Defining Army Capabilities to Meet Building Partnership Capacity Requirements

The U.S. Army has an opportunity to define itself for the future in terms of force structure and designated mission set to meet the demands imposed upon it by national leaders. As the nation looks toward the next quarter century, the national leaders responsible for the various national security, defense, and military strategies have articulated in these strategies with increasing fervor the future requirements to build partner nation capacity through advising and assisting. Further, that these endeavors should be smaller footprint excursions utilizing subject matter experts. An effort on the part of the Army to modify its force structure to provide for organizations that specialize in building partnership capacity activities is legally justified by the statute in Title 10 USC to support the national policies and implement the national objectives. The Army has a myriad of doctrine that painstakingly identifies the “ways” to conduct building partnership capacity activities. The proficiency requirements placed upon BCTs are vast when taking into consideration the spectrum of conflict. A dedicated force structure geared toward the smaller footprint advise and assist capacity building efforts would better allow unit commanders to more effectively focus on the training proficiency of their organizations.

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Abstract

DEFINING ARMY CAPABILITIES TO MEET BUILDING PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY REQUIREMENTS by COLONEL James E. Barren, United States Army, 50 pages.

The U.S. Army has an opportunity to define itself for the future in terms of force structure and designated mission set to meet the demands imposed upon it by national leaders. As the nation looks toward the next quarter century, the national leaders responsible for the various national security, defense, and military strategies have articulated in these strategies with increasing fervor the future requirements to build partner nation capacity through advising and assisting. Further, that these endeavors should be smaller footprint excursions utilizing subject matter experts. At between 3,500 and 5,000 soldiers, a BCT is far from a small footprint approach. An effort on the part of the Army to modify its force structure to provide for organizations that specialize in building partnership capacity activities is legally justified by the statute in Title 10 USC to support the national policies and implement the national objectives. A modification in force structure based on the national strategies would do exactly what this statute says. The Army has a myriad of doctrine that painstakingly identifies the “ways” to conduct building partnership capacity activities. The proficiency requirements placed upon BCTs are vast when taking into consideration the spectrum of conflict. Designed for high-end combat operations, BCTs must train to proficient readiness for offensive, defensive, and stability operations against both conventional and hybrid threats. This is a costly and challenging endeavor for even the best organizations. A dedicated force structure geared toward the smaller footprint advise and assist capacity building efforts would better allow unit commanders to more effectively focus on the training proficiency of their organizations. The creation of a standing Army capability to accomplish Building Partnership Capacity requirements is legally justified based upon the national strategies and Title 10 statute and has existing doctrine to guide the organization. The opportunity exists for the Army to meet the national requirements with forces that are moderately proficient in many types of operations or with forces highly proficient in operations that are more specific.
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Introduction

The United States must improve its capability to strengthen the security of states at risk of conflict and violence. We will undertake long-term, sustained efforts to strengthen the capacity of security forces to guarantee internal security, defend against external threats, and promote regional security and respect for human rights and the rule of law. We will also continue to strengthen the administrative and oversight capability of civilian security sector institutions, and the effectiveness of criminal justice.

National Security Strategy, 2010

As highlighted above, our nation’s strategic leaders mandate that it is incumbent that the United States strengthens its capabilities toward building security capacity in regional partners. Emerging challenges in a complex global environment make these efforts more important than ever before in our nation’s history. The rise of new powers, the growing influence of non-state actors, the spread of weapons of mass destruction and other destructive technologies, and a series of enduring and emerging socioeconomic trends will continue to challenge U.S. interests and international order. As the nation’s land operating force, the main effort to accomplish this requirement falls squarely on the shoulders of the United States Army. The national policy set forth in our nation’s key strategic documents demand that the Army take a hard look at its role within the context of Building Partnership Capacity as it defines its course for the future.

In order to remain relevant in an era of budgetary constraints the United States Army is at a crossroads as it both shapes future force structure and focuses the proficiencies of its force for the future. This monograph will argue that the Army must take advantage of this current period of decreasing resources and transition, to modify its existing force structure to establish a permanent capability that provides the “means” toward achieving partner capacity building. Thus defining an inherent capability for

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national policy-makers to understand and factor in when determining national objectives. It must clearly define its inherent capabilities within the realm of Building Partnership Capacity that are commensurate with the objectives articulated in the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review, and other strategic documents.

Traditionally, the effort to build partner nation security capacity by training and advising host nation forces or foreign security forces has been seen as within the realm of the U.S. Army Special Forces. With the employment of conventional army units in nation capacity building roles in Iraq and Afghanistan during the past ten years, this paradigm is obviously in flux. It is no longer strictly a mission for U.S. Army Special Forces. This current example coupled with the policies set forth in national strategic documents and a declining budget require much analysis and thought as the Army charts its course for the next decade. Thus, the Army must thoroughly evaluate and clearly define the capabilities that both the General Purpose Force (GPF) and the Special Operations Force (SOF) currently possess in terms of force structure, capabilities, and level of proficiency in order to remain relevant and viable for future endeavors pursuant to the objectives set forth by its national leaders. Finally, it must clearly articulate these capabilities to national leaders to set expectation management and inform the requirements derived from national policy and objectives.

As mentioned above, the U.S. Army has been the primary force provider in counterinsurgency and nation-building efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan for over ten years. The resource challenges these commitments posed to the Army represent one extreme of future requirements for its building partnership capacity capability. Considering the requirements identified in national strategic documents, the near future presents demands for the development and sustainment of lower level but long-term capacity


Future building partnership capacity requirements supporting Combatant Commander endeavors will be smaller footprints of Army organizations. These national strategy driven requirements, though not significantly large when compared to current forces engaged in similar efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, will spread partnership activities across multiple nations and unstable states. Thus, it is critical to think through the inherent qualities Army forces will require to conduct these long-term, smaller manpower intensive capacity building efforts and to translate those qualities into force-planning and force structure measures. As the Army completes its drawdown in Iraq and gradual downsizing of U.S. commitment in Afghanistan coupled with a decreasing Department of Defense budget, it is imperative that the Army clearly define its current and future capabilities within the context of Building Partnership Capacity or run the risk of losing relevancy with the senior leaders of our nation.

The Army as an institution has taken notice of the Building Partnership Capacity theme as articulated in U.S. national strategic documents. The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms define doctrine as “fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives.” The Army’s newest doctrinal manual, Army Doctrine Publication: 3-0: Unified Land Operations, published in October 2011 defines building partner capacity as “the outcome of comprehensive inter-organizational activities, programs, and engagements that enhance the ability of partners for security, governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions”. In the past five years, the Army published a great deal of new and revised doctrine that directly addresses the “ways” for achieving the “ends” or effect of Building Partnership Capacity. This doctrine is not limited to but includes the following:

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6 Ibid., 106.  
7 Ibid., 107.  
1. Field Manual 3-05.137, Army Special Operations Forces Foreign Internal Defense

2. Field Manual 3-07: Stability Operations

3. Field Manual 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance

4. Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency

5. Field Manual 3-30, Army Support to Security Cooperation (currently in draft form)

These manuals and others support the notion that the Army is placing emphasis on meeting the requirements levied in the national strategies. However, this emphasis is not limited to new and revised doctrine. Much writing in Army and government academia, professional journals, and speeches by senior Army and Department of Defense officials address the importance of the Building Partnership Capacity capability requirement. This monograph will draw heavily upon this vast body of literature and speeches. Additionally, Army concept publications describing the broad capabilities the Army will require in future years address activities that achieve Building Partnership Capacity. The Army Capstone Concept, Operational Adaptability: Operating Under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict published on 21 December 2009 poses the question “How will Army forces engage in security force assistance and support state building efforts as well as persuade and influence relevant populations in pursuit of national policy goals?” This question is at the crux of what this monograph hopes to address.

The requirement for an enduring Building Partnership Capacity capability is at the forefront of the challenges the Army faces as its major commitment in Iraq concludes, the drawdown of forces in Afghanistan begins, and the constraints imposed by significant decrease in budgetary resources becomes a factor for the near future. As the Army balances changes to its current force based on the impacts of the challenges noted above with the development of its future force, an opportunity exists for the Army to

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11 Ibid., 16.
modify its force structure to meet the demands of future Building Partnership Capacity requirements. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the conventional Army met these demands by forming ad-hoc organizations like Military Training Teams (MTT) drawn from soldiers across the Army to train and advise partner security forces. Additionally, it took existing Brigade Combat Teams and re-designated them as Advise and Assist Brigades without any change in Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE). Thus as former Defense Secretary Gates stated in a speech in February 2010, “advising and mentoring indigenous security forces is moving from the periphery of institutional priorities – where it was considered the province of special forces – to a key mission for the armed forces as a whole.” If these types of activities are as key a mission as former Secretary Gates articulates, why wouldn’t the Army dedicate conventional force structure to specialize in this area? An effort to do so would thus provide a specific capability geared toward supporting the demands placed upon the combatant commanders.

The requirement exists for the Army to establish a standing capability with the mission of building security capacity in partner nations. Regardless of decreasing budgetary challenges that demand reduction in personnel end strength, the potential for establishing this permanent capability exists within the current Army active component force structure. To best synchronize with national policy, the employment of this standing capability should nest with Combatant Commander’s Theater Engagement Strategies. The lack of assigned forces limits the Combatant Commander’s ability to conduct security cooperation events. The Army, as the force provider to the Combatant Commander, must organize itself with the appropriate capability that best meets the demands of the headquarters that employs its forces. In

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fact, the Army has begun work on identifying “Regionally Aligned Brigades” out of the Contingency Expeditionary Force (CEF) pool that would respond to Combatant Commanders for training exercises, Security Sector Assistance, and Theater Security Cooperation events around the globe based on mission demand.\textsuperscript{16} This is a good first step. However, the opportunity exists to take this concept of regionally aligned brigades a few steps further in terms of force structure modification and mission adjustment. This monograph will discuss potential modifications to future Army Division force structure and mission set allowing for better alignment with a Combatant Command and its requirements. The capabilities within these proposed force structure modifications will complement the requirements identified in national strategic documents. Further, they will include a specific capability in the area of security force assistance that directly addresses the demand of building partnership capacity. Finally, these proposed modifications will result in a decrease of required personnel within the Army Division structure.

The U.S. Army has an opportunity to define itself for the future in terms of force structure and designated mission set to meet the demands imposed upon it by national leaders. The primary focus of this research is to support the argument that the consistent theme of Building Partnership Capacity throughout all of the national security related documents of the United States demands that the Army provide a standing capability focused on security force assistance type missions. The first section of this monograph will review law and U.S. national security documents that define “the ends” for which the Army must possess capability. This includes a review of Title 10 United States Code for both the Army and for Special Operations Forces (although Army Special Forces are not the focus of this paper it is important to include their requirements and capabilities for comparison purposes). Additionally, the first section will examine Building Partnership Capacity requirements as stated in the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review, and

Combatant Commander testimony to Congress. The second section examines “the ways” the Army defines achieving Building Partnership Capacity with a review of Department of Defense Directives and Instructions (DODD and DODI) as well as Joint and Army doctrine. Much emphasis will be devoted to Army doctrine on Counterinsurgency, Security Force Assistance, Stability Operations, and Unified Land Operations. This emphasis will further illustrate the point that the Army has spent a great deal of intellectual energy in defining the “how to” or “the ways” but has glossed over the most effective “means” to build partnership capacity. The final section of the monograph will offer a bridge to the “ways” and “ends” discussion of Building Partnership Capacity by offering a potential “means” in terms of potential force structure modifications that may better optimize how the Army accomplishes its requirements without having to revert to ad-hoc force structure solutions. It will propose a standing Army capability to accomplish Building Partnership Capacity requirements within the current Army Division force structure that includes discussion of the four Brigade Combat Teams subordinate to an Army Division Headquarters. Additionally, this section will discuss alignment of Divisions with Combatant Commands and the focused mission set for each of the four Brigade Combat Teams.

**Legal and Strategic Requirements - "Defining the Ends"**

The Congress shall have Power … To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years …

Article 1, Section 8, United States Constitution

This statement in the United States Constitution provides the legal underpinnings leading to the establishment and maintaining of the United States Army beginning over two hundred years ago and continuing to the present. As all service-members swear an oath to the Constitution upon entry into the service of the United States, it is important to start here when defining Army requirements. Based on its Constitutional responsibility to raise and support an Army, Congress establishes and revises the statutory

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obligations in Title X of the United States Code that govern the roles and responsibilities of the
Department of the Army. Thus, the federal law found in Title X of the United States Code is the legal
basis from which Army capabilities are determined. Can the Army legally modify its force structure to
support the establishment of a Building Partnership Capacity capability? With dramatic defense budget
cuts on the horizon, Secretary of Defense Panetta has recently written that the “country is at a strategic
turning point after a decade of war and, therefore, we are shaping a Joint Force for the future that will be
smaller and leaner, but will be agile, flexible, ready, and technologically advanced.” The “crossroads”
articulated by Secretary Panetta provides the Army the perfect opportunity to explore the ramifications of
answering the question above. The following chapter will argue that the Army is not just within its legal
authority to modify its force structure toward a standing and enduring Building Partnership Capacity
capability. More importantly, it will argue that the Army has a legal obligation to establish and maintain a
capability that answers the requirements levied in national security documents.

Title 10

The United States Code is a consolidation and codification by subject matter of the general and
permanent laws of the United States. Title 10 of the United States Code outlines the role of United
States armed forces as mandated by federal law. It contains the legal framework outlining the roles,
missions, and organizations of the United States Department of Defense as well as each of the services.
Title 10 is broken down into five subtitles: General Military Law (which includes the Uniform Code of
Military Justice), Army, Navy and Marine Corps, Air Force, and Reserve Components. The five sub-titles
comprise 266 total chapters dealing with laws governing a full gamut of armed forces issues. The chapters

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June 2005, 2-6.

19 Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,

most applicable to this monograph are Chapter 6 (Combatant Commands), Chapter 303 (Department of the Army), and Chapter 307 (The Army). To understand the legal requirements levied upon the Army by federal law one must start with Title 10 of the United States Code, as all national policy and strategic guidance must link back to the federal statutes.

Ultimately, it is up to Army leadership to interpret all of the requirements it receives through those authorities empowered to provide it direction, from the Commander in Chief to the Secretary of Defense and finally to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and map those requirements to capabilities all the while ensuring their actions are within the confines of federal law. Army Field Manual 1: The Army, states, “The Army mission is to provide to combatant commanders the forces and capabilities necessary to execute the National Security, National Defense, and National Military Strategies.” Each of these strategies is prepared by the offices and staffs of the three key individuals mentioned above. These strategies provide a roadmap of the requirements that the Army must support as the land force provider to the Geographic Combatant Commanders. Even in a period, unlike that of today’s fiscal crisis, where budgetary resources were not stringent, the Army would not have the resources to possess a capability for every requirement levied upon it by the national strategies. In an ideal situation, all strategic requirements would map to resources. However, the system in which the Army functions and the manner in which the Congress allocates it resources, precludes the specific mapping of those resources to evolving strategic requirements. This challenges the Army to determine where it can assume an acceptable level of risk in its adherence to the strategic requirements imposed by national leaders in the strategies mentioned in the Army mission statement above.

In addition to the requirements levied by the national strategies, Congress also holds Army leadership accountable to the requirements levied upon it in federal law. Thus, a continuous challenge for the Army in an ever-evolving global environment is how it ensures that it has the right capabilities in

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terms of forces and force structure to meet its strategic requirements while remaining in compliance with federal statute. This leads to the following question: How far apart can the national strategic requirements really be from federal law? The answer is simple. They are not far apart but rather complementary. It is really a matter of how the Army interprets and prioritizes the requirements in accordance with the federal law. Title 10, Chapter 307 (The Army), Section 3062, Paragraph a states:

It is the intent of Congress to provide an Army that is capable, in conjunction with the other armed forces, of –

(1) preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense, of the United States, the Commonwealths and possessions, and any areas occupied by the United States;
(2) supporting the national policies;
(3) implementing the national objectives; and
(4) overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States.  

Without studying the legal foundations of the Army, the average citizen would expect that the Army be required to fight and win the nation’s wars or at least provide for the defense of the United States. Those points are included in the above paragraph of the United States Code. Additional Title 10 statutes further articulate these points to a higher level of specificity. The key points in the law cited above stating that the Army is capable of “supporting the national policies and implementing the national objectives” provides a basis for the argument that the Army requires a specific capability that directly addresses the building partnership capacity requirements levied on it and the other services in national strategic documents.

Another key paragraph (b) in this section of United States Code further specifies of the Army, “It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. It is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization

23 Ibid., Title 10, Chapter 307, Section 3062, paragraph a.
plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war.”

However, in providing capabilities the Army does not pay enough attention to the phrase, “except as otherwise assigned,” included in the above statute. The statutes cited above from Chapter 307 of Title 10 deal with the laws concerning Congress’ intent for the Army. Chapter 303 of Title 10 deals with the responsibilities given to the civilian head of the Department of the Army, the Secretary of the Army.

Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense and subject to the provisions of chapter 6 of this title, the Secretary of the Army is responsible for, and has the authority necessary to conduct, all affairs of the Department of the Army, including the following functions:

(1) Recruiting.
(2) Organizing.
(3) Supplying.
(4) Equipping (including research and development).
(5) Training.
(6) Servicing.
(7) Mobilizing.
(8) Demobilizing.
(9) Administering (including the morale and welfare of personnel).
(10) Maintaining.
(11) The construction, outfitting, and repair of military equipment.
(12) The construction, maintenance, and repair of buildings, structures, and utilities and the acquisition of real property and interests in real property necessary to carry out the responsibilities specified in this section.

The above statute grants the Secretary of the Army the authority to carry out the primary responsibilities of his or her office. The most important of which pertaining to this monograph are the responsibilities to organize, equip, and train the Army. The reference to Chapter 6 of Title 10 concerns the special operations forces resident in each of the services. This monograph briefly discusses the role of special operations forces in building partnership capacity activities later in this chapter. Paragraph c of this statute goes on to state that the Secretary of the Army is also responsible to “the Secretary of Defense for … the formulation of policies and programs by the Department of the Army that are fully consistent

24 Ibid., Title 10, Chapter 307, Section 3062, paragraph b.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid., Title 10, Chapter 303, Section 3013, paragraph b.
27 Ibid.
with national security objectives and policies established by the President or the Secretary of Defense.”28 Additionally, paragraph c of this statute further provides the Secretary of the Army the responsibility for “carrying out the functions of the Department of the Army so as to fulfill the current and future operational requirements of the unified and specified combatant commands”.29 It is important to note that both Chapter 303 and Chapter 307 of Title 10 specify that the Army take into account national security policy and objectives through both capabilities it possesses and the consistency of its policies and programs. Furthermore, Chapter 303 gives the Secretary of the Army the responsibility of fulfilling the current and future operational requirements of the unified and specified combatant commanders (a review of current requirements of the geographic combatant commander’s takes place later in this chapter).

In a 2009 Foreign Affairs article, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated, “…we must not be so preoccupied with preparing for future conventional and strategic conflicts that we neglect to provide all the capabilities necessary to fight and win conflicts such as those the United States is in today”.30 In accordance with federal statute, the Army must organize itself with the capabilities to not only prosecute land warfare but also conduct other activities such as building partnership capacity that support national policies and implement national objectives. This leads to the following question. Is Army force structure and organization in accordance with federal law? The author posits that the answer to the above question is yes but how strictly it is in compliance is left up for interpretation.

In its current design, the conduct of land combat operations is the theme that drives the organization and force structure of the Army. This is in accordance with Title 10 requirements; however, Title 10 also uses language such as “support national policies”, “implement national objectives”, “except as otherwise assigned”, and “fulfill the current and future operational requirements of the unified and

28 Ibid., Title 10, Chapter 303, Section 3013, paragraph c (2).
29 Ibid., Title 10, Chapter 303, Section 3013, paragraph c (5).
specified combatant commands”. For strict legal compliance with Title 10, Army organization and force structure must also account for the Title 10 requirements listed above. If the form of Army force structure follows from the functions for which it is required to accomplish, then what is the optimal form for building partnership capacity activities? As former Chief of Staff of the Army Sullivan recently stated in a Fox News opinion piece, “There is now almost unstoppable momentum from sources to significantly reduce Army…force structure and to refocus the force on ‘core competencies,’ which is code for conventional warfare. This thinking will eliminate many of the programs that emerged as essential to success in irregular warfare.” The Army is at a crossroads in wrestling with both the challenges mentioned by former Chief Sullivan as well how it translates its interpretation of building partnership capacity requirements into force structure. As this legal argument hinges on what the law specifies about supporting national policies and implementing national objectives, it is important to review the objectives and policies contained within the national strategic documents pertaining to building partnership capacity capabilities.

National Strategies and the Quadrennial Defense Review

Given the emerging security environment, the evolving character of conflict, and the Secretary of Defense’s vision of balance in our defense strategy, we see four roles for land forces in the 21st century: prevail in protracted counterinsurgency campaigns; engage to help other nations build capacity and to assure friends and allies; support civil authorities at home and abroad; deter and defeat hybrid threats and hostile state actors. To fulfill these four roles, we need an Army that is a versatile mix of tailorable and networked organizations…

GEN George W. Casey Jr.

The above quote from Chief of Staff of the Army General George W. Casey Jr. in late 2009 reflects the interpretation of the Army’s most senior leader at that time of the strategic requirements

31 Title 10, Chapter 307, Section 3062, paragraph a and b; Chapter 303, Section 3013, paragraph c.


levied upon the Army by its national strategic leaders. Important to note is that engaging to help other nations build capacity is one of the four roles envisioned for 21st century land forces and one could also make a case that this role overlaps with the other three roles. National strategic documents published since then are a new National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, and finally a hot off the presses Department of Defense document entitled Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense. To understand the requirements levied upon the Army by its national strategic leaders and in accordance with the Title 10 requirement to support national policies and implement national objectives the following section explores these documents and others with regard to building partnership capacity requirements for land forces.

Beginning with the National Defense Strategy published during the last year of the Bush Administration in June 2008, this monograph reviews building partnership capacity requirements levied in strategic documents from 2008 to the present. In outlining its strategic framework, the National Defense Strategy posits, “The security of the United States is tightly bound up with the security of the broader international system. As a result, our strategy seeks to build the capacity of fragile or vulnerable partners to withstand internal threats and external aggression while improving the capacity of the international system itself to withstand the challenge posed by rogue states and would-be hegemons.” This framework clearly illustrates that enabling partners so that they possess the capability of self-reliance to thwart threats is critical to the security of the United States. The National Defense Strategy goes on to list and outline its five key objectives:

1. Defend the Homeland
2. Win the Long War
3. Promote Security
4. Deter Conflict

34 Ibid., 26.
5. Win Our Nation’s Wars.\textsuperscript{36}

Two of the five objectives (Win the Long War and Promote Security) specifically mention the necessity to build the capacity and resolve of a broad spectrum of partners as well as helping others (nations) to police themselves (sic) and their regions as the basis for long-term international security.\textsuperscript{37} Even in 2008 the emphasis on building partnership capacity is unmistakably an overarching them in this strategic document. Finally, in its discussion of how it envisioned achieving these objectives, the National Defense Strategy states, “We will support, train, advise and equip partner security forces to counter insurgencies, terrorism, proliferation, and other threats. We will assist other countries in improving their capabilities through security cooperation, just as we will learn valuable skills and information from others better situated to understand some of the complex challenges we face together.”\textsuperscript{38} The 2008 National Defense Strategy plainly indicates the requirement placed on the services to build the capacity of partner security forces. What remains is how the services and more specifically, the Army, translate the requirements specified in the Department of Defense objectives and policy into capabilities or means that achieve those objectives.

Twenty months after publishing the National Defense Strategy and one year into the Obama Administration, the Department of Defense published the Quadrennial Defense Review Report in February 2010. This report mandated by federal law in Section 118, Title 10 of the United States Code requires the Secretary of Defense to “conduct a comprehensive examination...of the national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program and policies of the United States.”\textsuperscript{39} The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) continues to develop U.S. building partnership capacity capability by balancing changes to the existing

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 6.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 9-10.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 15-16.
\textsuperscript{39} United States Code, Title 10, Chapter 2,Section 118, paragraph a.
force with development of the future force. The QDR analysis identified “build the security capacity of partner states” as one of six key mission areas where the Defense Department must rebalance its policy, doctrine, and capabilities. It further listed the following initiatives to support this key mission area:

- Strengthen and institutionalize general purpose force capabilities for security force assistance
- Enhance linguistic, regional, and cultural ability
- Strengthen and expand capabilities for training partner aviation forces
- Strengthen capacities for ministerial-level training
- Create mechanisms to expedite acquisition and transfer of critical capabilities to partner forces

Finally, in its discussion of “Reforming How We Do Business”, the QDR identified security assistance as an area in need of reform by stating, “Despite the recognition that our security is increasingly tied to building partner capacity, our security assistance tool kit has not kept pace.” The QDR discusses each of the above referenced building partnership capacity areas in detail. It builds on the building partnership capacity requirements levied in the 2008 National Defense Strategy and further refines the specific activities conducted by military forces such as security force assistance and security assistance in the language it uses in identifying building partnership activities. Most significant to this monograph is the stated initiative to strengthen general purpose force capabilities for security force assistance.

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42 Ibid., viii.
43 Ibid., xiv.
44 Ibid., viii.
Three months after the release of the *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* and fifteen months after taking office, the Obama Administration released its *National Security Strategy* in May 2010. This strategy further reinforces the demand for building partnership capacity capability as a tool to achieve U.S. interests. In defining the “World We Seek” in its strategic approach, the *National Security Strategy* lists “Pursuing Comprehensive Engagement” as a key focus area and states, “Our military will continue strengthening its capacity to partner with foreign counterparts, train and assist security forces, and pursue military-to-military ties with a broad range of governments.”\(^{45}\) This statement implies that the military currently possesses some capability in the area of building partnership capacity activities; however, it also specifies that this capability requires strengthening to position the United States to champion mutual interests among nations throughout the world.\(^{46}\) In a section titled “Invest in the Capacity of Strong and Capable Partners”, the *National Security Strategy* further illustrates this point by demanding, “The United States must improve its capability to strengthen the security of states at risk of conflict and violence. We will undertake long-term, sustained efforts to strengthen the capacity of security forces to guarantee internal security, defend against external threats, and promote regional security and respect for human rights and the rule of law.”\(^{47}\) Reviewed in sequence beginning in 2008 it is easy to notice the theme in U.S. strategic documents calling for both an improvement and strengthening in capability that builds capacity in partner nations. More specifically for U.S. military leadership, these policies and objectives call for this capability in the area of training, advising, and assisting security forces of partner nations. As the *National Security Strategy* is the capstone document from which all other military related strategies derive their objectives, it is significant to note that this requirement for capability is not a new policy as it builds and further refines similar points in the subordinate strategic documents (*NDS* and *QDR*) that precede it during this timeframe. The trend in the strategic documents published between 2008 and 2010

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\(^{46}\) Ibid., 9.

\(^{47}\) Ibid., 27.
identifies a need for the improvement and strengthening in capability for the conduct of building partnership capacity activities. The timeframe is interesting to note, as it was prior to the highly publicized impending defense budget cuts that began to loom in 2011. Published as the impending defense budget cuts took center stage, the final two strategic documents this monograph reviews are the National Military Strategy and the Department of Defense document entitled Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense.

Through the National Military Strategy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff prioritizes and focuses the efforts of the Armed Forces of the United States while conveying his advice to the President of the United States with regard to the security environment and the necessary military actions to protect vital U.S. interests. Taking into account the NSS and NDS, it provides military ends, ways, and means that inform the guidance used by combatant commanders in the employment of the Joint Force to protect vital U.S. interests and the Service Chiefs in the development of Joint Force capabilities. Admiral M.G. Mullen published the current version of the National Military Strategy of the United States of America: Redefining America’s Military Leadership (NMS) six months before he retired as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in February 2011. The 2011 NMS defines the following four National Military Objectives:

1. Counter Violent Extremism
2. Deter and Defeat Aggression
3. Strengthen International and Regional Security
4. Shape the Future Force

Each of these objectives emphasizes the importance of seeking opportunities to partner with other nations to further U.S. interests and foster a secure environment across the globe. When discussing the

48 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) CJCSI 3100.01B, Joint Strategic Planning System, Washington, DC, 12 December 2008, D-2.
49 Ibid., D-2.
objective “Counter Violent Extremism” the NMS asserts, “We will strengthen and expand our network of partnerships to enable partner capacity to enhance security…and nest our efforts to build partner capacity with broader national security priorities, consolidate our institutional processes, and improve coordination across agencies.” While stressing the demand for building partnership capacity, this statement also proclaims the need for this capability to better synergize efforts with other government agencies.

The section of the NMS dealing with the objective “Strengthen International and Regional Security” is replete with building partnership capacity mandates for the joint force. It begins by stating, “Strengthening international and regional security requires that our forces be globally-available, yet regionally focused. Missions can change rapidly and we will continue to shape our joint force to be able to aggregate our capabilities quickly.” As this section discusses U.S. interests in different regions across the globe, it becomes evident that the successful implementation of the strategy requires the commitment of U.S. forces in some form or fashion to build the internal security capacity of partner nations in those regions. The discussion of this objective closes with a discussion of the specific importance of Theater Security Cooperation, Humanitarian Assistance, and Security Sector Assistance in executing the strategy.

In illustrating the significance of Theater Security Cooperation, the NMS asserts, “The Joint Force, Combatant Commanders, and Service Chiefs shall actively partner with other U.S. Government agencies to pursue theater security cooperation to increase collective security skills with a wider range of partners.” In specifically mentioning the Service Chiefs, one may infer that the NMS is looking to the force providers to develop some form of specialized capability that works with interagency partners to accomplish theater security cooperation tasks in a more efficient manner.

Finally, the call for improvement in the area of building partner capacity once again resonates as the NMS calls for comprehensive reform of internal procedures to improve the effectiveness of security

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51 Ibid., 6.
52 Ibid., 10.
53 Ibid., 15.
assistance endeavors and the requirement for more flexible resources and less cumbersome processes to enable better and more effective partnerships.\textsuperscript{54} From an Army perspective as the force provider, this should pose the question of whether utilizing the current modular Brigade Combat Team as the existing capability in terms of force structure to best accomplish these types of requirements is the most optimal solution. Nevertheless, with impending cuts to the Department of Defense budget at the time of the publishing of this NMS, the Army was not in a position to hedge its bets on a course correction in force structure. The strategy was subject to change based on ongoing analysis concerning budgetary constraints as noted, six months after the release of the NMS, by then Chief of Staff of the Army, General Martin Dempsey.

We may reach a point where we say as Joint Chiefs we cannot achieve the strategy, here’s the recommendations we make on changing our strategy, whether it’s forward presence, whether it’s allocating resources or not to building partner capacity.\textsuperscript{55}

The last strategic document reviewed is the most current strategic document available at the time of this writing. It is the product of the ongoing analysis in the Department of Defense referenced above by the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during his confirmation hearing in July 2011. \textit{Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense} released by Secretary of Defense Panetta in early January 2012 reflects the President’s strategic direction to the Department of Defense and “was deeply informed by the Department’s civilian and military leadership, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the Combatant Commanders.”\textsuperscript{56} Released at a time when the Department of Defense is facing the most significant budget cuts in many years, the document is significant enough to include a cover letter from the President himself. This strategic direction does not

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 15.


dismiss the requirements to build partner capacity levied in all the strategic documents preceding it. In fact, it further reinforces the necessity of this type of capability. When discussing the challenges associated with the global security environment, the document emphasizes the importance of building partnership capacity in sharing the cost and responsibilities of global leadership.\(^{57}\) Furthermore, it asserts that the U.S. whenever possible “will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.”\(^{58}\) Thus, the initial overview of this document makes clear that as resources decrease in terms of budget allocation, the requirement for building partnership capacity activities is not going away. How the Army takes note of the approach implied above may determine its relevance following the conclusion of its large-scale efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

*Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* defines ten primary missions for which the Joint Force must recalibrate capabilities and make selective additional investment to achieve future success.\(^{59}\) Of the ten, five require building partner capacity capability for the conduct of actions to ensure success. In discussing the mission of *Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare* it states, “…global counter terrorism efforts will become more widely distributed and will be characterized by a mix of direct action and security force assistance.”\(^{60}\) Once again, the language clearly emphasizes an increase in these type efforts. Innovation and a streamline approach and commitment of appropriate capability are extremely important and critical for each service in meeting these demands. Finally, this document emphasizes a point that may become contentious for the Army by stating, “We will resist the temptation to sacrifice readiness in order to retain force structure, and will in fact rebuild readiness in

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\(^{57}\) Ibid., 3.
\(^{58}\) Ibid., 3.
\(^{59}\) Ibid., 4.
\(^{60}\) Ibid., 4.
areas that, by necessity, were deemphasized over the past decade.\textsuperscript{61} For the Army this should take to a different level the debate that took place in the late 1990’s when Army leadership intellectually recognized the need for integration of stability operations into military operations while embracing warfighting in their hearts and thus diluting the subsequent Army doctrine.\textsuperscript{62} The level of this debate will not be over doctrine. As is discussed later, Army doctrine is replete with the different “ways” the Army outlines to accomplish building partnership capacity. The debate should be over specialized force structure to focus strictly on building partnership capacity activities.

\textbf{Combatant Command Perspective}

One final set of perspectives to explore in defining the strategic requirements (ends) are those of the United States Combatant Commanders (CCDRs). It is up to these commanders to best understand the requirements levied by the national strategic documents and incorporate them into their own regional strategies. Two primary documents from which they receive their guidance from the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), respectively. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) translates strategic priorities set in the \textit{NSS}, \textit{NDS}, and \textit{QDR} into implementable direction for operational activities through the GEF, which issues two-year direction to Combatant Commands (CCMDs) for operational planning, force management, security cooperation, and posture planning.\textsuperscript{63} It serves as an essential tool for CCMD planners as it provides strategic end states to guide planning.\textsuperscript{64} Additionally, the security cooperation focus areas articulated in the GEF enable CCMD planners to link CCDR security cooperation activities to the achievement of CCMD campaign plan end states in support of the strategic

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., 7.


\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., II-3.
end states. According to *The U.S. Army Concept for Building Partner Capacity* of the ten strategic end states and eleven security cooperation focus areas identified in the GEF, seven and five of those areas respectively pertain to building partnership capacity. This equates to about half of the strategic guidance provided to CCDRs from OSD. The JSCP is the companion document to the GEF produced by the Joint Staff for the Chairman that provides guidance to accomplish tasks and missions based on near-term military capabilities to CCDRs, Service Chiefs, and other agencies to accomplish the end states identified in the GEF. It provides detailed planning guidance, force apportionment guidance, assumptions, and tasks them to prepare campaign, campaign support, contingency, and posture plans and apply security cooperation guidance. These documents essentially translate the national objectives and guidance provided in the national strategies into requirements for CCMDs to execute.

It is important to explore the interpretation of the strategic guidance by those tasked to execute the requirements it articulates with regard to building partnership capacity activities. While conducting a review of recent testimony by CCDRs to Congress, it is significant to note that each CCDR specifically discussed the necessity of building partnership capacity endeavors in their area of responsibility (AOR) for ensuring regional security. The Commander of United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), General Douglas Frasier testified, “Building partner nation capacity and enhancing interoperability is at the core of everything we do in our AOR.” His testimony further emphasized the importance of

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67 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) CJCSI 3100.01B, Joint Strategic Planning System*, Washington, DC, 12 December 2008, D-3.4.

68 Ibid., D-4.

providing training and equipment to partner nations’ ground forces to strengthen their capacity to respond to transnational criminal organization (TCO)-related events requiring a military response as well as improving partner nation capacity to conduct disaster relief operations within their borders. General Carter Ham, Commander of United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) stated, “Our primary effort for increasing stability and deterring conflict is focused on building partner capacity.” He further asserted that the way to reduce threats to our citizens and interests both in the AFRICOM AOR and at home is by helping African states provide for their own security through the programs, activities, and operations conducted by AFRICOM. Furthermore, Admiral James Stavridis, Commander of United States European Command (EUCOM), attested, “The most important activities and initiatives…are those in which we work together with our allies and partners to build capacity to ensure U.S. security in the European theater and, thus, defend our homeland forward.” Finally, Admiral Robert Williard, Commander United States Pacific Command (PACOM) testified, “In response to the growing threat posed by violent extremist organizations (VEOs), USPACOM supports improving the counter-terrorism (CT) capabilities with security assistance programs, executed in partnership with the Department of State and embassy country teams, designed to build host-nation capacity and capability.” Thus, the message from each of the CCDR’s testimony is that they acknowledged and understood the significance of building partnership activities in their AORs as mandated in the national strategic documents.

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70 Ibid., 14-15.
72 Ibid., 3.
A significant point to note from the review of the CCDR testimony is that although they fully acknowledged the requirement to conduct building partnership capacity activities in their regions, the means through which they aimed to execute it were not quite as clear. To physically train, advise, and assist partner nations in the various AORs of the CCMDs requires troops to on the ground. The commitment of U.S. troops to the endeavors in Iraq and Afghanistan precluded the normal conventional Army organization, the Brigade Combat Team, or parts of them from apportionment to the CCMDs for these type activities. What was most discussed were programs such as Foreign Military Sales and Foreign Military Financing run by security assistance officers that hang their hats in U.S. Embassies. As the PACOM Commander noted, “Foreign Military Financing—the program for funding the acquisition of U.S. military materiel, services, and training that support regional stability goals—has been particularly important to supporting partners engaged in combating violent extremism, especially the Philippines and Indonesia.”75 Another partner capacity building tool mentioned during the testimonies was the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program funded by the Department of State which provides military course education and training for foreign military and select civilian personnel.76 The fact is that the CCDRs must apply innovative ways to achieve to their partnership capacity building objectives. What few Army units they have apportioned to them through the JSCP may not actually be available due to other competing demands. Additionally, Army General Purpose Forces (GPF) do not consist of specific units that specialize in training, advising, and assisting partner nations similar to the Training Support Brigades that it employs to train U.S Reserve and National Guard units. As discussed below, the Special Operations Forces (SOF) apportioned to the CCMDs have many other functions to accomplish in the various AORs and are too valuable a resource to strictly employ for CCDR building partnership capacity initiatives.

75 Ibid., 13.
76 Ham Testimony to HASC, 24.
Special Operations Forces

Each of the military services possesses specialized organizations better known as special operations forces (SOF). They include Army Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA) teams, Navy Sea, Air, and Land [SEAL] platoons, Marine special operations teams, Air Force special tactics teams, and operational aviation detachments (OADs). Although they each have highly specialized skill sets associated with each service and receive funding for service requirements from the various services, in accordance with United States Code Title 10, they belong to the United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM) whose function is to prepare special operations forces to carry out assigned missions. Title 10 Section 167 further defines the special operations activities as they pertain to special operations as:

(1) Direct action.
(2) Strategic reconnaissance.
(3) Unconventional warfare.
(4) Foreign internal defense.
(5) Civil affairs.
(6) Psychological operations.
(7) Counterterrorism.
(8) Humanitarian assistance.
(9) Theater search and rescue.
(10) Such other activities as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense.

The key language in the law cited above is that SOF conducts the above activities as they pertain to special operations. Utilizing SOF as the only tool for CCDMs to accomplish their physical boots on the ground building partnership capacity activities would preclude their employment in other areas for which they provide specialized capability. In his monograph Understanding Advisory Roles in Large Scale Counterinsurgencies, Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Roberson illustrates an advisory triad for counterinsurgencies where U.S. SOF advised partner nation SOF or commando forces and GPF filled the

77 QDR, xvii.
78 Title 10 United States Code, Chapter 6, Section 167 (a).
79 Ibid., Section 167 (j).
role of tactical advisors for partner nation general security forces.\textsuperscript{80} His monograph provides an excellent illustration of optimal employment of advisors in large-scale efforts such as Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghanistan; however, the concept is also applicable to the requirement for building partner nation capacity in order to preclude partner nations from similar predicaments. If the primary role of SOF becomes building partnership capacity activities in support of CCDM engagement, then the U.S. must develop new SOF to accomplish all of the other requirements identified in Title 10. Obviously, with impending budget cuts to the Department of Defense this is not feasible. This is a requirement that Army GPF must prepare to shoulder.

**The Requirement for Building Partnership Capacity Activities**

The message of the national strategic documents over the past four years is clear regarding the military requirement to build partner capacity. As illustrated with the 2008 *NDS* written as the Iraq drawdown began and forward to the most recent document *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* written in the face of impending budget cuts to the Department of Defense, the strategic documents utilized language like strengthen, improve, and gain efficiency when defining this requirement. In receiving this requirement through the strategic guidance in the GEF and JSCP, Combatant Commanders refer to the necessity of this obligation in achieving success in their AORs. In focusing on the Army as the provider of land forces to the CCMDs, the question remains how it organizes to support this requirement. Current Army force structure surely meets the requirement levied in the national strategic documents and mandated by law in Title 10 to fight and win our nations wars, deter and defeat aggression, and conduct combat operations on land. However, what about the Title 10 mandate to support national objectives and implement national policies.\textsuperscript{81} Building partnership capacity definitely meets those mandates based on the objectives in national strategies and CCDR interpretation of regional

\textsuperscript{80} Roberson, 51-52.

\textsuperscript{81} Title 10, Chapter 307, Section 3062, paragraph a.
requirements. However, Army force structure is currently lacking in a standing GPF organization specializing toward this clearly defined requirement. Thus, in defining “the ends”, the nation’s strategic leaders are clear in establishing building partnership activities as a requirement. Although “the means” by which the Army as a service defines this specific capability is debatable, the Army has gone to great lengths to codify in doctrine the various “ways” for accomplishing building partnership capacity activities.

**Current Army Doctrine: “The Ways”**

Army doctrine published in recent years is replete with tactics and techniques for conducting activities that build partnership capacity. To lay the groundwork in identifying which Army doctrine is most applicable this monograph refers to *The U.S. Army Concept for Building Partner Capacity* published in November 2011. This recent document asserts, “Building partnership capacity is achieved by applying a variety of ways and means – security cooperation, security force assistance, foreign internal defense, and security assistance.”[^1] The Army currently has doctrinal manuals specifically dedicated to security force assistance and foreign internal defense activities. It also has a manual, currently in draft form, entitled *Army Support to Security Cooperation*. Although, it does not have a doctrinal publication specifically dedicated to security assistance, the Army does have multiple regulations specifically addressing security assistance activities. Additionally, *Army Doctrine Publication: 3-0: Unified Land Operations*, “the common operational concept for the Army,” as noted by Chief of Staff of the Army, General Ray Odierno in his forward to the publication, states the following about GPF and SOF activities as they relate to building partnership capacity:

> Building partner capacity is the outcome of comprehensive interorganizational activities, programs, and engagements that enhance the ability of partners for security, governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions. The Army integrates the capabilities of the operating and generating forces, to include special

operations forces, to support capacity-building efforts, primarily through security cooperation activities. Supported by the appropriate policy, legal frameworks, and authorities, the Army leads security force assistance for partner units, institutions, and security sector functions. Army operating and special operations forces units train and advise partner units to develop individual and unit proficiency in security operations...Elements of the operating, generating, and special operations forces contribute to security sector programs that professionalize and strengthen partner security capacity to synchronize and sustain operations. These Army security cooperation activities enable other interorganizational coordination to build partner capacity for governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions.\textsuperscript{83}

The above description of building partner capacity in some of the Army’s newest doctrine published in October 2011 bears striking resemblance to the description of primary stability tasks in another Army field manual, \textit{FM 3-07 Stability Operations}. Additionally, this assertion specifically mentions the application of three of the four “ways and means” mentioned in \textit{The U.S. Army Concept for Building Partner Capacity}. Thus, it is important to include Army doctrine on stability operations in the following discussion. This chapter explores “the ways” in which the Army defines the activities it conducts associated with building the capacity of partners to determine which of the ways or combinations thereof best answer the requirements levied in the national strategic documents.

**Stability Operations**

In assessing current Army doctrine and its relationship to the requirements to build partner capacity levied in the national strategic documents, it becomes quite evident that a great deal of terminology exists that is overlapping in description. Some of the terminology describing “the ways” is more overarching and all encompassing. Stability operations is probably the most all-encompassing doctrinal concept in the Army repository with regard to activities associated with building partnership capacity. The concept is central enough to Joint Doctrine that the Department of Defense defines it in Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3000.05, Stability Operations:

Stability operations is defined as an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of

national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.  

Army doctrine illustrates stability operations as one of three types of operations (offensive and defensive) within the context of decisive and sustainable land operations. Army Doctrine Publication: 3-0: Unified Land Operations further illustrates the overarching nature of this doctrinal concept defining stability operations as follows:

Stability operations are military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and to provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. They include five tasks: establish civil security, establish civil control, restore essential services, support to governance, and support to economic and infrastructure development.

Referring back to the definition of building partner capacity referenced from the same Army doctrinal publication it is easy to establish parallels in the activities each of the definitions identify. Obviously, these congruencies represent efficiencies Army forces must possess but at what level and on what scale. Taken in their totality, they represent requirements for large Army organizations working with interagency and intergovernmental partners to accomplish. In fact, Army Field Manual 3-90.6, Brigade Combat Team, dedicates an entire chapter to stability operations and states:

Stability operations are a fundamental aspect of Brigade Combat Team (BCT) full spectrum operations. Stability operations focus activity on maintaining or reestablishing a safe and secure environment, and on providing essential services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. They lead to an end state that, in support of a legitimate government, enables these activities to facilitate other instruments of national power. Stability operations can be conducted simultaneously with offensive or defensive operations, tasks, and activities in which the needs of the population must be addressed immediately.

Implied in this doctrinal discussion of brigade combat teams and stability operations is that the brigade as an organization must reorganize its assets to accomplish either all or a combination of the

84 Department of Defense Instructions (DODI) 3000.05, Stability Operations, 16 September 2009, 1.
85 Army Doctrine Publication: 3-0: Unified Land Operations, 5.
86 Ibid., 6.
activities mentioned above. Additionally, this requirement does not jibe with the “innovative, low-cost, and small footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives” articulated in *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense.*

Nor does the employment of a Brigade Combat Team in its entirety meet the needs of the CCDRs as part of their theater strategies geared toward proactively building partner nation capacity precluding the necessity for large-scale troop deployment and subsequent operations. However, the doctrinal concept of stability operations captured in *Army Field Manual 3-07: Stability Operations* provides an overarching menu of “ways” that taken individually instead of collectively provide a framework from which to build specialized organizations to accomplish specific CCDR requirements to engage partner nations in an effort to establish relationships and enhance their capacity. Finally, it is important to note that *Army Field Manual 3-07: Stability Operations* addresses each of the following sections previously identified in *The U.S. Army Concept for Building Partner Capacity* as the ways and means the Army achieve building partnership capacity.

**Security Cooperation**

The national strategic documents and CCDR testimony contains several references to security cooperation and its contribution to the improvement in various capabilities of partner nations. It is a significant enough concept that the GEF actually specifies security cooperation focus areas in its guidance to CCDRs.

Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5132.03, DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation defines security cooperation as follows:

> Activities undertaken by the Department of Defense to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. It includes all DoD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DoD-administered security assistance programs, that: build defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and

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89 *The U.S. Army Concept for Building Partner Capacity*, 7.

90 *DSCA CAMPAIGN SUPPORT PLAN 2010*, C-1.
multinational operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.

Upon review of Army doctrine, regulation, and other documents regarding security cooperation, the trend of overlapping terminology continues. As depicted above by the DOD definition, security cooperation is an overarching endeavor conducted at a more operational or strategic level of engagement as compared to the discussion of stability operations which is much more a tactical or face to face level of engagement at the point where the capacity building needs actually exist. According to the most recent Army Posture Statement (APS), security cooperation is the cornerstone of Army support to building partner capacity, wherein “we seek to improve the capacity of partner nations to provide internal security, defense against external threats, and to promote regional security.”91 This statement taken by itself could lead to the assumption that the Army’s interpretation of its role in building partner capacity through security cooperation is to train, advise, and assist partner nations security forces. However, the description then provides examples that consist of numbers of foreign military sales, institutional Army doctrine and education exchanges, and military personnel exchanges.92 Army International Security Cooperation Policy defined in Army Regulation 11-31 clarifies these examples provided in the APS as being in congruence with regulation when it defines the following ways that the Army accomplishes security cooperation:

- Education and training
- Exercises
- Exchanges
- Military-to-military contacts
- International support and treaty compliance


92 Ibid.
- Foreign military sales and technical training
- International cooperative research, development, and acquisition
- Standardization

One may surmise that the language in the APS (written three years after publication of AR 11-31) taken with how the Army describes its ways of conducting security cooperation in the regulation indicate that the Army is working to redefine the ways in which it views its activities that fall within the realm of security cooperation. This is logical in the face of the impending budget cuts to the DOD and the requirement to build partner capacity so prevalently articulated in the national strategic documents. To its credit, the Army is developing a manual entitled *FM 3-30 Army Support to Security Cooperation*. This manual currently in draft form may achieve the task of codifying all of the overlapping terminology into a coherent taxonomy that provides an index of the ways in which the Army meets future requirements levied in the national strategies. In its preface, the draft manual states:

Field Manual (FM) 3-30 is the Army’s first doctrinal publication for supporting security cooperation. It describes Army support to security cooperation as an integral component of Unified Land Operations and nested within the national strategic framework. The outcome of Army support to security cooperation includes strengthened partner relationships that promote U.S. security interests, improved friendly and allied security capabilities and capacities, and peacetime and contingency access to host nations.

As illustrated above the Army is working to refine the language it uses in defining its activities toward building the capacity of partners. In describing security cooperation as an integral component of Unified Land Operations nested within the national strategic framework it seeks to link the tactical activities to the strategic requirements. In describing this linkage, the draft manual also sets out to describe “the relationship of security cooperation to security assistance, security force assistance, foreign

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93 Army Regulation 11-31: Army International Security Cooperation Policy, 24 October 2007, 3-4. The regulation provides a detailed explanation for each of these activities, which describe in detail the strategic level of engagement.

internal defense and security sector reform. As the above manual is still in draft form, it is important to review some of the other less overarching activities that define the “ways” for building partner capacity.

**Security Assistance**

In an era of impending budget cuts, the Army application of security assistance is sure to become more challenging based upon the cost associated with the programs it comprises. Additionally, the focus of efforts toward this activity are geared more toward institutional level engagement in education and training as well as material acquisition and less toward on the ground partnering and relationship establishment to build the capacity of partner nations. Army Regulation 12-1, Security Assistance, Training, and Export Policy define it as follows:

Security assistance is a subset of a larger, more general category called security cooperation and consists of a group of programs, authorized by law, which allow the transfer of defense articles and services, including training, to friendly foreign governments or international organizations. The statutory authority for security assistance is provided primarily under the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 as amended and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976 as amended.

A subset of security cooperation, security assistance remains a tool for which the Army must maintain expertise in both the institutional Army as well as in GPF to meet the requirements levied in the national strategic documents. The scope of the programs associated with security assistance is strategic in nature and consist of Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Construction Services (FMCS), Leases of equipment for specified missions and for specific periods of time, and International military education and training (IMET) for professional military education. Within budgetary constraints, security assistance activities provide a tool for CCDRs to employ in building partner capacity at a strategic level of engagement in that it provides partners the tools in terms of equipment, materiel,

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95 Ibid., 1-1.
96 Army Regulation 12-1: Security Assistance, Training, and Export Policy, 23 July 2010, 1.
97 Ibid., 1.
education, and specialized training from which they can either take or leave the onus to advance their capabilities.

**Foreign Internal Defense**

Numerous Army doctrinal manuals provide reference to the activity of Foreign Internal Defense (FID). As discussed in the previous chapter, Title 10, Section 167 mandates FID as one of nine special operations activities conducted by SOF. The Army uses the joint definition of FID in its manuals when discussing its application as follows:

> Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security.

The above definition sounds similar to definitions of other building partner capacity related terminology illustrated earlier in this chapter. However, this definition implies a more hands on approach by military forces to the tune of training, advising, and assisting. Overall U.S. FID efforts involve the application of all instruments of national power (diplomatic, information, military, and economic) in support of the partner nation internal development and defense program (IDAD). The military application of FID is broken into three components: indirect support, direct support, and combat operations. In describing each of these components, the doctrine also references much of the other terminology previously mentioned in this chapter such as security assistance and security cooperation reinforcing the earlier assertion of the overlapping terminology when discussing “the ways” associated with building partner capacity. Finally, doctrine discussing FID does not go for very long without also mentioning or relating it to another activity that has an Army manual dedicated to it application. Along

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98 Title 10 United States Code, Chapter 6, Section 167 (a).
101 Ibid., 1-5 and 1-6.
with FID, doctrinal manuals routinely mention Security Force Assistance when discussing components of a host nation’s IDAD strategy. As illustrated below, there exist many parallels between the two capacity building activities defined in Joint and Army doctrine.

**Security Force Assistance**


> The Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the US Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions.

*Army Field Manual 3-07: Stability Operations* the field manual for the mission that Security Force Assistance is a derivative defines it as:

> The unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority. It is integral to successful stability operations and extends to all security forces: military, police, and border forces, and other paramilitary organizations. This applies to all levels of government within the host nation as well as other local and regional forces.

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102 Roberson, 9.


Finally, nine months after publishing *Field Manual 3-07: Stability Operations*, the Army published an entire manual, *Field Manual 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance*, which defines Security Force Assistance the same as the preceding definitions’ first sentence but then further states:

Security force assistance (SFA) improves the capability and capacity of host-nation or regional security organization’s security forces. These forces are collectively referred to as foreign security forces. *Foreign security forces* are forces—including but not limited to military, paramilitary, police, and intelligence forces; border police, coast guard, and customs officials; and prison guards and correctional personnel—that provide security for a host nation and its relevant population or support a regional security organization’s mission. 106

This discussion of the various “ways” the Army codifies in doctrine the methods through which it achieves building partnership capacity clearly indicates that it understands the requirements levied in the national strategic documents. To the casual observer, this doctrinal effort is somewhat confusing with the overlap in what encompasses each activity, as security cooperation, security assistance, security force assistance, and FID, are rarely, if ever, discussed without mention of one or more of the other activities. The following chart from *Field Manual 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance* best illustrates the overlap of all of the building partner capacity activities identified in *The U.S. Army Concept for Building Partner Capacity*.

This chart illustrates that FID is actually a subordinate activity of security force assistance. It also depicts the relationship of security forces assistance with security cooperation and security assistance activities on the periphery. Additionally, someone not versed in doctrine may think that FID is a purely SOF activity (codified in Title 10) while security force assistance is a GPF activity. This is not true. Field Manual 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance, does not make any distinction between GPF and SOF when stating, “Many criteria determine when conventional forces, special operations forces, or a combination are appropriate to conduct security force assistance”. Either GPF or SOF is appropriate for this activity. Regardless, both FID and security force assistance fall within the realm of Army activities that build partner capacity as do security assistance and security cooperation. It appears the Army is working to

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107 Ibid., 1-7.
108 Ibid., 1-9.
further codify the relationship of all of these activities and their contribution to building partner capacity in the manual *Army Support to Security Cooperation* currently in draft form.

**Conclusion: “Refining the Means”**

To the endeavor of building partner capacity, the requirement for the Army clearly exists. Army doctrine unmistakably and through much intellectual endeavor defines the various ways to answer the requirements. The question however, remains by what means shall the Army articulate its capability toward this endeavor. During the middle of the last decade, the Army restructured “from a division-based to a brigade-based force—the modular force.”\(^\text{109}\) The Army continues to rely on brigade combat teams as the organization that answers the requirements of Combatant Commanders. Army *FM 1* refers to these modular organizations as strategically flexible formations capable of conducting most operations with capabilities organic to its structure.\(^\text{110}\) However, is the brigade combat team the most optimal means to accomplish the activities associated with building partnership capacity?

Brigade combat teams (BCTs) are large organizations that range in size from 3,500 to 5,000 soldiers.\(^\text{111}\) Structured primarily for the conduct of combat operations, the doctrinal expectations of brigade combat teams are such that their organizational flexibility enables them to operate across the spectrum of conflict.\(^\text{112}\) BCTs have recently provided the nucleus for ad-hoc employment toward large-scale capacity building efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Iraq they were reorganized into what was then called advise and assist brigades (AABs). As Phillip Battaglia and Curtis Taylor asserted in their article in *Military Review* in August 2010, “The inherent flexibility of the BCT allows it to shift from security

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\(^{109}\) Field Manual 1: The Army, 4-7.  
\(^{110}\) Ibid., 4-7.  
operations to counterinsurgency to major combat as the environment evolves during the deployment.”113

For the current mission in Afghanistan the BCT is providing the manpower for a similar ad-hoc organization the Army is calling Security Force Assistance Advisor Teams (SFAATs). SFAATs are relatively small teams of highly trained officers and noncommissioned officers who will advise and assist their Afghan counterparts as they conduct security operations.114 Thus, for recent large-scale requirements the BCT has proven flexible enough to modify its organization out of necessity to answer requirements levied upon it. However, the national strategies are now calling for smaller footprint approaches to engage with multiple partner nations in advising and assisting capacity-building efforts across a plethora of areas. Are Battaglia and Taylor correct in their assertion that “discussions to develop a custom designed advisory force structure to replace the BCTs are moving in the wrong direction”?115 Contrarily, with the previously discussed guidance in the national strategies, operations concluded in Iraq, the Army reducing its commitment in Afghanistan, and a decreasing defense budget resulting in end-strength cuts to Army force structure, the development of a force structure strictly focused on building partnership activities is worth serious consideration by Army leadership.

The means to accomplish building partnership capacity activities tasked to the Army other than the utilization of the BCT in its current form is worth further exploration for the following reasons. First, as the nation looks toward the next quarter century, the national leaders responsible for the various national security, defense, and military strategies have articulated in these strategies with increasing fervor the future requirements to build partner nation capacity through advising and assisting. Further, that these endeavors should be smaller footprint excursions utilizing subject matter experts. This implication makes the employment of an entire BCT a moot point. At between 3,500 and 5,000 soldiers, a

115 Battaglia and Taylor, 4.
BCT is far from a small footprint approach. The Iraq and Afghanistan examples mentioned above utilized the majority of the BCTs in a reorganized structure. If employing a BCT for the smaller footprint approach, it would mean utilizing a small portion of the BCT. Perhaps a platoon of approximately 60 soldiers or a company of approximately 200 soldiers would suffice. This will render the remainder of that BCT incomplete and may negatively impact its ability to accomplish other assigned missions.

Second, as discussed in detail earlier in this paper, an effort on the part of the Army to modify its force structure to provide for organizations that specialize in building partnership capacity activities is legally justified by the statute in Title 10 USC to support the national policies and implement the national objectives. A modification in force structure based on the national strategies would do exactly what this statute says. Thus, naysayers would not have much if any of a legal basis to argue with.

Third, as illustrated earlier, the Army has a myriad of doctrine that painstakingly identifies the “ways” a specialized organization employs toward this endeavor. In fact, the chart on page 37 taken from the Army doctrinal manual on Security Force Assistance could provide a good starting point to establish the specific proficiencies required of such a new organization.

Finally, the proficiency requirements placed upon BCTs are vast when taking into consideration the spectrum of conflict. Designed for high-end combat operations, BCTs must train to proficient readiness for offensive, defensive, and stability operations against both conventional and hybrid threats. This is a costly and challenging endeavor for even the best organizations. In recent years, with the demands of future missions to Iraq and Afghanistan, BCTs have been able to focus their efforts on stability operations and assumed risk in proficiencies associated with the more conventional offensive and defensive combined arms operations for which the design of the BCT better corresponds. A dedicated force structure geared toward the smaller footprint advise and assist capacity building efforts would better

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\[116\] *Army Doctrinal Publication 3-0: Unified Land Operations, 5.*
allow unit commanders to more effectively focus on the training proficiency of their organizations, be they BCTs or building partnership capacity type organizations.

The Training Support Brigades (TSBs) that currently exist under the command and control of the United States First Army could serve as a baseline model for a new force structure designed to conduct building partnership capacity activities. The 16 TSBs employed by First Army are cadre organizations comprised of approximately 250 officers and senior non-commissioned officers from the active component whose core competency is designing and conducting collective training and exercises to train soldiers, staffs, and command teams in the Reserve Component and National Guard. Modeling a Security Assistance Brigade designed to specialize in capacity building and security assistance activities after these cadre-based TSBs is an option worth further exploration and analysis. This argument is not new. Thomas Talley and Robert Dixon writing in Small Wars Journal earlier this year argued for a cadre structure organic to each Brigade Combat Team that would focus on partnering, training, and staff augmentation of partner nation forces in the areas of security force assistance and building partnership capacity during Phase 0 operations (no expectation of imminent combat operations). A cadre organization designed to possess expertise diversified across the spectrum of security assistance related endeavors would allow for the employment of the small footprint approaches to building partnership capacity demanded by the national strategic documents without the Army reverting to an ad-hoc structure to accomplish the task.


Recommended Modifications to Army Force Structure for Further Exploration

With the above points in mind, the Army has an opportunity to take advantage of its current situation with defense budget cuts looming to restructure its forces to meet the requirements of the next quarter century. The following is a baseline recommendations for further exploration focused on developing a specific Army force structure capability that specializes in building partnership capacity activities. Parts of this recommendation already are in the works according to the Army Posture Statement and other media reports.

The current Army Division has on average of four BCTs subordinate to it. In its active component, the Army maintains 45 BCTs and 10 Division Headquarters. Based on reductions in the future defense budget, recent media reports indicate that the Army is preparing to “slash the number of combat brigades from 45 to as low as 32 in a broad restructuring of its fighting force aimed at cutting costs and reducing the service by about 80,000 soldiers.” As a BCT normally averages between 3,500 and 5,000 soldiers, it is clear that the above quote also takes the requisite cut in force structure that provides administrative and logistical support to those BCTs into account. Rough math puts the reduction closer to the range of 45,000 to 65,000 soldiers in terms of only the BCTs. For the purpose of this recommendation, assume a size of 4,000 soldiers for a BCT. Additionally, assume that the size of the new organization called a Security Assistance Brigade that focuses solely on capacity building activities is 500 soldiers.

With the above assumptions, the recommended modification to force structure is relatively simple. First, align the ten active component Army Division Headquarters’ with each of the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs). Excluding U.S. Northern Command, this maps two Army Divisions to each GCC. This proposal is similar to the concept of Regionally Aligned Forces discussed in the 2011

\[119 \textit{QDR}, \text{xvi.} \]

\[120 \text{Baldor, “U.S. officials plan deep changes in combat brigades.”} \]
Army Posture Statement. This allows the Division Commander to shape his training focus to specific scenarios associated with the respective GCC as well as language and culture familiarization and training. Additionally, it provides the GCC and its subordinate Army Service Component Command (ASCC) with an opportunity to provide additional focus and other considerations to those Divisions habitually aligned. It also affords the opportunity to establish relationships between the staffs.

The alignment discussed above is in a perfect world but best sets the conditions for what is at the crux of the recommended force structure modification. The Army has the opportunity to go back to a Division hierarchical structure as the drawdown looms. Eliminate 15 BCTs going from 45 to 30 so that each Army Division has three subordinate BCTs. This results in a reduction of approximately 60,000 soldiers not counting the additional reductions in administrative and logistical personnel required to support those BCTs. Finally, add a Security Assistance Brigade to each Division. This adds back 5,000 soldiers, thus a reduction of 55,000 soldiers. This leaves the Division Commander with three BCTs and a Security Assistance Brigade to focus on the smaller footprint approach to capacity building and advisory efforts.

The specific skill sets, organization, and mission essential tasks for the Security Assistance Brigade remain for further research and analysis. However, when looking at this type of force structure modification during an impending drawdown, the upside is a gain in specialized capability that did not previously exist while the loss is a loss in force structure that was already destined to occur. With the addition of Security Assistance Brigades, the Division Commander has the ability to better focus and tune the training proficiency of the Division. An opportunity exists to focus two subordinate BCTs on the high-end and costly to train offensive and defensive operations against both conventional and hybrid threats while the third BCT focuses on high-end stability operations and the Security Assistance Brigade focuses on specialized advise and assist capacity building efforts. It is up to the Division Commander but with this type of force structure looking out through the next quarter century, the opportunity exists to
meet the national requirements with forces that are moderately proficient in many types of operations or with forces highly proficient in operations that are more specific.
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