MID-COURSE CORRECTIONS:
The Army Reserve’s Campaign to Mitigate Its Officer Vacancies during the Global War on Terror

A Monograph
by
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The United States Army Reserve (USAR) experienced exceptional utilization between 2001 and 2011, requiring transformation from a strategic to operational posture. The USAR used the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model to source combat rotations while transforming, and currently envisions using it to plan readiness across the service. Throughout, the USAR’s officer vacancies were – and will remain – a key limitation to effective ARFORGEN manning. This monograph articulates challenges related to officer vacancies and enumerates various mitigation efforts employed. The author analyzes these within the bounds of Unified Land Operations to identify whether the USAR implemented a campaign plan to address its vacancy problem. The USAR first formal Army Reserve Campaign Plan (ARCP) in 2010 focused generally on manning and distribution requirements, never addressing officer vacancies directly. However, the USAR’s officer mitigation efforts are categorizable into four lines of effort: accessions, management, retention, and transition. In pursuing these LOEs, the USAR essentially executed the components of operational art. Lacking formal planning and recognition, however, the campaign plan was insufficient to fully rectify the USAR’s officer vacancies positions due to lack of proper phasing and transitions, poorly established end state, and ineffectively defined necessary or desirable conditions.

Army Reserve, officer vacancies, Army Force Generation, ARFORGEN, Army Reserve Campaign Plan, operational reserve, transformation

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Abstract

MID-COURSE CORRECTIONS: The Army Reserve’s Campaign to Mitigate Its Officer Vacancies during the Global War on Terror by MAJ Katherine Numerick, US Army Reserve, 67 pages.

The United States Army Reserve (USAR) experienced exceptional utilization since 2001 in the Global Wars on Terrorism (GWOT), requiring its transformation from a strategic to operational posture. The Army and USAR used the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model to source combat rotations while executing this transformation, and currently plans to continue using it to plan readiness across the service. Throughout this endeavor, the USAR’s officer vacancies were – and will remain – a key limitation to effective ARFORGEN manning.

This monograph articulates the challenges the USAR faced related to officer vacancies and enumerates various mitigation efforts employed during the GWOT decade from 2001-2011. The author analyzes these efforts within the bounds of Unified Land Operations to identify whether the USAR implemented a campaign plan to address its vacancy problem.

The USAR did not formally establish an Army Reserve Campaign Plan (ARCP) until 2010, and when established, the ARCP focused generally on personnel manning and distribution requirements, never addressing officer vacancies directly. However, the USAR’s officer mitigation efforts are categorizable into four lines of effort: accessions, management, retention, and transition. In pursuing these LOEs, the USAR essentially executed the components of operational art to address its officer vacancy problem. Because it lacked formal planning and recognition, however, the USAR’s officer vacancy mitigation campaign plan was insufficient to fully rectify its unfilled positions due to lack of proper phasing and transitions, poorly established end state, and ineffectively defining necessary or desirable conditions.
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Introduction

After more than 10 years of war, the United States (US) Army has transformed its Reserve Components (RC) from strategic to operational forces. Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Robert Gates articulated the RC operational nature in Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 1200.17. The Army pursued this requirement by aligning its components within the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle to synchronize personnel, equipment, and training to ensure unit deployment readiness. However, the process presented each component with unique challenges that they must address to achieve the desired end state. Among other things, the United States Army Reserves (USAR) marketed ARFORGEN as a way to provide its Soldiers and their families deployment predictability. Unfortunately, ARFORGEN fails to provide USAR officers such predictability and results in extensive unit instability. Many reasons contribute to this circumstance, but consistently high officer vacancy rates are a key influence.

Currently, Congress struggles with fiscal limitations in an era of persistent conflict, and many voices support maintaining an operational Reserve capability for fiscal and strategic flexibility reasons.

1 Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (Arlington, VA: Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 2006).

“RCs as an operational force. The RCs provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. In their operational roles, RCs participate in a full range of missions according to their Services’ force generation plans. Units and individuals participate in missions in an established cycle or periodic manner that provides predictability for the combatant commands, the Services, Service members, their families, and employers. In their strategic roles, RC units and individuals train or are available for missions in accordance with the national defense strategy. As such, the RCs provide strategic depth and are available to transition to operational roles as needed.”


5 James Jay Carafano, The Army Reserves and the Abrams Doctrine: Unfulfilled Promise, Uncertain Future (Washington: Heritage Foundation, 18 April 2005), 1-3. After the Vietnam War, the Abrams Doctrine and Total Force Concept organized the US Army in such a way that extended military campaigns required mobilization of its RC, where most of its logistical support structure and extended combat capability resides. Combat operations from 2001 to present day mobilized and deployed RC forces well beyond the 1970s original vision for a strategic reserve.
Indeed, the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR) found that the “nation requires an operational reserve force....[and] there is no reasonable alternative to the nation’s continuing increased reliance on its reserve components for missions at home and abroad.” In 2011, the Office of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff (VCJCS) and the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD-RA) completed a joint report on the Reserve Components’ future use. The report recommended that DOD “envision the Guard and Reserve as a ‘force of first choice’ for such [recurring predictable] missions and tasks, and the process by which roles and missions are assigned to the Reserve Component should reflect that judgment.”

This discussion demonstrates that “operationalizing the Army Reserves” – even as a concept – assumes the USAR remains highly integrated in ongoing global and contingency operations, and functions concurrently within the immediate force structure. As the US pursues an operationalized Army Reserves, officer availability and stability may be the pivot point for sustained success. This monograph identifies the USAR’s officer vacancy issues over the last 10 years and enumerates the United States Army Reserve Command’s (USARC) efforts during this time to mitigate these problems. It briefly discusses the USAR’s officer personnel system status prior to September 2001 and surveys the USAR’s various efforts to mitigate officer vacancies. Then, using the elements of operational art, the author analyzes the efforts according to Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, to determine if they comprise a campaign plan designed to overcome identified issues before suggesting future

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6 Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, *Commission on the National Guard and Reserves* (Arlington, VA: Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 2006), 11, 5. Hereafter, referred to as CNGR.

Although the USAR did not create a specific, formal plan focused on mitigating officer vacancies, by pursuing multiple activities across four lines of effort, the USAR effectively pursued a campaign plan that included most elements of operational art and tenets of unified land operations. Lacking a focused end state and articulated conditions, however, the USAR could not mitigate its officer vacancy problem fully. As a result, these vacancies persist as the component moves forward into a continuously operational environment.

Before examining how vacancies reduce operational effectiveness, one must view the impending operational environment. The VCJCS/ASD-RA report envisions five operations with potential RC roles.³

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Operation</th>
<th>Potential Role of Reserve Component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large-Scale Conventional Campaign</td>
<td>Reserve Component can provide trained and ready units in accordance with Service force generation processes; Active Component can be expected to provide full spectrum conventional military capabilities for such operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large-Scale Stability Operation</td>
<td>Reserve Component can take on a larger role than in large-scale conventional campaigns owing to more predictable demands associated with large-scale stability operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steady State Engagement Activities</td>
<td>Because Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) and BPC activities are predictable, relatively consistent over time, and can be substantially enabled by long-term personal and geographic relationships, the Reserve Component should be considered a viable force for such missions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief</td>
<td>Reserve Component elements that are available with short warning and can provide important contributions during the initial phases of such operations. However, because catastrophic events occur with little or no warning, forward deployed Active Component forces can be expected to provide the initial DOD forces for such operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civilian Authorities</td>
<td>Except in rare circumstances, the National Guard can be expected to support civil authorities at the direction of State Governors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Support</td>
<td>Because many of these tasks are predictable and relatively consistent over time, the Reserve Component offers a potential source for the necessary units and personnel.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

³: Future RC operational possibilities identified by the VCJCS and OASD (RA)⁴

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⁴ Future Role of the RC, 32. It is important to note that this particular report did not differentiate between services or components, including both National Guard and all service capabilities within its purview.

⁵ Ibid.
Within these operations, the report visualizes the operationalized Reserve in three variations: rotational units, team missions, and individual augmentees. The rotational unit variation uses the RC in whole units that rotate through their service-designated deployment readiness program and become available during deployment windows. Team missions include long-term, multi-component or interagency tasks that require continuity or receiving and maintaining enhanced training. Individual augmentees provide temporary mission support when units experience resource shortfalls. This monograph focuses on the rotational unit missions, as this comprises the largest USAR population. Figure 2 highlights the rotational unit missions viewed as suitable for the RC.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rotational Unit Missions / Tasks Suitable for the Reserve Components</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Combat</strong></td>
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<td>Full Spectrum Operations – Combat / Sustainment /</td>
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<tr>
<td>Follow-on Forces</td>
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<td>Air and Missile Defense</td>
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<td>Cyber Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nuclear Command &amp; Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>Space Command &amp; Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategic Intelligence / Targeteering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theater Specific Command &amp; Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Command &amp; Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Stability Operations</strong></td>
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<td>Stability Operations</td>
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<td><strong>Homeland Defense</strong></td>
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<td>Homeland Defense</td>
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<td><strong>Defense Support of Civil Authorities</strong></td>
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<td>Defense Support of Civil Authorities</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Relief and Reconstruction</strong></td>
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2: Rotational unit missions suitable for the RC, as identified by the VCJCS and OASD (RA)

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11 Ibid., 36. Examples include intelligence, health affairs, professional military education, reconstruction and transformation, military information support operations, and maritime security.

12 Ibid., 36-37. Examples include linguists, planners and strategists, acquisition/contract management, aviation support, and information technology/C4I systems support.

13 Ibid., 40-41, 35-36.

14 Ibid., 36. “This list of missions or tasks was developed initially by review participants attending the QDR-Directed Comprehensive Review Reserve Component Symposium held at the U.S. Army War College on 21-22 July 2010 and subsequently amended during report coordination.”


As part of rebalancing the overall force, operationalizing the RC offers potential cost savings by increasing capabilities, sustaining the past decade’s investment, and reducing stress on the Active Component (AC). Each service developed cost estimates for possible force realignment options. Given the widespread and favorable recommendations for sustaining routine RC use after the current overseas contingencies, the current fiscal constraints, and the financial benefits identified by the services themselves, it is timely and relevant to identify possible barriers to successful RC operationalization, regardless of its structure.

**Background**

Units with officer vacancies must fill these positions before deployment. When officer supply is insufficient for the requirements, this disrupts deployment predictability across the force, because individuals must “jump around” among positions so the service can achieve fully sourced units. Assigning officers to the vacant positions requires full utilization of the military personnel management system. The military personnel management includes four tasks relevant to this paper: procurement – defined here as accessions and initial training, management – including assignments, transfers, mobilization/ deployment, and reconstitution – retention, and transition. This monograph addresses each area below, but it is important to explain why the USAR had such a significant officer shortage in 2001, because this situation affected the USAR throughout the Global War on Terror (GWOT) decade as officers – and their vacancies – progressed through the ranks.

In 2001, the USAR had a junior officer gap of 8,700 captains, and although the on-hand strength for lieutenants was 143 percent of authorizations, many served in the vacant captain positions, leaving 2,000 lieutenant positions vacant in USAR units. Additionally, the USAR had vacant positions for 1,300 majors. The USAR assigned officers between the Troop Program Units (TPU) and Inactive Ready

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15 Ibid., 53. See Appendix B.
Reserves (IRR) largely based on personal requirements rather than military priorities. The USAR had not implemented the lengthy mobilization and deployment procedures for large-scale deployment since DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Few officers officially transitioned out of the USAR unless they were eligible for retirement. If the officer was not serving until retirement eligibility, they simply moved from active reserve duty in TPUs or from the active component – if they had a remaining service obligation -- into the IRR. Once an officers’ service obligation passed, few officers took appropriate action severing their relationship with the US Army. The officer gap resulted from three primary factors.

In 2001, prior to OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), the USAR accessed new lieutenants through three primary sources: Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), Officer Candidate School (OCS), and direct commissioning. Additional accessions came from active duty officers who transferred into the USAR with remaining military service obligations. These accession sources remain in effect.

First, ROTC Cadet Command failed to achieve its accessions mission during the years 1989-2001 and active duty requirements reduced the already few ROTC lieutenants commissioned for the RC. From 1995-2001, the USAR received an average of 245 lieutenants through the ROTC program – its largest accession source – to fill the 619 accessions authorizations required annually. Second, the Army Reserves Personnel Command (AR-PERSCOM) ineptly implemented the Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA). Specifically, AR-PERSCOM took nearly two years to implement the law from its passage, poorly communicated new documentation requirements, and used a narrow DOD interpretation of the law. As a result, promotion boards passed over many officers and eliminated a

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17 Troop Program Units are those where Soldiers attend 48 paid training assemblies annually and participate in at least two weeks of annual training, which Commanders can extend to 29 days – often referred to as “one-week-a-month/two-weeks-a-year.” IRR Soldiers are the largest group of trained Soldiers not already assigned to a unit that are available during Congressionally-declared national emergency or partially under Presidential Reserve Call-Up Authority.


20 Ibid., 18.
previously routine Selective Continuation (SELCON) Board process that retained worthy officers who were twice non-selected for promotion.\textsuperscript{21} Third, active duty officer management affected USAR officer accessions. Throughout the 1990s, AR-PERSCOM maximized officer assignments utilizing IRR to TPU transfers for those with remaining service obligations. However, the same ROTC shortages affected the active component, which resulted in more officers fulfilling their entire service obligations on active duty. Furthermore, the active duty began to use SELCON to retain officers twice passed over for promotion, further reducing qualified officer transfers into the USAR, whether as IRR or drilling TPU Reservists.\textsuperscript{22}

**Challenges and Mitigations**

Although the USAR entered the GWOT decade undermanned, its leadership did not remain idle. Instead, as stakeholders identified challenges, the USARC implemented an array of solutions to mitigate its officer personnel problems. This section discusses the challenges identified, solutions proposed, and mitigations attempted in the human resource areas of accessions, management, retention, and transition between 2001 and 2011. USARC’s aim in implementing these efforts was to increase its officer corps size so it could effectively support combat operations while providing officers long-term stability in an environment where federal laws and guidance evolved before culminating in the ARFORGEN policy.

**Officer accessions**

Officer accessions acquire “the right number and type of officers … of high military merit, to meet the Army’s authorized strength levels.”\textsuperscript{23} Increasing USAR officer accessions was critical in effecting

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 29-30. The ROPMA went into effect in 1996 in part to bring the RC promotion systems in alignment with one another and with the active component to increase overall equity. It specified that promotions would go to the “best qualified” rather than “fully qualified” officers, and DOD could not appoint officers to the position of captain without a baccalaureate degree. Although AR-PERSCOM had data systems documenting officers’ educational completion, these were not “trusted systems” and officers had to submit transcripts or diploma copies to substantiate their civilian education. This was the case even when commissioning depended upon achieving a baccalaureate degree, such as graduation from the US Military Academy at West Point. As a result, between ROPMA implementation and the end of CY2001, the USAR separated 16,000 lieutenants for two-time non-selection to captain.

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 36-37.

\textsuperscript{23} AR 600-8, 15. Accessions typically occur at the junior, lieutenant, rank, but the Army also accessions officers at higher ranks based on branch specialty (such as medical) or when moving from one component to another (e.g., active to reserve).
USAR officer mobilization frequency. With improved accessions, the USAR could increase officer deployment predictability and unit stability.

Over the GWOT’s initial 10 years, USARC, DOD, and even Congress undertook six significant initiatives to address the company-grade officer shortage. Four initiatives targeted lieutenant accessions: increased ROTC scholarships, direct commissions, officer candidate school, and cash bonuses for accessions. Four initiatives targeted captains and mid-level officers: cash bonuses for affiliation, reduced military service obligation for active participation, and direct commission. For Fiscal Year (FY) 2004, Congress wrote legislation so ROTC scholarship awards could target students who wanted a guaranteed reserve commission, authorized non-contracted ROTC cadets serving in TPUs to receive room and board expenses, and increased ROTC scholarships for students attending junior college.24 Subsequently, USAR accessions from ROTC scholarship recipients consistently exceeded previous years’ maximum accessions.25

The USAR increased its direct commission accessions to such a degree that it was the largest commissioning source in 2008.26 Initially, applicants had to demonstrate baccalaureate degree completion. By 2003, the requirement became partial degree completion, usually 60 semester hours.27 By 2005, the USAR waived the baccalaureate degree as a commissioning prerequisite.28 The direct commission program served its initial goal, but had undesired second-order effects. Specifically, by drawing talented non-commissioned officers (NCO) into the officer corps, the USAR hollowed out its NCO corps. This left new lieutenants without the senior NCOs to mentor them in traditional junior

25 See Appendix C.
27 Captain John Kelley, e-mail message to author, 27 February 2012.
28 This author served as a Major Subordinate Command S-1 from 2004-2005 and received instructions to identify all subordinate units’ Soldiers with a 110 ASVAB GT score, regardless of college degree or course completion. This was the first round of identifying potential direct commissioning candidates. The explanation was that new lieutenants could not be promoted to captain for five years, and that was sufficient time for them to complete a baccalaureate degree, “even if they were deployed for a year.”
leadership tasks. Additionally, since the senior NCOs who would have provided the mentoring were now the lieutenants who they would have mentored, some newly commissioned officers experienced greater difficulty transitioning from the NCO “doing” role to the officer “planning” role. In the cases where the USAR directly commissioned enlisted Soldiers, they lacked traditional NCO leadership and operational experiences, requiring those who recommended the Soldier for commissioning to consider external civilian success factors rather than recognized competence within the Army organization. Finally, this produced a zero net gain for USAR Soldier strength.²⁹

**The Officer Direct Commission Program in the US Army Reserve, 2001-2009**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total No. Direct Officer Commissions in USAR</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,267</td>
<td>1,263</td>
<td>1,078</td>
<td>766</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>1,082</td>
<td>1,028</td>
<td>1,007</td>
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</table>

Percentage at each rank

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
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<tr>
<td>2LT</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1LT</td>
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<td>14</td>
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<td>MAJ</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3: USAR Officer Direct Commissions increase after baccalaureate degree requirement removed. Numbers include chaplain and medical service branches, which comprised over 175 direct commissions in FY09.³⁰

In a related program, the USAR implemented a “green-to-green” program in FY09 and FY10.

Active duty enlisted Soldiers applied for commission through Officer Candidate School to become USAR officers. In both years, HRC held a selection board, however General Officers in command could directly select deserving Soldiers for OCS attendance and program participation. Each Major General commanders could select up to 20 Soldiers and Brigadier General commanders each could select up to


³⁰ Catherine H. Augustine, James Hosek, Ian P. Cook, and James Coley, *Analysis and Recommendations on the Company-Grade Officer Shortfall in the Reserve Components of the US Army* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011), 41. Source: ARCD communications with the authors. NOTE: 2LT = Army second lieutenant. 1LT = Army first lieutenant. LTC = Army lieutenant colonel. The numbers include chaplains and medical service branches. Without these professionals, the USAR directly commissioned 831 officers in FY2009.
seven Soldiers. The USAR experienced a sharp rise in accessions as a result, doubling the OCS accessions two years after implementing this program.

The USAR implemented a series of cash bonus programs designed for accessions across all ranks. The Accessions bonus program targeted incoming lieutenants and warrant officers, while the Affiliation bonus program targeted officers in any rank. Officers had to serve in critical military specialties, but were not necessarily required to serve in units anticipating deployment. This program began in 2004 with a $6,000 lump-sum bonus for a three-year commitment. In January 2006, the bonus increased to $10,000 for the same commitment period, and the program ended 31 December 2011. The Affiliation bonus targeted accessions from the AC and the IRR if the officer had been an IRR Soldier for 12 months or more. The USAR experienced some increase in AC accessions after implementing this program. However, the AC released few officers prior to their MSO and the after-tax net result for a $6,000 bonus was not compelling for many Soldiers. The USAR experienced a noticeable accessions increase after the bonus increased to $10,000.

For officers not swayed by cash, the USAR offered a four-year ‘service-for-time’ pilot from 2006 to 2010. IRR Soldiers who completed their remaining service in a TPU would reduce their overall military service obligation (MSO). Officers with specific specialties could reduce their MSO as much as two full years in this pilot. Officers sometimes could combine this program with the Affiliation bonus.

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31 US Department of the Army, FY10 Regular Army Enlisted to Reserve Component Officer Candidate School Program, MILPER 236 (Washington, DC, 2009); US Department of the Army, Regular Army Enlisted to Reserve Component Officer Candidate School Program, MILPER 152 (Washington, DC, 2009).

32 See Appendix D for OCS specific accessions and Appendix E to review the various lieutenant accessions programs.


34 See Appendix F for AC to RC Accessions by fiscal year and rank.

35 US Department of the Army, Reducing the MSO of IRR Soldiers in Exchange for SELRES Duty (29 SEP 2006), e-mail to DCS G1 Military Personnel Enlisted (Washington, DC, 2006).
In 2010, the Army G1 piloted a five-year direct commissioning program that accessed individuals directly to the rank of captain. The initial concept focused on accessing individuals into critical shortage branches and functional areas.\textsuperscript{36} The program forecasted priority placement for these individuals into branches with relevant technical certifications or civilian training, such as Engineering, Finance, Civil Affairs, and Chemical. These external sources provided the Army verification that the incoming officer had existing relevant knowledge.\textsuperscript{37} This concept is similar to the medical licensure or passing the bar exam for Medical and Judge Advocate General officers, who also enter the Army at ranks higher than second lieutenant.

**Officer management**

Officer management “distributes officers … to meet the needs of the Army [and] ensure the presence of the leadership and technical skills necessary for mission accomplishment.”\textsuperscript{38} Officer management also encompasses the promotion selection process. Army regulations do not define specifically what it means to ‘ensure the presence of leadership and technical skills necessary for mission accomplishment.’ One might consider personnel stability, as it allows for physical presence and provides time to gain necessary technical skills, but little salient research exists correlating personnel stability per se to direct military unit mission performance.\textsuperscript{39} When examined more discretely, though, personnel stability is relevant to the kind of leadership, problem-solving, and mission execution military forces require. Personnel stability positively correlates with shared group knowledge for task-oriented problem solving, gained from shared training experiences.\textsuperscript{40} These problems require leaders who delegate roles

\begin{flushright}
\footnotesize

\textsuperscript{37} US Department of the Army, *Direct Appointment to Captain Program*, MILPER 284 (Washington, DC, 2010).

\textsuperscript{38} AR 600-8-15.


12
and duties to achieve multi-faceted goals. With stable group membership, leaders draw on the shared
knowledge, delegating roles and duties based on individuals’ unique competencies and relative abilities.
When individuals arrive late to a group – even if trained in an identical manner – groups demonstrate
lower abilities in remembering and coordinating task-based actions. The group also resists innovations
these newcomers identify, even when the group is in failing circumstances. In a military context, then,
officers arriving late to a mobilizing unit lack the ability to access the shared knowledge and doubly
stymied because newcomers’ innovations are typically unwelcome – essentially, they lack credibility to
be effective leaders. With the significance of personnel stability in mind, this section considers stop loss,
cross-leveling, unit-level assistance to officers, and promotion considerations, in turn.

**Ensuring leadership presence: Stop loss**
In the immediate days after 9/11, the military services implemented ‘stop loss’ programs to retain
their service members supporting combat operations. The USAR used the ‘stop loss’ program longer than
any other component or service. Individual skill-based stop loss efforts started as early as 2001 for some
officers. However, from November 2002 through July 2009, the USAR implemented a unit stop loss
program that retained all unit personnel starting at alert through 90 days after the unit’s redeployment. As deployment cycles became more predictable, units received mobilization alerts a year prior to
mobilization. At steady state, the unit stop loss program managed officers with a broad brush, locking

reports.reports.asp (accessed 22 December 2011). Studies specifically examining military unit cohesion produce varied results, often outdated and attributing military successes solely to the studies’ peer relationships without examining the population’s inherent military capacity, based on training, combat experience, resources, and overall tactical environment.


them into their units for over two years. Eventually, the USAR revised these parameters and unit stop loss began just 90 days prior to the unit’s mobilization period.\textsuperscript{43} In 2009, the USAR replaced unit stop loss with Designated Unit Stabilization Pay (DUSP). This program encouraged Soldiers assigned to the unit at alert to volunteer for mobilization with their unit and promising to participate in all pre-mobilization training. Specifically, Soldiers received a financial incentive of up to $1,200 each based on their participation in unit training assemblies in the six months prior to mobilization.\textsuperscript{44} The USARC designated specific units eligible for this program through published operations order annexes. However, the USARC published the annexes slowly – as much as 16 months past the program’s unit-level initiation date – disrupting the program’s effectiveness as a pre-mobilization retention tool. DUSP ended officially on 31 December 2011, with 287 units identified as eligible.\textsuperscript{45}

In 2007, after the USARC and other RC Commanders submitted concerns about restrictive mobilization policies that effected unit cohesion, Secretary Gates revised mobilization policy guidance to permit multiple involuntary Reserve Soldier mobilizations but limited each mobilization period to 12 months total duration.\textsuperscript{46} With this limited mobilization timeframe, the USAR developed a train-mobilize-deploy model where units completed pre-mobilization training requirements during drill weekends rather than after formal mobilization.\textsuperscript{47} The model reduced Soldiers’ total mobilization timeline from 15-18 months to just 12 months. This reduced time away from their families and jobs due to \textit{mobilization}, but created training and cohesion problems tied to personnel resourcing. Additionally, the training requirements ultimately resulted in RC Soldiers spending more cumulative time away from their families.

\textsuperscript{43} Soldiers Town Hall.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{45} US Department of Defense, “\textit{Pay and Allowance for Inactive Duty Training,}” Financial Management Regulation 7000.14-R: Volume 7A, Chapter 58 (Washington, DC, August 2011), 58-7. This author mobilized on 31 July 2010, during Fiscal Year (FY) 2010. As of April 2011 (third quarter of FY11), the first general officer command in her chain had not received the FY10 DUSP authorization list. Authorized units mobilizing in July 2010 needed notification prior to January 2010 to use DUSP as its intended pre-mobilization retention tool.
\textsuperscript{46} CNGR, 238.
\textsuperscript{47} Directive 1200.17; Colonel Jonathan Guy Ives, “Army Reserves: Transforming While at War” (strategy research project, United States Army War College, 2005).
and jobs over a five-year period than under the previous mobilize-train-deploy model.\textsuperscript{48} The USAR’s 2007 train-mobilize-deploy model assumed unit integrity before mobilization, maximizing training across the planned five-year ARFORGEN unit deployment cycle. In reality, the Army Audit Agency found that USAR units did not have stable enough personnel levels to complete required pre-mobilization training tasks.\textsuperscript{49} Thus, this model – designed to provide reservists more time at their home and civilian jobs, decreased officer deployment stability, because of the increased pre-mobilization training demands, and second-order effects when officers joined units late in the pre-mobilization cycle.

**Ensuring leadership presence: Cross-leveling**

Cross-leveling, which effected unit cohesion, training completion rates, and overall readiness, especially for those non-deploying units remaining in the continental US (CONUS), also contributed to unit instability.\textsuperscript{50} Initially, commanders were responsible for finding Soldiers to cross-level, and when unable, they passed unfilled requirements to the next higher headquarters to fill until the search reached the USARC G3 for nationwide cross-leveling. Mandatory reassignment occurred 90 days before the mobilization date.\textsuperscript{51}

Cross-leveling occurred for many reasons, generally encompassing three categories: unit vacancies, personnel losses to the unit or service, and backfill for non-deployable personnel.\textsuperscript{52} By law, involuntary mobilization and deployments are unit, not individual, activities. As a result, the Army selected units with the greatest dwell-time – the time in the US since previously deployed – for

\begin{footnotes}
\item[48] GAO-09-720.
\item[50] CNGR, 186-188. According to testimony from Lieutenant General Jack Stultz, in 2006, “only eight percent (8%) of non-mobilized Army Reserve units met deployment standards” as a result of cross-leveling effects. Cross-leveling is the process of transferring personnel from one or more units to fill deploying unit vacancies. Congressional Budget Office, *CBO Testimony: Issues That Affect the Readiness of the Army National Guard and Army Reserves*, by J. Michael Gilmore, before the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (Washington, DC, 2007), 3.
\item[52] Lippiatt and Polich, *Reserve Component Unit Stability*, 56.
\end{footnotes}
mobilization over those that had returned more recently. Because these decisions involved no further analysis, the alerted units might be fully staffed or undermanned.\textsuperscript{53} If staffed, assigned personnel may not be deployable due to personal, medical, legal, or educational issues, or other concerns. In any of these instances, another Soldier must deploy in the vacant position.

In a longitudinal study, RAND examined cross-leveling and instability in RC units during 2003-2008. Although the USAR historically has significant personnel instability – between 20 and 30 percent annually – OEF and OIF deployments exacerbated the problem. Generally, each unit’s deploying element included 40 to 50 percent newly assigned Soldiers arriving to the unit within the 12 months before deployment. This occurred even when the unit originally had few vacancies upon alert notification. The turnover rates were consistently high across all unit types and grade levels, with officer instability being the highest. The most common reasons for officer turnover were unit moves at 22 percent. From those moves, the officer deployed either before or after their home unit.\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{53} Chapman, \textit{Manning Reserve Component Units}, 4-5. This author observed this process in action on several occasions. In one, the Army mobilized several low-density high demand units in turn from the same understrength battalion. Although different units officially deployed, the same personnel pool kept returning to theater. In another, the Army alerted a nearly empty unit for mobilization with a completely trained and staffed unit alerted at the same time to replace it the following year. Because the second unit had a shorter dwell time, the two units could not switch places in the deployment timeline to provide the first (empty) unit additional time to recruit and train for the mission.

\textsuperscript{54} Lippiatt and Polich, \textit{Reserve Component Unit Stability}, 55.
Perhaps the most common reason for personnel losses was inadequate medical and dental readiness. Initial analysis showed that the USAR had over nine percent nondeployable personnel, but an additional five percent of Soldiers lacked the necessary records or decisions concerning their deployability. Early deploying units arrived at mobilization stations without Soldiers’ completed or reviewed annual medical certification. For Soldiers over 40 years, only 32 percent had the necessary medical examinations. Furthermore, dental readiness significantly limited deployment. A dentist had to certify that each officer would have no dental emergency within the following 12 months. Given the high deployment volume, wide RC personnel distribution, limited military dental staff, and scarce dental insurance in the US, the RC presented the Army with a dental crisis upon mobilization. The USAR mobilized cross-leveled Soldiers for those with significant dental readiness emergencies. In light of the

4: Officer Losses in USAR Military Police (MP3) and Transportation Companies (TK3) demonstrate 43-50% unit losses within 12 months of mobilization.  

55 Ibid., 28.  
56 GAO-04-1031, 40-41.  
overwhelming impact, Congress approved funds that provided the USAR resources facilitating routine and proactive medical and dental exams before mobilization. These exams allowed Soldiers sufficient time to start necessary treatment at their own cost and thus increased officer availability and stability.

The 2004 USAR transformation plan included two additional efforts to reduce its cross-leveling requirements. First, by reducing units as a whole, the USAR could increase personnel levels to 90 percent or higher. At this time, the USAR had a 219,000 Soldier Force Allocation Authorization but only a 205,000 Authorized Soldier End Strength. Thus, its organizational structure at OEF’s start created 14,000 vacant positions before any other personnel challenge came to bear on the situation. The 2004 National Defense Authorization Act aligned the USAR’s Soldier Force Allocation and Authorized End Strength at 205,000, automatically improving the available force percentage, and providing the necessary permission to execute the force restructuring.\(^5^9\) Second, the USAR created a Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students (TTHS) account for all Soldiers awaiting or participating in training or awaiting unit assignment, so unit rosters better reflected deployable personnel.\(^6^0\) Ultimately, although these efforts improved the overall USAR fill rate, they did not provide for the desired 90 percent personnel staffing levels until late in units’ ARFORGEN cycle. The TTHS account better identified officers available for deployment, but upon receiving mobilization orders, units inevitably identified more non-deployable officers, such as those who were pregnant or experiencing personal matters that would hinder deployment, such as long-term legal issues. This resulted in additional personnel cross-leveling.\(^6^1\)

**Ensuring leadership presence: Unit-level assistance**

Geography presented an ongoing challenge for the USAR’s officer management system. Per Army Regulation 135-91, paragraph 5-5, the USAR cannot assign Soldiers involuntarily to units where

\(^{59}\) Colonel Jonathan Guy Ives, “Army Reserves: Transforming While at War” (strategy research project, United States Army War College, 2005), 2, 7.


they are required to travel beyond a 50-mile radius of their home and duty location, or 100-mile radius for enlisted Soldiers, if the unit provides food and lodging at the training site. However, the CNGR received information indicating that many Reserve Soldiers voluntarily attended drill outside the regulatory 50-mile limit without reimbursement. In some cases, the officers drilled with a unit for personal reasons, like a previous deployment experience. In other cases, though, officers traveled extensive distances because it was the closest place with an appropriate duty position. From its findings, the CNGR recommended funding travel reimbursement and lodging-in-kind (LIK) for Soldiers attending inactive duty training (IDT). In March 2007, the USAR issued guidance to its subordinate commands funding LIK. The National Defense Authorization Act for FY00 had authorized the program, but the USAR did not use the authorization until after the CNGR published its 2006 report.

The USAR revised the policy effective December 2011 to curtail costs. Specifically, the USAR targeted LIK for units in their ARFORGEN Train and Ready III or Available years. Shortly after publication, however, the USARC received complaints from its subordinate commanders, particularly concerned about the impact they anticipated from the more constrained policy. Many USAR officers contributed significant time to their reserve duties beyond the drill weekend, and the USAR culture supported this as the officer’s contribution to “God and Country.” However, with escalating transportation and lodging costs, officers’ cost-benefit for traveling far from home dwindled quickly as these cut into or eliminated the pay they earned for the weekend’s work. As a result, unit distance and unreimbursed travel costs became increasingly contentious points.

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62 CNGR, 251.


64 US Army Reserve Command, *FY12 Lodging-in-Kind (LIK) Policy for Army Reserve (AR) Soldiers, undated memorandum received 27 October 2011*, by Colonel B. Lynne Owens (Ft. Bragg, NC, 2011). Eligibility expanded to non-commissioned officers at the ranks of Master Sergeant and Sergeant Major and contracted for warrant and commissioned officers. Soldiers in these groups had to be members at battalion-level units or below to receive LIK, and commissioned officers were authorized LIK only if they held the position of Commander or Battalion Operations Officer.

65 Carlos Perez (Readiness Analyst, USARC G1), in discussion with the author, 30 January 2012.
Ensuring technical skills: Promotion considerations

With many officers having repeat tours, promotion equity became another contentious topic.\textsuperscript{66} Although ROPMA brought RC officer promotions into greater alignment with AC timelines, increased RC service during this period highlighted the remaining inequities. By 2008, it took only three years to become a captain in the AC but almost twice that in the RC.\textsuperscript{67} Although late in implementation, the USAR took six specific measures that both addressed officers’ concern and its officer vacancy problem.

First, as the USAR eliminated the commissioning requirement for a baccalaureate degree in 2005 as a procurement tool, the DOD reduced degree requirements for officer management. In July 2005, the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness) issued a policy retaining twice non-selected first lieutenants lacking a baccalaureate degree. The services could retain these lieutenants until the end of their service obligations – typically eight years – but not promote them further.

Second, in FY2006, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) approved a promotion policy change that created more discrete reserve promotion categories. Henceforth, promotion boards would select reserve officers on three separate lists: USAR Active Guard Reserve (AGR), USAR non-Active Guard Reserve (Non-AGR), and Army National Guard. Before this change, promotion boards selected officers based on a total number requirement. This meant that selection lists could include far too many officers from one category – such as the AGR where there are a finite number of positions for each grade – and too few from another category.\textsuperscript{68} With the revision, the USAR could shape promotion selection targets more discretely based on existing vacancies and move closer to increased officer deployment predictability.

\textsuperscript{66} See Appendix G.

\textsuperscript{67} Feidler, \textit{Junior Officer Shortage}, 11.

\textsuperscript{68} Office of the Chief Army Reserve, \textit{Promotion consideration of Army Reserve Officers, undated memorandum}, by Lieutenant General James R. Helmly (Washington, DC, undated).
Third, in March 2006, the USAR accelerated first lieutenant promotions to captain across all branches through FY15. This effort served multiple functions. This acknowledged the fact that, because the USAR was understrength in captains and over-strength in lieutenants, lieutenants filled captain positions without commensurate pay or rank. In addition, at a time when AC first lieutenants became captains at three years, this change brought RC captain promotions down to a more comparable four years time in grade. Further, the USAR hoped the accelerated promotion process encouraged non-educationally qualified officers to complete their requirements in a timely manner.

Fourth, in FY2007, the USAR began considering captains for below the zone (BZ) promotion to major. Subsequently, BZ promotion opportunities extended to lieutenant colonels in FY08 and to colonels in FY10. Although army regulations permitted BZ promotions in the USAR for major through colonel prior to this time, none had occurred. Boards could recommend up to 10 percent from each list for BZ promotion, although this could increase to 15 percent with SECDEF authorization. The first year Human Resource Command (HRC) held BZ promotions boards, the board returned a zero BZ selection rate. From that point forward though, each year promotion boards selected officers BZ (see chart below). Clearly, the SECDEF authorized exceeding the 10 percent BZ rate at least three of the four years promotion boards made BZ selections. These high BZ rates have two causes. First, is the large number of vacancies in major and lieutenant colonel ranks. Second, however, also is significant: lack of educational qualification. For promotion to lieutenant colonel, majors must complete certain military educational

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requirements. Many officers are educationally unqualified, and the promotion boards seek BZ promotable officers when authorized to fill the gap.

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5: Below the Zone Selection Rates in USAR since inception, disaggregated by AGR and non-AGR selection lists.  

The fifth effort used to address promotion and vacancy concerns related to Position Vacancy Boards (PVB). These special RC selection boards “exist to promote officers to fill vacancies in USAR units that cannot be filled by local commanders with qualified officers of the authorized grade.” Historically, regional commands held these boards as needed, but usually twice annually. Due to the boards’ regional nature and the USAR command and control structure, PVBs often occurred with fewer applicants than expected, especially when vacancies occurred near regional command boundaries. The Army consolidated PVBs at HRC to improve consistency and regularity, expanded overall awareness across units and regional commands, and potentially increased applicant quality and quantity. Applicants had to satisfy minimum qualifications for the next grade, and although not designed to promote officers

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below the zone, this is the PVB’s ultimate result. Like the accelerated captain board process, the PVBs provided officers currently serving in those vacant positions opportunity to compete for the promotion, recognition, and pay, associated with the work they already performed.

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<th>Officers Selected for Position Vacancy Board Promotions</th>
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<td>FY 03</td>
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3: Position Vacancy Board Promotions by Year

With promotion timeline changes and exceptionally high promotion rates, officers used the phrase, “No lieutenant left behind,” when discussing junior officer quality. These wiry comments belied resentment within the officer corps about a promotion system based on service length rather than skills, ability, or wartime service. One recommendation was that officers receive 360-degree evaluations that included feedback from peers and subordinates, rather than only the rater and senior rater. The Army did not implement 360-degree evaluations into its formal evaluation program. Instead, in 2011, it required rating officers to note whether the rated officer had completed or initiated such feedback within the


77 Military personnel used this phrase uniformly across ranks, inserting the appropriate rank for the context. When discussing the AC’s transition to universal attendance for majors at the Command and General Staff College, the phrase would be, “No major left behind.”

previous three-year period on all evaluation reports. In this way, the Army implemented a recommendation to improve officer quality without endangering the immediate officer retention rates.

Despite these various efforts that increased officer readiness and training completion prior to deployment, the Army Audit Agency identified unstable staffing levels in 2009 as a key threat for mobilization training readiness. Units did not complete pre-mobilization training tasks and executed those completed inefficiently; repeating training as different personnel assignment waves arrived. This finding highlights the importance of officer management for future operations. As an example, the 2011 Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component identified Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) within the discussion about ‘using the capabilities and capacities of the Guard and Reserve to best advantage.’ The chart below depicts the DOD timeline for personnel deployment in a HADR mission.

4: When RC forces are needed, insufficient leadership personnel would hamper the Army’s ability to quickly deploy RC units if personnel consistency cannot be maintained.  

79 GAO-09-720, 11.  
80 Future Role of the RC, 27, 30.  
81 Ibid., 30.
This model for RC participation presumes units are intact and trained in their primary missions well enough that DOD can waive the 30-day mobilization notification and expedite critical RC unit to the HADR locations. However, ARFORGEN prioritizes personnel, equipment, and training resources for receipt during the last two years in the cycle, once a unit receives deployment notification and a specified mission. From that point, the unit shifts its training focus from its primary mission to its deployment mission, if different. Deployment training builds on the primary mission knowledge and individual and team-level skills built during the initial ARFORGEN years – the lower-priority years for personnel, equipment, and training. In essence, the only way a unit would be available for HADR missions – given realistic integration of these training and deployment models – is for the HADR mission to occur during a unit’s fifth ARFORGEN year when its identified ARFORGEN deployment mission already matched its primary mission. In this case, some original unit personnel would have received the full five years of training, and the unit would have experienced two years of dedicated personnel, equipment, and training resources.

**Officer retention**

Officer retention comprises various efforts that encourage Soldiers to remain in the Army, including, benefits, personal well-being, and quality of life programs. Personnel accounting and strength reporting also serve retention functions because it provides the USAR the capacity to evaluate Soldier duty status as a component of combat power over time. This information is necessary when identifying quality Soldiers for retention as well as the necessary component strength level. Operationalizing the USAR in a predictable manner appears to improve retention, as officers who mobilized and deployed had

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82 Ibid.
85 AR 600-8, 15-16.
lower attrition than those who mobilized but did not deploy or those that did not mobilize at all.\textsuperscript{86} Interestingly, service loss rates – the rate at which Soldiers left the Army altogether – did not change between 2000 and 2008, but remained at 12 percent, with officer departures approximately 6 percent.\textsuperscript{87} This section examines USAR officer retention efforts improving officer force strength and benefits.

**Improving force strength**

With OIF’s high operational tempo, units needed more officers than the standard ARFORGEN model provided the existing force pool. Congress and the DOD addressed this need by implementing short- and long-term policies and programs that helped increase manpower and removed obstacles that kept the USAR from using its existing force pool. These included end strength changes, innovative recruiting campaigns, and unique contingency-specific service opportunities.

First, Congress approved a DOD-requested end strength increase for active and reserve forces. From 2008-2010, the AC increased by 65,000 Soldiers and the RC by approximately 9,200, in what the Army called the “Grow-the-Army” campaign.\textsuperscript{88} This campaign was an official success – from 2006-2008, the USAR gained 12,000 Soldiers. During the same time, however, it experienced a 14 percent company-grade officer attrition rate. Essentially, the USAR hemorrhaged junior officers; the fact that in-grade shortages remained generally constant speaks volumes to procurement efforts and successes, if not retention.\textsuperscript{89} The Grow the Army campaign included the Call to Active Duty Program, which brought IRR, TPU, and retired Soldiers back to active service. Soldiers could always transfer from the RC to AC, but before OEF, the USAR granted transfers sparingly, and only in meritorious cases. Merit remained a criterion after 9/11, however the USAR granted transfers more liberally in an effort to increase the Active

\textsuperscript{86} Pontius, "Projecting Officer Strength."

\textsuperscript{87} Lippiatt and Polich, *Reserve Component Unit Stability*, 23, 27.


\textsuperscript{89} See Appendix H for chart showing officer vacancies by rank and fiscal year.
Component manpower. Eventually, TPU captain losses came disproportionately as a direct result of these transfers.  

Second, the DOD requested a specific RC duty status change that would not count against the maximum active duty end strength. Thus, Congress created Active Duty for Operational Support (ADOS). This short-term policy provided interested officers an avenue for more frequent deployments and helped fill deploying unit vacancies. Regrettably, the deployed officers’ home unit retained the officer on their rolls, unable to fill against that position and adequately prepare for subsequent deployment. This deprived units of both leadership presence during pre-mobilization periods, and in some instances, required additional cross-leveled Soldiers when CO-ADOS-serving Soldiers had not redeployed when the unit mobilized.

One insufficiently addressed obstacle pertained to USAR lieutenants’ Basic Officer Leadership Course (BOLC) attendance. Despite the reduced yearly lieutenant population, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) did not provide sufficient seats in BOLC for all newly commissioned officers. ROTC-commissioned USAR officers waited an average of nine to ten months before beginning their BOLC, with some waiting as much as 13 months depending on branch. By 2008, this contributed to 10 percent of USAR company grade losses annually. Additionally, officers without BOLC could not deploy, meaning these lieutenants existed on the USAR manning roster, non-deployable but ostensibly

90 Feidler, Junior Officer Shortage, 6.  
91 Also known as Contingency Active Duty for Operational Support (CO-ADOS) if duty is in conjunction with the OEF, OIF, OPERATION NOBLE EAGLE or their support operations.  
92 CNGR, 190; Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Public Law 108-375, § 416, US Statutes at Large 118 (2004): 1866; Congress, DOD, and the media heavily debated federal law regarding USAR deployments. Some argued that Title 10, United States Code Section 12302 authorized Reserve Soldier mobilizations for 24 months cumulatively during a Presidential Call-up. Others argued that, as long as Reserve Soldiers’ mobilizations never exceeded 24 months consecutively, repeat involuntary mobilizations met federal statutory requirements. By providing Soldiers effective ways to volunteer for mobilization without affecting the active duty force cap, ADOS essentially circumvented this debate while allowing the DOD to pursue Grow-the-Army recruiting/retention efforts.  
93 Augustine, Hosek, Cook, and Coley, Recommendations on the Company-Grade Officer Shortfall, 49.  
94 Feidler, Junior Officer Shortage, 8. These individual officer losses contributed to the overall 14 percent company grade officer attrition rate noted on page 26.
present, filling company grade unit positions and providing a false understanding of lieutenant availability.

**Improving benefits**

While working toward sufficient force strength, Congress and the USAR implemented individual-level actions to improve officer benefits. USAR benefits were both in-service and post-service, designed to retain officers in the immediate period as well as encourage career service. In-service benefit improvements included revisions to mobilization tour lengths, service opportunities across the components, and income replacement. Post-service benefit improvements included continued service beyond typical parameters and earlier retirement pay receipt.

Initially, when RC forces deployed in large numbers for OIF, DOD had no set deployment or mobilization length and Soldiers mobilized for 365 days, including pre-deployment train-up periods. Depending on the unit, training requirements, and strategic transportation priorities, some units arrived in theater with six months or less remaining on their orders. The DOD implemented a 12-month “boots-on-the-ground” (BOG) policy in December 2003, which resulted in a 15-month deployment for most USAR Soldiers, including post-mobilization training requirements. Although all Soldiers – active and reserve – had a 12-month BOG, reserve Soldiers identified the typical three months’ post-mobilization training as an extension of their deployment, since they were away from their homes and civilian employment. By 2007, DOD revised this policy, determining that a 12 months total mobilization period was the ideal sustainable length for that RC Soldiers, families, and their civilian employers. This reduced family and employment strain for USAR Soldiers, and made continued service more palatable.

Another in-service benefit resulted from the symbiotic cross-effects of simultaneous AC and RC officer shortages, which caused the organizations to fight for officers within the same resource pool. As the AC successfully retained its officers, and called retirees and RC officers to active duty service, the RC

95 Author’s personal experience as deployed Soldier during OIF and Battalion Assistant Operations Officer in charge of subordinate units’ deployments and redeployments.

recruiting pool dwindled, further stressing the existing officer corps. At any time during the GWOT
decade, most officers had three options: stay in their current component (AC or RC), switch to the other
component (TPU/IRR or Call to Active Duty), or leave the military altogether.\textsuperscript{97} While not beneficial to
the USAR organizationally, the competitive environment led both components to offer broadly available
officer retention bonuses.\textsuperscript{98} Unfortunately, there is no way to determine whether the retention bonuses
actually influenced receiving officers’ service decisions. It may very well be that participating officers
planned to continue serving and took advantage of an available benefit.\textsuperscript{99}

A third in-service benefit was the Reserve Income Replacement Program. Under this program,
USAR Soldiers whose military income was less than their average civilian income received military
payment for the difference between the two income levels. In this way, the USAR compensated officers
who ‘lost’ money when mobilized or deployed for extended periods, removing financial strain as a reason
for avoiding deployment. Payments under this program began 1 September 2006 and ended 31 December
2011.\textsuperscript{100}

The first post-service benefit was Selective Continuation (SELCON), of which there were two
versions. The initial version began in calendar year (CY) 2003. When major and lieutenant colonel
promotion boards finished their selections, the board immediately considered officers twice non-selected
at this review for SELCON at their current rank – either captain or major. Within the first three years, the
SELCON process retained 1,998 officers for AR service. Initially, the USAR granted officers SELCON
for three years, but extended this in 2006 when all officers SELCON under this program remained until

\textsuperscript{97} James Hosek and Trey Miller, \textit{Effects of Bonuses on Active Component Reenlistment Versus Prior

\textsuperscript{98} Hunter R. Coates, Teresa S. Silvernail, Lawrence V. Fulton, and Lana Ivanitskaya, “The Effectiveness of
content/37/1/5 (accessed 21 December 2011). Historically, officer bonus programs only existed for medical
professionals, in the active duty Special Forces, and occasionally pilots.

\textsuperscript{99} Ibid., 16.

\textsuperscript{100} US Department of Defense, “\textit{Reserve Income Replacement Program},” \textit{Financial Management
Regulation 7000.14-R: Volume 7A, Chapter 55} (Washington, DC, August 2011), 55-3, 55-5 through 55-6. This was
a Congressionally-identified and funded program.
20 or 24 years of commissioned service, for captains and majors, respectively.\textsuperscript{101} The USAR implemented the next version – Voluntary Selective Continuation – in 2005, for lieutenant colonels and colonels that were alerted or serving in GWOT operations. This SELCON extended these officers beyond their typical maximum commissioned service years but no longer than 90 days past the officers’ mobilization period.\textsuperscript{102}

The second post-service benefit, which served as both a potential procurement and retention effort, relates to transition out of the armed services. Although AC officers receive retirement benefits immediately upon completing 20 years’ service – some as early as 41 years old, RC officers receive deferred retirement benefits, not payable until age 60. The National Defense Authorization Act of 2008 reduced RC Soldiers’ retirement age by as much as 10 years, based on the number of days the Soldier serves on active duty supporting an overseas contingency operation like OEF and OIF.\textsuperscript{103} Although the benefit was not retroactive and had other caveats, it provided Soldiers an incentive to continue deploying, especially mid- and senior-grade officers and NCOs within retirement planning windows.

**Officer transition**

Officer transfers and discharges provide “a mechanism to terminate the services of an officer prior to the terms of the original contract (both voluntarily and involuntarily)…transfer officers from one component to another…[and] discharge officers from all military obligations.”\textsuperscript{104} A key problem identified was how few AC officers transferred to TPU after leaving active duty. Approximately 2,500 officers left active duty each year, however, most resigned their commission altogether or transferred to

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{101} US Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, *Standardization of the Length of Continuation for Reserve Component Officers Selectively Continued* (undated), by Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (Manpower & Reserve Affairs) Daniel B. Denning, memorandum (Washington, DC, undated).
\textsuperscript{103} Soldiers Town Hall.
\textsuperscript{104} AR 600-8, 15.
\end{flushleft}
the IRR rather than become drilling reservists.\textsuperscript{105} The USAR undertook five significant actions to increase officer transition between components: established an information operations (IO) campaign, improved records management, initiated a stabilization program, created a civilian employer partnership, and undertook organizational revisions to encourage a continuum of service.

First, the Army established a USAR service IO campaign. It heavily advertised the innovative accessions and benefit efforts outlined above encouraging all potential AC personnel leaving active duty to transition into the USAR. Additionally, the Army promoted “Blue to Green” opportunities that supported Air Force and Navy officers’ transfer to the Army and Army Reserves. Although military regulations authorized interservice transfers prior to 2001, they were infrequent. Beginning in late 2004, as the Navy and Air Force shaped their forces, the Army received increasing transfer requests, resulting in more than 200 new officers in an 18-month period.\textsuperscript{106}

Second, the USAR increased its reliance on transitioning IRR officers into TPUs for cross-levels. In 2004, AR-PERSCOM, now renamed HRC, involuntarily mobilized 5,600 IRR Soldiers for service in OEF and OIF. This was a turning point for the IRR for two reasons. Previously, HRC and the RC had little interaction with IRR Soldiers during their remaining service obligation. With this action, HRC discovered how inaccurate its records were for IRR Soldiers, with invalid contact information for as many as 40,000 IRR members.\textsuperscript{107} As a result, it culled the IRR rolls. At the time, there were as many as 114,000 Soldiers in the IRR. By 2008, the USAR reduced the IRR to 7,000.\textsuperscript{108} This dramatic shift resulted from improved communication. Officers typically had active service obligations – whether in the active or reserve component – and then subsequent inactive service obligations. Many believed their service obligation was terminal, much like enlisted Soldiers’ contracts. As a result, few in the IRR formally resigned their commissions at the end of their service obligations. However, under federal law, an

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{105}{Feidler, \textit{Junior Officer Shortage}, 7.}
\footnotetext{107}{GAO-03-921, 37.}
\footnotetext{108}{See Appendix I.}
\end{footnotes}
officer’s commission is for his lifetime unless he resigns or retires. Thus, HRC’s involuntarily mobilization touched officers who thought they had been “out” of the Army and USAR for many years. This created a publicly backed groundswell against a so-called “illegal draft.”

Subsequently, HRC systemically contacted IRR officers and publicized a window where officers could formally resign. Although this effectively increased the USAR’s personnel shortages, this action was a success because it provided an accurate force structure representation. With the remaining IRR Soldiers, HRC developed easily accessible systems to maintain communications. Once HRC tidied the IRR list, involuntarily mobilizations became more effective.

Third, in FY05, the Army created a stabilization program that prohibited involuntary mobilizations for two years when AC Soldiers joined a TPU after active service. The USAR developed this program to reduce AC Soldiers’ concerns about imminent redeployment in the RC. In concept, officers joined TPU’s early in the ARFORGEN process, trained with the unit, and deployed during its ready year. Ideally, these officers would remain in the unit after their service obligation. Initially this increased overall numbers, and potentially in the critical mid-grade ranks the USAR lacked most. Unfortunately, the program requirements did not require participating officers to affiliate with units in their first or second ARFORGEN year. As a result, if the TPU mobilized before the participants’ stabilization periods ended, these Soldiers also required replacements – increasing the cross-level requirement and further destabilizing other officers’ deployment predictability.

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110 This, along with exceptional efforts that verified Soldiers’ contact information, duty status, and health readiness, resulted in the significant IRR population decrease.


112 Carlos Perez (Readiness Analyst, USARC G1), in discussion with the author, 29 December 2011.
Fourth, the USAR created the Army Reserve Employer Partnership Initiative in 2008. This program addressed Soldiers’ concerns regarding civilian employment and recurring service. The USAR partnered with large-scale, Fortune 500 corporations that worked in industries similar to USAR unit missions. The USAR thus connected its trained, drug-free personnel who had leadership experience with companies desiring these individuals whose operations were large enough to sustain the impact a Soldier’s military training or deployment might have for their company. This reduced Reservist-employee conflict and local community impact.

The fifth action was a collection of efforts to implement a continuum of service (COS). Simply stated, a COS is the organization of Army systems so Soldiers can move between different military statuses based on both their personal as well as the Army’s service needs. Conceptually, the Soldier maintains his benefits and the Army retains both the Soldier and its training and educational investments. In the chart below, the black line visually depicts a Soldier’s career within this concept as he seamlessly moves between active and reserve components and participates in a civilian career. Successful implementation requires adjustments to legislation, personnel management systems, payroll processing, and altering the separately managed and distinct retirement active and reserve compensation structures.

113 Feidler, Junior Officer Shortage, 12.
115 “The continuum of service is a set of management policies that provide variable and flexible service options and levels of participation that could make military service attractive to a broad population – options that are consistent with DOD manpower requirements and an individual’s ability to serve over the course of a lifetime of service. The continuum aims to facilitate … transparent movement of individuals between active military, reserve military, and civilian service. Such policies offer the Department greater flexibility in accessing the variety of skills required to meet its evolving requirements – particularly highly technical and civilian-acquired skills that are difficult to sustain full time in the force.” Directive 1200.17.
5: Once completed, a Continuum of Service would support the Army's investments with a Soldier for life. In this model, the Soldier’s career – represented by the black line – moves between components and civilian career depending on the Soldier’s need, but ultimately retaining the Soldier for military service beyond the existing “in or out” system.\(^{117}\)

The USAR began discussing the COS as part of the Federal Reserve Restructuring Initiative in 2003.\(^{118}\) To date, this concept has received much interest and the Office of the Secretary of Defense Reserve Affairs developed an implementation plan, but provided no set timeline. Many of the changes require Congressional approval, such as laws that limit how USAR Soldiers transfer between reserve and active duty statuses.\(^{119}\)

In total, the USAR committed extensive energy and resources toward mitigating officer vacancies during the 2001-2011 GWOT decade. Many efforts ended as US troops departed Iraq in 2011. Although the USAR made significant inroads, additional officer corps vacancies persist, and the component remains ‘out of balance,’ especially in this area. The next section examines the USAR’s current efforts to manage its officer corps.

\(^{117}\) Chief Army Reserve, Reserve Vision & Strategy 2020, 23.

\(^{118}\) Colonel Dan Blakeney, Army Reserve Force Programs, “Army Reserve Federal Reserve Restructuring Initiative (FRRI)” (presentation to Senior Department of the Army Staff and Leadership, Washington, DC, 23 April 2003), Slide 16.

\(^{119}\) Soldiers Town Hall.
State of the Campaign Today

The USAR created an Army Reserve Campaign Plan (ARCP) 2010, and its Human Resources Support annex identifies one “HR Imperative: Sustain the Army’s Soldiers, Families, and Civilians.”

From that, the USAR identified four Lines of Effort (LOE) and associated enabling tasks, depicted below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOE</th>
<th>Task</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-Provide Trained, Equipped, and Ready Soldiers and Cohesive Units</td>
<td>a) Fully Man the Force to Create Whole, Cohesive Units;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b) Shape the Force thru Targeted Transition, Recruiting &amp; Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-Leverage Army Reserve Soldier Military/Civilian Skills and Capabilities</td>
<td>a) Refine Full Time Support;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b) Adapt Recruiting &amp; Manning Processes to Support ARFORGEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-Take Care of Soldiers and their Families</td>
<td>a) Reduce Personnel Turbulence and Deliver Responsive Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-Develop the Next Generation of Army Reserve Leadership</td>
<td>a) Increase Joint Qualification Across the Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b) Develop a Continuum of Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c) Implement Civilian Leadership Initiatives</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

USARC wrote the ARCP 2010 and its 2011 follow on broadly. Although the USAR included personnel sustainment as a priority in its Posture Statements throughout the GWOT decade, this author did not find evidence that the USAR created a specific, official campaign plan to mitigate officer vacancies during this period, or that it has one currently in place.

In the Army’s 2011 Army Strategic Planning Guidance, the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) identified “restoring balance and setting conditions for the future” as significant, current strategy challenges. The CAR received the tasks to rebalance the USAR Generating Force, develop a Human Capital Strategy, and create a stationing plan for USAR forces. More importantly, the

120 LTC Daniel E. Duvall and Carlos Perez, e-mail messages to author, 21 February 2012.
121 Ibid.
123 ACP 2011, 33.
ACP detailed coordinated responsibilities to institutionalize the RC as an operational force. These requirements largely extended the USAR’s existing efforts as outlined in the 2010 Army Posture Statement. Concurrent with the ACP’s publication, the CAR published the Army Reserve Vision and Strategy 2020, followed shortly by the Army Reserve Campaign Plan (ARCP) as an annex to the Army’s Campaign Plan in March 2011.\(^\text{124}\) The chart below highlights the personnel-specific ‘imperative,’ campaign objective, and major objectives identified.

| **Imperative:** Sustain Citizen-Soldiers, Families and Civilians (U)\(^\text{125}\) | **Major Objectives (U):** |
| --- |
| **Campaign Objective (U):** |
| Man the AR & Preserve the All-Volunteer Force |
| 1- Manage Accessions and Transfers within the AR |
| 2- Retain Qualified Soldiers in the AR |
| 3- Develop a Continuum of Service |
| 4- Develop Resilient Soldiers, Civilians & Units |
| 5- Improve Medical Readiness |
| 6- Strengthen the Employer Partnership Program (EPO) |
| 7- Integrate Strategies to Sustain Individual and Family Readiness (Family Programs) |

\(^7\): Reserve Vision & Strategy 2020. LTG Jack Stultz.\(^\text{126}\)

In pursuing these objectives, Lieutenant General Stultz, CAR, e-mailed all Reserve Soldiers in May 2011 to discuss personnel efforts that the USAR initiated to support ARFORGEN. Specifically, he discussed Shaping the Force efforts to reduce over-strength assignments, Releasing from Active Duty (REFRAD) AGR lieutenant colonels and colonels, and reducing unsatisfactory or non-drill participants. The over-strength reductions resulted in a nine percent decrease in TPU colonels, one percent decrease in AGR lieutenant colonels, and 10 percent decrease in AGR colonels.\(^\text{127}\) Other Shaping the Force efforts


\(^{125}\) Ibid.

\(^{126}\) Ibid.

included targeting senior grade management, examining AGR utilization in Above the Line (ABL) units, and improving IRR management in anticipation of future needs.

Regarding senior grade management, the USARC implemented a policy requiring units to assign lieutenant colonels and colonels only in positions commensurate with their grade, or one grade below. Additionally, units cannot assign more than one officer to the same position. Units used this practice – double-slotting – to fill their unit numerically, although not necessarily with officers in the correct grade. Double-slotting also resulted from GWOT promotion policies that allowed mobilized Soldiers to accept promotions without having identified unit vacancies. Given the cross-leveling frequency, policies allowed officers time to find a position within a specified time after redeployment. Geography, personal preference, and a commander’s desire for fully manned units generally thwarted this plan. Now, if units do not have valid positions for all officers individually, the officer can transfer to another unit, the IRR, an Individual Mobilization Augmentee position, reclassify for a valid vacancy, retire, or accept discharge. If the officer does not volunteer for one of these options, the unit can involuntarily reassign him to a valid vacancy, reclassify him for another position, or reassign him to the IRR.

Regarding AGR utilization in ABL units, the CAR focused his staff’s efforts on the number and type of positions these officers held. Some positions supported the USAR’s integration in the organizations’ operations. Others, however, supplanted an AC officer with little benefit to the USAR’s mission or operations. He directed that AGR officer assignment priorities support below the line units – those that reported directly to the OCAR or USARC – first. This prioritization also returned the positions supplanting AC officers to the AC for manning. The CAR subsequently published and refined manning

\[\text{link to further reading material}\]


uidance for FY11 and FY12/13, respectively, directing sourcing levels for below the line units, as they could not be filled 100 percent.130

Regarding IRR management, the USAR partnered with HRC and the National Guard to create the IRR Affiliation Program (IAP). This is a mandatory program for all IRR Soldiers to “provide IRR Soldiers a local network of support, improve readiness, promote COS, and retain Soldiers with valuable skills, knowledge, abilities and experiences.”131 HRC placed expanded IRR information on its website, including the IRR Handbook. The IRR Handbook explains the IRR system including promotions, training, and service obligations, and serves as a RC and AC recruiting tool, explaining the opportunities, benefits, and incentives available for service when the Soldier decides to change his duty status.132

Because ARFORGEN ultimately motivated all these efforts, the USARC built a specific ARFORGEN Operations Order and associated manning actions to support USAR ARFORGEN implementation. The manning annex offers carefully considered policies on recruiting, promotes prioritized accessions based on Soldiers’ military occupational specialty qualification level and the time available to retrain Soldiers, given respective units’ ARFORGEN cycle, and reviews incentive plans, articulating a number that the USARC intends to eliminate along with the rationale. Although the annex focuses heavily on the enlisted ranks, it discusses some actions relevant to officers. Specifically, the USARC outlines actions to improve Soldier medical readiness, including expediting the medical review process, reducing the Medical Evaluation Board backlog, increasing AGR staffing, and expanding organic use of dental capability during annual training periods. Because the USAR lacks infantry, armor, field artillery, and Special Forces positions, the Army G1 granted the USAR an exception to Army regulation to reclassify officers in these branches involuntarily. The USARC requested additional


132 Ibid., Table of Contents.
exceptions to policy: first, to delegate officer separation authority including resignations in lieu of involuntary separations to the USARC from HRC, and second, to authorize separating officers who fail to satisfactorily participate if they have less than five years commissioned service. At the same time, USAR made the “unsatisfactory participation” definition more rigorous. Addressing over-strength ranks and mid-grade vacancies, the USARC will remove Soldiers over age 60, consider assigning over-strength O5s against O4 requirements, and examine the impact on ARFORGEN when USAR Soldiers mobilize for non-USAR tours.

In addition to Shaping the Force efforts, a critical detractor for the USAR in the ARFORGEN process is the mobilization delay for critical response resources. As noted below, existing planning documents anticipate 80 percent of USAR forces deploying within an operation’s first 45 days. However, Soldiers must receive 30 days notification before mobilization under current policies.

CEF Demand

A LAD Force Flow Look

8: Existing planning documents anticipate 80 percent of USAR forces deploying within an operation’s first 45 days.  

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The USAR is addressing the short-notice response time by establishing unique TPU organizations that cater to rapid response missions, using training schedules other than the traditional ‘one-weekend-a-month/two-weeks-per-year’ model, and selecting only Soldiers willing to deploy on short notice. The Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC) is an example of this structure. The JECC has Joint Deployable Teams that exist to “facilitate rapid establishment of Joint Force Headquarters, fulfill Global Response Force execution and bridge joint operational requirements.”135 JECC assigns members to teams that have 90-day alert rotations every 18 months, during which time officers have a 72-hour deployment window. The unit provides significant training options, opportunities to achieve joint service credit, and flexible drill periods – of which just two are mandatory. Officers can complete the remaining drill periods via distance and personal schedule and readiness requirements direct annual training dates, not a unit calendar.136

Clearly, the USAR’s officer vacancy mitigation campaign today incorporates lessons from the last decade. The command developed highly refined requirements for its personnel actions across accessions, management, retention, and transition. In addition, its current efforts pursuing exceptions to policy that expedite release of non-performing officers, among others, demonstrate the USAR’s commitment to attacking the officer vacancies directly and with vigor.

**Analysis**

Military campaigns are “a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space.”137 Ideally, a commander uses the elements of operational art to develop a plan so he can implement his operational approach. Certainly, the USAR faced critical officer personnel shortages in 2001, which OEF and OIF only exacerbated. By applying the elements of operational art to the USARC’s officer amelioration efforts during the 2001-2010 timeframe,

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137 ADP 3-0, 7.
and again with only those efforts currently in place at the time of writing (February 2012), it is clear that the USAR implemented a campaign plan that addressed its officer vacancy problems, albeit without an official plan. This section discusses the actions described above within a campaign plan context and assesses the USAR’s operative campaign plan using the tenets of unified land operations.

Operational art is the “pursuit of strategic objectives, in whole or in part, through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose,” and demonstrates the Army’s tenets of Unified Land Operations. To develop an effective operational approach, commanders must understand their operational environment and visualize the desired end state. Then, recognizing the available ways and means, and mitigating associated risks, they create and describe their operational approach using the elements of operational art. Commanders identify a problem’s center of gravity (COG) because it represents the “source of power that provides the moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act.” By leveraging the COG’s associated critical requirements and vulnerabilities to inform planning and monitor during execution, commanders can evaluate their operational effectiveness.

**COG Analysis**

As demonstrated previously, the USAR had four critical capabilities: accessions, management, retention, and transition. Some capabilities interwove with other entities, such as US Army Recruiting Command or Human Resources Command – both of which serve as lead agencies for the USARC’s critical capabilities. The USAR required many resources – critical requirements – to be effective in these four areas including funding, a versatile and effective information campaign, a liaison with the AC, and a robust recruiting pool. Many requirements also were critical vulnerabilities, such as a lack of resources, policies, liaison with the AC, and a viable force structure. Ultimately, however, despite the funding,

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138 *FM 3-0, Change 1, 7-4 through 7-5*. The elements of operational art include end state and conditions, centers of gravity, direct or indirect approach, decisive point, lines of operation/effort, operational reach, tempo, simultaneity and depth, phasing and transitions, culmination, and risk.

139 *ADP 3-0, 7.*

140 Ibid., 7-9; *FM 3-0, Change 1, 7-4 through 7-5*.

141 Ibid., 7-6.

142 See Appendix J for complete Center of Gravity Analysis chart.
liaison, information, and other incentives, there is only one COG – the recruiting pool. Clearly identifying the recruiting pool became necessary for all other critical requirements to take effect.

**Lines of Effort**

In examining USARC’s vacancy mitigation efforts, the author presents two charts. The first chart depicts the USARC’s implementation and duration for its accessions, management, retention, and transition efforts. This visually presents the USARC’s lines of effort, its scale of simultaneity and depth for each decisive point as well as phasing and transitions.\(^{143}\) The USAR implemented existing options initially, and only began unique mitigation efforts in FY04 and FY05 with bonuses, pre-mobilization dental readiness, and USAR-designated ROTC scholarships. This is not surprising, however, and one should not view this timeline as inaction, since these efforts required Congressional approval and budgeting. In a circumstance like this, inclusion in Defense appropriations bills indicates the USAR implemented or facilitated shaping operations before the legislations’ passage that enabled these efforts. Clearly, the USAR implemented various actions across the four LOEs throughout the GWOT decade, most for sustained, multi-year periods.

The second chart depicts each action within the LOEs, identifying whether it entailed a direct or indirect approach and if it made progress toward its intended purpose.\(^{144}\) It is clear that the USAR concentrated the bulk of its efforts in actions that affected all officers, with a few tailored to specific officer force pools (e.g., AC, IRR, retirees, new officers). This demonstrates the USAR’s campaign depth. The USAR implemented efforts targeting the IRR, retirees, other services’ officers, enlisted AC, and pre-accessions candidates as well as its traditional officer pool – the Army AC for accessions and transition. Although most actions were direct, the USAR demonstrated depth by facilitating indirect efforts such as reduced retirement age, the income replacement program (RIRP), dental readiness, and civilian transition assistance through the Employee Partnership Program. USARC furthered its operational reach through SELCON, VSELCON, stop loss, DUSP, and the RIRP, all that retained officers who otherwise would

\(^{143}\) See Appendix K: LOE Timeline.  
\(^{144}\) See Appendix L: Operational Approach Analysis.
have departed the service. Throughout this period, cross-leveling and stop loss were key tools preventing culmination.

The two operational art elements largely absent this campaign are end state and phasing / transitions. In part, without an official campaign plan, it is difficult to articulate a clear end state. If the end state was, “meet Combatant Commander deployment requirements,” then the USAR likely met its end state. However, if the end state was, “achieve a 95 percent fill rate for all officer ranks,” then the USAR did not meet its end state. Lacking an articulated plan, the end state and its relevance or success is moot. Regarding phasing and transitions, the LOE timeline demonstrates the tempo the USAR maintained while implementing various mitigation efforts. However, there are no phases evident – even visually, the LOEs are like a faucet – turned on or off, with most congressionally authorized programs ending in December 2011.

**Unified Land Operations Tenets**

As the USAR faces continued operational use, one must assess the operational plan it used for mitigating officer vacancies. This is necessary from a reflective standpoint so the organization’s leaders can continue or adjust their actions, particularly since the USAR is entering a force-shaping period. Using unified land operations (ULO) as an analysis framework, the USAR’s officer vacancy mitigation campaign plan ultimately demonstrates a level of each ULO tenet, but not enough collectively to achieve sufficient lethality.¹⁴⁵

Within its legislative constraints, the USAR implemented a flexible and adaptive campaign that incorporated conceptual depth across time and space. Specifically, the USAR tried to create a resilient organization that both overcame the vacancies present at GWOT’s start and addressed associated contributing variables as the force pool responded to ongoing wartime demands across the whole Army,

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¹⁴⁵ Unified land operations “describes how the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage … [to] prevail in war ….” *ADP 3-0*, 1, 7-8. Unified land operations tenants are flexibility, integration, lethality, adaptability, depth, and synchronization. Given the non-combat circumstances, this author substitutes effectiveness for the lethality tenet, which is the only tenet explicitly tied to mission accomplishment in doctrine.
demonstrating depth. To the extent that the USAR could integrate its officer requirements with the Air
Force and Navy’s force shaping efforts, it did so. Additionally, recognizing that not all officers would
continue in their existing component, the USAR and Army AC implemented multiple programs that
called RC officers to active duty and transitioned AC enlisted Soldiers and officers into the USAR’s
officer ranks, demonstrating integration across components.

Synchronizing and integrating the various LOEs is the campaign plan’s weakness, and the
primary cause for its insufficient lethality (effectiveness). Although many efforts occurred
simultaneously, there is minimal evidence that the USAR synchronized these efforts. This hindered the
plan’s overall integration and flexibility. Legislative delays might have contributed to this unsynchronized
system, since most innovations required Congressional authorization or funding. Additionally, each
service received the same Congressional authorizations. This may have increased the pressure to
implement all options fully with little scaling, simply given how many officer vacancies existed, in a rush
to draw from the limited force pool. Ultimately, these execution limitations highlight considerations for
USARC’s future operational planning.

Recommendations

The USAR’s officer vacancy mitigation campaign illustrates concepts found in strategic planning
and organizational change literature. Henry Mintzberg argues that no strategy should be entirely
deliberate or emergent. Instead, real-world strategic planning combines deliberate strategy with emergent
strategy in a manner that balances “the ability to predict as well as the need to react to unexpected
events.”146 Peter Senge notes that organizations undergoing change often exhibit a “Shifting the Burden”


146 Henry Mintzberg, The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning: Reconceiving Roles for Planning, Plans,
articulated plans, it identified its intended strategy and implemented its deliberate strategy. Unrealized strategies are
intended strategies that the organization did not implement or did not achieve. Emergent strategies are actions taken
singularly, but over the course of time, these actions create their own patterns. The emergent strategy alters the
organization’s deliberate strategy with varying degrees, resulting in the organization’s realized strategy.
This campaign demonstrated both concepts, and by avoiding their duplication, planners can improve future operational efforts.

When the GWOT decade began, the USARC understood their environment, and the constraints within which it operated. The USARC undertook three types of symptomatic solutions to address its officer vacancy problem. This problem’s fundamental solution was acquiring increased numbers of officers in the correct ranks, branches, and physical locations. The first symptomatic solution set maintained officers on-hand, using stop-loss, cross-leveling, COTTAD, SELCON, retaining lieutenants who had been twice non-selected for promotion, and so forth. However, this short-term win resulted in anger at lowered quality and standards among officers as well as general frustration at involuntarily retention – likely contributing to the high turnover rates through the GWOT decade. The second solution set focused on having officers in the correct ranks through PVB, direct commissions, BZ and accelerated captains’ promotion boards, and mobilizing units at 110 percent strength to compensate for expected mobilization station losses. This simply pushed the problem to a later time and often location as well.

9: Officer Vacancy Mitigation Campaign analyzed using Senge’s Shifting the Burden archetype.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁷ Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art & Practice of the Learning Organization (New York: Currency Books, 1994), 103-112. “Shifting the burden” is a form of limiting one’s growth by solving superficial – or symptomatic – problems rather than rectifying the fundamental issues creating the problem. These superficial solutions may elicit new problems in fact, further drawing the organization away from resolving the fundamental issues.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.
The third symptomatic solution set addressed ancillary matters, and thus were helpful overall, but not relevant to solving the fundamental problem of increasing the number of officers in the right ranks, branches, and locations. This set included dividing promotion lists into three separate categories, creating the TTTHS file, funding LIK and LIK, and extending VSELCON. Some actions actively supported resolving the officer vacancy problem. These include increased advertisement, Blue-to-Green accessions, AC to RC stabilization, increased AR-ROTC scholarships, affiliation and accessions bonuses, and the COS.

The political and active military interest in maintaining an operationalized USAR has removed some constraints for future operations. However, USARC’s previous efforts often were responses to external factors, whether opportunities – such as Congressional funding or sister service drawdowns in the Air Force and Navy – or reactions – such as implementing the AC to RC stabilization program or culling the IRR data system. Lacking a formal campaign plan and given the numerous external influences and ever-evolving vacancy mitigation tactics, the USAR’s strategic plan is described best as emergent, rather than balanced, as Mintzberg recommends. The USARC must balance understanding its current environmental frame with monitoring and assessing its efforts to both respond to current requirements and predict future circumstances if the organization wants to achieve its desired strategic objectives. To do this effectively, the USAR must assume longevity; specifically, that the current circumstances are not a black swan, but instead represent the existing reality. In doing so, the USAR can identify and articulate an end state, coordinate and write a plan, and synchronize phasing for its actions and those of its stakeholders. When the USAR better expresses its plan and overall objectives, its leadership and planners can tailor options and actions to envision, create, and maintain an operational approach that provides ongoing progress, rather than fits and starts.
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APPENDIX A

The Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model evolved from its initial introduction in 2007 through the present day. Regardless, the model always has three force pools for evolving readiness states.

Figure 6 ARFORGEN Force Pools, Reimer Study\textsuperscript{149}

The current model is 1-4-15-72K. Specifically, ARFORGEN model provides the Army a continuous output of one corps, four divisions, 15 brigades, and 72,000 enablers every year. Of this, the RC – in this case both USAR and National Guard – provide proportional representation to the deploying forces.

## APPENDIX B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rebalancing Option</th>
<th>Illustrative Case</th>
<th>Result Obtained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Adjust AC/RC Balance to Address AC Capacity Shortfalls</td>
<td>1a) Army Combat Heavy Engineering Battalion</td>
<td>May lower cost if sourced partially or fully from Reserve Components</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1b) Army 10,000 Troop Enabler Force</td>
<td>May lower cost if sourced partially or fully from Reserve Components</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Draw Selected Rotational Units from Reserve Components</td>
<td>2a) Army Fires Brigade in Korea</td>
<td>May lower cost if sourced partially or fully from Reserve Components</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2b) Air Force F-15C Aircraft in Europe</td>
<td>May lower cost if sourced partially or fully from Reserve Components</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2c) Marine Infantry Battalion in a Continuous Presence Mission</td>
<td>May increase cost if sourced partially or fully from Reserve Component due to relative lengths of mobilization and BOG periods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Establish habitual relationships between selected Reserve Component Units, as appropriate and available, and Combatant Commands or other DOD Components</td>
<td>3a) Joint Reserve Unit (Navy estimate)</td>
<td>May lower cost if sourced using rotational Reserve Component personnel rather than FTS Reserve members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3b) Mobile Training Teams (Navy estimate)</td>
<td>May lower cost if sourced from Reserve Components</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Enable Differing Methods of Service within the Reserve Component</td>
<td>4) Differentiated Military Police Company (Army Estimate)</td>
<td>May lower cost if sourced from Reserve Components</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Rebalance Reserve Component to Meet Emerging Needs</td>
<td>5) Air Force Distributed Common Ground System (ISR unit)</td>
<td>May lower cost if sourced from Reserve Components</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Enhance Active-Reserve integration</td>
<td>6a) Reserve integration within Army Active Helicopter Unit (contractor estimate)</td>
<td>May lower cost if sourced partially or fully from Reserve Components</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6b) Reserve integration within Army infantry Brigade Combat Team</td>
<td>May lower cost by including Reserve Component battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Use Reserve Component to Meet Some Institutional Needs</td>
<td>7) Army Drill Sergeant Surge</td>
<td>May lower cost when sourced from Reserve Components</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Service identified cost results using various AC/RC rebalancing scenarios<sup>150</sup>

<sup>150</sup> *Future Role of the RC*, 62.
APPENDIX C

ROTC / NROTC Lieutenant Accessions to the USAR
FY1997 - 31 JAN 2012
(Congress increased funding for USAR-specific ROTC scholarships in FY04)

APPENDIX D

USAR OCS Accessions by Source
FY 1997 - 31 JAN 2012

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APPENDIX E

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USAR Lieutenant Accessions FY1997-31 JAN 2012
by Commissioning Source

(Aviation and Professional Accessions redacted)
AC to RC Accessions by Rank and Fiscal Year
(FY97 - 31 JAN 2012)

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APPENDIX G

Officer Deployment Frequency by Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGR</th>
<th>IRR</th>
<th>TPU</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sum of 1 Deployment</td>
<td>Sum of 2 Deployments</td>
<td>Sum of 3 Deployments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>15816</td>
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<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
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<td>1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

\(^{155}\) Created by author utilizing data from USAR G-1 Office.
USAR TPU Vacancies by Rank and FY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lt.</td>
<td>2891</td>
<td>2991</td>
<td>2643</td>
<td>1425</td>
<td>1601</td>
<td>1171</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cpt.</td>
<td>2091</td>
<td>2607</td>
<td>2342</td>
<td>1614</td>
<td>1657</td>
<td>1262</td>
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<tr>
<td>Op</td>
<td>10418</td>
<td>9538</td>
<td>5938</td>
<td>3740</td>
<td>3054</td>
<td>2629</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Created by author utilizing data from USAR G-1 Office.
USAR Officers in the IRR by Rank (1997 - Jan 2012)

Created by author utilizing data from USAR C-1 Office.
## Center of Gravity Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Critical Capabilities:</th>
<th>Center of Gravity:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Accessions</td>
<td>Recruiting / Force Pool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Management</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Retention</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Transition</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Critical Requirements:</th>
<th>Critical Vulnerabilities:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Money</td>
<td>- Money</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Recruiting pool (AC – All services, Civilians, Enlisted/Internal promotions, Retirees, Inactive Ready Reserves)</td>
<td>- Policies</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Recruiters</td>
<td>- Information campaign</td>
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<tr>
<td>- HQ structure</td>
<td>- Liaison between services / components</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Information campaign</td>
<td>- Existing (2001) force structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Liaison to Active Component, other services</td>
<td>- Force distribution plan (ROTC accessions, officers move/self-select locations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Policies</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Force structure</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Force distribution plan (how to align officers with units)</td>
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</tbody>
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APPENDIX K

Lines of Effort Timeline

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<td><strong>Accessions</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Increase Direct Commissions</td>
<td>Position Vacancy Boards</td>
<td>Increase AR-designated ROTC Scholarships</td>
<td>IRR &amp; AC to RC Affiliation Program</td>
<td>IRR &amp; New Accessions Bonus - 10/28/04-1/5/06 $6k .. 1/6/06 $10k</td>
<td>IRR MSO reduction for TPU service</td>
<td>Reserve Income Replacement Program 8/1/06 - 12/31/11</td>
<td>Green to Green</td>
<td>Direct Commission to CPT (5 yr pilot)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Cross-leveling</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>24 mo cumulative MOB</td>
<td>24 mo consecutive MOB</td>
<td>COTTADs / EAD</td>
<td>TTHS</td>
<td>Retain two-time non-select 1LTs without baccalaureate degree</td>
<td>Fund pre-MOB DDS readiness exams</td>
<td>MOB 110% unit strength</td>
<td>CRC / push program</td>
<td>Divide promotion categories (AGR, non-AGR, and National Guard)</td>
<td>Train-MOB-Deploy</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Retention</strong></td>
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<td>Skill-Based Stop Loss</td>
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<tr>
<td>24 mo cumulative MOB</td>
<td>SELCON 2x N5 MAJ/LTCs</td>
<td>MOB 110% unit strength</td>
<td>CRC / push program</td>
<td>Grow the Army Campaign</td>
<td>Voluntary SELCON LTC/COL past Mandatory Retirement Date</td>
<td>Reserve Income Replacement Program 8/1/06 - 12/31/11</td>
<td>12 month total mobilization</td>
<td>Lower Retirement pay date for OCO service</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Transition</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cull IRR rolls</td>
<td>Blue to Green program</td>
<td>AC to RC Stabilization program</td>
<td>AR Employment Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Continuum of Service</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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Operational Approach Analysis: Which efforts within each LOE served as direct or indirect actions in improving officer accessions, management, retention or transition? Of these efforts, how much success did the USAR achieve?

**Accessions:**
- Increase Direct Commissions
- Position Vacancy Boards
- AR-ROTC Scholarships
- Affiliation Bonus
- Accessions Bonus
- MSO Reduction for TPU Service
- Income Replacement Program
- Green-to-Green
- Direct Commission to CPT

**Retention:**
- Unit-Based Stop Loss
- Deployed Unit Stabilization Pay
- Individual-Based Stop Loss
- SELCON 2x NS MAJs/LTCs
- VSELCON LTC/COL past MRD
- 12 mo total MOB
- Reduced retirement age

**Management:**
- Cross-leveling
- COTTADs/EAD
- TTHS Account
- Retain 2x NS 1LTs
- DDS Readiness
- MOB 110% Unit
- CRC / push program
- Divide promotion categories
- Train-MOB-Deploy
- Leave-in-Kind
- Below-the-Zone Boards
- Accelerated CPT Boards

**Transition:**
- Increase Advertisement
- Cull IRR Rolls
- Blue-to-Green Program
- AC-RC Stabilization
- AR Employee Partnership Program
- Continuum of Service

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