Third-Party Opportunism and the (In)Efficiency of Public Contracts

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Abstract

The lack of flexibility in public procurement design and implementation reflects public agents' political risk adaptation to limit hazards from opportunistic third parties—political opponents, competitors, interest groups—while externalizing the associated adaptation costs to the public at large. Reduced flexibility limits the likelihood of opportunistic challenge lowering third parties' expected gains and increasing litigation costs. We provide a comprehensible theoretical framework with empirically testable predictions.

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### ABSTRACT
The lack of exibility in public procurement design and implementation re ects public agents’ political risk adaptation to limit hazards from opportunistic third parties| political opponents, competitors, interest groups| while externalizing the associated adaptation costs to the public at large. Reduced exibility limits the likelihood of opportunistic challenge lowering third parties’ expected gains and increasing litigation costs. We provide a comprehensible theoretical framework with empirically testable predictions.
In contrast to private contracts, public contracts are open to challenge by third parties. The whiff of corruption and the concern for misuse of other people’s monies⁠¹ make challenging public contracts feasible. Even though the enactment and performance of a contract may be honest and legal, public agents may fear politically motivated challenges, and hence will *ex ante* adjust the nature of the contracts so as to limit those features whose probity may be questioned. These adjustments will imply more contract specificity in design and rigidity in implementation. Such contractual adaptation, however, is not costless. Contractors’ perception of specificity and rigidity will translate into *ex ante* higher prices as well as the enactment of stronger compensating clauses. The contractual complexity and adaptation required to limit the potential for third-party challenges, whether opportunistic or not, make public contracting look “inefficient.”

The higher level of contract specificity and rigidity in public contracting can be understood, then, as a political risk adaptation by public agents.⁠² It is not that civic-oriented legislation limits public agents’ discretionary actions with “red tape,” but rather that public agents limit their exposure to the risk of third parties’ challenges through contract formalities and rigidities, externalizing the associated costs to the public at large.

This paper provides an operationalization of Spiller’s (2008) third-party opportunism (TPO), towards an understanding of the organizational foundations of pricing, specificity, and rigidity—the outer features (Spiller and Tommasi 2007)—of public contracts. Spiller’s framework of public organization is rooted in a transaction cost-*cum*-positive political theory and follows Williamson’s four cornerstones of the economics of governance—namely, governance,⁢³ transaction costs,⁢⁴ adaptation,⁢⁵ and interdisciplinary social science⁢⁶—and introduces third-party opportunism as the quintessential hazard of public transactions.

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¹ What Williamson (1999, 311) calls the hazard of probity posed by transactions organized in the public sector.
² As Goldsmith and Eggers (2004, 122) underscore, “when something goes wrong in a public sector network, it tends to end up on the front page of the newspaper, instantly transforming a management issue into a political problem.”
³ Williamson (2005, 3) defines governance as “the means by which to infuse order, thereby to mitigate conflict and realize mutual gains.”
⁴ Acknowledging that hierarchies and procurement are “alternative methods of coordinating production” (Coase 1937, 388).
⁵ Not only though the price system, but also as a managerial decision.
⁶ The need to incorporate insights from law, political science, and sociology to understand what the rough price theory cannot fully capture.
1 Prior Literature

Third-party opportunism relates to a threefold literature on public contracting: industrial organization, public administration, and political economy.

In the industrial organization literature, public contract pricing is fundamentally determined by informational costs, arising from informational asymmetries, the extent of verifiability of information, and the presence of repeated interactions (Bajari and Tadelis 2001; Laffont and Tirole 1993; Loeb and Surysekar 1994; Macaulay 1963). According to Marshall, Meurer, and Richard (1994a), when terms can be contested by excluded sellers, agreements are carefully delimited and more formal features govern them. It is, however, the nature of the hazards from opportunistic third parties that determines the fundamental features of public procurement and contracting.

Whereas the parties in private-private relations adapt to new information as it becomes available in order to save litigation costs, and courts are used rather to terminate disputes, public contracts appear bureaucratic and over-monitoring in situations in which it is not needed (Prendergast 2003, 932–933). According to the public administration view, contracting inefficiencies are associated with the large number of formal processes that appear to be essential to ensure the public sector’s functions as well as with “red tape,” i.e., costly and compulsory rules, regulations and procedures with no efficacy for their functional object (Bozeman 1993, 274). Bureaucrats are used only for “hard” agency problems, where consumers cannot be trusted (Prendergast 2003, 933). Extensive rules and regulations arise from dividing authority among the separate branches of government (executive, legislative, and judicial), designed to prevent abuses of power, protect people’s rights (Baldwin 1990, 10–11), and reflect equity values not necessarily present in private firms, including educational, health-related, legal, and environmental (Forrer, Kee, Newcomer, and Boyer 2010, 480). Red tape regulations are intended to decrease public employees’ uncertainty about how they should behave (Kurland and Egan 1999, 440). Both formalities and red tape are the instruments by which bureaucracies restrict public agents’ discretion (Boye 2002; Lan and Rainey 1992) and “overcome the temptation to capitulate to consumers simply to avoid complaints” (Prendergast 2003, 932).

The political economy profession has long been divided into advocates of public interest theory (in line with the public sector motivation literature), and “capture” or interest group
theory of government intervention in industries, seeded by Buchanan (1965) and Olson (1965), and elaborated by Stigler (1971). This positive approach, both in its Chicago school (Becker 1983; Peltzman 1976; Stigler 1971) and Virginia school (Buchanan 1975; Buchanan, Tollison, and Tullock 1980) modalities, concentrates on the demand-side, “black-boxing” the supply-side of political decision-making (Laffont and Tirole 1993, 475–476). On the other hand, positive political theory scholars, led by Riker (1963), focused on the supply-side of political decision-making, studying how politics—legislative procedures, administrative procedures, and bureaucratic oversight—affects legislative, judicial, and regulatory behavior. Positive political scholars have also studied the use of interested parties (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; de Figueiredo, Spiller, and Urbiztondo 1999) and consumers (Prendergast 2003) as instruments of oversight.

Laffont and Tirole (1993) emphasize that the link “between procurement and regulation and the associated administrative and political constraints is still unknown to us or is still in a state of conjecture. […] Institutions are endogenous and should as much as possible be explained by primitive considerations.” This paper is an attempt to rationalize the basic features of public contracting from its primitive considerations: its fundamental hazards.

2 A Model of Third-Party Opportunism

2.1 Signaling Process: Hazards into Rigidity

We focus our analysis on the public agent’s perspective. Furthermore, we ignore sunk costs to abstract from governmental opportunism and to make the argument on TPO straightforward.

There are four agents explicitly and implicitly involved in public contracting:

1. Incumbent public agent
2. Private contractor
3. Third-party challengers, i.e., political opponents to the incumbent public agent, competitors to the contractor, and interest groups

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8 See Spiller (2008) and references therein.
4. Public at large, i.e., voters and courts

The signaling process starts before the contract is signed. The public agent receives project features and budget $P_{bud}$ to contract for goods and services. The public agent perceives the threat of potential third-party challenges and tries to minimize political risks and maintain political support. The private contractor may not be directly aware of the hazards faced by the public agent, but observes contract specificity and rigidity. Specificity and rigidity equal less adaptability, higher contracting and implementation costs, and hence higher final prices charged to the public agent. Third parties privately perceive the benefits from challenge. Contract features affect third parties’ strategies, thereby affecting political outcomes. If a public contract does not meet the public’s expectations, political consequences may include weakened chances of re-election or re-appointment for incumbent public agents, judicial challenge, and loss of reputation and current position. Figure 1 presents the timing of the signaling process from third-party hazards into contract rigidity.

**Public agent:**
1. Receives project features and budget
2. Perceives threat of potential TPO challenges
3. Minimizes political risks by contract specificity and rigidity
4. \( t_0 \)

**Private contractor:**
4. Observes contract specificity and rigidity
5. Less adaptability equals higher contracting and implementation costs, and hence higher final price
6. \( t_1 \)

**Third parties:**
6. Privately perceive benefits from potential challenge
7. Contract features affect third parties’ strategies, thereby affecting political outcomes
8. \( t_2 \)

**Figure 1:** Signaling Process: Hazards into Rigidity—Timing

### 2.2 Conceptualizing Contract Specificity and Rigidity

Contract specificity refers to *ex ante* complexity of subject, completeness of clauses, technical provisions, and processing costs (Laffont and Tirole 1993, 307). Contract rigidity refers to
ex post enforcement, penalties, hardness, and intolerance to adaptation of contracts,\(^9\) and normally correlates with contract specificity: the more specific the contract is, the more rigid its implementation and enforcement is expected to be. Otherwise, if the contract is specific and then the parties agree to deviate, third parties can accuse the contracting parties of collusion. We treat specificity and rigidity hereinafter as interchangeable.

Complex public contracts have more contractual rigidities than simpler contracts. The cost of ex post enforcement increases in complexity. Because the public sector has more ambiguous objectives than private organizations (Boyne 2002), and it is difficult to assess to what extent these objectives are achieved (Lan and Rainey 1992), public contracts’ high rigidity mitigates ambiguity and problematic evaluation. For example, U.S. Department of Defense directives specify in great detail source selection policies, including the development of objective technical, cost, schedule, manufacturing, performance, and risk criteria, the auction techniques, the organization of the selection committee, and the pertinence of contacts with contractors.\(^{10}\) Public agents must also follow imposed standards of evidence, and may be constrained to formulate standards and follow their own rules to avoid discriminating between distinct situations on the basis of non-verifiable information (Laffont and Tirole 1993, 5).

### 2.3 Modeling Hazards, Rigidity, and Pricing

To illustrate and operationalize the third-party opportunism theory of public contracts, we introduce some simple notation.\(^{11}\) Third-party challenges may arise from honest attempts to control costs and from opportunistic attempts to replace the public agent. Public agents’ third-party related costs, then, have two components: expected third-party opportunism costs \(E(T)\) concomitant with political costs of loss of office, reputation, and support that arise from contract discretionary terms (flexible contracting), and third-party adaptation costs \(K\) that increase expenses associated with the contract. If a third-party challenge is successful, there are also costs associated with the financial and social costs of a new tender, i.e., time and documentation,\(^{12}\) or settlement awards made by the winning bidders to protesters in exchange

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\(^9\) In this regard, contract rigidity is the opposite of a “best efforts” clause.


\(^{11}\) See Appendix A for a glossary of notation.

\(^{12}\) Marshall, Meurer, and Richard (1994a) sustain that allowing excluded bidders to challenge the outcome of a procurement process inefficiently reduces sole-sourcing.
for a promise to drop their protest (Marshall, Meurer, and Richard 1994b). We underline political\textsuperscript{13} costs as the main burden for public agents concerning third-party challenges, which are difficult to appraise, let alone to measure financially. The more discretionary the contract terms are, the more room there is for third parties to challenge the contract. Therefore, we assume that expected third-party (both honest and) opportunism costs $\mathbb{E}(T)$—both honest and opportunistic—can be mitigated by contract rigidity $R \in (0, \infty)$.\textsuperscript{14}

Hazards faced by the public agent are subject to the likelihood of TPO challenge $\rho$ and the likelihood of success of TPO challenge $\tau$,\textsuperscript{15} which are driven by contract complexity (sector-specific) and political contestability.

The likelihood of success of a challenge $\tau$ is common knowledge to all players. Given that it is harder to prove wrongdoing when there is less room for discretionary actions, the likelihood of success of a TPO challenge $\tau$ is assumed to decrease in rigidity $R$, as the courts are more likely to dismiss and the public to ignore challenges to more rigid—"narrower"—contracts. Likewise, in order to fit to more rigid contracts, an opportunistic challenger will have to incur higher monetary, political, and reputational costs of challenge and litigation $c$. Therefore, the cost of challenge and litigation $c$ is assumed to be increasing in rigidity $R$. $\tau$ and $c$ capture the critical institutional features germane to TPO. We formalize these institutional features in Assumptions 1 and 2:

\textbf{Assumption 1} The likelihood of success of an opportunistic challenge $\tau$ is convex and monotonically decreasing in $R$, so that $\frac{\partial \tau}{\partial R} < 0$ and $\frac{\partial^2 \tau}{\partial R^2} \geq 0$.

\textbf{Assumption 2} The cost of challenge and litigation $c$ is concave and monotonically increasing in rigidity $R$, so that $\frac{\partial c}{\partial R} > 0$ and $\frac{\partial^2 c}{\partial R^2} \leq 0$.

\textsuperscript{13} Maser, Subbotin, and Thompson (2010) study the efficiency of the bid-protest mechanism in the US. In underlining "fairness" in contracting, i.e., that giving equal treatment to "all potential suppliers matters, not only to winners, but to losers as well" (Maser, Subbotin, and Thompson 2010, 2; their emphasis), they characterize the challenger as a loser bidder and focus on the transaction-cost side of TPO, ignoring the political context of public agents. They make this point more explicitly next, recalling the rule-of-law doctrine: "official duties are supposed to be defined primarily by neither instrumental aims nor political pressure, but by law" (Maser, Subbotin, and Thompson 2010, 3).

\textsuperscript{14} $R = 0$ denotes the minimum rigidity to avoid opportunism hazards inherent to relational contracts.

\textsuperscript{15} We use the term "likelihood" instead of "probability" to underline that we refer here to singular public contacts. The likelihood of third-party challenge and the success of the challenge can be compounded, since what makes a challenge actual is its likelihood of success (the likelihood of third-party challenge $\rho$ increases with the likelihood of success of a challenge $\tau$). Every challenge has some probability of success; otherwise the challenger would lose resources and reputation.
Expected third-party opportunism costs $\mathbb{E}(T)$ depend on the political costs of a successful challenge to the incumbent public agent, and also on the costs of a new tender (documentation, new analyses), cost of externalities (including the value of lost time for users),\(^{16}\) and the public agent’s reputation.

**Definition 1** $\mathbb{E}(T) = \mathbb{E}[T(R)] = T_0 \rho(R) \tau(R)$

where $T_0$ is the public agent’s cost if a TPO challenge is successful. Larger projects are associated with potentially larger TPO costs to the public agent and benefits to third parties, therefore are linked to higher $T_0$. Third parties observe benefits from opportunistic challenge $T_0$, but the public agent does not know *ex ante* the particular value of $T_0$. The public agent’s beliefs about benefits of opportunism for third parties $\tilde{T}_0$ are assumed to be distributed normally, with mean $\mu$ and standard deviation $\sigma^2$.

The public agent endogenizes the likelihood of challenge $\rho$ by adjusting rigidity $R$. The top likelihood of a TPO challenge $\rho$ is given by the probability of a positive expected benefit for third parties, i.e., it is the complementary of the cumulative probability of third parties’ expected benefits from an opportunistic challenge being equal or lower than the cost of challenge $c$: $\rho = \Pr(\tilde{T} > c) = 1 - \Pr(\tilde{T} - c \leq 0)$.

An increase in rigidity $R$ carries two effects:

1. It lowers the likelihood of success of a TPO challenge $\tau$; hence, for any given continuous distribution function of third parties’ expected political benefits from contract challenge, it yields a scalar transformation distribution function which is first-order stochastically dominated by the distribution function at lower rigidity $R$ (downward probabilistic shift of the cumulative distribution curve of expected third-party opportunism benefits $\tilde{T}$)

2. It increases cost of challenge $c$ and thus it decreases the probability at which an opportunistic challenge pays off (rightward move of the cost of litigation)

\(^{16}\)E.g., highway repair generates significant negative externalities for commuters through increased gridlock and commuting times. Lewis and Bajari (2011, 2) take the example of Interstate 35W, a main commuting route in Minneapolis carrying over 175,000 commuters per day. If a highway construction project results in a 30-minute delay each way for commuters on this route, the daily social cost imposed by the construction would be 175,000 hours. If we value time at $10 an hour, this is a social cost of $1.75 million per day. Most public contracts affecting the public at large, from sewage disposal to worse service because of a delay in buying IT equipment, carry externalities.
Figure 2 shows a graphical representation of the combination of these two effects resulting in a decrease in the likelihood of challenge $\rho$ due to an increase in contract rigidity $R$.

**Figure 2:** This graph plots the cumulative probability ($y$ axis) of the public agent’s beliefs about third parties’ expected benefits from an opportunistic challenge ($x$ axis): blue solid line for low rigidity and red dot line for high rigidity contracts. It assumes low rigidity $R^L = 10$, high rigidity $R^H = 30$, a normal distribution of benefits from an opportunistic challenge for third parties $T_0$ ranging from 0 to 100 with $\mu = 30$ and $\sigma = 20$, $\tau = \ln[\exp(1) + R]^{-1}$, and cost of litigation $c = \gamma R + 10$, where $\gamma = .2$ and 10 are calibration parameters for an increase of $c$ in $R$. The likelihood of a TPO challenge $\rho$ is the complementary cumulative probability of the third parties’ expected benefits from an opportunistic challenge being lower than the cost of challenge, i.e., $\rho = 1 - \Pr(T < c) = \Pr(T - c \geq 0)$. The cumulative distribution function at high rigidity is first-order stochastically dominated by the cumulative distribution function at low rigidity. An increase in rigidity from $R$ from 10 to 30 induces a decrease in the likelihood of TPO challenge from $.5$ to $.1$.

$\rho$ is, therefore, given by the probability of a positive expected value of a challenge $\Pr(T - c > 0)$. The public agent adjusts $R$ ex ante according to her beliefs about the likelihood of incidence $\rho$ and likelihood of success $\tau$ of third-party challenges. The public agent’s rational expectation of $\rho$ is consistent with third parties’ costs and strategic decision, i.e., $\mathbb{E}(q | R) \equiv \Pr[T_0 \zeta \tau(R) > c(R)] \equiv \rho$.

**Proposition 1** The likelihood of challenge $\rho$ is decreasing in rigidity $R$.\textsuperscript{17}

**Proposition 2** Expected political third-party opportunism costs $\mathbb{E}(T)$ are decreasing and globally convex in rigidity $R$.

The intuition that $\mathbb{E}(T)$ falls in $R$ is that the likelihood of a successful TPO challenge

\textsuperscript{17} Proofs are presented in Appendix B.
can be reduced to negligible by extreme contract rigidity.\textsuperscript{18} Alternatively, $\mathbb{E}(T)$ can be seen as the public agent’s disutility of lack of contract flexibility.

From the third parties’ perspective, the realization of TPO benefits is also subject to the competitive environment. TPO costs borne by the incumbent public agent may not be internalized entirely by the challenger, but distributed to all third parties involved. We model third parties’ competitive environment with concentration parameter $\zeta \in (0, 1]$. If $\zeta = 1$, the TPO challenger’s benefits are symmetrical to the incumbent public agent’s TPO costs (bi-partisan or duopolistic market); if $\zeta < 1$, the political market is oligopolistic and the challenger does not internalize all benefits from a successful contract protest.

Contract design (\textit{ex ante}), and implementation and enforcement (\textit{ex post}) costs are subject to contract preparation time, professionals (lawyers, engineers, consultants), documentation, and control needed, as well as discounted penalties due to deviations from contract at rigidity $R$. Penalties and part of these adaptation costs are borne directly by the contractor ($K_{pr}$) and reflected in the contract price, and part is borne only by the public agent ($K_{pu}$). We assume adaptation costs $K$—both public and private, and so contract price $P$—to be increasing in $R$. The slope of the $K$ curve is a function of the marginal positive and increasing cost (effort) of adaptation—what Laffont and Tirole (1993, 307) call “processing costs”—and penalties at $R$.

\textbf{Assumption 3} Adaptation costs $K$ are strictly convex and monotonically rising in rigidity $R$, so that $\frac{\partial K}{\partial R} > 0$ and $\frac{\partial^2 K}{\partial R^2} > 0$.

The price $P$ bid by the contractor is the sum of operating costs (company-specific), adaptation costs for the private contractor (contract-specific subject to rigidity $R$), and a mark-up (economic profit). The contractor’s maximum bid price is $P^{bud}$. To simplify our argument, we assume a uniform technology across firms and a competitive (or Bertrand competition) bidding market, such that $P$ is the lowest possible cost subject to zero economic profit and follows private adaptation costs $K_{pr}$. We also assume away governmental opportunism, i.e., direct or incremental expropriation by the public agent.

\textsuperscript{18} The type of specifications we deal with is non-designative, i.e., they do not point to any particular bidder and do not preclude a competitive bidding market. The particular case of designative specifications is developed in Subsection 2.8.
2.4 Existence of an Internal Equilibrium

We define the following objective functions for the agents:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Incumbent public agent: } & \text{ minimize } \mathbb{E}[T(R)\mid\tau] + K(P,R) \\
\text{subject to } & K = K_{pr}(R) + K_{pu}(P,R), P_{bud} \geq K_{pr} \\
\text{Private contractor: } & \text{ maximize } (P - K_{pr}) \mid R \\
\text{subject to } & P_{bud} \geq P \geq K_{pr} \\
\text{Third-party challengers: } & \text{ maximize } q \in \{0,1\} q[\tilde{T}_0\zeta - c] \mid R
\end{align*}
\]

\[\text{(1)}\]

Bid price \(P\) equals \(K_{pr} \mid R\), which also minimizes \(K_{pu} \mid R\). Expected third parties’ benefits from an opportunistic challenge are given by \(\tilde{T}_0, \zeta, \) and \(c\) and conditional on \(\tau\) at \(R\).

If the challenge is realized \((q = 1)\), expected third parties’ benefits equal \(\tilde{T}_0\zeta - c\).

The public agent internalizes expenses related to the contract, i.e., at the end, she is accountable, directly or indirectly, for all costs borne.\(^\text{19}\) She has to pay contractors’ costs and her own costs, while aiming at minimizing political costs. The optimal level of rigidity \(R^*\) is, therefore, driven by expected TPO costs, actual adaptation costs, knowledge about \(\tau\), and the public agent’s beliefs about \(\rho\).

Given \(T_0, \tilde{T}_0, \tau, c, \zeta,\) and \(K\), the equilibrium \(\{q^*, \rho^*, R^*, P^*\}\) is such that:

\[\begin{align*}
\text{(a) } & R^* = \arg\min_R[T_0\rho(R)\tau(R) + K(P,R)] \\
\text{(b) } & \rho^* \equiv \mathbb{E}(q^* \mid R^*) \equiv \Pr[\tilde{T}_0\zeta(R^*) > c(R^*)] \\
\text{(c) } & P^* \in [P_{\text{min}}, P_{\text{bud}}] = K_{pr} \mid R^*
\end{align*}\]

This solution can be achieved intuitively backwards. Starting from \(R^*\), any deviation from equilibrium makes the public agent worse off:

\[\begin{align*}
\text{(a) If } R < R^*, \text{ then } \tau(R) > \tau(R^*), c(R) < c(R^*), \text{ therefore } \rho > \rho^* \text{ and } \mathbb{E}[T(R)] - \mathbb{E}[T(R^*)] > K(P,R) - K(P,R^*) (\mathbb{E}(T) \text{ increase offsets gains in } K \text{ decrease}) \\
\text{(b) If } R > R^*, \text{ then } \mathbb{E}[T(R^*)] - \mathbb{E}[T(R)] < K(P,R) - K(P,R^*) (K \text{ increase outmatches gains in } \mathbb{E}(T) \text{ decrease})
\end{align*}\]

\textbf{Lemma 1} \text{If Assumption 3 and Proposition 2 hold and if at low bound rigidity } R, \text{ the marginal expected third-party opportunism costs } \mathbb{E}(T) \text{ decrease is bigger than the marginal…}

\(^{19}\) See Subsection 2.6 for a treatment of different levels of internalization of contracting costs.
adaptation costs $K$ increase, the sum curve of expected third-party opportunism costs $\mathbb{E}(T)$ plus adaptation costs $K$ is U-shaped and has an interior global minimum at $R^\ast$.

If $\mathbb{E}(T)$ does not fall faster in $R$ than $K$ increases in $R$ for low $R$ states, TPO is irrelevant for the outcome of the contract (e.g., relational contracts). If TPO is a relevant hazard for the public agent, Lemma 1 implies that the optimal contract is partly flexible and of finite rigidity. A too-flexible contract would be politically too risky while an over-rigid contract would be too expensive. Figure 3 plots an example of expected third-party opportunism costs $\mathbb{E}(T)$ falling in rigidity and specificity $R$, costs borne by the contractor $K_{pr}$ and adaptation costs $K$ rising in $R$, and the U-shaped sum of $\mathbb{E}(T) + K$ as the objective function of the public agent minimizes.

**Figure 3:** This graph plots expected third-party opportunism costs $\mathbb{E}(T)$ (red solid line) falling in rigidity and specificity $R$, costs borne by the contractor $K_{pr}$ (blue dash line) and adaptation costs $K$ (blue double-solid line) rising in $R$, and the U-shaped sum of $\mathbb{E}(T) + K$ (green dot line) as the objective function of the public agent minimizes. The contracting sets of price and rigidity are given by the area above costs borne by the contractor $K_{pr}$ and below the price budgeted by the public agent $P_{bud}$. $P_{min}$ is the equilibrium price in a competitive market for public contracts.

**Corollary 1** In the presence of TPO, the sequential equilibrium public contract that minimizes political and contracting costs is rigid, ergo more expensive in its design, implementation, and control than the theoretical first-best in the absence of TPO.

A direct outcome from Corollary 1 is that the higher $\mathbb{E}(T)$, *ceteris paribus*, the higher $R^\ast$ and $P$ will be.
2.5 Endogeneity of Opportunistic Challenge

The endogeneity of opportunistic challenge provides contractual properties consistent with observations in the practice of public contracting:

(a) Larger contracts are associated with higher expected political benefits for opportunistic third parties (higher mean $\mu$) and, therefore, are associated with higher likelihood of challenge $\rho$. Similarly, $\rho$ increases in the proximity to elections, since potential political gains are discounted at a higher discount factor.

(b) Inherent public-private information asymmetries increase with complexity of transactions. The dispersion of third parties’ beliefs about expected political benefits from an opportunistic challenge $\sigma$ is higher in high informational asymmetry (low scrutiny) states and than in low informational asymmetry ("open accessibility") states.

(c) The more dispersed third parties’ beliefs about expected political benefits from an opportunistic challenge is, lower cost of litigation $c$ leads to lower $\rho$ and higher $c$ leads to higher $\rho$.

(d) $\rho$ is sensitive to the institutional environment determining $\tau$ and $c$: the higher $\tau$, the higher $\rho$; the higher $c$, the lower $\rho$; the more $\tau$ decreases in $R$, the more $\rho$ will fall in $R$.

(e) The rule of law implies, ceteris paribus, higher $\rho$.

(f) The lower bound of $\rho$ depends on the third parties’ priors, i.e., the propensity to litigation adherent to the institutional framework.

(g) Exogenous institutional changes—e.g., new environmental norms, amendments to the legal system—alter $\tau$ and $c$, and produce a new cumulative probability of challenge distribution, which will first-order stochastically dominate the former distribution when the legal system becomes more restrictive (i.e., an increase in clauses subject to challenge) or will be first-order stochastically dominated by the former distribution when the legal system is deregulated.

2.6 Scrutiny: A Two-Sided Sword

An increase in scrutiny—i.e., critical public observation and accountability through transparency and public participation—lowers the informational asymmetry between the actual
political costs for the incumbent public agent and the third parties’ beliefs about the political benefits from an opportunistic challenge. First, an increase in scrutiny induces a calibration of beliefs about expected benefits from an opportunistic challenge (lower standard deviation), yielding a second-order stochastically dominant distribution (see Figure 5), with the inflection point at the mean expected benefits (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green 1995, 197–199). Hence, all other things being kept constant (particularly, mean expected benefits at low scrutiny $\mu^L$ equal to mean expected benefits at high scrutiny $\mu^H$), an increase in scrutiny leads to an increase in the likelihood of challenge $\rho$ at low litigation costs $c$ and to a reduction in $\rho$ at high $c$.

Ameliorated transparency symmetrizes the information of the public agent and third parties. Consequently, the public agent can better forecast third parties’ reaction to her project and choice of $R$. This prompts a counter-intuitive implication: increased scrutiny increases third parties’ knowledge about the public agent and, thus, the public agent knows better what third parties know. This leads to a reassessment of the distribution of the public agent’s beliefs about benefits of opportunism for third parties $\tilde{T}_0$.

Second, an increase in scrutiny updates mean $\mu$ of third parties’ beliefs about the benefits from an opportunistic challenge. If costs for the incumbent public agent were downwardly biased (underestimated) by third parties ($\mu^L < \mu^H$), benefits from an opportunistic chal-
Figure 5: This graph plots the cumulative probability (y axis) of the public agent’s beliefs about third parties’ expected benefits from an opportunistic challenge (x axis): blue solid line for low scrutiny states and red dot line for high scrutiny states. It assumes rigidity $R = 10$, a normal distribution of benefits from an opportunistic challenge for third parties $T_0$ with $\mu = 30$, $\sigma = 20$ for low scrutiny states and $\sigma = 10$ for high scrutiny states, $\tau = \ln[\exp(1) + R]^{-1}$, and $c = \gamma R + 10$, where $\gamma = .2$ and 10 are calibration parameters for an increase of $c$ in $R$. The likelihood of a TPO challenge $\rho$ is the complementary cumulative probability of the third parties’ expected benefits from an opportunistic challenge being lower than the cost of challenge, i.e., $\rho = 1 - \Pr(\tilde{T}_0 \ln[\exp(1) + R]^{-1} < \gamma R + 10) = \Pr(\tilde{T}_0 \ln[\exp(1) + R]^{-1} - \gamma R + 10 \geq 0)$. The distribution function at high scrutiny (red dot line) second-order stochastically dominates the distribution function at low scrutiny (blue solid line). All other things being kept constant, an increase in scrutiny leads to an increase in the likelihood of challenge $\rho$ at low litigation costs $c$ and to a reduction in $\rho$ at high $c$.

Challenge would be upwardly adjusted (first-order stochastic dominance given the same standard deviation); correspondingly, if costs for the incumbent public agent were upwardly biased (overestimated) by third parties ($\mu^L < \mu^H$), benefits from an opportunistic challenge would be downwardly adjusted (see Figure 6). The impact of an increase in scrutiny on contract features depends, therefore, on the adjustments in third parties’ beliefs. Neutral adjustments in beliefs lead to higher $\rho$, and thus higher $R^*$ for low litigation costs environments and lower $R^*$ for high litigation costs environments. Generally, an increase in scrutiny leads to public contracting efficiency (lower $\rho$, thus lower $R^*$ and $P$) with upwardly biased third-party beliefs, i.e., when the distribution of third-party beliefs about benefits from an opportunistic challenge at high scrutiny $F(\tilde{T})^H$ is first-order stochastically dominated by the distribution at low scrutiny $F(\tilde{T})^L$. Likewise, high scrutiny regimes are inefficient (or not intended by the contracting parties) with downwardly biased beliefs.\footnote{An example where the public-private contracting parties plausibly benefited from low scrutiny and...}
Figure 6: This graph plots the cumulative probability (y-axis) of the public agent’s beliefs about third parties’ expected benefits from an opportunistic challenge (x-axis): blue solid line for low scrutiny states ($\mu^L = 30, \sigma^L = 20$), red dot line for high scrutiny states and neutral beliefs adjustment ($\mu^H = 30, \sigma^H = 10$), green dash line for high scrutiny states and upwardly adjusted beliefs ($\mu^H = 35, \sigma^H = 10$), and black dash-dot line for high scrutiny states and downwardly adjusted beliefs ($\mu^H = 25, \sigma^H = 10$). Upwardly adjusted beliefs (green dash line) first-order stochastically dominate neutral beliefs adjustment (red dot line). Generally, an increase in scrutiny leads to public contracting efficiency (lower $\rho$, thus lower $R^*$ and $P$) with upwardly biased third-party beliefs.

Furthermore, scrutiny increases the level of internalization of adaptation costs $K_{pu}$ by the public agent and leads, ceteris paribus, to a gain in efficiency due to lower optimal contract rigidity and contracting price. On the other hand, from calibration and update effects from scrutiny better informed third parties may increase or decrease the likelihood of TPO. Hence, it is equivocal whether open information policies (as the case of the State of California21 or

downwardly biased beliefs was reported by the Financial Times: “Royal Dutch Shell and other natural resources companies have stepped up efforts to counteract planned anti-corruption rules that would force them to disclose payments to governments in countries where they operate. The Anglo-Dutch group, Europe’s largest oil and gas company by market capitalization, has put forward a series of alternatives, arguing that the current proposals will have ‘limited impact and unclear benefits.’ The new requirements for US and EU quoted businesses are designed to highlight regimes that receive large sums from selling oil, gas, minerals and forests but then siphon off the proceeds rather than reinvest locally for public benefit. The EU has proposed a series of amendments to existing rules on transparency, including detailing payments on a project-by-project basis. The unions’ Competitiveness Council meets this week to agree a general approach.” See: Andrew Jack and Sylvia Pfeifer, “Shell joins push to dilute EU’s proposed anti-corruption rules,” Financial Times, February 20, 2012, p. 17.


21 The California State Legislatures Brown Act of 1953 guarantees the public’s right to attend and participate in meetings of local legislative bodies. The Brown Act solely applies to California city and county government agencies, boards, and councils.
the State of Berlin\textsuperscript{22} lead to more efficient public contracts.

**Proposition 3** *Assuming away administrative scrutiny costs, an increase in scrutiny reduces $R^*$ only if the internalization of adaptation costs by the public agent is larger than the increase of TPO costs due to calibration and update of beliefs by opportunistic third parties.*

**2.7 Political and Market Structure**

The model accounts for political and market structure. If the political opposition is fragmented, benefits from a challenge can go to any of the political competitors, not necessarily to the challenger who bears costs $c$; as $\zeta \approx 0$ (atomized political opposition), there will be no TPO challenges, which resembles a mono-partisan or autarky system.\textsuperscript{23}

Analogously, a loser bidder will challenge a contract output only if the expected benefits $\tilde{T}$ are higher than litigation costs $c$. In this case, $\zeta$ describes the challenger’s market structure: $\zeta = 1$ for symmetrical Bertrand duopolies (one’s contractor losses are the gains for the other), $\zeta < 1$ for oligopolies, and $\zeta \approx 0$ for perfect competition, where an individual competitor has no incentives to challenge a public tender outcome.

\textsuperscript{22} According to the amendment of the Freedom of Information Act of the State of Berlin of July 2010, all contracts have to be made available to the public (see http://www.berlin.de/sen/finanzen/ and Alexander Dix, 2011, “Proactive Transparency for Public Services: the Berlin Model,” http://www.freedominfo.org/2011/10/proactive-transparency-for-public-services-the-berlin-model/; accessed December 5, 2011). The primary subject of this Act is the access to contracts on the delivery of basic public services to which the State of Berlin and private investors are parties. Additionally, in February 2011 the State of Berlin was forced by referendum to unconditionally disclose all contracts, decisions, and side agreements associated with the partial privatization of the Berlin Water Utilities and closed between the State of Berlin and the private shareholders: see “Act for the full disclosure of secret contracts for the partial privatization of the Berlin Water Utilities,” as of March 4, 2011, (GVBl. p. 82).

\textsuperscript{23} Argentina’s President Cristina Kirchner does not hold councils with the Board of Ministers nor organize press meetings, and closes the doors to dialogue with the politically fragmented opposition. See: Carmen de Carlos, “El caudillaje de Cristina Kirchner (I),” \textit{ABC}, Barcelona, February 19, 2012, pp. 36–37.
2.8 Designative Specifications

In the event that over-detailed specifications were designative, i.e., pointed to one or more particular bidders and precluded a competitive bidding market, they would be a source of TPO challenge of potential collusion or favoritism.

In this case, $\mathbb{E}(T)$ is convex but not strictly decreasing in $R$, i.e., expected political TPO costs $\mathbb{E}(R)$ first fall in $R$ and then rise in over-specificity $R$. If $\lim_{R \to 0^+} \frac{\partial [\mathbb{E}(T) + K]}{\partial R} < 0$ holds (see Appendix B.3), then designative specificity is a sufficient condition for finite optimal equilibrium rigidity as shown in Lemma 1.

3 Contract Price Under TPO

The public agent budgets—explicitly in tender information, announcements, or budget notes; or implicitly in internal regulations—a maximum price $P^{bud}$ that she can pay the contractor. The acceptable contracting price-rigidity sets for the public agent are below $P^{bud}$, i.e., contracts “in the budget,” and subject to low TPO costs adjusted by $R$. The contractor sees rigidity $R^*$ and bids accordingly. On the contractor’s side, the acceptable price-rigidity sets are those above her private adaptation costs $K_{pr}$. Therefore, the contracting area—i.e., the sets acceptable to both the public agent and the contractor—is given by price-rigidity combinations above $K_{pr}$ and below $P^{bud}$. At a given $R^*$, the minimum price required by the contractor is $P^{min}$. Figure 3 plots $\mathbb{E}(T)$ and $K$ curves, optimal rigidity, and budgeted and minimum prices.

Before the tender, especially in complex contracts, the public agent only has an estimation of the contractor’s adaptation costs $K_{pr}$, but does not know them with certainty. If $P^{bud}$ budgeted by the public agent is below the minimum acceptable price $P^{min} = K_{pr}$ for the contractor at a given $R^*$, then there will be no bidders or—in the case that $P^{bud}$ is not known by bidders prior to the tender—bidders will bid $P > P^{bud}$ and the tender will be annulled.24 Therefore, “no contract” is a possible outcome if political risks are significant.

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24 In October 2011, the regional government of Lower Silesia, Poland, assigned PLN 12 million for road renovation and maintenance. Meanwhile, it received bids ranged from PLN 46 million to PLN 115 million. Similarly, the city of Łódź, Poland, which planned to spend PLN 201 million for a stadium, received bids ranged from PLN 218 million to PLN 322 million. See: http://www.umwd.dolnyslask.pl/transport/aktualnosci/artykul/o-planach-zwiazanych-z-partnerstwem-publiczno-prywatnym-1/ (accessed January 26, 2011).
and budgeted expenses are too low at a given rigidity. In this case, the tender will have to be redesigned at a lower rigidity level at the risk of higher TPO for the public agent; the budget reconsidered, creating room for third-party challenges attempting to control budget expenses; or terms negotiated after bidding, increasing TPO on suspicion of collusion.

4 Interrelation Between Third-Party and Governmental Opportunism

In this paper, our goal was to highlight third-party opportunism implications for public contracting. The model, however, can also serve to analyze the impact of governmental opportunism (G) as a hazard to public contracts (Moszoro 2011; Spiller and Savedoff 2000; Troesken 1996).

The public agent can administratively expropriate sunk investments I borne by the private contractor. The private contractor assesses ex ante the likelihood ψ of expropriation loss A ≤ I. The likelihood of governmental opportunism can be mitigated by restrictive contractual terms—additional rigidity—requested by the private contractor. The residual expected governmental costs E(G) = ψ(R)A are imputed to private adaptation costs Kpr and further to price Pmin.

**Proposition 4** In the presence of governmental opportunism, the private contractor will respond by seeking further rigidity R and charging an additional premium ψ(R)A to her private adaptation costs Kpr.

Figure 7 presents a graphical representation of an increase in equilibrium rigidity and price due to governmental opportunism.

**Corollary 2** A corollary of the interrelation of third-party and governmental opportunism is that higher price P′ due to governmental opportunism makes the contract more vulnerable to third-party challenges, or not feasible, if the P′ is above the maximum price Pbud that the public agent is willing or able to pay.

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25 Scarce budgeted expenses for transport infrastructure along with excessive contract rigidity due to continuous TPO can explain the paralysis in highway development in Poland during the last decade. See “Poles repositioned,” *Project Finance Magazine*, October 23, 2010.
Figure 7: This graph plots expected third-party opportunism costs $\mathbb{E}(T)$ (red solid line) and expected costs of governmental opportunism $\mathbb{E}(G)$ (green solid-dot line) falling in rigidity $R$, and costs borne by the contractor $K_{pr}$ (blue dash line) and adaptation costs $K$ (blue double-solid line) rising in $R$, and the U-shaped sum of $\mathbb{E}(T) + K + \mathbb{E}(G)$ (green dot line) as the objective function of the public agent minimizes. The contracting sets of price and rigidity are given by the area above costs borne by the contractor $K_{pr}$ and below the price budgeted by the public agent $P_{bud}$. The equilibrium rigidity in a competitive market for public contracts with governmental opportunism rises from $R^*$ to $R'$ and the equilibrium price rises from $P_{min}$ to $P'$. The contractor’s taking out insurance against adverse political events (e.g., governmental expropriation, confiscation of assets, or repudiation of contracts) mitigates the expected costs of governmental opportunism, but shifts up adaptation costs $K$ by the insurance premium. In a competitive insurance market, the political risk insurance premium equals the public agent’s expropriation rents expected by the insurer $\mathbb{E}_S(G)$, while the contractor’s willingness to pay for political risk insurance equals her expected expropriation loss $\mathbb{E}(G)$. Political risk insurance will be beneficial for the public at large only if the political risk insurance premium, compounded now in the contract price, amounts to no more than the differential between contract prices with and without political risk insurance, i.e., $\mathbb{E}_S(G) \leq P' - P_{min}$, this differential being due to further rigidity and the contractor’s expected cost of governmental opportunism at $R'$. Political risk insurance will be cost-efficient for the contractor if the political risk insurance premium is lower or equal to her expected cost due to governmental opportunism, i.e., $\mathbb{E}_S(G) \leq \mathbb{E}(G)$.

Private contractors can only partially insure themselves against governmental opportunism as it cannot be managed and insurers want to avoid moral hazard on the investors’
side. Similarly, would the public agent know that the investor has insurance, it increases
the incentive to misbehave as it will trigger less opposition. If political risk insurance premi-
uums are too low, contractors that face opportunistic-type governments will lower rigidity and
take out insurance—moral hazard—triggering more governmental opportunism and further
increasing claims. Advancing this result, the insurer will increase political risk premiums.
If political risk insurance premiums are too high, it will not be cost-efficient for contractors
of non-opportunistic-type governments to take out political risk insurance. In equilibrium
without informational asymmetry on the government type, bankruptcy constraints, and risk
neutrality, contractors will be indifferent about taking out political risk insurance. In the
presence of informational asymmetry about the likelihood of governmental opportunism \( \psi \),
limited liability, and risk aversion, an adverse selection screening game—largely described
in the literature on insurance markets—will take place, which explains high political risk
insurance premiums, the existence of tiny private markets for political risk insurance, and
the indispensable involvement of multilateral agencies (MLAs).\(^{26}\)

5 Applications and Supportive Evidence

The TPO model attends to standard public procurement. Nonetheless, it encompasses a
wider range of public contracting praxes and can be conductive to the understanding of
mechanisms in public management and efficiency. We now apply the TPO framework to
specific settings to derive empirical implications.

5.1 Bureaucracies

Civil servants are subject to more rigid contracts (e.g., regulated hiring, list of duties and
responsibilities) than their peers in the private sector.\(^{27}\) A private company can hire whoever
it wants and a typical employment contract may simply say “follow the instructions of your
principal,” while in most jurisdictions the process of employment of civil servants in public in-
stitutions is highly formalized and procedural, and responsibilities are detailed in civil service

\(^{26}\) See, for example, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), a member of the World Bank
Group (http://www.miga.org/; accessed July 15, 2011), or the Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC), a U.S. Government’s development finance institution (http://www.opic.gov/insurance; accessed July
15, 2011).

\(^{27}\) In this instance, bureaucrats as individuals are the private party contracting with the public agent.
laws and internal regulations of the agency, department, office, and section in question (Horn 1995, 20, 88, 112), and subject to independent ordinary and extraordinary controls (Horn 1995, 98). Both specific employment procedures and rigid contracts in the civil service are aimed at avoiding challenges of favoritism (Horn 1995; GAO 2003), but nonetheless result in civil servants being allowed less discretion, less initiative in bringing solutions, and lower productivity (analogous to higher price in public tenders). TPO thus provides a consistent explanation of civil service inefficiencies that is broader than the public administration view on red tape.

Bambaci, Spiller, and Tommasi (2007) describe the Argentine bureaucracy as a combination of constitutional protections of civil servants, relatively low wages, and low accountability to “short-lived” political public agents, which produces unresponsive bureaucrats with few incentives to invest in their own capabilities. Precisely because political public agents do not last long, TPO is not a prevalent hazard for them. The institutional adaptation that emerged is the large use of a “parallel bureaucracy,” i.e., temporary contracted professionals, better paid, more responsive to their principals, under a more flexible regime than permanent bureaucrats, and whose appointments are left to the discretion of the principal public agent in office (Iacoviello and Tommasi 2002; Bambaci, Spiller, and Tommasi 2007). Thereby, political public agents in Argentina blend permanent bureaucracy with temporary bureaucrats who respond more flexibly and efficiently.

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28 For example, controls may be overseen by the Government Accountability Office in the USA, the Australian National Audit Office in Australia, the Tribunal de Contas da União in Brasil or the Bundesrechnungshof in Germany, to name a few.

29 According to the British Office for National Statistics (ONS), public sector productivity fell by 3.4 percent in 1997-2006, compared with a rise of 28 percent in the private sector over the same 10-year period (see Robert Watts, “Public sector pay races ahead in recession,” The Sunday Times, January 3, 2010).


31 In 1999, Federal Government wages divided by GDP per capita equaled 1.65 in Argentina, compared with 3.70 in Brazil, 3.25 in Colombia, 3.05 in Chile, and 1.99 in Mexico. See Carlson and Payne (2003).

32 The low accountability of the Argentinian administration is to a large extent due to the high turnover of political public principals: ministers, secretaries, and undersecretaries of state. For instance, the average tenure of Ministers of Finance in 1950-1989 was 1 year, compared with 2.4 years in developed countries and 2.0 in developing countries (Bambaci, Spiller, and Tommasi 2007, 165).

5.2 Fixed-Price vs. Cost-Plus Contracts

In theory, fixed-price contracts are preferable when the adverse selection problem decreases relative to the moral hazard problem (e.g., in the procurement of standardized goods and services, or in projects involving a low level of informational asymmetry between the contracting parties), while cost-plus procurement is preferable in complex projects when the adverse selection problem increases relative to the moral hazard problem (i.e., when uncertainties related to technological requirements are unknown and bigger than the inefficiencies arising from incomplete monitoring and insulation of the contractor from cost overruns).\footnote{See Loeb and Suryekar (1994).}

In practice, cost-plus contracts have been criticized by the Obama administration for frequent and substantial cost overruns in government contracting. A GAO (2008) study of 95 major defense acquisition projects found cost overruns of 26 percent, totaling $295 billion over the life of the projects. Cost-plus contracts are more adaptable, but also abusable\footnote{Cost-plus contracts are seen as a “blank check” for contractors and the root cause of procurement inefficiencies. A notable exception is the case of London’s Heathrow Airport Terminal 5, which was delivered on schedule and under budget, under a cost-plus regime (see http://www.airport-technology.com/projects/heathrow5/ (accessed July 10, 2011)).} and shading (Fehr, Hart, and Zehnder 2011). The Presidential Memorandum of March 4, 2009, for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on Government Contracting, explicitly stated that “there shall be a preference for fixed-price type contracts. Cost-reimbursement contracts shall be used only when circumstances do not allow the agency to define its requirements sufficiently to allow for a fixed-price type contract.”\footnote{See Presidential Memorandum of March 4, 2009, for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on Government Contracting, retrieved from http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Memorandum-for-the-Heads-of-Executive-Departments-and-Agencies-Subject-Government/ (accessed July 11, 2011).}

Procurement laws normally allow public agents the design of public procurements based on a menu of price, technical, and quality criteria. Public agents are given discretion regarding the choice of criteria and the weights of those criteria in the final decision scoring. There is, however, a strong affinity for the price criterion when accountability and scrutiny, and attached to them political hazards are high. In France, only 2 percent of all public tenders include soft clauses.\footnote{See: http://www.ngo.pl/x/686690.} In pre-EU Poland, most of public contracts where tendered based on a menu of objective and discretionairy criteria: 39 percent of public tenders where based on the lowest price bidder single criterion in 2001 and 2002, 51 percent in 2003, and only 29 percent
in 2004. The lowest price bidder as the single criterion increased to 53 percent in 2005, 64 percent in 2006, 87 percent in 2007, 84 percent in 2008, 90 percent in 2009, and 91 percent in 2010 (Jarzyński 2011, 17). According to analysts, this preference for fixed-price bidding was the result of increased frequency, complexity, and profundity of controls after Poland’s joining the European Union.38 Public agents preferred to include technical and quality parameters in specifications and rely on the more “objective, clear, and accountable”—less contestable—price criterion for bid selection to avoid political risks.

Fixed-price contracts do not provide adaptable risk-sharing mechanisms and may lead to an unintended increase in government payments.39 In the presence of closer third-party oversight and fear of TPO,40 public agents will prefer fixed-price contracts in settings where cost-plus contracts could prove to be more efficient. Our result that larger (and thus more complex) projects lead to more restrictive terms of contracting seem counter to the extant literature that cost-plus is preferable for complex projects.

5.3 Public-Private Partnerships

Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are public service businesses operated under long-term agreements with private providers. Beside fiscal motives, they are aimed at gaining efficiency from the private sector’s technical and managerial advantage through innovation and flexibility. Flexibility, however, makes PPPs vulnerable to third-party challenges (higher $\rho$). To limit the scope of ex post challenges from third parties, public agents control outputs through Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), i.e., measures under which the contractors are evaluated. At the same time, KPIs constitute a signal for the public at large that the service, although privately provided, remains publicly accountable. KPIs are thus crucial to curb third parties’ ability to challenge PPPs. Nevertheless, the failure of many (potential) PPPs can be rooted

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38 Poland entered the European Union on May 1, 2004, which can be considered a transition year.


40 As stated in the Presidential Memorandum (op. cit.), “reports by agency Inspectors General, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and other independent reviewing bodies have shown that non-competitive and cost-reimbursement contracts have been misused, resulting in wasted taxpayer resources, poor contractor performance, and inadequate accountability for results” and “improved contract oversight could reduce such sums significantly” (emphasis added).
in high adaptation costs $K$ imposed on private contractors.

A number of Australian studies of private investment in infrastructure reached the conclusion that, in most cases, the PPPs were inferior—overall more expensive for the public or delivered lower quality of services—than the standard model of public procurement based on competitively tendered construction of publicly-owned assets. One response by public agents to these negative findings was the development of formal procedures for \textit{ex ante} assessment of PPPs using the Public Sector Comparator (PSC) and Value-for-Money (VfM) methodologies, i.e., introducing more contractual \textit{ex ante} specificity and contractual costs.\textsuperscript{41}

In 2009, the Treasury of New Zealand, in response to inquiries by the new National Party government, released a report on PPPs that came to the conclusion that “there is little reliable empirical evidence about the costs and benefits of PPPs” and that “the advantages of PPPs must be weighed against the \textit{contractual complexities and rigidities} they entail.”\textsuperscript{42}

PPPs were introduced to bring private management practices to the public sphere and over time became closer to regulation. In the presence of TPO, public agents will pursue private provision of public goods only in projects where expected gains from contract flexibility and better private management offset the increase of costs of compliancy with \textit{ex ante} cost-benefit assessment and \textit{ex post} KPIs.

\section*{5.4 External Consultants and Certification of Contractors}

The engagement of independent consultants (e.g., multilateral agencies, international advisers, especially in countries with weak legal systems) strengthens the objectivity of procurement processes and prevents third-party challenges that cooperation between public agents and private contractors has crossed the line and become collusion.

Moszoro and Krzyzanowska (2008) report the employment of external consultants in the city of Warsaw in the pre-procurement planning phase when it wanted to introduce novel PPP contracts: firstly, to overcome the lack of expertise in complex contracting (to reduce $K$) and, secondly and most importantly, to “safeguard the city authorities against complaints and criticism by subsequent administrations.” While the city authorities could have designed the tender process in-house, they seem to have outsourced it to reduce TPO. The use of

\textsuperscript{41} See, for example, the Department of Treasury and Finance of Victoria’s (2001) technical note on PSC.
\textsuperscript{42} Brian Rudman, “Promised electric trains derailed by misguided enthusiasm.” \textit{The New Zealand Herald}. June 1, 2009. Emphasis added.
external consultants, however, came at a cost: PLN 10 million ($3.2 million), i.e., 1.2 percent of the estimated budget for those projects.

Similarly, certain public tenders require certification of contractors and sub-contractors, increasing contract specificity and the price of the tender. In May 2010, a public procurement for the “Canal Safety and Drainage Improvements Project” in Antioch, Pittsburg, Bay Point, Clyde, and Walnut Creek (California), tendered by the Contra Costa Water District Construction Department, was objected to by JMB Construction. JMB Construction argued that the apparent low bidder Con-Quest Contractors included a non-certified subcontractor. According to Contra Costa Water District Construction Department, the relevance of the works the alleged sub-contract would provide was minimal for the project overall; however, the challenger argued that the inclusion of a non-certified subcontractor allowed Con-Quest Contractors to bid a lower price ($756,000 compared with JMB Construction’s $852,000, i.e., 11 percent cheaper) than if it had included only certified subcontractors. Furthermore, if required “red-tape” certificates exclude qualified bidders and prevent competitive bidding, the market structure will become more oligopolistic and additional dead-weight inefficiencies will add to the final equilibrium price.

In both cases—the use of external consultants and certification of contractors—the implicit aim is to lessen the likelihood of TPO challenge $\rho$. There is a trade-off for the public agent between lower TPO hazards and additional contracting costs $K$ of external consultants and certification. The public agent will employ external consultants and certification when additional contracting costs $K$ incurred are lower than price gains in contract flexibility due to lower $E(T)$ and $R^*$.  

5.5 Efficient Small Communities and Authoritarian Regimes

Small local governments (towns, counties) can be more efficient in public contracting than larger governments (metropolises, states). Due to the lower value of the contracts compared with larger governments, the benefits from political challenge are relatively low. Thus, the likelihood of challenge is lower and subsequently potential TPO costs are lower. The public agent can therefore engage in more discretionary contracts and incur lower transaction costs.

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44 Based on an interview held in May 2010 with a Contra Costa Water District engineer.
Coviello and Gagliarducci (2010) present a study covering 3,825 Italian municipalities and 27,537 auctions, where an increase in the mayor’s tenure of one term is associated with fewer bidders per auction (−23.28 percent), a higher probability that the winner is local (+3.20 percent) and that the same firm is awarded repeated auctions (+25.52 percent), i.e., more discretionary contracting (lower $R^*$) correlated with longer tenure. They also find evidence that a high level of heterogeneity within the government coalition reduces the possibility of favoritism in shaping the procurement process, that less “colluded” mayors are more likely to be reelected and survive longer, and that citizens and competitors are more likely to closely monitor large public projects.

Two reasons can be given why mayors with longer tenure show a low concern about TPO and contract discretionarily. First, the Italian electoral system in municipalities is a simple majority regime. Consequently, in small municipalities, high political contestability (low $\zeta$) results in dispersed voting and a relative advantage for incumbent mayors. Second, procurement protests in Italy go through courts, where penalties for breaking procurement laws are rarely enforced (low $\tau$). When $K$ increases in $R$ more rapidly than $E(T)$ decreases in $R$, or when $E(T)$ are irrelevant due to lack of political contestability (as seems to be the case in Italian municipalities), the outcome is discretionary procurement.

Authoritarian regimes, where the likelihood of challenging the incumbent public agent is low, can contract public works more discretionarily and, thus, cheaper and quicker. The lack of chances for TPO can help to explain the rapid development of infrastructure in Paraguay during the Stroessner regime. Molinas, Pérez-Liñán, Saiegh, and Montero (2006, 12–13) report the significant ability of the regime “to reap the benefits offered by long-term economic opportunities. (...) [Development programs were] possible because of the intertemporal

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45 Coviello and Gagliarducci (2010, 26–27) argue that mayors’ time in office leads progressively to a long-term relation (“collusion”) with a few favored bidders, and propose two interpretations: one based on favoritism and bribes in procurement, and another based on a learning process of by mayors about the quality of contractors and a preference for higher-quality contractors.

46 If $m$ is the population and $n$ the number of candidates, a candidate needs $m/n + 1$ votes to win the election.

47 During the period 2005-2008, the Italian central purchasing authority CONSIP made 4,095 random inspections on the ex post renegotiations of procurement contracts for goods and services, and found a total of 1,455 contractual infringements. Only 4 percent of the associated penalties were paid (Coviello and Gagliarducci 2010, 27). In Italy in 2009, the average waiting time for a bid protest first instance hearing was 18 months (European Commission 2011). Furthermore, anecdotally, it takes on average more than 10 years for juries to come to a verdict on bid protests. How public contracting can actually take place in an environment in which penalties are seldom paid remains a subject of future research.
'cooperation’ of the key actors (the government, the Party, and the Armed Forces). The adaptation of the development model to allow for increasing integration with Brazil would have been unlikely under short-lived governments like the ones characterizing the post-Chaco war period (1936-1954). During that 18-year period, there were 12 different presidents, and political volatility prevented an adaptation to changing economic environments. (...) During the 1960s and the 1970s, Paraguay built roads, silos and, most importantly, the biggest dam in the world, the Itaipú Hydro-electric Dam, built jointly with Brazil. The long-term growth strategy turned out to be effective. During the 1960s, real GDP growth was 4.2 percent. During the 1970s, Paraguay had one of the highest growth rates in the region, with real GDP increasing at 8 percent over the decade.” That ability to move policy decisively and effectively by an authoritarian regime, however, also funneled most of the benefits from this fast development period to a few contractors and subcontractors—companies owned by the dictator’s followers (Fogel 1993, 16).

5.6 Privatizations of Government-Owned Companies

Privatizations of government-owned companies are usually subject to clauses of commitment by the private acquirer concerning labor retention, modernization processes, future investments and other social sensitive issues. On the one hand, rigid privatization contracts (high $R^*$) take place in the fear of TPO challenges to the incumbent public agent by labor unions, the local community, and the political opposition. In order to minimize TPO challenges to privatizations, public agents embed clauses and golden shares in privatization contracts that allow them to limit “cream skimming” (Kolderie 1986) and the discretion of the private investor. On the other hand, such privatization clauses limit the company’s governance and, consequently, lower its value (analogous to a high price in a public procurement). If the revenue to the public budget from privatization is low, the public agent can be accused of collusion with the private agent or of “selling off the family silver” (Kolderie 1986). The corollary is that privatizations’ aftermath regarding price and efficiency appears to be a sell-off from a government’s valuation standpoint and rigid from a private managerial perspective.

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48 PPP and privatization differ in that the former is a transfer to the private sector of a right (which may or may not come with a physical asset) to perform the public function, while the latter usually refers to the sale of an asset which is not necessarily idiosyncratic to the public sector (e.g., liquor stores in Pennsylvania).
6 Concluding Remarks

Our approach combines political hazards and transaction costs to explain apparent inefficiencies in public contracts. High \textit{ex ante} payment volatility or \textit{ex post} flexibility in implementation may trigger drawbacks, leading to contract failure or costly adaptation by the public official, whether in terms of time or political career. A paramount conclusion of our analysis is that public contracts cannot be directly compared to private contracts. Instead, they can only be compared to analogous public contracts, and should pass Williamson’s “remediability criterion,” which holds that “an extant mode of organization for which no superior feasible alternative can be described and implemented with expected net gains is presumed to be efficient” (Williamson 1999, 316; the emphasis is original), to attest to their efficiency.

The fact that public contracting is more expensive and rigid than private contracting, however, does not mean that transferring those activities to the public sector would reduce political risks and hence make them more efficient. Public procurement is used for “hard” agency problems where consumers cannot be trusted and “when bureaucracies work poorly, [but] consumer choice works worse” (Prendergast 2003, 930–933). Not only, as Williamson (1999, 320) discusses, do certain transactions have special needs for probity and require the security of the State, but the privatization of public functions itself involves TPO hazards, making them less preferable for public agents than public contracting itself.

In this paper, we have analyzed public procurement in a variety of environments to show that much of its outer features can be understood as political adaptations to the fundamental hazard of third-party opportunism prevalent in public contracting.
### Appendix A  Notation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Formula</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$A$</td>
<td>$\leq I$</td>
<td>Public agent’s rents from penalties or expropriation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$c$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cost of challenge and litigation for third parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mathbb{E}(G)$</td>
<td>$\psi A$</td>
<td>Expected costs of governmental opportunism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mathbb{E}_S(G)$</td>
<td>$T_0 \rho \tau$</td>
<td>Expected expropriation rents estimated by the insurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mathbb{E}(T)$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Expected third-party opportunism costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F(\cdot), f(\cdot)$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cumulative distribution function (CDF) and probability density function (PDF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$I$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sunk investments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$K$</td>
<td>$K_{pr} + K_{pu}$</td>
<td>Adaptation costs, compound of costs borne by the contractor $K_{pr}$ and costs borne by the public agent $K_{pu}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Price bid by the contractor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P'$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Price bid by the contractor beset by governmental opportunism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_{bud}$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Price budgeted by the public agent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_{min}$</td>
<td>$\geq K_{pr}$</td>
<td>Minimum acceptable price by the contractor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$q$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Third parties binary decision variable: $q = 1$ when a contract protest is placed; $q = 0$ otherwise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^*$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Optimal contract rigidity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R'$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Optimal contract rigidity at governmental opportunism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$T_0$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Political costs of third-party opportunism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tilde{T}$</td>
<td>$\tilde{T}_0 \zeta \tau$</td>
<td>Third parties’ benefits from an opportunistic challenge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tilde{T}_0$</td>
<td>$\tilde{T}_0 \sim N(\mu, \sigma^2)$</td>
<td>Distribution of public agent’s beliefs about benefits of opportunism for third parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha^L, \alpha^H$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Level of internalization of contracting costs by the public agent under low and high scrutiny regimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta^L, \beta^H$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Types of informed third parties under low and high scrutiny regimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu^L, \mu^H$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mean of third parties’ beliefs of benefits from opportunistic challenges under low and high scrutiny regimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\psi$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Likelihood of governmental opportunism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho$</td>
<td>$\text{Pr}(\tilde{T} &gt; c)$</td>
<td>Likelihood of third-party opportunistic challenges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Likelihood of success of third-party opportunistic challenges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\zeta$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Political (market) concentration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Abbreviation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>U.S. General Accounting Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLA</td>
<td>Multi-Lateral Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPO</td>
<td>Third-Party Opportunism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B  Proofs

Appendix B.1 Proof of Proposition 1

Third parties’ choice of opportunistic challenge \( q \) is such that \( q = 1 \) iff expected returns to TPO are positive, i.e., \( \tilde{T}_0 \zeta \tau (R) > c(R) \). From the public agent’s perspective \( \rho \) is the expected value of the random realization of \( q \):

\[
\mathbb{E}(q \mid R) \equiv \Pr \left[ \tilde{T}_0 \zeta \tau (R) - c(R) > 0 \right] \equiv \rho \tag{2}
\]

Given that \( \frac{\partial \tau}{\partial R} < 0 \) and \( \frac{\partial c}{\partial R} > 0 \),

\[
\frac{\partial \rho}{\partial R} = f \left[ \tilde{T}_0 \zeta \tau (R) - c(R) \right] \left( \tilde{T}_0 \zeta \frac{\partial \tau}{\partial R} - \frac{\partial c}{\partial R} \right) \leq 0 \tag{3}
\]

Appendix B.2 Proof of Proposition 2

Let \( F(\tilde{T}_0) \sim N(\mu, \sigma^2) \) be the twice differentiable normal distribution of \( \tilde{T}_0 \) with mean \( \mu \) and standard deviation \( \sigma \). From the linear transformation property of normal distributions, let \( f \left[ \tilde{T}_0 \zeta \tau - c; \zeta \tau \mu - c, (\zeta \tau)^2 \sigma^2 \right] \). \( E(T) \) decreases in \( R \)—From Proposition 1:

\[
\frac{\partial E(T)}{\partial R} = T_0 \left( \tau \frac{\partial \rho}{\partial R} + \rho \frac{\partial \tau}{\partial R} \right) < 0 \tag{4}
\]

\( E(T) \) is locally convex in \( R \):

\[
\frac{\partial^2 E(T)}{\partial R^2} = T_0 \left( \tau \frac{\partial^2 \rho}{\partial R^2} + 2 \frac{\partial \rho}{\partial R} \frac{\partial \tau}{\partial R} + \rho \frac{\partial^2 \tau}{\partial R^2} \right) \tag{5}
\]

Differentiating Equation 3 with respect to \( R \):

\[
\frac{\partial^2 \rho}{\partial R^2} = \frac{\partial f(\cdot)}{\partial R} \left( \tilde{T}_0 \zeta \frac{\partial \tau}{\partial R} - \frac{\partial c}{\partial R} \right) \left( \tilde{T}_0 \zeta \frac{\partial^2 \tau}{\partial R^2} - \frac{\partial^2 c}{\partial R^2} \right) \tag{6}
\]

Replacing Equation 6 in Equation 5:

\[
\frac{\partial^2 E(T)}{\partial R^2} \begin{cases} 
\geq 0 & \text{for } -\frac{\partial f(\cdot)}{\partial R} \leq \frac{\tau f(\cdot)(\tilde{T}_0 \zeta \frac{\partial^2 \tau}{\partial R^2} - \frac{\partial^2 c}{\partial R^2}) + 2 \frac{\partial \rho}{\partial R} \frac{\partial \tau}{\partial R} + \rho \frac{\partial^2 \tau}{\partial R^2}}{\tau (\tilde{T}_0 \zeta \frac{\partial \tau}{\partial R} - \frac{\partial c}{\partial R})^2} \\
< 0 & \text{otherwise (locally concave)}
\end{cases} \tag{7}
\]

\( E(T) \) is globally convex in \( R \)—From Assumption 1 and Proposition 1:

\[
\lim_{R \to 0^+} \frac{\partial E(T)}{\partial R} < \lim_{R \to \infty} \frac{\partial E(T)}{\partial R} = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \lim_{R \to 0^+} \frac{\partial^2 E(T)}{\partial R^2} > \lim_{R \to \infty} \frac{\partial^2 E(T)}{\partial R^2} = 0 \tag{8}
\]
Appendix B.3 Proof of Lemma 1

For \( \lim_{R \to 0^+} \frac{\partial [E(T) + K]}{\partial R} \geq 0 \), \( R^* = 0 \) (e.g., relational contracting). Otherwise, since \( \lim_{R \to 0} \frac{\partial K}{\partial R} \) and \( \lim_{R \to \infty} \frac{\partial K}{\partial R} \) are not zero, \( \exists R^* \in (0, \infty) : R^* = \arg \min_R [E(T(R)) + K(P, R)] \) and \( \frac{\partial [E(T(R^*)) + K(R^*)]}{\partial R} = 0 \).

Appendix B.4 Proof of Corollary 1

This proof follows from Lemma 1 and the discussion provided in the text.

Appendix B.5 Proof of Proposition 3

(a) Let \( \alpha^L, \alpha^H \in (0, 1) \) be the level of internalization of contracting costs by the public agent, where \( \alpha^L < \alpha^H \), \( \alpha^L \) represents low internalization for low scrutiny states of the world and \( \alpha^H \) represents high internalization for high scrutiny states of the world, and \( \alpha^L, K \) are third-party contracting and enforcement costs accounting for scrutiny.

(b) An increase in scrutiny from \( \alpha^L \) to \( \alpha^H \) leads to an increase in the internalization of direct and indirect expenses by the public agent, i.e., \( \frac{\partial \alpha^H K}{\partial R} - \frac{\partial \alpha^L K}{\partial R} > 0 \).

(c) In comparative statics, if Proposition 2 and Assumption 3 hold, and for any given \( K_{pr} \), an increase in the level of internalization of contracting costs by the public agent \( (\alpha^L \to \alpha^H) \) leads to a decrease in the optimal rigidity \( (R^L > R^H) \), thus—ceteris paribus—lower \( R^* \) leads to lower \( K_{pr} \) and lower \( P_{min} \) due to monotonicity and strict convexity of \( E(T) \) in \( R \).

(d) Let \( \beta^L, \beta^H \in (0, 1) \) be the types of informed third parties from scrutiny, where \( \beta^L \) represents low informed types for low scrutiny states of the world and \( \beta^H \) represents high informed types for high scrutiny states of the world, and \( \rho \beta \) is the likelihood of third-party challenges accounting for scrutiny.

(e) \( \frac{\partial E(T) \beta^H}{\partial R} - \frac{\partial E(T) \beta^L}{\partial R} = T_0 [\tau \frac{\partial \rho}{\partial R} + \rho \beta^H \frac{\partial \tau}{\partial R}] - T_0 [\tau \frac{\partial \rho}{\partial R} + \rho \beta^L \frac{\partial \tau}{\partial R}] = (\beta^H - \beta^L) \rho T_0 \frac{\partial \tau}{\partial R} \).

(f) Depending on the type of informed third parties, \( \rho \beta \) may increase in scrutiny (\( \beta^L < \beta^H \), i.e., downwardly biased third parties) or decrease in scrutiny (\( \beta^L > \beta^H \), i.e., upwardly biased third parties).

(g) If \( \beta^L > \beta^H \), every increase in scrutiny leads to a decrease in \( R^* \) and \( P_{min} \).

(h) If \( \beta^L < \beta^H \), an increase in scrutiny leads to a decrease in \( R^* \) only if \( (\alpha^H - \alpha^L) \frac{\partial K}{\partial R} > (\beta^H - \beta^L) \rho T_0 \frac{\partial \tau}{\partial R} \).

Appendix B.6 Proof of Proposition 4

Let \( I \) be sunk investments and \( A \) be the rents of the public agent from expropriation (where \( A = I \) represents total expropriation and \( A < I \) represents partial expropriation) and \( \psi \) the likelihood of governmental opportunism of appropriating \( A \). Expected costs of governmental opportunism equal \( E(G) = \psi(R)A \), where \( \psi \) is assumed to decrease in contract rigidity \( (\frac{\partial \psi}{\partial R} < 0) \).
For any $\psi > 0$, the higher sunk investments $I$ are, the higher possible expropriation rents $A$ and expected costs of governmental opportunism $E(G)$ will be, ergo the private contractor will demand higher contract rigidity $R' > R^*$ and higher final price $P' > P^{\text{min}}$.

Appendix B.7 Proof of Corollary 2

Proof provided in the text.
References


GAO (2003). Equal employment opportunity. SSA Region X’s changes to its EEO process illustrate need for agencywide procedures. Report to Congressional Requesters.


Third-Party Opportunism and the (In)Efficiency of Public Contracts

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Columbia University, and NBER

Limits of Acquisition Symposium, DAU
September 18–19, 2012
Table of Contents—Plan for the Talk

1 Introduction
2 Related Literature
3 A Model of TPO
   - Signaling Process: Hazards into Rigidity
   - Conceptualizing Contract Specificity and Rigidity
   - Endogeneity of Opportunistic Challenge
   - Scrutiny: A Two-Sided Sword
   - Political and Market Structure
   - Designative Specifications
4 Contract Price Under TPO
5 Interrelation Between Third-Party and Governmental Opportunism
6 Applications and Supportive Evidence
7 Concluding Remarks

The “story” about TPO

Theoretical model: some interesting insights

Cases where TPO is explanatory—ideas for empiricists
Characteristics of Public Contracts

- inefficient
- low quality
- delays
- expensive
- corruption, favoritism
- bureaucratic, red tape

- politics
- intricate, convoluted
- scrutiny, regulation
- controls, inspections
- protests, courts
- ...

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TPO and (In)Efficiency
Sept. 2012
Characteristics of Public Contracts (cont.)

- ... third parties...
... third parties...

Figure: Monster-in-Law
Characteristics of Public Contracts (cont.)

- third parties...

Figure: Monster-in-Law

... not necessarily interested in the success of the relationship (political opponents, excluded bidders, and interest groups)
What is the impact of third parties in public procurement and acquisition?
Third-party opportunism (TPO) as key hazard of public transactions

Specificity and rigidity in public contracting are a political risk adaptation by public agents
- Public agents limit the risk of third parties’ challenges through formalities and rigidities
- ... externalizing the associated costs to the public at large

Scrutiny increases public contracting efficiency in costly litigation environments, concentrated (politically) contestable markets, and with upwardly biased beliefs about benefits of challenge
Preliminaries:

- Public agent’s perspective
- Simple short-term contract for standard good/service
- Ignore sunk costs to abstract from governmental opportunism

Four agents explicitly and implicitly involved in public contracting:

1. Incumbent public agent
2. Private contractor
3. Third-party challengers, i.e., political opponents to the incumbent public agent, competitors to the contractor, and interest groups (“anti-arbitrators”)
4. Public at large, i.e., voters and courts
Signaling Process: Hazards into Rigidity—Timing

Public agent:
1. Receives project features and budget $P^{bud}$
2. Perceives threat of potential TPO challenges
3. Minimizes political risks by contract specificity and rigidity $R^*$

Private contractor:
4. Observes contract specificity and rigidity $R^*$
5. Less adaptability equals higher contracting and implementation costs, and hence higher final price $P^{min}$

Third parties:
6. Privately perceive benefits from potential challenge
7. Contract features $R^*$ affect third parties’ strategies, thereby affecting political outcomes
## Variable Description

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>$f(R)$</th>
<th>In Paper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\tau$</td>
<td>Likelihood of success of TPO challenge</td>
<td>⟷</td>
<td>Assumption 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$c$</td>
<td>Litigation costs</td>
<td>⟷</td>
<td>Assumption 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$K$</td>
<td>Private $K_{pr}$ and public $K_{pu}$ adaptation costs to TPO: \textit{ex ante} contracting and \textit{ex post} penalties, implementation, and enforcement costs (time, lawyers, documentation, and control)</td>
<td>⟷</td>
<td>Assumption 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho$</td>
<td>Likelihood of TPO challenge</td>
<td>⟷</td>
<td>Proposition 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mathbb{E}(T)$</td>
<td>$= T_0 \rho \tau$ Expected political costs of the loss of office, reputation, and support</td>
<td>⟷</td>
<td>Definition 1 &amp; Proposition 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Nature of the Game

We define the following objective functions for the agents:

\[
\begin{aligned}
\text{Incumbent public agent:} & \quad \text{minimize} \quad \mathbb{E}[T(R) | \tau] + K(P, R) \\
& \quad \text{subject to} \quad K = K_{pr}(R) + K_{pu}(P, R), P^{bud} \geq K_{pr}
\end{aligned}
\]

\[
\begin{aligned}
\text{Private contractor:} & \quad \text{maximize} \quad (P - K_{pr}) | R \\
& \quad \text{subject to} \quad P^{bud} \geq P \geq K_{pr}
\end{aligned}
\]

\[
\begin{aligned}
\text{Third-party challengers:} & \quad \text{maximize} \quad q[\tilde{T}_0 \zeta \tau - c] | R \\
& \quad \text{where} \quad \zeta \in (0, 1] \text{ is the political (market) concentration and } \tilde{T} = \tilde{T}_0 \zeta \tau \text{ reflects opportunistic third party’s beliefs about her potential internalization of the incumbent public agent’s costs}
\end{aligned}
\]
Existence of Sequential Equilibrium

Given $T_0$, $\tilde{T}_0$, $\tau$, $c$, $\zeta$, and $K$, the equilibrium $\{q^*, \rho^*, R^*, P^*\}$ is such that:

(a) $R^* = \arg \min_R [T_0 \rho(R) \tau(R) + K(P, R)]$

(b) $\rho^* \equiv \mathbb{E}(q^* \mid R^*) \equiv \Pr[\tilde{T}_0 \zeta \tau(R^*) > c(R^*)]$

(c) $P^* \in [P^{\text{min}}, P^{\text{bud}}] = K_{pr} \mid R^*$

This solution can be achieved intuitively backwards. Starting from $R^*$, any deviation from equilibrium makes the public agent worse off:

(a) If $R < R^*$, then $\tau(R) > \tau(R^*)$, $c(R) < c(R^*)$, therefore $\rho > \rho^*$ and $\mathbb{E}[T(R)] - \mathbb{E}[T(R^*)] > K(P^*, R^*) - K(P, R)$, i.e., $\mathbb{E}(T)$ increase offsets gains in $K$ decrease

(b) If $R > R^*$, then $\mathbb{E}[T(R^*)] - \mathbb{E}[T(R)] < K(P, R) - K(P^*, R^*)$, i.e., $K$ increase outmatches gains in $\mathbb{E}(T)$ decrease
Endogeneity of Opportunistic Challenge

High rigidity: litigation cost $c = 16, \rho = .1$

Low rigidity: litigation cost $c = 12, \rho = .5$

Cumulative Probability $1 - \rho$

Third Parties’ Benefits From an Opportunistic Challenge
Optimal Contract Specificity and Rigidity

- Costs, Price vs. Specificity, Rigidity ($R$)
- Third-party opportunism costs $E(T)$
- Contracting and enforcement costs $K$
- Costs borne by the contractor $K_{pr}$
- $P_{min}$
- $R^*$

Equation: $$R^*$$
Institutional implications of third-party opportunism in public procurement and acquisition
Scrutiny: Calibration of Beliefs

High litigation cost, high scrutiny: $\rho = 0.8$

Low litigation cost, high scrutiny: $\rho = 0.7$

High litigation cost, low scrutiny: $\rho = 0.3$

Cost of litigation

Cumulative Probability $1 - \rho$

Third Parties’ Benefits From an Opportunistic Challenge

Low litigation cost, low scrutiny: $\rho = 0.1$
Scrutiny with Biased Third Parties’ Expectations

Upwardly biased third parties’ expectations \( T_0 \)

High scrutiny reduces challenges in high litigation cost environments

Downwardly biased third parties’ expectations \( T_0 \)

High scrutiny increases challenges in low litigation cost environments
Scrutiny: A Two-Sided Sword

- On the one hand, better informed third parties due to scrutiny may increase or decrease the likelihood of TPO, depending on calibration and update of beliefs.
- On the other hand, scrutiny increases the level of internalization of adaptation costs by the public agent.

⇒ It is equivocal whether open information policies (as the case of California or Berlin) lead to more efficient public contracts.

**Proposition**

Assuming away administrative scrutiny costs, an increase in scrutiny reduces contract rigidity $R^*$ only if the internalization of adaptation costs effect is larger than the increase of political costs due to calibration and update of beliefs by opportunistic third parties.
Recall: TPO challengers maximize $q\left[T_0\zeta \tau - c \right] | R$, i.e., $q = 1$ iff $T_0\zeta \tau > c$

As $\zeta \approx 0$ (atomized political opposition), there will be no TPO challenges (as in a mono-partisan or autarky system).

Analogically, $\zeta$ may describe the bidders’ market structure: $\zeta = 1$ for symmetrical Bertrand duopolies, $\zeta < 1$ for oligopolies, and $\zeta \approx 0$ for perfect competition or monopoly.
Applications

- Bureaucracies
- Fixed-Price vs. Cost-Plus Contracts
- Public-Private Partnerships
- External Consultants and Certification of Contractors
- Efficient Small Communities and Authoritarian Regimes
- Privatization of Government-Owned Companies
Bureaucracies

- Specific employment procedures in civil service
- Aimed at avoiding challenges of favoritism, but nonetheless result in lower productivity (analogical to higher $P$)
  - UK 1997-2006: public sector productivity fell by 3.4%, compared with a rise of 28% in the private sector
  - Argentine bureaucracy = combination of constitutional protections of civil servants, relatively low wages, and low accountability to “short-lived” political public agents. Because political public agents do not last long, TPO is not a prevalent hazard for them → “parallel bureaucracy”

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Fixed-Price vs. Cost-Plus Contracts

- In theory, fixed-price better when adverse selection < moral hazard
  - Fixed-price: *standardized goods*, low informational asymmetry
  - Cost-plus: *complex projects*, i.e., technological uncertainties > inefficiencies from incomplete monitoring

- In practice, cost-plus subject to more TP challenges
  - GAO 2008 on defense acquisition: *cost overruns* of 26% ($295B)
  - More adaptable, but also *abusable* (“blank check”)

- Under TPO, **fixed-price preferred** where cost-plus more efficient
  - Fixed-price does not provide adaptable risk-sharing mechanisms
  - Costs underestimation in 9/10 of transport projects
  - Event study—Poland: 29% of contracts to lowest price bidder in 2004; 91% in 2010: EU increased frequency and depth of controls
Public-Private Partnerships

- PPPs: *ex ante* flexibility in contracting to gain efficiency
- *Ex ante* flexibility makes PPPs vulnerable to TPO (higher $\rho$)
- Response: KPIs as *ex post* quality control and signal that service remains publicly accountable
  - Australia (2001): the PPPs inferior—more expensive or lower quality of services—than the standard model of public procurement
  - Response: formal procedures for *ex ante* assessment using the Public Sector Comparator (PSC) and Value-for-Money (VfM), i.e., more contractual *ex ante* specificity and costs
  - New Zealand (2009): “there is little reliable empirical evidence about the costs and benefits of PPPs” and that “the advantages of PPPs must be weighed against the contractual complexities and rigidities they entail”
- Trade-off between gains from better private management and higher costs of compliancy with *ex ante* contractual complexities and *ex post* KPIs
Independent consultants (e.g., MLAs, advisers) enrolled to increase objectivity of processes and lower $\rho$

- External consultants in Warsaw in PPP pre-procurement phase to “safeguard the city authorities against complaints and criticism by subsequent administrations”
- Cost: PLN 10M ($3.2M), i.e., 1.2% of the estimated budget

Certain public tenders require certification of contractors

- “Canal Safety and Drainage Improvements Project” (Contra Costa Water District Construction Department, 2010) objected: the apparent low bidder included a non-certified subcontractor and could bid a lower price ($756K compared with loser’s $852K, i.e., 11% cheaper)
- Besides, certificates may add inefficient market concentration ($\uparrow P$)

Trade-off between lower TPO hazards and additional adaptation costs $K$ of external consultants and certification
Efficient Small Communities and Authoritarian Regimes

(a) Efficient small governments: low value of contracts $\widetilde{T}_0 \rightarrow$ low $\rho$

(b) Authoritarian regimes: low $\rho, \tau$

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{discretion} &= \text{inexpensive and swift contracting of public works}
\end{align*}
\]

- E.g., rapid development of infrastructure in Paraguay during the Stroessner’s regime: “During the 1960s and the 1970s, Paraguay built roads, silos and, most importantly, the biggest dam in the world, the Itaipú Hydro-electric Dam, built jointly with Brazil. (...) During the 1970s, Paraguay had one of the highest growth rates in the region, with real GDP increasing at 8 percent over the decade” (Molinas et al., 2006)

- ... but corruption costs: that ability to move policy decisively also funneled most of the benefits to a few contractors—companies owned by the dictator’s followers
Privatization of Government-Owned Companies

- Privatizations subject to **clauses of commitment** (high $R^*$) from acquirer concerning labor retention, modernization processes, future investments, and other “social sensitive” issues.
- Such privatization clauses limit, however, the company’s governance and, consequently, **lower its value**.
- If the revenue from privatization is low, the public agent can be accused of collusion or “selling off the family silver”.
- Corollary: **trade-off** between sell-off from a government’s valuation standpoint and rigid from a private managerial perspective.
Immunity for Public Agents

- Immunity from legal prosecution = a way to **insulate** public agents from threats of media smear campaigns, courts, and legal harassment
- Dal Bo et al. (2006) show that, by limiting the potential for pressure from interested groups, immunity may indirectly lead to an **increase in the quality** of public officials, and hence better public policies
- Congruently, from a TPO theory perspective, immunity lowers $\tau$ and thus $\rho$ because the public agent will not have to prove probity and, consequently, provides flexibility that leads to an **increase in the efficiency** of public agents
- E.g., Mario Monti appointed *Senatore a vita* a day before becoming Italy’s PM
Concluding Remarks

TPO theory combines political hazards and adaptation costs to explain apparent inefficiencies in public contracts

- High *ex ante* payment volatility or *ex post* flexibility in implementation may trigger drawbacks, leading to contract failure or costly adaptation by the public official, whether in terms of time or political career

- High specificity and rigidity, and high prices of public contracts is a sequential equilibrium: public agents minimize political third-party costs with contract specificity and rigidity, which induce high contracting prices

- True inefficiency in public contracting should pass Williamson’s (1999) remediableness test