PEACEFUL RELATIONS?: UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND THE MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

MATTHEW J.P. CASTILLO, MAJOR, USAF
B.S., Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas, 1999

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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Abstract
The complex relationship between the United States (U.S.) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) includes stated desires for increased military-to-military relations. China’s increased participation in United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), since 1990, provides a venue often mentioned as an opportunity to increase the U.S. and PRC military relations. The purpose of this thesis is to test assertions on this topic, specifically, that cooperative participation in UN PKO is an effective means to improve the U.S. and PRC military relationship. The thesis presents and analyses the organizational framework of UN PKO, and U.S. and PRC military contributions such operations. The thesis concludes that two primary challenges exist which prevent a likely increase in U.S. and Chinese military relations at this time. First, the small number of U.S. military troops contributed to UN PKO and second, the nature of PRC People’s Liberation Army troops contributed in formed units, thus limiting their interaction or integration with other troop contributing countries. The thesis suggests that UN PKO participation at the tactical level does not directly support the desired increase in military relations.
Name of Candidate: Major Matthew J. P. Castillo

Thesis Title: Peaceful Relations?: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and the Military relations between the United States and the People Republic of China

Approved by:

_____________________________, Thesis Committee Chair
Jeffrey J. Kubiak, Ph.D.

_____________________________, Member
Joseph G.D. Babb, M.A.

_____________________________, Member
Major Julio E. Rodriguez, M.A.

Accepted this 8th day of June 2012 by:

_____________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


The complex relationship between the United States (U.S.) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) includes stated desires for increased military-to-military relations. China’s increased participation in United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), since 1990, provides a venue often mentioned as an opportunity to increase the U.S. and PRC military relations. The purpose of this thesis is to test assertions on this topic, specifically, that cooperative participation in UN PKO is an effective means to improve the U.S. and PRC military relationship. The thesis presents and analyses the organizational framework of UN PKO, and U.S. and PRC military contributions such operations. The thesis concludes that two primary challenges exist which prevent a likely increase in U.S. and Chinese military relations at this time. First, the small number of U.S. military troops contributed to UN PKO and second, the nature of PRC People’s Liberation Army troops contributed in formed units, thus limiting their interaction or integration with other troop contributing countries. The thesis suggests that UN PKO participation at the tactical level does not directly support the desired increase in military relations.
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DROC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>FPU</td>
<td>Formed Police Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOPI</td>
<td>Global Peace Operations Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOM</td>
<td>Head of Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>HOMC</td>
<td>Head of Military Component</td>
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<tr>
<td>HOPC</td>
<td>Head of Police Component</td>
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<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara</td>
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<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
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<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>United Nations Operations in Mozambique</td>
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<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peace Keeping Operation</td>
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<td>PLA</td>
<td>People’s Liberation Army</td>
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<td>PRC</td>
<td>The People’s Republic of China</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMIC</td>
<td>United Nations Advanced Mission in Cambodia</td>
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<td>UNIKOM</td>
<td>United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission</td>
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<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>Unified Task Force</td>
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<td>UNLSC</td>
<td>United Nations Logistics Support Command</td>
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<td>UNMIBH</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>Code</td>
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<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>UNMISS</td>
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<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia I/II (UNOSOM I/II)</td>
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<td>UNPREDEP</td>
<td>United Nations Preventative Deployment Force</td>
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<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
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<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
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<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>United Nations Truce Supervision Organization</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

As things stand, the international situation is undergoing complex and profound changes. There is growing instability and uncertainty in the world economic recovery, and regional security threat has become more salient. Under these circumstances, it is all the more important for China and the United States to increase their communication and coordination.

— President Hu Jintao, Remarks prior to APEC Summit

Meanwhile, the United States will continue our effort to build a cooperative relationship with China. All of our nations—Australia, the United States—all of our nations have a profound interest in the rise of a peaceful and prosperous China. That's why the United States welcomes it. We’ve seen that China can be a partner from reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula to preventing proliferation. And we’ll seek more opportunities for cooperation with Beijing, including greater communication between our militaries to promote understanding and avoid miscalculation. We will do this, even as we continue to speak candidly to Beijing about the importance of upholding international norms and respecting the universal human rights of the Chinese people.

— President Barack Obama, Remarks to the Australian Parliament

Relations between the United States and The People’s Republic of China

The United States, as a global super power, is faced with uncertainty on many fronts as it deals with China’s growing economy and influence as an emerging world power. Chinese President Hu Jintao agrees, stating prior to the 2011 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit that the world is facing “growing instability and uncertainty.” However, in the eyes of the US, a considerable amount of this uncertainty surrounds the role China will play in the world’s future, and a perceived lack of transparency regarding their intentions. According to the 2010 National Security Strategy, the U.S. seeks to “pursue a positive, constructive, and comprehensive
relationship with China” and welcomes a responsible China that seeks to “advance priorities like economic recovery, confronting climate change, and nonproliferation” in partnering with the international community.\(^1\) The 2010 National Security Strategy also states the U.S. “will monitor China’s military modernization program and prepare accordingly to ensure that U.S. interests and allies, regionally and globally, are not negatively affected.”\(^2\) The dual message reflected by these two quotes taken together is common in national level and Department of Defense (DOD) publications as the U.S. seeks to both foster positive relationships with China as a growing world power, and mitigate any risks of the unknowns of their intentions.

China’s official position regarding the intentions of their development as related to the rest of the world is reflected in their *White Paper on Peaceful Development* published in September 2011. It states that “China should develop itself through upholding world peace and contribute to world peace through its own development. . . . It should seek mutual benefit and common development . . . [and] work together with other countries to build a harmonious world of durable peace and common prosperity.”\(^3\)

The excerpts from the major strategic guidance documents of the two states provide a very small glimpse into the complexities of U.S.-China relations, revealing a U.S. that seems hesitant to believe China's intentions are as peaceful as they assert. Based on the statements made, U.S. apprehension is not lost on the Chinese.

In an effort to manage this complex relationship, U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President Hu initiated the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in 2009. This “bilateral forum” between the two governments serves as “an essential step in advancing a positive, constructive, and comprehensive relationship between the two
countries.” U.S. representation includes the president, secretary of state, and secretary of treasury who address strategic and economic issues with their respective Chinese counterparts. Among the national-level issues focused on, both countries have committed to the “improvement and development” of military relations as important to the future of a positive relationship between the two nations.

The 2011 DOD Report to Congress entitled *Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (PRC)*, lists the U.S. strategy regarding military relations with China as:

> The U.S. position is that our engagement with China should expand cooperation in areas of mutual interest, provide a forum to candidly address areas of disagreement and improve mutual understanding. The United States sees value in sustained and reliable military ties and regards the military relationship as an integral component of a comprehensive U.S.-China relationship.

The DOD Report to Congress provides three “general” areas that improved military relations would benefit U.S. and China relations. Each focus area can be conveyed in terms of tactical to strategic level interactions. At the tactical-to-operational level, military activities conducted together would contribute to a “cooperative capacity . . . that enhance or facilitate our ability to interact” and increase the “understanding of each others’ military institutions in ways that dispel misconceptions and encourage common ground for dialogue.” The remaining area addresses the benefit that increased military relations provide opportunities for “senior-most leaders to address the global security environment and relevant challenges” with strategic impact and partnering.

During the third meeting of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue held in January 2011, “senior military leaders” from both countries were included to address how to “reduce the dangerous risks of misunderstanding and miscalculation” within the
Asia-Pacific region. The Strategic and Economic Dialogue meetings have provided a framework for government and limited senior military leadership to increase engagement with Chinese counterparts. However, no such forum exists that provides for the interaction of more junior military officers and enlisted personnel at the operational and tactical levels that would be required to achieve the desired outcome of cooperative capacity.

The U.S. includes military relations with China as an aspect of the comprehensive U.S. and Chinese dialogue. Appropriately, the 2010 U.S. Pacific Command Strategic Guidance includes an emphasis area to “mature the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship.” U.S. Pacific Command includes three points under this area of emphasis: first, to “sustain a consistent military-to-military relationship to prevent miscommunication and miscalculation,” second, to “pursue opportunities for increased military cooperation in areas of mutual interest” and lastly to “monitor China’s military modernization program and prepare accordingly.” These documents clearly reveal the desire for increased military relations with China at the tactical to operational levels.

While the official U.S. position regarding building and sustaining military relations with China is clear, there are issues that hinder such development. First, the weight of emphasis and rapid nature military modernization “remains a point of concern in the United States,” and generates substantial suspicion within the U.S. security community. Additionally, China can easily suspend military relations with the U.S. as currently conducted. For example, China uses military relations when negotiating or protesting issues key to their perspective. These issues include non-interference in national sovereignty regarding Taiwan. As recent as January 2010, “one day after the
U.S. Government approved the sale of an arms package to Taiwan . . . the PLA suspended military relations with the United States for a second time since 2008.”13 As China increases its power within the international system, this type of behavior can be expected.

Another issue that has received blame for hindering U.S. and Chinese military relations is the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, which established a limitation on the authority of the Secretary of Defense regarding military interaction with China. Specifically, the act as signed by President Clinton states the Secretary of Defense cannot authorize U.S. and Chinese military exchanges or U.S. military contact with the PLA, where such contact “would create a national security risk due to inappropriate exposure.”14 The law includes twelve areas where exchange or contact is not to take place in order to protect U.S. security interests. These operational areas include:

1. Force projection operations.
2. Nuclear operations.
3. Advanced combined-arms and joint combat operations.
4. Advanced logistical operations.
5. Chemical and biological defense and other capabilities related to weapons of mass destruction.
6. Surveillance and reconnaissance operations.
7. Joint warfighting experiments and other activities related to a transformation in warfare.
8. Military space operations.
9. Other advanced capabilities of the Armed Forces.

10. Arms sales or military-related technology transfers.

11. Release of classified or restricted information.

12. Access to a Department of Defense laboratory.

The act includes two stated exceptions, “any search and rescue or humanitarian operation” or exercise of the same. Based on its enumerated restrictions limiting military contacts, the “PLA has objected to the U.S. law as an “obstacle” to the mil-to-mil relationship, blaming the U.S. side.” In contrast, the Department of Defense maintains that it is not “necessary to change or lift the law to enhance exchanges” and that its safeguards are sensible while not completely restrictive. The National Defense Authorization Act does not address peacekeeping as a limited activity, nor is it specified as an exception.

Acknowledging the significance of the U.S. and China relationship, the U.S. government announced its strategic Priorities for 21st Century Defense in January 2012. President Obama, Secretary of Defense Panetta, and Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dempsey, shared in publically announcing the change in U.S. strategic focus. While stating the U.S. would continue global activities, it states the U.S. “will [out] of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.” The document addresses China’s emergence with a “potential to affect the U.S. economy” and “security interests” while stating a mutual desire to build a “cooperative bilateral relationship.” It continues calling for China to increase transparency on “strategic intentions” associated with military modernization in order to “avoid causing friction in the region.”
Following the change in U.S. strategic focus, the then U.S. Pacific Command Commander, Admiral Robert F. Willard, testified before the Senate Armed Service Committee in February 2012 on Pacific Command’s posture. His testimony identified China as the “greatest test for USPACOM among its seven challenge areas.”

Additionally, he provided insight into USPACOM’s willingness to support the establishment of “continuous, stable, and reliable military-to-military relations” with China as desired by Presidents Obama and Hu. Admiral Willard provided three reasons why military engagements with China were neither at a level nor progressing to a level in pace with other U.S. and China efforts. These reasons include a difference in approach to the use of military-to-military engagements in “building confidence.” He highlights that the “U.S. seeks comprehensive military contact from the strategic to tactical levels” while China’s approach “emphasizes strategic [level] dialogue.”

Second, China’s “tendency to suspend military-to-military” exchanges or contacts in response to U.S. relations with Taiwan limits the ability to maintain continuous relations. Third, that China’s “distrust of U.S. regional intentions” and their “demands that perceived impediments to the relationship be conceded before military relations can advance,” hinder the relationship.

Admiral Willard concludes, that China’s “increasing participation in regional and international security activities and forums such as multi-lateral exercises, counter-piracy operations, and peacekeeping can foster informal, but useful U.S.–China military engagement.”
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: An Opportunity Based on Mutual Interest

This study will analyze whether the U.S. could achieve its objective of increased military relations with China within the context of UN Peacekeeping Operations. Arguments for pursuing this course are many. The framework of a UN PKO allows each contributing country to continue participation and maintain military relations with one another under a common mission construct. Additionally, using UN PKO as a venue to increase military-to-military relations may allow the U.S. to achieve all three of the stated purposes listed in the 2011 DOD report to Congress. Thus, there is widespread rationale supporting the idea that U.S. and China joint participation in UN peacekeeping missions can be an effective opportunity to achieve the stated DOD goals of the U.S. regarding increased military relations.

Primary Research Question

The emergence of China as a significant world power facilitates the need for the U.S. and China to manage the complexity of their relationship. Additionally, an established framework to achieve greater military relations will assist in reducing the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation between their respective militaries. The focus of this research is to determine if UN PKO provide a promising means of improving U.S. and PRC military relations.

Secondary Research Questions

The following secondary research questions are necessary to address the primary research question:
1. Do UN missions that include two or more countries contribute to increased “cooperative capacity . . . at a tactical or operational level” for participating countries? 

2. What characterizations apply to U.S. participation in UN PKO in terms of personnel contributed?

3. What characterizations apply to PRC participation in UN PKO in terms of personnel contributed?

4. Have other states participated in a UN mission with Chinese forces and experienced a benefit reflected in their military relations with China?

**Significance of Thesis**

This thesis will contribute to academic knowledge on possible outcomes using UN missions as a venue to increase U.S. and PRC military relations. This data may contribute to policy makers and strategic planners as the U.S. attempts to engage China for the reasons and at the level stated in the national and DOD strategic Guidance. Additionally, this research may support pursuing the feasibility of U.S. participation in future UN PKO with a contingent from China to increase U.S. and China military relations. At the conclusion of this study, a recommendation is included for additional studies to address the feasibility or benefit of using other international organizations as a venue for increased U.S. and PRC military relations.

**Assumptions**

China will continue, and likely increase, its level of support for UN peacekeeping operations in terms of overall numbers of personnel, and broaden the makeup of those
personnel. Chinese participation will continue to include PLA Engineers, Transportation and Medical unit members and police from the People’s Armed Police and civilian police agencies with the future possibility of other PLA units (possibly infantry units). China will continue to modernize its military to include sophisticated equipment and complex employment capabilities. Finally, the changing of the Chinese President expected in 2012 will not significantly alter their contributions to UN peacekeeping missions or their current strategy as communicated in the September 2011 White Paper on China’s Peaceful Development.


Limitations

Research material consisted primarily of unclassified print or internet-based sources. Specific research relied upon digital material available from the United Nations, the embassy and consulates of the People’s Republic of China, U.S. organizations, media reports, and research conducted through the Combined Arms Research Library. Research material included from Chinese sources will likely introduce possible translation errors or mischaracterizations of intended Chinese message content. Material from Chinese based media sources was likely under some level of government control. Misinformation through translation or content was mitigated by the use of multiple sources to corroborate content. This thesis was conducted without additional funding requests or requirements.
The research methods applied were guided by the Masters of Military Art and Science degree program.

**Delimitations**

The research contained in this thesis covers U.S. and Chinese contributions to UN PKO active between 1990 and March 2012. This study is limited to UN PKO and will not address other multilateral constructs that may include humanitarian assistance or disaster response or regional agreements on security matters such as anti-piracy missions. For the purpose of this study, UN PKO include those missions authorized by a UN Security Council mandate under either chapter VI, Peacekeeping, or VII, Peace Enforcement, of the UN Charter and managed by the UN Department of PKO (DPKO). The limitation to UN PKO ensures a focus for this study within an international organization with an established charter and peacekeeping practices versus the multiple variables possible within bilateral or coalitions formed for regional security issues. This study will not address U.S. political motives leading to the commitment of U.S. personnel under UN missions beyond the interest to increase U.S. and PRC military relations.

**Definitions**

**Peacekeeping**: As defined by the UN DPKO, “is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers,” usually conducted under Chapter VI of the UN Charter.30

**Peace enforcement**: As defined by the UN DPKO, peace enforcement “involves the application . . . of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force . . .
authorized to restore international peace and security in situations where the Security
Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act
of aggression,” usually conducted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.31

**Peace Operations.** According to US Doctrine as captured in Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, amended through 15 March 2012, “A broad term that encompasses multiagency and multinational crisis response and limited contingency operations involving all instruments of national power with military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. Peace operations include peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacemaking, peace building, and conflict prevention efforts.”32

**United Nations Charter: The “foundation document for all the UN work . . . gives the UN Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.”**33

**UN Charter, Chapter VI:** The chapter within the UN charter that addresses “pacific settlement of disputes” commonly referred to as peacekeeping.

**UN Charter, Chapter VII:** The chapter within the UN Charter that authorizes “action with respect to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression” used when “authorizing the deployment of UN peacekeeping operations into volatile post-conflict settings where the State is unable to maintain security and public order.”34 Commonly referred to as peace enforcement operations.

**UN Observer:** “UN military observers are unarmed military officers generally deployed to monitor and supervise any military arrangements that parties to a conflict
may have agreed to, such as a ceasefire or armistice, withdrawal of forces or the preservation of a demilitarized or neutral buffer zone. The primary task of military observers is to monitor and report on the parties’ observance of these military arrangements and the military situation in general in their area of responsibility.”

Summary

This chapter introduced the U.S. point of view regarding China’s emergence as a growing world power. It categorized the U.S. point of view as both welcoming a responsible China, involved in the international community that worked to “advance priorities like economic recovery, confronting climate change, and nonproliferation” and suspicious of “China’s military modernization” as a possible threat to U.S. interests around the globe. It described the Strategic and Economic Dialogue established by Presidents Obama and Hu, as a forum for government and senior military leadership interaction. This complex relationship and the desire for military relations establishes the background from which to analyze participation in UN PKO as a means to increase U.S. and Chinese military relations and thus overcome the current challenges that exist.


2Ibid.


5Ibid.

7 Ibid.


10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.


13 Ibid.


15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.


18 Ibid.


20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.


23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.


31 Ibid.


33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.


36 The White House, National Security Strategy, 43.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The previous chapter concluded that there is reason to believe that U.S. and Chinese participation in UN PKOs may provide a desired opportunity for achieving the U.S. objective of an improved military relationship with China. This chapter will first explore literature surrounding the topic of UN Peacekeeping Operations (UN PKO) as an effective means to improving relations, followed by works that imply or recommend peacekeeping operations as an effective means to improving U.S. and China military relations. This is followed by the proposition of a testable hypothesis and discussion of the methodology through which the hypothesis will be tested.

**Recommendations to leverage UN Peacekeeping to improve U.S. and China relations**

In Stephen Waller’s study “Fostering Cooperative Relations with China: U.S. Economic and Military Strategy,” he proposes an “integrated economic and military strategy of cooperation” to better U.S. and China relations. His proposal recommends engagement between “senior U.S. Department of Defense officials and military leaders” with their peers in China as opposed to tactical or operational level units. In his estimation, this provides a safeguard to U.S. security, avoiding the release of “tactical or operational capabilities” or risk of espionage.\(^1\) He continues to offer examples of possible cooperation to include that “U.S. leaders might consider proposing U.S. airlift of PLA elements to United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa.”\(^2\) While not explicitly stating that this particular cooperation would improve relations between the two nations, Waller’s work does imply mutual benefits to cooperation in such operations.

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Similarly, the authors of “Conflict with China: Prospects, Consequences, and Strategies for Deterrence,” a 2011 RAND paper, recommend the U.S. and China cooperate on operations of common interest, one of which is listed as UN PKO. The paper states that; “China’s . . . growing interest in United Nations peacekeeping should, thus, become the basis for enhanced U.S.-Chinese cooperation.” The authors include UN PKO as a means to increase U.S. and China cooperation in an overall effort to overcome the current “climate of mutual distrust and suspicion” between both countries. The goal of such cooperation is necessary in the near term in order to avoid risks of a deteriorating security situation in Asia. While the authors do not include evidence of what is to be immediately expected after such cooperation, it is conveyed as necessary for the U.S. to begin cooperative efforts in order to shape the U.S. and Chinese relationship in a manner where the U.S. can “leverage Chinese power as well as restrain it” as China grows in power.

Mark Nakagawa’s thesis, “United States Military-to-Military Contacts with the People’s Liberations Army: Can It Further U.S. Policies and Aims in the Asia-Pacific Region?” written in 2003 analyzes military-to-military contact as a means towards desired U.S. policies. In his conclusions, he identifies challenges to creating military-to-military contacts and recommends possible “small steps” towards U.S. objectives. Nakagawa includes UN PKO, as a possible venue to increase “personal relations, among midgrade officers in the U.S. military and the PLA” that “could contribute to future Sino-U.S. relations.” Mid grade officers are stressed as a targeted demographic category due to their “broader understanding and more critical perspective on foreign militaries,” higher experience levels, and overseas travel. Nakagawa further identifies UN PKO as
an area of common interest and states “[c]ooperation and participation between the U.S. armed forces and the PLA in programs supporting areas of common interests . . . would further the [Military-to-Military Contact Program] between the two countries. . . . Better understanding and mutual respect can invariably result by working in cooperation on common interests.”

While Nakagawa conveys UN PKO as a common interest, his statements on UN PKO participation follow from Russell D. Howard and Albert S. Wilner study, “China’s Rise and the U.S. Army: Leaning Forward.” The premise of their study is based on a stance that participation in a common interest can increase contacts and relationships between U.S. and Chinese military personnel. Further, those relationships, with a shared experience, “could have tremendous benefits for both countries, not only by improving capabilities to respond to these activities but also by offering a relatively benign way to pursue reciprocal visits and enhance transparency.” From this perspective, UN PKO may serve as a means to support the resumption of military exchanges, as the focus of their study.

UN PKO provide a venue that addresses each of the recommendations described above and further includes safeguards to the concerns stated. Peacekeeping typically does not require sensitive capabilities, “it does not require such expensive military accoutrements as armored brigades, advanced air forces, or 30-day supplies of smart munitions. Peacekeepers don’t require such things because they don’t have to force their way into disputed territory.” This serves to alleviate some of the concerns over releasing sensitive capabilities or acting in a manner inconsistent to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000.
While the above authors recommend participating in peacekeeping activities and or address the possibilities that surround peacekeeping activities to increase U.S. and China relations they do not analyze the construct of UN PKO to assess its likelihood to present opportunities for U.S. and Chinese interaction or cooperation. Further, they lack analysis on what can be reasonably expected should the U.S. and China participate in any a UN PKO based on the norms associated with recent contributions to active operations. The following section provides insights from four authors on the specific topic of this thesis work - increasing relations between two specific nations through peacekeeping.

**Improving Relations Through Peacekeeping**

Two authors address the specific topic of improving relations between two nations through participation in peacekeeping operations. First, Beth Makros and Jeremy Saunders, in their study “Improving US-Russian Relations Through Peacekeeping Operations,” analyze U.S. and Russian relations after the Cold War with peacekeeping operations as “the most viable and likely way to increase cooperation between US and Russian forces.” Much like the current complexity of the relationship between the U.S. and China, their study on U.S. and Russian relations includes a focus on military relations in support of overarching strategic relations. As an example, the authors state that the “more often the two militaries are able to operate together, the more likely they will be able to close both operational and cultural gaps that hamper successful missions.” The authors continue, stating the expected outcome from participation in peacekeeping operations:

The interaction between the two militaries in peacekeeping operations provides an area of engagement between higher political figures. Regardless of other events affecting the relationship, involvement in peacekeeping operations offers, at a
bare minimum, a reason for interaction because both nations are committed to a number of peacekeeping operations. While there are often disagreements over political issues that may be harmful to the relationship, it is nevertheless important that dialogue occurs and there is a continued agreement on the involvement of the two countries.¹⁵

Makros and Saunders conclude their study with recommendations based on two case studies, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Implementation Force and Stabilization Force operations in Bosnia and the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), to support increased relationships. Two of their recommendations exist at the tactical to operational level and link with the U.S. DOD desired goals in relations with China. First, to counter the cultural differences and better integrate efforts, they recommend resuming “combined patrolling missions.”¹⁶ Combined patrols are said to have two primary outcomes, first, they display a “unified front” to the host nation population, who in the case of operation in Bosnia were trying to “drive a wedge between” the U.S. and Russian forces.¹⁷ Second, combined patrols provide a means for exposure to tactics and practices as well as causal discussions as members “learn more about each other.”¹⁸ In addition to combined activities, the authors recommend training for participants that covers “military culture, terminology, procedures, etc.” down to the non-commissioned offer level.¹⁹

Makros and Saunders highlight language issues within their study. Due to limited numbers of individuals skilled to speak both English and Russian, usually only liaison officers, language was “one of the biggest issues” faced within the operations of their case studies.²⁰ To counter these limitations the authors stress that liaisons should “receive adequate training” prior to deployment and participants should be provided “phrase books that provide essential information on carrying out common or shared tasks in both
These efforts would help to reduce the shortage of personnel skilled in both languages.

Lastly, the authors provided two overarching recommendations to improve U.S. and Russian relations through peacekeeping activities. First, countries that participate in a given PKO should have a role in planning the operation. While identifying the challenges that accompany involving an increased number of countries in planning, they suggest a given country’s role in planning be linked to their level of participation in the operation. Additionally, they assess that those counties that participate in planning “gain a vested interest in the Peacekeeping operation and this allows contributing countries to express and work through areas of concern before the commencement of the mission.” Further, the authors state that planning activities help facilitate “the development of relationships at a higher level of [the] political and military structure.” This falls in line with the current DOD objective to increase U.S. and PRC military relations in order to provide a framework for senior leaders from both countries to “address the global security environment and relevant challenges.”

Khairol Amali Bin Ahmad conveys a similar benefit of participating in multinational peacekeeping in his thesis titled “Malaysia’s Participation in a UN Standing Force: A Question of National Security.” The focus of his study addresses whether Malaysia should participate in a UN standing force. While addressing the “benefits of small state’s participation” in a UN standing force, he addresses the benefits expected from participating in a UN operation with multiple nations. These stated benefits span the tactical to strategic levels of a relationship between two nations. As stated by Ahmad:

The interaction among the troops will foster better relations between the nations involved. In conducting real operations together, the troops will be able to develop
further understanding of each other and improve the capability for interoperability better than would have been achieved by merely conducting training with each other. The cooperation among troops will also provide opportunities among the leaders of the nations to interact further. All of these can add value and further strengthen the existing military, economic or political ties among states.\textsuperscript{26}

The benefits asserted by Ahmad in his 2002 study fall closely in line with the three areas set forth in the DOD 2011 \textit{Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China}. The three areas listed by the DOD state improved military relations would benefit the overall U.S. and China relationship. The areas of desired military-to-military relations include (1) increased “cooperative capacity,”\textsuperscript{27} (2) a better “understanding of each others’ military institutions in ways that dispel misconceptions and encourage common ground for dialogue,”\textsuperscript{28} and (3) a framework for senior leaders to “address the global security environment and relevant challenges . . . [to] facilitate common approaches to challenges and serves as a bridge to build more productive working relationships.”\textsuperscript{29}

Dr. Bates Gill, Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, is a subject matter expert on peacekeeping and a regional expert on China. In 2011, he coauthored a work with Chin-hao Huang, titled \textit{China’s Expanding Presence in UN Peacekeeping Operations and Implications for the United States}.\textsuperscript{30} Gill and Huang presented an overview of China’s perspective on their increase in UN PKO and discussed multiple rationales supporting China’s increase in UN PKO. According to the authors, from China’s perspective, motivations include those that “enhance multilateral security cooperation to help secure a stable international environment; reassure neighbors about China’s peaceful intentions; and balance U.S. and Western influence while gradually but more firmly establishing China’s Great Power image within the international
community.” The authors continue, that an “indirect link” exists where UN PKO may have an “impact on the PLA’s military modernization effort.”

After examining China’s background and motivations concerning UN PKO, Gill and Huang provide recommendations on how the U.S. could leverage China’s increased participation in peacekeeping as “potentially beneficial areas of military-to-military cooperation.” The authors are clear that increasing U.S. and China relations is not as simple as sending military contributions to a given UN PKO and list many complexities involved. They conclude with four policy recommendations in support of improving U.S. and China relations, the first two of which are covered here. Their first recommendation is to “intensify bilateral and multilateral dialogue and policy coordination with China on mutual security concerns such as Afghanistan and Zimbabwe, and on the prospects for multilateral peacekeeping support and deployment.” The underlying motivation desires to “shape Chinese policies” bringing them more in line with the “more flexible views toward intervention [held] by the international community” thus increasing their “involvement and cooperation.”

The second policy recommendation is to “expand military-to-military relations to encompass forms of peacekeeping training and capacity building.” Gill and Huang suggest that U.S. policy makers “encourage greater Chinese participation in future peacekeeping training exercises under” existing U.S. efforts. They further recommend the U.S. “could also work with China to explore the prospects of supporting peacekeeping capacity-building in [Global Peace Operation Initiative] GPOI partner countries in Africa, where both the United States and China have increasing areas of common interest.”
The above literature on increasing relations through peacekeeping activities ranges from theoretical references that UN PKO benefit relations between participating countries, to offering a more layered approach to engage China’s interest and activities in UN PKO. This range of options provides a base that supports the U.S. undertake UN peacekeeping for the intent of increasing relations with China. However, the above literature is unclear on which aspects of UN PKO are likely to address the DOD objectives regarding a relationship with China, to increase the “cooperative capability . . . dispel misconceptions and encourage common ground for dialogue,” and enable “senior-most leaders to address the global security environment and relevant challenges.”

This thesis exists to analyze the construct of UN PKO, and U.S. and Chinese contributions to UN PKO in order to determine if they provide a desired means to improve U.S. and Chinese military relations.

**Hypothesis**

This thesis seeks to test the assertions and implications made in the reviewed literature on this topic, specifically, that cooperative participation in UN PKO is an effective means to improve U.S. and China military relations, benefiting their overall strategic relationship.

The hypothesis of this research is built on the reviewed literature illustrating UN PKO as an area of common interest and opportunity for relationship improvement between the U.S. and China, and the three military relationship objectives stated in the 2011 DOD report to congress that underpin the overarching U.S. and China strategic relationship goals. The hypothesis of this study is: U.S.-China participation in UN PKO is an effective means of achieving the three military relationship objectives set by the U.S.
DOD—(1) increase “cooperative capability,” (2) “dispel misconceptions and encourage common ground for dialogue,” and (3) enable “senior-most leaders to address the global security environment and relevant challenges.”

**Research Methodology**

This study will analyze the UN PKO construct, and the character and history of U.S. and Chinese participation, to assess the potential for cooperation between the U.S. and China on a given operation to contribute to improved military relations. The data analyzed in this research, therefore, falls into three distinct categories; (1) the organizational framework, under which UN PKO are executed, (2) U.S. contributions to UN PKO and lastly, (3) PRC contributions to UN PKO. Analysis of data collected in this format will shed light on the relationship between the specific framework of UN PKO the expected benefit to U.S./Chinese relations.

The first area of data collection pertains to the organizational framework of UN PKOs. This organizational construct will determine the degree to which participation by two or more countries in a given PKO is likely to include military interaction. Research will include established UN policies on command and control; the nationality of leadership positions associated with each UN PKO to include the Head of Mission, Head of Military Component, and Head of Police Component; and the size and demographics of other contributing countries. Where available, the deployment locations will be included to capture the physical locations of countries operating in proximity to each other based on UN Deployment Maps. This data will establish a baseline for analysis on levels of expected interaction between participating nations at the tactical to operational level.
The second area of data collection will study U.S. military contributions to UN PKO. This section includes data from 1990 to March 2012. This information will be categorized by named UN operation, location, characterization of the mission mandate, UN charter chapter, inclusive dates of participation, demographics by country, and number of military personnel and or police contributed.

The third area of data collection is focused on China’s contributions to UN PKO from 1990 to March 2012. Chinese participation in UN PKO naturally divides into two periods with the modern period beginning about 1990. This section will include personnel contributed from the People’s Liberation Army as military troops, and those contributed for service with UN Police. Information on China’s contributions to UN PKO will fall into the same categories of that collected on U.S. contributions with the addition and distinction of Chinese police contributions, which can consist of the People’s Armed Police and civilian police agencies, mostly the border police.

The analysis of U.S. and PRC contributions to UN PKOs using the UN PKO framework is designed to help identify the characteristics of operations that hold the most promise for improving military relations between the U.S. and China. The identification of such characteristics may narrow the type or types of UN PKO that provide a feasible option for U.S. policy makers to pursue in the effort to improve U.S. and Chinese military relations. The analysis of the UN PKO framework will facilitate a qualitative assessment of the degree to which a nation participating in a given operation can expect to have military interaction with other nations. This research will identify characteristics of a preferred UN PKO organization construct, which offers increased military
interaction between contributing nations in support of DOD desires to improve military relations with China.


2Ibid., 16.


4Ibid.

5Ibid.

6Ibid.


8Ibid.

9Ibid., 63.


14Ibid.

15Ibid.
16 Ibid., 75.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., 78.
23 Ibid., 79.
26 Ibid., 40.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
31 Bates Gill and Chin-hao Huang, “China’s Expanding Presence in UN Peacekeeping Operations and Implications for the United States,” in *Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other Than Taiwan*, edited by Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, April 2008), 107.
32 Ibid., 108.
33 Ibid., 114.
34 Ibid., 120.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., 120-121.

37 Ibid., 121.

38 Ibid.


40 Ibid.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH PRESENTATION

This chapter will introduce the UN framework under which peacekeeping operations are executed while examining those conducted since 1990. Emphasis is placed on existing UN guidance regarding the organization and command and control within UN PKO, in order to later assess the likelihood of military interactions between two participating countries. It will present U.S. then Chinese participation in UN PKO and conclude with the presentation of U.S. and China contributions to four current UN peacekeeping missions that represent the best opportunity to improve U.S. and Chinese military relations through such participation.

The United Nations and Peacekeeping

The United Nations Charter lists four purposes that guide its existence. The first three purposes summarized are “to maintain international peace and security,” “develop friendly relations among nations,” and to “achieve international co-operation in solving international problems.” The fourth regards the UN desire to “be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.”¹ Within these purposes, the UN attempts to harness collective support from 193 member countries to conduct multiple activities around the globe. The overarching theme of the UN providing an “international framework through which a wide array of partners can act with legitimacy and in coordination” toward common objectives supports the purpose of this thesis to assess UN PKO as a means to increase U.S. and Chinese military-to-military relations.²
The UN began its first peacekeeping operation in May 1948 as United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). Authorized by the UN Security Council, it is still active as of this writing. UN PKO experienced a rapid increase between 1990 and 1999 during which time the UN authorized 35 new PKO, 25 more than any other decade since 1948. In addition to the 35 newly authorized UN PKO, there were 10 additional missions that had been authorized prior to 1990 and either ended or continued though this period. These missions, and the 15 current UN PKO as of March 2012, each have unique characteristics in terms of mandate, size of force, contributing countries and complexity. According to “A New Partnership Agenda Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping,” a UN document co-authored by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and UN Department of Field Support, each UN PKO requires the authorization of the UN Security Council and must follow the UN “basic principles for peacekeeping.” These principles include “consent [of involved parties], impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defense and in defense of the mandate.” UN PKO provide a framework to employ personnel from 115 currently contributing countries towards common objectives with financing shared among all UN member states.

**United Nation Peacekeeping Command and Control**

All UN PKO begin with a UN Security Council Resolution in the form of a mandate. The mandate serves as a legal document linking justifications, based on the UN Charter, with desired outcomes as approved by the UN Security Council. Mandates vary in the detail and have generally increased in the specification of activities since an internal review was conducted in 2000, often referred to as the Brahimi Report. Further, the level of specification coincides with a growth in the complexity of the missions
undertaken. As an example, a 2008 Government Accountability Office report states, “UN operations in 1998 averaged three mandated tasks, such as observing cease-fires; in 2008, they averaged nine more ambitious tasks, such as restoring government institutions. Operations in 2008 were located in some of the world’s most unstable countries, were larger and more complex than in 1998, and deployed thousands of civilians.” The increase in complexity faced in UN PKO gave rise to the term “multi-dimensional” peacekeeping, where PKOs include “military, police, and civilian components” working in concert to establish security and stability while increasing the host nation’s ability to do the same. Additionally, multi-dimensional PKO may include tasks that support the political process and governance while working to “provide a framework for ensuring that all United Nations and other international actors pursue their activities at the country-level in a coherent and coordinated manner.”

Once the Security Council approves a resolution and mandate authorizing a PKO, the Secretary General appoints a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) to serve as the Head of Mission (HOM). The HOM for each UN PKO is “responsible for implementing the mission’s mandate” and executes UN Operational Authority, which originates with the UN Secretary General, over all military, police, and civilians contributed to the mission. UN Operational Authority includes the “full authority to issue operational directives within the limits” of the mandate, a pre-arranged timeframe, and the mission’s area of operations.

The HOM “is responsible for coordinating the activities of the entire United Nations system in the field” which includes directing military and police efforts. Military forces contributed to a given mission operate directly under the HOM or under a
head of military component (HOMC), who may is normally also designated the force commander in multi-dimensional UN PKO. The HOMC exercises *UN Operational Control* over assigned forces, which includes the authority to “direct forces assigned” in order to “accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location.” Additionally, *UN Operational Control* enables the HOMC or force commander to “deploy units concerned and/or military personnel, and to retain or assign Tactical Command or Control of those units/personnel.”

**UN Police**

The UN has policy guidance regarding the command and control of individual police and formed police units (FPU) supporting PKO. Police forces operate under a head of police component (HOPC), who exercises *UN Operational Control* over contributed police. *UN Operational Control* enables the HOPC to “assign separate tasks to all individual personnel, units and sub-units within the police component” and within the confines of the mission area of operations. FPU are tasked with three general areas: first “public order management,” second, the protection of UN resources, and third, those “police operations that require a formed response and may involve a higher risk.” UN Policy established three options for command and control of FPUs. The first option is to hold the FPU as an “operational reserve at the headquarters level to be deployed throughout the mission area on demand” which provides a flexibility to adjust police presence in the mission areas as required. The second option is to assign a given FPU an area of responsibility “in accordance with the overall regional United Nations police structure and attached to United Nations police regional commands.” The third and last
recommended option is a mix, where some FPUs are sent to specified regions while some are retained at headquarters as a reserve.”

Member states contributing military or police units to UN PKO maintain “full and exclusive strategic level command and control of their personnel and equipment” and exercise administrative control through a National Contingent Commander or senior national representative. Additionally, UN Member states establish a memorandum of understanding with UN headquarters that specifies the level of command and control authority the contributing states is granting the UN to exercise over their respective military or police contribution. Member states will negotiate the details of each memorandum of understanding for each specific UN PKO and retain the right to change the particulars within their memorandum of understanding pending coordination with UN headquarters.

Figure 1 illustrates the UN leadership positions within the context of strategic, operational and tactical levels. This thesis focuses on contributed troops and police at the tactical level to characterize their activities within the UN PKO construct and unique aspects of U.S. and PRC contributions.
The United Nations Peacekeeper

As of 31 January 2012, there were 98,653 total military and police supporting UN peacekeeping operations from 115 contributing countries. Of these, 82,187 were military and 14,492 were police contributions. The remaining 1,974 personnel were military observers also referred to as military experts on mission. Observers are unarmed military officers who follow a separate chain of command from other military troops involved in UN PKO. They are tasked to “monitor and report” existing agreements that can include
“armistice, withdrawal of forces or the preservation of a demilitarized or neutral buffer zone” and the overall situation within their assigned area and mission mandate. The following sections include numbers of military observers contributed, however, the location of these individuals was not obtained for analysis in this thesis.

Military troop contributions are most commonly infantry soldiers but also include support and individuals or units with special skill sets as “enablers.” These “enablers” include engineers, transportation assets and personnel, communications, medical and aviation assets and crews. The variety of skill sets required increases the number of countries that can contribute to UN PKO. Those countries limited in special units can contribute existing infantry troops to serve as the bulk of peacekeeping forces while those able can contribute specialized “enablers” as required by specific UN PKO. Regardless of specific skill set, the military members contributed to a UN PKO remain “first and foremost members of their own national armies” contributed to support a given UN PKO. Each UN PKO has a unique mix of contributing countries, offering a range of cultures and experiences working together toward achieving the mandate. This mix of contributing countries supports the rationale for this thesis.

Since its first peacekeeping efforts in 1948, the UN has authorized 67 PKOs in five major regions, which include the Middle East, Europe, Asia-Pacific, the Americas, and Africa. As illustrated in figure 2, Africa has experienced the most UN PKO, with approximately 43 percent of the 67 total operations. The Asia Pacific region and Europe are next with ten UN PKOs, or 14.9 percent each of those conducted. Figure 3 shows the regional breakdown of active UN PKO.
Figure 2. UN Peacekeeping Operations by Region, 1948-Present


Figure 3. Active UN Peacekeeping Operations by Region (March 2012)

The construct provided by UN peacekeeping provides a venue with more than 60 years of experience in multiple regions with a replicable framework independent of a single nation’s influence. The framework enables UN command and control of contributed forces towards mandate achievement while maintaining a link between each contributing country and its forces. This provides legitimacy, based on the international representation active in mandate approval and in the execution of any given PKO. Further the UN PKO construct, currently leverages approximately 100,000 military and police from 115 contributing countries working together towards their respective mission mandates.

**The United State’s Approach to United Nations Peacekeeping**

After the Cold War, a debate began over the level to which the U.S. should participate in UN operations and over what forms of support should be provided. “During the Cold War, US participation in UN operations had necessarily been limited to logistical support, transportation (especially airlift), and a few observers sent to selected missions.”26 According to Ivo Daalder, there “was no agreement within the Bush administration on whether the United States should participate in the full range of UN operations.” Additionally, there was debate on what capabilities the U.S. would offer for future UN operations, “it was decided that the United States would ‘advise the United Nations that a full range of military capabilities could be placed at the UN disposal in appropriate circumstances,’ but without specifying what types of capabilities these might include.”27 The third area of debate centered on “how the United States would participate in UN operations . . . particularly whether US combat personnel should ever serve under the operational control of a UN commander.”28 The culmination of these debates resulted
in National Security Decision Directive 74, which in regards to U.S. participation, “remained vague, only endorsing the participation of US forces if the use of their ‘unique’ military capabilities was necessary for the success of the mission.”

1993-2000 The Clinton Administration: Upon entering the presidential office there were indications the Clinton administration would increase U.S. support to UN PKO. Clinton issued Presidential Review Directive-13 on 15 February 1993, calling for a review of “the issues involved in the creation of a U.S. policy on peacekeeping and to identify options leading to Presidential decisions.” The Presidential Review Directive included areas to be reviewed, of note, command relationships were addressed within the “Multilateral Peacekeeping Operations and U.S. Participation” section. Specifically, Clinton asked for policy options regarding U.S. military participation in UN PKO and the “control of U.S. forces by non-American commanders.” The document indicates at least a willingness of President Clinton to explore a broader use of military units in support of UN PKO than covered in Bush’s National Security Decision Directive-74.

President Clinton’s initial willingness to increase the range of U.S. support to UN PKO changed in the fall of 1993. According to UN statistics on troop contributions, on 30 September 1993, the U.S. had 2,821 troops supporting United Nations Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM II). As the situation in Somalia deteriorated, America suffered 30 military casualties while supporting UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II). This remains the highest number of U.S. casualties in a UN PKO. In the aftermath of a raid to capture Mohammed Farah Aideed, a Somali warlord, on 3 October 1993, America faced the reality of “18 Americans killed, 78 wounded, and 1 soldier taken hostage . . . [and] pictures of dead American Soldiers being dragged triumphantly through Mogadishu
streets appearing on every American TV screen.”34 As a result of these events, “the congressional and public reaction was instantaneous and severe.”35 After this experience, President Clinton made the following statement; “My experience in Somalia would make me more cautious about having any Americans in a peacekeeping role where there was any ambiguity at all about what the range of decisions were which could be made by a command other than an American command with direct accountability to the United States.”36 This statement, and the belief that American causalities in Somalia were a result of a faulty UN mission, led to negative public and “congressional attitudes towards the United Nations.”37 Ivo H. Daalder points out the irony that “lost in the commotion was the fact that the 3 October raid was instigated by US forces operating under US control and without the prior knowledge of UN commanders on the scene.”38

During the Bush and Clinton administrations, the UN had 45 PKO taking place for at least some portion of the decade from 1990-1999. The U.S. contributed personnel to 17 of these missions. UN archives on peacekeeping contributions indicate the U.S. had 33 personnel contributed to UNTSO in November 1990 and no additional personal supporting the other seven active UN PKO taking place. The highest number of U.S. troops was 3,471 contributed to UNOSOM II in October 1993 and 2,226 contributed to UNMIH in 1995, after which the number of total contributed troops to UN PKO drops and remains below 1,000 personnel annually.
The administration of President George W. Bush from 2001-2009 included large U.S. military deployments to both Iraq and Afghanistan and a yearly reduction in the number of U.S. personnel contributed to UN PKO. During this administration, the contributions of U.S. personnel fell from 750 in December 2001 to 91 in December 2008. The UN authorized nine PKO and maintained 12 additional missions during portions of his administration. Of these, the U.S. contributed to 14 missions. Steven Rocker characterizes the Bush administration in his 2010 study on U.S. involvement in UN PKO as being “benignly neglectful to unequivocally hostile toward the UN in its first term, [however,] it too came to appreciate the added value of UN peacekeeping in addressing issues of global instability.” The likely basis for the referenced appreciation lies in use of human resources, similar to discussions regarding the use of US personnel after incidents in Somalia, and the financial value of UN PKO verses U.S. unilateral options.
The argument for financial savings in a UN PKO versus U.S. unilateral options originated with a February 2006, U.S. Government Accountability Office report on *Peacekeeping Cost Comparison of Actual UN and Hypothetical U.S. Operations in Haiti*. This study compared the actual UN PKO budget for the initial 14 months of MINUSTAH at $428 million to an estimate of what a U.S. unilateral operation of similar scope would cost. The findings reveal, that for the U.S. to conduct an operation of the “same size and duration [it] would cost an estimated $876 million,” twice as much as the UN PKO construct. During this period, the U.S. supported 14 of the 29 UN active PKO as depicted in figure 5.

President Barack Obama’s actions upon entering office indicated a willingness to increase U.S. support UN PKO. Once in office, he restored the Cabinet status of his Ambassador to the United Nations (UN), Susan Rice, raising the perceived status of the position and the role to be played within the UN. Additionally, Obama met with the leadership of troop contributing countries in 2009 to “underscore the United States’ commitment to UN peacekeeping, to express appreciation for those who contribute the most troops and to exchange ideas for improving peacekeeping missions at a time of expanding need and growing complexity.” During this meeting, he stressed that “peacekeeping operations are a cost-effective means for the United States and all nations to share the burden of promoting peace and security” and offered five areas his administration would pursue to address the challenges of UN PKO. One of these areas is of interest to this thesis as it addressed an area that may underpin the opportunity to improve military-to-military relations through UN PKO. Specifically, his administration would “help the UN mobilize critical enabling assets, such as field hospitals, engineers, transport and aviation units and is willing to consider contributing more U.S. military officers, civilian police and civilian personnel to UN missions.”

Ambassador Rice, in testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, included “increasing the effectiveness and the efficiency of peacekeeping” as “one of the Obama Administration’s highest priorities at the United Nations.” Additionally, her testimony to Congress secured financial support for UN PKO that enabled the U.S. “to clear all peacekeeping arrears accumulated from 2005 to 2008” and in her words “meet our obligations in full for 2009.” While financial support to UN PKO has increased during the current administration, the level of U.S. military and police contributed to UN PKO
has steadily declined since 2000, with the exception of 2010 when the U.S. increased the number of police contributed to MINUSTAH after the earthquake. Collectively the number of observers, police and troops contributed has reduced from 885 in Dec 2000 to 131 in March 2012.47

During the period from 1990 to present, U.S. contributions to UN PKO have varied by presidential administration, yet at least since 1995, the general trend has been a decline in personnel contributions. Further, U.S. contributions have repeatedly faced debates over placing U.S. military personal under the command of the UN and what specific capabilities should be contributed to UN PKO. The turning point in this period was 1993, when the U.S. suffered 30 fatalities while supporting UNOSOM II, which negatively impacted opinions towards UN peacekeeping. Despite the steady decline in personnel contributed, and while not yet experienced, the Obama administration has indicated the possibility of increasing military, police and civilian contributions to UN PKO. As U.S. contributions of personnel have declined, China has increased its contributions steadily since 2002.
China’s Approach to United Nations Peacekeeping

Yin He, author of *China’s Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations*, arranges China’s history of support to UN PKO in four periods. The initial phase lasted from 1971 to 1980, during which China “adopted an inactive policy towards UN PKO.”48 China attended UN Security Council voting, but kept “silent and [did] not participate in voting.”49 The second phase lasted from 1981-1987 and included China’s first vote in support of a UN Security Council resolution on peacekeeping and China’s first payment...
of peacekeeping assessments from the UN. China did not contribute any personnel to UN PKO during this period.

The third phase characterized by Yin, began in 1988 and ended in 1998. This period provides a transition to the current level of Chinese support to UN PKO. China sent its first contribution of military observers to the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in 1990. Military Observers were China’s main contribution during this period with support provided to eight UN PKO. These operations included; UNTSO, UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), UN Advanced Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), UN Operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), and UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL). Additionally, China’s first contribution of military troops took place from 1992 to 1993, with the deployment of military engineers to UNTAC. It would be ten years before China would again contribute PLA troops to a UN PKO. Figure 3 displays China’s contributions to UN PKO during this period.

![Figure 7. Chinese Contributions to UN Peacekeeping from 1990-1998](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml)

Yin’s final characterization covers China’s support to UN PKO after 1999 during which the contributions of troops, observers, and police increased to approximately 2000 members supporting 20 different UN PKO. The initial increase in troop contribution started in 2003 with the deployment of a PLA “175-person engineering company and a 43-person medical unit” in support of the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). This contribution remained at approximately 220 troops through 2010 when the mission ended and was replaced with MONUSCO, which continued to receive 218 troops through March 2012. Further, China had 569 troops deployed to the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) by December 2004, another contribution that has remained steady. By 2003, PLA troops made up the largest portion of Chinese contributions, surpassing military observers in UN PKO followed by police after 2004.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>DEC Observers</th>
<th>DEC Police</th>
<th>DEC Troops</th>
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<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Figure 8.** Chinese Contributions to UN Peacekeeping, 1999-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>DEC Observers</th>
<th>DEC Police</th>
<th>DEC Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Figure 9. Chinese Contributions to UN Peacekeeping, 1999-2011


**China’s Contributions to United Nations Peacekeeping**

Further examining China’s increase in UN PKO, the U.S. DOD asserts that “China regards participation in UN peacekeeping operations as serving multiple objectives, including improving China’s international standing and image, demonstrating support for international stability in troubled regions, providing opportunities to initiate

49
and expand intelligence collection, and enhancing relationships in the affected areas.”

As stated above, China’s initial contributions to UN peacekeeping consisted of five observers sent to UNTSO in November 1990. By 31 January 2012, China’s contributions had increased to 1,896 individuals deployed in support of 11 of the 15 active UN PKO as reflected in figure 5. These contributions ranked them 16 of 114 contributing countries and the largest contribution of peacekeepers among the 5 permanent members of the UN Security Council.56

Additionally, China increased its financial contributions to UN PKO. The UN reported in United Nations Peace Operations Year in Review 2010, that China had contributed 3.94 percent of their assessed financial support for operating period covering 2010 to 2012. This percentage placed them seventh among the top countries providing financial support for UN PKO.57 Figure 10 includes the top ten countries providing assessed financial support. While these numbers vary over time, China has clearly increased their participation in UN Peacekeeping.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MINURSO</th>
<th>MINUSTAH</th>
<th>MONUSCO</th>
<th>UNAMID</th>
<th>UNFICYP</th>
<th>UNMIL</th>
<th>UNFIL</th>
<th>UNMISS</th>
<th>UNMIT</th>
<th>UNOCI</th>
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<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>322</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Observers</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1896</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 10. Chinese Contributions to Active UN Peacekeeping, 31 January 2012

Since 1990, China has contributed military or police personnel to 24 UN PKO. When categorized by region, China provided support to 13 UN PKO in Africa, 54 percent of missions supported. Since 1990, the Asia Pacific region received the next greatest amount of support, with five UN PKO supported followed by the Middle East, Europe, and the Americas respectively. Figure 12 displays the 24 missions supported by China from 1990-2011, by region.
Since China sent its first observers to UNTSO in 1990, it has increased the number of personnel contributed making it the largest contributor of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. The significant milestones of PRC contributions to UN PKO include their first contribution of PLA troops to UNTAC in 1992 and 1993 and more specifically, their continued contribution of an increased number of PLA troops after 2003. China is currently contributing to 11 of the 15 active UN PKO with 1,904 military or police personnel contributed. While their interests are likely debatable, their increased participation provides an opportunity for military-to-military contact in areas where the U.S. shares interests.

A Focused Look: U.S. and Chinese Deployed Peacekeepers

For the purpose of this thesis, 4 of the 15 currently active UN PKO are analyzed. These include UNMIL, MINUSTAH, MONUSCO, and UNMISS. These UN PKO have U.S. and Chinese participation and represent the best opportunity to identify criteria linked to a desired increase in military relations. In the case of China, these UN PKO represent the missions with China’s first, second and fourth largest personnel contributions as UNMIL, UNMISS, and MONUSCO respectively. The remaining mission, MINUSTAH is selected as a non–African region mission and due to its larger number of participating U.S. personnel.

Figure 13. PRC and U.S. Contributions to Active UN Peacekeeping Operations by Region

UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)

The UN Security Council authorized UNMIL on 19 September 2003, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter with resolution 1509. According to its mandate, the mission of UNMIL is to “support the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and the peace process; protect United Nations staff, facilities and civilians; support humanitarian and human rights activities; as well as assist in national security reform, including national police training and formation of a new, restructured military.” The positions of SRSG as well as the HOM are currently vacant with duties carried out by the two deputy SRSG in country, one of Malian nationality and the other American. The force commander, and HOMC, is Major General Muhammad Khalid from Pakistan, and the police commissioner, HOPC, is Gautam Sawang from India.

Currently there are 43 countries contributing military personnel and 37 police contributors. The U.S. contributed at the start of UNMIL with 20 personnel, two military troops, seven observers and 11 police. U.S. support to UNMIL has varied since its start and peaked in December 2004 with 61 police in addition to seven observers and five troops. As of January 2012, the U.S. has 4 troops, 4 observers, and 13 police supporting the mandate.

China first provided personnel to UNMIL in 2003 with 77 personnel, 68 troops, 4 observers, and 5 police. China increased its troop contribution to approximately 565, which has remained steady since 2004. The numbers of observers and police have varied over the years. As of January 2012, China has one medical company and one Engineer Company operating in Tchien, Liberia in support of UNMIL. These forces are collocated with a Pakistani Infantry Company (plus), a Company sized quick reaction force, and a
team of UN Military Observers. China also has a Motor Transport Company collocated with UNMIL Headquarters, units from Pakistan, the Philippines, Nigeria, Nepal, Jordan, and Bangladesh operating in Monrovia, Liberia. Figure 14, shows the geographic locations of forces supporting UNMIL.

![UNMIL Deployment Map](http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/english/htmain.htm)

**Figure 14. UNMIL Deployment Map**

UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)

The UN Security Council authorized MINUSTAH on 30 April 2004, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter with resolution 1542. According to its original mandate, the mission of MINUSTAH was to:

- support the Transitional Government in ensuring a secure and stable environment;
- to assist in monitoring, restructuring and reforming the Haitian National Police;
- to help with comprehensive and sustainable Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes;
- to assist with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, public safety and public order in Haiti;
- to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence;
- to support the constitutional and political processes;
- to assist in organizing, monitoring, and carrying out free and fair municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections;
- to support the Transitional Government as well as Haitian human rights institutions and groups in their efforts to promote and protect human rights; and to monitor and report on the human rights situation in the country.

The Security Council has approved numerous resolutions to update the MINUSTAH mandate in response to the situation within Haiti. Most recently, the UN Security Council authorized two resolutions after the 12 January 2010 earthquake, which increased the authorized military and police components to a max of “8,940 troops” and “up to 4,391 police.” The SRSG position, also the HOM, has been held by Mariano Fernández, from Chile since 1 June 2011. The two deputy SRSGs include one American and one Canadian. The force commander, and HOMC, is Major General Luiz Eduardo Ramos Pereira from Brazil, and the police commissioner, HOPC, is Marc Tardif from Canada.

Currently there are 19 countries contributing military personnel and 50 police contributors. The U.S. contributed at the start of MINUSTAH with 28 personnel, 3 military troops and 25 police. U.S. support has varied since its start but has included troops and police since 2004. As of January 2012, the U.S. has 9 troops and 85 police
supporting the mandate. These numbers do not reflect U.S. military personnel deployed to Haiti after the 2010 earthquake under a U.S. Joint Task Force construct.

China first provided personnel to MINUSTAH in 2004 with 133 police and maintained this level of contribution until May 2010 when they removed their formed police unit, leaving approximately 20 individual police to continue operation support. As of January 2012, China had 17 individual police members supporting MINUSTAH operations in Haiti.

![MINUSTAH Deployment Map](http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/english/htmain.htm)

**Figure 15. MINUSTAH Deployment Map**

UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DROC (MONUSCO)

The UN Security Council authorized MONUSCO on 1 July 2010, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter with resolution 1925. MONUSCO is a continuation of a preexisting mission, UN Organization Mission in the DROC (MONUC), which was originally authorized in 1999. According to its mandate, the mission of MONUSCO is to “use all means necessary” in “the protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders under imminent threat of physical violence and to support the Government of the DRC in its stabilization and peace consolidation efforts.” The SRSG position, also the HOM, is Roger Meece, and American with two deputy SRSG in country, one from Algeria and the other from Côte d'Ivoire. The force commander, and HOMC, is Lieutenant General Chander Prakash from India, and the police commissioner, HOPC, is Abdallah Wafy from Niger.

Currently there are 53 countries contributing 16,975 military personnel and 27 countries providing 1,372 police. The U.S. contributed at two observers in 2010. As of January 2012, the U.S. had three observers deployed in support of MONUSCO.

China first provided personnel to MONUC/MONUSCO in 2001 with nine observers and one troop. China increased its troop contribution to approximately 220 in 2003, while observers increased to 12 in 2007. Since 2007, China has maintained more 218 troops and 16 observers in support of these operations executed under Chapter VII, of the UN Charter. Currently China has one medical company and one engineer company located in Bukavu, Democratic Republic of Congo collocated with two Pakistani Companies, one Uruguay Company. Figure 9 shows the geographic locations of forces supporting MONUSCO.
UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)

The UN Security Council authorized UNMISS on 9 July 2011, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter with resolution 1996. UNMISS started in 2011, however, it is a continuation of UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), first authorized by the UN Security Council in 2005 as a Chapter VII peace enforcement mandate. According to the mandate, UNMISS is “to consolidate peace and security, and to help establish the conditions for development in the Republic of South Sudan, with a view to strengthening
the capacity of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to govern effectively and democratically and establish good relations with its neighbours.” Hilde Johnson, from Norway, currently holds the SRSG position, with two deputy SRSG in country, one from Zimbabwe and one American. The force commander, and HOMC, is Major General Moses Bisong Obi from Nigeria. Major General Obi was the previous Force Commander for UNMIS and has remained in the position as UNMIS ended and UNMISS started.

Currently there are 50 counties contributing 4,726 military personnel and 32 countries providing 450 police. The U.S. first contributed police in 2005 under UNMIS. The U.S. contribution peaked with 14 personnel in 2008 while still under UNMIS, the precursor to UNMISS. As of January 2012, the U.S. had three military troops and four police supporting the mandate.

China’s contributions to UNMIS/UNMISS started in 2005 with 8 troops, 15 observers, and 12 police. This increased to 446 troops in 2006 and consisted of 339 troops and 14 individual police in March 2012. China had an Engineering Company and a Medical Company deployed operating out of Wau, South Sudan. These units are collocated with a Kenyan Infantry Battalion (minus) and an Indian Infantry Company.

The UN presented the Chinese peacekeepers with a “Special Contribution Award” on 26 October 2011. The Chinese were the only “detachment from 13 peace-keeping detachments” to receive this award.
The above examples illustrate U.S. and PRC contributions to specific UN PKO. While U.S. numbers were limited in each mission, PRC contributions to UNMIL, MONUSCO, and UNMISS each included a Medical Company and Engineering Company, with UNMIL having an additional Motor Transportation Company providing support, while MINUSTAH includes Chinese police. These four UN PKO represent the current opportunities to identify criteria linked to a desired increase in military relations.
In summary, this chapter has presented detailed information on the framework of UN peacekeeping command and control, while highlighting 60 years of peacekeeping experience and the legitimacy underpinned by the international participation in approval and execution of UN PKO. Further, the nature of multiple contributing countries working together towards common mandate objectives removes a single nation from driving operations and increases the opportunity for interaction between those participating. This chapter presented the U.S. and PRC approach to UN PKO and respective contributions made by each. U.S. support to UN PKO is marked by a declining number of contributed personnel with the possibility of an increase in military, police, and civilians mentioned by the Obama administration. Alternately, the PRC had increased contributed personnel since 2003, making it the largest contributor among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. This material has served to establish the baseline from which to analyze if UN PKO are a venue where U.S. and China military relations can be increased.


5Ibid.


14Ibid.

15Ibid., 12.


17Ibid., 10.

18Ibid.

19Ibid.

21 Ibid., 7.


24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.


27 Ibid., 39.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.


31 Ibid.


35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.


43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.


46 Ibid.

47 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Troop and Police Contributors.”


49 Ibid., 20.

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid.
52 Ibid., 24; United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Troop and Police Contributors.”


54 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Troop and Police Contributors.”


56 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Troop and Police Contributors.”


59 Ibid.

60 Ibid.


63 Ibid.

64 Ibid.


67 Ibid.

68 Ibid.

69 Ibid.

70 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Troop and Police Contributors.”


73 Ibid.

74 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Troop and Police Contributors.”


CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS

This chapter will analyze the data previously presented as it relates to the purpose of this thesis; to determine if UN Peacekeeping Operations provide a promising means of improving U.S. and Chinese military relations. To this end, the chapter will assess the expected level of interaction between Chinese PLA units and other national contingents within a UN PKO. The chapter begins with analysis of the difference between U.S. and PRC approach to military-to-military relations, followed by analysis of the type of units contributed by China to UN PKO and expected levels of interaction with other national contingents. This chapter concludes with analysis of past U.S. contributions to UN PKO to include types of units and examples of interaction experienced with other militaries.

Opposing Views on the Role of Military-to-Military Relations in Diplomacy

The use of a nation’s military in diplomatic efforts is not new and can take many forms. The nature of a specific application of a military force in diplomatic efforts is outside the scope of this thesis; however, the reader should understand the difference in U.S. and PRC approaches to the military role in their respective diplomatic efforts. The U.S. approach reveals a “bottom-up approach in which lower-level contacts build trust and identify areas of common interest. Once identified, these areas can be built upon with more in-depth cooperation.”¹ This perspective is apparent in the 2010 strategic guidance provided by USPACOM, which states their second focus area is to mature military relations with China.² Another characteristic of the U.S. approach is a focus on relationship building, for example, efforts are made in order that “personal relationships
can be developed between individual officers and points of convergence or commonality of purpose can be identified. By working in identified areas of agreement, more trust can be built, upon which a foundation for a strategic framework can be laid.”

In contrast, China approaches military relations from a very different perspective, emphasizing “a top-down approach in which higher-level dialogue is employed to build trust, which is a stepping stone to identify and reach areas of agreement. Without this trust and agreement on strategic issues, the PLA is uncomfortable with further enhancing cooperation.” A 1999 study conducted by the Center for Naval Analysis stated, “PLA leadership regards the military relationship with the U.S. as a political undertaking for strategic reasons—not a freestanding set of military initiatives conducted by military professionals for explicitly military reasons. Fundamentally, the military relationship is a vehicle to pursue strategic political ends.” The difference can be summarized “in the Chinese construct, [military] cooperation is the result of mutual trust whereas [military] cooperation in the American construct is a pathway to build trust.”

The near opposite perspectives on the use of military-to-military relations within a larger diplomatic relationship likely underpins the challenges experienced within the broader U.S. and PRC relationship. Awareness of the PRC top down approach establishes a foundation upon which to analyze the personnel and unit types contributed to UN PKO.

Units Contributed from the People’s Republic of China

As presented in chapter three, China’s contributions to UN PKO include whole PLA medical, engineer, and transportation units. UN information provides the garrison location of contributed units by mission in a graphic Deployment Map. However, this information does not include specific operating areas for each particular unit or
individuals within a given UN PKO. This is particularly limiting when attempting to characterize a geographic operating area for engineer units, and contributed police and a likely level of interaction expected with units from other troop-contributing countries. Further, the locations of individual police, when deployed in less than a formed police unit of approximately 120-140 personnel is not provided on the UN Deployment Maps. The following section will analyze the unit types contributed by the PRC in order to assess the likelihood of their interaction with personnel from other countries based on their mission tasks and operating areas in proximity to other forces.

China had four medical companies, one engineer battalion, four engineer companies, one motor transportation company, and five police detachments deployed in support of the eight active UN PKO as of 31 March 2012.7 Continuing the focus on UNMIL, UNMISS, MONUSCO, and MINUSTAH established in chapter 3, China had three engineer companies, three medical companies, one motor transport company and three police detachments deployed.

![Figure 18. Chinese PLA Support to UN Peacekeeping Operations, March 2012](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2012/March12_3.pdf)

People’s Liberation Army Medical Units

The PRC provided a medical company in support of UNMIL, MONUSCO, and UNMISS. Each medical company provides a UN level two medical facility for its respective UN PKO. The UN has established guidance for medical support and the term “level two” is not equivalent to U.S. Army Medical levels of care contained in Field Manual 4-02, Force Health Protection in a Global Environment. According to UN standards, a level two medical unit provides “a basic field hospital with limited specialist expertise (doctors) and limited surgical, intensive care, dental, laboratory, X-ray, ward, sterilization and pharmaceutical capabilities (e.g., life, limb and organ-saving surgery, definitive treatment against a wide variety of common diseases/illnesses).”

UN standards further state that a level two facility maintains the ability to conduct “three to four surgical operations per day; hospitalization of 10 to 20 sick or wounded for up to 7 days; up to 40 outpatients per day; 5 to 10 dental consultations per day; and medical supplies, fluids, and consumables for 60 days.”

Chinese Ministry of Defense reporting characterized the tasks of medical units in UN PKO as supporting “rescue and treatment of the sick and the wounded, medical evacuation and epidemic prevention.” The PLA medical units typically deploy in support of UN PKO in eight-month rotations and support the local population and other UN Peacekeepers. Chinese reporting provides an example of the scope of medical activities conducted while deployed. For example, the 13th Chinese peacekeeping medical detachment, which supported MONUSCO, “cured 1,600-plus patients/times, hospitalized more than 300 persons/times, treated over 60 infectious patients including patients of malaria, carried out 35 operations and rescued 40-odd critically-ill patients”
during their deployment from July 2011 to March 2012.\textsuperscript{11} As of 2009, the PRC reported it had treated more than 28,000 patients through its medical support to all supported UN PKO.\textsuperscript{12} According to the International Research Group, the UN DPKO recognizes the value of Chinese medical units because they provide a complete formed unit, which is “difficult to source, partly because they are costly to equip and train.”\textsuperscript{13}

Chinese medical units have received accolades for their support to UN personnel and local populations. The International Crisis Groups reports that “Chinese medical teams and equipment are state of the art, with separate facilities for contemporary and Chinese traditional medicine” based on interviews conducted and collected in 2009.\textsuperscript{14} As another example, the 13th Chinese medical detachment (MONUSCO) hosted Egyptian Major General Abdallah in January 2012. During the visit, he recognized the PLA medical company for “providing strong medical support to [the] Egyptian infantry battalion, special operation company, organic police detachment and military observers to Congo.”\textsuperscript{15}

Information was not available on patient demographics to provide numerical data in an effort to quantify the level of interaction with non-Chinese peacekeepers. However, medical support is a service provided based on need, and their assigned operating area limits the personal they will interact with based on proximity. To illustrate, the PLA-run medical hospital is one of four in MONUSCO, with the remaining staffed by India, Morocco, and Jordan.\textsuperscript{16} The PLA hospital operates in a sector with units from Pakistan, Uruguay, Egypt, Bangladesh and a PRC Engineer unit, which equates to six of the 53 participating counties in MONUSCO.\textsuperscript{17}
In a similar comparison, the PRC medical company supporting UNMIL is one of three hospitals with the remaining two staffed by Bangladesh and Pakistan contributed units. The UNMIL PLA medical unit is located approximately 60 miles from units from three countries of the 63 countries that contributed military troops. These include Pakistan, Bangladesh, Chinese Engineers, and two teams of UN Military Observers with unknown national compositions.

Lastly, the PLA run medical hospital in UNMISS was one of three active in January 2012 with the remaining facilities staffed by India and Bangladesh and located in other UN PKO sectors of South Sudan. The PLA medical company operates in Wau with Indian and Kenyan forces. While the PLA medical company provides support to these forces and the local population, none of the 46 additional countries supporting UNMISS are listed as operating within this sector.

People’s Liberation Army Engineer Units

The first PLA contribution to UN PKO consisted of PLA Engineers sent to UNTAC, which included 800 troops during 1992-1993. After UNTAC, China did not send PLA troops to another UN PKO until March 2003, when PLA troops were sent to MONUC. As of March 2012, there were PLA Engineer companies in support of MONUSCO, UNMIL and UNMISS and an Engineer Battalion supporting UNFIL. The primary tasks for PLA engineers include road repair and construction, “airfields, helipads, and bridges” in addition to infrastructure improvements. Specifically where mandates call for supporting a new or fragile government, tasks may include “construction of water and power supply facilities” as they did in Liberia under UNMIL. PLA Engineering support to UN PKO included more than “7300 kilometres of
paved roads and 200 bridges . . . and cleared more than 7500 explosive devices” by 2007.25

The operating area of engineer units is more difficult to assess based on the mobility requirements inherent in their tasks and mission execution. In an attempt to characterize likely interaction with forces from other countries, the following section will present PLA Engineer operating locations and their proximity to other national contingents within the same sector or general area where PLA Engineers are active.

The PLA Engineer Company supporting MONUSCO is located in Bukavu, Democratic Republic of Congo with the PLA Medical Company. Additional co-located forces are from Pakistan, Uruguay, Egypt, and Bangladesh. Both Bangladesh and Uruguay also have Engineer Companies operating within approximately 50 miles from Bukavu. According to the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy, which assists the Democratic Republic of Congo’s “Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for War-Affected Areas,” each of these engineer units was working on separate sections of key roadways around Bukavu in early 2012.26 Previously in 2010, as another example of work carried out without integration of units, the PLA Engineers completed a section of roadway, then transferred work to the Bangladeshi Engineers.27 No examples were found in this research that included PLA Engineers working as part of an integrated effort that required active interaction with other nation’s forces.

The PLA Engineer Company is co-located with the PLA Medical Company providing support to UNMIL in Tchien (Zwedru), Liberia. A Pakistani Infantry Company, Quick Reaction Force, and a UN Military Observer Team are also located in Tchien. The nearest UN forces outside Tchien are Pakistani Infantry units located
approximately 45 miles away, and a Bangladeshi Infantry Company and Engineer Platoon approximately 60 miles away. The PLA Engineers conduct many of the same tasks mentioned above with their primary focus being road construction and repair. In 2010, the PLA Engineers incorporated local assistance in completing a new road near Tchien. One example of contact with other nations within the UN PKO construct occurred during the annual UN Military Evaluation Team visit. In February 2012, the team included “Military Affairs Office of the United Nations Headquarters and 4 staff officers from the Operation Division” of UNMIL. Based on a photograph included in the report, at least one member of the evaluation team was from the U.S. Army. These evaluations are likely of a short duration and periodic, thus are not likely to lead to increased cooperation or interaction. The UNMIL SRSG recognized the contributions of the PLA Engineers during a UN Peacekeeping Medal ceremony in January 2012. She commented that the PLA Engineer efforts supported the recent elections through their “62-day emergency road repair” effort, which “made it safer and easier for many Liberians to go to the polls in what was a milestone first nationally run election. These repairs were indeed a remarkable and unique contribution to the democratic process.”

The latest deployment of PLA Engineers was to UNMISS in January 2012. This deployment indicates a possible change in the types of troops PRC will contribute to UN PKO. The 9th Chinese Peacekeeping Detachment deployed to Wau, South Sudan and according to China News, the PLA Engineer Company is organized in three “engineering support units, 1 backup support unit and 1 guard unit, [and] is mainly responsible for building roads, bridges, airports, makeshift barracks, protective shelters and field works, providing engineering support to troops within the mission area and other tasks.”
unique characteristic of this detachment is the inclusion of an organic guard unit. China
News characterized the organic guard unit as being the “first time in history,” such a unit
was included and that they were “equipped with armored vehicles.”

The article justified
the guard unit by stating that the UN was not going to provide additional security for the
ingenieurs while performing their missions in South Sudan. The Engineering Unit
commander, Wang Zhonghua, was quoted in China News that the guard unit was
organized based on the unpredictable “security conditions of the construction site.”
Additionally, he addressed the training completed during their first month in South
Sudan, “such as guard coordination in maneuver, armed protection during engineering
operation and handling attacks, as well as a joint drill with the Kenyan protection
troops.” The presence of organic light security and the openness of reporting on their
training may indicate progress on the part of the Chinese to include combat troops in UN
PKO, a step that has yet to take place. Additionally, the inclusion of an organic security
may limit future interaction with other UN forces that previously would have been
necessary to provide security at operating locations.

People’s Liberation Army Transportation Units

The PLA Transportation Company is deployed in support of UNMIL and has
provided support as the only Transportation unit in UNMIL since 2003. The unit is based
in Monrovia, Liberia and co-located with UNMIL headquarters in addition to units from
Pakistan, Philippines, Nigeria, Jordan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Ghana, and the UN Military
Observer headquarters and UN Military Observer Team 2. While the PLA Transportation
Company is the only true transportation unit in UNMIL, Bangladesh provides a Logistics
Company that operates out of two locations, one of which is a platoon also based in
The People’s Republic of China Police Contributions

China contributed police to four UN PKO in March 2012, which included 17 police in UNMIL, 16 in MINUSTAH, 23 in UNMIT, and 14 in UNMISS. In each case, Chinese police were contributed as individual police and likely placed with other police contributing countries to carry out their tasks. Prior to deployment, Chinese police receive training in “maintaining law and order (crowd control, VIP protection, hostage rescue), training local police, reconstructing the local legal system, assisting in law enforcement, protecting civilian rights and assisting in humanitarian relief efforts.” As an example of duties within a given UN PKO, Chinese statements describe the duties of their contributed police in UNMIL as conducting “joint patrols with other UN Formed Police Units and advisors, as well as the Liberia National Police” and providing “police support, information collection, criminal investigation, traffic management, and emergency response.” The International Research Group describes China's police as
“highly professional, well trained and able to work effectively in difficult operational environments.”

The Chinese Police received praise from the UNMIL SRSG for their service increasing the proficiency of the Liberian National Police. Specifically, she commended them for “training new LNP officers; assisting in enhancing traffic management skills; engaging in community policing activities such as crime prevention, and self defense training for women” and using their own “resources to rebuild the LNP [Liberian National Police] station on Bushrod Island” outside Monrovia.

The UNMISS Police in South Sudan address tasks under three primary types of activities, the training of South Sudan Police Services, reform of the South Sudan Police Services, and the “protection of civilians.” During a medal presentation ceremony held in May 2011, the UNMISS Police Commissioner described the Chinese police as “professional, committed, hard working officers” and that during their deployment they were sent “all over the country in Sudan, north and south, and they were willing and competent in performing their duties outstandingly well.”

The Chinese police support to MINUSTAH began in 2004 with a group of individual police followed by a Formed Police Unit of approximately 120 police that arrived in Haiti in October 2004. The Formed Police Unit operated as a “self contained police force,” providing MINUSTAH the ability to “provide operational backup to individual police officers, or perform public control duties, which are usually regarded as being sensitive for military troops as well as too difficult for ordinary police officers.” Specifically, the Chinese Formed Police Unit was tasked to “control the crowds, assist in the maintenance of public order, participate in patrols, and conduct verification check-
China rotated support to this Formed Police Unit in Haiti until May 2010, when it was withdrawn, leaving the contribution of individual Chinese police to support MINUSTAH.\textsuperscript{50}

While outside the immediate scope of this thesis, a single patrol was conducted in Haiti with Chinese police and U.S. military troops in January 2010. The U.S. troops were members of the 82nd Airborne Division serving in Haiti as part of a U.S. Joint Task Force deployed after the earthquake to provide humanitarian assistance and were not subordinate to, nor associated with the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti. The Chinese police were a “tactics team of 10 Chinese riot police” contributed to and operating under MINUSTAH.\textsuperscript{51} The patrol was reportedly organized by “Hendre Ciprian, a Romanian police officer with MINUSTAH,” in an effort to assist Haitian police.\textsuperscript{52} The patrol lasted over an hour, with the U.S. and Chinese providing security while “Haitian special police were questioning and searching for suspects.”\textsuperscript{53} No additional information was found to further characterize this interaction.

Non-UN Mandate Activities of Chinese Peacekeepers

In addition to tasks associated with carrying out mandate tasks, PLA units have performed tasks geared towards the local population, many of which are outside UN funding and direction. Examples include cultural activities and support to local entities. For example, in UNMIL, the PLA Medical and Engineer detachment received accolades from the UNMIL SRSG in 2011 for surpassing UNMIL mandate requirements by providing material support to a local elementary school and for medial engagements with the local population in their operating area.\textsuperscript{54}
In December 2011, PLA forces supporting MONUSCO conducted a cultural exchange with students and teachers associated with a local student development group in Bukavu, the Democratic Republic of Congo. The PLA detachment hosted “students from 8 universities and colleges” and “more than 80 teachers” from the Bukavu area. The PLA unit provided tours, a showing of “China’s national publicity film and videos of the detachment’s peacekeeping work,” and “cultural and art exchange” through dancing and singing. Additionally, as a continuing effort, the PLA detachment supporting MONUSCO started providing support to the SOS Children’s Village in Bukavu in 2005. Since then, the rotating PLA Medical staff has continued support to include food donations, “computers, stationeries and clothes.”

Examples of interaction with other UN forces in the above cases were limited. As an example, PLA engineers deployed to MONUC in 2003 issued the "China Blue Helmets Bulletin" to capture their experience. According to the PLA Daily website, the PLA engineers were garrisoned near “peacekeepers from Uruguay, India and South Africa and other countries.” While the website does not include any references to integration in mission tasks, it does include off duty activities where some “Uruguayan soldiers would come to the Chinese barracks to learn Chinese from Chinese engineers” and that post-deployment, some of the Chinese stayed in contact with their “students” and that one even continued to send “Chinese learning materials to his ‘student,’ a Uruguayan sergeant.”

Another example of non-mandate related activities is PLA sponsored events to demonstrate Chinese culture to other UN Peacekeepers. For example, the PLA troops in South Sudan supporting UNMISS performed “martial arts, including wrestling, Shaolin
kungfu, hard qigong . . . to the officials of the theater headquarter[s] . . . and the officers and men of the Kenyan protection battalion and Indian reserve company.”60 The unit also hosted a Chinese New Year party in January 2012 and invited peacekeepers from other troop-contributing countries, likely India and Kenya based on the garrison location being Wau, South Sudan.61 Chinese Police in Haiti also hosted a Chinese New Year’s celebration in 2009, inviting other peacekeepers and locals.62

Assessing the Interaction of PLA Forces with other National Contingents

The 2009 International Research Group study on Chinese participation in UN PKO included interview data that characterized PLA peacekeepers as able to “fulfill their tasks well but rarely take any initiative.”63 They include a quote from an anonymous UN Official who stated that deployed Chinese Peacekeepers:

have a very strong work ethic, are professional and very committed. The one area where they are often hampered is language and English in particular. On a day-to-day basis they operate well in missions, but during meetings and planning, they can’t contribute much. I imagine they could make useful contributions, were it not for this language barrier.

Lastly, they provide statements that “observers have frequently criticized the propensity of Chinese troops to segregate themselves from other peacekeepers as well as the local population. This tendency, also noted of other countries’ contingents, can prolong the time necessary to begin to contribute to the mission.”64 Specifically concerning China, they state, “traditionally, the armed forces have avoided extensive interactions with foreign militaries, but as the country becomes more integrated into the international community, PLA officers are becoming more comfortable with the practice. Soldiers consistently report that they learn a great deal from contact with foreign militaries.”65
United States Contributions to United Nations Peacekeeping

As addressed in chapter 3, the U.S. support to UN PKO in March 2012, included 129 total personnel, broken down as 27 military members and 102 police. The military contributions more specifically include nine military observers and 18 individual troops. As of April 2012, the U.S. contributes individual police through contracts managed by the Department of State.66 The small number of U.S. contributions (27) as military observers or individual troops limits the ability to characterize their activities and assess likely interaction with other troop contributing countries. This section will instead present ways the U.S. does provide support to UN PKO, that include financial support above UN assessed contributions and activities under the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). This section concludes with a review of historic U.S. contributions to UN PKO as an illustration of what future contributions may include should they increase.

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Figure 19. United States’ Support to UN Peacekeeping Operations, March 2012


In addition to funding the UN assessed portion of the UN Peacekeeping Budget (approximately 27 percent or “about 2 billion”), the U.S. provides additional financial
support to UN PKO efforts. Ambassador Jeffrey DeLaurentis, U.S. Alternate Representative for Special Political Affairs to the UN, highlighted additional financial contributions to the UN provided by the U.S. during the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations Session in February 2012. He conveyed a U.S. contribution of “$23 million over the last two U.S. fiscal years–to help enhance the operational capacity of police peacekeepers and to contribute to the development of UN doctrine, policy, and training on international policing.” Additionally, in 2009, the Obama administration provided “almost $3 billion in humanitarian and development assistance for the eight countries that host multidimensional UN peacekeeping missions” and “more than $600 million dollars of training, equipment, and logistics assistance to 55 nations to help bolster their capacity to contribute troops and police for peacekeeping operations.” Some portion of these funds are likely included in efforts undertaken by the GPOI.

The GPOI originated in 2004, as the U.S. “contribution to the broader G8 Action Plan for Expanding Global Capability for Peace Support Operations, adopted at the 2004 G8 Sea Island Summit.” The overall goals that stemmed from the G8 summit included:

- Train and equip 75,000 peacekeepers worldwide by 2010 with a focus on Africa;
- Create a G8 Africa Clearinghouse to exchange information and coordinate PSO capacity building activities and related assistance;
- Develop a transportation and logistics support arrangement to facilitate the deployment and sustainment of troops to PSOs; and
- Support the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU), an international training center for stability/formed police unit trainers located in Vicenza, Italy.

In support of this effort, the U.S. established the GPOI with a “budget totaling $ 577 million for fiscal years 2005–2010” under the Department of State’s Peacekeeping Operations account. Phase I ended in 2009, when “nearly 87,000 military personnel from 78 countries had been trained on peacekeeping related topics through GPOI-funded
activities.” GPOI Phase II, began in 2010 and is scheduled through fiscal year 2014. The focus of phase II “has shifted from the direct training of peacekeepers by U.S. personnel to building sustainable, self-sufficient, indigenous [peace support operations] PSO training capabilities in targeted partner countries.” GPOI Phase II also adds a “program objective” to work in “coordination with other U.S. government and international community efforts, [to] provide support to deploying units to address partner countries’ capacity shortfalls.” According to the U.S. Department of States, GPOI “training and activities are implemented through a close partnership between the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Department of Defense” and that “DOD organizations implement nearly 50% of all GPOI programs, events, and activities.”

Ambassador DeLaurentis revealed the levels of U.S. support provided under GPOI between 2005 and October 2011 during the United Nations’ Fourth Committee Debate on Peacekeeping Operations. In his words, the U.S. had “trained over 140,000 peacekeeping troops since 2005, and supported the training of 41,000 more through partner countries. We [the US] have facilitated the deployment of more than 138,000 peacekeepers from 31 countries to 19 peacekeeping operations around the world.”

Ambassador Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, further highlights the contributions of the U.S. under GPOI’s equipping efforts through a 2009 provision of “substantial equipment packages to African troop contributing countries, including nearly $20 million in equipment packages for Burundian and Ugandan battalions in AMISOM, and another $20 million for 72 urgently-needed armored vehicles.”
U.S. Police Contributions

As far back as 2005, the U.S. has utilized a contracting firm “to provide U.S. civilian police, either active duty on a leave of absence, former, or retired . . . hired for a year at a time and paid by the contractor.” According to the U.S. Department of State, they contract “with private companies to recruit, select, equip, and deploy subject-matter experts in policing, criminal prosecution, court administration, judicial adjudication, criminal appellate practice and correctional programs.” Individuals selected to serve as police in a UN PKO receive training in the U.S. before deploying to their respective mission area. Individuals “seconded to the UN” for peacekeeping, carry out UN Police duties under UN Operational Control with administrative and support matters handled by a contractor office located in the mission area.

Analysis of Past United States Contributions to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

In light of the current level of U.S. troop contributions to UN PKO, the following section presents a summary of past sizable U.S. troop contributions to UN PKO as a possible example of the types of units to be contributed should the current or future presidential administration decide to increase military support. It is first necessary to differentiate a practice where the U.S. has deployed troops within a U.S. construct, under U.S. command and control, in the same operating area as UN PKO, while not acting under the UN DPKO. In order to distinguish this fact it becomes necessary to distinguish between actions under a UNSCR and those specifically authorized as a PKO. This practice took place in Somalia in 1992-1994 and Haiti in 1995 and 2010. In Somalia, the majority of U.S. forces (28,500 personnel) remained under a UNSCR authorized; U.S.
led Unified Task Force (UNITAF). In comparison, only 2,700 U.S. troops operating under UN control in support of UNOSOM II once initiated in May 1993. Haiti provides another example, when in 1995 the U.S. had forces, first under a U.S. led operation, then approximately 2,400 transitioned to serve as peacekeepers under the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) upon its authorization in September 1995. Finally, in Haiti, after the January 2010 earthquake, U.S. forces operated under a US Joint Task Force providing humanitarian support that included coordination and interaction with MINUSTAH peacekeepers while not under their control.

To further illustrate, the U.S. deployed up to 25,800 troops under UN Security Council Resolution 794, which established Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia in late 1992. UNITAF, authorized by the UN Security Council was not a PKO, instead it was to serve as a “humanitarian aid mission to provide protection for relief workers and food convoys” within Somalia. In May 1993, the missions under UNITAF were handed over to UNOSOM II, as a UN PKO. The U.S. troops contributed to UNOSOM II, ranged from 2,700 in May 1993 to a high of 3,471 troops in October 1993, with the majority of those contributed providing logistic support under UN control. The U.S. ended troop contribution to UNOSOM II in February 1994. According to a U.S. Army After Action Report, the U.S. troops under UN control acted as the UN Logistics Support Command (UNLSC), providing:

- theater level general support logistics and direct support logistics to those contingents that did not have organic transport, engineer, and storage capability. This was particularly true in the case of Class I (rations), water, and Class III (fuel), and construction engineering. Although some national contingents such as Belgium, France, Italy and Morocco were essentially capable of self-sustainment level II logistics, most were not. Consequently, UNLSC provided the bulk of the
long haul transportation requirements, much of the local haul transportation, and almost all of the engineer work on the main supply routes.

The shortage of sustainment resources facilitated the interaction with other troop contributing countries as U.S. troops provided logistical support. In addition to those troops supporting UNOSOM II, the U.S. maintained Joint Task Force of approximately 17,700 troops, “including a 1,150-soldier Quick Reaction Force” in Somalia. The U.S. contributions in support of UNMIH in Haiti included “2,400 military personnel to UNMIH while 12 other countries contributed 3,600 personnel, for a total UNMIH military force of 6,000.” The U.S. troops contributed in mid 1995 were from the “2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Polk, Louisiana.” U.S. troops were reduced in January 1996 till they were removed in April of the same year. As of February 1996, “309 U.S. personnel” were in Haiti “providing logistical, aviation, psychological operations, engineering, staff, and medical support” under UNMIH.

A final example includes U.S. support to the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia with operating locations in “Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.” UNPROFOR was active from February 1992 to March 1995. In 1995, two missions took over UNPROFOR. United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) remained active in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while UN Preventative Deployment Force (UNPREDEP), assumed the forces operating in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and remained active until February 1999.

Early U.S. support to UNPROFOR included the “only Level III” medical facility supporting UNPROFOR, located in Zagreb, Croatia. The hospital was “sequentially manned (in 179-day deployments) by the U.S. Army, Air Force and Navy... [with] an
inpatient capacity of 60 beds (30 for acute care and 30 for minimal care holding and 
recovery), two operating rooms and x-ray and lab capabilities.” 92 The hospital provided 
support in Zagreb from November 1992 until December 1995.

In addition to the medical unit, the U.S. “augmented the UNPROFOR Macedonia 
peacekeeping force with a combat-equipped U.S. Army contingent.” According to 
President Clinton in a 1994 letter to Congress, the U.S. contributions included 
approximately 300 soldiers who rotated between units. As an example in 1994, the “1st 
Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) . . . assumed the 
mission on January 6, 1994.” 93 As the mission transitioned to UNPREDEP, U.S. soldiers 
were tasked “observe and report on activities in the country and on its borders with 
Albania and with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), with the 
goal of deterring the spillover of conflict.” 94 By 1995, “Roughly 500 U.S. soldiers 
continued to be deployed in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as part of the 
U.N. Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP).” 95

Conclusion

The UN Peacekeeping framework presented in chapter three and examined further 
in this chapter enables the identification of characteristics that may increase the 
likelihood of improving military relations between participating countries. The most 
likely scenario is a multidimensional UN PKO hosted in Africa with a large number of 
participating countries. This combination enables the U.S., with limited contributions, to 
best select a force to contribute in an effort to compliment a PLA formed units, possibly a 
logistics unit for periodic contact with PLA units or a light infantry unit to provide 
security for PLA formed units. Africa as a region has hosted 47 percent of all UN PKO
compared to other regions. Similarly, of the UN PKO China has supported since 1990, 54 percent were in Africa. It is likely that a UN PKO in Africa increases the likelihood of sharing a U.S. common interest.

Based simply on the types and construct of contributed PLA formed units (transportation, engineer, and medical support) their interaction with forces from other national contingents is limited. These units do not require interaction or cooperation to carry out tasks in support of their mandate. Additionally, the assigned garrison operating locations of PLA engineer and medical units further limit their interaction to those national contingents within the garrison site, or geographic operating sector. As illustrated above, the contact that does take place between PLA and other troop contributing countries occurs at a level that does not seem to include regular interaction, or the integration of forces from multiple national contingents as they work towards mandate achievement, to a degree that would support increased relationships.

Assessing the level of interaction with Chinese police is likely dependent on the size of the contingent contributed to a given UN PKO. For example, when Chinese contributions are less than a Formed Police Unit in a given UN PKO, as they were in March 2012, the individual police are usually “divided into groups of one or a few and dispatched to different UN police sections and mixed with those from other countries” indicating a higher degree of interaction with other troop contributing countries and unlike the formed PLA units discussed previously. In contrast, should China contribute a Formed Police Unit in a manner similar to that referenced in MINUSTAH, Haiti from 2004 to 2010, interaction with other troop contributing countries is less likely as they will operate as a formed unit in an assigned sector of operations.
The qualitative analysis presented above sheds light on what the U.S. and PRC contribute to UN PKO in contrast to level of contributions presented in chapter three. This presents a challenge in drawing conclusions when the U.S. has very limited military contributions from which to assess a level of interaction with other troop contributing countries. Further, PLA contributions consist of formed units, limiting interaction and cooperation, both necessary for military relations. While Chinese Police contributed to the UN in less than a FPU provide what appears as a promising opportunity for interaction with other contributing nations, the U.S. does not currently send military police to such missions, relying instead, on contracted civilian police. These specific challenges to increasing military interaction and cooperation through UN PKO also exist within the inverse approach to military relations practiced by the U.S. and China. These examples add to the complexities involved in the overarching U.S.-China relationship, and represent the data from which to draw conclusions in this thesis.

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36The International Crisis Group, “China’s Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping,” 27.

37United Nations Department of Field Support Cartographic Section, “UNMIL Deployment Map.”


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60 Xia Along, “Chinese Peacekeepers to South Sudan Show Martial Arts.”


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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions
This thesis analyzed the construct of UN Peacekeeping Operations and the current contribution practices of the United States and the People’s Republic of China to determine if such participation provided a promising means of increasing U.S. and PRC military relations. Two primary challenges exist which prevent an increase in U.S. and PRC military relations at this time. First, the small number of U.S. military troops contributed to UN PKO and secondly the nature of PLA troops, contributed in “formed” units, thus limiting their interaction or integration with other troop contributing countries. Additionally, the UN PKO construct does not imply integration or cooperation of contributed forces. Other venues would likely prove more beneficial and effective at increasing U.S. and PRC military relations.

This thesis specifically sought to answer the question: Is cooperative U.S.-China participation in UN PKO an effective means of achieving the three military relationship objectives set by the U.S. DOD; to (1) increase “cooperative capability,” (2) “dispel misconceptions and encourage common ground for dialogue,” and (3) enable “senior-most leaders to address the global security environment and relevant challenges.” The overall answer to this question, based on the research conducted, is no. The research suggests a number of limitations to reaching the DOD goals through cooperative UN PKO involvement. These limitations center on a lack of integration likely between the two nations’ forces. The following sections will present conclusions based on specific limitations.
Limitations based on China’s Contributions to UN PKO

As recommended by Makros and Sanders in their study on improving U.S.-Russian relations through peacekeeping, “combined patrolling missions” were are said to provide a means for exposure to tactics and practices as well as causal discussions as members “learn more about each other.” This research suggests that the formed units contributed by the PRC - Engineers, Medical, and Transportation units - limit their interaction with other troop contributing countries in carrying out mandate tasks. Only the Transportation Company in UNMIL likely experiences regular interaction with other national contingents as they deliver logistic support in Liberia. PLA Medical and Engineer Units were characterized as very capable in accomplishing their tasks without cooperation required with other national contingents. This was further supported by other research indicating PLA “armed forces have avoided extensive interactions with foreign militaries” while supporting UN PKO, however there exist indications this may be a declining trend.

This research concludes that, under the current trends of Chinese contributions to UN PKO, Chinese police provide the most likely entity with which sustained interaction and cooperation between the two countries appears possible when contributed in less than a formed police unit. Given the fact that the Chinese police force does not fall directly under the PLA, and given the U.S. practice of contributing contracted police, the opportunity lacks a direct link to increasing military relations, within the scope of this thesis. However, as the parent organization of the People’s Armed Police is the Central Military Commission, such interaction should not be considered fruitless and may yield
insight into China’s overall operating practices and support the greater U.S.-PRC relationship.

Limitations of the UN PKO Construct

This research analyzed the construct of UN PKO to determine if they might provide a favorable setting within which military interaction and cooperation may take place contributing to increased military relations. It further documented the historic and current contributions to UN PKO by the U.S. and PRC. This body of research suggests that interaction between U.S. and PLA troops on a future UN PKO would be limited, and likely not of a sustained duration. This is supported by the types and construct of contributed PLA formed units and the small number of U.S. troops contributed. Should the U.S. increase the contributions of military troops, there remains at least a single recent indication that interaction would not be increased.

Overall U.S.-PRC Relationship Benefits Through UN PKO

The existing U.S. and PRC Strategic and Economic Dialogue construct benefits the U.S.-PRC relationship, providing a reoccurring forum to address common interests and the U.S.-PRC relationship specifically. The common participation in UN PKO has served as a means for strategic interaction, while admittedly to a lesser degree. President Obama’s 2009 meeting with top troop-contributors included delegates from China and 12 other countries, to discuss ways to increase UN effectiveness in peacekeeping serves as an example of such interaction.³ Should U.S. and PRC strategic relations be stressed, the shared support to UN PKO “offers, at a bare minimum, a reason for interaction because both nations are committed to a number of peacekeeping operations.”⁴ It is unlikely that
UN PKO will surpass the role and value of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue in the near term, but it provides yet another area of commonality from which to address global security issues.

**Limitations of Conclusions**

The ability to assess a level of military relations that would effectually reduce “misconceptions” and foster a “common ground for dialogue,” exceeds the level of research material obtained in this thesis. Accessible research material in this thesis included UN web based documents, U.S. media, and Chinese government and media sources. Information on the tasks and interactions of personnel assigned to UN staffs at the operational level was not obtained. Additionally no information on military observers was obtained beyond numbers of military observers contributed.

**Recommendations**

Due to the complexities of the U.S. and PRC relations, apparent obstacles should be identified and where possible analyzed for change or adjustment. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 is one obstacle identified by the Chinese as hindering U.S. and PRC military relations. The 2000 National Defense Authorization Act does not list peacekeeping as a limited activity, nor is it included as an exception similar to the stated exceptions for “any search and rescue or humanitarian operation” or exercise. Gill and Huang highlight the likely implication as written with regard to “peacekeeping training and capacity building” in the following manner: The act does not explicitly restrict official exchanges on peacekeeping training and coordination, but it will require strong political will at the senior policymaking level to make the case that such exchanges do not pose the kind of security risk referred to in the act. In the absence of such political will, and as...
long as the limitations have legal force, there will be continued caution in the level of interaction between the two countries’ militaries.\textsuperscript{8} The adjustment in the National Defense Authorization Act to explicitly include “peacekeeping operations, training or exercise” would remove a source of external criticism and may reduce internal hesitation where it exists.

While participation in a UN PKO is not likely to increase directly U.S. and PRC military relations at the tactical and operational levels, participation in peacekeeping training venues may offer a venue with greater interaction and control. A second policy recommendation is to “expand military-to-military relations to encompass forms of peacekeeping training and capacity building.”\textsuperscript{9} Gill and Huang suggest U.S. policy makers “encourage greater Chinese participation in future peacekeeping training exercises under” existing U.S. efforts.\textsuperscript{10} They further recommend the U.S. “could also work with China to explore the prospects of supporting peacekeeping capacity-building in GPOI partner countries in Africa, where both the United States and China have increasing areas of common interest.”\textsuperscript{11} Training activities further provide a range of opportunities that can effectively manage the scope or duration of engagement and be conducted through a neutral venue or third party construct where the PRC may be more hesitant to end participation in protest to issues within the U.S.-PRC larger relationship.

Future Research

The research for this thesis did not obtain desired sources that would highlight areas targeted for military-to-military interaction and cooperation. The activities and multinational representation on UN peacekeeping staffs provide a venue where close and sustained levels of interaction and integration are more likely in executing duties. The
characterization of interaction between UN staff officers at the operational level provides an opportunity for future study. Additionally, this targeted aspect of UN staff officers better aligns with current U.S. military contributions to UN PKO for analysis. Should the Obama administration increase military contributions to UN PKO, (a consideration indicated in 2009); it will likely include some portion of “U.S. civilian police, civilian personnel, and military staff officers to UN missions.”

The duties and roles of military observers is another area for academic study in an effort to better characterize the multinational demographics on military observer teams. U.S. contributions to UN staff positions and military observers appear to offer a better opportunity for integrating with multiple contributing countries in mission tasks over a sustained period of time. Finally, the small contribution of military as staff officers or military observers would likely yield the greatest value, as individuals experience the UN construct and observe other national contingents.

This thesis focused on UN PKO as a legitimate and structured venue to increase U.S. and PRC military relations in an effort to overcome existing challenges. However, considering the People’s Liberation Army Navy anti-piracy activities in the Gulf of Aden since 2008, perhaps an area for further study includes non-UN activities of the PLA where interaction with other national militaries takes place. The People’s Liberation Army Navy anti-piracy activities included cooperation with other countries to include the U.S. A study that analyzed the ability of a bilateral or regional alliance, based on common security interests, that includes military interaction and cooperation, may better support the U.S. DOD objectives for improvised military relations with China.

**Concluding Remarks**

This thesis analyzed the construct of UN Peacekeeping Operations and the current contribution practices of the United States and the People’s Republic of China to
determine if such participation provided a promising means of increasing U.S. and PRC military relations. Due to the challenges presented above, the research suggests that UN PKO participation at the tactical level does not directly support increased military relations. Other venues, or constructs would likely prove more beneficial and effective at increasing U.S. and PRC military relations


7Bates Gill, Chin-hao Huang, “China’s Expanding Role in Peacekeeping, Prospects and Policy Implications,” 22

8Ibid.

9Bates Gill and Chin-hoa Huang, “China’s Expanding Presence in UN Peacekeeping Operations and Implications for the United States,” 120 and 121.

10Ibid., 121.


12The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Strengthening UN Peacekeeping to Meet 21st Century Challenges: President Obama’s Meeting with Leaders of Top Troop-Contributing Countries.”
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Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

Dr. Jeffrey J. Kubiak  
U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies  
201 Reynolds Avenue  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

Mr. Joseph G.D. Babb  
DJIMO  
USACGSC  
100 Stimson Ave.  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

Maj Julio E. Rodriguez  
USAFELM  
USACGSC  
100 Stimson Ave.  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301