Aviation Security Force Assistance: Joint General Purpose Forces as Air Advisors

Lt Col Paul Scott

Joint Forces Staff College
Joint Advanced Warfighting School
7800 Hampton Blvd
Norfolk, VA 23511-1702

This thesis was written to satisfy graduation requirements from the Joint Advance Warfighting School at the Joint Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA. The thesis argues that the Services must develop an integrated and coordinated joint methodology to organize and train general purpose forces (GPF) as air advisors for fixed-wing and rotary-wing aviation security force assistance (AvSFA) missions. It also proposes a joint solution to flexibly increase the depth and breadth of GPF air advisor capability without burdening the Services with creating additional force structure.

The core of the proposed joint solution is to create Joint GPF AvSFA Unit Type Codes (UTCs). Upon implementation, the Services will possess taskable packages of GPF fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and aviation support capability. These three AvSFA UTCs could be used independently or employed in concert to support the theater campaign plans of the geographic combatant commands. Eight recommendations result from the thesis. The three primary recommendations are to adopt the proposal, to identify a lead Service to chair joint implementation, and to convene a joint working group to determine the precise composition of the recommended GPF AvSFA UTCs.

Aviation Security Force Assistance, Air Advisors

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited

Aviation Security Force Assistance, Air Advisors

Unclassified

Unclassified

Unclassified

Unclassified

78

757-443-6301
AVIATION SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE: JOINT GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES AS AIR ADVISORS

by

Paul J. Scott

Lieutenant Colonel, United States Air Force
AVIATION SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE: JOINT GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES AS AIR ADVISORS

by

Paul J. Scott

Lieutenant Colonel, United States Air Force

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

11 March 2013

Thesis Adviser: Denis P. Doty, Colonel, USAF

Approved by: Michael Bennett, Associate Professor
Committee Member

Keith Dickson, PhD
Committee Member

James B. Miller, Colonel, USMC
Director, Joint Advanced Warfighting School
ABSTRACT

The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG)—released amid pending decreases in U.S. military spending—states building partnership capacity remains important to sharing security costs and responsibilities, and it emphasizes innovative, low-cost, small-footprint approaches. It also reaffirms the intent of the 2010 National Security Strategy to strengthen the capacity of partner nation security forces. In a June 2012 speech, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta declared, “[T]hose security cooperation capabilities and skill sets once considered the exclusive province of the special operations community will need to be built up and retained across the force.”

Toward meeting the policy intent, this thesis argues the Services must develop an integrated and coordinated joint methodology to organize and train general purpose forces (GPF) as air advisors for fixed-wing and rotary-wing aviation security force assistance (AvSFA) missions. It also proposes a joint solution to flexibly increase the depth and breadth of GPF air advisor capability without burdening the Services with creating additional force structure.

The core of the proposal is to create Joint GPF AvSFA Unit Type Codes (UTCs). Upon implementation, the Services will possess taskable packages of GPF fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and aviation support capability. These three AvSFA UTCs could be used independently or employed in concert to support the theater campaign plans of the geographic combatant commands. Eight recommendations result from the thesis. The three primary recommendations are to adopt the proposal, to identify a lead Service to chair joint implementation, and to convene a joint working group to determine the precise composition of the recommended GPF AvSFA UTCs.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Colonel Denis Doty regularly provided sound counsel and guidance in preparing this thesis. My classmates proved invaluable in helping to develop and refine the underlying concepts and recommendations. My family provided consistent and unselfish support through long hours of writing. I am grateful to all.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1: Introduction ........................................................................................................ 1  
Chapter 2: Security Force Assistance Overview .............................................................. 6  
  Roots of U.S. Security Cooperation and Security Force Assistance ............................. 6  
  U.S. Policy and Guidance for Security Force Assistance ........................................... 11  
  Aviation Security Force Assistance ............................................................................. 16  
  Security Force Assistance: Key Terms and Relationships ......................................... 19  
Chapter 3: Central Factors for Aviation Security Force Assistance ............................... 24  
  Aviation Capability Enhances Security .................................................................. 25  
  Development Must Be Partner Nation Centric ......................................................... 26  
  Assessment is an Essential Foundation .................................................................. 27  
  Enduring Results Flow From Enduring Interaction ................................................... 29  
  Geographic Combatant Command and U.S. Embassy Coordination ....................... 30  
  Aviation Enterprise Development as a System ....................................................... 31  
  Traits of an Effective Air Advisor ........................................................................... 32  
  Air Advisor Training is Essential .............................................................................. 33  
  Funding is Complex and Difficult ............................................................................. 34  
  Chapter Summary ...................................................................................................... 35  
Chapter 4: Estimating the Demand for Aviation Security Force Assistance .................. 36  
  U.S. Africa Command ............................................................................................... 37  
  U.S. Central Command ............................................................................................. 39  
  U.S. European Command ......................................................................................... 40  
  U.S. Northern Command .......................................................................................... 40  
  U.S. Pacific Command .............................................................................................. 41  
  U.S. Southern Command ........................................................................................... 42  
  Summary of Global Demand for AvSFA ................................................................... 43  
Chapter 5: U.S. Capability and Capacity for Aviation Security Force Assistance ......... 44  
  Special Operations Forces AvSFA Capability and Capacity ....................................... 44  
  General Purpose Forces AvSFA Capability and Capacity .......................................... 46  
    United States Air Force .......................................................................................... 47  
    United States Army ............................................................................................... 49  
    United States Navy ............................................................................................... 50  
    United States Marine Corps .................................................................................. 51  
    United States Coast Guard .................................................................................... 52
AvSFA Capability and Capacity Conclusions .................................................................52
Chapter 6: GPF Solution to Increase Aviation Security Force Assistance Capacity........54
  Recommendation: Joint GPF AvSFA Packages .......................................................55
    Create Joint GPF AvSFA Unit Type Codes .........................................................56
    Flexible Options for GPF AvSFA UTC Employment ...........................................57
    Standardized Pre-Mission Preparation .................................................................57
    Summary of Joint GPF AvSFA Advantages and Disadvantages .............................58
  Discarded Options ....................................................................................................59
  Notional Application of Joint GPF AvSFA ..............................................................60
  Chapter Summary ....................................................................................................64
Chapter 7: Recommendations and Conclusion ..........................................................66
  Joint GPF AvSFA Recommendations .....................................................................66
  Conclusion ................................................................................................................67
Glossary ......................................................................................................................69
Bibliography ...............................................................................................................70
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

General purpose forces (GPF) played a major role in helping to build a functioning army and air force during years of stability and counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Throughout the two massive reconstruction efforts, GPF gathered many hard-won lessons regarding “low-end” conflict, irregular warfare, foreign partnership, and security force assistance (SFA) missions. Now, with operations in Iraq complete and major operations in Afghanistan on schedule to conclude in 2014, strategic attention is shifting toward the Pacific as the U.S. military rebalances power toward the Asia-Pacific region.\(^1\) Simultaneously, the defense budget is certain to decrease, perhaps quite dramatically, as the Services attempt to reconstitute and recapitalize to face the threats of an uncertain future.

Within this context, conventional wisdom might expect the Department of Defense to drastically reduce GPF involvement in SFA, returning SFA to its pre-9/11 status when it was almost exclusively within the realm of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). Special operations forces (SOF) are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to work by, with, and through partner nation forces. Additionally, Joint Publication 3-05, *Special Operations*, identifies USSOCOM as the joint proponent for SFA, with responsibility to lead the development, coordination, and integration of SFA throughout the Department of Defense.\(^2\) From this perspective, SOF-only capacity for SFA might appear logical.

---


\(^2\) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Special Operations*, Joint Publication 3-05 (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 18 2011), II-12.
In today’s strategic environment, however, weak states impact U.S. security at home and vital interests abroad. Without GPF capability to conduct SFA, U.S. capacity to conduct security-enabling missions in priority areas is diminished. As the United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) Director of Strategy, Plans, and Programs opined, “building the capacity of our willing and important partners is not a strategic indulgence but rather an enduring strategic imperative. We believe that a small investment now that enables our partners to address an emerging challenge is a bargain.”

Looking to the future, Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta declared GPF will retain strong capability to execute SFA missions. In his June 28, 2012 speech to the U.S. Institute of Peace in Washington, DC, Secretary Panetta emphasized the importance of SFA and asserted his intent. “The approach of working with and through others has only grown in importance to our mission of defending our country. The task of training, advising, and partnering with foreign military and security forces has moved from the periphery to become a critical skill set across our armed forces.” While he reaffirmed the expectation that U.S forces would be smaller and leaner, he also emphasized that assisting foreign militaries would be an enduring aspect of Department of Defense operations, declaring “Those security cooperation capabilities and skill sets once considered the exclusive province of the special operations community will need to be built up and retained across the force and among civilians.”

---

5 Ibid.
Secretary Panetta’s intent to maintain SFA capabilities within GPF is not surprising. The January 2012 Department of Defense strategic guidance is known primarily for stating “we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.”6 Yet it also spoke directly to the importance of pursuing partnerships. “Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.”7  Maintaining GPF capability to execute SFA missions gives the U.S. greater capacity to execute small-footprint advisor missions by increasing the number of forces capable and available to assist other nations.

Maintaining strong GPF capability for SFA requires thoughtful planning and preparation. The Services must take systematic action to prepare GPF to partner with their foreign counterparts in the air, land, and sea domains. This thesis focuses specifically on the air domain and joint capacity to execute fixed-wing and rotary-wing aviation security force assistance (AvSFA) missions. As a step toward meeting Secretary Panetta’s intent, this thesis argues the Services must develop an integrated and coordinated joint method to organize and train GPF as air advisors for fixed-wing and rotary-wing AvSFA missions. The thesis then proposes a joint solution to increase both depth and breadth of air advisor capability using GPF, and compares that solution to alternative methods for increased AvSFA to support geographic combatant command (GCC) theater security cooperation efforts.

The solution has broad relevance. In his introductory letter to the most recent U.S. defense policy, President Obama set the context. “We are joining with allies and

---

7 Ibid., 3.
partners around the world to build their capacity to promote security, prosperity, and human dignity.”

Toward this aim, GCC theater security cooperation efforts require sufficient forces capable of partnering with other nations. The Services and USSOCOM are the foundation for organizing, training, and equipping forces for the mission. The solution is also relevant in the very near term. In an October 6, 2012 preview of the Department of Defense’s new Latin American Strategy, reporters were briefed that “U.S. special operations forces and counterinsurgency (COIN) specialists returning from Iraq and Afghanistan will begin ramping up operations across the globe, particularly in South America and Africa.”

This thesis examines relevant issues and explores potential options for using GPF from the Air Force, Army, Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard to execute AvSFA missions. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter Two establishes the context with a brief history of SFA, current U.S. SFA policy and guidance, and a specific discussion of SFA in the air domain. Chapter Two also reviews the SFA lexicon and associated terms. Chapter Three focuses on understanding the fundamentals of AvSFA using historical studies, doctrine, and lessons learned as the basis. Chapter Four develops an understanding of the scope of the requirement for air advisors across the GCCs. Chapter Five addresses the capability and capacity of USSOCOM and the Services to accomplish fixed-wing and rotary-wing AvSFA missions. It investigates current and potential GPF involvement in AvSFA across each of the five U.S. Armed Services and establishes the basis to conclude that the Services must develop an integrated solution to organize, train,

---

and equip GPF air advisors for AvSFA. Chapter Six proposes a solution which creates task-oriented packages of GPF air advisor capability to support the GCCs. It also evaluates the proposal against other potential methods to increase AvSFA capacity. The chapter concludes with an example of how the process would work, beginning from a GCC requirement through GPF AvSFA mission execution. Chapter Seven distills the body of the thesis into final recommendations for fielding GPF air advisor capabilities for AvSFA missions. In the end, the goal is to provide an enduring joint framework the Services can apply to prepare GPF air advisors for roles and responsibilities to train and assist foreign security forces in the application of air power.
CHAPTER 2: SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE OVERVIEW

The United States has a long and significant history of activities related to security force assistance and helping develop the capability of foreign security forces. From the Philippine Insurrection (1899-1902) to recent operations in Iraq and ongoing operations in Afghanistan, the U.S. has often provided military hardware and advisors to assist indigenous security forces.¹ As the global security environment has evolved, the U.S. government has adjusted its military and economic support to other nations in accordance with U.S. national security objectives.

While security cooperation activities have taken various forms, the common intent is development of sustainable security competencies and means within partner nations. The primary purpose of the resulting capabilities is to enable partner nations “to defend against internal and transnational threats to stability.”² The capabilities also enable the nation to defend itself against external threats and to contribute to multinational operations.³ Additionally, as reflected in the Nixon Doctrine from the Vietnam era, the intent of U.S. security cooperation activities is to enable partner nations to maintain ultimate responsibility for their own security.⁴

Roots of U.S. Security Cooperation and Security Force Assistance

Lend Lease was a massive security cooperation effort during the World War II era that sent approximately $31 billion (in then-year dollars) worth of war materiel to Great

---

³ Ibid.
⁴ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Foreign Internal Defense, Joint Publication 3-22, (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 12, 2010), I-2.
Britain and an additional $11 billion to Russia. Free France and China were also major recipients of U.S. equipment and assistance. During the same time period, the U.S. sent significant shipments of military ordnance and other hardware to support numerous Asian, European, Latin American, and African nations resisting the Axis Powers. While Lend Lease came to an end when the Allies achieved victory in World War II, security cooperation continued to transform with U.S. security interests.

As post-World War II peace deteriorated into Cold War competition, President Harry S. Truman sought to contain communist influence. Under the Truman Doctrine, U.S. foreign policy supported “free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” Economic, materiel, and advisory support flowed to Greece and Turkey in 1947 to help stabilize their governments. During the same period, the U.S. government initiated the Marshall Plan. The U.S. provided up to 90 percent of support to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, stimulating significant economic recovery and enabling greater regional stability in Europe and the Far East. Building on the same principles in other regions, the U.S. continued the policy of assisting friendly nations against communist subversion with programs such as the Alliance for Progress in Latin America during the 1960s.

The basis for modern U.S. security force assistance grew out of the Vietnam conflict. In his November 3, 1969, address to the American people, President Richard

---

7 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
Nixon explained the approach his administration would take to bring an end to the conflict. He set the context by reviewing actions taken by previous U.S. Presidents and the escalation that led to the seemingly open-ended commitment of U.S. forces to fight on behalf of South Vietnam.

President Eisenhower sent economic aid and military equipment to assist the people of South Vietnam in their efforts to prevent a Communist takeover. Seven years ago, President Kennedy sent 16,000 military personnel to Vietnam as combat advisers. Four years ago, President Johnson sent American combat forces to South Vietnam.\(^\text{11}\)

President Nixon set the foundation for the policy that would guide his administration for extricating U.S. military forces from Vietnam and bringing U.S. involvement there to a close on terms aligned with U.S. strategic interests. “The question at issue is not whether Johnson's war becomes Nixon's war. The great question is: How can we win America’s peace?”\(^\text{12}\) The President described actions he had taken to pursue peace with leaders in Vietnam, then stated three principles to guide American foreign policy.

- First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.
- Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.
- Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.\(^\text{13}\)

The three principles became known as the Nixon Doctrine. Applied specifically to the Vietnam conflict, the doctrine asserted U.S. involvement must lead to an end state in which the government of South Vietnam and its military forces would play a leading and

---


\(^{12}\) Ibid.

\(^{13}\) Ibid.
eventually self-sufficient role in securing South Vietnamese national defense. “The
defense of freedom is everybody's business--not just America's business. And it is
particularly the responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened….in this
administration, we are Vietnamizing the search for peace.”  

In the context of the time, the policy earned the label of “Vietnamization.” Though rooted in the lessons of
Vietnam, the underlying concept became an enduring doctrinal principle for future
foreign internal defense and SFA activities. As summarized by U.S. Joint Doctrine for
Foreign Internal Defense, “the U.S. would assist friendly nations, but would require them
to provide the manpower and be ultimately responsible for their own national defense.”

Plan Colombia is an example of recent SFA activities that are having the desired
effect. Colombian President Andres Pastrana developed the plan during his 1998-2002
presidential term. The plan received military and economic support from the United
States. To date, Plan Colombia has led to progress in reestablishing government control
of territories, weakening the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerillas,
and combating drug traffic and terrorism.

Following 9/11, U.S. special operations forces deployed to assist the Philippine
military against insurgents and militant Islamist threats on islands in the country’s
southern region. In particular, the Abu Sayyaf Group reportedly had training and
financial links to Al Qaeda and sought an independent state. The mission of the U.S.
forces was to advise and assist the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to conduct

14 Ibid.
16 Congressional Research Service, Colombia: Issues for Congress, by the Congressional
17 Ibid., i.
18 Congressional Research Service, U.S. Military Operations in the Global War on Terrorism:
Afghanistan, Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia, by the Congressional Research Service, August 26,
counterinsurgent operations. With U.S. assistance, the Philippine military improved
security, reduced the influence of the Abu Sayyaf Group, and developed greater
protection and stability for the local population.¹⁹

In Iraq and Afghanistan, special operations forces and general purpose forces
labored alongside coalition forces to develop indigenous security forces to meet national
requirements and support U.S objectives. The value of host-nation partnering was one of
eleven major strategic lessons from the Decade of War study. The Joint and Coalition
Operational Analysis division within the Joint Staff conducted the study to “make sure we
actually learn the lessons from the last decade of war.”²⁰ The report noted three key effects
of partnering.

- First, partnering enabled the host nation to develop a sustainable capacity
to provide security and counter threats. This provided an exit strategy for
the US and offered an alternative to sustaining a large US footprint on the
ground.
- Second, partnering enhanced the legitimacy of US operations and freedom
of action.
- Finally, partnering built connections between the US and host-nation
security forces, increasing opportunities for influence both within
respective militaries and with other sectors of government and society.
Partnering offered the U.S. a way to advance its objectives through
influence rather than through direct action.²¹

Indirect actions associated with organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding, and assisting
indigenous forces enabled the U.S. to advance objectives of enabling the host nation to
defend against internal and transnational threats to stability.

²⁰ U.S. Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, Decade of War, Volume I: Enduring Lessons
from the Past Decade of Operations (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 15, 2012), v.
²¹ Ibid., 32.
U.S. Policy and Guidance for Security Force Assistance

Security force assistance is a fundamental component in a proactive security and counterterrorism strategy. Weak states can become breeding grounds for terrorism or insurgency, impacting U.S. security at home and affecting our vital interests abroad. U.S. policy statements reflect the enduring importance of measures to further increase regional stability and thus bolster U.S. national security objectives. The three most recent National Security Strategy documents share a consistent theme. Statements from the current 2010 National Security Strategy include:

- We will also help states avoid becoming terrorist safe havens by helping them build their capacity for responsible governance and security through development and security sector assistance.\(^22\)
- It also includes helping our allies and partners build capacity to fulfill their responsibilities to contribute to regional and global security.\(^23\)
- Where governments are incapable of meeting their citizens’ basic needs and fulfilling their responsibilities to provide security within their borders, the consequences are often global and may directly threaten the American people.\(^24\)
- We will undertake long-term, sustained efforts to strengthen the capacity of security forces to guarantee internal security, defend against external threats, and promote regional security.\(^25\)

The Obama Administration’s 2012 Budget Request stressed the importance of continuing to provide funding for security cooperation programs that build the capability and capacity of foreign security forces.

In addition to [the Iraq and Afghanistan] programs, which are directly related to completing the mission in Iraq and combat operations in Afghanistan, the Budget provides $500 million for DOD’s global military “train and equip” assistance programs. DOD uses these programs to fund counterterrorism training in a variety of countries.\(^26\)

\(^{23}\) Ibid., 22.
\(^{24}\) Ibid., 26.
\(^{25}\) Ibid., 27.
In a similar manner, the 2013 Budget Request states “the Administration continues to strengthen counterterrorism programs and develop partner capabilities to prevent terrorist attacks on the United States and other countries.”


In this environment, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review recommends rebalancing the U.S. armed forces to better enable success in protecting and advancing U.S. interests. Within the context of the strategy to protect America’s interests, the Quadrennial Defense Review highlights the importance of strong allies and partners in preventing conflict. “Helping to build their capacity can help prevent conflict from beginning or escalating, reducing the possibility that large and enduring deployments of U.S. or allied forces would be required.”

---

29 Ibid., 10.
The Quadrennial Defense Review identifies “four specific issues where reform is imperative.”\(^{30}\) Among the four, “Reforming Security Assistance” leads the list of areas where the Department of Defense must innovate and adapt to keep pace with changes in the operating environment.\(^{31}\)

U.S. security is inextricably tied to the effectiveness of our efforts to help partners and allies build their own security capacity. The value of programs to build partner capacity extends well beyond conflicts such as Afghanistan and Iraq—indeed, as outlined earlier in the report, conducting such efforts before conflicts become serious can help mitigate them or even prevent them in the first place.\(^{32}\)

The fundamental change is an elevation of the role of security assistance should play in the current international environment. States lacking functional security have strong potential to create or exacerbate significant future threats to U.S. security. Assisting partners to face internal or transnational security challenges effectively will decrease threats to U.S. interests and will enable greater security in the increasingly complex international environment.\(^{33}\)

The final chapter of the Quadrennial Defense Review addresses risk management and assesses possible shortfalls or problems that could threaten the Department of Defense’s ability to successfully execute its priority objectives. Building partnership capacity and access to regions of potential concern are critical to success in achieving U.S. interests. If international partners are unable or unwilling to support shared goals or provide access, U.S. forces would face additional operational risk that could threaten U.S.

---

\(^{30}\) Ibid., 73.
\(^{31}\) Ibid.
\(^{32}\) Ibid.
\(^{33}\) Ibid.
ability in current or future conflicts. Risk can be reduced by developing relationships via security assistance.

Building the defense capacity of allies and partners and ensuring that the U.S. Armed Forces are able to effectively train and operate with foreign militaries is a high-priority mission. As the emphasis on developing the capability of indigenous security forces in Afghanistan and Iraq reflects, conducting security force assistance (SFA) operations is an increasingly critical element of building partnership capacity.

The Quadrennial Defense Review then communicates that because the Department of Defense expects an increasing role for SFA in U.S. strategy and operations, the Department is working to institutionalize GPF capabilities for SFA.

Former Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates staunchly advocated balancing U.S. capabilities to meet current and anticipated threats in the near and far term. In view of the international security environment, “the most lethal threats to the United States’ safety and security – a city poisoned or reduced to rubble by a terrorist attack – are likely to emanate from states that cannot adequately govern themselves or secure their own territory.” The U.S. civilian and military institutions that wield the nation’s instruments of national power were established in a different era to deal with an environment of powerful aggressor states. In the current and future era, assisting other nations to “better provide for their own security will be a key and enduring test of U.S. global leadership and critical part of protecting U.S. security as well.”

Though recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have taken a significant toll on the U.S. military, the execution has also demonstrated the effectiveness of GPF in many

---

34 Ibid., 91.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
38 Ibid., 3.
39 Ibid., 2.
SFA roles. The sheer magnitude of the missions led to GPF executing major roles in helping build a functioning army and air force in each country. “Though SOF are considered the “gold standard” for conducting SFA….the growing appetite for SFA missions cannot be met using only SOF forces.”\textsuperscript{40} That appetite for SFA missions reflects the increasing importance of partnering with other countries to enable them to provide the internal and regional security that contributes to U.S. national interests.

While the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance directs a rebalance of power toward the Asia-Pacific, it continues to place emphasis on building partner capacity using innovative, low-cost, small-footprint approaches that rely on rotational presence and advisory capability.\textsuperscript{41} Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta has stated his intent to continue the Department of Defense’s path toward greater ability to train, advise, and assist throughout the U.S. military. “All of the military services, and the Department as a whole, also must adapt as partnering with foreign militaries becomes even more of a mainstay of the U.S. defense strategy. We have got to develop a “partnering culture.””\textsuperscript{42} Those skills will further support a defense strategy that places more emphasis on building the capability and capacity of others to meet future security challenges and sustain peace and cooperation in the international order.\textsuperscript{43} With reference to the greater GPF ability to accomplish SFA missions, Secretary Panetta also stated, “I want to see the military retain the hard-won capability to train and advise foreign security forces in support of stability operations like in Iraq and Afghanistan.”\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{41} U.S. Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, 3.
\textsuperscript{42} Panetta, “Building Partnership.”
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 3.
Aviation Security Force Assistance

Security force assistance aids a partner nation to better meet its most pressing security needs. In weak and failing states, ground forces often present the greatest opportunity to effectively bolster internal security, anti-terrorism, and regional security measures. While effective host-nation land forces are an essential foundation, capability in the air domain has the potential to expand the operational reach, responsiveness, and effectiveness of the partner nation’s security structure.

After regime change in Iraq and Afghanistan, stability and reconstruction efforts focused heavily on developing land forces. After the fatal crash of Iraqi Air Force Comp Air 7SL in May 2005, Iraq’s defense minister made a personal plea for the U.S. Air Force to assist Iraq’s struggling air force.45 In Afghanistan, the U.S. had a commitment stemming from the 2002 Bonn Conference to help reconstruct the Afghan Air Corps and help enable the new government to exercise air control over the country.46 Yet it was not until 2006 that the U.S. Air Force took primary responsibility for helping build air capability in Afghanistan. “This marked a major undertaking for the Air Force and for [U.S. Air Force Central Command] in particular, as it had not previously been involved in such a wide-scale rebuilding and training effort.”47

Department of Defense Instruction 5000.68, Security Force Assistance, published in October 2010, makes the following noteworthy statements:

- SFA activities shall be prioritized using factors such as U.S. interests in the region, the willingness and ability of partner nations to absorb U.S. assistance, and the level of risk for partner nations to achieve their goals without U.S. assistance.

---

45 Jennifer D. P. Moroney et al., International Cooperation with Partner Air Forces, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), 46.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
The Department of Defense shall develop and maintain capabilities to...[c]onduct SFA across all domains – air, land, maritime, and cyberspace – in both permissive and contested environments, under steady-state or surge conditions.48

The instruction fittingly acknowledges that the Department of Defense must prioritize SFA activities. As appropriate to the situation, U.S. interests may be best served by developing joint and combined skills. The functional aspects of SFA, across the realms of air, land, maritime, and cyberspace, must be appropriately tailored.49

To remain integrated and consistent with other activities, the aim of aviation security forces assistance (AvSFA) in partner nations must support the GCC’s theater campaign plan. Accordingly, the aims are then also consistent with region-specific strategic directives from the Secretary of Defense as articulated in the Guidance for the Employment of the Force. The focus of AvSFA should take the form that is most suited toward advancing these aims.

In states facing internal or terrorist threats, air support to ground operations is an appropriate area of focus. Specific host-nation requirements involve potential development in airlift, attack, medical evacuation, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), either in combination or as stand-alone capabilities. Additionally, sufficient supporting infrastructure is essential for the capabilities to remain effective over the long term.

Airlift capabilities enable greater operational reach and help foreign security forces cope with a lack of transportation infrastructure. The effectiveness of indigenous security forces may be blunted without these capabilities. An example occurred in April

49 Ibid.
In 2012 when the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) declared they were ready to deploy 3,000 troops to northern Mali to counter separatists and Islamic militias. Though ECOWAS troops were ready to deal with a regional security threat, the lack of air transport capability among the nations complicated their deployment.

Only airlift resources would be able to deliver personnel and heavy equipment into the area of operations (AO) in a timely manner, provide operational mobility within the AO against dispersed and heavily armed irregular forces, monitor a geographic area larger than France, and sustain operations for years to come.

Similar challenges exist elsewhere on the African continent in areas such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, and Darfur.

The desired outcomes of AvSFA are consistent with security cooperation action to develop land forces. Coupling air capability with the ground element security forces enables results that are greater than the sum of individual capabilities. Aviation can enable the host nation to extend the operational reach of security forces over much greater distances. Returning to the ECOWAS deployment example, “airlift capacity is a strategic force multiplier for resource-constrained African security sectors.”

Effective AvSFA will lead to other desired outcomes as well. Professionalism among host-nation aviation forces cultivates interoperability with the other components of the partner nation security forces. Additionally, as advancements are made in host-nation military aviation, the improvements in supporting functions – such as air traffic control and airfield safety – lead to corresponding improvement in civil and commercial


51 Ibid.

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid., 2.
aviation. Advances in partner nation capability also boost the ability to operate with coalitions to promote greater security. Finally, improvements to aviation infrastructure enable greater interconnectedness. During day-to-day normal conditions, the aviation infrastructure contributes to further stability and economic growth. Under crisis conditions, the improvements further enable time-critical response from the international community by enabling expeditious air connectivity with the affected country.

**Security Force Assistance: Key Terms and Relationships**

The lexicon of security force assistance is complex and can lead to confusion. Before moving on to the next chapter, the following paragraphs provide a short review of SFA, then build outward to provide a working framework of associated terms and how they relate to SFA. Approved doctrinal definitions of the terms are also included in the glossary for reference.

*Security force assistance* is doctrinally defined as “the Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions.”

SFA includes joint force and interagency activities to organize, train, equip, build/rebuild, and advise and assist foreign security forces and the partner nation’s supporting institutions from the ministry level down to the tactical unit level. Through SFA activities, the U.S. military enhances host nation capability and capacity to facilitate achieving specific objectives shared by the governments of the U.S. and the host nation.

These activities are conducted in permissive or uncertain security environments in

---

54 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (As Amended through 15 August 2012)*, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 8, 2010), 276.
56 Ibid., I-16.
circumstances spanning the range of military operations, but do not include the participation of U.S. forces in direct combat.\(^5^7\)

**Aviation SFA** is the subset of SFA related to development of aviation capability. AvSFA includes both fixed-wing and rotary-wing (helicopter) aviation, along with the supporting capabilities and infrastructure that enable long-term self-sustaining aviation operations. AvSFA is a functional responsibility across the U.S. military services. As with all SFA, the intent of AvSFA is for the resulting foreign security forces to “possess the capability to accomplish the variety of required missions, with sufficient capacity to be successful and with the ability to sustain themselves as long as required.”\(^5^8\)

Air advisors are advisors from all aviation career fields, including pilots, navigators, loadmasters, airfield management, air traffic control, aircraft maintenance, air safety, communications, and other aviation-related specialties. Air advisors are “specially trained and educated to apply aviation expertise to assess, train/educate, advise, and assist foreign personnel in the development and application of their aviation resources to meet their national needs in support of US interests.”\(^5^9\)

The theater campaign plan is the geographic combatant command’s overarching plan to achieve U.S. strategic goals in the region. The theater campaign plan includes “ongoing operations, military engagement, security cooperation, deterrence, and other shaping or preventive activities.”\(^6^0\) Greater cohesion between U.S. defense activities in

\(^{57}\) Ibid., VI-30.  
\(^{58}\) Ibid., VI-32.  
\(^{60}\) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), II-4.
the region should result as security cooperation objectives are integrated more closely into the theater campaign plan.61

Security cooperation is the set of Department of Defense activities to encourage and enable countries to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. Security cooperation involves interactions for three purposes: to build relationships that promote U.S. interests; to develop capability for self-defense and multinational operations; and to provide peacetime and contingency access to the partner nation for U.S. forces.62 SFA is one type of security cooperation activity.

Security assistance is the group of programs authorized by laws such as the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or the Arms Export Control Act of 1976. Under these programs, “the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.”63 Security assistance programs are authorizations that provide resources and authorities to conduct SFA.

Special operations forces (SOF) are forces specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct special operations. SFA is one of special operations eleven core activities.64 USSOCOM is the joint proponent for SFA, with responsibility to lead development, coordination, and integration of SFA across the Department of Defense.65

62 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Foreign Internal Defense, I-10.
63 Ibid., GL-11.
64 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, II-6.
65 Ibid., II-12.
General purpose forces (GPF), also referred to as regular or conventional forces, are distinct from designated special operations forces or nuclear forces. GPF are not necessarily trained to conduct SFA missions. U.S. military special operations doctrine expects GPF to play a role in SFA activities, and also adds that “SOF conduct SFA using specialized tactics, techniques, and procedures, and to unique conditions and standards in a manner that complement [GPF] capabilities.”

Foreign security forces are the foreign persons with whom U.S. forces conduct SFA. The foreign security forces may range from the tactical to the ministerial level. They include but are not limited to military, paramilitary, and police forces; border police, coast guard, and customs officials; forces specific to the host nation, its provinces/states, or tribal/ethnic groups; prison and correctional officials; and government ministries and the departments responsible for the forces.

Foreign internal defense (FID) is both similar to and different from SFA. FID assists the government of a friendly nation to counter internal threats. Viewed from a U.S. perspective, FID is U.S. activities to support that nation’s ability “to protect against subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security.” SFA and FID overlap when SFA is conducted to protect a country from internal threats. However, aspects of FID that do not specifically deal with building capability or capacity of foreign security forces, such as U.S. direct military action, fall outside the scope of SFA. Likewise, aspects of SFA that do not focus internally, such as improving the

---

66 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dictionary of Terms, 67.
67 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, II-5.
68 Ibid., VI-31.
69 Ibid., I-2.
nation’s ability to defend against external threats or to operate externally with allied nations, fall outside the scope of FID.\textsuperscript{70}

Internal defense and development (IDAD) refers to the host nation’s program for growth and security. IDAD “focuses on building viable institutions that respond to the needs of society.”\textsuperscript{71} SFA activities that contribute to FID assist the host nation with implementing its IDAD strategy. Thus, the relationship between SFA and IDAD is similar to the relationship between SFA and FID. SFA may overlap with and assist IDAD, but as with FID, aspects of each mission fall outside of the other.

The preceding inter-related terms are unified by their application to common security interests between the partner nation and the United States. The U.S. has a significant history in security force assistance activities with adaptations that fit the evolving global security environment. The common purpose is development of sustainable security capability and capacity within partner nations. Aviation plays a key role in developing the operational capabilities and reach of foreign security forces. The following chapter identifies major observations from the relatively short history of AvSFA by reviewing recent actions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other partner nations, alongside doctrine that informs security cooperation activities.

\textsuperscript{70} U.S. Special Operations Command, Security Force Assistance, 8.
\textsuperscript{71} U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Foreign Internal Defense, I-1.
CHAPTER 3: CENTRAL FACTORS FOR AVIATION SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

Aviation security force assistance is one element of unified action to develop the capability and capacity of foreign security forces. Whether applied as the major focus of U.S. development activities or in coordination with other efforts, AvSFA further expands the operational reach and effectiveness of the partner nation’s security structure. By adding the range and speed of aviation to the capabilities of the nation’s other joint security forces, significant advances in internal and regional stability are possible.

Afghanistan and Iraq are the most recent examples of nations where the U.S. has undertaken major efforts to improve the aviation capability of partner nation security forces. Other examples include the Philippines and Colombia, along with numerous lesser examples dating back to the significant actions the U.S. took to build the Vietnamese Air Force. Nine common themes—applicable to GPF and SOF—recur within these AvSFA missions. These themes are summarized in Table 1, Nine Central Factors for AvSFA. Each observation is further explained in the following paragraphs.

Table 1. Nine Central Factors for AvSFA.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central Factor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Aviation Capability Enhances Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Development Must Be Partner Nation Centric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Assessment is an Essential Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Enduring Results Flow From Enduring Interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. U.S. Embassy and Geographic Combatant Command Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Aviation Enterprise Development as a System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Traits of an Effective Air Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Air Advisor Training is Essential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Funding is Complex and Difficult</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Aviation Capability Enhances Security

General Norton Schwartz, then Air Force Chief of Staff, noted the importance of aviation in stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and stated, “It is essential that each country has a credible and capable air force that can defend against internal and external threats.” Aviation development in both countries initially lagged other security efforts. In Iraq, the U.S. Air Force finally took responsibility for reestablishing the Iraqi Air Force in 2005. In Afghanistan, the U.S. Air Force did not conduct a comprehensive assessment for reconstituting the Afghan Air Corps until October 2006. A lessons learned report stated, “The role aviation resources provide to help a nation transitioning from conflict to gain and maintain security and stability were not well understood or considered by the U.S. security culture in the immediate post-September 11 era.”

AvSFA efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan got off to a late start, but “the train, advise, assist, and equip mission facilitated Iraqi Air Force development by acquiring 106 aircraft, training 7,200 airmen, and transitioning ownership of air bases in four locations.” Though relatively small compared to the numbers of ground forces produced, the resulting air mobility and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability were an important component of the nation’s security forces. Additionally, significant strides were made in Iraq’s ability to control and monitor its airspace.

In Afghanistan, aviation development is helping overcome challenging geography and terrain. The country is approximately the size of Texas, with numerous isolated

5 Ibid.
regions and limited infrastructure. Slow surface travel is further complicated by insurgent threats that hamper security force mobility. As a former commander in Afghanistan observed, “Afghanistan is a natural air power, because it cannot function as a modern state without mobility that air power alone can provide.”

Aviation was also a vital factor to security improvements in Colombia. Under Plan Colombia, Colombia’s security forces became far more professional, “but a professional force can do little if it cannot reach the insurgents in the rugged Colombian terrain. To overcome this obstacle, the Colombians significantly increased their air mobility capacity.” Likewise in the Philippines, aviation capabilities were tailored to complement and expand ground force actions. Focused development in night operations, rapid response, and air-ground integration significantly expanded security capabilities.

By increasing the range of security forces, AvSFA can be cost-effective in expanding partner nation security. When developed in concert with other forces, aviation extends their reach, thus improving host nation reach into under-governed or contested areas. At the same time, aviation increases the ability to accomplish humanitarian or medical relief missions which can further enhance government legitimacy.

**Development Must Be Partner Nation Centric**

Development of aviation capability must be tailored to the needs of the host nation. While the U.S. military may serve as an excellent model, capability of the foreign

---

security forces must fit the partner nation’s needs instead of mirror-imaging U.S. forces. More importantly, AvSFA support the aims of the host nation’s internal defense and development plan. By remaining true to this intent, advisors help to create capabilities and supporting institutions that are viable and enduring over the long term.

The Combined Air Power Transition Force (CAPTF) sought to exemplify this principle. The CAPTF mission statement is to “Set the conditions for a professional, fully independent and operationally capable Afghan Air Force that meets the security requirements of Afghanistan today…and tomorrow.”10 Compared with the U.S. Air Force, three major differences stand out. First, air mobility was the initial focus of Afghan military aviation, enabling movement of personnel and cargo and the execution of medical evacuation missions. Second, helicopters outnumber fixed-wing aircraft and play a major role in the Afghan Air Force. Third, most of the aircraft are of Russian origin. Refurbished Italian C-27 airplanes are replacing less-capable Russian An-32 airlifters, but Russian Mi-17 helicopters will remain the majority of the fleet, especially as the U.S. purchases new Mi-17s for the Afghans.11 The resulting force structure is designed to meet near-term Afghan needs and be Afghan sustainable into the future.

**Assessment is an Essential Foundation**

Assessment is a fundamental first step in AvSFA that is directly related to the theater campaign plan. An overall assessment provides understanding of partner nation capabilities within the region. It also identifies opportunities with significant potential to improve internal or regional security in support of U.S. interests. The country-specific assessment begins with developing a strategic understanding of the aviation capabilities

---

10 Boera, “The Role of CAPTF,” 2.
best-suited to the host nation. Lessons learned studies from Iraq and Afghanistan identify that “airpower assessments are complex endeavors aimed at balancing U.S. strategic interests with realistic [partner nation] operational and sustainment capacity.”

The geographic combatant command assessment should follow a strategy-to-task methodology. In January 2005, the United States gave C-130Es to the Iraqis before completing an assessment or establishing objectives for development of the Iraqi Air Force. Advisors struggled to get the Iraqis into the air and to enable self-sufficient Iraqi operations. In the aftermath of a fatal mishap involving an Iraqi Comp Air 7SL in May 2005, the commander of U.S. Air Forces Central Command directed a full assessment of the Iraqi Air Force “to establish ground truth and fix what they have.” The result was a December 2005 study with strategy-to-task analysis that formed the foundation of a full Iraqi aviation development plan. Subsequent efforts in Afghanistan built on the Iraq experience. The assessment team completed a thorough evaluation that included the goals of Afghan military leaders and Afghanistan’s ability for support and sustainment.

This assessment enabled [U.S. Air Force Central Command] leaders to significantly adjust their acquisition and training plans, which made their initial efforts more effective and better received by the host country. It will also likely improve the long-term effect of partnership-building efforts by ensuring that future investments are more relevant and sustainable and that Air Force personnel are more specifically trained to serve as advisers to the Afghan Air Corps.

By starting with a strategy-to-task plan, the effort in Afghanistan took strides to avoid what some advisors described as ineffective “toys-to-task” strategies.

---

13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Moroney, International Cooperation, 49.
16 Ibid., 49-50.
17 U.S. Department of the Air Force, Building Partner Airpower, 14. Of note, however, the program established in 2008 to provide Afghanistan with refurbished C-27 airlift aircraft recently ended in
Assessment is a foundational aspect of the 6th Special Operations Squadron (6 SOS), USSOCOM’s combat air advisor squadron. ‘Assess’ is the leading attribute in the unit’s mission to “assess, train, advise, and assist foreign aviation forces.” The typical employment concept involves initiating presence, followed by assessment of the partner nation’s aviation capability and its most important aviation requirements. Doctrine also affirms the importance of ongoing assessment throughout SFA missions, stating that “to be successful, SFA must be based on solid, continuing assessment.”

**Enduring Results Flow From Enduring Interaction**

The development of enduring aviation capability is not a simple overnight task. It involves sustained interaction between air advisors and the partner nation. Iraq and Afghanistan were massive efforts with constant presence and rotational deployments of air advisors over multiple years. Lasting results were often not realized over the course of a single deployment. As one air advisor to Afghanistan observed, “What the previous air advisors did 3-4 years ago is coming to fruition now.” Similarly in Colombia, long-term commitment was essential to building enduring capability and capacity for sustained

---

air operations. As a result, Plan Colombia portrays a model of long-term commitment that enabled Colombia to transition from a state near failure to a state that has “engendered confidence within the people and limited FARC gains.”

Iraq, Afghanistan, and Colombia do not necessarily imply, however, that all AvSFA missions require constant presence in the partner nation. Rather, the effort to develop partner nation capability must be structured for consistent engagement over sufficient time. The 6 SOS often phases assistance over multiple visits to accomplish in-depth training and develop specific skills. “Missions typically occur sequentially, beginning with assessment visits followed by training missions and exercises.” This partnership model allows for periodic and predictable interaction over time, creating enduring and self-sustaining capability without necessitating constant presence and long deployments. Past examples of recurring visits phased over time include missions to train capability for personnel recovery training and night vision goggle operations.

**Geographic Combatant Command and U.S. Embassy Coordination**

Aviation security force assistance is one component of unified action to support partner nation internal defense and development. Requirements originate at the national level and require coordination and cooperation between U.S. government agencies. In the executive branch, the State Department and Department of Defense have the major roles in security force assistance and efforts must be integrated. Guidance for creating or expanding country-specific partnerships is communicated to the geographic combatant command.

---

22 U.S. Department of the Air Force, *BPC Lessons From Colombia COIN Operations* (Washington DC: Office of Air Force Lessons Learned, February 11, 2009), 5. “Plan Colombia” was initiated in 1999, nine years before the report identified Colombia as a model of successful long-term commitment.

23 Ibid.


25 Ibid., 74.

commanders by the Secretary of Defense through the Guidance for Employment of the Force. The combatant commander’s theater campaign plan reflects the military’s integrated regional plan for implementing the guidance.\(^\text{27}\)

Coordination and cooperation between the geographic combatant command and the U.S. embassy in the partner nation are essential in planning and executing SFA. The Chief of Mission is normally an ambassador directly appointed by the U.S. President. The Chief of Mission leads the embassy and “has authority over all USG executive branch employees within the mission and host country except for employees under the command of a U.S. military commander.”\(^\text{28}\) In the embassy, the security cooperation office plans and administers military aspects of U.S. security assistance programs.\(^\text{29}\) Thus, it is essential for geographic combatant commands to thoroughly coordinate SFA with the security cooperation office throughout the phases of planning and execution. The coordinated efforts of the combatant command and the U.S. embassy result in the specific guidance and objectives for air advisors to executing AvSFA activities.\(^\text{30}\)

**Aviation Enterprise Development as a System**

Development of aviation capability should be viewed as a system involving people, equipment, and the supporting capabilities. In Afghanistan, where AvSFA is building an air force from scratch, development followed four major lines of operation.\(^\text{31}\) The first was “Aircraft Build” and involved equipping the Afghans with an appropriate

\(^{27}\) Sweeney, “A Primer,” 9.
\(^{28}\) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Foreign Internal Defense*, III-10.
\(^{29}\) Ibid., 13. Depending on the embassy, the security cooperation office may be alternately be identified as a “military assistance advisory group, military advisory group, office of military cooperation, or office of defense cooperation.”
\(^{31}\) Boera, “The Role of CAPTF,” 3-4.
mix of durable fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft to transport security force personnel and equipment. The second was “Airmen Build,” and included a broad array of functions that includes not only pilots and maintainers, but also personnel for airfield operations, air traffic control, flight records, airfield crash/fire rescue, and many other enabling capabilities. The third was “Infrastructure Build” for sufficient airfield facilities to effectively operate and maintain equipment. The fourth and final line of operation was “Operational Capability” to synchronize the various functions for operations such as airlift, airdrop, battlefield mobility, medical evacuation, and close air support.32

Other nations may not require the same magnitude of effort across such a wide spectrum of capability. Yet AvSFA in Afghanistan is a reminder that development of operational aviation goes beyond advising flyers and aircraft maintainers. It is also comprised of the supporting specialists who ensure airfields remain functional. The U.S. Air Force further recognized their importance in April 2010 when General Norton Schwartz signed the Institutionalizing Building Partnerships into Contingency Response Forces Concept of Employment.33 The “CONEMP” expanded the role of Contingency Response Groups—specialized units to open and operate forward air bases during contingencies—to include building partnership activities in developing nations.34

**Traits of an Effective Air Advisor**

By definition, an air advisor is capable of training, advising, and assisting host-nation counterparts in development and application of aviation resources.35 This implies the importance of being instructor-qualified as a baseline for air advisor duty. Yet

---

32 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan show that personality traits are also very important. Critical attributes of an effective air advisor include “patience, flexibility, job and cross cultural competence, motivation, interpersonal skills, language, and diplomacy.”

Similarly, the advisor must be careful to avoid demonstrating frustration with host nation personnel and must be capable of negotiating in a manner that facilitates achieving U.S. and partner nation goals.

To summarize, an effective air advisor is a qualified instructor in their particular aviation specialty who possesses maturity and strong interpersonal skills. This enables the advisor to build and maintain rapport with host nation personnel. Joint doctrine states, “Conducting successful SFA operations requires an advisor’s mindset and dedication to working through or with FSF.”

To ensure prospective GPF air advisors possess appropriate traits, the GPF may need a screening process similar to that of the 6 SOS, which “identifies a number of personality-based critical attributes that forecast an individual’s potential success in an advising capacity.”

**Air Advisor Training is Essential**

Face-to-face advising of partner-nation counterparts is a skill the vast majority of GPF have never been trained to accomplish. After estimating at least 600 air advisors would be needed during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. Air Force began developing an Air Advisor Training Course in March 2007 and the first class attended the

---

course in February 2008. The course provides training in core advisory duty, field craft, and language and culture.

Core training involving SFA and education regarding foreign military sales are important. Advisors from Iraq and Afghanistan stated the training was needed to perform their duty, and when lacking sufficient instruction, it was necessary for them to study it on their own. Additionally, communication training is essential. Optimally, the air advisor will be fluent in the host nation’s language. Since this is rarely the case, it is important for air advisors to learn practical application skills for communicating via a translator and to develop basic conversational language skills.

**Funding is Complex and Difficult**

The complexity of funding and authorities for executing SFA activities is a recurring concern. While this thesis cannot solve issues rooted in U.S. Code passed by Congress, funding complexity certainly deserves a brief spotlight. Persons involved in planning or execution of AvSFA activities must understand that significant constraints apply to various categories of funding. If not recognized and carefully followed, an otherwise carefully planned AvSFA event may become un-executable.

The Department of Defense has requested reform. In its 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report to Congress, the Department of Defense lists Security Assistance first among four issues where reform is considered “imperative.”

Despite an increased emphasis on the capacity-building mission over the past few years, America’s efforts remain constrained by a complex

---

41 Ibid., 17.
43 Ibid., 7.
patchwork of authorities, persistent shortfalls in resources, unwieldy processes, and a limited ability to sustain such undertakings beyond a short period.\textsuperscript{46}

In Congressional testimony to the Armed Services Committee, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and four geographic combatant commanders individually echoed similar concerns.\textsuperscript{47} After adding his support to the reform requested in the Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Admiral Robert F. Willard, then U.S. Pacific Command commander, testified “Congressional 1206 authority is the only partner capability/capacity building tool that we have to address urgent or emergent needs in the region.”\textsuperscript{48}

\textbf{Chapter Summary}

The nine preceding observations are taken directly from the relatively short history of AvSFA. While some of the observations are sufficiently enduring for inclusion in joint doctrine, other lessons are fresh from the recent involvement of GPF in AvSFA activity in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the next chapter, this thesis will estimate the amount of AvSFA required by the six geographic combatant commands.

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 62.
CHAPTER 4: ESTIMATING THE DEMAND FOR AVIATION SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

Aviation security force assistance is an important facet of on-going operations as the U.S. seeks to secure its interests in Afghanistan and around the globe. Viewed from an ends-ways-means construct, the U.S. interests are the ends. The geographic combatant commands conduct AvSFA activities as one of the ways to build partner nation capability and advance the aims of their respective theater campaign plans. The forces that conduct AvSFA are the means and the Department of Defense should appropriately size the force to conduct AvSFA in support of the ends. Unfortunately, a current quantitative annual requirement of means needed to conduct AvSFA is not available and the Services have difficulty estimating the potential future requirement.¹

In 2006, a RAND study team used insurgent activity as a starting point to estimate potential demand for AvSFA. Based on world events at the time, the study calculated

USAF planners could assume, parametrically, that the political-military conditions for providing operational aviation advisory assistance will be conducive in approximately 80 percent of future cases. Thus, having identified 35 insurgencies of interest, USAF planners could reasonably expect that assistance will be appropriate in 28 of those.²

As the authors attempted to quantify requirements, they consistently documented the need to expand U.S. military capacity to conduct aviation-related advisory missions with partner nations.³ During the study, SOF personnel estimated they had turned down at

² Alan J. Vick et al., Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era: The Strategic Importance of USAF Advisory and Assistance Teams, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006), 128-129. The study identified 35 insurgencies of U.S. interest. Because the U.S. has a security assistance relationship with 80 percent of the affected nations, AvSFA is appropriate in 28 instances.
³ Ibid., 150.
least 58 percent of requests for air advisors due to lack of manpower. The report also estimated demand was between 200 and 400 percent of capacity.

As a rudimentary estimate for current demand, the remainder of this chapter will review on-going U.S. military activities involving AvSFA in the six geographic combatant commands. To avoid classification issues, the primary references are the unclassified 2012 theater posture statements from geographic combatant command and other open-source reports.

**U.S. Africa Command**

Security force assistance plays a major role in U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM). The 2012 USAFRICOM theater posture statement reports “All of our efforts are guided by two principles; first that of a safe, secure, and stable Africa is in our national interest, and second that Africans are best suited to address African security challenges.” The same security concept is reflected in a 2011 Congressional Research Service report which stated “the command concentrates much of its energies and resources on training and assistance to professionalize local militaries so that they can better ensure stability and security on the continent.”

Strengthening the defense capabilities of partner nations to counter violent extremist organizations, illicit trafficking, and piracy is an important aspect of the

---

4 Ibid., 125.
5 Ibid.
USAFRICOM mission. Stability and conditions favorable to development are fostered by increasing the ability of partner nations to resolve and prevent conflict.8

Our capacity building activities complement Department of State programs and are planned with the embassy country team and the partner nation. We focus on the development of professional militaries which are disciplined, capable, and responsible to civilian authorities and committed to the well being of their citizens and protecting human rights. Our efforts focus on increasing the capability and capacity of African partner nations to serve as trained, equipped agents of stability and security on the African continent.9

Small team engagements are typical. Led by SOF or GPF service members, the low-cost, small-footprint approach is well-received by African militaries and results in the ability to cultivate personal relationships and deepen institutional relationships.10

Several of the engagements involve aviation development. In 2011, the nations of Djibouti, Kenya, and Mauritania were recipients of aviation assistance programs involving fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, airfield control systems, and mobility equipment.11 In 2012, USAFRICOM began the Africa Partnership Flight (APF) program.

APF features low footprint, short duration, high-impact, sustainable and predictable engagement with our African partners. APF will become the primary Air Force program for conducting building partnership capacity and will enable committed African states to enhance their aviation capabilities, foster greater regional cooperation, and increase air domain safety and security in Africa.12

USAFRICOM conducted the first APF event in Accra, Ghana in March, 2012, with participation of service members from Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Senegal, and the

8 House Armed Services Committee, USAFRICOM Posture Statement, 15.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
12 House Armed Services Committee, USAFRICOM Posture Statement, 15.
U.S. The military-to-military engagement activity included classroom instruction and hands-on training in “cargo preparation, search and rescue, airfield security, public affairs, flight and ground safety, aerospace physiology, fixed wing aircraft maintenance and more.”

**U.S. Central Command**

U.S. Central Command’s (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility includes nations with diverse levels of military and aviation capability. In his 2012 Posture Statement testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, General James Mattis, USCENTCOM commander, stated a vision of “a region where improved security leads to greater stability and where regional cooperation helps to isolate those who would use violence in pursuit of their goals.” Solutions to challenges in the AOR require collaboration with partners inside and outside of the region and he noted “it will become increasingly important to invest in building relationships and the capacity and capability of our partners to respond to emerging challenges.”

Major AvSFA activities are underway in Afghanistan. The 438th Air Expeditionary Wing (438 AEW) is comprised of air advisors focused on building the aviation capability of Afghanistan’s military. The unit is headquartered in Kabul, with three subordinate Air Advisory Groups operating from Kabul, Kandahar, and Shindand, and numerous lesser detachments stationed across Afghanistan. The 438 AEW is a part of the multi-national NATO Air Training Command-Afghanistan, which as of May 2012

---


15 Ibid.

consisted of more than 1,050 personnel and “included coalition partners from the United States, United Kingdom, Czech Republic, Croatia, Canada, Italy, Hungary, Jordan, Mongolia, Portugal, Lithuania, Latvia, Greece and Belgium.”

**U.S. European Command**

U.S. European Command’s (USEUCOM) area of responsibility includes nations with relatively modern western militaries. Thus, low-end SFA is a far lesser component of military engagement activities in Europe. Reflecting existing European capability, the 2012 posture statement appropriately cites the importance of sustaining “partner nations’ expeditionary capabilities while reinforcing their ability to maintain regional stability and to provide for their own security” with little reference to AvSFA-related activities.

**U.S. Northern Command**

U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) maintains security cooperation relationships with Canada, Mexico and The Bahamas. To the north, Canada has a strong and very capable military. To the south, border security and counternarcotics are key aspects of the relationships with Mexico and the Bahamas. Countering transnational criminal organizations is an increasingly important component of the relationship with Mexico.

As requested by Mexico, USNORTHCOM cooperates with the Mexican military in support of their efforts to build capabilities and capacities to employ against [transnational criminal organizations]. Above all, we will

---


20 Ibid.
continue to respect Mexico’s sovereignty and we stand ready to increase coordination and collaboration to the extent that Mexico desires and in accordance with U.S. Government policies.\(^{21}\)

The Mérida Initiative is an anti-crime and counternarcotics assistance program for Mexico and Central America. Under Mérida, USNORTHCOM collaborates with Mexico to counter transnational threats, but an active U.S. military presence in Mexico is not part of the initiative.\(^{22}\) Military cooperation is increasing and includes “Mexican participation in [Department of Defense] training programs in the United States.”\(^{23}\) In September 2012, the State Department announced the transfer of 21 aircraft to Mexican security forces.\(^{24}\)

**U.S. Pacific Command**

U.S. Pacific Command’s (USPACOM) area of responsibility includes nations with diverse levels of military capability. In his 2012 Posture Statement testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Admiral Robert Willard, then USPACOM commander, noted, “Each of these nations’ militaries partner with USPACOM at varying levels, including leadership exchanges, exercise series, USPACOM Assist Team [counterterrorism] capacity building actions and activities, and security assistance.”\(^{25}\) He also stated that despite the maritime nature of the region, many militaries are army-focused.\(^{26}\) The Philippines is a country where USPACOM is assisting the military to

---

\(^{21}\) Ibid., 18.


\(^{23}\) Ibid.


\(^{26}\) Ibid., 4.
develop greater aviation capability. “The Philippines has recently begun to focus on improving the ability of its navy and air forces…security assistance is focused primarily on supporting the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in [counterterrorism] efforts…and advancing AFP naval and air capabilities.”  

**U.S. Southern Command**

Security force assistance plays a major role in U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). The 2012 SOUTHCOM theater posture statement reports the command continues “to accomplish the primary objective of defending the United States while also promoting regional security and enduring partnerships.” Building partnerships is the foundation, enabling forward defense of the U.S. by helping to build capable militaries that share responsibility for security. The success of Plan Colombia continues to pay dividends. “In 2011, the Colombian Air Force began working with its Honduran counterparts to interdict illicit air traffic and expand intelligence sharing.”

The report also notes Air Mobility Command established the 571st Mobility Support Advisor Squadron (571 MSAS). The unit includes 25 aviation specialties related to air mobility and airfield support, and was employed in Honduras in a proof-of-concept as part of the Sovereign Skies Expansion Program. In the Dominican Republic, U.S. Air Forces Southern conducted training and exercises, increasing capacity to interdict illicit air traffic. The command also applied lessons from the Dominican Republic and Colombia to assist Belize, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras in areas

---

27 Ibid., 11.
29 Ibid., 14.
30 Ibid., 22.
31 Ibid., 32.
32 Ibid., 19-20.
such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and helicopter operations and maintenance.\textsuperscript{33} In the future, the command seeks to replicate their effective, small-footprint approach to improve security capability of militaries in the region.\textsuperscript{34}

**Summary of Global Demand for AvSFA**

To varying extents, AvSFA is applicable throughout the geographic combatant commands, but demand is difficult to assess quantitatively. From a qualitative perspective, significant demand for AvSFA currently exists in USAFRICOM and USSOUTHCOM and the level of demand will likely persist. In USCENTCOM, the magnitude of current operations in Afghanistan drives a significant requirement for air advisors, but the demand will probably decrease in coming years as the U.S. draws down Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Little demand for low-end AvSFA exists in USEUCOM due to the modern character of militaries and infrastructure in the region. In USPACOM, the U.S. military is taking important measures to build greater aviation capability and capacity within the Armed Forces of the Philippines, but AvSFA is not in high demand in other nations. Finally, in USNORTHCOM, the U.S. is assisting Mexico with additional aircraft for security forces, but the assistance does not currently involve in-country operations by air advisors.

From this basic framework of demand for AvSFA, the focus next turns toward understanding how the Services, as force providers, can flexibly organize and posture forces to meet uncertain but important AvSFA demand. The capability and capacity of the Services to support AvSFA missions is the subject of the next chapter.

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 15, 32.  
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., 4.
CHAPTER 5: U.S. CAPABILITY AND CAPACITY FOR AVIATION SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

During years of reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan, GPF demonstrated capability to train, advise, and assist foreign security forces. As described in the introductory chapter, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta intends to retain SFA capability within the GPF. Speaking to the U.S. Institute of Peace, he stated “Those security cooperation capabilities and skill sets once considered the exclusive province of the special operations community will need to be built up and retained across the force and among civilians.”

U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the military departments are the force providers for the broad spectrum of SFA missions. SOF and Service-specific GPF have differing capability and capacity to support AvSFA missions in the geographic combatant commands. To varying extents, each can support missions to train, advise, and assist aviation development in partner nations.

Special Operations Forces AvSFA Capability and Capacity

SFA is one of eleven special operations core activities. Joint doctrine states, “SOF are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to accomplish the eleven core activities.” The 6th Special Operations Squadron (6 SOS) is USSOCOM’s combat aviation advisory unit. The squadron’s mission is to “assess, train, advise and assist foreign aviation forces in airpower employment, sustainment, and force integration.”

---

2 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, II-6.
3 Ibid., II-5.
Advisors in the unit possess specialized capabilities for foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, and coalition support, which includes “upgrading host-nation aviation capabilities.” Advisors are represented across 32 specialty codes within the 6 SOS, enabling the squadron to advise partner nations across the range of hands-on flying and aviation support skills. The 6 SOS deploys tailored teams with the appropriate specialty skills and number of personnel for specific combat aviation advisor missions.

Air Force Special Operations Command established the unit as a squadron in 1994. Though it initially focused on assistance missions in South America and the Middle East, the squadron has expanded operations to nearly every region of the world. Typical engagements involve tactical and operational support via the four tasks of assessing, training, advising, and assisting. These tasks often occur sequentially.

A typical 6 SOS engagement begins with an initial assessment mission, during which aviation advisors evaluate the host nation’s aviation capabilities and limitations. These assessments may cover aircrew capability and safety, aircraft airworthiness, resource availability, and operational potential. Assessments are then followed by training or exercise missions, enabling the host nation’s aviation forces, usually through a “train the trainer” technique, to employ a particular tactic or skill. Later, advising missions are conducted to prepare the host nation to apply these tasks within a particular operational context, either to engage with hostile forces or to integrate its forces into coalition operations.

The sequence of recurring missions to the host nation allows a phased, building-block approach to enable the foreign security forces to develop the intended capability.

---

5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
9 Vick, *Air Power*, 118.
10 Ibid.
As a purpose-built flying squadron for special missions including security force assistance, the 6 SOS, by design, is suited perfectly for AvSFA. Despite these strengths, however, SOF faces two limitations. First, as of October 2012, the 6 SOS no longer operates helicopters. All rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft are being replaced with C-145A Skytruck airplanes, ending the squadron’s rotary-wing operations.\footnote{Michelle Vickers, “6th SOS Moves From Hurlburt to Duke Field,” \textit{ShadowSpear Special Operations}, October 1, 2012, \url{http://www2.hurlburt.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123320464} (accessed December 14, 2012).} Second, capacity to accomplish AvSFA missions corresponds directly to the unit’s size. Difficulty in meeting demand occurs when AvSFA requirements surge significantly or if other missions suddenly compete with the squadron’s AvSFA role. As stated in joint doctrine, “SOF cannot be quickly replaced or reconstituted nor can their capabilities be rapidly expanded.”\footnote{U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, \textit{Special Operations}, II-3.} Though the squadron size had increased to 207 personnel as of 2010 with further increases planned, the expansion took years amid rising demand.\footnote{Thaler, \textit{Building Partner Health Capacity}, 22.} Thus, while 6 SOS capabilities make it the unit of choice for AvSFA, it is limited by the fact that the squadron is no longer equipped for rotary-wing operations and as a single squadron, surge capacity is finite.

**General Purpose Forces AvSFA Capability and Capacity**

The U.S. military has developed greater capability for SFA across the air, land, and sea domains during years of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.\footnote{Panetta, “Building Partnership,” 1-3.} From a functional perspective, AvSFA corresponds to the air domain and is closely aligned with the Air Force. AvSFA requires a joint solution, however, because the Air Force has a very
limited number of helicopters and rotary-wing personnel.  Afghanistan is clear example of a joint solution. The U.S. Air Force led the Combined Air Power Transition Force, with responsibility for broad range of Afghan AvSFA, while the Navy contributed maintenance personnel and specific skills for rotary-wing aspects of the mission.

As the Department of Defense takes action to maintain fixed-wing and rotary-wing GPF AvSFA capability, each of the five U.S. Armed Services could have a potential role. The following paragraphs review the Services’ current aviation force structure and their current posture for the spectrum of SFA missions.

United States Air Force

The U.S. Air Forces currently operates 44 different types of manned aircraft, with a total of approximately 4,000 aircraft in the inventory.  All are fixed-wing except for 17 CV-22 Ospreys, 99 HH-60G Pave Hawks, and 62 UH-1N Iroquois.  Overall, the 161 helicopters are just 4 percent of U.S. Air Force’s fleet of aircraft.

In recent years, the Air Force has developed greater institutional capability and capacity to support AvSFA within the GPF. In April 2010, the Air Force expanded the role of the Contingency Response Groups to include building partnership activities in developing nations.  “[Contingency Response Force] leaders unanimously lauded the decision…They described their core airfield opening functions (aerial port, mobile

---

18 Ibid.
command and control, and maintenance) as perfect building blocks for the nascent air infrastructures of many nations with whom the U.S. desires closer relationships.”

In 2011, the Air Force established two Mobility Support Advisory Squadrons (MSAS) within the Contingency Response Groups. Their purpose is to support Air Force goals for building partner capacity by providing air mobility advisory and training assistance. The U.S. Government Accountability office reported in 2012 that “Mobility support advisory squadrons are expected to conduct activities in air mobility processes, such as maintenance, air traffic control, and airfield operations.”

The 818 MSAS at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey, focuses the majority of its efforts on Africa and the 571 MSAS at Travis Air Force Base, California, focuses the majority of its efforts on Latin America.

In June 2012, the Air Force created greater institutional structure for training and educating air advisors when it activated the Air Advisor Academy at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst. The Academy’s establishment marks evolutionary growth of the Air Advisor Course since the first class attended in February 2008. During the activation ceremony, the commandant noted “the academy currently provides training for Central, African and Southern Commands, and is expanding to cover European and

20 Ibid., 2.
22 Ibid.
Though initially conceived as a school focused on U.S. Air Force GPF air advisors, joint graduates include personnel from the U.S. Navy and civilians from the Defense Language Institute.

**United States Army**

The U.S. Army currently operates 23 different types of manned aircraft, with a total of approximately 4,500 aircraft in the inventory. Fixed-wing versus rotary-wing composition is approximately the reverse of the Air Force. All but roughly 275, or about 6 percent, are rotary-wing aircraft.

The Army is aligning GPF brigades and tailoring forces for ground SFA missions within the geographic combatant commands. Troops will deploy for security cooperation missions rather than operational warfare. “The regionally-aligned forces will remain at home station and deploy only those elements of the unit that are required to meet the specific geographic combatant command requirements.” The 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, of Fort Riley, Kansas, is the first Army unit to be aligned and “will be the main force provider for security cooperation and partnership-building missions in Africa.” The concept matches the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance which stresses “innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to

---

27 Addison, “Air Advisor Academy,” 1.
30 Ibid.
34 Lopez, “‘Dagger Brigade,’” 1.
achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.” (emphasis original) Two more Army brigades are tentatively identified for alignment with other geographic combatant commands in 2014. The 162nd Infantry Brigade at Fort Polk, Louisiana, will provide SFA training and other security cooperation training to prepare the regionally aligned GPF brigades prior to deployment.

Army brigade combat teams—including those aligned for regional security cooperation missions—do not possess organic aviation. To support rotary-wing AvSFA, the Army would need support from personnel among the GPF aviation brigades. The Army also has other potential options to support AvSFA. As of April, 2011, it had acquired 6 Mi-17 helicopters to support training for Mi-17 pilots and maintenance personnel within the continental United States. Professional training of Mi-17 aviators is accomplished by the 1st Battalion, 223rd Aviation Regiment.

United States Navy

The U.S. Navy currently operates 23 different types of manned aircraft, with a total of approximately 1,900 aircraft in the inventory. Of these, approximately 1400 are fixed-wing and 500 are rotary-wing.

36 Lopez, “‘Dagger Brigade’,” 3.
The U.S. Navy builds partner capability and capacity through a variety of fleet interactions, port visits, and engagements.\textsuperscript{43} The Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training Command “is organized to provide tailored mobile training teams, referred to as Security Force Assistance Detachments, to geographic combatant commands to conduct training with partner nation navies.”\textsuperscript{44} The range of events for the Security Force Assistance Detachments includes maritime interception, small boat operations, weapons training, professional development, and similar activities.\textsuperscript{45} Though AvSFA is not a focus, the Navy’s GPF rotary-wing and fixed-wing capability could dovetail into joint capacity for future AvSFA missions.

United States Marine Corps

The U.S. Marine Corps currently operates 21 different types of manned aircraft, with a total of approximately 1330 aircraft in the inventory.\textsuperscript{46} Of these, approximately 510 are fixed-wing, 650 are rotary-wing, and 170 are tilt-rotor MV-22 Ospreys.\textsuperscript{47}

For current SFA activities, the Marine Corps has organized forces as Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Forces-Security Cooperation (SPMAGTF-Security Cooperation).\textsuperscript{48} “These task forces are meant to build military capacity of partner nations, provide regional stability, and develop lasting partnerships with nations in the

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 23.
\textsuperscript{45} Congressional Research Service, Building Capacity, 41.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{48} Congressional Research Service, Building Capacity, 41.
region.”\textsuperscript{49} When directed, the Marines build the task force to meet combatant command requirements.\textsuperscript{50}

United States Coast Guard

The U.S. Coast Guard currently operates 7 different types of manned aircraft, with a total of approximately 185 aircraft in the inventory.\textsuperscript{51} Of these, approximately 45 are fixed-wing and 140 are rotary-wing.\textsuperscript{52} Compared to the other Armed Services, the Coast Guard represents a relatively small pool of potential AvSFA capability. Also, because it operates under the Department of Homeland Security unless transferred to the Department of the Navy during war or when directed by the President, the Coast Guard is not well-suited as a source for AvSFA capability.\textsuperscript{53}

AvSFA Capability and Capacity Conclusions

Each branch of the U.S. Armed Forces operates aircraft and thus has highly trained experts in aircraft operations, aircraft maintenance, and aviation support. To varying extents, this presents an avenue to expand U.S. capacity for fixed-wing and rotary-wing AvSFA using GPF as air advisors. By creating a joint solution, capability and capacity from across the services could be used in appropriate combinations to match the development needs of partner-nation security forces.

The Air Advisor Course is the key mechanism to prepare GPF for AvSFA duties. The course was originally developed to prepare U.S. Air Force GPF for air advisor duties

\textsuperscript{50} Congressional Research Service, \textit{Building Capacity}, 43.  
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{53} U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, \textit{Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States}, Joint Publication 1 (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 20, 2009), xiii.
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Now designated the Air Advisor Academy, it specializes in educating GPF from the joint force for global assignments in support of the geographic combatant commands.

The next chapter will consider potential methods to couple the aviation capacity of joint GPF with existing SOF and GPF AvSFA capabilities to meet demand from the geographic combatant commands. Because the quantity of future AvSFA missions is uncertain, scalable and flexible AvSFA-capable forces are important considerations. Additionally, budgetary impact is an important factor in the evaluation of potential options.

---

CHAPTER 6: GPF SOLUTION TO INCREASE AVIATION SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE CAPACITY

As noted in the introductory chapter, Secretary Panetta directed GPF to retain capability to execute SFA missions. “The task of training, advising, and partnering with foreign military and security forces has moved from the periphery to become a critical skill set across our armed forces….Those security cooperation capabilities and skill sets once considered the exclusive province of the special operations community will need to be built up and retained across the force and among civilians.”¹ The Services must take systematic action to prepare GPF to partner with their foreign counterparts to meet this intent. Specific to the air domain, the Services must develop an integrated and coordinated joint method to organize, train, and equip GPF as air advisors for AvSFA.

Any proposed method should be evaluated in light of the preceding chapters. Before considering methods to expand GPF support of AvSFA, a brief review of key points follows. Chapter Two outlined the history of SFA and reviewed policy. The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance is the most recent published policy. It directs innovative, low-cost, small-footprint approaches that rely on rotational presence and advisory capabilities.² Additionally, DoD Instruction 5000.68, published in 2010, states SFA activities shall be prioritized and the Department shall develop and maintain capability to conduct SFA across the air, land, maritime, and cyberspace domains.³ Chapter Three identified lessons from recent AvSFA missions and noted these nine important factors.

- Aviation Capability Enhances Security
- Development Must Be Partner Nation Centric
- Assessment is an Essential Foundation

¹ Panetta, “Building Partnership.”
• Enduring Results Flow From Enduring Interaction
• U.S. Embassy and Geographic Combatant Command Coordination
• Aviation Enterprise Development as a System
• Traits of an Effective Air Advisor
• Air Advisor Training is Essential
• Funding is Complex and Difficult

Chapter Four noted that AvSFA is applicable to varying extents across the six geographic combatant commands, but demand varies and is difficult to quantify. Chapter Five detailed SOF and Joint GPF capability and capacity to support AvSFA. Of particular note, the U.S. Air Force is very limited in rotary-wing aircraft, implying a joint solution for GPF AvSFA is appropriate. An optimal approach will factor the preceding key points into the proposed solution.

**Recommendation: Joint GPF AvSFA Packages**

The goal is a solution which makes suitable packages of air advisor capability available from the Service force providers to the geographic combatant commanders for AvSFA in countries they prioritize in their theater campaign plans. Under the following proposal, the Services would establish a joint solution to provide three basic types of AvSFA packages: fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and aviation support. The packages could be employed in a stand-alone fashion, or teamed together as appropriate to match the geographic combatant command’s intent for AvSFA in the host nation. The result is a scalable and flexible quantity of aviation forces sourced from existing GPF force structure to support evolving requirements for AvSFA capability and capacity. The packages could be sourced from the joint GPF, and if necessary, they could be further pared and tailored to match mission requirements during the planning process. By design, the process prepares GPF for AvSFA missions without incurring costs associated
with additional force structure. The three main steps to executing AvSFA under this concept are outlined in the following sections. The final section of this chapter then provides a notional example of how the concept could be applied in practice.

Create Joint GPF AvSFA Unit Type Codes

The core of the proposal is the creation of taskable packages of GPF fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and aviation support capability. These packages should be jointly designed and coordinated by the Services using the joint unit type code (UTC) system.⁴ By convening a joint working group to design the composition of the UTCs, the Services would identify the appropriate instructor-qualified aviation skill-sets for the fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and aviation support UTCs. The Services would then match their Service-specific specialty codes to designate the personnel specialties to fill each UTC.⁵ Like other UTCs, the AvSFA UTCs would be filled by GPF personnel from a unit within one of the Services.

Using standard Service-specific processes, the tasked Service would deploy an AvSFA UTC from an organic aviation unit. Depending on the Service, the unit used as the source might be an Air Force Wing, an Army Aviation Brigade, a Marine Corps Air Wing, or a Navy Air Wing. Similar to other UTCs, the unit leadership would match personnel with the appropriate skills and professionalism to fill the slots within the UTC. The standardized UTC system also ensures each package of fixed-wing, rotary-wing, or

---

⁴ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 324. Unit type code is defined as “a Joint Chiefs of Staff developed and assigned code, consisting of five characters that uniquely identify a “type unit”. Also called UTC..” The Services have a significant role in developing UTCs. For example, Chapter Five of Air Force Instruction 10-401, *Air Force Operations Planning and Execution*, gives Air Force personnel detailed instruction on the development, registration, and maintenance of UTCs.

⁵ Congressional Research Service, *Building Capacity*, 31. The Air Force personnel system uses the term Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC), the Army and Marine Corps use Military Operational Specialty (MOS), and the Navy uses Naval Enlisted Classification (NEC) and Naval Officer Designation (NOD).
aviation support would provide a consistent level of capability independent of which GPF unit was tasked to fill the UTC. The result would be a capability-based modular system of UTCs that could be tasked to deploy independently or grouped as necessary to support the geographic combatant command’s intent for the air advisory mission to the host nation.

Flexible Options for GPF AvSFA UTC Employment

As a plan for modular packages of GPF AvSFA is established, the Services should give parallel thought to their employment. A key component of the UTC system is its flexibility, allowing adaptive tasking to suit mission requirements. The Joint Staff would task a Service to deploy the appropriate UTC to meet AvSFA mission timing and duration. Using the same process, the Joint Staff could task a UTC to support a finite set of recurring missions of variable length, thus providing personnel continuity across an established set of phased AvSFA missions in an effort to develop desired capabilities in a country. Additionally, the team identified to fill the UTC could be tasked to operate as an independent, stand-alone force in the host nation, or they could be teamed to augment personnel from another unit such as the 6th Special Operations Squadron or one of the Air Force’s two geographically-aligned Mobility Support Advisory Squadrons.

Standardized Pre-Mission Preparation

Once the UTC is tasked, persons assigned to complete the tasking begin the process of integration, preparation, and training as a group. The team would attend the Air Advisor Academy together at Fort Dix, New Jersey and refine their instructor skills.

---

6 Recurring visits match the typical engagements of SOF combat aviation advisors from 6 SOS as described in Chapter Five. See also Vick, *Air Power*, 118-119.
for the AvSFA environment. Additionally, the team completes any other required pre-deployment training. If the UTC will be paired with another unit or another UTC for mission execution, training should be synchronized to the greatest extent possible, enabling the combined team to train and plan together for the mission.

Summary of Joint GPF AvSFA Advantages and Disadvantages

The primary advantage of the recommended joint GPF AvSFA approach is the ability to tap into the existing depth of aviation capability and capacity in the U.S. Armed Forces without creating additional force structure. The concept matches the intent of current written policy, as well as the statements made in the public forum. By design, the concept can be tailored to specific situations, meeting the nine important aspects of AvSFA identified in Chapter Three. An additional strength is the flexibility of the UTC tasking system which can be scaled to task an appropriate number of UTCs to match the number of missions identified by the geographic combatant commands and prioritized by the Department of Defense and State Department. Finally, the concept creates capacity to support AvSFA missions using GPF, without creating additional force structure or converting units for the sole function of AvSFA.

Three potential downsides, however, are significant enough to be worthy of note. First, inexperience in air advising will likely be a challenge for each team. Though GPF air advisors demonstrated ability to overcome their inexperience in Iraq and Afghanistan, lack of experience may complicate the critical foundation of initial and recurring assessment of host nation aviation capability and needs. Teaming skilled assessment teams with GPF AvSFA forces on initial missions may be a method to overcome this

---

7 Refer to Chapter Three and its supporting references including joint doctrine for an overview of the importance of initial and on-going assessment specifically in AvSFA and with SFA in general.
concern. Second, screening to ensure personnel tasked for air advisor duty possess effective interpersonal skills will require attention as units match persons to AvSFA UTC slots. Because the air advisor mission is more complex than regular instructor duty, unit leaders will need to carefully determine which personnel to task for air advisor duty. Finally, GPF air advisors will not always be an appropriate substitute for 6 SOS combat aviation advisors or the AvSFA-focused personnel of an MSAS. The specific mission requirements, environment, priority, and level of risk will be important considerations for commanders in determining whether joint GPF AvSFA is appropriate toward achieving the desired outcome.

**Discarded Options**

Before choosing to advocate the development of joint AvSFA packages, four other options were considered and ultimately discarded. A brief explanation of each follows. The first was the simple option to do nothing. While doing nothing may have minor cost-saving merits, it fails to capitalize on relatively small investments to enable partner nations to help secure a broad range of U.S. interests. Additionally, this option ignores Secretary Panetta’s intent for “security cooperation capabilities and skill sets…to be built up and retained across the force and among civilians.”8 Another alternative was the creation of additional GPF units dedicated to AvSFA. Though this option could be modeled after the existing GPF MSAS’s to expand AvSFA-dedicated experience and capacity, it was rejected due to the inherent fiscal and manpower costs of new units. The third rejected alternative was the adoption a single-Service AvSFA solution. An Air Force single-service solution creates the dilemma of very little capacity for rotary-wing

---

8 Panetta, “Building Partnership.”
AvSFA or costly pursuit of methods to expand Air Force rotary-wing capacity.

Likewise, an Army single-service solution was rejected due to a mirror-image gap in fixed-wing AvSFA. While the Navy and Marine Corps possess greater balance between rotary-wing and fixed-wing aviation, neither is readily suitable as the sole source for GPF AvSFA. The fourth option was to let the Service’s AvSFA efforts—primarily in the Air Force and Army—continue to evolve along uncoordinated paths. Doing so, however, ignores an opportunity to increase AvSFA effectiveness using a joint and coordinated modular approach to meet geographic combatant command needs and neglects the cost-saving efficiency of standardized joint air advisor training.

**Notional Application of Joint GPF AvSFA**

How then might joint GPF AvSFA missions be initiated, planned, and executed in common practice? A notional example follows. It is designed within the structure of funding and authorities established by Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act.9 Two generic countries—X and Y—serve as examples to illustrate both fixed-wing and rotary-wing cases. Though the joint GPF AvSFA concept is designed to be applicable in any region, X and Y happen to be in the USAFRICOM area of responsibility. The example is representative rather than prescriptive, intending to demonstrate a workable option that could be adapted for use in any geographic combatant command’s annual planning and budgeting cycle. The example gives an overview of major events in the life-cycle of the notional mission, including origin of the requirement, coordination with the U.S. Embassy and State Department, identification and tasking of...
appropriate joint GPF, and their pre-mission training and preparation. Upon mission completion, combatant command and respective U.S. embassy evaluate whether to sustain, adapt, or take other action appropriate to support U.S. long-term interests.

The requirements for these sample AvSFA missions begin at the geographic combatant command. Based on the aims of the theater campaign plan and current assessments, USAFRICOM has prioritized countries X and Y for terrorism prevention security cooperation actions. Analysis by the J5 Plans staff at USAFRICOM indicates anti-terrorism and regional security in and around Country X would benefit significantly from further development of rotary-wing capability. For Country Y, development of greater fixed-wing capacity for air mobility is expected to have the greatest impact toward preventing terrorism and improving the security environment.

The intended plan for each country is coordinated bilaterally with that country’s U.S. embassy. For this example, an on-going collaborative relationship for coordination and planning already exists between the echelons of leadership in USAFRICOM and the U.S. embassies in both Country X and Country Y. The respective Embassy Country Teams were fully involved in establishing rotary-wing development as a priority in Country X and fixed-wing development as a priority in Country Y. From this baseline, the goal now is to create a framework of AvSFA missions in each country that will further build capability over the course of the next fiscal year.

The USAFRICOM planning staff develops each plan individually in coordination with the security cooperation office of the respective embassy.10 For Country X, the J5 planning team works with the security cooperation office to frame a mission for a team of

---

approximately 14 personnel to travel to Country X four times in the following year. The team will be composed mostly of rotary-wing aircrew and maintainers, supplemented with air traffic control specialists. Each of the four trips will be two to three weeks in length, during which the team will work alongside and advise their Country X counterparts. For Country Y, the security cooperation office and the USAFRICOM J5 planners developed a mission involving three one-month stays in the coming year. This plan involves a 20-person team with a mix of aircrew and maintenance personnel, supplemented by aerial port and airfield management specialties. For both countries, the plans are developed with sufficient detail to formulate Section 1206 proposals.

After USAFRICOM and the respective embassies internally vet the Section 1206 proposals for signature by both the Combatant Commander and the Ambassador, USAFRICOM submits the two proposals to the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.¹¹ Both proposals earn approval after an extensive process of Department of Defense and State Department review, prioritization, and Congressional notification.¹²

The approved missions are tasked for execution by the Joint Staff. For both missions, the Joint Staff reviews the capability and availability of forces from the Services and USSOCOM. For this example, the Country X mission is tasked to the Army and the mission to Country Y is tasked to the Air Force. The Army subsequently tasks a GPF aviation brigade to fill the rotary-wing mission and the Air Force tasks a wing from Air Mobility Command to fill the fixed-wing mission. Based on requirements written by the GCC, the taskings direct both units to maintain team integrity across the

¹² Ibid.
four TDYs to Country X and the three TDYs to country Y. The tasking also directs participants to attend the Air Advisor Academy before the mission.

Unit tasking occurs with sufficient lead-time for the completion of pre-mission training. Upon receipt of the task, the GPF unit identifies a senior-ranking officer (SRO) who will lead the mission throughout the coming year. The SRO takes responsibility to ensure members of the team are prepared. Ideally, Air Advisor Academy training and any other mission-specific training is accomplished with all members of the team. Using the mission timeline, the home-station units ensure all team members remain available through all phases in the coming year.

The next stage is mission execution. As each phase of the in-country mission is completed, the team accomplishes an after action report and, if necessary, adjusts plans for the next phase. USAFRICOM and the embassy monitor the missions. At the end of the year, they evaluate whether to continue them into subsequent years. If the decision is made to continue, the follow-on mission is planned and executed on a repeating annual cycle, creating annual stability and predictability for all involved including the host nation, the J5 planners, the embassy, the staffs involved in Section 1206 approval, the Service tasking process, the GPF units, and the GPF personnel who execute the mission. In this example, USAFRICOM and the embassy decide to terminate the mission in Country Y after a single year. For Country X, USAFRICOM submits a Section 1206 proposal for the next year, adjusting the previous year’s proposal as necessary. The process then follows a similar track, with the exception that the Army tasks a different GPF aviation brigade to accomplish the continuing AvSFA mission in the coming year.
As the first annual cycle completes and the newly tasked brigade prepares for the mission, the SROs of the outgoing and incoming teams coordinate a smooth transition.

In summary, the preceding example is intended to portray a stable, predictable, and sustainable illustration of the life-cycle of two GPF AvSFA missions. The sample missions began with a GCC requirement supporting the theater campaign plan and the intent of the U.S. embassies in the two host nations. To keep the illustration simple, both missions were tasked directly to a single Service which in turn tasked them to a single GPF unit. The concept could be adjusted, however, to fit unique circumstances to achieve greater mission effectiveness. Several potential variations include:

- Joint teaming of specialties from across the Services (e.g. Army rotary-wing and Air Force air traffic control advisors on the same AvSFA mission)
- Teaming fixed-wing or rotary-wing air advisors with aviation support air advisors on a single mission
- Combining fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and aviation support SFA missions for very large missions (e.g. major stability operations such as Iraq and Afghanistan)
- Employing SOF in the assessment phase of each mission
- Teaming experienced SOF or MSAS advisors as a GPF advisor mission begins or significantly expands in a host nation
- Teaming multiple GPF capabilities and advisors under a SOF-led mission
- Composition from multiple units within a Service to maximize language skills

Such variations would likely add complexity to planning and execution of AvSFA missions. Yet depending on the circumstances, the added complexity may be necessary to effectively accomplish the mission and support U.S. interests in the region.

**Chapter Summary**

Recapping joint GPF SvSFA, this chapter recommended creating modular UTCs that could be used as stand-alone teams, pared and tailored for specific missions, or teamed with other UTCs to execute AvSFA missions. Fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and
aviation support capability could be sourced from across the Services using this concept. For AvSFA missions with significant scope and complexity, teams from multiple units and potentially from multiple Services could be paired for the mission. Regardless of team composition, the deploying team must be trained and prepared for AvSFA in the host nation. Additionally, the mission may benefit from including SOF, MSAS, or other military personnel with a history of working with the host nation. After reviewing lesser-suited options for GPF AvSFA, the chapter presented an example of joint GPF AvSFA within a repeatable framework that can transition the mission among GPF units on an annual cycle. The thesis now transitions to capturing the final major recommendations for implementing joint GPF AvSFA in support of U.S. interests.
CHAPTER 7: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Successful service implementation of joint GPF AvSFA requires a coordinated and systematic process. The process should be guided with the end result in mind. The following recommendations provide a framework for enabling the U.S. Armed Forces to effectively employ joint GPF as air advisors in support of U.S. national security interests.

Joint GPF AvSFA Recommendations

First, the Secretary of Defense should write specific statements into the Defense Planning Guidance that directs the Services to develop and implement a joint GPF AvSFA concept. The concept enables a joint solution for GPF AvSFA and provides depth and breadth of air advisor capability and capacity to accomplish AvSFA within the geographic combatant commands.

Second, the Secretary of Defense should identify the U.S. Air Force or the U.S. Army as the lead Service to chair the development, fielding, and implementation of joint GPF AvSFA.

Third, the lead Service should convene a joint working group to establish the baseline composition of joint GPF AvSFA UTCs for fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and aviation support UTCs.

Fourth, the lead Service should oversee and coordinate the implementation of Service tasking processes to support joint GPF AvSFA missions. The Service processes should result in team integrity and team continuity during air advisor training and throughout the various phases of in-country mission execution.

Fifth, the Services should standardize air advisor training by adopting the Air Advisor Academy as the joint standard. The lead Service would coordinate a joint
review of the Air Advisor Academy curriculum, implement appropriate modifications, and establish process for on-going joint feedback and curriculum development.

Sixth, the lead Service should develop options and methods to team joint GPF AvSFA UTCs with experienced SOF or MSAS air advisors.

Seventh, the lead Service should accomplish site-visits to the geographic combatant command planning staffs for face-to-face briefs and discussion of the planned capability and capacity.

Eighth, the geographic combatant commands and the Services should agree upon and conduct a set of proof-of-concept missions in several prioritized countries. Upon successful proof-of-concept, the number of missions would grow in coordination with the Air Advisor Academy’s capacity to train air advisors.

**Conclusion**

Throughout the recent decade of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, GPF became heavily involved in conducting security force assistance activities to train, advise, and assist host nation forces. The U.S. Armed Forces concluded security force assistance operations in Iraq in 2011. Over the next several years, the mission in Afghanistan is projected to draw down significantly. In the wake these operations, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta declared his intent for the U.S. to retain SFA capability within the GPF by stating, “The task of training, advising, and partnering with foreign military and security forces has moved from the periphery to become a critical skill set across our armed forces.”  

---

1 Leon E. Panetta, “Building Partnership.”
Maintaining strong GPF capability for SFA requires thoughtful planning and preparation. In the air domain, a joint approach provides capability and capacity to execute the breadth of fixed-wing and rotary-wing AvSFA missions. The Services must take systematic action to prepare GPF to partner with their foreign aviation counterparts in support of U.S. interests. Joint GPF AvSFA is an effective means to provide fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and aviation support capacity to the geographic combatant commanders. The eight recommendations that support implementation of Joint GPF AvSFA provide a roadmap for fielding this capability.
GLOSSARY

Foreign Internal Defense – Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. Also called FID.

Foreign Security Forces - Foreign security forces include but are not limited to the following: military forces; police forces; border police, coast guard, and customs officials; paramilitary forces; forces peculiar to specific nations, states, tribes, or ethnic groups; prison, correctional, and penal services; governmental ministries or departments responsible for the above forces. Also called FSF.

General Purpose Forces - Those forces other than designated special operations forces. Also called Conventional Forces or CF.

Internal Defense and Development - The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. Also called IDAD.

Security Assistance - Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Security assistance is an element of security cooperation funded and authorized by Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Also called SA.

Security Cooperation - All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. Also called SC.

Security Force Assistance - The Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the US Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. Also called SFA.

Special Operations Forces - Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called SOF.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


VITA

Lt Col Paul Scott (USAF)

Most recently served as Commander of the 22d Operations Support Squadron, McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas.

Lt Col Scott was commissioned in 1992 from the United States Air Force Academy. He has multiple assignments and deployments flying the mighty KC-135 Stratotanker. He also served on the Air Mobility Command Staff in the Strategic Plans Division as the Chief of Future Concepts.

Lt Col Scott holds a Bachelor’s Degree in Engineering Mechanics from the United States Air Force Academy. He also holds Masters Degrees in Aeronautics/Astronautics from the University of Washington and in Military Arts and Sciences from the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.