The Muslim Brotherhood in America:
Orthodox and Active

A Monograph
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The Muslim Brotherhood in America: Orthodox and Active

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The al Ikhwan al Muslimim, the Society of Muslim Brothers or Muslim Brotherhood, (MB) is an international Islamist organization with over fifty national branches. Its motto reflects its Salafi jihadist motives and methods: “Allah is our objective. The Prophet is our leader. Qur'an is our law. Jihad is our way. Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope.” Contrary to the American national narrative endorsed by the media and public leaders, jihad is part of orthodox Islam and a fundamental component of Islamic law. The MB’s goals, strategy, doctrine, and tactics descended logically from the sources of Islamic law, Sharia, which include the “trilogy of Sharia”: the Qur’an, Sira, and Hadith. MB writers are not radicals who have adopted an unusual interpretation of Islam. Rather, they carefully based their strategy for political action in America upon Sharia-compliant doctrines of jihad, holy war, and da’wa, invitation to Islam. The MB in North America built their goals and strategies upon the international strategies and implemented these strategies through various front groups established to maintain some secrecy for the MBs members. The goals, strategies, and nature of the relationships with the MB and its affiliate organizations in America all work to achieve the international MB’s ultimate goal, which is to establish a global caliphate – a single Islamic state where Sharia is enforced. The MB thus seeks to propagate Islam universally as a political, social, legal, financial, and religious system. These international goals, as well as the supporting goals sought by the MB in America represent a fundamental threat to the United States (US) and the American way of life.
Title of Monograph: The Muslim Brotherhood in America: Orthodox, Active, and Dangerous
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Abstract

The Muslim Brotherhood in America: Orthodox and Active by Lieutenant Colonel Jason R. Morris, U.S. Army, 70 pages.

The al Ikhwan al Muslimim, the Society of Muslim Brothers or Muslim Brotherhood, (MB) is an international Islamist organization with over fifty national branches. Its motto reflects its Salafi jihadist motives and methods: “Allah is our objective. The Prophet is our leader. Qur'an is our law. Jihad is our way. Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope.” Contrary to the American national narrative endorsed by the media and public leaders, jihad is part of orthodox Islam and a fundamental component of Islamic law. The MB’s goals, strategy, doctrine, and tactics descended logically from the sources of Islamic law, Sharia, which include the “trilogy of Sharia”: the Qur’an, Sira, and Hadith. MB writers are not radicals who have adopted an unusual interpretation of Islam. Rather, they carefully based their strategy for political action in America upon Sharia-compliant doctrines of jihad, holy war, and da’wa, invitation to Islam. The MB in North America built their goals and strategies upon the international strategies and implemented these strategies through various front groups established to maintain some secrecy for the MBs members. The goals, strategies, and nature of the relationships with the MB and its affiliate organizations in America all work to achieve the international MB’s ultimate goal, which is to establish a global caliphate – a single Islamic state where Sharia is enforced. The MB thus seeks to propagate Islam universally as a political, social, legal, financial, and religious system. These international goals, as well as the supporting goals sought by the MB in America represent a fundamental threat to the United States (US) and the American way of life.

The Muslim Brotherhood in America bases its actions upon orthodox Salafi Islam and leverages funds from wealthy international Wahhabis to influence American Muslims, political leaders, and the media in favor of their Islamist agenda: obstruct counter terrorism activity by law enforcement agencies in America, raise funds for international terror organizations, undermine the American civilization, and establish a global Caliphate, an Islamic state ruled by Sharia law. To stop the growing threat posed by the MB and its affiliated organizations in the US, American senior leaders must confront these dangerous ideas through a whole-of-government approach. This monograph will set out the sources of Sharia, the Qur’an, Sira, and Hadith, and Islamic scholarly summary of Sharia. This will demonstrate that Sunni Islam has an established orthodoxy, Sharia, which is not compatible with the Constitution of the United States (US), the American way of life, or the interest of the American people. Islam is a monistic political and legal system, a complete way of life, and a philosophy, of which the monotheistic religion is only one part. Review of literature from the International Muslim Brotherhood’s leaders will establish the Islamic basis of their goals, and their intent to use jihad to achieve those goals. Literature produced by Muslim Brotherhood leaders in the US, including seized documents used in Federal Court, further establish the Brotherhood’s strategies for “civilization Jihad” in the US, as well as listing their affiliate organizations. Next, congressional testimony, professional articles, news sources, information from the affiliate organizations’ own web sites, and statements from their own leaders will all demonstrate how the known affiliate organizations in the US work together to leverage funding from international sources to finance Mosques and Islamic Centers in the US. This funding allows the Brotherhood almost complete control of messaging, education, and activities from up to 80 percent of Muslim institutions in the US.

This monograph outlines the ideological and doctrinal bases of Muslim Brotherhood strategy and behavior, which has its origin in Sunni Salafism. However, it is not an examination of Islam, its religious virtue, or of Muslims in general. It establishes the threat posed by the MB based upon their chosen doctrine, strategic goals, historic activities and affiliations, and operational plans, but does not discuss Islamic arguments against the MB’s doctrinal validity.
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Introduction

The *al Ikhwan al Muslimim*, the Society of Muslim Brothers or Muslim Brotherhood (MB), is an international Islamist organization with over fifty national branches.¹ Its motto reflects its Salafi jihadist motives and methods: “Allah is our objective. The Prophet is our leader. Qur'an is our law. Jihad is our way. Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope.”² Contrary to the American national narrative endorsed by the media and public leaders, jihad *is* part of orthodox Islam and a fundamental component of Islamic law.³ The MB’s goals, strategy, doctrine, and tactics descended logically from the sources of Islamic law, Sharia, which include the “trilogy of Sharia”: the Qur’an, Sira, and Hadith. MB writers are not radicals who have adopted an unusual interpretation of Islam. Rather, they carefully based their strategy for political action in America upon Sharia-compliant doctrines of *jihad*, holy war, and *da’wa*, invitation to Islam. The MB in North America built their goals and strategies upon the international strategies and implemented these strategies through various front groups established to maintain some secrecy for the MBs members. The goals, strategies, and nature of the relationships with the MB


and its affiliate organizations in America all work to achieve the international MB’s ultimate goal, which is to establish a global caliphate – a single Islamic state where Sharia is enforced. According to Mustafa Mashur, the leader of the Egyptian MB from 1996 to 2002, “Jihad and preparation towards Jihad are not only for the purpose of fending-off assaults and attacks of Allah's enemies from Muslims, but are also for the purpose of realizing the great task of establishing an Islamic state and strengthening the religion and spreading it around the world.”

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in America bases its actions upon orthodox Salafi Islam and leverages funds from wealthy international Wahhabis, also Salafist in their orientation, to influence American Muslims, political leaders, and the media in favor of their Islamist agenda, to obstruct counter terrorism activity by law enforcement agencies in America, raise funds for international terror organizations, undermine the American civilization, and to establish a global Caliphate, an Islamic state ruled by Sharia Law. To stop the growing threat posed by the MB and its affiliated organizations in the US, American senior leaders must confront these dangerous ideas through a whole-of-government approach.

This monograph will set out the sources of Sharia, the Qur’an, Sira, and Hadith, and Islamic scholarly summary of Sharia. Although this monograph will outline the orthodoxy of Sunni Salafism as the ideological and doctrinal basis for MB activity, it will not compare Islam as a religion to other religions. This is not an examination of Islam's religious virtue, or of Muslims in general, but of the doctrine, activity, and goals of the MB and its affiliated organizations. Sunni Salafism represents a significant portion of global Islam, but is not universally observed by all Muslims. Similarly, only a minority of American Muslims accept representation by MB affiliated organizations, and many American Muslims who oppose the MB have spoken out against the

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4 Ibid., 7.
MB. It is beyond the scope of this monograph to discuss all the arguments within the Islamic community against the MB’s doctrinal legitimacy. It is only possible to establish the threat posed by the MB based upon their doctrinal basis, strategic goals, historic activities and affiliations, and operational plans.

Review of literature from the International Muslim Brotherhood’s leaders will establish the Sunni and Salafi basis of their goals, and their intent to use jihad to achieve those goals. Literature produced by Muslim Brotherhood leaders in the US, including seized documents used in Federal Court, further establish the Brotherhood’s strategies for “civilization Jihad” in the US, as well as listing their affiliate organizations.

Next, congressional testimony, professional articles, news sources, information from the affiliate organizations’ own web sites, and statements from their own leaders will all demonstrate how the known affiliate organizations in the US work together to leverage funding from international sources to finance Mosques and Islamic Centers in the US. This funding allows the MB almost complete control of messaging, education, and activities from up to 80 percent of Muslim institutions in the US.

The MB thus seeks to propagate Islam universally as a political, social, legal, financial, and religious system. These international goals, as well as the supporting goals sought by the MB in America represent a fundamental threat to the United States and the American way of life.\(^5\) Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this monograph to consider appropriate measures to take

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\(^5\) In *After Jihad: America and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy*, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004), xiii, Noah Feldman argues that Islam and democracy “can be compatible, since both are flexible, mobile ideas that function in different ways all over the world.” This author agrees with that argument, because, Islam, and the MB both have significant democratic traditions and procedures. However, there is much more to the American way of life than democracy. This monograph cannot possibly define the American way of life. It must instead focus upon the doctrine and activity of the threatening organization.
as part of a whole of government approach toward protecting the US against the MB and its agenda.

**Literature Review: Islamic and Muslim Brotherhood Doctrine**

This section will explain the source of Islam and Islamic law, Sharia. Islam and Sharia establish clear doctrine and law. The MB’s literature will clearly demonstrate how it drew its ideology and developed its strategy for the Islamization of the US from these sources. Far from fringe or radical in its interpretation of Islam, the MB adheres to the very popular Salafi philosophy, which dominates the Middle East and North Africa.

Islam means “submission.” Islam is submission to Allah demonstrated by observing Sharia law, or Sharia, which means “path to the water hole,” or “the straight and narrow way.” The Arabic name is appropriate for a legal system to which all aspects of human life and civilization must submit. Sharia comes from three primary sources, or the “trilogy”: the Qur’an, which Mohammed claimed the angel Gabriel dictated to him as Allah’s revelation; the Sira, or traditional biographies of Mohammed; and the Hadith of the Prophet, or Hadith, which are Mohammed’s actions and sayings as observed or recorded by his companions. The Hadith and Sira combined form the Sunna. Sharia defines the method of imitating Mohammed and abiding by the Qur’an. Non-Muslims tend to think of Islam as a mystical eastern philosophy with unclear or unknowable tenets and ideas. That is not true. Sharia and Islam consist of rational and finite rules and tenets, the source reliability of which must endure significant academic criticism from

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the community of Islamic scholars. In fact, the secondary source of Sharia is Ijma, or “consensus.” Ijma may supplement -- but not contradict, or take priority over -- any Qur’anic text or Sunna.

According to Muslim theology, Mohammed received divine revelations from Allah via the messenger angel, Gabriel, over the course of 23 years beginning near Mecca in 610 AD, when Mohammed was 40 years old and ending with his death in 632 AD. During that time, Mohammed migrated to Medina, then returned to and conquered Mecca. Mohammed taught the Qur’an – which means, “recite” – to his followers, who recorded it on various media during his life and after his death. Four of Mohammed’s companions succeeded him as Caliph – or “successor” – the head of the Islamic state, Caliphate, and nation, Umma. By the time of the third Caliph, Uthman ibn Affan, the Caliphate had grown considerably and the geographically distant and culturally diverse Islamic centers had begun teaching differing versions of the Qur’an. Uthman obtained a complete manuscript of the Qur’an, which the first Caliph, Abu Bakr, had compiled. Uthman had several copies made and distributed to the provinces of the Umma with instructions to destroy all previous Qur’anic versions. Uthman’s manuscripts are the direct ancestors of the modern Arabic version of the Qur’an. Muslims claim the Qur’an is accurate because there is only one version of the manuscript, which is always in Arabic. Translations to other languages may vary according to unavoidable differences in language and idiom, but an Arabic copy today is supposed to be identical to Uthman’s manuscripts. This is a convenient claim because Uthman destroyed all potential sources for dissent. Uthman’s doctrinal purge makes sense for any leader intent upon establishing authority in a rapidly expanding state, and Muslims accept the authenticity of


\[9\] Warner, xiii.
Uthman’s approved manuscripts, so there is no significant debate in the Muslim community about whether they deviated from the Qur’an Mohammed first disseminated. However, Uthman’s Qur’an is not the Qur’an Mohammed recited. Mohammed’s Qur’an was in chronological order and was often repetitive. In fact, he delivered many of the same messages to different people in different places at various times. His message was simple enough for illiterate Arabs to understand in the context of their time and place.10

Although Muslims faithfully reproduced every Arabic manuscript of the Qur’an so it was identical to Uthman’s manuscripts, the Arabic versions still exclude all non-Arabic readers. Translation to other languages presents a special problem, especially for works of antiquity. Translators struggle to choose the right words and phrases to transmit the most important meanings of every phrase into a foreign language. To do so, the translator must be very knowledgeable of the subject at hand, and a master of both languages.

Abdullah Yusuf Ali (1872-1953) was a respected Indian Muslim scholar who traveled extensively in Europe studying European Literature. He translated the Qur’an into English over a three-year period (1934-1937) while acting as the Dean of the Islamic college in Lahore, India.11 Yusuf Ali’s translation of the Qur’an into English is among the most popular versions in the US. Notably, the US Army chaplaincy freely distributes Yusuf Ali’s version. The publisher’s note states that the late Ismail Raji Al Faruqi, who was then President of the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) in the US, completed the last review of the work before publication in 1989.12 That the publisher and reviewing committee of the most widely available English version

10 Ibid.,
12 Ibid., vii.
of the Qur’an are organizations associated with the MB is no coincidence. This monograph will describe the MB’s method of distributing literature in the US later.

The Qur’an consists of 114 Sura, or chapters, which appear in order from the largest to the smallest, rather than in the chronological order Mohammed shared them with his followers. Sura 1 is 286 verses, while Sura 114 is only six verses. Not only does the lack of a timeline or narrative make the Qur’an difficult to read, it lacks the context of events that would otherwise accompany and enlighten the various topics Mohammed instructed. Thus, western readers who attempt to read the Qur’an front to back, without knowing, or considering, the chronological order or historical context of the Sura, will likely suffer confusion and frustration from the apparently random and unrelated topics. Two doctrines, progressive revelation and abrogation, add to the confusion; because together they mean that latter revelations take precedence over former revelations.

Yusuf Ali’s translation provides a key for readers to discern the chronological order of the Suras. However, he does not tell why it is important to use the key. Uthman’s manuscripts established the order for the surviving Suras – according to their length, rather than chronologically – so they make the Qur’an seem a mystical book of theology rather than a strategy for conquest and political rule. Yusuf Ali introduces each Sura with a brief comment about the Sura's approximate chronology, relative to other Suras. He also tells whether it is part of the Meccan or Medinan Suras. His comments make the Qur’an discernible, but it is still difficult to read – difficulty Western readers must overcome, because the thematic differences between Meccan and Medinan periods become critical in light of these two fundamentally important Islamic doctrines of progressive revelation and abrogation.

First, progressive revelation means that Mohammed did not claim to receive the Qur’an from Allah all at once, but progressively – in stages. Authority for the doctrine of progressive revelation comes from the Qur’an itself: “(It is) a Qur’an which We have divided into parts from
time to time, in order that thou mightest recite it to men at intervals: We have revealed it by
stages (Qur’an 17:106).” Yusuf Ali commented on this doctrine.

The Marvel is that these parts, revealed at different times and in different circumstances, should fit together so closely and consistently as they do. *All revelation is progressive.* The previous revelations were also progressive. Each of them marked a stage in the world’s spiritual history. Man’s mind does not take in more than his spiritual state will have prepared him for. Allah’s revelation comes as a light to illuminate our difficulties and show us the way in actual situations that arise.

Second, abrogation in Islamic doctrine applies to precedence placed upon newer revelations over older revelations, as established in the Qur’an. “None of Our revelations do We abrogate or cause to be forgotten, but We substitute something better or similar: knowest thou not that Allah hath power over all things?” In that respect Islamic doctrine and Sharia is similar to our own legal system, in which the Supreme Court may overrule earlier cases. As a legal system this is logical, but it is highly questionable as a religious tenet.

Though the purpose of this monograph is to discuss the doctrinal threat posed to America by the MB and Salafi Islamic doctrine, it is beyond the scope to discuss the merits of Islam as a religion. At this point, it is sufficient to note that the Qur’an serves as a cornerstone in that legal system, and that doctrines of progressive revelation and abrogation are critical to understanding

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13 Ibid., 704.
14 Ibid., 704.
15 Ibid., 704.
17 It seems reasonable that an omnipotent and omniscient creator being would remain unchanging throughout time and space. How could Allah, and his commands, evolve over time in the same way human laws evolve over time? Religious tenets should be those that remain timeless. When all else in the world changes, religious tenets should not.
18 Islam’s merit as a religion certainly deserves discussion and comparison with Judaism, Christianity, Buddhism, and Hinduism, the world’s most popular religions; but other literature on the subject abounds.
the Qur’an and Islam. Most importantly, the Meccan and Medinan periods of the Qur’an represent distinct themes and doctrines. The western reader must understand these differences.

According to Seyyid Qutb, who was one of the most important leaders in the MB, the Meccan portion of the Qur’an dealt with the subject of “man’s existence in the universe, his ultimate goal, and his position and relationship to the universe; and […] of the relationship between him and the Creator of the universe.”19 Thus, the Meccan portion resembles what westerners would consider a religious text. According to Qutb:

In Mecca, the Muslims were not autonomous, nor did they have any influence in the society. Their practical life had not taken a permanent form so that they could have organized themselves according to the Divine Law (al-Sharia); hence no regulations and laws were revealed to them by God. They were taught only belief and those moral principles which follow from this belief after it penetrates the mind.20

This establishes an important component of the MB philosophy. Mohammed lived in Mecca when he claimed to receive the revelation of the Qur’an from Gabriel and began preaching to his fellow Meccans. At the time, the Meccans were polytheistic and stood to lose a great deal of income from pilgrims who visited Mecca to worship various gods if Mohammed should gain influence. Mohammed and the few people he managed to convert had to maintain a cooperative relationship with the polytheists in Mecca. Mohammed preached boldly, but did not advocate jihad. Mustafa Mashur provides the MB’s interpretation of the contextual influence on the Qur’an. “In the early days of Islamic Da’wa (Islamic missionary activity), when the Muslims were a persecuted minority, the Prophet Muhammad did not instruct the Muslims to retaliate but rather instructed them of ‘Sabr’, patience and steadfastness.”21 After thirteen years, Mohammed

19 Seyyid Qutb, Milestones (Damascus, Syria: Dar al-Ilm, publication date not available), 23.
20 Ibid., 34.
21 Mashur, 7.
had gained fewer than three dozen converts in Mecca. Under persecution from the Quraysh, Mohammed’s tribe in Mecca, they fled Mecca to Medina.

After significant political intrigue, Mohammed and his followers managed to take control of Medina. During this time, Mohammed began to advocate jihad, according to Mashur, “When the conditions were right, permission to fight was given in the words of Allah: [Quran, Sura 22, 39]: ‘Permission [to fight] is given to those upon whom war is made because they are oppressed, and most surely Allah is well able to assist them.”’22 The Medinan portion of the Qur’an established the modus operandi for political rule and a campaign plan for conquest. Qutb highlighted the difference between the Meccan and Medinan portions of the Qur’an. “Later, when an autonomous state came into existence in Medina,” commented Mosher, “general laws were revealed and that system came into existence which satisfies the needs of a Muslim community, and the power of the state was behind its enforcement.”23 Using Medina as a base, Mohammed led his followers on a military campaign to capture Mecca and all of the Arabian Peninsula over the course of ten years.

That is why the Meccan and Medinan divisions of the Qur’an differ so greatly. The Meccan stresses individual religion and philosophy, the Medinan establishes and enforces a political and legal system. The Meccan preaches tolerance and patience in the face of opposition, while the Medinan demands jihad to spread Islam and establish a Caliphate against all opposition, and subjugation of all who refuse to convert to Islam. Because the Medinan follows the Meccan, the doctrine of abrogation grants precedence to any issue addressed in the Medinan portion that conflicts with the Meccan portion. By the time Mohammed died, Islam, which means “submission,” meant submission to Allah, to the Muslim state, the Caliphate, and to Mohammed.

22 This paper will discuss doctrine of jihad later.
23 Qutb, 34.
As would any great leader, Mohammed set the example for Muslims to follow. Therefore, the Qur’an formed the first part of the trilogy of the new state’s law, Sharia – do what Mohammed claimed Allah directed. The Sira, Mohammed’s biography, formed the second part of the trilogy of Sharia – do what Mohammed did.

Islam and Sharia cannot be narrowly defined according to the Qur’an. As already stated, the Qur’an represented Allah’s message to Mohammed. Mohammed did not restrict his activities to preaching, though. He went on to conquer and to govern. His own words and actions became the procedure and policy for the political and military group he led. In the 20th Century, it would prove logical for the MB to interpret Mohammed’s life, as recorded in the Sira and Hadith, as a blueprint for renewed jihad.

Mohammed ibn Isaq’s Sirat Rasul Allah is the oldest biography of Mohammed, and among the most reliable Sira. Isaq lived about 707-773 AD. This Sira provides a reader-friendly primary source of Sharia, because it is a history built around a comprehensible narrative. He carefully documented the sources of all aspects of Mohammed’s life and avoided personal commentary or opinions. In fact, he demonstrated care in acknowledging the apparent trustworthiness of various sources with a minimum of distracting discussion. Unlike the Qur’an, Sirat Rasul Allah is plainly organized chronologically, and divided into three parts. This organization underscores the previous description of thematic differences in the Qur’an between the Meccan and Medinan portions and presents the relative value the biographer placed on Mohammed’s martial activity. “Part I: The genealogy of Muhammad; traditions from the pre-Islamic era; Muhammad’s childhood and early manhood,” has 105 dedicated pages.25 “Part II:

24 Warner, xii.
Muhammad’s call and preaching in Mecca,” which represents a thirteen year history, receives 109 pages worth of attention.26 “Part III: Muhammad’s Migration to Medina, his wars, triumph, and death,” requires a whopping 470 pages.27

Sira differs from Hadith, sayings and actions of Mohammed, in the historical aspect. Specifically, Sira establishes historical context for events, places, times, and conditions. Hadith give examples of things Mohammed did or said, but without any historical context. In many cases, Hadith are individual verses. This is important, because the Sira includes some Hadith.

The Hadith of the Prophet, or Hadith, form the third part of the Sharia trilogy. Hadith are Mohammed’s sayings and habits. Unlike the Sira, which provide historical context, the Hadith often occur with no context or explanation at all. In this way, the Hadith are similar to the books of Psalms and Proverbs from the Bible. There are six canonical versions (the Sahih Sittah) of Hadith in Sunni Islam: the works of Bukhari, Muslim, Abu Dawud, Tirmidhi, ibn Maja and Nasa’I.”28 The “companions” were followers of Mohammed during his lifetime. Among these, the most prolific commentators were Abu Hurairah Abdur Rahman bin Sakhar Dasi, who wrote 5,374 hadith. Abdullah bin Umar bin Khattab, Anas bin Malik, and Aisha each wrote over 2,200 hadith. Abdullah bin Abbas, Jabir bin Abdullah Ahsan, and Sa’ad bin Malik Abu Saeed Khudhri each wrote over 1,500 hadith. Numerous hadith collectors of varying quality and repute compiled their hadith. Six scholars stand out among them for reputed accuracy and authenticity in the selection of hadith they chose to include as a part of their collections. Hence, hadith from one of the six correct collections that reliably cites one of the seven companions, are irrefutable. In

26 Ibid., viii-ix.
27 Ibid., ix-xii.
addition, no *Sunna*, or rule, that arises from the hadith can contradict the Qur‘an. Instead, they are doctrinally authoritative explanations of the Quranic verses they support.”29

The Hadith represent scholarly analysis and historical compilation of various, almost random, statements by Mohammed as originally recorded by one of the seven companions. None of these supersedes the Qur’an, but they do greatly expand upon the themes established by the Qur’an. Most importantly, they record the example Mohammed set by his own words and deeds. Mohammed claimed the Qur’an is a message from Allah, which Gabriel delivered, but the Hadith are only attributed to Mohammed. The idea of learning hundreds, even thousands of Hadith may seem staggering to westerners. However, Islam is a simple system, which Mohammed and his followers easily conveyed to uneducated Arab tribesmen. The hadith that is the basis for the “Five Pillars of Islam” summarizes the most important tents, and are probably the most well known concepts of Islam in Western discourse:30

Narrated Ibn `Umar: Allah’s Apostle said: Islam is based on (the following) five (principles):

1. To testify that there is no deity (owing the right to be worshiped) but Allah and that Muhammad is Allah’s Messenger.
2. To offer the (compulsory congregational) prayers dutifully and perfectly.
3. To pay Zakat (i.e. obligatory charity).
4. To perform Hajj. (i.e. Pilgrimage to Mecca).
5. To observe fast during the month of Ramadan.31

The first pillar, Shahadah, requires recitation of the creed, “*La ilaha illa Allah,* *Muhammadur rasool Allah,*” which translated into English means “No deity, only Allah; and

29 Coughlin, 55-56.
30 Parentheticals in this quote are part of the original.
Mohammed is his messenger.”32 This pillar addresses an important theological, political, social, and military question: who is in charge? According to Islam, Allah is in charge. All other aspects of Islam answer a logical follow-on question: What is my duty to the one who is in charge? Since Mohammed speaks for Allah, Muslims are to obey Mohammed’s instructions and follow Mohammed’s example.

Considering the Qur’an’s thinly veiled distinction between Meccan and Medinan portions, and Sirat Rasul Allah’s overwhelming emphasis on Mohammed’s political and military exploits; it is easy to conclude that Mohammed’s example demands implementation of Sharia and performance of jihad.

Sharia establishes a finite and fundamentally efficient system of laws that a nation of uneducated Arab Bedouins, if properly motivated, could implement. Although its nature is foreign to westerners, it is not without logic, order, and authority. ‘Umdat al-Salik is an authoritative source and summary of Sharia law, which effectively compiles the aforementioned “trilogy” by subject. Ahmad Ibn Naqib Al Misri wrote ‘Umdat al-Salik, Reliance of the Traveller [sic] and Tools for the Worshipper, a Classic Manual of Islamic Sacred Law, also referred to as ‘Umdat al-Salik or Reliance of the Traveller, in the 14th Century AD. Nuh Ha Mim Keller, an American Muslim scholar, translated it for publication in 1991. Nuh Ha Mim Keller’s translation bears endorsements from designated national authorities from three Arab states: the General Director of Research, Writing, and Translation from Cairo’s al-Azhar University; the Imam of the Mosque of Darwish Pasha, Damascus; and the Mufti of the Jordanian Armed Forces. It also bears

32 Qutb, 24. “They knew their language well and knew the meaning of ‘Ilah’ (god), and they also knew the meaning of ‘La ilaha illa Allah’ (There is no deity except God).” Author’s note: Contrary to popular thought among Westerners, the name of the Muslim god, Allah, is not the Arabic word for “god”. It is a proper noun, the name of a god, such as Jehovah, Zeus, or Jupiter. The Arabic word for “god,” or “deity,” is “ilah,” or “ilaha.”
endorsement from the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) by Dr. Taha Jabir al-
‘Alwani, who is the President of IIIT, a member of the Islamic Fiqh Academy, Jedda; and
President of the Fiqh Council of North America. 33 Cairo’s al-Azhar University, the most
authoritative institute of Islamic learning certified that the “translation corresponds to the Arabic
original and conforms to the practice and faith of Orthodox Sunni Islam.” 34 Based on its
authority, any properly documented interpretation of Sharia that refers to ‘Umdat al-Salik is valid
and represents mainstream, or orthodox, Islam. 35

The only endorsement of the ‘Umdat al-Salik that is not from an Arab country is from Dr.
Taha Jabir al-‘Alwani, the President of IIIT, which is one of the MB’s affiliate organizations in
the US. This is one example of the IIIT’s activities in the US, which will receive attention later in
this monograph. For now, it is important to note that the most widely available and authoritative

33 Ahmad ibn Lulu Ibn al-Naqib, Reliance of the Traveller: The Classic Manual of Islamic Sacred
Law ‘Umdat al-Salik, ed. and trans. Nuh Ha Mim Keller (Beltsville, Maryland: Amana Publications, 1994),
xiv-xv.

[stamped], Imam of the Mosque of Darwish Pasha, Damascus, Syria, signed by two witnesses (A.H.
1408/April 1988 A.D.).

of the Jordanian Armed Forces, signed by three witnesses (A.H. 1409/February 1989 A.D.).

[signed], President of the International Institute of Islamic Thought, Member of Islamic Fiqh Academy at

Document 4. “Certification of al-Azhar”, Al-Azhar, Islamic Research Academy, General Director
of Research, Writing, and Translation, Fath Allah Ya Sin Jazar [signed], signed by one witness, Seal of al-

34 Ibid., xx-xxi. Note: Al-Azhar University’s status established via “Al-Azhar University,”
University (accessed March 19, 2012).

35 Coughlin, 49. Note: Reliance of the Traveller: A Classic Manual of Islamic Sacred Law Umdat
Al Salik is divided by books (A-Z), then paragraphs (1.1, 1.2, etc), and subordinate paragraphs ((1), (2),
etc). References to Umdat Al Salik would thus follow: “o8.0 Apostasy from Islam (Ridda)” represents the
paragraph 8.0 of rules applying to Apostasy from Islam (Ridda) from Book O, Justice. This paper will refer
to both the page number and the “book-paragraph” system, but the latter is the traditional way to refer to
the ‘Umdat al-Salik.
English version of ‘Umdat al-Salik is Salafist and doctrinally aligned with the MB, and represents mainstream, or orthodox Islam.

If the ‘Umdat al-Salik represents orthodox Islam, who follows it? Who is interested in observing orthodox Islam? Islam has clear doctrine, which is complicated, but has internal logic, is understandable, and does not change over time. Salafism is a term derived from salaf (predecessor), a reference to the first three generations of Muslims. According to Salafis, those generations understood and followed the right form of Islam. According to the Hadith, “Narrated Abdullah: The Prophet said, ‘The best people are those of my generation, and then those who will come after them (the next generation), and then those who will come after them (i.e. the next generation), and then after them, there will come people whose witness will precede their oaths, and whose oaths will precede their witness.’”

Salafis sought to practice authentic Islam as Mohammed taught it, and the first three generations practiced and recorded it, so they developed manhaj, method, to determine true Islam. One of the central ideas in manhaj is bid’a, innovation. They believe any innovation, or evolution, of Islam is bid’a, and therefore false Islam. They thus seek to identify all true Islam and reject all bid’a. The philosophy and goals the MB propagates remain fixed upon the

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38 Stemmann, 1.

39 Ibid., 1.

40 Ibn Taymiyyah was one of the early influences on the Salafi school. “Born in Damascus in 1268, he represented a fundamentalist approach to Islam at a time when the Near East was invaded by the Mongols from the North and East and the Abbasid dynasty was defeated. Since the Mongols had converted to Islam, Ibn Taymiyyah’s call for armed resistance may at first seem surprising. But as he saw it, these new coreligionists did not embrace Islam wholeheartedly but rather stuck to a certain extent to their old
aforementioned sources. Orthodox Islam provides dangerous justification for the MB and its affiliated organizations in the US, which include Islamic scholars and intellectuals who developed their views and plan their actions, based upon valid understanding of Islamic doctrine and gained status as Islamic authorities. Salafi doctrine is orthodox Sunni Islam. Even if Salafi doctrine were not orthodox Sunni Islam, one must contend with the vast Salafi following in the Muslim world. According to William McCants, at the US Military Academy Combating Terrorism Center, Salafism is vastly popular in the Middle East and North Africa.

The West, especially the United States, should be modest about its ability to intellectually challenge Salafism. The movement gained mass popularity during the last century and Salafis now constitute a majority or significant portion of the Muslim population in the Middle East and North Africa. This is despite the fact that it was often strongly opposed by secular nationalist regimes and non-Salafi clerics. Western governments have neither the local credibility nor the cultural expertise necessary to diminish the popularity of Salafism.41

Salafism is the greatest commonality in the Middle East and North Africa where tension between modernity and religion greatly influenced the MB’s formation.42 Throughout this area, leaders struggle for authenticity, as Robert D. Lee described it. A person must remain true to who he is, rather than try to be someone else and “not follow external recipes for ethical behavior and success, but should be guided by the innermost instincts of [his] being.”43 Similarly, plans leading

laws and customs and constituted, therefore, a threat to pure, traditional Islam which he felt needed to be restored in its pristine glory. Ibn Taymiyyah’s opinions were controversial even in his own lifetime and they did not become official doctrine after his death. But they have remained the guideposts of Muslim radicals ever since.” Walter Laqueur, Voices of Terror: Manifestos, Writings, and Manuals of Al Qaeda, Hamas, and Other Terrorists from Around the World and Throughout the Ages (New York: Reed Press, 2004) 388.

42 John O. Vall forward to The Society of the Muslim Brothers by Richard P. Mitchell (Oxford University Press, 1993), viii.
to societal success must remain true to the core values of that society.\textsuperscript{44} In that respect, the
Salafist movement represents a vast Muslim effort to be true to themselves. The MB was a
natural outgrowth of that movement in the early part of the twentieth century, when the Turkish
Ottoman Empire dissolved, leaving the Muslim world, the Umma, without a Caliphate – a nation
with no state, and no single ruler. European nations, empowered by their modern industries,
continued their domination of the Middle East and North Africa, which began with Napoleon’s
invasion of Egypt in 1798.\textsuperscript{45} As Arab nations rushed to modernize politically and industrially,
they lost themselves by confusing modernization with Westernization.\textsuperscript{46} Though he would not
have been familiar with the term “authenticity,” Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the MB sought
to restore Egypt’s authenticity as an Islamic state, and to end its imitation of and pandering to,
Western powers. The MB championed the popular Salafi movement in the twentieth century, to
restore Islamic authenticity while achieving modernity and competing with, and eventually
overcoming, Western powers.

Al-Banna demonstrated appreciable leadership and charisma, but his movement would
have died with him had it not been for at least one skilled writer among his followers. Political
prisoners produced some of history’s most influential writings, for better or worse, including
letters to early Christian churches from the Apostle Paul and Adolf Hitler’s \textit{Mein Kampf}, Seyyid
Qutb’s \textit{Milestones} is one such \textit{horribly} influential work. \textit{Milestones} and Qutb’s other works
would inspire a dangerous new generation of Muslims to renew jihad, not just to reform errant
Muslim states, but to regain lost glory by spreading Islam. Qutb’s work, and other literature later

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 4.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 4-6.
generated by the MB in America demonstrated the MB’s evolving and adopted plans to spread Islam to America and the world.

Seyyid Qutb, who lived from 1906 to 1966, represents one example of MB leaders who sought to restore Islamic authenticity and gain modernity, not to imitate the west, but to defeat it. Qutb was one of the most influential figures in developing the modern MB strategy. He joined the MB in 1951, disgusted with the decadence evident in secular societies, especially America. By 1952, he led the society’s propaganda department as editor-in-chief of the weekly, Al Ikhwan al-Muslimin. In 1954, a MB member attempted to assassinate the Egyptian president, Gamel Abd’el Nasser. During the subsequent repression, the government arrested many MB members, including Qutb, who received a 25-year prison sentence. He wrote prolifically in prison, producing a 30-volume commentary on the Qur’an, In the Shade of the Qur’an. Qutb suffered significant torture during his time in prison, which shaped his view of jihadist revolt against jahili (un-Islamic or ignorant of Islam) authority – in his case the Nasser regime. He wrote Ma'alim fi'l-Tariq (Milestones/Signposts in the Road) from 1962 to 1964. In 1964, the President of Iraq intervened on Qutb’s behalf to secure his release from prison.47 Eight months later, the Egyptian government again arrested Qutb on charges of armed revolt and terrorism, and then hung him on August 29, 1966. According to Albert J. Bergesen, Professor of Sociology at University of Arizona, Qutb’s influence owes its endurance to his ideas’ content, as well as his “martyrdom,” which added salience to his points.48

47 It is not apparent why the Iraqi president, Abdul Rahman Arif intervened on Qutb’s behalf.

48 Sayyid Qutb, the Sayyid Qutb Reader: Selected Writings on Politics, Religion, and Society, ed. Albert J. Bergesen (New York: Routledge, 2008), 3-4. Note: Seyyid and Sayyid are different English spellings for the same name.
In his now famous work *Milestones*, Qutb argued that the West had become “infertile,” bankrupting its systems and drawing on failed Marxist models.\(^\text{49}\) All contemporary societies, including those that claimed to be Muslim, had reverted to a state of *jahiliyya*, pre-Islamic ignorance, in which other sources of authority, such as the government, military, or economic power, replaced Allah's authority and primacy.\(^\text{50}\)

Qutb derived a modern strategy for revolution and jihad by emulating the strategy Muhammad and his *jama’at* (movement) followed in the face of their own *jahili* society. He stated that Allah had revealed his plan to Muhammad in a specific sequence (hence ‘Milestones’ or ‘Signposts’ on the Road), which the contemporary *jama’at* must follow to restore the Muslim world.\(^\text{51}\) Qutb reviewed several alternative strategies Mohammed could have taken, but did not. Qutb systematically considered several of Mohammed’s apparent strategic options, each of which were equivalent to the policy proposals taken by contemporary revolutionary groups in Egypt: pan-Arab nationalism, conversion of the masses through programs of social welfare (the *da’wa* wing of the MB), and movements of moral re-armament.\(^\text{52}\) Qutb reasoned that Mohammed pursued none of these, because Allah provided perfect guidance. The most appropriate approach, then, was to imitate Mohammed’s approach.

Qutb noted that Muhammad endured a period of persecution and weakness when he set himself apart from society and declared that Allah alone exercised all authority, a direct challenge to the polytheistic members of the Quraysh tribe those in authority in Mecca at the time. “The people ought to know that Islam means to accept the creed “*La ilea ill Allah*” [no deity, only/but

\(^\text{50}\) Ibid., 10-11.  
\(^\text{52}\) Ibid.
Allah] in its deepest sense, which is this: that every aspect of life should be under the sovereignty of [Allah], and those who rebel against [Allah’s] sovereignty and usurp it for themselves should be opposed (emphasis added).” Qutb predicted that the contemporary jama'at would also encounter a period of weakness as it built itself. He alluded to Muhammad's hijra (migration) to Yathrib (Medina), leading to the establishment of the Islamic community, at the invitation of the Ansar (helpers). Qutb said that the contemporary jama'at would need to follow this lead, establishing a community, “dar ul-Islam” (home of Islam) then engaging in jihad (struggle) in various forms against jahili society, “dar ul Harb” (home of hostility) until the Muslim society gained control.54

Milestones presented a Qur’anic strategy for revolution to apply to a modern context. “First, belief ought to be imprinted on hearts and rule over consciences – that belief which demands that people should not bow before anyone except God or derive laws from any other source. Then, when such a group of people is ready and also gains practical control of society, various laws will be legislated according to the practical needs of that society.”55

Qutb’s work also aligned with Salafism by providing a plan to restore the glory of Islam, without imitating the West. Qutb did not intend to bend Islam, but to observe it strictly. Beginning with Egypt, the MB intended to reform Islamic states that had become, according to the MB, un-Islamic. The plan for Islamic reform from within a state was novel, because Islamic tradition only addressed a single Islamic state, the Caliphate. Mohammed started the conquest to expand Islamic rule as a single state, which he ruled and reformed from the top down. He left no

53 Qutb, Milestones, 35.
54 Ibid., 118.
55 Ibid., 35.
guidance for reform driven from the bottom up. In addition, there were not two Islamic states in Mohammed’s time, only one Caliphate.

Majid Khadurri, an authoritative academic on Islam and Islamic law, addressed the Islamic idea of a state in his forward for Shaybani’ Siyar, *Islamic Law of Nations*. According to Khadurri, because Muslims could not subdue the entire world, they had to establish a body of laws for dealing with the *dar al-Harb* (house of war), which constituted all territory controlled by unbelievers.56 Since Mohammed, Muslims had readily fought unbelievers to expand the Caliphate. Even when the Caliphate fractured later, the primary actors were the rulers. State-on-state conventional conflict was the norm, as in the west. *Milestones* used orthodox Islam to reset the norm to evoke the populace to fight jihad against its own government as a grass roots effort, if necessary. Qutb and the MB did not invent jihad, but they did re-direct it.

It is beyond the scope of this monograph to consider all the documentation that provide the bases of the orthodoxy of jihad, but it is important to stress that jihad is an integral part of orthodox Islam and a key to the MBs strategy. According to Mustafa Mashur’:

The Imam and *Shahid* (Martyr) [Hassan al-Banna] writes in his Treatise on *Jihad*: "All of the sages, the earlier and the later ones... agree that *Jihad* is a religious public duty to spread *Da’wa* (Islamic missionary activity) incumbent upon the Islamic nation, and is a personal duty to fend off the infidels' attack on the nation... The Muslims today, as you know, are humiliated by others, dominated by infidels, their land is overrun and their holy places are desecrated...Therefore there exists an unavoidable personal duty for every Muslim to equip himself and prepare and gear-up towards *Jihad* until the opportunity arises and Allah will determine His word."57

57 Mashur, 5.
“Jihad means to war against non-Muslims and is etymologically derived from the word *mujahada*, signifying warfare to establish the religion.”\(^{58}\) There is no basis in orthodox Islam to conclude that it means anything different.\(^{59}\) It is not, as some people claim, merely a spiritual struggle to be the best Muslim possible. In fact, Hassan al-Banna addressed the basis of that confusion, to which some people refer when suggesting there is a greater jihad, consisting of internal struggle to be a good Muslim, and a lesser jihad, consisting of a physical struggle against non-believers.

The *Shahid* (Martyr) Imam (Hassan al-Banna) said in another place of his *Jihad* Treatise about the tradition [attributed to Muhammad]: “We have returned from the smaller *Jihad* to the greater *Jihad*.” They said: “And what is the greater *Jihad*?” He [Mohammed] said: “the *Jihad* of the heart or the *Jihad* of the soul.” He [Hassan al-Banna] said: “This tradition is not authentic Hadith (tradition) and some say that it was said by Ibrahim b. ‘Abla”\(^{60}\)

There are 164 Qur’anic references to support the orthodoxy of jihad as violent action against un-believers.\(^{61}\) One of these is the “Verse of the Sword.” “But when the forbidden months are past, then fight and slay the pagans wherever you find them, and seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem (of war); but if they repent and establish regular prayers, and practice regular charity, then leave their way free to them; for surely Allah is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful (Qur’an 9:5).”\(^{62}\)

*Milestones* included doctrinal reminders of Qur’anic justification for jihad and concluded:

The reasons for Jihad which have been described in the [Qur’anic] verses are these: to establish God’s authority in the earth; to arrange human affairs according to the true guidance provided by God; to abolish all the Satanic forces

\(^{58}\) Al-Naqib, “o9.0 Jihad,” 599.


\(^{60}\) Mashur, 5

\(^{61}\) Lopez, 45.

and Satanic systems of life; to end the lordship of one man over others, since all men are creatures of God and no one has the authority to make them his servants or to make arbitrary laws for them. These reasons are sufficient for proclaiming Jihad. However, one should always keep in mind that there is no compulsion in religion; that is, once the people are free from the lordship of men, the law governing civil affairs will be purely that of [Allah], while no one will be forced to change his beliefs and accept Islam.63

Qutb argued that jihad was not only valid, but an obligatory means of spreading Islam and enforcing Sharia among all defeated people. Qutb noted that there is no compulsion in religion, which is Islamic doctrine. However, Muslim treatment of prisoners bears strong resemblance to compulsion. It deserves discussion, because it demonstrates the complete disregard Muslims have for any *jahiliyya* or *kafr* (unbeliever). “The caliph makes war upon Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians until they become Muslim, or else pay the non-Muslim poll tax *[Jizya]*. The caliph fights all other peoples until they become Muslim.”64 Women and children, watch out! “When a child or a woman is taken captive, they become slaves by the fact of capture, and the woman’s previous marriage is immediately annulled.”65 The possibilities for men are worse. “When an adult male is taken captive, the caliph considers the interests and decides between the prisoner’s death, slavery, release without paying anything, or ransoming himself in exchange for money or for a Muslim captive held by the enemy. If the prisoner becomes a Muslim, then he may not be killed, and one of the other three alternatives is chosen.”66 Of course, anyone with foresight may easily avoid all these unsavory outcomes: “Whoever enters Islam before being captured may not be killed or his property confiscated, or his young children taken

63 Qutb, *Milestones*, 70.
captive.” As earlier noted, Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrian captives have a special option not extended to all other peoples. They may “pay the Jizya with willing submission and feel themselves subdued.”

Christians and Jews have another option when confronted with the potential of conversion to Islam: accept status as a dhimmi and pay the Jizya (non-Muslim poll tax). Dhimmitude represents an agreement of protection between the Islamic state and non-Muslim subjects who are Jews, Christians, or Zoroastrians. The aforementioned non-Muslim subjects must follow the rules of Islam and pay the Jizya. As Dhimmis, they must accept permanent second-class status beneath Muslims. A series of discriminatory constraints constantly reinforce their lower status. They must wear a zunnar, a wide cloth belt to distinguish themselves from Muslims; may not be greeted with “as-Salamu ‘alaykum,” or peace be upon you; must keep to the side of the street; may not build houses as tall or taller than a Muslim’s building; are forbidden to display wine or pork; are forbidden to ring church bells or display crosses; are forbidden to recite the Torah or Evangel aloud; are forbidden to make public display of funerals and feast days; are forbidden to build new churches. In short, “People of the Book,” may survive under Islam as Dhimmis, but they will not thrive.

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67 Ibid.
68 Ali, “Sura 9:29”, 445. Ali’s commentary on Jizya: “the root meaning is compensation. The derived meaning, which became the technical meaning, was a poll tax levied from those who did not accept Islam, but were willing to live under the protection of Islam, and were thus tacitly willing to submit to its ideals being enforced in the Muslim State. There was no amount permanently fixed for it, and in any case it was merely symbolical – an acknowledgement that those whose religion was tolerated would in their turn not interfere with the preaching and progress of Islam.”
69 Al-Naqib, “o11.0 Non-Muslim Subjects of the Islamic State (Ahl Al-Dhimma),” 607.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid., “o11.3 Non-Muslim Subjects of the Islamic State (Ahl Al-Dhimma)”, 607.
Qutb’s doctrinal dependence upon jihad as defined in sharia was far from novel. Legal language that describes execution, slavery, and subjugation is foreign to non-Muslims, but it is the law of war in Islam. In 1979, Brigadier General S.K. Malik, of the Pakistani Army wrote The Quranic Concept of War. According to General M. Zia-Ul-Haq, the Pakistani Army Chief of Staff at the time, the Quranic Concept of War “brings out with simplicity, clarity and precision the Quranic philosophy on the application of military force, within the context of the totality that is JEHAD. The professional soldier in a Muslim army, pursuing the goals of a Muslim state, CANNOT become ‘professional’ if in all his activities he does not take on ‘the colour of Allah.’” In the book’s preface Allah Bukhsh K. Brohi, the former Pakistani Ambassador to India, wrote “In Islam the personal will of the conqueror, his lust for power, his desire to have personal fame are totally irrelevant. When he fights in the name of Allah he does so to uphold His law and the honour of His Name and for the defense of legitimate interests of the believers. It is only in defined set of circumstances that war is permitted. As anyone can see, this is a highly controlled affair; indeed, it is totally regulated by law.” Thus, the legal language of jihad defines the modern Pakistani version of warfare. Malik wrote, “The Quranic philosophy of war is


It is clear that Zia supported The Qur’anic Concept of War, but it is not as clear how much influence the book and its ideology have with Pakistan’s current leaders. Hussain Haqqani (a professor at Boston University, was Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States from 2008 to 2011. In “How Pakistan Lets Terrorism Fester,” New York Times (May 10, 2012) http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/11/opinion/how-pakistan-lets-terrorism-fester.html?_r=2&smid=fb-share (accessed May 14, 2012), Haqqani described the political and religious turmoil in Pakistan. “The national mind-set that condones this sort of extremism was cultivated and encouraged under the military dictatorships of Gen. Mohammad Zia ul-Haq from 1977 to 1988 and Gen. Pervez Musharraf from 1999 to 2008. A whole generation of Pakistanis has grown up with textbooks that conflate Pakistani nationalism with Islamist exclusivism.” The point of this monograph is not to establish Pakistan’s current doctrine, but to demonstrate that Qutb’s modern use of Islamic text and sharia to support argument jihad is not novel or unusual.

infinitely supreme and effective. It operates within well-defined divine controls. Its laws and principles are universal in nature and abiding in significance,” and, “unlike man-made philosophies.”

Islam established the obligatory institution of jihad against non-Muslims in the Meccan period -- effectively making Jihad a sixth pillar of Islam. As Qutb pointed out, *jahili* (unbelieving) government, authority, or individuals, deserve only disobedience, opposition, subjugation, and humiliation or death from observant Muslims. Qutb’s contempt for the *jahili* government in Egypt led him to focus upon reforming that country from the inside out. However, his ideas for Islamization evolved and spread internationally.

The MB adopted the Palestinian struggle with Israel as its international cause, and pursued various lines of effort to support that cause, as evidenced in *The Blood of Lambs*, by Kamal Saleem. Saleem, whose name is a pseudonym, is a former Lebanese Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) terrorist recruited by the MB and PLO in 1965, when he was seven years old. In 1981, after years of training and many terrorist missions, he infiltrated America in order to recruit, educate, and train Muslims. He explained the MB’s methods of recruiting in the US.

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Majid Khadduri provides another example of the classical and mainstream application of the Qur’an toward war, peace, and diplomacy in the aptly titled *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1955).

Jihad is among the most controversial aspects of Islam and sharia, especially among non-Muslim scholars. Sincere attempts by uneducated non-Muslims to learn about jihad are likely to be met by what Daniel Pipes called “mealymouthed.” In Militant Islam Reaches America (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003), Pipes addressed the debate among American scholars about the meaning of jihad. Americans should find the debate interesting, but ought to also go to Muslim sources to gain understanding for the context for jihad. In understanding the ideology and motives for violent Islamists, one need only identify the basis for violent action in jihad, rather than all the Muslim arguments against violent action in jihad.


76 Ibid., 243.
[T]he strength of the American people and infrastructure is also its weakness. An open society with constitutionally protected freedom of speech and religion, which prides itself on its embrace of foreign cultures, was the perfect place to teach a message of hatred in broad daylight. I was a master at reaching the poor and those who perceived themselves oppressed. I taught them that Allah cared for them. I found them jobs, mentored them, and invited them to fellowship with my jihadist brothers, who all the while never mentioned jihad. Once the converts were hooked, we turned them over to the imams at small “apartment mosques” to be radicalized.77

Saleem networked with the MB groups already in the US when he arrived -- the Muslim Student Association (MSA) and the Muslim Arab Youth Association (MAYA). As he wrote, “I attended their conferences to hear Islamist speakers exercise their first-amendment right to hate America and the rest of the evil West.”78 The MB did not come to America to become American, they came to make America Muslim.

Saleem was an operator, and a soldier, who acted upon strategic guidance from the MB. Men like Shamim Siddiqi wrote the guidance for people like Saleem who were to engage in cultural jihad on behalf of the MB and based on Qutb’s strategy of the Milestones, which was inspired by the Qur’anic concept of progressive revelation. Shamim Siddiqi expressed a method for Islamizing a non-Muslim country. His 1989 book, Methodology of Dawah Ilallah: In American Perspective (Dawah Ilallah) is a direct ideological descendant of Qutb’s Milestones.79 Dawah Ilallah, the call to submit to Allah, applies the philosophy, ideology, and policy expressed in Milestones directly to a strategy for gaining Islamic control in America. Dawah Ilallah clearly demonstrates the progression of the MBs tactics to embrace “peaceful” means of expanding Islamist influence in the US rather than by violent means – not because of any moral reason to

77 Ibid., 7.
78 Ibid., 244.
refrain from violent jihad, but because Siddiqi perceives non-violent *Dawah Ilallah* as tactically more effective, especially in America. He does not rule out violence, though. In fact, he dedicates his book to “those Da’ees [workers] who are struggling and waiting to lay down their lives for establishing [Allah’s] kingdom on Earth,” and follows the comment with a quote from the Qur’an to endorse the expectation for laying down one’s life, “Of the believers are men who are true to that which they covenanted with ALLAH. Some of them have paid their vow by death (in battle), and some of them still are waiting; and they have not altered in the least. (AL-QUR'AN. 33:23)”

Siddiqi wrote that the need to control America was more pressing than any other Islamist objective, because American control would have a much greater positive impact on the future of Islam worldwide. Washington has assumed a role as the most effective enemy of Islamism (or, possibly, of Islam itself). According to Siddiqi, everywhere Muslims move toward establishing an Islamic state, the “treacherous hands of the secular West are always there...to bring about [their] defeat.” If Islam is ever going to attain its rightful place of dominance in the world, the “ideology of Islam [must] prevail over the mental horizon of the American people.”

Siddiqi described Mohammed’s time in Mecca and his campaigns afterward. His readers need not read or understand Qutb’s *Milestones*, or the Salafi school of thought, which influenced Qutb and al Banna before him. Siddiqi wrote on behalf of the MB to an audience of American Muslims who were not already affiliated with the MB in 1989. Thus, his work was not kept secret like other MB documents. Any effort to influence non-MB-affiliated American Muslims would have likely failed if he had included Qutb and al Banna’s names. Instead, he retraced their logic and theories, then applied them to an American context.

80 Ibid., dedication.
81 Ibid., vii.
82 Ibid., 46.
Anyone who read and understood *Dawah Ilallah* could use it to establish a campaign plan for Islamization of America. Though no longer in print, *Dawah Ilallah* is widely available on Islamist websites. Siddiqi lays out both a detailed rationale and a concrete plan for Islamists to take over the US and establish *iqamat ad-din*, Islamic rule.

The MB in the US worked diligently during the 1980’s and 1990’s to operationalize Siddiqi’s plans, but they were careful to maintain their secrecy, so the extent of MB influence among a variety of organizations in the US only came to light publically in the wake of the *United States v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (US v. HLF)* trial in 2007 and 2008. In 2007, the US v. HLF trial resulted in a mistrial when the jury failed to reach a unanimous decision, but the second trial in 2008 convicted the HLF and five of its leaders of providing material support to Hamas for terrorist activities. More importantly, the HLF trial revealed the extensive and dangerous MB network in the US. After the trial, prosecutors revealed a multitude of documents that clearly demonstrated that networks operational efforts to Islamize America. Before discussing those documents, the trial itself requires some explanation.

The MB established the HLF under the name Occupied Land Fund (OLF) in 1988 as a non-profit, tax-exempt, charitable trust headquartered in Richardson, Texas with branches in New Jersey, California, and Illinois. In 1992, OLF changed its name to HLF and advertised itself as a charity for needy Palestinian Muslims in Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and the Palestinian Authority, but its main function was to finance Hamas – which was named a terrorist organization in 1995 by President Clinton, making support of Hamas illegal. US authorities began monitoring the HLF in 1996 and raided the company that ran the HLF website, InfoCom Corporation, on September 5, 2001. They discovered that several other American Muslim organizations used the server – the

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Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR), the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), the Muslim Students’ Association of the US and Canada (MSA), the Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA), the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP), and American Muslims for Jerusalem.84 Stephen Schwartz, an expert on Islam wrote, “All these organizations drew from the common financial and technical pool at HLF. All shared a single administrative and technical contact for the maintenance of the web server. They had been erected as political shells around the Hamas hydra-head represented by HLF.”85 Weeks later, on December 4, 2001, the Bush administration seized all HLF assets and records because of its Hamas connections.86 In July 2004, federal authorities arrested five former HLF leaders and announced a 42-count indictment, which included providing material support for Hamas terrorists of 12.4 million dollars over a six-year period and more than 57 million dollars since the late 1988.87 The HLF tried to hide its terrorist-financing activities from American law-enforcement by making a few small contributions to innocuous, non-Palestinian entities while reserving the vast majority of its funds for terrorists. One insidious program channeled money to families whose relatives had been killed or captured while waging jihad; some of whom were suicide bombers.88

84 Ibid.
87 Ibid. Note: the five leaders arrested were Shukri Abu Baker (HLF’s co-founder and former President and Chief Executive); Ghassan Elashi (HLF’s co-founder and former Board Chairman and Treasurer); Mohammed El-Mezain (HLF’s co-founder and former Board Chairman); Mufid Abdulgader the half-brother of Hamas’s supreme political leader, Khaled Mashal); and Abdurrahim Odeh (HLF’s former New Jersey representative).
88 Ibid.
During the 2007 trial, prosecutors released a plethora of exhibits that established Hamas as the beneficiary of a network of American Muslim organizations led by the MB in the US.89 One of the most interesting exhibits, *An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America*, laid out a plan sufficient to impress any strategist. Then-Pentagon analyst Stephen Coughlin wrote an analysis of that document, noting that it “met evidentiary standards to be admissible as evidence in a Federal Court of Law and were entered into evidence for the case.”\(^{90}\) Coughlin’s assessment pointed out that “the Muslim Brotherhood should be considered a threat organization.”\(^{91}\) Further, the MB’s American Muslim affiliates “should be considered ‘front’ functional organizations operating as links and nodes of the overall network.”\(^{92}\)

Mohamed Akram wrote *An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America* as a suggested addendum to spells out the MB’s role and operational plans for achieving the organization’s strategic goal as approved by the group’s ruling *shura* council in 1987.\(^{93}\) It clearly articulates desired conditions for the year 2000:


\(^{91}\) Ibid.


1- Establishing an effective and stable Islamic Movement led by the Muslim Brotherhood.
2- Adopting Muslims’ causes domestically and globally.
3- Expanding the observant Muslim base.
4- Unifying and directing Muslims’ efforts.
5- Presenting Islam as a civilization alternative
6- Supporting the establishment of the global Islamic State wherever it is [emphasis added].

The memorandum carefully outlines a practical approach toward achieving the conditions sought. These strategies included a number of apparently constructive means of performing community service and gaining popular influence. The MB’s plan includes “settlement” as described:

The process of settlement is a “Civilization-Jihadist Process” with all the word means. The Ikhwan must understand that their work in America is a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and “sabotaging” its miserable house. By their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and God’s religion is made victorious over all other religions. Without this level of understanding, we are not up to this challenge and have not prepared ourselves for Jihad yet. It is a Muslim’s destiny to perform Jihad and work wherever he is and wherever he lands until the final hour comes, and there is no escape from that destiny except for those who chose to slack. But, would the slackers and Mujahideen be equal [emphasis added].

The Civilization-Jihadist Process is a direct doctrinal descendent of Sharia and the MBs philosophy as expressed through Hassan al Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and Shamim Siddiqi. Although the MB in America adopted its tactics to the political and cultural geography here, they did not change their doctrine one iota. The plan to Islamize America clearly reflects their complete disregard for the American way of life.

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94 Ibid., 18.
95 Ibid., 18-19.
96 Despite the MB’s stated objectives, political leaders and academics have accepted the MB as “moderate,” because they do not employ violent tactics in the US, although this monograph will demonstrate their support of international violence. One example is Alison Pargeter in The New Frontiers of Jihad: radical Islam in Europe (New York: I.B. Taurus, 2008). Targeter contrasted the “moderate” MB with “hardcore jihadists… their primary objective was to topple their own governments and replace them.
In addition to spelling out its seditious goals, the memorandum clearly listed the MBs affiliates in the US. It named two organizations as part of the MB in the text of the document: Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA) and the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), but also included an attachment that lists “our organizations…and our friends,” 29 organizations.\(^{97}\) In addition to the organizations listed as affiliates of the MB in *An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America*, federal prosecutors in the HLF trial released a list of nearly 300 “unindicted co-conspirators” and “joint venturers.”\(^{98}\)

It is beyond the scope of this monograph to examine the success or progress the MB in the US and its affiliated organizations have made toward their strategic goals. It is sufficient to demonstrate that there are organizations actively working to achieve the MB’s goals and that those goals are fundamentally seditious to the US Constitution and the American way of life, and that those goals orthodox Islamic doctrine justifies those goals.

Since the US v. HLF trial in 2008, the MB and its affiliated organizations have received ever-increasing attention from the American public, if not from American policy makers. One of the most significant studies to come from this attention is the Center for Security Policy’s *Shariah: The Threat to America: An Exercise in Competitive Analysis, Report of Team ‘B’ II*. The

\(^{97}\) Akram, 32. Note: See Appendix A for the complete list.


Note: “An unindicted co-conspirator is a person who is identified by a law enforcement officer to have engaged in a conspiracy, but who is not charged in the indictment charging that person’s fellow conspirators. Prosecutors may name persons as unindicted co-conspirators for: grants of immunity, pragmatic considerations, and evidentiary concerns. The term unindicted co-conspirator was familiarized in 1974. Although the use of unindicted co-conspirators in not prohibited by law, the United States Attorneys' Manual generally recommends against naming unindicted co-conspirators.” From “Unindicted Co-conspirator,” USLegal.com: Definitions, http://definitions.uslegal.com/u/unindicted-co-conspirator/ (accessed March 23, 2012).
2010 report resembles the original Team ‘B’ report, which then-Director of the CIA George H.W. Bush commissioned in 1976. The original Team ‘B’ report provided a second opinion to the US government intelligence (“Team ‘A’”) estimates of the Soviet Union and its intentions. The original Team ‘B’ report challenged détente policy, which the Team ‘A’ estimates justified.

Part of the MB’s strategy is to influence policy makers in favor of the MB agenda. An honest broker needed to consider the MB’s motives and methods. The second Team ‘B’, or Team ‘B’ II, report provides competitive analysis to the current US government’s party line toward “an even more insidious ideological threat [than Communism]: the totalitarian socio-political doctrine that Islam calls Sharia [which] seeks to regulate all manner of behavior in the secular sphere – economic, social, military, legal, and political.”\textsuperscript{99} The report provides a comprehensive summary of the Islamic sources of Sharia, basis of jihad and oppression in Sharia, and fundamental opposition between Sharia and the US Constitution.\textsuperscript{100}

Our leadership generally has also failed to appreciate the complementary subversion campaigns posed by groups like the Muslim Brotherhood – groups that fully share the objectives of the violent jihadist, but believe that, for the moment at least, stealthier, “pre-violent” means of jihad are likely to prove more effective in achieving those goals. It must always be kept in mind, of course, that stealthy jihad tactics are just that: tactics to prepare the U.S. battlefield for the inevitable violence to come.\textsuperscript{101}

It goes on to demonstrate how leaders and policy makers consistently fail in their duty to understand the threat and enable the organization most responsible for propagating the threat, the MB, by allowing and encouraging MB interaction at all political levels.

Of particular concern is the fact that political and military leaders in the United States find it difficult and/or distasteful to explain the true nature of the enemy to the public. Even when presented with detailed factual briefings and

\textsuperscript{99} Lopez, 2.\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., 7.\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., 10.
voluminous information about the essential linkage between shariah and violent acts of terrorism, most simply refuse to speak candidly about that connection. In fact, to the contrary, U.S. national intelligence, law enforcement and security leadership seems determined to hide the Islamic origins of jihadist terrorism from the public. Through internal policy as well as public statements, U.S. officials have devised and seek to impose purposefully obscure and counterfactual language, evidently selected to divert American attention away from the Arab/Muslim origins of shariah and the Islamic doctrine of jihad.\footnote{Ibid., 17.}

In summary, this literature review made the following important points. First, the MB in the US operates in alignment with the international MB. Although the MB in the US has adopted a temporary tactic of eschewing violence in the US, it is not for moral reasons. Rather, the MB in the US intends to participate in the political process in our free and open society in order to achieve their goals. The international MB, on the other hand, does not hesitate to use violence to achieve its goals; nor does the MB in the US hesitate to support that violence outside the US.

Second, the MB is a Salafist Sunni Muslim group, whose philosophy is popular across the Middle East and North Africa. It is not a radical or fringe organization. Rather, its goals and methods are deeply rooted in Islamic doctrine and Sharia. The trilogy – the Qur’an, Sira, and Hadith – clearly define Sharia. The ‘Umdat al-Salik, Reliance of the Traveller[sic] and Tools for the Worshipper, A Classic Manual of Islamic Sacred Law, summarizes and arranges that law in logical order. Several aspects of Sharia support the MB’s “Civilization-Jihadist Process” for destroying the US from the inside. These include progressive revelation, abrogation, and jihad. Third, Sharia rules for jizya and dhimitude underscore their complete disregard for non-Muslims and their incompatibility with the US Constitution.

The remainder of this monograph will describe the spectrum of Islamic religiosity in America as a means of explaining variation in practice and understanding of Islam among American Muslims. A brief description of the MB’s history will follow. Finally, the paper will
conclude with a highlight of the activities pursued by MB affiliated organizations in the US. These activities and organizational relationships will explain how the MB leverages funds from international sources to influence American Muslims, policy makers, and the media.

**The Spectrum of Islamic Religiosity**

This section will introduce and describe a spectrum of Islamic religiosity in America. The MB does not represent all Muslims, but it does draw its ideology from Islam and Sharia. Thinking about Muslims in relation to what one could call a spectrum of religiosity will help explain the differences among Muslims in America. Generalized labels, such as fundamentalist, extremist, radical, and moderate, are commonly used by non-Muslims, especially in America, to convey variations in attitude, religiosity, and activity among Muslims. They are, however, inexact and reflect more about the one ascribing the label than the one labeled owing to the culture specific reference of ‘moderate’ or ‘extreme’. Terminology requires grounding in context in order to be relevant, refined, and useful.

During the 2010 US census, 2.6 million people in America identified themselves as Muslims. They fall into an imaginary spectrum with apostates and Islamists on opposite ends and every variation of the two somewhere in between. The census did not ask Muslims to self-identify according to any of the aforementioned terms. The result would have been interesting.

The terms radical, extremist, fundamentalist, and moderate each represent Western parameters for Muslims, while the term apostate represents another lesser known and understood label for Muslims on the spectrum. Non-Muslims would rarely describe Muslims as apostates, but

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Muslims regularly use the word describe other Muslims. How Muslims view, and label, one another from different points on the spectrum of religiosity is important.

According to Douglas MacDonald, at the US Army War College, “The conflict with the radical Islamists cannot be allowed to reach civilizational proportions generally, and all other policies must be aimed at this fundamental goal. If it is allowed to become so, a significant portion of the world’s population will be perpetually at war with us, threatening lives and liberties both in the United States and abroad.” It is simply not practical, or in the America’s best interest to bundle all Muslims or treat all Muslims alike. The differences among them are highly relevant.

In November 2001, journalist and scholar Daniel Pipes wrote, “In the aftermath of the violence on September 11, American politicians from George W. Bush on down have tripped over themselves to affirm that the vast majority of Muslims living in the United States are just ordinary people.” The message from public leaders that Islam is a peaceful religion, hijacked by radical terrorists who sought to advance their own agendas continues unabated. Americans used the terms radical, extremist, and fundamentalist interchangeably to describe a few dangerous people, who were strange and unknowable. The descriptors, in this case, served only to give the impression that we could somehow identify those people as the problem and that we could isolate them from the rest of the population that calls itself Muslim. We could then solve the problem by dismantling their financial and logistical networks, interdicting their lines of supply, marginalizing their influence, and killing or detaining them as practicable or necessary. Because the radicals, extremists, and fundamentalists were the terrorists who gave Islam a bad name, the

US may even expect appreciation, if not assistance, from the rest of the Muslim population whose reportedly peaceful religion the terrorists had hijacked. Most dangerously, we believed these terms applied to a few people who operated on the fringe of the population. Senior US Leaders were wrong.

According to Merriam-Webster, a radical is someone whose ideas or goals represent a marked departure from established norms or who wants to make extreme or fundamental changes in society, government, economy, and so forth.¹⁰⁶ Those ideas could diverge from the norm in any direction. For example, the radical may seek to reform a secular, pluralistic, and liberal society into a religious, monistic, and fundamentalist one; or vice versa. A fundamentalist may consider a religious, monistic society not religious enough and try to pull toward greater fundamentalism, or an apostate may pull an already liberal society toward greater liberalism. Radicals may also introduce ideas that are foreign to the ideology, pulling the ideology off its left or right track and into an entirely new direction. For example, The Nation of Islam’s founder, Elijah Muhammed, proclaimed himself Allah.¹⁰⁷ Since radicals may occupy positions anywhere along the spectrum of religiosity, and act in any direction, the generalization proves a poor one for helping to understand radical views. When we describe an idea as radical, we mean that idea diverges from our norms. Thus, any non-Muslim might find orthodox Islam to be radical, and anyone who adheres to it to be a radical.


¹⁰⁷ Tynetta Muhammad, “About the Nation of Islam,” The Nation of Islam National Center, http://www.noi.org/about.shtml (accessed January 2, 2012). “He signed His name in 1933 as Master Wallace Fard Muhammad to express the meaning of One Who had come in the Early Morning Dawn of the New Millennium to lay the base for a New World Order of Peace and Righteousness on the foundation of Truth and Justice; to put down tyrants and to change the world into a Heaven on Earth.”
The term is relevant only in implying isolation from the mainstream, or normative, views. That isolation is not particularly helpful, because history is replete with examples of a few people who effectively forced their own views or influence (of any sort) on far larger populations. For the sake of clarity, this monograph will not use the marginally useful term “radical” again.

The common term “fundamentalist” is no more helpful. According to Robert D. Lee in *Overcoming Tradition and Modernity: The Search for Islamic Authenticity*:

> The word ‘fundamentalism’ has generally been applied to Protestant groups with strong commitments to a literalist interpretation and implementation of text. I side with those who do not find this term helpful in describing a range of Muslim groups that have sought to make a political ideology of Islam, some of which would achieve their aim through existing governments and others of which advocate violent overthrow. I prefer the term “Islamist” to describe such groups – a term that does not suggest that they are more “fundamental” or literal in their reading of the Qur’an than other Muslims.108

Islamism encompasses a variety of groups that include Wahhabis, Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, al-Qaida, the Wasatiyun, the founders and followers of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Hezbollah, the Justice and Development Party led by Prime Minister Recip Erdogan of Turkey, the *Parti de la Justice et du Développement* (PJD) in Morocco, the Tablighi Jama`at of Pakistan, and many other groups.109 If the spectrum of Muslim religiosity extends horizontally, imagine Islamists on the right end of that spectrum.

That may seem counterintuitive, because of the stereotypical association between fundamentalism, cum Islamism, and extremism. Accordingly, extremism should occupy the right end of the spectrum. However, extremism may also occur on the left end of the spectrum, where pluralism, liberalism, and secularism live – even if extreme liberals, secularists, and pluralists do

\[108\] Lee, 21.

\[109\] Sherifa Zuhur, *Precision in the Global War on Terror: Inciting Muslims through the War of Ideas* (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008), 3.
not get much press. If so, then extremism sits at both ends of the spectrum, and the terms “extremist” and “extremism” lose their value for describing Muslim religiosity.

Islamist groups vary in their tactics and strategy, most notably in their preference for, and use of, violence. Those that employ or espouse violence are “militant Islamists.” Those who do not are “non-militant Islamists.”

Moderates find themselves on the left of Islamists on the spectrum of religiosity. They span from non-militant Islamists on the right and extend through non-Islamists in the center to anti-Islamists on the left. According to Muqtedar Khan, “In America, a moderate Muslim is [considered] one who peddles a softer form of Islam is willing to co-exist peacefully with peoples of other faiths and is comfortable with democracy and the separation of politics and religion.”

Non-Muslim Americans typically consider moderate Muslims to represent the mainstream population and ideals. Though non-Muslims consider it a positive term, Muslims tend to accept the label as pejorative. To them, the term implies a Muslim has sold out politically, or has become “more secular and less Islamic than the norm.”

Muslims have good reason for their sensitivity toward anyone’s perception that they have become insufficiently Islamic. According to ‘Umdat al Salik, apostasy (leaving Islam) “is the ugliest form of unbelief (kufr) and the worst.” An apostate is a Muslim who has departed from Islam, as measured by a variety of criteria. It is a Muslim term used to describe other Muslims, based upon their demonstrated religiosity. Woe unto anyone who fails to maintain the appropriate religiosity in an Islamic state where Sharia is enforced!

111 Ibid.
Muslims do not use the term moderate, because it implies incomplete submission, which other Muslims interpret as apostasy. In fact, Muslims at any point on the spectrum of religiosity can, and often do, ascribe apostasy to all Muslims left of, or more liberal than, themselves. As one might imagine, argument over who has authority to apply the standard of apostasy and, accordingly, label others as apostates, represents a significant issue among Muslims. This leads to a struggle of real political influence. As with imposition of any law, the person or organization with the most influence within certain boundaries may exert law at his choosing. Thus, the normative religiosity in any area depends heavily on who can exert physical or moral influence on the Muslims in that area. It is, thus, not particularly important to determine what is “right” according to Islam. It is incredibly important to determine what the influential Muslims in an area think is right, according to their religiosity. It is safe to assume, any Muslim more liberal than the controlling entity risks the apostate label.

Not all Muslims have the same views or behave the same way. Most importantly, they vary according to level of knowledge and understanding of Islam, personal dedication to live according to what they know, and tactical or strategic ideas about how to achieve their goals. The spectrum of religiosity is most useful for non-Muslims to understand variations among Muslims. The bottom line: there is no moderation in Islam or Sharia. There is understanding and application of Islam, Islamist, which necessarily includes spreading Islam; and there are varying degrees of not understanding and applying Islam, non-Islamist and anti-Islamist, both of which constitute apostasy. Not all Muslims are Islamist. Not all Muslims want to spread Islam. Not all Muslims want to live under Sharia. Not all Muslims in the US are MB. Not all Muslim groups in the US are associated MB – although the most generously funded seem to be. Later sections of this monograph will discuss the approximate influence the MB has among Muslims and Non-Muslims in the US.
The Society of the Muslim Brothers

It is beyond the scope of this monograph to describe the twenty-nine organizations listed as affiliates of the MB in *An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America* and the nearly 300 groups and individuals named as unindicted co-conspirators in the US vs. HLF trial, let alone consider the new groups that have organized since the HLF trial. This monograph has provided the doctrinal basis for the MB’s goals and operational principles. Regardless of how effectively the organization pursues these goals, one must understand what the MB seeks to accomplish. This section will briefly establish the MB’s origins and expansion to the US, while the next section will describe how some of the most important MB groups operate in the US. Their current operations include receiving funds from wealthy Saudi contributors to gain and maintain control of operations of as many as 80 percent of the Mosques and Islamic centers in the US. They then use that control to educate and influence American Muslims, political leaders, and the media. They also use these resources to hinder law enforcement efforts to counter terrorism.

The global MB movement began in Egypt in 1928, when six men met Hasan al-Banna at his home and pledged as a group to “contract with [Allah] sincerely that it [the group] live for His religion and die in His service, seeking only His satisfaction, then its worthiness will assure its success however small its numbers or weak its means.”¹¹³ The Egyptian MB would go through three phases. The first phase, from 1928 to the 1952 Revolution, consisted of al-Banna’s classic strategy: the Islamization of society and the creation of an Islamic state as a gradual, multi-stage, “bottom-up” process.¹¹⁴ The MB developed a militant faction, whose rivalry with the military

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¹¹³ Mitchell, 8.
¹¹⁴ Altman, 2.
regime started the second phase: the MB dissolution and suppression in 1954 by Abd al-Nasir. During this phase, Qutb wrote *Milestones*, which inspired *takfiri* factions – someone who accuses others of apostasy. In the third phase, during the “Second Republic” under Presidents Sadat and Mubarak, the MB rejected the isolationist and violent strategies of the *takfiris* and chose to reform Egypt through gradual Islamization through *da’wa* and by participating in the increasingly available democratic tools in Egypt.\(^\text{115}\)

The transition from violence to peaceful means of political change in Egypt does not indicate the MB’s departure from violent jihad to accomplish its goals. Rather, it indicates the MB’s flexibility in adopting the most effective tactics according to the national or regional context. International MB organizations differ drastically in their tactics, but they adhere carefully to a common vision. That includes their understanding of Islam’s history and the crisis of Islam (in terms of maintaining pure Islam among Muslims and taking a back-seat to western powers); an inseparable view of Islam as both religion and state; and a desire to restore Islam to its rightful place (of dominance in the world, and in the hearts of Muslims). Robert D. Lee described this struggle in *Overcoming Tradition and Modernity: The Search for Islamic Authenticity* as discussed earlier. MB chapters in every area hold fast to their objectives: resist foreign occupation and all types of domination of Muslim countries, establish an Islamist state, implement Sharia, unify Muslims, and spread Islam as, a universal religion all over the world. The MB followed three main strategies to gain power and establish an Islamic state: *da’wa*, invitation, violence, and political activism.\(^\text{116}\)

The MB in America established a number of front organizations, many of which the US v. HLF trial revealed, that pursued its specifically American agenda, which was also revealed

\(^{115}\) Ibid.  
\(^{116}\) Ibid., 5
during the US v HLF trial via the *Dawah Ilallah* and *An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America*. Considering that *An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America* was written in 1991, seized in 2004, and released in 2008, it is remarkable that so many of the organizations continue to operate openly in the US. It is a testament to their political effectiveness at turning Americas civil liberties upside down that such organizations defend themselves with American virtue for religious tolerance even while they attack American tolerance as “decadence.”

**The State of Islam in America**

The MB has long recognized the permissive political environment in the US as a weakness. They take advantage of the absence of a government religion. Unlike Muslim countries, where established Muslim governments do not hesitate to restrict MB activities, the US allows the MB to operate completely unfettered in the name of freedom of religion. The relative irony: the MB enjoys its greatest freedom in a non-Muslim country! The MB efforts in America follow several lines. They attempt to influence policy makers to shape laws and policy in their favor, work to block anti-terrorism activities and investigations, influence American Muslims to support the MB agenda, and actively recruit non-Muslims to adopt Islam through *da‘wa*, invitation. This section will describe how some of the most important MB groups pursue those efforts.

There is no single hierarchy among Muslims in America, no “Muslim Ecclesia.” Many claim to represent one; but no one person or organization does completely represent or influence, the whole population of American Muslims. Yet, the MB and its affiliated organizations do dominate the field. In a 2011 Gallup poll conducted by the Abu Dhabi Center, 55 percent of American Muslim men and 42 percent of American Muslim women said no national American Muslim organization represents their interests. This is particularly telling, because the majority of American Muslim men and a good fraction of American Muslim women do not consider
themselves aligned with the MB, or any other Muslim organization.\footnote{What do the millions of unrepresented American Muslims believe? Once again, this is beyond the scope of this monograph. In \textit{Face to Face with Political Islam} (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2005) Francois Burgat argued that “it is easier to study one eternal and intangible Islam than all the thousands of interpretations.” (6). The focus here is the Sunni Salafi version of Islam exported by the MB.} This, of course, does not prevent Muslim groups, including the MB’s affiliates, from claiming to represent American Muslims.

The Council of American Islamic Relations (CAIR) only represented 12 percent of the men’s and 11 percent of the women’s interests, and it was the most apparently popular organization among American Muslims. The Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) followed with 4 percent of men and 7 percent of women; then the Muslim Political Action Committee (MPAC) with 6 percent and 1 percent of men and women, respectively; and the Muslim American Society (MAS) with no men and only 2 percent of women. Conversely, the Islamic Conference of North America (ICNA) represented only 2 percent of men and no women. Only 3 percent of men and 2 percent of women identified with the Imam Warith Deen Mohammed Group (the only group listed not associated with the MB).\footnote{“Muslim Americans: Faith, Freedom, and the Future: Examining U.S. Muslims’ Political, Social, and Spiritual Engagement 10 Years after September 11,” (Abu Dhabi: Abu Dhabi Gallup Research Center, 2011), 25. http://www.abudhabigallupcenter.com/148769/muslim-americans-faith-freedom-future.aspx (accessed February 7, 2012).} Based upon these results, the MB may lay valid claim to representing 24 percent of American Muslim men and 22 percent of women – nearly half of the Muslims who identify with \textit{any} national organization – since CAIR, ISNA, ICNA, and MAS are all part of the MB. Because of their relatively significant support among American Muslims, this paper will discuss each of these organizations in a moment. But first, it is necessary to consider the non-American organizations who act from behind the curtain to gain influence over American Muslims. Some of the world’s wealthiest people fund the MB activities in the US, effectively throwing off the balance of our perception of democratic play.
In the spirit of free-market competition for disciples and political influence in an open society, it would seem that American Muslim organizations, including those affiliated with the MB, are equally matched with one another and with unaffiliated American Muslims. Unfortunately, Islamic activity (religious, political, cultural, or otherwise) in America is not an internal affair. Foreign state and non-state (mainly Saudi) actors participate extensively to push their agendas. Why?

As we have seen, Salafism is orthodox Sunni Islam. The MB philosophy and goals clearly trace their lineage to Salafism. Another ideological descendant of Salafism is Saudi Wahhabism, which derived from the Muslim scholar, Muhammad bin Abd al Wahhab, who lived in the Arabian Peninsula during the eighteenth century (1703-1791). The terms Salafi and Wahhabi apply, generally, to the same Sunni philosophies that focus upon returning to the Islam preached and demonstrated by the prophet Mohammed. Since 9/11, the term Wahhabism has taken on a negative connotation in the west, mainly because of its association with al Qaida and other terrorist organizations, so adherents prefer the term Salafist (or Unitarian).\textsuperscript{119} The Saudi ruling family maintained a close relationship with the Wahhabi religious establishment since the modern kingdom of Saudi Arabia formed in 1932.\textsuperscript{120} That relationship afforded Wahhabi clerics

\textsuperscript{119} Christopher M. Blanchard, “Report for Congress: The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya” (2008), 1. This statement is a point of contention between Wahhabis and non-Wahhabist Salafists. Wahhabism is a sub-set of Salafism, so Wahhabists prefer to be referred to as Salafi, rather than Wahhabi. Non-Wahhabist Salafis consider Wahhabism a deviant movement and would disagree with the statement that Salafism and Wahhabism apply to the same philosophies. The point here is not to argue the validity of the MB’s ideological heritage, or present the case of all who disagree with the MB’s ideology, but to establish the ideological heritage the MB claims and the international associations they maintain. For more information about the Wahhabi movement, see David Commins, \textit{The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia} (New York: I.B. Taurus, 2006) or Natana J. Delong-Bas, \textit{Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad}, (New York: I.B. Taurus, 2007)

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., 1. “Wahhabi-trained Bedouin warriors known as the Ikhwan were integral to the Al Saud family’s military campaign to reconquer and unify the Arabian Peninsula from 1912 until an Ikhwan rebellion was put down by force in 1930. Thereafter, Wahhabi clerics were integrated into the new kingdom’s religious and political establishment, and Wahhabi ideas formed the basis of the rules and laws
in the religious, political, legal, and educational establishment to shape Saudi rules and laws.\textsuperscript{121} Thus, the MB shares common ideological Salafi roots with some of the world’s wealthiest people. The MB may claim its roots from Hasan al Banna and six dedicated men, but it did not evolve into the most powerful Muslim organization in the US, and arguably the world, without external support. It enjoyed significant endorsement from Saudi Arabia.

In testimony before the US Senate’s Judiciary Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security, Matthew Epstein, Assistant Director of the Investigative Project, stated:

> With deep pocketbooks and religious conviction, the Saudi Wahhabists have bankrolled a series of Islamic institutions in the United States that actively seek to undermine U.S. counterterrorism policy at home and abroad. In the United States, the Saudi Wahhabists regularly subsidize the organizations and individuals adhering to the militant ideology espoused by the Muslim Brotherhood and its murderous offshoots Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and al-Qaeda, all three of which are designated terrorist organizations.\textsuperscript{122}

As in other aspects of American politics, everyone gets a vote; but dollars buy media attention and study materials, and funded lobbyists gain access to decision-makers. Similarly, the Saudi brand of Wahhabis, through the MB and their subordinate or satellite organizations, enjoy a “disproportionate share of media and political attention.”\textsuperscript{123} Financial contributions come from private individuals, as well as official donations from the Saudi Kingdom.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has made establishing mosques, Islamic centers, institutes, and universities in a number of non-Islamic countries all over the world a very high priority. Sure that this is the most effective way to spread Islamic culture and Arabic language, the Saudi

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., 3.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{122} Matthew Epstein, “Saudi Support for Islamic Extremism in the United States,” Testimony before the United States Senate Judiciary Committee: Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security, United States Senate (September 10, 2003), 5.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., 7.}
Kingdom, under the leadership of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz, established 210 Islamic centers in non-Islamic countries in Europe, North and South America, Australia, and Asia.\(^\text{124}\)

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia contributed 100 million US dollars to the Islamic Academy in Washington, which accommodates 1,200 students (of which 549 are Saudis, the rest represent 29 different nationalities). It also partially financed mosques in New York, Washington, Chicago, Maryland, Ohio, and Virginia,\(^\text{125}\) as well as the Islamic Center in New York City.\(^\text{126}\) These are all expressions of zakat, which is not merely charity, but furtherance of Islam; and an aspect of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy to disseminate Wahhabi principles.\(^\text{127}\) One might say oil is Saudi Arabia’s biggest export. That, in turn, funds its second largest export: Wahhabism.

The Gallup poll indicates the MB does not control the hearts and minds of American Muslims, but it does control key assets in the community. In 2003, Shia and non-Wahhabi American Muslim leaders estimated that Wahhabis controlled 80 percent of the mosques in America.\(^\text{128}\) According to testimony before the US Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Defense Stephen Schwartz, the Director of the Islam and Democracy Program, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, explained:

\(^{125}\) Ibid., 49.
\(^{126}\) Ibid., 48.
\(^{127}\) Zuhur, 16.
Control of property, buildings, appointment of imams, training of imams, content of preaching – including faxing of Friday sermons from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia – and of literature distributed in mosques and mosque bookstores, notices on bulletin boards, and organizational solicitation. Similar influence extends to prison and military chaplaincies, Islamic elementary and secondary schools (academies), college campus activity, endowment of academic chairs and programs in Middle East, and most notoriously, charities ostensibly helping Muslims abroad, many of which have been linked to or designated as sponsors of terrorism.\textsuperscript{129}

In the space available, this monograph cannot give a detailed description of all the organizations and activities in the US associated with the MB. The MB listed 29 organizations among its affiliates in \textit{An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America}. However, it is important to note several of the most significant organizations, their ties to the MB, some idea of what their leaders say and do, and their impact on the American society. It should become clear then, how the Islamist doctrine, that has been set out thus far, is both the raison d’être of these organizations and their leadership, and the guiding strategy for their work.

Ahmed Elkadi, who founded the Muslim American Society (MAS), admitted his role as the leader of the MB in America. Interestingly, MAS is not one of the organizations listed as an affiliate in \textit{An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America}, nor is it among the unindicted co-conspirators from the US vs. HLF trial. However, MAS is MB. An April 19, 2004 article from the Chicago Tribune featured an interview with Ahmed Elkadi.\textsuperscript{130} According to Elkadi, he became president of the secretive MB chapter in the US in 1984, and he pushed to expand the group’s reach. Elkadi helped create several Islamic organizations, including the Muslim Youth of North America, and served as president of the

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{129} Ibid., 2.\
North American Islamic Trust (NAIT), a group that helped to build and preserve mosques. In 1993, a meeting of 40 MB leaders discussed the competing needs to increase the group’s public posture and influence, while protecting them against the possibility of an American crackdown against the MB. They voted to refer to themselves as the Muslim American Society. Elkadi was deposed shortly after MAS incorporated in 1993. Shaker Elsayed, a top MAS official in 2004, admitted the MB founded MAS. Although MAS had outgrown the MB, he stressed that MAS and the MB both believe in the teachings of Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna, which are “the closest reflection of how Islam should be in this life.” According to Elkadi, “Everyone's goal is the same – to educate everyone about Islam and to follow the teachings of Islam with the hope of establishing an Islamic state. Who knows whether it will happen or not, but we still have to strive for it.”

The connection between MAS and MB is clear, but MAS’s influence is unclear. The Abu Dhabi Gallup Poll showed no men identified with the MAS, while only 2 percent of American Muslim women did so. However, according to the poll other MB organizations may legitimately claim to represent significant influence over American Muslim.

According to the 2011 Abu Dhabi Gallup Poll, CAIR represented the interests of 12 percent of American Muslim Men and 11 percent of the women, the highest percentage of any American Muslim organization. CAIR eagerly claims status as the largest Muslim organization in America. Its overt mission is “to enhance understanding of Islam, encourage dialogue, protect civil liberties, empower American Muslims, and build coalitions that promote justice and mutual


131 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
understanding.” 134 However, ample evidence ties CAIR’s origins and purpose to the MB, and key
leaders’ speech and actions continue to provide evidence that it is far more dangerous than its
mission implies. The evidence ties CAIR’s founders to MB support for Hamas and links them to
the MB strategy to conduct civilization jihad in the US.

In October 1993, two CAIR co-founders, Nihad Awad and Omar Ahmad participated in a
secret meeting attended by 25 Hamas members and supporters in Philadelphia, PA. The main
purpose of the meeting was to discuss Hamas’ opposition the Oslo Peace accords, which
established a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The group also discussed the
need to participate in American politics and lobbying efforts. The Federal Bureau of
Investigations (FBI) monitored the meeting and provided the evidence from the meeting as part of
the HLF trial in 2008.135

At the time of the Philadelphia meeting, both Nihad Awad and Omar Ahmad were
members of the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP), which no longer exists. Another
memorandum entered into evidence for the HLF trial established the role between the IAP and
the Ikhwan (Brotherhood).

In 1981, the Ikhwan [MB] founded the Islamic Association for Palestine
to serve the cause of Palestine on the political and media fronts. The Association
has absorbed most of the Ikhwan’s Palestinian energy at the leadership and the
grassroots levels in addition to some of the brothers from the other countries. The
Association’s work has developed a great deal since its inception, particularly
with the formation of the Palestine Committee, the beginning of the Intifada at
the end of 1987 and the proclamation of the Hamas Movement.136

134 “Our Vision, Mission, and Core Principles,” CAIR, Council on American-Islamic Relations,
135 United States District Court, Northern District of Texas, Judges Notable Cases – USA v. Holy
February 6, 2011). Note: The Investigative Project on Terrorism website provides an excellent summary of
Main issues,” Government Exhibit, Elbarasse Search – 1, 3:04-CR-240-G, United States v. Holy Land
Nihad Awad and Omar Ahmad formed CAIR in 1994 as a lobbying organization for Hamas in the US. In 1995, the US declared Hamas a terrorist organization. During the US vs. HLF trial, prosecutors named CAIR among many unindicted co-conspirators Following the US vs. HLF trial, the FBI severed its relationship with CAIR. In an April 28, 2009 letter to Senator Jon Kyle from the FBI’s Office of Congressional Affairs, the Bureau explained that

During that trial, evidence was introduced that demonstrated a relationship among CAIR, individual CAIR founders (including its current President Emeritus and its Executive Director) and the Palestine Committee. Evidence was also introduced that demonstrated a relationship between the Palestine Committee and HAMAS, which was designated as a terrorist organization in 1995. In light of that evidence, the FBI suspended all formal contacts between CAIR and the FBI.

Although CAIR is a relatively young organization within MB, its history clearly demonstrates its real purpose. CAIR founder, Omar Ahmad resigned as the CAIR chair emeritus in 2009, shortly after the FBI’s decision became public. Nihad Awad, a former IAP member and CAIR founder, is CAIR’s current leader, so the ties to the MB remain as strong as ever.

Examples of seditious and obstructive activities abound. One recent example includes training young Muslims in New York “not to speak with police even if their parents, imams or Muslim clerics urge them to cooperate. “You’ll even hear imams saying, ‘As long as I obey the law, I

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have nothing to worry about.’ But that’s not how it plays out on the ground,” said Cyrus McGoldrick, CAIR New York’s civil rights manager.”

Several MB organizations in the US are much older than CAIR, and their influence among American Muslims and US policy makers steadily increased over time. The Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) is one of the most important organizations. During the US vs. HLF trial, prosecutors named ISNA as an unindicted co-conspirator, and specified it was a known part of the MB in the US. It was the first in the list of “our organizations and likeminded friends,” in An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America. Another document from the US vs. HLF trial, Shura Council Report on the future of the Group Work paper#1: A historical outline and the main issues, written on October 25, 1991 describes the ISNA’s origin:

In 1980, the Muslim Student Union was developed into the Islamic Society in North America (ISNA) to include all the Muslim congregation from immigrants and citizens, and to be a nucleus for the Islamic Movement in North America…The ISNA has developed significantly in the eighties but the Ikhwan’s leadership and direction of it started to gradually decrease due to their scarce presence in it.

The Saudi-funded MAS formed ISNA in 1981. ISNA focuses heavily on providing Wahhabi theological indoctrination materials to a large percentage of the mosques in North America, in conjunction with its affiliate, the North American Islamic Trust (NAIT). ISNA claims to be the largest Muslim organization in the US. Its conferences certainly are – attracting as many as 30,000 participants. Steven Emmerson, an expert on terrorism, said that ISNA, “is a

141 “Attachment A: List of Unindicted Co-Conspirators and/or Joint Venturers.”
radical group hiding under a false veneer of moderation…[which] convenes annual conferences where Islamist militants have been given platform to incite violence and promote hatred.”\textsuperscript{143}

ISNA’s activities include holding fundraisers for terrorists, condemning the US government’s post-9/11 seizure of Hamas’ and Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s financial assets, and publishing a bi-monthly magazine, *Islamic Horizons*, that “often champions militant Islamist doctrine.”\textsuperscript{144}

In testimony before the US Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security, expert witness Stephen Schwartz stated, “Both ISNA and CAIR, in particular, maintain open and close relations with the Saudi government – a unique situation, in that no other foreign government directly uses religion as a cover for its political activities in the U.S.”\textsuperscript{145}

As earlier mentioned, the ISNA’s affiliation with NAIT, another unindicted co-conspirator in the US v. HLF trial, is crucial to the ISNA’s influence among American Muslims.\textsuperscript{146} Put simply, NAIT facilitates Saudi financial control of Wahhabi and MB doctrine in the US. Its website states:

NAIT is a waqf, the historical Islamic equivalent of an American trust or endowment, serving Muslims in the United States and their institutions. NAIT facilitates the realization of American Muslims' desire for a virtuous and happy life in a Shari'ah-compliant way. NAIT was established in 1973 in Indiana by the Muslim Students Association of U.S. and Canada (MSA), the predecessor of the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA). NAIT supports and provides services to ISNA, MSA, their affiliates, and other Islamic centers and institutions. The President of ISNA is an ex-officio member of the Board of Trustees of NAIT…\textsuperscript{147}


\textsuperscript{144} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{146} “Attachment A: List of Unindicted Co-Conspirators and/or Joint Venturers.”

NAIT is a financial subsidiary of ISNA, and exports Saudi Wahhabism and Shari’ah compliance by holding the mortgages, raising funds, and offering limited interest-free loans on mosques, Islamic centers, and Islamic schools.\textsuperscript{148} It exercises financial control that keeps the majority of Islamic activity in the US in line with the MB. Estimates of its control range from 27 percent of mortgages on mosques to 80 percent.\textsuperscript{149} Its website states it holds mortgages on 325 properties in 42 states (but does not specify they are mosques, of which there about 1,200 in the US). According to its website, “NAIT does not administer these institutions or interfere in their daily management, but is available to support and advise them regarding their operation in conformity with the Shari’ah.”\textsuperscript{150}

NAIT also manages the Dow Jones Islamic Fund (DJIF), a no-load mutual fund offered by a subsidiary called Allied Asset Advisors, which invests in “Shariah-compliant companies, in response to the needs of Muslim investors, who not only want to have a financially rewarding investment, but a Shariah-compatible one as well.”\textsuperscript{151}

NAIT probably represents the greatest real control MB and Saudi Wahhabists have over non-sympathetic Muslims in the US. They have adapted to the financial as well as the political means of exerting influence in America’s free-market society. It represents a very real and legally binding manner of enforcing Sharia.

Leaders from MB organizations in the US moved from one organization to another and in many cases founded more than one organization. Abdulrahman Alamoudi is one such example.

\textsuperscript{149} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{150} “North American Islamic Trust.”
Alamoudi, an Al Qaida financier and Hamas operative, founded the AMC in 1990 to encourage Muslims to become politically active. Alamoudi had already led the ISNA in Washington, DC and served as the president of MSA when he founded the American Muslim Council (AMC). He gained unprecedented access to US policy makers who sought outreach to representatives of the American Muslim community, especially after 9/11. While the head of the AMC at the 1996 Islamic Association for Palestine conference held in Chicago, Illinois, he tipped his hand revealing a degree of his real agenda:

It depends on me and you, either we do it now or we do it after a hundred years, but this country will become a Muslim country. And I [think] if we are outside this country, we can say oh, Allah destroy America but once we are here, our mission in this country is to change it. And (the prophet) told us that there are three ways of changing things, either by your hand or your mouth or within yourself, and we can change it by our hand and by our mouth, but positively. There is no way for Muslims to be violent in America, no way. We have other means to do it. You can be violent anywhere else but in America.

Alamoudi was not opposed to violence – he supported it outside the U.S. – but he did oppose attacks on US soil. He made public statements endorsing Hamas and Hezbollah at a rally outside the White House in 2000 and was eventually arrested and convicted in 2003 for providing at least 1 million dollars to al Qaida.

Louay Safi is another example of MB members who led or participated in multiple MB organizations in the US. As the head of two MB fronts – the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) and the ISNA, he declared that, “The principle of jihad obligates the Muslims to

152 Clare Lopez and Policy Center for Security, 89.
154 Epstein, 6.
155 Ibid.
156 Lopez, 76.
maintain and achieve these objectives [i.e., the triumph of Islam and the institution of the caliphate]. The best way to achieve these objectives and most appropriate method of upholding the principle of jihad is, however, a question of leadership and strategy.”

Safi enjoyed access to thousands of American senior enlisted men and officers as an instructor in the US Army-sponsored Leader Development and Education for a Sustained Peace (LDESP) program before the LDESP suspended him in November 2009, when a faculty member raised security concerns about Safi’s connections to accused Fort Hood murderer Major Nidal Malik Hasan. That access and branch of the MB’s approach will likely yield as much, or more, fruit for the MB as any influence gained over policy makers.

The ICNA was one of two organizations (the other was ISNA) named as part of MB in the text of *An Explanatory Memorandum On the General Strategic Goal for the Group In North America*, the one of the documents entered into evidence in the US vs. HLF trial. “The goal of ICNA shall be to seek the pleasure of Allah (SWT) through the struggle of Iqamat-ud-Deen (establishment of the Islamic system of life) as spelled out in the Qur’an and the Sunna of Prophet Muhammad (SAW).” However, the “Contact Us” page on the ICNA’s web site states “[The

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157 Ibid., 18.


ICNA] seeks to obtain the pleasure of Allah (SWT) through working for the establishment of Islam in all spheres of life. ICNA has many projects, programs, and activities which are designed to help in the process of molding the individual and reforming society at large.”\(^{160}\) It is worth noting that a search for the term “iqmat ud deen” on the ICNA website yielded no results. A search on the same website for “goal” only yielded articles about fund-raising goals, such as the seventh annual ICNA fund raising event April 2, 2011, guest speaker Loren Booth said, “Dawah and relief are the two key duties of Muslims in the west.”\(^{161}\)

ICNA performs MB activism through legal means within the US, especially promoting Sharia. ICNA recognized that “[some] states [are] moving to ban courts altogether from the consideration or use of Shariah.”\(^{162}\) They responded by launching an “Understanding Sharia” campaign in May 2011 to educate the public on Shari’ah and “counter the rise of Islamophobia in America.” Naeem Baig, Executive Director of the ICNA Council for Social Justice hopes the campaign will further shift focus from the misnomer “Sharia law” and draw attention to religious freedom.\(^{163}\)

An example of ICNA’s Sharia second stage of a similar campaign extended to Kansas City, Missouri area from January 23 to February 19, 2012, during which the organization aired radio messages and posted a prominent billboard endorsing Sharia.\(^{164}\)


\(^{163}\) Ibid.

In the past couple of years, a group of conservative pundits, analysts and bloggers have identified Shariah, or Islamic religious law, as a growing threat to the United States. These pundits and analysts argue that the steady adoption of Shariah’s tenets is a strategy extremists are using to transform the United States into an Islamic state.

The main purpose behind their agenda is to generate Islamophobia and the perception that Islam and Muslims should not be part of American Society. What is quite amazing, however, is that the vast majority of those who argue against Shariah know very little to nothing about its definition, its scope or even the processes of its implementation.\footnote{Ibid.}

In typical fashion, the ICNA press release for the campaign blamed Islamophobia for creating the need to educate the populace on Sharia. The tactic is common among all the MB affiliates, or as Stephen Schwartz calls it, the “Wahhabi lobby:

[...T]he Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), and the Muslim Students' Association of the U.S. and Canada (MSA) – that [has] dominated American Muslim life. If less so than before, the Wahhabi lobby still monopolizes the American Muslim voice in the halls of government and in the pages of media.”\footnote{Stephen Schwartz, “Islamophobia Reassessed,” Center for Islamic Pluralism (November 14, 2011) http://www.islamicpluralism.org/1936/islamophobia-reassessed (accessed March 23, 2012).}

The MB’s method is simple, push the MB agenda at every turn, then complain about racism, bigotry, and Islamophobia when anyone resists. According to Schwartz,

The Wahhabi lobby, and especially CAIR, has been grossly irresponsible and, in traditional terms, un-Islamic, in loudly and prolifically comparing the current situation of American Muslims with those encountered in the past by indigenous Americans, Black slaves, or the ethnic Japanese relocated in camps during the second world war.\footnote{Ibid.}

As earlier stated, the MB represents only a minority of American Muslims – about 22%, yet MB affiliated organizations regularly claim to represent the American Muslim population. These claims and the MB’s activities receive opposition from the 78% of the American Muslim population who resent those claims and activities. For example, the American Islamic Leadership
Coalition, whose mission “advocates for defending the US Constitution, upholding religious pluralism, protecting American security and cherishing genuine diversity in the faith and practice of Islam. AILC provides a stark alternative to the Islamist organizations that claim to speak for what are diverse American Muslim communities.” The AILC vigorously opposes the MB agenda in the US. As stated in one AILC press release:

We are conscious of the fact that Muslim Brotherhood legacy groups and other Islamists and their surrogates in the U.S. are trying their best to portray any opposition to manifestations of sharia law as “racism” and “discrimination against Muslims.” However... we denounce this fear-mongering and playing of the race card, which only serves to mask the Islamists’ highly politicized agenda. According to AILC member C. Holland Taylor, “the Islamist agenda threatens not only the well-being of the United States and its inhabitants, but also undermines and distorts the highest principles of Islam itself.”

It is beyond the scope of this monograph to investigate the various forms and reasons for Islamic opposition to the MB’s doctrine, strategies, affiliations, and methods. The goal is not to prove whether the MBs doctrine is valid, but what the doctrine is, and whether that doctrine is compatible with the Constitution of the US.

Conclusion

The MB in America is a Salafi jihadist organization largely funded by Saudi Wahhabists (also known as Salafis) that functions by establishing front organizations, which operate freely within the religiously permissive environment in America. Unfortunately, Islam is not just a religion. It is a political, social, legal, and economic system. The MB continuously pursues its goal is to establish a global Islamic state (Caliphate) and enforce Sharia. Far from fringe or

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radical, these objectives represent mainstream and orthodox Sunni Islamic doctrine that includes jihad, war by Muslims against all non-Muslims. This represents a Salafi orthodoxy that is popularly supported by most Muslims across North Africa and throughout the Middle East. Although the MB in the US has generally adopted peaceful means for action within the US, it maintains ties to and supports terrorist activities, especially by Hamas. Within the US, the MB has pursued “civilization jihad” through various front organizations for years in an effort to undermine the American culture and establish an Islamic Republic of America. These organizations continue to influence American policy makers, American Muslims, and the American populace at large by pretending to be religious organizations.

Although this monograph outlined the orthodoxy of Sunni Salafism as the ideological and doctrinal basis for MB activity, it did not evaluate Islam’s religious virtue, or of Muslim’s in general. Rather, it focused upon the doctrine, activity, and goals of the MB and its affiliated organizations. Sunni Salafism represents a fraction of the world’s Muslims, and the MB represents a fraction of American Muslims. Islamic doctrinal opposition to the MB’s activities internationally and in the US abound. Yet, this monograph does not include the arguments against the MB’s legitimacy. Rather than argue why the MB should not adhere to its doctrine, it is sufficient to establish what doctrinal basis the MB has chosen, the strategic goals it has established, the activities and affiliations it has exhibited, and the operational plans it has for the future.

It is further beyond the scope of this monograph to suggest a course of action for the US Government to combat the Muslim Brotherhood’s actions in the US. It would be sufficient for policy makers to recognize that the MB is a threat, and that everyone who has ever sworn to support and defend the US Constitution must contribute to developing and executing plans for countering the threat posed by the MB, its affiliated organizations, and any other that may seek to impose Sharia anywhere in America. We cannot guard against what we do not know or
understand, and we must not outsource understanding to the organizations and individuals who wish us ill.
APPENDIX A: A List of MB Organizations and Friends

An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America included a single attachment:

“A list of our organizations and the organizations of our friends

[Imagine if they all march according to one plan!!!]

1-ISNA = ISLAMIC SOCIETY OF NORTH AMERICA
2-MSA = MUSLIM STUDENTS’ ASSOCIATION
3-MCA = MUSLIM COMMUNITIES ASSOCIATION
4-AMSS = THE ASSOCIATION OF MUSLIM SOCIAL SCIENTISTS),
5-AMSE = THE ASSOCIATION OF MUSLIM SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS
6-IMA = ISLAMIC MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
7-ITC = ISLAMIC TEACHING CENTER
8-NAIT = NORTH AMERICAN ISLAMIC TRUST
9-FID = FOUNDATION FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
10-IHC = ISLAMIC HOUSING COOPERATIVE
11-ICD = ISLAMIC CENTERS DIVISION
12-ATP = AMERICAN TRUST PUBLICATIONS
13-AVC = AUDIO-VISUAL CENTER
14-IBS = ISLAMIC BOOK SERVICE),
15-MBA = MUSLIM BUSINESSMEN ASSOCIATION
16-MYNA = MUSLIM YOUTH OF NORTH AMERICA
17-IFC = ISNA FIQH COMMITTEE
18-IPAC = ISNA POLITICAL AWARENESS COMMITTEE
19-IED = ISLAMIC EDUCATION DEPARTMENT)
20-MAYA = MUSLIM ARAB YOUTH ASSOCIATION)
21-MISG = MALASIAN [SIC] ISLAMIC STUDY GROUP
22-IAP = ISLAMIC ASSOCIATION FOR PALESTINE
23-UASR = UNITED ASSOCIATION FOR STUDIES AND RESEARCH
24-OLF = OCCUPIED LAND FUND
25-MIA = MERCY INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION
26-ISNA [SIC] = ISLAMIC CIRCLE OF NORTH AMERICA
27-BMI = BAITUL MAL INC
28-IIIT = INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR ISLAMIC THOUGHT
29-IIC = ISLAMIC INFORMATION CENTER


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