BEYOND AN OPERATIONAL RESERVE

by

Ronald W. Burkett II

Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army
### Beyond an Operational Reserve

**Author:** Ronald W. Burkett II, Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army

**Performing Organization:** Joint Forces Staff College Joint Advanced Warfighting School 7800 Hampton Blvd Norfolk, VA 23511-1702

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by
Ronald W. Burkett II

LTC, U.S. Army

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This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

Signature:

1 MAY 2013

Thesis Adviser: 
Name

Signature: 
Eric Peterson, Colonel, USMC, Thesis Advisor

Approved by:

Signature: 
Keith Dickson, Ph.D, Academic Advisor

Signature: 
John Paul, Colonel, USAF Committee Member

Signature: 
James B. Miller, Colonel, USMC Director, Joint Advanced Warfighting School
BEYOND AN OPERATIONAL RESERVE

LTC Ronald W. Burkett II, US Army

Joint Forces Staff College
Joint Advanced Warfighting School
7800 Hampton Blvd
Norfolk, VA 23511-1702

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This analysis will demonstrate that the Reserves have contributed to the Operational Force, and it is these contributions that should be sustained. As strategies develop to guide the Defense establishment through a period of reduced budgets and changing strategic conditions, it is important to understand how the Reserves contribute to the operational concept. Equally important is an understanding of how this force fits within the Total Force Policy. The study initially includes analysis across all services to establish the total, operational, and strategic concepts; however, ultimately concentrates on the Army and its integration challenges.

Operational Reserve, Operational Force, Total Force Policy, Strategic Reserve

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ABSTRACT

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves was established by Congress in 2005 under the authority of the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act. Congress chartered the commission to examine the Reserve component of the United States Military and to make recommendations to ensure the National Guard and other Reserve components were organized, trained, and equipped to meet current and future defense requirements. The commission released its final report in 2006 urging Congress to take immediate steps to operationalize the Reserve, stating the Reserve components could no longer be held back as the nation's strategic reserve. That same year, each of the Service posture statements included verbiage proclaiming the necessity for sustaining an Operational Reserve; a new requirement necessitated by a growing dependence on the Reserve to augment the Active component in the post-Cold War strategic environment.

History shows that the National Guard and Reserve has routinely served in an operational capacity to both expand capacity and to relieve stress on the Active force. The notion that the Reserve component was held in strategic reserve is inaccurate. When the draft ended, the Department of Defense embarked on a Total Force concept to integrate the capabilities of the Active and Reserve components and adopted the Total Force Policy in 1973. The Services were required to apply the policy to all aspects of planning to include manning, equipping, and budget programming. The Total Force approach was intended to serve as the foundation for achieving a force balance between Active and Reserve components. Through the integrated capabilities of the Total Force, the United States military would meet both operational and strategic force requirements.
Current efforts to sustain an Operational Reserve as part of the Operational Force are designed to insure the Services have properly integrated component capabilities, but not a departure from the historical use of the Reserve. The need to balance the force, to define the mission and roles of the Reserve in an evolving strategic environment, and to maintain the confidence that the Reserve is trained, equipped, and ready to meet these challenges are all reoccurring trends. To address these trends, part of the effort must include defining strategic and operational force requirements; however, consistent application of the Total Force Policy will be required to reverse the trends.
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OPERATIONAL AND STRATEGIC CONCEPTS

Introduction

The war in Afghanistan began in October 2001, sparking a period of persistent conflict in which the United States remains engaged. The Reserve force of the United States military consist of the Army and Air National Guard, and reserve components of the Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard, have been involved from the onset and continue to prove their value as integrated members of the United States military’s Total Force. Due to the frequency and size of reserve mobilizations over the past two decades, the Reserve force’s generally perceived characterization as a purely strategic force (or perhaps the more commonly derisive description of a weekend warrior) has changed. Dating back to the start of the 1991 Gulf War, these strategic forces have been repeatedly mobilized to respond to domestic crisis events, while simultaneously being called upon to augment the Active Component (AC) in two major conflicts and several overseas contingency missions.

To meet the military demands of the nation, the Reserve Force had to evolve into a force capable of full spectrum operations. Over the course of the past 20 years, a more contemporary term, operational force, seems to have replaced the traditional characterization of the Reserves as being a strategic force. As part of its final report to Congress in 2008, the Commission on the National Guard and Reserve concluded that there was no alternative to the Nation’s continued dependence on the Reserve components to remain part of the Operational Force. Submitted in accordance with the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2005, the
commission’s report established a starting point for Congress to adopt recommendations that enabled the Department of Defense to utilize the Reserve Components (RC) in a more efficient and predictable manner.\(^1\) The transition to an Operational Reserve is widely documented and often quoted as being necessary to both enhance the capability and capacity of the Active components abroad, and to meet the challenges of preserving national security interests at home. In a 2011 article, Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, then Chief of the Army Reserve, outlined his 2020 vision stating, “We have been, and are now, in changing and uncertain times. The evolution of the Army Reserve as an operational force is a reflection of the need to provide flexible and responsive capabilities in a complex security environment.”\(^2\) Both vision and strategy are necessary to operate in this new environment, yet both must be supported by deliberate efforts.

Operation New Dawn, the subsequent to Operation Iraqi Freedom, is now complete; the United States and coalition forces are planning to end combat operations in Afghanistan by the end of 2014. Significant challenges remain; however, for both the Active and Reserve components as the United States attempts to balance the requirements of national security and fiscal responsibility. The military will have to transform itself into a leaner force while continuing to maintain its full-spectrum operational capability. To do so, the Department of Defense will have to continue to leverage its Reserve forces. Beginning in 2006, each of the Service chiefs highlighted the importance of sustaining an Operational Reserve in their annual posture statements. As part of the 2005 Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB), published through the Office of the

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\(^1\) Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, final report to Congress October 2008. 4.

Secretary of Defense, the board chairman indicated that the board was continuing to work issues related to “The New Reserves: Strategic in Peace, Operational in War,” symposium conducted earlier that year.\(^3\) The following year, the 2006 RFPB report indicated that, “the time when the reserve components functioned primarily as a strategic reserve is over.”\(^4\) For the Reserve force to continue in an operational role, the services must remain completely dedicated to the significant and sustained investment necessary to meet personnel and equipment readiness demands. Additionally, as members of an all-volunteer force, the transition from a strategic to an operational force will require continued sacrifice and commitment of Reservists, their families and employers from across the nation.

This study examines the roots of the Operational Reserve concept, analyzes how the operational characteristics differ from pre-existing strategic and other employment models, and assesses current transformation efforts and challenges. Depending on the source, different terms are used to describe future requirements of the Reserve Force.\(^5\) The two terms that have surfaced in recent years are Operational Force and Operational Reserve. This analysis will demonstrate that the Reserves have contributed to the


\(^5\) The use of the term, Reserve Force, in this paper, refers to the Reserve Components of each service, or when specifically referring to the Army or Air Force Reserve forces. With the exception of the Army and the Air Force, which also have a component in the National Guard, each service has a Active and Reserve force component. When federally activated, the National Guard and Reserve components are part of the active force structure. The Reserve structure, to include the National Guard, is further divided into three categories: Ready, Standby, and Retired. The Ready Reserve is comprised of military members that are liable for recall to active duty as part of a unit or as an individual in time of war or national emergency. The Ready Reserve consists of three subcategories: Selected Reserve, Individual Ready Reserve, and Inactive National Guard. The Selected Reserve consists of those units and individuals within the Ready Reserve designated by their respective Services and approved by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, as so essential to initial wartime missions that they have priority over all other Reserves. Reserve Components of the Armed Forces, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs, Washington, DC., 2005
Operational Force, and it is these contributions that should be sustained. As strategies develop to guide the Defense establishment through a period of reduced budgets and changing strategic conditions, it is important to understand how the Reserves contribute to the operational concept. Equally important is an understanding of how this force fits within the Total Force Policy. The study initially includes analysis across all services to establish the total, operational, and strategic concepts; however, ultimately concentrates on the Army and its integration challenges. Recommendations presented will focus on adding the most value to the Total Force and include, renewing the nation’s commitment to existing policy, establishing clear expectations for both the AC and RC, and the importance of sustaining mechanisms that provide the resources necessary to achieve established manning, training, and equipping standards.

**Historical Perspective: Cold War to present**

The United States has long embraced the patriotism of its citizen soldiers-a tradition of volunteerism that dates back more than 375 years. With approximately 1.1 million military personnel filling the ranks of today’s Ready Reserve, America’s commitment to an all-volunteer force remains steadfast. Recent discussions concerning the use of the RC in an operational role stems from an increased reliance on units and individual personnel required to augment the AC over the past two decades, dating back to the 1991 Gulf War. The assessment that the Reserves have evolved into an Operational Reserve implies a departure from a previous strategic force role. Historical

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evidence proves this assessment in not correct. Discussions regarding total force integration however, are not new within the Department of Defense. Over the course of the past decade, the United States military has engaged in multiple military operations while also responding to both domestic and international crisis events. Consequently, there is renewed focus within the Department of Defense on sustaining the operational capabilities of the Reserves as part of the integrated total force concept. Efforts to transform the Reserve into more efficiently manned, trained, equipped, and accessible force remained constant in each decade following the end of World War II.

Critical to the nation’s success in World War II was its ability to mobilize the entire nation in support of the war effort. In addition to the substantial contributions of private industry, more than 16 million Americans served in the military during the war. To support this unprecedented increase in military strength, the United States conscripted nearly 10 million of its citizens into military service. Equally impressive were the contributions of the Reserve forces. By the end of the war, more than 75 percent of the personnel serving on active duty in the Navy, nearly 70 percent of all Marines, 90 percent of all Marine Corps aviators, and over 90 percent of all Coast Guard personnel were activated Reservists. The Reserves were mobilized immediately to expand the size and capability of the Active force prior to the United States’s entry in to World War II. Reserve units deployed soon after activation and remained mobilized throughout the course of the war.

Following the end of the War, the nation’s security strategy focused on deterring a global war with the Soviet Union, but if deterrence failed, the United States retained a

7 CNGR. *Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st Century Operational Force.* (Washington, DC: Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 2008): E-5.
sizeable force to defeat the threat of communist expansion. In the midst of substantial
demobilization efforts, President Harry Truman and Congress launched several initiatives
to restructure the military establishment. The National Security Act of 1947 created the
Department of Defense and the three subordinate departments of the Army, Air Force and
the Navy. Reporting to the Secretary of Defense was a civilian service secretary,
identified to lead each military department and communicate the needs of their respective
Active and Reserve component forces. During this same year, the National Guard
Bureau was reorganized under the Departments of the Army and Air Force to improve
inter-service coordination. The legislation that established conscription was allowed to
expire in 1947 but, in anticipation of possible Cold War contingencies, the draft was
reintroduced with the enactment of the Selective Service Act of 1948. In this act,
lawmakers once again acknowledged the necessity of building and maintaining the
nation’s armed strength, and reinforced the idea that the security of the nation may
require the National Guard and Reserve to provide units and organizations to the AC in
times of crisis. The Act states, “. . . it is essential that the strength and organization of the
National Guard, both Ground and Air, as an integral part of the first line defenses of this
Nation, be at all times maintained and assured.”8 All three elements of the Active,
National Guard, and Reserve force were identified in the act as necessary to achieve a
balanced force, but specific language denoted the purpose of the National Guard and
Reserve forces as necessary to provide forces when, “. . . units and organizations are

needed in excess of those of the Active components. . .” 9 This language does not imply that the Reserves should be maintained as part of a strategic force pool, but rather specifies a requirement for these forces to be manned and ready.

Following the end of World War II, force alignment within the Army resulted in the components taking on different roles regarding national and civil defense functions. The Army Reserve, under federal control, contained a majority of the Army’s combat support units responsible for logistical and other combat service support functions. The National Guard had the majority of reserve combat units and maintained dual status capability, meaning that unless they were mobilized for deployment, the states would maintain and utilize units and individuals and would remain under control of the state governor to address civil disturbances or recover from local disaster events.

Additional reorganization activities within the Department of Defense explored possible efficiencies that could be gained through consolidating the National Guard and Reserve into a single force. As part of this effort, then Secretary of Defense, James Forrestall, directed a board to conduct an assessment of potential benefits that could be gained through a merger of the National Guard and Reserve and appointed the Army Assistant Secretary, Gordon Gray as the board’s chairman. The Gray board recommended merging the two components to form the National Guard of the United States. 10 The board determined that by consolidating the two Reserve components,


higher readiness levels could be achieved through a more efficient use of resources. The board also concluded that a federally controlled National Guard would be more accessible and therefore, better postured to meet the demands of the Cold War environment by removing the dual allegiances (state and federal) shared by Guardsmen. The board did not discuss or define its understanding of the demands that federal control would enable.

The Grey board recognized the utility of a reserve force whose ranks, to a large degree at that time, consisted of highly experienced war veterans. However, the board also characterized the experience of a veteran reserve force as an inherent weakness, proclaiming, “the reserve forces must be provided with a continuous flow of pre-trained personnel if they are to perform the missions which national security requires of them,” and concluding, “the impression that these forces now contain elements which are ready for combat is a dangerous illusion.”11 While the board appears to have placed a premium on the value of experienced veteran Reserve Soldiers; as these veterans left the service, there was no mechanism in place to train new Reserve recruits. Pre-trained Soldiers entering the Reserve ranks would indeed have a common base line of training and would not have to rely on the instruction of veteran service members. The board did not comment on the importance of sustainment training or mission related training. Through this omission, perhaps the board assumed that as a strategic force, the RCs could train to standard following activation. If the RCs were intended to be a Strategic Reserve entering into the Cold War, this understanding was not reflected in policy or strategy documents within the military departments. The board concluded that as two separate

11 Abbott A. Brayton "Army Reserve Policies since World War II." Military Affairs 36, no. 4 (December 1972): 139.
reserve structures, the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard (ARNG) lacked the money, facilities, and equipment necessary to sustain the experience of their veterans or the capabilities expected of them.\textsuperscript{12} The recommendation to combine the two components, as well as the board’s findings, sparked a firestorm within Congress and was defeated through successful lobbying by the National Guard and the National Guard Association of the United States.\textsuperscript{13} Beyond the failed attempt to consolidate the two components in an effort to gain efficiencies, the debate did not identify strategies to correct the noted training deficiencies, nor was the purpose of the RC redefined. What was clear at the time; however, was that under the Truman administration, defense spending would be cut dramatically and cuts would necessitate reductions in military troop strengths. President Truman intended to mitigate the risks associated with a rapid military draw down by leveraging the United States’s nuclear capability and the perceived security umbrella it provided.

**Korean Conflict**

The Truman Administration’s Cold War strategy aimed at containing the threat of the communist expansion while remaining fiercely committed to reducing both government spending and the national debt. The entire military establishment suffered from the rapid post-war draw down and the reductions in manning, equipping, and training resources that followed. The administration levied heavy budget cuts that left the services smaller than anticipated, but it was accepted as common knowledge that

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\textsuperscript{12} Abbott A. Brayton "Army Reserve Policies since World War II." *Military Affairs* 36, no. 4 (December 1972): 139.

\textsuperscript{13} Alice Buchalter and Seth Elan. “Historical Attempts to Reorganize the Reserve Components”. Federal Research Division (Washington, DC, 2007), 2.
however, “a smaller Army supported by a large reserve system was considered more in accordance with the democratic citizen-soldier concept.”\textsuperscript{14} In addition to mitigating the risks of a smaller military establishment through a more robust reserve, part of Truman’s security strategy focused on the concept of “collective security.” The concept was applied in 1947 to Latin America with the signing of the Rio Pact and again in 1949 with the North Atlantic Treaty and the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Through collective security, an attack against any one of the member states would be considered an attack against them all. The concept was tested the following year when the United States came to South Korea’s aid following its invasion by Communist North Korea in June of 1950.\textsuperscript{15} United States military involvement would require immediate use of the Nation’s reserves; in part by design, but also because the military budget cuts under the Truman Administration produced what historians later referred to as a hollow force.\textsuperscript{16} Within months of the invasion, the entire Marine Corps ground Reserve was mobilized; 33,000 men and 138 units were ordered to active duty along with reserve aircraft squadrons. The services also relied on the Reserves and National Guard to fill vacancies in their units as well as to benefit from the experience of the Reservists. In the Fall of 1950, President Truman declared a national emergency in response to Chinese intervention in Korea. The President’s declaration called for additional military forces, including four ARNG divisions, to provide a deterrence to the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[14] Brayton, "Army Reserve Policies," 139.
\end{footnotes}
threat of possible Soviet expansion in Europe.

In addition to a robust mobilization effort, concurrent planning within the Defense Department called for an immediate restructuring of the Army’s ground forces with a goal of establishing 18 divisions by 1952 and 21 divisions by 1955. As part of this effort, the president approved the induction of two additional National Guard divisions, while activating the remaining six Guard divisions. Two of these divisions were deployed to the European theater in support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.17 Throughout the Korean conflict, more than 240,000 reservists were deployed to provide both strategic depth and enhanced capability to the AC.

The effort to mobilize, train, equip, and deploy these forces exposed numerous inefficiencies that prompted Congress to pass the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952. This Act codified the seven reserve components as, the Army National Guard of the United States, the Army Reserve, the Naval Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air Force Reserve, the Air National Guard of the United States, and the Coast Guard Reserves. Within each component, the Act also included the sub-classification of Ready, Standby, and Retired Reserve. The Ready Reserve was identified as has having a higher priority for mobilization than the Standby or Retired Reserve, and a higher priority of resourcing. The act stated that reserve forces were maintained in order to provide trained and qualified units and personnel for use on active duty in time of war, a national emergency, or at any other time these forces would be required to meet the needs of the

Service components addressing matters of national security.\textsuperscript{18} The law also defined presidential and congressional authority, and established the provisions necessary to order reservists to active duty and specified the length of expected service.\textsuperscript{19}

As part of his New Look Defensive Strategy, which emphasized nuclear-armed air power and a stronger military Reserve, President Dwight Eisenhower urged Congress to pass the Reserve Forces Act of 1955. Once enacted, the 1955 RFA authorized the president to activate up to one million personnel without congressional approval and increased the Ready Reserve strength to 2.9 million personnel. A large and accessible Reserve was needed to support a mass mobilization in case of war with the Soviet Union. The RFA sought to enhance training standards and competence across the force and prescribed the annual training requirements for all personnel in the Ready Reserves, but did little to address funding, equipping, and training resources. Pursuant to the Act, a new recruit could avoid conscription into the AC by directly enlisting into the Reserve or National Guard, fueling concerns that instead of building a stronger and more capable force, the Act would fill the Reserve ranks with individuals seeking to avoid military duty.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{18} Alice Buchalter and Seth Elan. “Historical Attempts to Reorganize the Reserve Components”. Federal Research Division (Washington, DC, 2007), 2.

\textsuperscript{19} Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, Public law 476, 82d Congress, 2d sess, (July 1952), 482, 489. Similar to the Selective Service Act of 1948, the 1952 legislation referred to the Armed Forces Act of 1916 and its subsequent amendments in order to reinforce the necessity of maintaining the strength and organization of the Army and Air National Guard as an integral part of the Nation’s first line of defense. The act further defined the circumstances that, prior to activation, would require the consent of the Governor of the State or Territory or the Commanding General of the District of Columbia National Guard.

\textsuperscript{20} US Military History Companion Reserve Forces Act on Answers.com. \textit{The Oxford Companion to American Military History} Copyright 2000 by Oxford University Press, Inc.. Published by Oxford University Press, Inc. (2000): 7. http://www.answers.com/topic/reserve-forces-act (accessed October 14, 2012) As a result of the 1955 RFA, personnel assigned to the Ready Reserves would complete 48 scheduled drills and complete up to 17 days of active duty or active duty for training, or complete a total of 30 days of Active Duty for Training each year.
President Eisenhower, who felt Congress was doing a disservice to the National Guard by not applying the same active to reserve transfer incentives to the Guard. The President was further concerned that the bill did not include a provision that established universal military training or a mandatory basic training for all active and reserve enlistees. In an effort to reduce the training gap between AC Soldiers and Reserve recruits, in 1957 the Department of the Army launched a training strategy that required all new reservists complete four months of active duty training following their enlistment.

**Berlin Crisis and Viet Nam**

In response to the Berlin crisis in 1961, President John Kennedy took immediate steps to increase the nation’s war fighting readiness. Two Army National Guard divisions and one Army Reserve training division were mobilized for one year of active duty. In addition to increasing the Nation’s overall readiness, the President believed that activating the Reserve sent a clear signal to the Kremlin regarding the commitment and capability of the United States to defend its national interests. It took the two ARNG units nearly nine of the allotted 12 months to achieve combat readiness. The rapidity of events that led to the Berlin crisis in 1961 demonstrated the volatility of the relations between the superpowers; nine months of post call-up preparation time did not meet the intent of a robust and capable Reserve force needed to mitigate the risks of

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22 Abbott A. Brayton "Army Reserve Policies since World War II." *Military Affairs* 36, no. 4 (December 1972): 140.

Cold War strategic environment.24

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara regarded the entire reserve structure as wholly mismanaged and therefore, unable to achieve the necessary training and equipment readiness levels. Compounding the lack of readiness, in Secretary McNamara’s assessment, was the lack of a stated purpose or mission that linked reserve units to their active duty counterparts. He also saw redundancies in the Ng and RC structure and sought to combine Ng-RC capabilities into a single Reserve force. The Secretary’s efforts suffered a serious setback 1964 when, McNamara announced, in a press conference, that he planned to merge the Army Reserve and Army National Guard’s force structure under the command of the National Guard.25 The merger proposal died for lack of Congressional support following the recommendations of a special congressional subcommittee appointed to review the merger plan. As part of its conclusions, the subcommittee indicated, “the merger was not in the national interest because it would result in an immediate and serious loss in the combat readiness of the affected Army Reserve units.”26 Ultimately the proposal never gained the necessary support and neither did any discussion towards extending the authority of the Secretary of


26 William F. Levantrosser. "The Army Reserve Merger Proposal." *Military Affairs* XXX, No 3, no. Fall 1966 (November 1966, 1966): 142. While the subcommittee based its conclusions on the negative implications the merger would have on select units, according to an article published in *Military Affairs* magazine in 1966, the merger failed due to Secretary McNamara’s inability or unwillingness to tactfully address Congressional sensitivities. Instead of communicating his plan openly and as often as necessary to allow Congress to query the proposal and potentially build support, McNamara basically informed Congress that he was going to merge the two components. Instead of assessing the merit of the proposal, the question among congressional representatives was whether or not the Secretary of Defense had the authority to make such a decision.
Defense. Although McNamara’s attempt to consolidate the two Army reserve components failed, disagreements pertaining to the function and use of the Reserve persisted between the Department of Defense and the national leadership, as the nation increased its military involvement in Viet Nam. McNamara was in favor of mobilizing and deploying the Reserve. The Defense Department created a 150,000 member Select Reserve Forced (SRF) in 1965 that consisted of both Guard and Reserve units and personnel that trained exclusively for the deployment. To correct the deficiencies noted in the previous mobilization effort, McNamara ensured the three divisions and six separate brigades that made up the SRF were given top priority for equipping, manning, and training. As a result, the SRF achieved full manning and training readiness within a few months’ time, proving that given the proper organization and resources, reserve units could be maintained and deployed for combat with greatly reduced response times. McNamara recommended calling up an additional 235,000 reservists to meet the force request of General Westmoreland, commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam. McNamara suggested a two-year mobilization window, which would allow sufficient time to train reservists for combat, provide a one-year utilization tour in Vietnam, and demobilization time. President Johnson rejected the proposal, fully aware of the political ramifications that would result from a large-scale mobilization at a time when he was attempting to

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28 Abbott A. Brayton "Army Reserve Policies since World War II." Military Affairs 36, no. 4 (December 1972): 140-143.

mitigate public concerns. President Johnson also wanted to avoid sending a signal to China and the Soviet Union that through mobilization of the Reserves, the United States was preparing for large-scale conflict. Throughout his term as president, President Johnson attempted to reassure the American people that the role of United States military forces was to assist in the defense of South Viet Nam and not an attempt to conquer its Northern neighbor. The President maintained that the United States’ involvement would not result in American forces being “. . . tied down in a land war in Asia”.30 Without access to the RC, the Army had to depend on conscription to expand their ranks. The end strength of the Army grew from 965,000 in 1965 to more than 1.5 million in 1968, while the numbers of troops deployed to Viet Nam grew from 60,000 to 540,000 over the same time period.31 Nearly 40 percent of the Army’s officers and 70 percent of its enlisted force had less than two years of experience in 1968. Unit cohesion suffered and discipline problems mounted.32

While discussion concerning the need for and potential use of a strategic reserve did take place early in the conflict, this discussion did not include the Reserve components. In 1966, while serving as the commander of U.S. Forces in Vietnam, General Westmoreland requested a three-division corps be formed, and held in reserve until conditions required their use in Vietnam. Without access to the Reserve, General Westmoreland’s suggestion was to create a strategic reserve corps utilizing AC forces


stationed within the continental United States. This request was not fulfilled, as Westmorland later concluded, because the Joint Chiefs were concerned that the Active component simply did not have the force structure to carve out three active divisions to serve as a strategic reserve.\textsuperscript{33} The denial of General Westmoreland’s request further illustrated the stress that President Johnson’s earlier decision not to use the Reserve placed on the Active force. When the North Vietnamese launched the Tet offensive in 1968, General Westmoreland urged President Johnson to give him the assets necessary to seize the initiative. General Westmoreland felt conditions had changed and victory was within reach.\textsuperscript{34} In April of 1968, President Johnson mobilized $24,500$ Reservists for deployment, including individuals and units from the Army, Air Force, and Naval Reserves. The majority of the ground reserve units were pulled from the SRF force pool that had organized and trained in 1965 and these units would later receive considerable praise from active Army commanders.\textsuperscript{35}

The Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve deployed several tactical fighter squadrons, whose performance also received significant praise from their AC counterparts. The Air National Guard units received the highest performance ratings of all deployed air assets, which resulted in Congressional inquiry to explain how Reserve units could out perform their Active duty counterparts. In response to the inquiry, Major General Tom Marchbanks, Chief of the Air Force Reserve responded,

\begin{quote}
As a skill level, or as a resource, reserve squadrons are…as good or better than comparable active units. But certainly no worse. . . .The
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{34} Westmorland, “A Soldier Reports”, 143
\textsuperscript{35} Abbott A. Brayton "Army Reserve Policies since World War II." Military Affairs 36, no. 4 (December 1972): 140-141.
old weekend warrior, I would say, left us years ago. . . . They [Reserve component Aviators] have to meet the same standards as their counterparts in the [active] major air commands.³⁶

The Navy reserve contributed several fighter and attack squadrons, in addition to naval construction assets. The deployments of the Reserve naval squadrons were delayed and exposed a significant equipping issue. At the time of the call up, the Navy Reserve aviation squadrons had not been issued operational aircraft. Reserve Navy Aviation units were equipped with training aircraft only and needed to re-fit and train prior to deployment. The Marine Corps and Coast Guard provided individual personnel fills, however, did not deploy any reserve force units during the Vietnam Conflict.³⁷

President Kennedy’s decision to use the RC in the Berlin crisis was in sharp contrast to President Johnson’s decision to not use them in the early stages of the Vietnam war. In both cases, the decision centered on a relaying a message of national strategic intent; however, using the Reserve as part of a messaging campaign did little to clarify its purpose in either a strategic or operational context. In both cases, the Reserve was used in an on-call capacity consistent with the intent behind the legislation that preceded these decisions.

**Total Force Policy**

Perhaps an earlier decision to mobilize the reserves during the Vietnam era would have produced different results; for example, less reliance on conscripts and increasing the Army’s capacity to organize a strategic reserve. In 1968, when the decision was made to mobilize the RC, the will of the American people no longer supported conflict. In the

³⁶ Abbott A. Brayton "Army Reserve Policies since World War II." *Military Affairs* 36, no. 4 (December 1972): 140-141.

³⁷ Ibid., 140-141.
early stages of the conflict, from 1964-1966, anti-war demonstrations were mainly confined to college campuses and included a few hundred to a few thousand. By the end of 1967, crowds of anti-war demonstrators would exceed several hundred thousand and included public locations across the country.\(^3\) At its conclusion, the Vietnam conflict was the longest period of military conflict in the nation’s history, and placed a considerable strain on an Active component that was responsible for sustaining a long war without using its reserve forces.

The decision not to call up the Reserves placed even greater reliance on the Draft, resulting in an individual replacement system which eroded unit cohesion. The one-year rotation policy further hurt unit cohesion and continuity of command. Draw down of personnel from Europe created a paper army there and eventually in the U.S.\(^3\)

By electing not to use the Reserves, President Johnson attempted to avoid unnecessarily raising concern among the American people. His actions may have had the exact opposite effect. Dating back as far as the Battle of Lexington in 1775, the Nation’s citizen-soldier has fought alongside their active counterparts. Perhaps recounting lessons learned from Vietnam, former Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre stated in 1998, “. . . the Army needs the Guard because the Army doesn’t touch America, the Guard touches America.”\(^4\) While his remarks were Guard-centric, his message suggested that the public responds differently when the Army engages in conflict if the citizen-soldier is not involved. The yellow ribbon campaigns that adorn mail boxes and trees across America and the hometown deployment ceremonies that accompany reserve unit

\(^3\) [http://www.history.com/topics/vietnam-war-protests](http://www.history.com/topics/vietnam-war-protests) (accessed March 25, 2013)


departures are a necessary and integral part of involving, and perhaps rallying, the American people. Over the course of the conflict in Southeast Asia, the Johnson administration witnessed a continual decline in the public’s support of the United States’s involvement. While there were several reasons that are attributed to the loss of public support, the administration’s reliance on the draft to build and sustain the military’s personnel strength and combat capability would certainly be among the contributing factors. Perhaps equally damaging to any chance of sustaining the public’s support for the war effort was their growing distrust and dislike of the military in general. As part of his campaign, Richard Nixon voiced his desire to end conscription, a pledge that no doubt helped his campaign given the growing number of antiwar protests that focused on the draft.

Following his election in 1968, President Nixon charged his Defense Secretary, Melvin R. Laird, with finding a practical means for ending that draft that did not compromise the nation’s security objectives. The solution was identified through the work of a presidential commission chaired by Thomas S. Gates in 1969. The Gates Commission concluded that conscription service could be abolished through the use of an “all-volunteer force”. Like the commission, Secretary Laird viewed the Guard and Reserve as the cornerstone of this force. Armed with the recommendations of the Gates Commission, Secretary Laird, in 1970, introduced a concept that called for the adoption of a total force strategy. A Total Force approach would mitigate the risks of moving away conscript military while capitalizing on the benefits of an all-volunteer force.41


http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy6.ndu.edu/docview/214106323?accountid=12686
In a memorandum to all of the military departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary Laird explained that continued budget reductions would require the services to cut personnel and capability within their active components, thus increasing reliance on the Guard and Reserves to mitigate associated risks. The Secretary stated, “In many instances the lower peacetime sustainment costs of reserve forces units, compared to similar active units, can result in a larger total force for a given budget or the same size force for a lesser budget.”42 The memorandum emphasized two main provisions under the concept. The first provision stressed that when considering the Total Force, it was important to determine the right mix between Active and Reserve forces. Under the second provision, the Guard and Reserve were now the initial and primary source for augmentation in any future crisis that required a rapid expansion of the AC.

Secretary of Defense Laird’s intent went beyond leveraging the reserves as simply a means to mitigate the risks associated with reducing the size of the Active force. He also understood that by removing the draft, the Active and reserve components, acting as one force, would have to be ready when needed. To achieve a higher state of readiness, Secretary Laird stated at the press conference, “A total force concept will be applied to all aspects of programming, planning, manning, equipping and employing National Guard and Reserve forces.”43 Unless Congress reinstated the draft, there would be no alternative to mobilizing the Reserves to enhance the size and capability of the Active force. Defense spending by 1973, when measured by total buying power, was at


its lowest point since 1951. Secretary Laird intended for the concept to be applied to all aspects of planning, to include equipping, manning, and budget programming and execution. While the active components felt the pinch of tightening budgets, allotments for both the Guard and Reserves grew significantly.\textsuperscript{44}

The Air Force was quick to implement a total Air Force concept, consistent with the Total Force Policy in 1973. In fact, the architect behind the original Total Force concept introduced by Defense Secretary Laird was Theodore Marrs, a former Air National Guardsman. While serving as the Assistant Secretary of the Air force in 1966, Marrs requested a Rand study to examine future roles for the Air reserve forces. The resultant study concluded that the national interests would be better served by expanding the role of the Air Reserve to include nearly every mission set conducted by the Active component of the Air Force. When Marrs later became the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs in 1970, he shared the concept of a total force model with Secretary Laird.\textsuperscript{45}

The Total Force concept was codified as an official policy in August of 1973 when Secretary Laird’s successor, James R. Schlesinger signed the Total Force Policy and in a statement, declared, “Total Force is no longer a ‘concept.’ It is now the Total


Force Policy which integrates the Active, Guard, and Reserve forces into a homogeneous whole.”46

Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee in May of 2011, Lieutenant General Harry M. Wyatt, Director of the Air National Guard, summarized the intent behind Secretary Laird’s Total Force concept; “Facing a need to reduce the Defense budget in response to domestic priorities and the need to sustain defense capabilities in light of growing foreign challenges, Secretary of Defense Melvin B. Laird put his faith in the Reserve Components.” Quoting Secretary Laird, Wyatt stated, “Within the Department of Defense . . . economics will require reductions in overall strengths and capabilities of the Active component forces, and increased reliance on the combat and the combat support units of the Guard and Reserves.” Wyatt concluded his remarks by stressing that Secretary Laird understood that by increasing readiness and reliability, the Guard and Reserve would serve the as the Nation’s initial and primary source for Active component augmentation while being a cost effective means of maintaining both capability and capacity.47

**Abrams Doctrine**

When General Creighton Abrams, the former commander of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, was appointed as the Army Chief of Staff 1972, he inherited a restructuring plan for a post-Vietnam environment that was already in motion. Given the former commander’s experiences in Southeast Asia, he saw the restructuring effort as an


opportunity to keep the United States from engaging in future conflicts that lacked the support of the American people. The lack of support, in the Abrams’s view, was related to the president’s decision not to activate the reserve components. Consistent with the vision and intent described in Secretary Laird’s Total Force concept, General Abrams focused his restructuring effort on achieving a force structure balance between the Army components that ensured the Nation would not be able to engage in a major combat operation without the National Guard and the Reserve.

The General adopted a total Army model, more commonly referred to as the “Abrams Doctrine,” which integrated the reserve and active components in such a way that one was “inextricable from the whole.” Key to Abrams’s restructuring initiative was maintaining a ground force that could counter the soviet threat, which in his view required the Army to maintain 16 active divisions. The plan that Abrams inherited; however, suggested the Army could be reduced to only 13 active divisions; a plan that gained initial support due to the associated cost savings. The solution was introduced in concept form in 1973. Named the Army Affiliation Program, and fully adopted a year later. Under the program, the Army would integrate the RC through a concept of rounding-out, or augmentation. Keeping to cost reduction efforts already underway,


49 General Abrams effort to restructure the Army while ensuring full integration of the National Guard and Reserves was subsequently referred to as the Abrams Doctrine. It was not General Abrams intent to have the restructuring effort, one that was in full support of Secretary Laird’s Total Force Policy, adopted as the Abrams’ Doctrine.

Abrams proposed reducing the number of active duty brigades in select divisions to two, while providing each division with third reserve brigade that provided Roundout capability. Following this model, the Army was able to reduce the force, but maintained the 16 active divisions. Augmentation involved adding selected reserve battalions and brigades to the active divisions, giving the division its full capability and combat power.

In a treatise published in 1981 for students at the Army War College, Harry Summers, a critic of the Vietnam strategy, argued,

... before World War II, Presidents could not undertake major military operations without engaging the support of the American people because the United States maintained a small standing army and would have to mobilize the citizenry before going to war. The large Cold War militaries, on the other hand, allowed Presidents to resort to arms before engaging public support.

Described as a Department of Defense success story, both the Total Force Policy and the Abrams Doctrine provided insurance that the nation would not fail to garner, build, and sustain the will of the nation before entering into and while participating in armed conflict. Perhaps abiding to the Clausewitz’s principle of a remarkable trinity, these aforementioned restructuring initiatives built upon the principles of mutually a supportive military, government, and people, to achieve the Nation’s military objectives.

"... The Reserves were the ideal instrument to revitalize the ‘remarkable trinity’ by stiffening the congressional backbone and ensuring Congress' active support for wartime

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53 Carafano, “The Army Reserves and the Abrams Doctrine”, 5
operations." Secretary Laird and General Abrams developed the framework for integrating the Reserves as part of the Nation’s Total Force, while meeting demands for a reduced defense budget and while finding a way to end conscript service that did not compromise the nation’s security.

The Army was pleased with the early success of the Affiliation Program and by 1979, over 100 Reserve and National Guard combat, combat support, and combat service support units including brigades, battalions, and separate companies were participating in the program. “The next logical step was to package the entire concept and take it to a higher level, the integration of RC units into war plans.” As a sequel to the Affiliation Program, the Army then introduced the Capstone Program in 1979. The new program maintained the Roundout connectivity between the components while requiring all of the Army’s RC units to align with an Active duty gaining-command. The theory behind the program was that integration could be expanded across the ground force and improved through increased collaboration and communication between the components.

Under the new program, every reserve unit would have an identified wartime mission and reserve training plans and exercises would garner the attention of both active and reserve leaders, fostering more integration and better readiness. The program did not


replace the assignment of Roundout brigades or augmentation, rather expanded the integration coverage to all Army reserve component forces.\textsuperscript{57}

The concept of a smaller standing military, sustained through an all-volunteer force pool and augmented with a robust and integrated reserve, continued throughout the Cold War, yet the task of deterring the threat of the Soviet Union remained. Supporting the Reagan administration, Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger was concerned that the low enlistment and reenlistment rates experienced across the services over the previous decade were not sufficient to maintain the active strength at levels necessary to counter. Moreover, due to years of funding deficiencies, the military was in dire need of modernization. Although both Reagan and Weinberger rejected proposals for reinstating the draft, the administration successfully lobbied for greater defense spending, some of which focused on increasing the incentives and compensation for military service members. Secretary Weinberger increased priority for force modernization efforts to enhance the United States’ strategic capabilities relative to the Soviet threat.\textsuperscript{58} Acting against the historical grain of reduced defense budgets, Secretary Weinberger was able to achieve the growth necessary to support the administration’s vision. To produce a compatible, responsive, and sustainable Total Force, the equipment imbalance that existed between the components needed to be rectified. By identifying the additional


\textsuperscript{58} SecDef Histories-Caspar Weinberger, 15\textsuperscript{th} Secretary of Defense, http://www.defense.gov/specials/secdet_historie/bios/weinberger.htm (accessed 16 December 2012)
planning and programming guidance, Secretary Weinberger attempted to advance the goals of the Total Force Policy.\textsuperscript{59}

In 1987, a report generated by the Reserve Forces Policy Board, which included signatures from senior military and civilian officials from the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Coast Guard lauded efforts made to Reserve readiness. The board, serving as an advisory body to the Secretary of Defense, concluded that many reserve units had achieved an increase in overall capability and readiness in fiscal year 1986. The board cited equipment improvements, better-qualified recruits and an increase in overseas training opportunities for reservists as the key contributing factors to the positive bump in readiness. However, the board also noted that there had been a disproportionate amount of growth between reserve readiness and recent increases to the defense budget.

Even though 1986 marked an increase in reserve readiness, the improvement was at risk of decay. “The board asserted that the reserve budget has not kept pace with the growth in personnel strength and increased missions assigned to the National Guard and Reserves in recent years.”\textsuperscript{60} The intent behind the board’s report was to relay a concern by senior reserve leaders that their forces were far from ready to engage in wartime duty. When the report was submitted, it identified shortages in communications equipment, electronics and wheeled vehicles, as well as personnel shortages in critical specialty areas such as doctors and nurses. The report concluded that the nearly 75 percent of the


\textsuperscript{60} Richard Halloran, "Reserve Officers Warn Forces are Unprepared." \textit{New York Times}, (March 1987), 1.
Army’s medical units and nearly 30 percent of the Air Force’s medical airlift and medical personnel were in their reserve components. The report also noted training suffered because the facilities used by the National Guard and Reserve were inadequate and the projected deficit in reserve construction would only exacerbate the problem.\(^6\) Readiness, sustainability, and modernization were the watchwords used during Weinberger’s time in office to achieve the necessary growth in the defense budget, even if his efforts were criticized by the reserves.

Weinberger’s commitment to the Total Force concept, and only deploying forces with the support of the American people held firm. Given his focus on increasing Reserve readiness, it is fair to conclude that Weinberger viewed the Total Force Policy as necessary to achieve the nation’s security objectives, but that even during periods of sustained readiness and modernization; the force must be used judiciously. In a speech he delivered in 1984, entitled “The Uses of Military Power,” Secretary Weinberger described six conditions for the use of United States military forces, including, “Before the U.S. commits forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress.”\(^6\)

Not only did his stated conditions reinforce the initiatives that began under Secretary Laird and Army Chief of Staff, General Abrams a decade earlier, they were used, in part, when President Reagan crafted the Basic National Security Strategy in 1986. Regan’s security strategy included additional reinforcing guidance:

The United States requires military forces that are organized, manned, trained, and equipped to deter aggression across the entire spectrum of potential

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\(^6\) Halloran, "Reserve Officers Warn Forces are Unprepared.", 1.

conflict. The full range of U.S. military capabilities must be appropriately balanced among combat and support elements, and mixed within active duty and reserve components.  

Post-Cold War and Desert Storm

In the late 1980s the Cold War came to a dramatic end, prompting President George H. W. Bush to shift the focal point of the nation’s national security strategy away from a well-defined threat in the European theater to strategy calling for a forward presence with the flexibility to meet a broad range of contingency operations in various theaters around the globe. Although not related events, it was only hours after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 that President Bush delivered a previously scheduled address at the Aspen Institute in which he unveiled his new strategic vision for the nation.

The administration’s strategy included a 25 percent reduction in defense spending and a resultant reduction in both Active and Reserve components. The President explained that the new security environment would require a force structure that was not simply reduced in scale, but restructured to meet emerging challenges. President Bush emphasized his commitment to readiness while introducing a potential paradigm shift in the future use of the Reserve force:

As we restructure, we must put a premium on readiness. For those active forces we’ll rely on to respond to crises, readiness must be our highest priority. True military capability never exists on paper; it’s measured in the hours spent, experience gained on the training ground, under sail, and in the cockpit. Nothing is more shortsighted than cutting back on training time to cut costs; and nothing, I might add, is more is demoralizing to our troops. Our soldier, sailors, our airmen, our marines must be well-trained, tried and tested, ready to perform every mission we ask of them. In our restructured forces, reserves will be important, but in new ways. The need to be prepared for massive, short-term mobilization has

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diminished; and we can now adjust the size, structure, and readiness of our reserve forces to help us deal with the more likely challenges we will face.\textsuperscript{64}

The president reemphasized that the restructuring initiative would take five years. While his remarks did not include the details or indicate a specific shift from an operational to a strategic reserve, they clearly marked a departure from previous administrations who sought to achieve a more responsive, robust, and integrated reserve component; one that was necessary to mitigate the risk of downsizing the active force. Perhaps more significantly, his remarks indicated that the current strategic environment no longer required planning for massive, short-term call up of the Reserves. In other words, the Active component can be postured to meet current challenges without relying on the Reserve force. The events that took place following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait contradict the president’s statement that the need for massive, short-term mobilizations of the Reserve had diminished.

The opportunity to test of the Total Force Policy, after nearly 20 years since its inception, presented itself when the United States sent ground forces to Saudi Arabia with an immediate goal of keeping Iraq’s invading forces from advancing beyond Kuwait. As AC units were preparing and deploying in support of the first phase of the military operations, known as Operation Desert Shield, President Bush activated more than 50,000 Reserve personnel. At the peak of the mobilization effort, and in support of the second phase, Operation Desert Storm, approximately 213,000 reserve personnel were on active duty representing all services.\textsuperscript{65}


As Abrams had envisioned, the majority of the Reservists were activated to augment ground combat service and service support units. For the Army, Desert Shield and Desert Storm served as the potential proving ground for the Capstone program. During the war and immediately following, the National Guard and Reserve were highly praised by senior military leaders for their ability to add flexibility and balance to the force. The consensus within the senior leadership was that the overall performance of the Reserves should be regarded as among the major success stories of the conflict.66 The GAO published a report in March 1992 that focused on the Army’s ability to provide support forces during Desert Storm. The report complements the performance of support forces as a leading contributor to the success of the entire operation. The report further highlights the Army’s ability to integrate all elements of its Total Force to support combat operations.67 The Army Reserve and ARNG provided more than 70 percent of the Army’s support units.68

However, none of the Roundout brigades performed combat operations in Iraq. Two of the Army’s active duty divisions deployed without their Roundout brigades, and of the three Roundout brigades, only one was certified as combat ready following what was, at the time, determined to be an overly lengthy and unacceptable amount of preparation time. The non-use of the Roundouts caused significant debate and concern


among congressional and military leaders. From the Congressional inquiries that followed, at least two studies, one conducted by the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) and another conducted by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) identified inadequate peacetime training and improper program evaluation as the leading causes. The CRS study specifically cited, “high-level inattention to the actual readiness” as a contributing factor. According to the two studies, senior military and other defense leaders identified poor readiness as a critical inhibitor to the unit’s deployability. Various factors were cited as contributors to the sub-par readiness, ranging from inadequate training and poor maintenance practices, to a wide range of personnel issues. 69

Arguments abound as to why some senior leaders considered the roundout units unready and why ultimately they were not used. While these conclusions suggest a lack of senior leader involvement, they should not have come by surprise. In 1982, only three years after the implementation of the Capstone Program, GAO study reviewed the program and determined that implementation was well behind schedule. The 1982 GAO study found that numerous units had no contact with their active duty gaining commands. Furthermore, the report indicated that the program had no systematic process for assessing progress made towards completing the program objectives. Reserve units were not required to submit reports or provide any feedback concerning training and exercise guidance or execution. The 1982 GAO report concluded with the following statement:

We share the view of the Army that CAPSTONE is important, both to the defense of this country and to the improvement of Reserve component training…Unless the Army develops an information system that enables it to monitor progress and to correct problems as they are identified, CAPSTONE will not achieve its desired goals, and planning and training activities for the Reserve

components will be less effective than they could be.\textsuperscript{70}

At the time of their deployment in support of Operation Desert Shield, two of the active duty divisions left with additional active duty brigades in lieu of their reserve Roundout brigades. In the book, The Whirlwind War: The United States Army in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the authors indicate that some senior Defense and Army leaders cited several reasons for supporting the decision to substitute active units for the reserve Roundout brigades. Among these reasons were claims that the immediacy of General Schwarzkopf’s request for full strength heavy divisions. More controversial, however, were claims that the reserve units were not needed because there were plenty of active brigades that could be used instead. The decision to not use the reserve brigades; however, sidestepped a training and deployment strategy that had been in place since the start of the Affiliation Program (later renamed Capstone) nearly 20 years prior. In the book, The Whirlwind War, the authors claim that the feelings of many AC senior leaders were summed up in the following statement attributed to retired Lieutenant General John W. Woodmansee, Jr., former V Corps commander, "It's patently absurd to take relatively untrained troops when you have trained troops available".\textsuperscript{71} Woodmansee’s comments reflect little understanding of the concept behind the Total Force. Given the lessons learned during the Vietnam conflict and the nearly twenty year existence of the Total Force Policy and Abrams’ Doctrine, the notion that the roundout brigades would be anything less than trained should have been equally absurd. His

\textsuperscript{70} General Accounting Office. Problems in Implementing the Army's CAPSTONE Program to Provide all Reserve Components with a Wartime Mission. Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, 1982. 1-11

\textsuperscript{71} Schubert, Frank N. and Theresa L. Kraus, eds. The Whirlwind War: The United States Army in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, (Florida: Red and Black,1995), 72.
remarks may have, in fact, summed up the feelings of at least some senior AC leaders. This perception, to the extent it existed then or now, marginalizes the importance of the Army’s RC’s combat units in the Total Force and causes friction between the components. At the time, “many reservists and the congressional delegations that represented them had assumed that in all circumstances the Roundout unit would deploy with the parent division.” Secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney, in an attempt to defend the decision, cited two reasons for not deploying the Roundout brigades. First, the military requested reserve combat support and combat service support, not reserve combat brigades. Secondly, he explained that the use of the Roundout brigades was impractical due to the restrictive time limits imposed on reserve mobilizations. Cheney based his argument on Section 673b of Title 10, United States Code, which would have limited the call-up to 90 days, followed by a renewable period of an additional 90 days. With only 180 days to work with, too much time would be spent mobilizing, training, and moving the units into theater, therefore negating any advantage in the use of the Roundout brigades. While Secretary Cheney was quoting congressionally imposed limitations, adherence to both the Abrams Doctrine and the Total Force Policy, would have caused him to question the disproportionate mix of reserve and active forces. Pursuant to the Reserve Forces Act of 1955, President Bush had the authority to call up as many as 1 million reservists for up to two years by declaring a national emergency, and while briefly considered, ultimately the president determined this action was unnecessary. Therefore, acting under the administration’s self-imposed limitation, Cheney initially intended to use up to 200,000 reservists for a maximum period of 180

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72 Schubert, Frank N. and Theresa L. Kraus, eds. The Whirlwind War: The United States Army in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, (Florida: Red and Black,1995), 72.
days. Members of the House Armed Services Committee; however, credited the failure to use combat reservists as anti-reserve bias. “Led by those critics, Congress took up Secretary Cheney's challenge and crafted an exception to Section 673b. Signed into law on 5 November, the amendment extended the period for which the president could activate reserve-component personnel from a total of 180 days to 360 days for fiscal year 1991”. The Center of Military History published an historical account of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 2010 that provides an argument that the Army was simply not prepared to employ the Roundout units. This historical account claims that the Roundout concept supported Cold War scenarios involving escalating roads to war that would last months; giving Reserve combat units time to train. The requirements for Desert Storm emerged suddenly and left the Army ill prepared. The delays experienced in reporting to the mobilization centers were necessary, as indicated in the Center’s report, to give local AC commanders time to build training plans. Units were then required to report to the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Erwin to validate. The NTC had to make significant adjustments to receive the brigade-sized elements in that the cadre and facilities were historically designed to train units no larger than a battalion. Even with the delays, the report indicates that the 48th Infantry Brigade took 55 days to fully meet the requirements in each mission area, including a twelve-day brigade sized validation exercise. The 48th Brigade completed its training on February 28th, the same day the cease-fire was declared and never deployed. The training scenarios at the NTC had to adjust to accommodate brigade-sized elements, but also shifted focus from European-based Cold-War scenarios to the scenarios used by AC units training in the

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73 Schubert, Frank N. and Theresa L. Kraus, eds. The Whirlwind War: The United States Army in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, (Florida: Red and Black, 1995), 74.
deserts of Saudi Arabia. From this historical account, the reader can conclude that the RC ground combat units were just as prepared for conflict in Southwest Asia as their AC counterparts who used the time provided during Operation Desert Shield to validate their ability to counter Iraqi tactics. In 1991, as part of a First Impressions Report aimed at capturing lessons learned from Desert Storm, Admiral J.T. Howe, commander U.S. Naval Forces Europe, stated that Reservists serving in Desert Storm validated the Total Force concept. He attributed the successful validation to mission focused training and maximizing the training opportunities available during a Reservists annual training period. Howe stated, “Most Reservists arrived well-trained from previous annual training periods in theater and were fully and easily integrated into day-to-day operations in minimum time.”

The commencement of ground combat operations on January 17, 1991, marked the transition from Operation Desert Shield to Operation Desert Storm. The following day, President Bush mobilized nearly 1 million reservists to active duty for an initial mobilization period of two years, but only a small fraction of this number was sent to the Persian Gulf. While the Army maintained it validated the Total Force Policy in its use of the reserve forces, conditions were set to make dramatic changes to the concept of Roundout units and the future role of the Reserve.

While military actions in Southwest Asia were continuing to develop, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell was determined to realign the national military strategy to conform to President Bush’s new national strategic

74 Center of Military History, War in the Persian Gulf: Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, August 1990-March 199, United States Army (Washington, DC, 2010); p. 34-35.
vision. Powell used a concept entitled, Base Force, to address the President’s restructuring initiatives and the post-Cold War environment. To meet the desired 25 percent force reduction, the RC, especially the Army’s Reserve Components, suffered significant personnel cuts from 1991 to 1995. Although the cuts to the Reserve components were not as deep as those identified by the administration, the Base Force concept attempted to reach the 25 percent reduction in the total force while maintaining the United States superpower status. Additionally, the Roundout concept was replaced by a new concept called roundup, in which combat reserve brigades would add a fourth brigade to an active duty division in the event they were ultimately needed.

In December 1990, the Department of Defense submitted the Total Force Policy Report to Congress that introduced efforts to improve the implementation of the Total Force Policy. The report highlighted the need for AC forces capable of immediate deployment and sustainability for a period of at least 30 days without additional support. According to the report, use of the RC should only be considered for large scale operations expected to last longer than 60 days. The report specifically stated that for “extended crises or sustained operations”, the RCs should be expected to provide some combat capability, but substantial support capabilities. The report also introduced a new concept involving a contingency corps. The contingency corps would be made up of five Army AC divisions with an RC brigade assigned to roundup each division, replacing the roundout concept. The contingency corps was not further defined as a strategic reserve, but rather a strategic response capability needed to respond to a changing global

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strategic environment. The recommendations in the report and the decision not to use the Roundout units in Desert Storm implied that the Department of Defense was looking at options to “deemphasize the role of Reserve forces in its planning for future deployments.” For the implication to be valid, there would need to be a reduced demand for U.S. military forces around the world, or the size of the AC would grow to meet the increased demand. As the 1990s came to a close, the demand for U.S. forces had not diminished and the size of the AC continued to shrink. While a large portion of America’s ground forces remained forward in Cold-War bases, forces were still required in Southwest Asia nearly ten years after the conclusion of the first Gulf War and requirements in the Balkans were ramping up. As a result, instead of a reduced role, the RC became even more involved.

**Chapter I Conclusion**

The purpose of the historical analysis, starting with post-World War II restructuring initiatives to the beginning of the current era of persistent conflict, was to gain insight on how the role of the Reserve force evolved. The analysis indicates that the assumption that today’s RC evolved out of a Cold-War strategic Reserve is simply not correct. Instead, the analysis demonstrates reoccurring concepts and trends among past administrations, military leaders, and the legislative actions that followed each period of armed conflict. These concepts trends include:

- The ability to mitigate the risks associated with reducing the size of the AC force by increasing the role of the RC
- The RC, when needed, expands the capability of the AC and provides depth across the force
- The desire to establish a more capable and integrated Reserve force

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- An increased awareness that the lack of integration results in extensive post activation training and equipping time.

These trends continued throughout the Cold-War period in spite of a Total Force policy that was designed to resolve them, indicating that this policy, while residing at the Department of Defense level, is not sufficient and subject to interpretation by each successive administration and military leader.

The total force concept was crafted with the idea that an increased reliance on the combat and combat support capabilities of the Reserve and National Guard would allow for an economically achievable force balance between the active and reserve components. Among the Services, the Army has made the least amount of measurable progress in achieving the objectives of the Total Force Policy. As the largest service, and the only one in which the combined size of its RC exceeds the size of its AC force, it would be fair to conclude the Army has a different set of challenges. Chapter I also identified trends contributing to the RC’s inability to meet Total Force objectives. A lack of consistently applied leader emphasis on integrating the AC and RC resulted in insufficient budget allocation, predictability, purpose, and mission focused training, while perpetuating a lack of perceived confidence and value in the Army’s RC.

Although the “Operational Force” terminology was not used then, from the end of WWII to the end of the First Gulf War, this chapter illustrated several examples of how the Reserves were called upon to be part of the operational force. In comparing the terms, strategic and operational, it is interesting to note General Westmoreland’s use of the term, strategic reserve, when he requested the Army identify divisions from the Active component to create a strategic corps reserve that could be used exclusively for service in Viet Nam should additional forces become necessary. In this example, the
term strategic reserve pertained to units and personnel that were not in the fight, or when using today’s terminology, Westmoreland’s strategic reserve would apply to units and personnel that were not operational. Each component must contribute to both the operational and strategic needs of the force. As part of his effort to ensure the Army was postured to support the Total Force Policy, General Abrams focused on building a total Army approach. In what is commonly referred to as the Abrams Doctrine, he aligned Army forces among the components to make certain the Army would never again go to war without its Reserve. Under these initiatives, the Army Reserve force structure included combat service and service support units not found in the Active force and units in the Army National Guard received roundout missions. In both cases, the Abrams initiatives meant these units would maintain an enduring operational mission. Instead of providing expanded capacity; the Reserves would be called to provide immediate capability. It was not until the first Gulf War, the Nation’s first opportunity to field-test its Total Force policy, did this perception begin to change.
CHAPTER 2: EVOLUTION OF THE OPERATIONAL FORCE

In the nearly ten years between the conclusion of ground combat operations associated with Operation Desert Storm in 1992 and the start of the Global War on Terror, the RC was frequently called upon to provide units and personnel to support military operations. Throughout the 1990s the Reserve was needed to support missions in Southwest Asia, Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, as well as several disaster relief missions both at home and abroad. As a result of this increased dependency, one could easily conclude that the Reserve force’s evolution from a strategic to operational force began in the 1990s. Throughout this decade, the Reserve components of the Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard were used in a variety of operational missions and exercises. The Air Guard and Air Force Reserves routinely flew missions in support of Operation Northern and Southern Watch to enforce no-fly zones. The Reserve component provided critical capabilities to Operations Joint Guard and Joint Endeavor in Bosnia and Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, and in fact continues to support ongoing operations in the Balkans today. Throughout the era of persistent conflict, defined as the period beginning with the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 to present, the nation has witnessed the maturation process of the Reserve force’s ability to integrate and expand the capability and capacity of the Active force. During this period, several key events and policy decisions contributed to the evolution of the operational force.

Bottom Up Review

As part of President Clinton’s administration, one of the initial undertakings by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin involved a comprehensive review of the entire military
establishment to include an assessment of the defense strategy, force structure, modernization, infrastructure, and foundations. The Secretary felt a review from bottom to top was necessary given the changes in the strategic environment brought about by the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The Bottom-Up Review (BUR), as it was termed, provided “the direction for shifting America’s focus away from a strategy designed to meet a global Soviet threat to one oriented toward the dangers of the post-Cold War era.” Central to the Department of Defense’s analysis was the judgment that the United States, with the help of its allies, retained the fighting capability to win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. The intent of the BUR was to provide a foundation that would identify the forces, capability enhancements, and funding required to achieve President William Clinton’s pledge of keeping, “. . . America’s military the best-trained, best-equipped, and best-prepared fighting force in the world.” In the BUR, Secretary Aspin assessed the need for several reform initiatives, including the future role of the reserves. While acknowledging the Reserve was a vital part of the nation’s success in the Gulf War, citing the several thousand reserve volunteers that were among the first service members deployed, the BUR concluded that new regional challenges would require that the RC adapt to meet the new demands. “Our approach is to seek compensating leverage, that is,

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1 The BUR was conducted by a Pentagon Steering group at the direction of the Secretary of Defense Les Aspin. The steering group included input from OSD, the Joint Staff, and the services and resulted in a final report delivered by Secretary Aspin as a Report on the Bottom-UP Review.


3 Ibid., iii
to use the Reserve components to reduce the risks and control the costs of a smaller active force.”

The approach did not attempt to compensate for a smaller AC by increasing the size of the RC. In addition to better integration of the Total Force, the leverage would come by adapting the RC to meet new challenges by assigning them missions tailored to utilize their strengths, while insuring the funds necessary to sustain desired readiness levels were provided. The BUR stressed the importance of defining the roles and missions assigned to the Reserves to meet the requirements of the new security environment. Yet in compliance with the Total Force Policy the Reserve was still expected to provide forces, as needed, to augment and reinforce the Active component in any future conflict or crisis event. Further, the BUR stated that the Army and Air National Guard would continue to provide the first line of defense in the event of a domestic crisis. As stated in the BUR, the National Guard, “. . . will provide forces to respond to natural disasters, domestic unrest, and other threats to domestic tranquility.”

With the release of the BUR, the Secretary of Defense took steps to increase reliance on the RC through several restructuring measures. The steps taken were consistent with the strategic foundation laid out in the Total Force Policy. The following provides a summary of these initiatives and an increased awareness regarding their roles and expectations leading up to September 11, 2001.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{4}} \text{Report on the Bottom Up Review, by Les Aspin, 1993.}\]


\[\text{\textsuperscript{6}} \text{The BUR provided a comprehensive review of all Services and Reserve Components, while surfacing many of the Army’s challenges regarding the Total Force Policy. From the stand point of Total}\]
To meet the President’s pledge, the Army needed to modernize key weapon systems and would achieve the necessary funding requirements through AC and RC force reductions. To reduce, restructure, and realign the two largest Reserve Components, the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard, the BUR stated that the associated tasks would be more challenging. Central to these tasks, given the new security environment, was to explicitly define the roles and expectations for the Army’s RCs. The BUR did not use the term, Strategic Reserve, nor did it suggest a necessary shift from historical uses of the Reserve. Instead, the BUR indicated that the Army’s RC would need to continue, as they had in the past, to provide significant support forces in the early days of a contingency, while Reserve combat forces would still be needed to augment and reinforce deployed AC forces. The Army Reserve retained the principle mission of providing the Army with wartime combat service support capability, resulting in the majority of these units being moved under the Army Reserve force structure along with a portion of the Army’s combat support units. The Army National Guard maintained the majority of reserve combat units and retained the dual-purpose mission of supporting the Army during wartime and providing domestic support as required. In addition to defining roles, the Army needed to modernize key weapon systems and intended garner the necessary resources through personnel reductions, both RC and AC. The Army leadership concluded that the cuts would allow for force modernization and maintenance of readiness for higher priority units, both Active and Reserve. The Army conducted two Off-Site meetings that included senior leaders from all three of the Army

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components, the first in 1993 and later in 1997, to discuss the restructuring initiatives and associated reductions. The location of the meeting was away from the Pentagon, as the name implies, and deliberately organized to achieve a consensus among Army leaders. Given the need to make force cuts across each component, the consensus was important to reduce tension between the Army’s components while gaining political backing and legitimacy for the proposals. According to Army historian, George Bennett in his book, The United States Army: Issues, Background, and Bibliography, tension among the Army’s components was neither new nor unavoidable, but complicated the restructuring initiatives. The tension to this point in the Army’s history, as Bennett explains, existed because full-time career Army Soldiers, who spend all of their professional time in a military environment, are prone to be skeptical toward the capabilities of citizen-Soldiers who, regardless of their ability and dedication, are part-time. He also explains that Reservists and Guardsmen will argue that their pre-mobilization readiness is much higher than their AC counterparts are willing to admit. Even though a consensus was reached, Bennett maintains that the Guard was concerned that force structure compromises would only lead to more reductions once the cuts were agreed to, and that the AC underlying intent was to strip the Reserve of its combat units entirely. At the conclusion of the BUR; however, the Army designated 15 of the ARNG’s maneuver brigades for enhanced readiness. The Enhanced Brigades, as they were later named, would be organized and resourced to maintain a higher state of readiness, so that when activated, they could be mobilized, trained and deployed within 90 days. Two years after naming the 15 brigades,

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9 Ibid., 72.
a 1995 GAO study identified numerous deficiencies, similar to those noted in 1982 by the GAO regarding the implementation of the Capstone Concept and nearly identical to the deficiencies noted in the Roundout brigades. The 1995 study highlighted a lack of proficiency in assigned tasks and personnel issues stemming from high turnover and inadequate training. The GAO report concluded that the 15 brigades would need far more than 90 days to reach deployment readiness. Consistent with issues identified following Desert Strom, the report cited an insufficiency in post mobilization sites and training personnel capable of properly assessing, training, and evaluating the 15 brigades.10

Driven by the need to reduce force structure and legacy aircraft, the BUR expanded the roles and missions assigned to each Air Force component. For example, the Air National Guard was assigned the mission of air defense of the United States, and both Air Reserve components assumed a greater role in global refueling and airlift support operations.11 In 1997, the Air Force unveiled the Future Total Force (FTF) concept that suggested the Air National Guard would part with its traditional fighter and mobility missions in favor of new emerging missions associated with unmanned aerial systems, cyber warfare, and space operations. The FTF would allow the Air Force to pull aircraft out of selected states, paving the way for the service to reduce the size and cost of the requisite infrastructure. The FTF initiative sparked a firestorm of debate among the

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11 Angelo, M. *Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces*. Washington, DC: Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, 1996. According to the Air Force Magazine article, much of the language contained in Title 32 of the United States Code was drafted in the 1950s and emphasizes that this language continues to affect the organization, responsibilities, and chain of command of the National Guard, both Army and Air. Recommendations to resolve this debate require analysis that goes beyond the scope of this paper; however, the debate is included as it will certainly play a role in how the services plan and communicate their rebalance initiatives.
states, Congress, and the Defense Department. At the heart of the debate is a legal question based on section 104 of Title 32, that acknowledges the president’s authority to “designate the types of units that go to each state or territory”, however, “no change in the branch, organization, or allotment of a unit located entirely within a state may be made without the approval of its governor.” Similar to the dilemma faced by Secretary McNamara two decades earlier, the Air Force attempted to make significant restructuring moves without fully analyzing the effect on the states, or including the State Adjutant Generals in the early phases of the discussion. At the core of the debate, is the issue of trust and the perception that if allowed, the AC would minimize the role of the RC.

The 1995 national security strategy leveraged the work done during the BUR, and included the assessment that the United States, with support of its allies, must be capable of winning two major conflicts simultaneously. The realignment, reductions, and restructure initiatives imposed as a result of the BUR were designed to increase the role and reliance of the RC to reduce the stress that continual operational demands had placed on the Active force, and as seen repeatedly in the previous chapter, to mitigate the risk of reducing the size of the standing military. A 1995 Rand study concluded that the force structure called for in the BUR would, “. . . adequately meet the requirements to support two near-simultaneous contingencies, but due to an inability to achieve proper readiness levels, would not include suitable support forces to contend with anything beyond a single modest-sized contingency.”

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When the Cold War ended, the Nation’s focus on soviet expansion as the central threat to its security ended as well. However, new threats and challenges emerged. The democratization of the former Soviet states added to regional instability, an increase in ethnic tension and number of rogue states, threats regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction gained prominence.\textsuperscript{14} “In addition to the war fighting capability of our forces in regional conflicts, the new strategy emphasizes the need for strong capabilities to conduct smaller scale intervention operations like peace enforcement, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to further support U.S. interests and objectives”.\textsuperscript{15}

In 1996, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs produced a handbook entitled, The Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces. In the foreword, the handbook states that the National Guard and Reserves are no longer considered forces of last resort, but recognized as necessary not only in the early stages of a conflict, but as a cost effective member of the Total Force during peace time. The verbiage used in the handbook implies that the Guard and Reserves were regarded as a force of last resort. This statement is confusing and historically inaccurate. The handbook identified five essential non-combat activities for which the RC were well suited: military-to-military contacts, nation assistance, humanitarian operations, counterdrug operations, peacekeeping and peace enforcement. These activities supported national strategic goals to promote democratic ideals, relieve suffering, and enhance regional stability.

\textsuperscript{14} Angelo, M. \textit{Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces}. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Washington, DC, 1996).

\textsuperscript{15} Angelo, M. \textit{Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces}. Washington, DC: Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, 1996.
The handbook suggested that the current and future operational environment would require substantial use of Reserve combat and combat support early in response to any regional contingency. “Reserve component forces can expect to be mobilized immediately and to remain on active duty throughout the conflict, whether they are directly or indirectly involved in the operations”.16

Faced with continual budget restrictions, but increasing military requirements, Defense Secretaries that followed Secretary Aspin remained focused on enhancing the operational capabilities of the Reserve component. In 1995, Defense Secretary William Perry directed the services to establish Total Force objectives that would further operationalize the RC and enhance their capabilities to fulfill operational requirements both domestically and overseas.

In 1997 Defense Secretary William Cohen, recognizing the growing dependence on the Reserve force, released a Total Force memorandum that reinforced the need to have an integrated Active and Reserve force. The memorandum clarified his intent by stating,

By integration I mean the conditions of readiness and trust needed for the leadership at all levels to have well-justified confidence that Reserve Component units are trained and equipped to serve as an effective part of the joint and combined force within whatever timelines are set for the unit—in peace and war.17

As if recognizing that since its inception in 1973, Secretary Cohen’s statement suggests the Total Force Policy has witnessed renewed attempts to follow the concept,


but few attempts to implement necessary changes. Leading up to this memorandum, reoccurring issues and trends continue to surface that must be reconciled before integration can take place. These issues include: lack of RC readiness, unacceptable predeployment training times, lack of properly maintained and equipped RC units, particularly regarding combat units. The reoccurring trends include: the need to reduce budgets through decreased AC strength; the desire to achieve a balance between AC capability for RC capability, the need to have a flexible and integrated force, and the need to define the roles of the AC and RC in an environment of evolving security requirements. Secretary Cohen challenged the military establishment to set the conditions for improved readiness, and perhaps equally important, to set the conditions of trust at all levels of leadership so that well justified confidence in the RC exists.

Era of Persistent Conflict

The era of persistent conflict began on the morning of September 11, 2001.

“This event took the Nation into a new era that required a new national strategy, new thinking about the application of national power, including military power, and new ways of thinking about military strategy, doctrine, and employment of forces—which include Reserve Forces.”

Following the realization that the first of four plans had been hijacked, the Federal Aviation Administration reported their observations and Air Force fighters, to include Air National Guard aircraft began flying Combat Air Patrols (CAP) over Washington, DC and New York City. In the days that followed, the CAP missions were expanded to include other major U.S. cities and President George W. Bush authorization a partial

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18 Winkler, John D. "Developing an Operational Reserve." *Joint Force Quarterly* 59, no. 4th Quarter (2010): 15
mobilization of the Reserves on 15 September 2001, initiating what became known as Operation Noble Eagle. The operation enhanced the nation’s homeland defense posture and provided support to civil authorities with an initial call up of approximately 35,000 reservists from all services.\textsuperscript{19} A large number of the call-ups were Guardsmen, mobilized under Title 32, directed through state governors.

On 20 September 2001, President Bush announced that the United States, in response to the attacks, was now engaged in a “Global War on Terror”. Less than three weeks later, Operation Enduring Freedom was launched against al-Qaeda to capture Osama bin Laden and topple the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Approximately 18 months later, the United States led an additional military campaign, Operation Iraqi Freedom, to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime, and destroy Iraq’s ability to produce and distribute weapons of mass destruction.\textsuperscript{20}

Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operations Enduring Freedom commenced in support of the larger campaign to defeat terrorists of global reach, but lacked a definable time table. To compensate for the demands against the Total Force troop strength ceilings were raised across the services, equipment shortages were filled, additional training resources were acquired and new operational levels of efficiency regarding joint, interagency, coalition, and service interoperability also grew out of necessity. The compensating steps mentioned above were necessary to both expand the operational capability of the AC and to reduce stress generated through lengthy and frequent deployments. The demand for forces resulted in the increased use and dependency on the


Reserve. As part of the operational force, the resources necessary to meet manning, equipping, and training requirements increased proportionately, and resulted in a level of proficiency, confidence, and capability not matched since the start of the Cold War.

Beginning in 2001, the majority of the operational use, growth and capability experienced across the Reserves was facilitated through the use of Overseas Contingency Operational funding (OCO) and war supplements in addition to a steadily increasing Department of Defense base budget. The Defense Department’s 2013 budget submission assessed that more than 825,000 Reservists were activated since September 11, 2001, in support of Operations Nobel Eagle, Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and Operation new Dawn.21 Even though force requirements against these operations have been greatly reduced, the requirement for the Reserves to remain actively engaged continues. A new term for the Reserve began to immerge in 2006, suggesting the Strategic Reserve no longer existed and an Operational Reserve had evolved. The Center for Strategic and International Studies released a study in 2006, entitled The Future of the National Guard and Reserves. The study emphasized the importance of completing the efforts necessary to transition the National Guard and Reserve from a purely strategic model to an Operational Reserve model in support of an Operational Force. The study did not expand on its claim that the Guard and Reserves were previously strategic, nor did it define the either an Operational Force or Reserve. The study did, however, include over forty recommendations for how this transition should be implemented. The recommendations were bundled into six overarching areas, three of which mirror the trends identified

previously; roles and missions (define the roles and expectations), force structure
(achieve balance between AC and RC), employment of the Reserve Component as part of
the Operational Force (integrated part of Total Force).22

The FY 2013 defense budget, stated that the military establishment would
continue to “. . . use the Guard and Reserves as a vital part of the operational force, and
where it makes sense, as a force of first choice.”23 The term, Operational Force also
appears in each of the FY 2013 Service posture statements.

Department of Defense Directive 1200.17

Policy and planning guidance for using the Reserve as part of the operational
force was codified in the Department of Defense Directive 1200.17. This directive,
implemented by then Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, in 2008, reinforced the
relationship the Reserve has to the Total Force. The directive specifically tasked the
respective Under Secretaries, Directors, and Service Secretaries with managing the
Reserves as part of the operational force, to include preparing the necessary fiscal
guidance for sustainment. The directive defined two roles for the Reserve, both as an
operational and a strategic force:

The RCs provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S.
defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. In their operational
roles, RCs participate in a full range of missions according to their Services’ force
generation plans. Units and individuals participate in missions in an established
cyclic or periodic manner that provides predictability for the combatant
commands, the Services, Service members, their families, and employers. In their
strategic roles, RC units and individuals train or are available for missions in
accordance with the national defense strategy. As such, the RCs provide strategic

22 Center For Strategic and International Studies, The Future of the National Guard and Reserves,
by Christine E. Warmuth, CSIS, (Washington, DC 2006), vi-viii.

depth and are available to transition to operational roles as needed.\(^\text{24}\)

The directive requires the services to ensure the Reserve components participate in the full spectrum of missions at home and abroad and to implement expectation management programs to provide Reservists, family members, and employers with maximum predictability consistent with operational requirements.\(^\text{25}\)

**Army Force Generation Model**

To meet the demand for land forces in an era of persistent conflict, the Army introduced the Army Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN), which was eventually codified in Army Regulation 525-29 in April, 2011. ARFORGEN allows the Army to move away from the inefficiencies of the traditional alert, mobilize, train, and deploy model of the Cold-War through the establishment of a train, mobilize, deploy model. The model “. . . synchronizes strategic planning, prioritizing, and resourcing to generate trained and ready modular expeditionary forces . . .”\(^\text{26}\) ARFORGEN cycles units through three distinct force pools, described as Reset, Train-Ready, and Available. Units enter into the cycle as either Contingency Expeditionary Forces (CEF) or Deployment Expeditionary Forces (DEF). DEF units have an assigned operational mission, while CEF units are available to Combatant Commanders to execute a contingency mission, operational plan, or other supporting missions.\(^\text{27}\) Designation as either a CEF or DEF corresponds to the intended use of the unit during its available year; however, the


\(^\text{25}\) Ibid., 5.


\(^\text{27}\) Ibid.
designation can change once the cycle starts based on the needs of the Army. DEF units are part of the Army’s Operational Force while CEF units, regardless of component, are part of a trained and ready force pool in their available year. The Army may cycle units through the model to achieve faster “dwell” periods, defined as the time between the reset and available year. During steady-state periods where the available force pool exceeds the demand for forces, Reserve units can expect a mobilization to dwell ratio of 1:5, meaning for each year a unit is available for mobilization, there will be 5 years spent preparing for an operational contingency. The Active component deployed to dwell ratio is 1:3 during steady state periods. Flexibility in the model allows for differing dwell periods to maintain steady-state, surge, or full surge requirements. ARFORGEN provides the Army with a rotational model to ensure it has trained and ready forces to meet operational force demands, but provides Army Reservists with the added benefit of predictability for their families and employers. The rotational model applies to the Army units identified as part of the Operating Force (OF), who have a purpose to fulfill worldwide operational requirements. Units within the Army force structure that perform the function of generating and sustaining operational units are part of the Generating Force (GF) and are not included in the rotational Model.

Increased Access to Reserve Force

Section 12304b was included in the Title 10, United States Code in January 2010, providing Service Secretaries with the authority to access Reserve forces in support of preplanned combatant command missions.

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29 Ibid.
When the Secretary of a military department determines that it is necessary to augment the active forces for a preplanned mission in support of a combatant command, the Secretary may, subject to subsection (b), order any unit of the Selected Reserve, without the consent of the members, to active duty for not more than 365 consecutive days.\(^\text{30}\)

Under the 12304b provision, Combatant Commanders have the flexibility to include Reserve Forces in a broad range of missions, including those that support theater security cooperation initiatives and exercise support. The authority does not; however, apply to emergent missions or humanitarian support. As explained in the FY12 National Defense Authorization Act, use the Reserve under 12304b has the following limitations: the manpower and associated costs must be included in each Service’s Program Objective Memorandum for the year in which the utilization will occur, and no more than 60,000 reservists can be on active duty under this provision at any one time. The Act also explains the conditions under which personnel can be involuntarily activated under the 12304b authority.\(^\text{31}\) Used in this capacity, combatant commands gain access to additional resources and the individual Reservist gains predictability.

**A Declining Budget**

When addressing the media for the first time after taking office in July 2011, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta acknowledged that his office would make tough budget choices to reduce defense spending, but that he would not allow the “false choices” that lead to a weakened state of security. He also stated, “Even as the United


States faces fiscal challenges at home, there will be no hollow force on my watch.” A month later Congress passed the 2011 Budget Control Act that called for a reduced spending strategy that would trim the Defense budget by $487 billion over ten years. The Law also introduced an additional $1.2 trillion in across-the-board cuts, known as the sequestration cuts, that would go into effect in 2013 should a congressionally appointed committee failed to propose reforms to reverse the growing national debt. The committee did not reach and agreement and as of March 1, 2013, the threat of sequestration is now a reality. At the time it was introduced; however, the reality of a sequestration seemed highly improbable. In a January 5, 2012 press conference, Secretary Panetta addressed the risks that a sequestration would induce. During his remarks, Secretary Panetta said,

There is no doubt that the fiscal situation this country faces is difficult, and in many ways we are at a crisis point. But I believe that in every crisis there is opportunity. Out of this crisis, we have the opportunity to end the old ways of doing business and to build a modern force for the 21st century that can win today's wars and successfully confront any enemy, and respond to any threat and any challenge of the future.33

Like many of his predecessors, Secretary Panetta had the right idea; the status quo is not the way ahead. In addition to the previously mentioned trends requiring role clarity between AC and RC, the need for a balanced force, and the need for better integration, Secretary Panetta’s statement, when compared to the challenges of his predecessors, demonstrates the old ways of doing business have not changed.


CHAPTER 3: 
THE WAY FORWARD

As the nation prepares to transfer full responsibility for the security of Afghanistan to the Afghan government and end combat operations in that theater, the United States must address domestic economic challenges while also maintaining its role as the global leader, pursuing “. . . a just and sustainable international order, where the rights and responsibilities of nations and peoples are upheld, especially the fundamental rights of every human being.” 34 History shows that the United States has faced these challenges before, albeit under different circumstances. Within the new strategic environment, al Qaeda and other violent extremist organizations continue to threaten the United States and its allies around the world. The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, states that meeting the nation’s security objectives will require the use all elements of national power. The military’s role, in achieving these objectives will require continued dependence on its Reserve and a valued member of the Total Force. Just as the Gray board observed in 1948 shortly after the end of World War II, the ranks of today’s Reserve are filled with highly qualified veterans. Still true is the board’s conclusion that unless there is a sustained training effort and a commitment to readiness, this experience will fade, as will the capability and confidence the RC has earned throughout the era of persistent conflict.

Rebalance against Risks

The Department of Defense currently finds itself reducing both its budget and the size of post-war force. The risk of a strategy-force structure mismatch exists when the size, composition, or capability of the force is unable to support the strategic goals. The next national security strategy will include a security environment reflective of a post-war Iraq and Afghanistan, the two significant drivers behind force requirements for the past twelve years, yet significant security challenges remain. In 2012 the Department of Defense released new strategic guidance that outlined defense priorities for 21st Century. In the cover letter, President Barack Obama stated that at conclusion of these wars, the nation will face “. . . a broader range of challenges and opportunities . . .” and must meet these challenges at a time when reductions in defense spending are needed. The President said it was important to “. . . remember the lessons of history and avoid repeating the mistakes of the past when our military was left ill-prepared for the future.”

Following the President’s cover letter, Secretary Panetta added that the future challenges would be met with a force that is “. . . smaller and leaner, but will be agile, flexible, and ready . . .”35 Panetta’s remarks also pointed out that the Defense Department was currently shaping the Joint Force to meet future demands. A smaller force will require the Services to rely on the integrated capabilities of the Total Force. In doing so, the Defense Department finds itself addressing similar issues faced by Secretary Laird prior to the release of the Total Force Policy in 1973. To achieve the level of integration required, the Defense Department will need to recommit to the original policy. Unlike 1973, confidence in the proven abilities of the nation’s National Guard and Reserve is

extremely high. The conditions of readiness and trust needed to build the well-justified confidence that Secretary Cohen stressed in his 1997 Total Force memorandum were necessitated by the events of September 11, 2001. Balance must be achieved by reconciling the force requirements against the demands of the nation’s security strategy, roles and expectations need to be defined before resources can be properly applied to ensure the force is trained and equipped to adequately meet future challenges.

Each Service will have its own unique challenges and approaches to mitigating risk while. DoD Directive 1200.17 recognized that rebalancing efforts must be conducted on a continual basis and that these efforts must result in a force mix that includes Active and Reserve capabilities and capacities to sustain the Operational Force.36 But these efforts are required to sustain the Total Force, which includes maintaining both strategic and operational capabilities.

The Army will reduce its current end-strength of 570,000 to 490,000 Active Army, 358,000 to 353,500 Army National Guard, 206,000 to 205,000 Army Reserve Soldiers. These reductions may seem disproportionate, but compared to 1991, the AC is will remain larger, while the RC end strengths are nearly the same. In its FY2012 Posture Statement, the Army states that reductions will occur in a manner that preserves readiness while avoiding the conditions that lead to a hollow force. To do so, the Army will utilize three, “. . . rheostats that must be continuously assessed and adjusted: end strength/force structure, readiness and modernization.”37 The adjustments are necessary


to ensure end-strength reductions do not equate to reduced capability and so readiness and modernization initiatives are not in competition with each other.

In addition to these criteria, discussions concerning the Army’s Active force end-strength should include a mission and defined expectations for both the AC and RC. The most recent version of Title 10 United States Code and the FY2012 Army Posture Statement include roles for the total Army; however, both address the Reserve components separately. Both Title 10 USC and DoD Directive 1200.17 provide a purpose statement for the RC, but not for the AC.\(^\text{38}\)

From the start of the Cold War through the period leading up to the Era of Persistent Conflict, the ability of the United States to quickly move ground forces was hinged against a continual overseas presence and forward basing options. By the end of 2013, nearly 90 percent of the nation’s ground force will be located within the continental United States. Power projection in the future should be expected to take longer and will include countries with underdeveloped infrastructure therefore the United States will have fewer alternative basing options. In 2008, the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC), in partnership with the Sustainment Center of Excellence Deployment Process Modernization Office (DPMO), conducted a Global Deployment Assessment to study the United States’s ability to move forces to potential contingency areas.\(^\text{39}\) A 2013 article

\(^{38}\) Title 10 United States Code. [http://uscode.house.gov/pdf/2006/2006usc10.pdf](http://uscode.house.gov/pdf/2006/2006usc10.pdf) (accessed January 15, 2013) As reflected in current Title 10, United States Code, 10102: The purpose of each reserve component is to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require, to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever more units and persons are needed than are in the Active components.

published in Armed Forces Magazine discussed the results of the ARCIC/DPMO study, concluding with an assessment that the Army’s current strategic deployment goals are unachievable. The article specifically cites the 2011 Army Campaign Plan as overly optimistic in its claim that “... it should take four to seven days to insert a modular brigade anywhere in the world.”

40 The 2008 ARCIC study and claims made in the aforementioned article are relevant to determining how big the Operational Force should be and require additional analysis. Right sizing the Operation Force, should be linked to the nation’s power projection capabilities. This type of analysis should be a starting point that informs the Army as to how large the AC should be. Both the Active and Reserve components will provide operational and strategic forces; however, AC forces that can not be moved within the time frame required for comparable Reserve units to mobilize should not be considered part of the Operational Force, and by default become part of the Strategic Force. Limiting the size of the AC strategic reserve will help sustain resources needed to sustain the Total Force’s operational requirements while serving as a forcing function for Total Force integration through increased use of the RC.

**Renewed Commitment to the Total Force Policy**

The term Operational Force is new, however the Army has always maintained operational forces. The idea that the RC somehow transitioned into an Operational Force following September 11th, is misleading. The desire to maintain its presence in the Operational Force remains of critical importance to the RC, because in this capacity, the RC remains an integrated component of the total Army. DoD Directive 1200.17 tasked the Services with managing the RC as part of the Total Force. Within the Army, previous

attempts to integrate the components resulted in programs such as Roundout, Roundup, and Enhanced Brigades. The lack of consistent adherence to the Total Force Policy resulted in these programs loosing emphasis. Reserve contribution to the Operational Force will enable integration among the Army’s components as long as there is emphasis placed on the Total Force. Evidence indicates that previous Defense Secretaries, Service Chiefs and senior military leaders have diligently attempted to meet the requirements of the 1973 Total Force Policy. Nearly all of the defense secretaries in each of the preceding decades, dating back to the enactment of the Total Force Policy, recognized the deficiencies that existed in the Reserve force and attempted to renew the department’s adherence to the Total Force Policy. The downfall of each attempt stemmed from the lack of a forcing function. As a Defense Department policy, the Total Force concept lacks consistent application and emphasis, which has contributed to the Army’s inability to achieve and integrated Total Army. Further evidence exists to show that Congress has acknowledged that, in spite of the programming intentions expressed in the original policy, the Reserves require additional funding to equip their formations. In 1986, Congress passed legislation that funded and continues to fund the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account (NGREA). According to a fact sheet provided through the National Guard’s internet homepage, “the congressional intent for NGREA funding is to fill shortfalls in equipment provided by the Service,” and to help insure the Reserves remain, “relevant in both overseas and domestic operations.” 41 As indicated, the congressional intent behind NGREA is remarkably similar to Secretary Laird’s intent behind the Total Force concept. The Total Force lacks a contemporary definition, and

should be defined, but more importantly it lacks a forcing function. The concept behind the Defense Department’s Total Force Policy should be addressed in the President’s National Security Strategy, and codified in a future defense bill to ensure the policy is applied to all aspects of planning, to include equipping, manning, and programming as originally intended. This step will reverse previous trends, by forcing the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to address Congress on progress made toward Total Force integration.

**Sustain Characteristics of an Operation Reserve**

The characteristics of today’s operational force include: equipment compatibility between components, mission ready units and personnel, predictable operational requirements, and perhaps most importantly, leaders who are confident and capable in meeting current and future security challenges. Throughout the Era of Persistent Conflict, America has once again proved its effectiveness as a resourceful and industrialized nation. The ability to surge equipment to meet training and mission requirements, the ability to surge personnel and project forces rapidly reinforced demonstrated America’s military capability and dominance; all characteristics of a true super power. Although incapable of being surged, another characteristic that was demonstrated was leadership. Though enhanced use over the past two decades, the junior, mid-grade, and senior leaders of today’s Reserve forces have been tested and prevailed under hazardous and challenging situations. Speaking at an AUSA symposium in February 2011, General George Casey, former Army Chief of Staff, discussed the need to maintain the combat edge that was honed over the preceding decade,

> The other thing we have to do to maintain our combat edge is to consolidate these gains we've made with the Reserve Component. I've never seen the
relationship between the Active and Reserve components better than it is now. Half of our Guard and Reserves are combat veterans. They are an operational force -- and that makes us a fundamentally different and better Army.42

In addition to the combat rotations, mentioned by General Casey, over the same period there were continuous noncombat rotations that supported of a wide variety of overseas military operations, including peace keeping, and humanitarian relief missions, while the demand for defense support to civil authorities here at home also remained constant. The demand for forces and challenging operational environments enabled the development of RC junior leaders at all levels. This characteristic resulted from the RC being and integrated member of Total Force, but can only be sustained through additional deployment opportunities and challenging exercise environments.

**Force Generation Models**

With a renewed commitment to the Total Force, the RC will be trained and equipped to remain a valued component the Operational Force. Remaining operational will require “devising individual and unit rotation policies that respond to the needs of the mission while offering predictability for the combatant commands, the Services, service members, their families and employers.”43 Each of the services has adopted a force generation model that in addition to providing ready operational forces provides predictability. The Army relies on the ARFORGEN model, but the Marine Corps, Navy and Air Force have similar reset and reconstitution models intended to achieve proper dwell periods between deployments. For Reserve units that that are notified for DEF


related missions, the value to the service remains. Through the addition of section 12304b in Title 10 United States Code, reserve units should experience deployment opportunities beyond the required contingency operations. Similar to the other services posture statements, the FY2012 Army Posture Statement highlighted the Army’s responsibility to provide combatant commanders with “capabilities, capacity and diversity needed to be successful across a wide range of operations. With a leaner Army, we have to prioritize and also remain capable of meeting a wide range of security requirements.”44

The Nation continues to rely on the service and sacrifice of an all-volunteer force. Legislation and restructure initiatives throughout this historical analysis have not included strategic or operational reserve concepts, but rather have all remained consistent with the stated purpose of the reserve force following the end of World War II, as prescribed in the Selective Service Act of 1948, the Reserves are to provide forces when, “…units and organizations are needed in excess of those of the Active components” and it is imperative that they, “at all times be manned and assured.”45 Current efforts to sustain an Operational Reserve as part of the Operational Force are designed to insure the Services have properly integrated component capabilities, but not a departure from the historical use of the Reserve. The need to balance the force, to define the mission and roles of the Reserve in an evolving strategic environment, and to maintain the confidence that the Reserve is trained, equipped, and ready to meet these challenges are all reoccurring trends. To address these trends, part of the effort must include defining

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strategic and operational force requirements; however, consistent application of the Total Force Policy will be required to reverse the trends.
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