Expeditionary Operations Require Joint Force Capabilities in the Future Operating Environment

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Following the Cold War the Services sought to redefine themselves in the face of a future operating environment devoid of a singular threat. As this era unfolded the term expeditionary came to the forefront of each service culture and has increasingly dominated discussions over the past decade. The core competencies, capabilities, and conditions that should underpin expeditionary operations are not common across the services and are not codified by DoD policy, joint doctrine, or joint training standards. Today the expeditionary moniker is used universally, albeit with varying definitions and associated training tasks, conditions, and standards developed by each service. The essential element of being “joint” is the ability to speak a common language and this is not the case with expeditionary operations. This creates interoperability and capability gaps that could be exploited and generates expectations and assumptions in the planning process that may not exist otherwise. This paper will demonstrate that only by establishing and implementing joint expeditionary doctrine and training standards will the joint force be effective in the current operating environment and meet the challenges of the projected future operating environment.

Joint Expeditionary Operations; joint doctrine; joint training standards; UJTL

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

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ABSTRACT

Following the Cold War the Services sought to redefine themselves in the face of a future operating environment devoid of a singular threat. As this era unfolded the term expeditionary came to the forefront of each service culture and has increasingly dominated discussions over the past decade. The core competencies, capabilities, and conditions that should underpin expeditionary operations are not common across the services and are not codified by DoD policy, joint doctrine, or joint training standards. Today the expeditionary moniker is used universally, albeit with varying definitions and associated training tasks, conditions, and standards developed by each service. The essential element of being “joint” is the ability to speak a common language and this is not the case with expeditionary operations. This creates interoperability and capability gaps that could be exploited and generates expectations and assumptions in the planning process that may not exist otherwise. This paper will demonstrate that only by establishing and implementing joint expeditionary doctrine and training standards will the joint force be effective in the current operating environment and meet the challenges of the projected future operating environment.

Analyzing the American military expeditionary tradition shapes modern thoughts on the subject. Analyzing the way each service used the last decade to transform can help determine what the joint force needs to be successful in the future operating environment.
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Moreover, to my family, especially my two beautiful daughters Viktoria Grace and Ava Marie, without your energy and spirit this year would have been a vast departure from what it has turned out to be.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 1  
CHAPTER 1: Understanding Expeditionary ................................................................. 4  
   Expedition Defined ..................................................................................................... 4  
   Expeditionary Defined ............................................................................................. 5  
CHAPTER 2: Joint and Service Analysis ...................................................................... 11  
   Analysis of Current Joint Publications ................................................................... 11  
   U.S. Navy Analysis ................................................................................................... 16  
   U.S. Marine Corps Analysis ..................................................................................... 22  
   U.S. Army Analysis .................................................................................................. 30  
   U.S. Air Force Analysis ............................................................................................ 37  
CHAPTER 3: Historical Analysis .................................................................................. 43  
   Lessons of the American Frontier ........................................................................... 43  
   American Expeditionary Force of World War I ..................................................... 48  
CHAPTER 4: Joint Expeditionary Operations ............................................................. 53  
CHAPTER 5: Recommendations ................................................................................ 63  
CONCLUSION: ............................................................................................................ 67  
BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................... 69
INTRODUCTION

The core competencies that underpin expeditionary capability are not common across the services and are not codified by Department of Defense (DoD) policy, joint doctrine, or training standards. Today the expeditionary moniker is used universally but with varying definitions and associated tasks developed by each service.

A vital element of being “joint” is the ability to speak a common language and this is not the case with expeditionary operations. If a combatant commander expects a force with expeditionary capabilities to be available to him he will not be receiving the same baseline capabilities from all services. This creates interoperability issues and capability gaps that could be exploited by an adversary. It also generates expectations and assumptions in the planning process that may invalidate that plan. Furthermore, if the U.S. military finds itself needing true expeditionary capabilities, sending a force to the fight that does not possess the chief characteristics or the core capabilities for expeditionary warfare could be disastrous if based upon misguided lessons of the past decade.

Historically nations have conducted military expeditions to wage war or influence outcomes for their interests. The first known recorded account of this being the clash of the Hittite and the Cypriot fleets in 1210 B.C.  

The United States’ overseas expeditionary history dates back to the early 1800s with its dealings in Tripoli and the ensuing conflict with the piracy actions of the Barbary states. The United States continues this today by sending forces quickly to the far corners of the globe to conduct a

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2 Naval War College, Advanced Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Expeditionary Warfare and Conflict Deterrence, by Jack A. Federoff, LCDR and Christopher A. Melhuish, LCDR. Naval War College(Newport, RI, 1994) 36.
variety of missions. This paper will explore the common definitions of today; both
civilian and military. It will also look at the service specific definitions and capabilities
to highlight the salient similarities and differences. This paper will demonstrate that only
by establishing and implementing joint expeditionary doctrine and training standards will
the joint force be effective in the current operating environment and meet the challenges
of the projected future operating environment.

To provide a common framework for analysis this paper will focus on a
conditions based approach and ultimately define what capabilities are needed for
expeditionary operations. Chapter One will lay out the general baseline definitions and
descriptions for expeditions, expeditionary operations, and expeditionary forces.
Accepted dictionary references and military publications are used as the starting point for
civilian and military expeditions. Chapter Two looks at the existing joint expeditionary
architecture to provide the foundation for what the services should provide to joint
operations. This chapter then distills each services definition, key tasks, and culture to
bring out differences on expeditionary operations. The intent is to show how each
service has attempted to solve its own expeditionary requirement and how that can or
cannot provide for the future joint expeditionary force. Chapter Three looks at historical
examples from the Army expeditions on the American frontier and the American
Expeditionary Force (AEF) in World War I. This chapter looks at the conditions in which
these forces were used, what characteristics were common among them, and what made
them distinct. The analysis of the historical lessons lends credence to the requirements of
the future operating environment. Chapter Four provides the analysis and defines Joint
expeditionary operations for the future force. Chapter Four offers the defining
characteristics and capabilities the joint force needs to be labeled expeditionary for Joint Force 2020. Chapter Five offers recommendations for expeditionary joint doctrine and tasks added to the Universal Joint Task List so that Joint Force commanders will receive expected standard joint expeditionary capabilities when required. While the capabilities in United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the United States Coast Guard (USCG) are recognized they are not a subject of this paper. USSOCOM is not a separate service, and the USCG is part of the Department of Homeland Security that only fits this papers recommended definition of an expeditionary force when under the Secretary of the Navy or a Combatant Commander during a time of war.
CHAPTER 1: Understanding Expeditionary

Expedition Defined

Merriam-Webster defines expedition as a journey or excursion undertaken for a specific purpose, the group of persons making such a journey, efficient promptness, speed, or a sending or setting forth.\(^1\) An expedition is synonymous with travel. It is designed with a specific purpose in mind. By this definition, it is characterized by a certain efficiency and speed.

In order to define expedition in the military context, one must look at the etymology of the word and then place it in the proper modern context. The online etymology dictionary traces the origin to the 13\(^{th}\) century from the Latin “expeditionem (nom. expeditio).” This word was used to convey a sense of sending. It was not until the 15\(^{th}\) century that "military campaign; the act of rapidly setting forth," from the French “expédition” provided the first use in the context of this paper.\(^2\) The meaning "journey for some purpose" is from the 1590s and when placed next to the modern vernacular one can see that it has remained relatively unchanged. The sense is that by the 1690s, the word expedition also included the body of persons on such a journey. It is here in the 17\(^{th}\) century that an “expedition” also came to be known as a physical entity; a body of persons that also conducted an expedition. Although people traveled to other places for specific purposes and conducted warfare in this nature prior to this time it was during this period that it was given a name.

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Joint Pub 1-02 does not contain a definition for expedition. When one conducts a search for the term in Joint Pub 3-0, it states, “expedition. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.).”

Expedition Defined

It is not enough for a key military capability to simply state that expeditionary is related to expedition and expound no further as most dictionaries do. This allows anyone to define for themselves what is meant or means to be expeditionary.

The military defines a related term; however, the definition remains quite shallow in its description. Joint Publication 3-0 defines “expeditionary force” as “An armed force organized to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country.” Many attempts have been made to assign certain qualifying attributes to the term such as speed, flexibility, adaptability, and sustainability. GEN James L. Jones, while Commandant of the Marine Corps wrote an article titled “What’s in a Word?: Expeditionary Means More Than Just Getting There Quickly.” When conjecturing on the utility of the Department of Defense (DoD) definition of expeditionary, GEN Jones stated, “this is a broad and unfocused definition, embracing virtually every operational formation and military unit.” He goes on to explain the salient characteristics as agility, flexibility, speed, versatility, forcible entry, and sustainability. This further explanation still fits a wide variety of forces in the U.S. arsenal. GEN Jones wrote this article in 2000 when most of the services were attempting to either redefine themselves or gain entry into the

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3 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, JP 3-0 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011) 193.
4 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms: Joint Pub 1-02(Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2012) 117.
expeditionary arena. This coupled with the shallow joint definition will serve as the basis of recommended definition and description of expeditionary attributes to use for this paper’s analysis. It is worthwhile to discuss briefly the attributes that GEN Jones has attached to expeditionary warfare so that it can be leveled against the service’s comparative analysis in later chapters.

GEN Jones describes agility as “strategic utility, operational reach and worldwide utility.” The worldwide utility is derived from the agility of the expeditionary force being able to adapt to any climate, condition or terrain presented. Next, he describes flexibility as “adaptable, with the capacity to commit to a specific mission, while remaining ready to rapidly shift to an entirely different one.” The major benefit of this attribute is that the force is not tied to a large infrastructure system or host nation support. It is able to rapidly adjust to a changed environment, withdraw, reorganize and recommit where needed. He describes versatility as “capable of undertaking any task commensurate with its size and performing any mission across the operational spectrum.” Versatility enables the expeditionary force to be scalable and still perform functions across the spectrum of operations. Conditions of employment can change at a moment’s notice and require the force to scale up or down based on the mission or political interests of the host nation or its own government. This attribute allows the force to adapt to the new situation and still carry out the mission requirements by either reducing its footprint quickly or integrating into a larger force. GEN Jones describes speed as “enables swift and certain power projection…from a pre-crisis state to the actual

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7 Ibid, 2.
8 Ibid, 2.
conduct of operations.\textsuperscript{9} Speed is more than just getting there quickly. It is the ability of the force to establish itself expeditiously in the area of operations enabling the conduct of operations across the spectrum of conflict. He states forcible entry “remains the \textit{sine qua non} of expeditionary capability…when the mission involves combat, a force must be able to fight its way into the area of operations.”\textsuperscript{10} The expeditionary environment is unpredictable and can change rapidly. A permissive environment can morph into an uncertain or hostile environment, and the force must be able to overwhelm the enemy forces with superior firepower and maneuverability. GEN Jones describes sustainability as the “ability of being sustained indefinitely, even in an austere environment devoid of host nation support and complex local infrastructure.”\textsuperscript{11} Sustainability has many factors such as fuel consumption rates, environmental conditions, and the tempo of operations. A more in-depth discussion on sustainability will occur later; here sustainability is the management of resources for the indefinite logistical support for the force to carry out the assigned mission.

While these attributes can provide some depth to the shallowness of the joint definition of an expeditionary force, it is only one person’s viewpoint on the subject.

In 1994 the Naval War College’s Center for Naval Warfare, Advanced Research Department, submitted a study on the relationship between Expeditionary Warfare and Deterrence Theory. The study’s scope focused on the relationship and not the definition; however, as a foundation for analysis it offered the following:

Expeditionary Warfare is the application of military force (or threatened application of military force) outside the United States short of a Major

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid, 2.
\textsuperscript{11} Ibid, 2.
Regional Contingency (MRC). It can be characterized as flexible, adaptable, limited in objectives, sustainable, and tailored for specific regional requirements. It also entails committing forces on another country's territory, under U.S. command, to control or influence events.  

The authors state they compiled this definition from a number of documents on the subject and that it is a result of their own analysis. Although it is not doctrine, it still provides an additional layer of depth to the proposed definition. While the description provided by the Naval War College (NWC) research speaks to Expeditionary Warfare and this paper seeks to encompass all Expeditionary Operations, the definition fits inside the scope of this paper. In order to continue the discussion and set the foundational context for this paper, the focus will be on the contrasting aspects between GEN Jones’ assertions and those of the NWC paper. The characteristics provided by GEN Jones and the NWC research are very similar. The differences are that the NWC paper contends that Expeditionary Warfare must be limited in objectives, the forces must be under U.S. control, and the force must be regionally focused.  

The NWC paper states “to be designated as expeditionary, the objectives of the expeditionary forces must be limited. Vague or general objectives are not consistent with the precision required by Expeditionary Warfare.” While clear objectives are always a goal prior to committing forces, the reason to commit the forces may be to develop the situation or buy time for decision makers to choose those objectives. Whether used as a

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14 Ibid, 47.
deterrence force or as part of a flexible response option, having clear and limited objectives prior to commitment is sometimes a luxury.

The next assertion is “the forces inserted would be under U.S. command…Being a super-power; the United States expects that in any situation that it determines to be in the realm of its national interests, the United States will assume a leadership position.” 

The NWC paper was written in mid 1990s with a focus on U.S. policy towards peacekeeping. Since then the U.S. has been involved in over a decade of coalition operations, and become more familiar with coalition operations. Having to place troops under U.S. command as a qualifying factor discounts probable future coalition operations and unnecessarily constrains U.S. options. The ease to which the U.S. can conduct expeditionary operations in a supporting or partnered role in the future environment will be the norm.

Lastly, the NWC research suggests, “expeditionary warfare reflects the NSS emphasis to facilitate collective, comprehensive security across the divergent regional spectrum…The respective [Combatant Commands] know what their specific requirements are tailoring expeditionary forces to meet those requirements is the key.”

This characteristic conflicts with agility. To be utilized worldwide the expeditionary force needs to be able to operate in any environment and condition. Regional focus vice regional employment the force would inhibit their use globally. This is best left to the service provider to solve and is outside the scope of this paper. A regionally focused force will not be a characteristic of the force that this paper will consider.

15 Ibid, 56.
16 Naval War College, Advanced Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Expeditionary Warfare and Conflict Deterrence, by Jack A. Federoff, LCDR and Christopher A. Melhuish, LCDR. Naval War College(Newport, RI, 1994) 53. [Original used CINCs; changed to Combatant Commands to reflect current naming convention].

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History and each service’s “expeditionary culture” is analyzed to gain a holistic picture on what attributes the joint community truly values as expeditionary. Analyzing the American expeditionary tradition to gain insight on how it shaped the modern thoughts on the subject can determine if the future environment lends itself to retaining those traditions. Analyzing the way each service used the last decade to transform their respective capabilities can be used to determine if those visions will fit what the joint force needs to be successful in the future operating environment.

GEN Jones wrote his article when he observed each of the services going through a time when “our Nation has certainly embarked on an expeditionary age in National security. The military services, by initiating their respective transformation undertakings, have taken a step in the right direction.” Following the Cold War the services embarked on a transformation process to redefine themselves against the void of a singular threat. This paper will analyze whether or not the services, based on the historical data and the expected future environment, are taking a step in the right expeditionary direction and provide recommendations in the conclusion of this paper for the future joint force.

In summary, this chapter recommends that agility, flexibility, speed, forcible entry, and sustainability be used to characterize joint expeditionary operations. An objective limited, regionally focused, and U.S. command and controlled force will not be recommended characteristics brought forward by this paper.

CHAPTER 2: Joint and Service Analysis

Analysis of Current Joint Publications

The 2012 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) assumes the following:

Fundamental objectives of current national strategy will remain applicable in 2012-2025. The joint force will retain two of its main strengths: 1) a diverse set of capabilities inherent in the various services and other organizations that comprise the force; and 2) an exceptional ability to integrate those capabilities in pursuit of a common aim. That is, the joint force will maintain a broad variety of means it can employ to achieve a wide range of results, and it can effectively integrate its actions to achieve a high level of unity of effort.¹

The 2012 CCJO assumes the joint force will effectively integrate actions and capabilities. One can only make this assumption when those capabilities are clearly defined so that the correct forces are applied to the correct problem at the correct time.

The 2005 CCJO defined expeditionary as:

**4.E.4. Expeditionary.** An expeditionary joint force is organized, postured and capable of rapid and simultaneous deployment, employment, and sustainment. Implicit in this is a joint force that converges mission-tailored capabilities at the desired point of action from dispersed locations around the globe, regardless of anti-access or area-denial [A2AD] environments…As a situation evolves, these elements will be readily capable of transitioning to sustained operations, blending into new capability packages to execute follow-on or different operations, or dispersing until otherwise required.²

This is one of the most comprehensive joint definitions of expeditionary provided in current policy, concept, or doctrine documents. However, it added an additional capability requirement by saying regardless of A2AD environments. This makes it a

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¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005) 12.
² Ibid, 30.
requirement to have capabilities to operate in an A2AD environment in order to be regarded as expeditionary. This is why the conditions of an A2AD environment should be used to define characteristics of an expeditionary force.

The Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) is important in establishing a common language for the services to contribute to the joint capabilities-based planning concept. This definition, taken from the Joint Electronic Library,

The Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) serves as a menu of tasks in a common language, which serve as the foundation for capabilities-based planning across the range of military operations. The UJTL will support DOD in joint capabilities-based planning, joint force development, readiness reporting, experimentation, joint training and education, and lessons learned. It is the basic language for development of a joint mission essential task list (JMETL) or agency mission essential task list (AMETL) used in identifying required capabilities for mission success.³

A term as pervasive as expeditionary should have an operational task in the UJTL. Figure 1 depicts the only task currently listed in the UJTL that pertains to anything expeditionary. Tactical (TA) 1.6 Operate from an Afloat Staging Base speaks to the movement of expeditionary forces and still falls short of assigning a maneuver operation to those forces. What one can establish from this task is that the SOF and Army units applied to the joint expeditionary force should be able to operate from an afloat staging base. With the UJTL being the authoritative document for the tasks that the Joint force must accomplish, this leaves a significant gap in the communication flow of that common capability language. This has led the services to define and justify the expeditionary capabilities themselves against no real requirement from the joint force commanders.

This paper explores this fundamental flaw and the following sections provide analysis of each service’s expeditionary lens.

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The Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) makes Forcible Entry a part of Operational Access and states that “While the access ultimately required in a situation may require forcible entry, forcible-entry operations themselves rely on some level of pre-existing access in the other domains.”\(^5\) One must define and discuss what capabilities are required for operational access in an A2AD environment and then one can discuss Forcible Entry in the same environment. Operational access is the ability to project military force into an operational area with sufficient freedom of action to accomplish the mission.\(^6\) This term and the subsequent concepts, operations and associated tactics is how the joint force conceptualizes the future capability needed to defeat the A2AD threat. The JOAC lists two tasks that it states are inseparable when it comes to gaining and maintaining operational access. They are:


\(^6\) Ibid, 5. Operational access does not exist for its own sake, but rather serves our broader strategic goals, whether to ensure access to commerce, demonstrate U.S. resolve by positioning forces overseas to manage crisis and prevent war, or defeat an enemy in war. Operational access is the joint force contribution to assured access, the unhindered national use of the global commons and select sovereign territory, waters, airspace and cyberspace.
• The combat task of overcoming the enemy’s anti-access and area-denial capabilities through the application of combat power and,

• Moving and supporting the necessary combat power over the required distances, essentially a logistical task that can be a challenge in itself.

Gaining operational access is a defining expeditionary characteristic regardless of the A2AD environment.

Establishing operational access may require forcible entry, “the projection of land forces onto hostile territory in the face of armed opposition...The subsequent land operations may vary in scope and duration, from small scale raids to sustained campaigns.”

Here, the capability is further refined with operational access requiring forcible entry. The operating environment can range from permissive to hostile at any time. A force with operational access capability must have an inherent forcible entry capability. These forces may need to move directly to action and not to establish lodgment. To describe fully the capabilities services should develop, Joint Publication 3-18 is used to analyze the defining characteristics of forcible entry operations.

Joint Publication 3-18 describes the applications of forcible entry as a range from an operation as part of the initial phase of a larger campaign to a single operation designed for a strategic effect. It states that the “Armed Forces of the United States train and rehearse three primary forcible entry capabilities or options: amphibious assault, airborne assault, and air assault.”

To be relevant in the operational access realm a force must be capable of conducting one of the three forcible entry operations stated here. The final analysis of this paper places its findings against that context. JP 3-18 also discusses phases of forcible entry operations with the most relevant being phases IV and V. Phase

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IV is the Introduction of Follow-On Forces and Phase V is Termination and Transition.

According to JP 3-18, the considerations for Phase IV are:

- Force sequencing is adjusted continuously.
- Battle handover is completed.
- Reconstitution and/or redeployment of assault forces (e.g., embark the LF for a subsequent mission) is completed.
- Rear area operations issues are addressed.
- AOA is dissolved.\(^9\)

Phase V requires that:

- Joint force and/or component missions and command relationships are reorganized.
- Priorities of support are shifted.\(^10\)

The considerations and requirements in Phases IV and V of JP 3-18 articulate that the forces capable of conducting forcible entry operations conduct battle handover in Phase IV and shift priorities of support to follow on forces in Phase V. The salient characteristic of the forcible entry force and operation is that it establishes the conditions for follow-on operations.\(^11\)

This section established joint expeditionary forces must include operational access capability as defined in the 2005 CCJO. This capability must be successful

\(^9\) Ibid, V-3.
\(^10\) Ibid, V-3.
\(^11\) Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Forcible Entry Operations: Joint Pub 3-18* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008) V-3. Planning accomplished during the preparation and deployment phase of a forcible entry operation establishes the conditions for the successful transition to successful follow-on operations. Plans must accommodate accelerations or delays in transitioning from a forcible entry operation to those follow-on operations demed necessary to reach the JFC’s operational objectives.
regardless of the A2AD threat and include the ability to conduct forcible entry operations. Conclusions in this paper are placed against this context.

Naval Expeditionary
U.S. Navy Analysis

Naval Warfare Publication 3-32, *Maritime Operations at the Operational Level of War*, describes the contribution of Navy forces in the following manner:

Through attack aircraft, surface fire support, sea-launched cruise missiles, and special-warfare forces, Navy forces provide the capability to attack targets in the littorals, and they provide the capability to deploy, land, and sustain expeditionary forces ashore. Navy forces contribute the seaward element of naval expeditionary power projection.\(^{12}\)

The Navy tasks its amphibious shipping with embarking forces for transport and offload to shore by amphibious or other means as seen in Figure 2. The Navy provides shaping capabilities in the way of surface fire support, tomahawk land-attack missiles, and ISR in support of landing operations.

**NTA 1.1.1.3 Embark Forces**
To embark forces and equipment on naval (including expeditionary/amphibious and follow-on), military sealift or commercial shipping and aircraft, preparatory to movement to offload area. Includes preparation of loading and berthing plans. (JP 1, 3-0, 3-02, 3-02.1, NDP 1, 4, NWP 3-02 Series, 3-05.4, 4-01, NTTP 3-02.3, FMFM 1-5, FMFM 1-14)

Figure 2 NTA 1.1.1.3 Embark Forces\(^{13}\)


\(^{13}\) Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant, United States Marine Corps, and Commandant, United States Coast Guard, *Universal Naval Task List*, (Washington, DC: Department of Navy Issuance (DONI), 2008) 20.
While deployed this navy sealift is usually task organized within an Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG). An ESG is a flexible strike group that can operate in the littorals or open ocean. ESG capabilities support initial crisis response missions that may be undertaken in uncertain or hostile environments characterized by multiple threats, including, but not limited to, anti-ship missiles, ballistic missiles, fighter/attack aircraft, electromagnetic jammers, cruise missile–equipped surface combatants, submarines (nuclear and diesel), and terrorist threats. An ESG is typically comprised of amphibious shipping, embarked Marines, and surface escorts. The Navy assets within this group primarily do not fit the definition of expeditionary, as their primary mission is to remain at sea in support of operations. There are certain Navy units that do deploy ashore.

The Naval Beach Master Units are Navy units that provide Naval Beach Party Teams for deployment in conjunction with Expeditionary Forces in order to provide beach and surf zone salvage and to facilitate the landing and movement over the beach of troops, equipment, supplies, and the evacuation of casualties, prisoners-of-war, and non-combatants. A Beach Party Team consists of Traffic Control, Salvage, and Communications. The Traffic Control Section are tasked with controlling the boat traffic in the surf zone, controlling the beaching and retracting the landing craft, and directing the smooth and efficient flow of personnel and material over the beach. These units are vital in establishing the beachhead for the amphibious landing and do conduct ashore operations. Depicted in Table 1, these Beach Master Units fall within the ninety percent conventional navy forces but still conduct operations considered expeditionary.

The Navy established Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) in January 2006. It is comprised of approximately 30,000 sailors conducting a variety of missions.

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<th>10%</th>
<th>Conventional ~ 360K</th>
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<td>NECC ~ 30K</td>
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Table 1  U.S. Navy Conventional vs Expeditionary Forces\(^{15}\)

The NECC mission follows:

Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) serves as the single functional command for the Navy’s expeditionary forces and as central management for the readiness, resources, manning, training and equipping of those forces. Expeditionary forces are organized to accomplish specific objectives in other countries.

- Organize, man, equip and train forces to execute combat, combat support and combat service support mission across the spectrum of joint, combined and multinational operations in the near-coast, inshore and riparian environments to include irregular warfare and other shaping missions that secure strategic access and global freedom of action.

- Global force provider of military capabilities with maximum versatility across the widest possible range of engagements.

- Extend traditional Navy capabilities from blue water to green and brown water environments.\(^{16}\)


\(^{16}\) Ibid
In this mission statement, the NECC aims to provide forces capable of securing strategic access and global freedom of action. This broad statement crosses into the mission area of the traditional Navy of securing the global commons and chokepoints. NECC does not possess the capacity to fulfill this statement with only ten percent of the force. It may possess the capabilities to become a force multiplier to the joint force commander. When NECC was established, it sought to take the disparate communities of capabilities under one commander to better synchronize force provider functions. These communities include:

- **Coastal Riverine** established in 2012, combines Maritime Expeditionary Security units and Riverine units in order to maintain control of rivers and waterways for military and civil purposes, denies their use to hostile forces and destroys waterborne hostile forces as necessary.

- **Naval Construction (Seabees)** provide a wide range of construction in support of operating forces, including roads, bridges, bunkers, airfields and logistics bases; provides responsive support disaster recovery operations; performs civic action projects to improve relations with other nations; and provides anti-terrorism and force protection for personnel and construction projects.

- **Explosive Ordnance Disposal** conducts counter – Improvised Explosive Device (IED) operations, renders safe explosive hazards and disarms underwater explosives such as mines. EOD specialists can handle chemical, biological and radiological threats and are the only military EOD force that can both parachute from the air to reach distant targets or dive under the sea to disarm weapons.

- **Expeditionary Intelligence** delivers flexible, capable and ready maritime expeditionary intelligence forces that respond rapidly to evolving irregular warfare area intelligence requirements.

- **Expeditionary Logistics** delivers worldwide expeditionary logistics with active and reserve personnel to conduct port and air cargo handling missions, customs inspections, contingency contracting capabilities, fuels distribution, freight terminal and warehouse operations, postal services and ordnance reporting and handling.
• **Maritime Civil Affairs** is an enabling force working directly with the civil authorities and civilian populations within a Combatant Commander’s maritime area of operations to lessen the impact of military operations imposed during peace time, contingency operations and periods of declared war.

• **Security Force Assistance** supports Combatant Commanders’ Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) efforts by delivering timely, focused, and customizable training to designated host nations. Security Force Assistance draws training expertise from NECC forces and DoD to support in training delivery.

• **Expeditionary Combat Readiness** coordinates and oversees all administrative processing, equipping, training, deployment and redeployment of Sailors assigned as Individual Augmentees, In-Lieu of forces and to Provisional Units committed to Joint and Maritime Operations.  

These force’s capabilities greatly enhance the Navy’s ability to extend from the blue to brown water environment, as stated in NECC’s mission.

However, it goes well beyond that. Navy EOD teams, over the past decade have deployed as part of Navy and Joint units in both Iraq and Afghanistan and Expeditionary Intelligence Units have done the same. Most notably are the Navy Construction Units, or Seabees, and their task oriented land based deployments.

Figure 3 shows that Navy units are tasked with the construction or repair of airfields in the forward battle area. This task falls to the Seabees. The Seabees are scalable units capable of operating forward and conducting defensive military operations while performing construction functions.

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Structured in the division, regiment, battalion, and mobile unit model, the Seabee force is truly versatile and flexible. It has the capability for limited self-sustainment and can deploy quickly through various air and sealift means. When placed against the context of this paper’s criterion in Chapter 1, the Seabees are the only units within NECC that truly fit the expeditionary model.

The Seabees are a combat support force with defensive capabilities and do not possess a forcible entry capability. No forces within the NECC command umbrella possess a forcible entry capability.

In summary, the Navy analysis concluded that the Navy as a whole is not an expeditionary force nor does it possess a forcible entry capability. The Navy can gain and maintain operational access in an A2AD environment with its Carrier Strike Groups and Expeditionary Strike Groups. These groups are truly agile, versatile, flexible, and sustainable and can deliver forces with forcible entry capabilities in an A2AD environment.

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18 Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant, United States Marine Corps, and Commandant, United States Coast Guard, Universal Naval Task List, (Washington, DC: Department of Navy Issuance (DONI), 2008) 30.
Lieutenant General Victor Krulak, USMC, (Ret), in his book *First to Fight*, eloquently communicates the mindset of the Marine Corps when he states,

Voltaire, in a disclaimer of atheism, declared, “If there was not a God it would be necessary to invent one.” Similarly, some modern-day military philosopher might be inspired to say that if the United States did not have a Marine Corps it would be necessary, in our national interest, to create one. But…to try to duplicate today’s Marine Corps would be as hopeless as commanding a sculptor to create another David.\(^\text{19}\)

This quote exemplifies the way the Marine Corps thinks. It starts with its ethos and translates through its doctrine. As laid out in the introduction of this paper, the Marine Corps has defined for itself the characteristics that contribute to its expeditionary nature. The Marine Corps task-organizes around these principles. Figure 4, Marine Corps Task 1.1.2 directs Marine Corps units to organize into Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF). This provides the Marine Corps options for flexible, versatile, and sustainable operations.

**MCT 1.1.2 Provide Task-Organized Forces**
The Marine Corps organizes its operational forces as Marine Corps components and as MAGTFs to provide task-organized, self-sustaining, multipurpose forces to the joint force or naval expeditionary force. These uniquely organized Marine Corps forces can respond to a wide range of operational and tactical missions and tasks, providing an unmatched combination of deployment and employment options. *(JP 1, 3-0, MCDP 1-0)*

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Marine Corps Doctrine Publication 3 (MCDP-3), *Expeditionary Operations*, is the Marine Corps’ comprehensive publication that lays out its defining characteristics, the nature of expeditionary operations, and missions that would require an expeditionary force. MCDP-3 lists the following characteristics that it states are criterion for expeditionary operations:

- The defining characteristic of expeditionary operations is projection of force into a foreign setting.

- By definition, an expedition involves the deployment of military forces to the scene of a crisis or conflict and their requisite support some significant distance from their home bases. These forces may already have been forward deployed…or they may be required to deploy from their home bases in response to a developing situation.

- Expeditionary operations involve the establishment of forward bases, land or sea, from which military power can be brought to bear on the situation.

- Not all power projection constitutes expeditionary operations; operations that do not involve actual deployment of forces are not expeditionary.

- Power projection does not imply expeditionary operations are by definition offensive.

- An expeditionary force need not be primarily a ground combat organization…an expeditionary force may consist of aviation units operating out of an expeditionary airfield, supported by only a small security force.

- Expeditionary forces vary significantly in size and composition.

- Expeditionary operations may also vary greatly in scope, ranging from full-scale combat to non-combat missions.

- The term expeditionary implies a temporary duration with the intention to withdraw from foreign soil after accomplishing a specified mission.

- The term expeditionary implies austere conditions and support. This does not mean that an expeditionary force is necessarily small or lightly loaded.\(^{21}\)

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equipped, but that it is no larger or heavier than necessary to accomplish the mission. Supplies, equipment, and infrastructure are limited to operational necessities; amenities are strictly minimized.

- Expeditionary operations require a special mindset—a constant preparation for immediate deployment overseas into austere operating environments, bringing everything necessary to accomplish the mission.22

This list certainly provides the most comprehensive set of criterion found in any doctrinal military publication associated with expeditionary warfare; however, it too leaves further areas to define and analysis to conduct. This list states that expeditionary operations involve the establishment of forward bases and that expeditionary operations can range from full-scale combat to non-combat missions. In this case a non-combat evacuation operation (NEO) fits the criteria of the range of operations provided in this list. Members from a MAGTF that are sent ashore from amphibious Navy shipping, as in the Lebanon NEO,23 to facilitate the movement of evacuees onto amphibious transport, do not establish a forward base. Not all “expeditionary” operations, using the context provided here must involve the establishment of forward bases. This list also states that the term expeditionary implies a temporary duration. This temporal term must also be defined as it has implications into the sustainability of the force conducting the operation and the purpose of the mission. The criterions suggest that aviation units operating out of an “expeditionary” airfield fit the criteria of expeditionary operations. The authors use the adjective of expeditionary to describe the criterion they are trying to justify. One must first define and understand what constitutes the establishment of an expeditionary airfield.

to know that it fits the criterion of expeditionary operations. Marine Corps Task (MCT) 1.2.2, *Embark Forces*, tasks Marine Corps units to embark on shipping or aircraft and be prepared to offload based on tactical requirements as seen in Figure 5. This task runs specifically parallel to two of the criterion from MCDP-3. The criterion suggests that the force operates in austere environments, but that it is no larger or heavier than needed.

### MCT 1.2.3 Embark Forces

To embark forces and equipment on naval (including *expeditionary/amphibious* and follow-on) Military Sealift or commercial shipping and/or aircraft, preparatory to movement, to off-load area. Includes preparation of loading and berthing plans. How the forces are embarked may be determined by the expected tactical requirements upon offloading. *(JP 1.3-0,3-02,3-02.2,4-0, 4-01 Series, MCWP 3-32, NDP 1, 4, NWP 3-02 Series, 3-02.21, 3-05.4, 4-01, NTTP 3-02.3, NTA 1.1.1.3)*

Figure 5  MCT 1.2.3 Embark Forces

The relationship between these characteristics to task is critical in that the equipment used by the MAGTF must be able to fit onto the shipping and be readily moved and accessible by the units. When the force deploys it must take every possible combination of equipment required for the missions it is tasked to be prepared to execute on deployment. Therefore, if one takes this nuance of the characteristic and places it against the context of MCT 1.2.3, the only justifiable means of deploying a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) is by shipping. This is the only method to allow a force to bring everything it may require from its home base and be adaptable enough to execute only with the force and equipment scaled to its requirement. Lastly, the criterion suggests that an expeditionary operation is a projection of a force into a foreign setting.

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MCDP-3 also suggests that operations not involving actual deployment of forces is not expeditionary. Assumed here is that MCDP-1 is stating that deployment is synonymous with U.S. troops conducting operations on foreign soil. When placed against that context a MEU embarked on amphibious shipping is not expeditionary until it is used on foreign land. Until then it only has the capability to be expeditionary. This broader concept is discussed in the conclusion of this paper.

MCDP-3 also asserts that there are certain objectives that can only be accomplished by placing military forces on foreign soil, thus making them expeditionary. These are:

- To assure policy objectives pursued by other means have been secured; for example, to ensure compliance with established diplomatic solutions such as the adherence to a cease-fire or an agreement to hold free elections.

- To seize or control airports, ports, resource areas, or political centers to ensure their safe use, to deny their use to an enemy or disruptive element, or to facilitate future actions such as introduction of follow-on forces.

- To control urban or other restrictive terrain.

- To establish a close, physical, and highly visible presence to demonstrate political resolve, deter aggressive action, or compel desired behavior.

- To establish and maintain order in an area beset by chaos and disorder.

- To protect or rescue U.S. citizens or other civilians.

- To separate warring groups from each other or from populations at large, especially when enemy or disruptive elements are embedded.

- To provide physical relief and assistance in the event of disaster.²⁵

While this list arguably does not cover every conceivable instance in which forces project onto a foreign setting, it does give a broad range of examples. Most notably, the objective to facilitate future actions such as introduction of follow-on forces gives some hint as to the temporal nature of the operations. MCT 1.4.1.6, *Create Pioneer Roads and Trails*, provides an example of the nature of this objective to task link as seen in Figure 6. This MCT tasks units to facilitate the movement of their follow-on combat support units by creating the conditions in austere environments. If one also takes this objective and places it against the context of the criterion of the temporary nature of expeditionary operations, one can begin to set a basis for a uniqueness of this warfare.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MCT 1.4.1.6 Create Pioneer Roads and Trails</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Create expeditionary routes to allow CS units to maneuver in trace of assault forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>(JP 3-0, MCDP 1-0, MCWP 3-17)</em></td>
</tr>
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Figure 6  MCT 1.4.1.6 Create Pioneer Roads and Trails

Another theme one can glean from the limited list of objectives above is the environment the force can expect. This list of objectives does not explicitly state forcible entry as an objective. MCDP-3 asserts that, along with the characteristics previously listed, there are critical enabling actions that lead to the success of the operation. One of these is the speed of deployment; however, the expeditious deployment of a sustainable force is most critical. Another is the entry into the theater of operations. This entry may be permissive or hostile, or may change in the midst of the operation. MCDP-3 states, “a

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forcible-entry capability is a permanent requirement for successful expeditionary operations."^{27}

The link between the enabling factor of versatility in force, to the characteristic of an appropriately mission-sized force is critical when place against the context of flexibility, versatility, and sustainability. This linkage meets all three defining characteristics. MCDP-3 lists its defining characteristics, it does not list forcible entry. It lists this as a critical enabler, but then states that it is a permanent requirement for a successful operation. A factor placed this high as a priority should be defined as more than a critical enabler, it should be a defining characteristic of the force.

A method the Marine Corps uses to task organize for its definition of expeditionary operations is the MAGTF. Therefore, a brief discussion of the MAGTF concept is justified.

The MAGTF is task-organized into four elements- the Command Element (CE), the Air Combat Element (ACE), the Ground Combat Element, and the Logistics Combat Element (LCE). This task organization is designed to be complimentary and scalable. It is capable of conducting operations across the spectrum commensurate with its size. This versatility includes the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF 45,000), Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB 17,000), Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU 2,000), and Special Purpose MAGTFs (size commensurate with mission). The flexibility ranges from a MEU that can remain at sea for a deployment on Navy amphibious shipping, or a MEF that can conduct sustained shore based operations, such as in Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom. The MEU is designed to be deployed temporarily and then reconstituted and re-embarked

for operations elsewhere. The Marine Corps also relies on the Maritime Prepositioning Forces (MPF) operated by Military Sealift Command. These MPF vessels are the vital link, together with Navy shipping, to be able to deliver the full combat power of an entire 45,000 Marine MEF. These ships are designated to carry heavy equipment and cargo for the MAGTF and are forward deployed in key locations enabling airlifted troops to meet equipment in theater. This MPF concept is designed to sustain a MEB for 30 days; however, it must have both a secure airfield and seaport to conduct operations. This concept is designed either for permissive environments or as follow-on force flow packages.

This section’s analysis explored the characteristics, objectives, and critical enablers assigned to expeditionary operations by the Marine Corps. Placed against the context of the foundational characteristics described in this paper they are quite similar. Forcible entry is not a defining characteristic of the Marine Expeditionary Force. In the joint analysis, an expeditionary force must have a forcible entry capability. The Marine Corps does possess this capability but this capability does not define them as a force. Given all these characteristics, objectives, and critical enablers the largest “expeditionary” force the Marine Corps can deploy is its MEU. A MEU is the only force capable of being deployed into theater with all of its equipment into either a permissive environment or a hostile environment. Any larger force would have to wait until conditions were established to allow MPF vessels to enter a secure environment and deliver its associated equipment. Based on its established criteria and that one cannot predict when an environment will turn hostile, the MEU is the largest expeditionary force the Marine Corps can deploy.
In summary, the Marine Corps does not have the ability to project its power onto a foreign setting without the capability of another service. It requires the strategic airlift of the Air Force or the linked shipping assets of the MPF and Navy. It is agile, versatile, and flexible. Without the link to Navy shipping or land infrastructure MEU sustainability is limited to approximately 15 days. The MEU is the Marine Corps’ largest expeditionary unit. Other Marine Corps forces would constitute either forcible entry forces or follow-on forces. The MEU with its MAGTF concept and forcible entry capability is the Marine Corps’ contribution to joint expeditionary operations.

U.S. Army Analysis

Following the Cold War the Army sought to redefine itself against a future environment that would not be characterized by a dominant and predictable threat such as the Soviet Union. The Army realized that its doctrine was singularly focused and would not prove successful against the future trends. While most of the other services sought to define themselves as “expeditionary,” the Army was slow to join the “expeditionary race” initially and looked to a modular force concept within its larger concept of Force XXI.

The Army Force XXI concept was released in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 (PM 525-5) in 1994. It stated that to be relevant in the future the Army must “design organizations and develop capabilities that will allow it to be rapidly tailorable, rapidly expansible, strategically deployable, and effectively employable as part of a joint and multinational team to achieve decisive results in future War and OOTW [Operations
Other Than War] in all operational environments.\textsuperscript{28} While not stated in exactly the same terms, this is similar to other services realizations that it must have a force that can provide, in the Army’s case, land units against threats spanning the spectrum of conflict without significant delay in operations. To this end, PM 525-5 puts forth five characteristics that defines Force XXI. They are:

- Doctrinal flexibility
- Strategic mobility
- Tailorability and modularity
- Joint and multi-national connectivity and,
- Versatility to function in War and OOTW\textsuperscript{29}

These characteristics are very similar to the baseline expeditionary characteristics that this paper will recommend. They are different enough to require a brief discussion.

Doctrinal flexibility is described as “practiced in application of principles in varied scenarios, our soldiers and leaders will be able to continually adapt tactics, techniques, procedures, and organizations to meet future requirements.”\textsuperscript{30} This is the first step in the realization of instilling real change. The leaders must be flexible enough to allow for the feedback of the conditions and then flexible to absorb those changes in to the training cycle. The training would no longer be conducted using one scenario based on one adversary. It would be a full spectrum approach allowing for a dynamic environment.

\textsuperscript{29} Ibid, 28.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid, 28.
Strategic mobility is defined as “being at the right place at the right time with the right capabilities.” In PM 525-5, the Army recognized the balance between mobility and survivability. While striving to become a lighter and more mobile force, it will remain focused on survivability and lethality of its early entry forces. These “early entry” forces may be considered expeditionary in other circles and this paper will use this term against that context.

Tailorability and modularity was really the crux behind these changes. The Army recognized that future environments would demand that “organizations will [need] to grow flatter and less rigidly hierarchical.” This organizational change allows a command and control structure that is more flexible to the situation. Modularity of units enables the Army to adjust to the uncertain environment of future contingencies.

The Army specifically states that it is “dependent upon other services for strategic lift.” This statement alone denotes that as an independent service the Army alone cannot project its power on a foreign setting. The Army recognizes that it possesses “unique capabilities on land and at ports and airfields that other services cannot provide for themselves.” These points will be discussed in chapter four when redefining the future joint expeditionary force.

PM 525-5 discusses versatility and states “the Nation cannot afford to maintain an army of armies in the early twenty-first century.” This modular concept must be

33 Ibid, 29.
versatile across the spectrum of conflict and the concept addresses the Army as a whole. There will be no room for parts of the force to be trained in various missions that the other is not. The modular concept depends on that and versatility demands it.

PM 525-5 states Early Entry Forces are “forces that are not necessarily light or heavy, but tailored to METT-T [Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops-Time] in order to create the best possible capabilities-based force to meet the needs of any given contingency.”

To meet the needs of any given contingency, this force must have the capability for forcible entry or Operations Other Than War. This concept is sound. It describes either a short duration operation or as a foundation for successive operations. These early entry Army forces meet the criteria this paper will recommend for an expeditionary force. Mobility should be balanced against lethality.

A RAND document reports that,

For the future force, the Army has set a goal of deploying a brigade-sized unit in 96 hours. The metric for this goal has been defined as the time from wheels-up of the aircraft with the first load of the unit until the last aircraft is unloaded at the Aerial Port Of Departure. Thus, it does not include the time to negotiate basing and overflight rights, construct the GRL, or determine the force to deploy.

Based on the RAND report 96 hours is the Army goal for deploying a Brigade size force to point of crisis. This assumes that the lift is available for the unit. This does not include diplomatic measures associated with the operations, which is inherent in all service operations. One now knows the time it will take for a brigade to respond to a crisis. Figure 7 depicts the tradeoff between lethality and mobility. As the graph depicts, to get to the point of action quickly, the Army

36 Ibid, 39.
must decide to go with a lighter force. This risk choice to the force is depicted by the dotted line and marked risk to force. Conversely, if the Army wishes to apply heavy combat power to the point of action, it is forced to assume risk in the time it takes to arrive in the theater. The dotted line marked time penalty depicts this.

When speaking of Army brigades, generally, there are light brigades and heavy brigades. As the RAND report states,

Currently, the Army’s light-heavy conventional force structure forces a choice between response speed and combat power…When deployment time is critical and the combat power need exceeds that of a light unit at a desired level of operational risk, one of two risks has to be accepted (unless another service can provide the right combat power in the right time). If time is deemed paramount, then a level of force or operational risk will result. Alternatively, if the force risk is not acceptable, then time risk results.  

**Figure 7 Lethality vs Mobility**

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This aspect denotes a severe limitation in the Army force projection capability. The Army will either be swift to a crisis and may lack sufficient combat power, or arrive with sufficient combat power at a speed that is slower than desired. This limitation forces the joint force commander into an operational risk calculation unless another force can fill any existing gaps. This aspect calls into question the Army’s agility and mobility of its modular early entry forces and must be discussed against the context of individual services abilities to be expeditionary.

Modularity and Force XXI is how the Army attempted to posture their post-Cold War force. Field Manual 3-0, Operations, (FM 3-0) released in 2008 brought the Army into the expeditionary fold. The 2008 FM 3-0 speaks broadly of the Army’s capabilities as expeditionary and campaigning. Expeditionary is described as “an Army responsible for deploying forces promptly at any time, in any environment, against any adversary.”

Campaigning is described as “once deployed, the Army operates for extended periods across the spectrum of conflict, from stable peace through general war.” The fact that the Army distinguishes between these two capabilities shows that it recognizes that expeditionary capabilities are distinguishable from long term campaigning. This is a relevant and important fact to bring forward. FM 3-0 further describes expeditionary as “…the need to match forces to available lift drive expeditionary capabilities.” This shows that the Army recognizes its reliance on available lift to project power. More importantly the Army offers that it is the match between available lift and forces that drives expeditionary capabilities. This foundational concept is flawed in that the

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40 Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command, Operations, FM 3-0 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008) 9.
41 Ibid. 9.
conditions presented in a crisis will drive the needed capabilities. The forces brought to bear will be limited by the lift it receives; this may just present gaps in capabilities at the point of action. The Army still wrestles with the dilemma of combat power versus lift. This still presents a hurdle for the Army as speed and agility were presented as underlying characteristics of expeditionary operations. Once at the point of action the Army forces possess expeditionary characteristics. As stated in FM 3-0, “with their modular capabilities, these forces can be swiftly deployed, employed, and sustained for extended operations without an unwieldy footprint…these forces are tailored for the initial phase of operations, easily task-organized, and highly self-sufficient.”43 As with all services, the Army relies on foreign basing and forward deployed troops to provide swift response. FM 3-0 states, “Army installations worldwide serve as support platforms for force projection, providing capabilities and information on demand.”44 The Army, and all services, will need to readdress its reliance on basing worldwide in the future environment. This concept will be discussed further in Chapter Four.

In summary, speed and agility were presented as underlying characteristics of expeditionary operations; this still presents a hurdle for the Army. Once at the point of action the Army forces possess expeditionary characteristics. The Army’s forcible entry capability of airborne and air assault should remain its contribution to joint expeditionary operations. Unless forward deployed in the vicinity of the point of action, the air assault forces are better defined as follow on forces.

43 Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command, Operations, FM 3-0 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008) 27.
44 Ibid, 27.
U.S. Air Force Analysis

In a 1996 Air Power Journal article, Gen Looney III describes the goal of the conceptual Air Expeditionary Force as “to launch combat sorties in-theater 48 hours after an execute order is issued and then sustain combat airpower for the duration of the conflict or crisis.” This quote by Gen Looney about the concept of the Air Expeditionary Force speaks to two aspects of expeditionary characteristics—speed and sustainability. The Air Force was grappling with how to posture their service following the Cold War; going from forward garrisoning to CONUS launched operations into the theater of conflict. In the article he delineates four constraints that are “always required before considering the deployment of an Air Expeditionary Force.” These constraints are:

- An Air Expeditionary Force would require access to the host country and/or clearances into any airspace that requires transit to get to the fight.
- An Air Expeditionary Force needs an established base (usually an operational host-nation base) to furnish a runway, an area for a tent city, and some basic water and fuel infrastructure.
- Strategic airlift and tanker assets must be made readily available.
- The ability to get munitions into the location can be both a logistical and diplomatic issue. Prepositioned dumb/smart bombs along with missiles, either

46 Ibid, 7.
47 Gen William R. Looney, III, The Air Expeditionary Force: Taking the Air Force into the Twenty-first Century, Airpower Journal (1996) 7. The article suggests, “the deployment of an AEF would most likely occur during periods with normal day-to-day airlift requirements, not, for example, during a severe crisis, a major regional conflict about to erupt, or early in an isolated crisis situation. In such cases, an AEF should be able to gain top priority for that period. The airlift requirement has not been fine-tuned to date, but will probably fall in the neighborhood of 50 to 60 C-141 equivalents depending on the amount of pre-positioning in-theater,” 7.
brought in on deploying fighters or airlifted, will offer initial combat capability.\footnote{Ibid, 7.}

The constraints above suggest that the Air Expeditionary Force would not be able to stand on its own when it came to the expeditionary arena. It requires support infrastructure and access in order to commence its mission and sustain any operations. This analysis is based on conceptual information.

Air Force Task 5.4 from the Air Force Universal Task List tasks Air Expeditionary Forces to rapidly deploy and integrate in place as Figure 8 shows. Integrate in-place means to be able to either integrate with an existing Joint Force or a forward deployed Air Force structure. The task states that once integrated, the Air Expeditionary Force can perform functions across the core competencies. Unless integrated the Air Expeditionary Force cannot perform its functions or would be severely degraded.

**AFT 5.4 Provide Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) Capabilities.** To organize, train, equip, provide, and plan for the use of forces to rapidly respond to global requirements for combat capable aerospace organizations for expeditious in-place integration. Once integrated, AEFs can perform operations across the core competencies of the Air Force. (AFDD 1, AFDD 2).


The only other task associated with the term expeditionary in the Air Force task list is shown in Figure 9. Air Force task 5.4.1 tasks Air Expeditionary Force units to respond to global requirements for combat capable organizations. This task assumes that the global
requirements of *expeditionary* in Air *Expeditionary* Force are inherently understood in the Joint lexicon and this will be delineated properly in the Request for Forces (RFF) process. That is the key issue. The capabilities and defining characteristics needed are not codified to request a force properly. The task to respond to those requirements is not justified because there is not yet a joint task demanding them.

The Air Force envisions as its expeditionary future *America’s Air force: vision 2020*. This document “will guide America’s Air Force in meeting the diverse challenges of the 21st Century as a part of America’s Joint Military Team.”

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**AFT 5.4.1 Perform AEF Functions.** To rapidly respond to global requirements for combat capable aerospace organizations. (*AFDD 1, AFDD 2*).

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The future vision laid out by the Air Force in its service white paper is dedicated to showing that it is an expeditionary force. As the document transits through its explanation, it first speaks of its foundation, then its domain, and then its method. It states this method is expeditionary. The vision asserts, “We [the Air Force] are an expeditionary aerospace force configured for the full spectrum of aerospace operations.” The Air Force has ten deployable Air Expeditionary Forces. Two Air Expeditionary Forces are always deployed or on call to meet current national requirements, while the remaining Air Expeditionary Forces train, exercise, and prepare

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for the full spectrum of operations. Air Expeditionary Force provide joint force commanders with ready and complete aerospace force packages that can be tailored to meet the spectrum of contingencies—ensuring situational awareness, freedom from attack, freedom to maneuver and freedom to attack. They fit into established theater-based command and control structures, when such are available, or bring their own command and control when needed. The Air Force maintains an Aerospace Expeditionary Wing (AEW) on continuous alert as a “911” force to respond to unexpected developments, as well as on-call Lead Wings to open expeditionary bases. These Lead Wings give the AEF basing capability viewed as a constraint in its conceptual phase. The Lead Wing would be able to create the conditions necessary for the follow-on Air Expeditionary Force to conduct combat sorties upon arrival. Previous to the Lead Wing the Air Expeditionary Force had to rely on existing and working host nation or forward deployed organic infrastructure to deploy.

In a smaller-scale contingency, one Air Expeditionary Force, task force-organized, can provide intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and command and control of aerospace forces, over an area roughly half the size of Texas. The Air Expeditionary Force can provide air superiority while striking some 200 targets per day. One Air Expeditionary Force can surge to provide these capabilities 24 hours a day. More Air Expeditionary Forces can be added expanding the space we can control and contributing to our ability to transition rapidly from contingency operations to major theater war. This aspect allows the Air Expeditionary Force to be flexible and adaptable.

53 Department of the Air Force, "America’s Air Force Vision 2020," United States Air Force, www.af.mil/vision (accessed 15 November 2012) 5. These lead wings are able to provide for the start up logistics and operations of the expeditionary airfield. To “open an expeditionary base,” used here is not to suggest under forcible entry conditions, and some existing, but maybe presently dilapidated, infrastructure is present.
in a specific mission while remaining ready to shift rapidly to an entirely different mission. It also allows increased versatility enabling the Air Expeditionary Force to be scalable and still provide a force that can perform functions across the spectrum of operations. Flexibility and versatility are critical components of expeditionary warfare. The *Air Force Vision 2020* states “We [Air Force] have returned to our expeditionary roots in the way we organize ourselves and present our forces.”\(^5^4\)

While a complete review of the history of the Air Force is out of the scope of this paper, an example is provided to give context for the Air Force’s concepts of their expeditionary nature. During the Cold War the services organized specifically to counter the Soviet threat in a variety of arenas. The Air Force was tasked specifically with strategic air and nuclear capability. To employ this capability, the Air Force established the Composite Air Strike Force (CASF).

Very similar to the Air Expeditionary Force concept, the CASF is:

> a small, tactical air force composed of a command element, fighter, recon, tankers, troops carrier aircraft, and communications support units. The primary characteristic and determining quality of the force is fast reaction. [Emphasis in original] The CASF must be able to intervene swiftly against any aggressor in hours or the concept of deploying a strike force from the United States would lose its validity.\(^5^5\)

The CASF was primarily focused on speed. By possessing this composition of aircraft and capabilities, it also displayed a unique amount of flexibility offered by the Air Force up to that time. This enables an enhanced flexibility in options if forward basing becomes an issue. Sustainability was still a concern. Stated in *Composite Air Strike Force Concept of Operations*, “The CASF was designed to conduct sustained operations


for approximately 30 days with minimum logistics support (excluding food, fuel, and ammunition). Tactical Air Command designed “flyaway kits” containing spares and equipment vital to combat operations.”

Food, fuel and ammunition are the key factors when defining limits of sustainability, and any argument excluding those is not complete. The example of the CASF shows that the Air Force does possess expeditionary concepts in its history. The Air Expeditionary Force concept and employment closely mirrors that of the CASF, but improves on it with the component of the Lead Wing and endeavoring to ensure force-wide applications.

In summary, the Air Force has constructed its entire organization around an expeditionary concept. The concept is garrison based and is designed to control force flow as opposed to meet a battlefield condition. The Air Expeditionary Force is versatile, agile to a degree, and possesses speed. To be sustainable for any amount of time the Air Expeditionary Force requires an in-place physical infrastructure system and the Air Force does not possess a forcible entry capability. The Air Force’s contribution to joint expeditionary operations should remain a versatile force able to gain and maintain superiority in the air, space, and cyber domains within an A2AD environment allowing forcible entry by the Army or Marine Corps.

CHAPTER 3: Historical Analysis

Lessons of the American Frontier

Following the American Revolution westward expansion grew in America. As American settlers emigrated to the new lands of the western territories so too did the militias, and later the U.S. Army. The U.S. Army’s role in the American west was to protect the movement corridors for the settlers. Later the mission grew to seek and destroy the various Indian nation peoples. The U.S. Army sought to expand west by moving from garrison to garrison to afford a fair amount of protection.

During the Revolution Thomas Jefferson stated the following about a British Officer, Governor Henry Hamilton,

“These savages under this well known character are employed by the British Nation as allies in the War against the Americans. Governor Hamilton undertakes to be the conductor of the war. In the execution of that undertaking he associates small parties of whites under his immediate command with large parties of the Savages, and sends them to act, not against our Forts or armies in the fields, but farming settlements on our frontiers.”

This is a colonial power using an indigenous population as a force multiplier to harass early American western farming settlements. This is the catalyst for those same settlements to ask for protection.

Protection for the settlements came in the form of rangers. These rangers, also called Dragoons, modeled on both the friendly indigenous Indian model and the European Cavalry tradition were built to operate in any condition.

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Militia Commander Benjamin Church was a pioneer of his time and realized that the only way to defeat the Indians was to fight like them. In 1676 he began the traditions of learning the way of the Indians by being trained by a group of friendly Indians. Following this training, Church and his men set out on a winter campaign known as the “Nipmuck Expedition” relatively unheard of in its time.² They returned home after lack of provisions stretched the force to its breaking point. This showed sustainability was a defining characteristic in one of the earliest American expeditions in history. This “expedition” is also reported to have commenced the ranger tradition.³ Church and his scouts would “not lie in town or in garrison with them [the militia]…but would lie in the woods as the enemy did.”⁴ Austere conditions were inherent on the frontier and in the colonial lives in the 17th century. These conditions were valued by early Rangers as an advantage and were a defining characteristic of their warfare.

In the late 18th century with the quest for westward expansion, garrisoning became the norm and the operational success of Indian fighting decreased as a result. Brigadier General Lachlan McIntosh stated he did not possess the correct leadership skills for this new way of America warfare. He found himself in Ohio country and promptly built two new forts (naming one after himself) where he could sit and wait. As John Grenier states in The First Way of War,

“Instead of forcing his troops to act, however, McIntosh committed the classic blunder of frontier warfare. He garrisoned the newly constructed forts with troops who were safe from all but a want of provisions; as the winter progressed, the garrisons increasingly came to

³ Ibid, 33.
⁴ Ibid, 33.
depend on friendly Delawares for food. Shawnee war parties, meanwhile, had a free hand to scour the American frontier. In both January and February 1779, they attacked McIntosh’s other fort...The Americans did not need Continental regulars satisfied with garrisoning forts, but frontiersmen who would take the fight to the Indians no matter where they were located.”

This era witnessed a distinct rift in the way the new nation viewed the conduct of war. Following the Revolutionary War the newly formed Federal Army sought to define itself in the traditions of fighting the British Army; the traditions of European warfare which forts and lines. The frontiersmen and militia in the west sought to carry on the traditions of frontier fighting against the Indians. Out of the frontier lifestyle the “ranger way” was established. The frontiersmen regarded this as the only way to win the war with the Indian people and succeed in the progressive expansion westward. These traditions were passed down. In *The First Way of War* Grenier states, “the ranger companies of King William’s War became the nurseries for successive generations of New England rangers...[and] ranging was a way of life for successive generations...among whom a corporate knowledge of ranger warfare passed down from generation to generation.”

While expanding westward the Federal Army sought to hold land for the new nation by garrisoning. This tactic met resistance from the many Indian tribes seeking to maintain their land. The rangers of the frontier attempted to instill their form of Indian warfare into the greater Army’s culture. The ranger form of warfare was forbidden, limited, or the units were assigned positions of secondary

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6 Ibid, 171.
importance. This is because rangers were viewed by the regular Army as undisciplined in the context of the standard European model of warfare. Their form of warfare did not comply with the established norms of the time. At the time the regular Army and the rangers were conducting warfare against the same enemy for arguably differing reasons. The Army merely sought to hold ground for the new nation and progressive expansion of garrisons across the western frontier would work in this case. The rangers were comprised of local men who were fighting for the security of their homes, families, and states. The ranger way of seeking and destroying the enemy in and out of their own terrain was viewed by rangers as the best course of action. New Hampshire ranger Robert Rogers wrote characterizing ranger “rules,”

“There are, however, a thousand occurrences and circumstances which may happen, that will make it necessary, in some measure, to depart from them, and put other arts and stratagems in practice; in which cases every man’s reason and judgment must be his guide, according to the practical situation and nature of things; and that he may do this to advantage, he should keep in mind a maxim never to be departed from by a commander.”

This departure from the strict adherence to the rules and scripted battlefield play caused the rangers to be viewed as undisciplined. When placed against the context of the modern definition of expeditionary this departure runs parallel to the defining characteristic of flexibility and adaptability. Rogers is speaking to a rule for every ranger. If the ranger force is able to be flexible enough to depart from rules and strategy

8 Ibid, 171.
9 John, Grenier, The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 134. “These rules are from Roger’s original essay of over 3100 words. He distilled that essay down into 28 maxims and then in his “standing orders.” Those standing orders were the first formal doctrine of war making composed in North America. They elucidated the key points of ranging, so much that they remain the foundation of American ranger doctrine to this day. This approach was pragmatic and in contrast to the rigidorous battlefield rules of the time.”
to shift its focus quickly to another mission while still deployed the frontier ranger force is both flexible and adaptable.

There is a link between frontier garrisoning and the Forward Operating Base (FOB) operations in use today. This being a rather inflexible and adaptable modern approach based in a historical and continuing need.

The frontier garrisoning served a specific purpose. It was to hold land never to be relinquished. It also served as a base from which to operate. Settlements grew around these garrisons knowing that this land would forever be settled and that the garrison was there to provide that security. The idea was westward expansion and the objective was land acquisition. In the late 19th century the idea was the same. Following the Spanish-American War the U.S. put garrisons in the Philippines, Guam, Cuba, and Puerto Rico to hold and protect those acquisitions. Large, fortified settlements in these areas made sense.

Enormous permanent infrastructure does not enable an expeditionary force to be flexible and versatile. In Iraq and Afghanistan the U.S. military erected enormous FOBs which were perceived by many to be a symbol of occupation. Some argue that this is a necessary level of infrastructure to support operations. While some argue that the billions of dollars spent on the infrastructure and the niceties, including fast food chains and resort style accommodations, are a sign that the U.S. must export America to the battlefield in order to fight. The large FOB construct does not enable a force to reorganize and move quickly and does not allow it to scale down with ease should the political will of the host nation change.
American Expeditionary Force of World War I

When it entered World War I in April of 1917, the U.S. possessed a total land force of approximately 220,000 active duty soldiers and Marines. This number is an increase from the actual start of the war in 1914, but still considered quite small by European standards of the time.\(^\text{10}\) Many of these men were scattered among various outposts in the southwest or in the Philippines. While small in numbers most of the officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) had recent experience from fighting in the Spanish American war and in the Punitive Expedition in Mexico. GEN John J. Pershing was one such officer and he was tasked with creating and commanding the American Expeditionary Force (AEF). The AEF’s purpose was simple—“conduct a decisive offensive on the Western Front to win the war and ensure American dominance of the postwar peacetalks.”\(^\text{11}\) GEN Pershing and the new AEF deployed to Europe in June of 1917. When the AEF conducted its first offensive in 1918 it was a force of 667,000 men, and by war’s end it numbered over 2 million.\(^\text{12}\) Its first task in theater was to prepare for fighting.

The U.S. Army’s recent experience with the punitive expeditions in Mexico and the southwest U.S. created a paradigm and doctrinal belief that wide sweeping actions with small units were the successful way of warfare. Human on human involvement with the rifle and bayonet won primacy in doctrine. The traditions of European warfare of


\(^{12}\) Ibid, 26.
infantry line and columns were still strong. The U.S. Army was receiving accurate reports from the battlefield prior to its entry into the war on the methods of warfare utilized. These methods included advances and increased usage in tanks, artillery, machine guns, and infantry relying on trench warfare. The U.S. Army from 1914-1917 consistently wrote and published journals and articles discussing the importance of the infantry. The importance of bayonet tactics was a popular journal topic of this time. The U.S. Army was witnessing the battlefield changing in Europe but its leaders were entrenched in its previous paradigm of infantry and rifles winning wars.

When GEN Pershing arrived in theater in 1917 he witnessed exactly what was reported; heavy artillery, tank, and air bombardment, with infantry seeking to move from trench to trench and simply hold ground. This did not align with the American commander’s intent and he insisted all troops arriving in theater arrive trained in the art of “open warfare” with the idea of infantry primacy.13

The Western Front was in a stalemate for some time and it was GEN Pershing’s task to force a victory. He asserted that the only way to accomplish this was to force infantry into “open warfare” and force battle there. The AEF conducted training in the U.S. and Europe prior to its first engagement and as historian Douglas V. Johnson II states,

It produced infantry that attacked in linear formations of the decades gone by. It produced infantry that only knew how to attack straight ahead. It produced infantry unfamiliar with its normal supporting arms. It produced infantry willing to be killed in straight ahead attacks because it knew no better.14

14 Ibid, 44.
This is how the AEF conducted warfare in the early stages of its engagements. Unit commanders were instructed to seek and create opportunities for open warfare vice merely capitalizing or exploiting them. The Allied forces and German forces did not view open warfare and the infantry as obsolete but the thinking surrounding the timing and method of infantry employment had changed.

The underlying fundamental difference in this idea of warfare created difficulty. The American commander and senior commanders in general viewed trench warfare as inferior to open warfare. Open warfare and infantry according to American doctrine was the superior warfare and the way to win. The Europeans viewed open warfare and trench warfare as different methods to accomplish the objective.

Pershing’s and other top American leader’s view of trench warfare as inferior was not without cause. Prior to U.S. direct involvement, the reports from the battlefield were of Allied losses in the trenches and stalemates along the fronts. The American commanders believed this was due to Allied forces stagnation. American doctrine was based on the infantry unit being “charged with the main work on the field of battle…and they ultimately decided the final issue of combat.”15 While other units especially the artillery, “existed solely to assist the infantry in accomplishing its crucial role of closing with the enemy ranks and defeating them in man-to-man combat.”16 With reports of battlefield losses and a doctrinal foundation based on supporting infantry maneuver, some argue that the AEF commanders’ unswerving devotion to the doctrine of the time was sound.

16 Ibid, 15.
Still others argue that the commanders failed to recognize the changing battlefield conditions in the time prior to actual declaration of war and the first engagement of American troops.\textsuperscript{17} This led to most changes from battlefield trials of the lower ranks in the AEF.

The executors of the doctrine and the strategy learned much from their engagements and this is how the paradigm shifted. As one officer noted:

> It was the grim common sense of the ‘doughboy’ and not our obsolete and impossible tactics that won us ground. Oh! The precious time wasted in our elaborate, useless, murderous ‘science’ called ‘musketry.’ It is as much out of style as the musket from which it takes its name. Teaching it should be made a court-martial offense. It is murder in print. Battles were not fought in lines.\textsuperscript{18}

The AEF deployed with a clear objective. It was sent to a foreign setting as a fighting force to end World War I. The training was short sighted however, and was not modified based on the existing conditions of the battlefield at the time. The force deployed and its doctrine was not adaptable. The force became flexible, adaptable and versatile out of necessity to survive the conditions of trench warfare versus the open warfare style it was based upon.

The AEF and Federal Army of Post Revolution in the western American frontier provide lessons of leaders not being flexible, adaptable, and versatile in

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid, 31-43. An excellent description of Pershing’s conviction to the standing doctrine is given in The AEF Way of War: “To ensure that American forces sent to Europe would not be easily converted to any heretical ideas, Pershing sent a flurry of messages back to Washington directing that all military training stress the crucial role of infantry in battle, the preeminent value of the rifle and bayonet, and the American version of mobile fighting. He insisted that all soldiers be taught that the ‘rifle and bayonet remain the supremem weapons of the Infantry soldier’ and that the ‘ultimate success of the Army depends upon their proper use in open warfare…’Pershing argued that Americans differed from their European associates, with special inherent characteristics and capabilities, as well as, distinct traditions, and he claimed that they needed to fight with a doctrine that matched their national character.”

conflict. The lessons were learned at the lowest levels of the AEF and were executed as the War progressed. The leadership was more than reluctant to make any lasting changes to doctrine. This is contrasted with AEF junior leaders and those of Roger’s Rangers to learn traditions and lessons that can be applicable to determining requirements of an expeditionary force that may apply to the future operating environment and Joint Force 2020.

In summary, the historical analysis shows an expeditionary force must remain flexible, agile, and versatile and not wait until the mission presents itself to determine what training is needed. It must have the proper equipment and material for the mission at its disposal at hand to enter rapidly the area required.
This chapter will use joint and service expeditionary doctrine and training constructs U.S. traditions of expeditionary warfare, and related expeditionary terminology to describe and define joint expeditionary operations.

Expeditionary operations are required based on guidance in the 2005 and 2010 Chairman’s Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO), the 2011 Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC), and the 2010 projected Joint Operating Environment (JOE). There are common traits, characteristics, and capabilities that are useful in defining and describing Expeditionary operations and forces. These are agility, flexibility, speed, and sustainability. Expeditionary operations must take place regardless of the Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD) environment. Forcible entry in an A2AD environment is a required capability for joint expeditionary operations. Gaining and maintaining operational access in the A2AD environment to support forcible entry is a required capability. Regionally aligned forces and strict adherence to U.S. command and control are not useful characteristics for the future force and should not be included in any further description.

These common traits, characteristics, and capabilities are supported by the analysis conducted in chapter 2 and the Joint discussion uncovered key items that add to the expeditionary requirements. That was the ability to operate in an A2AD environment. The JOAC lists two tasks that it states are inseparable when it comes to gaining and maintaining operational access. They are:

- The combat task of overcoming the enemy’s anti-access and area-denial capabilities through the application of combat power and,
• Moving and supporting the necessary combat power over the required distances, essentially a logistical task that can be a challenge in itself.

Gaining and maintaining operational access regardless of the A2AD environment should be a defining expeditionary characteristic. To gain and maintain operational access, Expeditionary forces must be able to perform the above tasks. Forcible entry operations conducted as part of the operational access concept must include amphibious assault, airborne assault, or air assault.

The Naval analysis was broken into two parts, Navy and Marine Corps. The Navy analysis concluded that the Navy as a whole is not an expeditionary force nor possess a forcible entry capability. The Navy can gain and maintain operational access in an A2AD environment with its Carrier Strike Groups and Expeditionary Strike Groups. These groups are truly agile, versatile, flexible, and sustainable and can deliver forces with forcible entry capabilities in an A2AD environment. These forced entry capabilities are not Navy forces. The Navy cannot claim to possess expeditionary capabilities. The minimum definition is an armed force organized to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country. The Navy can only accomplish this when using the Naval team that includes the Marine Corps forces for ground operations across the spectrum of conflict.

The Marine Corps is based doctrinally on being expeditionary. It was coined the “expeditionary force in readiness.” It does not have the ability to project its power onto a foreign setting without the capability of another service. It requires the strategic airlift of the Air Force or the linked shipping assets of the MPF and Navy. It is agile, versatile, and flexible. Without the link to Navy shipping or land infrastructure MEU sustainability is limited to approximately 15 days. The MEU is the Marine Corps’ largest expeditionary
unit. Other Marine Corps forces would constitute either forcible entry forces or follow-on forces.

The Army analysis uncovered the Army’s Force XXI model and the expeditionary versus campaigning concept. The term modular and the Force XXI model draws close comparisons with efforts made by the other services in the expeditionary arena. Modularity allows the Army to be versatile; however, the Army’s agility is questionable. Because the Army is tied to strategic lift it must still make a tradeoff decision between speed to the point of action and combat power. This is a severely limiting factor in the expeditionary arena. The Army still wrestles with the dilemma of combat power versus lift. The Army will either be swift to a crisis with less combat power, or arrive with sufficient combat power at a slower speed. This limitation forces the Joint Force Commander into an operational risk calculation unless another force can fill any existing gaps. As speed and agility were presented as underlying characteristics of expeditionary operations, this still presents a hurdle for the Army. Once at the point of action the Army forces possess expeditionary characteristics. The Army’s forcible entry capability of airborne and air assault should remain its contribution to joint expeditionary operations. Unless forward deployed in the vicinity of the point of action, the air assault forces are better defined as follow on forces.

The Air Force has constructed its entire organization around an expeditionary concept. The concept was garrison based and was designed to control force flow as opposed to meet a battlefield condition. The AEF is versatile, agile to a degree, and possesses speed. To be sustainable for any amount of time the AEF requires an in-place physical infrastructure system and the Air Force does not possess a forcible entry
capability. It can contribute greatly to operations within an A2AD environment with its superiority in the air, space, and cyber domains. The Air Force and Navy can gain and maintain air superiority allowing forcible entry. These capabilities facilitate the movement and maneuver of expeditionary forces as part of a joint expeditionary force, but the capabilities by themselves are not expeditionary.

The historical analysis brought forth some salient points. The first being the differing ideas of conducting warfare closely parallel today’s operations. The garrisoning in the frontier served a specific purpose similar to FOB requirements in the projected future operating environment. One must seek innovative and operationally relevant ways to conduct these operations. The American Expeditionary Force (AEF) in World War I shows the importance of being flexible and versatile for any conflict. The AEF of WWI shows the force must take the lessons, incorporate the changes, and view the existing conditions of the future battlefield with an unbiased lens. This holds true for Expeditionary Operations for Joint Force 2020.

Analyzing these common traits, characteristics, and capabilities against current and projected service capabilities show that no one service in and of itself is Expeditionary. Then Expeditionary operations and forces must be joint. This requires inclusion of Joint Expeditionary Operations and Force capabilities in DoD policy Doctrine and Training Publications.

The services have undergone significant transformation in the face of a changing operational environment and regional requirements. Each service did this against its own perception of an expeditionary requirement due to the lack of Joint Requirements. This led to services being strong in some expeditionary aspects but not joint. Without joint
requirements and standards, the services and joint force commanders become forced to make too many assumptions regarding the capabilities and readiness of the provided forces.

To define our future joint expeditionary force, we need to understand the projected future operating environment. The 2010 Joint Operating Environment (JOE) states,

In America’s two recent wars against Iraq, the enemy made no effort to deny U.S. forces entry into the theater. Future opponents, however, may not prove so accommodating. Hence, the second constraint confronting planners is that the United States may not have uncontested access to bases in the immediate area from which it can project military power. Even in the best case, allies will be essential to providing the base structure required for arriving U.S. forces. But there may be other cases in which uncontested access to bases is not available for the projection of military forces. This may be because the neighborhood is hostile, smaller friendly states have been intimidated, negative perceptions of America exist, or states fear giving up a measure of sovereignty. Furthermore, the use of bases by the Joint Force might involve the host nation in conflict. Hence, the ability to seize bases in enemy territory by force from the sea and air could prove the critical opening move of a campaign.¹

This statement from the 2010 JOE paints the conditions that the future force may face and it is one where an expeditionary force should thrive. It will form the foundation for force requirements. The JOE states the U.S. may not have uncontested access to bases in the immediate area. The U.S. will no longer enjoy the large and widespread overseas infrastructure it has enjoyed in the past or enjoys now. This is due to a variety of reasons including the downsizing of the military, changing our forward posture and basing, and the perceived loss of influence in certain regions around the world. The U.S. military is currently going through a downsizing effort that includes cutting overseas basing. This will lead to an increased need to project power quickly from stateside

garrisons or deployed naval units. Countries that used to be under pressure to keep the U.S. on its soil or provide uninhibited access are starting to rethink those ideas and that access may be in jeopardy. The operational access concept and its subcomponents will remain salient characteristics of expeditionary operations through 2020.

Forcible entry, the main capability of operational access, will become critical in the future operating environment. Access will become more protected as nations seek to assert their sovereignty. The A2AD environment will demand forcible entry and may require the use of far more forces than in the past.

As a crisis unfolds, the desired political end states will dictate the decision to commit the forces. If those end states require more than the capabilities of a forcible entry force then planners must take into consideration the capabilities of the follow on forces against the objectives to be met. It would follow then, in an unpredictable future environment, of asymmetric threats, that expeditionary forces must have forcible entry capabilities and forcible entry forces must possess the characteristics of expeditionary forces should the conditions change without notice. This can only be met through a joint approach vice service specific contributions.

The JOE 2010 states, “the ability to deter a potential adversary depends on the capabilities and effectiveness of U.S. forces to act across the full range of military operations.” Versatility must remain a salient characteristic for the future joint expeditionary force. The future potential adversaries must remain cognizant that the U.S. can and will commit forces with the ability to respond to any situation in any condition.

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The same force must be able to reconstitute quickly and respond to an entirely different crisis.

As stated in the 2010 JOE, “The second scenario of particular significance confronting the Joint Force is the failure to recognize and fully confront the irregular fight that we are in...the requirement to prepare to meet a wide range of threats is going to prove particularly difficult for American forces in the period between now and the 2030s.” The U.S. must not wish away conditions it does not want to face using the AEF example from WWI. It must be prepared to meet the uncertain environments projected in the 2010 JOE. This ability underpins expeditionary warfare. This is why the foundational definition must change. An expeditionary force can no longer be a military force organized to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country. History suggests that mindset leads to a rigid approach that ignores the existing realities in favor of desired conditions. The future demands a force ready to deploy to meet a spectrum of requirements short of a major regional conflict.

The 2010 JOE states, “alliances, partnerships, and coalitions will determine the framework in which joint force commanders operate. This will require diplomacy and cultural and political understanding, as well as military competencies.” Contrary to the point made in the Naval War College’s Research Study having forces under U.S. control must not be a defining characteristic of an expeditionary force. In the projected future environment the U.S. will have to rely more and more on its partnerships, coalitions, and the NATO to accomplish its ends. This is not to say the U.S. does not reserve the right to

3 Joint Forces Command, Futures Group, Joint Operating Environment 2010 (Suffolk, Va: Joint Forces Command, 2010) 63.
4 Ibid, 41.
act unilaterally; the U.S. must become adept and comfortable with aligning its forces under command and control of a coalition partner.

The JOE 2010 goes on to project that “during this time, our forces may be located significant distances from a future fight. Thus, the Joint Force will be challenged to maintain both a deterrent posture and the capacity and capability to be forward engaged around the world.” Agility and speed will continue to play a significant role in the future expeditionary force. Just getting there quickly is not good enough. The force will have to balance response time with force capabilities. This will be commensurate with the objectives. If the objective is deterrence, a mere presence may be sufficient. The expeditionary characteristic is being able to respond to a range of military operations. The expeditionary force must arrive at the point of action with the necessary material to operate within that range. Any material that arrives later will be that in a follow-on force flow package.

In the future operating environment Joint Expeditionary Operations (JEO) are characterized by the following underlying characteristics:

- Agility
- Flexibility
- Speed
- Versatility
- Sustainability
- Forced Entry
- Operational Access in an A2AD environment

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Innovative and operationally relevant

Agility is derived from the worldwide utility and operational reach of future JEO. The future environment is uncertain and JEO need to be conducted in any climate, condition, or terrain presented. Flexibility characterizes the operations as able to shift focus rapidly within a changed environment. These operations will not be tied to a large static infrastructure system allowing operations to shift rapidly from one mission to another. Speed is simply a factor of time. Speed to crisis is critical in the future environment as, more and more, these operations are conducted either by afloat forces or by forces deploying from the U.S. Future JEO are scalable operations that are mission based and can mission adapt based on a variety of circumstances including the political interests of the U.S. or the host country. Versatility allows these operations that scalability to perform across the spectrum. Sustainability is a key aspect of future JEO. Future JEO will be conducted in austere conditions and conditions where access for sustainment may be denied for a considerable time. Future JEO cannot include large sustainment infrastructure. Large sustainment infrastructure is counter to versatility and flexibility. Where access is denied, future JEO is characterized by forced entry and operational access in an A2AD environment. Future JEO must include forced entry operations and counter A2AD capabilities. The future environment is unpredictable and can change rapidly. Future JEO must include forced entry operations to overcome the unpredictability. The future environment is also characterized by more and more nations developing A2AD capabilities. Future JEO must be conducted regardless of the A2AD environment. Operational access in the A2AD environment is a key characteristic of JEO.
then. Lastly, future JEO must be innovative and operationally relevant. The historical analysis proves this and the future environment demands it. Innovative thinking and operationally relevant practices able to solve the mission at hand characterize future JEO. Future JEO will certainly be based on doctrine but must morph to the conditions on the battlefield.

These are the underlying characteristics of future JEO. This is precisely why future JEO cannot be conducted be an expeditionary force from a single service. In order to solve the future expeditionary dilemma it will take capabilities from all services and it will be a joint fight.

The future joint expeditionary force must be one that displays all of the characteristics expressed herein and applies capabilities to conduct the operations described in this chapter. Proven in this paper, no single service possesses all the capabilities to conduct expeditionary operations in the future operating environment. The force must be joint. Depending on the situation, the mission may call for capabilities from all services discussed in this paper or it may only call for capabilities from two Departments. Chapter 5 will give recommendations for conditions and standards associated with a proposed Joint Expeditionary Task.
CHAPTER 5: Recommendations

While rewriting all joint doctrine and joint training manuals is out of the scope of this paper, this chapter is dedicated to provide three salient recommendations. They are to include the joint expeditionary operations definition, description, and requirements in JP 3-18, a revised definition of an expeditionary force in JP 1-02, and a Joint expeditionary operations task in the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL).

The revised foundational definition of joint expeditionary operations should be innovative and operationally relevant joint or multinational operations conducted in a foreign country with agility, flexibility, speed, and versatility sustainable regardless of the A2AD environment.

The revised foundational definition of an expeditionary force should be a joint or multinational force organized to accomplish objectives across the range of military operations, regardless of the A2AD environment, in a foreign country while able to reorganize and/or set conditions for follow on force objectives. Once organized this force will be tasked to accomplish objectives. To ensure readiness and to train to common standards the force can pull those tasks from the UJTL.

The UJTL ensures that there is at least a common starting point—a joint task from which to foundationally base operations. Joint Doctrine and a UJT has been lacking in the expeditionary arena allowing any and all to construct their own tasks and conduct their own versions of expeditionary operations. The UJTL Manual\textsuperscript{1} provides guidance on the formulation of a joint task and was used for the draft recommended expeditionary task provided in this chapter. The intent is not to be all-inclusive with the recommended

standards but to provide a point of departure for further development. The analysis concluded that this task fits best in the Operational (OP) Level of War (LOW). There will certainly be Tactical Tasks (TA) associated with this OP task and certain Strategic Theater (ST) tasks as well. There may also be one or two related Strategic National (SN) level tasks. The bulk of the measures will fit within the OP task level. The recommended joint task follows:

**OP 3.X.X Conduct Joint Expeditionary Operations (JEO)**

**DJS Approval Date:** DD-MMM-YY

**Description:** Conduct innovative and operationally relevant joint or multinational operations conducted in a foreign country with agility, flexibility, speed, and versatility sustainable regardless of the A2AD environment; JP 3-0, JP 3-18, JOAC.

**Notes:** This task may include military operations in a permissive, uncertain, hostile, and A2AD operational environment. The strategic and operational context of Joint Expeditionary Operations (JEO) is multifaceted. This task may include the integration of tactical level tasks. The decision to commit the expeditionary force within a hostile and/or A2AD environment to conduct a combat operation must have a specific tie to the overall end state. The future trend is urbanization and migration towards the littorals. More and more, expeditionary conditions may be characterized by operations conducted in the littorals as well as heavily populated urban areas. Forcible entry, the main capability of operational access, will become critical in the future operating environment. Access will become more protected as nations seek to assert their sovereignty. The A2AD
environment will demand forcible entry and may require the use of far more forces than in the past.

Potential adversaries, allies, partners, and friends must remain cognizant of the fact that the U.S. can and will commit forces that have the ability to respond to any situation in any condition without delay. In the same vein, the same force must then be able to reorganize quickly and respond to an entirely different crisis dealing with an entirely different end state.

The force will have to balance response time with needed capabilities. This will be commensurate with the objectives. A mere presence may be sufficient if the objective is deterrence. An expeditionary characteristic is being able to respond to a range of environmental and enemy conditions. The expeditionary force must arrive at the point of action with the necessary material to operate within that wide range.

**Recommended Standards:**

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<th>M1</th>
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<td>M2</td>
<td>Hours</td>
<td>To define assistance needed.</td>
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<td>M3</td>
<td>Hours</td>
<td>To posture forces to enter forcibly.</td>
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<td>M4</td>
<td>Hours</td>
<td>To establish liaison with appropriate foreign nation civilian government officials (after mission assignment).</td>
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<tr>
<td>M5</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Of valid requests for security assistance met.</td>
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<td>Hours</td>
<td>To gain air superiority in A2AD environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M10</td>
<td>Hours</td>
<td>To gain space superiority in A2AD environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M11</td>
<td>Hours</td>
<td>To gain maritime superiority in A2AD environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M12</td>
<td>Hours</td>
<td>To secure critical APODS and SPODS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M13</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Of critical APODS and SPODS secured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M14</td>
<td>Days</td>
<td>Sustain force in A2AD environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M15</td>
<td>Days</td>
<td>To set conditions for entry of follow on forces or resupply.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M16</td>
<td>Days</td>
<td>To reconstitute and redeploy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M17</td>
<td>Days</td>
<td>To integrate into force.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This list is not all-inclusive and is recommended as a starting point for further discussion and evaluation of the conditions and standards that must be included in the UJTL Joint expeditionary operations task. What is certain is that there must be a task. There could certainly be more than one—one for each level of war that aligns to the other; it is time that there is at least an OP level task so that the service may align and justify their service activities to a validated Joint training requirement. The joint force commander will now know what his Joint expeditionary operations task is and what the force providers are tasked to provide. This is the task to bind efforts and provide the common joint language. Both the services and the joint force commanders no longer need to make assumptions regarding the capabilities and readiness of the provided forces.
CONCLUSION:

“Our goal is, by a careful consideration of the future, to suggest the attributes of a joint force capable of adjusting with minimum difficulty when the surprise inevitably comes. The true test of military effectiveness in the past has been the ability of a force to diagnose the conditions it actually confronts and then quickly adapt.”

This quote from the 2010 Joint Operating Environment points to the very idea this paper is attempting to solve. Whether it was the American Expeditionary Force in WWI failing to acknowledge the conditions it actually confronted, or the idea of a current joint force unable to speak a common expeditionary language. There are gaps to be filled by this “careful consideration of the future.”

To be truly joint, campaigns require forces from at least two military departments. This is now the state of joint expeditionary operations. No service possesses the full scope of chief characteristics and distinguishing capabilities that underpin expeditionary operations. In fact, no service possesses the full scope of the expeditionary characteristics and distinguishing capabilities presented in this paper. In order to accomplish the requirements uncovered in this paper’s analysis of the future operating environment, the future force must conduct expeditionary operations as a joint force. When that joint force is not speaking the same language, and making assumptions about the capabilities, it wastes resources and possibly puts those forces at unnecessary risk. Without a validated joint requirement, the services have no measures to assess the readiness of their forces contributing to the joint operation.

2 Ibid, 7.
This paper demonstrated that future joint force commanders cannot count on standard expeditionary capabilities from the services with the current void in Joint/DoD policy, doctrine, and training standards. This paper provided a Joint definition of expeditionary force, the Joint task and conditions and standards for Joint expeditionary operations, and the analysis to support those recommendations. The recommendations provided in this paper are meant to facilitate needed development at commands responsible for the review and creation of joint training tasks, doctrine, and policy. The recommended change to the foundational definition of joint expeditionary force is provided for inclusion in the next update to Joint Publication JP 3-18 and JP 1-02. The attention and further work in this arena will prove extremely beneficial for Joint Force 2020.

The last decade of war has proved useful in allowing the U.S. interoperability opportunities. Services have grown accustomed to working with each other and it has become almost second nature. In the projected future-operating environment, this may not be the case. The services will need Joint doctrine, tasks, and a common language from which to operate. The expeditionary moniker has been taken for granted in that it permeates U.S. military operations. It is now time to codify it to provide a common framework and ensure a joint approach.
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