ICCRTS Panel

Task Force Fury – 4/82 ABN

Operation Enduring Freedom X
AUG 09 to SEP 10
COL Brian M. Drinkwine

The overall classification of this briefing in UNCLASSIFIED
**Report Documentation Page**

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. REPORT DATE</th>
<th>2. REPORT TYPE</th>
<th>3. DATES COVERED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JUN 2012</td>
<td></td>
<td>00-00-2012 to 00-00-2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</th>
<th>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</th>
<th>5b. GRANT NUMBER</th>
<th>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Task Force Fury -4/82 ABN. Operation Enduring Freedom X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6. AUTHOR(S)</th>
<th>5d. PROJECT NUMBER</th>
<th>5e. TASK NUMBER</th>
<th>5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</th>
<th>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Office Secretary of Defense, Joint Advanced Warfighting Program - Analytical Projects Office, Washington, DC, 20301</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</th>
<th>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presented at the 17th International Command &amp; Control Research &amp; Technology Symposium (ICCRTS) held 19-21 June, 2012 in Fairfax, VA.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 14. ABSTRACT                                           |                                |
|                                                       |                                |

| 15. SUBJECT TERMS                                      |                                |
|                                                       |                                |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</th>
<th>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</th>
<th>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</th>
<th>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. REPORT</td>
<td>Same as Report (SAR)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unclassified</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. ABSTRACT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unclassified</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. THIS PAGE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unclassified</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**TF Fury Mission & C2/Evolutions**

**C2 (Unity of Vision/Command)**
- NATO TACON/US OPCON
- Fury TAC ISO RCW, C2 TF Pro & 3F and synchronize – coordinate (SOF)
- Fury Main at KAF ISO RCS, C2 STB, BSB, 504MP, TF2F, TF1F, PRTs, and SFATs (x 6 O6/O5s)
- ADHOC BDE C2: CTZ Tac II in Zabul: then CTKC in Kandahar, ADTF West in RCW

**ORG for Combat Decisions**
- Command & Control (17 sub-CMDs, 5800 people)/Partner w/80,000 Afghans
- Resource TFs, SFATs and COISTs
- 3 x BCT C2 Nodes (temp 4th in Kandahar)
- Heavy LNO Network (Intel/Ops) at every level (NATO units, SOF, KIFC etc)
- Embedding in RC Staffs
- Reachback to the best of our ability
- UAV Plt in West (Center – North)
- MICO ISO of TAC in West
- Be agile enough to force generate
- Who/how to Partner (no set solution because requirements varied)

- Missioned to OIF/remissioned to OEF on 3 APR 09 (at MRE)
- Training BDE / CSTC-A (Must be better)
- IJC & NTMA- Standup / Standdown 2BCT Concept
- SFA & COIN w/wo Battlespace
- **Who Do You Work For?**
**4-82 ABN Mission**: Task Force Fury conducts security force assistance with Afghan National Security Forces (ANA, ANP, ABP, ANCOP) in cooperation with coalition partner units and other actors, to build ANSF capacity to defeat insurgents (INS)/criminals (CRIM) in order to protect the Afghan people, provide for a secure environment for sustainable stability, and enhance the development and legitimacy of Government of the Islamic Republic Afghanistan (GIRoA).

**Purpose**: Increase capability, grow capacity, improve competency & credibility, and then sustain the overall effectiveness of ANSF throughout our Operational Environment, in support of the RC-West & RC-South campaign objectives.

**Key Tasks (Through – With – By):**
- *(with our ANSF)* conduct Population Centric COIN (Counterinsurgency)
- Separate, disrupt/interdict INS from the Population (physically and psychologically)
- Freedom of Movement along main economic corridors
- SFA: Build, Equip, and Sustain ANSF units (Capacity Building)
- SFA: Advise, Assist, Train and Enable ANSF
- Conduct *Combined Action* with ANSF, improve competency and trust with the people
- Transform the environment through *Unified Action* to enhance GIRoA, increase development and reduce abuse of power, corruption and negative influencers
- Continue to assess our Operational Environments (OE), Afghan partners and ourselves
- Remain an agile, adaptive and learning organization (get better every day)
### 4-82 Main Effort ANSF Partnership Model

- **Align units with ANA, ANP, ABP organizations**
  - Companies and Battalions mentor and C2 subordinate advising elements
  - Mentor/Advising teams require MOS augmentation (Log, Admin, Intel, and Maintenance)
  - LNO required with B-Space owner/partnered forces
- **All elements of BCT have advisor/mentor role (BSTB/BSB)**

#### Partnership – Advisor Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partnered Unit</th>
<th>Advisor Unit/Team</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enable the Unit CDR</td>
<td>Advise the Unit CDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Show ‘what right looks like’ through joint staff processes</td>
<td>Train functional staff systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Show ‘what right looks like’ through execution</td>
<td>Instill values and ethics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Success is defined by the enduring capability/capacity retained by the ANSF**
Moving from Embedded Partnership to Integrated Partnership through Combined Action (Security) and Unified Action (Governance, Development, Sec, Information)
Mobile Diplomacy consisted of Leaders throughout 4BCT traveling via aircraft to geographically separated locations to conduct Key Leader Engagements with individuals who previously had been isolated as a result of route and trafficability. These diplomatic engagements were instrumental in establishing the relations necessary to enhance the BDE’s Security and COIN Mission.
Kandahar Dynamics (Peel the Onion Apr 10)

- Narco-Drug Nexus
- Threat Finance & Resources
- Criminal Networks
- Tribal Elders
- Financing Network
- GIRoA Officials (Gov & Mayor)
- Corrupt or ineffective GIRoA Officials
- ANCOP
- AWK PowerBrokers
- Tribal Conflicts
- National Provincial District Tension
- Media
- ANA
- NATO Country Policy
- Youth (<19) 50% of People
- ABP
- KPRT
- ISAF Forces ISAF/IJC View RC View Ground View
- Local Leaders & Influencers
- Corrupt PowerBrokers
- Local Leaders & Influencers
- NGOs
- Unemployment
- Tension
- Criminal Networks
- Local Leaders & Influencers
- Financing Network
- Tribal Conflicts
- National Provincial District Tension
- NATO Country Policy
- Youth (<19) 50% of People
- ABP
CTKC COIN Information Management (Collect – Fuse – Understand - Decide)

CTKC COIN Fusion Director “Continuous fusion Of information”

Stakeholders
CTKC
KPRT
ISAF & IJC & RCS
GIRoA
DOS/USAID
ANSF
TFK (CAN)
TF Strike (2/101)
525 BFSB
2SCR
SOF & OGA
NGOs

Inputs/Feedback
OCC
Units
Afghan Media
Intl Media
KLEs
Reports
SBs
Patrol Debriefs
Meetings
Workgroups
CCIR/Routine reports

Desired Outputs
COP “Dashboard”
CTKC Daily INTSUM
SIGSUM - HUMSUMs
HVT/HPTL Weekly
Effects FRAGO Weekly
FFIR/CCIR SIGACTs Postings
CTKC WiseWeb Portal Assessment/RODEA

Comprehensive understanding for comprehensive operations
Combined Team KANDAHAR City (CTKC) as an integrated team in full partnership with ANSF, joint, interagency and multi-national organizations, conducts population centric comprehensive counterinsurgency (COIN) in key terrain to neutralize the insurgency and increase the competency, capacity and credibility of Afghan institutions to achieve stability and security in Kandahar and to connect with the Afghan people.

**Concept of Operations**

**Collaborative Events**
- ANSF and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) J2 at OCC-K
- Appropriate connectivity at OCC-K including Mission Secret (MS); MOI secure fax; MOI Intranet
- Daily Intelligence meeting at OCC-K with representation from NDS, ANSF and ISAF J2
- Weekly provincial combined Intelligence summary; daily provincial combined intelligence summary
- Weekly Joint Intelligence Coordination Board involving provincial and regional NDS, ANSF and ISAF J2

**CTKC**

**Fusion**
- INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
  - OGA
  - NSA
  - NGA
  - DIA

**Synchronization**
- INTERAGENCY
  - DOS
  - DEA
  - USAID
  - FBI

**Assessment**
- ANSF
  - NDS
  - 205 Corps
  - 404 Zone ANP
  - 2d ANCOP

**Focus**
- ISAF
  - CTKC
  - TFK
  - RC SOUTH
  - IJC

**IM Cell**

**IM**
- Concept of Operations

**IM**
- Cell IM

**IM**
- Cell IM

**IM**
- Cell IM

**IM**
- Cell IM
Challenge 1: Knowledge Fusion
What is the standard and who owns the Network?

- Operational OCC-K and OCC-R, NDS, ANSF and ISAF intelligence representatives meet daily to share intelligence and compile daily intelligence summaries for release to both ISAF and the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA).

- The current RIG and Provincial JICB will be combined to form a weekly coordination meeting held between senior ISAF, NDS and ANSF intelligence representatives at both Provincial and Regional level to coordinate and synchronise Regional and Provincial intelligence collection and analytical efforts in line with operational requirements.

- ANSF and NDS intelligence reports will be fused with ISAF reports with the aim of increasing the quality of combined intelligence products releasable to GIRoA and for dissemination to all elements of the Combined Team (CT).

- ISAF partners to ANSF and NDS will seek to ensure that intelligence officers continue to receive appropriate levels of intelligence training.
Train for Combat – MCS/CPOF for our Common Operational Picture (COP) and SATCOM for the tactical fight. BCT and Battalion Portals is how we trained and were designed for information management. Quick storyboards to capture the 5W’s and rapidly disseminate lessons learned across the formation.

Reality on the Ground – BCT is backboned off of two strategic networks, access to portals below Bns is non-existant. Email becomes the C2 net because it will eventually get through. 7 Days and 700 Emails.

What We Did – Reconfigure and streamline. Created the Fury ring to link Senior leaders, allow for collaboration of key lessons and dialogue across the formation.
COIST/Fusion – Center of Gravity
(Must invest with people, time and resources)
Challenge 3: Knowledge Fusion Enterprise
*What it was – What it could be?*

**Fury Challenges:**
- Most spread-out decentralized BCT – operating in platoons and small SFATs
- Every unit needs access to Data on the move (mounted and dismounted) (data was at fixed sites)
- TiGRNET – CIDNE – CPOF - BIOMETRICS (Did not talk or share information) – bandwidth challenge
- Requirement tripled for Data/SIPR access – equipment available but no extra trained users

**Mission Command & Situational Understanding:**
- Most ambiguous and complex environment
- Unified Vision and CDR’s Intent understood and nested
- Decentralized, empowered, resourced accountable formations (US/Coalition/HN partners)
- Fuse information – top to bottom/time and bandwidth are your friction points
- *But: Who can link all inputs and analyze/fuse and what is real time vs after the fact knowledge*

*Can We leverage what is available today in the open market?*

**Build the Network:**  Verizon, T-Mobile or ATT/IPHONE.
- Common language and protocols
- Data, Data, Data - - - where is it stored and who knows?

**Here come the APPS:**
- Prioritize APPs for warfighting functions (Maneuver, Fires,..., and all types of key terrain)
- Power of all INTs fused and analyzed in present time (time sensitive – but pull previous information)
- Merging of unclassified to classified – integration of NGO, IGO and Unified Action Partners
- Must be mobile and scalable – and reduced size so the leader on the ground has it in the fight
- Seek user feedback – upgrade over time V1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and so on

**Stakeholders vs Shareholders**
- Shareholders – part of the enterprise want positive outcomes and measured improvement
- Stakeholders – the people on the ground whose lives depend on the information
Final Thoughts Mission Command

- Build consensus early – founded on trust and the team buying into the enterprise approach – rapidly integrate new teammates
- Subordinate approaches and visualization must be nested
- Don’t allow Doctrine to be a crutch – continue to assess/learn
- Art of Mission Command is ahead of the Science
- Cannot command/fight through Email – must strive to have a common “Dashboard” for CDRs – Staffs, Sub-units, others
- Be relevant and agile – build and generate new capabilities and capacity (help your boss/higher HQ solve problems)
- Intel, Info and Operations – can no longer be separate – all interwoven and part of a system of systems
- Knowledge Enterprise – who really owns it?
- Risk Taking – decentralize and empower till it hurts (ex clearing fires)
- Be inclusive and transparent & invest in your liaison network
- Key is to be right more than you are wrong – if you fail, fail quickly and adapt
Questions

COL Brian M. Drinkwine (USA)
bdrinkwi@ida.org
Challenge 4: Human Terrain
Is this the best we can do?

P – Democratically elected officials versus tribal leadership; government reach limited

M – Illegally armed groups versus National Army and Police - diverse security apparatus with limited C2 from national command

E – Narco trafficking versus a developing market economy

S – Diverse demographic; 85% Sunni /15% Shiite; Pashtun Wali stronger than adherence to official laws

I – Limited infrastructure in urban areas versus a predominantly disconnected rural population

I – Information disseminated through sermons and tribal leadership; lack of literate public empowers elite and religious personalities

Tribal Breakdown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Major Tribes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pashtun Tribes</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajik Tribes</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazara Tribes</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UNCLASSIFIED