Fort Leavenworth and its Education Legacy; Recommendations for ILE

A Monograph
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This monograph, using a historical narrative, reviews the education of mid-grade officers at Fort Leavenworth during two eras of instruction, divided by the Second World War. Using the criteria of student and instructor selection, teaching methodologies, and curriculum, it reviews both eras and makes recommendations to refine the current ILE curriculum to enhance the level of tactical education received by Fort Leavenworth graduates. These recommendations focus on returning the prestige of the school, once known for tactical excellence to a position of prominence in the Army education system.
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Abstract

Fort Leavenworth and its education legacy; recommendations for ILE.

By Lieutenant Colonel James D. Sisemore, US Army, 93 pages.

In its 130 years of service to the US Army, CGSC transitioned numerous times as an academic center of officer learning. In its early years, the Applicatory School of Cavalry and Infantry, was known derisively as the “kindergarten” where lieutenants learned the basics of soldiering as well as math and English. Later, during the First World War, “Leavenworth Men” were sought out to fill primary staff positions within division, corps, and army headquarters, leading the US Army to success on the battlefields of France.

During the interwar years, the Command and General Staff School, refined its applicatory instructional method and was responsible for educating thirty-three of thirty-four corps commanders who lead the US Army during World War II. Many of the Army’s well know leaders during the Second World War, names like Eisenhower, Patton, and Taylor, later commented on their positive experiences at Fort Leavenworth and the tactical education they received.

Following the Second World War, the College changed. Requirements for officers to serve in higher echelon headquarters resulted in an expansion of the curriculum to include joint, interagency, and inter-governmental topics. During this period of change, tactical and doctrinal instruction was reduced, changing the dynamic of education, where tactics was no longer preeminent. Additionally, Fort Leavenworth adopted a collegiate philosophy, changing its mythology of teaching from instruction to education. The adoption of ILE returned some of the tactical instruction focus, but not to the level experienced by the officer corps during the interwar era.

This monograph, using a historical narrative, reviews the education of mid-grade officers at Fort Leavenworth during two eras of instruction, divided by the Second World War. Using the criteria of student and instructor selection, teaching methodologies, and curriculum, it reviews both eras and makes recommendations to refine the current ILE curriculum to enhance the level of tactical education received by Fort Leavenworth graduates. These recommendations focus on returning the prestige of the school, once known for tactical excellence to a position of prominence in the Army education system.
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Leavenworth is famous…for the demands it makes upon its students. Stories of nervous breakdowns and even suicides amongst students are legendary. Likewise, outstanding success in the course is a mark of great distinction in an officer’s career.¹

Introduction

In May 1881, General William T. Sherman, the Commander of the Army of the United States, ordered the establishment of the forerunner of the Command and General Staff College, a “school of application for infantry and cavalry” at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. General Sherman’s vision was to train “one lieutenant of each regiment of cavalry and infantry” to prepare them for future command and staff positions.² General Sherman wanted the doctrine of the school to espouse that service with troops in the field during peace “is the most honorable of all, and the best possible preparation for high command when war does come.” He did not want instruction focused solely on books, but through drill, guard duty, and other forms of garrison duty, using the applicatory method of instruction.³ Sherman’s ultimate goal was that Fort Leavenworth to become the “best practical military school of all in the United States.”⁴ From its humble beginning, where junior officers received tactical instruction alongside remedial subjects like grammar and arithmetic, Fort Leavenworth grew to an institution that influenced the careers of many well-known World War II leaders like Maxwell Taylor, George Patton, and Dwight Eisenhower.⁵ The school continued its instruction during World War II, with an abbreviated ten-


³ Four companies of infantry, four troops of cavalry, and one light battery of artillery moved to Fort Leavenworth to allow training with Soldier and equipment. Ibid., 135-136.

⁴ Letter, General William T. Sherman to Lieutenant General Philip Sheridan, 22 November 1881. Ibid., 134.

⁵ The first year course at Fort Leavenworth consisted of two classes based on the knowledge of its students. The “first,” upper class received instruction on military topics (i.e. military law, signaling, and field fortifications). The “second,” lower class received remedial instruction (i.e. arithmetic, geometry, and
week class, graduating over 16,000 officers from twenty-seven Special and General Staff Classes. Following the war’s end, the Army established a Military Education Board to design a postwar education system for the Army. While this board played a significant role in the future of Fort Leavenworth, it was not the first or last revision of instruction at the school. However, this board began a trend in the school, transitioning a curriculum based on tactical excellence, to one attempting to balance strategic education with tactical instruction.

Since its opening day, the curriculum at Fort Leavenworth underwent numerous changes. These curricula revisions occurred for a variety of reasons, including advances in technology, changes in warfare and doctrine, and changes in philosophies of instruction. Selection standards for officers to attend training at Fort Leavenworth and for the selection as instructors at the school, also varied as Army requirements changed. Over its 130-year history, these changes in curriculum, philosophies of instruction, and the selection of students and instructors, have affected the quality of Leavenworth graduates and the education they received.

Today, the schools at Fort Leavenworth are subordinate to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC). Under CGSC, there are four learning institutions, with the Command and General Staff School responsible for conducting the Intermediate Level Education (ILE) course for mid-grade officers, normally majors, at Fort Leavenworth or at one of four

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6 Ibid., 45-46, 48-49.


8 Through its 130-year history, the “school” at Fort Leavenworth was renamed several times. Currently CGSC overseas instruction conducted by the Command and General Staff School (CGSS). However, the school has been known as CGSC, CGSOC, CGSS, and the Staff College, among other terms. In this monograph, the school’s name during a particular era or the term “college” or “school” is used.
satellite locations. The transition to ILE is the school’s most recent and perhaps the most dramatic change in the history of education for the Army officer corps. The concept of ILE is to provide every mid-grade officer with a common core of operational instruction, and then provide an additional, tailored education, as required by the officer’s branch. The intent of ILE is to prepare all majors for their next ten years of service. The change to 100 percent resident attendance was a significant shift in Army policy. Following World War II, Department of the Army boards centrally selected only fifty percent of majors to attend resident instruction. This system developed a perception “haves” and “have-nots” within the officer corps, with those majors not selected for resident Leavenworth attendance required to complete instruction by correspondence courses before becoming competitive for their next promotion. During a 2003 interview, Colonel Mike Griswold, the special assistant for Leader Development to the CGSC Commandant stated, the ILE program “will produce field grade officers with a warrior ethos who are grounded in warfighting doctrine, and who have the technical, tactical, and leadership competencies and skill to be successful in their career field.”

Fully implemented during the 2005-2006 school year, ILE has not lived up to its expectation of 100 percent attendance. Due to the ongoing war, attendance remains at roughly seventy-six percent of capacity, with only 1,390 of 1,792 seats available filled in the 2011-2012 school year. Based on this change, some question the quality of the ILE graduate today. Since

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9 The four schools subordinate to CGSC include the Command and General Staff School (CGSS), The School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), School of Command Preparation (SCP) and the School of Advanced Leadership and Tactics (SALT). United States Combined Arms Center, “The Command and General Staff School.” http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/cgss/index.asp (accessed December 10, 2011).


11 David Bresser, “Sustainability of Universal ILE” (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Command and General Staff College, 2007), 2.

12 Triggs, “Army to Transform Officer System.”

13 “CGSC Resident ILE / JPME Phase I Student and Faculty Comparison,” US Command and General Staff College, September 2011
1946, the school slowly shifted from a curriculum known for rigor and tough standards to a school year of “relatively stress-free down time, allowing officers to decompress” and “reflect on previous combat experiences in a stress reduced environment.”\textsuperscript{14} This change in the instructional philosophy of rigor was highlighted by a recent doctoral dissertation stating that following the end of the Second World War, “commandants, faculty, and civilian experts never succeeded in re-establishing the rigorous academic environment experienced by interwar students.”\textsuperscript{15} This difference in rigor and a change in the philosophy of teaching is considered as this monograph develops comparison criteria to compare pre-World War II instruction and ILE instruction.

**Monograph Thesis and Criteria**

The thesis of this monograph is that the pre-World War II CGSS curriculum better developed its graduates to execute tactical tasks at the battalion, brigade, and division level than the postwar CGSC curriculum, specifically, the ILE curriculum in effect today. This monograph will show that there are divergent teaching philosophies and objectives between the two periods of instruction, which has resulted in a different level of tactical expertise of the Leavenworth graduate. Not possible within the scope of this monograph is an hour-by-hour assessment of classroom instruction or analysis of each class taught. Instead, four criteria compare two selected eras of instruction at Fort Leavenworth.

The four criteria explore if there is a quantifiable difference in the quality of tactical instruction of pre-World War II CGSS graduate over today’s ILE graduate. The rationale of selecting these two periods for comparison (interwar period, focused on the 1930-1939 timeframe and postwar instruction, focused on the 2003-2010 ILE program) is based on the similarities of

\textsuperscript{14} Thomas Hollis, “ILE a Casualty of War” (Monograph, Advanced Operations Arts Studies Fellowship, Command and General Staff College, 2008), 25-26.

\textsuperscript{15} Michael Stewart, “Raising a Pragmatic Army, Officer Education at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1946-1986” (PhD Diss., University of Kansas, 2010), 7.
the two eras in history of Leavenworth. Both periods underwent a major shift in curriculum and were influenced by either a looming, or an ongoing war. However, both changes were initiated prior to the beginning of conflict. The decision to shorten the two-year curriculum to one year in the 1935 resulted from an increased demand for graduates for general staff assignments in an expanding Army. While many civilian and military leaders foresaw the coming of the Second World War, the reorganization of the curriculum was not a result of an ongoing conflict. The revision of CGSC to the ILE curriculum was directed in the findings of The Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) officer study, published in May 2001, prior to the September attacks that began the current War on Terror.

Clearly impossible is an objective comparison of a mid-1930’s CGSS graduate to a Twenty-First Century ILE graduate. Education and experience of students, as well as the world situation of the two periods, would flaw any graduate-to-graduate comparison. The criteria selected allow a subjective look at the instruction at Fort Leavenworth and suggest areas to modify or continue within the current ILE curriculum. The first criterion looks at how the Army determines who will attend Fort Leavenworth as a student. The difference in an incoming student’s perception of the course is also apparent within the two periods. The second criterion, important in any educational environment, is the quality of instructor. The monograph will contrast the differences in selection of instructors and the difference in perception of professional development and rewards that an instructor could expect by serving at Fort Leavenworth in comparing the two eras of instruction.

16 In the mid-1930s, CGSC attendance was by shifting to junior officers (opened to select captains and First Lieutenants) who were not expected to reach higher levels of command in the coming war, but who were expected to staffs headquarters in the coming conflict. Hunt and Lorence, *History of Fort Leavenworth 1827-1937*, 159; *A Military History of the US Army Command and General Staff College 1881-1963*, 30.

The third criterion is the mission of the school during the two eras. In the prewar period, tactical training and evaluation dominated every aspect of the curriculum. The mission of the school during this era was to train future commanders and general staff officers grounded in tactics, logistics, and general staff principles. While the ILE teaching mission is similar to the interwar period, focused on leadership, decision-making, logistics, planning, and operations, the curriculum minimizes tactical instruction, focusing on the challenges of joint, interagency, and multinational issues.

The fourth criterion, philosophy of instruction, shows a clear difference in both topics of instruction and grading. Student grading during the prewar period, evaluated rote memorization of a school solution in solving graded map-based tactical exercises. Over the course of instruction, students progressed from regiment, division, corps and eventually army level problems. The ILE curriculum takes a steep departure from this educational philosophy. The skills trained in ILE (examples being creative thinking and problem solving) are less tangible and more subjective, as are student evaluations. The ILE curriculum is designed to teach students how to think, not what to think. The teaching methodology emphasizes critical reasoning, creative thinking, and complex problem-solving techniques. There is no school solution to evaluate a student’s performance as in the interwar era. An additional difference addressed in this monograph under this criterion is the reduced number and type of exercises from the interwar course to the ILE course. These four criteria provide a subjective measure to compare the instruction for the two periods selected.

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The next two sections of the monograph give a historical perspective of the two periods of education selected for analysis. Section 2 provides an overview of the first 65 years of the Fort Leavenworth schools, showing how its early beginnings influenced post-World War I instruction. This section highlights the changes in instructional methods, illustrating how the school evolved to train officers for World War II service. Closed in 1916 to meet personnel requirements for the Mexican Board campaign, Fort Leavenworth reopened in 1919, reestablishing a curriculum using the applicatory method of instruction. Using the applicatory method, classroom instruction focused on problem solving using map exercises, maneuvers, and war games. Outside the classroom, staff rides reinforced principles of warfare studied earlier. This style of instruction remained relatively unchanged throughout the interwar period, influenced only by changes in course length, with classes reduced to one year between 1923-1928 and 1935-1940. The 1940-1945 period, while important in the training of staff officers of new divisions and corps during the war, is covered only to establish a point of departure for the next section.

Section 3 provides an overview of the staff college from the resumption of a one-year course in 1946, through the full adoption of the ILE curriculum (2004-2011). Renamed The Command and General Staff College in 1946, changes in instruction occurred during the tenure of nearly every commandant. Important in the analysis of this era was the shift in the philosophy of instruction that occurred from training officers to one that educates officers. Over the 57-years prior to the adoption of ILE, civilian academic professionals entered the faculty of the College, influencing Leavenworth instruction and introducing a collegiate approach to mid-grade officer education. The number of civilian faculty also changed the dynamic of instruction, with a mix of

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21 Dastrup, A Centennial History, 64.
military and civilian teaching teams. This section concludes with an overview of ILE and its education of the current population of mid-grade officer.

Section 4 compares the two instructional eras using the four criteria addressed above. Differences, highlighted in the two previous sections, show why the College’s education shifted from a pure command and tactical-staff focus, to a larger aperture covering areas from strategy to interagency coordination. This section highlights the postwar reduction in tactical instruction and the shift to a broad generalist education.

Section 5 concludes the paper with recommendations to modify the ILE curriculum. While the commander in the field clearly ideally desires a well-rounded officer who is tactically proficient and grounded in current doctrine, following pages show that the ILE curriculum reduced tactical training at the expense of educational topics. Section 5 recommends changes in student selection allowing for increased class rigor, increased instructor selection criteria, and a return to tactical instruction at the battalion and brigade level to prepare field grade officers for tactical duties immediately following graduation.

Scope and Repudiation

In order to narrow the scope of the monograph, several areas of research and discussion were purposely limited. This monograph uses the supposition that the Fort Leavenworth interwar education provided a solid basis for US success in World War II; counterarguments to this supposition are not addressed below.22 Due to its 100-year plus history, the monograph does not highlight every change of commandant or the impact of every College and Department of the

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22 Martin Blumenson and a recent book by Jogr Muth both dispute the quality of education provided by Fort Leavenworth during the interwar years. See Martin Blumenson, “America’s World War II Leaders In Europe; Some Thoughts,” Parameters 19, no. 4 (December 1989), 2-13 and Jorg Muth, Command Culture: Officer Education in the U.S. Army and the German Armed Forces, 1901-1940, and the Consequences of World War II (Denton: University of North Texas Press, 2011).
Army board or study. However, major modifications are highlighted as they influenced instructional changes at Fort Leavenworth. Although significant in the development of the planners in the Army, the establishment of the School of Advanced Military Studies and other schools within the CGSC structure are not addressed in detail in the monograph due to their coverage in other studies. The impact of Vietnam on the Army and the Goldwater-Nichols Act’s modification of military education are not the focus of the monograph and are referenced only as they influenced specific Fort Leavenworth curricular areas. Statistics for various academic years are highlighted through the monograph for reference and comparison, but not annually due to a lack of data, redundancy of certain years, and length requirements. Two other components of Fort Leavenworth, reserve, non-resident education and participation of international students in the College are not addressed due to criteria selected.

A final narrowing factor in this monograph is that it does not evaluate current ILE instruction against the “levels of learning achievement” as defined by Officer Professional Military Education Policy and curriculum learning objectives. While this is an important evaluation tool in assessing the quality of instruction against course objectives, limitations of space and data available to the author, does not allow for this type of comparison. In place of this limitation, empirical data on the hours and methodologies of instruction, and numbers and mix (military and civilian) of instructors are defined and used for comparison.

23 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1800.01D, Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), defines “levels of learning achievement” as learning in the cognitive and affective domains.

24 Limitations in information found by the author of recent modifications within the CGSOC instruction confine the recommendations presented in the final section to data available prior to 2010. Additionally, while instructor data on the total number of Ph.Ds, Joint Quality Officers, and Senior Level College graduates is reported to the Joint Staff annually, there are no easily accessible data points for the total resident CGSOC graduates, former battalion commanders, or former brigade commanders serving in instructor billets. Recommendations presented in Section 5 are based on the few documents located in the Fort Leavenworth Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) holdings and faculty data presented to the Joint Staff. Due to the currency of recent curriculum modifications and changes in instructor qualification requirements, some documents have not been entered into the CARL collections. Primary sources used to gather instructor data include “US Army Command and General Staff College 2005 Self-Study Report.”
Command and General Staff School, 1881-1939

The School of Application for Infantry and Cavalry was the result of the efforts by General Sherman to professionalize the American Army. His goal was the establishment of a school to provide officers with a specialized knowledge of their profession and prepare them for higher positions. The General Order establishing the school directed the school be commanded by the senior field officer present for duty at Leavenworth, with the officers of the next five ranks to serve as staff and faculty for the school. During his tenure as Commander of the Army, General Sherman maintained an interest in the school, ensuring it was a fixture of Army education for the future.

The first two-year class of forty-two officers began in March 1882, with General Sherman personally directing the initial course of study. Based on the diverse educational background and commissioning sources of the lieutenants attending, the class divided into two groups. The first group studied tactics, organization, drill and other military subjects, with the second group studying the basics of reading, writing, history and math. Once the second group

Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2005; “US Army Command and General Staff College Intermediate Level Education (ILE) Self-Study Report.” Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2008; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI 1800.01D). Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP). Washington: The Joint Chiefs of Staff (15 July 2009); and information presented to the Joint Staff pursuant of the requirements of the OPMEP; US Command and General Staff College, “JPME Student / Faculty Report to the Joint Staff (as of 1 October 2010).”


26 Hunt and Lorence, History of Fort Leavenworth 1827-1937, 33-34.

27 General Sherman was dissatisfied with the initial course planned at Fort Leavenworth, and personally directed parts of the curriculum. Robert Berlin, “An Experiment that Worked,” in A Brief History of the US Army Command and General Staff College 1881-1981 (Fort Leavenworth: CSI Press, 1981), 7.

established proficiency in basic subjects, they progressed to military topics.29 Serving as the speaker for the opening class, Sherman stated that “war is the only real school,” but that the next best way to learn about war was at a school with artillery, cavalry, and infantry combined in one environment.30 Following a break from June to October, thirty-five of the forty-two initial students graduated in July 1883, “having passed satisfactory examinations before the school staff.”31 The second two-year course began in 1883, maintaining the remedial and advanced class structure, graduating thirty of the forty attending students. In 1886, the school’s name changed to “US Infantry and Calvary School,” but few other curricular changes occurred.32

During its first five years, school facilities and curriculum developed slowly. Foremost, Congress refused to allocate funding for new classrooms or student housing, limiting the number of students able to attend. While $500 for books and other materials was authorized, few other improvements were made. The remedial course continued, due to the developmental needs of the officer corps, giving the school the derisive nickname of “kindergarten” by serving officers. In the end, the course failed to meet the high expectations of General Sherman, with contemporary authors of the time questioning the value of the school instruction for its students.33

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29 The first 35 graduates were commissioned from various sources, including 7 from West Point, 5 from the enlisted ranks, and 23 from civilian life. The longest serving officer was commissioned in 1866, the newest five officers were commissioned in 1881. Student breakdown from Official Army Register (Washington, 1883), cited in Timothy Nenninger, “Fort Leavenworth Schools: Postgraduate Military Education and Professionalization in the U.S. Army, 1880-1920” (PhD Diss., University of Wisconsin, 1974), 31.


31 Seven officers were withdrawn from the course for various reasons. At this early stage of Army education, it is unclear if failure to graduate held any adverse impact on future careers. Annual Reports of the US Infantry and Cavalry School, For the Years 1882 to 1891, Inclusive, 15.


The arrival of Colonel Alexander McCook, Commander of the Sixth Infantry and by default school commander, and one of his subordinates, Lieutenant Arthur Wagner, in 1886, marked a new beginning for the school. Colonel McCook took immediate steps to improve the school’s faltering reputation, overhauling the curriculum and instituting a new course in September, 1887. McCook broke with previous practices, instituting entrance exams for any student without a West Point or equivalent civilian academic degree and halting the system of an upper and lower class. In its place, he divided the class into sections of six students each. Student assignments were based on previous experience. During the school year, students who failed to meet minimum class requirements received either a reprimand or following additional infractions, were removed from the course. Adhering to the vision of General Sherman, McCook revised the course, including classes on tactics for infantry, cavalry and artillery. While McCook addressed organizational and policy issues, instructors began revising curricula and writing texts to fill voids in instructional material or to replace European texts.

Due to the small size of the Army, War Department guidance was to fill faculty and instructor positions from officers assigned to Fort Leavenworth, causing instructor quality to vary. While the post commander did hand-select instructors, the system allowed only limited flexibility in their quality or qualification. Additionally, instructors were generally required to fill other duties in their units. By exception, an occasional graduate remained as an instructor, but


37 During this period, the War Department also issued instructional guidelines for the school. Hunt and Lorence, History of Fort Leavenworth 1827-1937, 140.
generally officers assigned to troop positions, were detailed to instruct as an additional duty.\(^{38}\) Lieutenant Arthur Wagner, arrived at Leavenworth with Colonel McCook and became one of the most prominent early instructors of the school. Joined by Captain Eben Swift in 1893, these two junior officers played a prominent role in changing the school from its kindergarten reputation to a school where officers sought attendance to enhance their careers. Both officers brought a hands-on approach to the curriculum, with Wagner and other instructors writing texts on topics ranging from *Infantry Fire Tactics*, to *Seats and Saddles and Bits and Bitting*.\(^ {39}\)

Eben Swift, while a less prolific a writer than Wagner, revitalized the “applicatory method” in the school. Initially pursuing ways to improve communications on the battlefield to overcome historical shortcomings in field orders, Swift was later recognized as the father of what became the five-paragraph field order. Tied to his innovation in the field order was his push for practical instruction, using the applicatory method, combining wargaming and staff rides in the curriculum. His goal was to force students, as part of their instruction in theory, to get into the field and put that theory to practice.\(^ {40}\) The applicatory method soon expanded to map problems, and by 1895, map problems and written solutions were central in Leavenworth instruction, an aspect of instruction that continued into the interwar years.\(^ {41}\) This and other changes in the curriculum greatly increased the intensity of instruction and by 1896, the curriculum included over eighty map exercises and terrain rides.\(^ {42}\)

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\(^{38}\) A graduate from the first course, Lieutenant William Brown was the first student to remain as an instructor. This practice was used often during the interwar years and continues to the present day. Nenninger, “Fort Leavenworth Schools: Postgraduate Military Education and Professionalization in the U.S. Army, 1880-1920,” 43-45.


\(^{41}\) Peter Schifferle, *America’s School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010), 101.

The beginning of the Spanish American War in 1898 halted the new program of instruction just as it was beginning to stabilize. Due to the war, instructors departed the school to join units and instruction at the school was suspended. The Spanish American War and subsequent Philippine Insurrection caused a four-year suspension of Leavenworth classes. Following its reinstitution, many lessons were integrated into the instruction and changes were made to further improve the Army education system.

The Impact of Secretary of War Elihu Root

Appointed by President McKinley as Secretary of War in 1899, Elihu Root was instrumental in changes to the military and its education system. Using feedback from trusted officers and the findings of the Dodge Commission, which investigated the War Department’s poor performance during the Spanish American War, Root implemented reforms in three areas, the use of reserves, the development of a high command structure, and initiated a national-level planning agency or General Staff. Within his reforms, he identified a need to restructure the military school system, an effort that had a lasting impact on the legacy of Fort Leavenworth.

In November 1901, Secretary Root signed General Order 155, establishing a system of military education to ensure a “high standard and general training of officers of the Army.” This order placed the Fort Leavenworth course, soon to be renamed the General Staff and Services School, in a prominent place in officer education. The order established a hierarchy of schools, with internal post schools responsible for training tactics and basic tasks for initial entry junior officers. The next level of training was special service schools including a school of Artillery, Engineering, and a School of Application of Cavalry and Field Artillery at Fort Riley, Kansas.

43 Ibid., 150.

After completing any of these schools, an officer was eligible for selection to attend the *General Staff and Services School*. An officer’s final level of education was attendance at the Army War College, which preceded an officer’s eligibility for selection to general officer rank. Only on the recommendation of the Leavenworth faculty was an officer considered to attend the War College. Unlike past years, promotion at the field grade-level and above, was now linked to Leavenworth attendance. While specific in its description, the order, failed to influence any immediate change at Leavenworth and disappointed some officers expecting a new era of instruction at Fort Leavenworth following the Spanish-American War.

Reopened in August 1902, the prewar curriculum of the one-year course changed little except for its larger class size (twenty-nine cavalry and sixty-four infantry officers). The rank of students continued to be that of lieutenant, not changing to captain until after 1907. In 1904, the course extended to two, one-year courses. The first designated *The Infantry and Cavalry School* and the second, *The Staff College*. The arrival of Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell as Commandant, initiated a much needed reform of the post and its schools.

Similar in impact to Colonel McCook’s arrival in 1886, Brigadier General Bell’s 1903 arrival at Fort Leavenworth heralded a series of sweeping changes that provided focus to the school’s operation. He quickly realized the school was not meeting any of Secretary Root’s goals in providing a “postgraduate education” that was to combine practical and theoretical work to develop the officer corps. In performing his duties as Commandant, Bell was considered extremely enthusiastic in his actions, and was recognized as influencing the school more than any single individual in the early 1900s. Spending most of his time developing the curriculum, he was

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48 Brereton, *Educating the U.S. Army*, 104.
devoted to elevating the academics of the course. He was a well-liked Commandant, often found talking with students. His deportment went far to demonstrate to the students the importance of the education they were receiving while at Fort Leavenworth.\textsuperscript{50}

Brigadier General Bell focused on training officers beyond the basic leader tasks, which he considered the educational task of the service schools. Bell believed that graduates needed “knowledge of strategy, military history, a knowledge of recent war, and of the military geography of countries likely to be the next theater of operations for American troops.”\textsuperscript{51} Under his influence, the school integrated lessons learned from the Spanish American War and looked at subjects, including logistics and the strategic movement of soldiers and equipment. The class looked at problems involving the movement of equipment by steamer and rail as well as coordination between the Army and Navy.\textsuperscript{52} It was also during Bell’s tenure, that the War Department ended its policy of sending junior lieutenants to Leavenworth. The Army recognized that skills trained at Fort Leavenworth and advances in technology outpaced the slow officer promotion timelines of junior officers. Bell successfully convinced the War Department that the schools at Leavenworth existed to improve the Army by returning highly skilled, mid-grade officers back into the officer corps. In 1905, the War Department announced that students must be in the rank of Captain or Major to attend, a policy that took effect with the 1909 class.\textsuperscript{53}

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\textsuperscript{51} Dastrup, \textit{A Centennial History}, 44-45.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 47.
\end{flushright}
To ensure the quality of students and graduates of the second year course, only the top fifteen graduates of The Infantry and Calvary School, renamed The Army School of the Line in 1907, attended the second year. Many of these graduates would subsequently attend the Army War College for a third year of instruction. With this shift to more senior students, the instructors of this era spent their time preparing officers for command and staff duties and not junior officer training tasks.54 Started under the direction of Swift and Wagner in 1890’s, the applicatory method returned in the new curriculum, with an increased sophistication. Prior to 1898, the methods focused on small unit tactics. The new curriculum included strategy, staff duties, and logistics tied to map exercises, staff rides, and maneuvers.55 The School of the Line used Terrain Rides as instruction, while The General Staff College used staff rides. Terrain rides revolved around tactical actions included leading imaginary troops in the field, issuing and sending orders and messages (a focus showing Swift’s influence on orders and communications during his first assignment at Leavenworth) and required the students to make tactical deployments of troops as if in actual combat. The use of terrain rides followed preliminary map exercises, helping officers understand the relationship between the ground and the map. The staff ride focused on large unit operations at division and corps level, serving as a building block from instruction at The School of the Line. The Schools also conducted historical staff rides with a field maneuver exercise serving as the “graduating thesis of the applicatory system.”56 While Bell instituted these changes within the school, instructors like Major John Morrison arrived to continue the trend.


Arriving in 1907 to serve as the senior tactics instructor, Major John Morrison spent six years at Fort Leavenworth, pushing the curriculum to new heights. Beginning instruction at the battalion level, he expanded the complexity of tactics through every level to division. At each stage, students were tested using operational and staff problems nested in map exercises. Imbedded in this instruction, Morrison first demonstrated the fundamental principle for the tactics presented and then showed how to apply that principle with a common sense operational problem. Many of the Morrison’s graduates, later known as “Morrison Men,” remained as instructors at the college and helped draft the Army’s first field manual, the 1910 Field Service Regulations. Although modified slightly in 1914 and 1918, the Field Service Regulations served as the foundation for American operations in France during the First World War.57 General George Marshall, the future operations officer (G3) of the Allied Expeditionary and later Chief of Staff of the Army during the Second World War, was one of Morrison’s students who remained as an instructor at Fort Leavenworth.58 The efforts of Bell and several key instructors like Morrison were instrumental in changing the Army’s opinion of Leavenworth and the value of its graduates to the Army.

Following graduation, officers reported to a variety of assignments. While some returned directly to their former regiments, many moved to serve on higher staffs to use their new skills. Some immediately participated in militia and camp maneuvers the summer of graduation. In 1905, 1906 and 1907, graduates both umpired and planned maneuvers, allowing them the opportunity to observe large units in action. The officers who returned to their units shared the knowledge they had learned with subordinate, peer, and superiors. The use of the five-paragraph


field order, map problems, terrain rides, and staff war games, were all institutions promulgated by Leavenworth graduates. While graduating less than 700 officers from the end of the Spanish American War to the suspension of classes in 1916, the quality of education received at Leavenworth, became apparent as the Army fought in Europe during the First World War. 59

During American’s commitment to World War I, the value of Leavenworth graduate (known as Leavenworth Men), was recognized throughout the Army. General Pershing, Commander of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF), sought Leavenworth graduates for his staff as he established his European headquarters, and continued to use graduates in key positions through the war. The need for trained staff officers was such that Pershing ordered an AEF three-month staff school established in Langres, France, replicating staff training at Leavenworth. By wars end, Leavenworth graduates dominated the division, corps, and Army Staffs of the AEF. 60

Following the war, the Army moved quickly to reopen the school.

Post WWI, the Interwar Years

During the interwar years, the curriculum at Leavenworth evolved in four phases, framed by varying course lengths as designated by the War Department’s need for trained general staff officers. From its reopening in 1919 until 1923 there were two schools at Leavenworth, The School of the Line and The General Staff School, each a year long. Officers graduating in roughly the top half of The School of the Line (approximately 60 percent of the class) remained for the second year course. In 1923, the War Department directed the two schools to be combined, renaming the course The Command and General Staff School (CGSS). The new one-year course doubled the annual number of graduates to reduce a large backlog of officers waiting to attend. In

59 Ibid., 320, 323-327, 6.

60 While performance soon overcame negative views of a Leavenworth graduate, there were some who viewed a “Leavenworth Clique,” using the term as a negative connotation for graduates as “not practical soldiers.” Steadman, 19; Nenninger, “Fort Leavenworth Schools: Postgraduate Military Education and Professionalization in the U.S. Army, 1880-1920,” 333-336.
1928, the two-year course returned, and finally, in 1936, the curriculum returned to a one-year program to support the requirements of the expanding prewar Army. The following pages will address the changes in the interwar course in more detail.

In 1919, General Order Number 112 ordered the reestablishment of the General Service Schools, consisting of the School of the Line and the General Staff School. The schools began classes with 100 students in The School of the Line and forty-nine in The General Staff School. Officers attending these early classes varied in background, with a mix of AEF veterans and officers who remained in the US to mobilize and train soldiers. Additionally, the curriculum was modified from the pre-war courses to include lessons learned from America’s participation in the War. As faculty developed the curriculum, the writers focused not on greater European lessons, but on what the US Army accomplished, developing a uniquely US doctrine. Instructors, who once used European doctrinal manuals, began using AEF experiences and operational examples in their instruction, while developing new manuals at Fort Leavenworth. In early classes, instructors focused on three basic missions: impart to the students the knowledge of large formation operations, provide problem-solving skills based on example tactical problems, and imbue professional confidence through defining problems and delivering doctrinally sound answers. This system of instruction was a continuation of the proven applicatory method. With

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62 The US Army Signal School was also reopened at Fort Leavenworth, but relocated to New Jersey the following year. A Military History of the US Army Command and General Staff College 1881-1963, 22.
63 By November 1918, only 36 percent of serving US officers were assigned to the AEF. Peter Schifferle, “Preparing for the Inevitable War” Final Paper, History 974 (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 1995), 19-20.
64 Dastrup, A Centennial History, 63, 65.
the resumption of classes, instruction continued to reinforce principles of problem solving taught in the classroom, with map exercises, maneuvers, war games, and staff rides.\(^{65}\)

In 1920, Congress passed the National Defense Act, authorizing an active military force of 288,000 (the Army eventually stabilized at 140,000 total, including 14,000 officers), established a robust National Guard and Reserve structure, and developed a peacetime organizational structure. The Act organized the Nation into nine corps areas, each commanded by a Regular Army general officer. Within each corps, there was one regular division, two to three National Guard Divisions and two Reserve divisions.\(^{66}\) The Act also reorganized officer education, creating branch and special service schools with basic and advanced courses, and maintained *The Army School of the Line* and *The General Staff School* at Fort Leavenworth to prepare officers to staff and command large units. It also established the Army War College in Washington, D.C. to further officer education for higher-level positions, specifically duty with the General Staff of the Army.\(^{67}\) Based on the National Defense Act, officers would first attend schooling at Fort Leavenworth, and, if selected, attend the Army War College. On average, only the top ten percent of Leavenworth graduates attended the Army War College, with ten percent of those graduates later selected for general officer rank.\(^{68}\)

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\(^{65}\) Schifferle, *America’s School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II*, 100; Dastrup, *A Centennial History*, 64.


\(^{67}\) Large units as defined by the curriculum, were corps, armies, and army groups. Michael Matheny, “The Development of the Theory and Doctrine of Operational Art in the American Army, 1920-1940” (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Command and General Staff College, 1988), 10-11; Hunt and Lorence, *History of Fort Leavenworth 1827-1937*, 155.

\(^{68}\) Yarger provides an excellent overview of the officer career progression and education during the interwar period. Harry Yarger, “Army Officer Personnel Management: The Creation of the Modern American System to 1939” (PhD Diss., Temple University Graduate Board, 1996), 331-394.
Another characteristic imbedded within the National Defense Act was the decision to maintain a military that would expand in time of war and not to maintain a large standing force. Initially, Chief of Staff of the Army General Peyton March requested a 509,909-man Army in the postwar period, a distinct change from the traditional US notion of an expandable Army. Congress refused this proposal with the enactment of the 1920 National Defense Act. Based on this decision, Leavenworth focused on preparing officers to lead large formations within an Army expanded during time of war, not in training officers for immediate conflict. A characteristic of the Leavenworth school was its role as a surrogate to develop officer experience in command and staff duties within large units during a period of reduced manning and training budgets. Based on this basic theme, Leavenworth proceeded to produce potential “commanders and general staff officers who spoke the same professional language, following the same staff procedures, schooled in the same military doctrine, and thus ready to work together smoothly in any theater of war.” Although Leavenworth did not breed tactical genius, the interwar school did produce a large body of professionally competent officers who performed well during the Second World War.

Following the 1920 National Defense Act, Fort Leavenworth continued to refine its instruction. In the first years after reopening, The School of the Line provided instruction and exercises on tactics and organization of the Army from regiment to the division structure. The General Staff School concentrated on developing and training officers on formations above the

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70 Schifferle, *America’s School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II*, 17.


division structure, focused on training for command and staff duties at corps and army echelons. The needs of the Army, however, soon changed the course, combining the two classes into a single, one-year course.

After its demobilization at the end of the First World War, the Army maintained a large excess number of officers in the force. Within that excess, there was a “hump” of nearly a thousand officers recommended for advanced schooling at Fort Leavenworth, who were awaiting available class slots. In 1922, in an effort to overcome this hump, the War Department reduced the course length to one year, eliminating The General Staff School and changing the name of The School of the Line to The Command and General Staff School. The Army War College was to assume many of the instructional functions of The General Staff School, and the training of battalion level tactical tasks shifted to branch schools. The combination of the two courses effectively doubled the class size, from an average of 120 students during the 1920-1923 timeframe to approximately 235 students during the 1923-1929 timeframe. The Command and General Staff School (CGSS) would train officers in “the combined use of all arms in the division and in the army corps, the proper functions of commanders of divisions and of army corps, (and)

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75 It was General Pershing’s decision, now Chief of Staff of the Army in 1922, to shorten Leavenworth instruction to one year. Ball, 185.


the proper functions of general staff officers of divisions and of army corps.\textsuperscript{79} The last class under the two-year program graduated on June 15, 1923 and \textit{The General Staff School} closed.\textsuperscript{80} By reducing instruction to one year, the faculty felt the course did not allow for in-depth instruction and did not provide students enough time to absorb necessary information. Based on this feedback, the CGSS faculty recommended the course return to a two-year curriculum as soon as enough Leavenworth trained officers entered the force to satisfy Army requirements and reduce the post-World War I “hump.”\textsuperscript{81}

In 1928, the course returned to the two-year length, reducing the number of annual graduates from approximately 250 to 120. A change from the 1919-1923 two-year course, however, was that all students attended both years of instruction.\textsuperscript{82} During this timeframe, conferences and lectures accounted for forty-five percent of the courseware, with the balance of the class time used for tactical exercises and map problems. This curriculum remained relatively unchanged until 1936 when the Army revised its needs for Leavenworth graduates. Needing a larger pool of graduates to staff the nine permanent corps area headquarters and support a potential mobilization based on the 1933 National Mobilization Plan, the War Department again reduced the course to one year in 1936. It was determined that the Army needed quantity not quality from Leavenworth.\textsuperscript{83}


\textsuperscript{80} King, “Making the Leaders of World War II,” 21.


\textsuperscript{82} Ibid; Dastrup, \textit{A Centennial History}, 64-65.

\textsuperscript{83} Nenninger, “Leavenworth and Its Critics: The U.S. Army Command and General Staff School, 1920-1940,” 201; Schifferle, \textit{America’s School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II}, 81.
After the 1935 school year, emphasis shifted toward general staff duties because of a lowering of the average rank of students and a realistic assumption that few graduates would achieve high command positions in the coming war.\textsuperscript{84} In 1936, the faculty reorganized into offensive, defense, intelligence and history, and supply and logistics sections. Eliminated, was the command section, previously in place during the two-year course.\textsuperscript{85} While the course was significantly modified to train staff officers, it continued to maintain its rigor and tactical instruction in its curriculum.

The 1937 CGSS class received a total of 1,309.5 hours of instruction, including ten tactical rides (on horseback), twenty-three terrain exercises (seventeen were graded), twelve graded tactical problems and a end-of-course Command Post Exercise to integrate the year’s instruction. Within the yearlong course, there were 161 hours of conferences, fifty-three hours of map exercises, fifty-five hours of map problems, and fifty-seven hours of logistics instruction. Training at the division level included 127.5 hours of instruction, at the corps level, 203.5 hours of instruction, and another 141 hours of instruction on other Army topics. During the school year, 318 hours was spent on graded work, with each student required to achieve a seventy-five percent or higher to avoid an unsatisfactory (failing) mark.\textsuperscript{86}

Hands-on application of class work continued in the 1938-1939 school year, with practical work accounting for 744 of 1073 scheduled hours of instruction. While lectures and conferences on tactical principles, logistics, staff techniques and other military subjects continued as important topics, lectures were a less preferred method of instruction over the applicatory


\textsuperscript{85} A fifth section, “Miscellaneous,” is referenced in \textit{Military History of the US Army Command and General Staff College 1881-1963}, but content is not identified. \textit{A Military History of the US Army Command and General Staff College 1881-1963}, 30-31; Schifferle, \textit{America’s School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II}, 87.

method.\textsuperscript{87} As an example of the applicatory method, during the 1938-1939 school year, there were forty-nine map exercises, eight map maneuvers, thirty-eight map problems and fifty other practical exercises such as terrain rides and command post exercises.\textsuperscript{88} The concentration on tactical training and education remained was an underlying theme of interwar instruction at Fort Leavenworth.

The benefit of a common tactical education during the interwar years was the normalization of officer education in performing command and staff duties. In 1928, the CGSS Commandant Brigadier General Edward King made it clear in his opening address the intent of the course. He stated, “the purpose of the school is not to develop Alexanders, Napoleons and Fochs, but to raise the general average of ability and to produce a team that a Foch, Napoleon or a Pershing may have been able to use.” Through the interwar years, the school looked to develop a team player, grounded in tactics, general staff principles, logistics, and operations of divisions and corps.\textsuperscript{89} This focus remained throughout interwar instruction.

In the years between the World Wars, Leavenworth graduated twenty-three separate classes, graduating 3,677 officers, 2,602 from the one-year courses and 1,075 from the two-year course. The last regular course graduated in February 1940, ending after only five months of instruction.\textsuperscript{90}

As the US entered wartime footing, CGSS underwent several revisions in curriculum, resulting in a series of special classes of short duration. Beginning in December 1940, the school reorganized to teach staff functions, with dedicated instruction on air, ground, logistics and

\textsuperscript{87} Dastrup, \textit{A Centennial History}, 76.

\textsuperscript{88} See Appendix 1, Interwar Instructional Methods, for a description of the various types of exercises used during the interwar period. Nenninger, “Creating Officers: The Leavenworth Experience, 1920-1940,” 63.

\textsuperscript{89} Dastrup, \textit{A Centennial History}, 74-75.

administration functions in nine-week blocks. While the course length was abbreviated, the mission of the CGSS (renamed the General Staff Course in 1942) remained “to train selected officers in the basic command and staff doctrine, and as General Staff officers for divisions, corps.” This mission remained through the duration of World War II, and Leavenworth eventually began teaching other specialized courses. By wars end, over 16,000 officers graduated courses at Leavenworth, including the new staffs of forty-five divisions, in a four-week “New Divisions” course. School instructional standards remained, with some 683 failing to meet the minimum graduation standards during the wartime courses.

Command and General Staff School, 1946-2011

Following the end of the Second World War, change came slowly to Fort Leavenworth’s curriculum as the school attempted to reestablish classes and meet changing Army requirements. With the onset of the Cold War, subsequent changes in commandants, military faculty, and the introduction of civilian academic experts to the school, Leavenworth never succeeded in reestablishing the rigorous academic environment experienced by interwar students. This section provides an overview of impact of changing commandants and the numerous boards and studies conducted to improve instruction in military schools. This section concludes with an overview of the ILE curriculum and the current mid-grade officer education at Fort Leavenworth.

The Commandants and Dr. Birrer

Renamed The Command and Staff College in 1946, Fort Leavenworth resumed with a


92 Ibid., 59-60.

93 Interestingly, the student to instructor ratio remained high (10:1) through 1945, even with the increase to over 1,000 students per class. Schifferle, America’s School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II, 153-154; A Military History of the US Army Command and General Staff College 1881-1963, 33, 45.

new one-year curriculum that fall. The resumption of classes marked the beginning of an era of
dynamic growth and change in the College, a result of both Department of the Army directed
studies and internal reviews to update the curriculum. Topics of these studies ranged from
Army-wide issues, including the doctrine for tactical nuclear weapons, to changes in teaching
methodology and curriculum. The Gerow Board was the first post-World War II education
board to study Army officer education.

In November 1945, the Army established The War Department Military Education
Board, chaired by Lieutenant General Leonard Gerow, who was designated Commandant at Fort
Leavenworth earlier that month. Known as the Gerow Board, the membership included general
officers from the ground and air services who were directed to develop a plan for the postwar
Army education system. In May 1946, after some modification, the War Department approved
the Report of War Department Military Education Board on Educational System of Officers of the
Army, establishing a hierarchy of schools to train Army officers from entry through retirement.
The report directed changes to Fort Leavenworth, dividing the curriculum into two phases. The

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95 In May 1947, the College changed its name again to highlight aspects of training general staff
officers, renaming the school to The Command and General Staff College A Military History of the US
Army Command and General Staff College 1881-1963, 52.

96 See Appendix 2 for a review of significant boards and studies that influence changed at Fort
Leavenworth. Griffith, 33.

97 Richard Macak, “The United States Army’s Second Year Courses: A Continuing Tradition in

98 These boards and studies were routinely named for the board president or chair.

99 It is noteworthy that in his Gerow recommended closure of the Army and Navy Staff Colleges
in his report, recommending an “Armed Forces College” and an “Army Ground College.” The board’s
recommendations on this measure were not approved. Report of War Department Military Education
Board on Educational System for Officers of the Army, (Washington D.C., War Department Organization
and Training Department, G3, 1946), 10-11.

100 Annex 1, “Directives” to Report of War Department Military Education Board on Educational
System for Officers of the Army, (Washington D.C., War Department Organization and Training
Department, G3, 1946), 14-15.

101 With the exception of the Army War College established in 1950, this report set the template
for Army training and education through the 2001 and the ATLDG report. Tyler, The History of
first phase consisted of thirty weeks of instruction focused at the division and corps level, with
students receiving instruction on leadership, public relations, personnel management, and
command responsibility.¹⁰² The second phase consisted of ten weeks of specialized training
conducted by one of four schools directed to be established at the College (Administration,
Intelligence, Combined Arms, and Logistics). During the second phase of instruction, students
separated by branch for instruction conducted by one of the four schools¹⁰³

The stated mission at Fort Leavenworth changed little due the Gerow Board. It directed
the College to prepare officers for duty as commanders and staff officers at the division and
higher level, to keep officers current in changes in doctrine and recommend changes, and to
develop teamwork among officers. The College was to provide instruction based on lessons
learned from the Second World War as well as other technological developments, improve
administration, intelligence, tactical and logistical procedures, and continue training officer in
combined arms operations. Adding a joint flavor, the report directed the College to continue
education in the employment of divisions in coordination with air and naval forces.¹⁰⁴

Serving as Fort Leavenworth’s first postwar Commandant, Lieutenant General Gerow
inherited a far different institution than the one he had attended twenty years earlier. Missing in
the postwar College was the tradition of teaching division operations to highly select officers and
a faculty of highly selected instructors, familiar with a ten-month extended curriculum.¹⁰⁵ To
establish a baseline of instruction, Gerow requested an assessment of the educational program at

¹⁰² Report of War Department Military Education Board on Educational System for Officers of the
¹⁰³ The division of officers for specialization of training was the first effort by the Army to
establish definitive career paths for mid-level officers. A Military History of the US Army Command and
¹⁰⁴ Tab A, “Modifications of the WD Military Education Board for the School System for Officers
of the Army,” Report of War Department Military Education Board on Educational System for Officers of
¹⁰⁵ Stewart, “Raising a Pragmatic Army,” 7, 19.
the College. Unique to this study group, was its makeup of civilian academic professionals from the fields of education and psychology. Four PhDs from Ohio State University and Columbia University conducted the assessment. Named for its chair, Dr. Edwin Henry, the Henry Commission, made three visits to the College between August and December 1946 and provided recommendations to the War Department in February 1947.106

The Henry Commission’s recommendations included changing instruction from its structural (compartmentalized) format to functional instruction, where topics are presented in sequence as they relate. Another recommended change was to reduce large lecture instruction (up to 500 students in one hall) into smaller groups of twenty-five to thirty-five students. This recommended change took several decades to implement, and remained a topic of several subsequent studies.107 A final recommendation laid the groundwork for civilian educators to join the College faculty. In order to provide continuity to a faculty that changed every three years due to officer-instructor reassignment, the Commission recommended the addition of civilian faculty members. Following the Commission’s report, Dr. Jacob Orleans, an original member of the Commission, joined the faculty as the school’s first Psychology-Educational Adviser. His advice would be influential in the later Eddy Board.108

The findings of this Commission highlighted two tensions within the College that remained throughout the postwar period. The first was the philosophical debate on how to balance the education of an officer at Leavenworth and still provide the training necessary for


107 A later internal board, the Wood Board lead by Colonel Stewart Wood, looked at options to reduce the classes into smaller groups (as identified by the Henry Commission). The Board identified twelve classrooms to hold up to fifty students each and enough faculty overhead to provide teaching teams for each class. Beginning with the 1948-1948 fall class, classes were divided into groups of 35 to 45 students. E. Salet, “Reorganization of the Command and General Staff College,” Military Review 28 (September 1948), 6-8; Henry Phillips, The Making of a Professional, Manton S. Eddy (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2000), 61-67.

him to be successful upon returning to an Army tactical position. The prewar success of tactical training was counter to the evolving methodology of education in a university fashion as proposed by the civilian academics. A second tension developed over curriculum focus, of whether to develop officers as generalists or specialists at the College. These tensions remained prevalent in subsequent boards and studies.

While Lieutenant General Gerow initiated change at Leavenworth, Lieutenant General Manton Eddy continued change within the College. Arriving as the Commandant in January 1948, Eddy was a former student and instructor from 1932 to 1938. In 1949, soon after Eddy arrived, the Secretary of the Army directed him to conduct a second review of the Army Educational System. Known as the Eddy Board, this group was tasked to review officer-training requirements, with an additional task to determine if there was a need to reopen the Army War College. One of the Board’s findings was a lack of specialization training of combat tasks for junior officers, similar to what occurred in the interwar years. The board recommended the expansion of basic and advanced officer training at branch schools to resolve this issue. Significant to Leavenworth instruction was the recommendation to reopen the Army War College, and the need to refine the curriculum at Fort Leavenworth.


110 In his 1979 dissertation, Dale Litney highlights the challenges and debates between training and education, and the debate over developing officers as specialist or generalist in the years between 1947 and 1978. Dale Litney, “Challenges and Changes: A Study of Civilian Academic Influences on the United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas” (PhD Diss., Claremont Graduate School, 1979).


In its findings, the Eddy Board determined the College “did not meet the needs of the Army because it produced specialists at the theater army level and above where generalists were needed and that the College did not spend sufficient curricular time in training (officers at the) division and corps level operations.” After three years of postwar instruction, the Eddy Board determined that the ten-week specialization training took away from the overall College mission to train officers for command and staff work at the division, corps, and army level. Following approval of the board, the ten-week specialization classes ended and became the task of branch schools. The ten-month course of instruction reorganized into five departments of instruction (intelligence, logistics and armored operations, ground, airborne and amphibious, and personnel), with a minimum of twelve instructors in each department to match the number needed for small group instruction. The focus of the instruction returned to training staff officers and commanders at the division level, with total hours of division instruction increasing from 214 to 413 hours. While the Eddy Board reorganized the curriculum, the transition to smaller classroom format made little headway within the College.

Two civilian academic professionals on the College faculty greatly influenced the recommendations of the Henry Commission and the push to reduce class size. Dr. Orleans, the first Psychology-Educational Advisor and Dr. Ivan Birrer, his coworker and later replacement, both pushed the reduction from large lecture presentations to smaller group instruction. While smaller group instruction was considered a better format for in-class discussions and learning, the


114 The study determined sixty-five instructors were needed as the minimum, twelve per-department, plus a department head. Dastrup, *A Centennial History*, 93-94; *A Military History of the US Army Command and General Staff College 1881-1963*, 52-53.


116 Dr. Ivan Birrer, a psychologist, joined the college in 1948 in the Department of Analysis and Research, where he reviewed all planned classes for doctrinal correctness. He would go on to serve the College for thirty years playing a major role in restructuring instructional processes. Stewart, “Raising a Pragmatic Army,” 45, 50-51; Tyler, *The History of Leavenworth, 1937-1951*, 32-34.
overall class size of the College expanded from 319 in 1946, to 485 in 1949, increasing the average of the these small groups to over forty students. By 1951, classes averaged fifty students, limiting class participation to a small percentage during a one-hour block of instruction.\textsuperscript{117} The expansion to a fifty-student class was, in the end, little different from the former lecture hall instruction, as few students were able to engage in a discussion-based teaching methodology.\textsuperscript{118} The value of smaller group instruction was further reduced by the late 1960s, when class size reached 56 students per-section.\textsuperscript{119} Another requirement for successful small group instruction was qualified instructors capable of facilitating classes in a variety of topics.\textsuperscript{120}

As the number of topics increased, instructor talent became diluted as topics were divided across an instructor pool for presentation. Seldom was an assigned instructor knowledgeable about every topic he presented as in the interwar period, where an instructor was allowed time to master his topic.\textsuperscript{121} Many of the instructors within the five departments ended up teaching topics outside their knowledge base, due to the workload of the numerous classes. While some instructors recorded spending between fifty and seventy hours preparing a single class, their lack of familiarity reduced the effectiveness of the presentation.\textsuperscript{122} One senior faculty member, reviewing instruction after the change to the smaller groups stated that up to twenty-five percent


\textsuperscript{118} “The Eddy Board,” POIs and Catalogues 1949-1952 (Fort Leavenworth: Combined Arms Research Library, n.d), 107.

\textsuperscript{119} Litney, “Challenges and Changes,” 40-47.

\textsuperscript{120} Harding highlights poor instructors who read lesson plans word-for-word to their students. Harding, “Observations on Instruction,” 8.

\textsuperscript{121} Stewart, “Raising a Pragmatic Army,” 49.

\textsuperscript{122} In some instances, instructors received their teaching assignment when handed a 3X5 card by the department head and a staff meeting, with little regard to their qualification in that topic. Tyler, The History of Leavenworth, 1937-1951, 34-35; Stewart, “Raising a Pragmatic Army,” 46-49.
of CGSC instructors were unqualified to teach. In 1947, the rotation of faculty, the first large transition of instructors since reopening the ten-month course, further affected the instructor pool. From this point forward, the rotation and limited number of qualified instructors was a reoccurring theme at the College.

Another negative aspect of the College’s reorganization to a departmental structure was that departments became fiefdoms concerned only with their core requirements. In some instances, departments changed previously approved curriculum, cutting or adding classes without the oversight of the College leadership. While the Department of Analysis and Research initially provided oversight to the curriculum, after its deletion in one of the College’s many reorganizations, some departments focused on their narrow fields and not the overall goal of producing better graduates. Issues with departmental arrogance (departments instructing topics without regard for instructional requirements of other departments), remained an issue into the 1980s. The transition to interdisciplinary teaching teams in the ILE program later overcame many of the interdepartmental squabbles. Within the departments, another challenge was the lack of instructors to facilitate quality small group instruction.

124 Interestingly, in 1949, the Department of the Army recommended a cut of thirty-seven instructor billets at Fort Leavenworth, as College reorganized for small group instruction. The recommendation was not approved. The Board also recommended deleting the Department of Analysis and Research, which provided oversight to the overall curriculum, a recommendation later adopted. Tyler, The History of Leavenworth, 1937-1951, 32-34; Stewart, “Raising a Pragmatic Army,” 37-38.
Beginning in the 1950s, Fort Leavenworth continued to wrestle with reduced faculty members and a new denominator, a reduced knowledge base of the students attending, many of whom did not have wartime experience at higher echelons. With the onset of the Korean War, requirements for officers in deployed units increased, lessening the availability of instructors. Additionally, another factor as identified in the Eddy Board was that officers were not as professionally educated as in previous years. At a time when officers needed a solid education in their mid-grade years, the College continued to have shortages in instructors. A comparison of instructor quality in the mid-1950s to that of the interwar period was questionable at best. 128

Serving as the College’s second Educational Advisor and later as the Director of Graduate Studies, Dr. Ivan Birrer was an influence in the college from 1949 until his retirement in 1978. He provided a unique perspective to the College as an academic professional and as a 1945 wartime graduate of CGSS, serving as an Adjutant General Corps officer during the war. 129 During his tenure, Birrer participated in every change in curriculum and either developed or introduced some of the most significant structural changes in the College. The transitory tenure of commandants and deputy commandants, and the frequent rotation of instructors, provided Birrer with the opportunity to shape mid-grade officer education. 130

In July 1954, Major General Garrison Davidson arrived at the College as Commandant. Dr. Birrer, in recalling his service, stated he made several lasting changes. Having never attended

128 Prior to 1950, students like Lieutenant Colonel Creighton Abrams, a wartime battalion and brigade level commander attended the College, bringing a wealth of tactical experience to the course. Beginning in 1950, the majority of students attending served at lower echelons during the War. See Lewis Sorely, Thunderbolt, General Creighton Abrams and the Army of his Times (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 106-107; Stewart, “Raising a Pragmatic Army,” 66-70;


130 Stewart, “Raising a Pragmatic Army,” 309.
Leavenworth as a student, Davidson “brought a new look” to the school. Davidson reorganized the school into four phases, developing a “building-block approach similar to that used in the interwar years. Phase I began with principles and techniques, Phase II the application of those principles using simple tactical problems, and Phase III expanded to broader, complex problems. Phase IV was a connecting phase, with subjects dispersed throughout the previous three phases.

An underlying theme of Davidson’s changes was in developing educational aspects of the curriculum, not simple training. He emphasized the development of creative military thinking to keep pace with technological changes and the expanding responsibilities of the Army. His goal was the substitution of an analytical problem-solving type of work by the students for the traditional descriptive instructional-examination routine of universities. He reduced the number of examinations, and looked to broaden the perspective of the school’s instruction. During his second year as Commandant, Davidson requested an evaluation of the academic operations at the College. This evaluation was led by the former education advisor, Dr. Orleans, two additional PhDs (one, a former CGSS instructor), and three retired general officers (and former World War II Corps Commanders). The commission submitted its findings in June 1956, validating the changes enacted by Davidson and recommending additional changes to his replacement.

As Commandant from 1956-1960, Major General Lionel McGarr emphasized education

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132 During his two-year tour, Davidson expanded the College’s twelve-officer doctrine section to forty-two officers, a move that solidified the doctrinal review capacity of the College and would be critical with the introduction of nuclear warfare. A Military History of the US Army Command and General Staff College 1881-1963, 55-56; Dastrup, A Centennial History, 101.

133 Prior to his arrival, CGSC provided only ten hours of instruction on US National Policy. In 1955, based on a perceived need for increased education, Davidson also proposed the reintroduction of the two-year course. The proposal was not approved. Masland and Radway, Soldiers and Scholars, 283-287.

over training more than most of his predecessors or successors.\textsuperscript{135} Using Davidson’s study as a guide, McGarr defined the College’s educational mission as producing “military problem-solvers who can think objectively, decide logically, operate successfully…in the flexible application of the all-important principles.”\textsuperscript{136} McGarr also transitioned the curriculum to consider nuclear warfare as “typical” in the future. During the 1957-1958 academic year, Leavenworth modified its tactics and doctrinal instruction to the Pentomic Division structure, a major shift from the triangular structure used since World War II.\textsuperscript{137}

To facilitate further change, McGarr reorganized the College teaching departments. One now dealt solely with staff officer development and overall education, three focused on division structures (Infantry, Armor, and Airborne), one with nuclear weapons instruction, and the sixth centered on larger units and administrative support. The addition of the term “education” to one of the departments was significant in the post-World War II College. Within this department, ninety hours of instruction were allocated annually to non-tactical topics, including military history, geography, military organization and management, and leadership. This addition was a dedicated effort to expand the scope of the curriculum to provide a broader education.\textsuperscript{138}

Major General McGarr also reorganized the presentation of instructional topics. Working with Dr. Birrer, McGarr ordered the consolidation of instruction into two, three-hour teaching blocks, with six, fifty-minute class periods of instruction per day. Prior to this change, topics...


\textsuperscript{136} Lionel McGarr, “Keeping Pace with the Future—Fort Leavenworth Develops the Complete Man.” \textit{Military Review} (October 1958), 9.

\textsuperscript{137} The Pentomic Division structure, announced in 1956, consisted of five self-contained, dispersed, battle groups (each with five rifle companies, a support company, mortar battery, and headquarters company) designed to operate as semi-independent units on the “atomic” battlefield. The concept lasted less than five years, when the ROAD concept was announced. Robert Doughty, “The Evolution of the US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76,” \textit{Leavenworth Papers} (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 2001), 17-19; Ivan Birrer, “USA CGSC 1956-1966: A Fateful Decade.” \textit{Military Review} (May 1966), 4-5.

would change every fifty-minute period, impacting learning and student preparation. This change resulted in these three-hour blocks generally containing related topics of instruction from one department.\textsuperscript{139} Another change was in oversight of those blocks of instruction. Under the new structure, the Director of Instruction no longer reviewed and approved each class block.\textsuperscript{140} From that point forward, the director of each of the six departments was the approval for a block of instruction, reducing the oversight power of the academic staff.\textsuperscript{141} Beginning in the 1957-1958 academic year, the coordinating body for the new curriculum became an ad hoc group under the direction of McGarr.\textsuperscript{142}

The Educational Survey Commission also recommended changes to address the large size of classroom instruction. The 56-man classes tended to stress individual work, with limited class interaction, not student-to-student discussion. To address this recommendation, McGarr ordered classes divided into four sections with the use of acoustic curtains to divide the rooms. Desks were reorganized from strait lines to semi-circles or “U” formations to facilitate small group discussion. The curtains were opened for larger group instruction.\textsuperscript{143} The design of the new instructional facility (Bell Hall, opened in 1959), included a modification of its room design to facilitate small group discussion.\textsuperscript{144}

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\textsuperscript{139} Birrer, “Dr. Ivan J. Birrer: Service at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 20 January 1948 to 30 June 1978,” 42.

\textsuperscript{140} Prior to this change, a “murder board” was conducted by the Director of Instruction, with the author of each course block presenting the period of instruction for approval. Birrer, “USA CGSC 1956-1966: A Fateful Decade,” 5-6.

\textsuperscript{141} Birrer cites this change in his article, but does not state this as a good change for the College. At first reading, it would appear a negative change, allowing five separate standards of instruction to develop. Ibid., 6.

\textsuperscript{142} Birrer did not go into detail on the ad hoc group’s functions and does not reference the Director of Instruction at all in his comments in an interview twenty-one years later. Birrer, “Dr. Ivan J. Birrer: Service at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 20 January 1948 to 30 June 1978,” 41.

\textsuperscript{143} Dastrup, \textit{A Centennial History}, 104.

\textsuperscript{144} Stewart credits Dr. Birrer with the recommendation to change the Bell Hall design. Stewart, “Raising a Pragmatic Army,” 155.
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While both Davidson and McGarr made numerous curricular modifications, an increase in both quantity and quality of instructor was needed to implement those changes. In a note to the Army Adjutant General, McGarr, requested that any new faculty assigned come with a four-year college degree to further his goal for the College to provide a university-style education. While unheard of in today’s Army, many field grade officers in the 1950s did not possess a four-year college degree. In his request, McGarr reported that of the 252 officers assigned to the College, sixty-five had less than four years of college education, fifty-five had less than three years, and ten had no college education whatsoever. In total, over fifty percent of the faculty did not possess a university degree.\textsuperscript{145} Army requirements further reduced faculty numbers. During the 1959-1960 academic year, sixty instructors filled requirements away from post. Unlike the prewar years, Fort Leavenworth no longer garnered the support in the assignment of quality officers to instruct.\textsuperscript{146}

**Growing change in the 1960s**

Following the groundwork established by Davidson and McGarr, subsequent Commandants continued to refine the curriculum at the College but faced similar issues. After the opening of Bell Hall, small group instruction was limited by the availability of instructors. In many instances, students led class discussions with varied results.\textsuperscript{147} Large group lectures remained a necessary shortcoming to instruction, with one instructor teaching fifty to sixty-four students. Additionally, tactical instruction suffered. One former student, Colonel Clyde Tate

\textsuperscript{145} Lieutenant General Manton Eddy, CGSC Commandant from 1948 to 1950, is illustrative of the education of officers prior to the 1980s. Selected to serve as an instructor following his graduation of the two-year course 1934, Eddy had no formal education beyond high school. Phillips, *The Making of a Professional*, 63.

\textsuperscript{146} Stewart, “Raising a Pragmatic Army,” 143-145.

\textsuperscript{147} In the College, this concept was named the “Blue Goose” and the instructional guidance was issued on blue paper. Birrer, “Dr. Ivan J. Birrer: Service at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 20 January 1948 to 30 June 1978,” 50.
qualified the poor instruction with one word, “frustration.” He stated that lectures were
maximized and practical exercises minimized. When conducted, exercises resourced units at 100
percent personnel and equipment strengths, presenting an unrealistic example of staff work in the
tactical Army, where few units operated at 100 percent strength. During the early 1960s, Tate
stated the primary objective of students attending CGSC was to pass the limited number of exams
and “return to the real world,” a far cry from interwar student perceptions of Leavenworth. 148

In August 1960, Major General Harold Johnson became CGSC Commandant and
established student preparation for command as one of his priorities. He directed instruction to
feature the commander’s viewpoint, commander’s responsibilities, and the commanders’
problems, adding to the ongoing revisions of the curriculum. 149 Under his watch, the College also
changed its instruction to comply with the Reorganization Objectives Army Division (ROAD)
Report. Significant in this change was the transition from the Pentomic division structure back to
a three-brigade structure within divisions and the doctrine of “Flexible Response.” 150 This new
organizational structure no longer placed nuclear weapons as the principle, first-use weapon on
the battlefield. Correspondingly, instruction on nuclear warfare dropped from its high of 600
hours in the late 1950s to fifty-three hours in 1961. 151

Major General Johnson also reorganized instructional departments, establishing the
Department of Command, combined the three division instruction departments under the
Department of Division Operations, established the Department of Joint, Combined, and Special

148 Assessment of CGSC in Clyde Tate, “Teaching Tactics: A New Approach” (Student Essay, US
Army War College, 1975), 14. Cited in Doughty, “The Command and General Staff College in Transition,
150 General Maxwell Taylor’s “Security Will Not Wait” and “Our Changing Military Policy” were
Wait,” Foreign Affairs 39, no. 2 (January 1961), 1-11; Maxwell Taylor, “Our Changing Military Policy:
151 By 1966, instruction hours on nuclear weapons dropped to sixteen hours. Dastrup, A
Centennial History, 110.
Operations, and maintained the Department of Larger Unit Operations, including the employment of logistical commands. Johnson, who graduated from the first postwar CGSC class, and remained as an instructor under Gerow and Eddy, initiated an educational survey of the College to assess his changes and recommend further modifications.

Known as the Eddleman Commission for its chair, General (retired) Clyde Eddleman, the commission consisted of both retired general officers and academic professionals. The commission released its findings in the summer of 1962, as Johnson departed to duties in Washington, D.C. Brigadier General Harry Lemley, the Deputy Commandant was promoted to replace him as Commandant. The commission’s recommendations resulted in three significant changes in the College. One recommendation was to accredit the college to award graduate degrees to students. Endorsed by The North Central Association of Colleges in March 1963, the College was authorized to award a degree of Master of Military Arts and Science for a three-year trial period. However, due to required Congressional approval and other academic requirements, the College did not receive final degree granting approval until 1974.

Two other recommendations made far ranging changes to how and what officers learned at Fort Leavenworth. One recommendation of the commission was to reword the College’s mission to include the preparation of officers for “wartime and peacetime duty,” changing an eighty-five year focus away from traditional tactical wartime tasks. In conjunction with this change, the College added a block titled “Strategic Subjects” to the curriculum, using guest

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152 A fifth department, Department of Nonresident Instruction remained basically unchanged. Under Johnson, the Combined Arms Group (CAG) was established, the forerunner of the Combine Arms Center. *A Military History of the US Army Command and General Staff College 1881-1963*, 64-65.

153 Stewart, “Raising a Pragmatic Army,” 176.

154 College accreditation was a goal of the school for several years; temporarily approved following the release of the Commission’s report. Birrer, “USA CGSC 1956-1966: A Fateful Decade,” 10-11; Litney, “Challenges and Changes,” 31-32.

speakers as a source for portions of this instruction. These two small modifications, accelerated
the movement of the Army’s senior tactical institution away from its time-proven mission of
teaching officers how to fight and sustain tactical units. Over the next forty-five years, the
curriculum continued to expand to train officer generalists in a wide area of non-tactical tasks at
Fort Leavenworth. The findings of the Haines Board would further modify the curriculum.

Named for its president, Lieutenant General Ralph Haines, the Secretary of the Army
established the Haines Board to “determine the adequacy and appropriateness of the current
Army school system and the education and individual school training of Army officers.”
Reviewing education Army-wide, the Board was instructed to pay particular attention to
curricula, faculty selection, special training of senior officers in management tasks, and, if any
course could be eliminated. The 1966 release of the Haines Board Report, led to a redesign of
the curriculum that changed the hours and type of tactical training provided to officers.

Due to the size of the Army in 1965 (vice the smaller interwar structure) and the variety
of higher echelon assignments available to officers, the members of the Haines Board believed
that most students had already experienced service at the corps and division level prior to CGSC
attendance. The Board therefore determined that Leavenworth should expand officer education
to include high-level commands and organizations outside the structure of the Army in the field,
including joint staffs, reducing tactical instruction and incorporating electives. The Board
judged the curriculum at CGSC as “directed at the lowest common denominator of the class,” and

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156 During the 1962-1963 year, 66 hours was dedicated to strategic instruction. Stewart, “Raising a
Pragmatic Army,” 180.

157 A Military History of the US Army Command and General Staff College 1964-1970 (Fort
Leavenworth: Command and General Staff College, 1970), 8.

158 Unlike other boards, most Haines Board recommendations were implemented. Stewart,
“Raising a Pragmatic Army,” 209, 212, 224.


160 Board recommended that both general staff and division instruction be included in the career
course instruction as part of this change in CGSC curriculum. Ibid.
that it should be “supplemented by elective subjects” to improve individual learning. The Board recommended the College continue with core curriculum subjects, but allow students to choose other subjects from a list of electives. The Board recognized the challenges of this significant change, recommending a gradual transition to this curriculum from 1967 to 1973.\(^{161}\) Starting in 1967, students were allowed one forty-hour elective. By 1973, the requirement expanded to six forty-hour electives. Electives soon replaced core curriculum classes to support this change.\(^{162}\) The new curriculum continued toward producing generalists, with the incorporation of electives expected to “stimulate intellectual endeavor and to add significantly to the students' professional military education, allowing students the opportunity to specialize…to overcome gaps in their educational background.”\(^{163}\) In the subsequent years, tactical instruction declined. Once totaling over 600 hours in the 1950s, by 1971, tactical instruction fell to 300 hours.\(^{164}\) A second recommendation adopted from the Haines Board was to expand the number of students attending CGSC. In 1966, class size averaged 850 per year. After reviewing requirements for graduates in the total Army, the Board determined that the College should maximize Bell Hall classroom space, increasing annual class size to 1,341 officers.\(^{165}\) This change, in addition to increasing the strain on instructors and their classroom preparations, also


\(^{162}\) One of the curricular losers in the adoption of electives was tactical instruction, which lost 165 contact hours of core curriculum from 1968 to 1974. Stewart, “Raising a Pragmatic Army,” 226-227; Christopher Gabel, “The Leavenworth Staff College: A Historical Overview,” Military Review 77, no. 5 (September-October 1997), 100.

\(^{163}\) Department of the Army, “Report of the Department of the Army Board to Review Army Officer Schools, Volume III, Analysis of Current Army System of Officer Schooling” (Fort Leavenworth: Combined Arms Research Library, 1966), 474.


\(^{165}\) Tied to the student increase at Fort Leavenworth was the decision to CGSC credit for any graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College at Norfolk, VA. The total increase in students in the 1967-1968 academic year was 1244 US officers and 97 international officers. Birrer, “Dr. Ivan J. Birrer: Service at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 20 January 1948 to 30 June 1978,” 85-87; Litney, “Challenges and Changes,” 21.
impacted post support. In 1966, Fort Leavenworth was capable of supporting 583 families, including hospital, commissary, and most importantly, post housing services. Following the increase in class size, students were forced to live up to an hour’s drive away, until local housing became availability increased. In 1971, a Department of the Army survey of officer education, the Norris Report, sparked a drive to renew the master’s degree program at CGSC and influenced further expansion of electives at the College.

CGSC as a University

Major General Frank Norris was a former instructor at CGSC from 1950 to 1953, and later the Commandant of the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC). Following his tour at the AFSC, Chief of Staff of the Army, General William Westmoreland, tasked Norris to conduct a review of the current Army officer educational system and make recommendations to meet the challenges of the 1970s. His report encompassed all facets of officer education, and made several recommendations for the CGSC. Norris recommended dividing the current ten-month course into two sections, consisting of a four to five month "core curriculum" followed by a four to five month functional staff course. Norris believed that Fort Leavenworth should fill the role of a “professional university for the Army,” with an emphasis on “the conduct of high-caliber professional military education across the spectrum of skills required by the modern Army.”

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168 Ibid., 6-4.

meet this role, he recommended the expansion of electives and the master’s degree program, as well as the cooperative degree program with adjacent universities.171 Prior to the formal release of the Norris Report, a Fort Leavenworth internal study preempted his findings, further moving the College into a university setting.

In the fall of 1971, the Deputy Commandant, Brigadier General James Gibson established an internal CGSC committee run by Dr. Birrer, to review the curriculum. While the committee knew of Norris’s soon-to-be-released report, it proposed a fundamentally different approach to change at Leavenworth. The internal study proposed concentration of study in "majors," rather than functional staff specialization. The commandant approved the internal plan in late November 1971, and later received approval of the Continental Army Commander, Lieutenant General Ralph Haines.172

The plan as implemented, divided the curriculum into two major areas of study, similar to the Norris Board recommendation. The larger core curriculum retained sixty percent of instructional time, with the predominance of instruction occurring in the first six months of the course. The remaining forty percent went to elective courses. Implicit in this decision was the belief that the 650 hours (sixty-percent) of core curriculum was adequate to prepare officers for duty with regular Army-in-the-field units; the traditional CGSC mission.173 The electives portion, termed "Professional Electives," were considered an extension of the common curriculum. The

171 The Cooperative Degree Program was conducted in conjunction with Kansas University, Kansas State University, and University of Missouri Kansas City to provide the opportunity for a graduate degree while attending CGSC. The plan opened Thursday afternoons for electives (cutting 30-40 hours of instruction through the year) to support this degree. Birrer, “Dr. Ivan J. Birrer: Service at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 20 January 1948 to 30 June 1978,” 99-100; Norris, 6-5.

172 The Continental Army then served as the higher headquarters of Fort Leavenworth. Lieutenant General Haines, who was the Chair of the 1966 Haines Board, did not agree with the Norris Report, although there are clear ties to the report in the transition of the CGSC curriculum. Doughty, “The Command and General Staff College in Transition, 1946-1976,” 46-47; Birrer, “Dr. Ivan J. Birrer: Service at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 20 January 1948 to 30 June 1978,” 120-121.

design of the electives was to provide officers an opportunity to gain additional expertise in selected military fields. These electives began in the second half of the year, complementing remaining core classes.174

The following year, the command structure at Fort Leavenworth, and the College, reorganized. Within the College, the departments reorganized along functional lines, resulting in four departments (The Departments of Command, Tactics, Logistics, and Strategy).175 The role of the Commander at Fort Leavenworth also changed, now named the Commander, Combined Arms Center (CAC). The College remained assigned to CAC with daily operations and administration falling under the responsibility of the deputy CAC Commander.176

By the beginning of the 1973-1974 academic year, CGSC was a different institution than at the end of the Second World War, or even 1966. The focus on graduating officers as experts in division operations had faded. Now a Leavenworth graduate was a generalist, receiving thirty to forty percent of his instruction in areas that were essentially a secondary specialty. While still training tactical operations, Leavenworth no longer provided the in-depth exposure of the 1950s or early 1960s. Only by taking select tactical electives, could a student receive a similar level of instruction.177 The push toward electives reached its height in 1975, with students allowed to develop “a personalized” College experience.178 By the mid-1970s, the collegiate style of instruction was in full form at Leavenworth. Following the 1975-1976 academic year, however,

174 Ibid., 24.
175 In February 1972, the Army reorganized the United States Continental Command (USCONARC) into Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), CGSC’s higher command, and Forces Command (FORSCOM). A Military History of the US Army Command and General Staff College 1972-1973 (Fort Leavenworth: Command and General Staff College, 1974), 1-2; Dastrup, A Centennial History, 122.
178 Litney, “Challenges and Changes,” 64.
both the number and type of electives available changed. Many electives became “directed” based on the branch of the officer. Additionally, during the 1976-1977 year, the available elective periods of instruction declined from ten to eight.\footnote{It took two years after the establishment of TRADOC for the directed changes by General DePuy to influence class structure at Fort Leavenworth. Ibid., 61, 64; Doughty, “The Command and General Staff College in Transition, 1946-1976,” 130.}

The assignment of General William DePuy as the first Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Commander in 1973 and the influence of 1973 Arab-Israeli War resulted in a refocus on education and doctrine across the Army. Soon after taking command of TRADOC, General DePuy informed the outgoing CGSC Commandant, Major General John Hennessey, of his views on changing the curriculum. Specifically, he directed that fifty percent of the Leavenworth curriculum center on division operations, limiting instruction on corps and brigade operations to twenty-five percent each.\footnote{At that point, instruction on division operations met the requirement at fifty-four percent of the curriculum. However, brigade instruction was less than three percent and corps and above was close to forty-three percent of instruction. Stewart, “Raising a Pragmatic Army,” 241; Doughty, “The Command and General Staff College in Transition, 1946-1976,” 65-66.} Based on his World War II experience and time in Vietnam as a division commander, General DePuy believed that the Army was unprepared for the type of warfare demonstrated in the recent Arab-Israeli War.\footnote{The 1973 Arab-Israeli War demonstrated the “unparalleled lethality and violence” of the modern battlefield, with Israel fighting bordering countries with advanced weapons, resulting in high attrition rates of soldiers and equipment. DePuy believed that the Viet Nam War cost the US a generation of modernization and development and that the Army must develop the skills and doctrine to employ the advanced weapons of a complex combined arms team. He also stressed a requirement for readiness, with US forces prepared to fight outnumbered and disadvantaged. His views lead to the divide between him and Cushman over doctrine development. Doughty, “The Evolution of the US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76,” 41-42.} In order to prepare the Army for what he perceived as the primary threat (major combat in Europe), DePuy tasked Leavenworth to change instruction and develop a new doctrinal manual for the Army.\footnote{Although not the focus of this monograph, the doctrinal rewrite of Army Manuals was one of the missions of Fort Leavenworth. General DePuy sought a new manual that would tell the Army “how to fight.” Major General Cushman’s view was that doctrine should be an educational document rather than a set of rules. In the months after DePuy’s directive to Cushman to rewrite the manual, DePuy withdrew the task from Fort Leavenworth and gave the mission to select members of his headquarters. Paul Herbert,}
view that the Army had to be prepared for war in a come-as-you-are manner, in other words, the Army must be ready to fight on the first day of hostilities. Based on the speed and violence observed during the Arab-Israeli war, the Army could not plan on a period of preparation and mobilization before its next conflict. It had to be fully trained and prepared to immediately fight as part of a combined arms team to defeat the enemy.

General DePuy’s directive to update instruction resulted in both concern and dissention within the College. Preparing students to assume command of division or corps units was no longer the sole focus of instruction. Instead, classes should prepare officers to command a battalion, brigade, or equivalent-size units. Additionally, DePuy, believed that training, not education, should be the focus of Army education. Over subsequent years, traditionalists pushed to improve instruction of time-honored warfighting tasks, while the progressive-oriented faculty desired to continue electives and maintain the freedom and flexibility of the elective program. Within the departments of CGSC, there was a creative tension, as each fought for its piece of the instructional pie. Only the Tactics Department was pleased with the decision of the TRADOC Commander. In 1974, Major General John H. (Jack) Cushman arrived as the new Commandant to deal with these tensions of the ever-changing CGSC curriculum.


186 Herbert, “Deciding What Has to Be Done,” 54.
188 While the Tactics Department was overall pleased with the direction of increased tactics instruction, members did not agree with an increase in instruction below division level. Other disputes
Major General Cushman took over Fort Leavenworth following command of the 101st Airborne Division. He was a 1955 graduate of CGSC, remaining as an instructor from 1955 to 1958. While General DuPuy supported Cushman’s selection as Commandant, it soon became apparent that their views of training and education differed. Cushman desired to educate officers as well as train them professionally, preparing them for their post-graduation years as field grade officers. As Commandant, Cushman focused on three areas to improve instruction, while progressives within the faculty continue to push toward a university style curriculum. Cushman’s first priority, much in line with Depuy’s, was to refine tactics instruction, which he felt was not adequate for the needs of the Army. Second, he wanted to incorporate a syndicate system within the College, focused on reducing the size of the group instruction currently then in place. Third, he deleted examinations from the curriculum. During Cushman’s first year as Commandant, the curriculum was divided into three, sixteen-week terms, with students required to a “major” for focused study. Students also received a course catalogue to select their elective courses and assigned a faculty counselor to develop a class schedule.

After sitting in several classes, Major General Cushman felt the College was overly concerned with acronyms and checklists. He also felt there was a lack of realism in the classroom tactical instruction. He tasked the faculty to emphasize true-to-life situations, using historical examples in the form of case studies, and pushed the education of officers rather than simple

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189 Cushman had been an exchange Officer to the United Kingdom as a young officer and observed the syndicate system there. In reference to examinations, both he and General Harrison felt the College was not testing students on the right “things.” Birrer, “Dr. Ivan J. Birrer: Service at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 20 January 1948 to 30 June 1978,” 183-185.

training and rote memorization. He shifted tactical exercises to what he felt were more realistic, real world challenges. No longer were units at 100 percent strength in personnel and equipment for tactical exercises. Problem sets also including fighting in austere environments against a superior enemy force. In his initial instructional guidance to the faculty, he directed that the lessons should impart a "profession-of-arms attitude into discussions on tactics."

Major General Cushman also ended formal, major exam weeks at Leavenworth. He ended testing on common curriculum items during the traditional January exam week. In its place, Cushman introduced a continuous and subjective evaluation system, employing several mediums. These evaluations included formal and informal oral presentations, classroom contribution to discussion, written homework assignments, research products, book reports, quizzes and lesser examinations. After reviewing grade averages for previous years, Cushman dictated a grading curb for the class, authorizing faculty to award an “A” to only twenty percent of a class. In doing so, he directed that the remaining eighty percent of the class receive a “B,” “C,” or “U.” In the ensuing years, few students received a “C” or “U,” instead; most students received what became known as the “Leavenworth B.” Although initiated as an effort to increase student motivation to excel, the concept of a Leavenworth B in fact reduced student incentive, since the chances of failing were slight. The term “Leavenworth B” became

192 Ibid., 78.
194 Stewart, “Raising a Pragmatic Army,” 271.
195 Faculty Memorandum Number 17 defined an “A” for students with "Superior grasp of subject matter, equaled by few of the student's peers in that class at that time, and sufficient to warrant recognition for Academic Excellence." Other possible grades were "B+", "B," "B-", "C," or "U" for unsatisfactory. However, few students received a "C." The majority of the students received a “B.” cited in Doughty, “The Command and General Staff College in Transition, 1946-1976,” 86; Birrer, “Dr. Ivan J. Birrer: Service at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 20 January 1948 to 30 June 1978,” 150-151.
synonymous with a half-hearted effort and soon became synonymous with the interwar school solution as the standard at the College.  

While Cushman directed a reduction in the size of each class section to enhance group discussion, Fort Leavenworth still lacked the faculty numbers capable of providing quality instruction to small groups. Additionally, the impact of a marginal faculty on students personal CGSC experiences, began to taint the view of Leavenworth as “the best year of their lives,” resulting in several generations preferring experience to education.  

While Major General Cushman provided a refreshed vision of instruction at CGSC, no amount of vision or personal inspiration could compensate for a lack of a competent faculty. In the end, due to the push for smaller groups, there was an increase in instructor classroom interaction, but no corresponding increase in instructors, which resulted in faculty who were less prepared to facilitate instruction than in past.  

The shortage of CGSC instructors was highlighted in the 1978 RETO (A Review of Education and Training of Officers) report. As Major General Cushman pushing for an increase in small group instruction (requiring an increase in instructor presence), the 1977 CGSC faculty was at a low of 147 personnel, from an authorized total of 255.  

196 In 1979, a Faculty Council meeting noted, “The feeling that no officer will fail the College prevails, reinforcing the “Leavenworth B” syndrome on the part of students, encouraging academic lethargy.” Cited in Stewart, “Raising a Pragmatic Army,” 273; 270-272.  

197 Stewart, “Raising a Pragmatic Army,” 251.  

198 Ibid., 251-252. Stewart goes on to state that while in general there were numerous weaker instructors, the College still maintained a stable of qualified faculty, just fewer than were needed.  


200 The authorized strength for the faculty in 1975 was 255. That number was reduced in order to staff The Combined Arms Training Developments Activity, an ad hoc organization established by Major General Thurman, Cushman’s replacement, and again in 1981, to operate the Combined Arms Services School designed to teach captains staff officer skills. Benjamin Harrison, “A Review of Education and Training for Officers, Volume 2 - Career Progression.” Washington, DC, 1978, E-7-4; Doughty, “The Command and General Staff College in Transition, 1946-1976,” 84; Birrer, “Dr. Ivan J. Birrer: Service at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 20 January 1948 to 30 June 1978,”
resulted in an increase in work for the faculty on hand and a reduction in small group discussion. Lecture formats returned to an instructor-centered lesson plan, with students seldom interacting during classroom presentations. Instructor morale, as well as student learning, was lowered by this instructor shortage.\textsuperscript{201} A 1980 TRADOC study further reduced Fort Leavenworth’s total officer strength by seventy-seven billets, several from the CGSC faculty.\textsuperscript{202}

During the 1980s, there was a growing concern that CGSC instruction was not sufficient to meet the Army's needs. Not enough time was available for officers to complete comprehensive study and acquire an understanding of the complex demands of the modern battlefield.\textsuperscript{203} Compounding this concern was the continued shortage of instructors. During the 1981-1982 academic year, the College faculty numbered 151, an increase of only three since 1977, still too low to reached the small group instruction goal of fifteen-student classes.\textsuperscript{204} Also affecting the quality of instruction was the high turnover of faculty members of the College. Of the 151 faculty members assigned to teaching in 1977, fifty-nine were new to the College and to instructor duties.\textsuperscript{205} In the ensuing years, instructor numbers did increase slightly, with 190 assigned by 1985. This number included civilian instructors, who were beginning to join the faculty to work along side military members as course authors and principle instructors.\textsuperscript{206}

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\textsuperscript{201} Stewart, “Raising a Pragmatic Army,” 256.  
\textsuperscript{202} The TRADOC study determined that one instructor per 450 hours of instruction was sufficient. Cited in Stewart, “Raising a Pragmatic Army,” Footnote 66, 256-257.  
\textsuperscript{204} Birrer, “Dr. Ivan J. Birrer: Service at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 20 January 1948 to 30 June 1978,” 182-183.  
\textsuperscript{205} Partin and Robertson, \textit{US Army Combined Arms Center Annual Historical Review}, 111.  
\textsuperscript{206} These numbers were drawn from the 1984-1985 Self Study. After 1985, the overall number of faculty who served as instructors is not clear in documents researched by the author. US Army Command and General Staff College, “A Report of the United States Army Command and General Staff College 1984-1985 Institutional Self Study.” Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1985, 80-81, 85-86.
number were former students, who made up approximately twenty-five percent of faculty replacements each year.\textsuperscript{207} Unfortunately, the reduction of tactical instruction continued, as the College attempted to maintain a balance of instruction.

In the 1950s, roughly 665 hours of instruction was devoted to teaching tactics and operations. During the 1985-1986 year, tactical instruction consisted of a total 212 hours, plus thirty-six hours dedicated to exercises.\textsuperscript{208} Core tactics instruction between 1976 and 1996 averaged 225 hours, with division tactical training averaging only twenty-nine percent of those hours.\textsuperscript{209} One initiative to improve operational instruction was the 1983 establishment of the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS).\textsuperscript{210} While this one-year course provided select officers with in-depth study of the conduct of war at the operational level, seats for attendance were limited. Changes in the curriculum and teaching methodology also resulted in a reduction in rigor in grading starting in the 1980s.

One author and former Army officer, who published in the late 1980s, believed that an education at Leavenworth had become no more than a check the block requirement for advancement.\textsuperscript{211} Grade inflation became common in the 1980s, with the “Leavenworth A” replacing the “Leavenworth B” of previous years.\textsuperscript{212} Tied to grade inflation, was a sense of

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{207} Ibid., 81.
\item \textsuperscript{208} The 1985 statistics are in an increase in tactical instruction over 1974, which only number 170 total hours. The total of 212 hours in found in the 1985-1986 CGSC Circular 351-1. Of note, in a 1984 CGSC brief cited in Stewart, there were only 149 hours of tactical instruction. Wass De Czege, 37; US Army Command and General Staff College. “CGSC Circular 351-1, Catalog Academic Year 1985-1986.” Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1985, 55, 57-58; Stewart, “Raising a Pragmatic Army,” 268.
\item \textsuperscript{209} The remainder of the tactical focused instruction was divided between battalion, brigade, and corps instruction topics. Vincent Tedesco, “Tactical Alchemy: Heavy Division Tactical Maneuver Planning Guides and the Army’s Neglect of the Science of War” (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, 2000), 2-3.
\item \textsuperscript{210} Arnold, “Professional Military Education,” 26.
\item \textsuperscript{211} Christopher Bassford, The Spit-Shine Syndrome, Organizational Irrationality in the American Field Army (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 142.
\item \textsuperscript{212} One extreme in 1985 class highlighted by Dr. Michael Stewart, listed eighty-six percent of 743 students receiving an A (636 students), while only thirteen percent received a B (ninety-eight students).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
mediocrity expressed in some students’ views of the courses being taught. In end-of-course reviews, students felt the instruction at CGSC was not at the graduate level. The students felt instruction centered too much on basics; they desired graduate level instruction.²¹³

The arrival of Brigadier General Frederick Franks in 1985 as Deputy Commandant, initiated the final push toward small group instruction based on the recommendation of his predecessor, Major General Dave Palmer. While small group instruction was discussed every decade following World War II, by the 1984-1985 academic year, only one-third of instruction was in small, fifteen-twenty officer groups. The remainder of CGOSC instruction was at the sixty-student to one instructor or higher level.²¹⁴ After observing instruction, Franks believed the classes were too formal (lecture based), and sought to break down the formality permeating the curriculum. In September 1985, he instructed the Director of Academic Operations to look at how to reinstitute small group instruction, moving away from the one instructor, large group (1:64) format in the seminar rooms. Following the study, Brigadier General Franks ordered a change to only small group instruction in the following year.²¹⁵ He quickly received resistance from some departments, who realized the amount of work and time it would take to modify the classes, and equally important, the time it would take to prepare the instructors. The overarching faculty

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²¹³ From the instructor’s view, however, the diversity of the students in the class required the teaching of basic material to ensure the students had a common starting view of the topic. Ibid., 275.


²¹⁵ Franks arrived two months prior to the 1985-1986 academic year. He used the first year to instill his vision of small group instruction on the faculty. Combined Arms Center History Office, US Army Combined Arms Center Annual Historical Review (RCS CHIS-6 R3), 1 Jan 1985 to 31 Dec 1985 (Fort Leavenworth: US Combined Arms Center, 1986), 42.
requirement was to develop instructors who could facilitate discussion. The new philosophy of
instruction was to place the responsibility of learning on the students, a change from the previous
instructor-centered approach.216 Through his force of personality, Franks impressed the
significance of this change for the College. Within three months of the 1986-1987 academic year,
students were providing positive feedback on the quality and nature of the instruction.217 Franks’
final success in implementing a true small group environment ended the formal ranking of
students. With small group instruction and decentralized teaching teams now in place, the senior
faculty realized it was impossible to maintain a structured system for ranking students. Only a top
CGOSC graduate was recognized at graduation, selected using criteria other than just grades.218

In 1986, as Brigadier General Franks’ changes took shape, the Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense Reorganization Act was approved. Following its passage, the term
“jointness” became a prevalent in military professional education. While many of directives in the
Goldwater-Nichols Act are outside the scope of this monograph, its implications on “joint
education” did further change the schools curriculum. Fort Leavenworth became one of ten
schools that provided Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) credit to officers, based on
varying curricular requirements.219 Following Goldwater-Nichols guidance, the curriculum at
Fort Leavenworth incorporated joint study areas into its core curriculum requirements. The

216 The College developed a training program for instructors to instill this new approach. Rafuse,

217 Stewart, “Raising a Pragmatic Army,” 298, 300-301.

218 The top graduate at CGSOC was selected by the senior faculty, with candidates self electing to
complete. Section was based on individual performance and grades as well as extracurricular-external to
the College activities and achievement. Stewart, “Raising a Pragmatic Army,” 298-299.

219 The ten schools included each of the staff colleges and the senior service colleges and
equivalents. There are two levels of JPME credit, most staff colleges only provide JPME I credit. The
Armed Forces Staff College, a ten-week course in Norfolk, VA is one of the few sites that provides officers
180-181.
beginning of the Prairie Warrior Exercise further modified instruction at CGSOC, incorporating joint planning considerations and combined operations.\textsuperscript{220}

Established by guidance of the Deputy Commandant, Brigadier General J. Miller to the Tactics Department and School of Advanced Military Studies in 1989, Prairie Warrior was to be the end-of-course exercise for CGSOC.\textsuperscript{221} Initially tested as a pilot program with seventy-one officers in 1989, in 1990, the exercise expanded to include the entire CGSOC graduating class of over 1,100 officers.\textsuperscript{222} Prairie Warrior became the capstone exercise for CGSOC, testing the proficiency of the officers operating as part of combined arms teams. CGSOC students performed duties as commanders and staffs of the units involved, with the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) facilitating the overall execution. The staff of BCTP ran the exercise similar to a division or corps warfighting exercise, using its World Class Opposition Force as the threat force and lead after action reviews for the students to increase learning throughout the event.\textsuperscript{223}

By 1996-1997 academic year, CGSOC had regained some of its tactical focus to prepare officers. The mission to prepare officers for duty as field grade commanders and principal staff officers at division and higher echelons was illustrated by the dedicated hours of instruction.\textsuperscript{224} That year, the curriculum consisted of 863 contact hours, with 541 devoted to core curriculum classes, 210 hours to electives, and 112 hours committed to the Prairie Warrior Exercise.\textsuperscript{225} Overall tactics instruction in 1997 included 197 core-directed hours of instruction and sixty


\textsuperscript{221} The original concept was developed by General Sullivan in 1987, when he was deputy Commandant. Combined Arms Center History Office \textit{US Army Combined Arms Center Annual Historical Review (RCS CHIS-6 R3), 1 Jan 1990 to 31 Dec 1990} (Fort Leavenworth: US Combined Arms Center, 1991), 43; L. Holder and Rolland Dessert Jr., “Prairie Warrior: a Joint Combined Exercise,” \textit{Military Review} 76 (July-August 1996), 5.

\textsuperscript{222} “Prairie Warrior 96,” \textit{Military Review} 76 (July-August 1996), 5.

\textsuperscript{223} Holder and Dessert, “Prairie Warrior: a Joint Combined Exercise,” 5-6.

\textsuperscript{224} Chapter 3, Command and General Officers Staff Course, AY 1996-1997 CGSC Course Catalogue, 3.

\textsuperscript{225} Gabel, “The Leavenworth Staff College: A Historical Overview,” 99.
additional hours of advanced application classes, totaling 257 dedicated hours of tactical training. The 112 hours of the Prairie Warrior Exercise were in addition to these hours.\textsuperscript{226} For over a decade, the Prairie Warrior Exercise would stand as a mainstay of the CGSOC curriculum, ending in 2005 with the full implementation of the ILE curriculum.\textsuperscript{227}

**ILE**

The ILE curriculum was a result of the Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) Officer Study, chartered in June 2000 by the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric Shinseki. The study looked at training and leader development as part of the Army’s ongoing Transformation Campaign Plan.\textsuperscript{228} Initially released in 2001, many of the study’s findings were approved for implementation by General Shinseki in early 2003.\textsuperscript{229} Two decisions from the ATLDP Study affected Fort Leavenworth. The first was the decision to expand CGSOC attendance to 100 percent of active component, operations career field majors.\textsuperscript{230} The second decision dealt with curriculum content and structure.

Based on surveys conducted by the ATLDP team, the underlying theme of several field grade officers interviewed was that CGSOC did not meet the expectations of the graduate. Of the officers interviewed, many stated that they did not feel they were educated in combined arms skills, or the requirements to conduct full spectrum operations.\textsuperscript{231} These findings led to the creation of the ILE curriculum, which was to ensure relevancy in the education at Leavenworth.

\textsuperscript{226} Ibid., 100.

\textsuperscript{227} Rafuse, *On the Frontier – Preparing Leaders*, 17, 55.


\textsuperscript{229} Triggs, “Army to Transform Officer System.”

\textsuperscript{230} Operations Career Field officers are officers serving in their commissioning branch. Non-operations career field officers are those serving in specialty branches, for example: Army Simulations. Neal Bralley, “ILE: A New System for CGSC Students,” *Army Logistician*, (January/February 2008), 6.

\textsuperscript{231} “The Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study Report to the Army,” US Army Combined Arms Center History Office (Fort Leavenworth, 2001), OS-11.
and to increase the scope of officer education to meet the requirements of future Army leaders.\(^{232}\)
The new curriculum, fully initiated in 2004, divided the education into two elements. The first consisted of a three-month ILE Common Core curriculum taught at Fort Leavenworth and at designated satellite locations.\(^{233}\) This portion became “Universal ILE,” with every officer, regardless of career field, receiving a similar education in basic Army functions.\(^{234}\) The second element of ILE, the Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course (AOWC), was specifically for operations career field officers. AOWC consists of seven additional months at Fort Leavenworth that provides officers with a graduate-level education in strategic, operational, and tactical warfighting to prepare them for battalion command and higher-level staff positions. The focus of the instruction ranges from Joint Force Land Component Command down to brigade level operations. ILE retained electives as part of the overall program, with classes ranging from counter-insurgency to urban operations.\(^{235}\) Unique to the ILE Curriculum was the intent to prepare officers for the “next ten years” of military service, not focused on training officers to be commanders of divisions.\(^{236}\)

The ILE curriculum incorporated many of the changes made in previous sixty-five years to improve Leavenworth instruction. Section size remained small, with instructor teams

\(^{232}\) Hollis, “ILE a Casualty of War,” 13.


\(^{234}\) Either following or preceding this common core instruction, specialty officers would attend branch specific training or have the opportunity to attend Advanced Civil Schooling to enhance their unique skills. Brian Prosser, “Universal ILE Policy: Concept, Reality and Recommendation” (Strategy Research Project, US Army War College, 2007), 3.

\(^{235}\) Volney and Willbanks, “Preparing Field Grade Leaders for Today and Tomorrow,”106.

facilitating the education of student groups ranging in size from 16 to 18.  

237 While the Prairie Warrior Exercise ended as a capstone event at CGSOC, nineteen days of simulation exercises complemented the first year’s 480 hours of ILE instruction.  

238 Group exercises were spread throughout the academic year, with an emphasis on solving complex issues and developing decision-making and creative thinking skills.  

239 ILE instructional methods use historical case studies and practicum to increase learning, with thirty to forty percent of the curriculum revised each of its first three years.  

240 To overcome the parochial nature of separate teaching departments, interdisciplinary-interdepartmental teams of twelve faculty members were established for each sixty-four student seminar.  

241 The limitations of total faculty improved with the addition of civilian instructors.  

By the beginning of the 2005-2006 academic year, instructor numbers increased to 226, with 139 civilian instructors and eighty-seven military instructors. Civilian instructors were hired to make up active duty officer shortages due to the ongoing war.  

242 During this 2010-2011 academic year, there was a total of 373 officers and civilians involved as faculty or teaching team leaders. In this number, there are 107 military members from all services, four international
officers, and 264 civilians serving as instructors. This substantial increase in instructors was necessary, as the student body increased from 1,057 in the 2005-2006 academic year, to 1,439 during the 2010-2011 academic year. Overall, the CGSOC maintained a 4:1 or fewer student-to-faculty ratio.

Academically, overall contact hours declined from the 1939 era, with 1,073 hours spent in the classroom in the one-year courses prior to World War II. In the 1950s, hours remained around 1,000, and by 1985, the curriculum dropped to 886 contact hours. By the 1998-1999 academic year, just prior to ILE, hours of instruction stood at 762 hours, with just over four hours daily spent in the classroom. The current ILE curriculum totals 732 hours of academic instruction, with 326 hours dedicated to core instruction and 406 hours to the AOWC, including 192 hours of electives. Tactical instruction was reduced from its high of 655 hours in 1951, to 179 hours in ILE, when combining the blocks of instruction in Doctrine, Joint Functions, Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multinational (JIIM) Capabilities, and Planning. Roughly, one-third of the ILE core curriculum is devoted to group practical exercises (approximately 100 hours), and a nine-day group practical exercises is conducted as part of the sixty-two hour

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243 Unfortunately, the 2005 Self Study Report does not specify the total number of faculty that instruct students vice the number that serve in administration positions. The 2005 report states that instructors numbered 256, but caveats that 226 were full time faculty. Ibid; “JPME Student / Faculty Report to the Joint Staff,” US Command and General Staff College, October 2010.

244 In 2006, CGSOC initiated an off-cycle class (February to December) for approximately 250-300 officers each year. “CGSC Resident ILE / JPME Phase I Student and Faculty Comparison,” US Command and General Staff College, September 2011.


246 The reduction in contact hours is considered important to allow students to prepare for class. William Bristow and Robert Kupiszewski, “The US Army Command and General Staff College: A Changing Institution,” Military Review 77, no. 5 (September-October 1997), 102-103.


Planning block (roughly 54 hours).\textsuperscript{249} Clearly, there are benefits and shortfalls in the current ILE structure over the prewar CGSS structure. The next section will use the criteria developed to compare the two eras of instruction to develop findings and recommendations.

**Comparison**

This section of the monograph compares the instruction provided at Fort Leavenworth during the two eras discussed in Sections 2 and 3. Using the criteria of student selection, instructor selection, school mission, and the philosophy of instruction, this section will determine the validity of the monograph thesis: “that the pre-World War II CGSS curriculum better developed its graduates to execute tactical tasks at the battalion, brigade, and division level than the postwar CGSC curriculum, specifically, the ILE curriculum in effect today.”

By using these criteria, this monograph will note that pre-World War II CGSS curriculum did in fact better develop graduates to execute tactical tasks at the battalion, brigade, and division level than does ILE. However, the expanded nature of the CGSC mission, the requirements to train graduates to understand national level decisions and understand Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multinational (JIIM) Capabilities and functions, made this change necessary. Based on the finding from this section, recommendations are made in Section 5 to adjust the ILE curriculum to better prepare officers for tactical units.

**Criterion 1a, Student Selection- Interwar Years**

Due to the successes of World War I, the US Army officer corps lost its prewar antipathy for classroom instruction as a means to develop commanders and staff officers in the profession of war. The success of the US Army in Europe and subsequent statements by AEF leadership broke the barrier that had previously existed against Leavenworth’s method of training officers. Beginning with the 1919 classes, the education received at Leavenworth no longer had to prove

\textsuperscript{249} “Intermediate Level Education (ILE) – Common Core (CC),” 6, 9.
itself. From the end of World War I, to the outbreak of the Second World War, officers sought attendance at the CGSS as a pathway to promotion and success.

The senior officer in charge of each branch personally selected officers to attend CGSS based on efficiency reports and recommendations of superiors. During the interwar era, Leavenworth was not considered a break for an officer from a troop assignment, but was known for its reputation of rigor and hard work. Successful graduation was considered a pathway to promotion, selection to serve on the General Staff, and a necessary step to be competitive for eventual high-level command and promotion to general officer. Annually, the adjutant general sent a student selection directive to the branch chiefs regarding school selection. Branches developed an order of merit list for attendance. Additional oversight for attendance was the prerogative of the Chief of Staff of the Army, who in the years following World War I, did question officer selection from time to time.

While selection for attendance remained the prerogative of the various branches, class size and rank composition did vary in the interwar years. In the years immediately following World War I, most graduates were field grade officers (major, lieutenant colonel, and colonel) with combat experience. In the years from 1923 to 1933, most students were in the rank of major, in both the single and two-year courses. By 1934, due to the effects of the depression and slow promotion rates, the class’s composition changed, with over half the class consisting of captains (by this time most World War I officers had attended). By 1937, student ranks average thirty-five

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250 Dastrup, A Centennial History, 64.
252 General Pershing, who replaced General March as Army Chief of Staff, questioned one-year’s selections, when four officers deemed “average,” were selected over four others that he held in higher regard. Written responses were provided to General Pershing whenever this occurred, resulting in career branches carefully screening candidates prior to submission to the Army Personnel Officer (G1) for final approval by Pershing. Ibid., 60; Schifferle, America’s School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II, 124-125, 129-130.
percent majors, sixty-five percent captains, including some select senior lieutenants. The branch breakdown for the classes averaged ninety percent combat arms officers.  

Even with the strict selection criteria used by the Army to choose students, issues did arise in the quality of officers attending CGSS in the mid-1930s. The school commandant, aware of this shift in the experience of officer attending, recommended changes in school entrance qualifications, in an attempt to influence branch selection. Colonel Charles Bundel, a former instructor following World War I and then Commandant, recommended all students complete a correspondence preparation course and pass an entrance examination prior to attendance. His recommendations, due to the focus on increasing graduate numbers, were not implemented. In June 1939, the last full one-year course graduated 228 students. From this point to the end of World War II, the Command and General Staff School greatly increased the number of students, while greatly reducing class length. Following the expansion of the Army during World War II and the impact of the Cold War, the size of Fort Leavenworth classes greatly expanded.

**Criterion 1b, Student Selection- Post World War II**

Attendance at CGSC following the Second World War remained selective until adoption of the ILE program. The War Department kept selection standards high for attendance, although selection quotas were not initially set. The Gerow Board set attendance at 350 officers for the regular course, and the later Eddy Board established an attendance goal of fifty percent of field

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grade officers. Of that percentage, slots were further delineated between the branches of the Army, with sixty-five percent given to combat arms officers (infantry, armor, and artillery branches), twenty percent allocated to the engineer, signal, and intelligence branches, and the remaining fifteen percent to the branches of ordinance, quartermaster, chemical, transportation, and military police. Selection remained a subjective process handled by each branch individually, resulting in varying qualities of students. Those not selected, completed CGSC by a correspondence (or non-resident course), with completion of CGSC considered a Military Education Level 4 (MEL 4) requirement for consideration for promotion to lieutenant colonel. The Army later began using a centralized selection-board process to choose approximately fifty percent of each branch for attendance. While selection was considered a reward for past performance, starting in the mid-1970s, selection was deemed more important to ones’ future than the education received in the course. The 1978 RETO report noted that officers then viewed selection for CGSC attendance, as an indicator for eventual promotion to colonel. Their view was validated by 1970 statistic that roughly fifty percent of majors would eventually make

257 There are some contradictory statements between the Gerow and Eddy Boards reference attendance percentages. The 1949 Army Board of Educational Systems states the Gerow Board recommended a fifty percent attendance rate at CGSC, but the document only gave vague recommendations on percentages across Army schools. War Department Memorandum to the Commandant, “Command and Staff College,” in Report of War Department Military Education Board on Educational System for Officers of the Army (Washington D.C., War Department Organization and Training Department, G3, 1946), 2; War Department, Report of the Department of the Army Board of Educational System for Officers, 15 June 1949 (Fort Monroe: Chief of Army Field Forces, 1953), 48, 78.


259 Tyler, calls these students “poorly selected.” Tyler, The History of Leavenworth, 1937-1951, 46; allocation of CGSC slots in “Report of the Department of the Army Board to Review Army Officer Schools, Volume I, Summary and Recommendations,” 45.


261 Bralley, “ILE: A New System for CGSC Students,” 6; Triggs, “Army to Transform Officer Education System.”

262 Stewart, “Raising a Pragmatic Army,” 240.
the rank of colonel, the same percentage selected for resident CGSC attendance prior to ILE.\textsuperscript{263} In 2001, the ATLD Panel changed the dynamic of CGSC attendance.

The ATLD Panel determined that attendance at CGSC was a discriminator for the fifty percent of officers not selected for resident attendance, as they did not receive the education needed to prepare them for the demands of full spectrum operations.\textsuperscript{264} These findings resulted in 100 percent resident attendance for all field grade officers in the operations career field. This policy went into effect in 2005, with every officer selected for promotion attending ILE instruction at Fort Leavenworth or a distance learning course location.\textsuperscript{265}

Universal ILE attendance now provides every officer the opportunity to receive a resident CGSOC education, something not guaranteed prior to 2004. Provided this opportunity, it is incumbent for the attending officer to make the most of his educational experience. As the adage goes, one can bring a horse to water, but one cannot always make him drink. With any education, it is a team effort between student and teacher. Both play an equal part in the learning experience. The next portion of this section will look at instructor selection and quality, as instructors provide a critical component of any quality education.

\textbf{Criterion 2a, Selection of Instructors- Interwar Years}

During the interwar years, serving as an instructor in the Army was considered a career enhancer, if not a requirement for future advancement. Assignment as an instructor ranked above most other assignments, including service in divisions or other troop assignments. For infantry officers, service as an instructor at Leavenworth ranked third of eleven assignments, only behind


\textsuperscript{264} “The Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study Report to the Army,” OS-12.

\textsuperscript{265} Ibid., OS-13; McKinley, “An Assessment of the Army Officer Education System,” 27.
duty with the General Staff or serving as an instructor at the Army War College.\textsuperscript{266} During the 1920s and 1930s, nearly one-half of all regular army officers served in various school duties across the Army. Generally assigned on a three-year tour, instructors at Leavenworth often returned for a second assignment.\textsuperscript{267} Considered an experience similar to that of the student officer, service as an instructor was a principle way for officers to gain professional experience in an era of limited opportunities and resources.\textsuperscript{268}

A dynamic observed throughout the interwar period was the focus on placing the best officers possible as instructors. When fighting for appropriations for Leavenworth in 1923, then Commandant Brigadier General Hanson Ely stated before Congress that “The officers who are sent there (to Leavenworth) as instructors are among the keenest men in the Army.”\textsuperscript{269} In 1927, duty as a Leavenworth instructor ranked forth, behind duty in a tactical unit, service on the General Staff, and duty as an Army War College instructor.\textsuperscript{270} Illustrative of instructor importance are the statistics of infantry officers in 1929. In that year, one in ten captains or majors served in a branch school, one in twenty served at Leavenworth or the Army War College, and more than half of all captains and majors were teaching ROTC, or Reserve or National Guard soldiers. In one officer’s twenty-year career, he served eight years as an instructor, four years as a student, four years on the Army General Staff, and four years in troop duties. By 1932, the Infantry Branch considered instructor duty at Leavenworth as its second highest personnel

\textsuperscript{266} Peter Schifferle, \textit{America’s School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II}, 91-92.

\textsuperscript{267} Ibid., 21, 87.


\textsuperscript{269} Of thirty-four corps commanders during World War II, fourteen were both graduates and instructors at Leavenworth. Robert Berlin, \textit{US Army World War II Corps Commanders: A Composite Biography} (Fort Leavenworth: CSI Press, 1989), 11; Quote in Schifferle, \textit{America’s School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II}, 18.

\textsuperscript{270} Yarger, “Army Officer Personnel Management,” 466.
The priority of placing quality officers as instructors and the value of that experience was demonstrated in World War II, where fourteen of thirty-four corps commanders served at Fort Leavenworth as an instructor. An assignment at CGSS was a key part of an officer’s interwar professional experience in an era of limited opportunities and resources.

Service as an instructor, held both benefits and challenges for officers. Lieutenant General Troy Middleton, Commander of VIII Corps during World War II, found his service as an instructor agreeable, but busy. To become an expert in an assigned topic, instructors concentrated on one small aspect of the overall course. The same instructor, for example, would lecture on the essential tactical elements involved in attacking a river line, and then lead a map exercise devoted to the subject. This instructor would then supervise the preparation, administration, and grading of a map problem to test the student’s grasp of that subject, using a school solution he helped develop. A positive impact of this type of instruction was that students left the school with the impression of expertise within the faculty as a whole, not just of an individual instructor.

Commandant from 1948-1950, Lieutenant General Manton Eddy, a former instructor and World War II corps commander under General Patton, stated the CGSS faculty “were highly selected” for assignment to Fort Leavenworth as an instructor. According to Eddy, after arriving, instructors “were drilled rigorously in special Leavenworth techniques of imparting

271 Schifferle, America’s School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II, 19.


275 Phillips, The Making of a Professional, 64.
knowledge and evaluating student performance.”276 When serving as a course author, instructor duties included preparation of briefing notes, maps and charts for the lectures and the practice of their presentations before their superior officers for approval. Instructors not only spent long hours teaching, but they also spent many hours refining textbooks, and army doctrinal manuals.277 Instructor selection and the benefits of serving as an instructor were much different following the Second World War.

**Criterion 2b, Selection of Instructors- Post World War II**

The prestige of an assignment as a CGSC instructor never reached the level of importance or benefit to an officer’s career that it had been in the interwar years. Although several future CGSC Commandants and Chiefs of Staff of the Army served as CGSC instructors following the Second World War, many of these officers were nominated by the faculty to remain following their time as CGSC students. This action provided some continuity as well as selectivity of incoming faculty.278 Some faculty, like General William Westmorland, served as an instructor for a single year (1950-1951) and then moved on to another assignment.279

While there were clearly, quality officers who served as CGSC instructors through the post-World War II era, by the 1970s and 1980s, the officer corps had developed an “accumulated

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276 While Eddy references this process, no formal instructor-training plan was discovered during the author’s research. Dr. Jacob Orleans, the first civilian Academic Advisor at Fort Leavenworth also references instructor training prior to instituting a formal plan in 1946, but no details are given. Dr. Birrer referenced a murder board for all academic instruction, a practice ending in the 1957. Ibid., 64; Jacob Orleans and Harold Kehm. “Instructor Training,” The Journal of Higher Education 20, no. 7 (October 1949), 361; Birrer, “USA CGSC 1956-1966: A Fateful Decade,” 6.

277 Peter Schifferle, America’s School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II, 105-106, 87-89.


disdain” for service at Fort Leavenworth, based largely on low promotion rates. In the 1980s, the lack of quality officers in the faculty at Fort Leavenworth was a source of frustration across the College. During a 1983 interview discussing the quality of the CGSC faculty, Deputy Commandant, Brigadier General Crosbie Saint, stated “the quality isn’t here. I have maybe ten people I can give a job to (and expect its completion).” Along with the quality of instructors, there was also a consistent quantity shortage of faculty. Following the first large postwar rotation of instructors in 1947, the School’s faculty pool declined in number and quality, a reoccurring issue throughout the postwar period. From 1947 to 1950, instructor numbers dropped from 151 to 141, while the student population increased from 319 to close to 500. The senior faculty took measures to counter the impact of this large experience turnover, by implementing an instructor-training course in 1946, but this became a band-aid to an open wound of instructor losses. A second significant loss of quality instructors occurred immediately following the 1949 deletion of the ten-week specialized training block. When the requirement to staff the four schools (Administration, Intelligence, Logistics, and Combined Arms) ended, many of the instructors on these four “schools” departed Leavenworth for other assignments.

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280 General Harold Johnson, Lieutenant General John Cushman, and Major General John Hay, among many others, served as CGSC instructors prior to returning as Commandant. Other former instructors went on to four-star rank as well. For a discussion on the relative disdain of officers toward serving at Leavenworth, see Stewart, “Raising a Pragmatic Army,” 253.


282 Ibid., 37-38.


284 The instructor course was an internal course ranging from sixty to ninety hours of instruction over two or three weeks. Orleans and Kehm, 361; Harding, “Observation on Instruction,” 20.

The reoccurring shortage of faculty resulted in blocks of instruction presented to groups of fifty to sixty officers, limiting student interaction and peer learning. Instructor shortages also resulted in faculty presenting classes on topics they were not prepared to teach, further decreasing the value of instruction. Col. Harding’s 1951 statement on the substandard quality of twenty-five percent of CGSC instructors, illustrates the disrepair of instruction in the 1950s. Numerous postwar boards and studies of the College highlighted the obvious need for quality instructors at the College. However, unlike the interwar years, Fort Leavenworth no longer maintained a favored status with the Department of Army for officer assignments.

With the exception of select officers remaining as instructors following their CGSC graduation, the assignment of faculty to Fort Leavenworth since World War II, was based on officer availability for reassignment from across the Army as a whole. In a manner similar to all Army divisional formations, Fort Leavenworth is staffed based on a Department of the Army personnel decisions. Unlike the interwar years, when a Fort Leavenworth assignment was not only sought after but considered a career enhancer, in the post-war era, an assignment to Fort Leavenworth was perceived of questionable benefit to an officer’s career. One of the reasons for this perception was likely the promotion statistics for instructors.

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286 Some instructor workloads increased by “twentyfold” due to a lack of instructors and the small group concept. Of note, the College continued to push CONARC to provide additional faculty, realizing the impact of low faculty numbers on instruction. Ibid., 49, 136.

287 Harding served as an instructor at Fort Leavenworth for four years. Harding, “Observation on Instruction,” 6-7.


289 Officer manning authorizations to serve at Fort Leavenworth as instructors is at the same level as any other TRADOC post. There are no special quotas for officers, nor a functional branch of officer assigned as an instructor (Functional Area 47), similar to that seen at the US Military Academy at West Point. Tyler, The History of Leavenworth, 1937-1951, 46; Interview with the CAC Deputy G1, December 2011.

290 Lieutenant General Cushman did request to stay at Leavenworth following CGSC attendance in 1955, although in his memoir, he alludes to this request as a way to “beg off” a West Point utilization tour. John Cushman, Fort Leavenworth- A Memoir, Volume I, Narrative (Fort Leavenworth: Combined Arms Research Library, 2001), 9; Stewart, “Raising a Pragmatic Army,” 38-40.
In 1981, promotion rates from major to lieutenant colonel for officers serving at Fort Leavenworth, were twelve percent below the Army average. Following the efforts of Commandant Lieutenant General William Richardson to improve instructor quality, promotion rates did improve. In 1984, promotion rates at Fort Leavenworth did, in fact exceed the Army average by 13 percent, however, during an interview that same year, recent graduates stated there was a “stigma attached to staying at CGSC to teach” and that “students would fight [an] assignment” at Fort Leavenworth.291

As illustrated in Section 3, shortages and quality of faculty remained a theme throughout the post-war period until civilian faculty became a substitute for military instructors. Military members now share classrooms with civilian professors, who have increased significantly since the creation of the Combat Studies Institute and the addition of professional historians and other academic professionals.292 Since 2001, civilian faculty numbers slowly grew to their current statistic of over 264, as compared to 107 military faculty. While instructor-to-student ratios were reduced and small group instruction was fully instituted under ILE, teaching institutions remain only as good as the qualifications of its instructional staff and the willingness for students to seek knowledge.293 The inherent risk of hiring large numbers of civilians as faculty (even those with prior military service) is that there is an ever increasing gap between students with recent operational experience and the currency of knowledge and understanding that a retired military officer provides to those students. The next area of comparison looks at course mission and the curriculum that instructors and students were given in the postwar era.

292 Ibid., 259-260.
Criterion 3a, Course Mission and Curriculum- Interwar Years

While changes in course length occurred several times during the interwar period, the mission of the school changed little. After 1923, the CGSS mission was to train mid-grade officers for command and general staff assignments at the division and corps level. The mission was broken down into four components, tactics and techniques of the various branches in order to ensure combined arms coordination, operation of large units up to the Army corps, command and staff functions at the corps level, and duties of the corps area general staff.294

The school developed a curriculum that taught officers the basic principles of operations, and then combined those principles with a rigorous practical application process. Key components of instruction were developing officer competence in handling large formations, developing skills in problem solving, and the development of decision-making skills. Through the interwar period, officers attending CGSS were educated in the employment of large units, divisions, corps and the functions of general staff officers. The use of practical application and war gaming was an essential part of this education.295

The interwar curriculum progressed from the simple to the complex. Whether the course was one or two years in duration, instruction developed using a process of “building blocks.” The school year, beginning in September, initiated with two weeks of general lectures and conferences that provided students a basic overview of tactical topics ranging from the organization of infantry divisions, to the use of field artillery, to the integration of cavalry and other arms on the battlefield. Simple map exercises complemented this instruction, reinforcing basic principles and tactics. As instruction progressed and students gained more knowledge and


confidence, the faculty introduced additional rigor to the problems. Exercises titled “The Corps in Overseas Expedition and Landings on a Hostile Shore,” “Attack and Defense of a River Line,” and “Air Forces in Direct Support of Ground Forces,” were examples of the expanded difficulties of the map problems.\footnote{Winton, 16; Timothy Nenninger, “Creating Officers: The Leavenworth Experience, 1920-1940,” \textit{Military Review} 69, no. 11 (November 1989): 64.} Instruction in the 1920s and 1930s concentrated on tactical and operational subjects, with over seventy percent of instruction dealing with tactics. Instruction centered on texts often written by instructors and published at the school printing plant. Two texts, \textit{The Principles of Strategy} and \textit{Tactical and Strategical (sic) Studies of Corps and Army}, are examples of textbooks written for instruction at Leavenworth.\footnote{The second book went through five updates, beginning in 1925. Mathey, 12-15.} Other topics of instruction included military history, intelligence, law, leadership, psychology and training. Generally, instruction was by lecture, although some students produced papers on original research.\footnote{Strategic topics were not considered a course topic. Nenninger, “Creating Officers: The Leavenworth Experience, 1920-1940,” 64.} The War College, where the best Leavenworth graduates would eventually attend, provided further preparation for duty on the War Department General Staff and higher headquarters.\footnote{Timothy Nenninger, “Leavenworth and Its Critics: The U.S. Army Command and General Staff School, 1920-1940,” 202-203.}

Through the interwar years, the central theme of the course was “tactical principles and decision making.” This instruction consisted of complex tactical problems involving increasingly large combined arms formations.\footnote{By 1938, instruction included what was then theoretical areas, including mechanized warfare.} The entire curriculum emphasized the command process, involving interaction between commanders and general staff officers and tactical decision-making. During this timeframe, the senior faculty at Leavenworth consistently reoriented to the school’s title, which included both the development of future commanders and staff officers. Graduate expectations were that they were fully capable of performing in command or staff
billets, two or three grades above their present rank, a likely scenario in a mobilization based Army structure.\textsuperscript{301} The mission of CGSC and ILE changed noticeably from its interwar roots.

**Criterion 3b, Course Mission and Curriculum- Post World War II**

In comparison to interwar period, the post-World War II CGSC mission and curriculum changed numerous times, expanding to include joint and strategic topics at the expense of tactical instruction. When the school reopened the ten-month course in 1946, CGSC’s mission focused in four areas. The College was to use lessons learned and modern developments to: a) research and study to improve methods of personnel, intelligence, tactical, and logistical procedures; b) develop efficient administrative, intelligence, and logistical support of the fighting forces; c) train the effective development and employment of fighting forces; and d) coordinate employment of Army units with air and naval forces.\textsuperscript{302} The 1949 Eddy Board modified the CGSC mission and recommended returning the curriculum to the core areas of the interwar course. The Board placed preparing officers for “duty as commanders at division, corps, army, and comparable levels in the communications zone” and the preparation of officers for “duty on the general staff” at these echelons as one of its priority areas.\textsuperscript{303} The Board recommendation removed the reference to coordination with air and naval forces. Of note, a 1951 CGSC mission study maintained reference to training officers for a mobilized Army, stating, “the primary task of the C&GSC is to prepare officers to perform duties during mobilization and war.”\textsuperscript{304} This task, a carryover from the 1920 National Defense Act, remained a factor in curriculum planning until the realities of the 1973


\textsuperscript{302} Tasks for the college included preparing officers for duty as commanders and staff at Division and higher levels, review and make recommendations to change doctrine, and to build teamwork. Military History of the US Army Command and General Staff College 1881-1963, 48-50.

\textsuperscript{303} Appendix B to Annex 6, “Mission and Scope of Proposed Regular Course, Command and General Staff College,” Report of the Department of the Army Board of Educational System for Officers, 15 June 1949, 45.

\textsuperscript{304} “Staff Study Mission,” 14.
Arab-Israeli War made change necessary. In 1951, following the Eddy Board, the focus of the instruction returned to the training staff officers and commanders at the division level, with total hours of division instruction increasing from 214 to 413 hours.305

During the mid-1950s and 1960s, the College curriculum was characterized by a determined push toward a collegiate atmosphere. From 1954 to 1956, Major General Davidson emphasized the educational aspects of the curriculum at Fort Leavenworth, not the traditional training focus. His goal was to develop creative military thinkers, needed to keep up with the changes in technology of the time. He was one of the first officers to set the College in motion toward a university view of education, reducing the number of examinations, increasing strategic level topics, and providing an analytical problem-solving type of education.306 Following Davidson, Major General McGarr served as Commandant for four years and continued the drive toward a collegiate view of officer education. He reorganized instruction by introducing two three-hour blocks of instruction each day, and, working with Dr. Birrer, removed oversight of the Director of Instruction over the six instructional departments.307 Although this change could be considered a streamlining of instruction, the change ended the time-tested “murder board” process, where a committee of senior officers reviewed and approved class presentations prior to execution.308 In essence, the deletion of this oversight turned over class content and presentation to the caprice of the department directors, each with their own “parochial” educational agenda.309


306 Prior to his arrival, CGSC provided only ten hours of instruction on US national policy. Masland and Radway, Soldiers and Scholars, 283-287.

307 By 1960, the resident CGSC departments included the Department of Airborne Operations (with aviation and unconventional warfare), the Armored Division, the Infantry Division, Larger Units and Administrative Support, Nuclear Weapons, Staff and Educational Subjects. From “Staff Directory, 1960, Military History of the US Army Command and General Staff College 1881-1963.


309 Cited earlier, Wass De Czege states that Departmental fiefdoms remained into the 1980s at CGCS. Wass De Czege, 66.
The findings of the Eddleman Commission resulted in an increase of strategic instruction in the curriculum and another modification to the CGSC mission. For the first time, the College’s history, the mission now included the task to prepare officers for peacetime duties.\textsuperscript{310} The mission continued to morph over the next decades to include generalists’ tasks, moving away from the College’s once tactical-only focus. Following the 1966 Haines Board, classes on duty at echelons-above-corps and with joint staffs were added to the curriculum.\textsuperscript{311} The initiation of electives further generalized instruction, allowing officers to choose areas of study.\textsuperscript{312} Electives eventually gained forty percent of the curriculum.\textsuperscript{313} Electives also replaced core tactical instruction, which fell to 335 hours in 1968 and just 170 hours in 1974.\textsuperscript{314}

Following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the establishment of TRADOC under General DePuy, tactical instruction increased, but the College continued to move toward a university style curriculum. While General Depuy directed the curriculum to focus fifty percent of its instruction on division operations and another twenty-five percent on brigade and below instruction, the College eliminated examination weeks, started requiring students to declare “majors,” and developed a course catalog as seen in colleges and universities.\textsuperscript{315} Depuy’s view of future war


\textsuperscript{313} This sixty percent, roughly 650 hours, was deemed adequate to prepare officers for “Army-in-the-field” duty. Birrer, “The New CGSC Curriculum,” 22.

\textsuperscript{314} Gabel, “The Leavenworth Staff College: A Historical Overview,” 100; Stewart, “Raising a Pragmatic Army,” 226-227.

resulted in his guidance to refocus instruction away from a mobilization Army, to one prepared to fight immediately as a combined arms team.\textsuperscript{316}

During the 1980s and 1990s, a modest increase in tactical instruction occurred, the last change prior to the introduction of ILE. By 1985, the College mission had become generic, showing the change in focus to developing officer generalists. The mission was to “develop leaders who will train and command units at the tactical and operational level…(and) to develop and assist in the promulgation of combined arms doctrine.”\textsuperscript{317} In 1985, tactical instruction had increased from 170 hours in the mid-1970s, to 212 hours, plus a thirty-six hour end of course exercise.\textsuperscript{318} By 1997, the CGSC curriculum contained 257 hours of tactical training plus the final 112-hour exercise, Prairie Warrior. Included in this instruction were sixty hours of electives. Of note, however, only 144 hours of that instruction were dedicated to corps and division level instruction, with the remaining hours divided between other staff functions and strategic instruction.\textsuperscript{319}

The initiation of ILE was the culmination of fifty-plus years of change following the Second World War. Section-level exercises were conducted throughout the year, a distinct difference from the individual map and terrain exercises of the interwar years. In ILE, group products was developed and briefed to faculty and other students, focused on solving complex


\textsuperscript{318} Within this instruction, seventy-nine hours was dedicated to corps operations, sixty-five hours to division operations, and twenty-four hours to combined arms fundamentals. “CGSC Circular 351-1, Catalog Academic Year 1985-1986” (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1985), 55, 57-58.

issues; no longer did exercises center on the tactics of divisions as seen in the interwar years.\textsuperscript{320} Hiring civilian faculty as ILE instructors overcame the shortage needed to facilitate small group instruction. Contact hours of instruction declined from a 1939 high of 1,073 contact hours to 732 contact hours in 2011, with an average of four hours a day spent in the classroom.\textsuperscript{321} Under the ILE curriculum, tactical instruction averaged 179 hours, not including available elective classes.\textsuperscript{322} Practical exercises make up approximately 100 hours of the ILE curriculum, and a nine-day group practical exercise was added.\textsuperscript{323} With the large increase in civilian faculty, some without prior military experience, the quality of these exercises, no doubt, varies.

In a closer review, the number of contact hours dedicated to “tactical” instruction is misleading. When reviewing the level of tactical training and doctrinal instruction, only a minimal number of hours are committed at the brigade and division level, with the majority of contact hours focused at the joint and combatant command level. In the 2010 \textit{C600: Planning Theme Advance Book}, of sixty hours dedicated to planning, only thirty-four hours were at the brigade level, where many officers would serve during their next 10 years of service. Within this block, Lesson C603, “Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) Application,” there was a four-hour introduction and overview of MDMP, six hours of mission analysis and course of action (COA) development, and three six-hour blocks of practical exercises on COA


\textsuperscript{323} \textit{Ibid.,} 6, 9.
development, analysis, and COA approval and orders process. A review of other course literature failed to identify any other contact hours dedicated tactical instruction below division level. The next level of instruction identified was at the joint task force level.

In the end, ILE combined many of the efforts instituted by the various boards and studies conducted. In reviewing the course content, however, course lessons clearly moved away from tactical instruction toward joint and higher echelon topics. The final comparison criterion, philosophy of instruction and grading methodology, looks at the course mission and curriculum discussed above to show further differences between the interwar and post-World War II periods.

Criterion 4a, Philosophy of Instruction and Grading Methodology- Interwar Years

While refined several times during the interwar period through 1940, instruction generally following a set pattern. To maintain a small student-to-instructor ratio, classes were broken down into ten-student groups, under the instruction of two faculty members. Students attended lectures as a large body, but were evaluated individually during map or terrain exercises. Morning classes took place between 8:30AM and 12:00PM and afternoon classes took place from 1:00PM to 5:00PM. Morning classes varied between one-hour lectures with the group, map exercises, and smaller committee meetings, where students came together under the direction of a faculty members to discuss either lessons learned, cover highlights of past exercises, or to prepare for upcoming problems. Group lectures generally focused on the principles pertinent to upcoming

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324 Command and General Staff College, Intermediate Level Education (ILE), C600: Planning Theme Advance Book, AY 10-02 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 2010), 13-14.

325 Discussions with current (2011-2012) ILE students confirmed a lack of tactical instruction. The one map exercise recalled by a student was a single page overnight requirement to add graphics to a single copied black and white map. Ibid., 11; discussion with ILE students, February 16, 2012.

326 Schifferle, America’s School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II, 68.
tactical problems. Afternoon classes usually focused on problem-solving using either map maneuvers and exercises or tactical rides. If no map, field, or terrain exercise was scheduled, students spent their time in individual study. Many former students reported studying far into the night preparing for the next problem set. Throughout the year, both graded and ungraded problems occurred, with two or three evaluated problems assigned each week.  

To reduce subjectivity in grading student work, grading was conducted by using an approved school solution. These school solutions, were drafted by the course author and approved by his supervisor, were updated by other instructors and from the input provided by problem-solving conferences. After several graded events, students attended small group problem-solving conferences to discuss and amend the school solution documents. By 1936, these conferences had evolved into a less-structured academic event and into a contemporary After Action Review (AAR) format. Instructors encouraged a “free and frank discussion…in order that the salient points,” were highlighted “to facilitate learning.” At the end of the course, map maneuvers reiterated learning points. These maneuvers would involve force-on-force exercises, with students playing either blue or red forces. Some instructors served as umpires, while others served as facilitators to reinforce the “principles to be illustrated.” To ensure the exercise design illustrated the proper principles, school directors conducted the exercise prior to the students.

When Fort Leavenworth reopened following World War I, the School gave traditional grades, A, B, C, and CU, the later indicating unsatisfactory performance. Periodically posted grades allowed students to review their performance, but overall class standings remained

327 An example of Patton’s study habits were study period from 2:30 to 6:00 PM and then again from 7:15 to 11:45 PM. Charles Heller, “World War I and the Interwar Years, 1916-1939,” 52; Schifferle, America’s School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II, 102-104, 107;
328 Schifferle, America’s School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II, 114
329 Ibid., 109.
confidential until graduation. The School designated honor graduates (the top ten percent of the class), distinguished graduates (the next fifteen percent of the class) and graduate (the remaining seventy-five percent).\textsuperscript{330} Competition and the preoccupation with class standing and its negative impact on learning became prevalent in the early 1920s, and in 1925, the school changed grading procedures to reduce academic pressures on the student body. From this point on, posted public grades only showed “S” for satisfactory, “U” for unsatisfactory.\textsuperscript{331} The faculty continued to compile percentage grades and maintained a class standing, which was published at graduation by the designation of honor and distinguished graduate. In 1927, however, the designation of honor and distinguished graduate was eliminated, based on a perceived need to eliminate the “unhealthy” concern of students over class standing throughout the year. Only the faculty knew the student rankings, submitting a ranking list to the War Department following graduation.\textsuperscript{332}

Use of the applicatory method reigned at Leavenworth, with students serving as commanders and staff. Through map maneuvers and staff exercises, student led attacks, pursued a retreating enemy, conducted a reconnaissance, formed a counterattack or withdrawal from action, and moved troops by rail and motor vehicle. The school began the year with exercises using reinforced brigade-size units and concluded the year with exercises at the corps level. At each level, instructors started the block of instruction by demonstrating the preparation and issuance of combat orders, necessary troop leading procedures, and the functioning requirements of commanders and staff officers. As a practical exercise, the class then divided, with students acting as commanders or staff and the instructors as the enemy. Other faculty provided advice and


corrections to allow the students to learn by their mistakes.333 Grading of exercises was by the use of a “school solution” for the various assigned problems.

While sometimes discussed as a negative aspect of the school that halted individual thought, the school solution provided an objective set of principles for grading each student’s work.334 In 1926, the school provided written guidance to instructors on using the school solution, stating, “in marking problems, the school solution should not be followed rigidly. Where the student shows a logical, reasonable, sensible line of reasoning, he should received full credit.”335 This guidance continued to evolve through the late 1930s classes, with guidance to give “proper value to a workable solution although it may differ from the solution issued by the school.” The faculty was told, “great care must be exercised to avoid injuring the initiative of officers.”336 While difficult to ascertain if this guidance was followed by all instructors, Lieutenant General Troy Middleton, the youngest colonel to serve in the AEF, and a Leavenworth graduate and four-year instructor stated, “I gave some students a better grade when they made a wrong decision but wrote better reasons for the decision and for the execution of it.”337 The focus on a reasonable solution using basic principles and procedures, rather than an adherence to a single solution,


334 One of several vocal critics of the “school solution” and Leavenworth schools in the interwar years is Charles Kirkpatrick, who stated the school solution “discouraged innovation and creative tactical and operational thinking, instead rewarding conformity and established doctrine.” Charles Kirkpatrick, “Filling the Gaps: Reevaluating Officer Professional Education in the Inter-War Army, 1920-1940” cited in Nenninger, “Leavenworth and Its Critics: The U.S. Army Command and General Staff School, 1920-1940,” 211; See also van Creveld, The Training of Officers, 59-61.


337 Price, Troy H. Middleton, A Biography, 91.
appeared a constant theme through the interwar period. The curriculum and evaluation of students following World War II was significantly different from the prewar CGSS.

**Criterion 4b, Philosophy of Instruction and Grading Methodology- Post World War II**

The philosophy of instruction and grading methodologies used following the Second World War were modified several times, and by 2011, were vastly different from the interwar years. The foremost instructional change was the decision to conduct small group instruction. In 1946, lecture formats of 300-plus students-to-one instructor remained the standard. The 1951 Eddy Board transitioned CGSC into a smaller group instruction, with the expectation that student learning and discussion would increase. However, over the next thirty-five years, classes averaged forty-five to sixty-four students-to-one instructor, allowing few students time to interact during a fifty-minute class. It was not until the arrival of Brigadier General Franks in 1985, that true small group classes became the norm, increasing student interaction and learning. While small group instruction aided in class discussion, the change also resulted in a diluted level of instruction, as instructor shortages required faculty to teach blocks of instruction they were not familiar with nor had time to prepare. Unlike the interwar years, instructors did not have time to become experts on a topic prior to its presentation. Following the standard set by Franks, ILE

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339 In the 1977-1978 CGSC history, the college educational philosophy included the statement “Students are expected to be participants in a learning experience in every class rather than be just an audience for the instructor.” It when on to state that when ever possible “instruction is to be conducted in small groups.” True small groups were still not in place at this point in the curriculum. A Military History of the US Army Command and General Staff College 1977-1978 (Fort Leavenworth: Command and General Staff College, 1978), II-7.


341 Stewart, “Raising a Pragmatic Army,” 49.
instruction centers on sections averaging one instructor to sixteen to eighteen students, using an integrated teaching team philosophy.

The ILE program decision to establish integrated interdisciplinary teaching teams had a positive impact on the quality of instruction. These integrated teams eliminated much of the departmental parochialism of the past decades, returning the focus to the education of students.342 The hiring of civilian faculty since 2001 expanded the number of instructors to staff dedicated teaching teams and the experience of the students, many with multiple combat deployments, further increases the value of a seminar style of instruction. These students bring a wealth of knowledge to the classroom and student discussion.343

Along with the initiative of small group instruction was the overall move by several CGSC commandants toward a collegiate style of instruction, centered on the education of officers rather than the training of officers as seen in the interwar years. Beginning in 1954 with Major General Davidson’s drive to educate officers to become creative military thinkers, the College reduced the number of examinations and worked to create an analytical, problem-solving educational format.344 Major General McGarr expanded Davidson’s ideas, broadening the CGSC curriculum to develop military problem-solvers.345 The ending of major examinations and the ranking of students, which dated to first days of the Fort Leavenworth, further transitioned the College to a university setting.


344 Masland and Radway, Soldiers and Scholars, 283-287.

Under Major General Cushman, CGSC deleted examination weeks following core
instruction, changing instruction and the way the students looked at that instruction. Cushman
replaced exam weeks with in-class grading of presentations, classroom contribution, written
work. In an effort to change an inflated grading system, he also restricted the number of “A’s”
that could be awarded to twenty percent of each class. Believing that this would increase
student effort and drive to achieve an “A,” it in fact changed the dynamic of the class, where
many students did the minimum to pass. It was following this change that the “Leavenworth B”
began to be equated to achieving the school solution during the interwar years. The ranking of
students ended following the full implementation of small group instruction. At that point, it was
determined that objective evaluation across the school was no longer possible. The tension
between educating and training officers is the final significant philosophical difference between
the interwar era and post-World War II instruction highlighted in this section.

Following the initiatives of Major General Cushman during his service as Commandant
(1973-1976), Fort Leavenworth was a changed institution, training generalists and not the tactical
specialists of the interwar years. Students no longer experienced individually-graded map and
terrain exercises, but participated in graded section-level exercises as member of joint,
interagency, or multi-national planning staffs. These exercises and the broad ILE curriculum
progress students through a process that educate them as officer generalists. The electives of the

346 Birrer, “Dr. Ivan J. Birrer: Service at the Command and General Staff College, Fort
348 Stewart highlights that “evaluation standards collapsed,” in 1974, four students failed to
graduate CGSC. In the next five years, following Cushman’s changes, regular course officers failed.
Stewart attributes this to the subjective nature of evaluations. Doughty, “The Command and General Staff
College in Transition, 1946-1976,” 86; Birrer, “Dr. Ivan J. Birrer: Service at the Command and General
Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 20 January 1948 to 30 June 1978,” 150-151; Stewart, “Raising a
Pragmatic Army,” 270-273, 310.
349 The proposal to end class ranking and modify grading standards was discussed in several of the
boards in the preceding decades, specifically the Eddleman and Hanes boards. Stewart, “Raising a
Pragmatic Army,” 298-299.
Advanced Operational Career field provide various choices for officer to “specialize” in tactics, the core curriculum does not imbue this singularly as seen in the interwar curriculum. The dissonance between educating an officer on the broad requirements of being successful as a senior leader dilutes the training many officers need to be successful upon return to a tactical Army at war. While the interwar CGSC curriculum produced tactical experts ready to serve in a mobilized army, today’s graduate can be characterized as a generalist who studied the military profession in greater breadth than his 1930s counterpart. ILE’s first graduates will enter general officer ranks in the ensuing years, and history will determine the success of the ILE philosophy of instruction.

**Recommendations**

This monograph provides a review and comparison of the interwar and post-World War II curriculum of the staff college at Fort Leavenworth. Using a historical narrative of the two eras and considering the criteria selected, this section provides recommendations to modify the current ILE program. These recommendations center on three areas, student selection, faculty selection, and tactical instruction, to improve both the value of the education provided by CGSOC to majors returning to the force and the reputation of the College as a valuable experience.

Officers attending the interwar Command and General Staff School generally believed that their attendance would be rewarding both professionally and personally based on the reputation of the school and the education it provided. During those years, the course was

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350 Litney’s dissertation provides an excellent discussion of this tension, as cited in the previous section. Doughty in his special study project highlights a similar tension during the Vietnam era. See Litney, “Challenges and Changes,” 1-5; Doughty, “The Command and General Staff College in Transition, 1946-1976.” 3, 20; Masland and Radway, Soldiers and Scholars, 283-287.

351 Gabel, “The Leavenworth Staff College: A Historical Overview,” 100.

352 As addressed in “Scope and Repudiation,” recommendations found in this section center on data available to the author. No comparison of levels of learning and objectives of instruction are addressed due to research limitations.
considered substantive, well run, and of value to the service as a whole.\footnote{Nenninger, “Leavenworth and Its Critics: The U.S. Army Command and General Staff School, 1920-1940,” 203.} Conversely, officers attending the postwar CGSC no longer considered attendance as a seminal experience, but a mark of professional achievement, where selection was more important to one’s career than the education received.\footnote{Stewart, “Raising a Pragmatic Army,” 306-310.} Many officers chose to emphasize the social aspects of the College, where “the best year of your life” ended with officers never desiring to return.\footnote{Ibid., 302-303.} The following recommendations offer areas to improve the College and its image as a resource for the Army.

**Recommendation 1, Student Selection**

The decision to increase CGSOC attendance to 100 percent of active duty mid-grade Army officers changed the dynamic of a student body that was already experiencing the College’s move to a university setting. While the ATLDP Panel stated that the change was to ensure all officers were given a necessary education to serve over the next ten years, it was also a decision that took place during an era where officers were departing the Army in large numbers, due to dissatisfaction with the military. Interestingly, their was not move to improve the non-resident course, to ensure those not selected were properly educated; instead, the resident course was expanded at the expense of lowering the level of education to the least qualified student.

In 1966, during the era of fifty percent officer attendance, the College was patronized by the Haines Board, which found instruction being conducted to the “lowest common denominator (the least qualified student).”\footnote{This was a fundamental argument for the initiation of the elective program. “Report of the Department of the Army Board to Review Army Officer Schools, Volume I, Summary and Recommendations,” 39.} When considering that comment prior to 100 percent attendance, it is hard to determine what the “lowest common denominator” is when the College is tasked to
educate both the *top* and *bottom* levels of Army mid-grade officers. A historical example is illustrative of the impact of 100 percent selection for attendance, without screening criteria. In 1902, officers were selected to attend GSSC and fill seat quotas without regard to previous performance or potential. During that class’s mid-year examinations, one third of the class failed the tests. Strict selection guidance was enforced the following year and only five officers failed to pass the same exams.\(^{357}\) Today, there are no criteria for ILE attendance, yet few students fail to graduate. Although not a clear metric, this is telling statistic when considering what rigor is involved in the current ILE curriculum.

The ATLDP decision that all mid-grade officers need a “quality resident ILE” due to the demands of full spectrum operations is questionable for the enduring quality of the Army. The decision made was to improve every officer’s education, but the result now is a lesser education for every officer.\(^{358}\) The reinstitution of student selection for CGSOC attendance by the Department of the Army, using values of fifty, or even sixty-five percent of a given year-group, would provide the College with a student body that is proven by performance. By raising the quality of student, the level of instruction could be raised in a corresponding manner. The metric of instruction to the “lowest common denominator” would be a top fifty or sixty-five percent of officers. As demonstrated in other military school situations, a competitive environment is conducive to learning and a culture that emphasizes success.\(^{359}\) Selection criteria would return the status of attendance as a mark of success, as well as, provide higher quality students.

\(^{357}\) Following the Spanish-American War, the 1902 class was filled without following later selection criteria from officers not serving overseas (due to Philippine Insurrection manning requirements). The class had 101 students. Nenninger, “Fort Leavenworth Schools: Postgraduate Military Education and Professionalization in the U.S. Army, 1880-1920,” 146-147, 183.


\(^{359}\) The 1958 Williams’ Board made a finding that "mass production" would reduce standards in instruction, when investigating the possibility of increasing the productivity of Ranger School. This same analogy is pertinent to discussing 100 percent attendance at ILE. Bresser, “Sustainability of Universal ILE,” 32; Report of the Department of the Army Officer Education and Training Review Board (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1958), 22.
The findings of a recent officer professional education study stated that instructors are one of the four necessary attributes for an institution to provide “a world class” military education. During the interwar years, the Army went to great lengths to maintain quality instructors for Fort Leavenworth. Following the Second World War, the emphasis on bringing quality instructors to the College was never an established priority. Since 2001, the faculty of CGSOC increased to support small group instruction and a larger student population. By 2011, the instructor mix was seventy percent civilian and thirty percent military. While no civilian instructor is a contractor (all are hired under Title 10) and most have recent prior military service, their currency in educating younger field-grade officers is considered by some, short-lived. Since the beginning of the War on Terror, officer shortages resulted in a shortage of TRADOC and Fort Leavenworth military instructors. In May 2011, General Martin Dempsey, then Chief of Staff of the Army, stated that he planned to reverse this trend and increase the number of military personnel serving in Army instructor positions. The impact of this statement is still pending at

360 Per discussions with a member of the Office of the Dean of Academics, there is currently and effort to compile career and educational data on CGSOC instructors, but that data was not available to the author for inclusion in this monograph. The recommendations in this section are based on this limitation in information available.

361 World-class students, curricula, and facilities where the other three requirements identified by the authors. Charles Wilhelm, et al., US Marine Corps Officer Professional Military Education 2006 Study and Findings (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University, 2006), i.

362 A 2010 study by the House Armed Services Committee determined that after two to four years, military retirees no longer fit the appropriate military faculty substitute profile that CGSC attempted to fill by its hiring of retirees to fill instructor positions. This same study found that some retired officers had not been selected for resident CGSOC attendance, the course they were now instructing, nor had then been promoted with their peers, giving the impression to the students that that their instructors had not “made the grade” while they were on active duty. US House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations, Another Crossroads? Professional Military Education Two Decades After the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel (Washington: Committee Print 111-4, April 2010), 128; Command and General Staff College, Commander’s Orientation Brief, “CGSS Faculty,” November 30, 2011, Slide 16.

Fort Leavenworth. Currently, the quantity of CGSOC instructors is not at issue. However, the quality of the instruction provided by the current faculty will be determined in ensuing years by the quality of our Army graduate.

To increase the desire of mid-grade officers to serve as CGSC instructors, a change in the perception of instructor duty and its benefits must be implemented. The low promotion rates of instructors in the 1980s, as well as the perception that CGSC was not of importance to the Army, continues in the attitudes of many Army officers.\footnote{364} One recommendation is to characterize service as an instructor at CGSC as a broadening assignment or as a secondary key developmental (KD) position following a currently recognized KD position.\footnote{365} This action, if captured in Army policy, would increase interest in officers to serve as an instructor at Fort Leavenworth. Another consideration is adding duty at the College as an instructor team chief positions as a former battalion commander billet. While former commanders are in high demand across the Army, as the Army draws down, an assignment for former commanders who are either War College graduates or who awaiting selection would immediately add to the quality and currency of the instructor pool and likely the quality of instruction presented.\footnote{366}

Only by improving the overall perception and benefits of being a CGSC instructor, will high quality officers request to serve at Fort Leavenworth following a KD position in the field force. In a study conducted by General Dempsey’s transition team, one officer quoted the need to “restore the luster to the institutional Army.”\footnote{367} Clearly, the luster of instructor duty needs to be

\footnote{364} Stewart, “Raising a Pragmatic Army,” 258, 276.

\footnote{365} A broadening assignment is one that exposes officers to experiences outside their normal career path as identified in DA Pam 600-3. A key developmental position is one that is identified in DA Pam 600-3 as fundamental to the development of an officer, or deemed critical by the senior Army leadership to provide experience across the Army’s strategic mission. Department of the Army, “Department of the Army Pamphlet 600–3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management” (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2010), 14.


\footnote{367} Bacon, “New Army Chief of Staff Eyes Big Changes”
reestablished. The final recommendation is to increase instruction in tactical areas, to ensure officers returning to battalions and brigades in combat are prepared.

**Recommendation 3, Increase Tactical Education**

In the years following the Second World War, the senior leaders of the CGSC took deliberate steps to modify the CGSOC curriculum to encompass a broad range of subjects. This change included changing the education methodology into one that resembled a university. The implementation of electives in the 1960s was to provide a broader education for officers, allowing officers to select topics in areas of interest. Since that time, many tactics and doctrine blocks of instruction became elective in nature.\(^{368}\) This reduction in core hours of tactical instruction changed the level of tactical education received by the graduates of Fort Leavenworth from that received during the interwar years.

The loss of tactical expertise, as a focus of instruction, became apparent to commanders in the field as well. In 1995, General Donn Starry, who followed General DePuy as the second TRADOC Commander, stated that from the tactical commander perspective “Leavenworth had become an orientation course for majors, with emphasis on humanities, political and social sciences.”\(^{369}\) Changes in ILE addressed part of this tactical instruction shortfall, with group exercises. During the academic years between 2010 and 2012, brigade level instruction increased to seventy-eight contact hours, a significant increase over the pre-ILE curriculum. While this increase clearly provides an improvement in the tactical education of students, very few of those hours were regimented instruction. Of the seventy-eight hours, fewer than twelve hours were

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\(^{368}\) The Electives Program Course guide for 2009-2010, offered twenty-two electives under the Center for Army Tactics (CTAC). Other departments also offered electives that included tactical instruction. Department of the Army, “Electives Program Course Guide Fort AY 2009-01” (Fort Leavenworth: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2009), 2.

instructor lead blocks, with the remaining hours tied to group exercises and group deliverable products in the form of PowerPoint presentations.370

While the dynamics of group work allow for a level of learning not experienced in lecture format, it is very different from the interwar curriculum of individual map and terrain exercises, where every student was tested and retested on their understanding of tactics and doctrine with a variety of tactical scenarios. Considering the ongoing war and the need for officers prepared to serve as operations officers at the battalion, brigade, and division level, additional tactical instruction, including exercises that develop individual knowledge, would provide graduates with a point of departure for their duties in their next assignment.371

By definition, ILE’s “Core Curriculum” is a building block for the intermediate level education process. Core instruction should establish a baseline of education to normalize officers understanding and basic skills at the battalion, brigade, and division levels; much as Colonel Morrison’s tactical building block approach developed future wartime leaders. Unfortunately, the current ILE Core Curriculum focus is on joint processes at the operational level, with little tactical education. To better prepare officers returning to tactical headquarters in combat, portions of Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Capabilities instruction, should be replaced with instruction on doctrine and tactics. In the 1920s, a block of instruction on Military Government was included in the General Staff School curriculum as part of the overall


371 Fortunately there are large numbers of large numbers of officers attending ILE with recent tactical combat experience, providing peer-to-peer learning. This operational experience can only enhance classroom learning. Hoffman, “Multiple Deployment Turn Command School Students into Experts.”
While this type of instruction no doubt paid dividends following the Second World War during occupation, it did not replace tactical instruction, but complimented that instruction. In considering the recent replacement of joint doctrine and planning in lieu of Army tactical instruction, this monograph recommends a return to a balance of tactical instruction for mid-grade officers who will return to an Army in the midst of combat operations. Joint and interagency topics are important for graduates to understand, but should not become the focus of instruction. These topics could serve as introductory lessons and tied to an overall exercise to familiarization officers of these dynamics in their future assignments.

While CGSOC was once considered central to an officer’s education, that mantra is no longer heard from today’s ILE graduate. The truism stated by numerous interwar officers that Leavenworth graduates speak a common language and use common staff procedures and doctrine is no longer heard in the field. Tactical expertise at the division level is no longer a prerogative of the school once known for tactical excellence. Telling, is the lack of former students from the 1980s and later referencing CGSC as a seminal event in their military education. Instead, references are made to a great year off, or a wasted year. To better serve the needs of the Army, a refocus on tactical instruction on the basics of doctrine at the division and below level, needs to be added to core instruction to retain relevance in the curriculum at Fort Leavenworth and relevance to the College to the Army as a whole.

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373 Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, 30; Schifferle, America’s School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II, 11.

Appendix 1- Interwar Instructional Methods

Between 1920 and 1940, the Command and General Staff School used five basic means of instruction: lectures, map exercises, map maneuvers, map problems, and conferences.

**Lectures:** Consisted of about 10% of total instruction time.

**Map Exercises:** Were illustrative problems; drills neither graded nor turned in for faculty critique, which required students to produce a brief oral or written solution to a tactical problem.

**Map Maneuvers:** Were two sided, tactical problems in which a number of students, often a large portion of the class, assumed the roles of commanders and staff officers of opposing forces and played out a competitive scenario control by faculty umpires.

**Map Problems:** Were considered the most memorable part of the course where the problems were essentially “written tests solved indoors.” These were timed events and each grade rested on the students own effort. A school solution was provided after grading to give students a means of comparison. This took up 70 percent of the total instruction time. In 1938-1939, the class had forty-nine map exercises, eight map maneuvers, thirty-eight map problems, and fifty other practical exercise such as terrain rides, staff rides, and command post exercises. The fifth and final means of instruction were

**Conferences or Group Discussions:** The faculty used these after map problems as means of reviewing and reinforcing the lessons to be learned from the approved solution. Conferences were usually conducted in a Socratic, question and answer format, consisting of 20% of instruction time.

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Appendix 2- Significant Boards Affecting CGSC Instruction


Haines Board (1965): Department of the Army review of officer education under the direction of Lieutenant General Ralph E. Haines, Jr. The review convened in July 1965 and completed its work six months later.


RETO (1977-1978): Review of Education and Training of Officers. Department of the Army study conducted while Major General Cushman was Commandant.


ATLDP (2001): Army Training and Leader Development Panel; instituted the ILE curriculum and 100 percent ILE attendance.

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