The National Guard in the Spanish-American War and Philippine Insurrection, 1898-1899

A Monograph
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The National Guard’s origins trace back to the militia of the first settlements in America. Since its inception in 1636, the National Guard has played vital role in the nation’s defense from the Revolutionary War to the most recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The utility of the National Guard has been questioned since the late nineteenth century, but political pressure from the states has always been sufficient to maintain a National Guard. This monograph examines the National Guard’s performance as the primary source for state volunteers in the Spanish-American War and Philippine Insurrection 1898-1899.

While the Regular Army generally viewed the National Guard as less professional and incapable of defending the nation, the results from the National Guard’s preparation for the Philippines supported the Regular Army’s disdain for them and seemed to indicate a likelihood of failure in combat. However, actual results from the Philippines lead to a different conclusion about the National Guard. This conclusion supports the National Guard as an operational force instead of the strategic reserve as they had been used since World War II. This change in the National Guard’s employment is even more critical because of the economic and security challenges the nation faces.

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SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

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Abstract


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INTRODUCTION

In early 1898, the United States seemed destined for war with Spain. Yet while political leaders, newspapers, and private citizens were calling for war, the Army was decidedly unprepared. The most telling sign of their unpreparedness was the size of the Army, barely 27,000 officers and soldiers. Additionally, the Army had been used as a frontier constabulary for the past thirty years, following the end of the Civil War. The Civil War had been the Army’s largest mobilization and it had involved hundreds of thousands of state volunteers. The mobilization for the Civil War had been wrought with inefficiency, and the Army had still not changed its method of doing business for large wars. As the nation seemed to clamor for war, the Army attempted to institute reforms that would enable it to grow and mobilize more efficiently. Unfortunately for Regular Army officers who desired a professional force, the National Guard was more than four times the size of the Army and had politicians in every state to support its efforts. Ultimately the political forces exerted upon the Army forced them to accept the National Guard as their primary source for mobilizing volunteers. The Army viewed this as problematic since they saw National Guard forces as unprofessional, untrained, and undisciplined social clubs that lacked the ability to defend the nation.

In many ways, the Army’s assessment of National Guard forces was correct. National Guard forces lacked the training, discipline, and professionalism of the Regular Army. In addition, the National Guard forces lacked modern equipment and they relied on political patronage entirely too much to suit the professional Army. But as it turned out, the Volunteer forces sent to the Philippines were composed primarily of National Guard volunteers from each state, meaning the war in the Philippines was the National Guard’s war. Soon after arriving the Volunteers began pressuring people in America to get them back home to their families and jobs.
With all of these factors against the National Guard, it seems clear they could not have been expected to defeat the Spanish forces and they would likely have wilted in the face of an insurgency fought in the Philippines.

This monograph will provide a thorough examination of the Volunteers’ preparation for and conduct of operations in the Philippines. The information gleaned from this examination will be assessed for usefulness in the modern context of National Guard utilization in support of Army operations. Similarities between the conflicts in the Philippines and southwest Asia exist. These similarities will provide relevance to the comparison of the two disparate time periods. The monograph seeks to answer the question of the National Guard’s role in future operations by examining their performance in the Philippines. The National Guard’s reputation entering the Spanish-American War in 1898, the problems associated with their mobilization, equipping, and training should have led to failure in the Philippines. However, their performance in battle far exceeded expectations, despite the numerous institutional failures at all levels prior to actual combat. In spite of this success, the Volunteers were nearly unanimous in their desire to immediately return to their civilian lives when not actually in combat with the enemy. Ultimately, this monograph will illustrate how the National Guard can be relied upon to expand the Army as an operational reserve, despite the difficulties associated with their employment.

This paper focuses on the war in the Philippines from 1898-1899. This conflict includes the Spanish-American War, the uneasy peace between America and the Filipino people following the defeat of Spain, and the beginning of the Filipino insurgency. The insurgency, commonly called the Philippine War, occurred as a result of America’s occupation and annexation of the Philippine Islands following the Spanish-American War. While the foes of America in the Spanish-American War and Philippine War were completely separate, the United States’ forces
that concluded the Spanish-American War were the same that began the Philippine War. As a result, the following examination of these forces will view these forces across the two conflicts.

These conflicts had significant ramifications to the United States Army and the nation during the twentieth century. Most significant of these events to the United States was the annexation of the Philippine Islands as a territory until granted independence following World War II. The changes to the United States Army, while less significant to the nation as a whole, were nevertheless instrumental in shaping the Army for two world wars and conflicts into the twenty-first century. The most significant change to the Army concerned how it mobilized, including force generation, training, and preparation for movement to an operational area. Nearly as critical to the Army as how it mobilized was how the Army employed its reserve component forces. Reserve component forces were necessary to reinforce the Army because of the small standing Army in the late nineteenth century following the Civil War. In recent conflicts, since 2001, reserve component forces have again become critical because of the multiple demands for the Army across the globe. In order to conduct a critical analysis, it is important to know what work has already been completed in this field.

Literature concerning the Philippine War generally begins with the Spanish-American War in 1898 as prelude and then discusses the Filipino insurgency against the United States beginning in early 1899 after the surrender of the Spanish forces in the Philippines. This chronological order provides the narrative necessary to introduce the United States into the Philippines. For this reason, many sources describe the events of the Spanish-American War concurrent to the issues of mobilization and employment of state militia volunteers in this conflict. In this paper, the literature has been categorized into three classifications: first, official federal and state government documents related to the conduct, prosecution, and official history
of the war; second, historical accounts; and finally, the literature that presents the Filipino or anti-imperial perspective.

Official United States government documents include papers specifically related to the war and other writings that discuss only briefly the Philippine War, but still provide additional perspective or information concerning the war.¹ Other government records include several state documents. These documents provide insight, by state, into the experience of the volunteer forces initially called up from the state militias, forerunners of the modern Army National Guard.²


Several reference works serve to guide a researcher to historical writings on the Philippine War that describes the volunteers, their mobilization, and their performance in the Philippine War. Other sources include the wide variety of private historical writings from a variety of perspectives. In addition to these writings, several books focus on the Army itself during the Spanish-American and Philippine wars for, example Colorado Heritage, Montana; The Magazine of Western History, Nebraska History, and Tennessee Historical Quarterly.


during this period. Essential to an examination of the volunteers in the Philippine War is an understanding of the volunteers for the initial mobilization in 1898. Several books have been written concerning the militia and National Guard with some discussion of this period.

A review of the significant works in the study of the Spanish-American War and the Philippine War finds one important area has not been fully developed. The writings on this conflict have failed to produce an in-depth examination of the first volunteers in the Philippines, covering their preparation and performance. These volunteers were mostly existing state militia units, the National Guard, that were mobilized with members who volunteered for duty. However, some of these units were mobilized from the population at large or a combination of members of the National Guard and volunteers from the general public because of decisions made by the governors in some states.

This paper will examine the United States Army’s conduct of the Spanish-American War and Philippine War, 1898-1899, focusing on the initial volunteer forces and their effects on the campaign. The first portion examines the origin, mobilization, and training of the volunteer

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forces. These volunteers were primarily the state militias, the predecessors of the modern National Guard. The initial examination of the preparation of the volunteer forces allows for identification of issues related to the use of the National Guard with respect to their mobilization and training. Next the text explores the actions of the volunteers in the Philippines and discusses their employment, conduct, and effectiveness in theater. Finally, the conclusion will draw themes from the first sections and relate them to a modern context, using the provided empirical evidence in support. The discourse generated from this conclusion, especially comparisons with recent and current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, concerning the use of the National Guard for expeditionary warfare during counterinsurgency or irregular warfare can contribute to future national security policy decisions. One example of a recent national security policy decision regarding the National Guard is the recent inclusion of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau as a full member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\(^7\)

**PREPARATION WOES**

Preparation for war in the Philippines revealed several themes that were constant throughout its course. These constant themes were a lack of preparedness at the national political and Army level for the Spanish-American War and the Philippine War in its aftermath, Army prejudice against the National Guard as a force, detrimental parochialism within the National Guard, and a lack of sufficient equipment at state level to support the mobilization of the National Guard for war. The lack of preparedness at the national political and Army level manifested itself in multiple ways: no definitive mobilization policy or structure to manage it effectively,  

insufficient planning regarding locations for training and housing, a lack of field equipment for mobilized units, and a significant lack of modern small arms and ammunition.

**Policy and Funding**

In early 1898 the United States seemed inexorably headed for war with Spain. Newspaper editorials called for war with Spain over its administration of Cuba, including Spain’s handling of the Cuban insurgency and treatment of Cubans and United States’ citizens in Cuba. Simultaneously, United States’ foreign policy, embodying the Monroe Doctrine, sought to remove Spanish influence from Cuba through supporting independence for Cuba. Spain’s recalcitrant attitude with respect to granting Cuban independence in the face of mounting United States’ pressure only intensified public opinion in favor of war. While the country seemed to clamor for war, the military was decidedly unprepared for war. The Army’s strength in 1898 was only 27,000. It was designed for continental defense and its most recent had been what would be considered frontier constabulary duty against the small, irregular Native American forces in the nation’s Southwest and Plains. An Army with this design and experience was not prepared for expeditionary warfare with Spain, as evidenced by attempts to increase the Army’s capacity and capability. In order to assist in the nation’s preparedness, President William McKinley succeeded in getting Congress to pass the “Fifty-Million-Bill” authorizing fifty million dollars for national defense improvements at the President’s discretion. The Army used most of its nineteen million dollars for improving coastal defenses because the Army believed the conflict with Spain would be primarily naval. The Army was also woefully unprepared for a mobilization on the scale that was ultimately required for the Spanish-American War. U.S. Representative George B. McClellan’s accusations of the Army’s inability to perform staff work in identifying future

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8 Cosmas, *An Army for Empire*, 1.
warfare contingencies or mobilize effectively as publicized in news articles in late 1897 and early 1898 seemed prescient when examined later.\(^9\)

The primary method for mobilization of forces for the Army had not changed since the Civil War when the President called for volunteers and states provided units, mostly from militia either previously existing or called up for the war. The militia was the precursor to the modern National Guard. Most state militias had adopted the term “National Guard” prior to 1898 with Connecticut becoming the first state to officially do so in 1861.\(^10\) The term “National Guard” was not codified into federal law for all states until the National Defense Act of 1916.

Colonel Emory Upton, a reform advocate, envisioned changes to the mobilization process, including the elimination of the National Guard. He advocated for the creation of a national reserve along a European model in the late 1870s following an inspection trip to Europe. Colonel Upton’s dream culminated in 1878 when the bill introducing his reforms was defeated in Congress.\(^11\) The National Guard Association was organized in 1878 to promulgate the National

\(^9\) The Army was not the only entity mistaken in this belief. The Navy also thought war with Spain would be a primarily naval affair, as did Congress and the President since twenty-nine million dollars of the “Fifty Million Bill” was earmarked for the Navy. As the conflict in the Philippines and assistance to Cuba bore out over the next three years, the United States had embarked on a voyage of empire and nation building in the Caribbean Sea and Pacific. This journey was to be primarily a mission for the Army. Coats, *Gathering at the Golden Gate*, 5. Cosmas, *An Army for Empire*, 1 McClellan was the son of Civil War general George B. McClellan which may have caused his criticism to be more strongly felt by the Army than if it had been from someone with no Army ancestry. Report of proceedings in United States’ House of Representatives, “Army Debate in the House,” *New York Times*, Jan 18, 1898.

\(^10\) The first recorded use of National Guard was by a battalion of the 7th Infantry Regiment of the New York National Guard who escorted Marquis de Lafayette during a visit in 1807. In order to recognize the event and honor him, they began using National Guard in homage to Lafayette’s command of the *Guard Nationale* in Paris. There is a unit in the modern New York Army National Guard that traces its lineage to that battalion of the 7th Infantry. Doubler, *Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War*, 108, 158.

\(^11\) Colonel Upton traveled to Europe in 1875-76 at General William T. Sherman’s direction. General Sherman was the Commanding General of the Army at the time and Colonel Upton was considered close to General Sherman. Despite the defeat of this bill, many in the Army felt that Colonel Upton’s reforms concerning a national reserve were the best route for a reserve force to augment the Army since the National Guard belonged to the governors of the states. Cosmas, *An Army for Empire*, 38-39.
Guard’s existence as the nation’s primary reserve component and it was instrumental in the defeat of the bill with the Upton reforms.

In addition to the National Guard Association’s support, John Schofield, Commanding General from 1888-1895, “admired the tenacity and common sense of the volunteer soldier,” and he supported maintaining the National Guard. General Schofield believed the National Guard “fostered a sense of public engagement and promoted local political support,” even though he considered it “not as efficient as the centralized national reserve systems of Europe.”

By the early 1870s, both the adjutant general and chief of ordnance for the Army encouraged the development of the National Guard as the national reserve to serve during war time as necessary, despite Colonel Upton and his followers’ attempts to move to a national reserve solely under federal control. The Army reluctantly began to accept the National Guard and started working with them during the 1880s and 1890s in order to bring about more professionalism in the Guard, a primary concern of the Regular Army.

The efforts by the Regular Army to support the National Guard were apparent in both federal funding increases to the National Guard and assignment of regular officers to train and inspect National Guard units. This had benefits to both the Army and National Guard because officers in the National Guard naturally sought increased professionalism through study.

However, the National Guard was still organized by state and each state had its own method of administering its state’s forces. This effectively created a myriad of state forces across the nation, each with its own methods of selection, fielding, and training forces. One of the most objectionable to the Regular Army was practice of allowing elections or appointments of officers to positions. This practice served to reduce the professionalism of the National Guard in the eyes

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12 Connelly, John M. Schofield and the Politics of Generalship, 5.
13 Cooper, The Rise of the National Guard, 88-89.
of the Regular Army. By 1895, the National Guard had increased in strength to 115,699, over
four times the size of the regular Army, an important consideration in 1898 as the country seemed
to be rushing headlong into war.\textsuperscript{14}

Subsequent to the “Fifty Million Bill,” Representative John Hull introduced a bill
authored by the War Department to increase Army strength during wartime. The initial Hull bill
was drafted to create an “expansible” army allowing the President to increase the size of the
Army to 104,000 during wartime. The initial bill appeared headed for passage when Army
attitude about the National Guard and its role caused the National Guard Association and state
political powers to intervene to defeat of the bill. The Army had planned to exclude National
Guard units and soldiers from the invasion of Cuba and this plan was tied to Hull’s bill. While
National Guard officers were not necessarily opposed to the “expansible army” idea, the
exclusion of the National Guard from the expected war doomed the bill to failure, mostly due to
strong martial spirit in the United States.\textsuperscript{15}

Since mobilization of additional soldiers for the Army had not changed since the Civil
War and the size of the Regular Army was unchanged following the defeat of the Hull bill on
April 6, 1898, President McKinley was forced to ask for volunteers. President McKinley planned
to call up 60,000 volunteers based on War Department recommendations. Shortly before doing
so, retired General Schofield convinced President McKinley not to make the same mistake that
President Abraham Lincoln had made during the Civil War. Retired General Schofield told
President McKinley that President Lincoln called up too few volunteers during his initial request
to prosecute the war to conclusion.

\textsuperscript{14} Doubler, \textit{Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War}, 121.
\textsuperscript{15} Cosmas, \textit{An Army for Empire}, 86-89.
As a result of retired General Schofield’s advice and to ensure no politically powerful state National Guard members felt left out of the war, President McKinley asked for 125,000 volunteers from the states, exceeding the strength of the entire National Guard. Mobilizing volunteers would place National Guard units under federal control as part of the revised Hull bill allowing National Guard units to volunteer as units and remain intact after doing so while limiting the “expansible” army to 61,000 soldiers. This number was small enough to require National Guard participation as expeditionary forces for the coming war with Spain and in meeting this goal, it was acceptable to the National Guard, its association, and politicians representing their states’ interests. 16

President McKinley’s call for volunteers on 23 April 1898 caused the mobilization to be a disaster because of a lack of “uniforms, weapons, food, tents, and other myriad needs.” 17 The issues with this mobilization lay at the feet of the both the states and federal government. The Army and many historians viewed the National Guard as having “failed miserably.” Some of the Army’s criticism can be traced back to the National Guard’s opposition to the Hull Bill, but some is directly related to poor performance by the states in mobilizing and equipping their National Guard and volunteers for the coming conflict.18

Ultimately the mobilization was extremely inefficient due to a lack of practice in mobilizing the nation to a war time status, a lack of policy at the national or Army level, inadequate resources, and the states’ and National Guard’s interference with the mobilization. Army planning for this mobilization consisted of creating the Military Information Division in early 1898. The primary responsibility of the Military Information Division was “to prepare

16 Although General Schofield had retired from the Army in 1895 following his assignment as Commanding General of the Army, he still had much influence, and President McKinley sought his opinion on this issue. Ibid., 100-1.
17 Traxel, 1898, 124.
18 Cooper, The Rise of the National Guard, 97-98.
mobilization plans for the components of the land forces—the Regular Army, the militia (National Guard), and volunteers that might be recruited.”

While this might seem as though the Army had planned, the Military Information Division had a paltry budget of $40,000 with only twelve officers, ten clerks, and two messengers to manage President McKinley’s call for mobilizing 125,000 volunteers, hence many of the problems that occurred with this mobilization.

The Commanding General of the Army, Major General Nelson Miles, identified only approximately 5,000 soldiers for the Philippine Island portion of the war with Spain. This number was out of approximately 150,000 members in the Army, including the new volunteers and the Regular Army. General Miles initially identified this force of three volunteer regiments of National Guard infantry, most of the Regular Fourteenth Infantry Regiment, two batteries of California National Guard artillery and two troops of Regular cavalry. General Miles made this recommendation to the Secretary of War Russell A. Alger in a letter dated May 3, 1898.

Guard Politics and Parochialism

In some states, National Guard units refused to volunteer for service or refused to serve after they volunteered and were called. One state’s militia forces even refused to return

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19 Bradford, *Crucible for Empire*, 27.
20 This occurred only 10 days before General Merritt’s letter to President McKinley. United States Adjutant-General’s Office, *Correspondence, Vol. II*, 635.
21 New York’s famed Seventh Infantry Regiment (first to claim the title of “National Guard”, note 10) refused to volunteer due to a mistaken belief they would be volunteering for duty in the Regular Army. The Seventh later plead to be allowed to volunteer, but these requests were denied. The State of New York also disbanded Brooklyn’s Thirteenth Regiment after they refused to enlist. The Houston Light Guard, a Texas unit, refused to enlist because they were only sworn to “defend their city, county, and state.” They later recanted this position and volunteered, but this action, along with problems mobilizing National Guard units led to significant criticism, especially by those who sought reform through a national reserve and elimination of the National Guard as state forces as posited by Colonel Upton in the 1870s. Cooper, *The Rise of the National Guard*, 106. In South Dakota, one company of the National Guard, Company G of the First South Dakota Infantry, refused entry into service because the newly appointed regimental commander, Colonel Alfred S. Frost, refused to allow them to elect their own officers. As a result, the entire company returned to their hometown of Huron, S.D. without entering federal service. “In South Dakota, too,” *The
equipment loaned to them by the federal government. Additional problems occurred with the mobilization because of politics in the individual states and the fact that each state’s National Guard was closer to an independent army than to a national reserve that was equipped, trained, and staffed uniformly.

Governor John Leedy of Kansas did not trust the National Guard. Governor Leedy chose not to call up any National Guard units, but did allow them to volunteer to fill Kansas’ four volunteer regiments. Only thirty of one hundred sixty-seven officers in the four regiments had National Guard experience. Of the thirty officers with experience, only two were field grade officers. Governor Leedy was very fortunate when he appointed Frederick Funston to the rank of colonel and gave him command of the Twentieth Kansas Infantry regiment even though he had no prior United States military experience. Colonel Funston was later promoted to Brigadier General, received the Medal of Honor, and led the raid that captured Emilio Aguinaldo, the leader of the Philippine insurgency, one of the factors that ultimately brought about the end of organized resistance in the Philippines.

22 The Navy had loaned a monitor to the North Carolina Naval Militia, who refused to return it to the Navy prior to the North Carolina Adjutant General interceding on the Navy’s behalf. The commander of the naval militia actually hoisted the North Carolina flag and challenged anyone to try to take the ship from him. Several states still have militia, including naval militia, but they are not part of the National Guard as it is codified under Title 32 United States Code. Millis, _The Martial Spirit_, 158.  
23 Graham A. Cosmas, “From Order to Chaos: The War Department, the National Guard, and Military Policy, 1898,” _Military Affairs_ 29, no. 3, (Fall 1965), 120.  
24 Cooper, _The Rise of the National Guard_, 99.  
25 To his credit, Frederick Funston initially balked at Governor Leedy’s proposal to exclude any National Guard units from being mobilized, but Governor Leedy refused to budge on this point. Frederick Funston accepted the position as colonel of the Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry. Colonel Funston was later promoted to Brigadier General of the Volunteers. General Funston remained on active duty after receiving a Regular Army commission to the rank of Brigadier General for his performance in the Philippines. General Funston attributed the Twentieth Kansas Volunteers’ outstanding performance as being directly related to having over 300 National Guard members in his regiment. General Funston actually served as General John J. Pershing’s superior during the Mexican or “Punitive” Expedition into Mexico in 1916-17. General Funston died of a heart attack on the eve of the United States’ entry into World War I, or he might have been the commander of the American Expeditionary Force in France as he
Governor Leedy’s actions in Kansas represented the most significant anomaly in how states raised their volunteers during the mobilization process of 1898. Other states generally followed President McKinley’s guidance in his call for volunteers by mobilizing entire National Guard units as volunteers. Another deviation from simply using mobilized National Guard units occurred when governors appointed officers into positions based on politics or personal reasons.

Texas Governor Charles A. Culberson appointed National Guard officers. However, instead of selecting line officers, Governor Culberson appointed his adjutant general and other staff officers as colonels in command of his regiments. In another variation, the governors of Colorado, South Dakota, and Washington used National Guard units to fill the requested troop allocations, but appointed Regular Army officers to command their regiments, as the law allowed. Under the revised Hull Bill, volunteer regiments were authorized one Regular Army officer each. Once mobilized, the volunteers were sent to training bases throughout the United States for preparation for overseas duty, either in Cuba or the Philippines. 26

The National Guard’s organizational structure, the lack of a clear national policy on mobilization, and even federal law can be blamed for some of the problems with the initial call for volunteers. In addition, the Army often used methods and procedures during the mobilization process that served only to exacerbate an already difficult mobilization. One example was when the Army moved Regular units to their encampment locations for training and preparation before movement into their theater of war over a week prior to President McKinley’s call for volunteers. Adjutant-General Corbin notified Regular Army units via telegram to move to designated

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was still senior to General Pershing when he died. Funston, Memories of Two Wars, vii-viii, 150. Thomas W. Crouch, A Leader of Volunteers: Frederick Funston and the 20th Kansas in the Philippines, 1898-1899 (Lawrence, KS: Coronado Press, 1984), 8-9.

locations on April 15, 1898 even while the government was still undecided over how many volunteers to call up for service.\textsuperscript{27}

The first United States’ units, including National Guard volunteer regiments, left San Francisco on ships bound for the Philippines on May 25, 1898; just over one month after President McKinley’s call for volunteers.\textsuperscript{28} The first deploying National Guard units would have had nearly 30\% more training time if the Army had notified them of mobilization at the same time as the Regular forces were notified. The discussion of overall mobilization numbers notwithstanding, it would have been possible to identify those few first deploying regiments while still determining the total number of volunteers required. While time was a component of the issues surrounding the mobilization of National Guard forces, it was not the only problem related to their mobilization.

Supply issues and confusion over where various National Guard regiments were to mobilize existed as well. The Tenth Pennsylvania began organizing over April 27 and 28, finally mobilizing for federal service on May 12, 1898. On May 17, 1898, Adjutant-General Corbin ordered them to Chickamauga Park, Georgia for encampment for potential service in Cuba.\textsuperscript{29} The Tenth Pennsylvania had not even begun to move when Adjutant-General Corbin changed their destination from Chickamauga to San Francisco in a telegram on May 18, 1898 to the Commander of the Tenth Pennsylvania, Colonel Alexander Hawkins.\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{27} Alger, \textit{The Spanish-American War}, 15.
\textsuperscript{28} Letters from General Miles to Adjutant-General Corbin on May 24, 1898 and the Assistant Secretary of War on May 25, 1898 concerning the ships with soldiers being prepared to move on May 24 and moving on May 25. United States Adjutant-General’s Office, \textit{Correspondence, Vol. II}, 671-73.
\textsuperscript{30} United States Adjutant-General’s Office, \textit{Correspondence Vol. II}, 658.
The source for this change in destination was most likely due to political pressure; politics being a pervasive theme with employment of the National Guard. Adjutant-General Corbin ordered the Tenth Pennsylvania to San Francisco in order to deploy them to the Philippines. When Colonel Hawkins requested a delay in Pennsylvania for equipment, Adjutant-General Corbin denied his request. Adjutant-General Corbin told Colonel Hawkins he “hope[d] to have these things ready for you when you reach San Francisco.” The trip across the country took six days for the Tenth Pennsylvania, finally arriving on May 25, 1898. They were to embark for the Philippines on June 14, 1898, barely three weeks later. This was hardly enough time to engage in meaningful training and preparation, especially when many soldiers arrived lacking the necessary implements, including clothing and field equipment, to train as soldiers.

The Fifty-first Iowa Volunteers had a similar experience when they were mustered into federal service on May 30, 1898 and ordered to Chickamauga as well. Adjutant General Corbin ordered them to San Francisco for the long voyage to Manila just three days later on June 2, 1898 in a telegram to the regiment’s commander, Colonel John C. Loper. This change was only three days before the Fifty-first Iowa boarded trains for San Francisco after they had been planning to go to Chickamauga for several weeks with the other regiments from Iowa.

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31 Representative J.B. Showalter, PA, sent a telegram to Adjutant-General Corbin requesting the Tenth Pennsylvania be utilized in the Philippines on May 18, 1898, just prior to Adjutant-General Corbin’s telegram to Colonel Hawkins directing his regiment to San Francisco. Colonel Hawkins’ request to Adjutant-General Corbin was to delay in Pennsylvania in order to provide 175 of his men with uniforms and equipment and 160 with weapons, as these soldiers were without these essential items. Adjutant-General Corbin’s response is indicative of the state of supplies and equipment for the Army during this mobilization period and further illustrates the significant logistic problems facing the Army. Ibid., 658-9.


33 United States Adjutant-General’s Office, Correspondence Vol. I, 593.


35 United States Adjutant-General’s Office, Correspondence Vol. I, 593.
In Nebraska, the First Nebraska Volunteer regiment mustered into federal service on May 10, 1898 with 51 officers and 983 enlisted. The regiment departed Lincoln on May 16, 1898 and arrived in San Francisco over May 20-21, 1898. The First Nebraska was the first unit from outside California to arrive at Camp Merritt, a former horse racing track located between the Golden Gate Bridge and The Presidio of San Francisco.

The men of the First Nebraska found reason to complain about Camp Merritt because of the cold weather and fog. Another source of contention was surface at Camp Merritt. Sand had been used to cover the horse racing track, necessitating the First Nebraska’s requirement to march to either the Golden Gate Park or Presidio Hill for drilling since most of Camp Merritt was covered with wet sand “four to six inches deep,” a difficult surface on which to conduct drill.36

Despite the Nebraskans presence in San Francisco amounting to little more than one month prior to their embarkation for transport to the Philippines, it was enough time for rumors about the regiment’s final destination to run rampant. These rumors ran the gamut from the regiment performing guard duty in Arizona to being returned home instead of going to the Philippines. The political nature of the National Guard was illustrated when Captain Frank Eager, First Nebraska Volunteers, sent a telegram to Nebraska Senator William V. Allen requesting assistance in getting the regiment to the Philippines. Senator Allen did not become involved, but the regiment boarded a ship only 11 days later for the Philippines.37

Colorado Governor Alva Adams called up the Colorado National Guard on April 29, 1898 four days after President McKinley issued his call for volunteers. The 1,400 soldiers organized in two infantry regiments, an artillery battery, and three cavalry troops in Denver to

prepare for transportation to California as part of the Philippines expedition. After mustering the
National Guard, Governor Adams reorganized them into a single infantry regiment, the First
Colorado Volunteer Infantry, with 46 officers and 970 enlisted. The First Colorado swore into
federal service on May 8, 1898 and boarded trains for San Francisco just one week later before
finally arriving in San Francisco on May 20, 1898.

The circumstances around the Colorado Volunteers represented another instance of how
confusing this mobilization had become for the Army. Major General Elwell S. Otis, wrote to
Adjutant-General Corbin on May 18, 1898 to tell him that “none of the troops are properly
equipped” in describing several regiments, including the Colorado Volunteers. Ironically, two
days later, on May 20, 1898, General Elwell Otis wrote to Adjutant-General Corbin again, but
this time he described the Colorado Volunteers as being “at full regimental strength, well
equipped, well officered, and having superior medical officers”38 as part of a recommendation to
send them immediately overseas to the Philippines. Both of these letters were written by the same
author to the same recipient about the same unit only two days apart and before the unit arrived or
was present for inspection.39

Governor William P. Lord of Oregon was only required to provide one regiment for the
Presidential call-up. In order to avoid accusations of showing favoritism to anyone he mobilized
both the First and Second Oregon Infantry Regiments to consolidate them into a single regiment.
The Oregon soldiers were to proceed to Portland within twenty-four hours after Oregon Adjutant
General B.B. Tuttle published the orders mobilizing them on April 25, 1898. The Second Oregon
mustered into federal service on May 7 and 15, 1898 with 50 officers and 970 enlisted men before
moving to San Francisco on May 11 and 16, 1898. The officers, including the regimental

38 United States Adjutant-General’s Office, Correspondence Vol. II, 659-660, 663-664.
commander, were selected on the basis of seniority by rank in the National Guard. Since this process did not require all officers to be selected, many officers willingly accepted appointments at lesser ranks to serve, and some even stated they would enlist if no commissioned vacancies were available. “Love for country was the motive for going to war” 40 for Oregonians not fame or fortune.

General Merritt had placed his second-in-command, General Elwell Otis, in charge of chartering and preparing transports. These duties included working with General Merritt in determining the schedule for troop movements to the Philippines. As early as May 19, 1898, General Elwell Otis identified the Second Oregon Volunteers as “now here and in fair shape” to Adjutant-General Corbin in a letter on May 19, 1898 recommending that regiment as one of the first to move to the Philippines. 41

Of more than passing interest are the apparently contradictory remarks between General Elwell Otis’ “fair shape” telegram, compliments he and General Merriam reportedly gave to the Second Oregon commander, Colonel Owen Summers, on the “splendid physique of his men, their equipment, and drilling,” and later War Department criticism of the lack of adequate equipment and proper screening of the soldiers in the Second Oregon Volunteers. 42 It is impossible to tell which of these three very different descriptions of the Second Oregon’s equipment and physical preparation status is accurate. At a minimum, any criticism overlooks the idea that the

41 General Otis rescinded this recommendation within twenty-four hours after a measles outbreak in the Second Oregon Volunteers that required their quarantine. United States Adjutant General’s Office, Correspondence Vol. II, 663. General Otis to Adjutant-General Corbin in letter dated May 20, 1898.
Quartermaster for the Department of the Pacific sent Oregon volunteers to a clothier for uniforms. Upon arrival, the Second Oregon found that the First California Volunteers had already secured all clothing items during their visit. The Army’s inability to remedy supply problems was yet another example of the Army’s ill preparedness for a mobilization of this size and rapidity. Letters from senior officers, both inside and outside the Second Oregon Volunteers tend to implicate the Army’s logistic system for the failure, despite not specifically making that accusation.43

The First California Volunteers were mustered into federal service on May 6, 1898, in San Francisco with 51 officers and 986 enlisted. San Francisco was home for the First California Volunteers as a National Guard unit, and it was the only west coast city that was home to an entire regiment, one of the factors considered in its selection as the staging base for the Philippine Expedition. Additionally, Captain Frank de L. Carrington, a Regular Army officer assigned to observe the California National Guard, described the First California as having “excellent”44 personnel and discipline. This evaluation and their proximity to San Francisco made the First California Volunteers one of the units selected for the first expedition to travel to the Philippines on May 23, 1898, less than three weeks after they were mustered into federal service.45

43 Colonel Summers wrote Adjutant-General Corbin on July 8, 1898 after arriving in Cavite, Philippine Islands regarding his soldiers’ limited clothing and equipment owing to minimal provisioning by the quartermaster in San Francisco. Brigadier General Thomas M. Anderson echoed these concerns when he wrote to Adjutant-General Corbin the following day, July 9, 1898, regarding the clothing issues and how the Second Oregon’s quartermaster was denied most requested items. General Anderson reported the Second Oregon Volunteers soldiers had only one pair of shoes, but he avoided blaming the “administration” in San Francisco. United States Adjutant General’s Office, Correspondence Vol. II, 776-78.

44 Coats, Gathering at the Golden Gate, 31.

At Montana Governor Robert B. Smith’s direction, the Montana National Guard began
reporting to Helena, Montana to muster for federal service on April 28, 1898. They occupied a
hastily formed encampment named Camp Robert B. Smith, after the governor, and mustered into
federal service from May 5 through May 10, 1898 with 48 officers and 976 enlisted. The First
Montana Volunteers arrived in San Francisco on May 28, 1898 to await transportation to the
Philippine Islands, but this was not to come until July 10, 1898.46

Montana was originally only tasked with a quota of only 419 based on their filled units at
the time of mobilization. Montana had been very proactive in organizing their National Guard,
despite their limited history as a state. In 1894, Montana requested Army assistance in training
the Montana National Guard. The Army agreed and assigned Lieutenant Robert Wallace, Regular
Army, as the military secretary to Montana’s governor. Lieutenant Wallace was able to
implement training, military schools, and create the first military code for the state. The positive
changes in the Montana National Guard’s professionalism from Lieutenant Wallace’s assignment
were instrumental four years later in convincing Secretary of War Alger that Montana could field
an entire regiment, as they were ultimately asked to do.47

Governor Frank Briggs of North Dakota ordered the North Dakota National Guard to
report for service at Fargo on May 2, 1898. The 1st North Dakota Volunteers mustered into
federal service between May 13 and May 16, 1898 with 27 officers and 658 enlisted men. The

46 Robert K. Hines, “First to Respond to Their Country’s Call: The First Montana Infantry and the
Spanish-American War and Philippine Insurrection, 1898-1899,” Montana: the Magazine of Western
History 52, no. 3 (Autumn 2002): 49-50. United States Adjutant General’s Office, Correspondence Vol. I,
602.
47 Hines, “First to Respond to Their Country’s Call,” 46,49.
First North Dakota Volunteers left Fargo on May 26 and arrived in San Francisco on May 30, 1898.\textsuperscript{48}  

North Dakota was not without its own set of problems arising from the mobilization as well. Governor Briggs used the National Guard for the mobilization with its own officers, but the state’s original quota was for “five troops of cavalry.” The North Dakota National Guard had only one troop of cavalry, but nine infantry companies in its 1st Regiment. The state had been providing information to the War Department since the early 1880s, but the War Department apparently ignored North Dakota’s actual strength when assigning quotas. One possible reason for this anomaly was Teddy Roosevelt attempting to organize a western cavalry regiment. North Dakota did not simply accept this direction that they viewed as detrimental to the National Guard. Governor Briggs and North Dakota Adjutant General Elliott S. Miller wrote to North Dakota Senator Henry C. Hansbrough to change the assignment. Senator Hansbrough managed to convince the War Department to allow North Dakota to volunteer her infantrymen as infantrymen.\textsuperscript{49}

The final organization was for two battalions of four companies each, not a complete ten company regiment. North Dakota’s problems with strength prior to mobilization was the reason for this lower quota than that given to many other states. Ultimately nearly sixty percent of enlisted soldiers that formed the 1st North Dakota Volunteers were from outside the National Guard as result of the strength issues. This also meant the regimental commander could not mobilize as a full colonel, another source of conflict for Governor Briggs. Fortunately, the original regimental commander was very unpopular, so Governor Briggs was able to promote the senior major who had been a battalion commander, simultaneously solving his personnel issue,  

\textsuperscript{49} Cooper and Smith, \textit{Citizens as Soldiers}, 39.
keeping the politically influential National Guard appeased by adhering to a promotion policy based on seniority.\textsuperscript{50}

The Thirteenth Minnesota was the only Minnesota National Guard unit assigned to the Philippine Expedition. The Thirteenth Minnesota was originally the First Minnesota, but Minnesota Adjutant General Hermann Muehlberg ordered it re-designated as the Thirteenth Minnesota on May 4, 1898.\textsuperscript{51} Minnesota Governor David Clough and Adjutant-General Muehlberg were proactive in their administration of the National Guard by ordering them to recruit an additional “fifteen hundred men” as a “precautionary measure” in preparation for likely war with Spain. Governor Clough made this decision following his receipt of news from Washington, D.C. that indicated passage of a war resolution was imminent and that it would include a provision for activation of the National Guard.\textsuperscript{52} When the call for volunteers came from the President on April 23 followed by the specific request for Minnesota Volunteers from the Secretary of War on April 25, 1898, the State’s regiments were at nearly one hundred percent of wartime strength, an excellent accomplishment on the State’s part.\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{50} Interestingly, one hundred percent of the commissioned officers in the 1st North Dakota Volunteers originated in the National Guard. Cooper and Smith, \textit{Citizens as Soldiers}, 38-39, 41-42. See also John Durand, \textit{The Boys: 1st North Dakota Volunteers in the Philippines} (Puzzlebox Press: Elkhorn, WI, 2010), 19.

\textsuperscript{51} The numbering of Minnesota’s regiments for federal service began where Minnesota left off numbering regiments mustered for the Civil War with Twelve, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth being the next three sequentially. The veterans of the old First, Second, and Third Regiments had prevailed upon the State to leave their regimental lineage and history intact at home. The First became the Thirteenth because the Second Regiment’s commander was senior to the First Regiment’s commander, so the Second Regiment became the Twelfth Regiment. The Third Regiment became the Fourteenth Regiment. Franklin F. Holbrook, ed., \textit{Minnesota in the Spanish-American War and Philippine Insurrection}, (Saint Paul: The Riverside Press, 1923), 21. HathiTrust Digital Library, http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=njp.32101049985961 (accessed 14 December 2011).

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 13.

\textsuperscript{53} Despite their accomplishment, the Minnesota National Guard had to direct additional recruitment efforts because of the number of personnel disqualified from enlistment into Federal service. Ibid., 15.
Utah Governor Heber M. Wells called for volunteers, primarily from the Utah National Guard, but he left open the possibility of civilians volunteering in his proclamation to the citizens of Utah on April 25, 1898. On May 9, 1898 nine officers and 242 enlisted soldiers were mustered into federal service following Governor Wells’ proclamation.54

This number was presumably for service in two artillery batteries and two cavalry troops. This quota was based on a letter from Secretary of War Alger on April 25, 1898 asking for two batteries of artillery and one troop of cavalry. Governor Wells then received another message from Secretary of War Alger asking for eighty-five mounted soldiers. The confusion created by Secretary of War Alger’s request led to some Utah volunteers being very disappointed after receiving Adjutant-General Corbin’s message about canceling the second troop of cavalry.55

Nor was this to be the only problem of the Utah Volunteers in their mobilization. In a similar theme with Adjutant-General Corbin’s last minute destination changes for the Tenth Pennsylvania and First Tennessee regiments, he changed the Utah Volunteers destination from Chickamauga to San Francisco less than a day before the units embarked on their train.56

The First Tennessee mustered into federal service from May 19 to May 26, 1898 with 975 enlisted and 47 officers. The regiment boarded trains for San Francisco on June 10, 1898 and arrived in San Francisco one week later on June 17, 1898.57 General Merritt identified problems with the First Tennessee shortly after they arrived when he described them as “destitute of equipment” and lacking proficiency in “drill and instruction to a great extent” in a telegram to

55 Ibid., 30-31.
56 Ibid., 33.
57 United States Adjutant-General’s Office, Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain, and Conditions Growing out of the Same: Including the Insurrection in the Philippine Islands and the China Relief Expedition from April 15, 1898 to July 30, 1902 Vol. I (Washington, DC: 1902), 618. Hereafter referred to as Correspondence Vol. I
Adjutant-General Corbin on June 20, 1898. General Merritt went so far in this letter as to request a regiment to replace the First Tennessee because he felt it would be sometime before they were ready for “duty in the field.”

While at Camp Merritt in San Francisco, the First Tennessee regiment suffered conditions poor enough that the commander, Colonel William C. Smith requested permission to move them to the Presidio for health reasons. This move did not take place until after other units had already left for the Philippines, freeing space for other soldiers to move from the poor drill and sanitary conditions at the Presidio, yet another example of the Army’s ill-preparedness for the training of newly raised volunteers for the Spanish-American War.

The state of Tennessee mustered three regiments for service in the Spanish-American War, but only one, the First Tennessee Volunteers, was designated for the Philippines. The Army’s addition of the First Tennessee Volunteers did not come about until after General Merritt requested additional troops beyond his first allocation by the War Department. General Merritt’s request for additional soldiers had the undesired side effect of putting him at odds with General Miles, Commanding General for the Army, who had only recommended 5,000 soldiers for the entire Philippine Expedition.

58 General Merritt specifically asked Adjutant-General Corbin for the First New York Volunteers, who he described as a “good regiment,” in a letter he wrote on June 20, 1898. United States, Adjutant-General’s Office, Correspondence Vol. II, 707. General Merritt’s opposition to National Guard forces was not complete, but was more likely due to his experience with western National Guard forces. General Merritt was disappointed with the western National Guard forces “particularly dismal” performance during strike operations in Omaha in 1877 and their “unreliable” behavior during strike operations in Chicago in 1894. General Merritt viewed the eastern National Guard forces, specifically New York as competent and professional based on his specific request for a unit from that state. Donald E. Alberts, Brandy Station to Manila Bay: A Biography of General Wesley Merritt (Austin, TX: Presidial Press, 1980), 247, 292, 298.


60 General Merritt mailed a letter to President McKinley on May 13, 1898, at President McKinley’s request, detailing a list of approximately 13,000 troops he believed necessary given the size of the Philippines. Ironically, General Merritt finally sent the same letter to Adjutant-General Corbin on May 16, 1898 with the statement that after writing the letter, it “occurred” to him that he should send a copy to
Regular Army Criticism and Discrimination

This disagreement was very clear in letters between Commanding General Miles, Adjutant-General Corbin, and General Merritt from May 16 to May 18, 1898. General Miles ultimately acquiesced to an earlier request for more troops by General Merritt by increasing the Philippines Expedition’s strength to approximately 15,000 soldiers. General Merritt countered, through Adjutant-General Corbin, that he disagreed with General Miles about whether 15,000 soldiers was enough given the Philippines’ geographic size, population, and potential numbers of enemy armed forces present. General Miles replied to General Merritt’s claim that the 15,000 soldiers he recommended on May 16 were more than adequate. General Miles added that 15,000 was 10,000 more than requested by Rear Admiral George Dewey, commander of the naval forces in the Philippines, and three times the number required in General Miles’ professional opinion. Adjutant-General Corbin notified General Merritt on June 14, 1898 that he would be receiving 20,000 soldiers for the expedition, apparently vindicating General Merritt’s argument about the forces required in the Philippines. The War Department later granted General Merritt’s request to include a corps headquarters for the Philippine Expedition. 61

the Adjutant-General’s office, so he was. General Merritt also explained in his letter to Adjutant-General Corbin that he only did this at the President’s invitation and that the contents were only his “opinion.” United States Adjutant-General’s Office, Correspondence Vol. II, 643-45.

61 20,000 soldiers still represented a very small portion, approximately 15% of the total Army after expansion, of forces available for the war. Another item of interest in this correspondence is how the Army viewed the Philippine Expedition. General Miles refers to the Philippines as “our possession” while General Merritt describes the expedition as designed to “conquer” the Philippines. Both of these statements portray a strategic intent from the highest levels different than is normally interpreted for our possession of the Philippines as almost an afterthought and something the United States did not want. President McKinley’s instructions to General Merritt on May 19, 1898 (Correspondence II, 676-678) direct the “occupation” of the Philippines. While President McKinley does not describe the length of the occupation, he does mention installation of a legal system, re-opening ports for commerce and collection of “duties” and “taxes” that would now be due to the United States as the “military occupier.” Acts of this nature can be fairly interpreted as displaying a long-term presence. Ibid., 647-649, 700, 707. One additional piece to this controversy was General Merritt’s alleged remarks to a New York newspaper about only having “1,000 regular troops” available and being “unwilling to undertake the command,” as quoted in Diary of a Dirty
The First Tennessee was not the only National Guard unit General Merritt had concerns about. In the same telegram to Adjutant General Corbin on June 20, 1898, General Merritt asked for another “good regiment” to replace the Twentieth Kansas Volunteers who had been in San Francisco for “some time” and had become well-known for the “want of capacity, so far as officers are concerned.” General Merritt excluded Colonel Funston from this assessment and felt he was a good officer, but the Twentieth Kansas Volunteers were still “unlikely to be fit for some time.”

General Merritt expressed displeasure throughout the mobilization process with the ratio of Regular to Volunteer forces for the Philippine Expedition. General Merritt was particularly bothered by the distribution of Regular forces between the Philippine Expedition and the planned invasion of Cuba, since only two Regular regiments were dedicated for the Philippine Expedition out of over twenty total Regular regiments. General Miles had originally proposed a 1:4 Regular to Volunteer ratio for the Philippine Expedition in his initial recommendation on May 3, 1898. Even after the War Department raised the troop strength of the expedition to 20,000 soldiers, the ratio of Regulars to Volunteers remained approximately 1:4. General Merritt was still desirous of additional Regular forces, but potential political ramifications made this impossible for President McKinley. Deployment of additional Regular forces would have meant replacing the Regular unit with a mobilized National Guard unit to take their place in stateside duties. The National Guard had already made its feelings known about ensuring their inclusion in overseas

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_Little War_. General Merritt later attributed these remarks to him being misquoted. Rosenfeld, _Diary of a Dirty Little War_, 71-72.

62 General Merritt letter to Adjutant-General Corbin on June 20, 1898. United States, Adjutant-General’s Office, _Correspondence Vol. II_, 707.

63 Ibid., 647-649. Letters from General Miles to Secretary Alger, May 16, 1898 with indorsements by the Assistant Adjutant-General, Adjutant-General, General Merritt, and General Miles.
duty during the Hull bill debates, so forcing one of their regiments to remain home for a Regular regiment to deploy would have been politically unacceptable.64

The mobilization of volunteers was mostly from National Guard units. However, in more than a few instances the political whims of various state level politicians did not serve to bring the best trained force into federal service in preparation for the Spanish-American War. Problems in the various states and the issues with the federal government in terms of equipping, assigning, and transporting units within the nation became more apparent over the first few weeks following President McKinley’s call for volunteers. Few states had been able to clothe or arm their National Guard soldiers in accordance with the federal standard. Although states had indicated a lack of equipment in various reports, the actual equipment situation was far worse than the most pessimistic pre-war reports.

The Army’s Chief of Ordnance had only expected to replace approximately one-third of the National Guard’s equipment; however, in practice he had to replace all the equipment for several regiments.65 Nor did the Army’s Quartermaster Department have adequate staffing or experience to support the mobilization. The Quartermaster Department had only fifty-seven officers serving when President McKinley issued his call for volunteers. Compounding the lack of personnel was the lack of experience for the head of the Quartermaster Department. Brigadier General Marshall Ludington’s assumption of the Quartermaster General duties preceded the sinking of the Maine in Cuba by only a few days.66

The equipment woes began at home because the federal government provided what amounted to insignificant funding for the National Guard in individual states. The federal

64 Coats, *Gathering at the Golden Gate*, 18.
65 Cosmas, *An Army for Empire*, 120.
government gave the states only $400,000 yearly that was divided amongst the states based on
their reported National Guard strength. The federal financial support for the National Guard had
not increased since 1887. The increase in 1887 was the first since 1808 and only doubled the
amount of money Congress contributed to the National Guard from $200,000 to $400,000, even
though the population of the nation had increased ten-fold in that period. This amount meant the
federal government contributed less than $4.00 per year for each member of the National Guard.
In contrast, the various states had spent $2,834,975 on to support their militia.67

The most egregious of the National Guard’s equipment woes came with respect to the
most basic weapon, the infantryman’s rifle. The National Guard’s infantry regiments were not
well equipped because they still possessed considerable numbers of .45 caliber Springfield rifles,
an outdated weapon when compared to the Krag-Jorgensen. The Springfield was a single shot
breech loader that fired black powder while the Krag-Jorgensen .30 caliber repeater could fire
five rounds without reloading and used smokeless powder. The relevance of black powder vice
smokeless powder was that black powder gave away the firer’s position because the rifle issued a
large cloud of black smoke when fired. The number of Krag-Jorgensen rifles in the federal
arsenal barely covered the size of the newly expanded Regular Army. This put the National
Guard soldiers at a disadvantage because there were not enough Krag-Jorgensen rifles for the
Army to issue them to the Volunteers and no smokeless powder was available for the Springfield
rifles. At least one general officer, General Leonard Wood, was aware of the importance of
smokeless powder, and the potential disadvantage it represented to the National Guard soldiers.68

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67 Major Howard A. Giddings, “How to Improve the Condition and Efficiency of the National
    Guard,” Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States 21 (Jul-Nov 1897), 72. HathiTrust
    Birth of the American Century, 142. A. Prentiss, ed., The History of the Utah Volunteers in the Spanish-
    American War and in the Philippine Islands, 232.
General Miles had already displayed poor judgment in his strength of forces recommendations and disagreement with General Merritt over the size of the Philippine Expedition. After that episode, he made what could arguably be classified as his most significant error in judgment during the Spanish-American War. As the Commanding General, General Miles recommended ceasing production of Krag-Jorgensen rifles the same week that the United States declared war with Spain. He wanted to shift production from the primary small arm of the United States Army to another rifle that the Army had already rejected twice. Fortunately, General Miles’ idea about halting production of the Krag-Jorgensens went the way of his recommended strength for the Philippine Expedition and was denied. 69

Ultimately while the Army kept the Krag-Jorgensen, very few of these rifles were provided to National Guard soldiers who were mobilized in support of the war against Spain, thus negatively impacting every mobilized National Guard regiment at the most basic level of the infantryman—his weapon. General Elwell Otis indicated the situation involving the National Guard using only the Springfield rifle was still unresolved a year later from a letter he wrote to Secretary of War Alger on May 16, 1899. 70

The issues mentioned are not meant to imply the Army did not work with the National Guard because they did. In fact, by 1895, thirty-three states had Regular Army officers assigned to state headquarters for three to four year tours to assist with training and inspection of National Guard forces. However, this number was not nearly adequate to the number of National Guard

70 The letter from General Otis to Secretary Alger regarding weapons and ammunition was in response to a letter from Secretary Alger concerning complaints he received over volunteers using Springfield rifles and black powder. General Otis dismissed the complaint because it was from August 1898 and said he did “not consider it of merit.” United States Adjutant General’s Office, *Correspondence Vol. II*, 990.
soldiers, who outnumbered the Regular Army by a four to one ratio just prior to the Spanish-American War.\textsuperscript{71}

In fact, Utah’s quota of two batteries of artillery was based on General Merritt’s request for additional artillery. Utah had one of the only National Guard field artillery units in the nation equipped with the modern 3.2 inch breech loading cannon. Most National Guard artillery units “were deficient” and had older muzzle loading cannons left over from the Civil War. This was one of the few instances where National Guard equipment was equal to that possessed by the Regulars, but it amounted to equality in arms for approximately 1% of the National Guard volunteers in terms of sheer numbers.\textsuperscript{72}

Unfortunately, issues arising in San Francisco only served to exacerbate an already difficult mobilization for the Army. Volunteers arriving in San Francisco after as many as five days aboard a train had to spend one more night on the train at the siding if they arrived after ferry service from Oakland to San Francisco had stopped.\textsuperscript{73}

Major General Henry C. Merriam, Departments of California and Columbia, was responsible for receiving the Volunteers and finding them bivouacs. On May 12, 1898, as the 1st Washington Volunteers arrived in San Francisco and moved into billeting with the California Volunteers, General Merriam observed that the Washington Volunteers were “half-uniformed and half-armed.” General Merriam had experience with the Washington Volunteers prior to assuming his role in California. General Merriam, as commander of the Department of Columbia, was

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\textsuperscript{71} The Regular Army’s strength in June 1897, prior to increasing its size after passage of the Hull Bill, was 27,532 while the National Guard’s strength was already over 115,000 by 1895. Heits, \textit{Historical Dictionary of the United States Army 1789-1903} Vol. 2, 626. Cooper, \textit{Rise of the National Guard}, 28, 89-91. Giddings, “How to improve the Condition and Efficiency of the National Guard,” 72.
\textsuperscript{72} Coats, \textit{Gathering at the Golden Gate}, 22. Feuer, \textit{America at War}, 54.
\textsuperscript{73} Coats, \textit{Gathering at the Golden Gate}, 44.
responsible for oversight of the Washington National Guard, and he likely formed his opinion of the Washington Volunteers during that duty.\textsuperscript{74}

After arriving at their encampments for federal service, the Volunteers immediately began having issues with disease and hygiene. According to Secretary of War Alger, “more than ninety percent” of the volunteer regiments had typhoid fever cases within two months of moving into camps at both the federal and state levels. Secretary Alger also asserts that “over eighty percent” of all disease deaths were attributable to “this camp scourge,” as he called it. Secretary Alger further asserted that “camp pollution,” or improper field hygiene, was the chief cause for the issues with disease.\textsuperscript{75}

Partially to its credit, the Army recognized the potential for hygiene to be an issue with large numbers of personnel living in camps that were hastily organized and predominantly occupied by volunteers. The problem with volunteers was that most had little field experience and demonstrated an “appalling ignorance of camp sanitary practices.” These factors led Army Surgeon General George M. Sternberg to draft Circular No. 1 on April 25, 1898 for issuance to all units upon reporting to camps for mobilization.\textsuperscript{76}

General Merritt, General Elwell Otis, and General Merriam all criticized various elements of the Volunteers after and, in some instances, even before their arrival in San Francisco. While all three of these two-star generals, the senior rank in the Army at the time,
recognized the issues with the Volunteers, there is little evidence to suggest the Commander, General Merritt, took positive action to correct the deficiencies.

General Merritt, overall commander of the entire Philippine Expedition, is reported to have visited the three sites where his expedition was living and training, the Presidio, the Fontana warehouse, or his namesake, Camp Merritt, a total of four times. Those visits were specifically to confer with General Elwell Otis and three coincided with the sailing of the second part of the expedition to the Philippines. General Merritt was only recorded to have made a single formal inspection of one unit at Camp Merritt. General Merritt’s apparent lack of interest in the training and living conditions of almost 12,000 soldiers whom he was going to rely on for nearly seventy-five percent of his combat power in the Philippine Islands is incomprehensible.77

General Merritt displayed only a “vague familiarity” with Camp Merritt when asked about the camp, even describing it as having “good sewerage.” This was not a comment he would likely have made had he resided at the camp or made even regular visits to that location. The cause of this unfamiliarity is likely due to his “fondness for comfortable urban living,” as demonstrated by his residency in the Palace Hotel, among the most luxurious in the West in 1898.78

General Merritt’s inattention to the actual conditions of his soldiers and their training was apparently unknown to his superiors. Secretary Alger described General Merritt’s actions as “devoting his entire time and energy in the instruction, organization, and equipment” of the soldiers in his command. Secretary Alger’s description can either be interpreted as lack of understanding of the situation on the ground or simple exaggeration in praise of General Merritt. Secretary Alger exhibited similar conduct when he described the seizure of Manila and

77 Coats, Gathering at the Golden Gate, 91.
78 Ibid., 92. Alberts, Brandy Station to Manila Bay, 284.
commended the “heroism” of Brigadier General George A. MacArthur’s troops without mentioning the arrangement between Admiral Dewey, General Merritt, and the Spanish governor through the Belgian consul to surrender Manila to the United States following a minor attack. This attack was conducted with the purpose of allowing the Spanish to maintain their “honor” when they surrendered.  

In contrast to General Merritt, General Elwell Otis lived and worked at Camp Merritt and prescribed activities for the brigades, regiments, and battalions there to engage in. General Elwell Otis required a minimum of three hours of drill per day, daily personnel inspections, including the troops, weapons, clothing, and hygiene in lieu of formal dress parades, formations with weapons at reveille and retreat; and conducting guard mount.

As illustrated in the nation’s preparation for war, several themes permeated the mobilization of the National Guard and other state volunteers for the Philippine Expedition. These themes were a lack of preparedness at the national political and Army level for the Spanish-American War and the Philippine War in its aftermath, Army prejudice against the National Guard as a force, detrimental parochialism within the National Guard, and a lack of sufficient equipment at state level to support the mobilization of the National Guard for war. The lack of preparedness at the national political and Army level manifested itself in multiple ways: no definitive mobilization policy or structure to manage it effectively, insufficient planning

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79 Alger, *The Spanish-American War*, 327, 337-339. Linn, *The Philippine War*, 24. Spanish honor was important because the previous Spanish governor had recommended surrender after seeing the futility of continuing to fight while outnumbered, with dwindling supplies, and naval support defeated. The Spanish government relieved the previous governor for recommending this surrender. Cosmas, *An Army for Empire*, 241-243.

regarding locations for training and housing, a lack of field equipment for mobilized units, and a significant lack of modern small arms and ammunition. Despite the myriad issues that confronted and, in many ways, confounded the mobilization, the performance of the mobilized National Guard and state volunteers belied the difficulties experienced during the mobilization.

SUCCESS AND LAMENTATIONS

The Volunteers were primarily formed from existing National Guard units in each state with the notable exception of the Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Regiment. Each state’s regiments had their own peculiar circumstances owing to the personalities of individuals, both in the unit and at home, politics within their states, and the culture of the individual states. The variables existing from state to state require an examination of National Guard performance by state. During this examination some themes revealed themselves as enduring across the nation. These enduring themes were appeals by unit members for state political assistance with issues, political involvement in the war effort by state politicians, and combat performance that met or exceeded Army expectations during the Philippine campaign. The appeals by unit members included direct appeals to politicians in the state and indirect through newspapers, family, and friends who then appealed directly to state politicians on behalf of the soldiers. Two other elements this research

81 While the examination of National Guard performance by state is mentioned, it is important to note that three states with volunteer units in the Philippines during 1898-1899 were excluded from this examination. All of these states, Nevada, Idaho, and Wyoming, had less than a regiment of soldiers in the Philippines and were involved in limited action. Nevada contributed only a single troop, eighty-one soldiers, of cavalry that saw action in only seven named engagements with only one soldier killed in action. Idaho contributed only two battalions of infantry, fought in only fifteen named engagements, and suffered only five soldiers killed in action. Lastly, Wyoming contributed only one battalion of infantry that fought in only six named engagements with only one soldier killed in action. United States, Adjutant-General’s Office, Correspondence Vol. I, 588, 604, 623-24.
revealed were that regimental leadership frequently caused issues and the performance of the volunteers had positive political implications for participants’ political futures within their state.82

**First Washington Volunteer Infantry**

Lieutenant Colonel William J. Fife’s reporting of the First Washington Volunteer Regiment’s arrival in Manila was typical of how news concerning the Volunteers arrived home in America. Lieutenant Colonel Fife wrote a letter home to Tacoma about the regiment’s arrival that was reported in The Yakima Herald.83 The First Washington Volunteers were in the Philippines until September 1899 and had a significant role in the Philippine War, but the regiment had its share of controversy.84

Washington’s Governor Rogers elected to use a Regular Army officer to command the First Washington Volunteers. Governor Rogers appointed Lieutenant J. H. Wholley as the regiment’s commander with the rank of Colonel in the Volunteers. Colonel Wholley was stationed at the state university in Washington prior to the appointment in May 1898. Overall

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82 One of the best examples illustrating how involved soldiers were in writing home to family, friends, and newspapers was the case of an assistant surgeon, H.P. Ritchie, with the Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteers. Dr. Ritchie had an “arrangement with the St. Paul papers whereby he was to keep them fully apprised by letter and cable of the course of events here.” This arrangement was made directly with the newspaper and this article referred to a similar arrangement between the regimental surgeon and the Minneapolis newspapers. “Gen. Reeve’s Answer,” *The Saint Paul Globe*, 1 December 1898, 3. http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn90059523/1898-12-01/ed-1/seq-3/ (accessed 9 January 2012).


people were initially pleased with Colonel Wholley’s appointment according to a published report.\textsuperscript{85}

The initial pleasure with Colonel Wholley’s appointment wore off over time. The National Guard officers in the regiment, including the second ranking officer Lieutenant Colonel Fife, eventually were arrayed against Colonel Wholley with considerable tension existing among the officers of the regiment. This tension fully revealed itself with Colonel Wholley’s arrest of several officers, including Lieutenant Colonel Fife, on multiple occasions during the campaign in the Philippines for a variety of charges including “conduct unbecoming an officer” and “public drunkenness.”\textsuperscript{86} Lieutenant Colonel Fife was acquitted, but the damage was already done.\textsuperscript{87}

Ultimately, the officers of the regiment requested Colonel Wholley’s replacement as the regimental commander. The officers in the regiment accused Colonel Wholley of being a

\textsuperscript{85} (n.t.), \textit{Pullman Herald}, 28 May 1898, 4. http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn88085488/1898-05-28/ed-1/seq-4/ (accessed 18 December 2011). Also see Cooper, \textit{Rise of the National Guard}, 102. According to the regiment’s official history Lieutenant Colonel Fife was initially selected to be the regimental commander, but was out of the state and could not arrive in time to organize the regiment, so he accepted the position of lieutenant colonel in the regiment. Prior to the war, he was a colonel in the Washington National Guard where he had a long history, having actually raised the State of Washington’s first militia company in Tacoma in 1875. Of additional historic note was the service of Major William J. Canton with the First Washington Volunteers in the Philippines from his arrival on March 2, 1899. Major Canton’s service is of note because he was the Adjutant General for the Washington National Guard from May 1898 to December 1898 prior to embarking for the Philippines in January 1899. William L. Luhn, “Official History of the Operations of the First Washington Infantry, U. S. V. in the Campaign in the Philippine Islands” in Faust, \textit{Campaigning in the Philippines} (Washington), 52-53.


“coward”, a “drag” on them, and his “stupidity” being the cause of another officer’s death. Governor Rogers was unwilling to address the charges against Colonel Wholley. He correctly identified the War Department as having responsibility for the regiment and Colonel Wholley. However, someone leaked the news to the papers, including the fact that the regiment’s officers twice requested Colonel Wholley’s removal, and that they blamed Governor Rogers for failing to take action.

The War Department apparently held Colonel Wholley in high regard, despite the complaints emanating from the First Washington Volunteers. This was evident when General Henry W. Lawton, division commander, gave Colonel Wholley command of Brigadier General Charles King’s brigade while General King was ill.

General Lawton’s selection of Colonel Wholley likely had to do with the First Washington Volunteer’s excellent combat record and his performance under General King. General King had described the First Washington as a “gallant regiment” that had been a “delight” to him as the brigade commander following action on February 5, 1899. The First Washington Volunteers were hailed as being “cool,” and “brave” in published reports of their combat.

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actions. The regiment displayed their combat ability when they crossed a river using native
canoes in the face of “heavy enemy fire”94 on one occasion and waded through “water neck
depth”95 on another. The Volunteers also conducted two amphibious landings to seize Calamba96
and Morong.97 One published report even went as far as to compare them to Teddy Roosevelt’s
Rough Riders and assert that “braver troops never fought”98 in describing the First Washington
Volunteers. While the last quote may have contained some braggadocio, the First Washington
had a successful record.

The success of the First Washington in combat was more unusual when considering the
issues within its officer corps. Governor Rogers cited Colonel Wholley’s reputation as a
disciplinarian as a possible cause for some of the dissent within the regiment. Governor Rogers
even suggested to the regiment’s other officers that soldiers usually complained about
disciplinarians, but that officers who are disciplinarians often achieved results in combat. The
regiment’s success tended to support Governor Rogers’ theory. In addition, the enlisted soldiers
came to Colonel Wholley’s defense in two interviews with newspapers.99 The enlisted soldiers’
support for their commander likely meant they found the value of his leadership in combat

91 “Brave Action of a Company of Washington Volunteers,” The Yakima Herald, 23 March 1899,
2011).
92 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95 “Another Town Captured,” The Pullman Herald, 10 June 1899, 2.
97 Governor Rogers’ opinion and one interview in support of Colonel Wholley are in “Wholley in
a Bad Odor,” The Yakima Review, 20 July 1899, 4, and “Gave His Shirt to a Yakiman,” The Yakima
some Remarks Concerning Colonel Wholley’s Detractors,” The Seattle Star, 20 July 1899, 2.
outweighed any issues they may have had with his disciplinarian style. In fact, Colonel Wholley’s leadership was likely some of the impetus behind more than one hundred of the First Washington Volunteers re-enlisting in Manila to continue fighting in the Philippines instead of returning home to Washington with the regiment. The Army viewed Colonel Wholley’s performance as warranting continued service. The Army displayed its confidence in Colonel Wholley through appointing him to major of the volunteers from his rank of first lieutenant after his time with the First Washington Volunteers was completed.

Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry

In contrast to the First Washington Volunteers, the Second Oregon Volunteers did not have the concerns over the regiment’s leadership. The Second Oregon was among the first units to arrive in the Philippines on June 30, 1898 after a brief stop in Guam on June 20, 1898, where soldiers from the regiment landed and escorted the naval officer who accepted the surrender of the Spanish garrison in Guam. By early 1899, the people of Oregon wanted the regiment released from duty in the Philippines.

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102 Elements of Companies A and D of the Second Oregon accompanied approximately 40 Marines ashore where the Spanish governor surrendered because of the overwhelming number of United States forces. Initially the Spanish were unaware of the state of war because they had received no mail from Manila in over three months. This ignorance lead to a somewhat comical situation as the Spanish garrison thought initial United States naval gunfire was a salute. The Spanish were in the process of apologizing for not returning the salute when they were informed of the state of war between the United States and Spain and their new status as prisoners of war. Adjutant General’s Office, The Official Records of the Oregon Volunteers in the Spanish American War and Philippine Insurrection, 29-32.
The desire for the Second Oregon to re-deploy soon became more pronounced as the spring of 1899 wore on. By April 20, 1899 Governor T. T. Geer, had scheduled a time for hearing petitions by those parties interested in seeing the Second Oregon’s return from the Philippines expedited. Ironically, the hearing of petitions was scheduled the same day that General Elwell Otis, commander of the soldiers in the Philippines, announced that Volunteers would be returned in the order they were deployed. General Elwell Otis statement was that the Second Oregon was in the first group of soldiers deployed to the Philippines along with Volunteers from California, meaning they would be among the first to re-deploy to the United States. Subsequent to that announcement, no one came to present petitions, possibly as result of General Elwell Otis’ statement. 103

While the desire for the Second Oregon to be returned soon had reached the level where Governor Geer felt it necessary to schedule a hearing on petitions, not everyone felt the same. An auxiliary group in Portland, the ladies’ emergency corps asked for the return of the Oregon Volunteers, but only after “the government has no longer a pressing need for their services.” 104 At the same time the ladies’ emergency corps in Roseburg, Oregon sent a petition to Governor Geer for the regiment’s immediate return. 105 Some of the Second Oregon’s desire to return may have come from conditions in the Philippines where they were used as garrison forces in both Cavite and Manila.

Nor was the Second Oregon treated equally when compared to Regular Army units. Brigadier General Thomas M. Anderson, division commander over the Second Oregon Regiment,

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104 Ibid.
elected to take a “palatial building”\textsuperscript{106} at Cavite for the Fourteenth Infantry Regiment, a Regular Army unit. General Anderson’s action forced the Second Oregon into substandard quarters that were poor enough for Admiral Dewey to remark that it was a “shame and an outrage”\textsuperscript{107} that the regiment was in these quarters when he observed them. Admiral Dewey suggested alternate buildings that were more livable and the Oregon Volunteers moved there. General Anderson became “highly indignant”\textsuperscript{108} over this move and ordered the Second Oregon back to the substandard quarters, displaying a clear preference for Regular Army soldiers.

The Second Oregon initially did not have a position in the line against the Spanish forces occupying Manila because they had been designated by General Anderson as the regiment to garrison Cavite. The regiment was initially disappointed not to be included in the positions besieging Manila, but General Anderson and General Merritt assured Colonel Summers that they were being reserved for an important mission and would participate in the assault on Manila, should it be necessary because the Spanish refused to surrender\textsuperscript{109}.

When the Spanish surrender hinged on an attack by United States forces as a face saving measure, General Merritt ordered the Second Oregon onto ships in the harbor as the assault on Manila began on August 13, 1898. After the initial assault, representatives of Admiral Dewey and General Merritt went ashore to meet with the Spanish commander, who agreed to surrender, but requested six hundred United States’ soldiers to occupy the walled portion of Manila for the purpose of maintaining order. The Second Oregon, onboard ships in the harbor, was in the best position to meet this requirement, and they conducted an unopposed amphibious landing into

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\textsuperscript{106} Adjutant General’s Office, \textit{The Official Records of the Oregon Volunteers in the Spanish American War and Philippine Insurrection}, 36.
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{109} General Merritt even used Company F, Second Oregon Volunteers, as his personal bodyguard for the assault on Manila. Ibid., 40-41.
\end{flushright}
Manila. The Oregon regiment raised the first Stars and Stripes over the capital city and officially began the United States occupation of Manila.110

The Second Oregon was assigned as part of Brigadier General Loyd Wheaton’s First Brigade of General Anderson’s First Division in the VIII Corps under General Merritt’s command. Along with the Second Oregon Volunteers were the Twentieth Kansas, under Colonel Funston, and First Washington, under Colonel Wholley. During the assault into the Guadalupe District on March 12, 1899, the three volunteer regiments were aligned, left to right, with the Twentieth Kansas, Second Oregon, and First Washington regiments. As the assault progressed, both the First Washington and Twentieth Kansas encroached on the Second Oregon avenue of advance so much that the regiment was completely squeezed out of the advance by the other volunteer regiments’ impetuousness. General Anderson commended Colonel Summers’ decision-making in staying to his line and not becoming entwined with the other two regiments. This incident simultaneously illustrated the initiative and lack of discipline, both of which were often attributed to the volunteers.111

Just two days later, General Wheaton chose the Second Oregon to lead the assault on Pateros in front of the Regular and Volunteer regiments in his brigade. General Wheaton’s choice illustrated his confidence in the Oregon Volunteers and their combat performance. The Second Oregon swept aside the enemy, forcing them back across the Pasig River.112 The actions of the

110 The raising of the Stars and Stripes coincided with the 2nd Battalion of the Second Oregon marching up Reina Christina drive into the walled city while the Star Spangled Banner was playing, an impressive sight. Ibid., 41-44. See also A. Prentiss, ed., The History of the Utah Volunteers in the Spanish-American War and in the Philippine Islands, 197. The Filipinos even recall this event with Oregon in the description of a “company of Oregon infantry” taking the Spanish flag from Fort Santiago as a “war souvenir.” Zaide, The Philippine Revolution, 217.
regiment were even more noteworthy during their lead of the assault on Malalos in late March 1899. The regiment was described as displaying “heroic bravery” during their assault through multiple enemy entrenchments, jungle, and open fields under heavy enemy fire. In this action, the Second Oregon Volunteers “displayed courage, valor and endurance of the highest order.” Ultimately, Colonel Summers was selected for brigade command as “a reward for such distinguished service.”¹¹³

General Wheaton continued to use the Second Oregon, choosing Colonel Summers to lead an attack on Maasand with Oregon, Dakota, and Utah volunteers as well as elements of the Third Infantry Regiment. Colonel Summers’ forces crossed a river and defeated entrenched enemy forces, causing numerous Filipino casualties in action during the first part of May 1899.¹¹⁴

During the Second Oregon’s efforts in combat in the Philippines, infighting occurred in the State of Oregon over the regiment’s disposition. Governor Geer spoke out in an interview after receiving petitions requesting release of the regiment to return home. Governor Geer criticized the “agitation” for the return of Oregon Volunteers saying, “This agitation will have the opposite effect from that intended, and will work as injury in the cause instead of a benefit.” The Governor viewed this effort as a providing a morale boost to the Filipinos once they heard of it, thereby potentially increasing the length of the campaign. He continued even further with his criticism saying, “As a state, we have no right to demand their return, for they are in the service of the government.” Governor Geer also noted that no members of the Second Oregon requested the return of the regiment through his office. While this may have been true, an officer in the


regiment announced his resignation while still in the Philippines. Ultimately, the State of Oregon made no request for early release of the Second Oregon Volunteers.

The re-deployment of the Second Oregon gave the final source of frustration to both the State of Oregon and the regiment itself. Reporting in Oregon the first week of June indicated the Second Oregon Volunteers would be transported directly to Portland and mustered out at the Vancouver Barracks. By July 8, 1899 the Oregon Adjutant General was reporting that the Second Oregon was returning to San Francisco, and reports out of San Francisco had the city prepared to receive the Second Oregon Volunteers. On the same day, Adjutant-General Corbin confirmed the regiment would be arriving in Portland via Astoria. In confusion reminiscent of the pre-war mobilization destinations, these reports were published in *The Daily Journal* on the front page on the same day. Ultimately, the regiment arrived in San Francisco and mustered out there after the members’ unanimous request to Secretary of War Alger and President McKinley’s approval.

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Utah Volunteer Light Artillery

An examination of Utah’s Artillery Volunteers during the fighting in the Philippines prior to their re-deployment from Manila on July 1, 1899, reveals the unit that fought in potentially the most engagements of any unit, Volunteer or Regular, during this period. Army records had the Utah Artillery as fighting in forty-nine separate named engagements during this period.\(^{120}\) The reports of their performance were invariably positive.

Beginning with the Utah Artillery’s support of troops against Spain prior to seizing Manila that was described as covering the batteries “with glory”\(^{121}\) and fighting “like veterans,”\(^{122}\) reports of Utah were not controversial with leadership or performance issues. The Utah Artillery further distinguished itself in support of the seizure of Manila from the Spanish on August 13, 1898, by making it possible for the Colorado Volunteers to succeed in their portion of the assault on Manila.\(^{123}\) In fact, a Colorado volunteer officer even described the Utah Artillery as “the finest organization in the Philippines.”\(^{124}\) The Colorado regiment was not the only regiment with an officer that praised the Utah Artillery. Colonel Alfred S. Frost, commander of the First South

\(^{120}\) United States Adjutant-General’s Office, *Correspondence Vol. I*, 620.


Dakota Volunteers, described their work as “effective” in driving out the insurgents facing Manila. The Utah Artillery’s support of the Tenth Pennsylvania Volunteers during their attack into Manila was described as firing their guns with the “coolness of veterans” while “amid bursting shells and humming bullets.”

News from the Utah Volunteers frequently came in the form of letters from unit members or even those who had returned home because of illness, wounds, or even discharge. The Utah Artillery established a newspaper in Manila according to a published report based on a letter from a unit member in the Philippines. According to an interview with former Corporal Charles “Chick” E. Varian, a soldier who had returned from the Philippines, the editor of this newspaper, Sergeant Isaac Russell, was likely to remain behind in the Philippines to begin a newspaper in the colony there. Mr. Varian had resigned following his raising of concerns over food from the commissary. The reporter intimated that Mr. Varian had “resigned” from the Army because officers had put “heat” on him following his raising the commissary issue.

The most controversial incident during the Utah Artillery’s deployment arose following the fall of Manila. Prior to defending Manila against Aquinald’s forces on February 4, 1899, the officers of the Utah Artillery sent a letter to Governor Wells requesting return to the United States. The Utah Volunteers felt they were not required since they had been relieved for garrison

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duty within the city by two batteries of the United States Sixth Artillery.\textsuperscript{129} This went unreported in newspaper accounts, but was likely the source of Senator Frank Cannon’s visit with Adjutant General Corbin on December 7, 1898 urging him to release the Utah Artillery from duty in the Philippines as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{130} Following Senator Cannon’s visit, no other mention seems to have been made regarding an early return of the Utah Artillery with the beginning of the insurgency less than two months later likely factoring into the absence of further requests for their return.

Utah’s outstanding performance continued against the Filipino’s beginning with their part in repulsing Filipino assaults against Manila on February 4, 5, and 6. “The Utah Battery, acting in conjunction with the Nebraska troops, did great service” in repelling the insurgent attacks.\textsuperscript{131} Their combat performance continued at a high level, and they were commended further for the action at Calumpit where the Utah Artillery was described as doing “heroic work.”\textsuperscript{132} Later, Major Bell, Seventh Cavalry, described them as the “best d—d artillery in the United States’ service,”\textsuperscript{133} high praise from a Regular Army officer.\textsuperscript{134}

At home, the Utah Artillery’s senior officer, Major Richard W. Young, was enormously popular. His suggestion to re-organize the batteries from two into three was not only endorsed by

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[A. Prentiss, ed.,] The History of the Utah Volunteers in the Spanish-American War and in the Philippine Islands, 197.
\item This visit resulted in Senator Cannon learning that forces in the Philippines would be relieved in the order they arrived, meaning the Utah Artillery would be later in the re-deployment cycle. “Must Await Arrival of Relieving Force,” The Salt Lake Herald, 8 December 1898, 1. http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85058130/1898-12-08/ed-1/seq-1/ (accessed 21 December 2011).
\item For details of the fighting from February 4 to February 15, 1899, see Major Young’s official report to the Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters Second Division, Eighth Corps dated 15 February 1899. A. Prentiss, ed., The History of the Utah Volunteers in the Spanish-American War and in the Philippine Islands, 243-268.
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the State’s Adjutant General, but also by Governor Wells. Senator Joseph L. Rawlins then carried
the suggestion to the War Department, leading Assistant Secretary of War, George de Rue
Meiklejohn, to review the request. While Major Young’s suggestion was not implemented,
having the Adjutant General, Governor, and a United States Senator all work to implement it
illustrated his influence within the state. Major Young subsequently received several votes in
the Utah Legislature for him to receive a United States Senate seat. Major Young’s service in
the Philippines did not end with the return of the Utah Artillery, as he was one of two Americans
selected to serve as a justice on the first Supreme Court in the Philippines.

Tenth Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry

The Tenth Pennsylvania Volunteers arrived in the Philippines on July 17, 1898. Their
arrival as one of the earliest Volunteer regiments enabled them to participate in combat before the
fall of Manila and in the assault on Manila on August 13, 1898.

In fact, the Tenth Pennsylvania was one of the first two American units in the line during
the siege of Manila when Filipino insurgents under General Emilio Aguinaldo allowed them into

135 This influence is evident if one considers the implications involved in the War Department
taking time to consider a suggestion by a brand new volunteer field grade officer. It is unlikely that this

136 Major Young was not elected, but the fact he received votes attested to the status his service
had achieved for him in Utah. “Utah’s Soldiers Remembered,” The Salt Lake Herald, 7 February 1899, 5.

137 Major Young’s prowess in the military was not accidental. He graduated with “high honors”
from the United States Military Academy at West Point. Major Young subsequently resigned his
commission and returned to Utah where he practiced law before volunteering for service in the Spanish-
American War. Governor Wells appointed Richard Young to the rank of captain and assigned him as the
senior artillery officer in the Utah Artillery. A. Prentiss, ed., The History of the Utah Volunteers in the
Spanish-American War and in the Philippine Islands, 369-374. See also General Order No. 20, Office U. S.
Military Governor in the Philippine Islands dated 29 May 1899 in Otis, Report of Major-General E. S. Otis,
146-47.

the line in place of Filipino General Noriel’s brigade.\textsuperscript{139} Descriptions of the regiment lauded them as the “Brave Pennsylvanians” for their actions in the first ground combat in the Philippines on July 31, 1898.\textsuperscript{140} Likewise, Brigade commander Brigadier General Francis V. Greene complimented the Pennsylvania Volunteers, describing them as “worthy of the highest praise” for their actions during the seizure of the Manila.\textsuperscript{141}

The regiment’s most significant contributions during combat were in the initial fighting with Filipino insurgents over February 4-6, 1899 in Manila. The Tenth Pennsylvania was critical to the defeat of the Filipinos during those first attacks and suffered several soldiers wounded, but none were killed in action. The Filipino forces were soundly defeated with heavy casualties in their attack on Manila.\textsuperscript{142}

The Tenth Pennsylvania did not participate in many engagements during the course of the war, but they still created political pressure in America.\textsuperscript{143} Despite the lack of heavy casualties to the regiment, Pennsylvania politicians, led by Governor Stone, took it upon themselves to petition the federal government to return the Tenth Pennsylvania Volunteers to return as soon as possible

\textsuperscript{139} Zaide, \textit{The Philippine Revolution}, 191.
\textsuperscript{141} General Greene was complimentary of his entire command, but it is important to note that no units were singled out for poor performance since his command was composed of three regiments of Volunteer infantry from Colorado, Nebraska, and Pennsylvania, Volunteer artillery from Utah, and approximately one-third of two different Regular Infantry regiments. The performance of General Greene’s Volunteer regiments, which outnumbered his Regulars nearly five to one, dictated his brigade’s performance. “New Story of the Manila Fight,” \textit{The Scranton Tribune}, 3 October 1898, 1. http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84026355/1898-10-03/ed-1/seq-1/ (accessed 22 December 2011).
\textsuperscript{143} The Tenth Pennsylvania only participated in three more named engagements at the end of March during their participation in the Philippine Expedition. United States Adjutant-General’s Office, \textit{Correspondence Vol. I}, 614.
during a visit to Washington, D.C. on July 7, 1899. Ultimately, Adjutant General Corbin ordered the Tenth Pennsylvania home to be mustered out.144

Regimental commander, Colonel S. A. Hawkins, died of wounds at sea while being transported back with the regiment. Colonel Hawkins was a popular soldier who was wounded leading troops in battle at Malalos on March 31, 1899.145 Lieutenant Colonel James E. Barnett took command of the Tenth Pennsylvania as the next senior officer.

Lieutenant Colonel Barrett was promoted to colonel with his new assignment. His war record served to aid his political career as he was the only Republican nomination for Pennsylvania State Treasurer later that year.146 An officer from the First Nebraska even campaigned for Colonel Barnett in Pennsylvania, supporting him for State Treasurer.147

First Nebraska Volunteer Infantry

The First Nebraska Volunteers were the subject of controversy almost immediately following President McKinley’s call for volunteers. The source of this controversy was Governor Silas Holcomb’s appointment of First Lieutenant John M. Stotsenburg, instructor at the University of Nebraska, to major in the volunteers. Nebraska National Guard officers were concerned that Nebraska officers should have been given preference for field grade appointments.

Governor Holcomb’s justification for his appointment of Major Stotsenburg was that National Guard majors failed their physicals for appointment into the volunteers.148

Once in the Philippines, Major Stotsenburg proved his value almost immediately. The First Nebraska played an important role in the taking of Manila on August 13, 1898. As a result of the First Nebraska Volunteers’ performance and his individual bravery, Major Stotsenburg received a brevet, temporary promotion, to lieutenant colonel of the volunteers.149 This promotion became important with Lieutenant Colonel George Colton’s assignment at the Manila custom’s house in the uneasy peace following Spain’s defeat.

Less than a month after the fall of Manila, Governor Holcomb embroiled Nebraska, and ultimately the First Nebraska Volunteers, in national controversy by initially calling for the discharge of the Third Nebraska Volunteers under Colonel William Jennings Bryan. Governor Holcomb sent the initial telegram requesting discharge of the Third Nebraska Volunteers on September 5, 1898. The request likely had political implications as it was clear that Colonel Bryan, who had been a candidate for president in 1896, was not going to see action overseas with the Third Nebraska, and he was rumored to be planning to request discharge for political campaign purposes.150

148 Governor Holcomb did not have an explanation for one of the three failing majors not having failed and not being on the failed list. Governor Holcomb later made “amends” by appointing this officer to major in another regiment. Johnson, *Nebraska in the Spanish-American War and the Philippine Insurrection, a Study in Imperialism*, 24-25.


150 Governor Holcomb’s and Colonel Bryan’s attempts to get the Third Nebraska Volunteers discharged included a telegram to Nebraska Congressman John S. Stark on September 5, 1898, and visits on September 22, 1898 with Adjutant-General Corbin, Assistant Secretary Meiklejohn, and finally an audience lasting over an hour with President McKinley. The political charges were leveled more specifically by Nebraska Senator John Thurston when he accused Governor Holcomb of pandering to Colonel Bryan in exchange for political assistance during future campaigns in a speech to Republicans later in October. “Bryan’s Men are Dying,” *The Red Cloud Chief* (Red Cloud, Webster Co. NE), 9 September 1898, 6. http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84022835/1988-09-09/ed-1/seq-6/ (accessed 28 December 2011). “Tires of Being a Soldier,” *Omaha Daily Bee*, 22 September 1898, 1.
Governor Holcomb may not have realized the feelings this might arouse in Nebraska. Citizens there were upset that the First Nebraska, who had seen combat in the Philippines and had a longer service time than the Third Nebraska, was not being considered for discharge. Once the citizens’ feelings became apparent, the political implications seem to have caused him to re-think his proposal for the discharge of the Third Nebraska. Governor Holcomb’s change of heart occurred over less than a month from his initial telegram to Washington requesting discharge of the Third Nebraska and likely occurred as a result of two factors.

The first factor was the War Department’s response to Governor Holcomb’s request to discharge Nebraska soldiers. Assistant Secretary Meiklejohn, informed Governor Holcomb by telegram that he could choose one regiment to be discharged, but that the First Nebraska could not be discharged until another regiment was in San Francisco ready to be sent to the Philippines to replace them.151

The second factor was the amount of opposition to discharging the Third Nebraska as opposed to the First Nebraska. An example of this occurred when Governor Holcomb met with supporters of the First Nebraska in Omaha on October 4, 1898. These supporters expressed displeasure with Governor Holcomb’s support for the Third Nebraska’s discharge. One of the reasons these citizens gave Governor Holcomb was that discharging the Third Nebraska it would “not reflect credit on the state or the regiment” coming on the “eve of their departure” for Cuba.152 The supporters of the First Nebraska also expressed displeasure with the fact that the

http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn99021999/1898-10-03/ed-1/seq-5/ (accessed 28 December 2011). Governor Holcomb met with supporters of the Thurston Rifles, as Omaha based Company L of the First Nebraska Volunteers was known. “Want the Thurstons Out,” *Omaha Daily Bee*, 4 October 1898,
First Nebraska had been in service longer and was currently in the Philippines while the Third Nebraska had yet to go overseas.\textsuperscript{153}

Ultimately, Governor Holcomb was in a very uncomfortable situation with this decision. He felt it was the “greatest and most important question that has ever come before him.”\textsuperscript{154} When he finally made a decision, Governor Holcomb played the biblical role of Solomon by asking the War Department to allow him to discharge men of both regiments. The War Department acceded to Governor Holcomb’s request and authorized both regiments to reduce their companies from one hundred and six soldiers per company to eight-one soldiers per company. In this manner, Governor Holcomb mustered out a significant number of soldiers per regiment, two hundred fifty based on a ten company regiment.\textsuperscript{155} This two hundred fifty soldier reduction was imposed on both the First and Third Nebraska regiments. While seemingly unimportant in October 1898, this political action had the effect of reducing the combat power of the First Nebraska by nearly


\textsuperscript{155} “Reduces Companies to 81 Men,” Western News-Democrat (Valentine, NE), 20 October 1898, 1. http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn95069779/1898-10-20/ed-1/seq-1/ (accessed 28 December 2011). The Third Nebraska did deploy to Cuba from January 1, 1899 to April 7, 1899, but was involved in no combat and the only deaths from service were thirty-two soldiers who died from disease. In contrast, the First Nebraska was in the Philippines for nearly a year, July 17, 1898 to July 1, 1899. During this period, the First Nebraska fought in twenty-three engagements suffering the deaths of twenty-one soldiers who were killed in action, another fourteen who died of wounds received in combat, and twenty-eight deaths by disease. Another 177 soldiers in the First Nebraska were wounded in action during in the Philippines as well.
twenty-five percent just a few months before the beginning of the insurgency on February 4, 1899.

This was not to be the only controversy surrounding the First Nebraska. Colonel Bratt sent a telegram to Governor Holcomb on September 6, 1898 informing him of his request for discharge for health reasons during the same time of the discharge controversy. In this same telegram, Colonel Bratt recommended Lieutenant Colonel Stotsenburg for command of the regiment. Apparently there was already dissension in the regiment over this recommendation because Colonel Bratt referred to a potential petition requesting Lieutenant Colonel Colton’s appointment as the regiment’s commander. At the same time, petitions were circulated in the state opposing Lieutenant Colonel Stotsenburg’s selection as regimental commander over Lieutenant Colonel Colton because of the latter’s seniority, qualities as a soldier, status as a resident of Nebraska, and his long-time membership in the Nebraska National Guard. Governor Holcomb responded quickly in this case and appointed Lieutenant Colonel Stotsenburg as Colonel in the Volunteers on September 30, 1898. Colonel Stotsenburg assumed command of the First Nebraska on October 4, 1898 in spite of the opposition within the regiment.


assisting Colonel Bratt in similar behavior prior to Colonel Bratt’s resignation from service. The
level of acrimony over this reached the Nebraska state legislature who debated Colonel
Stotsenburg over several days before finally drafting a joint resolution of the two houses calling
for Colonel Stotsenburg’s removal and a full War Department investigation into allegations of his
mistreatment of the men and officers of the regiment. 158

Despite the concerns over Colonel Stotsenburg, the regiment performed well in battle.
Some reporting even gave him credit for the regiment’s superior performance. One Soldier even
wrote home and described the First Nebraska as being in “first class fighting trim,” and attributed
the regiment’s proficiency to Colonel Stotsenburg. 159 Whether it was reporting from the
Philippines or letters from soldiers, the legislature had cause to reconsider their earlier

158 The first reported remarks against Colonel Stotsenburg commanding the regiment occurred on
October 2, 1898 before he officially took command of the regiment during political speeches critical of
Governor Holcomb. Reporting on the complaints against Colonel Stotsenburg continued January 1899 and
culminated in the joint resolution mentioned. “Republican Nominations,” Omaha Daily Bee, 3 October
“Complains of Treatment,” Omaha Daily Bee, 5 January 1899, 7.
“No Dreyfus Case Here,” Omaha Daily Bee, 13 January 1899, 1.
“Stotsenberg (sic) is Up in the House,” Omaha Daily Bee, 13 January 1899, 2.
“Put in a Day on Stotsenberg (sic),” Omaha Daily Bee, 14 January 1899, 2.
“Complain of Stotsenberg (sic),” Omaha Daily Bee, 24 January 1899, 2.
“Want Stotsenberg (sic) Removed,” Western News-Democrat (Valentine, NE), 9 February 1899, 1.

159 “Observations,” The Courier (Lincoln, NE), 15 October 1898, 2.
condemnation of Colonel Stotsenburg. The majority of the criticism occurred during a time of relative inactivity in the Philippines, a circumstance that can lead idle soldiers to complain because of boredom from a lack of more pressing duties. The joint legislature passed a resolution in late March 1899 that commended the First Nebraska for their “gallant service.” During debate over this resolution, members of the legislature expressed “some words of praise” for Colonel Stotsenburg, a foretelling of the eventual repeal of the resolution calling for his removal from the regiment, and expunging it from their records on March 31, 1899. Sadly, the Nebraska House of Representative’s exoneration of Colonel Stotsenburg occurred just three weeks prior to his death leading a charge on insurgent positions. Newly elected Governor William Poynter, an opponent of imperialism, took the opportunity afforded by the legislature’s resolution commending the First Nebraska for their service to further his political ends when he vetoed this resolution in April 1899 just days after its passage. Governor Poynter’s veto exemplified some of the worst political machinations.

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162 Ultimately, the Nebraska Senate passed the resolution over Governor Poynter’s veto, but the Nebraska House of Representatives was unable to muster the votes to override the veto. “No Thanks to
evidenced during the Philippine War when a governor refused to allow acknowledgement of the service of his own National Guard troops while mobilized in a federal status and serving in combat.\textsuperscript{163}

The controversy over the Governor’s veto of the bill in recognition of the soldiers in the First Nebraska was not the final politically sensitive act involving the First Nebraska. After Colonel Stotsenburg’s death the regiment formally asked General MacArthur to “temporarily” relieve them from combat and take them out of the line. The reasons given for their request were having been continuously in the line for months requiring recuperation since some men had been in their uniforms over the entire period. While units wrote home complaining and families at home initiated requests for units to be returned, no other regiment had taken the unusual step of engaging its chain of command for the purpose of seeking relief from combat. The First Nebraska’s last engagement was on May 4, 1899. Subsequent to this engagement and the First Nebraska’s request for relief, General MacArthur removed them from the line and assigned them to barracks from May 21 to June 22, 1899 before their redeployment to America in early July 1899.\textsuperscript{164}


First Montana Volunteer Infantry

The First Montana Volunteers mustered into federal service from May 5 to May 10, 1898 with a total of forty-eight officers and nine hundred seventy-six enlisted under Colonel Harry C. Kessler. Unlike the other regiments, little controversy surrounded the First Montana following their arrival in the Philippines on August 24, 1898. The regiment’s initial time in the Philippines was to garrison Cavite, following the defeat of the Spanish on August 13, 1898. During October and November 1898, the First Montana moved to Manila to become part of its defenses. Defenses that became active when the Filipino and American forces became involved in hostilities on February 4, 1899.

According to General Elwell Otis the volunteer forces were desirous of returning to the United States as early as September 1898 and continuing into December 1898. Within one month after the fall of Manila, many volunteers felt they should be allowed to return home because they volunteered for the war with Spain and that war was over. The soldiers of the First Montana fell into this classification after three months of garrison duty on Cavite and in Manila. As a result, Quartermaster Sergeant Charles Sutton wrote a letter to Montana Governor Robert Smith on January 2, 1899 requesting Governor Smith’s assistance in returning the First Montana back to the United States. Sergeant Sutton claimed to have obtained the signatures of “80 percent of the

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166 General Otis believed the soldiers who were ill really suffered from being “homesick.” General Otis’ feelings about this caused him to recommend denial of the four hundred twenty-seven discharge requests he processed through to Adjutant-General Corbin. General Otis felt that soldiers being shipped home when ill contributed to the increase of soldiers on sick report. This assertion seemed to be confirmed when the VIII Corps opened a hospital on Corregidor where sick soldiers could recover and almost immediately afterwards, the numbers of soldiers reported as sick began to decline. Otis, Report of Major-General E. S. Otis, U.S. Volunteers on Military Operations and Civil Affairs in the Philippine Islands, 1899, 40, 43-44. See also Silbey, A War of Frontier and Empire, 61.
regiment” in support of this request in just two days. Ironically, by the time Governor Smith received the letter fighting with Aguinaldo’s forces had already broken out, so he was unable to take any action regarding Sergeant Sutton’s request. The governor did agree to take up the matter upon the cessation of hostilities in the Philippines.  

Despite their request to return home through Governor Smith, the First Montana performed admirably during their campaign in the Philippines against the insurgents. The First Montana was heavily engaged until they redeployed from the Philippines in August 1899. The regiment suffered twenty-one combat deaths and one hundred twenty soldiers wounded during their participation in more than twenty named engagements, representing some of the heaviest fighting endured by any of the National Guard volunteers in the Philippines.

The First Montana was not only heavily engaged, but they fought well, according to a variety of sources. General Elwell Otis, who earlier had criticized the volunteers for their desires to return home, now complimented them. After the fighting around Caloocan, General Elwell Otis described the First Montana as making a “spirited attack” against the insurgents. Later, on March 27, 1899, two hundred soldiers of the First Montana charged across open ground against over four thousand entrenched Filipinos with superior weapons, driving the insurgents from their positions. Captain Frank Medbery wrote about the First Montana’s charge when he authored the First South Dakota Volunteer Infantry regiment’s official operations history. Captain Medbery described this charge as “perhaps the most brilliant of the campaign.”

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167 Letter from Sergeant Sutton to Governor Smith as quoted in Splendid Service. Svingen, Spendid Service, 94.
168 United States Adjutant-General’s Office, Correspondence Vol. I, 603.
170 Captain Frank W. Medbery, Official History of the Operations of the South Dakota Infantry, U.S.V. in the Campaign in the Philippine Islands, 17-18, as included in Faust, Campaigning in the Philippines, South Dakota.
described the First Montana Volunteers’ commander, Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Wallace, as having exhibited “very efficient service and meritorious conduct.” General Harrison Otis also complimented the previous commander, Colonel Kessler, for having “proved in actual field service” his “capacity and fitness” and “skill and gallantry under fire.” While both General Wheaton and General Harrison Otis had singled out the commander, the compliments for Lieutenant Colonel Wallace and Colonel Kessler came as a result of the regiment’s outstanding performance. General MacArthur also complimented the First Montana during fighting near Manila when he said, “If I were not a general, I would prefer to be the colonel of the Montana troops.”

**Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry**

The Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry moved from San Francisco to the Philippines early enough to be involved in the capture of Manila from the Spanish on August 13, 1898. Their performance in this battle resulted in the regimental commander’s, Colonel Charles McC. Reeve, brevet promotion to brigadier general and presidential recognition of the Thirteenth Minnesota’s “gallantry.” In addition to President McKinley recognizing the regiment, General

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MacArthur described them as having “discipline and marked efficiency.”\textsuperscript{176} The Thirteenth Minnesota was said to have been in the “worst” of the fighting and having “distinguished” itself during the battle for Manila.\textsuperscript{177}

After their outstanding performance in defeating the Spanish and taking Manila in August 1898, the Thirteenth Minnesota almost immediately began to have some controversy concerning them remaining in the Philippines. At a meeting of the Thirteenth Regiment Auxiliary association in September 1898, General Reeve’s desire to return home because of financial concerns was made public. This led to discussion and agreement among the association’s members that if its commander returned, then the entire regiment should be returned as well. The association also agreed to involve Governor Clough should political action become necessary.\textsuperscript{178}

It was not long after General Reeve’s personal desire to return home became known that the members of the Thirteenth Minnesota began expressing similar desires. Conrad Rowe, who had served in the Philippines with the regiment, but had been discharged and returned home in September 1898, claimed that the only soldiers who wanted to remain in the Philippines were “making more money there than they could at home.”\textsuperscript{179} Another member of the regiment home in November 1898 also described a desire for the regiment to return when he said, “The men want

\textsuperscript{176} While having the quality of discipline may not seem like a very strong compliment, it is important to note that a lack of discipline has often been a criticism of the National Guard, making General MacArthur’s compliment a stronger one than it might seem at face value. Holbrook, ed., \textit{Minnesota in the Spanish-American War and Philippine Insurrection}, 55.


to get home as soon as possible.”180 Two more members of different companies in the Thirteenth Minnesota wrote of concerns with remaining in the Philippines in letters published in the newspaper.181 These statements from soldiers of different companies and different statuses, discharged and returned home, home on convalescent leave, and still in the Philippines serving begin to paint a picture of the general feeling across the regiment.

The pressure of various individuals and the regiment’s auxiliary association was evident in Minnesota Representative Frederick Stevens writing several telegrams assuring people in the state that the Thirteenth Minnesota would be returning home. The conventional wisdom had become that the Thirteenth Minnesota would return when the regular Third Infantry Regiment arrived in the Philippines. Adjutant General Corbin’s letter to newly elected Minnesota Governor John Lind in January 1899 seemed to refute that line of thought. Adjutant General Corbin told Governor Lind, in reply to an inquiry from him, that the Thirteenth Minnesota could return “if the situation warrants.”182

Close to the timing of Adjutant General Corbin’s letter Governor Lind was a letter from the commander of the regiment, Colonel Fred Ames.183 He wrote to Governor Lind expressing his desire for relief by the regular troops for the regiment and the regiment’s return home approximately three weeks prior to the Filipino attack on Manila, but the letter arrived after the beginning of hostilities between Aguinaldo’s forces and the United States. Governor Lind also

received numerous letters from other members of the Thirteenth Minnesota prior to his receipt of Colonel Ames’ letter.  

Despite the obvious desire of the Minnesotans to return home, they performed their duties in an exemplary fashion while they remained in the Philippines. Assigned to police Manila at the time of the Filipino attack on February 4, 1899, the Thirteenth Minnesota had “a most difficult task” in this duty. The difficulty of the regiment’s assignment notwithstanding, they successfully maintained “absolute control” and performed “perfect” police work. Brigadier General R.P. Hughes, Provost Marshal in Manila, described the action by the Thirteenth Minnesota in fulfilling their duties as provost guard as “exceedingly satisfactory.” Two newspapers published in the Philippines also praised the Thirteenth Minnesota’s performance in their provost duty.

While it had become obvious that there was still work for the volunteers to do in the Philippines, the political pressure on Governor Lind had become palpable through the soldiers, their families, and associations supporting the soldiers. As a result, Governor Lind began to pressure the War Department for answers about when the Thirteenth Minnesota would be

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188 These reports were both published the day after the regiment was assigned to field operations by two separate American sponsored newspapers published in the the Philippines. “Praise for Thirteenth,” The Saint Paul Globe, 6 May 1899, 8. http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn90059523/1899-05-06/ed-1/seq-8/ (accessed 18 January 2012).
returning home. He was even publicly considering using his personal relationship with President McKinley as a method of ensuring the regiment’s rapid return.\footnote{“News in Minnesota,” \textit{The Princeton (MN) Union}, 9 March 1899, 8. \url{http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83016758/1899-03-09/ed-1/seq-8/} (accessed 14 January 2012).}

Governor Lind was unsuccessful in persuading the War Department to commit to an early return of the Thirteenth Minnesota or even a timetable for when a delayed return might occur.\footnote{“Red Tape is Intact,” \textit{The Saint Paul Globe}, 12 March 1899, 10; \url{http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn90059523/1899-03-12/ed-1/seq-10/} (accessed 14 January 2012).} Following his inability to influence the return of Minnesota’s volunteers from the Philippines, the Minnesota legislature decided to take up the cause. The Minnesota senate passed a resolution calling for the “immediate return” of the regiment and for Governor Lind to deliver the resolution by hand to President McKinley for action.\footnote{“Fate of the Thirteenth,” \textit{The Saint Paul Globe}, 16 March 1899, 4. \url{http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn90059523/1899-03-16/ed-1/seq-5/} (accessed 14 January 2012).}

Political pressure concerning the Thirteenth Minnesota continued to grow, even as the regiment moved from provost duty to field operations on March 20, 1899.\footnote{Prior to this relief members of the regiment had been volunteering to go on missions with other units in order to see some type of action, as opposed to being relegated to provost duty. During this period, some soldiers were even court-martialed for going out on patrol with other units. United States Adjutant-General’s Office, \textit{Correspondence Vol. I}, 600. Holbrook, ed. \textit{Minnesota in the Spanish-American War and Philippine Insurrection}, 60-61.} Besides the previously mentioned letters and resolutions, editorials calling for the return of the regiment began appearing with the end of the Spanish-American War. The stated justification for the return of the Minnesota Volunteers was that they had volunteered for the fight with Spain and when the Treaty of Paris ended that conflict it had ended their obligation as well.\footnote{“What of the Thirteenth Minnesota!,” \textit{The Saint Paul Globe}, 14 April 1899, 4. \url{http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn90059523/1899-04-14/ed-1/seq-4/} (accessed 14 January 2012).} Governor Lind agreed with this line of reasoning and had stated as much when he communicated his desire for the quick return of the Thirteenth Minnesota from the Philippines. Governor Lind also shared with the Minnesota legislature that Colonel Ames cabled him that the regiment was “unanimous” in their
desire to return home as quickly as possible. Governor Lind received a separate cable from the officers of the regiment that called for their immediate return as well. The regiment’s return had a political side to it, and the Republicans in the Minnesota house refused to pass a bill that would have called for President McKinley to immediately return the Thirteenth Minnesota from the Philippines.

These failures to achieve any results in getting the regiment returned to Minnesota led Governor Lind to travel to Washington, D.C. While there, he had personal audiences with personnel at the War Department and later with President McKinley. The outcome of this visit was for Governor Lind, whose messages to Washington D.C. had gone largely unanswered, to learn the plan for the return of the Thirteenth Minnesota from the Philippines. Governor Lind said he was “confident” that the regiment would begin returning home around June 1, 1899, less than six weeks away.

First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry

The First North Dakota saw action in two dozen named engagements in the Philippines, beginning with participation in defeating the Spanish and taking Manila on August 13, 1898. This successful result had potential political implications for a member of the regiment as the Democrat and Populist parties combined to place Lieutenant W. A. Hildreth as their choice on the

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ballot for Attorney General of North Dakota. Intertwining military service, especially in war or a state’s National Guard, was often politically beneficial to a candidate.

Minnesota’s active pursuit of the return of the Thirteenth Minnesota regiment seemed to have spilled over to its western neighbor, North Dakota. Minnesota Representative Stevens received word from Assistant Secretary Meiklejohn that the Thirteenth Minnesota would be among the first to return from the Philippines in mid-December 1898. South Dakota Representative Henry C. Hansbrough took this opportunity to visit the War Department himself to learn how soon the First North Dakota might be able to return home. Representative Hansbrough learned the North Dakota regiment would not be returning until after the earlier arriving volunteers. His analysis of this brought him to the conclusion that enough regular forces were deploying to allow the First North Dakota to return around the same time frame as the Minnesota regiment with the other troops in the first expedition.

When the Filipinos attacked Manila just six weeks later in early February, the First North Dakota played an important role in its defense as reported across the country. While this action received a great deal of press, this was not the regiment’s finest hour. Under General Lawton’s

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command, the First North Dakota contributed the majority of soldiers that comprised Young’s Scouts.201

Young’s Scouts saw significant action following their organization on April 30, 1899. The first of its two most famous actions occurred on May 12, 1899 when the scouts encountered approximately four hundred entrenched Filipinos at San Ildefonso. After a full day of exchanging fire, the scouts mounted a flanking charge that routed the Filipinos from their trenches and the town itself. Two full companies of infantry relieved the scouts who had advanced General Lawton’s line five miles in a single day against a force sixteen times superior in strength to their own.202

The next day, May 13, 1899, the scouts were accompanied by Captain William Birkheimer, Fourteenth Infantry Regiment, to allow him to identify locations for artillery. As the scouts, now down to only eighteen soldiers after the previous day’s action, approached San Miguel, a town of almost twenty thousand inhabitants, they were engaged by insurgents. This time only three hundred insurgents were present against the eighteen scouts, slightly worse odds than the day before. After the insurgents began firing from their trenches, ten of the scouts immediately charged driving the insurgents out of their trenches and back across the bridge over the Calumpit River into the town. The scouts seized the bridge after a short firefight and continued engaging the insurgents in the town until two p.m. when the Filipinos fled. Captain

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201 The First North Dakota contributed sixteen of the original twenty-five to Young’s scouts. The remainder of these soldiers came from the Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry regiment initially and the regulars of Fourteenth Infantry Regiment. The volunteers from the Second Oregon were all eventually returned to their unit, leading to all of the scouts eventually being soldiers of the First North Dakota regiment. The leader of the scouts was a civilian, William H. Young, whom General Lawton personally selected for this. General Lawton’s explanation for this and their makeup was detailed in a letter he wrote to Colonel Barry, Assistant Adjutant General for the Department of the Pacific, on 14 May 1899. This letter was in response to Colonel Barry’s inquiry as to how Young, a civilian, had been wounded. House of Representatives, 56th Congress, Congressional Serial Set 3903, 227. See also Durand, The Boys, 389-401 and Faust, Campaigning in the Philippines, 214-215.

202 Cooper and Smith, Citizens as Soldiers, 98-99.
Birkheimer brought up two more companies to relieve the eighteen scouts.²⁰³ Out of these two engagements, fourteen soldiers received the Medal of Honor. Thirteen of the fourteen Medal of Honor recipients were volunteers, with nine coming from the First North Dakota and four from the Second Oregon.²⁰⁴

**First South Dakota Volunteer Infantry**

The First South Dakota Volunteer Infantry mustered forty-six officers and nine hundred eighty-three enlisted men into federal service from May 12 to May 19, 1898.²⁰⁵ South Dakota’s contribution to the war against Spain represented the largest volunteer to population ratio in the United States.²⁰⁶ While two battalions of the regiment arrived before the Battle for Manila in August 1898, they were garrisoned at Cavite until after the remaining battalion arrived in the Philippines. The Third Battalion of the First South Dakota did not arrive until September 1898, so none of the regiment participated in the fighting in Manila against Spain.²⁰⁷

South Dakota Governor Andrew E. Lee was one of three governors for states contributing soldiers to the Philippine Expedition that used their prerogative of appointing one Regular Army officer to make that officer the regimental commander. Governor Lee appointed then-First Lieutenant Alfred S. Frost to Colonel of the Volunteers. Colonel Frost belonged to the Twenty-Fifth Infantry Regiment, but was performing duties as the military tactics instructor at the State Agricultural College in Brookings, South Dakota and on the governor’s staff as the inspector

²⁰³ After the battle at San Miguel, Captain Birkheimer wanted to court-martial one of the scouts, and he approached General Lawton. General Lawton’s response was to tell Captain Birkheimer to leave the scouts alone and place a second lieutenant from the First North Dakota in charge of the scouts in place of Young, who was wounded and later died. Ibid., 99.


general for the South Dakota National Guard.\textsuperscript{208} Colonel Frost’s appointment was well received by the people of South Dakota since he had fought Indian campaigns in the state and was well-known by that reputation.\textsuperscript{209} There was some controversy in South Dakota with the National Guard, leading to issues within the regiment much later.\textsuperscript{210} Colonel Frost was also well received in San Francisco after the First South Dakota arrived there prior to shipping out to the Philippines where the regiment was called a “finely trained body of fighters” and “fortunate” have him as he was an “ideal commander.”\textsuperscript{211} In fact, the Army thought so highly of Colonel Frost that General Elwell Otis assigned him as a temporary brigade commander in San Francisco.\textsuperscript{212}

The First South Dakota Volunteers did not see any action until the Filipino attack against Manila on February 4, 1899. During this defense of Manila, Colonel Frost led a charge described as being “excellent in form” against blockhouse positions. This charge resulted in the capture of that part of the line from the Filipinos.\textsuperscript{213} The First South Dakota’s excellence in battle continued

\textsuperscript{208} Robinson, \textit{A Brief History of South Dakota}, 187.
during actions in the vicinity of Marilao in March 1899. Once again, the regiment charged over open ground “brilliantly” leading to the defeat of enemy forces far superior in number.214

In mid-April 1899, shortly after the regiment’s resounding victory in battle near Marilao, politics in South Dakota made for some national controversy. Governor Lee wrote a letter to President McKinley demanding the recall of the First South Dakota from the Philippines. Among the reasons Governor Lee cited were the completion of the Spanish-American War that the enlistments were for, the lack of “exigency” existing for them to remain in federal service, the unconstitutionality of keeping the soldiers there, and lack of any declaration of war by Congress.215 South Dakota Senator Richard F. Pettigrew wrote a similar letter to President McKinley within two days of Governor Lee’s letter. Senator Pettigrew demanded the return of the First South Dakota regiment for nearly identical reasons, citing one hundred nineteen requests for discharge received from soldiers in the regiment.216

While these stories were being reported nationwide, not everyone in South Dakota agreed with Governor Lee or Senator Pettigrew. South Dakota Lieutenant Governor John T. Kean wrote to President McKinley approximately one week after Governor Lee’s letter expressing a very different point of view. Lieutenant Governor Kean asserted to President McKinley that Governor Lee’s “personal” letter to the President did not represent the views of the people of the State of South Dakota. Quite to the contrary, according to Lieutenant Governor Kean, the people of South Dakota. Quite to the contrary, according to Lieutenant Governor Kean, the people of South Dakota. Quite to the contrary, according to Lieutenant Governor Kean, the people of South Dakota. Quite to the contrary, according to Lieutenant Governor Kean, the people of South Dakota. Quite to the contrary, according to Lieutenant Governor Kean, the people of South Dakota. Quite to the contrary, according to Lieutenant Governor Kean, the people of South Dakota. Quite to the contrary, according to Lieutenant Governor Kean, the people of South...
Dakota were fully behind the First South Dakota’s presence in the Philippines. These events, effectively dividing the office of governor for a state, signified some of the deepest divides over the Philippines in the states providing volunteers for the war there.

As though reaffirming Lieutenant Governor Kean’s assurances to President McKinley, many officers wrote to South Dakota Representative Charles H. Burke repudiating Governor Lee’s desires for the return of the regiment. Representative Burke reported that nearly all the letters he received criticized Governor Lee and asked to be allowed to remain in service until their mission in the Philippines was complete.  

Despite the distraction of the political debate occurring back home in their state, the First South Dakota continued their effectiveness in fighting the insurgents. One letter home even praised Colonel Frost’s hard training as getting the regiment in “excellent shape physically and in a military sense.” When the regiment returned to Manila in mid-June, General MacArthur complimented them on their fine performance in the field saying, “The record of the South Dakota regiment in the Philippines has no equal in military history, so far as I know.” After the regiment’s return to America, they were recognized for their “gallantry” in service.

**First Tennessee Volunteer Infantry**

The First Tennessee Volunteer Infantry arrived in San Francisco to begin training on June 17, 1898. Owing to shipping limitations and their arrival date, they did not leave for the Philippines until more than four months later on October 30, 1898. The regiment’s arrival in the

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218 Ibid.


Philippines on November 29, 1898 meant it was one of the last units to arrive, and that the First Tennessee missed the only combat action of the Spanish-American War in the Philippines.221

Ironically, the regiment was split between Cavite and Manila until February 3, 1899 when they were moved to Manila just prior to Aguinaldo’s forces attacking the next day. The battle on February 4, 1899 led to one of the First Tennessee’s only deaths in the Philippines when Colonel Smith, regimental commander perished of what was purported to be “apoplexy.”222 Colonel Smith was a Civil War veteran approximately sixty years old who had fought for the Confederacy.223

Despite the sudden passing of their commander, the First Tennessee exceeded expectations during engagements in Iloilo in March 1899 where they moved immediately following their “brilliant” performance in fighting near Manila over February 4-6, 1899.224 General Elwell Otis described the regiment as “in good condition and performing excellent work.”225 A later report described the regiment’s actions as “splendid” according to letters from both Admiral Dewey and General Elwell Otis.226

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221 United States Adjutant General’s Office, Correspondence Vol. I, 618.
While seeing limited action, the First Tennessee still managed to distinguish itself as a capable fighting force in the Philippines. Ironically, the First Tennessee had very limited controversy. The single located complaint generated to the newspapers was a report of a soldier named Private Duckworth writing letters to disparage the regiment by exaggeration of “petty grievances” and alleging “discontent” among its soldiers. Colonel Smith responded to this by ordering Private Duckworth to stop. Private Duckworth allegedly continued this practice and further exaggerated his claims, exacerbating the problem.

**Fifty-first Iowa Volunteer Infantry**

The Fifty-first Iowa Volunteers were among the last units to arrive in the Philippines when they finally reached Manila on December 7, 1898 after a voyage of thirty-five days. Here the odyssey of the Fifty-first Iowa grew unusual. The regiment stayed aboard their ship, the Pennsylvania until December 26 when they sailed for Iloilo, arriving on December 28, 1898. Unfortunately, the regiment was not allowed to disembark, so they stayed on the Pennsylvania in Iloilo until January 29, 1899. From Iloilo the Pennsylvania sailed back to Manila Bay where the regiment finally disembarked onto Cavite on February 3, 1899. This strange and convoluted journey aboard ship meant the Fifty-first Iowa spent ninety-three days straight aboard ship on their passage over before disembarkation. More importantly, the regiment’s combat skills were “diluted” by this time on board the ship without sufficient space to train and drill.

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228 This shuffling back and forth of the Fifty-first Iowa without disembarking them once for nearly sixty days in the Philippines serves to illustrate some of the confusion existing there prior to hostilities with Aguinaldo’s forces on February 4, 1899. William F. Strobridge, “To San Francisco and Beyond: Fifty-First Iowa Volunteers in 1898,” *Annals of Iowa* 41, No.5 (Summer 1972), 1046. See also United States Adjutant General’s Office, *Correspondence Vol. I*, 593.
Despite the reduction in efficiency as a result of the time spent on the *Pennsylvania*, the Fifty-first Iowa soon proved themselves capable of contributing to the fighting against the Filipino insurgents. The regiment’s main campaign was in the vicinity of Malalos. During this campaign, the Fifty-first Iowa “charged across a river” under “heavy fire.” The commander, Colonel Loper, quoted General Elwell Otis as complimenting the regiment for its “gallantry and fidelity” during their conversations.

Most of the reason that the Fifty-first Iowa saw so little action was their time onboard the *Pennsylvania* and the ship of the return voyage. Over one-third of the time from the regiment’s leaving San Francisco until their return was spent onboard a ship. When time in garrison prior to and following operations is added, the Fifty-first Iowa saw little combat action, but performed acceptably when in contact with the enemy.

**First Colorado Volunteer Infantry**

The First Colorado arrived in the Philippines in July 1898. The regiment was promptly assigned to the trenches opposite Malate where they were engaged in the fighting overnight on August 1, 1898. The regiment later participated in the defeat of Spanish forces and seizure of Manila on August 13, 1898. The Colorado Volunteers were the “earliest” unit to charge and they forced the Spanish back to their second line of defense, then into the fortress, and then finally convinced the Spanish army through feat of arms to surrender.

The First Colorado’s part in the defeat of the Spanish and seizure of Manila was well recognized by Army leadership. The regiment’s commander, Colonel Irving Hale, received promotion to brigadier general for “gallantry” during the Battle of Manila. This resulted in a vacancy for command of the regiment, which went to Lieutenant Colonel Henry B. McCoy, who was promoted to colonel with the assignment.232

The soldiers of the First Colorado and their families had no desire for the regiment to remain in the Philippines. By October 31, 1898, unit members were already petitioning Colorado Governor Adams for their immediate return. One soldier claimed to represent “one thousand” of the Colorado volunteers and demanded the regiment’s return to America on the grounds that the Spanish had been defeated and the subsistence to the regiment was poor.233 Governor Adams forwarded this request to Secretary Alger for his action. At the same time, sixty family members of soldiers in the regiment also petitioned the governor for the return of the regiment in November 1898. The War Department refused to release the First Colorado, or any volunteer regiments, until regular regiments could reach the Philippines to replace them, effectively ending the calls for return of the regiment to the United States prematurely.234

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233 “Homesick Colorado Boys,” Deseret Evening News (Salt Lake City, UT), 1 November 1898, 1. http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83045555/1898-11-01/ed-1/seq-1/ (accessed 20 February 2012). As if to punctuate the request for redeployment related to inadequate subsistence, Company G, First Colorado, had refused to drill on October 20, 1898 because of the horrible condition of their rations. This condition of the meat was so poor that the regimental commander, Colonel McCoy, ordered the food buried. “Colorado’s Stand,” The Hawaiian Gazette (Honolulu, Oahu, HI), 11 November 1898, 1. http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83025121/1898-11-11/ed-1/seq-1/ (accessed 20 February 2012).

234 Ibid.
The Colorado volunteers garrisoned Manila during this period, defending it during Aguinaldo’s attack over February 4-6, 1899. Here the regiment distinguished itself again by making the first charge of the day that was “brilliantly successful.”

The First Colorado’s reputation spread as the Philippine War continued. In June 1899, Governor Theodore Roosevelt, formerly Colonel Roosevelt of “Rough Rider” fame, met former Governor Adams. Governor Roosevelt reportedly said in reference to the First Colorado Volunteers, “I’m proud of every man in that regiment and wish every one of Uncle Sam’s soldiers was as brave.”

Besides the early request to come home common to most of the volunteer regiments, the First Colorado had one other incident that tarnished their image as soldiers. The regiment was the home of the only traitor amongst the soldiers in the Philippines, Corporal Leonard F. Hayes of Company I, First Colorado Volunteers. Corporal Hayes was bayoneted to death during an engagement between insurgents, on whose side Corporal Hayes was fighting, and the Second Oregon and Twentieth Kansas regiments. Corporal Hayes’ actions occasioned great enmity in his fellow soldiers as exhibited by one American soldier’s quote concerning Hayes’ death, “We would have treated him worse, if we had known how.”

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237 Hayes fell in love with a Filipino girl to the point where he deserted his unit, joined the insurgents, and led a battery of artillery as a lieutenant in Aquinaldo’s forces. In addition to being bayoneted to death, the soldier who killed him “held him up over his head and held him there while other soldiers shot him.” The soldiers then buried him in a common grave with other insurgents. “The Death of a Traitor,” The Evening Herald (Shenandoah, PA), 28 July 1899, 2. http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn87078000/1899-07-28/ed-1/seq-2/ (accessed 25 February 2012).
First California Volunteer Infantry

The First California Volunteers were in the initial expedition to the Philippines along with the Second Oregon Volunteers arriving on July 15, 1898. The regiment was outside Manila during the first battle with the Spanish at Malate where they performed with “gallantry” marching through “a storm of lead and iron.”238 The regiment was also participated in the assault on Manila on August 13, 1898. General Greene later complimented the First California saying it made “a splendid showing” and that “Colonel Smith and his men fought bravely, as we knew they would.”239

Not long after defeating the Spanish and taking Manila, the First California faced what many other volunteer regiments in the Philippines did, the desire of many soldiers to return home, feeling they had done their part. In the California Volunteers, the first rumblings came from the commander of the Third Battalion, Major C. L. Tilden, while he was home on convalescent leave in October 1898. Major Tilden initially said it would not “be consistent with his position to express an opinion as to the annexation of the Philippines.” However, he quickly followed this remark by saying, “I think the volunteers who have borne the brunt of the campaign should be sent home.” Major Tilden further added that, “The battles are over and the remaining work should be left to the regular army.”240

238 “Volunteers and Regulars Vied for Brave Deeds,” The San Francisco Call, 5 September 1898, 3. http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85066387/1898-09-05/ed-1/seq-3/ (accessed 25 February 2012). For a contrary view of this engagement where the Californians were nervous and fired into the backs of the Tenth Pennsylvania, who were fortunately entrenched see Faust, Campaigning in the Philippines, 92.


240 Tilden was later discharged from service for his illness, but he still managed to remain in the California National Guard where he received command of the First California Infantry. “Major Tilden
Editorial writing contemporary to Major Tilden’s comments seemed to echo similar sentiments. One writer said that the First California “must be returned home” because of the problems in Manila, especially the growing rate of illness amongst the soldiers. A soldier in the First California also said that despite a report to the contrary, soldiers in the regiment wanted to return home not remain in federal service describing them as “crazy” to get back to the United States.

The California Volunteers’ desire to return home manifested itself into action back in California. The primary instigator of the action was a group of friends and family of the soldiers in the regiment. Initially the group began by drafting a petition to President McKinley and Secretary Alger requesting the return of the First California. This group circulated the petition for signature and cited the following reasons in the petition: climate, illnesses, and the regiment having already volunteered for and having served in an actual war. The petition also requested replacements for those in the Philippines the longest, so they could be returned home the most.


242 Corporal F. A. Healey arranged to act as a correspondent for The San Francisco Call after their previous correspondent returned home. Just three days after the newspaper published this report, they published a story about Corporal Healey’s return after being discharged in the Philippines for illness. Another report mentioned leisure stops in Hong Kong and Japan because he had recovered even though the discharge was because he needed to return to America for recovery. The San Francisco Call admitted requesting Mr. Healey’s discharge, but denied Healey knowing about it. The newspaper claimed it had undertaken the request following Mr. Healey’s report to them of his illness. This seems unlikely given Mr. Healey’s prior disparaging reporting on the state of healthcare in the Philippines. “Thanksgiving Cheer Among Soldier Boys,” The San Francisco Call, 5 January 1899, 6. http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85066387/1899-01-05/ed-1/seq-6/ (accessed 26 February 2012). See also “Corporal Healy Coming,” The San Francisco Call, 8 January 1899, 13. http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85066387/1899-01-08/ed-1/seq-13/ (accessed 26 February 2012) and “Californian Boys’ Health Improving,” The San Francisco Call, 13 January 1899, 7. http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85066387/1899-01-13/ed-1/seq-7/ (accessed 26 February 2012).
quickly. Subsequent to drafting the petition, the group met on January 17 and January 29, 1899 for the purpose of raising awareness and determining a strategy to get the regiment home. These meetings had over three hundred and five hundred people in attendance, respectively. California Senator George C. Perkins sent a telegram to the group agreeing to help them with their cause of returning the First California as soon as possible.243

Aquinaldo’s attack on Manila gave the California Volunteers another chance to excel in combat. The regiment did not disappoint. On February 6, 1899 Lieutenant Colonel Duboce led the First California in a charge past the Fourteenth Infantry Regiment, a Regular unit, who were “in a tight place.” Lieutenant Colonel Duboce’s prompt action saved the Fourteenth Infantry from “being cut off.”244 The regiment continued fighting over the next few days and succeeded in “driving the rebels out of town” after they had re-occupied Pateros following an earlier defeat there.245

Although the First California was in the thick of the fighting with Aguinaldo’s insurgent forces, their family and friends back in California again took up the cause of their return. Adjutant-General Corbin had replied to the group petition by the family and friends of members of the regiment in the form of two telegrams. The first telegram intimated that the First California

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would be returned “as soon as expedient.” No one in the group seemed certain what that meant, but the second telegram was very clear. Adjutant-General Corbin claimed that General Elwell Otis had written saying that the California Volunteers wanted to remain in the Philippines “until hostilities ceased.” The group drafted a reply to Adjutant-General Corbin that effectively accused General Elwell Otis of lying about the desires of the regiment’s members. The group replied that they knew what the unit really wanted because they were the families of the men in the regiment, and they had been told by the soldiers themselves about their desire to return home. Former Captain E. C. Sutcliffe, Company G of the First California, had recently been discharged, and he confirmed that the members of the unit had wanted to return home when he left the Philippines in January 1899.

The First California received more praise and commendation during the ensuing months. One such compliment came in the form of President McKinley’s promotion of the regiment’s commander, Colonel James A. Smith to brigadier general for “valiant service.” Another compliment originated from Major C. H. Potter, Eighteenth Infantry Regiment, who described the First California as a “fighting body” that performed “splendid work” in the Philippines.

The First California finally arrived in California for discharge on August 26, 1899. However, contrary to the War Department’s statements and assurances from congressmen, it was

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247 Ibid.
248 California Representative Julius Kahn reported to the group that he had been given assurances that the regiment would be among the first to return. Representative Kahn also urged the group to take no official action. Ibid.
not among the first to return because the Second Oregon had returned forty-five days earlier on July 12, 1899.251

**Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry**

The Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry had one of the more spectacular records of the volunteer regiments. A significant part of the reason for its performance was the commander, Colonel, later General, Funston and his influence on the regiment. Colonel Funston made such an impression in San Francisco for his handling of the regiment that General King had already suggested promotion to brigadier general before the Twentieth Kansas left for the Philippines.252

The Kansas Volunteers arrived in the Philippines after the defeat of the Spanish and occupation of Manila in August 1898. The regiment was in the line when Aguinaldo’s forces attacked on February 4, 1899, and it “acquitted itself with credit” while fighting in the “savage wars of peace.”253 Another report described the Kansans as deserving of “the highest praise” for their “determined advance against heavy fire.”254 General MacArthur even declared that the Twentieth Kansas Volunteers charge on February 5, 1899 as the “best example of an infantry assault” he had ever seen.255 In fighting less than a week later near Caloocan, the Twentieth Kansas once again proved its mettle in combat when it “charged brilliantly” and seized Caloocan.

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from the insurgents. Nor had the battle successes of the regiment in its first two weeks gone unnoticed in Kansas. The Kansas House of Representatives passed a bill thanking the regiment for its “noble and brave” service and its “gallantry in action at Manila.”

In later action at Malalos, the regiment charged into the center of town while under fire. Colonel Funston was at the head and led a group of “dashing Kansans” into the battle. General Elwell Otis shortly after the battle at Malalos said the Twentieth Kansas Volunteers had “undaunted courage” and “fighting qualities” that are “wonderful.”

While the Twentieth Kansas regiment was compiling a superb war record, not everyone in Kansas thought they should be in the Philippines. Mrs. H. M. Miller, whose son was serving in the Twentieth Kansas, wrote a letter to Kansas Senator Lucien Baker requesting his assistance in initiating the return of the regiment from the Philippines. Mrs. Miller cited the formal end of the war with Spain, for which her son had enlisted, as the primary reason for the Kansans’ return.

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259 Senator Baker effectively passed the buck to Adjutant-General Corbin by telling Mrs. Miller she would be better off petitioning him directly. In accordance with Senator Baker’s suggestion, Mrs.
Colonel Funston continued his seemingly fearless leadership of the Twentieth Kansas regiment in fighting near Calumpit. Colonel Funston led four other soldiers from his regiment and swam across the river under fire in an extraordinary display of bravery. One report described this action as Colonel Funston’s “crowning feat of valor.” While this crossing of the Bag-Bag was indeed impressive, the crossing of the Rio Grande two days later on April 27, 1899 was even more so. Colonel Funston was in the first small boat ferrying across the Rio Grande with seven other soldiers against at least six hundred insurgents that were part of a force of nearly four thousand defending the river in that vicinity. The gallantry displayed by Colonel Funston and the other members of the Twentieth Kansas was truly conspicuous and resulted in the receipt of the Medal of Honor by Colonel Funston and Privates Trembley and White upon the recommendation of Generals MacArthur and Wheaton. Generals MacArthur and Elwell Otis recommended Colonel Funston for promotion to brigadier general as well. President McKinley, citing Colonel Funston’s “actual skill and gallantry” in the fighting at the Rio Grande and “most

Miller created a petition requesting Adjutant-General Corbin to facilitate the return of the Twentieth Kansas as soon as possible. The petition had “several hundred” signatures. Ultimately, this effort did not bring the regiment home any more quickly. “To Bring the Twentieth Home,” The Iola (KS) Register, 21 April 1899, 8. http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83040340/1899-04-21/ed-1/seq-8/ (accessed 3 March 2012).


261 This crossing was only possible when two soldiers of Company B, Privates W. B. Trembley and Edward White, who stripped off their clothes and swam unarmed across the river to anchor the rope used for the ferry. The Twentieth Kansas kept up a terrific fire to keep the insurgents in their trenches while Trembley and White crossed the river and anchored the rope. Colonel Funston was in the first boat full of eight men to cross the river. Funston, Memories of Two Wars, 278-286.

262 Ibid., 288-89. See also Zaide, The Philippine Revolution, 318.
gallant services since commencement of the war”, approved Colonel Funston’s promotion to
brigadier general on May 2, 1899.263

General Funston’s fame was known throughout the country. At home in Kansas, this
began to have political implications for after the war. General Funston’s name was being
discussed as being a Republican nominee for a Congressional opening.264

While most of the Twentieth Kansas’ service was without any controversy, the same
cannot be said after they returned. General Funston learned the Army wanted to retain him
following the discharge of the regiment. General Funston returned to service in the Philippines
and then encountered accusations concerning his service with the Twentieth Kansas Volunteers.
Several individuals from outside and inside the regiment came forward with a variety of
allegations against General Funston. These allegations against General Funston included looting a
church, ignoring a subordinate having ordered the execution of prisoners, exaggerating his war
record, and cowardice by seeking cover from enemy fire. While he was vindicated, this period
was trying for General Funston and members of the Twentieth Kansas regiment as many came to
his defense.265

also Zaide, The Philippine Revolution, 319.
264 “A Funston Suggestion That May Bear Fruit,” The Iola (KS) Register, 6 October 1899, 1.
265 These accusations were all in the newspapers over a period of little more than a month in late
1899. Former members of the regiment were involved in the attacks on General Funston. Ultimately
General Funston was exonered after numerous other members of the regiment came to his defense along
with a priest who refuted the allegations of church looting. Aiding General Funston in his defense was the
fact that all the accusers were proven to have some personal motivation against General Funston. The
motivation of the soldiers and civilians accusing General Funston had been punished or rebuked by him
during the campaign for inappropriate actions. “Takes Ireland at His Word,” The Wichita Daily Eagle, 2
Other Examples of Volunteer Performance

Many concerns were raised by senior officers in the Regular Army prior to the war concerning National Guard units and soldiers. The vast majority of the state volunteer units mobilized for the Spanish-American War were comprised of members of the National Guard. These were the soldiers that ultimately fought against Spain and the Filipino insurgent forces under Aquinaldo shortly after the end of the Spanish-American War.

Although these concerns centered on the idea that the National Guard was too unprofessional and undisciplined to be an effective fighting force, the narrative of their performance during the war was very different. In examining the states’ volunteer units performance, most had at least one senior Regular Army officer telling how well the unit performed.

In addition to the previously cited praise for the volunteers’ performance, several other examples exist, including some from outside of America. The German consul, overlooking the field after a battle involving the Second Oregon, said, “I take my hat off to the American volunteer.”266 A British officer observing in the Philippines after the fall of Manila was complimentary of the difficult conditions and restraint used by the volunteer forces. He said the volunteers “uncomplainingly remained in the streets under heavy tropical rains, good-temperedly carrying out the difficult and troublesome duty of preventing armed Insurgents from entering the town and carefully abstaining from coming into unnecessary conflict.” He added that this restraint was in spite of “the large mass of Spanish officers and soldiery who were rather aggressively...

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parading the streets.” He also affirmed that he had been unable “to elicit any report of a complaint
being made of any act of pillage or assault committed by an American soldier.”267

Newspaper accounts present another source of positive comments regarding the service
of the volunteers. One article praised the First Minnesota and Twentieth Kansas. This article went
onto laud the “fighting qualities of the American troops,” predominantly state volunteers,
following the defense of Manila in February 1899.268

Major J. S. Mallory, served as General MacArthur’s inspector general and was
responsible for visiting and inspecting units in the Philippines. He said, “I wish to add my
testimony that these volunteers although not thoroughly trained and disciplined soldiers, have in
the present war proved themselves to be magnificent fighting men.”269 General Elwell Otis
described many state volunteer successes in his report on the volunteers in the Philippines. Some
of these successes included recognition of how the First Colorado attacked entrenched enemy
with “great vigor” and drove the insurgents out of their positions.270 General MacArthur
described the Fifty-first Iowa as doing “some fine work” and the Twentieth Kansas as making a
“handsome offensive return” in a telegram to General Elwell Otis on June 16, 1899.271

Perhaps the best quotation concerning the performance of the state volunteers, comprised
primarily of National Guard soldiers and units, during service in the Philippines came in Soldiers
in the Sun. Sexton observed that the “volunteers had done their work nobly and borne the brunt of
the heaviest fighting during the Insurrection.”272

267 Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, 163.
269 Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, 162.
Affairs in the Philippine Islands, 1899, 136.
271 Ibid., 140.
272 Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, 162.
CONCLUSION

This examination of the Army in the Philippines from 1898 to late 1899 found the National Guard composed the majority of state volunteer units serving in the Philippines. The preparation of the state volunteers illustrated many instances of failure at the state, Army, and national levels prior to the volunteers actually fighting in the Philippines. These institutional failures manifest themselves in poor planning for mobilization, poor funding for the National Guard, and National Guard parochialism and willingness to involve political leaders to support the Guard’s agenda over all else. Another problem borne out of this examination was Army prejudice against the unprofessional, undisciplined, and untrained National Guard because of the Guard’s perceived inability to fight for the nation. In spite of these institutional failures, an examination of the Volunteers’ performance on the ground revealed results that far exceeded the magnitude of the sum of the failures prior to combat. The Volunteers’ success in the Philippines was in contrast to their almost unanimity in seeking to return from the Philippines at the earliest opportunity, regardless of the situation on the ground.

The success of these volunteer units coupled with the difficulties of mobilization under the process at the time foreshadowed the passage of the Militia Act of 1903. More commonly known as the Dick Act after its sponsor, Ohio Representative Charles Dick, this law specified the National Guard as the primary reserve for the Army. The law also prescribed federal funding and oversight for the Guard, including minimum requirements for training. This law truly represented a significant change for the relationship and expectations between the National Guard and the Army. The Dick Act was passed soon after the experience of the National Guard’s problems with mobilization, a discussion that largely ignored their exceptional performance during the Spanish-
American and Philippine Wars. When viewed through from the modern lens, one can easily see how the American experience in the Philippines was a significant factor in the changes to the National Guard.273

After eight years in Iraq and almost ten in Afghanistan, the Army has left one war and is winding down another, a similarity with the beginning of the twentieth century. While the Army is beginning a reduction of over ten percent of its strength, a significant reduction befell the Army after the Philippines and before the Punitive Expedition into Mexico in 1916. The Army’s temporary growth under the revised Hull Bill required a reduction in its size following hostilities.

The drawdown requires the Army to make decisions about where to prioritize its staffing and funding. The National Guard offers a critical capacity during this time of change by shifting from its history as a strategic reserve to continuing its modern recent employment as an operational reserve. This shift would entail the National Guard contributing forces to complement the Regular Army on a rotational basis in order to assist a smaller Army in meeting its obligations. This change would be similar in scope to the legislative changes from 1903 to 1916 regarding the National Guard’s role as a reserve component.

Similarities between the Army of both periods exist. One of the overarching similarities was that both periods had a volunteer Army completing expeditionary wars that required heavy

273 Some of the changes to the National Guard included an increase to federal funding for the National Guard by one hundred fifty percent, requirements for drill and summer camps, training and formal assistance by the Regular Army, and call-ups into federal service. The notion of voluntary participation in the call-up was eliminated as well for Guardsmen who failed to report for a call-up were subject to court martial. The Dick Act also paid National Guard soldiers for their service during summer camp where members of the National Guard had often paid membership dues to their unit before. By 1908, National Guard funding had increased from $400,000 to $4,000,000, a ten-fold increase in a decade. National Guard officers could also attend professional military education, such as the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The Dick Act did not solve all the problems of the National Guard being designated reserve for the Army, but it was the beginning of legislation that did. The Militia Act of 1908 and National Defense Act of 1916 were the last pieces of the puzzle that shaped the National Guard into the professional force it is today that is available for federal service overseas. Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 143-145, 151-152, 156-158. See also Cooper, The Rise of the National Guard, 109-112, 153-56.
use of the National Guard. Another similarity is that none of these expeditionary conflicts was a war for national survival. This caused these conflicts to have the quality of becoming more unpopular with the nation as time progressed. These factors created the synergy that allowed the Army and National Guard to come together in a more symbiotic relationship to provide for the nation’s security in the early 1900s.

These same factors can be seen creating a similar synergy for change in the National Guard one hundred years later. Supporting this concept, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has been quoted as being unwilling to put the National Guard “back on the shelf” because of it has become an “effective, lethal fighting force” over the last ten years.274 One action that seems to indicate movement in this direction is the inclusion of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau as a full member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act. The next step is for the Army and National Guard to plan the best method to implement this change as the drawdown occurs.

While a change of this magnitude is likely to be fraught with its own difficulties and problems, an opportunity truly exists to improve the Total Army and balance our increasingly limited national defense resources. One of the most significant obstacles will be the Regular Army’s acceptance of a significantly increased Army National Guard role, since even today the Army views the Guard as a less professional force. Fortunately, history provides us with examples of exceptional National Guard combat performance in the Philippines at the turn of the twentieth century and Southwest Asia at the turn of the twenty-first century. Both of these should serve as examples of the value we can derive from a Reserve Component that is actively engaged alone, or side by side with the Army, in our nation’s defense.

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