - H.

The boss had said, "Solve for X." The answer was H. "After a year's work, Boss, X = H."

** * * * *

X = H

This is not a smart-ass answer nor an attempt to be cute. It represents a principle which we've tried to drill into ourselves during a year of reading and listening and thinking: "What is the essence?" (It is a principle our Army must learn. If we do not, we will not survive.)

"H" comes from the same place as E = mc². E = mc², when it was fleshed out a bit and put into practical use, became a shaker of the first order. H has the same potential. H, in the language of theoretical physics, is information.

That same language (which is a language of the essence) tells us that anything and everything is nothing more than:

MATTER - ENERGY, ORGANIZED BY INFORMATION

The history and background of the problem of reducing the difference between actual and potential force readiness reflects a preoccupation (US and USSR) with the matter-energy side of things. And the problem says that, in that area, we're just not hacking it.

X = H says that the force, the power, the factor by which we can best reduce the difference between actual and potential lies not so much in the matter-energy side, but rather in the "organized by information" side. Our task then, simply stated, is to increase the efficiency and
effectiveness of how we use information to organize matter-energy. In combat in Vietnam, we called this "orchestrating." The troops call it, "Getting all your stuff together in one rucksack." Whatever it is, it is a matter of much more than computers, and compilers, and MIS.

Those of us who have gnawed on this "solve for X" bone for more than a year are now convinced that working with "organized by information" is our best bet for achieving the additional force readiness we need (and do not have now) with which to deter or whip our opponent. Simply stated, we need to have a better, clearer, cleaner, quicker nervous system with which to apply "the sinews of war" to the enemy when the time comes.

* * * * *

(There are 2 or 3 macrofactors pertaining to information that are relevant here:

a. Our world is in the teen-age growth stage of the "Age of Information"--growing like hell, but somewhat awkward and spastic. Toffler described the beginnings in Future Shock.

b. Our nation leads our world in the information business. The production and distribution of knowledge and information now replaces manufacturing as the dominant activity of the U.S. economy, currently involving roughly 50% of the labor force. Information activities, which include publishing, word processing, data communications, library and information services, research computer services, printing and even typing, are growing at about 10% per year or nearly double the rate of the economy as a whole.

c. Our opponent, according to some of our senior super scientists, is putting as much emphasis on information ("cybernetics") as he is on nuclear warfare. We read of this in a Russian book Automation of the Command of Troops, translated by...an American computer. Is interesting, this book.)

* * * * *

"H"

"Information" will fool the hell out of you. Everyone thinks they know what it is, but no one does. Ashby, Ackoff, Shannon, Weiner, Miller,
and others have not been able to yet agree on a tight, clear definition. You can come at it mathematically, historically, diagrammatically, or with words, matrices, and pictures, but it still defies precise definition. It is even more confounding and aggravating than "system."

One way to get a partial handle on what information is, is to look at it as the tiny electro-chemical impulses that are moving along all the nerves in the human body. You've got a modest 100 billion of these nerves, with several impulses flowing through each one. All those impulses are organized into patterns, and these patterns move around here and there, turning things on, turning things off, speeding up this and slowing down that...i.e., controlling. This flow of impulses and patterns is what makes you function. It keeps you and your activities organized (to varying degrees) both physically and mentally. Keeps you in control of yourself (to varying degrees) both physically and mentally.

That's one way to look at..."information." The analog gives you a feel for what it is--how it flows, how much of it there is, and how it integrates and coordinates all those thousands of different parts and hundreds of different processes that combine to make the human being a thing of such incredible complexity. The same analog also tells you that, despite all this vast complexity, you are still nothing more than matter-energy, organized by information.

Now, if you took all those billions of neurons, and multiplied them by all those impulses and patterns, and kept track of all that for, say, 24 hours, you'd find that it takes a staggering amount of information just to run yourself for one day. And, if you took whatever number that is, and multiplied it by the 750,000 other members of our Army, what you'd get is a number so damned big its not hardly worth thinking about. Except, for what it says about the almost unimaginable complexity of our Army as a whole. Despite all that complexity, there is still a clean and simple way to view our Army or any of its component parts. A way to look at the forest, rather than the trees. Our Army is nothing more than, matter-energy organized by information. Clean and simple as that may be, you still can't do anything with it...yet.

* * * * *

SYSTEMS

Our Army is also a system. "System" is a word always in our mouths, but seldom in our minds--at least not in any clear and commonly understood way. We do not have time here to get into all the feather-fighting involved in trying to find the definition of "system." There are, however, many important thoughts associated with the word "system" that we should discuss. But we won't. We're looking for the essence of "system", and the essence is...relatedness. Relatedness and interdependence. Any system, of whatever kind, an individual soldier or
our whole Army, is composed of interrelated parts. What the parts are is not important right now. What is important is the interrelatedness.

What is it that does the interrelating among the parts? H. Plain 'ole H. Information. Whatever system you’re talking about, it is information that hooks the components together. It is information that links all the parts into a whole. A whole system, a whole man, a whole Army. Darned few of us have a true "systems perspective"—a view of the whole. That's because we've been programmed to think in functions...my MOS, this office, our "shop." Infantry, armor, artillery. Trainers, logisticians, and the DCSPER family. And "proponents" of every kind, shape, and description. But, a systems perspective, even briefly held, is what drives home the powerful implications and almost limitless potential of..."organized by information."

There's one more essence that goes with "system." Any system worth talking about—any real system like you, or like our Army—is humming on the inside. There are things going on in there...things happening, moving, flowing. These things are processes. You got 'em. And our Army's got 'em. There are thousands, millions, of different kinds of processes going on in any real system. You couldn't begin to list them all, even your own, but there are four great "macroprocesses" to which all of the others belong. Each can be expressed in a single word. You will readily associate three of these words with the idea of "system." The fourth word you'll remember, but you, like our Army, would probably forget it if it wasn't brought to your attention. The four macroprocesses of any real system and the four words that go with them are: INPUT, THROUGHPUT, OUTPUT...and FEEDBACK.

Now look at those words. They describe the essence of a system—a real system like you or our Army—but there's something else about those words. Something that characterizes each of them. They're alive. They all talk about something happening, something going on, something moving, something flowing. Each word by itself says that...and when you hook all four of them together, with feedback linked to input, the whole lash-up starts moving, cycling, flowing. And that's how a real system works, and how you work, and how our Army works. Looks like this:
This is a cybernetic control model. By "cybernetic" is meant a process which uses the negative feedback loop represented by: setting goals, measuring achievement, comparing achievement to goals, feeding back information about unwanted variances into the process to be controlled, and correcting the process. Complicated, ain't it? Nope. All three of those things we been talking about -- a system, and you, and our Army -- are nothing more than matter-energy, organized by information. But now, hopefully, you can see that 'ole H doesn't just sit there like a block of cement. Information flows, moves, makes things happen. It gives organization (for better or worse) to those four macroprocesses. Organizes each one of them individually, and organizes the four of them as a whole. Information flows, moves, makes things happen...in you, in our Army, in any real system.

* * * * *

INFORMATION FLOW

It is time now to move from the abstract world of theoretical physics and the moony language of systems theory and get to the real world where the soldier lives, to the raggedy world of actual force readiness. You need to get a handle on what information flow--its efficiency and effectiveness--can mean in the life of, say, the combat battalion. And you need some facts and figures.

Back in the tail-end of the Vietnam War, an infantry brigade commander wrote back to Ft Benning. "There's something wrong with the way our battalions are functioning. Don't know what it is. I could relieve the battalion commanders, but that's not the problem. It has something to do with how the whole damned headquarters operates. All my battalions have the same problem, and I see it in other brigades as well. The command groups just don't function smooth. What can you do about that?"

It was a tough and squirrely problem, but it came from a field commander in combat, and couldn't be ignored or put off with a thanks-but-no-thanks letter. Benning got moving with two initiatives. One was a technologically-based simulation which evolved over time and became what you know today as the Combined Arms Tactical Training Simulator (CATTS) out at Leavenworth. The other initiative was a piece of scientific research known as "the FORGE Project." It was done by the HumRRO unit at Benning. You never heard of it. And it took five years.

What the HumRRO scientists did was build their research design on a piece of organizational theory known as "the adaptive-coping cycle." What this theoretical concept said was that an organization, in dealing with critical external events impacting on the organization, goes through a predictable cycle in dealing with the external event. The
cycle is composed of seven steps or stages. You can get the gist of the "adaptive-coping cycle" and each of its 7 stages by looking for the essence of the brief descriptions laid out here:

**ADAPTIVE-COPING CYCLE**

* Sensing (the external event).
* Communicating Sensing (to the parts of the organization).
* Decision-making (about how to deal with the event).
* Stablizing internally (to compensate for effort anticipated).
* Communicating Decision-Making (to the parts of the organization).
* Coping (with the external event, i.e., action).
* Feedback (on how the action is going).

Now look carefully at that list...and think about those 4 macroprocesses that we mentioned earlier. Now look at it again, and think of...information flow. You got it! Those Benning scientists worked from a damned "systems" perspective, and they worked with "organized by information".

They identified those 7 things not as steps or stages, but as processes--on-going, moving processes dealing mostly with the flow of information in the nervous system of the organization. The FORGE scientists spelled out the operational definitions of each of these processes; then trained observers to identify them when they saw them happening; then developed criteria by which each process could be measured and assessed. All this was headwork--books, and studies, and papers, and pipes. Then they put on their white coats and moved to the lab.

In the lab, they put together a number of battalion "battle staffs" (damned fine term). Battalion commander and primary staff and maneuver company commanders. 10 men. Not real battle staffs, but ad hoc ones, composed, however, of combat veterans and, when possible, with combat experience in the staff positions to which they were assigned.
Next, the HumNRO researchers designed a long CPX. Vietnam scenario, with about 150 combat events (the "external events" of the adaptive-coping cycle). Then they worked stress into the design. Organized the CPX into 3 stages of stress by varying the frequency and nature of the combat events. From bad, to worse, to just plain awful.

When the battle staffs ran through the CPX, the scientists collected their data. And what they collected was...the information that moved through the battle staff as it dealt with an array of combat events and ever-increasing stress. Taped all the radio nets, collected all the written material, and even put the battle staffs in squad leader radio helmets so they could tape all of the person-to-person traffic. Took all that data, and transcribed it, and analyzed it. (And now you can see why it took five years.)

The essence of all that analysis of all that data was this: the better the battle staff performed those 7 processes, the better it handled the combat events, and the better it held up under stress. Two data displays from the report tell the story of efficiency and effectiveness of what is, for the most part, information flow in battalion battle staffs.

![Diagram](image-url)

*The ability of the organization to sense changes in its external and internal environments, to internally process the information sensed, and to adapt its operations to the sensed changes.

**Effectiveness in terms of how well the battle staffs performed the 7 processes.
Well, "...all that stuff was done in the lab, and those were ad hoc battle staffs, and that was a Vietnam scenario, and, most important, what would all that look like in a real war, say, in Europe, today?" Damned if I know. Same thing applies to the XM-1, and about half our officer corps, and maybe three-fourths of our whole Army. Don't know what they would look like in a real war. But we do know what the adaptive-copying cycle looks like in real battle staffs, in the field, in Europe, today.

What happened was that the Ft Benning colonel who got the FORGE Project going initially in 1968 was promoted to general and was commanding a division in Europe in 1978. He, as a Division commander, evidently saw some of the same problems as the brigade commander in Vietnam whose initial query triggered FORGE. He evidently also knew enough about the results of the FORGE research to see its potential. What he did was call back to CONUS, find the leader of the original FORGE research team and say, "Drop what you're doing, get your butt over here, and replicate your FORGE research. This time, we'll do it in the field, not in the lab; with real battle staffs, not mock-ups; and instead of a 10-hour jury-rigged Vietnam CPX, we'll use a 3-day, standardized, Russian-based staff workout called "PEGASUS."

That's just what happened, and the results were just the same: the better the battle staff performed those 7 processes, the better it handled the combat events...and the better it held up under stress...and the more enemy it killed...and the fewer casualties it took...and the longer it stuck on the battlefield. And here's a data table from that research:
### Dimensions of Battalion Effectiveness

**Comparison of Battalions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BNs with More Effective Process Performance</th>
<th>BNs with Less Effective Process Performance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEOGRAPHICAL AREA TAKEN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERSONNEL, WPNS &amp; EQUIPMENT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REMAINING AFTER COMBAT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENEMY TO FRIENDLY CASUALTY RATIO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sample size 12 combat battalions in Europe. All comparisons statistically significant.

NOTE: In each case, no matter how effectiveness was measured under the simulated battle conditions, the battalions which performed the 7 processes better were also more effective ON THE BATTLEFIELD.

---

What we have at this point in the pursuit of X=H is two recons--two patrol reports, one from the lab, one from the field. Ten years' difference in time, and two different scenarios of war, but both reports telling us about the same thing: the better a battalion can perform certain identifiable processes, the better it can fight. The recon patrols were not looking at training, or leadership, or weapons, or tactics. They were looking at battalions as systems, they were focused in on the processes going on in those systems, and the processes they were watching were processes dealing with information flow. Time to send out another patrol.

The next research effort launched from the Systems Science Institute at the University of Louisville, early in the spring of 1979. Six tank battalions this time; four in CONUS and two in Europe. And the research team on this recon would look at the battalions in their "natural state"...no simulations, no ad hoc staffs, no particular sort of exercise; just tank battalions engaged in the regular day-to-day activities of a tank battalion. From the wide range of activities that
could have been studied, the research team focused in on the one most important in peacetime...training.

The research team was more powerful this time. It had organizational psychologists, as before, but this time it also included systems scientists, and mathematicians, and ORSA people and computer specialists. Like the FORGE researchers, they worked from a systems perspective, but their knowledge of systems and processes and how to measure these things was far more extensive...and the daddy-rabbit of the Systems Science Institute was a Nobel-class scientist.

Like the FORGE researchers, they were looking at processes, but their focus was more precise, and specifically aimed at...information flow.

They reasoned that, in any real system, like, say, a tank battalion, the notion of "organized by information" can be extended into the idea of an information "metabolism". This information metabolism is the thing that does the organizing and it corresponds to what we've been calling information flow. "Metabolism" can be broken down into smaller, bite-sized, component information processes. The information processes that the Louisville researchers gathered data about are expressed in the language of information science as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Input Transducing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Gathering information from outside the battalion.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internal Transducing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Maintaining and reporting information about activities within the battalion.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Channeling.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Relaying information throughout the battalion without changing meaning.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decoding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Translating information for use within the battalion.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Memory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Storing and retrieving information.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Associating.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Using new information to make changes.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deciding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Using information from the other processes to develop instructions for what the battalion is to do.)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Encoding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Preparing information for reports or requests that are going outside the battalion.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Output Transducing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Sending information to places and people outside the battalion.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These were the information processes the Louisville scientists studied. And, of all the different kinds of information flowing through a battalion, they selected out that which applied to the management of training. Then they picked out the 15-20 positions most critical to the management of training and interviewed people in those positions...extensively and in depth. They took the data from those interviews, from other surveys they ran, and from all available records and reports about the performance of the battalion, then ran all that through some highly complicated analytical procedures. The essence of the end result of all that was the same as the FORGE research: the better a battalion performed these information processes, the better it performed in its most important peacetime activity...training.

But the effort of this third research patrol was cleaner. They had dealt specifically with the flow of information--training information--through a scientifically-derived set of information processes found not just in a battalion, but in any organization. And what they had found was a positive link between the efficiency and effectiveness of information flow and the efficiency and effectiveness of training.

Now, just for the hell of it, leap around a little bit, intuitively, here and there. Suppose we did this research again, but this time with the management of personnel, instead of the management of training? And then with the management of maintenance? And then with the management of resources? And in every case, suppose we found the same thing that our three recon patrols have reported—a positive linkage between the effectiveness and efficiency of information flow, and the performance of the organization? We're onto a hot trail, now.

Take one more intuitive leap. All these researchers we've been talking about looked at all those battalions not as battalions, but as systems. One of the "mechanics" of general systems theory is that what you find out about one kind of system applies to other systems of the same kind. And the "kind" that we've been talking about here is not really the battalion, but the organization. Therefore, that consistent finding about information flow that popped out of all the research, as well as the leaps we made above, applies not just to a battalion, but to any organization...from squad, to battalion, to our whole Army. The better the efficiency and effectiveness of information flow, the better the performance of the organization. That means that we can augment the feedback we get from looking at our output by also looking at our throughput processes. On that system model we used earlier, here's what it looks like:
Now let "performance" be not the management of training, nor personnel, nor maintenance, nor resource management, but the management of all those things and others tied together into a bundle called "force readiness"—actual force readiness — the essential performance output of a system we call US Army. Now...maybe you're beginning to see why "X = H"!

****

THE CONCEPTUAL BINDER

The main message thus far—about the positive linkage between information processes and the performance of an organization—is not new. It's something you already knew. Intuitively. What is new is that science, in its inexorable way, has come along to probe, then explain, then use, what was, at one time, common sense. Years ago, we knew, intuitively, that the chances of getting your head knotted were pretty good if you sat under an apple tree in October. Things fall. Science probed that phenomena. Guy name of Newton did some lab work, did some measuring, did some calculating, then developed some laws, principles, and formulas. In time, what was once just common sense about apples in October grew up into a technology that was instrumental in helping man break out through the earth's atmosphere and into the vast new frontier of space. What we see here, in this business of information flow, is a similar "growing up" of our intuitive and common sense notions of how to run an organization.

We could, perhaps, dismiss the promise of "X = H", by saying, "Well, hell, all that information flow business is just...good leadership." Ok. Agreed. Now where do we get some of that? Enough, at least, to solve the force readiness problem we started with? And what are the criteria of good leadership? And how do you persuade our Army's leadership to reach for these criteria? And how do you persuade our senior leaders that their leadership ain't already good? And how do you distinguish between leadership and management? And which does what? And what role is played by the new guy, organizational development? And how much are any and all of these dependent upon resource management? And what about all those related notions, like chain of command, and troop leading procedure, and "C3I"?

"Good leadership," paradoxically, is confusing as hell...unless...in the midst of all this complexity, we go to the essence. We did this once before, when, faced with bewildering interactions and boundless complexities, we said, "Anything and everything is nothing more than...MATTER-ENERGY, ORGANIZED BY INFORMATION."

There is an essence just like that for leadership...and all of its cousins. A phrase for focusing on the forest. If you study leadership for 15-20 years, you'll find it defined forty hundred different ways.
Of all of those, the cleanest is a definition by a man named Ashby—one of those physicists who speaks the language of the essence, and whose definition of leadership links common sense and science sense together:

Leadership is nothing more than...TURNING INFORMATION INTO ACTION. (And the same thing goes for all the cousins.)

If this is true, then information science, which really got moving only at the start of the present decade, is the science which will begin to grow up our common sense notions of "How to Run an Organization."

Our initial guidance, as we started with the problem of "solve for X", was to find the "conceptual binder" which would tie together our powerful but somewhat disparate ideas about "How to Run an Organization." All that we have learned thus far, buttressed by the battalion research reported, and essenced by Ashby, says clearly that the conceptual binder, the thing that stitches all those ideas together, is...information flow. Looks like this:

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47
COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS

If you want, you can dismiss this developing notion of information flow as merely another "gimmick." God knows, our Army has had enough of those in this decade, and is understandably gun-shy. But before you do, look around a bit at the flow of information in our Army.

Are there any "communication problems?" Up and down the chain of command? Sideways between MACOMs? With instrumentalities outside our Army system, like DOD, and the Congress, and our people? When a senior decision-maker comes up with a new and different strategic level concept, or even a simple notion about berets, how long does it take to turn information into action? Do you run into fellow soldiers, like maybe those who ride the PPBS circuit, who speak a jargon you just flat cannot comprehend? Do you get 1, 2, 3-inch thick "papers", written in other jargons, with a next week suspense? Ever see wheels get re-invented? Folks behind the power curve? People, or offices, or even whole damned commands never getting the word? Problems with lack or loss of organizational memory? Great and good programs aborted, or distorted, or contorted, on the action end? Generals in a state of mental dazzle from information overload? Communication channels choked and gagged with garbage and "statistical reports" of measurable trivia? And how many young troopers know and understand our Army's goals? And how long does it take our Army to get the spin-offs of new war technology into their minds and hands?

All these questions and a thousand more bespeak the workings of ORGANIZED BY INFORMATION and TURNING INFORMATION INTO ACTION. They are things which account for the raggedyness of our plots of actual force readiness. They are things that plague us all, as individuals, as units, as an Army. "Just the natural way things are," you say. Nope. Plagues used to be natural, too, until we found that they were attackable...through science. So also is the raggedyness of our readiness. Attackable. Through science. Through the science associated with the conceptual binder that runs through all our ideas about "how to run an organization". Through the sciences associated with the study of information flow.

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PART II
ASSAULT

Alright. We have said, "X = H". And we have put together many things: force readiness, lab research, field research, intuition, common sense, and common problems. If you're beginning to see the logic of X = H, and beginning to sense its promise for increased force readiness, then another question is beginning to form in your mind: "How do we start to turn this insight into application? What the hell can we do?"

We could, at this point, figure out long lists of recommendations and taskings aimed at the improvement of information flow in our Army. But let's not do that. Let's see if we can look at our organizations as systems and get to the essence of how to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of information flow, and drive up the curve of actual force readiness. Go back to that simple system model (which can represent a major headquarters...or a battalion...or a company...or you). Remember we said it is alive with information flow.

Those three recon patrols and their reports (that we talked about back in Part I) tell us that one objective in this assault has to be engineering those information processes which make up throughput so that the system hums. Hopefully, with efficiency. For now, let's call that "Information Engineering" and talk about it more later.

So, where else can we tune up information flow? Well, it's for damn sure that some of our systems are humming away doing things right but not doing the right things. Our systems have two big inputs: what we do -- that's Mission; and how we do it -- that's Performance Standards. Performance Standards come from VALUES. For right now, let's just define values as things that are important...to people and bunches of people. Where do these values come from? Are they written down someplace? And how do those values fit with the mission? Do we have values shared sideways? Up and down? A second objective, then, might be "Values Engineering" (we'll discuss this in detail later). And put together with our simple system model, all that looks like this:
Now there's something else going on there in those systems besides bits and bytes of information whipping around. Those systems—our organizations—have people for components...not just diodes and resistors and electrical gadgetry. If all we had to work with was the "cognitive dimension", like facts, data, and numbers, then engineering values and information would be a relatively quick fix. But systems that hum with people add an "affective" dimension to information. People have feelings and sentiments and emotions and their own values...and all of those color how information is interpreted. So what we must do is overlay that simple system up there with a third objective: put the damn affective dimension to work. We need to talk about the tactics required to reach those objectives.

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"3 x 3 x 3"

Let's see if we can get to the tactical essence. Three concepts of operation, all interdependent and mutually supporting; all applicable to our Army as a whole; all directed to improving the efficiency and effectiveness of information flow...and the whole damned bundle all together aimed at driving up the curve of actual force readiness. The mental picture looks like this:
That's the essence of putting $H$ to work to solve for $X$. A "3x3x3" -- 3 levels of our Army, and 3 concepts of operation, and 3 parts to each concept. That's the essence. Now here's what that $3x3x3$ mental picture says...from the bottom of our Army all the way up to the top. Let's start at the operational level.

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INFORMATION ENGINEERING

This is an easy notion, and more specific, more concrete than those that follow. "Information engineering" is a term we just invented a few pages ago. Don't know how it's defined in the literature, but certainly it's been used before. We won't try to define it here, but let's look at what it means in the context of putting $X = H$ to work for our Army. It means putting information science to work to study how information flows in our Army, and it means engineering these flows for better efficiency and effectiveness.

For the moment, and despite the title above, just forget about computers and compilers, bits and bytes, and all MIS's in general. Those are
important, but not right now. To get a handle on what we mean by "information engineering", first go back to that third recon patrol -- that interdisciplinary team of scientists (with 2 Army men on it) from the University of Louisville. You know the essence of what they found. Now it's time to look at some of the details.

Recall that they were looking at those battalions as organizations, and they were looking at those organizations as systems, and they were looking at the information flow within those systems. They broke information flow down into 9 component information processes. And here's that list again:

- **Input Transducing.** (Gathering information from outside the battalion.)
- **Internal Transducing.** (Maintaining and reporting information about activities within the battalion.)
- **Channeling.** (Relaying information through the battalion without changing meaning.)
- **Decoding.** (Translating information for use within the battalion.)
- **Memory.** (Storing and retrieving information.)
- **Associating.** (Using new information to make changes.)
- **Deciding.** (Using information from the other processes to develop instructions for what the battalion is to do.)
- **Encoding.** (Preparing information for reports or requests that are going outside the battalion.)
- **Output Transducing.** (Sending information to places and people outside the battalion.)

What we didn't explain earlier is that the efficiency and effectiveness of each of these information processes is measurable. The researchers developed the methodology for measuring the performance of each of those processes individually, as well as the performance of all 9 information processes as a whole. They measured variables like lag time, distortion, rate, volume, and meaning -- variables that underlie many of those "communication problems" we discussed earlier. They turned these variables into objective data...into numbers, so that they could bring to bear the power of mathematical logic to help us understand the problems that plague us, information-wise. What these scientists did, in effect, was a damned depot-level "TI" of the
information flow mechanism (they called it a "metabolism") in the battalion...and herein lie powerful implications.

For example, the kind of information these researchers were studying was that pertaining to the management of training. In this regard, there were high-performing battalions and low-performing battalions. High performing battalions spent almost twice as much effort in "input transducing". Low performing battalions, on the other hand, spent almost twice as much effort in "output transducing." What this says, in our language, is that the high-performing battalions were more aggressive at getting out, finding out, and bringing back into the battalion more information about training management. Low performing battalions more or less took what came their way through regular channels, and put their main strain instead on getting information about what they had done out to people and places outside the battalion...training reports, after action reports, status reports, and general broadcasting.

This objectively describable phenomenon fits what we feel intuitively, i.e., "Damn! This outfit (unit, office, Army) is always reactive and never proactive!" Ever heard that before? Sure, but the difference is that now we've got a handle on that homily—a scientific handle, and a technology with which to apply it. Not just that one homily, either, but a hundred other homilies (like some of those "communications" problems we noted earlier) which reflect problems with the flow of information in our Army.

There's no need here to go into all the details, but, using techniques developed by this research team, it is possible, now, to move into an organization and, with minimum disruption of the organization's "natural state", examine its information flow processes, diagnose problems, locate information flow "pathologies", then prescribe accurate, do-able, understandable, relatively easy, common sense things to do to clear up the "communication problem". And, what really clears up is performance!

Now, all this business about diagnosing information flow pathologies and prescribing easy cures may sound like a snake-oil pitch. It's not. What we're seeing in this break-through research is a new approach, not by some consultant corporation, but by a new science, to assault the problems of a new "Age of Information" whose fallout will make our plot of actual force readiness even raggedyer unless we can somehow get a better grip on the difficult business of TURNING INFORMATION INTO ACTION.

What we must do in this "information engineering" business is three things. First off, we must expand immediately the sort of systems science and information science research accomplished by the Louisville research team. To do this, we need to take what we learned from those three recon patrols about information process performance, and validate it, and expand it with more kinds of information and more kinds of
systems. Then we have to tighten up and simplify methods of gathering information. And develop more and better diagnostic and prescriptive formulas. And above all, we have to translate all that into language our Army can understand. In essence, we need to get this research expanding, out ahead of us, and talking to us.

The second thing we have to do is start developing this information flow expertise in our Army. What we don’t need is a new school, or a new staff position, or a bunch of briefing teams released out onto the “workshop” circuit. We need simply to expand, to develop, to “grow up” more a staff position we’ve already got—the “communications” officer. Need to add a new dimension to what he does and to the curriculum that teaches him to do it. Information flow technology of the sort developed by the Louisville team. Give him an additional dimension of expertise that will enable him to diagnose and correct problems in information flow, problems with information overload. Give him, for example, the knowledge to analyze the complicated mechanics of TURNING INFORMATION INTO ACTION. Teach him to do things like this:

Is that diagram “communications”? Sure as hell is, in a sense of the word far truer than AV: 680-2765 or 29.25 megacycles. Complicated? Sure as hell is, this new dimension. But then, there was a time when the already complicated role of the S3 was made even complicateder by
E = mc^2. S3s everywhere in our Army had to learn a whole new dimension of "operations", namely, nuclear weapons employment. And that last diagram on information flow analysis is certainly no more difficult to learn and use than all those formulas and nomograms we had to use to determine a "DGZ". All that was a whole new dimension, added, to an existing staff function. To meet the challenge of ever-increasing knowledge. Got to do that same thing again. With the "commo officer". Grow him up some more.

The third thing we must do in this "information engineering" business is put that sorry suck-egg computer to work. There is an enormous source of "information power" in the computer that we have scarcely tapped. Information scientists estimate that us folks in the business of TURNING INFORMATION INTO ACTION use computers at only a little more than 10% of their capacity. That's because we have been awed by mystique--mystique engendered by strange terminology. Hardware and software, computers and compilers, bits and bytes...and bullshit! We have treated computers as generals all these years. It's time to make 'em SP-4s and put 'em to work. What can they do? A thousand things at least, all related to, and helping with, those information flow processes we discussed earlier.

For example, take the memory and decision-making processes. S3 and his folks are in the TOC, working like hell and already "behind the power curve". And now the 'ole man comes in with a whole additional load of requirements for a new operation he's planning. Needs data. About ammunition supply rates, movement times, expected casualties, and a whole bunch of other facts. S3 turns to Ops Sgt. He's busy with a grease pencil, keeping the situation map up to date. But...the 'ole man is hot for that planning data, so S3 and Ops Sgt drop what they're doing, get out FM 101-10-1 (Staff Officers' Manual - Organization, Technical, and Logistical Data), get out their work sheets, thumb through to the right tables, look up the right formulas, then start arithmeticking.

All that they're doing can be done more quickly, more accurately by SP4 Computer. All those damned tables can be put on "floppy discs", and all those formulas and all that arithmeticking can be programmed ("trained") into that SP4, so that he produces the right answers in a few seconds, even under extreme stress. And while he's doing that, he can also keep that situation map up to date, and make entries in the journal at the same time. All that, plus, he don't blow grass and he can't get pregnant.

Now, you say you already knew about those capabilites noted above. Nothing new. Right...but then why is it we're just beginning to revise, then print a hundred thousand or so copies of a new FM 101-10-1, even though we're getting ready to order microcomputers for distribution down to the battalion level? And Leavenworth ain't teaching nothing about the use of computers in 'ole JAYHAWK.
Computers are coming into our homes, into our battalions, into our companies...and our schools are teaching our youngsters how to use them. It is imperative that we take charge of these imperious bastards and put 'em to work, doing the right things, right. One way to do this is to make SP4 Computer a principal tool in the kitbag of that expanded "communications officer" to help him with the maintenance of the information flow processes in the organization. Further, if we start moving with this notion soon enough, we may learn enough to start bringing the benefits of military applications of modern information science into the staff procedures that we will teach all our majors in the CAS\(^3\) course at Leavenworth. "Chain of Command", "Estimate of the Situation", and "Troop Leading Procedure" will all grow up too.

In summary, then, "information engineering" as we have used it here, means that we must expand the sort of information flow research we discussed earlier; tool up the military expertise through which this research can be put to work; and begin to exploit hell out of the capabilities of the computer...just like we did in between the two WW's when we got serious about airplanes. And that's the essence of the operational level of our assault.

Now let's move up to the coordinative level and see what we can do with...the "affective dimension".

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56
SON OF A BITCH

"Information", as we have used the term thus far, appears to be a pretty specific thing. Bits and bytes. Measure this and measure that. Make that SP4 turn out data, facts, numbers. Trouble is, "H" isn't all that precise. Told you earlier that it was an even more aggravating thing to pin down, definition-wise, than "system". That's because of a son of a bitch.

There was once an 'ole hound-dog breeder down in north Georgia who pointed to a young male beagle pup and said, "See that there dog? He's the son of a bitch that's whelped more than 40 pups in the time I've had her. She's pure hell on a rabbit, but he's so damn dumb he couldn't trail a tractor!" In this context, "son of a bitch" is simply a statement of fact -- data from the cognitive dimension of "information." If the clean, precise, factual cognitive dimension was the only dimension there was, then putting H to work to solve for X would be fairly simple, and we could lean mostly on "information engineering" notions to get the job done. But, it don't work that way. There's two dimensions to information flow. There's the cognitive dimension, like facts, data, numbers. But then there's also the affective dimension, which carries feeling, sentiment, and emotion.

"Son of a bitch", looked at in the cognitive dimension, and used as illustrated, is simply a clean statement of fact about a family relationship between two beagle hounds. But...when you first saw that word in the sub-head above, it triggered off not the cognitive dimension of fact (family relationships), but the affective dimension of feeling ("not nice to use that sort of word in this paper").

You can, and probably have, taken the cognitive statement of fact, "son of a bitch", loaded it up, and fired it at an individual. Just by where you aim it, you change the whole meaning of that word. And in comes the affective dimension. But the affective dimension is a function of more than just words. It is a function of context, and culture, and values; and group norms, and gestures, and expressions; and modulations of volume, and rate, and lag time. Little of this is cognitive, but all of it is meaning. The meaning that is carried by information is a function of both the cognitive and affective dimensions. Call a man a son of a bitch. With the right affective loading, that can tell a trooper you love and admire him. Or, you can change the affective loading and turn him around 180°...make him want to kill you if he gets the chance. And family relationships between beagle hounds don't figure in one damn bit in either case.

How important is the affective dimension in the transfer of meaning? Pretty damned important. Some representative research, from the scientists who study the transfer of meaning, shows that in a spoken message (such as you get in a staff meeting, for example) the words
themselves carry only 7% of the total meaning of the message. Inflections in the voice carry about 38%, and gestures and expressions...55%! And inflections, gestures, and expressions are things of the affective dimension.

So, information flow is not a clean and precisely measurable thing that you can get at with a voltmeter or with an oscilloscope that picks up frequencies in the electromagnetic spectrum. You could take this architectural approach to information flow if these information flow processes (the ones that TURN INFORMATION FLOW INTO ACTION) all flowed strictly through machines, and transistors, and condensors, and chip circuits. But that ain't the way it is. The "living systems theory", upon which this whole paper is based, says that people are the principal components of the organization as a system. And you and I both know that "People are the Army." Information flow must flow through people. And where there's people, there's affect. And where there's affect, there's chemistry, not architecture.

You knew all this too, didn't you? Just like the possibility of putting FM 101-10-1 on a floppy disc. You knew about the importance of intangibles, like morale, and esprit, and will, and commitment—things which, in war, can outweigh weapons. Well then, why is it when we look at the great "C 3I" diagrams -- the information flow by which we will organize matter-energy on the next battlefield -- why is it that all we see is "architecture"? Boxes and electronic devices carrying low-band, high-power, burst-transmitted digital displays...or whatever? These are important, but they're architecture. On that next battlefield, the information flow that organizes things will, for sure, flow through machines, but it will also flow through men. And where there are men, there is the affective dimension. And there's no chemistry, nor affective dimension, nor people, in all those C 3I diagrams.

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PUTTING THE AFFECTIVE DIMENSION TO WORK

Putting H to work to solve for X is relatively easy if all we worry about is "information engineering" and the cognitive dimension of information flow. When we ring in the affective dimension by recognizing that people are the Army, the task of putting H to work to increase force readiness gets tougher, but it's do-able. What we have to do is bring to center stage our Army's awareness of the dimension of affect, and give our Army the means with which to tap this largely latent source of combat power potential.

There are three things we need to do for starters. Don't need any more people programs. Don't need X number of hours of affect in the service school curricula. Got just about what we need of both of those right now. What we need to do is give those things a sense of purpose, grow 'em up a bit here and there, and get 'em fitted in with the rest of what our Army's doing.
The first thing we need to do is bring a full recognition of the affective dimension into our planning. Need to bring it into the planning for our regular peacetime activities...and we need to bring it into our war planning. Let's look at peacetime first.

Whether we like it or not, the real throttlemen for peacetime activities are the resource managers...the DCSRM folks, and the PPBS people, and the comptrollers...spaces, and funds, and budgets. Something unique about these particular planners: all you got to do is give them something they can count, and they can then, by some strange combination of mathematics and alchemy, work it into the budgeting for spaces and funds. Right now, they can see damned little to count over in the affective dimension, so they don't do with it. And thus, "things affective" don't figure very centrally, in the planning of our peacetime activities.

But...within the last ten years or so, the field of management science has been developing a new technology designed specifically to bring the affective dimension into the planning of the resource managers. The technology is called "Human Assets Accounting", or "Human Resource Accounting." A few Army folks know of this technology, but by and large, it got lost in the welter of "human" programs that followed in the wake of the VOLAR transition and then fell through the cracks. It is still a growing technology; but with it, our Army can begin to get a quantitative handle on some of the so-called "intangibles" of human variables and variable humans. For example, an unanticipated upsurge in the early retirement of colonels, becomes not just a lot of speculating about "something wrong" with our Army (or our colonels), but rather "a failure to fully amortize investments, each of which represents approximately $2.5M in sunk costs." Now people don't like to be looked at as investments and not many of us want to be "amortized", but this quantitative, dollar-cost approach to something wrong (in the affective dimension) between our Army and our colonels, certainly could bring the problem -- and ones like it -- center stage in the planning process. And what about the "relative utility value" of filling a certain TOE position with a highly motivated SP4 of moderate ability versus a young sergeant of high ability who didn't give a damn? Such counting, and dollar-costing, and "util-izing", is possible through the newly developing technology of human assets accounting. Brought into the budget planning process by the resource managers, it can sensitize a whole Army, at pocket book level, to the importance of the affective dimension. And do it a hell of a lot better than a "Go brief all the generals." Whoever is proponent, integrating center, or daddy rabbit of the way we do our budget planning, must begin now to learn and exploit this new technology.
Bringing the affective dimension to our war planners -- the combat developers -- is going to be a bitch. They are flat locked on and locked in to the "architecture" of the battlefield, with little or no awareness of the chemistry. They move a little toward the chemistry by recognizing "man-machine interface," but to a good CD'er, this means ergonomics, a technology of matching meat to metal with studies of the average fibula length and foot pressure required to operate the foot pedals of a truck or tank. Man-machine interface, thus conceived, is a matter of cognitive fact and numbers, with little recognition of factors from the affective realm, like confidence in the machine, for example, or commitment to keeping it moving, firing and maintained. Those factors, too, it seems, are critical elements of the interface. The new weapon on the battlefield by itself is not enough. It must be linked up with the soldier, cognitively and affectively. Training is the mechanism. A simple formula tells how this is done:

\[
\text{SKILL} \times \text{WILL} \times \text{DRILL} = \text{KILL}
\]

In a diagram, that same formula looks this:

![Diagram](image)

Somehow, that Army-green Ballentine beer symbol must move right up front in the minds of our war planners.

The CD'ers man-machine myopia is understandable. It is they who must bring onto the battlefield within the next few years an unprecedented array of technological wonders with which to fight. New systems, new weapons, with price tags into the megabucks -- and it is the CD'ers who must get them started, ride herd on their development and production, and figure out how they should be used. Little wonder that they concentrate on the architecture and not the chemistry. New weapons, new machines, and tight suspense schedules are tough to handle without the
clarity of cognitive fact.

But...if our Army is to become fully aware of the force readiness potential of the affective dimension, that dimension must figure in our war planning. There are two general things and one specific thing that our war planners must do. The first general thing is to somehow develop, throughout the CD community, a clear recognition of one of the prime dicta of the history of war: "New weapons are worthless in the hands of troops who have neither the will nor intelligence to use them." Given that recognition, the second general thing our war planners must do is set about to bring the "human dimension" full bore into the planning. We will know this has happened when consultants and contractors begin to gnaw on such things of affect as "measures of confidence," and "measures of commitment", and "measures of will"... and...when such factors figure centrally in decisions.

The specific thing our war planners need to do, now, is bring the chemistry of the affective dimension to the architecture of our C3I planning -- our information flow planning. Put people and affect and meaning in the middle of those circuit diagrams that stretch over Europe. Recognize that C3I is only part of a larger, human communication process involving complexities such as this:
The principles of information science, not just in the context of electrical currents and radio frequencies, but also in the context of processes of information flow within a living system, can help bring this chemistry we need to our C^3I planning. This seems logical, simply because of the role of the affective dimension in the transfer of meaning, and the sure knowledge that emotion will be a central feature of the opening of the Central Battle. But there is an even more compelling reason lying smack in the middle of 10 year's worth of heavily-resourced scientific research done by the Ohio State University's Disaster Research Center.

The thrust of this government-sponsored research was to determine what happens to the communications and decision-making (C^3I) in organizations under conditions of extreme stress and crisis. Most of their data came from actual case studies of communities struck by natural disasters like tornadoes and hurricanes. One of the central findings emerging from the 300 researches was that the greatest C^3I problems in organizations attempting to cope with extreme stress and crisis are not the technical breakdowns (although these were widespread), but rather the social and human breakdowns, i.e., the affective dimension. The several hundred findings of this extensive and responsible research should certainly be of value to war planners working the C^3I problems inherent in the extreme stress and crisis that will mark the onset of the Central Battle.

What we have argued thus far in this section is that the affective dimension or, "the human side of military enterprise," must become a major factor in the planning—not just the speeches—of our resource management and combat development communities. The purpose of this is to help our Army recognize that the affective dimension is critical, not so much in terms of altruism, or social responsibility, or "welfare of the troops," but rather in terms of its impact on the transfer of meaning...on the information flow that organizes our Army's matter-energy in the production of force readiness.

We said there were 3 things to do in putting the affective dimension to work in using H to solve for X. The planning business above is one. There are 2 more, and they don't take as much explaining.

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COHESIVENESS

Cohesiveness...its critical role in combat and great potential as a source of force readiness have been clearly established 100 times in 3 different ways: in the lessons of history; in scientific research of Army units in combat; and in what every damn one of us who has ever
commanded a unit knows from common sense, intuition, and experience. But damn! We still have annual turnover rates of as much as 130% in some of our units, and the DCSPER trend data says the turnover curve is on the upswing. We try all sorts of "rotation experiments" over the years, but they are one-shot things...showmanship things, with a lot of PR coverage. We pay little attention to gathering feedback on how these experiments work out, and we put even less effort into adapting our personnel policy to the lessons learned. To tell our Congress and our nation that "we're doing the best we can with what we've got", and, at the same time, virtually ignore the great combat power potential available through unit cohesiveness, seems to be...just flat out organizationally dishonest.

In putting H to work to solve for X, cohesiveness is of extreme importance. Not so much because of things like esprit and teamwork, but specifically because of its impact on the affective dimension of communication and of information flow. Underlying damn near all the positive force readiness spin-offs of unit cohesiveness is good affective communication among the people of the unit...the "human components" of the living system. Good affective communication cannot be learned worth a damn from written words and diagrams. There's only one way to build it. That's with time. Time together and in contact with each other. The reason for this lies in all the complexity of affective "language." And this "language" ain't like English or Spanish. Every individual is different, and what this means is that every individual has a somewhat different affective language, and what this means is that it takes time for the people in a unit to learn all these different languages. Time. Time together. Ain't no other way, and the computer can't help.

If we have thus far made a fairly good argument for the importance of the affective dimension in the efficiency and effectiveness of information flow, in the transfer of meaning, in the turning of information into action, in the organization of matter energy, then how in the hell, with the evidence of history, research, and experience staring us right in the face, can our DCSPER community (and "family") sleep at night without having unit cohesiveness on the right front burner and turned up to HIGH?

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OD STAFF OFFICERS

There's a third way to get the affective dimension moving. It involves the OESO. Despite all the defining, feather-fighting, and forced-feeding of the past several years, what this guy really is is our Army's main source of expertise in the language and communication of affect. Think about it. That's what he works with when he handles the transition of commanders, the team-building sessions, the listening workshops. Gets the affective information out in the open where it can
be put to work. Our Army has learned much from the OESO...and now it's time to "grow him up." We need to "institutionalize" not the OESO, per se, but rather the expertise that he has brought to our Army. We need to institutionalize that expertise, but we need also to aim that expertise in the right direction. Specifically, we need to aim it toward the production of force readiness, not at "personal growth", which is where much of this expertise is aimed now.

Here's what we must do to grow up the OESO, institutionalize this expertise, and aim that expertise toward force readiness. First, we need to take about half of what the OESO does and give it to the SI. Not the big, complex things, but some of the easy things where today's OESO spends most of his time, like surveys of organizational climate and transition workshops, for example. ADMINCEN right now is beginning to train a new kind of SI. An SI whose traditional role has been expanded by another dimension -- the human dimension. The most effective of the easy things that the OESO's have learned over the past several years should go right into that new expanded SI role. The SI is a staff officer, and these "easy parts" of OE would seem far better institutionalized when performed by a unit staff officer rather than by an outside "consultant" from higher headquarters. And there ain't no need for ADMINCEN to get all bothered about resources and time for front end analysis and training development. Just plug in at ADMINCEN what the OECSs has already developed, taught and evaluated.

We need next to look out across the 500 or so OESO's that our Army has trained, and pick out the best half. Then from among these, who have demonstrated competence at OE Skill Level 1, we need to pick some out and start sending them to graduate schools with established and effective organizational development programs. And beyond this, the problems of how to "handle", where to assign, how many and to whom, what MOS, where to go to school, how to influence that school's curriculum, funding, AERB slots, etc. etc. have already been worked out...in the paradigm of the ORSA. And with that, we can phase out our OE Center and School, because this new, "grown-up" OESO, like the ORSA man, won't need a special school.

What we'd have then is an Organizational Development Staff Officer who will have as much or more influence on our Army's force readiness as does the ORSA. What this OD staff officer does to "develop" the organization is look at the organization as a system. Not some simple-assed, abstract, fuzzy-wuzzy system, but a real, concrete living system which has people as its principal components, and force readiness as its goal. And what he looks at within that system is the information flow by which that system TURNS INFORMATION INTO ACTION. And within that information flow, he specializes in, maintains, and troubleshoots the affective dimension. And what both he and his counterpart, "grown up", commo officer lean heavily on, in their work on the affective and cognitive dimensions of information flow, is the systems science and information science research that we hope to get out ahead of us and
talking to us in Army language. We need this OD staff officer. To bring human assets accounting to the DCSRMers. To bring the chemistry of war to the CDers. To do with the battle staffs of divisions and corps what those researchers learned with the battle staffs of combat battalions.

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"THEM BASTARDS UP AT PLATOON HEADQUARTERS"

We have at this point discussed two of the organizational levels and two of the three "concepts of operation" necessary to put H to work in solving for X. The concept dealing with information engineering was fairly specific and "tactical." Went in mostly at the operational level. The concept of bringing to our Army a full awareness of the potential of the affective dimension was less specific and dealt mainly with planning and staff matters, i.e., applicable mostly at the coordinative level. The last concept is more abstract. It intermingles the cognitive and the affective. It is the stuff of the "strategic" level, and it speaks of values, and of philosophy...the kind of things that for centuries have flowed from the wisdom of the old warriors and the tribal elders...the kind of things that today flow through the 4-star meetings, the Army Commanders' conference, the Chief of Staff's office, the SELCOMs and PIGRICs and policy councils.
What we must do up here at the strategic level of our Army is marshal two forces that will multiply the benefits received from concepts introduced at operational and coordinative levels. The two forces are no-cost things. Can't be counted. Can't be funded. Can't be programmed or pronounced. Once marshalled, however, they can drive our whole Army's notion of "How to Run an Organization", and in such a way as to increase exponentially the efficiency and effectiveness of information flow processes throughout our Army. The two forces are, values and a perspective of the whole. First off, we need to go a few rounds with the notion of values.

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VALUES

Let's define "values" for right now simply as things that are important...to people and to bunches of people. And by now, we should know that each person and every bunch of people is different, so the sets of values they have will be different. The values of a preacher and a used car salesman are different, probably, but if these two men are from South Georgia, then some of their values are the same, but still different from those of a preacher and used car salesman from New York City.

Getting a handle on values is tough. What are yours? And what are those of our Army? Our nation? And which ones are the same and which ones are different? Tough...but don't quit. Fuzzy as they are, we're going to put these values to work in solving for X...in producing force readiness. Hang in there a bit.

Values sit right smack in the middle of your "perceiver." Whatever information comes in to get perceived, it must pass through those values. They filter, color, change, distort whatever information comes through. Works the same way for bunches of people (like organizations), as it does for individual people. What this means is that you can never really know the "real" world, nor can you ever really know the real meaning of information that another person tries to transfer to you. It's a difficult task to transfer even part of true meaning from one individual to another. And that's just two people. What happens when you hook up 10 people and try to move meaning in one end of that lash-up and out the other? Ever play that party game where the individual at one end reads a message written on a piece of paper, then whispers it to the next person, and so on down the line? Diagrammatically, that party game looks like this:
Now look carefully at that diagram. If you can get your perceiver screwed around right, what this is isn't a picture of a party game, but rather a chunk of a C3I layout. Those round things are the "nodes" (which we hope will someday represent machines and people) and the arrows are...information flow.

If you really got a good perceiver, you can grab that lash-up at either end, jerk it straight, put it vertical, and you got...a chain of command.

Back to the party again. Suppose all those people were preachers. Would meaning move better? What if they were all New York City preachers? Better still? How 'bout not just preachers, but rabbis? And then, what would happen if you stuck a couple of South Georgia red-neck used car dealers right in the middle?

And that's how values work, whether they're found in a party game, South Georgia, a chain of command, or a C3I system beginning to pulse with the start and the stress of the Central Battle. They are a central determinant of the efficiency and effectiveness of each of the information processes that make up the information flow that TURNS INFORMATION INTO ACTION. The greater the similarity of the values among those "nodes", the more efficient and effective the transfer of meaning. And values, for sure, can't be dorked by some Russian counter-commo satellite.

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ARTICULATION OF OUR ARMY'S VALUES

What are our Army's values? We've all got some ideas, and we could flop out Duty-Honor-Country, or some things out of the Officer's Guide, but the fact remains that we have made no concerted, coherent, full-bore effort to articulate just what our Army's values are. Until we do that -- and there are at least two good reasons why it can only be done up at the strategic level -- we have no way to set about seeing what we can do to build the similarity of values that will lead to the more efficient and effective transfer of meaning.

If we intend to do our damndest to close up the difference between our actual and potential force readiness, and if all we've said about "X=H" thus far holds promise to do that, then one of several quantum jumps we
must make is the one that puts us on top of being able to say, with some specificity, just what our Army's values are. And this must be the task of the strategic level. Two reasons.

Whatever those values are, they can only come from one place. They are not a matter of the votes or consensus of the membership of our Army. Nor are they a matter of the value system of the young men and women coming into our Army. It would be fine if both of these value systems could be accommodated, but our Army's values can only come from one place, and that is, from those things that our nation holds our Army responsible to perform. And, simply from a "communications" perspective, it is our strategic level...Chief, 4-stars, the E-ringers, the top slice...that is in the best position to know, from the instrumentalities through which our nation governs itself, what it is that our nation holds our Army responsible to perform.

The second reason that articulation of our values must be the task of the strategic level is simply that the strategic level "runs" the whole organization. It's decisions, guidance, policies, and programs lay out for all of us what must be done. And that level also establishes the "organizational climate" within which we must do the things that must be done. And there must be consistency between the two. Values calibrate.

"Values", as we said, are abstract as hell, but they are, as we said, those things that are important. When there are disconnects, and confusions, about what's important, whether among the people of our Army or the institutions of our nation, we got problems. Running deep beneath the agony of our Army, two or three years on both sides of 1970, were the workings of values. Values. Abstract things. Strategic...and all-important.

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VALUES ENGINEERING

That's another word we just made up, just a few pages back. Values "engineering." It will be offensive to some, but here it means putting what we know about values to work...to build force readiness...through better information flow. Once again, science has been at this values business, probing, with things like "formal axiology models", a phenomenon that we have been working for years with common sense and intuition. From this has come some knowledge we can use...if we can get those values "articulated" in some fashion at the strategic level.

Science tells us that a set of values is formed early in life (man or organization). That set of values remains pretty stable from then on. Supposedly, and according to old dogs, those values are locked in and can't be changed. But that's wrong. A powerful and significant event in the life (of men, or of organizations...or old dogs) can be the occasion for a change in values. Entry into our Army is a powerful and
significant event in the life of a young man. And whatever values he had with him on the "outside" are changed to some degree when he (or she) gets on the inside.

Those who study values scientifically call the process of forming, changing, and sustaining values the process of "socialization." Through research, they understand many of the mechanics involved -- the how to's. They've looked at the process in many kinds of institutions and organizations. In WW II, they called the process "indoctrination" and studied what happened with thousands of soldiers coming into our Army. And 10 years ago, they studied what we were doing with "Beast Barracks" up at West Point (we listened briefly, then went back to "plain 'ole common sense and intuition").

The research continues and the implications for application increase. Three aspects of the transition from civilian to soldier or from one assignment in an Army organization to another are immediately apparent. First, people in transition are in an anxiety mode. They're anxious and motivated to learn their new functional and social roles as quickly as possible. Second, no transition occurs in a social vacuum. Superiors, subordinates, peers and other associates support, guide, hinder, confuse, or push the individual who is learning his new role. Finally, the stability and productivity of any organization depend in large measure on the way newcomers to various positions come to carry out their tasks.

Psychologists at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology have developed 7 socialization "dimensions". Each of the major people processing strategies, as applied, can be thought of as existing somewhere between the two poles of each of those 7 dimensions. Across the dimensions, the strategies are not mutually exclusive. In practice in our basic training centers and in all our organizations, these strategies are either explicitly or inadvertently (but not strategically) applied, and they're typically combined in sundry and often very inventive ways.

Now, just for the hell of it, take an Army value, like "courage" for example, and think about it in terms of the 7 socialization dimensions and the strategy poles on the next page. Think about courage and how our Army goes about changing, developing, and sustaining that value as we bring in new men and women and when we move our people from assignment to assignment, location to location, post to post, or desk to desk. If courage is one of those "important things", could these dimensions and strategies (translated into Army terms) help us get it built and shared, Army-wide? Could we use those socialization dimensions to consciously build a strategy to develop courage in all our soldiers?
SOCIALIZATION DIMENSIONS

FORMAL - INFORMAL

The formality of a socialization process refers to the degree to which the setting in which it takes place is segregated from the ongoing work context, and the degree to which an individual's role is emphasized and made explicit. Formal processes prepare an individual for a particular role. Informal processes normally occur when the individual is placed in his slot and must learn the actual practices, situational applications and nuances of the general skills he learned in the formal round of socialization.

INDIVIDUAL - COLLECTIVE

Perhaps the most critical dimension. When groups go through a socialization program together, they tend to develop an "in-the-same-boat" attitude. In highly competitive settings, however, members know their own success is increased by the failure of others. The individual process is akin to apprenticeship.

SEQUENTIAL - NONSEQUENTIAL

Sequential refers to a series of discrete and identifiable stages through which an individual must pass (such as marksmanship and physical training in BT) in order to achieve a defined role and status within an organization. Consistency is the key. Newcomers quickly spot conflicts and are eager to exploit them. Nonsequential processes are accomplished in one stage.

FIXED - VARIABLE

Fixed processes provide the individual with an explicit timetable for completing each step. Variable processes are characterized by rumors and innuendos and can create anxiety and frustration if the "expected" rate of advancement is not met. The variable process, however, provides great leverage for influencing individual behavior.

TOURNAMENT - CONTEST

In the tournament process, one failure puts the newcomer "out". In the contest strategy, on the other hand, there are many avenues to success.

SERIAL - DISJUNCTIVE

Serial refers to experienced members grooming newcomers about to assume similar roles. It is, perhaps, the best guarantee that an organization will not change over long periods of time. In the disjunctive process, the newcomers have no experienced predecessors in whose footsteps they can follow. The serial process risks stagnation and contamination. The disjunctive risks complication and confusion.

INVESTITURE - DIVESTITURE

The divestiture strategy dismantles the newcomer's former identity. The investiture strategy says "Stay the way you are 'cause we like it". The investiture strategy is useful for top management positions. The endurance required to undergo the divestiture process itself promotes a strong fellowship among those who have followed the same path to membership.
Right now, sitting astraddle many of the human entry points into our Army is a "Committee of 9", composed of key decision-makers who understand what socialization means. They have not yet begun to apply, in a concerted way, such value engineering notions as the "strategies" above, but they sure as hell could, and would, and should, if we could provide them the expertise. Right now, they work with a set of values, mixed in with other things of less importance, which they themselves hived out. These values are on track, but, what if they worked with the set articulated by the strategic level? And what if we had an overall strategy for working in our Army's values, not just at basic training centers, but at all entry points into our Army, including West Point, ROTC, and OCS? And how 'bout on out into the Recruiting Command? A common set of Army values, consciously applied at all entry points, would go a long way toward calibrating all those "perceivers" through which flows the information that organizes matter-energy.

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CALIBRATION

It is not enough just to get our values "articulated." Nor is it enough to take these values, once articulated, and apply them in the socialization of those people becoming soldiers. If we're going to use values to help us produce greater force readiness, then we must use our Army's values, whatever the set turns out to be, as a "calibrator" -- a device, of sorts, with which to align the purpose of our Army and the performance of our people...and everything in between. For example, there is the tendency, in times of peace, for competition to be so fierce among units or individuals, that some of us, some times, actually hope the "other guy" fails! His failure increases our chance for success. Yet in times of war, we want that "other guy", that other unit, that other company commander, to be the best...even better than we are. If that battle value is one of our Army's core values...and there's every reason to believe it is...then our peacetime behavior should be consistent. We should reward cooperation and provide a win-win atmosphere for our people and our units.

We are back again to the point about consistency between the values which underlie what we do and those which underlie the climate in which we do it. One way to achieve this is to consistently, or congruently, link our Army's values, once "articulated" at strategic level, directly to the performance of the individual...to the various formal components of our Army's appraisal "system."

Now we've tried this before. Bunch of nice-sounding (and different!) adjectives on each OER and EER form we ever came out with. But, there are definitional problems, and the values those adjectives reflect were figured out by efficiency report study groups and not by the strategic level, and there was no clear linkage between those adjectives and our Army's values, and...and there's a whole hell of a lot more to our
appraisal "system" than just efficiency reports.

If we could get that value set articulated, into the heads of our incoming soldiers, and into what we do, and into the climate in which we do it, then what we would start to see developing is a different set of norms (those powerful, unspoken, informal rules that govern so much of what people think and do) which would reflect our Army's values. These norms (which don't have to be written down, staffed, printed, ISD'ed and taught in the school system) would shape the meaning we assign to the words which we use to describe our missions and roles. The organizational objectives derived from mission and role would thus be linked to values. To the extent that individual objectives are a breakout of organizational objectives, the linkage extends from organizational values to individual objectives. And if we can derive performance criteria and expectations directly from these individual objectives, then we got one long calibration running between the purpose of our Army (expressed in our values) and the performance of our people (expressed in our appraisal criteria).

Our Chief of Staff has already told all his commanders about this need for calibration. Do it in conjunction with getting this new OER going. A picture of what he said looks like this:
Complicated as hell, and still much imperfect, but, if we can get it figured out and running, it works in conjunction with socialization at entry points and climate building at the strategic level...all to the ultimate purpose of more effective and efficient transfer of meaning. But first, we need those values, expressed in some fashion so that all of us can begin to understand, to talk about, to feel, and to apply a common "corporate ethic."

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A PERSPECTIVE OF THE WHOLE

THE FIRST TWO LETTERS IN US ARMY IS "US". Ever since we started working the problem of "Solve for X", this simple-assed phrase has been center stage in our thinking. We never really knew what it meant, but it was always there, whether we were studying Simon's ideas of "suboptimization" in organizational theory, or the Hebrew scholars' translations of ancient papers written by Genghis Khan's staff, or the neurophysiological workings of acetylcholinesterase at the synaptic gap in the control system of the human body.

That notion of "US" is pretty powerful. It speaks of cohesiveness, and we have already noted that factor as an untapped source of force readiness. It speaks of competence, when competence is a thing of teamwork, crewwork, unitwork. And it speaks of the corporate ethic, whose central importance we discussed a page or so ago. But even beyond these all-important things, "US" says that somehow we must "de-turf", to some extent, our whole Army.

We get too concerned with the boundaries indicated by the lines which circumscribe the boxes on the organizational charts. Too much concerned about proponency and jurisdiction. Too much energy expended on maintenance of turf -- energy that we need to put instead on the problems of force readiness. Our notions about "How to Run an Organization" are shot through with too much...rooster behavior. Rooster behavior far beyond that called for in the word "command", or "coordination", or "control". We have a tendency to get in those boxes, those turfs, and limit our concern and effort to just what happens in there. That ain't the first two letters in US Army. It's the last two.

A reasonable amount of rooster behavior is absolutely essential to concerted, purposeful action, but, carried too far, it works to the detriment of cohesion, and competence, and the corporateness of a corporate ethic. Carried too far, it also works to the detriment of those processes of information flow that organize matter-energy. In your mind, for a moment, go 'way back to those battle staffs we talked about early-on in this paper.

The better those battle staffs performed those information flow processes, the better they performed on the battlefield. But information
flows, throughout an organization (or system), and boxes and boundaries can be barriers to the flow. The reason the high-performing battle staffs were high-performing was not because of an outstanding S3, or S2, or battalion commander. It was because of an outstanding battle staff, and because of people who saw themselves as parts of a battle staff first, and as 2's, 3's, or whatever, second. They de-turfed. Un-roostered. And that's a main reason why information flowed more efficiently and effectively. And that's how come the end result was far more than the sum of the products of each of the boxes. They got "US" working, and it gave them an extra...a quantifiable, measurable extra...on the battlefield...in outputs of force readiness.

Now how do we get this "US" business -- this perspective of the whole -- working for our whole Army? We start right here where we are now. Up here at the strategic level where things are abstract and where decision-makers are concerned, hopefully, with the essence and not the details. And we don't have to do anything new. We just have to do more of what's already starting. Systems thinking. Don't know where it came from, but it's there. Maybe the ORSAs brought it with them.

Two years ago, or thereabouts, the IG, US Army -- who, like a dozen or so others at the strategic level, must think of our whole Army, rather than any functional part -- started putting out the word: "As you go around checking things out in this Army of ours, I want you to start developing and applying a systemic approach, rather than a compliance approach. When you find something not working right, don't concentrate on giving somebody the dart in the butt for failing to comply with some specific point in a regulation. Look instead for problems in some process. Look at the whole organization, and out across all functions. A maintenance problem may not be a maintenance problem, per se, but rather a funding problem, and that may exist simply because the next higher unit got its dates mixed up on which windows were opened when."

Those weren't the IG's words exactly, but, with something akin to that, he got 'em thinking. System thinking. Indirect effects. 2d and 3d order causality. The inescapable interrelatedness of things, and, in that interrelatedness, the notion of the whole. "US".

To build the perspective of the whole, which will help information flow move more smoothly between and among all those essential boxes, we need to get our strategic level to start using more "systems thinking". It ain't hard, and doesn't require any schools or workshops. Systems thinking...thinking! By not only the analysts and engineers up there at the strategic level, but by everyone. All the generals and colonels who must tackle the tough problems with far-reaching 2d and 3d order effects in totally unrelated fields. Thinking...not complicated, but thorough. And with a "perspective of the whole", built around some very simple conceptual tools like those on the next page.
WHOLENESS:
Initially and throughout the decision-making process, any command or administrative problem is to be seen in its broadest light. Once focused on the broad mass of the problem, the commander must resist the temptation to boil the problem down to an oversimplified cause and effect. Considerations of wholeness alert the commander to the fact that the five "best" solutions to five apparently separate problems may conceal as to produce unsatisfactory results. In a similar vein, wholeness dictates that the efficiency of several individual units or staff sections probably will not result in an efficient battalion, brigade, or headquarters.

STEADY STATE:
Traditionally, commanders have often worked to achieve satisfactory balance between organizational ingredients. When a balance point was found, the commander attempted to lock all variables and thus hold the organization in the balanced state. With a machine (excluding friction losses) such can be done. Organizations are not machines, they do not achieve a machine-like balance, but rather they fluctuate between the bounds of some homeostatic steady state.

MUTIPLE CAUSALITY:
Events in organizations rarely have single causes and the commander who continuously seeks the single "bottom line" cause is deluding himself, and wasting everyone's time. Organizational behavior is usually generated by long chains of cause and effect, building up in time, or by multiple factors acting simultaneously.

INTEGRATION:
An "US" model of an organization portrays an integrated mass rather than a collection of independent units. The concept of the "combined arms team" is an example. Traditionally, a decision concerning a company or the G-3 Section was considered relevant only to that one piece of the organization. An "US" view urges looking beyond the immediate effects, and out to the 2nd and 3rd level effects which arise as the decision permeates the entire organization.

ORGANIZED COMPLEXITY:
Organizational behavior is more than the simple sum total of the behavior of the organization's units. As the FORGE research showed us, outcomes on the battlefield result not only from each individual piece doing its part, but also from the synergy resulting from the interactions of all the parts.

DYNAMIC RELATIONSHIPS:
Army organizations have static relationships (picture our organizational charts) and dynamic relationships based on feedback. The dynamic feedback mechanisms are the mechanisms that enable units to "move in" on a target or a goal (IG inspections, AAR, results, etc.). These feedback relationships are time-dependent. Delays are detrimental, for instance, when events such as weapons improvements or organizational restructuring depend on feedback which must swim its way through long bureaucratic staffings of field results.

SUBSYSTEM PROCESS PERFORMANCE:
From an "US" view, the liveliness of any Army organization requires the performance of certain critical functions and processes. The scope of the various functions will vary with the size of the unit or section. Fundamentally, however, every organization has similar life functions that must be carried out. When a commander fails to include the performance of critical functions in planning his organization, then that organization will fail or the omitted functions will be performed in a clandestine manner.

ADJUSTMENT PROCESS:
Commanders without an US-oriented view may attempt to solve problem situations by initiating some project or program to compensate. Rather than confound a disturbed system by introducing some strange new procedure, an US-oriented commander would often conserve resources by recognizing and supplementing the organization's adjustment processes.

FLOWS AND DECISIONS:
From an "US" view, the commander sees the organization as a collection of process-performing subunits, connected together by a vast network of information (and material) flows. The rate and content of these flows are the primary controls that the commander works with in "running the organization".

TERMINATION:
Systems die; armies are defeated, shaes are overthrown, and corporations go bankrupt. Traditionally, organizational failure is ascribed to bad luck, poor control or bad strategy. The commander who uses an "US" mental model attends to those considerations which can cause a system to die. By knowing what causes a system to die, the commander can avoid (or postpone) similar events in the organization under his command. Conversely, when the situation demands, an US-oriented leader can be a strategic "executioner" and perform timely and effective terminations where appropriate.
**THINKING OUTSIDE OF A BOX**

What this perspective of the whole might lead to, for example, is a DCSPER-type who de-turfs a bit, and begins to think outside of his box. Instead of merely lowering a shoulder and butting the internal, boxed, organizational windmills, our man up at platoon headquarters might begin to look into other fields, across those often dysfunctional organizational lines. That's how the environmentalists started off with an engineering project and ended up with all them damn little snail-darters. That's how the DA base closure guys get to the essence of the 2d and 3d order impacts of a new Army stationing plan. And that's how our DCSPER-type might come up with insights outside his box -- like over in training -- like in the box below:

**TRAINING--THE ONLY WAY**

"If we say (maybe in other words) that we love the soldier, and if this comes from not just our mouths but from down deep in our soul, then we really have no choice but to bend every effort, every resource, every activity, and every priority toward his TRAINING...not because it is true that "training is our most important peacetime activity"; not because it is also true that "training is what the soldier gets paid for"; not because it is also true that "training in peacetime keeps him alive in war"; but because 'way down deep beneath all those truths is the even more fundamental truth that TRAINING is the flat-out only way that the soldier can be what he entered our Army to be...the only way...the only way that we can meet his expectations...the only way that organizational and individual goals can both be served...and the only damned way that we can preclude what really amounts to cheating the man whom we must one day send to perform "the noblest act of mankind."

So...if we speak to soldiers of our concern for "PFC Warne", or "Snuffy", or "Joe Tentpeg", or "those kids", or whatever terms we devise, sometimes inappropriately, to express care and affection for the soldier, then the soldiers will listen...but...they will have heard all these terms before, in all shapes and forms, and it will be the soldiers' TRAINING, and not our words, by which these troopers judge whether or not we're sincere and professional or just another bunch of feather merchants with a bad case of alligator mouth and hummingbird ass.

Now if this way of looking at TRAINING, even though it's "shrinking," makes sense to you, then carry it a few steps further. It says, to me at least, that TRAINING is our Army's ultimate "Human Goal", that TRAINING underlies all that we do to build "Quality of Life," and that TRAINING is the place where our Army's leadership, all of it, can do the most in terms of serving both the mission of the unit and the welfare of the men."
"Promulgation" is a tough word. Sounds like some stomach disorder. In the context of this paper, it means getting the word out...out from our strategic level and across our whole Army. What word? Well, the word about our Army's values, and about the perspective of the whole. There are two ways to do this, one indirect and one direct.

If our strategic level, operating as an "US", gets serious about articulating our Army's values, and if they come to see the perspective of the whole as a valuable tool in handling their grave responsibilities, then both of these abstract things -- values and systems thinking -- will be reflected in the decisions, policies, and programs that come from the strategic level. These values and systems notions then become carried by our Army's "organizational climate". And that's the indirect approach.

The direct approach to spreading the word is to use the information mechanism that armies have used for ten thousand years -- the chain of command. But what must flow down that chain of command is not a proclamation, or a letter to everybody signed personally by the boss's signature machine, or a wallet card covered with plastic. What must go rattling down through that chain of command is a philosophy...a philosophy of "How to Run an Organization"...a philosophy which picks up those values, combines them with the notion of "US", and sends them down along the chain to flow and spread out across a whole Army. That direct message (and it can come via all sorts of media and formats), buttressed by the same message carried indirectly by the climate, can do much to "orchestrate" the efforts of a whole Army.

And that's how the strategic level can marshal two forces -- two abstract forces -- in such a way as to enhance the information flow that organizes matter-energy...the strategic level.

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**FORMULATE AND ARTICULATE ARMY PHILOSOPHY AND VALUES**

- Values -- Calibrator of Purpose and Performance
- Perspective of the Whole
- An Army Philosophy

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**INCREASED EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INFORMATION FLOW**

- **COORDINATIVE LEVEL**
  - Planning
  - Cohesiveness
  - Crowed-up OD Staff Officer

- **OPERATIONAL LEVEL**
  - "Information Engineering"
  - Research
  - Crowed-up Comm Officer
  - SPA Computer

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**PUT AFFECTIVE DIMENSION TO WORK**

- **STRATEGIC LEVEL**
  - Values -- Calibrator of Purpose and Performance
  - Perspective of the Whole
  - An Army Philosophy
If you look close at that 3x3x3 up there, and if this recon paper has made at least some sense in places, then you'll probably see a rough parallel to our simple cybernetic system model. INPUT comes from the strategic level -- values, and a perspective of the whole, and an Army philosophy. THROUGHPUT is carried out by and at the coordinative level -- in planning, through efforts to build cohesion, and by the growed-up OD officer. The OUTPUT shows up at the operational level. It is measured against the PERFORMANCE STANDARD of better information flow. FEEDBACK, the "lost process", must come from the closest thing we got to battlefield performance. Maybe that's the NTC when we get it going. Maybe it's better reading of ARTEP and SQT data. Whatever the criteria of force readiness or battlefield performance that feedback is derived from, it's got to close the loop back to the strategic "top" level of our Army.

In essence, what we have laid out here in Part II are a few ideas about what to do if we believe that greater efficiency and effectiveness of information processes is one of the keys to greater force readiness. The proposals that we have developed range from the specifics of measuring the efficiency of information processes in a unit like a tank battalion, all the way up (or out) to the abstractedness of senior decision-makers putting "systems thinking" to work. None of these proposals, by themselves, call for any drastic or cataclysmic changes. Most of them flow along with the "natural state" of our Army. They involve extending, expanding, "growing up" things we are already doing, through the application of what we have learned through science. And we don't have to do 'em all. If we do just one, any one, we'll get some measure of additional actual force readiness. If we want to do 'em all, if we want to go for the "synergy", it'll take a little bit of resource, a moderate amount of time...and a whole hell of a lot of "US"! And we ain't got but a few more years......
AN IG INSPECTION NEED NOT MEAN IGNOMINY

LTC Dandridge M. Maloney

Many professional soldiers, officer and enlisted, are fundamentally opposed to inspector general inspections, announced or unannounced, not because of what the IG inspection is supposed to do, but largely because of what it actually does. When the IG inspection system works in the way it usually does (at least over the past 20 years), it invariably produces unfavorable side effects—tension, superficiality, nonproductive competition, stretched truth and, often, just plain lies and dishonesty.

Now we can go on and complain about power-mad demigods, fingerprints on brass, 2 1/2-ton trucks full of "mobile overages," pre-pre-pre-pre-inspections and the like. But complaining will not accomplish much. Let's think and talk a little about the what and why of IG inspections.

The IG system, like the officers' efficiency rating system, is based upon the exertion of raw, arbitrary, unidirectional, coercive power. Any such system is invariably going to be unpopular, and "troops," including you and I, will try to figure out ways to "beat the system." Why? Because we do not like to be "powered upon" by any person or organizational entity.

So, looking at this problem constructively, the task is to cause changes deep in the very heart of the IG inspection system—and the operational question becomes: how do you get people to look at the IG inspection as something other than a rammed-down-your-throat demonstration of force?

It might be possible to change the basis of the IG inspection from coercive power to what might be called supportive power. Commanders and units have to perceive, and believe, that the IG inspection is helpful. We can give lip service to this idea all we want, but mere words do not count; belief does. How can you get units to anticipate and undergo an IG inspection without all the undesirable side effects? Perhaps the secret lies in linking help with the inspection—real, physical, qualified, reporting-for-duty help, not just the usual "detailed report" or "expert advice." Help, in this case, means people who are specialists, temporarily assigned to the unit to assist in correcting its IG "deficiencies."

Perhaps we can think about splitting an IG team into two parts. Call the parts what you will, but for right now, think of one part as charged with inspections, and the other part with support. From time to time, say every two or three months, the two parts switch functions, for reasons that will be explained.

An IG inspection would be a two-phased affair. First, the unit would get the detailed inspection, critique and report. Then, in the second phase, the support team from the IG would join the unit for a short period of time, perhaps two weeks, and actually help with the work required to correct deficiencies. The unit gets people—people with the same expertise as the inspectors (because the "supporters" will sooner or later become the inspection team).
We might add here that it would be unwise to have the inspection unit first do the inspection, then turn around and become the supporters; both parts have to be separate, but still perceived as "the IG team." You have to have two parts—good guys and bad guys; plus and minus—so that the unit can at least have the alternative of positive perception.

You might lose time by maintaining two separate parts, but it does establish, automatically, an internal system of "checks and balances" within the IG team. Most important, having two parts makes it possible for the unit to perceive "the IG team" as helpful.

With the two-phased IG routine, there are some obvious disadvantages: time and personnel costs, scheduling problems, IGs that have never done it this way before, and the like. But there are some beneficial side effects.

The "supporters" have to be good, because they are also, at other times, inspectors. In the unit, there is probably the perennial shortage of qualified specialists. With two weeks or so of "support," a lot of know-how can be passed on by the "supporters" from the IG team to the unit personnel. So, training becomes one advantage.

Next, assume a situation where a unit supply sergeant has been submitting work orders for months trying to get a toilet fixed—and nothing happens. A "supporter" expert, running into this same problem as he helps the supply sergeant get work orders in for all his R&U discrepancies, has the know-how and clout (because he is a member of the IG team) to move whatever or whomever responsible for the work orders not being acted upon. So, by getting the supporters involved in the problems of the units, you get some additional indirect supervision of the divisional or post support system.

This involvement with the unit should also make the supporters better inspectors when their time comes to inspect, since they gain more understanding and a more realistic view of the unit's problems.

I have another recommendation on IG inspections: what about an inspection where the inspectors do not look for what is wrong but rather for what is right—not just right, but outstandingly right? This, admittedly, is idealistic and may require some changes in one's thinking. During and after an IG inspection, there would be no comment on things that were wrong. The team would look for things that were done exceptionally well. If they did not find any, there would be nothing in their report. Nothing. Units might then work to avoid a "no comment" report, and the only way they could do this would be to build and work for systems, procedures and conditions that were exceptionally good. When exceptionally good things were found, then the reporting procedure would be concerned with explaining the details of how this good thing was accomplished.

Reports like this might be appropriate for circulation within the division, but perhaps it would be best not to identify, for the rest of the division, the unit that did the exceptionally good thing. Now this may seem peculiar, too, but think for a moment of the natural human quality of professional pride and professional jealousy. Some commanders, and even supply sergeants, are too proud to accept help from their "competitors." So, when a team did find an exceptionally good procedure or system, such as
in a unit fund, the reporter identifying the procedure and the unit would go up the chain of command, and the unit would get its recognition along the way. The report to the rest of the division would not be concerned with giving recognition, but rather with providing the details of "how to do it," and thus how to avoid that "no comment" report.

And still another alternative: could you give a unit commander, say at battalion or brigade level, a choice between several different kinds of IG inspections? Maybe the two outlined above, or maybe two or three others, but at any rate, some sort of choice. Choice or option does at least two big things: it removes much of the negative impact of coercive power and secures at least some degree of positive commitment on the part of the chooser.

How can you get choice working in an IG inspection system? Use alternative methods, alternative dates, an alternative inspection sequence, or alternative types of reports, although it would be difficult to prepare and coordinate all these alternatives.

Think about the mission, the purpose of an IG inspection.

What is it, really? Is this purpose accomplished if the inspection system creates an atmosphere of anxiety and tension throughout the command? Is it accomplished if efforts to prepare are focused on impressive superficiality and measurable trivia? And is it accomplished if professional soldiers are coerced to accept distortion and dishonesty as accepted means of accomplishing a task?

As for these ideas on the IG inspection, maybe they will work, maybe they will not; maybe they have already been tried, and maybe they "reinvent the wheel." But what is wrong with reinventing the wheel? We need double-belted steel radials, not rounded stone, for today's Army. We have got to question the established order, to think about and try new things. We must keep changing in every area, for we cannot afford to drive our "Green Machine" into the future at 100 mph--with our eyes locked firmly on the rear view mirror.
A REGISTER OF MILITARY CONSULTANTS

by

Lieutenant Colonel Dandridge M. Malone
and Lieutenant Colonel Walter C. Cousland

(How can the Army keep its finger on the voluminous amount of information and varied expertise held by its members? Can a practical, ready reference system be devised that will opportunely produce needed data?)

In 1969, the Secretary of Defense issued a directive that outlined policy "To assure that the Department of Defense and the Nation gain the maximum possible value implicit in the work and thought at each of the middle-level and senior Service schools." The guidance for achieving this objective deals, in the main, with the processing and disposition of abstracts of selected student research papers. The directive's purpose is well-sighted, but its aim can be improved.

The purpose here is to propose a way of expanding current procedures to make available, across the entire Department of Defense, more of the special expertise extant within the military. The concept to be discussed envisions a ready access to far more information than just that found in student research papers.

Unquestionably, much good, diligent, solid effort goes into most student research projects. But most begin with--as an academic ground rule--an explicit definition of the problem. Tomorrow, today's problem may well be a thing of yesterday. Studies, per se, are all too often static.

The Department of Defense directive is aimed at enhancing motivation for and giving a sense of participation to students within the military school system. This approach omits recognition of the fact that significant research is done elsewhere as well--at graduate schools, for example, or on military staffs. And some individuals do extensive research on a particular subject just because they are driven by that elusive phenomenon called "intellectual curiosity."

Irrespective of where the research is done, the end product takes one of many forms: thesis, staff study, book, instructional course, essay, or simply extensive but unpublished knowledge. The form of the product notwithstanding, motivation and individual ability repeatedly produce true expertise. Frequently, however, this know-how is unavailable because it is hidden.

The expertise oftentimes atrophies because the expert's career gets "managed." He rotates to other assignments, and his area of expertness is left behind. Without approaching any closer to the hoary lair of "generalist versus specialist," it is obvious that little is done to nurture a hard-won skill beyond either the utilization or permanent change of station tour.
How long has it been since anyone asked your advice or opinion in the area related to the research you did while at a Service school or graduate school? Were you ever asked? Are you current in your field? Do you read the professional journals and books? Do you get an allowance for buying these books and journals? What conferences or conventions have you attended?

High-level problem-solvers, while considering questions of grave importance, often find themselves faced with problem components beyond the ken of their study group. Other problems of significance beckon—or threaten—and there is not time to do the research needed to develop the required knowledge. So, the problem component gets "farmed." This proclivity for "administrative agriculture" has become quite prevalent in the military environment. Partly because of this circumstance, true to the dictates of history, a conglomerate of defense strategies and tactics has evolved. Nevertheless, the problem component is still "farmed out" to a civilian organization or to a consultant—experts in the field being scrutinized.

An example of how the Army overlooks its basic resource of individual expertise occurred not long ago. In 1968, officers assigned to the Department of the Army Staff were required, and possibly are yet required, to attend a series of films on the subject of effective writing. These films were produced at a sizable expense to the Army because their production relied heavily on advice from civilian consultants and agencies. On viewing these films, a former West Point instructor questioned their cost (as well as their competence—due to several technical errors in style and grammar). He asked whether the films' proponents had contacted an especially well qualified Army officer who at the time was Professor and Assistant Head of the Department of English at West Point. This English professor's office was located down the hall from a military TV studio with the capability of producing films. The professor, a nationally recognized authority in the teaching of effective writing, had a complement of officer instructors who could have produced, directed, and even acted in the films. Although this military expert was available, he was not consulted—simply because those responsible for producing the films did not know about him.

The military school system, the civil schools program, and the initiative of the true professional give the military establishment a productive capability for the development of expertise.

We do poorly in using this expertise. We do poorly in keeping it alive. But, we can use this expertise far more fully; we can sustain it—and we can do this in a manner that will enliven academic motivation and increase the sense of participation throughout the Department of Defense. It can be done with little time, little effort, and limited funds.

First, establish criteria appropriate to the designation of an individual as a "consultant." Initially, these standards should be based on knowledge; experience-based criteria might be developed later by Service schools. From an academic perspective, the knowledge level accompanying a master's thesis would seem to be an approximation of that desired in a military consultant; for example:
• Knows basic references in the area of expertise.
• Knows names and contributions of leading authorities.
• Has completed a survey of relevant literature.
• Has an understanding of basic theories.
• Knows and has read primary journals and periodicals.
• Has completed an informal oral examination by others knowledgeable in the field.
• Has profound knowledge in at least one particular portion of the area of expertise.

Second, offer the designation of "consultant" as a matter of individual choice. Coercion will erode motivation and perhaps destroy the sense of participation and contribution. Introduce the program on a limited, experimental basis; e.g., as an individual student research option at a senior Service college. No written product would be required, but rather an intellectual product—to be developed by in-depth reading. Allow the written product to be an individual option. Assume honesty and professionalism on the part of program participants. Later, expand the program to other senior Service colleges. Eventually, depending on program evaluation, include middle-level schools, civil graduate schools, and qualified individuals. It should be noted that anyone who serves the military would be eligible to qualify as a consultant: active duty officers and enlisted personnel, retired persons, and civilian employees.

Third, begin compilation, publication, and issue of a Register of Military Consultants—a companion document to Field Manual 101-5: Staff Organization and Procedure, and the Dictionary of United States Army Terms. Organize by subject, catalog alphabetically by subject area descriptors, or use a standard library shelving code. List subject, then the consultant's name, address, and AUTOVON telephone number. Computerize—similar to the US Army Register.

Fourth, establish, publish, and teach guidance for consultants and consultees. Formulation of the concept is based on the premise that consultants will give advice, opinions, information, references, and referrals—not do studies or staff work on action papers. The primary means of communication with consultants will be by telephone (AUTOVON). Essential also is the constraint that the designation of "consultant" should not be a factor in official evaluation procedures, to include academic reports. The consultant register should be organized by subject, not by name.

Fifth, establish a computerized feedback system for annual update and evaluation. Use a one-page mail-out with simple questions for the consultant, e.g.:

• Recent or anticipated change of address or AUTOVON number?
• Estimated number of queries during the year?
Still want to be listed in the register?

Problems?

Other comments?

Sixth, pay the price. Provide the consultant with an annual allowance of from $50 to $100 for the purchase of professional journals or other publications concerning his areas of interest. This allowance, or a more liberal one, could be considered as a primary extrinsic incentive for the program. More important, it would assist the consultant in solving today's problems today.

With a little imaginative thought, improvements which could be made to the application of this concept become readily apparent. At least one major adjustment will be required; e.g., the method whereby consultant status is validated. Initially, certain seemingly applicable criteria can be established: graduate schooling, other schooling, extensive publishing experience, and certain personal experiences could be used at first.

Later, these requirements could be expanded to allow branch schools and staff colleges to award the designation of "consultant" to qualified students. The system might be broadened further to allow a supervisor to recommend a subordinate who had demonstrated expertise in a special area.

This concept assumes and is based upon the integrity and professionalism of the military. Carrying out the program, somewhat along the guidelines suggested, can do much to increase military problem-solving effectiveness. It is not unreasonable to envisage an enhanced image of the military, as the civilian community sees academic expertise promulgated in a myriad of expressions coming from those in uniform. The greater value of the concept, however, lies in the personal and organizational pride that would ensue as the military Services and personnel help one another, participate more in the overall effort, and contribute to the cause of their particular Service.
WE'RE HERE TO HELP YOU . . .

D. M. Malone

How many times you heard 'ole IG say that? What were your thoughts and feelings? Did you believe what he said? Did he believe what he said?

On 1 Nov 1979, something happened in our Army that makes it possible for 'ole IG to really help, and for you to believe that he's helping, and for him to believe that you believe he's helping. What it was that happened was the OER support form.

Let's say you're a unit commander. By this time, you've probably met with your boss, and the two of you have sat down and talked about the details of what he expects of you. Together, you have worked out the principal objectives and criteria for you and your unit, and put these in priority. Objectives, criteria and priorities. Unique to your unit. The things that focus the effort for you, your chain of command, and your unit.

Now, if it's true that an organization does well those things that get checked, then it seems that you could get your "things" done better if the IG's "checking power" was tailored to, and focused on, the particular set of objectives and priorities that you and your boss have worked out on the OER support form. This would make the IG's "help you" number a damned sight more believable, since the IG would be bringing extra in-depth inspecting, detailed knowledge, and supervision to those specific objectives for which the boss is going to hold you and your unit responsible.

Further, and to the degree that the OER support forms reflect differences among like units and their commanders, an IG inspection tailored to a specific unit might help commanders compete more against objectives and criteria than against each other. Like the troops do on their S QTs.

So . . . 'bout 30 days before your next AGI, why don't you get 'ole IG to come see you? Sit him down and lay out those objectives, criteria, and priorities that the boss holds you and your unit responsible for, then ask him if he can put together an AGI geared specifically to your unit. It'll mean some extra work for him, but he means extra work for you, so why not put all that extra work that the two of you are going to do anyhow into those things that the chain of command thinks are most important?
OF POT METAL AND GOLD

I'm a mechanic. One day, this policeman drives in in his Ford cruiser and says to me, "Look, from time to time, I got to be able to outrun the bad guys with this thing. I ain't been able to get much money from City Hall for maintenance lately and I'm gettin' some knocks and thumps in the engine. It doesn't run very smooth, the mileage ain't too hot, and I think it's losing power."

So I lift up the hood and look it over. I look at it, and listen to it, and touch it here and there. I know the cop doesn't have much money, and I like him, so I look to make a single, simple, significant adjustment--the essence of mechanicing.

I look some more--then I see it, down deep in the engine ... a pot metal screw, obviously forced into the engine some time ago by some turkey who didn't know much about engines. On the head of the screw are the words, "Up or Out," and I take the damn thing out. As I pull it out, out pours fear; and destructive competition; and little ground-up bits of dignity, and loyalty, and sacrifice; and a norm-referenced replacement policy which dogmatically and expensively assumes that parts must be replaced continuously, irrespective of how they function.

The engine begins to run smoother, and the evaluation regulator--hot, smoking, and about to blow up earlier--begins to cool down.

In my tool box, I got one little part that's a new thing made by some company down in Virginia. It takes a lot of time to make one of these things, and a mechanic has to go to school to learn how to install it. It's a very simple part, but a lot of mechanics who've heard about it, just don't really understand it. It's a small golden screw called "Tasks, Standards, and Conditions."

I screw it into the engine--into the hole where the Up or Out was--and that hummer starts to hum! All over the engine, expectations for each part are clarified. And with that, responsibilities, and priorities, and resources begin to line up as they should. And with that, superfluous functions (which are everywhere, gumming up the engine and sapping its power) are eliminated.

The total load on the engine begins to distribute itself naturally. Hot parts, about to wear out from maximum stress, begin to cool down. Other parts, which hadn't been getting or doing their share of the work simply because they didn't know, begin to hum. The engine runs smoothly, and all the parts work together.

I close the hood and wipe off the grease. The cop gets in, says thanks, and drives away. Ahead of him in the distance, I see a big mountain. I don't know how he'll make out with that, or with the bad guys (maybe he needs a Cadillac) but his damn engine's fixed.

And I throw the pot metal screw in the shitcan.
KNUCKLEBONES AND CHICKEN LIVERS

COL D. M. Malone

Hey, Army! You know I care about you, big fella, but sometimes you just ain't got good sense. You do things that make me want to punch you out.

Not long ago, I saw a message from MILPERCEN to the world. The subject was OERs. You know what the message said? It said, to me and to rating officers all over the Army, "Look, if you relieve an officer for cause, for crying out loud, don't give him a damned 'outstanding' on his OER." MILPERCEN wouldn't have whipped that one out unless they had some real problems. Now, you'll probably give MILPERCEN the dart in the butt for sending out such a message, but it ain't them that's got the problem, 'ole buddy, it's you! You got to do something about that sorry OER system.

A thousand people must have told you that that turkey is inflated to the point where "average" and "maximum" are the same. This means that, to the degree that you use the OER to promote, you might as well use dice. You could add some measure of sophistication to this, perhaps, by tossing knucklebones on the ground at midnight, or by throwing chicken livers over your shoulder and getting some systems analysts to study the landing pattern.

You must know, too, that some professionals in the business of executive appraisal have looked at that OER thing and concluded that it has neither validity nor reliability. To me, this means it doesn't tell the truth, and won't even lie the same way twice.

I once saw a statistical curve which showed how the performance scores of all captains (maybe it was colonels) plotted on a scale from zero to 200 maximum. The average, the damned average, was up above 195. Now when you've got eight to ten thousand folks clustered around a 195 average, you've got some real problems making the sort. Scores get skewed—and folks get shafted.

Years ago, I complained about this to your personnel persons. They said to me, "Look, the numbers don't really mean anything (hell, I already knew that); what's really important is how the OERs are worded. Selection boards and assignment officers can really draw meaning out of those words."

I thought of some Army words I'd heard, like "underachieve," and "overalign," and "prioritize," and "promigate" (that one sounds like somebody throwing up), but what the personnel folks said made sense—for a little while.

Then I realized that writing ability, like any other human skill, falls in a normal curve if you measure the writing ability of 100 writers. And what the personnel people had really told me was that the OER was actually measuring the behavior of the rater, rather than the ratee. Damn!

As I see it, 'ole buddy, you've only got one good thing going for you with the present OER lash-up. That's this: the OER will have a lot of
friends in the equal opportunity community because it sure as hell doesn't, won't and just flat can't, discriminate. Now think about that a minute.

If that OER thing can't discriminate, then the operators in an appraisal system—like commanders, promotion boards and selection boards—will start looking around for other things to base their judgments on. And what does that do? It blows out of all proportion the long-term career significance of insignificant error, of measurable trivia, and of efforts and activities related marginally, if at all, to mission performance. And what does that do? It works head-on opposite against many of the things you're trying so hard to develop in our officer corps like initiative, for example, and willingness to delegate, and willingness to speak out and up.

This is where all that sorry ticket-punching business comes from, and this is why every officer job has an unofficial "career enhancement" score, and this is why Gen. "Abe" Abrams once said, "For God's sake, doesn't anybody out there just want to do a good job?"

What's the solution? I don't know. I've got at least a dozen, not even including the knucklebone alternative—and so does every officer I've ever talked to on the subject. That's part of the problem, but it's also part of the solution. The answer's out there, somewhere. Have you tapped this potential, Army? Yes, you have.

And you've got something else. Buried up there in MILPERGEN is a capability you never had before. Always before, you designed OERs with ad hoc study groups headed by two or three generals. That's where our present rotten OER came from. Now, however, you've got two or three officers who, years ago, said to hell with career enhancement scores.

These men dedicated themselves to becoming expert in executive appraisal. Today, they're among the best in the nation. They're good, and for at least the last three years, they've been in touch with the ideas of thousands of officers in the field through tests and surveys. Why don't you let 'em launch? Whatever they come up with, even if it's the knucklebone alternative, can't be any worse than what we've got. Nothing is something you can't lose.

Look, old friend, I know you're going to get mad at what I'm telling you, especially here in public in front of God and everybody. You're going to say, "Colonel, you're destroying the officer corps' confidence in their whole reward system." Well, 'ole buddy, in the first place, the OER is a damn long way from being the whole reward system. And in the second place, how in the hell can I destroy something that has ceased to exist?
A splendid idea! Any soldier in this Army, conceivably, could write a paper which could, if it passed the test(s), become DOCTRINE for the way our whole Army does or thinks about, a certain thing. That message alone says a lot about "us" and how we do things in our Army.

But we need some way to focus the effort. First, we need a target, or at least an impact area, for the operational concept papers. Second, we need some way to bring informed expert judgment to bear on the concepts.

How do we organize the target area? What is it we want to write doctrine about? Three alternative content area breakouts come to mind:

a. The 46 OPMS specialty fields. This would wrap up our whole Army (theoretically) and, because of MILPERCEN organization, make it easy to bring expertise to bear. But, this is an awesome range of content to handle; plus, it doesn't say much about interdependent effort.

b. TF Delta working variables. Sometimes, in our TF discussions, we represent our whole Army with 5 variables: doctrine, hardware, organization, training, and the will of soldiers. This does get at the interdependence business, but, whereas alternative a. is too specialized, this alternative seems too general.

c. BDP's critical battlefield tasks. This alternative splits the difference on the specificity--generality continuum, but, better than that, it focuses the doctrinal effort on getting ready for the next war. It also aligns the decentralized writing of doctrine with the "macrodoctrine" of the BDP roadmap, and, further, permits us to use the expertise that the BDP effort unearths to help in assessing the content of the operational concept papers.

(We should, even now, be including an 11th critical battlefield task. Call it will, if you will, and describe it as the will to fight, coupled with confidence ... confidence in battle performance of self, buddy, crew, unit, and equipment. How does the Threat stand on this one? What are the shortfalls? How do we overcome them? What are the variables? The baselines? The easy way to answer these hard questions is to offer up some hot air about "the intangibles of war." The hard way is to say, "By God, if we can conceive it, we can achieve it ... now how are we going to do that?")

Three additional thoughts on organizing the target area:

a. Perhaps we need a "levels" breakout. FM 100-5 and our "organizational leadership" matrix both have a levels breakout. So does some of our best management and organization theory. There seem to be
three levels in any organization: strategic, coordinative, and operational. A captain with a hot operational concept on "target servicing," for example, might be better able to focus his message if he had some such "levels" paradigm.

b. We might narrow the target area even more if we gave some thought to what should be indoctrinated and what should be undoctrianted. Of all the things having to do with target servicing, for example, we should indoctrinate those which limit flexibility, creativity, initiative and innovation.

c. We need to spell out some format criteria for operational concept papers. Not overly restrictive, but designed for the purpose and the processing of the papers. ATSC "visualizers" like Mr. Zuckerman and good magazine editors could help with this one. How do you get the essence of something onto 10 pages? It's do-able. Will and Ariel Durant did the whole history of mankind in 100 pages!

So now we've got a young Infantry Captain with a strong, thought-out idea about what should be with respect to something artillery on the battlefield. He focuses in on target servicing, and his idea fits there. And it seems to fit best at the coordinative level. The young man is one hell of a fine writer, and so he gets his operational concept articulated in nine pages, with two figures, and one small table of data. The paper is crisp, clear, concise. Meaningful, appealing, and logical. Besides that, it just sounds good. But ... so does a used car, on a rainy night, with its transmission full of sawdust. We need some way to bring expert judgment to bear.

On May 12, 1981, the Artillery School held its second annual Target Servicing Conference--three-day affair--72 people from all over our Army, mostly Redlegs. On the second day, in the Coordinative Doctrine division (one of three sub-groups of the Conference), a young Infantry Captain took his turn at the podium and "presented" his paper--just like the academicians do when their discipline has its annual meeting. The 27 members of the CD division, all experts in target servicing, has read his paper beforehand--nine pages, two figures, one small table of data. They were ready for the young captain.

He finished his pitch, stood back, took a deep breath, asked for questions. No hands went up ... then one 'ole target servicer (from DARCOM) stood up and said, "I've read your paper, and I've listened to what you said ... and ... there ain't no sawdust in your transmissions. I've wondered many times how to do what you propose. I've seen 100 efforts fail. How in the hell did some damn Infantryman finally figure it out?"

The CD division concurred; two colonels offered some wordsmith and phrasemonger guidance; and the dammed captain got on the phone to MILPERCENT and branch-transferred. The "operational concept" had passed its first major test.

On May 15, 1981, the Selection Committee of the TS Conference met with the Commandant of the Artillery School. From the 54 concept papers presented at the conference, they had selected nine which seemed to best meet our Army's target servicing needs (fairly well identified in the BDP). The
Commandant had read seven, listened to two. He approved the selection and asked that they be reproduced and sent to all the Conference attendees. He singled out three of the papers and sent 'em to TRADOC. He hit each one a lick with a rubber stamp with Israeli characters. Translated into English, the characters said, "Recommended Doctrine."

On Aug 2, 1981, CG FORSCOM received a 3-ring binder from TRADOC. It was labeled "US Army Battle Doctrine--Selected Operational Concepts (Working Draft)--150 pages, 11 sections, and a cover letter. The cover letter noted that each concept had been assessed carefully by numerous subject matter experts and the doctrinal staff at HQ TRADOC. The letter requested review by principal staff and major field unit commanders--and return to TRADOC by 1 October 1981.

Two days before the 1981 Army-Navy football game, at the Army Commander's Conference, CG TRADOC issued to the attendees the first-run copies of a 3-ring binder entitled, "US Army Battle Doctrine, 1982." In his presentation to the Conference, he illustrated the content of the binder with two figures and one small table of data.

On 3 March 1982, at Ft. Hood, an artillery battalion commander had one hell of a time coordinating his target servicing with a tank battalion commander. They argued. And argued. Then they went to the G3. "Just how the hell is it we are supposed to do this thing, 3?" 3 whipped out a 3-ring binder. "It's right in here," he said. "Look at that small table of data." The artilleryman grinned-he'd read thru the binder just last month when it first came in. Even had an officer call about it. The tanker read, grunted, and said, "Christ ... there must be a better way. In fact, by damn, I know a better way!"

3 said, "Well ... now let me tell you what you can do about that. ..."

* * * * *
OFFICER PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (OPMS) REFINEMENT

by COL D. M. Malone & MAJ(P) Martin M. Ischinger

Somewhere, somehow, sometime after its inception, the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) got off track. When the word was passed out to "pick our best commanders for command," it got changed to "pick our best officers for command." That just isn't the same thing. Some of our best officers aren't commanders, don't want to be commanders, and can best serve our Army in positions other than command. On the other hand, having identified good commanders, we do our Army a disservice by shuttling them out of the command milieu into positions where they become stale and out of touch with the unit environment.

Over the years, a stigma has been attached to officers, particularly combat arms officers, who have been non-selected for command. We need to refine the OPMS so as to maintain the combat imperative of the officer corps while simultaneously recognizing and rewarding the legitimate role of the specialist, thereby, removing that stigma. Implementing the following recommendations will be a giant stride in that direction.

- Provide a requirement for officers at about eight years of service to indicate whether or not they want to be considered for battalion command selection. Don't send them a form--they'd all check "yes." Have them apply for command and include with their application a videodisc on which they've explained "My Philosophy of Command and Why I Want To Execute It." One might also consider similar tapes on "Why I Want To Be a Personnel Management Specialist," or "My Philosophy of Operations and Force Development."

- Ensure that battalion and brigade level command selection boards are loaded with successful commanders and officers with recent or current troop duty.

- Establish selection or screening boards for key specialist positions such as division principal staff officer and higher level staff officer, stabilize these positions for minimum of 18 months and publicly announce selection lists for these kinds of positions. The Army Times headline would read something like "14 Selected for Division G-4, 12 For G-2."

- Ensure that selection boards understand and act according to the principle that battalion command is not essential for secondary zone to colonel or selection for War College.

- Develop a peer pre-screening, recommendation process for all type selection boards.

- Develop the tactical commander's specialty which incorporates battalion command and other related assignments.

- Extend command tour lengths to an indefinite tour with minimum of 24 months and maximum of 36 months, depending on local conditions and the division commander's judgment.
• Develop a "list" or set of "lists" that command trackers are not eligible for such as extended stabilization, special schooling, fellowships, grants, etc.
A CONTEXT FOR COHESION

A living system's survival is determined entirely by how it fits and functions within the larger system of which it is a part. If we want our Chief's vision of cohesive units to happen, then we got to get to work, now, on how to hook these units into their larger "supra-system." It don't do any good to just give an order. What we have to do is build a context . . . a context for cohesion. To build this context, we need a strategy. So, by damn, let's just start layin' one out. Right now. Right here.

The objective of the strategy is simple as hell: get the notion of "cohesiveness" -- and related concepts -- just flat-out embedded in how our Army thinks, and how it does its business. OK, and if we set out to do that, how would we know when the objective was achieved? That's simple, too. The objective would be achieved when cohesion got to be a "natural" variable in the decision-making that runs our Army. There would be things you could see and hear.

In troop units, you could see, especially, more and more of those 25-30 things the Delta Force folks call "criteria of high performing units." At DCSPER level, in papers and discussions, you would see that concern with cohesion may be as natural as concern with, say, dollars. And over in MILPERCENT, if you looked, for example, at the titles of 3-4 months' worth of poopsheets going into the Boss, you'd see "cohesion" getting the same kind of effort and attention from action officers and division chiefs as things like "MOS mismatch," and "end-strength decrement," and "personnel priority"
models." If you could see and hear things like these, then you would know that the strategy was working. Cohesion would be "embedded." A natural, normal variable. The context for cohesion would be built.

Now, how long would all that take? And how do we make those things happen? We could do it in a year, if we got serious. Hell, we already got at least four good things goin' for us. First off, we got the full support and personal interest of the Chief. I can name you a hundred projects under way right now that don't have that kind of steam. Second, there's general recognition across our whole Army, at all levels, that cohesion is a powerful source of extra combat power. Programs like equal opportunity, and drug abuse, and OE never had 'that goin' for 'em. Third, although it was a tough fight, we finally, somehow, got the DCSPER and MILPERGEN families married up with the TRADOC and FORSCOM families in the business of building cohesive units -- the COHORT companies. And fourth, we got, on the DA Staff, a mechanism already in place whose whole business is "cohesion" -- the Manning Task Force. With these things already working, we could make the strategy happen -- get cohesion embedded -- if we could just learn, and do, the things required to build . . . a context for cohesion.

And, by damn, we can build that context. We can make those "see and hear" criteria happen. We got three things we have to do. First, we have to learn. I mean, learn. We have to learn, and read, and study, and research . . . not just cohesion, but military cohesion. And not just military cohesion, but all those other related areas, like interdependence, and teamwork, and turnover, and turbulence, and stability, and integration . . . and esprit.

Second, in addition to things we need to know about, there's things we need to do. Like right now. We have to do things across our whole Army, or on a test basis, or here and there in different units and different levels, just to get the idea of "cohesion" spread throughout our Army. Poppin' up everywhere. Not just centered on the COHORT companies.

And third, there's one thing we need to think about before we start all that learning and doing. We need to think about just how damn ignorant and inept we are on this whole business of cohesion and related concepts. For example, we know, from all kinds of history and all kinds of research, that cohesion is, without question, a powerful source of combat power. And we know that you build cohesion by working for stability; and by emphasizing unit rather than individual; and by getting soldiers thinking about "US" instead of "ME." Knowing all that, how come we still continue to use a personnel system which functions almost entirely in terms of "individual," and almost never in terms of "unit?" We are ignorant. And we are even more inept than we are ignorant. Go back in time, say, maybe a couple decades, and look at some of our earlier ventures in the cohesion domain.
Twenty years ago, starting in the late '50's, our Army built not just a cohesive company, but a whole damn cohesive brigade ("battle group"). We started out with officer and NCO cadre, added a couple thousand young men right out of the reception stations, then ran the whole thing thru basic training, advanced individual training, basic unit training, and advanced unit training. Took a year. The outfit had almost no turnover, and damn little turn-out. It was a beautiful thing. It was a "whole." An "US." Tough. Trained. Combat efficient. Combat effective. Combat-ready.

We put it on a troop ship, sent it to Korea, hooked it into the 7th Division... and within three months, it died. It died because it was combat-oriented, and thought about war; while the Division thought mostly about the "Moosie-Mai," and about what an awful burden the one-year short tour was. It died because the Division ripped out many of its young leaders to staff "spaces" in the Division Headquarters. It died because every soldier over 6'2" was pulled out and sent to be interviewed for the Division Honor Guard. It died because every sumbitch who could toot a flute or peep a piccolo got put in the goddam Division Band. It died because it didn't understand starched fatigues, and lacquered helmet liners, and pretty little hibbed silk scarves, and cardboard stiffeners in patrol caps. It died because it loved to prowl and roam up in the mountains, working and sweating its way up narrow, rocky ridges to "the high ground," while down below, in the valley, the Division scratched its ass, and passed some gas, and walked down the road to "the village."

Now the Division had specific orders to "properly host" this cohesive brigade (it was called an OVUREP Battle Group), and, shortly after the brigade arrived, there were all sorts of top-level briefings for all sorts of visitors about how well "it" was doing. And certainly there were all sorts of orders and admonitions rattlin' around through the Division Headquarters about how important the OVUREP program was, and how General So-and-So was personally interested in it, etc., etc., etc. But that proud, tough, competent, combat-ready "whole" died. Took about three months. And within a total of about six months after it arrived, it was just another fat, lazy, clapped-up, sorry, suck-egg 7th Division outfit.

Shortly after that, in the early '60's, we did it again. Along about that time, our Army got a new weapon, called the Davy Crockett. Weird-looking thing. A sort of a modified recoilless rifle. Fired an egg-shaped atomic warhead out for about a mile or two, and, according to the troops, was designed mainly to provide nuclear support for hand-to-hand combat. Anyhow, it was new, and complicated (even though it would produce only a "small" nuclear explosion), and it took a hell of a lot of time and bucks (and cudgels and persuasion) to train gunners to fire the damn thing. So we built a "cohesive platoon" on Davy Crockett gunners. Whole platoon. Kept 'em together, trained 'em together, tested 'em together, alerted the personnel
system, and then shipped 'em together, towards Korea -- specially designated
and earmarked not to be used for anything else except to man the boatload of
Davy Crocketts that we had sent over earlier.

Somehow, we lost the whole goddam platoon. Just lost it. And the
platoon leaders. Somewhere along the line, somebody misread the earmarks,
out-ranked the platoon leader, split up the gunners, pitched 'em in the 'ole
surge tank, and trickled 'em out through all the little pipelines to fill
God-knows-what-kind of "spaces." And we never could find 'em all, or even get
'em back together. Too expensive. And too many "he just PCS'd" among bosses
at critical communications points.

And, in the mid-'70's, damned if we didn't do it again. Just 4-5 years
ago. This time we did it to "cohesive crews." Tank crews. What happened was
that we had made a major change to our main battle tank. Big enough change to
call for a new model number... M60A2. We knew something about systems
then, so we got the systems analysts and the generals together and they
hatched out a scheme ("program"). Went something like this. We'd figure out
how long it would take the boys in Detroit to get the M60A2's rolling off the
line, and then we'd add to that the time it took to mail the iron monsters to
Europe. Then we'd back up from there, time-wise, and start training whole
M60A2 crews down at Knox so that we could have 'em trained up and mailed out
to Europe to arrive at the same time as the machines. Trained, cohesive tank
crews. Going right down to the dock to pick out their new tank and drive it
home.

"Good plan, Colonel!" "Yessir, thankyousir... ."

Detroit got going with the nuts and bolts, and Knox got going with the
people. Picked the crews, controlled for turnover, trained hell out of the
troopers, psyched 'em up, got 'em all ready to go. Alerted the personnel
system. IPR'd all the generals, got the right stories into Army Times,
spray-painted the troopers traffic orange, hung signs around their necks
("DON'T SCREW WITH"), handcuffed each crew together, and shipped the whole
bunch of cohesive crews out across the Atlantic.

The cohesive crews somehow made it to the Replacement Center in Europe.
But then, up in Detroit, for some reason, the M60A2 line went down. And then,
somewhere between there and the personnel system, communications got
distorted. And then, some generals got mad. And then, some action officers
got scared. And then, communication got distorted even more. Meanwhile, at
the Replacement Center, the cohesive crews waited, and waited, and waited.
("Where the hell's our goddam tank?")

Somewhere along about three months later, a weary 'ole chief warrant at
the Replacement Center was sitting behind his desk, taking some heavy fire
from a hot-eyed, heavy-stressed, young staff major who'd just come in from Bad Pickelheimer'sburg:

"Look Chief, I gotta have some damn bods. . . ."

"Ain't got none . . ."

"The hell you don't. I can see some . . ."

"Yeah, but those are for somebody else . . ."

"But this is my fifth damn requisition, Chief . . ."

"It don't matter, Major . . ."

"Well, maybe I can borrow some. We got to have cooks . . ."

"I don't know . . ."

"Well, look at these poopsheets from my General, Chief . . ."

"Damn! A front-channel, three back-channels, and a personal star-letter . . ."

"Right, and I wrote 'em all myself, too. What do you think now, Chief? . . ."

"Well . . ."

"Chief, he's goin' to be flyin' down here next week . . ."

"OK, Major. Tell you what. See that bunch of orange ones on the shelf back there? They're hooked up in fours. Here's the keys. Take a couple, but don't tell nobody . . ."

And there went the programmed, trained, cohesive M60A2 tank crews.

* * * * *

Now you'd think our 'ole Army, with 4-5 experiences like these burnt into its memory, would have started to learn something about the how-to's of such things as unit rotation, and teamwork, and building cohesive units. But it hasn't. Damned if we didn't screw up again. Just this year. Just a few months ago. A sergeant major who was there told the story . . .

For about a year, as a result of the Chief's ARCOST initiatives, we been
trying to build some cohesive units. Cohesive companies. Some of these companies, according to Army Times, have done well. But the one we're going to talk about here was, according to the sergeant major, a sorry-ass failure (a smooth colonel or general would say "an underachievement"), and the sergeant major was what sergeants major usually aren't -- bitter and disillusioned.

He and a group of NCO's, all carefully selected, had gone to a training center just as a company-sized bunch of recruits was finishing basic training. They had taken charge of these youngsters, and, for a month or so, they had briefed, interviewed, counseled, encouraged, fanged, shaped, drilled, bent, beat, hammered and forged this gaggle of young men into a close-knit, cohesive, combat-oriented company of soldiers. Then, with great pride, the NCO's had moved their company out, put it on the plane, and brought it home to their parent unit.

What they brought home was a whole company that had the same high levels of performance, discipline, and give-a-damn that we usually see, just for a short time, in individual soldiers right out of basic. But the NCO's had achieved these high levels not just with individuals. They had done it with a whole company. They had built, by hand, a cohesive unit. And they hadn't really accomplished any miracles. They'd just been allowed (and trusted) to do what NCO's can do better than any "Committee of Nine" or anybody else -- build soldiers.

And so they brought their company home. And they were proud. And then, this company they had built was hooked into a battalion . . .

Within a few weeks, it was obvious that the NCOs' hand-crafted company and the other four poopsheet-guided, computer-programmed, system-built, assembly-lined companies just weren't in the same class. By whatever measures or indicators -- objective or subjective, formal or informal -- the hand-made cohesive company just flat put all the others down. Its youngsters knew what "soldier" meant. As a noun, and, especially, as a verb.

At first, their high performance didn't cause too many problems. After all, this new company was something "special," and different, and interesting. Then, after a couple more weeks, at soldier level, the peer pressure began:

"How come you dudes all got them short haircuts? Look like a buncha damn faggots...."

"Sergeants ain't no officers. How come you guys always sayin' 'Yes, Sergeant' and 'No, Sergeant'? . . . ."

"Ooeee! Look at all them dumb sumbitches standin' there at parade rest in the chow line. . . ."
"Pass? What you mean, 'pass'? My ass is a pass . . ."

"You guys gotta run five miles? In boots? Well . . . ain't that nice . . . we only gotta go three . . . and we do it in tennis shoes. . . ."

And on, and on, and on. The youngsters hung in there, and the NCO's stuck by the standards. Then, one day, the battalion commander blew it.

It wasn't really a big thing. Happened after a month or so. Happened at officer level. Couple of company commanders started talkin' to the battalion commander:

"Sir, on the road run. You know, with all this stuff about 'standardization,' we really need to do some standardizing here in the battalion. The standard you gave us for the road run was three miles. And we finally got 'em doing that. All of 'em. Now here this new company comes along and does five. My troops just don't like it, Sir. They say pretty soon everybody's goin' to have to do five. Lot of bitchin' among the troops, Sir. And besides, Sir, these new guys run in combat boots and steels. Looks like hell when one company's out of uniform. . . ."

The battalion commander listened, looked wise, and said he'd think about it.

Next morning, at the 0600 "Work Call," the cohesive company got the word from its First Sergeant. Right there in formation, they had a short, 'unstructured' discussion session, and then the First Sergeant summarized.

"Goddammit, men, I tole you. It don't make no difference whether its right or wrong. It's policy. From now on, goddammit, three miles . . . in tennis shoes. . . ."

And after that, within a few more weeks, the whole cohesive company came unglued.

Now the sergeant major who was telling this story wasn't too happy about all this, so you have to take his story with a pound or two of salt. But what the sergeant major was saying was that building a cohesive company isn't the problem. We can do that. Our Army knows how. The instinct is bred into our NCO corps. Genetically-determined. But what we don't know much about, yet, are all the how-to's of successfully transplanting one of these cohesive units into a larger unit. Into its "supra-system." We don't really know how to hook up all the wires, and tubes, and connectors. Now, and over the last 20-30 years, it seems that, after we build a cohesive unit, we just jam it into the larger unit, order everybody to make it work, and schedule a few TPR's. Then we get all bent out of joint as the characteristics of cohesion
begin to disappear. Then we do the 'ole face-saving bit by calling the whole effort "just a test"; stab a half-dozen more pins into the chest and buttocks of the little MILPERCENT doll; and once again, sell the whole idea of cohesiveness and unit rotation right down the 'ole river -- soon as the incumbent Chief moves on. Did it with GYROSCOPE, did it with OVUREP, did it with BRIGADE 76, and did it with all sorts of smaller efforts like the CROCKETT platoon and those traffic-orange M60A2 tank crews. And, by damn, sure as hell, we will do it again with COHORT unless . . . sometime before the present Chief splits, we get with it and make a serious, Army-wide effort to learn about, and build . . . a context for cohesion. Thus far, we've laid out a strategy and a strategic objective; we've listed some "see and hear" criteria for that objective, and we've sketched out a "learn and do" concept of operation. Now . . . how about the specific how-to's? Well, by god, here's about a dozen. I worked like hell thinkin' 'em up for you. Judge 'em any way you want, but how 'bout you working up one, just one, of your own and sending it into the Delta Force on the comment sheet? Will you do that?

** ** ** **

1. We said we had to learn about cohesion and realted concepts. Well, you know, you can learn from damn near anything. For example, there is this story rattlin' around the Happy Hour Bar at the Infantry School. It's about an Armor officer. Apparently, this Armor officer, over his career, had spent so much time ridin' around that he ruined his rectum. Now he was a good Armor officer, so the doctors decided to DX his rectum. Organ transplant. They went ahead and transplanted the new rectum, but then, the damned rectum rejected the Armor officer.

Our folks at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research could, in a short time, describe the "essence of the dynamics of organ transplant." Tell us what makes it work and what makes it fail. When it does work, it is clearly a case of a system getting successfully hooked into its larger "supra-system." Doctors now know how to do this -- how to create the right context -- with living organs like hearts and eyes (and rectums). Our commanders and personnel staff officers need to know how to do this not with living organs, but with living units. Like the COHORT companies. The doctors' organs and the commanders' units are both living things -- living systems. Conceivably, TRADOC's expertise and field research with Living Systems Theory might be the means, or conduit, for translating what our doctors know about transplanting living organs, into what our commanders and personnel folks need to know about transplanting living units. COHORT units.

** ** ** **

2. "Train Your Men as a Team." Ever hear that one? It's an ages-old principle of leadership that we keep pounding into the heads of our young
leaders. It's a damn fine principle, but how should that young leader go about doing it? What are some specific tactics and techniques? And are there different kinds of techniques for different kinds of teams? Sure as hell are. . .

The literature of organizational theory identifies three clearly different kinds of teams, based on the nature of interdependence that exists within the team. One kind of team is based on "pooles interdependence." Team performance is simply the sum total of individual performances. Like a bowling team. Or a company firing for record on the rifle range.

Another kind of team is based on "serial interdependence." Team performance depends not only on individual performance, but also on the performance of individuals being done in a certain sequence. Like a relay team at a track meet. Or maybe a 105mm gun crew doing crew-drill.

The third and most complex kind of team is built on "reciprocal interdependence." Team performance depends upon individual performance, upon the performance of smaller sub-teams within the larger team, and upon the sequence and timing of all these individual and sub-team performances. Like a football team. Or a rifle company in a firefight.

Does our leadership doctrine -- whatever it is -- teach the young leader how to recognize these different kinds of teamwork? And what techniques to use to make each kind work better? To build the context, we need to know about these things.

Maybe the Army Research Institute ought to be studying the characteristics and dynamics of these kinds of teams -- in Army environments. Studying in the literature, in the labs, and in the field so that within, say, a year from now, we would be able to identify each of these three kinds of teamwork when we saw it, and then have some particular criteria and techniques to make it work better.

** * * * * 

3. Hangin' on the wall in the bar at Ft Rucker, there's a sign that says "Chopper Pilots Do It In Mid-Air." At Knox, another sign says, "Tankers Do It in the Mud." In my head, there's a sign that says, "Cowboys and Eagles Do It for Money, Once a Week, In the Middle of the Afternoon, Right Out in Plain View of 100,000 People." And this tells us another place where we can learn. What that last sign means is that there are two large business organizations, known by damn near everybody, who are working like hell, profit-motivated, to understand the force multipliers of cohesiveness and teamwork. They're trying to learn about these force multipliers because, if they don't, the Dallas Cowboys and the Philadelphia Eagles will lose, financially.
The kind of teamwork these professional teams are vitally interested in is "reciprocal interdependence" -- same kind you find in the company in a firefight. Football is the name of the game, but teamwork is the name of what wins the game. These outfits study teamwork with a depth, intensity and a percentage of resource allocation far beyond anything our 'ole Army has ever come up with. They study it with video, from every conceivable angle. And they study it with computers, every time the yard markers move. And they coach and counsel in terms of team performance. What's more, they have quantifiable criteria measures to work with, like yards . . . and points.

It seems that if our Army is willing to listen to, and use, business management and PPBS budgeting techniques worked out by Ford Motor Company's "whiz kids," then we ought to also be willing to listen to, and use, teamwork techniques developed by organizations vitally interested in the same kind of teamwork in the stadium that we're interested in on the battlefield. Seems like if we can have Army officers stationed with big civilian organizations in Detroit, working at the frontiers of machine technology, then we ought to also be able to have some Army officers stationed with civilian organizations in Dallas and Philadelphia, working at the frontiers of human teamwork technology.

What do you think we might learn about teamwork on the battlefield if, say, starting at the beginning of pre-season training next summer, TRADOC's Training Development Institute had one 2-man recon team with the Cowboys and another with the Eagles? Wonder if TDI has any ORSA's who have been football players? Think 'ole hard-nose Tom Landry would ever go along with such a wild-eyed idea? You don't? Well . . . he already has. Been in touch with our Army through Delta Force and the Training Development Institute. And, as of now, our 'ole Army's got the ball . . . if we want to run with it.

*** *** ***

4. There's another place where we can learn. It's a place in Suitland, Maryland, and it's a place that would probably subvert the sex life of any real, red-blooded, pale-skinned, horn-rimmed, myopic AG officer. Great big building, and inside . . . files. Juse damn miles and miles of files. 13.2 miles, to be exact. It's our Army's organizational memory. It's where we keep many of our 'ole wore out poopsheets and documents. Our archives. Records and reports about things we did and how we did 'em in the fairly recent past. And the Chief of Military History can get in there . . . Maybe he ought to fall out about a squad of archivists and an AG patrol leader and send 'em over to Suitland to recon "Vietnam War, Last Half, Personnel Policies."

Many of us remember what a sorry-ass mess our Army was in the '70-'72 era. Its spirit, will, and discipline were shot. A lot of ideological and political factors contributed to this, but much of it we did to ourselves, or,
we acquiesced into letting somebody else do it to us. We were either
abysmally ignorant in techniques of handling aggregates of men, or, we were
woefully lacking in courage up there at the Army-DOD border positions. A
major factor in destroying the spirit, will and discipline of our Vietnam Army
was what we did to soldiers and their units in the last few years of that
war. Transferred those troopers around to 4-5 different units, in as many
months, just to meet some piss-ant analyst's end-strength numbers.

Maybe the Military History Chief's recon team could bring us back some
case studies or a list of lessons learned from the Vietnam War about how not
to handle, and what not to do with, and what not to do to, aggregates of
soldiers.

* * * *

5. That's about four things we need to learn about how to build the
context for cohesion . . . what about some things we can do --? Well, for
one, we can start building the context over in our training domain. For
example, did you know that the folks at the Army Training Support Center can
task analyze just about any individual or collective task? Yep. Take the
task, and break it down into its essential sub-tasks, and tell you things
about each of those sub-tasks. Not long ago, in about our 15th
Women-in-the-Army study, some folks were able to lay out and go through about
every sub-task there is to see which ones had implications for the differences
between men and women. Now if we could put time and bucks into the WITA study
effort time and time again, then it seems like, for the first time, we ought
to be able to get the task analyzers to lay out all those sub-tasks and see
which ones have implications for . . . teamwork. And not just for teamwork,
but for each of the three kinds of teamwork.

If ARI could develop ways to identify the kinds of teamwork, the ATSC
could use that to describe or score-out each individual and collective
sub-task in terms of the main kind of teamwork it contributed to. Put a
"teaming weight" on each sub-task. If you could describe sub-tasks in terms
of their implications for building teamwork, then an Army that understood the
combat potential of teamwork (and ours does) could get moving on the teamwork
business by more efficient application of time and effort.

* * * *

6. Maybe TRADOC's Training Development Institute could get four or five
folks up to speed on identifying the three different kinds of teamwork, then
take each sub-task of the ARTEP and determine in which category of teamwork
the sub-task would best fit. Then weigh each sub-task in terms of the kind of
interdependence required. A sub-task which involved "reciprocal
interdependence" gets the highest weight. Now we all know the ARTEP's are not
"evaluative"(?), but they sure got a hell of a lot of attention, and this would certainly begin to focus more "command interest" on teamwork and cohesiveness as essential components of getting ready to fight.

7. Hell, maybe we just ought to get ahead and make the ARTEP evaluative. Troop commanders think it is anyway. So much so that, according to good research by ARI, when about 20 of our battalion commanders were given the choice of running their ARTEP against a trained OPPOR battalion or against a sister US battalion, 18 chose their sister battalion. At any rate, maybe we just ought to go ahead and make the ARTEP evaluative. With flat-out candor and courage. And then put the results right on the individual leader's performance report. But we could do it in a way that would help build the context for cohesion.

We could put "cohesiveness" right slap in the middle of our Army's formal reward system, simply by letting maybe one-third of the performance rating of each leader be the rating that his next higher unit received on the ARTEP. A measure of the leader's ability to work with, rather than compete against, other leaders at his level. A measure of reciprocal interdependence. A measure of "US", rather than "ME." And certainly no harder to figure out than a damn score for "Tact."

Now, that would probably work for leaders at fire team, squad, platoon, and company level . . . and probably only for the combat arms. Might not be "fair or equitable." Well, that's tough. Getting killed in a firefight ain't fair or equitable, either.

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8. Maybe there's something else we could do to get cohesion working in the reward system. Goes like this. We know that the way to get cohesion goin' is to reward folks for getting it goin'. And we know that turnover, which wipes out cohesion, is caused about one-half by MILPERCENT and one-half by commanders in the field. Now, suppose we created an award called the "C.R.U.": Combat Ready Unit award. A unit version of the E.I.B. Awarded it only to company-sized combat units. And, as we developed the criteria (SQT scores, ARTEP scores, etc.) suppose we added, as a major criterion, a measure of personnel stability. That should help reduce markedly that half of the turnover caused by commanders in the field. For the sake of a C.R.U., company commanders just might argue like hell with the personnel "leveling" ideas of the battalion, brigade, and division commanders. And the higher commanders just might go along with 'em, because every C.R.U. award to a company would reflect favorably on the higher units . . . and on their commanders.

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9. We can find another notion about things to do if we look at nursery schools. Russian nursery schools. Those folks try to develop teamwork early. In some of the State-run child care centers, for example, all the damned nursing bottles have two nipples. A little 'ole single sucker all by himself can't get any chow. Takes a double-suck. Honest. Takes the combined suck power of two Russian babies to make the nursing bottle function. Reciprocal interdependence. Teamwork. Then, later, when the kid gets a little older and wants to play with, say, a wagon, all he will find in the toy room is half a damn wagon. A handle, two wheels, and half a wagon body. If he really wants to get rolling, then he's got to go find another kid standing around with another half of a wagon, and then the two of them have to get a "whole" put together before they can go anywhere.

All that's far out, for sure, and the Russians start pretty early, but what specific techniques do we use, for the specific purpose of developing teamwork, in the early development of... soldiers? Do we start this in the reception stations and continue it on through basic, or do we say, "To hell with it. Not our responsibility. Says so right in our mission statement. I.E.T. We do individual training. Let the damn units worry about all that team-building jazz."

At the end of basic, we measure how well the recruit can fire an individual weapon or put on an individual protective mask. Should we also be measuring how well he can work as an individual member of a team? How can we do that?

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10. The folks out at ORCAS turn out OESO's with a whole kit-bag full of techniques from the world of organizational development. Team-building is just one of maybe 40-50 techniques. Maybe, if we get serious about building this context for cohesion, team-building should become one of the main tools in the OESO tool kit. Like a tank mechanic's sledge hammer. Maybe ORCAS should just about double the time, and effort, and research, and people allocated under the heading of "team building." Maybe, within a year, the OESO's could become the folks who are the specialists at transplanting living units into their larger "supra-systems."

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11. How would you like to have the job of marrying up about a hundred merchant ships -- run by civilians -- coming from New York, Baltimore, Norfolk, and Jacksonville; and then moving that whole gaggle out across the North Atlantic to the north edge of Russia? Through dense fog, black nights, and winter storms? With no lights and only occasional radio contact? And with whole wolf-packs of German submarines hasslin' you all the time?
In WW II, we had folk, mortals like you, who did precisely this same "mission impossible." At first, we had a hard time. Boats got lost, ran into each other, got ate by the wolf-packs, or maybe just said to hell with it, quit, turned around, and went home. Then we wised up. What we started doing was looking at the convoy as a "whole," and at the convoy commander, his staff, and certain key captains as the whole nervous system of that larger whole. Then we'd keep the nervous system together. Soon as the convoy reached Russia, we'd bundle up the convoy commander, his staff, and the key captains and fly the whole damn bunch back to Norfolk or New York to pick up another convoy. Transplanted a whole nervous system from one convoy to another.

And that's how we accomplished an extremely difficult wartime command and control task. Did it by building cohesive command and control mechanisms. How come we don't do something like that today, now, as part of an overall effort to build a context for cohesion?

Look, we're starting to build 20 cohesive companies ... how come we don't try to also build maybe four or five cohesive staffs? Battalion staffs. Not necessarily to run the cohesive companies, but just to see how the damn things work.

Let the newly-designated Battalion Commander pick maybe half his battalion staff (spaces and faces), and let MILPERGEN and division pick the others. Give the Battalion Commander control of these men before he assumes command. Put the whole lash-up on TDY. Let the OECS folks help train this particular command and control team. And let them build that training on the high-performance battle staff processes of Project FORGE that HumRRO proved out in the lab and the 8th Infantry Division proved out. 10 years later, in the field in Europe. Do all this cohesive staff training at Leavenworth, under the Combined Arms Center, in conjunction with the Pre-Command Course. Double the resources to that splendid CATTs facility, and then work the hell out of it.

And let OECS do it because, after 3-4 years of studying these FORGE processes, they now know how these processes work ... in the real world ... in real combat units. Training battle staffs in these processes could well become the main purpose of our whole OE effort. Thus far, OECS has taught these FORGE processes and techniques mostly to individuals. Conceivably, if we turned loose the OECS folks, with their exceptionally effective group instruction skills, and let them train up whole battle staffs, we would produce cohesive battle staffs for sure, but also, you know, we just might find an unbelievably powerful combat power multiplier. And, at the same time, we might open up the door to an entirely new basis --- a whole new world --- of command and staff procedures. A command and staff doctrine geared specifically to the requirements of running Army outfits in this brand new Age.
of Information. A command and staff doctrine which recognizes that, "X=H."

Maybe it's also time, out there at the Command and General Staff College, for a whole new approach to the command and staff business. I mean a whole new approach. One based on information science, and on information technology, and on how the great multitude of recent developments in these two areas can be integrated to drive efficient and effective performance of the processes of a battle staff, rather than just the poopsheets. Then put all that together with the "how-to's" of building a cohesive battle staff. Potential for a quantum jump?

You know it's been almost 80 years since we made a major evolutionary advance in how Army staffs function? Some major got it started. Out at Leavenworth.

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12. Leavenworth is also the home of the Combined Arms Center. Wonder who it is that studies the whole business of tactical combining? And integrating. And teamwork. And combat interdependence. Should there be a group of smart folks out there, looking at, say, those three kinds of teamwork on the future battlefield?

Tactical doctrine has it that our brigade headquarters, in battle, must be capable of quickly hooking up and unhooking various mixes of combat battalions. What do we really know about this "hooking up" business? Maybe it's like hooking up a radio onto a jeep. Most of us can probably get the male plug into the female socket but all too often, in doing so, we somehow manage to bend or bust some of those small pins inside that do the real combining and connecting. Do we know what we need to know about the requirements of this "combining" task in battle? Anybody ever see brigade headquarters practicing hook-ups and un-hooks with battalions in garrison? How 'bout in the field? Can we do a professional job in this kind of "combat transplanting," or are we satisfied to just write down "OPCON" somewhere on a poopsheet, and then run it over to the Message Center? Maybe a "combining" or "combat integration" office at the Combined Arms Center could tell us how to do these things better... how to do what the troops called "orchestrating" in VN battles. If the CAC folks could do this, then the context for cohesion would begin to spread into our tactical doctrine, and, if you want to "embed" something into our 'ole Army, that ain't exactly a bad place.

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13. Up above the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, purely individual problem-solving begins to give way to collective problem-solving... team problem-solving. Suppose we had a good task analysis of the kinds of things our
colonels and generals do. If we had that, and if we knew the techniques of identifying those three kinds of teamwork, you know what we could do? We could get hold of those new BG designees and teach them about effective team problem-solving at senior officer level. Teach them about interdependent problem-solving. Teach them not to use individual problem-solving techniques in collective problem-solving situations . . and vice-versa.

Now it just so happens that our War College, just a couple years ago, did a pretty good task analysis of the jobs of every officer of the rank of colonel and above. Wonder what War College management instructors could do with that if we got serious about building this context for cohesion?

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14. The first major scientific study of cohesion in combat units was done by Shils and Janowitz in WW II. Many Army folks are familiar with their study, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht." They describe, pretty clearly, how it was that cohesion brought extra combat power to German Army line units; and they also describe how the Germans went about building and maintaining cohesion.

At the time, German combat units were gettin' their schnitzels waxed quite regular. They took a lot of casualties, so cohesion wasn't based on keeping groups of troops together. Where the Germans got their cohesion was by keeping troops in the same unit as long as that unit survived. Cohesion was built around a handful of troopers who were the "old-timers" in the unit. They knew its history, its uniqueness, its unwritten rules. They were what you and I know as a missing ingredient in most any of our units or headquarters today. Those old-timers in the Wehrmacht units were . . . the unit's organizational memory. As such, they were, in effect, the unit's stabilizers. And a few in each unit brought many of the force multipliers of cohesion.

We got any stabilizers in our units? Can't have too many, not with turnover rates of 30 percent a quarter. One battalion commander at Ft Carson said he'd had 14 company commanders in less than two years. A study in a combat division in Texas showed four months as the average time on the job for battalion S1's. All sorts of data point to an Army of itinerants. Like migrant fruit pickers.

We could start putting stabilizers in units. Sure could. Just a few here and there to serve the same purpose as those old-timers in the WW II Wehrmacht. Can't do it, yet, with our officers. Too much pressure from "Career Management." Can't do it, yet, with our troops or NCO's. Too much pressure from "MOS management." But we could sure as hell do it with that splendid bunch of soldiers our personnel managers often forget . . . our warrants.
MILPERGEN doesn't mess with the warrants too much. And since they're usually technical experts in a given field, the assignment officers can't lure the warrants off into odd-ball jobs and places by telling them they need it in order to "be competitive." Maybe we could just assign a few into a unit and leave 'em alone. Some folks would argue that warrants are mostly highly trained technical experts and belong in headquarters, not combat units. Well, you could argue that, but maybe that's the way it is, and not the way it should be. Seems like we hear a lot of moaning and groaning about how are our combat units ever going to learn and employ all these 40-50 highly complex hardware systems now beginning to come on line. Well, doesn't the complexity come from "high technology"? If warrants are technical experts, maybe we could use them to bring the high technology into the units. Let 'em mid-wife the new hardware into the unit, and, at the same time, serve the same "stabilizer" function as those old-timers in the WW II Wehrmacht. If you were commanding a tank company with the new Abrams tank, how would you like to have a couple warrants, known as master gunners, who knew all the technology and weren't going to PCS next month?

I want to talk you about building cohesion in a whole Army. There's a specific way we could go about it. To understand it, you just need to listen to a story...

Think about young recruits just as they finish basic. Think about 'em passing in review at the Graduation Parade. They're proud as hell... and they probably make you proud, too. Now, no matter what we may have heard about their intelligence levels, they are, in addition to being proud, smart as hell. So smart, in fact, that they once outwitted the Secretary of the Army and a handful of good generals...

Somewhere in the first half of the 70's, we were having trouble gettin' the "Volunteer Army" to work. Not enough new soldiers volunteering. Some trainee surveys had suggested that our Army just wasn't meeting their expectations... wasn't what they had thought it was going to be. They were disgruntled. Sec Army himself got concerned, and so he went out to Ft Knox to talk with some new recruits to find out what it would take to get them grunted again.

When he came back from talking with the recruits, he said, "Hell, there ain't nothin' wrong. The surveys are off-base. Those youngsters like the Army. Tell you what. I bet that if you gave every one the option of leaving the Army right after basic, you wouldn't lose more that 5%. At the most."

So, three basic training companies were picked for the test and all the recruits in those companies were told that, if, after basic, they didn't like
the Army, they could get out and go home, no questions asked.

Well, the end of basic started coming closer and the generals at Knox and DCSPER started gettin' nervouser. They weren't allowed to do anything to persuade the recruits one way or another, and they just knew they were going to lose about half the recruits or maybe even more. But there wasn't a damn thing they could do about it.

Graduation Day came and, sure as hell, over half the recruits in each company chose the discharge rather than the PCS. Sec Army lost his bet; the generals were embarrassed; the FA and E folks and comptrollers were up in arms about all the wasted time and money, and manpower; and the discharged recruits packed their bags and went back home.

Then, about three weeks later, the young recruits who had taken the discharge began to educate Sec Army and the generals about how smart the American soldier really is. It seems that, after Sec Army had made them his offer, and about halfway through basic, a couple of recruits in one company started digging around in the regulations governing discharges. What they found was that, because of low strength levels at the time, any soldier who was discharged could, within 30 days, come back in with the same grade and MOS, and, further, could choose his own duty station.

So, the recruits had figured it this way: "If we stay in after basic, we get about 10 days' leave and have to go where 'ole Army sends us. If we take the discharge, then enlist again, we get 30 days at home and then go to whatever duty station we want. And you know, they sure as hell ain't gonna change any regulations with the Sec Army watchin'!" The word spread to the other companies. No one in authority found out what they were going to do ... and they pulled it off. The actual losses, at the end of 30 days, were pretty close to Sec Army's figures. So goes the story. . . .

The purpose of this story is to illustrate to you just how smart the American soldier is, even as a recruit. Somehow, many of us tend to look down on his intellect and ability, while at the same time saying how important and precious he is. If you really believe in his significance and potential, then this proposal for building cohesiveness won't seem too far out. There is a way for the plain 'ole American soldier to play the main role in bringing significantly greater cohesiveness to our Army as a whole. All it takes to get it going is faith in that guy we say is "most important" ... the soldier. Now ... hang on to your helmet liner. . . .

I want us to send the new soldier to "Leadership School." Every single soldier. Probably right after he's finished basic. Doesn't have to be a long school, maybe 3-5 days, done right in the same company area, and done by the Drill Sergeants, who can now see him and treat him as a soldier, rather than a
recruit or trainee.

The purpose of the Leadership School is not necessarily to make him a leader. It might do that, but its purpose is to teach him what leadership is, how it works, and how important it is to any organized effort. It's to help him better communicate with and better understand "them bastards up at platoon headquarters." It's to help him better understand the "why" that is so important to the American soldier. The secondary effects might well trigger off or bring to light a hell of a lot more latent leaders than we ever knew we had. And what the hell would be wrong with building up our Army's pool of leadership knowledge as a hedge against heavy casualties or rapid mobilization?

But, the real purpose of the Leadership School is none of the above. The real purpose is to bring cohesiveness to our whole Army ... to make the U. S. mean "US." And to have the plain 'ole ordinary American soldier be the main one in making that happen. It's really not hard to do ...

The new soldier is not ignorant of leadership. Been around it all his life, but probably never knew it by that name. He's got parents, been in "gangs" and "bunches," and if he's a high school graduate, then, according to the research, for most of his life, he's been in close and continuous daily contact with a little over 100 of a certain type of leader called "teacher." The fact that he can tell you which was the best one and which was the worst one suggests that he has a set of effective leadership criteria that he applies, and, if you got him to describe those best and worst teachers, you'd find his leadership criteria are pretty much in agreement with the ones you use. He sure as hell has the experience. To understand it, all he needs is a framework with which to interpret it. We can build that framework with the curriculum of the Leadership School.

There are four pieces (for now, let's not call 'em "modules") to the curriculum: ANALYZE, ORGANIZE, DEPUTIZE, and SUPERVISE. That's all. Training Development Institute and some good Drill Sergeants could string out the skills under each heading and figure simple ways to teach them. And we could teach all four pieces in 3-4 days. Remember now, we're not trying to develop leaders as much as we're trying to develop soldiers who know what leadership is and how it works.

So how the hell does all this build cohesion? Well, I ain't told you yet. But it's pretty simple. All you have to do is first go right slap up to the top of the Army and find FM 100-1. It's only 26 pages long. Look in there and find the parts on "Army Values" and "Soldier Qualities." Then you operationalize these. Describe what you can see and hear and feel when someone demonstrates these values and qualities. Then you take these descriptions and work 'em into the criterion statements for ANALYZE, ORGANIZE, DEPUTIZE, and SUPERVISE. Mix all that with whatever the ARI folks can tell...
you about simple, practical, do-able methods and techniques of "the socialization process," and you got your curriculum. TDI and the Drill Sergeants will keep it green.

"... And every new soldier learned about Army values in Leadership School. He learned not so much the names of the values and qualities, but rather how they looked and how important they were in the everyday life of the Army. And he bought into these values, partly because he liked the idea of going to Leadership School, but also because what he learned as being the criteria of good and sorry Army leaders were pretty damn close to his own experience and ideas of good and poor leadership. The new soldiers began to believe in these values and qualities, and, in a short while, they began to expect these same values and qualities in their own leaders. By the strange chemistry of human behavior, these expectations of subordinates were sensed by more senior leaders and began to shape their behavior -- the expectations of others being one of the most powerful determinants of human behavior. The more senior leaders really didn't have any major problems meeting the expectations generated by these expected values, since the senior leaders knew all along that these values were "right" in the first place. And, in time, Army soldiers and Army leaders came to share strongly a common set of values and qualities, and the psychologists who came to study this highly effective Army had a name for this sharing of values... they called it the very essence of ... 'cohesion'."

That's not too wild a dream, is it? Isn't the top-to-bottom sharing of values the main reason why the Japanese, for the last 10 years or so, have been consistently cleaning the clocks of US corporations? Haven't some pretty good armies of the past been marked by this sharing of a common set of values? The Leadership School, as a way for getting value sharing going in our whole Army, may seem too far out, but, just once, before you start thinking of resources, start thinking of some other things: What would it mean to the soldier's self-concept and confidence and what would that mean on the battlefield? What would it mean to his folks and friends? What would it mean to potential enemies? What would it mean to prospective employers when the soldier left the Army? What would it mean to the "image" of our Army -- both to ourselves and our public? What would it mean to the enrichment of our nation's manpower pool when the lean years come in another decade? What would it mean to Congress? Most important, what would it mean on a high intensity battlefield, with communications gone, with appointed leadership specifically targeted at strategic and tactical levels, and with small unit decision requirements reaching a magnitude of 17 decisions required every 15 minutes as a battle begins? Think about those things first, and then ponder those 'ole hoary things like bucks, and time, and space, and faces. . . .

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So, in summary, if we ever hope to realize the combat multipliers of
cohesion, we need to build not just cohesive units, but, we must also build a context within which those units can survive. This paper lays out some thoughts about how sorry we are at doing that. It also lays out a strategy, objectives, criteria, concept of operation, and 10-15 notions about the how-to's of building a context for cohesion.

Maybe, with this as a start, we could dig out the working papers of the Chief's early ARCost study group, add their 100 or so brain-stormed how-to's for building cohesion (Jake Jacobs could find 'em), and come up with a "main attack" or central purpose for the Manning Task Force, and CAC, and the 9th Division; in other words, all those fine folks working on "high human technology." There will be, for sure, a lot of flak from the "high machine technology" group -- the numbers men, and the measurers, and the analysts. But, when they start calling your human technology notions "squirelly," then all you got to do is go find the movie film of the "Ping-Pong" Missile that the machine technology guys built, at high cost, for our Army back in the 60's.

The film opens with a rocket lifting off from the pad at a test site in the Arizona desert. It's what's called a "reconnaissance rocket." As it arcs over toward the "enemy" positions, it programs into itself the trajectory it's following. As it starts to come down on the enemy side, retro-rockets begin to fire to slow its descent. The retro-rockets finally stop the damn Ping-Pong rocket about 1000 feet above the recon area and, at that point, the damn thing takes a photograph. Then, still hovering in mid-air, it ignites some retro-retro-rockets and flies itself back over the very same trajectory it came in on. Amazing! High technology. Real high. The last part of the film shows troops, trucks, jackrabbits, and road-runners all scramblin' like hell trying to get out of the way as the damn thing comes roarin' back, crashes down into the launch pad, and explodes all to hell...
If we say (maybe in other words) that we love the soldier, and if this comes from not just our mouths, but from down deep in our soul, then we really have no choice but to bend every effort, every resource, every activity, and every priority toward his TRAINING ... not because it is true that "training is our most important peacetime activity," not because it is also true that "training is what the soldier gets paid for," not because it is also true that "training in peacetime keeps him alive in war," but because 'way down deep beneath all those truths is the even more fundamental truth that TRAINING is the flat-out only way that the soldier can be what he entered our Army to be ... the only way that we can meet his expectations ... the only way that organizational and individual goals can both be served ... and the only damned way that we can preclude what really amounts to cheating the man whom we must one day send to perform "the noblest act of mankind."

So ... if we speak to soldiers of our concern for "PFC Marne," or "Snuffy," or "Joe Tentpeg," or "those kids," or whatever terms we devise, sometimes inappropriately, to express care and affection for the soldier, then the soldiers will listen ... but ... they will have heard all these terms before, in all shapes and forms, and it will be the soldiers' TRAINING, and not our words, by which these troopers judge whether or not we're sincere and professional, or just another bunch of feather merchants with a bad case of alligator mouth and hummingbird ass.

Now if this way of looking at TRAINING, even though it's "shrinkish," makes sense to you, then carry it a few steps further. It says, to me at least, that TRAINING is our Army's ultimate "Human Goal," that TRAINING underlies all that we do to build "Quality of Life," and that TRAINING is the place where our Army's leadership, all of it, can do the most in terms of serving both the mission of the unit and the welfare of the men.
TRAINED TO KILL

by CPT Dandridge Malone, Inf.

(Editor's Note: Captain Malone points out that judo, primarily a defensive art, is the basis for current hand-to-hand combat training and advocates substituting karate, an offensive art, as the foundation for such training in the future. Most of his points are well taken and should be fuel for discussion among thinking Infantrymen.)

Unarmed, and seemingly defenseless, the man faced the charging bull. When the massive head hooked close, the man leaped aside, his open hand swinging downward in a flashing arc, its lower edge smashing against the bull's horn ripping it loose from the skull. As the bull turned, the man shifted too. And again the calloused hand came down. The bull stood stunned and defenseless, great, curved horns gone and only empty, bleeding sockets remaining. Quickly, the man stepped directly in front of the bull, knotted his hand into a fist and drove it downward into the bull's forehead, just between the eyes. A faint splitting sound. The bull staggered, fell and died.

This barehanded kill was made by an Oriental named Oyama. His deadly combination of power, speed and violence--karate.

There is nothing mysterious about karate. It is a physical art developed over several hundred years with typical Oriental study and patience. It is a combination of rapid movement and striking power. The movement brings the karate fighter through, around or over the enemy's defenses. Then, the striking power is used to attack the vulnerable points of the enemy's body. Speed is the key to both the movement and the strike.

The fighting stance of the karate fighter is puzzling to those who have never faced it. He will assume a half-crouch position about 8 feet from his enemy, face him head-on, like a wrestler, or turn to either side, like a boxer. He may even turn his back to invite an attack. He switches freely from one position to another, waiting for an opening so that he can strike from any position with explosive fury.

In the attack, the karate fighter may lunge directly at his enemy, using his feet or the knife-edge of his hand to batter aside the defender's arms, fists or hand-held weapons. But, he may instead spin suddenly to the right or left, adding centrifugal force to a sweeping roundhouse kick into the kidneys or ribs of the defender's unprotected side.

The karate fighter's most awesome attack is the jump kick, in which he springs forward high into the air directly at his enemy and over his defense. As he comes through the air, his kicking foot is first drawn close to his body, then driven forward with full force into the enemy's face or chest. This attack cannot be stopped by an upraised hand or forearm. It has behind it not only the full power of the karate fighter's kick, but also the momentum of his body. It can be delivered from as far as 12 feet away and can seldom be deflected or avoided, even by another karate fighter.
Once the karate fighter has broken through his enemy's defenses, he applies the second element--striking power. Each blow must be destructive. Each blow is aimed in a split second at some vulnerable point. One strike may be designed to break bone, another to paralyze a muscle group or nerve center, or still another to rupture or severely damage some vital organ. Behind each blow is striking power, the key to karate.

Striking power actually is pooled from several sources. Muscular strength is the basic element. To this may be added the power of leverage, centrifugal force or momentum. By proper timing and coordination, these forces can be concentrated at a single point.

A good example of striking power is the golfer's swing. When he swings, muscular strength comes from his legs, back and shoulders. Leverage is added by the twist of his hips and upper body. Centrifugal force comes from the downward swing of the golfer's extended arms. The power of momentum also begins in this downward swing, and is then amplified many times by the "snap" in the golfer's wrists. These sources of power are brought together at a single point--the point where the golfer's hands grip the club. The karate fighter uses these same forces, but for him, the concentration point for power is some vulnerable spot on his enemy's body.

For weapons, the karate fighter uses various parts of his own hands, feet, arms and legs. These weapons and the manner in which they are used give karate its characteristic violence. The fighter uses his feet when he needs range or distance to kill an enemy armed with a knife or a stick. He can deliver a kick from any direction--forward and upward into the groin or chin, or sweeping in from the side into ribs, kidneys or skull. For in-fighting, he uses his hands, his knees and his elbows, perhaps stabbing at his enemy's eyes with his fingers while simultaneously ramming his knee upward into the groin. He drives home each blow with power and speed, and with a fury derived from the determination to kill.

The karate fighter's hands are his quickest and deadliest weapons. With them, he can punch, stab or cut in any direction. Long hours of conditioning toughen and develop the various striking points on the hand. Gristle and callouses are formed so that the bones and flesh can withstand the shock of impact.

Various parts of the hand are used to provide a variety of weapons. The lower edge of the hand, called the "knife-edge," is used to splinter the bones in an enemy's arms or legs. Striking power delivered by a blow from this "knife-edge" can break a two-by-four. The fist, with one knuckle of the second finger protruding, gives the pointed weapon needed to attack nerve centers or other small targets like the temple. The fist is also used to provide the blunt power required to crush a skull or a rib cage. An expert can shatter a brick with his fist.

The karate fighter's fingers are the most vicious weapons of all, however. Extended and stiffened, they can be driven into an enemy's throat, eyes or abdominal cavity in much the same way as a pointed stick. One Japanese karate fighter demonstrates this strike, known as the "spear-hand," by plunging his fingers through the side of a live pig, then pulling out ribs and intestines--all in a fraction of a second.
Intensive training conditions the karate fighter to move, block and strike almost by reflex. He develops this lethal skill by practicing repeatedly the various kicks, thrusts and blows that are used to attack and destroy an enemy. Training develops the keen mental discipline required in a fight where the loser dies. The training is tough, sometimes painful, always serious.

In the early stages of training, the fighter learns a series of complicated calisthenics to strengthen and stretch the muscles and tendons needed later for fighting. Other early exercises teach methods for creating and delivering striking power, and the methods for attacking from any direction or position. The fighter toughens his hands, knees, elbows and feet by hitting and kicking hundreds of times at a "striking post," a post or heavy board about five feet high wrapped tightly in Manila rope. Once the fighter masters the fundamental movements, he is ready to begin matching his skill against human strength and responses.

Sparring bouts develop the karate fighter's proficiency more than any other type training. When the fighter first learns to spar, he does his blocking and striking "by the numbers." As his skill increases, he progresses to half-speed and finally, full speed. Masks, gloves and other protective devices are not worn because they cut down on freedom of movement and striking speed.

To keep from injuring or killing his sparring partner, the karate fighter learns to deliver his strike without making actual contact. The kick or punch is not "pulled" in any way--it goes at full power and speed, but it is "aimed" at a point several inches short of the target. This technique teaches the fighter how to control his lethal weapons. It adds to the sparring bout the critical ingredients of any good combat training--realism and a degree of danger.

During the advanced stages of training, the karate fighter learns to fight under special conditions. Sparring bouts continue, but now the fighter spars with two or more partners at the same time, striking at one with his hands and at the others with his feet. He learns the flashing kick used to disarm an enemy armed with a knife, pistol or club. He learns to fight with an arm or leg crippled. He learns to fight even if he's thrown to the ground--to strike upward with his feet into his enemy's unprotected stomach or groin. This advanced training gives the final polish. It gives versatility and finesse to the fighter trained to kill.

Karate should perhaps be the new basis for our hand-to-hand combat training. Karate gives a significant advantage to the soldier who, at the battlefield's moment of truth, must "close with and destroy." It is easy to teach because it is based on repetition and practical exercise. An open field and a wooden striking post meet all the requirements for training facilities. There is no need for uniforms, protective devices, wrestling mats or sawdust pits. Karate even provides a bonus effect, excellent physical conditioning. It develops combative responses as well as strength, endurance and agility.

The US Army's present system of hand-to-hand combat includes a few karate techniques, but the system is based on Judo. Judo teaches the use of leverage applied against an opponent's balance and momentum and requires
that the fighter first grasp some part of his opponent's clothing or body, then throw or twist him to the ground. Finally, judo is a defensive combative since it normally involves a reaction to an opponent's attack.

In contrast to judo, karate is designed to destroy while judo is designed to disable. Instead of choking an enemy by locking an arm around his neck, the karate fighter crushes his windpipe with his fist. Instead of dislocating a shoulder by twisting an arm, the karate fighter splinters the collarbone by smashing downward with the knife-edge of his hand. Instead of stunning an enemy by throwing him to the ground, the karate fighter kills him by driving a pointed knuckle into his temple. The karate fighter is trained to attack. The karate fighter is trained to kill.

Much of the Army's judo was derived from techniques used by civilian police. Judo is ideal for police work. Using it, the policeman responds in "self-defense." He is not the aggressor, and this is proper—for a policeman. The criminal, or opponent, is disabled, not killed. This, too, is necessary, since the criminal must later be brought to trial.

In military hand-to-hand combat, "self-defense" and "disable" are not the right concepts, nor is there any requirement to bring the opponent to trial. The only requirement is to destroy the enemy—to blind, cripple and kill him—using feet, fists, knees and elbows to rip, break and beat the life from his body. This savagery has no place in judo, but it is the heart and spirit of karate.
TRAINING AIDS THAT SNAP, SNARL AND ROAR

Lieutenant Dandridge M. Malone

Training aids are useful, important, sometimes simple and sometimes complex. But I hazard the assertion that only the Infantry School's Ranger Department Florida camp has aids that snarl, snap, bite and roar.

These "training aids" are used in survival instruction for Ranger students, Air Force pilots, Naval Aviation cadets, Boy Scouts, and others who are taught to eat them, or to avoid being eaten by them.

Procurement is the most difficult problem and not because of contractual problems with production agencies. Wild pigs, skunks, raccoons, wildcats and rabbits have to be trapped or, better still, hunted, chased, run down, and grabbed. Skunks require special skills not listed in the MOS catalog. The hunter must approach cautiously, using a poncho like a bull fighter's cape to ward off the "polecat's" CBR agents. Then at the Moment of Truth he must discard his poncho and in a desperate, all-out lunge seize the skunk's tail. To a skunk, this resembles a Chinese headlock in reverse, and renders him helpless, unable to fire.

Reptiles are found in deep swamps and sluggish rivers along the Gulf Coast. Snakes, which usually feed at night, are either grabbed or caught with a noosed stick, depending upon their dental structure. A large alligator snapping turtle (80 to 90 pounds) is best caught by first attracting him with a powerful hunter's lamp. He will remain motionless on the stream bottom for a short time, wondering why the night was so short. Meanwhile, a swimmer slips over the boat's side, takes a deep breath, and drops quietly to the bottom. Like a good Ranger, he approaches out of the darkness and into his objective's rear. Pre-attack reconnaissance must be thorough. The business end of this reptile can shatter a one-inch board or a three-quarter-inch finger and bone. "Grab hold and hang on"—and the washtub-sized turtle is pushed, pulled and guided to the surface. Those in the boat execute a maneuver which resembles a combination of boat drill and Stand By to Repel Boarders as the turtle comes on board.

Alligators require less work but more brute force. At night, his eyes, when caught in the beam of the lamp, resemble red reflectors. The boat is paddled silently to within six or eight feet. The hickory-sapline pole reaches out and gently eases its steel-cable noose around the curious alligator's head and neck. As the noose tightens, the alligator, short on brains but long on strength, realizes it's time to move out, and heads for other parts.

Noose pole, boat and Ranger instructors follow at speed determined by the alligator's size and the strength of the rowers, who backwater furiously. Sooner or later the pond lizard is pulled to the surface—roaring, snorting and snapping, tail lashing like a whip. Water flies everywhere, occupants of the boat fall or get knocked overboard. Eventually someone gets another noose around the snout and the alligator is pulled ashore where his legs are tied over his back.
The powerful tail—six to eight inches thick and four or five feet long—is still a hazard. Its lash can knock a man down. Recently, an unsuspecting hunter stood with his back to a big 11-foot alligator. With almost blinding speed, the long tail whipped through the air. Luckily, only the tip connected. The seat of the hunter's trousers was torn out and what it had covered carried a wide black-and-blue stripe.

Feeding is a problem. Snakes must have mice, frogs, lizards, eggs, small birds, and minnows. Some species will eat only certain foods. The spreading adder must have toad frogs. The coral snake feeds almost exclusively on the tantilla, a small burrowing snake. The big Eastern diamondback rattlesnake prefers small rabbits and mice but more often than not refuses to eat at all. At such times a mixture of hamburger, eggs and cod-liver oil is forced down his throat through a rubber tube. He doesn't care for this service and must be held during the process.

Alligators are generally fed fish and liver. Curiously, they must also have a certain amount of rocks and small pine knots to aid digestion. Fur-bearing animals eat almost anything. Raccoons prefer sardines, while skunks are fond of eggs.

With a hundred-odd inhabitants in Survival House, some are bound to develop various ills and incur certain injuries. Snakes, for example, are susceptible to certain mouth diseases and alligators must fight periodically to determine who is Bull of the Herd.

During late summer, many of the animals bring forth their young, or earlier-laid eggs hatch in the incubator. Often, midwife services are required because of close quarters.

All these conditions combine to make the maintenance of these training aids unique in the Army. Not long ago, a 12-foot alligator got a large hambone stuck in his throat. For all his roaring and head-shaking, it remained there. Roped like a steer, he was pulled out on the bank and trussed securely. A handler held out a four-inch log, which he immediately bit into. Jaws and log were then tied together, thus holding the jaws open. While three or four men straddled back and tail, another reached in and removed the bone. A shot of penicillin completed the treatment. In another instance a five-foot rattler had a severe mouth infection. The entire mouth was sterilized with antiseptic and painted with merthiolate solution and, again, a small shot of penicillin.

These unique training aids have two primary uses in Ranger training. Exhibited alive to the student, they represent practically all the wildlife he will encounter as he trains in the vast inhibited swamplands of the Florida Ranger Camp. Secondly, many of the species, killed, cleaned and cooked, constitute the student's main dish in a typical survival meal. Whether looked at or chewed on, these training aids do their share to make Ranger training the best and most realistic in the Army.
OFFICER ACCESSIONS AND "THE NATURAL STATE"

by COL Mike Malone

Last summer, our Army had three study groups working at West Point, doing some appeasement research in the wake of "The Great West Point Cheating and Lawyer Harrassment Affair." Buried among the annexes of that research were bits and pieces of evidence which, when assembled, have a message very disturbing to me. Further, the message, I'm sure, is now gradually disappearing, somewhere back among those endless rows of barely warm "back burners" that stretch to infinity out across the top of the great Army stove.

The message that I saw, simply put, was this: when you measure military skills, knowledges, attitudes, and values of young officers, there are no statistically significant differences which can be attributed to source of commission. When you measure comparative cost, however, there are enormous differences, and these differences can be summed up, rather crudely, like this: "Pay $100,000 bucks a copy at USMA, or, go down to Benning and buy the $10,000 K-Mart special. Ain't no measurable difference, except for the label."

Then the haggling begins. The main argument used to justify the $90,000 differential is that you can't really quantify what West Point does to a man, but, in the final analysis, West Point produces dedicated career officers, deeply endowed with the virtues of "Duty, Honor, Country." Nope. At least one datum buried in last summer's research shows conclusively that the $100,000 model, with four years' construction time, is no more dedicated to an Army career than the $10,000 K-Mart special that rolls off the line in 14 weeks.

West Point survives today, even in the face of the cost analysis so crudely put, above. That's because over on the Hill, the tribal elders still remember Blanchard and Davis; and Eisenhower and Bradley and Patton; and a stirring movie of the "Long, Grey Line"; and the annual highlight of the nation's football season--the Army-Navy game. (Two years ago, the score was -12 to -8.)

About 10 years out from the Hill, there's a unique kind of Congressional cohort coming. Included in this cohort are those intelligent, dedicated leaders of the generation whose members mutinied against their chain of command on a thousand college campuses; whose long-term memory associates soldiers with babies burnt or bayoneted; and whose value system not only condoned, but conferred status upon, those who spray-canned their 4-letter slogans on national monuments and wiped their butts with the nation's flag.

We don't like these guys and, quite naturally, we'll attempt to disavow the threatening and undesirable: "... Oh, they'll mellow when they have to get a job and raise a family," or "... the good 'ole hard core American people will never vote those guys in." This kind of rationalization won't hold.
The expressions and beliefs of the now-approaching "natural" leaders may appear to be mellowed. In reality, their behavior may be only more subtle, emanating nevertheless from a value system already programmed in. And "the good 'ole American people" of today will be gone tomorrow--replaced by another American aggregate who will laugh at our cars and clothes, and put clips of our Apollo program on the Saturday morning TV comedies for the kids. (It happened to Orville and Wilbur.)

Now this coming Congressional cohort, whose pointmen are beginning to appear (Fonda will replace Reagan), will not be impressed when we start using our name-dropping number to justify West Point. They'll counter with Lincoln, Washington, Kennedy, Einstein, Jesus Christ, and, probably their heroes of their war: Baez, Hayden, Rubin, and a Beatle or two. ". . . Ain't none of them dudes ever went to West Point, man! Now give me another reason, General, why I shouldn't buy the K-Mart special."

"This will never happen," you say. "West Point's been there 150 years. All kinds of attempts have been made to get rid of it in the past, and they all failed. There'll always be a West Point." Careful, now. I suspect that, within a hundred yards of where I am right now, some wise and respected Army elder made just about the same kind of statement when Fortress Monroe was the most powerful, impregnable fort in the world. But . . . it got pregged. Can you describe the collar insignia of the Coast Artillery?

In the event that West Point goes the route of the disappearing 12-inch rifle, we need to leave our Army (ours today, theirs tomorrow) prepared to meet the reverberations that will occur in the officer accessions system. I'd like to offer a place to look, a candidate option, an officer accession program which might fill the significant gaps when West Point becomes a VA hospital.

I was deeply impressed by an institution I visited not long ago. Before I describe that impression—which I'll term "the natural state"—let me make two points.

First point. For three years, I was an instructor at West Point. Taught psychology, leadership, karate and MOI. As a non-grad, I didn't take much for granted. I studied that institution, and all of its interwoven, inextricable, time-honored, super-coordinated systems and procedures. And I studied those fine young men. In many ways, I'm a greater "grey-hog" than a grad.

Most of what those young studs did, they did because they had to. Some tendrils of some system or some regulation was always present, leading back somehow to privilege and punishment. Some folks call this "discipline"; others, loosely, "duty"; and still others, academically, "socialization." But when those cadets did the Army number, in any of its manifestations, they did it mostly because they had to.

Second point. I was an ROTC student in college. Navy and Marines . . . and took Army ROTC courses on the side. But I had little context then. For the last two years, however, I've watched closely an Army ROTC detachment at the University of Florida. Drank with them, ran with them, fished with them, talked leadership with them—for 2-3 days at a time.
They're a different sort of dude. Most of what they do, they do because they want to. Challenge. Fun. Interest. But they ain't much account on things Army. They try, but theyumble. Eager, but awkward. Fuzzes all.

And, on a continuum difficult to describe, they're on the other end from those grey young men at West Point. Neither end is "natural."

Last month, I saw "the natural state" at a place called North Georgia College. Only there two days, but I gave one big lecture (on soldierly purpose); taught two classes (one OE, one Leadership); talked with students; lived with the PMS; spoke with the Lion's Club; and joked with "Hair Bag" (?), a freshman guitar-picker 1st class. Against the contextual backdrop of the West Pointer and the ROTC student, these young men stood out in a striking way. When they did things Army, it was just, by God, "natural." Not forced, not awkward... natural.

At first, as I watched and listened, I didn't know what it was. Something strangely, markedly different about these guys. Whatever it was, it was good, from an Army perspective. Then I started thinking about the way they talked with me; about how they wore their uniforms; about how they saluted officers and official sedans; about how they cleaned weapons in the supply room; about how they addressed each other by rank (Colonel, Captain, Sergeant); about how they worked with TEC tapes; about how they asked questions; and what they asked about. All this was... natural. Not forced and compelled and obedient. Not awkward and fumbling and superficial. Natural. Smooth. Assimilated. OVM. They just looked, acted, and talked like soldiers. Different from the Pointman and the ROTC cadet.

If this is, why is it? Damned if I know. Maybe it's because they wear issue Army uniforms all the time; or because they salute the flag at Retreat every day; or because the 400-man Corps marches to breakfast every morning and joins some of the other 1500 students at the cafeteria; or because the college pays company commanders $100 a month for maintaining good order in the dormitories; or because every student has a 4-drawer dresser, with two drawers Army (rolled underwear) and two drawers civilian (jumbled indescription); or because the state pays the school $100 for every student enrolled; or because when them damn crackers up in the hills of Habersham put that place together a hundred years ago, they didn't know of (and wouldn't have heeded) the West Point model or its VMI and Citadel surrogates. Ever what they got going there at North Georgia College, it is, in my view, "natural Army."

So what? So let's get some heads together and go study that phenomenon and that place. Possibly, we might find there the beginnings of an evolutionary institutional adaptation to those stresses our 'ole Army will face when we are gone and the cohort comes.
PORTRAIT OF A MOB

by CPT Dandridge M. Malone

On a warm spring night about 30 years ago, a group of men and boys clustered near the local jail in a small town in Texas. A woman had been attacked, and the attacker was supposedly inside the jail. Outrage, curiosity, and the desire for excitement had brought people together. And thus, with little effort whatsoever, a mob had been born. On this particular night, the mob was only an embryo. Given time, it would grow and mature into a thing of terror.

A wise sheriff secretly moved the accused to a jail in another town. But an unwise judge scheduled the trial for the local courthouse. Not only that, the judge scheduled the trial for the coming Friday—only ½ days away.

For the remainder of the week, during the noon hour and in the evenings, people gathered here and there in small groups, milling about. Opinions, attitudes and rumors wormed their way from person to person. Any information, whether truth, half-truth or lie, was absorbed eagerly and passed along. The infant mob was growing rapidly to adolescence.

On the morning of the trial, there were many new faces in the town. People came in from the farms and surrounding communities. They were not troublemakers, they were just curious people who had smelled the smoke of excitement. And these many new faces joined with many old and well-known faces in the growing crowd at the courthouse.

Luckily, the unwise judge had thought to bring the accused to the courthouse early that morning, before the spectators began to arrive. As a further precaution, he had assigned four tough Texas Rangers to guard the accused and the court. So, with the Rangers on guard, the selection of the jury began. Outside on the courthouse lawn and in the streets, the crowd grew larger—and louder.

High noon came, and with it, the deafening stroke of rumor. This particular rumor was that the governor had telegraphed his Texas Rangers and ordered them not to shoot anyone. No one actually saw the telegram, but now the crowd grew more belligerent. Its margin of safety had been increased.

Just as the rumor spread through the crowd and became "fact," the perfect timing of fate came into play. The woman who supposedly had been attacked was brought by ambulance to the courthouse and then carried into the courtroom—through the crowd—on a stretcher. The crowd was a crowd no more. It was now a mob, ready to flex its muscles, and hot for action. It went after the accused with a roar.

Men smashed into the courtroom. The Rangers fought them back with drawn pistols and tear gas. The battle raged back and forth; then there was a momentary pause. The woman, covered with a sheet, was brought back out of the courthouse on her stretcher. Someone thought the accused was hiding under the sheet. The mob's attention focused on the stretcher. The
sheet was jerked away, revealing only the woman. But she was weeping and sobbing uncontrollably. Her tears were caused by the tear gas, but immediately the cry went round that she was hysterical from having been brought face to face with her attacker. Again, the perfect timing of fate. The mob went wild.

In the narrow corridor leading to the courtroom, the Rangers and their tear gas forced the leading elements of the mob to retreat. The judge, realizing now that he had not made the best decision, directed that the accused be locked in the courthouse vault room for his own safety. Outside, the mob growled and switched its plan of attack.

Rocks shattered the courthouse windows. Gasoline was thrown in. Some teenaged boys, led by a woman, touched off the gasoline. In a few moments, the courthouse was ablaze. Begrudgingly, the mob permitted the fire department to rescue the judge, the Rangers and other members of the court from the second floor courtroom. Finally, only the accused remained inside the burning courthouse—locked, for his own safety, in the courthouse vault. The flames began to engulf the entire building.

The firemen tried to fight their traditional enemy. "Let 'er burn!" said the mob. Hoses were slashed as fast as the firemen could hook them up. Some members of the mob even claimed that since they were citizens, they could damn well burn their own courthouse if they wanted to. The mob grew more vicious as it watched the flames. One man, seeing the county's records go up in smoke, remarked, "Now, ain't that a shame?" Within an instant, someone smashed him in the mouth with a pop bottle.

The National Guard arrived about dusk. The 52-man detachment set up a command post at the jail, about three blocks from the courthouse. The soldiers marched to the smoldering ruins of the courthouse, deployed, and started to disperse the mob.

But the mob didn't want to be dispersed. The mob was after its victim, regardless of his condition. The mob reasoned that if the Rangers wouldn't shoot, neither could the soldiers. Darkness came and the mob grew uglier. Then all at once, triggered by some unknown cause, the fighting began again. Bare bayonets, tear gas, and finally, the crack of rifle fire. Still the mob surged forward, attacking the soldiers with bricks, rocks, pieces of timber, chunks of concrete, broken bottles, and sticks of dynamite. The soldiers were forced back to their command post. The mob returned to its ruined courthouse.

The victim was still locked inside the huge steel and concrete courthouse vault. For 4 hours, the mob tried various plans to get at him. Finally, about midnight, someone brought an acetylene torch and began cutting a hole in the steel door. Dynamite, stolen from a hardware store, was forced through the hole and the fuze was ignited. A gaping hole was blown in the side of the vault. A mob leader leaped into the smoking opening. The mob stirred eagerly in anticipation.

"Here he is!" cried the leader as he threw out the lifeless body. The mob roared. Men quickly tied ropes to the body and hoisted it high in a tree for the mob to see. Another mob leader, perched in the tree with a
bottle of whisky in his hand, waved at the mob and yelled, "Let's take him home boys!" Down came the body.

A Ford roadster with two boys and two girls inside was driven up to the tree. Eager hands fastened the body behind the roadster and the mob began to move. Five thousand howling, yelling people followed the roadster and its grisly trailer. Some rushed forward to cut and slash at the body with pocket knives. City police tried to direct traffic. Horns tooted. Someone struck up the song, "Happy Days Are Here Again," and hundreds joined in.

The mob poured into the section of town where the accused had once lived. Again, the body was hoisted up into a tree, this time with a chain. Boards were ripped from buildings and piled under the body. The boards and the body were splashed with gasoline. And when the flames roared up, the mob gave a mighty cheer. An acrid smell filled the air.

After the burning of the body, the mob grew smaller as some of the women and children went home. However, the stronger element of the mob continued its wanton destruction spurred on by success and a liberal intake of looted liquor. Offices, stores and homes were ransacked. Then came gasoline, poured on walls and floors. Next, a forceful "whuff!" and building after building raged into flames. Firemen, restrained by the mob, were forced to watch helplessly as the blaze kindled.

In the wee hours of the morning, 150 more National Guardsmen arrived on the scene. Then even more troops came, armed with machine guns, rifles, and tear gas. By dawn, the mob was destroyed, its fury gone, and only wreckage, smouldering buildings and small groups of curious people remained. Martial law was established in the town. The mob had lived out its short but awesome life, and then it had vanished.

What on earth had happened here? Why had plain, ordinary citizens acted with such uncontrolled savagery? Why had they destroyed their own kind and their own property? The event was nothing new. Nor can the blame for this violence be placed on the citizens. The formation of a mob, and the mob's acts of violence is a recurring social phenomenon.

The potential for mob action exists whenever and wherever there is interaction among human beings. Whether or not a mob is created and what the mob does if created depends upon the right combination of events and the timing with which these events occur. Again, the blame or cause cannot be attributed directly to the people involved.

The storming of the Bastille, the freedom fighters' uprising in Budapest, the riots in the Congo, and the recent violence at Oxford, Mississippi—these are examples from the past. What lies in the future? Will the right combination of events occur with just the right timing in Berlin? In Vietnam? In Panama? In some American city? The possibility exists.

The commitment of military force against mob violence represents a particular horror of its own. Human being versus human being is bad enough. Citizen versus citizen is worse. Soldier versus citizen is perhaps worst or all. Nevertheless, military force, with its discipline
and regulation, is the last-resort weapon that has been and will be resorted to as the mob begins its rampage.

When the mob sounds its battle cry and when the jagged broken bottles begin to fly, distasteful decisions must be made. And when the streets are quiet once again, judgment must be made. But both decision and judgment are impaired by the very nature of the mob. When it's time for decision, communication with the mob, as such, no longer exists and it cannot be called upon for explanations. In the face of these twin dilemmas, what can be done to increase the accuracy of decision and judgement?

The answer lies in understanding the mob—in understanding why and how the mob develops. We're lucky. The social psychologists, studying the mobs of the past and the present, have found that the development of almost any mob follows the same standard pattern. So, in order to understand the mob, let's whip up one of our own using the psychologists' formula.

We'll start with the individual—the man. We know that this man has certain basic needs which direct his life and regulate his behavior. From day to day the man strives to satisfy these needs. Now, block the man's need. Make it impossible for him to satisfy one or more of his powerful, fundamental desires. Watch the tension build up within him as he struggles in vain to satisfy the need that keeps driving him on.

Multiply the frustrated man by a hundred, or by a thousand, creating group frustration or "unrest"—political unrest, religious unrest, economic unrest, social unrest or any combination of these and other types. We need unrest as the crucible for our mob.

To make a mob, we must somehow join people together. Pick some exciting event. Let them all know that a woman has been attacked or that a helpless person has been brutalized, or that a statue has been defaced. These things have all worked well in the past and they'll work now.

Spread the word by newspaper, radio, mimeograph machine or, better still, by rumor. No, the incident doesn't have to be true. It doesn't even have to be related to the need we blocked earlier. We can forget all about those needs now. Our sole purpose at this stage of the game is to get frustrated, tension-filled people together.

Schedule a rally or a speech or a demonstration—anything that will bring the people together. Schedule the rally for some easily accessible place like the downtown courthouse square. Schedule it for a weekend or a holiday so there won't be any conflict with the normal working day. Schedule it for the end of the day—the evening hours when the peoples' minds are tired, and when they will be less inclined to question what they see and hear. Pass the word far and wide. Add some more people to the crowd, those who "just came to watch." As they watch the crowd, they sense the immensity of its power. They see an easy chance to become part of the winning team. Social contagion has reached beyond the fringes of the crowd and out into the ranks of those who "just came to watch." There they go, into the crowd.
Add the excitement-seekers, the kids, from every class of society who'll do anything for "kicks" and the juvenile gangs on the prowl for amusement.

Finally, introduce the vicious ones--the psychopaths who come to kill or mutilate or burn, and the criminals who come to loot and steal. And in this category, we'll have to include the instigators--the catalyst to work a mob into a frenzy--who use the mob as a means to an end. And so, in they go, into the crowd.

At last, we've got the people together. Now watch. Watch the process the psychologists call "social contagion." This is what gives life to the mob. This is the process that will make all of our people think the same way. Here's how it works. Most of these people we've gotten together are curious. They'll listen. And since we picked the ones that were frustrated and tension-filled we know they'll be restless. Watch them move about. Any information that we add at this point will spread like wildfire throughout the crowd.

Toss in a handful of rumors. Choose the rumors carefully, because these rumors are the ones that will determine the mood of our mob. These rumors will play a major part in forming the "mob mind" and they'll determine most of the future actions of the mob. Note how quickly the rumors spread among the listening, restless people. In a short time, these people will all think and feel the same way. Did you hate the enemy during the last war?

How do we give this crowd the ability to commit deeds and acts that a mere group of people wouldn't think of doing? In this setting of collective excitement, pick out one of the frustrated people and have him give full vent to a feeling that has been in his mind for some time. Have him shout, for example, "Let's kill 'em!"

Normally, our frustrated man wouldn't dare make such a remark. However, as he senses that everyone feels the same way he does, he decides to give it a bit of a go. The people who hear him don't stop to apply the test of conscience. They absorb the remark and pass it on. And the idea of "Let's kill 'em" whirls away through the crowd. Repeat this process with a hundred different individuals and a hundred different remarks. Give the crowd a mind that won't be hampered by the normal inhibitions of civilized people. Let the primitive, savage, hidden urges surge to the surface.

We've got a mob. Its ranks include men and women, adults and children, rich and poor, educated and illiterate--all fused together into something far more than a crowd. For this instant, for this period of time, these people will think, feel and act in more or less the same way. Their self-control has momentarily vanished. They're ready to react as directed by the raw emotions that pulse through the mob. You don't think so? Just trip the delicate trigger. Use the sobbing woman in her stretcher, or the arrival of the student at Oxford. Watch what our mob can do!

You, National Guard, Reserve or Regular Army company commander may find yourself and your unit pitted against this mass mind called a mob. Prepare yourself for anything--including the most distasteful duty of your military life.
THE SQUAD

COL Dandridge M. Malone

When you run your mind across this vast Army of ours, there are really not a lot of us officers actually out there leading the troops. So many of us are squirreling away at desks, along with "in" boxes, "out" boxes, typewriters, telephones, poopsheets, programs, fluorescent lights and file cabinets. In the midst of all, do you ever get to thinking about the troops, formations, first sergeants, footlockers, motor pools, mess halls and mermit cans, and the soft, rhythmic rustle of field gear as men move along on a nighttime foot march? Do you ever get to where you just miss those troopers with all your heart? I'll bet you do. Think about 'em for a few minutes. Soldiers you've known. You'll see.

So why not go and be with 'em a little while. Trade off one of your "liaison trips" or "fact-finding visits" and go way down to the bottom, to where the gravel gets crunched. It'll help your heartache. More than that, it'll bring added meaning, understanding and humility, and a sense of purpose to your job, no matter what it is. Way down at the bottom is the "ultimate implementer" of all that you do, for better or for worse, today or tomorrow.

Not long ago, there came upon me a bad case of the miseries of which I speak. I split and took off for Fort Hood, Tex. I wanted to get way down to the very last link in the chain. Down to where the trooper is. Down to the squad. —And I wanted to just live there a little while and try to see the Army world from that plane.

The division commander understood, and he trusted and he cleared me down the chain. I checked in with commanders at brigade and battalion and told them I wanted to be with the troops. Both commanders were eager to cooperate. They offered a jeep and driver or they said, "Well, we have a major who is leaving shortly and he will be able to take you all over and let you see what is happening as these troops participate in this three-day field exercise we have coming up." I insisted that that wasn't really what I wanted—that I didn't want to look at troops or what they were doing, I wanted to be with them. Finally, they got the message and I got their permission to spend the next three days with a mechanized infantry squad as they moved out on the exercise.

On a Friday afternoon, carrying an AWOL bag and sleeping gear, I joined the rifle company, picked out an armored personnel carrier (APC), joined a squad and stayed with them for the next three days. My world during that time was that APC, those scroungy troopers and about 50 meters of Texas on each side of the vehicle. (Names used hereafter are substitutes for real ones.)

- Sgt. Henry was a squad leader with a total of about nine years of Army time. He had gotten out and come back in, and was now an E5 recently graduated from the local NCO academy. Henry was tall, lanky, raw-boned, with knobby elbows, eyes that were deep set and steely-looking, black hair and no butt at all. He looked like he had been in Texas for about a hundred years, changing from buckskins to levis to fatigues as the years
went by. He cared about his men and about being a good leader. And he
took to heart the serious task of trying to improve his leadership whenever
he could. He didn't lead by being hard-nosed, but rather by attempting to
understand his people. Like the rest of the squad after about 12 hours, he
seemed to ignore my presence.

His actions as squad leader were what I think he naturally did all the
time. I'd say he was a leader seriously concerned during the whole
exercise with doing the right thing by his men and by his superiors. When
I asked him how he felt about losing people, because almost all of them
told me they were going to get out of the Army as quickly as they could, he
said, "Ah sir, they always talkin' that way. I don't think but maybe one
or two of them are going to leave."

• Desman, a good-looking young man from California, had been with the
squad maybe a month and a half. He had taken basic and advanced training
at Fort Polk, and was a gung-ho little guy. At every stop he tried to do
the things he had been taught to do: put up some cover, a bit of
concealment, and start working on a range card. Late one night on an
outpost, Desman told me, "This would be a heck of a lot more interesting if
we just had some enemy out there." Even without an enemy, Desman played
the game all the way, all the time, for three days, with all the eagerness
of a new guy trying to do what a soldier was supposed to do.

• McNeal was a quiet black soldier and a lot like Desman in that he
was new and was trying to do the right thing. Even in the absence of
instructions, McNeal was always trying to be a good soldier. It wasn't
merely to impress me or his squad leader. About two in the morning, when
the squad leader and I were only big heaps of uniform and equipment while
asleep in the compartment of the track, McNeal noticed that nobody was
standing up to look out of the hatch as regulations or SOP prescribed. So
he got his equipment arranged and organized and with no instructions from
anyone, stood in the hatch for about two hours as the APC moved somewhere,
either in retrograde or approach march. He did this on his own, with
nobody watching him (except me, surreptitiously!).

McNeal had two cracked-out front teeth that came to a little "Y" in
the center. Out on the outpost, he lay there without a word, listening to
some bad-mouthing and unbelievable stories by his companions. Every now
and then, when things would get too preposterous, he would roll over and
say, "Ah, c'mon, man." That was about his main contribution. The other
folks respected McNeal because he tried hard and had the beginnings of some
sort of toughness that I could sense, and I'm sure some of the others
could, too.

• Davis had come to the 1st Cav from the 4th Mechanized Division at
Fort Carson, Colo. He had an AWOL on his records from Fort Carson that
worried him. When I asked him what the AWOL was about he said that while
at Carson his wife had gotten sick and the doctor told him that she needed
to stay in bed for two weeks. He had asked for leave, but his company
commander instead tried to get him to hire a nurse to help his wife and the
kids through her sickness. He got the leave and stayed with his wife, but
she needed another week in bed. Davis couldn't get the extra week through
official channels, so he went AWOL and was picked up and court-martialed.
He was a good man, but was concerned about the AWOL and looked upon it as an albatross around his neck—something that might damn all of his chances for the future.

- Fuente was the driver, and a fine one. To a man, the troopers believed he was the best in the whole company, and they nicknamed him "A. J." after A. J. Foyt. A. J. was a Mexican-American from a small town in Texas. He was a natural and informal leader in the squad, and he got this status from his proficiency at driving the track.

Think for a moment of tough nights of driving that you have had when visibility was limited by fog or other conditions, and you tried to rassle the car with your family in it down the highway when you were tired and couldn't see and were confused. Then put yourself in A. J.'s seat, moving across country for as long as six hours, hands locked on the steering handles of an APC and your only guidance the taillights of a vehicle ahead of you 30 or 40 yards away. Six or eight hours of that is damned tough going.

- Hammond, Sp. 4, just about to be Sp. 5, was the gung-ho type of young leader. He had spent a couple of years in Alaska, and claimed that he was one hell of an outdoorsman who had hunted and shot just about anything that walked on the face of the Alaskan landscape. He talked constantly of his exploits there to the point where once McNeal said, "Man, that's all you talk about is Alaska." To which Hammond replied, "When I get in tomorrow, I'll send one letter and get four albums of pictures that'll show you what I mean about Alaska."

Hammond was a team leader and sort of second in command. Although he didn't make a big issue of it, like the others he kept trying to do the things a soldier should do. He spent some time giving us all a little informal lecture on what could be done with the packet of cocoa powder from the C rations. He gave us the formula for making chocolate pudding or chocolate fudge, and he showed how to do this in the compartment of the track while A. J. was horsing the track up and down across country.

- Palmburne was the smallest of the squad in size and in status. He was like the littlest guy in a childhood gang. People picked on him from time to time. He tried to do right, but I think he saw this as maybe inconsistent with what other people expected of him. So he spent a lot of time trying ineffectually to fight The System. For this he caught a lot of static from all angles because he was violating the norms of military proficiency that seemed to exist in that squad.

When the other guys did get on him it was not for personal characteristics but rather for military things he had failed to do or had done poorly. Palmburne was on his way to being troublesome, but I think that inside the little dude wanted to do the right thing. How can you help a young man like him?

My visit with these men was one of the finest educational experiences I've ever had. I realize that to a battalion or brigade commander, only three days in the field wouldn't seem very significant, but in my experience they were. I tried to go back to the point where I had been 22
years ago, then to look at and think about what went on then at the bottom of the chain of command.

It is a lot harder than you might think for a colonel to get even a halfway accurate insight into what goes on at the private's level. There are external barriers to this. For example, all the elements of the chain of command that are used to having colonels inspect and check, find it exceedingly difficult to understand that sometimes a colonel doesn't want to inspect and check; he merely wants to be with the troops for a spell. These folks all wanted to show me something, or squire me around, or give me a briefing or talk politely—tough barriers to overcome. I had to put down their efforts to be helpful in what they thought I wanted.

There are internal barriers also. I remember clearly the apprehension I had about two or three hours before I was to join the rifle squad—apprehension about how to do it and what some of the consequences might be. Several times I was tempted to stop and observe at battalion, company or platoon, reasoning that at one level of command I could better observe what was going on—get the big picture. The temptation to do so was rather strong, made even stronger by the fact that by moving in with a squad I would be barging in on some trooper's "family."

I decided to go in civilian clothes: torn pants, plaid wool shirt, hiking shoes and a scroungy old insulated jacket that I have worn on many a fishing and hunting trip. I didn't try to deceive the troops. I told them that I was a colonel, but I felt that if I left the eagles behind it might become easier for them to communicate with me or talk with me when they felt that was what they wanted to do. I figured that without the constant reminders of rank they might relax sooner. Even more important, I felt that leaving the eagles behind would make it easier for me to drop some of the things colonels are supposed to do and not do.

To join the squad (after I told the company commander and the platoon sergeant what I was doing), I simply went up to the back of the track, looked in through the door, and said, "Hello, I'm Col. Malone. How the hell are you? Look, I know this sounds kind of screwy, but let me tell you what the deal is. I'm a colonel of infantry and I've been sitting behind a desk for about six years. I know you'll find it hard to believe, but I just plain miss you scroungy troopers. I'm not doing any study, I'm not inspecting anything, I'm not checking on anybody. I just want to be with you and do what you do for awhile. When you screw off, I'll screw off; when you foul up, I'll foul up. It makes no difference. I just want to be with you for a few days."

A couple said, "Well, come on in sir," so I pitched in my AWOL bag and crawled in the back of the track. (Later, when the company commander turned out the company for a safety briefing, he explained what I was doing. By and large, folks seemed to accept it, but I did see some rather suspicious looks.)

The troops treated me as a guest for, say, about 12 hours; then I noticed some abrupt changes. Their language changed. They started ribbing and joking with me a little bit. They were less concerned about my well-being. And as the track lurched and plunged out across the woods, they were less concerned that they got their feet in my lap, or
accidently dropped a rifle on me. These things were matter of course. I noticed that, besides the change in their language and the change in their deferent behavior, they quit trying to hide the little squabbles that broke out naturally from time to time. Then I knew I was getting closer to the "real" family.

That's how it was in this track with these mech infantry dudes after about 12 hours. They kept checking me out during that time, asking little questions and looking at me sideways occasionally. But I tried to be unobtrusive. I just did what they did, without making a big deal of it. When they camouflaged the vehicle, I did my share; when they manned an outpost, I joined them; if they stood in the mess line feeding tactically, I did that. I didn't ask a lot of questions, didn't give a lot of answers and didn't move around like an ant looking for a crumb.

The point is that it took about 12 hours before they "accepted" me at least part way. This could mean that many times commanders who are going out to try to understand the troops may be understanding only the good behavior, like the guys who make judgments of families based on a visit of a few hours. I remember thinking at the time about all these folks who beat their chests and biceps and holler about what it's like "where the rubber meets the road." That's hot air. I suggest that nobody above platoon (perhaps company) knows very much about what it's like where the rubber meets the road, because these casual visits by a busy commander seldom include three hours with the same group of soldiers, much less the 12 I needed. (You might argue that I was a visitor and they didn't know me. I later talked to my squad about who they knew by sight. The results will get to your ego. More on that later.)

I still didn't get all the way into the "family." There is a lot to be said for Chinese generals who spend 30 days a year as a private with their troops or for Avis executives who work two weeks at the front desk.

I'll bet most of us have forgotten the frustration and the frequent changes when we were enlisted soldiers or young officers. They became major factors as I watched what was going on in that mech infantry squad. Now, bear in mind that I was sitting at the bottom of what I would describe as a damned fine chain of command—from the division commander down to Sgt. Henry, the squad leader. I am not evaluating that chain of command and I'll challenge anyone who says that the problems I saw are attributable to sorry leadership above the squad. But change was a way of life for those dudes and as I sat in the middle of a hundred changes, I recalled that this was a big factor for me long ago—and one of the lessons I had almost forgotten.

Do we stress change enough as we talk about how the soldier must operate? Is living with change part of the indoctrination the young soldier or the young officer gets when he enters the Army? Is change something he is reminded of from time to time; that is, that change is natural and to be expected as a way of life and to which he must adapt? I doubt that we spend enough time getting this lesson across. If you have forgotten about the pervasiveness of change as I had forgotten about it, then that suggests, at least for you and me, that we were insufficiently indoctrinated on change as a major element in military life. Should our
leadership training and development at all echelons in the Army school system include a heavy dose of the lessons of transience?

At any rate, change was all around. Well, here's a thought on why. At our level, and at the general's level, we have staffs or assistants. Before we make a decision, the staff probes the pregnant areas of information for whatever might affect that decision. So, when we make a decision and issue an order, we have, because of the assistance and access to information that is available, insured against change to a degree. This works well at division and brigade, but it seems to me that as we move farther down the chain there is less assistance and less access to information that may produce change. So the possibility of change increases almost exponentially as we move down to the bottom of the chain. Change looks somewhat like a pyramid, so that while you and I cope with change to a limited degree at the top, at the base change is fast and furious.

I know the communication field well, yet down at the bottom I encountered a phenomenon that made me sit up and take notice. At our level, problems often stem from distortion of communication. We talk long and loud about the difficulties of communicating a message up or down through bureaucratic layers. Our main concern, however, is with distortion. Down at the bottom, the problem arises not from distortion but rather from the absence of communication. There just is not much poop down there about the outside world, or what's going on or what's going to happen next. There is a real and noticeable vacuum with respect to information about the situation—enemy, friendly and general.

Bear in mind what I said earlier about the quality of the chain of command above our squad. They were good. The men in the squad camouflaged at halts, manned outposts, took positions as airguards and did all the other things good infantrymen must do.

Yet I would guess that only about ten percent of the time did they really know whether they were attacking or defending or withdrawing or what. I would add that they were almost totally unaware of where battalion was, or if there even was one or what the overall situation was with respect to all higher headquarters. Their world more or less ended with "them bastards up at platoon headquarters"; and in a way, it ended there because that was about as far as they could see during movements across open areas or when the platoon stopped in a defensive position or attack position.

They were damned good at techniques, but they did it in the absence of any overall context. Could they have done better with constant knowledge of the big picture? I say again: at the bottom the problem is not one of distortion, but rather one of having little communication, if any.

Why is this so? Well, think back to what we have said about change. Also that the last link in the chain of command is the squad leader at the bottom of the bewildering array of changes. Changes come fast and furious, but he is the last man in contact with the ultimate executors of change. Much of the leader's credibility or authority lies in being able to tell his men what to do with some degree of firmness and specificity.
Maybe a squad leader learns quickly that if he tells his men to do one thing and ten minutes later to do something else and ten minutes after that to do the opposite, he will soon lose his credibility, or at least run the tails off his squad.

Perhaps the squad leader has adopted his own way of dealing with change. Rather than pass out every change to his troops (which would cut down his time for leading procedures and thus confuse them), maybe he sort of holds out until he senses that a particular change will last relatively longer than some of the others. He picks this one, studies it and then passes instructions down to the bottom. If he doesn't sort out these changes, if instead he passes each one on to the troops, they soon begin to run hither and yon adjusting to them, and the squad leader is made to look like an ass. So he holds back on communicating change until he gets one he feels is more credible than others that have come down to him. This may account for the vacuum or absence of communication down at the bottom.

The communication vacuum is somehow linked with the credibility of leadership down at the bottom. The more devoid the vacuum, the lower the credibility. What can be done about this?

We could go all out to exhort our leaders at all echelons to keep the troops constantly informed, but down at the base of the pyramid this might end up with the squad leader merely giving a series of five- to ten-minute briefings with only enough time between them to run to platoon headquarters for the next change. The problem has always been there. Experienced commanders know that the squad leader never has enough time for true troop-leading procedures. So some means other than the traditional may be required. What alternatives are available?

The technology of transportation and communication has greatly expanded the impact of change at the bottom. When a brigade commander watches a squad on the ground and monitors the company radio net he often fails to realize that he himself is four or five changes ahead of the squad leader. The other changes—maybe fragmentary orders from the brigade commander—are still being processed at intermediate levels. So the stage is set for confusion, frustration, chewing out, loss of leader credibility and failure of mission. How might we change our troop-leading procedures to compensate for the impacts of change and vacuums of communication?

As I watched the squad in its soldierly and human interactions, I felt that they were according status within the squad on the basis of who had what tickets or credits. At our level, the informal underpinnings of status are such things as good jobs, decorations, academic degrees and so on. It became obvious to me that at the squad level the stuff of status was military proficiency.

I watched the group bestow informal leadership on the APC driver. Although junior in rank to several others, he was definitely an informal leader in the squad. He got his tickets mainly because he was a good track driver. I noticed also that one member who was the low man on the totem pole was always being ribbed. He was low man because he demonstrated the least military proficiency. The currency or credits or tickets the squad used to establish a pecking order was what the unit considered most important: military proficiency. Four or five years ago, status might
have been awarded on the basis of who could best bad-mouth the Army, or who could most efficiently screw up the "lifers." This wasn't true in our squad.

If this phenomenon holds among troops in general and if we can in some way amplify this group tendency, we might go a long way toward using group phenomena to help reach organizational goals. Should we do this by looking more closely at the life of the trooper at the bottom? Through some means of peer rating that can determine what scores troopers use to evaluate each other, so that they themselves could see that despite the griping that soldiers have always done, higher status comes from higher military proficiency? Could peer ratings be so devised that we could tell what was the stuff of status in various kinds of units and in varied situations?

A common theme in television's doctor programs is the death of a patient and then the mental anguish over who will tell his loved ones and how they will go about delivering the tender message. Let's see what happens down at the bottom.

There are certain authorized reasons for relieving a trooper from a field exercise, one of them, I'm sure, being a death in his immediate family. After our mechanized column had been on the road for about six hours, while at a short halt I missed one of the squad members. When I asked what had happened to him, I was told that he had a "death in the immediate family." During the rest of the exercise, I asked here and there about where this man had gone. It turned out that someone had come up to him and said, "You are going back to garrison. You have a death in the immediate family."

"Well, what do you mean?"

"I don't know; you just got a death in the immediate family."

So the mystified soldier, riding for three hours back to the base camp, knew only that he had a "death in the immediate family." Not quite the same drama we see on "Marcus Welby, M.D." Would you like to live those three hours?

For me, another almost forgotten phenomenon was The They. The troopers used They as a nebulous term for anyone who might constrain them to work toward a particular end or who would be checking on what they did. They were mentioned frequently: "They are going to be down here checking our camouflage in a few minutes." "They won't like range cards that aren't filled out in detail." "They are not going to give us any administrative break." "They are going to make another change." "They told me to put out two-man outposts and then, just a few minutes later, They told me to put those outposts on 25 percent alert. Now how the hell am I going to do that?"

I saw a close parallel in what the troopers called They and what my contemporaries call The System. They and The System seem to be serving two functions: one is to serve as an organizational conscience, like an omnipresent overwatch; the second is as a scapegoat for various frustrations. For the trooper, They was vague and indefinite. From his point of view, They did not represent platoon headquarters, but rather
authority in general—all that was above him. They is a major factor in life at the bottom. Is this healthy or unhealthy at squad level? Should we try to modify, or use or eliminate the idea of They?

Some time ago, a quartermaster officer's headquarters gave him the job of determining how long a soldier can subsist on C rations and the effect of food on the soldier’s ability to perform his duties in and out of combat. It all appeared very scientific. I could see the standard Army menu (so many grams of meat, so many pounds of potatoes) being plotted on a curve against ergs of troop energy and the like. I'm sure this is all very worthwhile, but that's what's happening up at the policy level. What goes on below makes the scientism rather humorous.

I had almost forgotten the importance of chow in the soldier's life. To a trooper, chow is a hell of a lot more than a good mess sergeant and a clean mess hall. Perhaps because there is so little information around, he plays up meals and food to an extent we don't realize. I had forgotten how much time and effort go into bargaining over C rations, trading this for that, harassing each other on who had gotten the best rations and who the worst, knowing the secret code that tells you what you can find in each kind of ration, winning short-term status within the squad based on who gets what in the early-morning issue of the noon-meal Cs.

I was amazed also at the amount of food a trooper takes along in his duffel bag: cans of ravioli, chili, sardines, sausage and even potato chips and popcorn. I wonder if these were included in that quartermaster's formulas and curves?

He who controls the chow gets status. We were feeding tactically in the predawn hours prior to a move-out. Troopers were lined up in the darkness, ghosting along by the mermit cans, and, true to the dicta of history, the servers with steel helmets and rifles across their backs were squatted behind the mermit cans. We moved through the line with paper plates; the eggs, potatoes and whatever plopped into a mixed pile on the plate. When I passed the box where the rolls were lined up like a company in mass formation and reached for one in the rear rack the server threatened me with his fork. "Man, get your cotton-pickin' hands off that piece! You supposed to take this one," pointing to the front row where the rolls were being removed in military sequence. Those picked for server details are not the kind who have a lot of status. Here in the predawn hour, this server was in charge of his box of rolls and, given the importance of food in a soldier's life, he was making the most of his power and authority. The darkness being what it was, I doubt that he ever learned he laid an admirable chewing on an infantry colonel.

You and I, with a lot of experience and schooling behind us, have a fair concept of "headquarters"—company, battalion, brigade and division. We know what and who is there and what goes on. They are information centers that give us a sense of confidence and security and ability to deal with the unknown. For the old mech infantry squad, headquarters was the command track: a platoon leader, a platoon sergeant and a battered coffee pot that came out when the track stopped for as long as ten minutes. In the squad's eye, platoon was "way up there"; company was a far distant thing. I heard no mention of battalion or brigade, although the battalion headquarters was in the field and operational.
What might be the implications of this phenomenon? I don't know, but what it might mean is that once you get above the company, and maybe even at company level, you don't lead troops, you lead subordinate leaders. And when you think of setting the example, you are not doing so as much for the troops as for subordinate leaders. Look at it this way. When you commanded a company and higher you were important. All the information around you told you you were important and naturally you assumed your troops "knew" you. I suggest that at battalion and brigade level, most of "your" troops don't know you at all without your brass and name tag.

Perhaps this little lesson in humility might be a good one for senior commanders. Battalion commander, how many of your thousand men could pick your face out of a lineup of five officers of your grade? You assume all of them could, but I strongly suspect that maybe ten percent might. This means that you neither command nor communicate with troops, but rather with your subordinate leaders. What are the implications?

There's a big difference between leaders and men in terms of how and when they sleep. You and I would probably view the typical working day as one of waking activity--moving about, doing things, making decisions, getting information, acting upon it. Not so for the old mech infantry squad in the field.

The squad took advantage of every available opportunity to sleep in unbelievable conditions and positions. One night the track was lurching across country, the troop compartment dimly lighted by a small, red bulb, equipment scattered everywhere and moving about, the floor leaping and pitching, the engine grinding and howling. On the floor, his head under a loose duffel bag, was one trooper sound asleep on the quarter-inch aluminum floor. At another time, one lay sound asleep with back arched across two water cans in a twisted position, rifle cradled in his arms, helmet canted to one side.

Maybe some of us have forgotten how much a part of the soldier's life is spent in sleeping whenever he can. Does this result from boredom, lack of communication, poor planning somewhere up the chain of command? Do you and I, accustomed to activity while on the job, have a significantly different outlook on sleep and rest than does the soldier? We look at a soldier grabbing a short sleep and mark him as a goof-off? Do we see that as bad, when maybe he is doing so because of our orders, our changes, the way we work our downward communication? Is he fighting boredom when he grabs those Zs?

At dawn one day, after the column had been moving most of the night, A. J. Fuente lurched the track onto a small mesa, ravaged a few juniper trees and came to a halt under a large one in a camouflaged position. As he lowered the ramp and the light came in, all who were at least half asleep woke up. The track was an unbelievable mess. The ax had fallen out of its holder, a couple of water cans had fallen over and leaked, the contents of duffel bags were strewn around, weapons lay on the floor. The troopers themselves were disheveled and twisted, hair on end and shirrtails out—all the things that are natural consequences of moving across country at night for four to five hours, with barely time to halt or do anything.
As I looked at those mechanized infantrymen, I thought to myself that, had I been platoon leader or any leader above looking through the ramp door and into the back of the track, I would have started chewing out and taking names. Men and vehicle were a horrible mess. Had I made on-the-spot, immediate correction I would have been doing a disservice. The point is this: given this sorry-looking mess as A. J. dropped the ramp, the troops, in about 15 minutes and on their own, with no order from the squad leader, had straightened up the water cans, repacked duffel bags, replaced the ax, picked up their weapons, blown and brushed the dirt from them, and gotten out a small scrub brush to sweep out the floor. I think perhaps we must be careful when we jump with both feet into what seems a situation demanding on-the-spot correction. Could it be that because we as leaders and supervisors must move to so many places so quickly we don't allow time for natural self-correcting mechanisms to get working?

On one occasion the whole company and its tank attachments were moving across the valley floor. For a moment I imagined I was sitting atop a mesa in an OP, looking out across the valley at these armored personnel carriers and tanks. The formation was perfect, plumes of dust trailing out in the rear, pennants snapping, antennas waving, vehicles moving from cover to cover. Spacing between vehicles was correct; tank and other vehicle commanders sat up in their hatches, everything looked great from the outside—a perfect demonstration of cross-country movement in the Fort Knox manner.

I popped back down inside the track, to meet the same disorder and welter of men and equipment I mentioned earlier. On top of the whole mess sat one young trooper eating a box of cheese crunchers. So how much do we really see as supervisors and inspectors looking from an OP? What's going on inside the track? And inside the track, what's going on inside the man?

For a couple of hours one night we kept moving and stopping, moving and stopping. At each stop, troopers dismounted and the squad leader placed them on outpost or in security positions around the vehicle. As it grew later some of the troopers asked Sgt. Henry when we were going to stop for the evening. Henry was getting so many changes that he never did commit himself definitely. As a result, the troopers never did break out their sleeping bags. They merely went out to their positions, waited and came back to the track when we were to move out.

One of these halts (which at first seemed to be a temporary one) was really the final stop for the night. The troops didn't know this, so they lay in the moonlight on a hard rock, hands in pockets, jackets buttoned up. That's where they slept until about 0400, when Sgt. Henry roused them for breakfast. Neither the men nor the squad leader knew how long they were to be in that position and they never had the opportunity to get their sleeping bags out for some sack time. Now this has to do with sleep, but how often does this indefiniteness occur in all the other activities of the soldier down at the bottom?

That was our mech infantry squad. It was a small family—a primary group. The newest members had joined a month and a half before and I could see solidarity beginning to form in the squad of men who were only then becoming a team. Loyalties and status were beginning to develop within the group as men came to know each other's faults and virtues. The rules that
governed most of their behavior appeared to be based on proficiency in things military. Who can quarrel with that?

As I got ready to leave, I listed the names of the squad on a scrap of paper, then took it to A. J. Fuente.

"A. J., have I got these names spelled right?"

He looked them over and said, "Yes, sir."

"A. J., what are their first names?"

Abashed, A. J. looked at me. "Hell, sir, I just don't know."

I thought at the time, how would I like to work from day to day where I was constantly called by only my last name? Does this do something to a man's feeling of status or well-being? How important is it to be called by your first name? Who can do it and what does it do to the "line" that must exist between superior and subordinate? How important is that line? Where does it go when the enemy charges into the bunker?

Back at my station, as I thought over my visit with them, I realized that squad had given me some precious things: honesty, openness and trust. I had learned nothing earth-shaking, nothing that could be generalized to the Army as a whole. That squad let me rediscover the world, once mine long ago, that had slipped into the unknown with each step up the chain of command. 

So, armed with only the last names of the squad, I sat down and tried to thank them with this letter, here slightly edited:

Hey, you scrungy grunts!

By now, you're probably back from the field, and got the track and your equipment squared away, and still got a hangover from the company party. What I got is ticks and chiggers, and a sore butt and a memory of what is probably the most worthwhile training I've had in the last five or six years. And it was you guys that trained me.

Most of us officers that go out to "be with the troops" do it from a helicopter, or out of the back end of a jeep, or off the shoulder of a briefing officer pointing across the valley at some distant mesa, and you know, there's a hell of a lot you don't see that way and a lot that you don't find out about the soldier and how he lives. You guys taught me that lesson and you've made me a better colonel . . . and dammit, I thank you.

I know I spooked you when I first crawled into your track. I could tell by the way you looked at me. I could almost hear Hammond's thoughts to himself: "Hey, man, what's this weird dude up to?" But I think you started trusting me about the next morning . . . about the time the server there in the predawn mess line chewed me for taking the wrong piece of bread. Anyhow, I think you guys trusted me and got over the fact I was a colonel
and just played it straight with me all around. And by God, I want to thank you for that trust. It's a precious and important thing. What do we get accomplished if troops and officers are always bulling each other? (But some bull is necessary and good... right, Hammond?)

Let me say also that nobody in your chain of command picked you dudes as the crew I would rattle around with for a few days. Your company commander was busy as hell, and smart... and he let me pick whoever I wanted to be with. I chose you scroungy grunts because you looked like good soldiers... and by heaven, you are—as a squad and as individuals—and I really don't care about what may have happened in your past. I'd go into combat with any of you. Anytime.

Sgt. Henry. You're a damned cool leader. I saw you handle three or four leadership problems like a real pro. Like when a tired and sleepy "A. J." Fuente didn't want to get up and camouflage the track and he gave you some back talk. A dumb leader would have made an issue of it, and locked old A. J.'s heels and chewed him out. You tried to understand A. J. as an individual, and a worn-out one at that. And you backed off... and took back talk from a damn PFC! But, man... that was leadership because you knew your man. And if you ask Fuente right now, you'll find that there is no doubt in his military mind as to who is head in that squad!...

And don't get too torn up, Sgt. Henry, about all the changes that come whipping down through the chain of command. It happens all the way up the line... and a big part of the leader's job is handling these changes. They're just part of it, like red bugs and rain... so just expect it as "natural" and do the best you can. One thing that might help is to remember that the guy who gets loused up most by changes is the trooper... so you ought to be asking yourself all the time: "Do Palmburne and McNeal and the others know what's going on and what we're going to do?"

Desman. Man, can you ever eat! How many damn cans of ravioli did you have stashed away in your duffel bag? (And when McNeal was griping about who ate the insides out of his C-ration cans, I had my suspicions!) You're a good, conscientious soldier, Desman. Some guys will probably harass you about being too "gung-ho"... but never mind. Do what you inside know is right and you can't ever be wrong. Did you ever find your stray boot? It fell out of your duffel bag when you went for that sack of cheese crunchers. I tried to use it as a shock absorber for my rear end, and the last I saw of your boot somebody over on the left side was standing on it.

Davis. You're a good driver, my friend, and a good man. I wouldn't want to see you leave the Army. What I would want to see is for you to forget that AWOL, quit screwing up on the morning formations and start soldiering. You got the way of a soldier about you if you can just get it all together. Being a
leader is a challenge, isn't it? Like when you tried to get either Palburne or Desman to go fill up the water can. Neither of them would . . . and they wouldn't buy your "Why don't you carry it together?" business either. So you did it yourself . . . and found that the water truck was gone . . . and we didn't get any water. Why wouldn't Palburne or Desman help out? I don't know . . . but I do know that you learned a little leadership there, and I do know that humpin' the damned water can will be automatic when you guys get shook down as a squad and a team.

Fuente. I apologize, amigo, for calling you "Lopez" . . . but you really put it on me when I did! Gave me that look of amazement, and then turned and looked at your own name tag! Except for fixing loose tracks, you're one hell of a driver. Not many guys can make a track stand up on its rear and roar like a circus lion! You deserve that "A. J." nickname and the guys in your squad brag about you . . . but you're still not worth a damn on the loose-track number. But I got to give you and Sgt. Henry credit . . . you tried and you learned. And I noticed in the final analysis that it was you guys "supervising" the lieutenant when the track finally got put together. He is a hard-nosed, hard-core lieutenant and probably lays it to you from time to time . . . but . . . isn't it good to have lieutenants around who know their equipment?

Hammond. You have definitely got more crap than the Chicago stockyards! I might believe the story about the 10,000-pound elk, or the four-foot jackrabbit, but damn! . . . I'd have to see movies of two guys climbing a tree with snowshoes on--bear or no bear! Seriously, ole buddy, you got a good way about you when it comes to soldiering . . . a kind of a natural, hard-core leadership. I know, because that's the sort of leadership I looked for when I was a Ranger instructor and LRP company commander. Stay straight and keep soldiering like you're soldiering. You'd be surprised at the good reputation you've got in the short time you've been there.

McNeal. If Hammond ever tries to paint white freckles on you like he said he would, report him straight out to the RR&EO officer. It ain't authorized! You said with pride that you were a "Mississippi farm boy." I say with pride that you're a fine soldier and I see in you the beginnings of a real professional. I watched you, on your own initiative, take over the lonely hatch position, all by yourself, for about three hours during that long move Saturday night. Lots of guys would have just taken the easy way out and gone to sleep. (I would have gone to sleep, if I could have found some place to put my feet. Desman had hogged the seat on my side and Palburne and 1,400 pounds of miscellaneous equipment had taken over the floor!)

Palburne. I list you last, my friend, mainly because when you line the squad up alphabetically, "P" comes at the end. You get harrassed a lot, little dude, and I know it must be hard to take sometimes. Couple of things to think about. There isn't a
man alive, regardless of rank, who doesn't screw up and goof off from time to time. . . . And that includes Capt. Bunton and Col. Malone and Gen. Becton. You just happen to get noticed more often . . . like the time you woke up from a dead sleep and tried to dive out the back of the track while the hatch was still closed! Some guys learn quicker than others. That sure doesn't mean they're a better man. A man with average skill who tries like hell is a 100 times better man than some real smart dude who doesn't give a damn. In my mind, Palmburne, the thing that stands out most about you is that you're tough and got more than your share of guts. Hang some good soldiering on this and you're on your way to being a professional. Watch Hammond. He knows the business and he'll help you whenever he sees that you're really trying. He'll be tough on you, but he's good and he'll teach you the ropes if you want to learn. And I think you do. Good luck, little dude. Aim that toughness in the right direction!

And so I bring to a close a colonel's letter to the 2nd Squad, 1st Platoon, Company B of the 1/3 Cav. Three days in the field rattlin' around in the rear end of an APC is nothing to you guys. You had 4 1/2 more days to go when I left. But those three days and you scroungy troopers educated the hell out of one senior officer from the Army War College. For that, and for your trust and for your honesty, and for just being the splendid sort of man the American soldier is, I thank you. Good luck, and stay straight!

Your friend,
"The colonel"
D. M. MALONE
Colonel, Infantry

Some three or four months later, there came a penciled letter from Sgt. Henry. Like the man, it was honest, straightforward, uncomplicated. It is a challenge to all who call themselves leaders, or "managers of men." As you read it, think about regulations and organizational charts, and statistical reports and end-strength figures, and the generation of personnel policies way up at the top. Somewhere in the Pentagon a decision is made and an action officer gets a "chop" on a piece of paper. A little later, the decision, in some form, comes rattling down the chain of command, all the way to the bottom. And that which was, ain't no more.

We who know that "the whole can be equal to infinitely more than the sum of its parts," that "unity is strength," that "teamwork is the key to victory" have somehow forgotten what these principles mean down at the bottom. Up at the top, we type strength changes into a report. Down at the bottom, a trooper packs his duffel bag and clears the supply room. And that which was or might have been, is no more and cannot be. Sgt. Henry says it better:

Hi, Sir!

How's everything with you? The sqd. and I are just fine, sir, and we hope you are, too. They were surprised when you sent
the letter down to them and they dug it. I made copies of it and they all have one. That letter was really something. They really enjoyed it and laughed a lot.

I'm going to Korea in April of this next year and my wife is real happy about it. I don't remember if I told you, but my wife is Korean and she will get her citizenship by going back with me. Also, her family is there. We are real happy about going back. I asked for it about four months back. I'm also going to transfer any day now. This Bn. is going to Germany in May of next yr. on a six-month TDI basis. Only the people going to Germany will be left in the Bn. by the 1st of Dec. I should end up either in the 2/7 Bn. or a new Bn., the 5/7, which they just started. Once I transfer, I'll remain there till I go to Korea.

Hammond is a Cpl. now and still shooting the bull like always, but he's still as hard-core as ever. He's still trying to get his papers started for Ranger school. He's in charge of the 1st sqd. now and doing alright. It looks like he will be going to Germany with the company.

Fuente belongs to the 3rd plt. now. They started it about a month ago and pulled a few guys from the other plts. He made Sp. 4 while he was with me and he's a team leader now in the 3rd plt. He still drives every chance he gets. He will be going to Germany, too.

Davis is getting short for the Army now. He gets out the 31st of this month. I talked to him a lot about staying, but he decided he wouldn't be able to take it any longer. He took his wife home about a month ago and lives in the bks. now. He's been doing alright lately.

McNeal is doing just fine. He's a PFC now and I've been using him as a team leader. He works hard all the time and is one of the best soldiers I've seen. He accepts the leadership position with no question and is a damned good team leader. He will be going to Germany, too.

Desman is a PFC now, too. He's doing OK, but he has a small problem with his attitude sometimes. It's very hard for him to understand the way the Army works sometimes. I talk to him a lot and try to explain. He blew his top a few times and I've got on him, but he's a good soldier.

Palmburne is also a PFC now and he just returned from leave. He was so happy when he went on leave, you should have seen him. The guys don't ride him as much now as before and I always look out for him. He's a fine soldier and I'm glad he's in my sqd.

Well, sir, that's the old sqd. you knew. I've gained three more young soldiers and they're good, too. We all get along fine in the sqd. and things have been going well. We wish you the best of everything, sir. Everyone says hello. We were happy to
hear you hadn't forgotten us. Take care of yourself, sir, and drop us a few lines when you start getting bored.

Your friend,
Sgt. Henry & 2nd Sqd. 1st Plt.
"Why in the hell would a guy do a thing like that?" I hear this question all the time—from officers, noncommissioned officers, and troopers. And when someone tells me they want to study behavioral science, and I ask them why, they tell me they want to understand people's behavior. So, I think the question of what makes people tick is one that lingers in the minds of many. I've got some of the answer, so let me just talk for a while, and you listen. You and I are sitting side by side on a log somewhere out in the woods. From time to time, I'll pick up a stick and draw a figure in the sand. Here we go.

You know, if we look back across the history of mankind—all the way from today's vicarious exploration of the Martian landscape back to the point in time when we were digging and scratching in the holes of the Olduvai Gorge in Africa—we can see many facets of man's behavior. There are a lot of things he does that are common across that vast stretch of time. One thing he's always doing—he's doing it now, and he's been doing it as long as we've known him—is engaging in the pursuit of knowledge. I'll explain a reason for this a little bit later on, but for now, let's say that man always has been, is now, and always will be attempting to understand things, and, from this understanding, to then make implications and connections and understand even more things. Reading, writing, talking, listening, thinking—these are the tools of man's never-ending task of trying to understand.

Understanding things. There are a lot of ways we can go about understanding. We can take an item and look at its relationship to other items. We can dissect it and look at its insides. We can measure it. We can weigh it. We can visualize it in action, then forecast what might happen when it does what it's supposed to do. Another way of understanding things, however, is to adopt a molecular approach—to try to get to the smallest portion of the particular item that we want to understand, and then seek to understand not the whole item, but the molecule, or the basic component of that item.

I've got a pocketknife here. I use a knife a lot in hunting and fishing, and I can try to understand the knife in a number of different ways. I can look at the effects of this knife out over time after I've used it for something. I can look at it mechanically, how it's made and how it works. I can look at it in terms of its color, or its markings. Let's assume that I've got problems with it. It won't stay sharp. Well, another way I might go about understanding the knife is to look at the molecular structure of the steel in the blade. Now I can understand why it won't stay sharp. This molecular approach is one of several different ways of understanding things, one of several different ways that we curious people have used since our early days back there in the Gorge.

So, as we try to understand people, and what makes people tick, I want to take a molecular approach. I'm not able to locate, define, and describe the golden screw of all human behavior, but I can give you a "naive psychologist's" view of eight or ten basic things that seem to underlie
human behavior. And rather than use the jargon, data, and style of the academicians, I want to keep things simple, person-to-person, and man-to-man. So let's move out with a molecular view of why people do as they do.

We've got a lot of things going on in our Army today. Lot of problems. And when I say problems, I don't necessarily mean it in the negative sense. The problems we have to solve aren't necessarily negative. Our Army has a lot of people problems. Some are positive—challenges to meet. Some are negative—messes to be cleaned up. Let's look at some of these people problems our Army's concerned about.

We're concerned with race; we're concerned with job satisfaction; we're concerned with drugs; we're concerned with discipline. We're concerned with proficiency on the job; with family; with promotions and selections, and with demotions and RIFs. These are all problems in the people dimension. And they're important as hell. Like Abe said, "The Army is people." And besides, over half of our annual budget goes to the people field. At any rate, all of these concerns constitute a bunch of problems, a bunch of things that we want to get some understanding of. If we understand, we can predict. And if we can predict, we can plan. Well, let's go back to that molecular approach. Look at this sketch I've labeled Figure 1.

A MOLECULAR APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING PEOPLE PROBLEMS

There is a basic component common to every one of these problems. That basic component, that molecule, is the individual. And I know, flat out, that we can get a better handle on, a better understanding for, all of
these problems if we take a look at the molecule, the individual. That's what we are going to do. We're going to look at that person—the individual—and see if we can't figure out why he does what he does. We want to look at about ten things that seem to answer the question.

Personality.

The psychologists got together, over time, and came up with a term to express the idea of the totality of the individual. They use the word "personality," and it's a theoretical term. Back in high school days, "personality" meant how well you got along with other people. Look at the "goodbye and good luck" notes in your musty old high school yearbook sometimes. But that's not the way the theorists use it. To them, "personality" represents the sum total of the individual. They use the term to more or less wrap up all that the individual is and does—everything about him. And they've come up with at least 2,570 different personality "traits," and about 52 definitions of the term "personality." We don't want to get into that hassle. I'm not a psychologist, and I'm talking to you here just man-to-man, so let's say that personality is a term to represent the whole individual and how he operates—how he thinks, how he feels, and how he behaves.

So that's what personality is. When we talk about a guy's personality, we're talking about the sum total of the big picture of how he thinks, feels and behaves. That's how I want to use the term "personality" in discussing this individual, and in taking this molecular approach.

One classic argument that always runs through discussions of human behavior is the argument about the two great factors or forces that seem to shape man's behavior. One of those forces is heredity, or the genetic imperative—the world of chromosomes and genes and the DNA molecule, and all those parental gifts which supposedly shape the person's behavior, and which determine how big he is, how fat he is, how strong he is, and the color of his hair. The second big force or factor is the environment in which the individual operates.

Psychologists today continue to argue about which is the dominant factor, which seems to drive behavior. You and I still spend time talking about whether leaders are made, not born; or born, not made; or whatever. But these two big factors do shape behavior, and we need to get a handle on how they operate. I'll try to give you a summary view of how these two big factors go about shaping behavior. We'll get to some of the specific, second-order factors a little bit later, but for right now, be advised that these big factors, heredity and environment, do drive behavior.

For our purposes, rather than say one factor is all-determinant, and all-powerful—as opposed to the other—it's probably best to look at these things as a two-factor continuum. Let me show you what I mean. Look at Figure 2 on the next page. There's a diagonal line separating heredity and environment. We can say these two factors are going to operate, throughout the individual's life, and we can say that, early in life, heredity plays a relatively larger role in determining this person's personality. Heredity plays a larger role than does environment. Later in life, and not too much later, environment starts to shape more and heredity less. The fact that
the diagonal doesn't go precisely from corner to corner shows that both factors are always operating, to some degree.

Now, I'm going to digress a little and make a biological link. If you go to the world of zoology, you find a concept there called the "phylogenetic scale." This scale ranges animals, in terms of relative complexity and intelligence, all the way from man and the great ape--theoretically the smartest--down to worms, pissants, and microbes, down at the bottom of the scale--theoretically the simplest and the dumbest. If you look at this scale from bottom to top, and consider evolution, the phylogenetic scale represents the development of an intelligent creature. You need to remember that this is only man's view. We haven't heard from the worms and pissants yet. Anyway, as you trip up and down the phylogenetic, you find that those creatures at the bottom of the pile seem to operate mostly on heredity. They're genetically programmed, and environment has relatively little impact on them. Those at the top of the scale, you and I, the more intelligent ones, operate more in response to environment and less in response to heredity. So the phylogenetic scale suggests how man developed, and it also helps us understand the relationship of heredity and environment. It doesn't have a hell of a lot to do with our Army's people problems, but it's kind of interesting.

The two big factors shape behavior. They're always there. When a person does something, two things are working: heredity--what his parents
gave him; and environment—the surroundings in which he operates. Those
two things are shaping my behavior right now. The genes of my mother and
father didn't program me to write and talk, but they did give me an
opposing thumb and the physiological parts of a speech apparatus.

To get a better handle on this idea of personality, let's get to some
of the more specific things that seem to shape personality. These are
mostly environmental factors, but don't forget that heredity is always
there. There are four of these primary development factors. Look at
Figure 3, for example. These four factors don't all operate at the same
strength at the same point in time, but they are dominant in determining
most of how the individual will eventually think, feel and behave. We can
lay out these factors in a kind of a curve in terms of their relative
strength. On the left is the strongest factor in shaping personality,

RELATIVE INFLUENCE OF FOUR MAJOR FACTORS
OF EARLY PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT

and on the right the least strongest. Bear in mind now, that this is not
fact, but rather theory and concept—critical tools for understanding.

In general, the psychologists who've studied this area of personality
development pretty well agree that the number one primary thing that
determines how an individual thinks, feels, and behaves, is his family.
The family, early in life, in his most formative years, is his total world.
The family sustains him, physically and psychologically, and it has control
over, and determines, almost the whole of his environment.

The next developmental factor is his peers, or the non-family people
he begins to associate with as a little child. Peers, even in childhood,
have powerful impact. I think you can recall back to your own childhood when you had a little gang of kids you ran around with. There was always one little snot-nosed guy who everybody picked on when things went bad. He was always crying and sniffing. He was the low man on the totem pole, and the last in the pecking order, and everybody beat-up on him. Hell, maybe you were that guy yourself, but what you end up with, I think you can see, is that being in that kind of role as a youngster almost invariably has long term effects for the rest of the person's life. Peers are a powerful variable in shaping the individual's personality. And you can see their influence clearly, not just in early childhood, but up through, and especially, into the teenage years.

Probably the third strongest--and I'm saying probably--developmental factor is the school, and the church. Here the youngster picks up understanding, and a sensing of the value systems of society. Finally, the fourth factor is the social institutions that he's exposed to, other than the school and the church. School and church are also social institutions, but I'm talking about systems of law, systems of economy, systems of status. As he begins to understand these things, they begin to shape, or have a function or role in shaping, his behavior.

The psychologists have tried to give us a handle on how personality development occurs over time. Again, this is theoretical, figurative--a "model." The theorists agree--and you and I and our wives know--that there are definable stages as a youngster develops from the moment of birth later on out into his life. For understanding purposes, let's work with about four stages. These are shown in Figure 4.

THEORETICAL STAGES IN EARLY PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT

PERSONALITY

(HOW INDIVIDUAL THINKS, FEELS, ACTS)

0-3 YRS | 3-5 YRS | 5-12 YRS | 12-20 YRS

SELF

IDENTITY

SOCIALIZATION

INDEPENDENCE

★ THE DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONALITY PROGRESSES THROUGH IDENTIFIABLE STAGES

FIGURE 4
Four developmental stages. The first stage, or period, in the younger's life generally runs from about 0 to 3 years of age. It's called the stage of the self. The essence of this first three-year period is that he's trying to learn to look at himself as a whole—to put himself together.

When he's first born, he's laying there on his back, just looking up at nothing in particular. In a couple of weeks' time, when certain muscle systems mature and when he gets to where he can focus his eyes a little, he sees a hand go by, and then a foot, and he smells a smell. What he doesn't realize yet is that these are all part of him. He doesn't know that that hand belongs to him—it's just a hand that went by. He spends much—but by no means, all—of his first three years trying to learn to look at himself as an entity. He's beginning to understand all of the things that are part of him: the way he feels, the way he acts, and all of the parts of which he's composed. He's learning of himself as an entity, as a being, as a self. He's defining his self. Nomenclature, functioning, operation and maintenance of the being, human, small, M-76Al.

The second developmental period is the stage or the age of identity. This is somewhat like the first stage, but now the younger is seeing himself in relation to other things and other people. From the age of about 3 to 5, he's working at understanding and establishing the very beginnings of relational patterns with other humans. He learns that he has an identity with respect to, or vis-a-vis, his mother, his father, his little sister. He learns that he's smaller than they are, and that he's louder than they are. He learns also that certain things he does will almost always produce a predictable response in other members of the family. He learns to communicate, verbally and non-verbally. And here in this age of identity, he begins, more and more, to take all this new-found knowledge outside and try it on other people. He's expanding and developing his knowledge and abilities at building relational patterns with other people.

The age of 5 to 12 is the age, stage, era or phase of socialization. The younger learned basic relationships with other folks during the earlier age of identity. Now he's learning how to get along with them; how to operate with other people; how to pick up and perform roles expected of him. He's becoming socialized and civilized, if you want to call it that. Way back in the earlier stages, he would just as soon pick up an axe and relieve his sister of her head. He doesn't realize that that's improper. Now, however, he learns that he has other options. He learns what's acceptable, what's "right," and what's "wrong." It's here in this age of socialization that he starts to pick up the rules whereby he's going to operate; how he's going to operate within the family, how he's going to operate when he's out on the block with the other kids, how he's going to operate in the back yard, how he's going to operate in school, and in church, and in stores. He's learning the rules of behavior in this age of socialization. And we really pour it to him. Somehow, even at this early age, that little bugger picks up an incredibly complex and detailed knowledge of tens of thousands of rules and regulations which tell him how to operate in the particular society of which he's a part.

The last stage shown in Figure 4 is the timespan from 12 to 20, known to we who are parents as "the terrible teens." The personality theorists
call this the age of independence. The young fellow here has learned all these relational patterns, and all these thousands of rules and regulations. Now he's got to go out and try them for himself. He's got to break away from his family with all of its predictable behavior and security. He's got to begin to operate on his own. He's worked hard to learn all that he knows; he wants now to see how he can function in a far less predictable and far more complex environment. So he gets out there and has at it. This is the age of independence; most of us, considering our age and the age of our children, can observe this developmental stage at first hand.

There's another age, not shown in the figure, that I'd like to add in here, because the personality theorists haven't discussed this age very much. They're just starting to find out about it. I don't know what the hell to call this age, but it's the age where you and I are right now, right around the forties. We might call it the "middle-age menopause," or, as some people refer to it, the age of the 20-year-old ego, and the 40-year-old body. At any rate, there's an increasingly expanding body of research which shows that along about age 40, let's say between 35 to 45, man begins to--well, not exactly go downhill, but he can sort of see the end out there. He can see whether or not he's accomplished what he wanted to accomplish. He can look back at a sizeable history of achievements, and perhaps some failures. He can see some diminution in many of his abilities. His eyes and ears aren't as sharp. His reflexes, too, are slower. He's getting heavy around the middle. The 18-hour days, when they come, are tougher and tougher to handle. He can see these things and he starts to worry about them. Maybe he's not going to achieve his lifetime goals; maybe he's worrying about what's going to happen to his family in the years when he's not earning as much; maybe he's worrying about himself and his wife when they get old.

There's good evidence that this period, the 35 to 45 era, may be more traumatic than that age of independence when the youngster breaks away from the family ties. Psychologically, at least, the 35-45 stage may well be more traumatic than the terrible teens. But . . . it's not as evident. Why? Real simple. The teenager, facing a time of major changes in his life, flies off the handle, screams, kicks, shouts, cusses, fusses, and does all sorts of obvious things, because that's about the only strategy he knows. But out at age 40, faced with the trauma of a real and not just figurative change of life, you and I have the experience of 25 years under our belt. We've got a lot of strategies for handling frustration--a lot of different and usually well-hidden ways of handling problems which, as teenagers, we could only respond to in one way, i.e., the tantrum.

So that's another developmental age we need to think about if we're talking about the development of man and his personality. Personality development never ceases. Men can and do change over time. The old business of you can't teach old dogs new tricks is, in my view at least, a lot of hogwash. We've got good evidence that the 35 to 45 year old men coming here to the War College do change significantly during the one year they're here. I'll give you an example.

A fellow named Peterson did some research one time, here at the War College. He measured the values of incoming War College students as they came into the War College. Then when they left, he took the same
instrument—a different form of it—and he measured their values again. He
found statistically significant changes in 7 of 25 values that he was
measuring. For example, when students entered the War College, they had a
high need for orderliness. This was one of their values. They valued
orderliness—everything dress right dress and cover-down, squared up, neat,
precise. This was a very strong need, a very strong value. After a year
at the War College, the need for orderliness dropped significantly. At the
end of the year, they really didn't much give a damn whether things were
dress right dress and covered down. Well, this change might sound bad, but
actually, it's encouraging. That same drop in the need for orderliness
correlates very highly with increased education, understanding, and
intellect or intelligence. So there is some hope for you if you get to
where you just don't give a damn.

So much for the development of the individual, and his personality.
We can see how it occurs over time; we can see the factors that shape it,
and we can see that while most of a person's "personality" is determined in
those early childhood years, the developmental process never really ceases.

Motivation.

Let me continue on now with our molecular view and move on to another
big factor: motivation. What motivates a man? There are untold volumes
of books that have been written on motivation as people tried to get a
handle on this nebulous term. There are probably even more definitions for
motivation than there are for personality, but let's skip the word-smithing
and phrase-mongering and make a try at understanding what it is that
motivates a man.

There are about two ways you can go about trying to understand what
motivates a man. One way we can look at it is to say that there are
certain needs that a man has. This need approach gives a little dignity to
the individual. The need approach says that the man has his needs, and
that he then starts or begins to work toward achieving these needs. Well,
that's one view we can take—a man is motivated by certain needs and he, as
an individual, on his own, with initiative, moves out and seeks to meet
these needs.

Another view, or school of thought, relative to motivation is not the
need view, but the drive view. This approach says there are certain things
in the individual that drive his behavior. This is a different perspective
of motivation. A moment ago, we said the man has needs, and he exercises
initiative to meet those needs. The drive view of motivation, on the other
hand, implies that the person is driven by things over which he has damn
little control. Let's discuss each of these with some representative
thoughts or concepts from each point of view.

The best author, probably the most understood and the most versatile
theorist in the field on the need side, is Maslow, or, rather was Maslow.
Maslow is dead now, but his powerful writing continues on. Maslow talked
about a "need hierarchy." Let me go over that hierarchy for you, and look
at Figure 5 if you will.
Basically, Maslow said man has about five needs; and that these needs more or less turn on from time to time; and that as each of these needs becomes evident to the individual, he seeks to satisfy that need. At the very bottom of this hierarchy of needs are a person's physiological needs. He has to have fuel for his body, fuel for the machine that he is. When these needs turn on, that's what he's looking for—food and water and some of the basic fundamental fuels. He seeks to develop or satisfy these primary physiological needs. Once the physiological needs are fairly well satisfied, and the person has worked out ways to keep them that way, then these physiological needs no longer actually motivate behavior. Once he has them pretty well under control, another set of needs arises and begins to shape, govern, or motivate his behavior.

The second set of needs are needs for security. The man wants protection from the elements, from rain and snow and the hot sun and the saber-toothed tigers. He wants security—a hole, a cave, a house, or... a bunker with PSP and timbers, and three layers of sandbags! He wants protection from the environment or, at least, from the negative aspects of the environment. So security needs begin to motivate the man, and then he does things to meet these security needs, and, when he gets those under control, then another set of needs arise, and these are social needs. Now his behavior is motivated largely in trying to meet these social needs.

Most of his activities in meeting social needs are directed toward relationships with others: working with others, banding together with others to accomplish certain purposes, knowing what others are doing, and getting information about others. The need for belonging to an aggregate
of human beings is probably the basic social need. Bear in mind now that the two lower order needs—physiological and security—are pretty well under control. If they're fulfilled, then they're not really motivating the man's behavior. It's the next highest or unfilled need that he's working on, and this is what's determining or shaping most of his behavior.

Once the social needs are pretty well taken care of, he moves up a step. The next set of needs which arises are esteem needs. Perhaps I can best express these esteem needs by saying that now he wants recognition; he wants to be somebody in the eyes of some of these other people that he linked up with during the social needs time. You and I, considering our age, experience, and position, are probably operating mostly at the esteem need level. When we were brand new lieutenants, and just married, some esteem need motivation was present, but much of how we thought, felt, and behaved was probably directed to meeting the more basic physiological and security needs.

The final set of needs—and this concept is tough for me to explain—are the needs for self-actualization. The self-actualization need is the need that a man has to do what he feels, deep down inside, that he's ultimately capable of doing; the need to do what he senses he was put here on earth to do. MacArthur, or Patton maybe, were pretty good examples of men who were operating mostly at the self-actualizing level. But you and I can operate there from time to time. Let me give you an example.

Since I was a little boy, way back somewhere in that age of identity we talked about, I wanted to be a soldier, mainly because my dad was. To me, being a soldier was what it was all about, and that's what I was put here for. Well, I became a soldier, but I don't think I ever really reached the level of meeting self-actualization needs until one time after a battle in Vietnam, out west of Dak To. The fight started about 4 o'clock in the morning and lasted until 8 o'clock. It was a God-awful battle. An NVA regiment came across our wire and into a perimeter held by one and a half rifle companies, the red-leg battery, and the battalion headquarters. It was one hell of a kicking, screaming, hand-to-hand, and gland-to-gland sort of fight, and we won, and I was the battalion commander of the men that did that piece of splendid soldiering. Later, I wrote my wife. I said, "I've never been able to understand self-actualization until now, but I have just, by God, self-actualized as a soldier. This is what I was put here for, and by damn, I've done it." So a man doesn't self-actualize all the time, but at certain points in his life he seems to. That's the best I can do with self-actualization.

While the self-actualization need may be the highest order need, that doesn't mean it's the most powerful. The one that's most powerful is the next one up; that's not fulfilled. That means that it's the ones at the bottom, at the foundation, that are actually most powerful. If, for example, I make it difficult or impossible for you to satisfy those needs down there at the bottom—the physiological and security needs—then you quickly come skittering back down and begin to operate at the physiological level. If, for example, I put you in a situation with no food, where you actually start starving a little bit, you will probably begin to care less and less about what other people think about you. The esteem needs cease to shape your behavior. After a while, you wouldn't even care about other people. You'd give up your need for esteem, and belonging, and security,
and focus damn near all your thought, feeling, and actions on getting some chow. Go to some of the life raft survivor stories and you'll see this skidding down the scale, back down to the basic physiological level.

Well, this discussion is one expression of how this hierarchy of needs can serve as a motivating factor. Maslow's theory is splendid. It doesn't explain the world; it doesn't give you a magic formula; but it does help to understand men, motivation, and human behavior.

For example, you can take these needs and what they mean and apply them to the development of a man. A little child is mostly concerned with physiological needs. If you think about how he develops into a man and then lives out his life cycle, you'll see that, over time, he more or less works right on up the need scale. You can take the study of mankind, and apply Maslow's theory to civilization, and you'll see mankind following through these same need levels. Back in the Olduvai Gorge we mentioned earlier, man was working down at the physiological and security levels, knocking hell out of all those animals. Today, mankind is probably operating somewhere up in the social and esteem levels, with occasional excursions into self-actualization. The theory gives us a way of understanding civilization, and how that civilization might be developing.

Take Maslow's theory and apply it to an organization, or a business that's beginning to form. Or look at some new "shop" that's just been put together in the Pentagon. The theory gives a means of predicting what might motivate that organization at successive points out in the future. A nation might go the same way. In this country, we started off working, as a nation, down at the physiological level. Now, as I see it anyhow, we've worked up through the security level, and most of the social level, and the esteem level is just beginning to operate at full force. Maslow's theory applies to human motivation and it also has applications in related areas. The theory doesn't give answers, but it does provide a useful tool to help understanding.

The need view is one way of looking at motivation. The other principal approach to understanding motivation is the drives approach. It's a sort of a mechanical approach. According to this view, there are certain things in man that drive his behavior. He doesn't have a hell of a lot to do with it, he just more or less moves along responding to these drives. Being driven and reacting to drive forces is a hell of a lot different than needing something and then going out to get it. The psychologists that push this drive view of motivation say that we've got two kinds of drives. Let me draw you an organizational chart, because I know you're partial to that sort of thing. Look at Figure 6.

We've got two basic kinds of drives. We've got learned drives that drive our behavior. Drive for status is one of these. Drive for money, or drive for power are other learned drives. You learn drives from operating with other people—way back in those early developmental stages, and soon, they begin to drive your behavior.
The other principal category of drives is the unlearned drives. These are kind of built-in. We don't learn these; they're just there. Perhaps they come from genetic structure, or maybe they're just an innate characteristic of man—a human being's OVM. There are two kinds of these unlearned drives, physiological and general. And here, in these physiological drives, you can see a relationship between the two motivational approaches. Physiological drives are the more obvious ones, like food, water.

There's an interesting concept here with respect to physiological drives. This is the concept of homeostasis, or balance. Man, as an organism, attempts to keep himself in balance. When he's deprived of water, for example, he's got a basic physiological shortfall. The water drive activates, and he moves out to get more water so he can get the organism balanced again. Hunger comes, and he's got a shortage in hunger, and he moves to bring it back up to balance. Sex works the same way. Man is always trying to balance with respect to these drives. How he thinks, feels, and behaves are results of his efforts to balance these drives. He's got to get his drives in balance. Not just the physiological ones, but all of them. Why is this? I don't know. Maybe this is the golden screw.

The general drives are pretty much inborn. All people have these drives to some degree. One of these general drives is the curiosity drive. A man just has to poke and probe at something. Give him something new and he'll soon be looking at it, poking at it, probing it, messing around with it. Just like a soldier. A good leader once told me that you can take a
soldier out in the middle of the flat, sandy desert of Arizona, leave him out there with a regular old 400-pound cast-iron anvil, then come back in a week, and the soldier's going to be standing there and the anvil's going to be broke. The curiosity drive. Inborn in all men. Perhaps it explains our never-ending effort to understand. Where and what would we be without it?

Another built-in general drive is the maternal drive. There's pretty strong evidence for this drive. Mothers of men as well as many other lower order species have this drive. It gives these mothers the basic ops orders for giving birth and taking care of their young, and again, it applies to your wife, as well as my wife, as well as my beagle. The maternal drive is very strong and produces some extremely complicated behavior patterns once the birth process begins. If you've ever watched a dog have pups, and wondered how it is that they know how to do all these damn operations they perform, then you know what I mean. It's probably coming from this general drive, the maternal drive, with a hell of a lot of heredity programming behind it.

A third general drive that the theorists identify is the drive for acquisition. People need to acquire things, to gather bundles, to horde and pull things together, to have things and hold them. This drive is related to the "territorial imperative" that I'm sure you're familiar with. Animals have territories, and birds have territories, and people have their own turf that they operate on. People are pack-rats. You and I feel the power of the acquisition drive when it's PCS time and the movers come.

I've discussed with you now two basic approaches to motivation. These two views are valuable as hell in trying to understand motivation. But I've only nicked the surface of this highly complex and heavily researched area.

Conscious and Subconscious.

Another extremely important tool in understanding why people do what they do is the idea of conscious and subconscious behavior, or really, conscious and subconscious personality. We all, you and me, operate on two levels--a conscious level and a subconscious level. Let me explain what I mean with the diagram in Figure 7. I've drawn a diagram of an iceberg--a familiar analogy--and let's say that the horizontal line represents the surface of the water. That portion of the iceberg above the surface represents conscious behavior, and we're aware of that behavior, but there's seven or eight times more behavior which exists below the surface at the subconscious level, and we're unaware of this behavior. We do these things, but we don't know about it.

This analogy I'm laying on you applies not just to how a man behaves, but also to the totality of the personality concept--to how he thinks, how he feels, and how he behaves. You can describe for me right now your conscious feelings, but there are subconscious feelings that are also there, things in "the back of your mind" that are active and operating. According to good theory, you're solving problems right now in the back of your mind and you're not aware of it. Some of these problems were generated years ago, and you're still clicking away at them, but on a
subconscious level. Ever have the answer to a long-term, difficult problem come to you all of a sudden, like in the middle of the night, or when you're shaving? Where did it come from?

The concept of conscious and subconscious behavior is significant. It says an awful lot about the awesome potential of the human mind. It also says a lot about the difficulty of really knowing why people do what they do.

We need to bear in mind that a hell of a lot more is going on at the subconscious level than we're aware of. If you need proof of this, stop and look around the next time you're in an auditorium, or someplace where a large aggregate of individuals is looking at and listening to a speaker. Look at the behavior of the people in the audience. You're going to see people doing things at the subconscious level that they wouldn't normally do. You're going to see men sitting there with their jaws hanging open. Some are going to be scratching. Others are going to be picking at themselves, at their hair or their neck. You're going to see some individuals picking at their nose, too. And none of them are aware that they're doing these things. The behavior is occurring at the subconscious level. In essence, an enormous amount of thought, feeling, and behavior—both good and bad—is occurring all the time, and you and I are not even aware of most of it.
The Self-Concept.

One of the most important--and in my view, the most important--determinants of human behavior develops and functions almost wholly at the subconscious level. There's enough of it above the surface, however, so that we can get at it and understand it. I'm talking about the individual's self-concept, or self-image--how he views himself, and the kind of person he thinks he is.

Why do you look in the mirror every morning when you shave? OK...you do it to keep from cutting yourself and to see if you get all the whiskers off...but...why is it so important to have your whiskers off? They're warm when it's cold. And, what about later when you look in the mirror to check your tie? Why do you do that? And why do you wear a damn necktie? What purpose does it serve? The point I'm trying to get at is that you and I, maybe a thousand times a day, move, in a sense, out of our bodies and over into someone else's...and then, from that perspective, we look at ourselves and pass judgement. Then we come back, bringing the judgement with us, and add it to that knowledge which defines our own view of ourself. The composite of all these judgements is the self-concept or self-image. And what occurs when we look in the mirror illustrates how the self-image is developed and maintained. A pretty squirrelly concept, but, in my view, the most important of all.

So, every man has, in his mind, a picture of himself as he thinks others see him. This picture includes how others judge him, as well as what he thinks others expect of him. Look onto this expectations bit. As I see it anyhow, expectations of others is one of the most powerful forces which shape human behavior, and it's pretty close to being the golden screw. Figure 8 shows some of the more important sets of judgements and expectations that contribute to a man's self-image. That's a lot of masters to serve. And on the practical side, it's obvious that you and I--as leaders, parents, or friends--can exert a powerful influence on the behavior of others by working extra hard at the business of communicating expectations. The force is a powerful one. It must be, or you wouldn't be wearing that necktie.

The self-concept is not necessarily accurate. In fact, it's almost always distorted. We can easily misperceive the judgements and expectations that others have of us. Most of us distort our self-concept on the positive side. And when we get information from the real world that conflicts with this positive self-image, it's unpleasant and uncomfortable. Let me illustrate this, and at the same time prove that that self-image is usually positive.

Think about the very first time you heard your voice on audiotape. I'll bet you a case of beer that you were distressed, hurt, and a little bit shocked with what you heard. Here was this damn nasal, maybe high-pitched, weird kind of voice--and you'd always figured you sounded--to all those "others"--manly, and resonant, and clear-speaking. Now you listen to yourself on tape, and you say, "Christ, that can't be me!" And you don't feel too good about it. And, unless there's someone else around--an "other"--you don't try to laugh it off. What you heard on tape was, in a sense, the real world and what you thought was a manly, resonant voice was part of your self-concept. The contradiction wasn't much fun.
And I think it's easy to see that most people will try to avoid these contradictions. Now, what does that imply?

The self-concept in most of us is strongly positive, and it should be that way. It gives us the foundation for the exercise of initiative and problem-solving. It gives us "confidence." We get hellacious problems when a man consistently views himself as worse than he really is; for example, take a youngster raised up in a ghetto. He's always been slapped around, and not given much to eat, and everybody was always calling him a dud or a delinquent. His parents picked on him, his teachers picked on him, the cops picked on him, everybody picked on him. The judgments and expectations of all those significant others tell him that he's a damn loser. The bluegrass song, "Born to Lose," tells it well. That kind of negative self-concept is not too healthy. Self-concept is a powerful force, and predictably, the individual will try to meet damn near all those negative expectations.

Self-concept is how we think that other people view us, and it drives behavior, and I've come to believe it's one of the more important tools we've got in attempting to understand why men do as they do. Let's move on.
Learning.

You and I are what we are, mostly because we've learned to be what we are. Learning is the conduit through which that great "environment" force operates to shape behavior. I'm not going to get off into the routine about classical Pavlovian conditioned response, but I want to say just a few things about learning. I think I can reduce it down to the very basic level.

The fundamental of learning is extremely simple. Go to Figure 9 on the next page for just a minute. There sits the individual, and at this point in time, there's a goal that he sees and wants. Probably he's trying to meet some of those needs we talked about before or maybe he's working to meet expectations. At any rate, he's looking at that goal and he's trying to figure out how to reach it. He's never done this before.

He looks at the goal, figures out how he's going to get there, and sails off in a direction X. You and I know he's going the "wrong" way, but he hasn't learned this yet. He's never learned about the "direct approach," or about that business of the shortest distance between two points. He will continue right on in the wrong damn direction until something very critical occurs—until he gets some feedback which tells him he's not going in the right direction. Negative feedback (F(-)). Once he gets that feedback, then he comes back to start, thinks about what he did, and shakes his head. Route X is a bummer. He's learned this now, and he cranks it into memory for future use.

But he still wants to get to that goal—he's motivated—and he makes another effort. This time, he ricochets off toward X1. Screwed up again. More feedback, negative feedback, and he comes back to start. Now he says, "Well, by God, neither X nor X1 is worth a damn. Neither one of these will get me to that goal. But my 'ole self-concept tells me I ain't a quitter. I'm going to have at it again. I'm going to try X2." So he moves out with that third option, and this time, he makes it. He knows when he reaches the goal, or else, some person or machine or poopsheet—like a test paper—tells him he made it. He gets positive feedback (F(+)). He knows now that his particular behavior, X2, is the one that works when he wants to get to this particular goal, and the situation is as it is at that time.

But—and this is that simple but absolute fundamental I mentioned—no learning can occur without feedback. Attempts to learn without some kind of feedback are merely random behavior. If you got a rat, and you want him to learn to run a maze, and you stick him in there, he can never learn unless you give him some feedback. You have to let him know that when he makes a certain series of turns, he gets whatever you've got him primed to look for—food, water, or a lady rat. If he doesn't get this feedback, he'll just wander at random. Again, without feedback, attempts to learn are just random behavior. This says that there must be, in a learning situation, some kind of criterion, and some form of measurement or assessment of the individual's efforts to reach that criterion. This assessment, in turn, must be communicated to the individual. Without this feedback, in some form, the individual can never learn. So much for the basic fundamental of learning.
Reactions to Frustration.

To get at this particular key to understanding behavior, let's go back for a minute to that learning process we just talked about. As a result of that learning experience, the man programmed three things back into his memory—approach X, which wouldn't work; approach X₁, which wouldn't work; and approach X₂, which got him to his goal. Now he knows that X₂ is the way to go when that particular goal comes up again. He stores that in his catalog of behavior.

Then, one fine day, sure enough, that goal comes up again. He reaches back into his catalog of behaviors, and moves out with approach X₂. He's moving toward that goal, and it's getting closer, and it looks like he's going to make it. All of a sudden—Blap! Down comes a barrier between him and the goal. Figure 10 shows you what I'm talking about.
The man was moving towards the goals because of some of those motivational factors we mentioned earlier. When the barrier drops down, he's thwarted, and in comes frustration. For example, maybe his motivation had a sexual origin. He spots a likely object of conquest, and he's moving towards that object of conquest, and down comes the barrier, namely her husband, or his wife, and now he's frustrated. This happens hundreds of times each day— the frustration part, that is. If the sexual motivation is activated that often, then you got special problems. Barriers, frustrations, and the reactions to frustration explain much of man's day-to-day behavior. When you're trouble-shooting people problems, this is a good place to start looking.

Barriers come in all shapes, sizes, and degrees of strength. They can be mental, physical, or procedural. They can be circumstantial or contrived by others. They can be real, or imagined. Whatever they are, they produce frustration, and the individual reacts.

Look again at Figure 10. In reacting to frustration, the man has a lot of things he can do. One thing he can do is lower his head and go at the barrier head-on— slam in there and see if he can knock the barrier out of the way, and then do this again, and again, and again... like the proverbial billy goat. The shrinks call this reaction "fixation" or fixated behavior. No attempt to try any different alternative. The individual continues to batter up against the barrier, expending energy and time, but he really can't do any good. Finally, he collapses— if not physically, perhaps psychologically, and with serious consequences. Maybe, however, at long last, he'll try another tack.
Another reaction of the man faced with frustration might be simply withdrawal. He just says to hell with it, and he leaves. "The hell with the goal, and the barrier, and every damn thing else," and he just backs off and splits—physically, psychologically, or both. You ever seen soldiers do this? You can count, usually on Monday mornings, the ones who withdraw physically, but what about those who took the psychological route?

Here's another reaction. You run into some sort of big, tough barrier on the job. You wrestle with it all day—bat it a couple of times with your head, try to go over it, or under it, or around it. Nothing works, and it's still there at the end of the day. What happens that evening? Predictably, the wife and kids are going to catch hell. You fuss at the kids, cuss at your wife, and throw the dinner back out in the kitchen. "Displaced aggression" is what the psychologists call this one. It causes all kinds of problems, with the real fireworks coming when two people try to displace on each other at the same time. Even the neighbors might get in on this one. But I never did this, did you?

And still another. An individual, frustrated by some kind of barrier between him and his goal, might establish a different goal that's pretty much like the original, but not quite the same. Goal₂. It's like the first one, but not quite the same, and when he gets there, he'll be not quite as satisfied.

The most common reaction for all of us; when we're faced with these barriers, is to move off somewhere, away from the goal and the barrier, and then establish and occupy one of several different kinds of defense positions. Defense mechanisms are common human reactions to frustration. We all use defense mechanisms. We use them for a lot of things: to cover up our failures; to save us effort, to protect the old self-concept. Defense mechanisms. Normal and natural. And we got a wide range of options.

We might rationalize. Come up with ways of explaining our failure in such a way that it's not our fault. Well, "they" made me do it; or, "he" made me do it, or "I didn't get promoted because that son of a bitch gave me one bad efficiency report." We explain the failure away to ourselves and to others so we can live with it, so we can continue to see ourselves as capable, so we can continue to keep that crucial self-image on the positive.

Another common defense mechanism is regression. In essence, when we do this number, we go back to a reaction to frustration that we used somewhere way back in the past. Instead of coming up with a new way to meet a particular barrier, we regress back to some earlier point in time. Faced with extreme frustration, we may regress all the way back to options we used in childhood. We may even get to the point where we cry. I did this, just a few years ago. Right out in front of God and all those "others." I was so damn frustrated about the death of a young soldier—a Quad-50 gunner whom I admired for being such a tiger—that I just flat out wept when I saw him lying there dead by his weapon. There was just no way around that particular barrier. I regressed back to a mode of behavior that had seemed to help many, many years ago.
Repression is another. Faced with an unpleasant barrier and the resultant frustration, we might repress the whole situation. We crank it down to the subconscious level, where we don't have to look at it any more, or think about it any more. It's still there, somewhere in the back of our mind, but we just say, "Forget it" ... and we do. On purpose.

Still another defense mechanism is fantasy. We can't reach the goal, so we start to fantasize about the goal and the barrier and our possible response. We build a dream of what might occur, and what we might do. A classic example here is the old movie about Walter Mitty. Danny Kaye played the part. He day-dreamed of all the big frustrations in his life, and he came out the dashing hero in all encounters. The trouble was, he began to believe those dreams, and went off into another world, and never could get back. We all fantasize, and fantasizing is fun, but I wouldn't lean on it too heavily if I were you.

We could go on down the list in a good psychology text, and we'd find maybe 15 or 20 of these defense mechanisms. The point I want to emphasize is that I've done all these things, and so have you. These defense mechanisms are normal human reactions to frustration. Just don't get carried away with any one in particular.

Problem-solving.

All of the squirrely--but normal--reactions to frustration that we've just discussed have one thing in common. They're all negative. They don't get the job done. Besides that, these reactions don't represent the typical outcome when man meets a barrier. Usually, we get to the goal. A positive outcome. And we do it by solving problems. You and I solve thousands of problems every day.

To increase our understanding of the molecule that's part of all people problems, we should know how man goes about solving problems. He goes about it, strangely enough, in the same way that you learned at Leavenworth. Think back to what you remember about five paragraph field orders and the estimate of the situation.

Man, in figuring out ways to get around barriers and arrive at goals, comes up with an almost standard problem-solving routine. Age, sex, color, nationality, cultural background, education--it doesn't matter. There's a pretty much common pattern in the way that man solves problems. It's the key to learning and it's the key to many of these other concepts of behavior, as well. Much of how a man thinks, feels, and behaves is the result of tens of thousands of problems he's solved in the past.

Look at Figure 11 on the next page for a moment. Faced with a problem, the first thing a person will do is try to get information about the barrier and about the goal. He tries to gather information--the enemy and friendly situations--about the barriers, and about the goals, and about the possibilities. Once he's gathered that information, then he comes up with alternatives--things he can do, actions he might take, different ways that he might go about getting around the barrier and achieving the goal. Once he's got information, and some alternative actions, then he's going to wargame those alternatives against the barrier, and in that wargaming, many
of these keys to understanding that we've been talking about will come into play. Self-concept, for example. Is this alternative the way people expect me to behave? I want to get my car across this intersection. There's a red light in the way, and what I'd really like to do is just zip right across there, but people, namely the police, don't expect me to behave that way. That alternative is eliminated.

So the man wargames his alternatives against the information—the world as he sees it, the past as he remembers it, his motives as he senses them—and, once he's done that, he figures the pluses and minuses of each of these alternatives he's wargamed. He makes a decision. Then he acts, or behaves, or feels, or thinks.

A crucial point to remember about this problem-solving business is that you and I are doing it all the time. We do some at conscious level, but probably a whole lot more at subconscious level. Some problems are big and extensive. We can really get at them in detail and over a long period of deliberate thought. Others occur in a split second of time, and we solve them with blazing speed, barely conscious of what we do. Think of your own reactions to the sudden flash of the brake lights of the car ahead of you as you whip down the Interstate. Information, alternatives, wargaming, decision, behavior ... the whole routine. In a split second. What are you doing right now? Reading this page. Look at that as a

![Diagram: The Common (and Desired) Reaction to Frustration]

**THE COMMON (AND DESIRED) REACTION TO FRUSTRATION**

- **Problem-Solving** is an almost constant activity of human behavior.
- **1. Information**
- **2. Alternatives**
- **3. Advantages & Disadvantages**
- **4. War Gaming**
- **5. Decision**
- **6. Action**
response and trace it backward through the problem-solving process. It works! Insight into why you're doing what you do. Try the same backward analysis with the AWOL soldier, the timid lieutenant, the arrogant general. See there? Damn near all we do is problem-solving behavior and, although I'm sure no one has ever really pushed this notion, if we take the time to apply in reverse the basic planning and analytical tool that the Army has given us leaders--namely, the estimate of the situation--we already have a critical key for studying what makes people tick.

Funny thing about problem-solving behavior. Try this one yourself. Gather together a small bunch of troops, or civilians, or a mixture of both. Sit them down together around a table. Then give them a problem to solve. They don't have to have known each other before; they don't have to know a damn thing about human behavior, or about problem-solving behavior. Just give them a problem, and then record what they do and say. When you analyze what went on, you'll find that in solving that problem, they "automatically" followed the classic problem-solving process. Add this to an innate curiosity drive and you'll get a look at the history and the future of man. The problem-solving process offers a key to understanding, not just at the individual level, but at the group level as well.

Frame of Reference.

When we take all of these keys to understanding that we've talked about, and put them all together, they equal something. This something—which I've illustrated in Figure 12—is perhaps the best way to summarize what I feel should be the first thought that comes in your mind when you're trying to figure out what makes people tick. All these keys, in a sense, equal the individual's "frame of reference." The way that man views the world, the way he views the goals, the way he views the barriers, the way he views himself, and others—all these things make up a person's frame of reference. And it's frame of reference that shapes perception. You and I respond not to reality, but rather to what we perceive. That AWOL soldier, through his frame of reference, perceived a frustrating and probably impossible barrier. Chances are, that in reality, there was no barrier at all. But he damned well perceived one.

Our use of the frame of reference is about the same as looking at something out through a window. The pane of that window is like a film on a soap bubble. It's changing all the time. Colors are changing. Shapes are changing. Dynamic. Whatever you and I do, we react--with thought, feeling, or behavior--to something occurring somewhere on the other side of that frame. What we think we see—not necessarily what is really there—is a crucial first determinant of how we subsequently think, feel, and act.

In dealing with a man, whether he's a subordinate, or a superior, or a peer, or a teenager, or a whole man, or a woman, or a black, or a green, or whatever, we've got a problem of some sort--good, bad, simple, complex. The problem-solving sequence we discussed says our first move will probably be an effort at gathering information. What I'm suggesting is that we start work on our people problem by considering that other guy's frame of reference. If you can find out about his, and you know something about your own, then you know what parts of the frame of reference the two of you
FRAMING OF REFERENCE – A START POINT FOR UNDERSTANDING WHAT MAKES PEOPLE TICK

**Summary.**

What we've done here is taken a molecular view of the people side of people problems. We've gone to the individual as the smallest component of the problems which we, as leaders, have a responsibility--through regulations and expectations--to solve. We talked about 8 or 10 keys to understanding--central concepts in the study of human behavior. These 8 or 10 checkpoints are things you need to look at if you want to know what makes people tick.

You need to think about the idea of personality and how that personality is developed, and how it develops over time, and what are the major forces that shape it. You need to be aware that both heredity and environment operate to varying degrees. Whatever the individual does in his day-to-day behavior, there's some underlying motivational foundation. There's a reason for it. He may be responding to certain needs and drives. Whatever he does, the individual operates on two levels, the conscious level and a subconscious level. And behavior at the subconscious level may be more significant than that at the conscious level. Further, there may be six or eight times as much as thinking, feeling, and acting at the...
subconscious level as there is at the conscious level. The man carries
around with him a picture of himself as he thinks others see him, and this
in turn generates expectations, which again, govern much of how he behaves
and how he sees himself. He learns, as he lives his life, a variety of
responses, and situations, and ways of thinking and acting and feeling in
all sorts of situations. And all this comes to him through the basic
process of learning in which feedback is the absolute essential.

All the time, in responding to our world and its daily situations, we
run into frustration; some barrier or obstacle between us and the goal
we're motivated to achieve. A hundred or thousand times a day, we react to
and deal with those frustrations in a variety of ways. Some reactions,
even though they don't work, enable us to live with our failures. The more
usual reactions solve problems. Over the ages, man has developed a
problem-solving procedure which follows a predictable pattern. All these
concepts, from personality to problem-solving, contribute to the person's
frame of reference through which he sees the world and those things that
stimulate his behavior. To understand this frame of reference and the
factors which determine it, is to know much of the answer to, "Why in the
hell would a guy do something like that?"

What I've tried to do for you here in this discussion is sweep across
the whole field of behavioral science and pick up those ideas, theories,
and concepts which appear to me to be the crucial ones in understanding
human behavior. I've tried to keep things on a man-to-man,
person-to-person basis. I've not dropped any names... well, maybe one
or two, but I didn't make a lot of noise with them. And I've not laid upon
you a single "cognitive dissonance," or "Phi Phenomena," or "Ziegarnik
effect," or "retroactive inhibition," or any of the other concept labels
the psychologists use in trying to communicate. But I've given careful
thought to everything I've said, and I've covered a lot of ground. I work
my butt off for you. Now, I've got expectations. Let me ask you to do
something in return. My pitch or plea goes like this... .

Next time you approach a good, tough, people problem, please don't
just "wing it," or, as they say in the Pentagon, "rely on sound judgement
derived from a broad background of responsible experience." Give the
people problem the same sort of research and thought you'd give to a major
problem involving machines and equipment. Actually write out a plan, with
sketches, tables, schedules, and details. And why not use scientific data,
and the results of research?

If I asked you to solve the problem of moving a division to Europe,
you'd sure enough come up with a written plan. And in preparing the plan,
you'd lean heavily on old FM 101-10 and related or supporting publications
for research data on weights, times, capacities, slices, and the like.

Why not write out the details of the plan for solving a people problem
along the classic format of the "Estimate of the Situation"? Look at
Figure 13 on the following page. I'm telling you, it'll flat out work for
people problems. Run your AWOL trooper through there and you'll see. For
data for your people problem, let me suggest to you a book called Human
Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings by two guys named Berelson
and Steiner. It's full of the research findings of thousands of scientists
working across the whole range of human behavior: learning, thinking,
perceiving, opinions, attitudes, beliefs, behavioral development, ethnic relations, mass communications, persuasion, culture, society, motivation, organizations, institutions, the family, and face-to-face relations in small groups—among other things. No detailed explanations. No theory. Just clear, condensed statements of research findings of human behavior, each with supporting evidence. Carefully organized, indexed, and useable by "naive psychologists"... like you and me.

It's time now to move off this log, and off this low-key, conversational approach to understanding what makes people tick.

COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE

1. MISSION.

2. SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION.
   a. CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION. CHARACTERISTICS OF AREA OF OPERATION; ENEMY AND FRIENDLY SITUATION; RELATIVE COMBAT POWER.
   b. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.
   c. OWN COURSES OF ACTION.

3. ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING COURSES OF ACTION. ANALYZE EFFECT OF SELECTED ENEMY CAPABILITIES ON EACH OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION.

4. COMPARISON OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION. SUMMARIZE SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION AND ARRIVE AT A CONCLUSION AS TO BEST COURSE OF ACTION TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION.

5. DECISION. TRANSLATE SELECTED COURSE OF ACTION INTO A COMPLETE STATEMENT OF ACTION TO BE TAKEN (WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, HOW, AND WHY).

FIGURE 13
OF A DESERT BREEZE, AND THE EDGE OF DAWN,

AND A LITTLE DUDE NAMED JOHN

by COL Mike Malone

Picture a map of the world, and on that map, a triangle with lines connecting Washington, D.C., Dak To, Vietnam, and Fort Hood, Tex. Lot of distances involved in those lines. For some reason, one morning at Fort Hood, all these distances collapsed and the three places came together in my head. It was just about reveille time.

I stood for a few moments outside the BOQ, just looking and thinking. Stars were still out. A warm, steady breeze blew from the west. It carried springtime, and the desert, and mystery. I thought, "It's coming from a thousand miles away . . . across the desert, the mesas and the hills, and through the sagebrush and the cedars. It's from way out there, and has been a thousand places."

The lights of Killeen were in the distance, maybe two miles away. Slightly below me was the main road coming into Fort Hood. The road was a stream of light. Cars, bumper to bumper. Soldiers coming to work. I've traveled those streams a thousand times—and I know what's there. Soldiers. Comin' from an apartment or a trailer that does its best to be "home" to the soldier and his wife for one or two years. At 5 p.m., or 5:30, or 6, or 6:30, the stream reverses its flow. Back they go. Soldiers. Goin' home. Their day, for as long as I've known them, has always started early and ended late.

The activities of soldiering are varied. To get missions done, those activities must be scheduled. And those schedules show an 8-hour workday. What they don't show is all that must be done to get ready for that 8-hour workday. And all that must be done to straighten up and clean up when it's over, getting briefings, giving briefings, drawing equipment, cleaning weapons, making plans, giving orders, checking, changing.

As I watched the light stream, I thought of Army pay and benefits under fire. Benefits especially. In the view of many folks outside the Army—and some inside—pay now is equivalent to that of civilians doing comparable kinds of work. Therefore, we can save money by eliminating expensive fringe benefits. This is what the soldier is told as, one by one, fringe benefits are reduced or eliminated. The theme sounds good to a nation straining to achieve economies in its operation. And, statistics can be arrayed to support the theme. And, if the theme and supporting statistics are espoused by the uppermost offices in the chain of command (which the soldier is taught to respect), there is an almost guaranteed assurance that it will not be assailed with much vigor by lesser and lower links in the chain.

Thus, the theme of "civilian equivalency" may well be the rationale for elimination of most of the soldiers' fringe benefits. And it don't make no difference whether the rationale is right or wrong. It sounds impressive, and it's got the "factual statistics" as support, and it's
being trumpeted by "Defense analysts" and their bosses. It is, in my view at least, horse manure on about three counts.

(1) Elimination of fringe benefits runs against trends in the organizational world. If we took a look at what's happened in large organizations in the past 20 years, we'd find fringe benefits on the increase for members of those organizations. From what I read, fringe benefits are the principal chips in the arbitration game. Pay, per se, is used mainly for feints and distractions. But the main difference is that in the Army, the soldier has no one who will really help him play his stake. So, way down at the bottom of the chain, he stands mite, with dumb faith in his chain of command. He takes a screwing.

(2) Faith, fairness and honesty. Go back to the recruiting literature that brought the soldier into the Army or the reenlistment literature that got him to stay. Benefits were promised explicitly or implicitly. An informal contract. Some congressman doesn't like this term. That's too bad. Call it instead a "pact of faith, and trust, and belief."

"Give me hard work, and long hours, and the promise of your life if I need it and I'll take care of you." And thus, our country, through the chain of command, struck a deal with our soldier. In his faith, he didn't ask for it in writing. Later, when he felt he was somehow getting savaged by the wrong end of the stick, that 'ole chain of command that had struck the original deal was gone. It was like the soldier had bought a car. And then, six months later, when the transmission disintegrated, he went back to the used car lot where he made the purchase. And there was a sign: "Under New Management." That's what's wrong with the corporate mind, the institutional memory. Residing in the miles of files that it does, it lacks a conscience. But the soldier has faith in his chain of command, transitory or not. We teach him this. And he takes a screwing.

(3) The civilian equivalency argument assumes that the jobs and the work environment of the soldier and his civilian counterpart are equivalent. Need data for support? Go to Morris Janowitz', The Professional Soldier and find, over time and with the growth of technology, an ever-decreasing number of soldiers' jobs where the skill requirements are uniquely military. After all, if a civilian heavy equipment operator can drive a bulldozer and a crane, he probably can drive a tank. There just ain't that much difference. This "supporting logic" for the civilian equivalency theme is probably the biggest road apple of all.

The civilian heavy equipment operator can quit on two weeks' notice. And he can go find a job with another construction firm. And he gets time and a half for over eight hours. And if you whip him off to some remote location without his family, you double his annual pay and add on all sorts of bennies and freebies and tax exemptions. And, he's got a steely-eyed, cigar-smoking, hairy-armed union representative to fight for him when management starts to economize "for the good of whatever." And, he don't sign on to give, if necessary, his life, his limbs, his manhood, walking point down some distant jungle trail.

I knew a heavy equipment operator once. A little joker. Operated a Quad 50 machine gun at one of our fire bases out west of Dak To. Gunner.
Name of John. He was a stud. Young. Hard-core. Motivated. Laughing and grinning as he carefully cleaned the big weapon. Called it the "Pee Bringer." One day, while I was checking the perimeter, I was joking with him. As he sat there in the gunner's seat, I reached over, put my hand on his head, and wuzzled his hair. Like a Dad does his son.

That night, about 4 a.m., an NVA sapper battalion hit the company, and they went at it, up and down the trenches, and inside the bunkers. I got in at first light in my bird. Some wounded there at the pad. Gray-pale and bloody. Great swollen welts where the frag had gone in. Fifty yards outside the wire, the troops were mopping up the last remaining NVA. I worked my way up the hill toward the CP. I saw the Pee Bringer. Tilted down. Its four black barrels were pointed to the earth. What was left of our little stud gunner was sprawled across the seat of the Quad 50. A hole in the shield showed where the B-40 round had come burning through and hit him squarely in the face.

The troops said it happened almost as soon as the fight began. With no hesitation, the little stud had run to his weapon and started bringing smoke on Charlie. Four streams of red fire. Then a hell of an explosion and 'ole Pee Bringer was quiet and the life and the love and the future of Little John was gone as well. I looked down for a moment to think and say a few words to my God. There on the ground, beside my boot, was a bit of the hair I had wuzzled the day before. And goddammit, I cried for that man's sacrifice. I've not forgotten you, little stud. Some sonsabitches have.

In the light streams there at Hood and at Army posts everywhere, there are thousands of dudes like John. Ready—and sworn—to go, and do, and die. At Dak To or wherever. At the bidding of their chain of command. Now, how can we equate these soldiers and their potential destinies with civilians? The soldier is something unique, something precious. Maybe we should just, by God, take that "civilian equivalency" routine, mix it with straw, pulverize it, and plant it in the primroses so they'll overgrow the path.
THE JUNCTION BOX

D. M. Malone

Thinkers of strategy, makers of policy, and designers of systems for our Army might want to start looking more carefully and more closely at the Captain and his company (battery, troop). The "company" can easily get lost in the shuffle of larger things ... but ... the company is:

- A microcosm of the larger Army ... a lower order but derivative and parallel system.
- A junction box, into which are plugged the wires of a thousand programs and policies.
- The bailiwick of the Captain ... who fights the battle.
- The focal point of "combat readiness."
- The home—and the family—of the soldier.
- The cross-over point of Army energy, where above there is frenetic reaction and a search for time; and below, boredom and a search for purpose.
- The only place where the chain of command links directly into the "human" dimension—the affective, the intrinsic, the intangible.
- The place where the spirit of the soldier lives.
- The litmus paper of the Volunteer Army.
- The ultimate consumer of Army resources.
- The ultimate implementer of Army purpose ... where "it" gets done.

(What do our policies and programs look like from the bottom?)

* * * * *

100 Tasks, Competing Demands, and Shifting Priorities

At 1215 hrs on the 6th of February 1980, an informal study was made of what was going on inside the "brain" of a randomly-selected US Army rifle company. This unit was in its training phase—preparing for war. In about a month, it was due to move out on a major FTX. It was a good, solid, average, rifle company.

The "study" of what the unit was doing was made simply by making a list of what was on the desk tops of the CO, the XO, and the First Sergeant. In-boxes, out-boxes, notebooks, scraps of paper, official correspondence, and forms. The inventory is as follows:
1. Note to turn in cash collection sheet to Bn Mess Hall.

2. Computer print-out of unit equipment from Computerized Movement and Planning System (compass).

3. AR on Assignment of Personnel with Handicapped Dependents.

4. Receipt for $19.60 for attendance of Lt & Mrs Greene at a battalion function.

5. CBR Officer Course certificate to be given to Lt Lewis.

6. FM on organizational maintenance operations.

7. Draft EER for Mtr Sgt.

8. Forms, statements, and reports pertaining to theft of $100 bill.

9. Note from Bn, informing XO he would be appointed investigating officer for above.

10. Note to XO to round up references (FMs, SOPs, OPlans) for FTX.


12. Pencilled list of FTX Preparation Actions:

   07 Feb: Bde Chem Officer to check company CBR teams.
   07 Feb: Briefings for dependents on FTX.
   07 Feb: Bde practice convoy for FTX.
   11-13 Feb: Bde FTX.
   11-17 Feb: Bn FM radio update.
   15 Feb: FTX convoy briefings.
   19 Feb: FTX Advance Party depart.
   21 Feb: Submit FTX rail movement data.
   25 Feb: Bn wheeled convoy departs for FTX.
   28 Feb: Submit FTX air movement data.
   04 Mar: Bde Communications Exercise.
   07-13 Mar: FTX.
   20-21 Mar: Rail deployment, FTX return.
   22-25 Mar: Air deployment, FTX return.
   24-28 Mar: Wheel deployment, FTX return.

13. Note to put concertina around motor pool parking lot. Sister Bn has AGI.

14. DF from Bn: Staff Duty Officer roster.

15. DF from Bn: Lt Lewis go for Officer Record Brief.

16. Bn SOP on reports.

17. EER for Mess Sgt.
18. Hand receipt for Mess equipment used to feed mortar section in the field.
19. Claim form against soldier who kicked window out of private car.
20. Ammunition request for mortar training.
21. DF from Bn: Training notes on "lessons learned."
22. Ltr from member of unit who had PCS'd 3 months earlier.
23. Range request for mortar training.
24. Hand receipt for 1 folding cot.
25. Bar to reenlistment form for Pvt in the unit.
26. DF from Bn: Complete OER support forms.
27. Article 15 Record of Proceedings on PFC who failed to go to field training.
28. Weekly training schedule.
29. Note to counsel Smith, Jones, and Harris on reenlistment.
30. Equipment Dispatch Annex to Bn Maintenance SOP.
31. Set of handbooks for "PEGASUS" CPX.
32. DF on suspension of Art 15 punishment for Specialist Hammond.
33. DF from Bn: Submit handwritten training schedule.
34. EER for SSG Moon.
35. Diagrams for combat loading of vehicles.
36. Separate ration authorization for PFC Richards.
37. Medical examination report on little finger of PFC Atkins, with note from Bn to complete Line of Duty investigation NLT 15 February.
38. 1st Platoon loading plans.
39. Ltr from Bn: Composition of FTX Advance Party.
40. List of junior NCOs to attend Bn Leader Development program.
41. Ltr from Div: TOW and DRAGON training.
42. DA Circular on SQT for FY 1980.
44. Training Circular on tank-mech infantry team.
45. Battalion AR'FEP.
47. List of men absent from PT.
48. Schedule of re-enlistment interviews.
49. DF from Bn: Soldier of the Month.
50. DF from Bn: Motor Pool Police Responsibilities.
51. DF from Bn: Staff Duty NCO Roster.
52. DF from Bn: Regional Marksmanship Championships.
53. List of personnel requiring yellow fever shots.
54. DF from medic: Names of men due overweight weigh-in checks.
55. DF on individuals to attend remedial PT on Saturday.
56. DF for Lt Greene to take annual medical exam.
57. DF from Bn: School quotas.
58. Sick slip for PVT Flores: with sprained ankle.
59. Sick slip for PVT Barder: with lung trouble.
60. Academic report on E-5 who completed BNCOC.
61. DF from Bn: Appointment of E-5/E-6 Promotion Board.
62. PT Scorecard for Specialist Jenkins.
63. DF listing authorized SD assignments.
64. DF listing marksmanship scores of all individuals in unit.
65. Request for school allocations.
67. Request for quota to Bus-driving school.
68. Notes from 1 meeting of "Things to Do" before FTX:
   A. Load sensitive items at Bldg 311.
   B. Put out emergency leave procedure to all troops.
   C. Submit Rear Detachment list to Bn NLT Monday, 1200.
   D. Leave extra keys for rear detachment.
   E. Send 1 NCO and 2 men to railhead for loading.
F. Send troops to cold weather classes on 15 Feb.
G. Submit POV list to Bn Tuesday.
H. Advance party: take 1 CONEX (with rifle racks) per Co.
I. Send 2 men to Bn S2 for LRRP.
J. Submit report on Reports of Survey, prior to FTX.
K. Mark all individual duffle bags prior to FTX (Red).
L. XO check drive-trains of all vehicles.
M. Claims officer to brief troops Monday.
N. Bring enough trash bags for whole exercise.
O. Issue luminous tape for all troops.
P. Send drivers to Bn for Bn XO maintenance class, 1400.
Hey, there, my friend! Where're you going in such a hurry? How about taking a break for a few minutes; sit down here beside me, and let me tell you about the insides of our Army--about its heart and soul.

The "heart and soul" I'm talking about is our Army's corporate ethic. Some amazing things have been happening with this ethic over the last ten years. And I've been watching all that, and listening, and reading and trying to understand. I've got time. Because I'm a trailwatcher, not a pointman. And what I've seen over the last decade is, I think, ethical reform get started. And it's going on right now. I'm proud as hell of my old Army. Let me lay out the highlights.

It all started sometime after Tet, about in the back stretch of '68. If you listened, you could hear some faint ethical rumblings here and there. Then, after Tet, there was My Lai and those other messes. I wasn't very proud then. I was ashamed--of the actions of Lt. William H. Calley, for sure, but what really got to me were the less-publicized but far more pernicious things that happened within the three or four, or maybe even more, echelons up above young Calley.

Our whole Army leadership structure was getting confused along about that time. Within the lower levels of our leadership structure, a lot of our hard-cure NCO professionals had been shot away. And up at the top levels, our nation had "unleashed the dogs of war," but somehow surrounded them with chain-link fences--and put muzzles on them. And then, at all levels, and across our whole Army, there seemed to be a coming-loose of our linkage with our people--those whom we serve--and, in our Army, at least, that linkage is the heart of our heart and soul. But it came loose.

Confusion and ambiguity. Deep down inside. Inside individual soldiers, and inside aggregates of soldiers, and inside the whole lash-up, inside our Army. Somebody lost (or maybe somebody even unscrewed) the golden screw of our Army: its sense of purpose, the bedrock of will.

Now, in my view at least, I think that about that time our Army's collective heart just about broke. Maybe it didn't really break all the way, but it damn well "fibrillated." Your heart and mine will do that one of these days if we put the stress on them too much, too often, too quick, too long. Put continuing and increasing stress on anything, and whatever weaknesses there are will become more and more evident, and finally, it'll break. And I don't know of many things, human or otherwise, that have weaknesses and won't break: human hearts, steel anvils, or an Army's corporate ethic--stress will bust 'em all.

by damn, our old Army began to respond. In a way, it all started in our school system.

In 1970, right after Gen. Peers started writing back from My Lai and vicinity, Gen. William C. Westmoreland, then Army chief of staff, launched the Army War College on a study to determine if the weaknesses and cracks that had been reported extended throughout our leadership structure. "The War College," said the chief, "because of several things that have happened recently: the state of discipline, integrity, morality, ethics and professionalism in our Army is a matter of grave concern to me. Unlimber whatever intellect you have up there, go do an analysis of the 'moral and ethical climate,' find out if we've got problems, and if we do, find out what they are, and then come and tell me what you think we should do about them. You haven't much time. It's mid-April now, and I want to see what you have by 1 July. Move out."

Now why did the chief go to the Army school system instead of his primary staff? You may want to ponder that one. At any rate, the first phase of what I think may be becoming a major "institutional reform" started right there.

Army War College was standing in the chief's office on 1 July. They had the facts, and a good handle on our Army's moral and ethical climate, and a whole bunch of ideas about what we needed to do. But, despite Army-wide top priority and damn near around-the-clock effort by the War College students, staff and faculty, the study they did wasn't all that scientifically "rigorous." Survey samples weren't sufficiently strandomly stratified, or randomly stratified, or whatever. And some of the correlations were catawhompussed, but the facts they did have had enough validity to rattle the chief right down to his heels.

It was bad news. He kept shaking his head, but the facts started backing each other up, and they tracked with a lot of the other "moral-ethical" information available there at head-shed level. All together it said, "Bad news, boss. We've got a new value system working, and it says nothing about 'duty, honor, country.' What it says is 'Me, my ass, and my career.'"

Over the next week or so, there in the summer of 1970, the chief and his staff spent a total of about 25-30 hours on the problem. More facts, and more briefings, and more discussions, and more people called in. Those senior leaders knew that the corporate ethic was our Army's heart and soul, and that it was badly in need of some maintenance time.

The discussions went on. "Horse-manure! That's not the Army I know," said a two-star.

"Right--and that's just the damn problem," said a four-star. "Now sit down and listen!"

"We don't need all this hair shirt, mea culpa and self-flagellation," said one.

"Well," said another, "would you rather whip yourself or have somebody else do it?"
On and on it went, and then the chief made a decision. We did have a problem with our heart and soul--our corporate ethic--and, by heaven, we were going to do something about it.

The War College group had a whole arm-long list of solution concepts. Some got thrown out by the chief and his staff. Some got put on hold. Some got farmed out for someone else to study--sort of between a hold and a throw-out. But some got implemented right away.

Elimination of the six-month command tour was one that got off the boards in just a few weeks. Another assault on the OER got launched. "Zero defects" as a slogan applicable to normal human beings went down the tubes. Command selection boards got started as a replacement for "who do you know?"

And one afternoon in one of the discussions, the chief got the Army personnel chief moving on the initial concepts which later became ORMS (Officer Personnel Management System). The study had shown that at that time in our Army, there was only one narrow ladder to the top, and some folks up and down the rungs of that ladder were fighting and clawing each other for footholds.

And there in the summer of 1970, a whole lot of other actions happened, or got started or died. Some of the proposals are still around today, coming back to this world like a reincarnation in another form, in another study. If you ever get time, you ought to dig out that War College study and look at those solution concepts and read their rationale. You'll be surprised, but you'll understand how our corporate ethic is linked to so much of what goes on in our Army.

But I'll bet you'll have a hard time finding a copy of that study. That's because the chief, in my view at least, fouled up on the foremost, number-one solution concept that those War College folks laid on him, namely, "Dissiminate these findings to our Officer Corps."

He took that study and put that sucker on close hold. I mean close. Locked it up. And that's how it was for about two years. I don't know why the chief did this--probably because he didn't want to lay even more stress on a leadership structure that was already having a hard time trying to find where its sense of purpose had gone. But lock it up he did, and in the years that followed our Army had to sit there with its mouth shut and listen to and take lumps from the likes of King, and Loory, and Herbert, and Gabriel and other various broadcasters, to include this latest squirrel, "Cincinnatus." Hell, our Army already knew the things those guys were honking about, and was already doing something about it.

The close hold exacted a cost in another way, too. During the early 1970s, we whipped out all these various policy changes on our Army, but never gave our leadership structure the real reason why. If they had only known that all these changes were coming from a specific and concerted effort to repair and strengthen our corporate ethic, then, like those generals up there with the chief, they would've flat got with the program.

But that never happened. We never really did get a corporate effort going on our corporate ethic, and all of those great hopes and good
intentions of the chief and his staff never had too much impact—at least, not direct, observable, short-term impact. On the indirect, unobtrusive, long-term side, however, something big had started, and that’s why I have mentioned "a major institutional reform."

One of the solution concepts in that War College study was the one you find in almost any Army study: "Get instruction going in the Army school system." For some reason, that never happened. At least not in any organized, purposeful way. Some of the schools fell out the chaplains and maybe ordered a few theology books, but the effort was disparate and disjointed.

That’s understandable, for we had some awful and more obvious catastrophes, disasters and flaps going on in our Army during that first third of the 1970s. So, there never was a clear, concerted, commonly understood corporate effort on ethics instruction. But, the seeds had been planted in the school system.

Beginning in 1971, the War College cranked in 10-15 hours in a bloc of instruction called "Human Dimensions of Military Professionalism." It had some pretty good practical ethics stuff in it, which was new, but it had some other things in there that were new, too: soft skills—communications, group dynamics, counseling. "All that behavioral science junk," as the old colonels called it. What they didn’t know was that ethics is a thing of effect, not fact, and those soft skills that were being developed were the ones our Army would need to work the realm of ethics.

The term "professionalism" began to rattle around in the school system, too. The word began to appear in class titles. People made up slogans about it—and signs. They put it in messages, and letters and speeches. Finally, it got to where it was cropping up everywhere, and some folks started to gag when they heard the word. You know, our Army can really give a word hell.

Anyhow, the seeds were scattered out in the school system, not doing much. Then, somewhere during 1973 or 1974, this institutional reform I’ve been talking about reared up, roared and flexed its muscle for the first time. It happened out at Ft. Leavenworth. That was about the time that a major general name of John H. Cushman had just put that place in a state of living "future shock." Changes everywhere.

Some Leavenworth students in an elective one day were talking among themselves about things ethical and unethical, OERs and readiness reports, and ambition without dedication, and other topics like that, and damned if they didn’t give Gen. Cushman a proposal for Leavenworth to hold a special three-day conference to discuss their concerns about things ethical. He approved it. "And bring in one general for each 50-man section—and bring in some 'ethics experts,' too," he said, "military and civilian. And bring in some behavioral scientists, and some social scientists so we can have a panel for each section."

Gen. Cushman did it. And the generals came. And the experts. Things started off with some lectures in the auditorium. Pretty heavy stuff. Some theology, and some research, and some theory, and few prayers here and there. Then they all fell out and moved to the section rooms.
The panels pontificated, and the students nodded and dozed politely. Everybody real nice.

But then, sort of easy like, the students started coming in on the oblique with a few questions about the difference between ethical "what should be's" and unethical "what is's."

"What do you mean?" said the generals. That was a bad mistake. Those students just flat unloaded on them: policies, procedures and pressures; instances, examples and cases; dishonest demands coming down, dishonest reports going up.

"I never tolerated that in my division," said one general.

"I was in your division, general," said the student.

"Lock your heels," said the general.

When that corporate ethic flexed its muscle there in those Leavenworth section rooms, ethical things got hot, and generals' cools got lost, even to the point where students' heels got locked. It was tough, direct, and pointed and heated--and some of those generals got hurt--bad. Skewered. 50:1 odds. They just weren't used to that kind of talk, coming from majors, anyhow. But remember what was going on in our Army about that time. There was another one of those slogans on the wind. And generals were whipping it around just like everyone else. "Tell it like it is"--and that's just what those students were trying to do.

Gen. Creighton Abrams was Army chief of staff at the time. Within a day or so after the Leavenworth affair, "Abe," as usual, alerted early to something significant that had happened in his Army.

"What the hell happened out there at Leavenworth?" he said.

More reports started coming in. It was streaking time at the lurid levels of Americana then, and one of the wounded generals said, "It was a pointless springtime exercise in moralistic streaking."

"They got out of control," said another.

"It's that damned VOLAR--it's ruined us!" And so forth, with most of the wounded generals pretty well bad-mouthing the whole exercise. And naturally so. They're the ones that got the dart where it hurt. In front of people. Subordinate people.

Abe was, I think, about to sack the whole idea of "ethics conferences" and lower the boom on Leavenworth, but then, amid all the negative feedback and bad-mouthing, one voice said, "Chief, what kind of shape would our Army be in if we had gone out there to talk ethics with those youngsters, and, rather than some pretty powerful emotion, we had met apathy instead?" Abe was the essence of wisdom. The boom didn't fall.

From then until now, there never has been any "systematic, organized" professional ethics "program" in our school system. No hard directives or orders rattling down the chain to "teach ethics" in some
analyzed-organized-standardized fashion, although "officer professionalism" classes keep popping up, not because of directives but because of what you might call "institutional instinct." But, from then until now, ethics conferences, like the one at Leavenworth, keep happening all by themselves, here and there all over the school system, and every now and then you'll see one get started out in field units.

But let's get back to the mid-'70s, and that still-nascent, slow-growing, long-term institutional reform.

Ethics-wise, an event of major significance occurred in our Army on 12 October 1976. It was even more significant for the "institutional reform" than the start-up work by Gens. Peers and Westmoreland. It happened out at Ft. Benjamin Harrison, of all places.

Up until that time, "ethics stuff" had pretty well been the bailiwick of the chaplain. But what happened out there at ADMINCEN laid ethics right where it should be—square in the lap of our leadership structure. Clearly. Unavoidably. Inescapably. What did it was the concept of "organizational leadership."

For years, our Army's thinking about leadership had been centered on the idea of the individual leader, the traits he ought to develop and the principles by which he should operate. We'd give him a good shot of this individual leadership when he first came into the Army, and then figure that would be appropriate for the whole rest of his career. But the scientific study of leadership, which really got going only as recently as the 1950s, was telling something different: the demands of leadership vary greatly according to the level in the organization where you're leading—what works great at small-unit level may not be worth a darn up at the higher levels.

Lot of people don't realize this and it may be why some generals try to run companies. It may also be why all those helicopters used to stack up over firefights in Vietnam.

Anyhow, ADMINCEN's mission was to look at scientific studies of leadership, and they'd been out looking.

For about two years--across all major research and studies of leadership, civilian and military, scientific and practical—they put all that together, boiled it down to about 150-proof, and came up with a lash-up called the "organizational leadership matrix."

If you want to see how they did all this, you can read a pretty heavy academic poopsheet called Leadership Monograph #8, but what the leadership matrix said, very clearly, was that the demands of leadership do vary by organizational level.

The interesting thing here is that, while the ADMINCEN leadership researchers were coming up with that, the war researchers who were putting together a new tactical doctrine were coming up with the same "difference by level" idea. They were saying, "If we're going to do the right things right in the next war, then generals marshal, colonels direct, and captains fight."
You may think I'm a long way away from the ethics business I've been telling you about, but I'm not. I'm telling you that everything is related to everything else, and I'm suggesting the relational linkage between "things ethical" and "how we fight." But we probably need one more little piece of info to make the lineup clear, so back to that ADMINCEN leadership matrix.

In that matrix, there are nine basic leadership demands or dimensions. I won't list all of them common to every level. You can read them in FM 100-1: The Army. But I will tell you what the last one is: ethics. What our Army had begun to do, back there in the mid-'70s at ADMINCEN, was turn to the leadership structure and say, "Now on this ethics business, you've got the ball, and you can't just hand it off to the chaplain." In sum, ethics is a cornerstone of our leadership doctrine, and it generates leadership demands at all levels.

By 1975, this institutional reform was beginning to spread out. It had been cooking on "medium low" over in the school system for about five years, and now it was into the leadership structure and thinking, and, through that, into the war doctrine, and even up into the capstone doctrine for our whole Army. No one engineered that. Our Army did it. The institution. US.

But, any institution lives in a world of other and bigger institutions, and it's linked to all of them. This means that any truly significant "reform" in any one institution is going to have impacts on the others and on the biggers. And this also means that if a reform is going to really work in one place, the institution needs the understanding of the others and the support of the biggers. For our Army, the "others" I'm talking about are the other professions. And the "bigger" institution is our nation.

In the last decade or so, virtually all professions have learned, usually from their clients, about the importance of things ethical. And as to the "bigger," well, Watergate and its fallout, and how our nation feels about all that mess, should insure that the larger institution of which our Army is a part will not only support but will also, in fact, admire, and even applaud, an institution making a sincere, long-term, deep-down-inside effort to pull maintenance on its corporate ethic.

And that's precisely where the civilian secretaries fit in: they are what links our Army to our nation. Our nation sure wants an ethical Army, and the secretaries are in the prime position to help that happen. If our corporate ethic is our Army's heart and soul, then, each time a secretary lays a requirement on the Army, he ought to be thinking about that heart and soul. What are the moral and ethical implications of this requirement?

Certainly, if our secretaries use environmental impact statements to see what's going to happen to snail-darters and gecko lizards, surely they can use moral-ethical impact statements to predict what might happen to our Army's corporate ethic. Maybe they will. If they're perceptive, they'll sniff out and help with that institutional reform.

Between that ADMINCEN study and today, the institutional reform continued to gather strength. Through 1976 and '77, those ethics
conferences kept coming up. Our professional journals began to carry articles on things ethical. The organizational leadership matrix, saying that ethics was one of the nine critical dimensions for all of Army leadership, began to pick up steam within the leadership structure.

Instruction in the soft skills, and in the world of "effect," continued to develop in the school system—at the War College and virtually every other school. And at ADMINCEN the researchers launched again, this time to write a separate monograph on applied ethics, painted green, and they finished it in early 1978. They called it Leadership Monograph #13.

In 1979, as we put together a new course of instruction for battalion and brigade command designees, "things ethical" was the very first topic considered, and it became a principal subject for the course. And up at DA a little later in 1979, a group of 20-30 people from all over the Army, with pretty good expertise in things ethical, began to meet informally once a quarter, sponsored by the DA staff. They met not to write poopsheets or generate actions, but simply to discuss our Army's values, our Army's ethic and what we soldiers believe in.

By 1980, this ethical reform had spread out across the whole Army—into our schools, journals, and into our doctrine and our leadership. Finally, in the middle of last year, it all percolated up to the top.

In the early summer of 1980, and on their own initiative, senior generals of major commands and staff directorates began to get together with their principal officers—not to work a program, or hear out an IPR—but simply to talk about "things ethical." I suppose maybe 20 or 30 of our major commanders and directorates did this on their own.

Then, the chief of staff capped off this effort as he and the main men of the Army staff went off by themselves, and put in two full days just thinking and talking about our Army's values. And finally, in October, in the big annual ARMY Greenbook, the two lead articles by two Army four-stars, dealt not with weapons systems or strategies but with our Army's values, and things ethical.

Right now, from the bottom to the top of this Army of ours, the word is out and the will is there.

What, then, will happen to this "institutional reform," this major maintenance effort on our Army's corporate ethic? Damned if I know. We could kill it easily, like we've done with other natural things in the past. We might slogan it to death—or strangle it with regulations, programs and poopsheets. Or beat it to death with a stovepipe. Or shove it down peoples' throats where it'll get chewed up, and spit out.

All these things we have done before: killed a hundred natural growing ideas that could have been "reforms." But I think this one is just too big, too important, coming from too deep inside our Army and linked too well to what our nation needs. I think our routinizers and regulators just can't foul up fast enough to stay ahead of it.

Today, "things ethical" in our Army are sure a lot better than they were ten years ago. But we're still a long way from being all that we can
be, in terms of "things ethical." The rank and file of our officer corps, commissioned and noncommissioned, badly want things to be put right. And there are, in process, many interrelated initiatives and actions, formal and informal, moving in that direction.

We have at long last begun to find the words that will describe with clarity our Army's corporate ethic and the values that make it up. It is time now for us to put this ethic and its values into words, and to then put those words into action--into all that we say, for sure, but most importantly, into all that we do.

When that happens--and it will--then I need watch this trail no more.
Let us tell you about a military twilight zone. It's an area penetrated by only a few; a place relatively untouched by the probing fingers of current doctrine. It's a zone of uncertainty and mystery, filled with half-formed things. It's an area within whose vast and misty reaches may be hiding those secret and elusive elements of success in battle.

This is the twilight zone of responsibility. It exists in time of peace and in time of war, and in the times in between. It is that transitional area that lies between conventional and unconventional warfare. For convenience, we'll call it the area of special operations.

Who is responsible for the twilight zone? Where is the unity of command as special operations "escalate" from counterguerrilla training, to cold war patrolling against guerrillas, to raids deep in a conventional enemy's rear? Who does the work? Special Forces? In part, reluctantly. Conventional forces? In part, wishfully. Look closer at the role of each.

Try Special Forces. Counterguerrilla training? No, that belongs to the conventional forces. Operations against enemy guerrillas? No, that belongs to the shoot-after-shot-at MAAG "advisors." Raids deep in the enemy rear? No, "our" guerrillas do this. And before you sic them onto that enemy command post or missile site, ask a few more questions.

Are they conveniently located near your target areas? Do they have the skill and the weapons and the inclination? Can your Special Forces teams order "our" guerrillas to attack at times and places of your choosing? At present the basic task of Special Forces is to organize, train, and support guerrillas. Not counterguerrilla training, not fighting enemy guerrillas, not raiding command posts.

Try conventional forces. Can they carry out the special operations we mentioned? Sure, but let's add an if. If a division, for example, can provide good training within a program already crammed to the bursting point with countless hours of mandatory subjects. If the division can furnish qualified instructors. If the division has a realistic training area. If the division has the special equipment needed. If the division can provide adequate supporting combat intelligence. A conventional unit can carry out all sorts of special operations— if.

We have no force for the twilight zone. The responsibility is shared and not defined. This means trouble. Example? Yesterday's argument on the development of military rockets. So, find the force and fix the responsibility. We'll tell you where to look.

Look at the other armies of the world. Look for forces organized, equipped and trained for special operations. Counterguerrilla training? Try the British SAS (Special Air Service, a British special unit) right now
in Malaya. Operations against guerrillas? Check the Philippines' Scout Rangers in the Huk war, or the Greeks' Raiding Force, or the Germans' Jagdkommando. Hot war raids in the enemy rear? Try the British SAS again, or the British Commandos, or the French Commando Shock Battalion, or the Turks' Commando Battalions—or read of those who followed a leader named Skorzeny. All units of the twilight zone.

These special operations units are those of foreign armies. Within our own army, there are people who argue violently against "foreign influence." This was the argument being bruited about several years ago when Special Forces tried to adopt their beloved beret as official headgear. Too foreign. We bought a new antitank weapon shortly thereafter. The SS-10. From France.

Well, then, look for the special operations unit in our own Army. Not in the Army of today, but in the Army of yesterday. You'll find that we had a force in the twilight zone in virtually every war in our history. A special operations force. Rogers called them Rangers.

The Ranger patch is the mark of our finest young warriors. Proof? Try pulling Rangers away from their units for certain training tasks. You'll find the wildcat-wet noodle routine a lot easier. That black-and-gold patch is the mark of a man to whom mission is all. It signifies determination, endurance, night-fighting proficiency, and highly developed patrolling skills. How would you like a unit that meets this same description?

Give the Ranger unit a peacetime mission. Counterguerrilla training. Some divisions, like the 101st Airborne and the 82d Airborne, have given their individual Rangers a major part in counterguerrilla training. But this requires sacrifice. Units must give up their best young men to division schools and committees. The need for qualified instructors is the major demand in counterguerrilla training. A Ranger unit, temporarily assigned to a division, can furnish the know-how, the special equipment, and the instructors—all for free.

Check the reports on recent counterguerrilla training exercises. (Never mind the efforts of the Public Information Officer!) A glaring weakness is the lack of a qualified guerrilla-type aggressor. To practice conventional war, any soldier can be an "enemy." Our man in the foxhole and theirs are basically the same. But how many of our soldiers have the skills of the guerrilla? Does a composite unit, organized as a guerrilla band for a training exercise, approximate the same skills as the well-known 11th Viet Cong Company in Vietnam? A Ranger unit can give you the skills, the challenge, the test.

Give the Ranger unit a cold war mission. No need for a special two-month training program. No need for a "toughening" period. No need to pull out a third of the division's strength. Ranger units can be ready on call. Ready to search and kill in the guerrilla's home grounds. Or ready to give counterguerrilla training to a friendly nation's conventional forces. Remember, they've had practice at this as part of their peacetime mission.
Suppose you had to do either of these tasks right now. How would you go about it? Screen records, pull personnel, choose a training base, prepare training programs, individual training, unit training, special equipment. How long would it take? How quickly could you streamline and move a "Ready Force" counterguerrilla brigade? How effective is the two-thirds of a division that remains behind—if the counterguerrilla brigade should trigger off a hot war?

Give the Ranger unit a hot war mission, with or without the mushrooms. Put in that great stretch of the enemy rear that lies between the Ranger of divisional patrols and the limits of the operational areas of Special Forces guerrilla bands. Too deep for division patrols. Too strong in conventional forces for guerrilla operations. Shall we leave this area undisturbed, and depend mainly on the silent, flickering pulse of radar?

Be a corps commander for a moment. Fight the battle in an area that goes back 150 kilometers into the enemy rear. Do you need a force in those deep and critical target areas of which you know so little? Send a conventional helicopterborne force—if it can fly the gantlet of a modern air-defense system, if it can find its landing zones when the moon is down, or when it's raining, or when the silent ground fog comes padding through the valleys. You'd better ask for Rangers.

We used Ranger units in World War II. The Normandy landing is a good example. German coast-defense guns atop a vertical cliff were a critical target since the guns could sweep the landing beaches. Thousands of conventional troops were available and could have been given the task of destroying the guns. But who got the job? The Rangers. Why? Because this was a special operation.

The last time our Army used Ranger units was during Korea. As a sample of their actions, the 1st Airborne Ranger Company was committed to seize a critical, battalion-size objective. Three times they assaulted, with the grim doggedness born of pride and reputation. Out of an original strength of 137, 17 weary Rangers finally fought their way to the top. Take note of what this company was doing. This company that had been trained and organized to infiltrate and attack rear area installations.

In 1952, the fateful hue and cry arose. Some thoughtful souls, motivated by various factors, began their battle cry: "Do away with the Rangers; regular units can do just as well with special training!" These thinkers didn't consider—or at least didn't mention—the if factors. What "reasons" did these thinkers expound? Let's examine a few.

"Caucasian troops can't fight in an Oriental rear area!" We hear echoes of this even today. What about the success of white British in yellow Malaya and black Africa, or even Rogers' white Rangers in the red "Northwest Territory?" Ranger units, unless someone directs them otherwise, will fight almost entirely during the hours of darkness. They're trained to avoid everyone in the enemy rear, unless there's someone they want to kill. Maybe escaping prisoners of war in Korea had trouble in an Oriental rear. What logic compares a group of PWs to a Ranger unit? If there is an area somewhere whose people are green (and there are evidently some green ones about today), put a Ranger unit there and quit worrying. A
beard, some dirt, a camouflage stick, and the blackness of night make one man as green as another.

"Ranger units are taking the best infantrymen—and Ranger replacements are hard to find!" This was true, but it was rather carelessly chosen as a reason for disbanding the Ranger companies. Ranger units did take the best infantrymen, but they wouldn't have gotten them if they hadn't needed them. "Best infantrymen" was an essential ingredient of the Ranger companies.

Back to the tale about regular troops doing Ranger-type missions just as well with special training.

What's the proportion of "best infantrymen" in a regular unit, while the draft is on in CONUS, while recaptured AWOL trainees are getting shipped directly to the combat zone? The nature of special operations requires the best infantrymen and the best small-unit leaders. If you don't make the investment, you don't get the returns. As to the replacement bit, how would you like to be the GI of an air assault division, looking for helicopter drivers after that first SAM kiloton?

Now for the last of the "reasons" worth considering: "Ranger units cannot pull their weight in prolonged combat!" This also was true. And here, by the very nature of this complaint, we see why the Rangers' record in Korea is not up to their past traditions. Ranger units were used improperly. Nothing new. The same thing happened in World War II. Two Ranger battalions were slaughtered almost to a man when someone tried to use them as antitank weapons. Ranger units have been used improperly in two respects: as conventional units, and as scapegoats for errors in judgment.

A Ranger unit, by organization, by training and by equipment, is not designed for sustained, conventional combat. No artillery weapons, no vehicles. These things aren't needed for fighting deep in the enemy rear, or in the strongholds of the 11th Viet Cong Company, or in the area that the 20th Division uses for counterguerrilla training. Is a conventional unit designed for combat in these areas? Any string has two ends.

Before we leave the time period of the Ranger companies in Korea, think of something else that people wanted to discard: that piece of sharpened steel that fits on the end of an M1, or an M14, or the new Armalite. There were those who cried, "Do away with the bayonet! There's no place for it in modern warfare! Give the soldier a good, sturdy Boy Scout knife!" But what weapon struck terror into the hearts of the Chinese? What weapon was instrumental in putting fire in the soul of Eighth Army as it finally faced to the north with a sense of purpose? So much for the do-away-withers.

Quickly now. Strike while the iron is hot! Bring back the proud Ranger units. Beat the others to the punch. The Marines aren't blind to the publicity value of a special operations force. The Air Force already has Air Commandos. Even the Navy's getting into the act with airborne frogmen who pull Ranger-type commando raids. (Parafrogangdors?) They're waiting, back in the wings, waiting for the spotlight to dim.
Quickly now, a Ranger battalion. A combat force for the twilight zone. A unit whose reason for being is special operations, regardless of the temperature of the war. Counterguerrilla training today, a guerrilla stronghold tomorrow, an enemy commander's threat after diplomacy has run its course. Give killing power to the Special Action Forces. Sharpen the point on the STRICOM dagger!

Quickly now. Strike while the iron is hot! Bring birthing pains. Give it to Special Forces, to those who live behind enemy lines. In cold war situations, why not guerrilla and counterguerrilla doctrine under the same headquarters? Both can develop rapidly through the interchange of ideas and techniques, an interchange unimpeeded by channels and time and parochial view. In hot war situations, why not a force on the ground between the division's patrols and the guerrilla's areas? Coordinate the killing in the enemy rear. Insure a smooth link-up as conventional forces approach the guerrilla area. Give the battalion to Special Forces—now, while Special Forces has the spotlight, and the money, and the priorities.

Quickly now, a Ranger battalion. Make it part of the Special Forces Group. Give it the advantage of the Group's intelligence, its long-range communications, and its aerial delivery system. Use the battalion at army, but give it the ability to fragment itself so as to send Platoons and companies to divisions and corps. Give another "special weapon" to division and corps commanders—provided they have a mission and adequate combat intelligence. Let the Ranger Platoons, companies and battalions handle the myriad special operations that lie between conventional and unconventional warfare—in the twilight zone.

Quickly, a Ranger battalion—now! Change the charts. Erase the present command line at the Infantry School's Ranger Department. Draw a new line, straight and uninterrupted, directly to the Special Warfare Center. With this one quick stroke, give the Special Forces a Ranger Training Command. The instructors, lesson plans, training aids and a thousand square miles of rugged terrain are ready and waiting. Train Ranger units for assignment to Special Forces groups. Be flexible, retain the ability to modify class input, and turn out an occasional class of individual Rangers for assignment to conventional units.

Quickly now, the men. Take a TWX machine and ten days. Let the message read: "Volunteers for a Ranger battalion are now being accepted upon individual application. Must be Ranger-qualified. Process requests by . . ." There are 10,000 Ranger-trained soldiers in the Army right now, from generals down to privates. High-caliber, tested, volunteer manpower is the least of our problems.

USCONARC: "All combat units will develop the same capability in counterguerrilla warfare as in conventional warfare." Others: "There is no need for Ranger units. Adequately trained conventional forces can perform the required special operations."

Once upon a time, there was a man whose car got stuck in a ditch. He opened the trunk, got out a piece of rope, a horsewhip, and two small kittens belonging to his son. He tied one end of the rope around the
bumper and the other around the kittens' necks. Then, brandishing the whip over them, he said: "If I say you can pull this car out of the ditch, then you can; and you had better damned well pull it out. Now get to work!"

And so, the kittens pulled and pulled and pulled . . .
THE ESSENCE OF ARMY LEADERSHIP

COL Dandridge M. Malone

The very essence of leadership is its purpose. And the purpose of leadership is to accomplish a task. That is what leadership does—and what it does is more important that what it is or how it works. The purpose of leadership is to accomplish a task.

Individual Leadership

Political leaders, community leaders and scout leaders are all similar to some extent. All try to put people, things, time and effort together to accomplish a task. The big difference with Army leaders is the "Army" part, and that is a big difference.

Being an Army leader means that in the final analysis, that leader must be ready someday, somewhere, to lead soldiers to accomplish an ultimate task that no one else wants to do, under conditions that no one else wants to tolerate. Those intolerable conditions exist with an Army at war in combat—killing and dying. Small-unit leaders will usually lead this ultimate task, but any of us might someday get the call, no matter what rank, branch or military occupational specialty.

This ultimate task is what makes an Army leader so different from all those other leaders. It is also the essence of being a "soldier." And it is the essence of "service" as well, and the underpinnings of the whole idea of military "duty." All these things mean being ready to give up freedom, and even life, for the sake of our nation and its people in what has been called "the noblest act of mankind." At bedrock level, that is what Army leadership is all about. And that is why Army leadership is so important and so different.

To accomplish a task, that is the purpose. Army leaders have done or will do this a thousand times in response to orders direct, implied or trained into them. These orders will come down through the one thing that links all of our leadership together—the chain of command. This chain of command controls, coordinates and supports. It also challenges. Think about that time when the essence of leadership, soldier, service and duty will all come together, when the chain of command speaks of that ultimate task and when it says "Attack!"

The artillery shifts, small arms crack, men tremble and the platoon tenses for the final assault up the hill. An Army leader gives the signal, and they go. Why is it that John T. McFerren, soldier, US Army, obeys the leader's order? Leadership or followership? Neither. It is both.

John T. McFerren assaults up into this kill-or-die situation because:

- His buddies are counting on him to do his job.
- He thinks his buddies will call him a coward if he does not attack.
- He has learned that his leader knows the right thing to do.
• He wants to please his leader.
• He believes he will be court-martialed if he does not attack.
• He thinks he will be left alone if he does not attack.
• He believes that following orders is the right thing to do.
• He believes he will be rewarded for attacking.
• He believes that attacking is less dangerous than not attacking.
• He believes he will feel guilty if he does not attack.
• He wants to prove his manhood, his courage, his competence or his worth as a soldier.
• He hates the enemy.
• He enjoys the excitement and thrill of combat.
• Following orders has become an automatic habit.

McFerren assaults for any, or all, or some combination of the above reasons, or for some other reasons not listed. If the leader had the expertise and the time, he might somehow figure out the "why" for McFerren, but, next to him, there is Johnson, Allen and Brown. They go too, and each for some different pattern of reasons which neither the leader nor they will ever know--but they go.

They go because at that critical moment in time, when each will wrestle briefly with the decision of whether to attack or hide, attacking is their best choice. The Army leader, first out, first up and out front, shows them that this is so. And, so, they go. They follow him. He leads soldiers. That is his task.

The incident about the assault, McFerren and the leader up front also represents, in simple terms, the essence of Army leadership. All the bedrock elements are there, all the basic mechanics and the ultimate task. Listen to Army leaders talk leadership, and, sooner or later, this situation, or one just like it, will always come up. They will argue about the whys and the hows. They will tell war stories about what worked and what did not, and, every time, they will point out exceptions.

What all this means is that there is no set of absolute rules or procedures, learned from experience, that will tell us exactly how Army leadership works or what Army leaders should do step by step. Nor is there any psychological "model," learned from scientific research, that has all the answers or that can tell a leader how to turn a soldier on and off like some machine. Our Army knows more about leadership than any other institution, and what it knows it has learned from both the wisdom of experience and the findings of scientific research. Army leaders have no choice but to learn the same way.
Years ago, some wise Army leaders, at a time and place unknown, sat down, thought out and wrote up "the principles of leadership." These principles represent, better than anything else, the essence of what our Army has learned from experience. Just like the principles of war, they are basic tools for analysis and understanding and basic guidelines for what to do. These principles are present in McFerren's assault. They are in the leadership stories that Army leaders tell. They are found in the leadership schools and in the manuals. They are working wherever Army leadership is. They are basic tools and basic guidelines. They are simple, plain and straightforward. They are experience and wisdom. If you aspire to be a leader, you must know, practice and live them. You must:

- Know yourself and seek self-improvement. You must be honest with yourself about your strengths and weaknesses as a leader. By knowing yourself, and your soldiers, you should be able to tell how your actions will affect the actions of your soldiers.

- Be technically and tactically proficient. As an Army leader, you must show your troops that you have the knowledge and capability to lead them. Your rank and your position do not ensure that your soldiers will follow or trust you in battle. When the chips are down, they follow the man who knows. You must learn in detail all the technical and tactical aspects of your job.

- Seek responsibility and take responsibility for your actions. After you have found your strengths, overcome your weaknesses and become technically and tactically able to do your job, you must take the initiative to accomplish your unit's mission. You now must be ready to accept the responsibility for what the unit does or fails to do. Rank has its privilege, but responsibility comes first. You must also conduct yourself in the manner your rank requires.

- Make sound and timely decisions. As a leader, you must be able to make a rapid and true estimate of the situation and, from that, make sound decisions. A leader needs to be decisive. A soldier works well when his leader is quick to adjust to changing situations. A good decision, made now, is far better than the best decision made too late.

- Set the example. The standard for your unit is set by your example. "Follow me and do as I do" must be your guide to the way you act. This applies to all aspects of what you do as a leader, particularly in the face of hardship and danger. Your good example will produce good results in your unit.

- Know your soldiers and look out for their welfare. As a leader, you need to know and understand your soldiers. You must get to know your subordinates and be aware that they come from different backgrounds and that each is different. If your subordinates know you are concerned about them, they are more likely to become a unit that can be depended upon.

- Keep your soldiers informed. A well-informed soldier will have a better attitude toward his leader. As a result, he will be a better soldier, and you will have a better unit. Your soldiers need to know the situation to make a decision if you are gone. If your soldiers know the unit mission and their role in it, then they can set their own goals.
You will not always be able to give your soldiers the reason for every task because you may not know it or there may not be enough time to tell them. Let them know that, when possible, you will tell them the reasons why you are doing what you are. They will trust you when there is not enough time to give all the facts because they know you will do so later. Soldiers usually fear the unknown. By keeping them informed, rumors and fears will be reduced.

- **Develop a sense of responsibility in your subordinates.** Give your subordinates enough authority to do their job. This creates trust and respect between you and your subordinates. This also encourages your subordinates to take the initiative when doing their jobs. By giving your subordinates authority, you are showing you trust them to do their job. Keep in mind that too much supervision is as bad as not enough supervision. Delegate.

- **Ensure that the task is understood, supervised and accomplished.** Give clear and concise orders so your soldiers will know what they are to do. Soldiers usually respond quickly to orders they understand. Do not give too many details; let your soldiers develop their own ways for using their skills to do their tasks. You must make it clear that you are available for help. You must also check to see your orders are being followed.

- **Train your soldiers as a team.** Each soldier must know what his job is within the unit and how important he is to the unit. Make your subordinates feel they are a part of a team effort. Work to keep the morale of the soldiers high to aid in getting better teamwork. The team spirit also helps your men to feel safe.

- **Employ your unit in accordance with its capabilities.** Good training gets a unit ready for its mission. You must know what your unit can and cannot do. Employ your unit within its capabilities. Your soldiers will lose their spirit if they are continually given tasks that are too easy or too hard. You must use sound judgment in assigning tasks to your unit. If the unit fails time after time, your subordinates will lose trust in themselves and in you as a leader.

So where and how does a leader use these time-honored principles? He uses them wherever and whenever he is leading, and he uses them to put together the two great factors that underlie all that we know about Army leadership: mission and men. Leaders are always working with these two basic factors.

Wherever and whenever possible, a leader tries to balance so that the needs of the mission and the needs of the men are both met. But there are times, sometimes in peace and oftentimes in war, when the needs of both cannot be met. When leaders cannot balance, they must choose one over the other. In these situations, and the leader must make them few, mission must come first. The ultimate task tells us so and so does the meaning of "soldier," "service" and "duty."

The mission side of the scale requires, simply stated, knowing the job—weapons, gunnery, maintenance, tactics—in excruciating detail. This
is most of what "professionalism" means--technical competence. Without it, an Army leader can never lead for long. Just talk will not work.

The other side of the scale requires, simply stated, knowing the soldiers, not merely their hat size, birthday and where they are from, but what is inside of them--what makes them do things or not do things; what turns them on or off; what they can do and what they will do under stress; when they are afraid, tired, cold or lonely; how they feel as individuals and as teams; and where their will and spirit lies.

It is precisely here, here in this "balancing" business, where leaders most frequently fail. It is here where young leaders have their greatest difficulties and where even old leaders, despite their wisdom, sometimes lose sight of the ultimate purpose of leadership. The problem arises because of the relationship that exists between soldiers' "happiness and satisfaction" on the one hand and their "mission accomplishment and productivity" on the other.

Common sense would tell us that happy, satisfied soldiers will get the job done better. From this, a leader, especially if he is new, might well assume that if he can somehow keep his soldiers happy and satisfied, then they will be more productive--get the job done better. A thousand scientific studies of leadership and a thousand lessons of leadership experience show that this natural, common-sense assumption is precisely wrong!

In simple terms, task or mission accomplishment drives morale and esprit far more often than the other way around. When soldiers and units get done those things that soldiers and units are supposed to do, that is when morale and esprit get highest. That is why the individual soldier's morale and "motivation" are usually at their peak right after basic training. That is also why unit esprit and "motivation" are usually at their peak when the unit is training in the field. Mission accomplishment drives "job satisfaction" far more often than the other way around.

If an Army leader does not know both sides of this mission-men scale in detail, he will be forever getting it tilted the wrong way at the wrong time. Tasks will not get accomplished, and soldiers' time, soldiers' will or the soldiers themselves will be wasted.

Organizational Leadership

The preceding discussion has covered the cornerstones of individual leadership--primary purpose, ultimate task, basic principles and fundamental mechanics. All that has been said so far about the essence of leadership is sound, but it is incomplete. It is not all of the essence. There is one more thing--a whole additional aspect of leadership that leaders all too often overlook. To do well what our Army must do, Army leaders must understand this final essence.

Leadership must be more than the sum of its parts. It is analogous to an electrical connection. Take a battery, a piece of wire and a flashlight bulb. Lay them out on a table. What you have is three pieces, three individual things. That is all. Now, hook those three things all together. What you get is one thing composed of three pieces. Each piece
does something different, but, if each piece functions as it is supposed to, and if you get them all hooked together right, you get something extra. You get a fourth thing that you did not have before, something extra—in this case, light.

This simple word picture explains the final essence of leadership. Most of what I have said so far about the foundations of leadership concerns the individual leader—personal, individual leadership. Individual leadership is absolutely essential, critical and of the utmost importance. But, by itself, the idea of individual leadership is not enough to explain what Army leadership is and what it can be.

Go back to the word picture, back to where we had the three individual things, three individual pieces. Army leadership will work just like that example. Each individual leader in an organization, of whatever size, does something different, but, if each individual leader functions as he is supposed to, and if the commander gets them all hooked together right, something extra is created that was not there when there were only individual pieces.

In the example, the extra was light. In our Army, the extra is highly effective, high-performing units—the kind of units that have drive and killing power on the battlefield; the kind that get the right things done right, without a lot of hassle, down in the motor pool; the kind that have esprit, high standards and a reputation for solid performance. That is the extra.

Getting that extra is not easy, but it is not magic, charisma or luck. It is doable. The formula lies foremost in the competence of individuals, then in how communications flow throughout the unit and, finally, in the teamwork and cohesiveness of individuals and teams. Training hard, together, on the job and in the field, in all the individual and team tasks related to the unit's mission, that is what puts these three critical factors together to produce the extra. That is the formula, plain and simple. There is no other way.

It is not the tooth fairy that comes in the night and brings that extra that every soldier would like. It is the leadership of the unit, not the individual leaders by themselves, but the whole leadership of the organization, each piece functioning properly, and all hooked together right, developing the individual and unit skills needed to fight and win.

Our Army has always understood this notion of "organizational leadership." At least one of the principles of leadership gets at it straight out. But only recently have we begun to study our experience and our research so as to be able to put this idea into words, into our training and into the essence of how we lead.

To understand the practical value of this idea of "organizational leadership," go all the way up the chain of command to the top of our Army's leadership, up to the chief of staff's level, up to where the task to be accomplished is "defend this nation." If you start coming back down the chain of command, breaking that big task into subtasks, those into sub-subtasks, and so on down the chain, you can work all the way down to
the point where a section leader in the motor pool says, "Get that generator fixed so we can get this tank running."

In between those two tasks to be accomplished--defend the nation and fix the generator--there are a hundred million others, up and down and sideways. All come from that first one, all are related and all get accomplished, for better or worse, by the leadership of our Army.

It is easy to see from this example that leaders at different levels have different tasks to get accomplished. Leaders who are generals, leaders who are colonels and leaders who are captains all need different leadership skills--leadership skills that best fit the level where they work and the kinds of tasks that are found there. They need a basic load of basic individual leadership that applies at any and all levels, but, then, they also need the particular leadership skills required to accomplish the tasks at their particular level.

What all this means is that if we can really understand this notion that leadership varies by level and if we can, from our research and experience, put into words just what the differences are, then our Army, our whole Army, is on the way to getting some of that "extra." This idea of "organizational leadership"--not just talked about, but studied and tried--gives us the key for how to get the individual pieces hooked up right and how to get that extra.

What all this also means is that if we can get this new piece of our leadership doctrine working, our chain of command will work better. We will see less and less cases of company officers trying to do sergeant's business, generals and colonels in helicopters trying to fight rifle companies in combat or captains and majors trying to pass judgment on how the chief of staff should defend our nation.

To make this happen, the lower, middle and upper levels of our Army's training system must each teach the additional and particular leadership skills required at each level. And that means that every leader, as he moves up through the levels of our Army, will always have something more, something new and something extra to learn about leadership.
LEADERSHIP AT GENERAL OFFICER LEVEL

COL D. M. Malone

THE PROBLEM AND THE PURPOSE

This isn't a run-of-the-mill, fruit-of-the-loom, service school advance sheet. Its purpose is not to firehose you with facts (although we will lay a few on you), but rather to get you to think—to think about what is, and what was, and what can be. The informal style of this paper, considering our august USAWC educational environment, will be, to some, understandably, offensive. The informal treatment of the topic, considering the omnipotence of that topic in the professional soldier's life, will be, to some, sadly, irreverent. Nevertheless, let's get with it. . .

The "Wizard of Oz" comes on television every now and then. Some of the students (and most of the faculty) will probably watch the program later this year. Dorothy and her buddies and her scrumpy little dog will move out down the Yellow Brick Road, find the Emerald City, and be ushered into the magnificent presence of the Wizard of Oz. Amidst fire, smoke, crashes of thunder, and flashes of lightning, the Wizard will appear—huge, all-knowing, fearsome and powerful. When he speaks in his deep resonant voice, Tin Woodsman's knees will rattle, Lion will break down and cry, Scarecrow will come completely unglued and collapse, and that ugly little Toto will turn tail and split.

The point of this story is this: you don't have to wait for the annual showing of a TV program to see almost the same phenomena. A hot-eyed Pentagon general with a short-fused action can produce the same results. So can a general in the field. So can most generals.

Some years ago, the Office of Military Psychology and Leadership at West Point put together an interesting case study in organizational communications. The case related to the first few days when General Harold K. Johnson took over as Chief of Staff. He was on one of his first inspection trips. Looking at the troops somewhere. He passed one who had a hole in his T-shirt. "That's unsightly," he said, pointing at the shirt and turning to one of the entourage of sunshiners. Now General Johnson was a brand new Chief, not too well known, and virtually unspeculated on because he had come from 'way down in the deck. The sunshiners were understandably nervous. All antennae were fine-tuned. And when the Wizard spoke on that particular day, you and I and hundreds of thousands of soldiers felt the shock of impact. Remember that message long ago that went something like, "Effective immediately, the undershirt ("T" shirt) will no longer show above the vee in the neck of fatigue jackets, khaki shirts and other (?) work uniforms." The chain of command flexed and rattled and a hundred thousand troopers: (1) cut the necks out of their T-shirts, (2) pulled the tails down and tied them underneath like a body shirt, or (3) just quit wearing upper underwear. Theirs was not to question why.

About a month later, two things occurred. The PX, as might be expected, came up with a Vee-neck T-shirt. And another message (like some
which were part of the later "Great Haircut Communication") came down through the 'ole chain saying, in effect, "Look, we didn't mean it, men; just make sure they're clean and ain't got no holes in 'em when the Chief comes around." But it was too late. The clothing manufacturers, benevolently and patriotically ever-sensitive to the true needs of the soldier, had gotten into the act. Three or four years later, in Vietnam, you and I both saw the quizzical, puzzled look of the poor field troop when he held up for size a government-issued, O.D. undershirt with an off-the-shoulder design and a neckline that plunged to his navel. You probably still got a few of those in a footlocker someplace. Hell, maybe you're wearing one right now!

This story, too, has a point. A Pentagon general with a real and significant problem of changing civilian hairstyles in conflict with current military values can produce the same sort of unintended communication results. So can a general in the field. So can most generals.

The two tales together tell us a fact of military life which most of us have experienced and all of us have observed. "The general" is a powerful and awe-inspiring figure to many of us. This condition can often lead to fouled-up communication, overreaction, and poor or even counterproductive execution of the decision-maker's orders and instructions.

One of the surest ways to the sort of power which produces fear and awe is through uncertainty and mystery. The Wizard knew this. So did Indian medicine men, and shamans, and witch doctors. So do the leaders of some of the far-out cults which exist even today. And so do some politicians. Mystery . . . mystique . . . the strange and dark unknown. Surround a man with these things and you make him powerful, awe-inspiring, fearsome. Perhaps we soldiers have, over time, done this with "the general." Deified him. Made him God-like so that at those times crucial to the nation's survival, we can, at his bidding, make the sacrifices and do the things which must be done in war. To deify our generals could be right, and it could be wrong, and it could be worth some thought later on (one general recently told me it was one of his biggest problems), but let's get back on track.

Do we want our generals to be powerful, awe-inspiring, fearsome? Given our form of government, our national heritage and our kind of soldiering, I don't think we do, and I don't think most of our generals would want that either. Perhaps our best approach, then, is to reduce the mystery (and hence, the awe and fear) through knowledge. Pull back the curtain and find there not the omnipotent, all-mighty Wizard, but rather an ordinary mortal like you and I, executing the responsibilities of his office with abilities and techniques understandable to all. And that's the objective of this class on "Leadership, Power and Responsibility"--to understand all that we can about the general, and the requirements of his job, and how he meets these requirements. Hopefully, this understanding will enable us to communicate better with the general and to execute better the things that he, as decision-maker, wants done.

There's another rationale for studying the general . . . and that's you. Good data from several surveys of past USAWC classes tell us that
about 75 percent of the USAWC students aspire to become general officers (if they're West Pointers, the figure increases to 85 percent). Now . . . if a need, or goal, or desire, or aspiration level of this magnitude exists within the student body, and if this goal is linked directly to the future of our Army, then we should take the opportunity to explore the goal. Historical data show that about 15 percent of you will become generals. One out of every seven. Two per seminar. Have you thought seriously about what the general does . . . or are you just going to "wing it" when the time comes?

THE UNKNOWN SOLDIER

We run into one major problem when we sally forth to study (not just read about) the general. The data base. Nowhere in the Army Staff, or the Army school system, or ASDIRS, or whatever, could we find a place where there exists a concerted and organized effort to study and aggregate a body of knowledge on the general, his job, and how he does it. And yet, each year we thrust upward into positions of awesome power and responsibility some 50 or 60 brave and list-stunned colonels, armed with little more than a new pistol belt, a nice flag, a half-truckload of half-sized stationery, and some general general guidance (from the BC Orientation Program) something along the lines of, " . . . and remember, a closed mouth gathers no feet!"

Why the lack of information? How come we don't know more about the general and his job? How come we can't answer, with some measure of objectivity, that question heard by wives, close friends, and the General Officer Management Office when each new BG list is posted: "Christ! What the hell does a general do?" Perhaps the answer lies in the mystique mentioned earlier. Maybe we make him mysterious and beyond the ken of mortal man . . . on purpose. Maybe the generals want it that way, or maybe they're too busy with other things, or maybe they feel that to approve a concerted effort to study themselves would be immodest, or maybe . . . maybe we've just always been afraid to ask.

CAMPFIRE TALES

You and me and Uncle Sam have studied the squad leader, platoon leader, company commander and battalion commander in great and infinite detail. We've written books, and pamphlets, and special texts, and checklists. We've built programs, classes, courses and even whole schools around the jobs of these leaders and how those jobs are performed. Sure, there's thousands of different kinds of each, just as there are differences in general officers' jobs, but try to find out how to do the general officer thing. I'm afraid you'll find that the main source of information is a vast and everchanging mythology, bandied back and forth across the rims of coffee cups and cocktail glasses:

. . . Hell, I'll tell you one better than that. On the first day that General __________ took over the directorate down in the Pentagon, he walked right into his office, sat down, and threw both the in-box and the out-box right in the trash can. "Don't worry," he told the horrified horse-holder, "the really important actions will be right back in a few days."
... I was fighting a big ambush out west of Dak To. Gunships, air strikes, fourteen hundred kinds of artillery, and a cav troop. C&C runnin' low on gas. I called the TOC and told 'em I was goin' in to re-fuel. 'Ole General __________ came right in on my push--hell, I didn't even know he was there--and he said, "Go ahead, John, I'll run the show while you're gone." And damned if he didn't. Layin' that rapin' on the NVA, bringin' in the artillery, directing the gunship runs. Man, he was a regular master orchestrator!

... I'll be a suck-egg mule if I can figure out how that guy ever got to be a damned general. Why, he couldn't scratch his butt with a wildcat in each hand. I'll tell you, I remember one time I took a paper in to him, and he just sat there, and stared at it, blank-eyed. Didn't even read it. And it was a hot action. You know what he did? He said, "Bill, how's your wife and kids doin'?"

... Boy, what a general! That guy read everything and didn't forget nothing. I couldn't believe it. One time, back in '70, I saw him flip through the pages of a stud book on some 25-30 Reserve generals--he just spent 2-3 minutes doin' it--then he went out on the stage and gave his talk and called at least half of those dudes by their first names. He knew their units, equipment, strength. All that good stuff. I couldn't believe it. You know, I think all generals must have memories far beyond the capacity of most folks. How the hell do they do it?

... And the aide said to General __________, "Sir, you can't take those poopsheets with you on the trip. They're classified." And he said, "Well, I'm going to declassify 'em. Hand me those scissors." And damned if he didn't just cut the tops and bottoms off--you know, where it says SECRET--and stuff 'em in the briefcase! And that's how we went to the big conference at USAEUR headquarters.

And so goes the lore of what generals do and how they do it. A thousand stories over time, spiced with observations of generals in action, and we each develop our own idea or model of the general. And thus we train for our Army's prime positions of power and responsibility. Maybe this is the best way ... I don't know ... but ten thousand years ago on the broad savannahs of the African plain, when we were a little hairier and didn't stand quite so straight, we trained our generals in exactly the same way. (You might want to read the book, The Imperial Animal, by Robin Fox and Lionel Tiger. They'll tell you about those real early generals, and about the fascinating "ten-group," the basic organizational unit which those earlier, hairier generals commanded and which has persisted from then until now.)
THE LESSONS OF HISTORY

In addition to the tribal lore, we've got books. The "lessons of history," as Will Durant says. Most every great general gets chronicled. He either chronicles himself, or he gets chronicled by someone who knew him well. Biographies and autobiographies. All of us professional soldiers have read at least a few. "War as I Knew It," "Crusade in Europe," "Stillness at Appomatox," "Lee's Lieutenants," and so on, all back through the reaches of history. Insights into the lives of the great generals.

Good poop. Informative. Inspirational. An essential in the development of any professional soldier. And they are. But be careful. Think a moment.

Memoirs are good for leaving tracks in the sands of time, but you and I both know that human memory doesn't simply store facts objectively like a computer. It has a funny quirk. Negative "data" tends to fade and disappear. Positive poop hangs in there ... and it often gets embellished.

Is it true that the general who gets chronicled and lives on in history is usually the one who is exceptional or outstanding? We need historical generals who set the standards. But could it be that those standards are more appropriate for generals than for ungenerals like you and me? For every Patton, and Pershing, and Lee, there are thousands of just plain generals—where are the lessons of history on the "model" general, the position to which we can reasonably aspire?

Read a great book on a great general. The main lesson is almost always a picture or a sensing of the man's personality. Certain traits stand out. To follow this particular model of the general, then, all you need do is develop the traits. But ... one problem. The shrinks provide good evidence that one's personality becomes pretty well fixed early in life, say by the late teens. Thereafter it's tough to change. Sure, one's personality can be changed, but it's like changing the shape of a guy's head—possible, but pretty rough on the individual. Thus, if you don't have the trait as part of your own makeup to begin with, you might be ill-advised to try to develop it. Have you ever noticed the hollowness of many of the folks who try to ape Patton's trait pattern, or the guy smoking the cigar who really can't stand the taste?

Every now and then, a good writer and good researcher comes along, looks across a given span of history, plucks out the chronicled generals, then tries a comparative analysis. What pattern of traits and characteristics did these guys have in common? If only we could find that formula, then we'd be well on our way to understanding what a general really is. Puryear did this in his book, Nineteen Stars, published in 1971. Patton, Eisenhower, MacArthur and Marshall. General A. S. Newman, a writer whom we all admire, tried the same thing in the pages of Army back in 1969 with "What Are Generals Made Of?" Pershing, MacArthur Westmoreland, Simpson, Patton, Hodges, Collins, Huebner, Krueger. And sure enough, there was a pattern ... .

Courage, integrity, judgment, dependability, decisiveness, initiative, confidence ... and thrifty, loyal, brave, obedient, cheerful and helpful,
too. Certainly, some sort of pattern of traits emerges when we look across a comparative analysis of chronicled generals. But . . .

Even 'ole Aristotle couldn't define courage. The best he could do was say that courage lay somewhere in between caution and foolhardiness. Judgment, what's that? One of you told me earlier this year that judgment was what a student got from a War College education, i.e., moving from cocksure ignorance to thoughtful uncertainty. Initiative? How many of us have gotten whanged on an OER because our definition of initiative precisely defined some disgruntled rater's idea of "lack of tact"? (No problem with grunted raters.) Back about 1960, 150 executive readers of Fortune magazine were surveyed for their definition of various managerial traits such as loyalty, dependability, integrity and the like. There were 147 different definitions of "dependability."5 And so definitional problems rob much of the promise from the trait pattern approach to understanding the general. There are other robbers . . . and here we can lean for a moment on the scientific study of leadership, which abandoned the trait route in about the 1930s.

Let's say that we have, through our study of the chronicles, dredged up the GO formula—the pattern of the common traits that tells us what generals are and how they operate. And let's say that we have, as we Army types are wont to do, whipped the definition problem by spelling them out somewhere, Alice-In-Wonderland fashion ("... words mean just what I say they mean, nothing more, nothing less.") Good. We've got things pinned down, precise, organized. We're about ready to write up our "Officer's Call" or "Commander's Call." Title: The Army General. Distribution: two each officer. Ready for "promulgation." (A civilian once asked me what promulgation was. I told him it was a violent but short-lived gastrointestinal disorder best controlled by liberal doses of Pepto Bismol.)

Alas! We will find that the same pattern of traits which characterize the general also fits quite well other groups of people who are not generals. Privates, for example. The same pattern fits "opposite" kinds of individuals. And, further, we will find that opposite patterns of personality fit the same kind of individuals. Effective generals, for example. Bradley and Patton were both effective generals. How similar were their patterns of traits? Clarence Huebner and Terry Allen both achieved outstanding combat results with the "Big Red One." Huebner was strictly business, task, discipline; no foolishness. Allen shot craps with the troops. Opposite patterns. Outstanding results. Same outfit. So we must be careful of leaning too heavily on the lessons of history when we want to understand the general. The lessons are good, but, unless they're chiseled in stone and carried by a man in a long robe coming down off of a mountain, we had better look for additional sources.

And one final thought. As one reads through the biographies, autobiographies, memoirs, personality studies and comparative analyses of our generals, there is, in much of this literature, a common theme, expressed or implied: "You, too, can become a general, and here's how to go about it."

Nothing wrong with that theme. Harmless enough as it stands, and maybe helpful, too, for a group of bright and highly select officers, each
of whom has a 1 out of 7 chance of becoming a general. But what about the rest of the Officer Corps and the vast majority of our lieutenant colonels and colonels--good, solid, average professional soldiers? Is such a theme appropriate for them? Have we overplayed this theme too much in the last 15-20 years? Relied too much on the carrots? When did the rank of lieutenant colonel or colonel lose its significance and realism as the primary goal for the long-term professional? OP0 has always advised younger officers to work for certain assignments and schools so that they could "be competitive"--how long ago did we start using this criterion in counseling lieutenant colonels and colonels? As our beloved Abe said not long ago: "For Christ's sake, doesn't anybody out there just want to do a good job?"

So, as we study the general, let's be careful about our perspective. Let's be less concerned with how to get to be a general--and more concerned with what one is, and what the requirements of his job are, and how he meets those requirements.

**MAN, WHEN YOU BRIEF HIM, HE JUST SITS THERE AND STARES AT YOU!**

What does today's general look like? Well, when you're briefing him, he looks rather formidable. Staring at you. Not a lot of expression. Frowning. Formidable. He doesn't mean to look formidable, but maybe he appears that way because he's concentrating, listening with intensity, further condensing the condensation you're giving him. 120 proof poop. And when you're through in a few minutes, he's got to make a decision, or give some guidance, or at least say something wise and profound. He knows that's what you expect. And he knows that when you're through, some other dude is going to do it to him again on an entirely different subject. Another condensation, more listening, more thought, more alternatives, more pros and cons, more critical factors--and another decision, and more guidance. Given a daily dose of that routine, you and I could be very formidable.

Look at the enormous power and responsibility involved in any general's job. For instance:

At the start of the Korean War in 1950, the U.S. discovered that Okinawa--within fighter bomber range of all the major ports of mainland China--had strategic value. The U.S. began building bases, leasing land and training Ryukyuans. The High Commissioner's post--among the most sensitive politico-military assignments available to an Army officer--continued until 1972 when the U.S. returned Okinawa to Japan. One of the last incumbents, from 1961 to 1964, was Lt. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, now retired. Caraway's career took him from an Arkansas grammar school, where he learned about Okinawa in geography class, to control of the 650-mile-long archipelago with its 750,000 Ryukyuans, 90,000 minority group members and 75,000 military personnel.

The general's governing powers were absolute, and he used them. He dealt directly with the Secretary of
Defense, bypassing the Army chain of command and the State Department. Caraway could issue ordinances which carried the force of law; he could veto any legislation the Okinawans passed if he wished to (and if he failed to block it beforehand). He could appoint judges, remove people from office and shut down business that, in his opinion, operated contrary to the public interest. He held commutation and pardoning powers, plus control of 50 percent of the stock of the Bank of Ryukyus. He settled land-ownership disputes, consolidated suger mills, refused a request to import Cuban sugar to Okinawa for a Pepsi plant. He surveyed schools, inspected prisons, visited outlying islands, built water and sewer systems. He worked sixteen hours a day in a job that he described as halfway between being President and governor of a state. But actually Caraway represented more than that: the High Commissioner of the Ryukyus was executive, legislative and judicial branch of the government all wrapped into one.21

Or try this one:

Gen. Henry A. Miley oversaw, according to March 1972 figures, a $30 billion inventory, annual expenditures of $9 billion, 37 major weapons systems and 12,400 military and 132,000 civilian personnel, 83 military installations and over 100 depots, laboratories, arsenals, maintenance shops, proving grounds, test ranges and procurement offices. In 1969, at the peak of the Vietnam War, the Army Materiel Command's expenditures of $15 billion comprised one-fifth of the total defense budget.21

Those were perhaps exceptional generals. How about the "average general?" I don't know; it's tough to get a handle on his power and responsibility, but here's a thought... . . .

The Army's inventory of major and secondary items of equipment comes around to $29,700,000,000. Add $3,300,000,000 for the Stock Fund. Then about $60,200,000,000 worth of real estate. Add to all this the $22,900,000,000 of the FY 75 budget, and throw in $500,000,000 of Federal housing money. That gives you about $116,600,000,000. Add to that the work and play and joy and sorrow of 750,000 soldiers and maybe an equal number of dependents, then divide the whole lash-up by a mere 500 men. (Like Tennyson's Light Brigade, MTO&E), because it's the generals who are responsible for how the whole thing works. The product is a rather awesome slice of power and responsibility, even with the commissary bag arithmetic. You and I could look very formidable. But let's take a different approach to "What does he look like."

DEMOGRAPHY AND THE SHIFTING GENERAL

 Probably the most complete demographic picture done on the general officer is found in a book which most of you have read: Morris Janowitz'
Janowitz presents a detailed analysis of a survey done with more than 500 generals and admirals of the top three grades in the Army, Navy and Air Force. From that study, we get a rather complete profile of the model general—birthplace, age, source of commission and so on. But, The Professional Soldier was published in 1960, and the survey Janowitz reports on was done ten years earlier. That's almost 25 years ago. What are the changes between then and now, or, more importantly, what are the trends and shifts?

We could find no organized longitudinal demographic studies of our senior officers and no replication of the survey reported by Janowitz. But we can get at the changing picture of the general officer, particularly the trends, in a different way.

In 1974, an Army student at the Naval War College, LTC Chris Patte, conducted a survey with all officers at the nation's five senior service colleges. Six hundred fifty-three out of 850 students responded to his questionnaire which covered four basic areas: social background, education, personal beliefs and military experience—essentially the same areas covered in the 1950 survey reported on by Janowitz. If we make the assumption that the future generals among Patte's SSC students are not too different from their classmates, and that they represent the general officer of the 1980-1990 time period, then we have a basis for looking at general officer demographic trends over a 30-year time period. That's what Patte did. Some of the more interesting trends are outlined below.

In 1950, the greater percentages of our generals came from the north central and southern states. The trend is toward a decreasing number of generals from the south and northeast and an increasing number from the west and north central regions. The number of generals from urban areas has remained fairly constant, the number from small towns has decreased and there has been a ten-fold increase in the number coming from farm homes.

In terms of religious orientation, the Protestant dominance (89 percent of Army generals, for example) reported in 1950 has decreased significantly, making the Catholic proportion about 27 percent for our 1980 generals.

There has been a definite shift in the social origins of the generals. Janowitz, analyzing fathers' occupations, reported that it was the professional and managerial groups, rather than the business groups, which contributed most heavily to the generals of the '50s. Patte found an "opening up" of the top ranks to all comers, regardless of social origin. Far fewer sons of doctors, teachers, lawyers, ministers and executives—and a five-fold increase in the sons of blue collar workers.

There is a trend toward a broader educational base for the 1980 generals. Only 27 percent of the 1950 Army generals came from non-military colleges. (As an aside, it's interesting to note that the comparable figure for 1950 Navy admirals was 1 percent! Ninety-seven percent came from Craptown, and the remaining 2 percent hadn't graduated from anywhere. Beat Navy!) According to Patte's analysis, about 65 percent of our 1980 generals will be graduates of non-military institutions.
"What was your primary motivation for initial entry into the service, General?" Janowitz found four motive patterns in the 1950 generals: family tradition, opportunity for military experience, educational opportunity and boyhood ambition ... ambition. The 1980 generals mentioned educational opportunity also, but they expressed three different motive patterns: job satisfaction, challenge ... and the draft.

There were no significant changes or trends in personal beliefs and ideology. Janowitz reported a slight preference among the 1950 generals and admirals for the "somewhat conservative" label, with no real differences between the services. Patte found a more conservative Navy (46 percent to the right of center) and a more liberal Army (36 percent left of center). His whole sample of future generals and admirals stacked up 50 percent on dead center, 9 percent to the left, 41 percent to the right. (The hawkish Air Force and the Few Good Men obviously pulled the Army back into line!)

Janowitz, in *The Professional Soldier*, discussed two great categories of generals: the "heroic leaders" and the "managers." He noted that the manager types were growing in number and influence. He urged that we be careful of the balance and that we continue to perpetuate the traditions of the heroic leader. Apparently we have. Patte asked his future generals to position themselves on a leadership continuum between "heroic leader" and "manager." He got a very even distribution with a slight favoring of the managerial side. Ward Just, in *Military Men*, has written that the technocrat (executive/manager) is on the rise, but apparently our future generals will maintain the essential balance between hero and manager.

These, then, seem to be the central demographic trends in what the general was in the past and what he may be in the future. Let's take a look at him now. There are no studies or data which will enable us to describe today's general on the same dimensions as Janowitz and Patte, but if we take the general officer roster and available biographical sketches, then rassle with the data a bit, we can come up with a pretty good picture of today's composite general.

The composite general most likely was born in a town of less than 25,000 population, in a northern state, in the region east of the Mississippi. In terms of individual states, he is most likely to have come from New York. He is 51 years old and has served in the Army for 28 years. There is a less than 50 percent chance that he attended West Point. If he did attend, he is most likely to have graduated in the top third of his class. He holds a Regular Army commissioan and rose through one of the four combat branches, usually the Infantry. He has earned a masters degree from a civilian college or university and has graduated from the Army War College. He is married, usually within one year of the basic date of commissioning, and has three children. He serves on a staff rather than commanding troops, and is located in Washington, D.C. He has held his job for less than a year.

Nothing very startling about that. (Maybe two things are—the source of commission and time in the job—but more about that later.) Our general, demographically at least, is pretty much like the senior decision-maker of the corporate world. To get our general in perspective,
it may help to take a look at what might be considered his civilian counterpart.

There is a consultant firm headquartered in New York known as Heidrick and Struggles. Every five years they run a careful survey focused on America's business elite—the generals of the corporate world. Those surveyed are the top executives of the 500 largest companies in the country. Put our generals under your left arm and their president under your right arm and see how they compare. Think about the similarities, but think about the differences, too, for it's these differences that begin to define the general officer.

The civilian general's title is most often, simply, "president." Responsibility-wise, he is usually the company's chief executive officer. The management area that demands most of his attention is planning (vis-a-vis administration, marketing, personnel and so forth). His annual salary and bonus come to $100,000 or more; he has a stock option with the company, a company-purchased automobile and company-paid membership in a town club. He's about 52 years old, was probably born in the mid-west, been with the company more than 30 years and was made president before age 50. He probably got his undergraduate degree in a private eastern college, then later picked up an Ivy League law degree or MBA. His track to the top ("OPMS specialty") was usually through general administration or marketing. He's been president for five or less years. Position-wise, he normally wears just one "hat." Almost 90 percent of these guys work 50 or more hours a week.

And there's another comparison which some of you—and God knows how many other folks—saw in the newspapers not too long ago. It was one of those little newspaper nits reporting on a University of Connecticut survey which asked 400 citizens to rate the practitioners of 20 occupations as to their truthfulness:

1. Doctors 11. TV news reporters 12. Plumbers
5. Psychologists 19. Politicians
6. College professors 20. Used car salesmen
7. Psychiatrists
8. High school teachers
9. Lawyers
10. Law enforcement officials

There is in the literature far more research and data on the corporate president, including his decision requirements and the impact of his position on his personal life and family. We could trot these data out as we try to understand the requirements of his job, but you couldn't compare him with our general. We just don't have much comparative data available. We Army types have never been much for objective and organized introspection at our top levels.
THE GENERALS AND THE SHRINKS

In the fall of 1972, the Army took a unique and highly unusual step with respect to general officer development. The results of this effort can contribute quite a bit to our understanding of the general. However, we need to first digest a bit and get a handle on the concept of "assessment centers."

Some of you are familiar with the book, Assessment of Men, which came out of the Office of Strategic Services staff after World War II. The book describes in detail the procedures, tests and devices used to select and train OSS agents for covert operations. Much of that same comprehensive assessment methodology is found today in the rapidly-growing executive development concept of assessment centers. Corporate executives attend these centers and participate in an extensive and comprehensive assessment program often lasting several weeks. Psychological inventories, situational tests, intelligence tests, stress situations, in-basket exercises—a whole assessment battery designed to provide an objective and detailed "wholeman" evaluation. The results go to the individual for his own self-development and to the company for use in executive development, assignment and promotion. The point is that the executive is subjected to intensive, detailed, comprehensive, objective evaluation by experts, almost constantly, over an extended period of time. A regular depot-level, executive "TI."

In August and September of 1972, the Army sent 12 brigadier generals—some were colonels (P)—to an assessment center known as the Center for Creative Leadership in Greensboro, North Carolina. For two weeks these generals underwent an evaluative "trial by fire." Psychological inventories, leaderless group discussions, communications skills assessment, instructor evaluation, peer evaluation, subordinate evaluation—the whole gamut. Much of each man's behavior was recorded on audiotape and videotape for later detailed analysis.

We visited the center during one of the sessions. In one room, a group of "assesseees" ("stuckees" in War College parlance) was seated around a table trying to solve a minority group problem which was occurring on another planet in the 26th Century. The whole situation was different. None of the traditional ways of analyzing and solving problems would work. The whole power and authority structure was new and different. The assesseees were "on their own"—hard pressed and hard at it.

In a room adjacent to the discussion room, six assessors were seated at a long work table observing the action through a one-way window. (Their presence was known to the assesseees.) One assessor was recording shifts in leadership, another was recording non-verbal communication, another was making notes on coalition formation among the group members, another was picking up each speaker with a video camera, and so on. Data out the gazoo.

At the end of the two-week session, the generals returned home and the assessment staff went to work analyzing the data. This took about three weeks, then each general returned individually to the center and sat down for a whole day's feedback session with a counselor from the assessment staff. This session was recorded on audio-tape. At the end of the
session, the counselor gave the cassette to the general. And this was the
only record which linked the general by name to any of the results.

Incidentally, some of the generals had been understandably reluctant
to attend. "Two weeks of testing by a bunch of shrinks, and me a brand-new
general?" When it was over, however, all gave a high indorsement to the
program, almost all suggesting that it be incorporated into the various
levels of the Army school system. The final report from the assessment
center (which discusses the generals without naming names) is the only one
we know of which looks both scientifically and comprehensively at the
behavioral make-up of the general.13 Bear in mind, however, that we're
only talking about 25% of one year's general officer crop.

You got to watch those shrinks. They're sly. When our generals
attended the center, the shrinks mixed them in with an equal number of
counterpart civilian executives who were also assessed. These executives
were about 43 years old (as compared to 45 for our generals) and were
district managers, general managers, and vice presidents of companies such
as Rockwell Manufacturing, Prudential Insurance, Blue Cross and Blue Shield
and First Union National Bank. Furthermore, a year earlier, the
assess-center had run an identical assessment program on a dozen US Army
battalion commanders. We have, then, two groups against which we can
compare our generals for better perspective. Let's examine some of the
results.

All three groups were far above average in general intelligence, with
the generals perhaps most intelligent of all. For example, all three
groups scored in the top 2 1/2 percent of the population on one
intelligence test. On another intelligence test measuring verbal reasoning
and other verbal skills, here's how the raw score averages of the three
groups compared with a large sample of college-educated USAF captains:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USAF Captains</th>
<th>BGs</th>
<th>Execs</th>
<th>Bn Cmdrs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the other hand, we can look at their scores on a test measuring the
perceived importance of academic achievement. College students who drop
out before graduation average about 40 on this test; those who earn BAs,
about 50; those who earn MAs, 55; and PhDs, 60. All three of our groups
scored low: BGs, 48; Execs, 49; Bn Cmdrs, 48. According to the test, men
who score low on the scale and yet earn graduate degrees usually do so
because they have an important goal in mind which requires the degree for
its accomplishment.

Both the BGs and the Execs were more outgoing or extroverted than the
Bn Cmdrs. On one measure of extroversion and introversion, 50 percent of
the BGs and 67 percent of the Execs scored in the extroverted direction, as
opposed to 25 percent of the Bn Cmdrs. BGs were particularly high in
motivating and influencing others to participate. And on their
likeableness, i.e., their ability to project a favorable image, BGs were
higher than any other group ever assessed at the center.

There is a major difference between the BGs and Bn Cmdrs versus the
Execs in relative emphasis on mission and men. Seventy percent of the BGs
and Bn Cmdrs, versus 25 percent of the Execs, emphasized mission over men on a test called the Leadership Opinion Questionnaire.

Some indication of the personal needs behind the 12 generals' behavior can be found in a comparison of the need patterns of the BGs and the Execs versus the men-in-general norms of the test. (Entries are percentiles.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Need</th>
<th>BG</th>
<th>Exec</th>
<th>Bn Cmdrs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Need for achievement</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>No data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for order</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for dominance over others</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for endurance and tenacity</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for deference to others</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>69</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interest patterns come to light in a comparison of percentile averages on a 400-item test called the Strong Vocational Interest Blank. (This test, incidentally, is available to you through the USAWC inventory and assessment program.) Listed below are various areas of interest. The degree of interest in each area is shown by the percentile ranking in comparison with men-in-general. These numbers can be bewildering. To make them work for you, first circle the high scores, then study the resulting patterns.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest</th>
<th>BG</th>
<th>Exec</th>
<th>Bn Cmdrs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Public Speaking</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Law &amp; Politics</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Merchandising</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Adventure</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Recreational Leadership</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Social Service</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Religious Activities</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Office Practices</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Military Activities</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Sales</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Math</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Mechanics</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Music</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Art</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Teaching</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Writing</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Technical Supervision</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Still further insights into the psychological make-up of our generals comes from various scales on a whole battery of psychological tests and measurements. Again, scores for all three groups are indicated as percentile averages in comparison with the men-in-general norms of the tests used.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale or Item</th>
<th>BG</th>
<th>Exec</th>
<th>Bn Cmdrs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Achievement through conformity</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement through independence</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inability to accept own weaknesses</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ego strength, or ability to remain emotionally stable and calm</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy and drive</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual and personal efficiency</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociability (outgoing, participative)</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social presence (poise, self-confidence in interaction)</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attacking contrary points of view and criticizing others publicly</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saying what one thinks about things and criticizing those in authority</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership ability, dominance, persistence and social initiative</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance of other's aggressive feelings</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to appraise others, to sense what they feel and think</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interested in and responsive to inner needs, motives and responses of others</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility and adaptability of thinking and interpersonal behavior</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility in application of values</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsiveness to inner urges (hunches) versus being &quot;practical&quot;</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*--No specific score, but higher than 50th percentile)

The assessment staff offered these summary conclusions regarding the observed differences among the three groups:

1. The battalion commanders were more concerned with "standard" solutions than the other two groups.

2. The BGs and corporate executives were more outgoing and people-oriented.

3. The BGs and corporate executives were more flexible and adaptable in their behavior and approach to problems.

4. The BGs and corporate executives functioned better than the battalion commanders in less structured situations.
In the final section of their report, the assessment staff pulled all
the data and observations on the DGs, then conducted a separate in-depth
analysis. Their most interesting finding was that our generals could be
categorized rather clearly into three distinct and different managerial
types.

One categorization used by the staff was "the dependable, cautious,
managerial type." The hallmark of this man is dependability. He can be
counted upon to do what is expected of him. He is a highly capable,
competent, very intelligent individual who enacts a standardized leadership
role quite effectively. He has energy and drive. He is slightly
introverted, not to the extent of being unsociable, but to the extent of
being distant and somewhat removed. He'll score high on arguing for his
own point of view and persuading others to do what he wants. On anxiety
measures, he's a relatively non-anxious individual. He's trusting of
others but not very flexible and adaptable in his thinking and social
behavior. He prefers thinking to feeling as a basis for judgment. He
dislikes problems unless there are standard ways to solve them. He's not
very interested in people's feelings and may hurt them without knowing. He
is impatient when there are too many details to remember, but he likes
analyzing things and putting things in logical order. He has a strong need
for achievement, for order, for dominance, and for deference to others. He
has no greater understanding of people, no greater skill at influencing
people, and less interest in and need for people than the average man. His
strengths lie in his high-level capabilities, his dedication to mission
accomplishment, and his dependability or predictability. His weaknesses
lie in his lack of innovativeness (in areas where innovativeness is
appropriate but not organizationally required) and in his lack of
people-related concern and effectiveness in situations other than those
governed largely by authority relationships. Half of our generals fit this
category (as do 2/3 to 3/4 of the battalion commanders). That's our
largest group . . . in this sample.

The second type (and three of our generals fit this one) was termed
"the outgoing managerial type." He's a pretty interesting bird. He uses
his thinking to run as much of the world as may be his to run. He
organizes facts, situations and operations well in advance and makes a
systematic effort to reach carefully planned objectives on schedule. He
thinks everybody's conduct should be governed by logic, and he governs his
own behavior that way as much as possible. He enjoys being an executive.
He likes to decide what ought to be done, and he likes to give the
necessary orders. He abhors confusion, inefficiency and half-way measures.
He'll score high on measures of the need to control behavior of others and
high on intellectual efficiency. He'll also be high on personal
forcefulness and communications skills. And he's much better at
organizing, analyzing, deciding, etc., than he is at motivating
subordinates, building morale and delegating authority. He's
action-oriented, with a strong respect for facts and lots of know-how. His
special strength lies in his ability to "get things done" quickly and
efficiently. His special weakness lies in his frequent failure to perceive
more deeply and more complexly the possibilities inherent in various
leadership situations.
The third type was called "the potentially creative managerial type." (Our three remaining generals.) He can be either introvert or extrovert, but he is characterized by an active, independent mentality that places high value on curiosity and exploration. He will demonstrate innovativeness in a wide range of areas. If he's motivated to maximize self-expression, he will avoid conformity behavior and may appear to rebel against institutionalized authority. (None of the BGs appeared to be so motivated, but the three in this category appeared to have combined a creative disposition with a well-practiced and internalized role as a typical Army officer.) This type of individual sees more possibilities and alternatives in various leadership situations. This works well for him in isolated or independent situations but causes problems when situations are sequentially dependent (like PPBS?). These individuals scored higher than the other BGs on measures of intelligence and creative ability. They were higher than the average BG on enthusiasm, flexibility, need for achievement, forcefulness, self-objectivity and quality of decisions. They were above average in seeking feedback and opinions from their peers but below average in their effectiveness at presenting oral reports to a small group. They were higher than the average BG in influencing others but below average on all other group dynamics measures such as "led the discussion," "clearly defined the problem," and "effective in saying what he wants to say." They performed best in unstructured roles and unclear situations. These men listen well to other points of view; they seek feedback concerning their ideas; they incorporate into their own ideas what they learn from others; and they don't push "losing" causes. Finally, (and remarkably) all three BGs in this category (and only BGs in this category) showed a tendency to favor men over mission on the previously mentioned Leadership Opinion Questionnaire. The special strength of these creative types is performance in situations where discovering the best ways to proceed is the major part of the problem. Their special weakness would be in proceeding full speed ahead along well-defined pathways.

And this completes the summary of the assessment center's findings with respect to the psychological make-up of our 12 BGs. Before we leave this unique and lonely in-depth study of the general, we should review some cautions. Despite the depth and detail of the analysis and the professional knowledge and experience of the assessment staff, 12 BGs is too small a sample for us to be able to generalize to generals in general, generally. And you should think also about the same cautions mentioned earlier with respect to traits and personality patterns (although these just discussed are measured scientifically by validated instruments, rather than just hunched at). Finally, be aware that, while the assessment report contains some of the implied theme of "here's how to get to be a general," there is no implication that we should be like some sort of phony professional chameleon and display an outside skin that best fits the surrounding bushes and weeds. In the words of the assessment staff:

Based on our evaluation of the twelve BGs, we now believe that the best strategy for an individual aspiring to become a general is to become very proficient at actualizing the kind of person he most naturally is, taking care to mute but not to completely submerge tendencies that conflict with what appears to be desirable behavior in specific situations. The reason we believe this is that the BGs we evaluated
displayed a wide range of individual differences, with each individual possessing his full share of human faults and frailties. What these very successful men have done, it appears to us, is to develop themselves in ways that permit their strengths to be applied full force to problems, people, and situations, without becoming bogged down by their relative weaknesses.13

TAKE ME TO YOUR LEADER

Among all the other things that the general is, good and bad, he is the Army's normative leader. After climbing 'way up the flagpole, he sets the example of how to lead for you and I, and for our subordinates, and so on down the line. "General" and "leader" are in many ways synonymous, at least on the first pass. Whatever a general is, and whatever the requirements of his job are, general officer leadership is a central issue. Let's look at general officer leadership for a few moments.

In 1971-72, the Army did a study called "Leadership for the 1970s" (available in USAWC Library). The data base of that study is massive. It contains leadership opinions from 30,000 Army leaders at all grade levels. Included among those leaders are approximately 100 Army generals....

The study design makes it possible to go to any grade level (generals, for example) and analyze their views of: the leadership of their superiors, the leadership of their subordinates, and their own leadership. Thus, when we pull the data for the generals and the colonels, we can look at general officer leadership from three perspectives: as their superiors see them, as their subordinates see them, and as they see themselves. Sort of a tri-focal perspective. First off, how satisfied were these people with their general?

One section of the data base relates to satisfaction with the overall performance of the grade level being examined. When we put the general on the spot, he does pretty well (colonels and senior NCOs caught hell). The results for the generals are shown below:

How do you personally feel about the overall performance of the individual you have used as a reference in this study?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUPERIORS OF GENERAL OFFICERS</th>
<th>GENERAL OFFICERS THEMSELVES</th>
<th>SUBORDINATES OF GENERAL OFFICERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTALLY DISPLEASED</td>
<td>HIGHLY DISAP-POINTED</td>
<td>TOTALLY PLEASSED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGHLY</td>
<td>SOMewhat</td>
<td>HIGHLY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOMEWHAT</td>
<td>LUKEWARM</td>
<td>SOMEWHAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUKEWARM</td>
<td>HIGHLY PLEASED</td>
<td>TOTALLY PLEASED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOMEWHAT</td>
<td>PLEASED</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLEASED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the study, "leadership" is operationally defined as 43 specific, observable items of leadership behavior--things the leader does. About half of these items are related to the mission dimension of leadership and the other half to the men dimension. Now let's look at some rank orderings of these behaviors with respect to general officer leadership.
Let's go first to the immediate subordinates of general officers (most of these subordinates were colonels or other generals) and look upward. Of all 43 items of leadership, what do subordinates feel are most important in their generals? The top five on the list, in rank order, looked like this:

1. Being willing to support subordinates.
2. Being aware of morale and attempting to improve it.
3. Communicating effectively with subordinates.
4. Being technically competent to perform his duties.
5. Approaching each task in a positive manner.

Next, let's look downward. What do generals' superiors feel are most important?

1. Keeping boss informed of the true situation, good and bad.
2. Communicating effectively with subordinates.
3. Letting his men know what he expects of them.
4. Knowing his men and their capabilities.
5. Seeing to it that people work up to their capabilities.

How about the generals themselves—what do they think are the five most important things in their own leadership?

1. Being technically competent to perform own duties.
2. Establishing and maintaining high level of discipline.
3. Letting men know what he expects of them.
4. Communicating effectively with subordinates.
5. Being aware of morale and attempting to improve it.

In the eyes of the three people most involved in the general's leadership, the three lists above are the most important things the general should do. What leadership behavior do they see him actually doing or displaying most often? Again, in rank order, here's what subordinates see:

1. Setting the example on and off duty.
2. Approaching each task in a positive manner.
3. Being technically competent to perform his duties.
5. Seeking additional and more important responsibilities.

The general's superiors have a different view (different items or different rank order) of what he does or displays most often:

1. Being technically competent to perform his duties.
2. Assigning immediate subordinates to specific tasks.
4. Being willing to support subordinates.
5. Approaching each task in a positive manner.

And when we ask the generals about the kind of leadership they themselves do or display most often, we get about the same things, but in different rank order.
2. Approaching each task in a positive manner.
3. Being willing to support subordinates.
4. Setting the example for men on and off duty.
5. Being willing to make changes in ways of doing things. (Interesting ... on both the superiors' and subordinates' lists this item didn't appear until much further down, somewhere lower than 10th place!)

Finally, let's look at the principal areas where general officers—on those few, rare, occasional, unique, isolated, exceptional occasions—screw up, leadership-wise. (The study uses the term ... "shortfall.") Subordinates list these as the top five among the 43 items:

1. Criticizes subordinates in front of others.
2. Doesn't constructively criticize poor performance.
3. Doesn't keep subordinates informed of the true situation, good and bad.
4. Doesn't see to it that men work up to their capabilities.
5. Doesn't know his men and their capabilities.

Superiors of generals see some of the same "shortfalls" and a few new ones:

1. Doesn't see to it that men work up to their capabilities.
2. Doesn't let men know what he expects of them.
3. Doesn't establish and maintain a high level of discipline. (Interesting ... next to being technically competent, the generals feel this is the most important thing they should do.)
4. Doesn't keep boss informed of true situation, good and bad.
5. Not easy to understand, communications-wise.

Finally, if we showed the list of 43 items of leadership behavior to all of our generals, then asked them to pick the top five items, here's what they would pick as their own leadership weaknesses:

1. I'm not easy to understand, communications-wise.
2. I fail to show an appreciation for priorities of work.
3. I don't know my men and their capabilities.
4. I don't let the members of my unit know what's expected of them.
5. I do not communicate effectively with subordinates.

And there we have one brief look at part of the data on contemporary general officer leadership, through the eyes of the three people closest to, and most concerned with, that leadership. The lists presented are perhaps rather tedious to some, but in their content and rank orderings lies a picture of a man working like hell to understand and balance between his own self-concept and the expectations of others. When you have some
time, you might want to go back and compare rank ordering and content. Incidentally, there is also available in the USAWC Library, Leadership Monograph #6: Field Grade Officer Leadership. This monograph works from the same data base and does with lieutenant colonels and colonels what we have just done with the generals, but in greater detail.

There was other data on general officer leadership in the Leadership for the 70's study. It was subjective data, but perhaps even more important than the massive volume of quantitative information. Let's look...

A MULE CAN STARVE TO DEATH BETWEEN TWO BALES OF HAY

One USAWC student on the Leadership for the 70's study group had worked in the General Officer Branch prior to attending USAWC. He knew many of the generals personally, and they trusted him. Largely because of this trust, about 50 generals permitted this researcher to record, on audiotape, a structured interview (common questions for all generals) dealing with their candid views of their own leadership, and the leadership of their superiors and subordinates. Fifty tapes, varying in length from 30 minutes to more than two hours. Collectively, a rare and unique insight into leadership at the top. The respondents were assured of anonymity. By and large, they pulled no punches...told it like it was.

A brief and tentative analysis of this data base showed it to be rich—facts, details, honest feelings—and the interview design was such that it would facilitate accurate and extensive content analysis. There was, in this data base, great potential for a comprehensive study of the real-life requirements and techniques of general officer leadership. Lessons for all of us. There was other potential there, too. The data base was a potential pot-boiler.

The interview data showed clearly that we obviously had (and presumably still have) some problems with respect to general officer leadership...some bad problems. Perhaps the most significant problem was related to the general's role as exemplar, or normative leader, or standard setter for all Army leadership. To illustrate, let's go analog...

Switch into your own role as parent. Ole Dad. Yesterday, Junior played hookey from school. Little Sister found out about it. Squealed. And now you got Junior there in front of you, with his heels locked. "...Junior, I don't give a damn if everybody else does play hockey. It's wrong. Now you're going to school today, and you're going to tell 'em what you did, and you're going to face the music like a man, understand? Any questions? Never mind...when I want your opinion, I'll give it to you." Meanwhile, back in the kitchen, true to the dicta of history and motherhood, Mom is penning a note: "...Dear Mr. Applewhite: Please excuse Junior's absence yesterday. He didn't feel well and we thought it best that...etc." When it's over, what message does Junior get from the combined generalship of the two family generals? In the context of the family with teenagers, this may not be a very big problem, but when we're talking about general officers and the leadership of the Army, even relatively small variability in standards can be of major significance.
And that's why the data base was a potential pot-boiler. Here are some examples that will help in understanding a major problem in general officer leadership:

On the relevance of moral standards:

General A: "... I would not keep a subordinate who had questionable moral standards even though he was technically competent."

General B: "... Off-duty conduct is not important unless it reflects on the Army... ."

On the relief of subordinate commanders:

General A: "... I have relieved commanders in VN. It is a difficult task. If a man can't orchestrate everything in combat you must take him out. Unit had a dramatic improvement after relief."

General B: "... Most of the time when you relieve a Commander it does not solve a unit's problem."

General C: "... I relieved a battalion commander in public to impress his troops—he was endangering their lives."

On the 'snowjob' by subordinates:

General A: "... I have not seen subordinates trying to please their superiors at the expense of their unit."

General B: "... I can cite case after case where the Army took a major position on erroneous info furnished by people who did not want to rock the boat or else were afraid."

General C: "... I've heard of lower ranking officers being phony but I don't know of any as a general officer. I cannot imagine a battalion commander falsifying anything. I can isolate phonies very quickly."

Unfortunately, we will never be able to study, work with, and learn from the 50 tapes on general officer leadership. They were anonymous, they were objective, they were candid, they were specific... and they were destroyed. Who did it? I'm not sure... maybe it was Lion... or it could have been Tin Woodsman... .

THE GENERAL ON THE JOB

Thus far, all that we have looked at has skirted around the central issue, the main objective, the focal point of our effort—namely, the general's job. We want to try to understand that job, and its demands, and
how those demands are met. And that understanding won't be the ultimate answer, either. The psychologists tell us that the behavior we see in an executive (a general, for example) is the result of a rather strange chemistry. The way the general thinks, acts, and feels comes from the mix of two basic elements: the true person that the general is inside, and the requirements and demands of the job—with time, perhaps, as the catalyst.

The resulting compound is often unpredictable. Sometimes, it explodes (and you get caught within the bursting radius!). Other times, it just sits there—in the crucible—inert. Abe said it better once: "... You know, I don't know what the hell it is, but some men just change. Men that you've known for a long time through the years—good, capable, honest officers—and then they get to be generals, and they change completely. ... just a different person altogether. ... a man you don't know any more. I can think of several like that." "I know some, too, Abe," I said to myself. So... we've had a cursory look at the "true person, inside" part of the general through the assessment center studies. Let's go next to his job and its requirements.

When we asked the chief of the General Officer Management Office what it is that generals do, he said, "... That's a good question. I get it all the time—quite frequently from the brigadier general designees. And here's what I have. Back in the files, I've 538 job descriptions which cover every job a general can have. But, and I'm sorry, I don't have any generalized description of the general's job." We dropped this lead simply because of the scope of the effort required for a studied consolidation. But it has promise. And more about that later...

THE GENERAL'S JOB IN GENERAL

When you ask the question, "what is it that generals do?", there's one piece of data that can lead to three tentative conclusions about the general's job. First, the tentative conclusions:

1. The general's job is relatively simple and readily learned.
2. The general's job demands superhuman abilities.
3. The efficiency reporting system, over time, selects out certain individuals who have a pattern of abilities uniquely tailored to the requirements of the general's job, whatever they are.

Now let's look at some data on general officer time on the job ...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME IN JOB</th>
<th>GENERAL</th>
<th>LIEUTENANT GENERAL</th>
<th>MAJOR GENERAL</th>
<th>BRIGADIER GENERAL</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>PERCENT OF 502</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 to 11 months</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>54.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 to 23 months</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>66</td>
<td></td>
<td>124</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 24 months</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The data represent the status of general officer tenure as of 1 May 1973. It says that, at that point in time, about 55 percent of our generals had held their jobs for less than a year and around 80 percent had held their jobs less than two years. From this, I came up with the three tentative conclusions stated above—and I don't think any of 'em are right! What do you think? Given the enormous responsibilities that a general has, plus what appears to be a bewildering turnover rate at the Army's topmost echelon, what does this say about the general's job in general? We'll come back to this point in another section.

THE GENERAL AND THE ART OF COMMAND

Back in 1967, the Franklin Institute Research Laboratories (same guys who did the Junior Officer Retention research) did a study entitled, "The Art and Requirements of Command." The data were developed from three lines of inquiry: a questionnaire and interview program directed at 150 general officers; an historical study, and a study of the then existing Seventh Army command process.

Unfortunately, for our purposes, the study is focused tightly on the command and control function. While a precise and narrow focus is the hallmark of good research, command and control is only a single facet of the general's job and perhaps more appropriate for the field commander than for generals in general.

The "ARC" Study is unique in its treatment of command as an information transfer process. And it is practical and usable in its presentation of the data gathered from retired and active duty generals. One volume (Volume II: Generalship Study) of the four-volume report presents 15-20 selected general officer responses to each of more than 70 questions pertaining to the command and control function at division, corps, and Army level. The questions themselves are a valuable insight into tactical decisionmaking, and the answers (available in the study) would appear to be a must for a USAWC student making it down the OPMS command track. Some of the questions which highlight the requirements of troop leading procedure at general officer level are listed below:

What importance do you attach to the personal transmittal of the mission by your superior commander to you?

In determining and defining the limits of the mission, what kinds of information are necessary to your estimate of the situation?

Who, specifically, do you look to for these various kinds of information? Is all required information generally available through staff sources or do you look to subordinate commanders as well?

What personal techniques and practices do you find to be especially effective in this stage in the command process?
What practices do you feel should be avoided during this stage?

In what manner are directives most frequently issued? Orally? In writing? Orally with written confirmation when possible? What factors determine manner of issuance?

What specific techniques do you employ to assure that your staff and subordinate commanders fully understand your directives?

What specific practices do you feel should be avoided during this stage?

In the conduct of your follow-up activities, where do you place your general officer subordinates? How are they employed in the overall supervisory role? Are they, for example, dispatched to combat elements only or across the entire force? Why?

What general pattern do you follow in visiting subordinate units, elements of the support command, etc.?

As regards your own personal visits to the combat area, what purposes do such trips serve? Are visits made chiefly to gather information (if so, of what kind?) to boost morale?

In the past, some generals have elected to carry a number of their key staff officers with them as they change assignments. Others have organized their staffs, building around the personnel available at their new assignment. Which method do you prefer, and why?

What would you project the requirements of a Division Commander to be five years from now, in terms of (a) communications, (b) display, (c) other command mechanisms? We do not expect highly technical responses, but would appreciate your outline of general requirements.

The ARC study is interesting and informative. And it provides good guidance for what is perhaps the most critical aspect of the general's job—commanding troops in the field. But . . . how often are generals in the field in combat or simulated combat conditions? And how often are generals commanding troops? Not as often as you might suppose. Let's look at the 502 generals on active duty as of 1 May 1973:21
GENERAL OFFICER ASSIGNMENTS

We can get a general idea of the general's job by taking an overview perspective of all general officer assignments. The Army War College did this in October 1971 with a limited distribution study entitled "Professional Generalship."30

The purpose of the study was to analyze general officer positions, and derive from this analysis the principal military functions common to general officer assignments. The primary source of data was the 1 May 1971 General Officers Assignment List. The research methodology centered around determining the dominant function in each assignment, then grouping these dominant functions into mutually exclusive categories.

The study identified five separate categories or types of general officer assignments. The types of jobs and the dominant functions which characterize each type are as shown:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF JOB</th>
<th>DOMINANT FUNCTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Category I: POLICY/STRATEGY</td>
<td>Assignments dealing primarily with matters of international, national, DOD, Joint, and DA policy and/or strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category II: MANAGEMENT/ ADMINISTRATION</td>
<td>Assignments concerned with the procurement and allocation of resources, and direction of the utilization of those resources other than in a primarily tactical sense.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category III: MAAGs, MISSION MILITARY DIPLOMACY</td>
<td>Assignments, other than those involving formulation of overall policy or strategy, in which international military cooperation is the dominant consideration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category IV: OPERATIONS/TACTICS</td>
<td>Assignments in which the predominant activity involves tactical military operations in the field of training therefore (less branch material assignments).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The second part of the analysis showed how general officers (in general and by grade) were distributed among the five categories. It is interesting to note in these data that the greatest proportion of 0-7 and 0-8 assignments fall into the "branch material" category, while the greatest proportion of the 0-9 and 0-10 assignments deal with the "Policy/Strategy" function. This points up significant differences in the general's job by grade level and suggests that among the general officer grade levels, things are pretty much as they should be, function-wise, i.e., the more general the man is, the more general his job is.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>0-7</th>
<th>0-8</th>
<th>0-9</th>
<th>0-10</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I (Policy/Strategy)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II (Management/Administration)</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III (MAAGs, Missions, Military Diplomacy)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV (Operations/Tactics)</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V (Branch Material)</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>267</strong></td>
<td><strong>191</strong></td>
<td><strong>45</strong></td>
<td><strong>13</strong></td>
<td><strong>516</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A third facet of the study focused in specifically on the 58 0-9's and 0-10's on duty at the time. The data in this case showed that these senior officers had spent, on the average, about seven years in grade as 0-7's and 0-8's. Perhaps more interesting is the wide variety of assignments that these senior officers had held during their total time as general officers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of 0-9's</th>
<th>Number of Different Categories in Which Assigned</th>
<th>Number of 0-10's</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A final facet of the study, which rested largely on subjective consensus of general officer assignment experts, sought to isolate specific types of activity deemed common to all jobs of general officers, regardless of the type of assignment:

**MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION.** Management and administration in some degree, are aspects of any general officer assignment.
JUDGEMENT OF SUBORDINATES. Within the frame of reference of his relationships with other military personnel, a general officer's influence is such that his judgements of subordinates are crucial to insure both fairness to individuals and the future best interests of the Army. Hence, he needs thorough understanding of the Army's present and developing requirements and an ability to judge the attributes of individuals accurately and objectively in terms of those needs.

PERSONIFICATION OF THE ARMY IMAGE. By virtue of his status each general officer has an especially significant impact upon the impressions of the Army held by the civilian public at large. This applies to what he says, to his conduct of official and semi-official community relations and of his personal affairs, and to the manner in which he is publicly perceived as performing his official military duties.

PUBLIC EXPRESSION OF ARMY VIEWS. In a related but somewhat distinct sense, Army general officers are the Army's most influential public spokesmen. This function can be expected to increase in significance in proportion to the rank of the general officer. In consequence, judgement as to what to say (and how to say it) is an important requirement of general officers, and reasonable competence in public speaking is a valuable attribute.

PERFORMANCE AS CONGRESSIONAL WITNESS. At one time or another, many general officers will be called upon to testify before congressional committees and to negotiate with individual congressmen. Ability to deal successfully with the Congress is therefore an important requirement.

DEALINGS WITH PUBLIC INFORMATION MEDIA. Similarly, dealing with the public information media is a requirement sooner or later facing most general officers, at the local if not at the national level.

ASSOCIATION WITH FEDERAL CIVILIAN OFFICIALS. Particularly for general officers in the Pentagon, but also for more senior officers in the field, a requirement exists to work successfully with senior appointed civilian officials, recognizing such officials as sharing the soldier's primary interest in national security but also as influenced by considerations more ecumenical than those normally influencing the professional military man.

PERSUASIVE COMMUNICATIONS. The last five of the preceding types of activities common to general officers are significantly influenced by the degree of an officer's effectiveness (as distinct from "mechanical" skill) in oral communication--taking this term to include persuasiveness, logic of analysis, plausibility, and choice of terms meaningful to the specific audience.

LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS. Either as commanders or as members of senior staffs, general officers require an informed, although not technical, grasp of legal relationships, authorities, and limitations; this should involve an understanding of the scope of civilian and military jurisdictions in both their civil and criminal applications (addressing both national and international legal aspects), and include the legal obligations and authority as they pertain not only to the internal government of the Army but also to the Army's associations with private contractors, civilian communities, the other military services, and the civilian departments and branches of the Government.
This study, just summarized, came closer than any in defining the demands of the general's job. And if the author's list of "activities common to all generals' jobs" sounds strange, then you should know that he was attempting to derive criteria for the Army War College curriculum—to keep some of you from having to "wing it" at some future point in time. His methodology may have been weasly here and there, but the author had served many years as a speechwriter for several Chiefs of Staff—and he knew what of he spoke.

THE GENERAL THROUGH OTHER EYES

In 1972, a young lady named Maureen Mylander attended the USAWC National Strategy Seminar. She also spent countless hours digging through the US Army Military History Research Collection—especially through the "oral histories" of recently retired generals. She plowed deep into the Army Library in the Pentagon. And she interviewed scores of officers like you and I, and generals by the dozen. From this, she has written a book entitled The Generals.21

Mylander is a professional journalist, wife of a US Naval Academy instructor, and an Army brat. In the pages of her book, you can hear the voices of hundreds of officers just like you who have passed through the Army War College in the last five years. Perhaps our understanding of the general and his job can profit by some excerpts taken mostly from one chapter of The Generals, "Jobs Generals Do."

... With the arrival of women, blacks, eggheads, managers, technologists and specialists, the general's club has ceased to be an exclusive collection of combat leaders. Yet the Army has not fully absorbed this fact and still promotes jack-of-all-trade generals to perform jobs specialists can handle far better. This inspires not only (Israeli) jokes about exchanging General Dayan for General Motors, but complaints by young officers about the quality of senior leadership. While that matter certainly bears scrutiny in a later chapter, any critique must recognize the changing nature of generalship. For in large part the "problem" with generals may be not that they are incompetent, but that they are different.

... A major general who commanded the Army Transportation Center at Fort Eustis, Virginia, once attended in the line of duty a Christmas program at a local children's home. After the performance as he was talking to some of the other guests, a little girl asked, 'What do generals do?' He paused for a moment, then said, 'Honey, I wish I knew!'

... Once he pins on the first star, the grooming period ends and Army requirements begin to take precedence over personal considerations. General Harold K. Johnson, Army Chief of Staff in the mid-1960s, was known to retire any general who complained about an assignment. Johnson's Deputy Chief
of Staff for Personnel, General James K. Woolnough, recalled that the policy was strict: Generals went where Uncle Sam needed them. 'That's the way it's got to be...'

... an officer enjoys no better chance of heading a division as a major general than he had of commanding a battalion as a lieutenant colonel. With thirteen combat divisions and about two hundred major generals there simply are not enough to go around.

... To some generals, command represents the ultimate challenge, an exercise in human relations and in controlling others and a chance to apply everything learned throughout a long career. To some generals it is power and prestige. To others it is an ego trip or a stepping stone to bigger things. To still other generals it means all of these. And for a few, command is a time to innovate.

... Of some five hundred generals in the Army as of May 1973 only about one hundred and fifteen—or less than 25 percent—held jobs directly involving the Army's most important function—leading troops. These generals served as corps, division, assistant division and independent brigade commanders, post and training center commanders.

... The approximately 80 generals who command such specialty agencies, plus about 60 in miscellaneous jobs like school superintendents, advisors, attaches and project managers, plus about 115 who directly command troops account only for half the generals. The other half—about 250 as of May 1973—served on staffs. The Joint Chiefs of Staff employed 13, another 17 served on the Department of Defense staff, and no fewer than 94 worked for the Army Staff. The remaining 125 served on staffs of various agencies throughout the world.

... Pike's Law for locating colonels and generals: THE AMOUNT OF BRASS AT ANY GIVEN BASE IS DIRECTLY PROPORTIONAL TO THE TEMPERATURE. Pike's Law notwithstanding, at least some Army generals turn up in less than idyllic places. A May 1973 listing showed a major general in Vicksburg, Mississippi, holding back the waters of the Mississippi River as the area's Division Engineer. Nine generals lived in Fort Hood, Texas, famous for its summer cool spells when the temperature dips to 88 degrees. There were several generals at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, and several, including the deposed Brig. Gen. Samuel Koster, at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland.
... In the Army no assignment lasts forever—or even for very long—so the high-ranking denizens of Fort Huachuca in one year might find themselves headed for greener pastures in another. At various times there are attaché or advisory jobs for Army brigadier or major generals, for example, in Mexico, Argentina, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, the Philippines, Brazil, Taiwan, Iran and Turkey.

... In peacetime, a general's normal sixty-five-hour work week might include conferences, staff meetings, inspections, trips, field exercises, plus hours spent solving personnel problems, cutting red tape, answering entreaties, assuaging grievances. One troop commander's schedule: On the morning of June 21, 1972, Maj. Gen. George G. Cantlay, commanding general of the Second Armored Division, spent half an hour with his staff supply officer, another ninety minutes with the staff judge advocate 'dispensing military justice' and ninety minutes on plans to meet possible civil disturbances at the upcoming national political conventions in Miami. Then, Cantlay said, 'I spent one hour at a battalion birthday party patting soldiers on the back, and I'm spending one hour with you. Later I'll see Art Allen, from the Secretary of the Army's office, about reserve tests.'

... if an efficiency expert made time and motion studies of the Army's top executives, the results would reveal a great deal of time devoted not to essential command functions but to ceremonial duties: greeting, escorting and entertaining important visitors, handing out awards, pinning on insignia at promotion ceremonies, acting as guest speaker, attending parties and parades, posing for grip-and-grin photos, planting trees, snipping ribbons.

... Then there are the inquiries, the reports, and briefings. One project manager for the MBT-70 (Main Battle Tank) gave more than 300 briefings in one year—an average of more than one per working day—to report on the tank's status and to seek necessary approvals. The office of a former commander of the US Army in Europe sent 630 required reports each month to the Pentagon. And still the general received constant telegrams asking for data contained in those reports.

... While only a few generals ordinarily serve on special studies and boards—four participated in the 1965 Army officer education system study, five were on the 1971 officer-efficiency-report study and one general conducted the 1972 Army reorganization study—no fewer than thirteen generals sat on the Army Uniform Board to decide such pressing matters as the width of a new Army necktie.
... In the Air Force, where one would expect it, about 70 percent of its generals are pilots. But in the Army, as of late 1972, about four dozen generals and 230 colonels were also drawing flight pay. The presence of top-ranking pilots in the Army stemmed from (1) the growth of helicopters as a tactical weapon system in Vietnam; (2) the philosophy that men who command helicopter units should be experienced pilots themselves; and (3) the fact that the Army by 1970 owned nearly as many aircraft—a total of twelve thousand—as the Air Force.

... Gen. Bruce Palmer, former Army Vice Chief of Staff, told a reporter that he had considered learning to fly, but had been frightened by so many general-officer pilots that he decided against it.

... High turnover touches all levels. Twenty different generals held the Army's top intelligence job, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, between 1940 and 1970. The post of Director of Enlisted Personnel, a brigadier general's slot, had eight incumbents during its first nine years, with the longest tour lasting two years, the shortest two weeks. This office is responsible for assigning and managing the careers of hundreds of thousands of Army enlisted men. During a recent three-and-a-half-year period, four brigadier generals headed the Experimental Command of the Combat Developments Command. Each was responsible for conducting field tests which underlie Army combat doctrine, organization, training, and procurement for twenty years in the future.

... Lt. Gen. Garrison H. Davidson, now retired, wrote an article for Army magazine in which he compared tenures of top Army and civilian executives:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>ARMY GENERALS</th>
<th>AVERAGE TENURE</th>
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<tr>
<td>Controlling Army executives (Chief of Staff, Vice-Chief of Staff and Chiefs of General Staffs) since World War II</td>
<td>1.3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principal tactical commanders for the past 10 years</td>
<td>1.9 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps and division commanders for the past 10 years</td>
<td>0.9 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commandants of Army War College, Command and General Staff College, and US Military Academy since World War II</td>
<td>1.8 years</td>
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CIVILIAN EXECUTIVES

Senior executives of six major industries since World War II 8.0 years

Presidents of sixteen major civilian educational institutions since World War II 9.7 years

... In mid-1973, Brig. Gen. John A. Wickham, Jr., held three top-level positions in less than a month, and finally ended up as military assistant to Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger. On the other hand, seven generals, most of them two-stars in special staff assignments, had served since 1968 or earlier in jobs ranging from Assistant Judge Advocate General to Secretary of the American Battle Monuments Commission.

... One of the most persistent critics of excess officer rotation is Vice Adm. Hyman Rickover, who has called the practice 'a system for evasion of responsibility.' Rickover once testified before Congress that private industry could afford to shift its top management every two or three years only if the owner had unlimited funds or 'a damn good forger working for him.' Another side effect of high-level rotation causes officers, from the top Army command on down, to treat every problem as a new one. This lack of institutional memory breeds innumerable task forces, committees and study groups. More often than not, these convene to solve a problem that—unknown to all—was the subject of an excellent study five or six years earlier.

... The whistle-stop commands, the here-today-gone-tomorrow personnel policies show no sign of abating even though they violate every principle of leadership the Army has ever taught. They show no sign of changing even though they make generals figureheads with little real control or enduring impact on the vast organizations they supposedly head.

... Increasingly, the Secretary of Defense and the secretaries of the various services are making the important decisions, as well as many unimportant ones. While relegating generals to the task of furnishing data for those decisions may seem desirable from the standpoint of civilian control, centralization, by definition, places awesome power into a very few hands, even though they are civilian hands.

... More important, centralization makes it difficult for the services to function properly. Various civilian policies force military commanders to
tailor their actions in ways that curb their powers to discipline, replace and, hence, control their men. Centralization also has cumulative effects that have made the Army's own command structure reluctant to delegate authority to subordinates.

... Generals have their own pecking order, which affects, among other things, upward mobility. Minus the hazing, the Army treats brigadier generals essentially like plebes at West Point. The former serves in testing assignments on the fringes of power and try to establish or strengthen their 'colleague reputation,' as Morris Janowitz calls it. Brigadier and major generals are still subject to efficiency reports which, although inflated even more than at lower echelons, nevertheless act as behavior determinants as well as potential stumbling blocks. The incumbency of most brigadier generals, therefore, is limited both in time and substance. Of the sixty to seventy promoted each year, the bulk remains about five years and retires. Only a third makes the more difficult transition to permanent major general and beyond.

... Yet, since a dozen or more lieutenant generals emerge annually from a pool of nearly two-hundred major generals, some culling method is necessary even though many of them are not true competitors. The method is basically a form of 'colleague rating.' According to one retired lieutenant general, it operates as follows: Each year he and his three-star colleagues names the ten major generals most likely to be promoted to lieutenant general. During six years of drawing up such lists, he claimed to have correctly guessed at least seven of the ten selected each year.

... Admittedly, in most professions a person must cater to the boss. But a general's position is unique because he has so many bosses, and because he cannot readily seek employment elsewhere. Nor, after toiling for twenty-plus years to attain general's rank, does he want to. Thus generals, more than others who rise to the top of a large system, become indistinguishable from it. In refusing to criticize the System, regardless of how it treats them, generals bow to a greater reality: Just because they love God—or the System—does not mean that God or the System must love them.

... generals invariably discover that rank hath not only its privileges, but its pains, privations and perturbations. ... By far, the heaviest burdens are social. Depending upon his assignment, a general must host parties, attend receptions, conduct tours,
entertain VIPs, plant trees and make speeches. One
general who transferred to San Antonio after his
promotion told a free-lance writer in 1971: "I'm
still wondering why I got an invitation to the Texas
Sheep and Goat Raisers Association Convention
Banquet." Such demands make a rugged constitution
imperative. Many generals in the Washington, DC area
attend three and four parties a week, and some in key
jobs appear at several parties in one evening. A
retired general, James K. Woolnough, remembers being
asked to persuade a fellow general to undergo a
thorough physical examination at Walter Reed Hospital
because the latter could not stay awake during
briefings. Woolnough commented that he also knew
generals who would merely pretend to doze off on such
occasions, then suddenly wake up and start asking
pointed questions.

... 'My wife and I have entertained seventeen
straight nights without a break. ... I have a whole
mittful of hobbies I would like to pursue but cannot.'

... A general's quarters allowance is $230 a
month without dependents, $288 with. Subsistence
allowance for all officers is $48 a month. Thus
Regular Military Compensation for generals with
twenty-six years service, according to January 1973
rates is:

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<tr>
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<th>MONTHLY</th>
<th>ANNUALLY</th>
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<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>$3,589</td>
<td>$43,072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
<td>$3,587</td>
<td>$43,039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General</td>
<td>$3,440</td>
<td>$41,277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General</td>
<td>$3,031</td>
<td>$36,373</td>
</tr>
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... In less controversial realms, generals
remain eligible for:

--hostile fire pay of $65 a month (not
payable in time of war declared by Congress);
--special pay of $100 to $350 a month for
doctors, dentists and veterinarians;
--family separation allowance of $30 a
month;
--dislocation allowance (equal in amount to
one month's quarters allowance);
--reimbursements for travel and
transportation, down to tips to Pullman porters;
--overseas housing and cost-of-living
allowances;
In addition to these special pays and allowances, the
armed services provide:
--a virtually guaranteed income;
--30 days a year paid leave;
--low-cost life insurance;
--free medical care;
--burial expenses and other death benefits;
--discounts of 20 to 30 percent on the cost of food and dry goods sold in commissaries and post exchanges;

--and, as part of the post-exchange system, discount prices for gasoline, liquor (in many areas), laundry, dry cleaning, shoe and watch repair, beauty and barber shop, and garden supplies.

According to a 1973 Defense Department analysis, to a brigadier general with three dependents, the annual value of the commissary privilege alone is $462 and the value of medical care is $846. Moreover, the combination of (1) commissary and medical benefits, (2) quarters and subsistence allowances, (3) retirement contributions, and (4) tax advantages raises effective take-home pay to about $41,000 for brigadier generals, $46,000 for major generals and $51,000 for lieutenant generals and generals. These totals do not incorporate such items as flight and other special allowances. Nor do the totals include innumerable 'extras' which enhance military lifestyle:

--low-cost Federal Housing Administration mortgage loans;
--special discounts at many civilian businesses and recreational facilities (including 50 percent discounts at Disneyland East and West);
--free space-available military flights anywhere in the world with 30-day advance registration and VIP travel arrangements for generals and admirals;
--25-cent movies at post theaters;
--nickel beer and Bloody Marys during 'Happy Hours' at most officers clubs;

And, on many posts:

--free or low-cost use of sports gear, including ski and camping equipment;
--low-cost military recreational facilities;
--free loan of government furniture;
--free or low-cost veterinary care;
--free legal services, when available.

... Lest anyone consider 7.2 percent annual military pay raises excessive, a number of corporation executives increased their pay by substantial percentages between 1971 and 1972. According to Senator Proxmire:

--The president of Chrysler Corporation received a 215 percent increase in pay and bonuses, from $175,000 to $551,000;
--the chairman of the board of Chrysler received a 210 percent increase;
--the president of Weyerhaeuser Lumber Company received a 56 percent raise, from $195,000 to $350,000.

. . . Perhaps the question should be not whether privilege, a perennial target for congressional critics, is justified, but whether it is worth opposing when more important issues cry for attention. If a general's work were more satisfying, his assignments longer lived and his powers more real than apparent, aides and other trappings of high rank might seem more expendable. As matters stand, privilege may represent one of the few genuine rewards—besides pay—that generals enjoy.

. . . Luck is as important as sponsorship and key jobs in entering the inner elite. In many cases choice assignments go to officers simply because they happen to be available at the time. When Samuel Koster became Superintendent of the US Military Academy in 1968, he succeeded to one of the Army's most coveted posts not only because he was a favorite of General Westmoreland, but because he was the only acceptable candidate not already assigned elsewhere.

. . . It is tempting to conclude that if there are too many headquarters, there must be too many generals and that both should be severely pruned and forgotten. Rather than forget, the country needs, as never before, to define what it wants generals to do, and then let them do it. A wise civilian leadership concerned with strengthening the nation's defenses will keep generals on the job long enough to transcend the trivial and will allow them to exercise the powers to which they are entitled, and delegate the remainder to subordinates. Only then will Army leadership become more than an empty label, and generals more than a group of men who endure but seldom prevail.

* * * * *

And thus we end our moderately eclectic survey of the general and his job. We have by no means covered all sources, but hopefully the references selected and summarized have given you different insights and a better understanding of the general officer and his job.

The mode of this advance sheet now changes. In the next section, we ask you to move from the passive mode of reading to the more active role of thinking. The section includes certain "ponderables"—concepts, questions and ideas—which might, for this lesson, serve as a good start point for implementing General Smith's guidance to "think about what you read." There are no written or suggested solutions to these ponderables. The only answers are those which you yourself derive.
1. What if we sent all of our BGs to an assessment center and were able to come up with a pretty good "best fit" for each one in terms of the three types discussed earlier in this advance sheet? Let's assume also that these BGs were open enough and self-confident enough to let assessment results be known to DA. Now, scan over those types again—the dependable, cautious (we'd have to come up with a better name), the outgoing, the potentially creative. Next, go down to the General Officer Management Office ("GOMO" ain't very good, but it's infinitely better than "GOB") and look over their 538 general officer job descriptions. Could we cluster those jobs—or at least a majority of them—in the same three categories? Then what's the next step? Round pegs in round holes. It might cost us 2-3 thousand bucks a head, (unless we put together our own assessment center, and that's expensive) but how does it compare with the cost of pulling a complete depot-level TI on each of our main battle tanks? And what might be the long-range costs to the Army of assigning a dependable, cautious general to some of our research slots? Or a potentially creative one to head up our planning, programming, and budgeting system? Lieutenant General Betts, former Chief of Research and Development, cites a case where a program manager left $18,000,000 out of the cost estimate for the Cheyenne helicopter. This would hardly pass as "a little honest and understandable error." The "oversight" could have been due to inexperience, but it could also be attributable to the right general (generals are always right, even when they're wrong!) in the wrong job.

2. Pick any general at random. Pull his job description and look at it. Suppose you wanted to extend that job description to the next level of specificity, i.e., add more meaning to the description? There's a way. Listen... every morning, on damned near every general's desk, there's a little card that lays out the general's daily schedule. At first glance (and I've peeked at a few, haven't you?), the card might seem to be simply a listing of events. But if we think about it, maybe the card is a product... a product of a heretofore relatively little known managerial skill which we might call "time and priority engineering." At any rate, it seems that the card translates the job description to greater specificity. Suppose we got a bunch of horse-holders collared and got them to save for us their generals' schedules for a three-month period. A representative sample of field generals, and staff generals, and brigadiers and four-of-a-kinds. Would an analysis of all the cards tell us something of the requirements of the general's job and of how he allocates his time, his effort, and his priorities?

3. What could we learn from a careful empirical study of the general's job? Suppose we took a two-man research team, then had them do background research on a given general and that general's job. Then put them on that general constantly for a whole day, from the time he comes to work until the time he goes home. Just watch and listen while he gets advice, gives guidance, attends briefings, gives briefings, hands out plaques, sits on committees, attends meetings, drinks cocktails, attends dinners, and the like. Study the contents of a day's worth of in-baskets and out-baskets. Debrief the horse-holder. Talk with the general, if he has time, about why he's doing what he does. Stick with him and describe in precise detail a day in the life of a general. And suppose we did this with not just one general, but with a representative 25 or 30? What could
we learn from such data, and how could we use it? And how would the
general feel about having these two dudes in his hair for the whole duty
day?

Two or three years ago, we used to hear from our commanders and
personnel managers that most of the troubles that were plaguing the Army at
that time were due to a common cause—personnel turbulence. Racial
problems, drugs, dissent, fraggig, lagging, fagging, MOS mismatch,
disertions, poor maintenance, and combat unreadiness—root cause:
personnel turbulence. The major impact of turbulence, we were told, was
felt at the unit level where some companies had had more than four company
commanders in a single year. And the turnover of company NCOS was even
worse, what with them on their third and fourth tours to RVN. Units were
screwed up and often ineffective because of turnover, particularly at unit
leadership level. So we sent all out to reduce turnover and stabilize
tours. And today, due in large part to personnel stabilization, we see
more effective and more combat ready units. Now ponder an equation:

PERSONNEL TURBULENCE = OFFICER CAREER MANAGEMENT

The equation is obviously incorrect. But . . . in the personnel management
system, there are certain conditions and management mechanisms that create
turbulence. So the question is: to what extent are these same conditions
and mechanisms operative within our career management policies?

Think about that, and about how many times you've moved in the last
twenty years or so, and about the pre-OAMS theme of "Every man a
generalist!", and about the five Deputy Commandants USAWC has had in as
many years, and about the eight directors of the Enlisted Personnel
Directorate in a nine-year period, and about Mylander's data which shows
that as recently as 1973, 54 percent of our generals had held their jobs
for less than a year. Personnel turbulence within the leadership is the
direct cause of many significant problems at company level. Does the same
relationship hold in the big company known as the "Green Machine"? Could
we, with a careful but revolutionary revision of the assignment policies
governing our generals, make our nation's Army significantly more
effective?

5. Small headline, Army Times, September 1980: "WANTED:
APPLICATIONS FOR GENERAL OFFICER." Right after WW II, we said to our own
RA officers, ". . . Look, being Regular Army is a pretty fine thing in many
respects. Lots of officers want to be RA. If you're so inclined, you'll
have to go on what we call a 'competitive tour.' If you want it, you got
to work for it." Could we do this with our generals? Let colonel be the
goal of an Army career, then for those who want to be generals, ask them
for a straight-out commitment. "Hell, yes, I want to be a general, and I'm
willing to compete." Two years competitive tour as colonel. Rotate these
burners through 2-3 different kinds of jobs, most representative of what
generals do—maybe staff, and troops, and schools and training. Move them
through an assessment center for a complete executive TI; check out their
backgrounds somewhat like we do with political nominees; and follow and
report on their progress with a separate, intensive, multiple-input,
multi-rater performance reporting system. Then, pick the winners. With a
general officer board. Why not just be open and honest about the whole
thing? Play the game where everybody (even the spectators) knows the rules
... and the players. Is it right, or reasonable, or realistic to let Lady Luck play a significant role in picking our generals? Is the big crap game in the best interests of our soldiers and our nation?

6. We've got in our Army a lot of splendid full bulls who, because of either the few imperfections or our truly exceptional efficiency in reporting system, or because of the strange mathematics of Congressional "binomial oglamometry," or because of poor luck, will never be generals. Many of these colonels are better generals than some of the generals. We've got a lot of other fine colonels not as good as the generals in doing whatever it is that generals do, who nevertheless are mission-oriented and capable of great contributions. And we've got still other colonels who are capable as hell but whose light bulbs get turned off (and they then go to sleep in some chicken farm, like 'ole CONARC) after missing two shots at the general officer list. Then we've got a fourth category of colonels whose secretaries are experts at writing 14-page, single-spaced "biographical sketches for a talk to be given to the Lions Club next month"—listing all academic degrees, positions, or titles and scopes of supervisory responsibilities, etc. The point is that we've got a hell of a lot of developmental costs in some of these thinking machines, and yet for the last 6-8 years they're in operation, there's a sizeable number that we can't get turned on and revved up. They just sit there (in the best quarters on post) or, at best, chug along at a less than modest idling speed. How come we can't offer the retirement title of Brigadier General as a career goal for about a third of these birds? No money, just the title. The Navy tried this, but they dropped it. They also, on earlier occasions, dropped other ideas for a while: submarines, steam propulsion, aircraft carriers and attacks on Pearl Harbor. If the true story were known, we would probably find that it was the admirals who torpedoed the tombstone promotions—to petty officers with flag rank?.

7. Next time you're boondoggling off on TDY and you go into the AVIS office to pick up a rent-a-car, look around. If you see a guy about your age working the counter, chances are good that he's a senior or middle level executive of the AVIS corporation. Might even be the president, himself. The president of AVIS told us last year at the National Security Seminar, "Every year, every one of our executives goes into the trenches for a week. Right there on the counter. Filling out forms, losing keys, listening to complaints, getting cars serviced and parked. A clerk—for a week. It does wonders for morale and policymaking both." And we hear from our China experts, although precise documentation is lacking, that every year or so, generals in the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army shed their rank and privileges and go serve as a private for 30 days. Could we do something like that with our generals? Or some of them? Of course, those Chinese generals had it easy. All them Chinamen look alike, and their general could pass whereas ours is usually too old and too grizzly to fool anybody. Last year, at Fort Dix, an Army captain named Margrave joined a BCT company on its first day. He lived and worked with them around the clock for a whole cycle. When he first joined them, he said simply, "I'm spooky at first—so were the NCOs who knew Margrave was a captain—but after a few days, he was just plain "Margrave" to trainees and NCO's alike. His report is in the USAWC library. There is a unique and credible authenticity to his observations. What he says about Category IV personnel, for example, is in many ways more meaningful than the
observations of training battalion commanders or statistical analyses. Could our generals, or just some of our generals (those being assigned in personnel management slots) try this? Would they? Would maybe just one of them give it a go? AVIS does. And all them Chinamen . . .

8. Every now and then, we rassle together those officers programmed to assume battalion and brigade command (or equivalent jobs). Then we zip 'em off to Fort Knox for a two-week course of instruction designed to help them be better commanders. Both the stucces and the stickors for this program give it high marks. If we do that for those guys (and apparently do it well) why can't we do it for our new generals? Now we do send them to a four-day Brigadier General Designee Orientation Program at the Pentagon—the "Charm School"—but some graduates of the program feel that neither the briefings nor the Pentagon have much to offer in the say of charm. A series of function-oriented "who shoots John" briefings, with interlocking bands of supporting luncheons and cocktail parties—with the students in a euphoric fog which, when combined with already mysterious climate of the Pentagon, produces little other than a long-term, intermittently horrid hangover and the punch lines from a few dimly-remembered jokes: ("... Now that you're a general, when you hear something you don't believe, say, 'Incredible!', rather than what you're accustomed to saying.") Perhaps we could do better by doing for our future division and directorate commanders at Carlisle Barracks what we do for our brigade and battalion commanders at Knox. Build a data base on "the General officer" at USAWC. The MHRC and the Oral History Program already give us a strong head start. Split the BGD's into two groups of 20-30 each. Bring each group here for a two-week course. Integrate them two per seminar (as—we will soon do for the generals of the Senior Reserve Officer Course) so they have what may be their last opportunity for frank and free exchange of ideas and information before they turn into generals. Run special classes covering what we know about the general, and the requirements of his job, and how these requirements are met. And perhaps an assessment program somewhat more modest than the one we've discussed. And keep it all low key. Maybe one reception and a seminar party, and time for golf, and the library, and the Military History Collection. A last chance for these hard drivers to relax a bit and find out about themselves, and their future jobs, and the views of the officers who will soon be their subordinates. What would the generals' reaction be to such a course? The odds are heavy for, "Incredible!".

9. And one final, sensitive ponderable . . . one that may take a year or more to answer. Which is more important to you, and to the Army: being a general or just doing a good job?
REFERENCES


1. General officer activities and general officer roles may be grouped in three categories—those concerned primarily with interpersonal relationships, those that deal primarily with information processing, and those that involve the making of significant decisions.

2. The work of general officers of all types may be described in terms of ten observable roles: symbolic head, liaison, and leader (interpersonal roles), monitors, disseminator, and spokesman (information roles), and entrepreneur, disturbance handler, resource allocator, and negotiator (decisional roles).

3. These ten roles form a gestalt—an integrated whole. The three interpersonal roles derive from the general officer's formal authority and status; these give rise to the three informational roles; and these in turn enable the manager to perform the four decisional roles.

4. The simplest of general officer roles, that of symbolic head, identifies the general officer as a symbol, obliged to carry out a number of social, inspirational, legal, and ceremonial duties.
5. The leader role identifies the general officer's relationship with his subordinates. He defines and regulates much of the organizational climate in which they work, motivates them, probes into their activities to keep them alert, and takes responsibility for hiring, training, and promoting them. The general officer attempts to bring subordinate and organizational needs into a common accord to promote efficient operations. The leader role pervades virtually all the general officer's activities in which subordinates are involved, even those whose main purpose is not interpersonal. The power of the general officer is most clearly manifested in the leader role.

6. In the liaison role the general officer develops a network of contacts outside of his organization, in which information and observations are traded for mutual benefit. General officers spend considerable amounts of time performing this role, first by making a series of commitments to establish these contacts, and then by carrying out various activities to maintain them.

7. Evidence suggests that the general officer serves as "nerve center" of his organization's information. His unique access to all subordinates and to special outside contacts (many of them
nerve centers of their own organizations) enables the
general officer to develop a powerful data base of
external and internal information. In effect, the
general officer is his organization's generalist
with the best store of nonroutine information.

8. As monitor the general officer continually seeks
and receives information from a variety of sources
in order to develop a thorough understanding of
the organization and its environment. Information
arrives on internal operations, external
events, ideas, and trends, and in the form of
analyses and pressures.

9. A good part of the general officer's information is
current, tangible, and nondocumented. Hence the
general officer must take responsibility for the
design of his own information system, which
he does by building liaison contacts and by
training subordinates to open up.

10. The general officer uses his information to detect
changes, to identify problems and
opportunities, to build up a general understanding of
his milieu for
decisionmaking, to
determine organizational
values, and to inform
outsiders and
subordinates.

11. As disseminator the
general officer sends
external information into
his organization and
12. The general officer serves as the focal point for his organization's value system. Influencers direct their statements of preference to him; he, in turn, assimilates and combines these according to the power of the source, and disseminates information on overall organizational values to subordinates who use it as a guide in decisionmaking. The dissemination of values occurs in terms of specific statements on specific issues, not in terms of global preferences.

13. The general officer faces a "dilemma of delegation." Only he has the information necessary to make a great many important decisions. But much of the information is in the wrong form--verbal and in memory rather than documented. Hence dissemination of it is time-consuming and difficult. The general officer must overload himself with tasks or spend a great amount of time disseminating information, or delegate with the understanding that the job will be done with the use of less information than he has.

14. As spokesman the general officer must transmit information to various external groups. He must act in a public relations
capacity; represent his organization; keep key influencers (board of directors or boss) informed; inform the public about his organization's performance, plans, and policies; and send useful information to his liaison contacts.

15. As spokesman, furthermore, the general officer must serve outsiders as an expert in the field in which his organization operates.

16. The general officer must take full responsibility for his organization's strategy-making system, the system by which important decisions are made and interrelated. He has the necessary authority and information, and by having control over all important decisions he can integrate them.

17. As entrepreneur the general officer initiates and designs much of the controlled change in his organization. He continually searches for problems and opportunities. When a situation requiring improvement is found, the general officer initiates an "improvement project"—a series of related decisions and other activities, sequenced over a period of time, that leads to the actual improvement.

18. The general officer may involve himself in an improvement project on one of three levels. He may
delegate all responsibility to a subordinate, implicitly retaining the right to replace him; he may delegate responsibility for design but retain responsibility for choice via authorization; or he may supervise the design phase himself.

19. At any one time senior general officers appear to maintain supervision over a large inventory of improvement projects. These vary widely in stage of development, some in limbo, and some nearing completion. Each is worked on periodically, with each step followed by a period of delay during which the general officer waits for the feedback of an event. Occasionally, a project is completed or a new one added to inventory.

20. As his organization's generalist, the general officer must take charge when his organization meets with an unexpected stimulus for which there is no clear programmed response. In effect, he assumes the role of disturbance handler. Disturbances may arise from conflicts between subordinates, conflicts between the general officer's organization and another, and losses of resources or threats thereof. Disturbances arise both because "poor" general officers are insensitive and because innovation by "good" general officers inevitably leads to
unanticipated consequences. Faced with a disturbance, the general officer gives it priority and devotes his efforts to removing the stimulus—to buying time so that it can be dealt with leisurely by an improvement project.

21. In his resource allocator role the general officer oversees the allocation of all forms of organizational resources (such as money, manpower, reputation). This involves three essentials—scheduling his own time, programming the work of the organization, and authorizing actions.

22. In scheduling his own time the general officer implicitly sets organizational priorities. What fails to reach him fails to get support. Thus, his time assumes a significant opportunity cost.

23. The general officer takes responsibility for establishing the basic work system of his organization and programming the work of subordinates—deciding what will be done, who will do it, what structure will be used.

24. Basic continuing control over resource allocation is maintained by the general officer by authorizing all significant decisions before implementation. This enables him to interrelate decisions. Some decisions are authorized within a
regular budgeting process; most are authorized on an ad hoc basis. These are difficult choices—time is limited, yet the issues are complex and subordinates' proposals cannot be dismissed lightly. In some cases the general officer decides on the proposer rather than the proposal.

25. To help in evaluating proposals, general officers develop loose models and plans in their heads. The models describe a great variety of internal and external situations. The plans—in the form of improvement projects to be initiated—serve to provide a common basis against which to evaluate proposals. The plans are loose, flexible, and implicit, so that they can be updated with the arrival of new information.

26. As negotiator the general officer takes charge when his organization must engage in important negotiation activity with other organizations. He participates as symbolic head, as spokesman, and as resource allocator.

27. The ten roles suggest that general officers, while generalists when viewed within their organizations, are in fact specialists required to perform a particular set of specialized roles.

28. Organizations require general officers not only because of imperfections
in the system and unexpected changes in the environment, but because a formal authority is required to carry out certain basic, regular duties. The ten roles suggest six basic purposes of the general officer—to ensure the efficient production of the organization's goods and services, to design and maintain the stability of organizational operations, to adapt the organization in a controlled way to its changing environment, to ensure that the organization serves the ends of those persons who control it, to serve as the key information link between the organization and its environment, and to operate the organization's status system.

What is this thing we soldiers call... The Company? It is often called a "unit." And if you'll look that word up, you'll find that a unit is a "one"... a whole composed of parts put together... a single thing.

Now picture this "thing" on the battlefield. It came there to fight. Its sole purpose in life is to destroy enemy, and to take and hold ground. It was designed that way. It was designed, like you were, by evolution. What it is is the result of countless centuries of adjusting and adapting to the demands of thousands of battles. In each of those battles, only the fittest survived. And that "thing" there on the battlefield is the result of all those lessons learned, back across all those centuries. It is there on the battlefield for one reason... to fight. It's standard is simple: SURVIVE. And on the battlefield, that means only one thing: WIN.

This "thing" can move across country, by itself, at 3 miles an hour. When it moves, it stretches out, like a snake, in a line about half a mile long. When it rests, it curls up, facing outward, ready to fight, in a circle about 300 meters across. It if rests for very long, it begins to disappear down into the earth. On the battlefield, when it's fighting, it eats about 2000 cans of C-rations in a day. Drinks about 500 gallons of water. And it never sleeps.

When this thing attacks, its destructive power is awesome. It can come from any direction, day or night. It can hit head-on, but usually, it won't do that. It will, instead, send out pieces of itself in the night to sense out the weak and unprotected places ahead of time, and then, just at the edge of dawn, it strikes.

It kills mostly by firing steel projectiles into the vital organs and critical parts of its opponents. In a day of sustained combat, it can deliver almost 30,000 of these projectiles, of all shapes and sizes. Many of these projectiles explode and shatter on contact, each creating a thousand more fragments of steel that search for those vital organs.

Very seldom does this thing fight by itself. In battle, it calls its kin, and they come... other "things" that look just like it, and others that move at high speeds in steel machines, and some that fly, and some that just stand back and shoot... all of them, delivering steel into vital organs. This "thing" is, for certain, bad.

This thing, like you, is alive. Like you, it has muscles, called soldiers. Like you, it has a brain, called the Company CP. And like you, it has, linked to that brain, a nervous system that carries the information that controls and coordinates the muscles, and this is called the leadership of the unit... the captain, the lieutenants, the sergeants... linked together with a chain of command. How well this thing fights, and how well it can deliver steel, depends upon the muscles and the nerves.
And upon whether both function as they are supposed to. And, finally and mostly, upon how well and how much the muscles and nerves have practiced, together.

In the least complex and most humble of all the kinds of fighting companies in our Army today, there are 169 men. For each of these men, there are 66 items of clothing and equipment that belong to him. There are 20 more items of clothing and equipment that the company gives to each man. And the company itself has 866 more major items of equipment and weapons that the 169 men use when the whole thing fights. That's a hell of a lot of items. And most of these items that belong to the company serve the purpose of . . . delivering steel.

Now, if the unit is to do what it's supposed to do on the battlefield—fight and win—then it needs to know how to use all of these weapons and items of equipment efficiently and effectively. How well it does this depends greatly on how much skill the unit has. If the unit is fully trained and ready to fight, it knows about 1500 different kinds of individual skills. And it can combine these individual skills into 500 more packages of skill that are used by the company's squads, platoons, and by the company itself. That's 2000 different skills. Soldiers and teams use all these skills to put all those weapons and equipment to work, to fight, to win.

All these numbers tell you how complicated that "thing" is on the inside, and why it is so deadly. And it is you, the leadership of the unit, that organizes and coordinates the whole, complex, deadly lash-up that we soldiers call . . . The Company.
You are going to learn some things about the chain of command right now that you never knew before. You already know that it lays out very clearly the line of legal authority from the President of the United States right on down to you. It spells out who has authority to issue orders to who. It identifies for anyone, at any level, who is "in charge." And finally, it identifies who is responsible... for getting tasks done, and for taking care of the people who do them. A chain of command is an absolute essential for getting done, in an organized way, any task which requires the effort of more than one person. That is a flat-out fact of any organized effort. What this should tell you, as a leader, is that here is a leadership fundamental. Knowing how the chain of command works is an absolute essential in figuring out how to know what to do, and how to get it done.

For right now, never mind the links of the chain that run up through those upper levels of leadership and on up to the President. Think instead about the links in the company. And call this the leadership of the unit. The captains, lieutenants, sergeants. The nervous system. The channel of communication that coordinates and controls. The thing that puts together skill, will, and teamwork... and all that equipment, and all those weapons. The thing that focuses combat power. Why is the chain of command so important? Well, as is true for almost everything else in our Army, if you want to know the real reason or purpose of something, go to the battlefield, where the unit fights. The "why" for anything about our Army must always be answered there.

In the company, on the battlefield, there is no time for silly arguments and discussions about who takes orders from who, or which orders to follow, or what the objectives ought to be, or what standards should be established. Any of this wastes time, and destroys the quick, smooth coordination that the unit must have if it is to win in the deadly business of delivering steel. On the battlefield, the formal chain has been established by law and TO&E; leaders have been appointed by the commander to hold designated leadership positions; and authority, responsibility, and obedience are facts. All that's settled. What the chain of command does on the battlefield is COMMUNICATE.

Somewhere, in a leadership class, you probably spent considerable time on the techniques of how people communicate. But this isn't really that kind of "communicate." This is communiate, as on the battlefield. And there, the chain of command is the main channel, the prime line, of the communications—the information—that must flow among all the parts of the company so that it can fight as a unit... as a whole "thing."

The chain of command coordinates and controls. And to do this, it must move information, up and down, among the levels of the leadership of the unit. The chain of command moves battle information... quick, clear, clean, complete... and only the critical... and only the
truth. It is the nervous system of the unit. And if the chain has breakdowns or failures, then the unit, just like you, will go to pieces, and lose, and die. This simple fact of the battlefield explains many things.

It tells you why there are prescribed hand and arm signals. It tells you why there is a prescribed language for the radios and telephones, and why experienced leaders will discipline this carefully. It tells you why you should learn, use, and make instincts out of the ESTIMATE, the TROOP LEADING PROCESS, and the FIVE PARAGRAPH FIELD ORDER—these are the main messages in the "language" of a chain of command communicating in battle. And finally, it tells you why our older, wiser, experienced leaders are always so concerned about "working through the chain." The reason is simple. What these leaders know is that the development, functioning, and maintenance of the chain of command, in peacetime, is the major determinant of whether the unit will survive and win in battle.

As a leader, you are a link in the chain of command. You already know this, but it means far more than just a green tab or a position on the organizational chart or a picture on the Day Room wall. When that unit fights, you do many things, but the most important thing you do is communicate—get, process, and move information. Both up and down. In a smooth functioning chain of command, working hard at delivering steel, there are only two kinds of information moving downward in the chain, and two kinds moving up.

Flowing downward are orders—the things that control. Once in a while, you might get a whole, written-out FIVE PARAGRAPH FIELD ORDER, brought by a runner. More often, you'll get a frag order, coming over the radio from your leader as he makes the inevitable changes and adjustments called for in that final step of good troop leading procedure. The other kind of information moving downward is planning information—the kind that you as a subordinate need for your planning; and for coordinating with other parts of the unit; and for figuring out, ahead of time, "what to do" next.

Moving upward in the chain, there are, first and most important, reports like enemy sightings, and status reports, and SITREPS, and locations. Reports tell the unit's "brain" about what's happening inside the unit... what all the parts are seeing and doing, and what kind of shape they're in. More important, these reports moving upward describe the progress in carrying out the orders that came down before.

The second kind of information moving upward are requests for support—which parts of the unit need more of what to carry out their orders. It is these requests that can bring to bear the awesome power of the combat support units.

And so, very simply, that's what happens when the chain communicates and the unit fights... mainly two kinds of information moving down and two kinds of information moving up. Now, this information doesn't just flow along, like through a pipe. It is carried by many things. Messages on paper. Runners. Hand and arm signals. Smoke grenades and flares. Radios and telephones. And, most often, at your level, by men yelling and shouting and calling to each other.
This is how the chain of command communicates. The chain of command is what it is that tells a unit "what to do." And the chain of command is what gets it done.

You, as a leader, are vital, critical, as battle information flows up and down the chain of command. Again, the most important thing you do, as a link in the chain, is COMMUNICATE—get, process, and move information. And right here, let's develop some how-to's about these three tasks.

First off and flat out, you, as a leader, must be "expert" in the nomenclature, functioning, operation and maintenance of any piece of communications equipment and any communications procedure used or likely to be used at your level. As a leader, this is far more important than being "expert" with your individual weapon. There is no qualification badge for being "expert" in communication. That's one of the things that any leader is expected to be.

Getting information does not mean waiting until it's given to you. If it's needed, you get it. From above or below. This says that you, as a link in the chain of command, need to be thinking constantly about what information is needed by the link above you, and by the link below you. Getting doesn't mean just receiving. What you get, from above or below, may have errors in it. Or you may not understand it. In either case, think, and compare what you get with what you already know and remember. If it doesn't seem right, or you don't understand it clearly, go back to where you got it and check.

A remote unit radio set up on a hill somewhere can pass on, unchanged, all the information it gets, going up or going down. But remote units aren't links in the chain of command. You, as a leader, are supposed to process the information to use it, and to do things with it. If you get a FIVE PARAGRAPH FIELD ORDER, you process the information in there by running it through the ESTIMATE. Then you move that information on when you issue your own orders.

Most of the time, good processing requires that you cut out some of the information you get before you pass it up or down. This is tricky. Remote unit radios can't do it. To cut out the right things, and do it right, you have to know the information needs of the link above, and the link below. Then you can answer this question: Which information is NEED TO KNOW, which is GOOD TO KNOW, and which is NICE TO KNOW? If time is critical and things are moving fast, then cut out the NICE and the GOOD.

Processing also means that you must often change information. Not the meaning or the truth of the information, but you often must change the words, or the language, or the way the information is carried—so that the next link up above or down below can understand it. You "translate." A frag order comes down to you as a bunch of words on the radio, and you translate that into a hand and arm signal for the next link below. The meaning of the words and the signal was the same. The words on the radio and your arm both said, "Attack!"

Moving information means you don't sit on it. If you've made a conscious decision to stop some item of information while you were cutting down and translating, that's fine. But, if you know the information needs
of the links above and below, then you know what's critical. And if what you got is hot, then it's got to move with speed and accuracy—like a reflex action in the nervous system of a well-trained athlete.

Speed is determined mainly by how important you think "communications" is, and by how "expert" you are with communications equipment, procedures, and techniques. And accuracy... accuracy is determined not by you, but by the link that receives the information you pass on. Up or down. There is one simple, critical rule right here, particularly applicable in the tricky business of moving orders downward. Always check to see that an order is understood. An affirmative nod or a "Roger" on the radio is often not enough. When there's time, and you're moving a critical order, ask the link on the receiving end to say back the information you sent. And further, if you're good, you won't quit there. You'll watch to see what happens as a result of the information you sent.

To discuss these three things that you do as a link in a chain of command communicating in battle, we had to slow down the action. We had to break down a highly complex, high-speed activity so you could better understand what the chain of command is and how it functions. And it's never that clean, and neat, and simple. Nevertheless, these same basics of communication apply today, right now, as our Army prepares for war, like it always does in peacetime.

The chain of command coordinates and controls; orders and planning information flow down; reports and requests flow up; and each link in the chain gets, processes, and moves information. Fighting the battle takes only a short time. Getting ready to fight is a full-time, long-term, every-day activity, with a multitude of tasks to be accomplished. The chain of command is what gets both things done. Time spent studying and talking about how the chain communicates will not be wasted.
Of all the thousands of things that come under the heading of "Leadership," what is it that's "MOST IMPORTANT?" Simple . . . soldier values. This is the MOST IMPORTANT subject, but it is also LEAST SPECIFIC. No step-by-step "how-to's." There can not be such a thing as an Army without discipline, and soldier values is what it is that builds discipline. You'll see why in a moment.

Go find a handful of unit crests. Read the words. What those mottos say is what those different units want to be, what they aspire to, how they want to be known, what they want to be known for, what they want their reputation to be based on, and what people can expect of them. Those words in those mottos tell you "what's important" in those units. Values are nothing more than a few words that describe "what's important." And that's all "values" are. They say "what's important" in an outfit. In a company, or a whole Army.

If you think back to one of the best units you've ever been in, you'll most probably find that you can recall the words of the unit's motto. And if you think a little more, you'll remember that there were times when those words gave you some guidance about what you, as a member of the outfit, should do. The words helped you make decisions. Helped you figure out what was "right." Values lead leaders to do the right things. And they lead soldiers to do the right things. That's what values do.

Any unit or organization must have values . . . a few words that say "what's important" for that outfit and that lead leaders to make the right decision and do the right things . . . on their own. Now if you'll think about the words on all those unit crests, you'll see that those words usually talk about what is "most important" in terms of that unit accomplishing its mission . . . its purpose. I'll bet you can't find one unit crest that talks about the welfare of the men. Mission, purpose, values—they're all linked together.

Our Army's purpose, as we've said before, is to fight and win the land battle. That means our Army's purpose gets accomplished at one specific place . . . the battlefield. And that means that our Army's values must serve some function when the unit fights. Many experienced combat leaders feel there are about four Army values which do this. Four words. They come from all the words on all those unit crests put together. They represent what we want our Army to be. They describe what our nation expects of our Army. Finally, and most important, they serve our Army's purpose . . . on the battlefield, when the unit fights. The four words are CANDOR, COMMITMENT, COURAGE and COMPETENCE. Each one affects the other. They are what you must build into the man called "soldier."

CANDOR. This is not a very "strong" word, but here, in this discussion, it means openness, plus honesty, plus simplicity. On the battlefield, it is the prime rule governing communications among men. It
operates to insure the best possible transfer of meaning among people. The stakes are too high, and time is too short to screw around with anything but the essence and the truth. Men in battle can't mess around with little white lies, and private secrets, and little games. Communication of fact, and of feelings as well, must be clean, simple, whole, accurate.

The candor of the battlefield serves to develop and support the trust upon which men's commitment to each other is built. The candor of the battlefield is why "buddy groups" form there so quickly and permanently. The candor of the battlefield is why lies told there are punished not with gossip, but with action.

The battlefield must be the most honest place in the world.

COMMITMENT. Battlefield commitment is mainly to men and groups of men, far more than to things. For the soldier, it is commitment first to that 'ole buddy, then close after that, commitment to the squad or the crew. Some commitment to larger units and a little to the nation, but not near as much as to the buddy and the squad. This value operates to provide security, which comes from mutual trust. It also serves as the central foundation for teamwork and coordination. Basic training gets this value started. The PARFOX fighting position is an example of putting commitment to work. Fire and maneuver, and combined arms teamwork—the underpinnings of the whole way we fight—are a function of the strength of commitment to men and groups of men, commitment to each other, and to the "US" in US Army.

Leaders' commitment to men focuses downward, to the troops. In some strange but somehow essential way, the strength of this downward commitment often decreases as leader rank increases. In a way, what happens as rank increases, is that commitment to men begins to change into commitment to purpose or mission.

Commitment to other soldiers is the main message in most Congressional Medal of Honor citations.

COURAGE. Courage is taking a risk, even though the choice not to do so is open. On the battlefield, the risk is a total loss risk, and yet, for various reasons, the soldier himself decides that the total loss risk is his own best choice. This risk-taking is the ultimate definition of "soldier." That's why some people say that to be a soldier is "the noblest act of mankind."

Courage, in individuals, turns the whole action on. The action cannot start without courage on the part of some individuals. That's what battle leaders do, and what the green tab is supposed to mean, and why SET THE EXAMPLE is always so damned important. Further, the battlefield action cannot continue to its conclusion unless courage continues, not just by the leader, but by all involved. In battle, in the unit, courage grows from an individual trait into a unit process.

There is a contagion to courage, and it spreads most rapidly in cohesive units.
COMPETENCE. The oldest value on the battlefield. Ten thousand years ago, 'way back even before there were such things as "armies," 'way back when it was one-on-one, competence determined which one won.

Competence is also the central value, since the other three are linked to it. On the battlefield, candor is important only to insure accurate transfer of meaning about changing status of competence. Competence is the basis for skill and for confidence in one's self, which is where courage comes from. Competence is also the basis for confidence in others, which establishes commitment, since the patterns and strength of trust and mutual support are formed on the basis of where competence lies and in what degree.

On the battlefield, it is competence that establishes status and "pecking order," and so the patterns of strong informal leadership which actually "run" the action may or may not correspond to the formal pattern or actual chain of command. This depends on the competence of the formal "chain," and each of its members.

On the battlefield, subordinates, superiors, and buddies value competence more than any other attribute . . . except courage.

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And that's what those four Army values do, on the battlefield. How can you use them in developing leaders? Well, think a moment about the Traits of a Leader. Those four words summarize the traits. Then think about the Principles of Leadership. Those four words summarize the principles. Since this is so, and since you're a leader, and since you know that the one best way to lead is to SET THE EXAMPLE, then develop your subordinate leaders by you showing them what those values look like when a leader leads. When you lead.

If they do like you, then every soldier in the unit begins to understand "what's important." And the more that occurs, the greater the chance that every soldier will do the right thing . . . on his own. And isn't that what "discipline" means?
Let me lay out for you a damn fine tool for developing soldiers. All it is is two simple words...ABLE and WILLING.

At this point, you probably already know that developing soldiers = building skill and will. And you know that building skill, or training, is the primary task and principal responsibility for any company-level leader this side of the battlefield. And that every time you build skill, you automatically build will. These things apply, in general, to developing all soldiers. But every soldier is a different individual, and what you probably need are some "how-to's" for developing individual soldiers. What works well for building skill and will in one soldier may not work at all for the next. It would if soldiers were machines...but they ain't.

The standard for you in the task of developing soldiers is to produce a man who is both able and willing. Some soldiers are able and willing all the time. They have the skill and the will, no matter what task you give them to do. Some have the will—they try hard—but not the skill—whatever they touch turns to mud. Others have the ability to do the task you give them, but not the will—you have to stand over them and flat-out make them do the task.

What all the above says is that if you want to develop soldiers as individuals, then start by sizing up each soldier in terms of "HOW ABLE IS HE? and HOW WILLING IS HE?" Make an estimate. Check his headspace. With an "able and willing gauge." This simple basic estimate works, saves you time, helps you do the right things right, and, in addition to all that, it's logical. It makes good sense for a leader to come down hard on a soldier who has the ability to do a task but won't do it. On the other hand, it makes no sense at all to come down hard on a man who is trying his damnedest, but has never really been taught the skills required to do the task.

Knowing how to judge a soldier in terms of "able and willing" is the first step in developing soldiers as individuals. Listed below are some ballpark traits and characteristics of soldiers in each of the four different categories of "able and willing." As you study these, think about your immediate subordinates, right now. Each one. As an individual. Very few individuals will fit clearly and completely in any one category. But if you'll think about your man, you'll see that one of those four categories seems to describe him better than the others. Go ahead and try it. With each of your subordinates. In which category would Smith fit best? And Jones? And so on down the line. If you know your man, as the 6th Principle of Leadership requires, you'll get the right man in the right category about 90% of the time.

I. Able and willing

   Has done the task right before.
• Does many other tasks without being told.
• Never seems satisfied until work is done "right."
• Accepts the need to put in extra time when necessary to get the job done.
• Works out ways to get the job done better.
• Recent performance has been satisfactory.

II. Unable but willing

• Has never performed task before, or can't recall it if he did.
• Recent performance has been enthusiastic, particularly on tasks similar to what you want him to do now.
• Pays close attention to your instruction.
• Watches others doing same task; asks questions.
• Spends some of his "own time" learning or practicing.

III. Able but unwilling

• Recent performance has been off and on. Sometimes to standard, sometimes below standard.
• Has done the job right before, but keeps asking for instructions and assistance.
• Doesn't appear to be concentrating. Work is sporadic, poorly planned.
• Lacks confidence in himself and his work.

IV. Unable and unwilling

• Has never performed the task to standard before.
• Recent performance has been below standard, even when he has received a lot of assistance and instructions.
• Works only when closely supervised.
• Seems satisfied with below standard results.
• Pays little attention to instructions; half-listens.

The descriptors for each of the four categories above are only rough indicators. The point to remember is that individuals are each different. And the differences that are most important to you in developing soldiers are the differences in skill and will. The ability to judge a subordinate on how well he measures up on both sides of the "able and willing" scale is another one of those basics that you must learn, practice, think about, and turn into an instinct. Soldiers aren't machines. They are men, each one different from the other. A big part of your job is knowing those differences, then using that knowledge to lead better and smarter. Now how do you work with each type of soldier?

A soldier who is fully "able and willing" is the living standard for you in the task of developing soldiers. You work with an "able and willing" like you were a COACH with a good quarterback. He can operate with mission-type orders and probably call most of his own plays. He does the right things right. He should not be given close supervision. What this soldier does best is get your job done, and save your time. He earns your trust. This is the kind of man you want to start "grooming" to bring into the leadership ranks. And finally, if you want to do the tricky
business of "developing" right, delegate important jobs only to these soldiers that you feel are able and willing. The others will seldom get the job done.

The "willing but unable" soldier is the one that usually comes to you in the replacement stream. The new guy. You work with this man like you were a TEACHER. There will be much that he doesn't know. AIT and OSUT will have only given him maybe 2/3 of the skills that his MOS calls for. And he's probably never seen an operational "unit." These soldiers need careful handling. They believe most of the rumors they hear. In all the confusion, they can become discouraged and frustrated very easily. Or get led off on the wrong track. They need patient instruction, and a lot of feedback. They will eat up much of your time, but, in this case, putting in the extra time is like putting money in the bank.

The "able but unwilling" soldier is your main challenge. You know you got a good horse, and you take him to the water, but he just won't drink. You work with this man like you were a FATHER. His unwillingness may be only a lack of confidence. All he needs is a nudge . . . an opportunity and some encouragement. On the other hand, this "able but unwilling" soldier might have a real problem--like with a young wife, or a big debt, or with himself. The one best thing you can do is let him tell you about it. Listen to him. But listen carefully. About 5% of the time, the able but unwilling soldier may just be getting over on you. Shirking. So, in either case--the man with the problem, or the shirker--insist that they complete the task, and make them do it to standards. The man with the problem will feel he's done something worthwhile; and the shirker will learn that, with you, the "shirk" don't work.

The "unable and unwilling" soldier shouldn't be in your unit in the first place. Somewhere along the line, a poor leader knowingly passed him on, or let him slip through. You work with this man like you were a WARDEN. He doesn't know how to do his job, and he doesn't care about learning. He is a "quitter." If you punish a quitter, then what that means is that he is smarter than you are. Instead of punishing him when he quits on you, make him complete the task. Why? Well, if he doesn't want to do his job, and you punish him instead of making him do it, then he gets what he wanted. He got out of doing the job. You actually rewarded him. He outsmarted you.

Making the unable and unwilling soldier complete a task to standards has another advantage. Maybe you'll lead him to something he's never learned much about . . . success at some skill. And maybe that success at some skill will build a little more willingness. And he'll try another skill, and . . . there he goes! A finally turned-on soldier. Salvaged. That will happen about one time out of five, after you have invested more hours in these five problem soldiers than in all of your other men put together. Putting a lot of time in with the unable and unwilling soldier is noble and humane. It is not, however, "leadership effective" in terms of the effort you must invest, the return our Army gets on that investment, and the other soldiers who will benefit far more from your time and effort. Don't pass this man on or let him slip through. There is no place for him on the battlefield when that "thing" we called a unit does its work.
So there's the "able and willing" tool—a simple and practical "how-to" for identifying four different categories of soldiers, and a simple strategy for developing individuals in each different category. The differences have nothing to do with race, creed, color, sex, etc. The differences have to do simply with skill and will, which is what you, as a leader, are responsible for developing in your soldiers. When you size up a soldier, you should be sizing him up on skill and will. Skill + Will = Performance. Performance is what gets the task done. And the purpose of leadership is . . . to accomplish the task.
"TEAMWORK"

D. M. Malone

About a hundred thousand years ago, when "War" was first invented, soldiering was pretty simple. "Armies" were small: maybe 10 men. There was one officer: the biggest and meanest and harriest. There was one uniform: a piece of animal skin. There was one weapon: a club. And one MOS: 11B. And one tactic: hand-to-hand, man-to-man. In those days, if the numbers were about equal, what won on that battlefield then was SKILL and WILL.

Ten thousand years later, on the battlefield, things had changed. Those small armies were bigger: 100 men now, organized into 10 groups of 10 men each. There was a chain of command, and 11 officers: one leader for each group of 10, plus one biggest and meanest leader of the leaders. There were two more uniform items: foot gear, and shields. And two new kinds of weapons: bows and arrows, and long spears carried by men on horses. And two new MOSs: 13E and 19B. Tactics were more complicated. The infantrymen still did just about what they had done before, but the cavalrymen, with their long spears and horses, had to coordinate their faster speed with the movement of the slower infantrymen. And the artillerymen had to learn to shoot their arrows before their infantry and cavalry buddies got going with their clubs and spears in the hand-to-hand business. With that, the two basics of all combat teamwork were born: fire, and maneuver.

What won on this never battlefield was SKILL and WILL, plus a new factor . . . TEAMWORK. And it was discovered, on countless battlefields after that, that an army of 100 men who could work together as a combined arms team, could whip the daylights out of an army of 1000 men who couldn't.

Ever since that time, as war and weapons have become more complex, TEAMWORK has become more and more the deciding factor on the battlefield. Military history points this out, time and time again. That's why, ever since you started learning to be a soldier, someone has stressed the importance of you, as a leader, working to build SKILL, WILL, and TEAMWORK. That's why the 10th Principle of Leadership, which carries with it the wisdom of war, holds you responsible to . . . "TRAIN YOUR MEN AS A TEAM."

In this discussion on building teamwork, we're going to develop that 10th Principle in detail; more than it's ever been developed before in any Army leadership manual. The complexity of the battlefield for which you are preparing, coupled with the fact that you must fight and win outnumbered, make TEAMWORK more important for Army Leadership today than it has ever been. It is in teamwork that we can find that "extra" that wins.

Suppose that, through some military magic and a mighty individual training effort, the leadership of your unit had been able to develop, to standards, every single one of the 1500 individual skills that the unit needs. What would you have? You'd have 169 individuals you could be proud
of, but that's about all. If individual skills were the only kind of skills you had, then the company, the unit, would not survive on the battlefield. Individual skills must be put together.

The business of putting things together is basically what "teamwork" is. "Putting together" is the responsibility of the leadership of the unit. Fire team leaders put together the individual skills of soldiers, and build a team. Squad leaders put together two fire teams and build a larger team called a squad. Platoon leaders put together four squads and build a larger team called a platoon. And the company commander puts platoons together to build the basic fighting team of the US Army. That deadly "thing" on the battlefield that we call The Company is a combat team. All parts put together. Functioning smoothly. As a whole. As a team. Working at the deadly business of ... delivering steel.

There are three different kinds of "teamwork." What makes the difference is: (1) how much the individuals in the teams have to depend on each other; and (2) how much the leader must control the actions of the individuals.

The first and simplest kind of teamwork is like a bowling team. Each individual, by himself, does the best he can, then individual scores are added up to determine how well the "team" did. There's not much real teamwork involved. Individuals are not dependent on each other, and the leader has little to do in the way of coordinating and controlling their actions. His main task in this case is to train and motivate individuals. When a unit is firing on the rifle range, it is functioning basically as this kind of a team.

Things get a little more complicated with a relay team in a track meet. Individual skill (speed) is critical, but now, with this second kind of teamwork, each team member must do his task right before the next man can start to do his. Leaders still work to fire up individual performance, but now they concentrate on the specific part of the action and the specific point in time where the individuals depend on each other—the hand-off. And, if even one runner, even the "World's Fastest Human," drops the stick, the team loses. There are many examples of this kind of teamwork in a military unit. The mechanic down in the Motor Pool must get the C.O.'s 1/4-ton running before the C.O. can get to the field to coordinate and control the FTX.

The third and most complex kind of teamwork is the kind you find in a football team. Every individual is dependent on everyone else. If one man, like the center, or one "fire team," like the defensive backfield, fails to do the right things right, then that can cause the team, as a whole, to lose. The leader of this most complex kind of team is concerned about motivation, but, more importantly, he is most concerned about how to coordinate and control the actions of every single individual. To win, the team, as a whole, must "get it all together." War is not a game, but the best military example of this most complex kind of teamwork occurs on the battlefield. There, the leadership of the unit—the captain, the lieutenants, and the sergeants—puts that whole "thing" together, and it fights.
You have seen, in these three examples, a common-sense principle that you already know: "Different strokes for different folks." This means that you, as a leader, must do different things, according to the kind of teamwork involved. If the requirement is for excellence of individual performance, then build and control the team by carefully explaining and closely supervising the individual training and individual motivation. If the teamwork requirement is for a sequence of actions to be performed by different individuals, one after the other, then build and control the team by concentrating on the specific times and places where one man "hands off" to the next. Finally, if the teamwork requirement is the one where everyone is dependent on everyone else--and this is the battlefield kind of teamwork--then there is only one way to build and control the team. And you already have a pretty good idea of what this is, don't you?

Right.

Your requirement as a leader in this most complicated of the three kinds of teamwork is to control each action of each man so that all the pieces of the action fit together right. To do this, you must control what each man does, how he does it, and when he does it. If you're a squad leader or higher, you've got to be controlling not subordinate individual soldiers, but your subordinate teams. What they do, how they do it, when they do it. And you do this through the chain . . . through your subordinate leaders. Clear, uncomplicated orders and clear, uncomplicated communications will help; but even with these, there is NO WAY you can watch over and control, constantly, what every man or team does, or how they do it, or when they do it.

There's only one way you can build the kind of control essential for battlefield teamwork, and that is to build that control into the individuals and teams themselves. Build internal control. And there's only one way to do that. Same way the football coach does. DRILL. Practice and critique, practice and critique, practice and critique. Over and over, until individuals and teams learn to control themselves . . . until they learn where, when, and how they are dependent on one another . . . until the individuals and teams learn what each individual and each team must do in order to "get it all together." DRILL.

Football coaches call these drills "scrimmages," and they write them down in "play books." Army leaders call these drills "collective tasks" or "battle drills," and they write them down in ARTEP manuals. Coaches that win on the playing field and leaders that win on the battlefield will both tell you the same thing: you must start with good, basic individual skills as a foundation. Coaches say, "run, block, and tackle." Battle leaders say, "move, shoot, and communicate." After that, it's DRILL and DRILL and DRILL. DRILL until working together becomes instinct. And DRILL toward perfection. Practice doesn't make perfect. What makes perfect is perfect practice. DRILL.

Basic individual SKILL, the WILL to work to get ready, and TEAMWORK drill. That's the only road that leads to winning teams. And now we can lay out another one of those simple, basic "formulas" of leadership arithmetic:

SKILL X WILL X DRILL = KILL
"BUILDING A TEAM"

D. M. Malone

War sure as hell ain't a game ... but thinking about games can sure as hell help you learn about war.

Think about a football team. Think about what it does, and how it operates. Now see if you can come up with a half dozen examples where a football team is something like a unit on the battlefield. That ought to give you a pretty good idea of how teamwork works, on either the playing field or the battlefield.

What I'd like to do now is give you some good guidance for how to build a team. Let me lay out for you, first, an overall team-building strategy, and second, a dozen or so specific "How-To's" for doing what one of those Principles of Leadership tells you to do—"Train Your Men As A Team."

Fire team leaders build teams out of subordinate individual soldiers. Squad leaders and above build teams out of subordinate leaders and their teams. In either case, there is one simple overall leadership strategy for building a team. This is a strategy—an overall way of operating—not a specific how-to. The strategy has two requirements for you.

You, as the leader, must constantly, on a day-to-day basis, do things and say things which will convince each individual team member that he is a part of a whole team. And not just a plain 'ole part, but an essential part—a part that other individuals depend upon to get their work done, and that the whole team depends upon to get its work done.

The second requirement of the strategy is that you do and say things on a day-to-day basis to convince the individual team member that his wants, needs, hopes, goals, etc., are tied to the performance, output, and work of the team. Each individual team member, just like you, will usually operate in his own best interest. He'll do what he thinks is best for him. That doesn't sound too nice, but that's a fact of human nature. In building a team, what you have to do is work to convince each team member that the best way for him to get what he wants is through what the team does. A football player who wants recognition doesn't get a hell of a lot of it on a team that loses all the time.

In essence, this team-building leadership "strategy" says: (1) convince each team member that other team members and the team as a whole are dependent on him; and (2) convince him that much of the whole business of reward and punishment, for him, is tied to the output or performance of the team he belongs to.

Building the complex kind of team that the battlefield requires is tough. You sure as hell can't get it by just giving an order. Or asking. Takes time. Takes thinking ahead. Takes the 6th Principle of Leadership—KNOW YOUR SOLDIERS and what's inside each man. Beyond the
general strategy above, there is no step-by-step procedure which is very practical for use by company-level leaders. There are, however, about a dozen good team-building techniques which come from experience and research, been around for a couple thousand years, and will work for captains, lieutenants, and sergeants.

- The best way to build the kind of team the unit needs is the way that's probably already obvious to you just from thinking about football teams . . . DRILL. Dismounted drill is good, but the best DRILLS for the kind of teamwork you need most are spelled out in the ARTEPs. If you can't get out in the woods, then walk through the ARTEP on an open field. (I wonder if you could have an "ARTEP Parade"?) If you can't do that, then try a blackboard, or a terrain model, or a map. Always critique a DRILL. Critique the performance of the team, and how each individual team member contributed—or failed to contribute—to the team's performance. Point out the specific places where coordination and timing of individuals and teams worked and didn't work.

- High stress and heavy pressure applied to the whole team will build teamwork. That's a fact. The trick is to do it right. Events, exercises, activities which are extreme challenges, and which demand a hard-core, all-out effort by the team and by each team member, will build teamwork. Add danger, and teamwork gets even stronger. The high stress of battle puts teams together so well—sometimes in just a few hours—that they continue to have annual "get-togethers" for years after the war is over. In training, get as close to battlefield stress as you can. Without a war, Captain, try a 100-mile road march; or run 10 miles with weapons, helmets, and LBE; or climb a mountain; or run a super-tough, non-stop, day-and-night, 24-hour battle drill over the worst terrain you can find. Do any or all of these high stress events as a team. Then later, start listening for the bragging and war stories. About "Us." It'll work. Guaranteed.

- Get tasks done by teams, rather than "details." You, First Sergeant, can do a lot about this. Next time Battalion hits you up for "a 10-man detail and 1 NCO," check into the chain first, but then send a fire team with its own team leader instead of a "detail." Chances are good that half as many men, working as a team, can do twice as much work in half the time. Bet on it . . . and, if you're as smart as I think you are, you'll let the team know you bet.

- Whenever there are formations, leave teams together. "Break off and fill it in back there!" may make the platoon formation look better, Lieutenant, but what you're breaking up is teams and teamwork. How units work is more important than how they look. And you're supposed to be a specialist in unit work.

- Whenever you, Sergeant, as the leader, must form your men, brief your men, move your men, work your men, critique your men, feed your men, or billet your men, then do it the same way you're going to have to fight your men on the battlefield. Do it as a team. You can tell your troops, "Everyone be down at the Motor Pool at 1300 to clean the tracks." That's the way a Boy Scout leader might try to do it. It may (or may not) get them all there by somewhere around 1330. And, Sergeant, if you do it that way, you've just lost one of those valuable day-to-day opportunities to
keep working on teamwork. Form them up as a squad in the company area, march them to the motor pool, in step, stand them at ease, give them their instructions with something like a 3-4 minute version of THE FIVE PARAGRAPH FIELD ORDER (including standards in the mission part), supervise the fire team leaders, keep the whole squad at it until the whole job is done, form them up again, critique their performance as a team, march the whole squad back to the company area, and only then turn them loose to be individuals. If you, as the leader, can keep your subordinates working and living as a team in their day-to-day activities, those ARTEP drills will automatically come out far better, and so will that "thing" that we call The Company, when it fights... on the battlefield.

* Up on the wall in the Orderly Room or the C.O.'s office, there's a manning board. It probably looks like nothing more than a chart covered with acetate and filled in with a grease pencil, but what it is is a main tool for building and maintaining teamwork. The First Sergeant and the platoon leaders will be making the primary recommendations about who goes where, but the C.O. will be making the decisions. Never move a name around, Captain, without first thinking about the impact on... teamwork and the team. When you move names around in an attempt to "even out" strength figures, you may be doing the same thing as when the Lieutenant "evens up" the platoon formation. The board may look better, but your unit may work worse because you've unintentionally destroyed some of your teamwork power. Some of that "extra." Each time you move a name, what you're really moving is a man, and you're moving him out of his "family." Put that under "Welfare of the Troops." More importantly, when you move him, you're moving a part of something bigger. If that "something bigger" is a smooth-functioning team—a "fighting machine"—then what you may be doing is pulling out the damned carburetor. And a carburetor can't be replaced with an oil pump. You can put that under "Mission." As a general rule, hold manning board moves to an absolute bare minimum, and, always consider first the impact on that team of which the soldier is a part.

* There is a simple, guaranteed way that all leaders can build teamwork. Simply start using the team words—"We," "Us," and "Our," instead of the three individual words, "I," "Me," and "My." When a leader starts leading by example with his language, followers will follow. And they'll start talking and thinking more about "Us" than about "Me." The first two letters in US Army are "US." The last two are "My." Think about that. It ain't a bad philosophy.

* Any man worth a damn will work hard to live up to his reputation. So will a team. Whenever a team does something that is both unusual and good, and when they do it as a team, then let all the leadership of the whole unit know about it. When this happens three or four times, the word will get back to the team. At that point, they'll find out that they have a reputation to live up to.

* Whenever you're supervising a task that requires a high degree of teamwork, (like maybe an ARTEP), then try to gear your supervision, critique, reward, and punishment to what the team does, more than to what individuals do. Do it in such a way that each individual can see clearly that what he wants most (or maybe wants least) depends more on what the team does than on what he does. Punishing a whole team is extremely effective, but do it very carefully. You wouldn't punish a whole relay
team just because "World's Fastest Human" got careless and dropped the
stick. Punish a whole team when all the hand-offs are too sloppy or too
slow; when there's no trust among the parts; or when all the parts get to
thinking more about "Me" than about "Us."

- Next to DRILL, the best thing for building teamwork is that
  all-powerful, all-purpose leadership tool you've heard discussed so many
times before--the 5th Principle of Leadership, SET THE EXAMPLE. It's not
hard to do. If you're a squad leader, for example, you probably want your
squad members to believe that, for them, the squad's mission is the most
important thing there is. If you do want them to feel this way, then all
you've got to do is show them that for you, the squad leader, the platoon's
mission is the most important thing there is. If you're a squad leader,
never complain about the platoon's mission or the platoon leader in front
of your followers. If you do, they're going to follow your example and do
the same about the squad's mission and about you. Do you want your
followers to cooperate, work together, and trust each other? Then show
them, by example, that that's exactly how you work with other squad
leaders. From the Motor Pool to the battlefield, in any situation,
followers will do as their leaders do. Good or bad. That's the plain
chemistry of followership.

- What makes your team different from other teams? Find out what
  those differences are and keep emphasizing them to your teams. It may be
the kind of work they do, or where they do it, or when they do it.
Whatever makes them different from other teams. This is another way of
telling team members that their team is something special, something
different, something important. Want to build some teamwork in your
company, Captain? Well, one thing that's always different in any unit is
the unit's history. Send a letter up through channels and find out what
"A" Company did in the last war or two. Then sit down some time and tell
the troops about their team at war, and how it fought in wars in the past.
No lecture . . . just a talk and some stories. Do this two or three times,
covering two or three wars, and watch what happens with "teamwork."

There now, my friend. You got a simple strategy and some simple
How-To's for building a team. All of them are easy, common-sense things to
do. Will they work? Well, let's go back to where we started . . . to the
football game. Find one of the teams that nearly always wins. Read up a
little on it, and how it works inside, and what the coach does. What
you'll find is the strategy and most of the How-To's we've discussed.
In the whole process of developing leaders over time, there is one general malfunction that will occur. The leadership of the unit will continue to operate, even with this malfunction, but it won't run smoothly on all cylinders. This malfunction has to do with "balancing".

Two great factors underlie all we know about Army leadership: accomplishment of the mission; and welfare of the men. Mission and men. Leaders are always working with these two basic factors. Whenever and wherever possible, a leader tries to balance between the two, so that the needs of the mission and the needs of the men are both met. But there are times, some times in peace and often times in war, where the needs of both cannot be met. You cannot balance. You have to choose one over the other. In these few situations, and you must make them few, MISSION MUST COME FIRST. There are those few times when our Army will not, cannot, and should not "be fair." The whole meaning of Army leadership rests on this law of MISSION MUST COME FIRST. So does the meaning of "soldier," and "service," and "duty."

In the balancing business, the "mission" side of the scale requires, simply stated, knowing your job. Weapons, gunnery, tactics, maintenance. In excruciating detail. Technical competence. Without it, an Army leader can never lead for long. Just talk won't work. Troops know.

The "men" side of the scale requires, simply stated, knowing your soldiers . . . knowing what's inside of them, what makes them do things or not do things; what turns them on, or off; what they can do and what they will do under stress, or when they're afraid, or tired, or cold, or lonely. These are the things you need to know about your soldiers. They're what tells you how a soldier measures up on the "able and willing" gauge.

You, as a leader, try to balance between these two requirements—mission needs, and men needs. And it is precisely here, here in this "balancing" business, where leaders most frequently fail. It is here where young sergeants and young lieutenants have their greatest difficulties, and where even old leaders, despite their wisdom, sometimes lose sight of the ultimate purpose of leadership. The problem arises because of the relationship that exists between soldiers' "happiness and satisfaction" on the one hand, and their "productivity and mission accomplishment" on the other.

Common sense might tell you that happy, satisfied soldiers will get the job done better. From this, a leader, especially if he's a new sergeant or new lieutenant, might well assume that if he can somehow keep his soldiers happy and satisfied, then they will be more productive . . . more likely to get the mission accomplished. But the strange chemistry of "leadership" just doesn't work this way. A thousand scientific studies of leadership, and a thousand lessons of leadership experience, both prove
that what seems to be a natural, common-sense assumption is precisely wrong!

In simple terms, mission accomplishment builds morale and esprit far more often than the other way around. When soldiers and units get done those things that soldiers and units are supposed to do, that's when morale and esprit gets highest. That's why the one best way to build WILL is to build SKILL. That's why those new Basic Training graduates are so all fired up about "soldiering," and about our Army. That's why unit esprit is at its peak when the unit has a good FTX going out in the field. Mission accomplishment drives morale far more often than the other way around.

If leaders don't know both sides of this "leadership scale"--the needs of the mission and the needs of the men--in full detail, they'll be forever getting the scale tilted the wrong way. And when that happens, the soldiers' time, or the soldiers' spirit, or the soldiers themselves will be . . . wasted.

There are times, in training, that will lead you astray. Cold, wet, muddy troops coming in from a night field exercise at 0200. "Hell, let's let 'em get a hot shower and some sleep, then we'll pull maintenance when it's light enough to see." And there are times just like that in war. A bloody and shot-up company, stalled in the assault, for the second time, half way up the hill. "Hell, they just can't do that again. Let's dig 'em in, pound that hill with Red-Leg, and ask BN for reinforcements." If you love your troops, in the noble way that good leaders do, both these decisions, at the time, seem to be just logical, common sense. But both are the easy way out, and both violate the ultimate purpose of Army leadership.

Now you can, and should, argue this point, but if you're talking leadership, there's no way you can win. The purpose of leadership is to accomplish a task. And in the final analysis, when the artillery shifts there on the battlefield for which you are now preparing, MISSION MUST COME FIRST. As you lead, and as you build leaders, this law has to be, flat-out, the cornerstone of your foundation.
COMMON SENSE, COMPANY-LEVEL LEADERSHIP

"LEADERSHIP MALFUNCTION--THE DIFFERENCE"

D. M. Malone

A major malfunction that will occur in the process of developing company-level leaders will occur when the leadership of the unit puts insufficient efforts on recognizing, emphasizing, and using . . . THE DIFFERENCE.

Of the 169 men in a full-strength company, 43 are officers, and 126 are not. Forty-three are in the leadership of the unit and 126 are not. And that's THE DIFFERENCE. There's a line.

The line is totally unimportant in terms of making the 43 "better" individuals than the 126. Any one of the 169 can be as good a man as any other. The line is extremely important, however, in terms of making it possible for the leadership of the unit to lead the unit. Any organized effort involving two or more people must have someone in charge. There must be leaders and followers. Leaders and followers do different things. Leaders analyze, organize, deputize and supervise. Followers execute. The line establishes THE DIFFERENCE between the two. New lieutenants and new sergeants, just as they have a hard time "balancing" between mission needs and men needs, also have a hard time learning THE DIFFERENCE between leaders and followers.

Somewhere amongst your young "able and willing" soldiers, there's probably one that you have started on the road to becoming a leader. You picked him out because he seemed to be the "main man" in one of those informal "buddy groups" that hang around together. Now why do you think his buddies looked at him as the main man? It was because he knew, better than anyone else, what was inside his buddies. How they felt about the Army and about their job. What their attitude was. What their needs were. And he was "main man" also, because he, better than anyone else, could speak for them. Act as their "spokesman" in passing on their attitudes and needs to the leadership. That's what makes an informal leader. Of a good group or a sorry group. He knows his buddies' attitudes and needs, and they think he's the one who can most probably get something done about them. That's why they put him in charge," informally. Then you put him "in charge," formally. You did right, because he's a leader, in your eyes and theirs.

This young man, as an informal leader, is an expert in "needs of the men." But at this stage, there is no way he can do the balancing between mission and men which is so critical. He knows little about "needs of the mission." When you bring him across that line that separates leaders from followers, "needs of the mission" are what he must learn. And then, when he's started learning that, he will begin to understand the price he has to pay to become a leader of men. Nothing good ever comes for free. What he will learn is that never again, as a leader, can he be "one of the boys." He's across the line. Graduated. Different.
Since he's different now, he's got to find some new "buddy groups." He's got to "hang around" with leaders, and not with "the boys." And that's why brand-new sergeants should be re-assigned within the unit; and that's why, in good units, there are separate areas in the Mess Hall where sergeants can talk about "sergeant's business"; and that's why, in good units, there are separate NCO clubs where they can talk about it some more; and that's why there are separate NCO rooms in the barracks; and why there are separate NCO get-togethers, meetings, and activities. All this has nothing to do with "NCO prestige." The purpose of all this separating is to teach, to develop, to strengthen, to make clear, THE DIFFERENCE... between those who are part of the leadership, and those who are not. The better the leadership of the unit does this separating, then the better the unit is led.
THIGHBONES AND BEDROCK

by COL D. M. Malone & Dr. Donald D. Penner

One of the great data bases from which our Army draws its ideas about "how to run an organization" is the literature of the field of management. Many members of the Army Secretariat were, earlier, corporate executives from various management strata; most all of our generals have extensive schooling in advanced management; in all probability, the majority of our Army's graduate degrees are in the management field; and the libraries of our school system are loaded with civilian management literature.

Most of the management lore noted above came from empirical research, observation, and contemplation of the civilian corporate organization... AT&T, General Motors, or the Hawthorne Plant of Western Electric. Damn near none of it came from the 1st US Infantry Division, Third US Army, or US Army Europe--organizations of a size at least equal and a complexity far greater.

The point is that we soldiers go out on recon into the civilian management world; then pick up ideas, techniques, procedures, and philosophies that seem good; then drag these things back across our boundary and try to just stick 'em in our organization. And... as might be expected, the greater the rank of the "sticker," the greater the probability that the crankshaft for the Ford will serve admirably as the rear axle for the Chevrolet.

We need to be extremely careful about trusting too quickly, or too much, things from the lore of corporate management that seem "just right" for some ailing counterpart in our Army. Doctors specializing in organ transplants know this lesson well. The receiver system often rejects the transplant organ, even though the organ appears identical and worked just fine in the donor system. Or, even if the receiver system accepts the transplant, the transplant can have hidden and dysfunctional effects. There is a story about this latter phenomenon, concerning the unintended and embarrassing effects which occurred when a bone surgeon used a segment of the rear leg of a large dog in rebuilding the thighbone of a man whose leg had been shattered in a car wreck.

In my view, at least, before we drag back across our boundaries, and make policy about, transplants from the civilian management world--transplants like PPBS, ORGA, MBO, OD--we need to run those ideas (procedures, "systems", gimmicks, and whatnots) through a series of filters before we incorporate them into our Army's notion of "how to run an organization." The idea just may not fit, or worse, it may seem to fit, but in reality produce hidden, long-term, dysfunctional effects.

The filters are those fundamental things deep in our Army's basic metabolism... the differences (between our Army and the corporate world) which are down at bedrock level... those things that make our Army special and unique... those things far more complex than can be expressed in some organizational theorists' taxonomy of "types of organizations."

284
This paper, in addition to providing a warning about the need to filter all this stuff we drag in from outside, is also a first shot at attempting to lay out some of the filters... some of the ways in which our Army is... "different." These filters are not necessarily good or bad. Where one stands on any point depends mostly upon where one sits. So look at some of these "organizational idiosyncrasies," and add some more of your own, and then perhaps, start to challenge some of those things we've dragged in from outside.

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* We don't operate by profit and loss statements. Criteria of effectiveness are thus obscure. Our output is force readiness—not as we think it is, but as our people perceive it. And the Russians. And force readiness has no clear, valid, objective components which can be measured, compared to a standard, and then fed back into the production process. We can't even define it clearly.

* Closely related to the criterion business above is the fact that our source of capital is external to our Army. We can do little to generate our own capital. We must rely on Congress—with no profit and loss statements from which to argue. This situation gives us little ability to control our own destiny. It also puts us in a position of highly scrutinized accountability.

* The quantity and quality and structure of our Army's labor force is regulated externally by an outside organization, both directly through law (e.g., draft, OGLA), and indirectly through limits imposed on capital expenditures for pay and hiring.

* Size is an obvious difference. Our 'ole Army has more than 1,200,000 soldiers and civilians and an annual budget in excess of 29 billion dollars. Ford Motor Company, a pipsqueak by comparison, can go from policy statement to doctrine in a matter of months. In our Army, it might take years to get doctrine into the minds of a million men.

* General Motors may be a large organization like us, but size-wise they don't change as much, as often, as rapidly, as we do. WW I = 108,000 to 3,500,000. Then back to 218,000 for a while, and all of a sudden up to 6,000,000 for WW II... and down again to 554,000 a few years later. Like a damned accordian. What other large organization could handle such fluctuations without dying? What bedrock ways of "running an organization," deep down in our vitals, enable us to do this and survive? Is there a chance that some new "procedure" from the corporate world might destroy this robustness?

* Our Army's primary task, armed land combat, is totally unique to us as an organization.

* Unlike Standard Oil, the requirement for us to perform our primary task occurs infrequently. And the gaps in between are measured in years. Fireman and police provide "proof of service" every day for almost every
individual source of outside capital. Our Army has no way to do this. Soldiers are like "summer chimneys" and catastrophe insurance.

* On those occasions when we do provide "proof of service," our Army and every one of its members must be prepared to do things that no other organization would do, under conditions no other organization would tolerate, all in accord with a simple organizational policy whose essence is: fight = kill or die.

* Our Army is characterized by extreme centralization and standardization. The reason for this lies in the need for control and coordination required to execute the policy noted above—to marshal, focus, apply and absorb the complex chemistry of combat power. Standardization receives even greater importance because of the "die" component of the simple policy . . . and the resulting need to replace dead men, and broken machines, and shattered units with like components.

* The people of our Army are organized into three distinct social classes: officers, enlisted, and civilian. While some parallel might be drawn between AT&T's "management/labor" and our Army's "officer/enlisted," the comparison is spurious, particularly in terms of the balance of power.

* Class or status differences, as well as power differences, between officers and enlisted personnel in our Army are enforced by law. Our enlisted personnel can be jailed for various forms of disrespect not involving assault. "You Can Take This Job and Shove It," our nation's most popular Bluegrass song last year, could easily become a court-martial offense.

* AT&T's "labor" can negotiate with AT&T's "management" on issues involving pay, working conditions, and safety. Labor in the corporate world is organized into unions which bring legal, political, and economic power to bear in support of labor negotiating with management. Our Army has nothing similar. While unions in our Army are not forbidden by law, collective bargaining is.

* Our Army's "labor," its enlisted men, are employed on a personal services contract. Under threat of extreme punishment, they cannot of their own volition leave their employment until their term of contract expires. In the corporate organizations of the civilian management world, such contracts are illegal.

* Virtually all members of our Army's work-force are displaced from their homes. Even if a young man lives near an Army post, he cannot go there and "get a job at Army." If he continues to work in our Army, he is inevitably and frequently displaced from community as well.

* The great majority of our Army's work-force is very young, with thousands still in their teens. For almost all, our Army is their first experience in any large organization, other than schools.

* Most of the young individuals entering our Army view work with the Army as temporary employment. Coupled with the displacement noted earlier, this gives our soldier a transitoriness, an anchorlessness, an absence of
ties and social supports which he must seek instead among the members of his work unit or in an equally anchorless family of his own.

* Our Army is characterized by a rate of turnover which no corporate organization would tolerate or could pay for. A routine turnover rate of 30% each quarter would soon force out of business any "profit center" or subdivision of International Harvester. For our Army, this turnover rate is the "natural state" and amplifies even more the rootlessness and lack of social supports mentioned before.

* The individual member of our Army's work-force has limited control and limited options with respect to his work and work environment. He must do what he is told to do, when he is told to do it. He can be fined or jailed if he fails in either respect. An employee of United Airlines might get fired.

* Likewise, our Army's work-force member has limited control over his work hours. While many work an eight-hour day, they are still subject to recall at any time of the day or night, or may be scheduled for exercises where they are "on the job" 24 hours each day for extended periods of time. The corporate world's overtime, maximum hour work week, and minimum hourly wage are not applicable.

* Promotion for our Army's work-force member is largely, but not wholly, based on seniority. Additional pay is not directly contingent upon better performance or increased output. For more than 50% of the lower ranks of our work-force, pay is based partly on need. A soldier with dependents will be paid more than one without even though both perform the same task and work identical hours. Some corporations are similar to our Army with respect to basing promotions on seniority, but none, to my knowledge, pay extra for a wife and children.

* Our Army's management group, its officers, are members of a unique profession. Professional status is defined more by a state of being employed than by a unique set of skills, or by membership in a professional association such as the American Medical Association. There is no governing body, per se, for our unique profession, nor does our profession have a written code of ethics. A member of the medical profession employed by IBM can leave IBM, go to Litton Industries, and still remain a member of the medical profession. An Army officer who leaves the Army and goes to Litton is no longer a member of our profession . . . under penalty of law.

* Promotion within our Army's management group is to a rank, rather than to a position. The corporate organization would promote a manager first to a position, then give him the rank, pay, and status associated with that position. Texas Instruments would hardly promote a man to vice-president first, and then assign him to whatever vice-president-level position was open.

* Promotion within our management group is a centralized procedure where a board examines paper files and a photograph to select several hundred officers from among several thousand. Managerial promotion in the corporate organization, in practically all cases, is on an individualized basis. When a management position in United States Steel becomes available, higher management selects a specific individual to fill the
specific job. The individual selected is usually the "best qualified," and chosen from among several who have been identified previously and groomed as potential fillers for the specific job.

* The career of a member of the management group of the corporate organization will span 45-50 years. A member of our Army's management group will average about 26 years. Bell Telephone would probably consider this a failure to amortize a developmental investment.

* The short career noted above, coupled with strong emphasis on a "wide range" of experience and schooling for career development, coupled with a fair share of duty in "undesirable" overseas areas, coupled with the rootlessness previously noted, all combine to produce a degree of turbulence which the corporate organization could neither comprehend nor tolerate. A successful member of our Army's management group will most probably spend less than 2 years in any single job in his career.

* The position turnover just described, coupled with the diversity of the jobs which a member of our management group will fill, make it extremely difficult for any officer in any job to develop a great deal of expertise in any one area. This is particularly true at the uppermost levels of our management group where the true specialists are required.

* The generalists of our management group, also required at the uppermost levels, are, in range of small samples, of diverse positions, rather than by extensive experience at being generalists.

*And finally, in this particular run-out of our Army's uniqueness, is the concept of service. A member (management of labor) of Allied Chemical, when he enters that organization, enters also a contract. There is the formal, written employment contract which lays out wages, hours, duties, and the like . . . but there is also an unwritten, informal organizational contract which implies that the relationship between the organization and the member will be "fair" . . . 50/50 "meet you half way" . . . balanced over time by variations in output and compensation. Our Army cannot be fair. It can, and does, strive for fairness on a day-to-day basis, but deep down in its bedrock metabolism runs that simple but inescapable imperative which drives our Army's whole sense of purpose: fight = kill or die. Every member of our Army is subject to this imperative . . . and it just, by God, ain't fair, but, that's what "service" means—that's the "business" our Army's in, and I'll be damned if I can find much about that in the literature of the field of corporate management.

* * * *

We, us soldiers, need to write our own doctrinal literature about "how to run an organization." Not bits of Drucker and Leavitt and Fayol, and Taylor, and Talcott Parsons painted green. We need some help from those scholars, but what we need most is something that comes from our bedrock . . . something that comes from all we've learned in 200 years . . . something that recognizes our uniquenesses . . . something grounded on our simple imperative . . . something that comes from the first two letters in US Army . . . something that comes from . . . US.
YOU CAN'T RUN AN ARMY LIKE A CORPORATION

by COL D. M. Malone and Donald D. Penner

One of the great data bases from which the Army draws its ideas about how to run an organization is the literature of the field of management. Many past and present members of the Army Secretariat were once corporate executives at various levels and nearly all of our generals have extensive schooling in advanced management. Probably the majority of the Army's graduate degrees are in the management field and the libraries of our school system are loaded with civilian management literature.

Most of this management lore came from empirical research involving observation and contemplation of the civilian corporate organization—AT&T, General Motors, or the Hawthorne Plant of Western Electric. Practically none of it came from the 1st US Infantry Division, Third US Army or US Army, Europe—organizations of a size at least equal and complexity far greater.

The point is that we soldiers go out on recon into the civilian management world, pick up ideas, techniques, procedures and philosophies that seem good, then drag these things back across our boundary and apply them in our organization. And, as might be expected, the greater the rank of the officer promoting the outside idea, the greater the probability that the crankshaft for the Ford will be made to serve as the rear axle for the Chevrolet.

We need to be extremely careful about trusting too quickly, or too much, things from the lore of corporate management that seem "just right" for some ailing counterpart in the Army. Doctors specializing in organ transplants know this lesson well. The receiving system often rejects the transplant organ, even though the organ appears identical and worked just fine in the donor system. Or, even if the receiving system accepts the transplant, the new organ can have hidden dysfunctional effects.

Before we attempt transplants from the civilian management world bearing labels like PPBS, ORSA, MBO, OD, we need to run these ideas (procedures, systems, gimmicks and so forth) through a series of organizational filters. The idea just may not fit, or worse, it may seem to fit, but in reality produce hidden, long-term, dysfunctional effects.

The filters are those fundamental things deep in the Army's basic metabolism, the differences between the Army and the corporate world which are down at bedrock level. They are those things that make the Army special and unique, things far more complex than can be expressed in an organizational theorist's taxonomy of "types of organizations."

The Army does not operate by profit-and-loss statements, so criteria of effectiveness are obscure. Our output is force readiness—not as we think it is, but as the American people and our adversaries perceive it. And force readiness has no clear, valid, objective components which can be measured, compared to a standard and then fed back into the production process. We cannot even always agree on what force readiness is.
Closely related to performance criteria is the fact that our source of capital is external to the Army. We can do little to generate our own capital, but must rely on Congress—and with no profit-and-loss statements from which to argue. This situation gives us little ability to control our own destiny and puts us in a position of highly scrutinized accountability. Worst of all, it makes us poor-mouth ourselves when we must ask for help.

The quantity, quality and structure of the Army's labor force is regulated externally, both directly through law and indirectly through limits imposed on expenditures for pay and benefits.

Sheer size is an obvious difference between the Army and civilian corporations. The Army has more than 1,200,000 soldiers and civilians and an annual budget in excess of $29 billion. Ford Motor Co., a pipsqueak by comparison, can go from policy statement to doctrine in a matter of months. In the Army, it might take years to get doctrine into the minds of a million men.

A very large corporation like General Motors may approach the Army in size, but it does not fluctuate as often, as rapidly, as we do. In World War I, the Army expanded from 108,000 to 3,500,000. Afterwards, strength was back to 218,000 for a while, then all of a sudden up to 6,000,000 for World War II and down again to 554,000 a few years later.

What other large organization could handle such fluctuations without dying? What bedrock ways of running an organization, deep down in our vitals, enable us to do this and survive? Is there a chance that some new "procedure" from the corporate world might destroy this robustness?

The Army's primary task, land combat, is totally unique. Unlike Standard Oil, the requirement to perform this task occurs infrequently. And the gaps between performances are measured in years. Firemen and police provide "proof of service" every day for almost every individual source of outside capital. The Army has no way to do this. Soldiers are like "summer chimneys" and catastrophe insurance.

On those occasions when we do provide "proof of service," the Army and every one of its members must be prepared to do things that no other organization would do under conditions no other organization would tolerate, all in accord with a simple organizational policy whose essence is fight to win and kill or die.

The Army is characterized by extreme centralization and standardization. The reason for this lies in the control and coordination required to marshal, focus, apply and absorb the complex chemistry of combat power. Standardization assumes even greater importance because of the need to replace dead men, broken machines and shattered units with like components.

The Army's people are organized into three distinct social groups: officers, enlisted and civilian. While some parallel might be drawn between the civilian management-labor dichotomy and the military's officer-enlisted, the comparison is spurious, particularly in terms of the balance of power.
Class or status differences, as well as relative power, between officers and enlisted personnel in the Army are enforced by law. Enlisted people can be jailed for various forms of disrespect not involving assault. The spirit of "You Can Take This Job and Shove It," our nation's most popular bluegrass song last year, could easily become a court-martial offense in uniform.

AT&T's "labor" can negotiate with AT&T "management" on issues involving pay, working conditions and safety. Labor in the civilian world is organized into unions which bring legal, political and economic power to bear in support of negotiations with management. The Army has nothing similar. In fact, organization is now forbidden by law, as collective bargaining has long been in the military.

The Army's "labor"--its enlisted force--is employed on personal services contracts. Under threat of extreme punishment, they cannot leave their employment until the contract expires.

Virtually all members of our Army's work force are displaced from their homes. Even if a young man lives near an Army post, he cannot go there and "get a job at Army." If he continues in the Army, he is inevitably and frequently displaced from his home and community as well.

The great majority of the Army's work force is very young, with thousands still in their teens. For almost all, military service is their first experience in any large organization other than schools. Most of these young people view the Army as temporary employment. Coupled with the displacement noted earlier, this gives the soldier a rootlessness, an absence of ties and social supports which he must then seek among the members of his unit or in an equally anchorless family of his own.

The Army thus has a rate of turnover which no corporation would tolerate or could pay for. A routine turnover rate of 30 percent each quarter would soon force out of business any "profit center" or sub-division of International Harvester. For the Army, this turnover rate is the "natural state" and amplifies even more the rootlessness and lack of social supports mentioned above.

The individual member of the Army's work force has limited control and limited options with respect to work and the work environment. He must do what he is told to do, where he is told to do it. The soldier who fails in either respect can be fined or jailed. An employee of United Airlines might merely be fired.

Likewise, the soldier has limited control over working hours. While many work an 8-hour day, they are still subject to recall at any time of the day or night, or may be on the job 24 hours a day for extended periods in the field. The civilian world's overtime, maximum hour workweek, and minimum hourly wage are not applicable.

Promotion in the Army is largely, but not wholly, based on seniority. Additional pay is not directly contingent on better performance or increased output. For more than half of the lower ranks of our work force, pay is based partly on need. A soldier with dependents will be paid more than one without, even though both perform the same task and work identical
hours. Some corporations also base promotions mainly on seniority, but none, to our knowledge, pay extra for a wife and children.

The Army's management group, its officers, are members of a unique profession. Professional status is defined more by a state of being employed than by a unique set of skills. There is no governing body, per se, for the profession, nor do they have a written code of ethics. A member of the medical profession employed by IBM can leave for Litton Industries and still remain a member of the medical profession. An Army officer who leaves the Army and goes to Litton is no longer a member of his profession.

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Promotion within our management group is also a centralized procedure, where a board examines career files to select several hundred officers from among several thousand. Managerial promotion in the civilian corporation, in practically all cases, is on an individual basis. When a management position in United States Steel becomes available, higher management selects a specific individual to fill that particular job. The person selected is usually the "best qualified," and chosen from among several who have been identified previously and groomed as candidates for the job.

The career of a member of the management group of the corporate organization might span 45 to 50 years. A member of the Army's management group will average about 26 years. Bell Telephone would probably consider this a failure to amortize a developmental investment.

The relatively short career, coupled with strong emphasis on varied experience and schooling for career development, a fair share of duty in "undesirable" overseas areas and the rootlessness previously noted, all combine to produce a degree of turbulence which the corporate organization could neither comprehend nor tolerate. A successful member of the Army's management group will typically spend less than two years in any single job.

High turnover and diversity make it extremely difficult for any officer in any job to develop a great deal of expertise. This is particularly true at the uppermost levels of our management group where special expertise is most required.

The Army's generalists, also required at the uppermost levels, have that status mostly by virtue of wide but shallow samplings of different jobs, rather than by extensive experience as generalists.

And finally, in this delineation of the Army's unique character, is the concept of service. A management or labor member of Allied Chemical when he enters that organization enters also into a contract. There is the formal, written employment contract which lays out wages, hours, duties and the like. But there is also an unwritten, informal organizational contract which implies that the relationship between the organization and the member
will be "fair"—50/50—"meet you half way," balanced over time by variations in output and compensation.

The Army cannot be fair. It can, and does, strive for fairness on a day-to-day basis, but deep down in its bedrock metabolism runs that simple but inescapable imperative which drives the Army's whole sense of purpose: fight to win and kill or die.

Every member of the Army is subject to this imperative—and it is not fair to have a person give his everything and receive nothingness in return. It isn't fair, but that's what "service" means—that's the "business" the Army's in.

Soldiers need to write their own doctrinal literature about "how to run an organization." Not bits of Drucker and Leavitt and Fayol and Tayloe and Talcott Parsons painted green. We need some help from the theory and research of those scholars, but what we need most is something that comes from our bedrock, that comes from all we have learned in 200 years and that recognizes our uniqueness.
Somewhere, sometime, years ago, several of us Army teachers were sitting down drinking some coffee during a class break. Talking, as always, about Army things. And this little guy from Georgia said, "You know, we're always talkin' about all these good ideas and the things that ought to be, but nobody ever writes the damn things down. . . ."

And so I tried to do that . . . to take the things that soldiers bitch about and dream about, then write 'em down and teach 'em. I don't know whether they're right things, or wrong things, but I do know, by God, they're Army things.

How come you don't start writin' things down? Hell, it's not hard. You don't even need one of those outline things. Just start writin' like you were talkin' to somebody. Want to know something that really works?

"If you get an idea or a notion you're really fired up about, then go get a buddy, and sit him down in front of a blackboard, and explain to him just like you were over in the Mess Hall. Curse words and all. Just lay it out. Natural-like. But do all that on audio tape. Then go find some gal to type the tape. And you got it. Knock out the nasty words, and put it in paragraphs, then wind it off to Army, or Infantry, or wherever it seems to fit best. Hell, you might just get somethin' really good goin' around this damn Army of ours. . . ."
"I don't know about you, but I spend a hell of a lot of time just looking and listening--tryin' to get a 'feel' for this whole Army. There's been a hell of a big change just recently--just since President Reagan came in and we got rid of that sorry SFC Army we had before."

"We've been on our butts for about 10 years, and back in '70 and '71, we probably didn't even have an Army, but now, things are moving. We still don't have a lot of new equipment and filled-up outfits, but, everywhere I go, I see confidence and give-a-damn that I haven't seen since early Vietnam. Say before tet. Something else I see, too. Out across our division commanders and up in DA, and on our brigade and battalion command lists, the real warriors, like 'ole 'Charger' Lynch, are startin' to come on strong. There's still a few pussies, and numbers guys, and 'soldier-scholars,' and duck-butts, but by and large, across the board, I got the feelin' that this 'ole Army of ours is startin' to get ready. It's puttin' the warriors in where it counts. I think it knows now that the people care and they sure as hell didn't seem to before. I think our Army's got a spirit that it hasn't had for a long time. And I'm damn proud. Hell, I wouldn't of thought about leavin' if you guys still had it all screwed up. . . ."

To The Future?

Our Army's whole future lies somewhere in this business of information. The "information explosion" is damn well here. Two or three years from now, when computers, and terminals, and microprocessors, and all that stuff come into our homes and offices like televisions and those little calculators, then that's it. Information will be the name of the game. The whole business of leadership will be based on information. The human stuff will still be there, but we'll have an entirely new idea of leadership, and command, and staff procedure--all based on the flow of information, and even more so, on the meaning of that information. It's here. We got the science, the technology, and the hardware, now! The TRADOC Commanders' Conference on video last year was the first beginning, but a lot of people didn't understand what all those television techniques really meant. That conference was the beginning of the future. And we got to get our butts to work!
What others say about Mike Malone
It's a great temptation to turn Mike Malone's own words into platitudes describing his contributions to the institution of the Army. His words, of which there are more than a few -- colorful, pointed, and pertinent -- are one measure of what he represents to the Army, privates and generals alike. His greater legacy is as a teacher. His text is concerned military professionalism. The product lives on in his students, tomorrow's leadership.

Over a full career he has given life and meaning to the terms "conscience of the Army" and "Spirit of the Soldier," for both are accurate descriptions of Mike Malone -- the man, the Soldier.

This collection of his writings then is the distilled essence of his career: his beliefs, teachings, and feelings, and I commend them for study. If you end your reading of this collection of vintage Malone without a belief that his contribution to you and me was more than "just another job," then I too am "a sorry, suck-egg mule."

E. C. MEYER
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
This volume brings together the collected wisdom of a great soldier as reflected in his published writings. Colonel Mike Malone has been a certified, genuine original in an era, and in a profession, which tends to stifle such creative individuality despite its best efforts not to. He has, in the minds of many, served as a sort of ombudsman between the Army and its members—often jabbing us whenever we seemed to need a little shot of conscience, be it in the areas of leadership, training, values, communications, or whatever.

To some people Mike Malone must seem to be a man of contradictions. On the one hand, he is a quintessential man of war—an airborne, ranger, martial arts expert. But he is also an intellectual, in every sense of the term—fathering Delta Force and its concepts network into a highly respected forum. He is, in the final analysis, the prototype soldier scholar. A man of many faces and interests who binds them all together through his love for the Army and for US—his comrades in arms.

Mike is retiring from active service, but his ideas and his influence will surely remain—through those of us who were fortunate enough to count him as a friend, through his Delta Force organization, and through this collection of his ruminations. I strongly recommend what follows to your reading enjoyment and professional enlightenment. They were written by an expert.

DONN A. STARRY
General, United States Army
Commander in Chief
Teacher, counselor, advisor, leader, and soldier are only a few adjectives that barely describe Dandridge M. Malone. Of personal importance to me is the fact that he is also a friend. Mike’s impact on the Army is immeasurable, yet it is difficult to pick up any contemporary writing on the subject of Army leadership or soldiering that you will not find words by or credits to this superb man. Whether in the jungles of some far-off battle zone or on the platforms of our most prestigious schools, Mike Malone is at home because he is dealing with people. The soldiers and commanders of VII Corps will miss his poignant comments which were always on target. The US Army is better off because Colonel Dandridge M. Malone was part of us.

[Signature]

JULIUS W. BECTON, JR.
Lieutenant General, US Army
Deputy Commander for Training
The writings included in this collection of papers which were authored by COL Mike Malone represent in themselves a significant contribution in contemporary literature. They are frank, insightful, often joyful, and always readable. They have made people think and they've made some people think twice. Together, they have influenced hundreds of officers over the past decade and will influence thousands in the future. Their total impact has permeated throughout the Army school system and their tone and tempo represents better than anything I know the pride, stresses, strains, foibles, and optimism that is in the US Army.

These collected writings represent only a part of the contribution that Mike Malone has made to our Army. His unique effectiveness as an instructor in the Ranger School, the Army War College, the Task Force Delta Forum, the Pre-Command Course, and at a variety of service schools constitutes in itself an enormous contribution. Mike motivates, entertains, and teaches. Further, he generates self-criticism and institutional assessment. His writing and speaking have been catalysts in terms of the professional development of the Officer Corps since the early 1970's. He has, contrary to his announcements that he has not, been the Army's conscience—or at least a major spokesman for the Army's conscience.

The courage, wisdom, and warmth of Mike Malone may or may not come through clearly in this collection. His personal bravery in battle was noted by his peers and subordinates in particular, and his absolute candor and directness in perhaps the tougher battlegrounds of the Pentagon and the news media were total. While others sat on the sidelines on a controversial issue, Mike entered quickly onto the playing field. He raised hell with the things he saw as being wrong whether it be the Secretary of the Army's pronouncements about the Military Academy or the runners' complaints about horse droppings on the jogging path. Mike Malone's real legacy is the formulation of a strong link between the best traditions of the past and the complexities and challenges of today. He represents what soldiers are supposed to be. These writings constitute one part of Mike's grand contribution.

W. F. ULMER, Jr.
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding
MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL MIKE MALONE

1. Years ago when I was unbent and bright eyed and a somewhat naive, gung ho, airborne, ranger, infantry kind of a lieutenant, I met another young, eager, hard charging lieutenant very much like me. We were both even about the same size and build, both cussed a little bit just for the hell of it, and best of all, we both thought fish and fishing were the real reasons why God borned us. Coincidentally, we were also both branded semi-mavericks at a reasonably early age.

2. As the years rolled by, me and him raised kids; did a little fishing in some strange parts of the world; went to all sorts of Army schools (usually at the same time); spent an awfully cold year together on top of some Korean mountains; and carried one of them damn duffle bags back and forth to Vietnam a couple of times where we stopped maybe being as bright eyed and naive as we had been back before we got our own carcasses pretty beat up—or saw our men get themselves shot up sort of fierce.

3. And the years kept creeping by us—and so here we are. Still happy, thank God. A little wiser maybe. Mostly a lot more grubby. Still soldiers and damn proud of it. And this other guy—the finest soldier there ever was. The one with the bestest integrity and clearest perception of little guys. The one with both the courage and the talent to make this old Army of ours stop, look and listen—but mostly listen. The bestest example ever for the Infantry Chapter of the Benevolent Collection of Present and Future Cantankerous Soldiers. That is old Dandridge Michael Malone, Sir. And as one of his initial disciples, I stand one pace to the left and one pace to the rear and salute the Godfather of grubby soldiers as well as broken down, bent-up scruffy Generals.

4. God help the fish.

[Signature]
G. S. MELOY
Major General, GS
Director of Training
B.S. in Psychology. Vanderbilt University, 1952.

M.S. in Social Psychology. Purdue University, 1964.


Continuing Education, in Managerial Psychology. Wichita State University, 1973.

Continuing Education, in Leadership Education. Georgia State University, 1975.


Armed Forces Staff College. Norfolk, VA, 1967.

Professional Summary

Director, Organizational Dynamics and Management Theory. US Army War College, 1980 to 1981.

Director, Task Force Delta (Inter-disciplinary US Army "think tank"), 1978 to 1980.


Staff Officer (Personnel), Department of the Army Staff, 1968 to 1969.

Infantry Battalion Commander, Republic of Vietnam, 1968.


Instructor (Leadership, Management, Psychology, Methods of Instruction) US Military Academy at West Point, 1964 to 1967.

Athletic Coach (Karate), US Military Academy at West Point, 1964 to 1967.

Infantry Rifle Company Commander, Republic of Korea, 1961.


Instructor and Director of Training, Army Ranger School, 1957 to 1960.

Director, Leadership Academy, Berlin, Germany, 1955 to 1957.

Operations Officer, Berlin, Germany, 1954 to 1955.

Infantry Platoon Leader, Berlin, Germany, 1954.


Memberships

Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society
Association of the US Army
Honors


Infantry Hall of Fame. Ft. Benning, GA.

Publications

Theses:

"Follower Confidence in Authoritarian and Democratic Leaders". Purdue University, 1964.

"Job Satisfaction on the Department of the Army Staff". US Army War College, 1970.

Articles:

"The Trailwatcher" (to be published). Army, 1981.

"Rx for Information Overload" (to be published). Military Review, 1981.


"You Can't Run an Army Like a Corporation". Army, 1980.


"Soldier". Army Times, 1977. (Reprinted) (Also in Congressional Record)

"Of a Desert Wind". Army Times, 1976.

"The Squad". Army, 1974. (Reprinted)

"Alternatives to Ignominious". Army, 1974.

"The Prize". Army, 1973. (Reprinted)


"Portrait of a Mob". Infantry, 1964. (Reprinted)

"Trained to Kill". Infantry, 1963.

"Journey into the Twilight Zone". Infantry, 1963.

Books:

Common Sense Leadership (final draft complete).

Soldiers and Leaders (first draft complete).

The Recon Man (outline complete, research in progress).

Book Chapters


Major Technical Reports:


Leadership at General Officer Level. (A survey of all existing literature on the Army General's position, with implications for General Officer development.) 1975.


Toward the 80's. (A long-range development plan, for the US Army War College, encompassing all major educational variables. Presented to Chief of Staff, US Army.) 1972.

Leadership for the 70's. (A comprehensive analysis of the views of 30,000 Army leaders regarding leadership needs for the Volunteer Army. Presented to Chief of Staff, US Army.) 1971.


The Officer Efficiency Reporting System. (A comprehensive analysis of the US Army officer appraisal system, with recommendations for improvement. Presented to the Army Staff.) 1969.

Academic Papers Presented:

"Leadership for the 70's". Presented to Inter-University Seminar for the Armed Forces and Society. University of Chicago, 1972.


Videotapes:

"World of the Soldier". Command and General Staff College, 1980.

"Military Ethics". Command and General Staff College, 1980.

"How to Run an Organization". Command and General Staff College, 1980.


Preferred Teaching Subjects (any level):

General Social Psychology  General Systems Theory
Leadership  Applied Professional Ethics
Interpersonal Communications  General Psychology
Organizational Communications  Adult Education
Executive Development  Career Transition Planning
Applied Instructional Technology  Futures
Educational Systems Design  Organizational Dynamics
Effective Writing  Executive Skills
Public Speaking  Assessment Technology
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